JPRS ID: 9234 WORLDWIDE REPORT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

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• Collection: JPRS
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9523
February 1981
U SSR Re ort
p
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOG1CAl AFFAIRS
(FOUO 3/81)
FBIS FOI~EIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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- transmissions and broadcasts. I~aterials from foreign-language
sources are translated; tho~e from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, wiCh the original phras~ng and
other characteristics retained.
HeadlinES, edi~toriai reports, and material enclosed in brackets
ar~ supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators ~uch as [Text)
or [Fxcerpt] in the first line of each item, or fol~owing the
last Line of a brief, indicate how the original inf~rmation was
- processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
- mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion m.ark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an
ite~ originate cvith the source. Times with in items are as
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The conCents oL" this publication in no way represent the poli-
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JPRS L/9523
4 February 1981
USSR REPORT
pOLITICAL AND $OCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
(FOUO 3/81)
CONTENTS
INTERNATI~iAL
= Shah's ' Reactionary' Regime Analyzed
(M. S. Ivanov; VOPROSY ISTORII, Nov 80) 1
Analysis of Rise of Islam, Its Contemporary Role
(D. B. Malysheva; VOPROSY ISTORII, Nov 80~............~........ 20
Turkmen Ideologist Attacks Western Public Diplomacy to U'SSR
(K. Bagdasarov; T[TRKMENISTAN KOMMi1NISTI, Nov 80) 40
NATION~:L
Nationalism, Religiosity in Dagestan
(M. G. Mustafayeva; VOPROSY NAt;(~IN000 ATEIZMA, No 26, 1980).... 46
- a - ~III - USSR - 35 FOUO]
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INTERNATIONAL
SHAH'S 'REACTIONARY' REGIME ANALYZED
Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Russian No 11, Nov 80 signed to press 18 Nov 80 pp 58-74
[Article by M. S. Ivanov: The Antipopu~ar Nature of the Rule of the Pahlavi
the author hiikhail S ergeyevich Ivanov, doctor of Historical
Dy-nasty in Iran , ,
sciences, prof, and Heputy head of the Chair for the History of Near and Middle
Eastern Countries under the Institute of Asian a:~d Af.rican Countries at Moscow
University, is the author of many works on Iranian history, including: "Babidskiye
Vosstaniya v Irane 1848-1852 gg." (The Babi Revolts in Iran in 1848-1852), "Ocherk
~ Istorii Irana" (Outline of Iranian Hist ory), "Iranskaya Revolyutsiya 1905-1911 gg."
(The Iranian Revolution of 1905-1911), "Noveyshaya Istoriya Irana" (Modern History
of Iran), "Rabochiy Klass Sovremennogo Irana" (The Working Class of Modern Iran),
"Iran v 60--70-kh gg. XX Veka" (Iran in the 1960's-1970's), 2nd others]
[Text] In February 1959, the popular, antishah and antiimperialist revolution put _
an end to the despotic power of the Pah lavi Dynasty in Iran. For more than a half
a century this dynasty had ~lundered and suppressed the country, and had been an _
~ obedient tool in the hands of t}ie English colonialists, Nazi Germany and American
' imperialism.
The state coup of 21 February 1921 was the beginning of the political activities of
Reza Khan who in 1925 seized the shah's throne and began the Pahlavi Dynasty. This
was a period of an upsurge in the nati onal liberation movement aimed against the
English colonialists and the rotten Qaj ar Dynasty, a rise in the popularity of
Lenin's policy of the young Soviet stat e toward Iran and the other countries of
the East. It was becoming clear to the English imperialists who had occupied Iran
that it would be impossible to maintain their positions and carry out the previous
plundering policy with the help of the Qajar Dynasty and the old feudal aristoc-
racy. The coup organized by the colonialists was to remove the gover~?ment consist-
ing of representatives of the fuedal aristocracy and bring to power an externally
"radical" cabinet which would maintain the British positions in iran, suppress the
national liberation movement, and not ~zrmit the normalization of Soviet-Iranian
relations.
The plan for the coup was worked out by the commander of the English occupation -
troops in Iran, Gen E. Ironside, by a C ol Smith and the English consul in Teheran,
Howard.l Also involved in~carrying i t out was a colonel of the Persian cossack
units, Reza Khan. But the Er~gl~ish military instructors, the officers who also led
the operation, played the ~ru~ial role, as S. K. Pastukhov (S. Iranskiy) who in
1921 held the position of ~~~e head of the First Eastern Section of the RSFSR
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People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, has written.2 Reza Khan was selected by
Gen Ironside as a man known for active participation in suppressir,g the national
liberation movement in Iran and for his hostility to communism.
After the coup, Sayyid Zia ad-Din Tabatabai who was closely linked to the English
impera.alists was put in the position of nrime minister, while Reza IQian was ap-
pointed the comrsander of the division of Iranian cossacks. In April 1921, Reza
l~an received the portfolio of minister of war. Numerous and diverse sources, in
particular the Iranian press, participants and witnesses of the events, have de-
scribed the role of the English imperialist circles in carrying out the coup of =
21 February 1926 and the promotion of Reza IQian.3 In the journal of the Iranian
Yeople's Party DON'YA an article was published by the secretary of this party's _
central committee, A. Kambahsha, and he has given a number of new data substantiat-
ing the active role of the English in bringing Reza Khan into the political ~rena.
Kambahsha sharply criticized those who felt that Reza IChan was acting independently,
separately from the English, as a"national" figure.4 Western European witnesses
who during the coup were in Iran also substantiated the role of the Engl~sh im-
perialists in the events.s And this was also openly written about by the English
themselves who were involved in carrying out the policy of British imperialism in
Iran. Thus, the deputy English financial adviser in Iran, J. Balfour, has admitted
that the government created after the coup, having nomir:ally nullifiec~ the 1919 ~
Anglo-Iranian agreement, in fact observed its conditions.6 It is also possible to
cite other, including American, evidence, for exa.mple, of V. Sheean and G. Haddad,
that precisely the English oraanized the 1921 coup which marked the beginning to
the elevation of Reza 1Qian.~
Both before and after tne coup, Reza Khan was linked with the representatives of
the English occupation cotmnand, and had secret meetings with them.a Th~e British
colonialists, both directly and through their numerous agents among the ruling
circles of Iran, supported Reza IQian, hoping to use him in the struggle against
the growing naticmal liberation movement within the country and against Soviet
Russia. And in the cabinets which followed one anot}ier after 1921, Reza Khan re-
mained continuously the minister of war. According to the plans drawn up by the
English colonialists, ;~e carried out a reorganization of the armed forces and from
the diverse troop units (cossacks, sarbazians, South Persian riflemen, and others)
created a centralized army which was subordinate to him personally. The gendar,??-
arie and police were also under Reza Khan. Benefiting from the martial law in the
most important areas of the country and referring to the necessity of providing
the army with money, through his supporters, the military governors, he began to
get his hands on the tax and financial system and on the entire economy of the
nation. The British-armed Iranian army was used against actions by the people.
_ It suppressed the national liberation movement and the peasant actions against the
landowners and authorities in Gilan (1920-1921), the 1922 Lahuta Revolt in Tabriz,
and others. The Iranian Communist Party (ICP) which was formed in 1921 and the
trade unions were abolishPd. Also suppressed were the actions of the tribes who _
did not wish to submit to the growing power of Reza Khan. Ir~ the Iranian press
tt~ese activities of his were depicted as supposedly corresponding to the national
interests of Ixan.
. In October 1923, Reza I~an seized the position of prime minister, and in February
1925, under the pressure of the divisional commanders loyal to him and the troops
ready to move against Teheran, the mejlis, against the ~onstitution, passed a
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decisioii to appoint him the supreme commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of
the nation.9 At the end of 1925, the Constituent Assembly, elected under the con-
ditions of the omnipotence of Reza Khan, Nith falsification and actual elimination
of the masses of people from th~ elections, proclaimed him the hereditary shah of
Iran with the fa~ily name of Pahlavi. Reza Khan assumed this name in order to im-
press the population with the ancient origin of his tribe.
Behind Reza Shah who had founded the new dynasty stood the Englist imperialists.
This can be seen from the declaration of the English Foreign Secretary A. Eden
which, after the entry of English troops into Iran in 1941, ?vas broadcast over the
' London Radio and then printed in Iran as a separate publication. It stated: "In
1919, we concluded with Iran an agreement which many understood as our desire to
turn Iran into our protectorate.... After we had seen that the Iranian people
_ were poorly inclined to this agreement and considered that it pursued ill-conceived,
self-seeking goals, we nullified it and instead of this began to strengthen the
Iranian government and provide it with help so that it would be strong and could
ensure order and securit} in the country. The secret of our support and aid to
Reza Shah consisted precisely in this.i10 From the words of Eden, one can see that
the true purpose of English policy toward Reza Khan was to create a strong power
obedient to the imperialists and capable of suppressing the antiimperialist and
democratic mnvement within the cow~try, and turn it into an anti-Soviet cordon. _
W. Churchill was even more categorical. After the English had sent Reza Shah into -
exile in South Africa, subsequent ,:o forcing him off the throne in 1941, Churchill
stated: "W2 put him on the throne, an~ we have removed him,"11
In applying various forms of harsh pressure, blackmail and violence, the shah took
possession of the enormous rich landholdings in the most fertile areas of the
country such as hiazanderan, Gilan Gorgan (Astr.abad) and elsewhere.12 He seized
_ the lands of around 2,000 villages consisting of almost 10 percent of the arable
land of the country, and became the largest landowner of Iran. With money stolen
- from the people, he built several large textile mills and became the richest man
in Iran .
Under Reza Shah there remained untouched the remnants of feudalism as well as the
harsh rent paid by the peasantry for the landowner, state and waquf lands
(belongii~g in fact to the higher clergy) . The peasants had to pay to the land-
owner from one-half to four-fifths of the crop and, in additian, perform a number -
- of abligations in kind. The arbitrariness of the landowners predominated in the
countryside. The peasantry eked out a bare subsistence, they lived in extreme
poverty, they were almost completely illiterate, and deprived of any medical aid
whatsoever. On the coast of the Persian Gulf, in Sistan, Baluchistan, Fars, -
Kerman and other southern and eastern areas of the country, many peasants for 6
and more months a year survived on dried and salted locusts, grass and ground date
pits.
. The Iranian workers lived under equally severe conditions. A large army of unem-
ployed was constantly filled out with ruined peasants who fled to the cities seek-
ing work. The workday lasted 10-14 hours. Female and child labor was widely ex-
ploited. Wages were miserly. Women for equal labor received half the amount of
men, and children 4-fold less than men. Social security, labor legislation a~id
labor safety were lacking.
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The workers and peasants who acted to improve their lot were subjected to cruel
persecution. The democratic trade unions, the ICP and the other worker organiza-
tions were broken up and driven underground. Participants in the strike movement
were arrested without trial, they were imprisoned and exiled to the remote southern
and southeastern desert regions of the country. In May 1931, the government ap-
- proved a special law against the communists, and this envisaged a punishment of 10
years of forced labor or solitary imprisonment for belonging to the communist party
or for acting against the monarchical system.13 In 1937, 53 leaders of the commu-
' nist party and the illegal democratic trade unions were arrested, and in 1938, ex-
tremely severe sentences were handed down in the so-called "Trial of 53." The
shah~s prison wardens murdered the leader of the Iranian communists, the professor
of Teheran University, Tagi Erani, in 1940.
The peasant actions against the landowners and the shah's authorities as well as
the actions of the soldiers, the majority of whom were also peasants, in breaking
out in 1926 in Iranian Azerbaijan, Gilan, Khurasan and other areas, were suppressed
by the troops, and their participants were turned over to military courts. In the
Azerbaijan area of Hoi-r9aku alone, several-score persons were executed under sen-
tences of these courts.14 The new wave of the peasant movement which developed in
Iran during the years of the world-wide economic crisis of 1929-1933 was also cruel-
_ ly suppressed. In just 6 months, from July through December 1932, more than 150
participants in the peasant disturbances were executed, hundreds were condemned to
forced labor, to imprisonment or were exiled to remote eastern areas,15
~ The shah's authoriti.es also dealt fis�rcely with the actions of the Baluchi, Lurian,
Southern Iranian and other tribes directed against the arbitrariness and violence
of the military governors appointed by the shah. The nomads also protested against
the violent conversion to a sedentary way of life. The shah applied barbarian
methods for the mass resettiement of certain tribes to remote and desert areas,
and this threatened these tribes with death. Reza Shah denied the very existence
of the national minorities (Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Lurs, Bakhtiaris, Baluchis,
Turkmens,Arabs, Kashagai and others) and which comprised over one-half the popula-
tion of Iran. Instruction in schools as well as court and office proceedings in
the central and local institutions were carried out exclusively in the Persian _
tongue.
The slightest appearance of opposition and democratic thought was suppressed. The
progressive intelligentsia suffered fierce repression. In 1924, there was the
murder of the well-known poet Eshki who had been against Reza Khan, in 1932, the
very prominent poet Malek ash-Shoara Bekhar was arrested and exiled, and in 1939,
the poet Farrokhi Iyezdi died in prison. Also persecuted were the xepresentatives
of the clergy who were against the Reza Shah dictatorship. Ayatollah Modarres and
certain other prominent religious leaders were arrested and murdered. A regime
of arbitrary police rule reigned in *he nation. The constitution and all demo-
cratic liberties were eliminated. T}ae deputies of the mejl.is were "elected" upon
~_he instructions of the shah, and the mejlis was turned into his obedient tool.
Reza Shah carried out certain superficial reforms in the area of education, cul-
ture and e>>eryday life. The schools, with the exception of religious ones, were
taken away from the clergy and put under the control of the ministry of education.
But the number of students was minuscule. Only the children of landowners, the
bourgeoisie and officials studied in schools. As a rule, the children of workers
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were deprived of such an opportunity. Public educati on received 10-fold less
money than the army.16 A decree was published prohib iting women from appearing
in the chador in public places, and the p~lice ripped the chador off those who
did not carry out this requirement. But polygamy and the unequal position of women
in the family and everyday life were maintained. Reza Shah himself had several
wives. Women were deprived of the right to vote. Upon the orders of the shah who _
did not consider the opinion and desires of the population, there was enforced in-
troduction of European clothing in 1928. Here the authorities employed naked vio-
lence and even armed force for suppressing resistance. In 1936, in Meshed, they
opened up with machine gun fir~ against an enormous crowd of people which had -
gathered at the main Shi'ite holy place of Iran, the Mosque of Imam Reza, in pro-
- test against the injustice of the police in carrying out the order to replace the
old headgear with the "Pahlavi" cap which was introduced upon the shah's orders.
In carrying out a domestic policy that was unpopular with the people, the shah re-
lied on armed �orce. An enormous part of the state budget was spent on the army. -
According to official data, over the two decades that Reza was in power (from
1921 through 194Z), the army expenditures averaged each year 33.5 percent of all
the income of the state budget.l7
During the first years of the rule of the Pahlavi Dynasty, certain measures were
carried out to strengthen the positions of the landowner and bourgeois circles of
Iran. The conditions of surrender were eliminated and an independent customs tar-
iff was introduced. Sut then Reza Shah more and more began to subordinate his
foreign policy to the intarests of the imperialist powers. In the Anglo-Iranian
conflict of 1932, on the auestion of revising the conc essionary treaty with the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOG), Reza Shah, contrary to national interests, held
a conciliatory position. On 29 April 1933, the Irani an government signed a new
- concessionary treaty with the AIOC, and according to this, in exchange for a cer-
tain insignificant increase in the concessionary payments, the period of the con-
cession was extended up to 1993 (by over 30 years in comparison with the old con-
cessionary treaty). The AIOC kept all the unequal conditions of the old treaty
which were extremely disadvantageous for Iran, including the right of the company
to have its own police, to buy land, build railroads, ports, airfields, radio
stations, telegraph and telephone lines, and so forth. These conditions made it
possible for the British colonialists to continue the unrestricted plundering of
the basic natural wealth of the country and use the AIOC as the main implement for
applying political pressure on Iran.
The unified press depicted the position of Reza Shah a t the Anglo-Iranian talks in
1932-1933 as the defense of the national interests of the country. But in reality,
the shah entered into direct collusion with the Engli s h colonialists. He dealt
fiercely with those politicians who demanded that bett er conditions be secured for
Iran in concluding the new concessicnary treaty. Upon orders of the shah, the
minister of the court, Teymtirtash, was arrested and imprisoned for having insisted `
upon an increase in the amount of the deductions of the AIOC, including the right
of Iran to obtain a portion of the profits from the company's enterprises in other
countries, the turning over to Iran of one-quarter of the shares of the company, _
the elimination of the monopoly of the AIOC to build oil pipelines, and on the
right of Iran to cancel the concession prior to 1993, and so forth. Certain other
Iranian politicians, for example, Mostoufi al-Malmalak and Sardar Asad, paid with
their lives for acting against the interests of the English imperialists.
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Regardless of the normal relations which existed between Iran and the USSR, in
1937 Reza Shah signed the anti-Soviet Saadabad Pact which the imperialist circles
of England, the United States and other countries viewed as a major link in the
policy of surrounding and isolating the Soviet Union. In 1938, Reza Shah refused
_ to sign a new trade agreement with the USSR, and this led to a sharp decline in
trade between the two countries. This caused great harm to the Iranian economy and
- to the national interests of the country.
After the Nazis had seized power in Germany, Reza Shah began actively to side with
the Nazis, feeling that fascism would be a more reliable support for his dictator-
ship. On the eve of World War II, Nazi Germany, with the aid of Reza Shah, moved
actively into Iran, turning it into a German vassal state. Even in 1938-1939,
Germany held first place in Iranian f~.,reign trade. It was responsible for 41.5
percent of Iranian foreign trade, and in 1940-1941, 45.5 percent.18 Germany im-
ported into Iran German goods at very high prices which exceeded the world level,
and exported from there an enormous amount of raw m~terials which in terms of value
greatly exceeded the German goods imported into Iran. In benefiting from the clear-
ing agreement with Iran concluded in October 1935, Germany did not pay for this
difference. The Nazis had a monopoly on supplying Iran with industrial and rail-
road equipment, they built airfields, they controlled military plants and other
enterprises. Under the guise of specialists, experts and advisers thousands of
German agents were planted in the nation and they conducted Nazi propaganda.
After the start of World War II, and particularly after the attack of Nazi Germany
on the USSR, the Nazis endeavored to tu~n Iran into a staging area for aggression
against the Soviet Union. The policy of Reza Shah led the country to the brink of
disaster, and only the introduction of Allied (Soviet and English) troops prevented
Iran from becoming an arena of military operations and saved it from casualties and
destruction. The policy of Reza Shah which came down to turning Iran into a tool
of Nazi Germany collapsed, and on 16 September 1941, he was forced to abdicate in
favor or his son hiohammad Reza.
The collapse of the antipopular policy of the founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty as
well as the defeat of Nazi Germany by the Soviet Union and its Allies caused an
upsurge in the democratic movement in Iran. In October 1941, the People's Party
of Iran, the successor of the Iranian Communist Party, was formed. With the bal-
ance of class fcrces existing in the nation during World War II, the new shah at
first did not dare disclose his true face. The defeat of Nazi Germany and the
strengthening of U.S. positions in Iran led to a situation where the United States
became the imperialist protectors of the Pahlavi Dynasty. After the end of World
War II, an acute rivalry arose between the United States and England over the ques-
tions of exploiting Iranian oil and the Iranian market, and a struggle developed
for the dominant positions in the higher levels of the state apparatus. The Amer-
ican imperialists, using their military missions which had begun operating in Iran
during the war, as well as advisers in the police, the gendarmarie and various eco-
nomic departments, gradually strengthened their positions and drove out the English.
Mohammad Reza established close contacts with the U.S. imperialist circles, but not
breaking, however, with the British colonialists. In 1946-1947, upon the orders of
the shah and the pro-American prime minister Ahmad Qavam, with the aid of American
imperialists, the shah's army dealt out fierca reprisals against the participants
of the democratic movement in Iranian Azerbaijan and the national liberation
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movement of the Kurds. According to information in the Iranian press, 760 persons
were executed and hanged in Iran~ian Azerbaijan. Several thousand persons were mur-
, dered by reactionary bands, b~ the police and soldiers in the course of unauthor-
- ized reprisals.19 The authorities dealt just as fiercely with the Kurdish demo-
crats. Their leaders Kazi Mohaumiad, Sadr Kazi and others were hanged.
At the same time the democratic movement which had developed widely after World
- War II was suppressed in other areas of Iran. The committees of the People's
Party and the trade unions were abolished in Teheran, Isfahan, Kazvin, Gorgan,
Shahi and in other cities and regions. In Shahi (Mazanderan) alone, S00 workers
were arrested, in Teheran, 400 workers, and as a total throughout the nation,
several thousand persons. The arrested were beaten and tortured to make them sign
false confessions. The soldiers and the police broke up the peasant unions which
had been created during the rise of the democratic movement, killing and arresting
the activists. The victories of the peasants (an increase in their share in
dividing up the crop, the abolition of certain obligations in kind, and so forth)
were eliminated, and medieval agrarian relations were restored in the countryside.
Regardless of the repression, the democratic forces in Iran continued to struggle
against the power of the shah and the imperialists who supported it. In 1948, a
mass popular movement began against the main bulwark of imperialism in Iran, the
- AIOC. According to estimates in the Western press, the AIOC, from 1914 through
1950, received around 5 billior~ dollars in profit, but during this same time paid
Iran as concessionary payments only 420 million dollars, or around 8 percent of
the company profits.20 The People's Party of Iran played an important role in this
struggle. In order to create a pretext for attacking this party of the workers
and the other democratic organizations, on 4 February 1949, a provocatory attack
was made on the shah, and responsibility for this was placed on the People's Party.
The authorities declared the introduction of martial law in the countr.y and the
abolition of the people's Party, which was forced to become illegal.
Its leaders who were hiding in the underground~were sentenced to death in absentia.
More than 1,000 participants of the democratic movement were arrested. Within a
period of several months, the military tribunals handed down mass sentences. For
strengthening the shah's dictatorship, his rights were extended for dissolving the
mejlis and for the first time in the history of the country, a senate was created
which the imperialists and the shah hoped to use as a tool of the reaction.
But the repression could not prevent a further rise in the mass antiimperialist
and antishah movement. The movement against the AIOC assumed a truly nation-wide
character, At the end of 1950 and the beginning of 1951, in Teheran, Qum, Rasht,
Abadan and other cities, mass meetings and demonstrations occurred and the partici-
pants of them demanded the canceling of the AIOC concession and the halting of its
operations. This movement was headed by the People's Party and the other demo-
cratic organizations, as well as by the National Front led by M. Mossadegh and
which combined various groupings of the national bourgeoisie, the patriotic clergy
and other groupings. Under the pressure of the masses, the mejlis on 15 March
1951, approved a law on nationalizing the enterprises of the AIOC.~1 The British
imperialists, endeavoring to maintain their positions in Iran and to block the
implementation of this law, resorted to diplomatic, military, financial and other
methods of pressure and blackmail. English naval ships were sent to the Fersian
Gulf. However this time this policy did not produce the expected results.
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On 29 April 1951, Mossadegh became the prime minister of Iran. He implemented a
series of ineasures to carry out the law of 15 March. The National Iranian Oil
Company (NIOC) was created, and this took over the AIOC enterprises. The U.S. im-
- perialist circles, hoping to us e the law on nationalizing the AIOC enterprises, -
initially demagogically supported it, figuring that the Iranians would be unable to
- manage these enterprises by themselves and would seek U.S. a.id. But when the anti-
imperialist movement of the Iranian people began to threaten the U.S. plans, the
American impE+rialists came to the support of England. However, the joint Anglo-
American pressure, the appeals to the Hague Internati.onal Court and to the UN Secur-
ity Council, ~is well as a boycott of Iranian oil did not alter the positions of the
Mossadegh govE~rnment. In 3anuary 1952, the English consulates which had inter-
vened into the internal affairs of the country were closed down on the territory of
Iran, and in October of the same year, diplomatic relations with England were
broken.
_ Mohammad Reza endeavored to block the policy carried out by Mossadegh and to defend
the positions of his imperialist protectors. An attempt was made to remove Mossa-
degh from power. On 18 July, the shah appointed Ahmad Qava.m who was closely linked -
with the American imperialists as the prime minister of Iran, and this caused ang~y
demonstrations of protest in Teheran and other cities of the country. Qavam and
the shah sent troops against the demonstrators and the troops opened fire. Accord-
ing to data in the Iranian press, 90 persons were killed and 800 wounded.22 But
the popular protest was so decisive and angry that on 21 July 1952, Qavam in a panic
fled the country. On 22 July, Mossadegh again became prime minister and he assumed
leadership of the defense ministry. The mejlis granted him extraordinary powers
- for 6 months.23
In October 1952, a conspiracy w as discovered of the Iranian reaction and the imperi-
alists against the Mossadegh government. In February 1953, the reactionary military
circles linked to the shah and the United States endeavored to murder Mossadegh.
Thus, the American imperialists, even from the end of 1952, being convinced that it
was impossible to persuade Mossadegh to turn over the Iranian oil to American and
English oil companies, began preparations to overthrow his government. For this
purpose they organized an economic blockade of Iran as well as subversive actions
against its economy, figuring that a boycott of Iranian oil and vir.tually the com-
plete halting of oil income would bring about a sharp deterioration in the finan-
cial and economic state of the country, a rise in prices and a decline in the stand-
ard of living of the masses of people. As a result of the boycott, the deficit of
- the state budget over the 3 years, from 1951 through 1954, increased by 6-fold
(12.8 billion rials), and exceeded thP total annual state income (9 billion rials)
by almost 1.5-fold. The debt of the government to the Iranian banks by the begin-
ning of 1954 during the years of the blockade had more than doubled (17.4 billion
rials). The deficit in the balance of trade rose from 2.7 billion rials with ex-
ports of ~.3 billion rials, in 1951-1952 up to 7.4 billion rials with exports of -
8.4 billion rials in 1953-1954. The overall index of the cost of living for the
seven major cities of Iran (Teheran, Isfahan, Tabriz, Hamadan, Meshed, Rasht and
Kermanshah) rose from 784 in 1950-1951 up to 992 points in 1953-1954 (the cost of
living index in 1936-1937 has been used as 100),2T+
The CIA agents, having begun pi�eparations for a state coup in Iran and acting in
agreement with Moharimiad Reza Shah caused a split in the National Front. The right
wing of the front (A. Kashani, M. Bagai, Haeri Zade and others) in the first half
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of 1953 sided with the Mossadegh opponents. Imperialist propaganda, aimed at
~ distracting the public's attention from the coup being prepared, started up a cam-
paign against the "growing threat of communism in Iran" and in favor of strengthen- -
ing the shah's power and the "reinforcing of the throne.ri25 Also involved in the
preparations for the coup were the numerous American military advisers who were
in the Iranian army and headed by Gen McClure. Also arriving from the United
States in Iran was Gen Schwarzkopf who during the years of World War II and after
its end had headed the Iranian police and was linked with the reactionary Iranian
generals. The CIA agents maintained close contacts with the retired Gen F. Zahedi
who was assigned the role of the formal executor of the c.oup. The conspirators
used the shah's Guard, certain tank units and other mili:~ary subunits located in the
Teheran area.
- The first attempt at the coup was made during the night of 16 August 1953. The shah
promulgated an ukase on the removal of Mossadegh from the position of premier and
the appointing of Zahedi to it. Then the chief of the shah's Guard, Nasyri, tried
to arrest Mossadegh in his residence. But military units loyal to Mossadegh dis-
armed the soldiers of the shah's Guard. Nasyri and the officers who accompanied him -
were arrested. The moves of the attempted state coup caiised a wave of mass anti-
imperialist and antishah demonstrations on 16-18 August. Their participants pulled
down the statues of the shah, and demanded that Iran be proclaimed a democratic re-
public. The frightened Mohammad Reza fled abroad by air. However the Mossadegh
government did not take the necessary measures against the plotters, This was used
by the CIA agents and the Iranian generals linked with them. Having brought up mili-
tary units loyal to the shah around Teheran, during the night of 19 August 1953 they
carried out a state coup.26 Zahedi was appointed prime minister, while ~lossadegh
and his supporters were arrested and turned over to the court of a military tri-
bunal.
In Iran, a regime was established of military-police terror, mass arrests were car-
ried out, democratic organizations were broken up and newspapers closed down. The
People's Party was subjected to particularly fierce persecution. After this
Mohammad Reza returned to Iran. Thus, the CIA restored the power of the Pahlavi
Dynasty in the nation. There began a 25-year period of an ever-growing influence -
of American imperialism which ultimately had taken over all the economic and polit-
ical life of the country. Mohammad Reza was turned i~to the direct henchman of the _
U.S, imperialist circles.
P,ccording to an agreement reached between Mohammad Reza on 19 September 1954 with
the International Oil Consortium (IOC) which had been set up in April of the same
year and in which the main role was played by the American oil companies, Iranian
oil was to be Pxploited by Anglo-American oil companies up to 1979, with the pos-
sible extension up to 1994. The conditions of the agreement differed little from
the one-sided conditions of the AIOC concession, with the exception that now the
profits were split evenly between Iran and the IOC, as was already the case by
this time in all the other oil-producing countries in the basin ot the Persian
Gulf. Having signed the agreement with the IOC, Moha.mmad Reza helped to restore
the positions of imperialism in the Iranian oil industry.
After the coup of 1953, foreign capital was given extensive opportunities to plun-
der the natural riches of Iran. After the agreement with the IOC, Iran concluded
agreements with many other American and European oil cpmpanies on producing oil on
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the territc~ry of continental Iran as well as in its territorial waters of the
Persian Gulf. However the IOC, even in the 1970's, when these oil companies had
_ already begun to exploit the oil deposits, w3s responsible f~r more than 90 percent
of al l the oi 1 produced in Iran. The plundering of the basic Iranian natural -
w~ealth, oil, L~y foreign, and primarily American, capital reached monstrous amounts.
While during the last year of the operations of the AIOC (in 1950), 32 million tons
of oil were produced, in 1963, the figure wa~ 72.8 million tons, and in 1974, al-
ready 302 million tons.27 The IOC and the other foreign oil companies received
enormous profits. With a cost of 75 cents per ton of Iranian oi1 at the beginning
- of the 1960's, the selling price was around 14 dollars per ton.28 Each dollar in- -
vested into the Middle East oil industry brought the American oil monopolies an
_ average of 9-fold more profit than investments into any other sector of the economy
outside the United States.29 In June 1972, the secretary general of the Organiza-
tion of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC), Pachachi, stated in London that, aceording
to official American data, the profits of the foreign, and primarily American, oil
companies in the Near and Middle East in 1970 alone reached 79.2 percent of all in- -
vested capital, while the profit of the American companies engaged in extracting
other minerals in the developing countries was just 13.5 percent,30
Foreign, and primarily American, capital, in addition to the petrflleum industry, in
the form of joint companies also penetrated other sectors ~f Iranian industry such
as the petrochemical, automotive, chemical, electronic, and others. In 1955 a
special law was approved vn the attracting and protecting of foreign capital, and
after this foreign capital investments in Iran begaz to increase rapidly. While in
1970 their total amount was S.S million dollars, in lSi7, as was stated by a rep-
resentative of the Ministry of Economics at the apening of the Fifth International
Trade Fair in Teheran, it had reached 7 billi.on dollars. In 1958, a special law
was approved on lifting restrictions on foreign banks, and after this in the 1970's,
more than 10 banks were founded with the participation of Iranian and toreign (Amer-
ican, English, West German, Japanese, and other) capita1.31 ~
In the various Iranian institutions and departments, there was an enormous number
of foreign, particularly American, advisers, consultants a_nd specialists who re-
- ceived salaries that greatly surpassed the wages of Iranians performing the same
job. As was stated in November 1977 by the U.S. President J. Carter in a speech at
a ceremony welcoming the shah to Washington, in Iran at that time there were
arnund 40,000 Americans. In 197~, around 300 American companies and ~heir divi-
si~ns were operating in the country,32 and thereafter their number rose to 5000
An "open door" policy was carried out in the area of foreign trade. This led to a
- growing negative Iranian foreign trade balance. By the end of the 1950's and the
start of the 1960's, imports into Iran exceeded exports by 5-fold, and subsequently
the foreign trade deficit increased further. This was a consequence of the orient- ~
ing of foreign trade to the imperialist states. In 1974-1975, the importing of
_ American goods into Iran exceeded by 30-fold the exports from Iran to the United
_ States,33
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi carried out a foreign policy advantageous to the imperialist
powers, and particularly for the United States. Immediately after the 1953 coup,
the abandonment of the policy of neutrality was declared. 0~. 11 October 1955,
Iran joined the aggressive, anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact which after the withdrawal of
Iraq in 1958 was called the "Central Treaty Organizatior~' (CENTO) . On 5 March 1959,
Iran signed a military agreement with the United States which, in essence, gave the
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latter the ri~ht to bring its troops into Iran in the event of direct or indirect
aggre5sion, by which one understood actions of the Iranian people against the
shah's regime. These agreements led to an unprecedented increase in military out-
lays which at tlie end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's were more than
40 per.cent ~f the current state budget,34 as well as to an increase in the number of
American officer instructors as part of the U.S. military mission which established
co;ltrol over the Iranian General Staff and troop units. The United States armed the
~ Iranian Army with the most modern weapons. On 31 October 1964, the mejlis approved
a law granting diplomatic immunity to American military advisers.
The shah's regime and the Iranian Army were turned into a tool of American policy
in the Near and Middle East. Regardless of the fact that formally Iran did not
have diplomatic relations with Israel, in the Near Eastern conflict the shah ac-
tually supported this state. Considering the extreme unpopularity of the Israeli
aggression against the Arab states among the broad strata of the Iranian populace
the policy of support for Israel as dictated by American imperialism was carried out
secretly. In words the Iranian representatives condemned Israeli aggression but -
in fact supplied Israel with oil. Iran did not join the embargo announced by the
- Arab states on the exporting of oil to countries which supported Israel, and co-
operated with Israel in economic and military areas as well as in the intelligence
area. The Israeli intelligence agency Mossad participated in organizing the shah's
secret police or SAVAK ("Organization of National Security and Information"). The
- shah also cooperated actively with the South African racists, providing nine-tenths
of their oil requirements.35
The shah's regime in the Persian Gulf also carried out the same mission of the de-
- fender of U.S. interests, and primarily American oil monopoli es. After the evacua- _
tion of English troops from this area at the beginning of the 1970's, the role of
the policemen guarding the interests of the oil monopolies was entrusted by the
United States to Iran. It was viewed as a bastion of imperialist influence in the
entire Middle East. In carrying out this role, the shah in 1973 sent troops into
Oman for suppressing the national liberation movement in Dhofar. Iran also helped
- Somali in aggression against Ethiopia. American imperialists were completely satis-
fied with the behavior of their policemen in the Persian Gulf basin. ~ With good
reason, Carter during his visit to Iran stated: "Due to the great leadership of
the shah, Iran is an island of stability in one of the most turbulent regions of
the world."36
- The United States intensely supplied Iran with modern types of weapons. In May
1972, President R. Nixon and the Secretary of State H. Kissin ger signed an agree-
ment with the shah according to which he could purchase any weapons systems.~~
The financial capabilities of Iran to purchase weapons rose sharply a�ter OPEC,
- and in 1973, Iran along with it also increased oil prices by 4-fold
because of inflation in the capitalist world and the increase in prices for the
goods imported into the oil-producing countries. The income of Iran from oil rose '
from S billion dollars in 1973 to almost 20 billion dollars in 1974 and.1975. If
these enormous amounts had been used in the national interest, they could have
helped develop the national economy and raise the standard of living of the popula-
tion. But a larger portion was returned back to the foreign monopolies in the
form of payment for enormous amounts of weapons (the United Statss, England and
the FRG), loans and credits to the developed capitalist and developing countries
(England, France, Egypt and athers),38 and as capital investrnents in foreign
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- companies (for example, Iran purchased 25 percent of the stock of the Krupp firm),
and was embezzled by the shah, his family and the persons around the shah. .
_ In the course of investigating an attempt at a recent state coup against the Islamic
Republic of Iran, it was established that the Iranian Army was one of th~ chi e�
tools in the strong mechanism set up during the years of the shah's rule for en-
suring the political, military, economic and strategic interests of the United
States.39 At an international conference on investigating U.S. intervention in
the affairs of Iran, a report was given entitled "The United States and the Iranian
Army" and which pointed out that after the 1953 coup, the armed forces of the
country came under U.S. control. The American missions to provide aid to the
Iranian police and army, the military and military-technical specialists were to
reinforce U.S. domination in the country. Th?y controlled the Iranian air bases
and all the armed forces of the country. Iran was turned into one of the major
espionage centers of the region. All expenses for supporting the personnel of the
- American missions rested on the shoulders of the Iranian people.
~'h~ report submitted at the international conference also took up the role of the
CIA in shaping Iranian policy, including the.decisi.ons of the central government.
The American military acted as advisers of the shah on the questions of ensuring
security, defense, foreign policy, and so forth, certainly, in accord with U.S. in-
terests and plans without fail. The authors of the report quoted the cynical ad-
mission of the former head of the Pentagon, J. Schlesinger, that the U.S. Defense
Department and the office of the secretary were to act as intermediaries between the
American military industry and the Iranian government, putting pressure on the lat-
ter so that the weapons which the United States did not need or which it did not
use would be sold to Iran. In this manner the latter was turned into a dump heap
of American military equipment.
- Under U.S. pressure, the Iranian military budget grew excessively from 880 million
dollars in 1970 up to 9.4 billion dollars in 1977. America-Iranian military con-
tracts from 1971 through 1977 reached 20.8 billion dollars. In 1977, the United
States sold a total of 11 billion dollars worth of weapons to 75 countries, and
Teheran was responsible for 5.8 billion dollars worth. Consequently, Iran pur-
chased more weapons than the remaining 74 countries, including Israel and Saudi
_ Arabia. In the United States, a special account Q'frust Fund") was opened to be
used to funnel payments coming from Iran without supervision. The U.S. administra-
tion categorically refused to inform the Iranian side of the money deposited on
this account. One of the secret Pentagon reports stated: "The United States is
capable of halting air flights in Iran, by refusing to supply spare parts. If a
revolution ~~erE to occur in Iran and the shah's regime would be replaced by an
anti-American one, the United States could bring the new Iranian regime to its
knees in controlling the Iranian Air Force." This statement helps one to under- _
stand the role which the IJnited States and its puppets gave to the Iranian Air
- Force in the coup planned for 1980.40
The shah also made large purchases of weapons in England and the FRG. The Iranian
Ar~r~y, some 400,000 strong, was armed with up-to-date systems of fighters, heli-
copter~, tanks, missiles, and so forth. In 1975, more than 230 dollars per inhabi-
tant were spent on military needs, and this exceeded by 2.5-fold the average annual
per capita income of the rural inhabitants.41 The military expenditures planned
for 1975-1976 of 525.5 billion rials (around 8 billion dollars) were 30 percent of
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the total gross national product of 1973-1974, while at the same time in 1975, in
France, the expenditures were 4 percent of the total gross national p~oduct, 4.2
percent in the FRG, 3.1 percent in Italy, and 5.8 percent in England.42 In 1975,
the military expenditures for each inhabitant of Iran, where the standard of living
was 3-4-fold lower than the standard of living in the developed capitalist nations,
exceeded by more than 3-fold the average per capita expenditures in the entire
world,43 ~
The enormous military expenditures and purchases of weapons abroad were used by the
ruling upper clique of Iran as a source for personal gain. The American magazine -
T~ME announced that "the generals, ministers and other officials at the court and
- in the government regularly receive 10-percent coramissions for weapons deals.i44
-
The embezzlement of state property, bribery and corruption, which Yias previously
been characteristic of the state apparatus of the Pahlavi dynasty, reached unpre-
cedented amounts during the last decades of the rule of Irbhammad Reza, The sha.h
himself, his family and close associates and highly placed miiitary and civilian
officials in the shah's regime deposited enorm~ous amounts with ?.merican and Swiss =
banks. According to info~ation published n the foreign gress, the shah alone
stole several tens of billions of dollars.4~
_ The colossal income from oil and the equipping of the Iranian Army with modern
weapons turned the shah's head. Having lost touch with reality, he began stating
that by the end of the century, Iran would be among the five leading powers of the
world, and that the country would follow a path toward a"great civilization," and
so forth.`+6 At the same time the enormous military expenditures, the embezzlement
of public property by the ruling circles and attempts to realize ambitious and ab-
- solutely unrealistic economic development plans--all of this led to a situation -
where the Iranian economy began to falter. Iran which in 1974-1975 did not know
what to do with its money caused by the increase in the price for oil and the oil
income, in 1975-1976 was in difficult financial straits. In 1975, because of the
_ economic decline in the West, the exports of Iranian oil dropped by 12.5 percent,
and this led to a decline in the oil income. Nevertheless the shah ordered that the
budget expenses be inc reased by 26 percent, and the additional all~cations were
again earmarked to purchase weapons and for other military needs. This led to ser-
ious financial and economic difficulties.`'~ In the middle of 1975, the Iranian
government not only decided to halt the granting of loans to foreign states, but
was itself forced to request a foreign loan of 4 billion dollars.`'~ The economic
- growth rate of Iran in 1977-1978 dropped to 2.8 percent in comparison with 41.6
percent in 1974-1975.4 9 Inflation raged in the country and prices rocketed. The
situation of the broad srrata of the people declined sharply, and the anger of the
- populace increased.
It was becoming obvious that the attempts at reforms undertaken by the shah in the
1960's and advertised as a"social revolution" for only a short while had checked
the growth of popular dissatisfaction. Land reform had been the most important.
As a result of it, according to official data, the number of large landowners having
50 and more hectares of plowed land during the reform rose by almost double (from
12,400 in 1960 to 23,000 in 1971 after the end of the reform), while their holdings
had increased by more than double (from 1,554,700 hectares to 3,288,000 hectares)
and were more than 20 percent of the entire plowed land. At the same time, the -
number of the smallest, unprofitable farms of less than 2 hectares during the re-
form had inc reased from 748,800 to 1,087,000, while the total area of their plowed
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- lands rose from 570,700 hectares to only 867,000 hectares. These smallest farms
corRprising almost one-half of the farms of Iran had only around 5 percent of the
plowed land.s~ Agricultural productivity remained extremely low, and the yield of
the basic cereal crop, wheat, was 7-7.5 quintals per hectare. Around 60 percent of
all the food consumed in the country was imported from abroad, while previously it
had fully supplied itself with food products. In 1975, 40 percent of the entire -
gainfully-employed population of Iran was employed in agriculture, but they produced
_ only 9.2 percent of the gross national product.51 The annual per capita average in-
come of the rural inhabitants at the beginning of the 1970's was around 100 dollars.
For a majority of the peasants the income was significantly lower. Many of them,
having been ruined, sold their plots and left for the cities. Over the last 25
years, the population of Iran increased from 1 million to 5 million persons, basi-
cally due to the increase in the number of poor living in urban slums.s2
The laws on worker participation in enterprise profits and on selling the shares of
the factories and plants to the public "above all to the workers and peasants,"
about which the shah's propaganda had raised such a great stir, in fact were social
demagoguery and did not provide anything real to the working class.
In 1975, the shah, in endeavoring to assume full control over the sociopolitical
life of the nation, disbanded the parties which he ha,d previously created along
American lines, but which had soon proven bankrupt, and created a new single
party "Rastahiza Mellia lran" (National Rebirth of Iran). Its basic principles
were declared to be: loyalty to the monarchy, the "revolutions of the shah and
the people" (the name given demagogically to the above-mentioned refoims of the
1960's) and the constitution. All the persons who did not share these principles,
and most importantly, loyalty to the monarchy were declared to be traitorso This
sham party was given the role of a tool in propagandizing the shah's policy. But
this party did not justify the hopes placed on it and after 3 years was disbanded.
This was one of the indicators in the cr~sis of the shah's regime.
The shah's foreign and domestic policy, the thousands of foreign companies and firms
established in Iran, and the enormous number of American advi:ers, both military and
civilian, caused growing dissatisfaction among the workers, peasants and intelli-
gentsia. The artisans, tradesmen and the small and medium merchants could not com-
pete with the flood of foreign goods as well as with the large Iranian capitalists. ~
Among the broad strata of the urban population, indignation grew with the dominance
of foreign capital, particularly American. "If the Irariian people look with dis-
taste at the United States," stated one of the Iranian reports at the above-
mentioned international conference, "this is the result of the actions of the pro-
American governments which came one after another and led Iran to economic, politi-
cal and social bankruptcy. The Iranian people ~~vitnessed the ever-growing inter-
vention into their own affairs during the bloody years of the rule of the Pahlavi
Dynasty, when more than a million persons were wounded and more than 100,000 killed.
The relations between the United States and Iran were relations between the sup-
pressors and the suppressed.i53 The Iranians were also indignant over American
domination in the area of culture, over the nature of the TV broadcasts, and the
showing of American and other Western films which were frequently incompatible with
the ethics and morality of Isl am.
_ At the end of the 1970's, the strikers who had demanded an increase in wages began
to be joined by broad non-proletarian strata of the urban population. Student
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protests started against the antinopular policy of the shah, in particular, in the
area of education, against Iranian intervention in Dhofar, and against American
domination. Indignation seized broad groups of the intelligentsia. The clergy and
students in religious schools protested.
The shah endeavored to suppress these actions by cruel repression~, by mass arrests
and punishments. SAVAK answerable only to the shah was given a free hand. The
"security organization" with the aid of its secret agents controlled the activities
of all the ministries, departments, institutions, plants and factories. SAVAK had
at its disposal secret prisons equipped by American specialists for political pris-
oners who were subjected to refined torture. In the middle of the 1970's, accord-
~ ing to evidence in the Western press, the number of political prisoners in Iran
ran into tens of thousands of persons.5`' Iran held one ~f the first places in the
_ world in terms of the number of death sentences handed down by military tribunals
and executions. SAVAK dealt with many prisoners without a court. A rule of terror
was established in the country.
But neither SAVAK terror nor an army armed with the most modern American weapons
could restrain the growth of popular wrath. A revolutionary situation developed in
- the country. In January 1978, popular dissatisfaction burst out in the form of an
antigovernment demonstration in the important religious center of Qum. The shah's =
authorities fired on the demonstration, several-score persons were killed and hund-
reds arrPSted. But in February and in the following spring and summer months, mass
demonstrations engulfed the entire country. Troo~s, tanks and helicopters which -
fired on the demonstrators were sent against them. However, these massacres could
not halt the movement which involved the broad strata of the urban petty bourgeoisie
and the poor, the artisans, students, the national bourgeoisie, the workers, the
clergy, that is, virtually all the strata of the urban population. The oil workers
and workers of other industrial sectors went on strike. In the villages the
peasant movement grew broader. Along with economic demands, political ones were _
also advanced directed against the shah, his secret police and American imperialism. `
By the end of 1978, the popular movement had assumed the nature of a general strike.
In Teheran alone, several million persons were involved in the demonstrations. The
movement had assumed the same nature in other cities of the country such as Tabriz,
Meshed, Isfahan, Abadan, Qum and elsewhere. The unprecedented scope and strength
of the popular movement can be seen from the number of demonstrators killed during
clashes with the troops and the police. The foreign press mentions a. figure of
60,000-65,000 persons killed.55
The Shi'ite clergy which was headed by the Ayatol~ah Khomeyni who had been exiled _
from Iran assumed an active, leading part in the antishah and anti-American move-
ment. The socioeconomic backwardness of Iran and the survival of significant
meci:eval vestiges were one of the basic reasons for the strong influence of religi-
ous ideology among the broad masses of the people. Another factor was that in the
past the Shi'ite clergy had often led the masses of people against foreign conquer- _
ers and suppressors and sometimes even against despotic rule of the shah. One
might mention the mass movement against the English tobacco concession of Talbot
which occurred in Iran at the end of the 19th century under the leadership of the
clergy. It involved the entire country and led to the canceling of the concession.
The Iranian antifeudal and antiimperialist revolution of 1905-1911 started by mass
demonstrations and holy parades which were also led by the Shi'ite clergy. During
the years of the struggle for the nationalization of the oil industry (1950-1953),
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a portion of the Shi'ite clergy took an active part in the struggle against the
AIOC and in defense of Iranian national interests. All of this created around the _
clergy an aura of a fighter for the cause of the people, against despotism and
foreign enslavement.
In material terms, a majority of the Shi'ite clergy had traditionally been inde-
pendent of the shah's powers. ~s a rule, the source of its existence was income
from the waquf, the land and other possessions presented by the believers, as well
as other payments of the Moslems. Since a predominant majority of the mosques was
independent of the shah's powers, in the situation of SAVAK terror tr.ey became
the only place where feelings of opposition to dESpotic rule could be expressed.
The crushing and merciless suppression by SAVAK of all the viable democratic and
opposition parties as well as groupings which could have led a popular movement
also facilitated the promoting of the Shi'ite clergy to leadership over the popular -
actions. Its appeals found a receptive ear among the broad strata of the Iranian
population and created for it the authority of a consistent defender of popular,
national interests. On 17 August 1978, Khomeyni issued a fetwa (a high religious
order) calling for the overthrow of the shah's regime. Confronted by a rapid rise
of a nati~nal movement, the shah who had continued to receive U.S. support resorted _
to playing for time. In the second half of 1978 and at the beginning of January
1979, there followed several cabinets of ministers (J. Amuzgar, S. Imami, Gen G.
Azhari, S. Bakhtiar), but these were unable to halt the growth of the popular move-
ment. The general strike grew into a revolt of all the people. The army was power- _
less against the people's uprisi.ng. The troop units began Co va~illat~ land.~~som~ of
them went over to the side of the people. On 16 January 1979, the shah fled Iran.
On 1 February Ayatollah Khomeyni returned to the country, and he was given a trium-
phant welcome. He instructed M. Bazargan to form a provisional transitional govern-
ment. For a certain time there was dual power in Iran. The prime minister Bakhtiar
who had been appointed by the shah at the beginning of January 1979 tried to remain
in power by relying on the army.
On 10 February 1979, at the Farahabad Air Base near Teheran, an exchange of fire
started between the cadets who had gone over to the side of the people and the offi-
cers. It grew into an armed struggle between the supporters of the monarchy and
the people. The cadets were helped by detachments of the armed people who seized
the weapons dumps located at the base. The shah's Guard was able to suppress the
_ revolt. Barricades appeared on the streets of Teheran. The armed people set fire
, to tanks sent against the rebels, and sacked the headquarters of SAVAK and the
~ police. The army command uncertain of the mood of the soldiers was undecided in
sending in the troop units to suppress the popular movement. The Iranian army,
trained and armed by the American imperialists, surrendered to the rebelling people. _
7.'he shah's rotten regime collapsed.
On 30 March 1979, a national referendum was held in Iran on the question of the _
future state system of the cot.mtry. Some 97 percent of the voters were in favor
of proclaiming Iran to be an Islamic republic. Thus an end was pu*_ t~ the more
than 50-year bloody rule of the Pahlavi Dynasty which came to power and ruled with
the help of the imperialists and was destroyed 3s a result of the antishah and
antiimperialist revolution.
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FOOTNOTES
1Malek ash-Shoara Bekhar, "Concise History of Iranian Political Parties," Vol 1,
Teheran, 1944, pp 62, 68, 110 et seq. (in Farsi); K. Makki, "A 20-Year History
of Iran," Vol 1, "The State Coup of 1921," Teheran, 1945, pp 106-107 (in Farsi);
B. Qmid, "Memoirs," Teheran, 1957, pp 284-285 (in Farsi).
' 2M. Pavlovich, S. Iranskiy, "Persiya v Bor'be za Nezavisimost [Persia in the
Struggle for Independence), Moscow, 1925, pp 181-182.
3ETTAHAD, 12 October 1921; TUFAN, 3 October 1921; B. Omid, op. cit., pp 284-287;
y M. Bekhar, op. cit., pp 51, 62, 66, 69, 81, 95, 110; K. Makki, op. cit., pp 101-
. 102, 104, 106-107, 110-111, 130, 225, 227-228, 233; M. Fateh, "Fifty Years of
Iranian Oil," Teheran, 1956, p 468 (in Farsi), H. Arfa, "Under Five Shahs," '
Edinburgh, 1964, pp 109-110; R. K. Ramazani, "The Foreign Policy of Iran. 1500-
1941," Charlottesville, 1966, p 176, and so forth.
4DON'YA, 1350 (1971-1972), No 2, pp 97-100.
5E. Lesueur, "Les Anglais en Perse," Paris, 1922, pp 155, 167-168.
- 6J. Balfour, "Recent Happenings in Persia," London, 1922, pp 233-234; see also
F.A.C. Forbs-Leit, "Checkmate. Fighting Tradition in Central Persia," London,
1927, PP 24, 78-79, 197, 235.
~V. Sheean, "The New Persia," New York, 1927, p 37; G. M. Haddad, "Revolution and
Military Rule in the Middle East," New York, 1965, p 139.
8K. Makki, op. cit., pp 106-107; M. Bekhar, op. ~it., p 62.
9"Compendium of Laws and Decrees of the Mejlis, Fifth Sitting," Teheran, no date,
- p 113 (in Farsi).
IOM. Fateh, op. cit., p 468.
llZp RUBEZHOM, No 6, 1979, p 8.
12A. Banani, "The Modernization of Iran. 1921-1941," Stanford, 1961, p 125.
13~~Compendium of Laws and Decrees of the Mejlis, Eighth Sitting," Teheran, 1933,
pp 42-44 (in Farsi).
14A. Chervonnyy, "Disputed Questions of Modern Persia," BOL'SHEVIK, No 4, 1927,
p 57.
- 15M. S. Ivanov, "Noveyshaya Istoriya Irana" [Modern History of Iran], Moscow, 1965,
- p 83.
1dA. Banani, op. cit., p 97.
17Ibid., pp 56-57.
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- 18~~Statistique annuelle du commerce extarieur de 1'Iran en 1319 (1940-1941),"
Teh~ran, 1941, p 3.
Z9MARDOM, S July 1947 (in Farsi).
20B. Shwadran, "The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers," New York, 1956, p 159.
21"Compendium of Laws and Decrees of the Mejlis, 16th Sitting," Teheran, no date,
p 14 (in Farsi) .
22PRAVDA, 24 July 1952.
23"Compendium of Laws and Decrees of the Mejlis, 17th Sitting," Teheran, no date,
pp 1-2 (in Farsi) .
2`'"Finansy Capitalisticheskikh Stran" ~Finances of the Capitalist Nations~, Moscow,
1956, pp 122-123; "Sovremennyy Iran" [Modern Iran], Moscow, 1957, p 216; BANK
MELLI IRAN BULLETIN, No 170-171, 1956, pp 248, 250.
25L. Elwell-Sutton, "Iranskaya Neft [original title: "Persian Oil"~, Moscow,
1956, p 387.
26V. A. Ushakov and V. Ya. Shestopalov, "Who Organized the 1953 Coup in Iran,"
VOPROSY ISTORII, No 4, 1980, p 185.
27iIran Almanac 1975," Teheran, 1976, p 272.
28S. A. Orudzhev, "Neftedobyvayushchaya Promyshlennost' Irana" [The Iranian Oil
Industry), Moscow, 1965, p 72.
29L. Tokunov, "The Near East: Oil and Politics," KONA4UNIST, No 16, 1974, p 115.
3oBURS, 18 June 1972 (in Farsi).
31~~Iran Almanac 1974," Teheran, 1975, p 284.
32Ibid., pp 204, 505-532.
33AYANDEGAN, 27 August 1975 (in Farsi).
34BANK h1ELLI IRAN BULLETIN, Nos 220-221, 1960, pp 224, 228.
35p, Demchenko, "The Downfall of Absolutism," KONA~UNIST, No 3, 1979, p 79.
36Ibid., p 77.
37ZA RUBEZHOM, No 47, 1979, p 9.
- 38The total loans and credits granted by Iran to other states, according to a
statement by the Iranian prime minister A. Hoveida made by him at a press confer-
ence in January 1975, were 9 billion dollars in 1974.
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39PRAVDA, 23 July 1980.
''oIbid.
41M. Farhang, "The Economic Life of Iran," Teheran. 1354 (1975-1976), p 384 (in
Farsi}~ .
42PRAVDA, 23 December 1975,
43pRAVDA, 18 April 1976.
44KONII~i[1NIST, No 3, 1979, p 79.
45ZA RUBEZHOM, No 33, 1980, p 19.
46Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, "On the Way to a Great Civilization," Teheran, 1978
(in Farsi).
'~~ZA RUSEZHOM, No 47, 1979, p 10.
`'SAYANDEGAN, 14 July 1975; ETTALA'AT, 13 August 1975 (in Farsi).
`+9iStatistical Annual for 1353 (1974-1975)," Teheran, 1355 (1976-1977), p 520.
The jump in Iranian economic growth in 1974-1975 was explained by the increase
in income from oil as a result of the abrupt rise in oil prices.
50~~Results of the Agricultural Census of 1350 (1971-1972)," Part 2, Teheran, 1352
(1973), p 4 (in Farsi).
51"Statistical Annual for 2535 (1976-1977)," Teheran, 2535 (1977), p 541 (in Farsi).
52"Iran Almanac 1978," Teheran, 1978, p 416.
53p~VDA, 23 July 1978.
54~y~ tiyEEKLY, 24 May 1975.
55K. Bahrami, "Through the Prism of Revolution," PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 6,
1980, p 89. ~
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo PRAVDA, VOPROSY ISTORII, 1980
10272
CSO: 1807
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,
INTERNATIONAL
ANALYSIS OF RISE OF ISLAM, ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE
Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII in Russian No 11, Nov 80 signed to press 18 Nov 80 pp 97-110
[Article by D. B. Malysheva: "Islam (Up to the Beginning of the 20th Century)".
Dina Borisovna Malysheva is a candidate of historical sciences and ~cience ~ssoci-
ate at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations under the USSR
Academy of Sciences. She is specialized in the history of Africa and ideological
questions. She is the author of the book "Religiya i Politika v St~anakh Vostochnoy
Afriki" (Religion and Politics in the Countries of East Africa), as well as a number
of other publications]
[Text] As is known, "any religion is nothing more than a fantastic reflection in
the minds of people of those external forces which prevail over them in daily life,
_ a reflection in which earthly forces assume the form of unearthly ones."1 Marxist-
Leninist ideology views religion as a social phenomenon, it explains "materiaZistie-
aZZy ...the source of faith and religion among the masses,"2 and indicates how re-
ligious ideas, in taking possession of the masses, influence their daily life and
thus become themselves a material force. For this reason Marxism-Leninism is
against any sort of a"political war against religion.i3
In history a special role has been played by the so-called world religions which
have united masses of people under a co~on faith regardless of their etnnic, lin-
guistic or political ties. Islam is one sucli religion. Islam (Arab.--submission)
holds second place in the world after Christianity in terms of the number of be-
lievers. At the beginning of the 1970's, the total number of Moslems (Arab. ^~uslim
--one who surrenders or submits) was around a half billion persons.'' According to
very inaccurate foreign data, at present there are around 0.9 billion Moslems (in-
cluding minor members of families). They live predominantly in Asia and Africa,
but also in Europe and America. In 32 African and Asian countries, Moslems com-
prise a majority of the population, and in 14 of them, an influential minority.
~F?e largest number of adherents of Islam live in Indonesia (125 million), followed
by India, F'akistan and Bangladesh (with 60 million in each). In African countries
(A1~er~A~ the Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Guinea, Mauritania, Nigeria,
Somali, Senegal, Mali, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Madagascar and
others), Moslems comprise a majority or a significant portion of the population,
and one-half of them is in North Africa, where Islam is the dominant religion. In
28 states (Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, the Sudan
and elsewhere), Islam has been declared the official state religion.5
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In the countries of the East, Islam is also a form of social conscience and a fac-
tor regulating morality, law, family and domestic relations, and in many ways is
also a way of life. However in spite of idealistic notions, it is impossible to
speak of a"Moslem world" as a certain single entity. All these countries differ
in terms of the racial and ethnic composition of the population, in terms of lan-
guage, customs, culture, traditions, in terms of the level of socioeconomic and
political development, the size of territory, natural conditions, and size of the
gopulation. The class structure of the Moslem Asian and African states also varies.
For example, in the Arab countries of North Africa, a bourgeoisie and proletariat
have already formed, while in a number of the Tropical African countries, these -
classes have not yet finally formed. Nor must we forget the het~rogeniety of the
ideological platforms of the regimes ruling in the Moslem countries as these often
differ very greatly from one another. The Pan-Islamic aspirations of joining them
together under the slogan of Moslem solidarity, to overlook or level out the con-
tradictions existing between them, on the one hand, contribute to the consolidation
of these states on an antiimperialist basis, and on the other impede the struggle
to escape from obsolete forms of ideology and for social progress.
Islam arose at the beginning of the 7th century in the Hijaz (the western part of
the Arabian Peninsula), during a period when the tribal system was dying out among
the Arab tribes populating it and class relations were arising. The basic popula-
tion of Arabia consisted of nomads, and among these an upper group gradually be-
came separated, particularly the leaders of the tribes (sheikhs). The rich mer-
chants who controlled the cities which were the points of caravan trade struggled
against the privileges of the tribal aristocracy, and for a basis of this struggle
required a more advanced ideological weapon than the old tribal cults, and for
this reason they supported the idea of renewing the faith. At this time the re-
ligious map of Arabia was extremely motley. A majority of the Arabs were pagan and
worshiped the moon, the sun and ancestors. In the northwest of the peninsula,
the cult of the Bethels was spreading (beyth-el--dwelling of the god)--stones
placed on their sides, the largest of which was black, probably of ineteoric
origino It was in a niche of the external wall of the sanctuary of the Ka'ba
(Arab. ka'b--cube) in Meccao
By the time of the rise of Islam, around the Ka'ba stood 360 stone tribal idols,
and the black stone was already perceived as a higher divine symbol,6 and this
shows the gradual outgrowth of the idea of monotheism among the Arab tribes. More-
over, along with the polytheistic cults in Arabia, there was also the partial
spread of monotheistic religions, such as Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism.
They did not become dominant among the Arabs, but did play their role in preparing
them to accept the idea of monotheism. The process of the centralization of the -
Arab tribe~ had a significant impact on the evolution of religious beliefs. This
was particularly evident in the region of Mecca where the upper group of the
Quraysh tribe had participated actively in the caravan trade and was successful in
subordinating neighboring tribes. With the growth of the might of the Qurayshites, ~
their ancient tribal god Allah (Aramaic "alakha" or divinity) assumed the primary
position and merged with the greatest idol Hubal.~
= The geographic position of Arabia and its involvement since ancient times in the
trade, political and cultural ties with the various states of the East and West
also contributed to the spread of monotheism among the Arabs. The Old Testament
biblical legends and the evangelical revelations, the Ancient Greek philosophy and
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Roman jurisprudence, Zoroastrianism and Buddhism, the traditions of Eastern despo-
- tism and the state standards of the centralized bureaucratic ancient kingdoms, as
well as the pre-Islamic beliefs of the Arabs themselves played a definite role in
the formation of Islam.8
The immediate precursor of Islam was hanifism or the movement of prophets and
- preachers, the "seekers of the truth," who acted against the tribal cults and who
worshiped the single god Rahman, that is, the merciful).9 The prominent hanif
Museilima who died in 633 did a good deal to contribute to the triumph of monothe-
ism precisely on the basis of the Ka'ba.l~ In the Meccan, so-called Rahman chapters
of the Koran, Abraham, the father of Ismail, who is considered to be the progenitor
of the northern Arabs figures several times as the hanif. He is also venerated
as the founde r of the Ka'ba and the initiator of the pilgrimage to Mecca.ll Until
the 9th century, all Moslems were named hanifs.
The spread of Islam is linked to the name of Mohammed (c. 570--8 June 632). Prob-
_ ably even before him local prophets acting in the name of god predicted the arri-
val of the "hour" after which all adversity would cease. However only the prophet
Mohammed was successful. Nis biography is not reflected in contemporary sources
and ~s written down for the first time in the 8th century.12 He belonged to the
impoverished family of Banu-Hashim from the Quraysh clan, he was orphaned early on,
and came to live with his uncle, tending his flock, and later worked in merchant
trade. At the age of 25 Moha~mned married the 40-year-old rich Meccan widow Khadija
whose affairs he had managed. Acquiring material independence, he abandoned trade
and emersed himself in religious and ethical problems to which he felt drawn. He
began to be attended by "visions"; in spending nights in ascetic vigils on Mounc ~
Hira, he heard "voices" and in 609-610 began to preach the worshiping of a single
god in contrast to paganism. As he related, during one of the nights of the month
of Ramadan (in other terms, Ramazan, the 9th month of the lunar calendar, when the
Moslems observe a 30-day fast during the daylight hours called the "uraza" among
the Turks, the "ruze" among Iranians and the "saum" among the Arabs) the Archangel
Jebrail (Gabriel) appeared before him and revealed the content of the Koran (that
is, the "book for reading") which was kept in the heaven, under the throne of Allah,
and after this comrnanded him to preach the will of god to his compatriots.
The success of the preachings of Mohammed was brought about by the fact that the
new belief became one of the forms for the struggle of ordinary people against the
feudalized tribal upper clique and the merchant-usurer group who acted in the role
of suppressors, while the ideas of equality and fraternity contained in these
teachings met the aspirations of the poorest strata of the population. The preach-
ings of Mohammed caused dissatisfaction among the Qurayshite upper cli~{ue of Mecca
and the priests of the Ka'ba who lived off the sacrifices and pilgrims. After the
death of his wife and uncle, Mohammed was forced to leave with a few followers (the
"ansars") for nearby Yathrib (subsequently Medina). As rivals of the Qurayshites,
the people of Medina willingly accepted him and soon thereafter Mohammed there
founded a community which united the local Arabic (Aws, Khazraj) and Jewish
(Keinoka, Kureiza, Nadir) tribes. This event marked a political success of the new
teachings. For this reason the year 622, the date of the "hijra" (or resettlement)
is considered the first year in the Moslem era.13
The Arabian aristocracy was quick to recognize the advantages of the idea of mono-
theism, as with its aid it would be possible to more easily reconcile the masses of
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_ people to the joyless reality. And in fact, having carried out his "religious
revolution,"1`' Mohammed created in Medina a model society in which religion served
as the justification of the existing law and order, social suppression and politi-
_ cal conquests. For this reason Islam from its very inception began to assume the
nature of a state religion. Soon, Southern and Western Arabia fell under its in-
~ fluence. In the year 630, the resistance of Mecca was broken. The supporters of
the Medina prophet accompanied by the Bedouins who had accepted Islam peacefully
entered the city, while the Qurayshite aristocracy, having accepted Islam, assumed
a prominent place among the closest followers of the prophet: "The leading circles
of Mecca...now could peacefully enter the community of Mohammed; they were no long-
er confronted with a dangerous dreamer but rather the ruler of a state to whom they
, could be and actually were useful."15 Mecca was declared to be the sacred capital
of the Moslems, and in 632, Mohammed made a"hajj" (pilgrimage) there, thus becom-
ing the first haji. He was buried in Medina, and his grave is considered to be the
second holy place after the Ka'ba among the followers of Islam.
After the death of Mohammed, the question arose of who would be his "khalif"
[caliph](successor) and would become the theocratic head of the Moslems, bringing
together the leaders of the religious community and the state.16 Although Ali,
Mohammed's so n-in-law and cousin, was closest to the prophet, Abu Bakr was
chosen the first caliph (632-634). Eiis successors Omar (634-644) and Osman (644-
656), like Abu Bakr, were "muhajirs" (participants in the hijra). However even then
- currents and sects appeared in Islam. This was related to the political rivalry,
the struggle for power and the various interpretations of the dogmas found in the
Koran as well as in the Sunna and hadiths.
The Koran (Arab. kara'a--to read) is as holy for the Moslems as the Bible is for
the Christians and the Jews. All significant events are sanctified by the reading '
of the Koran whether it is the birth of a child, trade transactions, testimony in
court, marriage or death. It was written in the ancient Arabic tongue, which at
present is a dead language. According to Moslem tradition, the Koran was not cre-
ated but existed eternally. But science has shown that it was written after the
death of Mohammed, and during his life no such book existed. The words of the
prophet were kept in the memory of his sup~orters and followers. After his death
only fragmentary notes remained on the l.eaves of date palms, stones and bones.l~
Hearing that the prophecies would be forgotten, Abu Bakr instructed Mohammed's
former secretary, Zayd Ibn Sabit, to bring together the variations of the prophe-
cies. As a result of the work done under Caliph Osman, the text was canonized (the
Osman reaction), and the remaining variations were destroyed. The modern canonical
text is contained in the Cairo edition of 1923. Europeans first learned of the
- text of the Koran from a Latin version in the 12th century, and a complete trans-
lation into Prench was made only in the 17th century.18 The most recent Russian
translation from the Arabic original was made by Academician N. Yu. Krachkovskiy.19
Since the positioning of the 114 suras (chapters) of the Koran is based upon their
length (the long ones are placed at the beginning, the short ones at the end), -
_ there has been a mixing of the chronological order of the eacposition of the materi-
al divided into 90.Meccan chapters (the years 610-622) and the 24 Yathriban
[MedinanJ. And in the "ay,yats" (verses) from which the suras are formed, quite
often it is a Question of things that are not related either thematically or in '
time. For this reason editing was needed which, however, would not eliminate the
alogisms. Moslem legend has it that Osman devoted the main share of the day to
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working on the sacred text and was murdered while at this work. Sheets of the -
Koran which supposedly were bespattered with Osman's blood have become an art2c~le
- of veneration. One such sheet kept in St. Petersburg was a flagrant forgery.
As for the content, the Meccan prophecies predict the near end of the world, after
- which will follow retribution for crimes cornmitted. These suras have, thus, an
eschatological character. They have been written by inspiration, and represent
rhymed phrases with a definite rhythm and abrupt assonances, and look like a flow
of intertwined, confused invocations. The Medinan prophecies are more practical
and are determined by the pclitical and social tasks which then confronted Mohammed,
acting now not as a hanif, but rather as a political figure and leader of an influ-
ential community. These same suras contain the standards aimed at regulating the _
- way of life of the believers. Here the prophecies descend to the level of prose.21
Belief in *_he single god Allah and his messenger Mohammed is expressed in the -
"jihad" (formula): "There is no other god but Allah, and Mohammed is his prophet."
This is the basic dogma of Islam. From this also derived the name of the new re-
ligion as the belief of the "Moslems," and the teaching of predestination here has _
been brought to complete fatalism and blind obedience of fate. "Fatalism is the
basic core of Moslemism."22 Man is powerless to make an independent choice between
good and evil and choose his path. Allah has done this for him, and He "whom He
so desires...leads astray, and whom He so desires brings to the straight path....ii23 _
What has been promised to you will come about, and you are unable to change this.
Due to such confidence in the unchanging predetermination of fate, the Moslems en-
tered a"Holy tiYar" without fear and doubt. The believer who remained alive re-~
ceived gain, while the killed entered paradise. The idea of predestination plays
an important role also in the justification of class, political and property in-
equality by the exploiters.
The Koran instructs the believers to carry out noble deeds: to contribute to the
poor the "zakat" (tax) comprising around 2.5 percent of the total value of property,
to say prayers (Pers.--namaz, Arab.--salat) five times a day, to observe the fast,
and visit holy places. T'~e "jihad" (zeal) or war against the "infidels" was de-
clared a holy cause, and in Russia this was often called a"gazawat" (raid) .24 In
form, the Koran is a dialogue between Allah (who speaks now in the third person and _
then in the first) and nonbelievers. It discusses polytheism; Allah is shown to be
the creator of the world; a description is given of Judgment Day, Paradise and
Eiell; polemics are waged against the non-Moslems; the death is described of the
peoples who have not followed the prophets; the way of life and conduct of the be-
lievers are prescribed; the ritual rul~s are given.25 This is the first written
monument of Arab prose.
The lack of clarity, the cloudy allusions and contradictions found in the Koran
n.ecessitated an interpretation of it. Couunentators appeared. The founder of exe-
gesis (the "true" interpretation) is considered to be the second cousin of Moham-
med, ibn A1-Abbas (died c. 677). In the Middle Ages, the most honored were the
commentaries of the historian and theologian of the 9th-lOth centuries, al-Tabari,26
and which up to the present have served as a support for the conservatives . Con-
versely, the Moslems who have endeavored to renew Islam, adapting it to the modern
age, h ave followed the commentaries of the reli~?ous reformer of the 19th century,
M. 'Abduh, one of the founders of Pan-Islamism.
_ ~ -
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The doctrines of Islam have not remained fixed but have been updated by the Moslem
theologians al-Bukhari, an-Nishapuri and others. They compiled the "sui, (way
of actions) which should derive from the holy tradition. This is given in the
"hadiths" or stories about the life, miracles and teachings of Mohammed and his
companions. All Arab tribes at one time had their own sunna which was passed down
from generation to generation.2S The hadiths which came into being after the
birth of Islam reflected changes in the life of the Arabs who moved into a class
society and adapted much from the peoples conquered by them. In the hadiths one
encounters borrowings from the bible, the Gospels, Ancient Greek, Hellenistic
Persian and Indian works. All of this was covered under the name of Mohammed. A
- compendium of tens of thousands of hadiths compiled inthe lOth century was named
the "sunna," and thereafter became one of the sources of Moslem law.
Each hadith consists of a matn (the text reflecting the content) and the isnad
("support"; it gives the persons who were the transmitters).29 In the struggle of
the religions-political groupings for power, each side endeavored to reinforce its
position by words which had been said at one time by the prophet. Precisely in
' order to reduce the abusing of the name of Mohammed, from the second half of the
8th century, the hadiths began to be classified and were compiled in six canonical
collections, and the most reliable are considered to be those belonging to al-
Bukhari and an-Nishapuri. Soon the Moslem theologians stated that the sunna could
get by without the Koran, but the Koran could not get by without the sunna. The
orthodox were therefore given the riame "akhl as-sunna" (people of the sunna, or
tantamount to the concept of "orthodox"). Those who departed from the sunna fell
into a state of "bidy," or heresy, or even became a supporter of "qufr" or complete
= disbelief.
_ A predominant portion of the hadiths were written to explain phenomena in the life
of the caliphate and which occurred after the death of the Prophet. In addition to
legendary material, they contain data which are of value for studying the history
of Islam as well as socioeconomic, political and moral-legal relations. Differ-
ences of opinion over the question of "bidy" or innovations in Islam led to the
formation of various schools of Islamic law or "maddhabs" (that is, ways). Up to
the present, four of them have maintained an influence and they have been named
after their founders or jurist-imams: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali. The -
school of the followers of ibn Hanbal, basically the inhabitants of Saudi Arabia, .
is the strictest and is marked by extreme intolerance and because of this has been
least widespread. The followers of Abu Hanifa who predominate in the Asian coun-
tries take a calmer attitude toward state innovations. The students of Malik ibn
Anas (the countries of the Magreb and West Africa) zealously honor the sunna. The
followers of al-Shafi'i (East Africa and Indonesia) have endeavored to reconcile
the Hanafis and Malikis.
All four schools are based on the shariat (Arab. sharia--pure way), a compendium
of religious, ethical and legal precepts. This is a typical feudal law which for
a long time protected the class interests of the feudal rulers, the rich merchants
and the clergy.30 The shariat is based not only on the Koran and sunna, but also
on the "fiqh" (Arab.--"understanding") derived from them. This is jurisprudence
- which employs the "kiyas" or logical interpretation of the Koran and the "ijmu"
(agreement) or the general opinion of experts on domestic questions and who hand
down a"fatwa" (decision) on a specific case. Without such a decision, no case
would make neadway. The shariat officially regulated all aspects of the life of
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Moslem society, but actually prevailed in the system of family and inheritance
law. In the spheres of trade, finance and administration, it was unable to replace
state and civil law. Moreover, the Moslem jurists kept a number of provisions of
customary law, the adat, which exis~ed among the Arabs prior to Islam.31
Moslem jurists divide the deeds of people into five main categories: compulsory,
xecommended, permitted, unapproved (but not punishable), and prohibited (punish-
able). The nonfulfillment of obligations without valid reason is tantamount to
apostasy. The criminal legislation of the shariat reflects the rights of the prop-
erty owning classes in providing severe punishments for the violating of private _
property. At the same time for murder there is only the right of relatives for
revenge. A characteristic trait of the shariat is particular concern for property
and little attention to the human individua1.32 In trut}i, the shariat prohibits
the practice of suicide, as well as the murdering (in special instances) of newborn
female babies which was widespread in pre-Islamic Arabia. The provisions of the
shariat dealj.ng with women are extremely conservative. In a number of Moslem
countries the latter are virtually without rights and are unbelievably repressed,
As a whole the ideology of Islam was simpler and more comprehensible to the broad
masses of believers, particularly the nomads and farmers, than were Christianity, _
Buddhism and Judaism, while its precepts were comparatively uncomplicated.33 These
particular featui�es of Islam played a role in its rapid spread among the peoples of
Asia and Africa. Soon after the death of Mohammed, Islam was fully victorious
among the Arabs. They united under the banner of the new religion. Their path was
now clear: to convert the nonbelievers to Islam and put everyone under the banner
of the Prophet. This path also corresponded to the desire for gain and military
booty which even during the time of Mohammed had been an important source in the
prosperity of the Moslem community. Four-fifths of the spoils was distributed be-
tween the warriors, one-fifth went to the leader and was initially to be given to
the poor.34
Under the first successors of Mohammed, "under the green banner of the Prophet,"
the neighboring countries of the Mediterranean and Near Asia were conquered. Their
population had been under the power of the Byzantine and Sassanid empires and i~.-
cluded Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Iran and Transcaucasia. In the 8th century, Arab
expansion extended to all North Africa, Afghanistan, Central Asia and Spain. A
vast Moslem empire or caliphate arose. From the llth century, Islam spread into
_ Northern India. In the 14th century it was adopted by the Golden Horde, and some-
what later by the peoples of the Northern Caucasus and Western Siberia. As a rule,
Islamization was a consequence of military operations. One of the comparatively
rare examples of the peaceful spread of Islam was its penetration into Indonesia,
where this religion became predominant due to the propagandizing by Arab and Indian
- merchants and there almost completely forced out Hinduism and Buddhism.
During the first decades of the caliphate, the aim of the Arab conquests was not to
spread the new belief among the conquered peoples. Even the very participants of
the conquest~, particularly the nomadic Bedouins who often comprised the strike
force of the troops, had not accepted Islam sufficiently, and (according to the
- evidence in the Koran) did not have the particular trust of Mohammed. In the
opinion of a majority of researchers, the possibility of easy enrichment became
the main incentive for the conquests.35 These conquests were facilitated by the
political isolation which existed in ma~ states of the East, by the infinite
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quarrels between the feudal rulers, by polytheism and by the absence of a religion
which united the other peoples.36 The victory of the Arabs with the subsequent
Islamization of the conquered peoples was also facilitated by an economic incentive.
In Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Libya, where there were many Arabs, the
- process of Islamization actually came down to the Arabization of the indigenous -
population, that is, to replacing the indigenous~ language and culture with Arab
ones. In Iran, Transcaucasia, Central Asia and Afghanistan, where there were few
Arabs, the economic policy of the conquerers contributed to winning over the broad
masses who suffered from the suppression of the local feudal rulers. The land was
_ declared to be state property, and the caliphs or their deputies disposed of it on
behalf of the state. Taxes and trade duties were sharply reduced for the Moslems;
the duties of the peasants who converted to Islam were eased. The accepting of
Islam freed them from the head tax. The population which had been worn out by the
infinite feudal quarrels linked Islam with a stabilization of social life. The
urban inhabitants and merchants played a leading role in the spread of Islam.
Previously, a merchant having grown rich most often encountered the envy of those
- around him; having been ruined, he did not find sympathy or support. After
- adopting the new religion and living among other Moslems, he gained social rec,og-
nition, and his profession began to be considered virtuous and god-favored.37
Islam answered the aspirations of the most diverse social groups and strata. Due
to its simplicity, the accessibility of its dogmas and rights, no preparation was
- required for the elementary mastery of them, while the standards of the shariat
largely coincided with the traditional customs of the new followers. At the same
time "Islam, having maintained its specific Eastern rites, itself restricted the
area of its spread to the East and North Africa which had been conquered and basic-
~ ally populated by Arab Bedouins. Here it could become the dominant religion, but
not in the West,"38
Ar~ example of the easy adaptation of Islam can be its triumph in a number of areas
of Black Africa. It was first victorious in the Western Sudan, where already in
- the llth century the empires of Ghana and Mali were ruled by Moslem rulers. The
Islamization of the East African coast started in the 7th centur,y. It was restrain-
ed by the existence of a strong Christian kingdom in Nubia which fell under the -
pressure of the Moslems only by the 16th century (Christianized Ethiopia has re-
mained from it). Arab merchants held strong positions on the western coast of the
Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and later moved south, where they also created Islamic -
_ centers such as Mogadishu, Mombasa, Zanzibar and Kilwa, mixing with the indigenous
population and forming the nationality and language of Swahili.39 Islam was closer
_ to the Africans of that era than was Christianity, because it arose out of a tribal
society and in a way adopted its structure, inspiring the believers in a preclass so-
ciety with feelings of their broader community and providing an opportunity to esta.b-
lish useful contacts with other ethnic groups professing the same religion.40 But
the simplicity of the principles of Islam led to a situation where certain preach-
ers of the new religion, most often the Africans themselves, under the guise of
Moslemism propagandized the former pagan rituals and their own views. This led to
a distortion of Islam. In Africa to the south of the Sahara, as nowhere else, its
principles became unstable and hazy,`'1
Like any religious current, Islam did not avoid splitting into schools and sects.
Fifty years after its r?se, the "~slems had split into three groupings which strug-
gled for power and in time turned into inde~.~endent religious schools: Sunnism,
. .27-
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Kharijism and Shi'ism. Kharijism was the first to arise, when after the death of
Mohammed, the struggle for the title of caliph became the central question of the
Islamic community. After the murder of the third "true caliph" Osman, by the sup-
porters of Mohammed's cousin Ali, the malcontents headed by the Prophet's widow
A'isha and the deputy of Syria, Mu'awiya (the founder ot the Umayya Dynasty) came
out against Ali. Before the decisive clash, Ali entered into talks with them.
A portion of his supporters in protest left his army, rejected both pretenders, and
in 657 elected the rank-and-file warrior ibn Wahba as caliph. They were called the
l~arijites (Arab. khawarij--leavers). �
The l~arijites recoonized the le~itimacy of only two caliphs--Abu Bakr and Omar.
According to their teachings, the community itself should elect a caliph by free
elections, and the election was t o be determined not by birth, but rather by per-
sonal c{ualities. The religious head of the Moslems should be the most worthy,
zealous and loyal executor of the will of Allah. Because of this, any Moslem, in-
cludi.ng both the slave and the non-Qurayshite,could become caliph. Thus, the sunna
was rejected which stated that the caliph must be..a Qurayshite, and Mu'awiya I made
the power_of the caliphs generally hereditary, and established a permanent capital
in Jamascus.`+2 The..Khariji~~es were also strict in asse.ssing the conduct of ordi-
nary believers. For the.strictness of their ethics they began to be,called the
"puritans of Islam," and they themselves called themselves "shura" (sacrificing for
convictions). The social slogans of .the Kharijites reflected the aspirations of
the masses of peo;~le, including non-Arabs and the mawali emancipated slaves. Later
- on the Kharijites themselves split in the moderate Ibadites (their followers cre-
ated their own imamates in North Africa and Oman),`+3 the irreconcilable Azkarites _
who up to the end endeavored to overthrow the Umayyads,`+4 and the Safrites who occu-
- pied an intermediate p osition.
Another current appeared over a dispute on the question of predestination. Fatal-
ism is defended in the Koran. It was beneficial to the Umayyads, as belief in the
will of Allah sanctioned their ri ght to rule. But the Koran also does not deny ~
free will. The malcontents used this. The first to act together with the Christ-
ian Syrians were the Islamic theologians who were named Qadarites (Arab. qadara ar
fate). The teachings of the Qadarites who recognized that man was the creator of
his deeds were developed by the rationalist Mu'tasilites (those who are separate)
and who under the influence of Ancient Greek philosophy proclaimed reason to be the
criterion of religion and the standard of life.``5 They were supported by the
Abbasids. Caliph htamun (813-833) made the Mu'tasilite notion of the noneternal and
man-made nature of the Koran an obligatory dogma. The decline of Mu'tasilism was
linked to the activities of the founder of the "qalama" the scholastic theologian
al-Ash'ari (873-935). A former supporter of the Mu'tasilites, he later began to
sharply criticize them, and his theological theory developed by orthodox theolo-
gians for a long time became a weapon in the struggle against free thinking.46 Of
great importance for Islam was the split of the Moslems into the Sunnites and
Shi'ites. Shi'ism (Arab. shi'a--group) arose under Caliph Osman in a situation of
acute political struggle, as a party defending the rights of Ali and his offspring
(the Alids) from the Prophet's daughter Fatima, to the caliphate. Having been de-
feated, Shi'ism by the middle of the 8th century had developed into a separate re-
ligious current opposin g orthodox Sunnism. Subsequently spreading into Iran and
Iraq, Shi'ism repeatedly became the standard of the anti-Arab struggle of the in-
digenous population. This belief is based on the thesis according to which only
the offspring of the Prophet can be the legitimate successors of Mohammed, or
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imams. They are the keepers of the "higher knowledge" while the caliphs "elected"
by the community are viewed as usurpers. The Shi'ites who recognize the sunna in-
terpret it differently than the orthodox Moslems, seeing the imams as infallible
persons and the heirs of the Prophet. The disobedience of secular power by the
Shi'ites and their struggle against the caliphs caused their persecution. As a re-
sult of the centuries-long persecution, a cult of martyrs had developed in Shi'ism,47
They included Ali and his sons Hasan and Husein. The latter died in 680 in the
battle against the Umayyad caliph at Karbala. This event became the subject of an-
nual obscure mysteries, the mourning celebration of "shakhsei-wakhsey" during which
fanatics whipped to a state of ecstasy wound themselves, expressing their religious
dedication to the memory of the martyrs.
The split between the Shi'ites and Sunnites became so engrained that they became
irreconcilable ene,~~i~s, and the idea of suffering and atonement caused the formation
of one of the most important elements in the Shi'ite belief. The Shi'ite dogmas do
not differ fundamentally from the Sunnite ones, although the Shi'ites consider the
wording of the Koran not completely satisfactory, as it does not reflect the role
of Ali, and they believe that the true text of the Koran known to the imams will
appear with the "mahdi" or hidden imam who will establish truth and justice. In
the sunna they recognize only those hadiths which have been affirmed by the Shi'ite
imams, and as a counter to the others, they have created their own "akhbars"
(legends) about Mohammed and Ali. On the questions of worship, the differences be-
tween the Shi'ites and Sunnites are insignificant.`+8
In the lOth-12th centuries, Shi'ism became the state religion in the areas where
the power of the Fatimids had spread. As early as the 8th century, Arab settlers
had brought Shi'ism into Iran, where it gave a religious cast to the anti-Arab lib-
eration movement.`+9 With the coming to power of the Safawids in the 16th century,
�it became the state religion of Iran, and also spread in Yemen, Syria, India, -
Pakistan, Cen~ral Asia and Azerbaijar,.
Shi'ism gave rise to a number of deviations and sects. The split in it started as
early as the 7th century over the dispute about the number of imams and the person-
ality of the last of them. The most widely found current was the Imamites, other-
wise the Isnashirites (that is, the Twelvers). They consider that the mantle of
Ali had been inherited by 11 offspring, but the 12th imam, Mohammed al-Mahdi dis-
appeared while still a boy (between 874 and 878) and was living invisible in a hid-
den place, where he would emerge by Judgment Day.50 Until the return of the Mahdi,
his will should be carried out by the nayb'i, trusted persons who would rule in the
modern age of the "hidden imamate."51 These teachings found a fervent response _
among the suppressed peasantry and repeatedly became the religious grounds for the
ideology of popular movements such as the Serbedars (Pers. doomed) in Iran and
Central Asia in the 14th century against the Mongol-Turkic feudal lords, and the
Sayyids (Arab. lords) in Mazanderan and Gilan (14th-16th centuries).52
The teachings of the Imamites lay at the basis of the views of all the remaining
currents of Shi'ism. The differences came down to the number and composition of
honored imams. The Qa'isanites (the first Shi'ite sect) considered the brother of
Husein and the son of Ali from a slave concubine to be the fourth imam. This sect
disappeared in the llth century. The Zaydites named after Zayd (the grandson of
Ali) whom they considered, in contrast to the other Shi'i::es, as the fifth imam,
limited themselves to venerating five imams, they recognized the principle of
~ 2 9-
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� election and denied the inheriting of power. In the 8th-llth centuries, the
Zaydite Dynasty of the Idrisids ruled in Morocco; in 864-928, a state of Zayites
existed in Gilan and Tabaristan; from the lOth century this sect became firmly es-
tablished in Yemen, where its imams ruled in the north until the revolution of 26
September 1962. '
The most significant split in Shi'ism in terms of its consequences occurred in the -
middle of the 8th century under the sixth Shi'ite imam Ja'far al-Sadiq who deprived
his elder son Ismail of the right to inherit. A portion of the followers of Ja'far
did not agree with t}iis, and declared Ismail to be the legitimate se~.renth imam,
thus founding the sect of Isma'ilites. From the lOth century, Isma'ilism existed
in the form of two basic schools: the moderate religion of the Fatimid caliphs and
the teachings of the "Seveners" (those recognizing seven imams, considering Ismail
as the last), otherwise the Ka.rmatians (from the name of the founder of the sect,
Karmat), supporters of extreme forms of Isma'ilism who drew their support from the
urban lower classes and the poorest peasantry.53
In the first quarter of the llth century, the Druze sect split off from the
Isma'ilites (the Druzes were named after their founder al-Da.razi). They believed
in the divinity of the Fatimid caliph al-Hakim (996-1021). Hakim was marked by ~
- strangeness and imbalance: "At one time he sat with candlelight during the day, -
and spent the night in darkness.... Among the high officials no one could be sure
of his life: suffering from a morbid quick temper, he could turn on his best
friends.i54 Later to his capriciousness was added the demand that his subjects
consider him a diety. The preacher al-Darazi became the first popularizer of this
idea. The cult of Hakim was finally formed as a result of the activities of the
Persian missionary Hamzah Ali. When Hakim was no more, Hamzah declared that he had
decided to check on his supporters and would return again, and later Hamzah also
disappeared in order to "return with Hakim." The D~uzes seized mountainous Syria
where tl:ey leveled the mosque to the ground, converted the peasantry to their faith
and redistributed the holdings of the feudal lords, themselves becoming the rulers.
During this period the activities of the third missionary commenced; this was al-
Muqtan who also subsequently disappeared and who appealed to the other Isma'ilites
with letters seeking help. The 111 messages of Hakim, Hamzah and Muqtan formed the
"Book of Wisdom" or the sacred writings of the Druzes.55
The Druzes community differed so much from the other sects that some researchers
have viewed it not only as a religious current but also as a separate nationality.
This question remains disputed in science. The cult of the Druzes was marked by
simplicity. They did not consider it necessary to perform all the Moslem rites,
and the existing precepts of the Koran were interpreted allegorically. As members
of a secret organization, they helped each other, and distinguished themselves in
their industry, restraint and bravery. Gradually the Druze landowners began to ex-
ploit the peasantry more and more strongly. In the 19th century, the Christian
farmers of Lebanon (the Maronites) repeatedly rose up against the Druzes. Their
antagonism was artificially fanned by the imperialists. At present many Druzes are
members of the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon.56
In Islam there was also a significant spread of the mystic current "tasawuf" (con- -
templation) or "Sufism" (Arab. suf--wool; the propagators of Sufism, the Dervishes,
dressed in coarse woolen clothing). This arose in the 8th century on the terri-
tory of Iraq and Syria and later spread into Egypt, the Magreb and Spain, and from
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the lOth century in Iran and Central Asia, and then in India. The first Sufi com-
munities had prayer huts on the outskirts of towns. The Dervishes did not give sig-
nificance to the rules of religious worship and rites. They were usually ascetics,
and strove for individual unity with God and the achieving of this by concentration ~
and internal contemplation accompanied by the appropriate exercises. They idealized
poverty and abstinence, and they criticized the failings of the feudal lords and
clergy~ which won them popularity among the suppressed masses.57 They replaced
the five daily prayers with mystical zeal or "zikr" during which they fell into a
trance and "merged" with Allah.
The Sufi doctrine provides for several stages of gradual coming closer to God. This
path was named the "tariqat" and was realized in cloisters. In them the lay
brothers or murids (seekers), under the leadership of a mentor or murshid (indi-
cator) underwent training which came down to the complete rejection of any manifes-
tation of one's "ego." "The murid should be in the hands of the sheikh like a
corpse is in the hands of the washer of the dead," states the Sufi precept.s$ From
the llth century, Sufi orders were created. In the 15th century they developed re-
ligious and political activities, particularly in North Africa. Some of them~in
individual instances seized state power (until recently the Libyan king was the
head of suc~h an order). In terms of social composition, the orders varied: the
Dervishes could be both impoverished and rich. The charters of the orders differed
and likewise there were numerous forms of the "zikr." In some instances, the ec-
static trance was caused by singing, music and dancing, and in others by deep con-
templation. In certain fraternities, the religious element was completely secondary
(the fraternity of marksmen and jugglers in Morocco).59
The Sufi fraternities often possessed a good deal of earthly property, and their
heads (the office of murshid in certain orders had become hereditary), although tak-
ing the vow of poverty, at times became major feudal lords who played a significant
political role. The view which arose in late Sufism of a religious leader as the
intermediary between Allah and the faithful, belief in the magical abilities of the
murshid to perform miracles and predict the future, and the notion that he possessed
"barak" or magical strength helped tc reinforce the political influence of the Sufi.
The heads of the orders were often venerated as saints (in Iran, Afghanistan and
India they were called "wali," in Central Asia "awlia," and in Africa "marabouts"),
and the graves of outstanding ascetics became an object of pilgrimage, for example,
the t~mb of Amadu Bamba, the founder of the Muridian Order located in the sacred
city of Tubu (Senegal). The worship of saints in Sufism contradicts orthodox mono-
theism, and this was one of the reasons for the persecution of the Sufi. Each of
their orders gradually split into various schools which followed the teachings of
their founders, whose authority was unquestiona.b1e.60
_ The philosopher and theologian al-Gazali (1058-1111), "this Thomas Aquinas of
orthodox Islam,"61 reformed Islam, reconciling Sufism with Sunnism. A Sunni ortho-
doxy had developed which included a religion, a ritual aspect, philosophy, law and
political doctrines,62 and the teachings of Gazali had the strongest iafluence not
only on all Moslem science and theology, but also on the philosophy of Medieval
Europe. The further development of Sufism occurred by different means. These
teachings were used by various class groupings. The Sufi participated both in
holy wars against the "infidels" (the murids of Shamilia were considered Sufi), as
well as in popular antifeudal revolts (the Serbedars), in the organization of the
shah's troops (the Sefawid Dynasty in the 16th century), as well as in the creation
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of secret artisan unions.63 At present, the activities of the Moslem orders, par-
ticularly in the Arab countries, are practically limited. In Turkey, they were
prohibited in 1925. However this in no way has meant a crisis in Sufi ideology.6`'
By the 13th century, the process of the formation of Is]am as the dominant ideology
in the societ3es of the Near and Middle East had been co~leted. Islam then remained
in a state of quiet for a long period of time. In the feudal, despotic regimes
(the Ottoman Empire, Sefawid Iran and the state of the Great Moguls), it serveu a~
the standard for wars of conquest, and in the period of decline as a tool of
internal reaction. The exacerbation of the class struggle caused the appearance of
new sects ~uch as Wahhabism and Babism. The former aimed at returning Islam to its
initial simplicity; the latter, on the contrary, introduced into Islam "new ele-
ments which met the spirit of the times.~r65 ~e movement of the Wahhabites arose
in the middle of the 18th century among the Bedouins of Arabi a. Named after its
founder, the Moslem theologian Mohanmmed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the teachings of the
Wahhabites demanded a return to the simplicity of the first centuries of Islam, the
excluding of any cult, including the cult of the Prophet, saints and graves, and
the strict performance of the prescribed rites. The realization of this doctrine
was facilitated by t he fact that Wahhab became related to the influential Sheikh
ibn Saud. Both o� them, one the preacher and the other the sword, achieved the
propagation of the new teaching, they united under its standard virtually the entire
Arabian Peninsula, and formed a state headed by a dynasty which up to the present
has ruled in Saudi Arabia.66 Acting under the slogan of a jihad and the fight
against monotheism, the Wahhabites attacked the center of Shi'ite pilgrimage
Karbala (1801), and destroyed the holy places of Mecca (1803) and Medina (1804).
In their daily life they prohibited alcoholic beverages, music, dances and modern
clothing. Characteristic of them were a fanaticism, intolerance, and the viewing
of the representatives of other sects as "monotheists." In acting against innova-
tions and rejecting hanifism, the official school in the Ottoman Empire, the Wahha-
bites acted against official Islam. At the beginning of the 20th century, they got .
the upper hand in Najd, then conquered Hijaz with Mecca and Medina. At present
Wahhabism has become more moderate, and the local holy places have not only been _
rebuilt, but also are flourishing, becoming an important source of income for the
ruling clique of Saudi Arabia.
In the 19th century, the ideology of the national liberation movement arose in a
number of colonial and dependent countries of the ~ast. As a rule, these ideas
were fostered by representatives of the intelligentsia who came from noble clans
and theological circles, and later from the merchant class, the peasant and trades-
men milieu, Falling under the influence of Western ideas, these ideologists pro-
pounded reformist and educational views, and voi.ced the necessity of revising the
sociophilosophical system of Islam in light of the development of science, educa-
tion, culture, and the altered sociopolitical conditions and the tasks of the anti-
colonial struggle. The ideas of bourgeois reformism were first expressed in Babism
which arose among the urban poor and peasantry of Iran in the middle of the 19th
century. The foundEr of the teachings, Mohammed Ali, declared himself to be Bab
(Pers. "gates"), he preached the pending arrival of the "mahdi" and called for so-
cial justice, the elimination of obsolete rites and the equality of inen and women.67
Numerous adherents gathered around the Bab, and they propagandized his teachings in
Iran, Turkey and Iraq. Among them was the well known Zerrin Taj called Kurrat al-
Ain (Delight to the Eyes) and who became the founder o~ the women's movement in
Iran.68
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The teachings of Bab as an ideological banner for mass popular uprisings69 caused
serious concern among the authorities. The Shi'ite clergy fiercely attacked the
Babis. Upon the insistence of the mullahs, Bab was arrested and executed in 1850.
A portion of his followers was suffocated or burned, while others fled to Iraq.
'The deFeated Babis split into the Azalites (named after one of the students o� the
Bab, Azal)~~ and the Baha'is (the supporters of step-brother of Aza, Baha~ullah,
who declared himself to be Mahdi). Having discarded the revolutionary elements of
- Babism, Baha'ullah began preaching reconciliation and the abandonment of struggle,
he was against wars in general, and for patience and the achieving of justice by
peaceful methods. The idea of the abandonment of state frontiers, national inde-
pendence and sovereignty for the sake of forming a"single world state" as advanced
by the Baha'is after World War i as well as their abandoning of Islamic rites
helped to spread Baha'ism in Western Europe and North America. Baha'i centers
exist at present in the FRG and the United States.~l
In the general flow of movements for the modernization of Islam which developed
broadly at the end of the 19~th and ti:c beginning of the 20th centuries, a special
place is held by Pan-Islamism which is based upon the notion that Islam provides a
community that is above class and above the nation. The development of this idea
occurred under the conditior.~s of the expansion of the imperialist powers and the
- birth of capitalist relatior,~.s in the Asian and African countries. In order to
avoid the collapse of Islamic civilization, it was essential, in the opinion of the
_ Pan-Islamists, to return to its sources and by uniting all the Moslems to carry out
a"Islamic rebirth." At *_ne source of Pan-Islamism stood Jamal al-Din al-Afghani
_ (1838-1897) who establis;ied the idea of the unity of Moslems in a struggle against
foreign colonialists. He urged the Aioslems to assimilate European science and
technology in order to beat the colonialists with their very weapons.72 The above-
mentioned reformer Mohammed 'Abduh (1849-1905) is considered to be the most prom-
inent follower of al-Afghani.73
In the search to actually carry out Pan-Islamism, its ideologists turned both to
the Iranian shah and to the Turkish sultan. This led to a situation where the demo-
cratic and liberation elements gradually disappeared from their slogans, and the
preaching of the consolidation of the peoples of the East on a basis of Islam ran
counter to local bourgeois nationalism. At the beginning of the 20th century, Pan-
Islamism had turned into a conservative current, and its slogans were picked uP by
the extremely reactionary circles who thought of strengthening the "positions of the
khans, landowners, mullahs, and so forth."~`' In contrast to the Pan-Islamists, the
Moslem nationalists were in favor of a complete modernization of Islam and the
adaptation of it to the needs of developing the states of the East. From the be-
ginning of the 20th century, this movement has spread everywhere. In u number of
these countries, bourgeois reforms were carried out with the secularization of
legal standards and cultural and domestic mores, with the confiscation of the lands
of the clergy, the restriction of the sphere of action of the Shariat, the separa-
tion of church and state, and the introduction of a secular school education.
Secularization assumed a particularly radical nature in Tu-rkey, where after the
abolishing of the caliphate in 1924 and the establishing of a republic as a result
of the reforms of Kemal Ataturk, a great deal was accomplished. In 1937, "laicism"
(secularism) was officially included in the Turkish constitution. At present
Turkey is the only Moslem country where state power has a truly secular nature, and
- Islam has in fact been driven out of the sphere of political and social life.75 In
Iran, under the influence of Kamalist ideas and secular radicalism, transformations
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were started, the basic component of which was a series of bourgeois reforms and
secularist measures.76
The Islariic faith has influenced not only the ideological fqrmation of the national
liberation movement in the Asian and African countries, but also the entire atmos-
phere of the political struggle. During the popular revolts against the colonial-
ists in Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, the Sudan and Indonesia, it was used as an unique
form for the manifestation of patriotism and resistance to foreign suppression.
At the same time, in the life of these countries one can clearly trace a different
trend, that is, an appeal to Islam by the anticommunists, and a desire of the sup-
porters of extreme nationalism to utilize religious views and organizations for
opposing social progress and shattering the union of antiimperialist forces and
the socialist world. From the viewpoint of modern Pan-Islamists, the Moslem_states
are primarily not national communities, but rather members of the "wnma," the indi-
_ visi.ble Moslem co~nunity which should oppose the radical currents and spread of
socialism.
The development of the corresponding religious schools was of definite significance
for the evolution of Islam. In the Moslem countries, in a majority of instances a
religious education is a component part of the public education system, and reli-
gious disciplines are part of the school curriculums. At present there are around
30 Moslem universities or faculties of Islamic theology and law, many of which were
founded long ago, as well as a mass of madrasa who train Islamic priests. The most
prominent of these universities are: the Egyptian al-Azhar, the universities of
Alexandria and Cairo, the Tunisian Zeytun University, the Indian Aligarh, Allahabad
and Dehli universities, the Punjab University in Pakistan (also the Institute of
Islamic Studies), Ankara University in Turkey, the Islamic University in Indonesia,
Teheran University in Iran, and IQiartown University in the Sudan. They teach and
pr~ach orthodox Islam not only as a religion, but also as a universal ideology,
politics and culture.
Under present-day conditions, the ideological delimitation of the forces of prog-
ress and reaction, the forces of a socialist and bourgeois orientation in the Asian
and African countries is complicated by the fact that the awareness of the masses
who have lived through an age of colonial enslavement is burdened by lasCing
nationalistic and religious ideas.~~ The religious peasant and semiproletarian
strata are being involved ever-more widely and intensely in the ideological and
political struggle. And although many political concepts voiced by party and state
leaders in the various Moslem countries contain the ideas of the secularization of
social life and the limiting of the positions of the clergy, it is still too early
to speak about the disappearance of the religious ideology and the ~limination of
Islam from the conscience of the masses in the countries of the East. In some
places there may be regression as ca' be seen by the recently more frequent at-
tempts to interpret Islamic beliefs as a philosophy of life which encompasses all _
spheres of human endeavor: the economy, politics, ideology and everyday life.
Under these conditions, Islam continues to remain one of the factors impeding the
spread of the ideas of scientific socialism. There are also instances of an ec-
lectic use of Islamic ideas, and this has led to attempts to reconcile Islam,
nationalism and socialist slogans. Thus, revolutionary petty bourgeois leaders,
particularly in the Arab countries, consider the teachings of Mohammed about the
equality of all people before Allah as close to the ideas of democracy and social-
ism. Characteristic of the concepts of "Islamic socialism" is a~denial of
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scientific socialism, an assertion of its "inapplicability" in an Islamic society,
defense of private property and its "divine" nature, and an emphasis of the dis-
similarity of the idea of Moslem ownership to either private capitalist or social-
ist. Here the class struggle is denied and the "naturalness" of social and eco-
nomic inequality is asserted.78 The ideo,logy of Islam thus provides concrete
� material for using it in the most diverse social curTents in the course of the
political struggle now developing in the countries of the East.
FOOTNOTES
1K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 20, p 328.
2V. I. Lenin, "PSS" [Complete Collected Works], Vol 17, p 418.
3Ibid., p 417.
4iBol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" ~Great Soviet Encyclopedia~, Vol 10, 1972,
p 484.
5"Middle East and North Africa. 1979-1980," London, 1979; "Africa South of the
Sahara. 1979-1980," London, 1979; TIME, 16 April 1979, p 9; CURRENT HISTORY,
April, 1980, pp 149-150, 193.
6A. Masse, "Islam," Moscow, 1963.
~L. I. Klimovich, "Islam," Moscow, 1962, p 21; V. V. Bartol'd, "Soch." ~Works~,
- Vol 6, Moscow, 1966, p 87.
$L. Vasil'yev, "Islam: Schools, Currents and Sects," AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA,
No 1, 1980, p 58.
9Ye. A. Belyayev, "Araby, Islam i Arabskiy I~alifat v Ranneye Srednevekov'ye"
[The ~~rabs, Islam and the Arab Caliphate in the Early Middle Ages], Moscow, 1966,
pp 103-108.
lOL. S. Vasil'yev, "Kul'turno-Religioznyye Traditsii Stran Vostoka" ~Cultural-
Religious Traditions of the Countries of the East], Moscow, 1976, p 115.
11A. hfasse, op. cit., pp 24-25.
12"Das Leben Muhammed's," Nach Muhammed Ibn Ishak, Vol 1-2, GtSttingen, 1858-1860.
13S I, Seleshnikov, "Istoriya Kalendarya i Khronologiya" ~The History of the
Calendar and Chronology], Moscow, 1970.
_ 14K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 28, p 210.
15V. V. Bartol'd, op. cit., Vol 6, p 103.
16ph. K. Hitty, "History of the Arabs," New York, 1964.
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17I. Gol'dtsiyer, "Lektsii ob Islame" [Lectures on Islam], St. Petersburg, 1912.
18Th. NSldeke, "Geschichte des Qorans," Vols 1-3, Leipzig, 1909-1938.
19iKoran," Moscow, 1963.
20I. Gol'dtsiyer, op. cit., p 10. _
21R. Blach~re, "Introduction au Coran," Paris, 1959.
22K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 9, p 427.
23R. R. Mavlyutov, "Islam," Moscow, 1969, p 60.
2'"'Encyclopedie de 1'Islam," Vol 2, Leyden, 1965, pp 551-553.
- 25R. Paret, "Der Koran. Kolmnentar und Konkordanz," Stuttgart, 1971.
- 26For fragments of his works, see: L, I. Nadiradze, "I~restomatiya po Istorii
Khalifata" [Reader on the History of the Caliphate], Moscow, 1968.
27N. A. Smirnov, "Sovremennyy Islam" [Modern Islam], Moscow, 1930.
28A. Avksent'yev, "Koran, Shariat i Adaty" [The Koran, Shariat and Adats],
Stavropol', 1966, p 104.
29A. Ye. Krymskiy, "Istoriya Musul'manstva" (History of the Moslem World], Part 1,
Mcscow, 1904.
3oR. Sharl', "Musul'manskoye Pravo" [Moslem Law], Moscow, 1959, p 5(Foreword by
Ye. A. Belyayev).
31G. M. Kerimov, "Shariat i Yego Sotsial'naya Sushchnost [The Shariat and Its
Social Essence Moscow, 1978.
32V. V. Bartol'd, op. cit., Vol 6. _
33S. A. Tokarev, "Religiya v Istorii Narodov Mira" [Religion in the History of the
Peoples of the World], Moscow, 1976, p 527.
34L. S. Vasil'yev, op. cit., pp 119-120.
35W M. Watt, "Vliyaniye Islama na Srednevekowyu Yevropu" [The Influence of Islam
on Medieval Europe), Moscow, 1976, p 23.
36~~Istoriya Stran Azii i Afriki v Sredniye Veka" [History of the Asian and African
Countries in the Middle Ages], Moscow, 1968, pp 97-123.
37T. S. Saidbayev, "Islam i Obshchestvo" [Islam and Society], Moscow, 1978, pp 24-
25.
38K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 19, p 313.
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39p, Bartnitskiy, I. Mantel'-Nechko, "Istoriya Efiopii" [The History of Ethiopia],
Moscow, 1976; Ye. N. Myachina, "Yazyk Suakhili" [The Swahili Language], Moscow,
1960.
40A. Mrozek, "The Philosophy of Black Islam," "Istoriya, Sots~ologiya, Kul'tura
Naroduv Afriki" [History, Sociology and Culture of the African PeoplesJ, Moscow,
1974, p 281.
41J. C. Froelich, "Les musulmans d'Afrique Noire," Paris, 1962, p 135.
`+2H. Lammens, "~tudes sur le r~gne du calife Omaiyade Moawia l," Beirut, 1909.
43T, Lewicki, "Les subdivisions de 1'Ibadiyya," STUDIA ISLAMICA, Vol 9, Paris,
- 1958.
4``J. p~rier, "Vie d'al Hadjdj~di ibn Yousaf," Paris, 1904.
455, N. Grigoryan, "Srednevekovaya Filosofiya Narodov Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka"
_ ~Medieval Philosophy of the Peoples of the Near and Middle East], Moscow, 1966.
- 46~~Die dogmatischen Lehren der Anh~nger des Islam," BIBLIOTI-~CA ISLAMICA, Vol 1,
Wiesbaden, 1963.
47I. Gol'dtsiyer, "Kul't Svyatykh v Islame" [The Worship of Saints in Islam], Mos-
cow, 1938.
48H. Ldschner, "Die dogmatischen Grundlagen des siitischen Rechts," Cologne, 1971.
`+9I. P. Petrushevskiy, "Islam v Irane .v VII-XV Vekakh" [Islam in Iran in the 7th- _
lSth Century], Leningrad, 1966.
50ye. A, Belyayev, "Musul'manskoye Sektantstvo" [Moslem Sectarianism], Moscow, '
1957.
S1ye. A. Doroshenko, "Shiitskoye Dukhovenstvo v Sovremennom Irane" [Shi~ite Clergy
in Modern Iran], Moscow, 1975.
52I. P. Petrushevskiy, "Zemledeliye i Agrarnyye Oxnosheniya v Irane XIII-XIV vv."
[Agriculture and Agrarian Relations in Iran of the 13th-15th Centuries), Moscow-
Leningrad, 1960, pp 412-472.
53For their subsequent history, see D. B. Malysheva "The Isma'ilites," VOPROSY
' ISTORII, No 2, 1977.
54A. Mets, "Musul'manskiy Renessans" [The Moslem Rer,.naissance], Moscow, 1966, p 23.
' SSN. Boi~xon, "Les Druzes," Paris, 1930.
56A. Ismail, "Histoire du Liban du XVIIe si8cle ~ nos jours," Vol 4, Paris, 1958. t
57"Scholars, Saints and Sufis," Berkeley, 1972,
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58A. Ye. Bertel's, "Sufism and Sufi Literature," "Izbraru~yye Trudy" ~Selected
Works), Vol 3, Moscow, 1965.
59J. S. Trimingham, "The Sufi Orders in Islam," Oxford, 1971.
6oH. Corbin, "Histoire de la philosophie islamique," Paris, 1964, pp 262-268.
61A. M, Vasil'yev, "Puritane Islama?" [The Puritans of Isla.m?], Moscow, 1967, p 93.
62A. J. Wensinck, "La pens~e de Ghaz~li," Paris, 1940.
' 63R. Gramlich, "Die schiitischen Derwischorden Persiens," Vol 1, Wiesbaden, 1965.
. . -
64gur more detail see: M. T. Stepanyants, "The~Historical Fate of ~ufism," VOPROSY
. .
FILOSOFIY, No 6, 1980.
65~~Tslam and Its Cultural_Divergence," Urbana, 1971. ,
66y,_ g, Lutskiy, "Novaya Istoriya Arabskikh Stran" ~New History of the_Arab Nations~,
Moscow, _1966. - - - - ~ - ~
67E. G. Brown, "Materials for the :~tudy of the Babi Religion," Cambridge, 1918.
68M, T, Stepanyants, "Islam v Filosofskoy i Obshchestvennoy Mysli~ Zarubezhnogo
- -
Vostoka" [Islam in the Fhilps.ophical an~ Social Thought~ o�~the Overseas East ,
Moscow, 1974, p 24. ~
69por more about them see: M.S. IvaaoJ, "Babidskiye> Vosstaniya v Irane (1848-1852)"
- (The Babi Revolts in Iran (1848-1852) J, Moscow-Leningrad, 1939.
~~T. Abdel-Rahman, "Le b~bisme et 1'Islam," Paris, 1942.
.
71L. I. Klimovich, op. cit., pp 206-211.
- 72"Religiy-a i Obshchestvennaya Mysl'Narodov Vostoka" [Religion and Social Thought
oi the Pear~les of the East Moscow, 1971, p 256.
?3For t;nis s~ee Z. I. Levin, "Razvitiye Osnovnykh Techeniy Obshchestvenno-
Politicl-ie~skoy Mysli v Sirii i Yegipte" [Development of Basic Currents in Socio-
politi~cal. Thought of Syria and Egypt], Moscow, 1971.
%~+V, I. Lenin, PSS, Voi 41, p 166.
75"Noveyshaya Istoriya Turtsii" (Modern History of Turkey~, Moscow, 1968.
76For them see M. S. Ivanov, "Noveyshaya Istoriya Irana" [Modern History of Iran],
Moscow, 1965.
~~See "Zarubezhnyy Vostok i Sovremennost"' [The Foreign East and Modern Times],
Vol 2, Moscow, 1974.
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_ 78iBor'ba Idey v Sovremennom Mire" [The Struggle of Ideas in the Modern World],
Vol 3, Moscow, 1978, p 264.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo PRAVDA, VOPROSY ISTORII, 1980
10272
CSO: 1807
39
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~ INTERNATIONAL
TURKMEN IDEOLOGIST ATTACKS WESTERN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TO USSR ~
Ashkhabad TURKMENISTAN KOMMtTNISTI in Turkmen No 11, Nov 80, pp 58-63
[Article by K. Bagdasarov: "On Principles and Methods of Bourgeois Propaganda"]
[Text] The principles of propaganda consist of rules for. dir.ecting propaganda
work. These principles are the expression of a class ideology and of a precise
world view.
- The methods of propaganda, consisting of a system of principles and means, dissemi-
nate clear ideas and theories with their help, and men's beliefs are brought to
fruition. The methods of propaganda derive from its basic principles and express �
the class content of these principles.
The clarification of the class aspect of propaganda is a fundamental condition of
the comprehension of its principles, methods, goals and duties. Each of the con-
tradictory ideologies of the two social systems--socialism and capitalism--has its
own type of propaganda. Bourgeais propaganda is directed at preserving the class
interest of capital and serves the goal of steadying the imperialistic system. It
is a part of the ideological apparatus of capitalism and influences all aspects of
the spirit of a society and its way of life.
At the present time the role of propaganda has been strengthened in the internal
and foreign policy of imperialism and has brought about a consolidation of the
material-technical basis of propaganda in fundamentally capitalistic countries
and an increase in the number of workers in the ideological sphere. Bourgeois
theoreticians explain this by the proliferation of information, the growth of
electranic methods and by the strengthening of the effort to communicate to people
all the news happening in the world. Certainly the application of the newest
means of information handling to the propaganda process influences every aspect
of the propaganda process and does not restrict the numerical size of the lis-
tening audience. Truthfully, the powerful growth of radio and television has
brought a source of propaganda into every home and puts hiterto unprecedented
means to influence the minds of the people emotionally into the hands of the
propaganda organizers.
But in the contemporary world strengthening of the role of political propaganda
is formulated by fundamentally ideological factors. The growth of the importance
of monopolistic bourgeois propaganda is conditioned by sharpening the ideological
struggle between each other in the world arena. This situation has been especially
stressed in decrees f rom the 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU and in similar
party documents.
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The sharpening of the ideological situation, each against the other, is felt
especially in the strengthening of anti-communist, anti-Soviet radio propaganda.
Bourgeois radio transmitters have a large network spread throughout the capitalist
world whi~h broadcast to tne USSR and other socialist countries. This network
comprises not only the "Voice of America," the BBC, "Deutsche Welle" (in the FRG),
"Liberty," "Free Europe" and the "Voice of Israel," but also a radio transmitter
~ in South Korea broadcasting to the Soviet East and the NHK radio broadcasting
corporation which transmits programs in the Russian language. World bourgeois
radio--on a 24 hour basis--broadcasts close to 240 hours of programming to the ,
USSR.
There is yet another way to disseminate bourgeois ideas and religious views to _
_ part of the population of the USSR. Television programs broadcast from the capi-
talistic countries adjoining the Baltic and Central Asian republics can also be
seen . .
As is well-known, Western propaganda centers are closely affiliated with imperi-
alist intelligence agencies. A number of workers on program desks which are
broadcasting to socialist countries--such as the "Voice of America," "Liberty,"
"Free Europe" and others--are known to be agents of the Central Intellioence Agency
and other similar organizations, and some are fascist hirelings.
The CPSU, Soviet scholars, and communist and workers' parties of foreign countries
are studying the theory and practice of bourgeois propaganda and the methods by
which they poison men's minds, and they work out recommendations in order to step
up the results of the struggle against ideas alien to socialism. The fundamental
principles of bourgeois propaganda in articles, books and brochures ~ublished by
them are clear. These principles are supported by the resultant impact of 'uour-
geois philosophy, sociology and social psychology on the intellect, spiritual
aspirations and mood of the listeners and viewers. Bourgeois theoreticians, by
means of their interest in expressing their principles and methods of propaganda _
to the broad masses, attribute their success to the postulate that is characterized
by stimulating alienated viewers and sharp feelings. No voices are raised against
the stimulation of feelings and proclivities like these in the personality by an
entire system which has taken on itself the pointless diversion of educating and
influencing the workers in a bourgeois manner. They habitually refer to "the man
on the street" (a term from bourgeois sociology), view conformistic thought as
good, and tell him simple truths. They want the masses to believe in true spiri-
tual viability and intellectually accept a theoretical truth special to centuries _
of ignorance. In order to satisfy the masses from this point of view it is not
the simple truth given them but rather the knowledge of the centuries such as
� religious faith, stories and myths which give results. Philosophers and sociolo-
gists ~f capitalism attribute to all class mentalities the strengthening of the
irrationality of bourgeois social thought in the imperi~.list stage of growth and
do not recognize the existence of a Marxist-Leninist concept in bourgeois society.
It is necessary to mythologize the societal mentality, to fill it with imaginary
ideas and to influence the broad masses of the bourgeois population. Bourgeois
- propaganda plays the role of creating this type of influence, in other words,
, poisoning the mass mentality ideologically and subjugating the mentality of the
workers to the aspirations of the ruling class.
41
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In talkinR about the system of influencing the mass mentality in bourgeois society,
it is necessary to note not only a political propaganda apparatus but also the
participation of all means affecting man's daily life--art, com~ercial advertising, -
the creation of clothing styles for the masses and the marketing of commercial
wares. These means, together with political propaganda, set up what is called
the "opinion-making industry"; as for the "opinion-making industry," in alignment
with ideological functions it also achieves a pure commercial objective--it yields
straightaway massive profits for capitalist companies. But the interrelationship -
of ideological propaganda and bourgeois commerce is not constrained by its pene-
tration here, but at the same time satisfies a financial and spiritual utility as
a result of selling newspapers, books, films and phonograph records. In the
utilization of socio-psychological mechanisms in order to influence human mentality
the political propaganda of capitalism and commercial advertising complement each
other.
The discussion is especially about setting up stereotypes of the human thought
_,rocess by the teelp of which a person is compelled to accept whatever happens in
_ the world. The theory of stereotypes based on reactionary philosophical and
sociological concepts uninterruptedly soiling the human mind in the sociology of
mass communications is the basis of the practice of bourgeois propaganda.
The prominent American journalist W. Lippmann considered the importance of st~areo-
types in propaganda to be primary. He said that models simplified in the human
brain under the influence of information received through all sorts of channels
formed "simplifi~d images" or stereotypes about the world. According to Lippmann,
it is not that stereotypes adequately illuminate the truth, it is that they funda- ~
mentally simplify and diminish reality. An important attribute of stereotypes ~
con~ists of uniting human knowledge with emotional views of the personality.
According to this, it gives importance to the emotional shades of stereotypes for
bourgeois propaganda and gives them the chance to orchestrate the mentality of
that society and to implant misleading images, nationalism, militaristic and anti-
communist tendencies in the societal mentality. Stereotypes are established by
selecting the necessary information and changing them through the mass information
measures of the bourgeoisie. Measures such as casting aspersions on events,
placing them into a mold, and distorting the facts when they are related as news -
in order to stimulate negative emotions are widely used.
Concepts such as the "free world," "the communist menace," "trampling on human
rights," "anti-American affairs," "the American way of life" and "national security"
are used especially frequently. The diversionary work conducted daily by the
bourgeois information organs to implant stereotypes into the mass mentality have
a clear result. The Portuguese writer M. Kashtrin in an article in PRAVDA cites -
the words of an aging compatriot: "Here in our country there is much talk about a
an iron curtain. It must be an evil heavy curtain. One should look and see
whether this weight is from the iron. There is something else I would like to
know: how do the Russians raise and lower it? Do they use their hands, or a
capstan, or is there a straightforward mechanism?" In the "free world" of capi-
talism, see what they do to "purify the brain of the people."
" With what means are the ~:any stereotypes, anti-communist and anti-Soviet myths
constructed? Let us analyse several of these means.
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Lies and slander are used constantly. In these, it is not only the boulevard press
and the rightwing bourgeois publications, but they also use information organs
which appear to be far from politics. Let us take an example from an article
published in one of the American technical popular magazines. The journal writes
this way about the way of life in Soviet Siberia: "...A man on his way to
Verkhoyansk was talking in the following manner: when December comes everything
these--people, cattle, reindeer and pigs--stay inside their huts. They lie there
drinking a Siberian drink called z�apoy, The men, their eyes closed from drink,
sleep out the coldest months, and their wives wait on them. When springtime comes,
all, of them stagger to their feet and a powerful voice yells: 'Hey, men, time to
meet the morning."'
That is the way bourgeois propaganda slanders the Soviet way of life. Sometimes
Western magazines describe the quality of Soviet life in a friendly manner. In
truth, though, they repeat the conceptions about the way of life of peasants in
pre-Revolutionary Russia and about vodka which they say "is one of the secret and
sorrowful qualities of the Russian soul." Bourgeois propaganda thereby plants the
_ idea in the mind of the masses of the West that socialism is incapable of changing
the nature of the national structure, that it was unable to fill it with a new
- content, and that it was unable to eliminate the causes of national animosities
and conf licts .
At the same time it falsifies real socialism, bourgeois propaganda tries to conceal
the contradictions in capitalist society and spares no words in embellishing life
in the Western countries. In order to do this, methods of statistical comparisons
are broadly utilized. By this method they attempt to prove the special nature of
their system and its "abundance" in comparison with a system where the workers
control the means of production and there is a planned socialist economy. In the _
below-cited words of V. I. Lenin he reveals the falsity in the basic significance
_ of the exaggeration of average statistical quantities by the bourgeoisie: "The
fact that they consolidate workers and owners and extract an "average" to demon-
strate the "free way of life" in the shape of "free" pure profits is obvious...But
to extract an average number like this is completely false." (Works, V 3, p 152).
_ Bourgeois ideologists, by means of consolidating a question like this in such an
unscientific manner, increase the workers' share of national income in a capital-
istic period and reduce the income of the exploiting class equivalently. By
utilizing such numerical data thQy clarify the class orientation of the statistics.
While statistical organs of capitalist countries give exact quantitative data on
the numerics of production (on metal smelting, machinery production, etc.), in
. bourgeois society data on the frequency of hunger and spiritual riches, unemploy-
ment, the degree of illiteracy and the share taken by the monopoly is changed,
Here the fundamental objective cansists of concealing the data, the hostility to
man of this society, the use and exploitation of social inequities by any means
and the minimization of racial and national data at the outset.
As for the discussion of the political system of the West and the valuable aspects
of bourgeois democracy, here capitalistic propaganda, while criticizing certain
aspects, heaps praise on its structure as a whole. In bourgeois publications
distributed in the USSR on the basis of two-party agreements on cultural exchange,
" such a path is followed. For example, there is an article in the magazine -
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"Amerika" called "How and why do I vote?" where it quotes the views of a woman from
a middle-class family. At the end of the article she writes: "People interested
in politics consider it an interesting occupation connected to policymaking. What-
ever the deficiencies in our electoral system that strike other people's eyes, the
heart of the American voters fills wiCh hope and ~oy when a legislative body--be
it the Colorado Assembly or the Congress of the USA--there is no difference--is
sworn in for a new session." In such materials about the class structure of the
legislative organs of the states or of the Congress of the USA certainly nothing
is said because to talk about that would be extremely unpleasant in a government
of the wealthy whether in America or other countries of capital.
In discussing questions of democracy bourgeois propaganda demonstrates that the
formal aspect of the law given in these democracies is connected with the path
- noted above. Doing thusly gives the possibility of going outside the socio-eco-
nomical basis of the bourgeois type of such a democracy and of its basic class -
significance.
~
Bourgeois propaganda, especially by electing able political and societal workers,
attempts to stress the plenty and abundance in the life of a capitalistic society.
What is characteristic of bourgeois radio broadcasts destined for the socialist
countries is also characteristic of all propaganda publications like "Ainerika."
One sees this clearly in the 3d number of 1976 of "Angliya" magazine which is
- intended for Soviet readers. In such articles as "Purnishing the Apartment,"
"Doctor on an Island," "Play and Learn," "New Breakthrough in Medicine" and
"Fashion: New Clothes for Summer" there is no depiction of the antagonisms and
real problems between the impoverished and the affluent class or of the British
workers or of London's trampling on human rights in Ulster. Thus, even when the
publications of capitalist countries do not especially praise bourgeois society
in its materials and when they do not criticize flaws in socialism, it gives much
space to propagandizing the "abundance" of the Western way of life in every article
and educating citizens' views on personal life.
Bourgeois propaganda attempts to instill in the minds of inen anti-co~nunist, anti-
Soviet stereotypes, false conceptions and distorted views of the socialist way of
life by all diversionary means. Bourgeois propaganda, by content, is against
science and man and, while it does not refrain from falsehood and ignorance, still
holds many people in thrall under capitalistic ruling conditions. Certainly one
should not think that bourgeois ideology and bourgeois propaganda dominate in a
capitalistic societ~ because in this society the working class and the Marxist-
Leninist parties defending the interests of the broad working masses have press
organs which conduct Marxist-Leninist propaganda. The broadening of the economic,
cultural, touristic and other connections between the two social systems familiarizes _
the population of c3pitalist countries with people of the socialist world and the
humanistic belief in proletarian internationalism.
- At the same time bourgeois propaganda does not forget to poison the atmosphere
between the capitalist and socialist countries in the growth of their relationship
with its anti-communist ideology. The propaganda activity of the class enemies of
socialism is never neglected. As affirmed in the decree of the Central Committee -
of the CPSU "Gn the further strengthening of ideological and political-education
activity," "it is our duty to protect the indestructible collegiality of our paths,
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the powerful unity of ideas and the deep belief of every Soviet man and our
political awareness for which we had our Patriotic socialist revolution against
the diversionary political and ideological work of the class enemy an3 its badly-
intended slander against socialism."
Knowledge of the primary methods, principles and operations of bourgeois propaganda
~ will strengthen the party organization in its class positions of socialism in
ideational-educational work and, on the basis of teaching the exceptional example
of the socialist way of life, will give the possibility of reaching new heights.
COPYRIGHT: Turkmenistan Kommunisti No 11, 1980
967b
CSO: 1810
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NATIONAL
NATIONALISM , RELIGI OS ITY IN DAGESTAN
Moecaw VOPROSY NAU41NOG0 ATEIZMf, in Russi~ No 26, 198(l signed to press L7 Arp $0
pp 51-66
(Article by M.G. Mustafayev~ (Makhachkala): "International Contacts~ Intern~tion-
liBt and Atheistic Training"]
~Text] The study of problems of internationalist and atheiatic training under con-
ditions of international [mezhaatsional'nyq]*and intercreedal contacta is a complex
and multilevel problem.
In this article we firat would like to ezamine the social-psychological nature of
intemational contacts as an inseparable aspect of the proceas of internationaliza-
tion of aocial life under the conditions of mature socialism; second~ to att~mpt to
reveal the nature of the influence of international contacts on processes of aecu-
larizatian and~ finally~ to dwell on the practical tasks tihat these two aspecta raise
before tne proceas of internationalist and atheistic training.
In recent years, the very problem of contacts and reciprocal influence of people has
become the ob~ect of grawing scientific interest. Social-psqcholoqical problems of
international contacts remain weakest and least studied. The history of mankind at-
tests to the fact that each people at different stages of their history has experi-
enced to a greater or lesser degree in the course of contacts the definite influence
of other peoples. They have emulated their econo~mic experience, borrowed individual
forms and elements of economic and othe r traditians and enriched and improved their
culture and language. The social contacts of peoples ex~ert an inf luence on all as- � "
pects of national life. As a result of these contacts, there arises a whole series
of phenomena that are extra-national in their nature, wh:~ch undoubtedly contributes
to the development of peoples and to their rapprochement~ �
The character of ~.ntercourae of peoples whollq and entirelq depende on means of pro-
duction and on type of social relations, whereas contacts of nationalities occur
spontaneously; international intercourse under socialiem, which ia without doubt
voluntary, possesses a conacious and ecientificallq guided character. Within the
*(Translator~s note: From hereon,international, as ~ndicated by the text, will
refer almoet entirely, if not exclusively, to the term "mezhnataional'nyy." In
_ Soviet usage~ the tezm "mezhnatsional'nyy" relates to relations of the nations and
nationalitiea within the canfines of the USSR rather thm to thoae outside it.]
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framework of the USSR, more than 100 nations and nationalities participate in close
contacts. 1fie well-knam thesis of K. Marx to the effect that "each nation can and
- must learn from othera"1 under socialism becomes the norm and law of their
intercourse. -
The general Soviet, internationaliat, atheistic traite to be found in the psycho]ogy,
culture and way of life of the Soviet peoples are the product of their more than
sixty years of international contacts of the socialist type, a la~ful result of the
process of internationalization.
The intercourse of nationalities canatitutes a social-psychological phenomenon in
whose structure a multiplicity of aspects is to be found. In our view, the crux
of international intercourse is determined bq the following four factors : communica-
tion~ interaction, cognition and interrelations.2
We shall attempt to provide a brief expoaition of them.
The function of co~nunication in international life plays a big role in the trans-
mission of differen t~kinds of information, such as informative, regulative. This
communication is achieved Lhrough traasmiasion of iafotmation bq means of diffe rent
channels of communication.
International ties relating to exchange of values~ achievements and trade have al-
ways been accompanied throughout history by the development of nationalities.
We ~mderstand inte raction of nationalities to be a procesa that occurs in the
course of ~o3nt activity of people of different nationalities in fulfillment of
the common task of building a communiet society in our country. The society of
developed socialism promotes a high level of mobility among the population. This
- in turn ensures a high degree of interaction of nationalities and their reciprocal
influence.
Cognition is a process in which there takes place the perception of foreign national
values a.s the result of psychological analyais and selection. It occurs on the basia
of definite interpretation and procesaing of adopted social experience. The spe cif-
ics of its development are such that in the process of internatiaaal contacts~ peo-
ple~ on the one hand, realize quite totally their national affiliation and~ on the
othgr~ learn to app rehend and develop certain value ~udgmenta in regard to foreign
national values~ culture~ language, social traditions and cuetoms.
Interrelations refer to a11 kinda of ties and relations of peoples of different
nationalities which they engage in in the proceas of labor and other contacts in
their free time bq virtue of being neighbors, relatives aad the like. In this waq
people eetablish value attitudes tvward foreign national phenomena. It is namely
through direct interrelatic~ns of people of different nationalities that the full
breadth of international contacts is formed.
Thus, international contacts are not only necessary; they constitute a moat aignif-
, icant aspect of Feople's life activity and are displayed in all spheres of life of
a nation or nationality.
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The different forms of co~munity Without doubt leave a definite imprint an the
process of internationalization of the consciousness of the individual. Mrect
caatact in international intercourse is principal and guiding in our opinion.
I,et ue turn to examples of direct contact of Soviet people of diffe rent nationali-
ties. In this connection, it would hardly be possible to find another euch spot in
our Motherlead as Dagestan where such a large aunber of peoples and languages are in
close and active in teraational contact. Tlie repub lic is traditionally called a
"land of mountains and a mountain of languagea." The exalted S~SE r of Dagestan
- Rasul Gan?zatov expressed this feature of the repub lic in the tale "My Dagestan" as
follows: In Dagestan,"there may be found people riding on one bullock cart speaking
- five languages,and should five bullock carts stop at aa intersectian, you would hear
thirty languages."
Today it would be difficult to imagine in Dagestaa a populated area where several
nationalities are not simultaneously in direct con tact. Thus, at the well-knam
grape Sovkhoz imeni Sh. Aliyev in Derbentskiq Rayon, representatives of 18 national-
ities--Russians, Armenians, Azerbai~anis, Lezghinians, narginians, Tabasarians,
Avars, Laks, Kumyks and others-~work ehoulder to ahoulder.3 Druzhba Village in Ka-
yakentskiy Rayon is an example of friendship and fraternity of peoples. Here Lez-
ghinians, Tabasarians~ Agula~ Kumyks aad Darginians live and work as an international
f ar~i Iq.
It is interesting to note that a tremendous number of epecialiats of all national-
ities in the repub lic have received their training in VQZ's and tekhnikums of the
country (in Moscow, Leningrad. Baku, Grozayq, Tbilisi, Taganrog and manq other
cities).
It is well knawn that the nationalities of Dageetan do not possess a common linguist-
ic character. They are aided by Russian, the second native language of the peoples
of the USSR, which has been rightfully actcr.awledged everywhere as the language of
in ternational in tercourse. The active aad direct contact of several natianalitiea
in social and everyday life caatributes to the development not only of bilingualism
but also to trilingualism.
Migratory processes are intensified under the conditions of developed socialism. A
form of migration in Dagestan ie planned resettlement from high-mountainous inhabi-
ted areas that are difficult as to acceas to lowlands and foothills. During th~
years of the 5oviet pawer there have been resettled on lowlands more than 130~000
persons. In this tiffie more than 60 well-appointed villages were built fo r them.
Due to resettlemen t, there is an expaasioa of direct con tacts among people of dif-
ferent aationalities; exchange of work experience and reciprocal influence are in-
tensified. New multinational rayons have appeared. 14ie tendencq for increase of
migratory procesaes constitutes a characterietic feature of the demographic problema
of all Soviet society.4 Theae proceases stem from the large scope of industrial
construction; they are aleo the 8ocial consequence of scientific-technical progreas
aad urbanization.
The fast growth of international ties and relatioas, creating objective conditions
for the further rapprochement of people of different nationalities on an interna-
_ tional basis, is accompaaied in some instances by a mmber of aegative procesaes
caused bq the hypertrophic development of national aelf-conaciousnesa. In coming
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into contact with people of a different social-ethnic and religious group and with
the peculiarities of their way of .~u]�iug and behaving, the mountaineer diaplays
hie national atandards, his national and religious characteristics, as the individ-
ual senses his social and ethnic or religious traits, his affiliation with a given
ethnic group and talces part in international ties and contacts.
It should be eapecially emphasized that among believess Who have been resettled
from remote moim tainoess districts in the lawlands, growth of national self-conscious-
ness ie significantly distorted by religious pre~udicea. In the consciouaness of
such believers~ Islam, being associated with national self-conaciousness, emerges
as the expression of national community, as a co~mon trait of people of a given na-
tianality. This in certain cases leads to a certain revival of cult aad ceremonial
activitq on the part of believers. Together aith national traditions aad custome,
- a portion of believers tries to displav religious traditions, especially those contain-
ing holiday and celebration moments aad possessing a eocially demonstrative charac-
ter. It ie no accident that the number of those vho observe Moslem holidaqs with
fulfillment of national cuatome and traditions in cities, raqone and settlements
~ith a population that differa in its national and religioua makeup is bigger than
in populated areas with a homogeneous ethnic makeup.
In the course of concrete eociolegical investigatione, manq believere have elicited
opinione in conversations, the meaning of Which boils do~ to the fact that peflple
must differ in some way from each other, even in religion. The identificatior~ of
the religioua with the national and an this basis a certain revival of religious
customs of Islamic practice are not determined by the growth of religioue conscious-
ness but are the result of misunderstanding and incorrect evaluation of national
values and the inability to differentiate and separate the truly natianal from the _
religious. The participation of people in religioua holidaqs most fr~quently under
the guise of preservation of natiaaal features emerges here ae a consequence rather
than a cause.
Thus, in rapidlq growing cities and on newlq organized resettlement farma with a
varied national aad religiou,s makeup of the population, two opposing tendencies are
to be observed. ,
On the one hand, ~oint labor activitq, collective mutual relatioas and mutual assist-
ance, common political and social-economic goals and cultural ~nd social conditions
inteasify mutual contacts of people aad unite them through common character in all
spherea of life. On this basis ~ there occurs an iaexorable fall of nati~nal barriers
aad the further forming of cmmnon, internatianal traits of Soviet people and of non-
religious cuatoms and ceremonials.
On the other hand, there maq occur aaong.a part of the believing and indifferent
population a tendencq of temporarq revival of certain religious customs arid holidays
imder the baaner of national differeace, which to a certain degree alienal;es and
isolates people of different nationalities and religioua faitha, eapeciallq in the
sphere of family-and-marriage aad moral-and-social relationa.
Investigators of the demographic problems of Dagestaa~s urban population note that
a significant percentage of the population exists in constant active and direct
international contact. The national composftion of such of the repub lic's citiea
as Makhachkala, Derbent, Buynaksk, Khasavyurt, Izberbash, Rizlyar, Kizilyurt
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~
and Kaspiysk includea I~saian Avars, Darginians, Kuaryks, I.esghinians, Laks~ Taba-
sariana~ Nogaytay, Rutul~tsy, Aguls, Tsakhurs~ Azerbai~aais, Chechene, mountaineer
Jews~ Ukrainians, Armenians and otit~~cs campriae a significant ehare. Accordingly,
production,office~ teaching and other kinds of collectives are made up of represent-
ativee of these nationalitiea. Among the collectivea, a proceae of internatianaliza-
tion of way of life, opinions, tastes and beliefe is taking place. Internationaliam
in a multinational labor collective is a sign of a healthy moral and psychological
climate, a decisive factor in the euccessful operation of a collective. A marked
and natural grawth of the number of international marria~es, for example, is ob-
served among these collectives.
A characterization of thie proceas from positions of contacts of nationalities in
the sphere of family and marriage relations vould require~ in our opinion, a more
detailed analysis of available factual material on the republic. Dagestanian his-
torians justly underscore that although the indigenous nationalitiea of the republic
have remained in one or another degree in direct ecoaomic and ethnocultural contact,
marriages between represen[atives of different natianalitiee. especially when dif-
ferent faiths are involved, have been a rare exception. A serious hindrance to the
conclusion of international marriages has exieted fYVm way back because of the semi-
natural character of the economy, bec~use of laaguage barriers, clan endoganry and
territorial separateness and be cause of the ideology of ethnic exclusiveness~ spe-
cific traditions, customs and rites. Maniages that were preferable were coneidered
to be those concluded not only within the village but also within the clan group--
the tukhum. International marriages oacurr~d more frequently only in the feudal
milieu. Dagestanian khans, beys, shamkhale, utsmine and others intermarried no*_
only with each other but also with the feudal rulere of the Transcaucasus and the
North Caucasus primarily for political reasons.
An ideological barrier in the concluaion ot interethnic marriagea in prerevolution-
ary Dages tan was the religion--Islam. Marriages particularly between Ruseians and
repreaentatives of the nationalities of Dagestan constituted an exception. Accord-
ing to the Shariat, a Moslem man had the right to marry a peraon of another f~ith,
but a Moslem wom.an could marry a person of another faith only on the condition
that he adopt Islam. Nonobservance of this condition was cansidered to be on the
level of apos tasy, an insult to social mores and a violation of the age-old Hadith.
While marriage by a Dagestanian maa to a woman of another faith was extr~mely rare,
it did take place, but the marriage of a Dagestanian woman to a man of another faith
meant fleeinR beyond thP boundaries of the region, persecution,blood vengeance.
A mountain woman violating the norm8 of national and religious homogeneity would
have been forced to leave the familial hearth, while her relatives would have been
subjected to every possible humiliation and social cenaure oa the part of fellow-
villagers.
The victory of socialism, social and cultural progreas and the tricunph of the ideas
and principles of internationalism have produced in regard to life new manifeet~
tions in the national and religious sense--international and intercreedal marriages.
A study of regis tration cards for ~11 rural and urbsn aettlements in Dagestan at
the republic archives of the Civil Reg~lstry~Office for 1973 that was conducted by
the Ethnography Section of the Dageatan Affiliate of Che USSR Academy of Sciences
made it poasible to establish a number of tendencies in the growth and development
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of international marriages. As shown bq ~sociological-research data, marriage in
the great ma~ozity of cases occur within a particular nRtionality or ethnic group
(Avar men with Avar wo~men, Darginian men with Darginian women and $o on). They
comprised 86.3 percent of the total n~ber of concluded marriages.
T~e biggest percentagesof marriagea of the same nationalitq ~aere recorded for Dargin-
1aaR (93.5)~ Avars (91.7), Lezghinians (91.6), Teakhurs (91.4); the percent age was
somewhat smaller for Laks (85.2), Kumqks (84.2) ~ Tabasarians (84), Azerbai~anis
(74.7).
At the same time the relative share of international marriages is growing for Dage-
stan as a whole. Whereas in ]939, they comprised 5.7 percent, in 1963--10.5 aad in
1967--12.6 percent, by 1973 their percentage h~d increased to 13.7 percent of the
total number of marriages concluded in the republic.
The greatest percentage of interoational marriages takes place among the urban pop-
ulation, where they comprised 24.8 percent ia 1967 aad 25.5 percen t in 1975. In
large urban settlements, the relative share of international marriagea was still
higher: in Kizilyurt--36.7 percent, in Makhachkala--28.8 percent, in Buynaksk--
24.2 perc~nt, in Kaspiysk--24.1 percent aad in Izberbaeh--23.2 percent. There were
fewer international marriages in Ogai (20.6 perceat), Khasavyurt (19.1 percent)~
Derbent (15.1 percent). The high percentage of international marriages in cities
is to be explained firet and foremost by the international makeup of their popula-
tion, city production and teaching collectives aad a higher level of education and
culture among the youth. The number of international marriages is increasing in
these citiea due to the atudents in higher and secondary educational inatitu tiona
and students at vocationai-technical schools.
In rural regions of the republic~ the percentage of interaational marriages as a
whole is not high (4.8 toward the end of the '60s aad 7.4 in 1973). An excep tion
is to be found in rural districts located near cities aad worker settlements, par-
ticularly in the lowland. Thus, in Babayurtovskiq Raqon in 1973, the percentage of
international marriages was 21.7, in Tarumovskiq--19.3, in Nogaqskiy--17.3, ia Der-
bentakiy--17~ in Kizlyarskiy--16.8, in Rizilyurtovskiy--12.6 and ia ~aqtagskiy--12.4.
International marriages in districts With a homogeneous compoaition are either sig-
nificantly smaller or nonexistent. Ttius, fos example, in 1973 in Akushinskiy Rayon
, aaly 3 out of 296 marriages were international; in Botlikhekiy Rayon onlq one out
of 153 marriages we re intemational; in Sovetakiy Rayoa (rural) on lq one out of 133
marriages was iaternaCional and in Dakhadayevskiq oalq 2 out of 213 marriages were
international.l
Sociological researches show that internatio~al marriages occur mos t frequen tlq be-
tween representatives of the indigeaous nationalities of Dageatan. Tha psychology
- of national isolation, national distrust was characterietic in prerevolutionarq
times~ but it is naw being actively overcome. Foraer endogamq aad homogeneous
, marriages are being replaced by international and intercreedal marr3ages.
In rural localities, the highest perceatages of miaed mazriages are concluded be-
tween representatives of Dageatanian peoples (60 percent), while marziagea concludecl
between Dagestanians and non-Dagestanians constitute isolated cases. These data at-
test to the fact that not a~nly are zvral districts of the republic more homogeneoua
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in the ethnic sense than cities or work~r settlements but also tt~�at the character of ~
_ tradi~tions of ethnic endogamy and homogeneity in the couatrqside is more stable. ~
The proce$s of lapsing of these traditions evidently requirea more time inaemuch
ae it impinges on the deep psychological strata of human consciousnees. '
Attention is attracted to the large number of ethnic componenta forming internation- ~
al marriages. In 1973 male Kumyks and Lez~hiniana, for example, intermarried with
18 other nationalitiea of Dageataa, male Avars-~with 16, male Darginiane and Laks '
--with 12 . Among Avars ~ as in the ' 60s, there was a predominaace of marriages with
female Kumyks (61 out of 203 inte:uational marriagee) , with Ibusaians ~55 of 203
intemational marriagea) and With female Lachkes (Lachki] (19 of 203) . Among
Darginiana, firat place is occupied by marriages with female Rumyks (53 of 140 in-
ternational marriages) , seca~nd place---~ith female Russiaus (30 of 140) ~ then with
female Avars (13 af 140) ~nd with female Lachkes and Lezghinians (11 and 6 marriages,
reapectively. of 140). Among Lezghinians internatianal marriages predaminate with
Russians--44 of 140 international marrfages aad with female Azerbai~anis and
Tabasarians--19 and 15 marriages ~ respectivelq, of 140. Amoz~g Kumyks, of 242 inter-
national marriages, 83 were ~ritk~ Ruasian females, 44-~with Avar females, 37--with
Darginian female, 29--with Chechen females. Among Laks ~ of 101 international mari-
- riages 31 were with Ruseian women~ 17 with Avar wamen sad 15 with Darginiaa women.
' A special feature of marriages in Dagestan is in additio~ grawth of the relative
share~ of international marriages between men of the indigenous nationalities of
Dagestan and Russian wom~n. Zt is interestiag to note that of 424 international
marriages concluded in 1973 in the republic, 311, or 73.3 percent~ consisted of
Russian-Dagestanisn marriages.
A perfectly new development is to be found in marriages concluded between mountain
women and representatives of non-Dagestanian, especially European, peoples. In 1973,
there were 152 such marriages, or 20.4 percent of the total number of international
marriages .
~ Comparative data ciisclose thAt the old traditions are more persistent. among women.
- But the existence of marriages of mouutain women with non-DaRestanians makes it pos-
_ sible to speak of the onset of the process of overcoming these old traditions and of
the disappearance of the sense of national bias and exclusiveness. Profaund changes
are taking place in the paychology snd outlook not only of young women but also of ~
elderly ones, who, in permitting and approving such marriages of the youth~ as it
. were~ reinforce and "bless" the new ideology of internationalism. Whereas in 1936,
judging by archival data, only one mountain woman (a Darginian) married a Russian,
today such marriages constitute 19.3 percent (82 of 424 marriages).
In describing international marriages in Dagestan as s primary social micro~n-
vironment for the mixing of people of different nationalities and faiths, it is
necessary, in our view, to especially dwell on an analysis of the language of use
between spouses. Special ethn9graphic observations and sociologicgl studiea shaw
that for many ethnic mixed families (especially in rural localities) bilingualism
prevails. :'~~e language of both spouses, as well as the Russian language, which
aerves as the language of international intercourse both in urban and in rural
localities, is spoken in the familq. But this general tendency of grawth of bilin-
gualism does not excluded the presence of variants. Thus, if one of the spouses
comes from central xegions of the USSR (Rusaian, Ukrain~an) aad the familq lives in
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in a city or in a raultinational worker settlement ~ the Russian language usua? ~e-
comea the language of the family. In rural localities, however, Wt?ere the p~pula-
tion for the most part speaka in the language of oae of the indigenous n tionalities
(Avar, Darginian, Lezghinian, Kumyk and so on) and o~ne of the apouses belonge to the
given nationality, the language used by the epouaea usually becomea the language of -
the aurrounding social and regional microenviranment. Here a gradual procese is pro-
~ ceeding of assimilatioc~ of the migranx. In Dageatan, t~o-language families pzedominate
when bath languages are used,to the same degree languages of everyday intercourse.
There are particularly many surh families ia rural localities ~ more f requently in
- families of employeea~ teachere, physicians and so forth~ and pnrticularly in
Dagestanian-Russian marriagea. If the Wife comes from elsew
~~re (Russi~n, Ossetiaa) ~
the children usually sp~alc vith the father in his native language and with the �nother
in Russian, but the language of the surrounding milieu neveriheless predominatea.
Should, however, auch a family move to snother locality, where the popul3tion usee an-
other language, or to a city, the family usuallq ~egins to speak primarily in Ru~sian,
that is~ in a language with whose aid the family deals with the surrotmding
population.
In this way, international contacts contribute to the grawth of international and
- intercreedal marriages. In their tuzn, these marriages create most favorable con-
ditions for internatioaalization and atheization of the way of life of differ~nt
nationalities and faiths. However, residence in a populated area or work and social
activity in one collective, or uader the same conditions in e settlemeut of the
rural type, do not in every case result in international aad intercreedal mar-
riages. In exactly the same way~ not every interaational or intercreedal family is _
internationaliat or atheistic.

_ As already noted above~ under present-day conditions~ contacts of natio~ialities take
place not only directly but also indirectly. Such a form of contact is principally
connected with the mass information media: press, radio, television~ motion pic-
tures, telegraph, telephone. All expanding eontacts of regions, repub]ics, cities~
production and educational collectiyea~ as well as exchange of material and spirit~
ual values contribute to indirect interaational contacts.
Indirect contacts of nationalitiea in the age of ecientific-technical progress are '
being increasingly acCivated. For the internationalist and atheistic training of
workers, it assumes an increasingly bigger importance. The relative share of mass
inforcnation media is rather large. Furthermore~ intercourse with the help nf mass ~
information displays at the present tim~ a aharplq expressed teadency for gro~wth of
the general volume of spiritual contacts of people of different nationalities. Ac-
cording to the data of a sociological eurvey canducted in Taganrog, the residenta
of this city basically obtain information through the follawing sources: newspapers,
radio and television--80.3 percent of thoae aurveyed snd the rest through conversa-
tiona with cowozkers, relatives and neighhors. &
Simultaneous coverage of a large multinatioaal and multicreedal mass of people by
the information media gives birth to previouslq uathinkable forms of exchsnge of
experience and results of work among people, expanda the international outlcok of
a person and of his range of iaformation on these or those foreign national customs
and traditions aud on the special features of the life style nf other peoples of
the DSSR and the peoples of fraternal soc:~alist oountrie8 aad promotes the forming
of a unified internationalist ead atheistic Soviet public opinion on these eventa
of social life.
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There should be pointed out the dialectical interconnection of indirect and direct
contacts of peoples. One form of contact aupplements the other. The indirect form
of contact of pe~ples gradually created a need for direct contacts. The need for
con tacts and for the expansion of the geography of ties and friendly b ands with
other peoples is constantly growing. While the indirect form of contacta of peoples
ea it were expanda the limits of direct contacts~ indirect contacts increasingly and
more effectively contribute to mutual r~pprochemen t, exchange of elements of life
style, social and varioue other tr8ditions aad customs. The dialectics of the inter-
relation of these tWO forms of contact bq nationalities ie a dual, aleveloping, con-
tradictory and scientifically controlled process.
Contacts of nationalitiee produce in the individual the characteristic of imita-
tion and borrawing of the foreign national, which is aa ob~ective requirement of anq
aational community. I~itation and intercourse conatitute interdependent terms. ~e
imitation of samething foreign national is inconceivab le without international con-
tacta. Peoples mixing with each other do not imitate everything but adopt what is
closes t and related. Consequently, imitation in international contacts is a social-
psychological phenomenon characterized by the reproduction snd imitation of a model,.
with account being taken of special national features, c~ertain social norms of
morality and social-historical conditions.
In international intercourse~ certaia negative social-psychological phenomena and
negative national stereotypes play a retarding, dieintegratin~ role: pre~udices,
religious-naeionalistic antipathies~ social orientations and preconceivea re2igious-
nationaliatic public opinion. The functioning of national traditians and customa
may to some degree limi t and hinder the process of in tercdurse of nationalities
inasmuch as traditions a.nd cus toms are manifestations of s normative form of inter-
course and a social-normative program of international intercourse.
It should be pointed out that the process of fi~hting reliRious-nationalis tic sur-
vivals and the process of affit~caation of internationalism and atheism like moral
traits of the individual operates most contradictorily. It is one thin~ when we
purposefully and systematically work with children from their young years in terms
of internationalist and atheistic training before var~.ous religious-nationalistic
- ideas and opinions become fixed in their conscioueness and habits. It is quite
another when we let this time slip by and thus prm~ide an opportunity for negative
religious-nationalistic orientations to be formed in the early years; after theae
have been establiehed ~n a persor� after vie~ws and opinions have acquired a fixed
~ character in the apiritual makeup o~ the individual, we then must began a reeduca-
tion of the person in the spirit of internationalism and atheism. From this we can
- conclude that internationalist and atheistic training of Soviet people must be start-
ed at an early age.
In the overcoming of religious-nationalistic suzvivals in the process of interna-
tional intercourse, the role of public opinion is great. The formation of new, `
- socialist qual3ties in workers of all USSR nationalities and also the extirpation
of everything that we call religious-nationalistic survivals of the past in the
~ conaciousness and behavior of people demand the further boosting ~~f the educative
_ role of public opinion. Noting this, the 25th CPSU Congreas pointed out that public
opinio~ should be actively directed in the struggle against individual instances
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of display of a local, uihilistic~ religious~ nationalistic approach to national
values, customsy language and culture.9
At the present atage of the buildiag of cammunism, public opinion is becoming an
- increasingly effective force in interaationalist and atheistic training.
Under socialism, the peoples of the USSR have to auch a degree drawn closer and be-
come linked spiritually~ that common traits of spiritual makeup have been formed in
them. Internationalism and atheism in their apiritual makeup have assumed a lasting -
and s tab le position and have been transformed into an ideological, political and
moral value. But the process of internatioaalization aad atheization of the spirit-
- ual life of the peoples of the USSR does not at all~~ as bourgeois ideologiste -
are attempting to prove~ the negation and eliminatian of the national.
It would be deeply fallac~ous to understand the procese of internationalization and
atheization of social life as one of leveling or staadardization. "The internation-
ali~ation of the Soviet way of life is a harmonioue embodi~ent in m aingle whole of
everything that is valuab le that natians aad natiaaalities possess, including b oth
preserved progressive traditions of the past aad new traits of living, of aocial
psqchoiogy~ culture and the reat, arising under the cc~aditions of the building of
socialism."10 1t~e ~oining of the national with Soviet, i~ternational and atheistic
and the transformation of the national into Soviet do not at all signify the diaeol-
ution of the aational. Such a~oiaing confers on the verq nature of tne national
new~ international traits and auancea~ which is aa ob~ective and inevitable process.
1fie national in the process of close aad active international intercourse becomes
' the property of not ~ust oae ~eople but of all the aatione and natioaalxties of the
USSR. Within the framework of the ncw social-political, internationalist and athe- -
istic community of people, Soviet nations and natioaalities not only do aot loae
what ia theirs and natiaaal but, on the contrary, obtain complete freedom for all-
round development.
' 1hus, international intercourse is a socially ori~-~ted process. The latter occura
because of social need and necessity. Ttie socially oriented character of interna-
tional intercourse expresses ar achieves national zelations as a specific form of
social relations.
The historical experience of building of eocialism both in our country and fn the
fraternal socialist countries has irrefutably proved to the entire world that at
the present time~ under the conditions of the scientific-technical revolution, only -
_ the socialist social-political sqstem ie in a position of fullq utilizing all the
advaatages of the socialist order for the strengthening end enrichment of the ecan- `
- omic, political and apiritual ties among people of different nationalities.
FOOTNOTES
1. See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Worka]y Vol 23, p 10.
2. See on this: B.D. Parygin, "Osnovy sotsial'no-psikhologicheskoy teorii" ["Fund-
amentals of Social-Psychological Theory]. Moscaw, 1971, pp 219-280; V.N. Panfer-
ov, "The Psychology of Intercourse," VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 7, 1971, p 126.
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3. See N.A. Aliyev~ "The Movement for a Communist Attitude Toward Labor aad
Strengthening of Fri~eadship of Peoplae," "Internatsional'noye voepitaaiye
trudyashchikhsya" [ Iaternational Training of Workers Makhachkala, 1974,
pp 163-167.
4. See M. Sukhikov aad G. Demakov, "Vliyaniqe podvishnoati naeeleniya na sbli-
zheniye natsiy" [Influence of PoPulation Mobilitq on the Rapprochement of
Nations Alma-Ata, 1914; V.G. Atekseyeva, "Urbanization: Way of life aad -
Prob lems o f Education of Youth VOPROSY FILOSOFI I, No 6, 19 75.
5. See V.F. Aliyeva, "Gorodskoye naseleniya Dagestaaa" [The Urbaa Population of
Dagesta~n]. Makhachkala, 1975, PP 128-129.
- 6. See "Istoriya Dagestaaa" [Historq of Dageataa], Vol I. Moacow, 1967. -
7. See S.Sh. Gadzhiyeva aud Z.A. Yankova, "Dagestaaskaya sem'qa segodnya10 [The
Dagestaaiaa Family Today]. Makhachkala, 1978~ Table 1; S.Sh. Gadzhiyeva,
"Sem'ya i semeynyy byt narodov Dagestana" (Family and Family Life of the
Peoples of Dageatan]. Makhachkala, 1967, pp 80-81. "Sovremennaqa kul'tura
i byt narodov Dagestaaa" [Coatemporary G~lture and Life of the Peoples of
Dagestan] . Moscow, 1971, pp 182-183.
8. See P.K. Kurochkin, "Masa Information Media--aa Important Ideological Weapon
of the Communist Party," FILOSOFSKIYE NAUKI, No l~ 1972, p 15.
9. See "Materialq XRV s"yezda RPSS" (Materials of the 25th CPSU Congrese].
Moscow, 1976, PP 72-13, 75.
10. "The Soviet People--a New Histox~cal Co~munity of People," KOI~lUNIST, No 12,
1972, p 13.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl"', 1980
769 ~ END
CSO : 1800
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