JPRS ID: 9514 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 102
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 49
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ~01`LY
JPRS L/9514
30 January 1981
Sub-Saharan Af rica Re ort
p
- FOUO Na. 706
FBIS FOREIGN SROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
NOTF.
JPRS publications contain intormation prima.rily from foreign -
newspapers, periodicals an~ books, but also from news agEncy
transmissicns and broadcasts. riaterials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line ot each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original informa.tion was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was s~.immarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are -
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the bo~?y of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OW~IERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
QF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL,Y~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
= JPRS L/9514 _
3~ ~anuary 1981
SUB-S~HARAN AFRICA REPORT
.
FOUO No. 706
CONTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
- Diplomatic Success~ Financial Dieappointment of SADCC
~ (MA,'tCHES TROPICAUX AT MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Dec 80) 1 ~
Reaulte of SADCC Maputo Conference RevYew~d
(Pierre Clary; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 22 Dec 80-4 Jan 81) 4
Sudan Hosts Inter-African Trade Sympoeium
~SUDANOW, Dec 80) 6
Japanese Trade With Africa Detailed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 19 Dec 80) 8
African Countries Concerned About Libyan Role in Chad
(Mohamed Selhami, Abdelaziz Barouhi; JEUNE AFRIQUE,
3 Dec 80) 19
Chadian National Feeling Against Libya Ariaing -
_ (Christian Grain; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 3 Dec 80) 23
Revitalization of North-South Dielogue Reported
(Jean-Claude Lucae; MARCHES TROPICAUX AT MEDITERRANEENS, -
5 Dec 80) 25
Reportage on Lome I Projects
_ (MARCF~ES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Dec 80) 29
International Cocoa Accord Examined
(Editorial; MARCHES TROPICAIJX FT MEDITERRANEENS,
28 Nov 80) 31
Briefs
Progressive Forces Grouping 34
- a- ~III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
axco~.a
West Advieed To Abandon HosCile Attitude
(Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 19 Nov 80) 35
New Equip~nent, Improvementa for Benguela Railroad
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS, 5 Dec 80) 37
Briefe
USSR Agricultural Cooperation 39
BENIN
Unrest Within Labor Groups Examined
~ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Dec 80) 40
CAPE VERDE
Country Suited to New Energy Sources Research
(Augusta Conchiglia; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 10 Nov 80) 42
~'ciefs
A.gricultural Production Down 44
BADEA Fisheries Development Loan 44
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
CCCE Aid to Transporty Infrastructure, Telecoc~unicatione
Reported
' (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 Dec 80) 45
Briefs
Bokassa Aides Quit ~ 47
Release of Oppoaition Membera 47
CHAD
Habre Considered Capable of Continuing Guerrilla
War Against Goukouni
(Christian Hoche; L'EXPRESS, 22 Nov 80) 48
Briefs
New Chad Flighta 50
CONGO
Briefs
Cabinet Deciaiona 51
French Financis~g ~reement 51
West German Sent~~nced 5!
- b -
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE QNLk
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE C .
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
French Economic Aid Noted
~
(JEUNE AFRIQDE~ 26 NoV 80) 52
GABON
Data on Current, Projected Statua of Tranagabonese Railroad
(MARCHES TROPICAUR ET 1~DITERRANEENS, 5 Dec 80) 53
Brazilian Ambassador Diacusses Future Cooperation
(Joao Areias Neto; MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS,
28 Nov 80) 55
GUINEA-BISSAU
Briefs
Commisaions Formed 56
IVORY COAST
Struggle for Succesaion to Presidency Discussed
(Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 3 Dec 80)......... 57
Houphouet's Stand on Cocoa Price Assessed
(Philippe Simonnot; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 24 Dec 80).......... 60
MAL I
Briefs
Difficult Economic SituPCion 62
SENEGAL
Preaident's Office Defende Treatment of Mamadou Dia
(Djibo Ka; JEUNE AFRIQUE~ 3 Dec 80) 63
F'ower Struggle, Poasible Increased Authoritarianiam Expected
(Mariam Sysle; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 22 Dec 80-4 Jan 81) 65 ~
Reaction of Opposition to Senghor's Resignation Noted
- (Siradious Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQIIE, 17 Dec 80) 68
Oppoaition Attempting Joint Action Against Abdou Diouf
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQOE, 17 Dec 80) il
Briefe
Dakar Job Criais 74
" SIERRA LEONE
Diacovery of Large Gold Deposi~s Eapected To Aid Aconoury
, (Carlos Moore; JEUNE APRIQIIE, 26 Nov 80) 75
~ - c -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
TANZANIA
BADEA Road Conetruction, Realignment Loan
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERItANEENS, 21 Nov 80) 77
Briefe
Electric Power Rationing 79
Yugoslav Agricultural Aid 79
Swiea Road Network Aid 79
Afforestation Campaign 79
Additimnal Netherlanda Aid ~ 79
UGANDA
Eyewitnesa Accounts of Mini-Invaeion; R.efugee Statistice
(SUDANOW, Dec 80) 80
UPPER VOLTA
New Leadership's Ability To Rectify Itls Examined
(Ginette Cot; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 22 Dec 80) 83
Lamizana'a Downfall Anticlimactic
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 3 Dec 80) 99
Labor Unrest Preceding Recent Coup Diecuased
(Ginette Cot; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 8 Dec 80) 91
- d -
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY '
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS, FINANCIAL DISAPPOINZ2~NT OF SADCC
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 5 Dec 80 p 3363
[Article: "Contacts Made at Maputo Conferenee Augur Well for the Future"]
[Excerpts] The Southern African Development Coordination Confer~nce (SADCC) did
not produce those resulte expected by its member couatries--Angola, Botswana, ~
Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe--who had
invited prospective aid donors to meet with them ia the capital of Mozambique on
~6~28 November.
Although this meeting was firta~ci811y disappointing, the large number of foreign ,
delegations present did make it a diplomatic euccess. In fact, 30 couutries and _
18 international agenciea sent repreaentatives toMaputo in response to invitationa
from Botswana which chaired the conference.
The conference's final communique revealed that initial pledges of financial assist-
ance obtained from internatianal lending agencies amounted to 650 million dollars
over the next 5 years. The 97 tranaportation and communicatione project~ submitted �
by the nine African co~mtries amounted to nearly 2 billion dollars. But a certain
number of governments and development agencies announced they intended to furnish
additional funds in the near future.
It should be emphasized that the conference did not meet, after all, to establish
an organizatian for waging war against the Republic of South Africa. Ztioae SADCC
countries bordering on the latter were more reluctant than the other SADCC countries
to face the more or less dangerous effects open hostility to the Republic of South
Africa could have on Cheir economy. HenGe they sought rather to show that they
- were a significantly powerful force and that Southern Africa was not limited just
to the Republic of South Africa.
From this standpoint, the Maputo conference, as a vast public relatione operation,
was a success whose long-range consequences are still difficult to perceive.
Dialogu~y~Tith Europe -
Noteworthy, however, is the current strengthening of ties between the EEC an~d the
~outhern African "Nine," despite Mozambique's--the conference's host country--
refusal to sign the Lome Convention.
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
Because of this reluctance, Angola and Mozambique cannot benefit directly from
moneys allocated to the EDF [European Development Fund) for the Southern African
region as a whole: at least 100 million dollars under Lome 2, and actually pro-
bably more because Tanzania is not part of the southern region as defined by the
EEC. Yet Angola and Mnzambique will derive some indirect advantages from Lome 2
inasmuch as they are the natural outlets to the Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean
for the region's six landlocked countries.
Cheyason pointed out that the EEC wa~ participating, for example, in the initial
phase of [he reconstruc[ion of Angola's Benguela railroad~ the shortest route to
the sea for Zaire's Shaba Province and Zambia's copperbelt. Under the terms
of this participation, the EEC is to furnish rolling stock and maintenance ser-
vices to Zaire and Zambia, members of the ACP community, to which the EEC is linked
by the Lome agreements. Cheysson told the AFP that thie rolling atock obviously
will not atop at the border.
The European co~nissioner slso acknowledged that some difficulties did exist
between the Federal Republic of Ger~any and Angola and Mnzambique because of the
_ special ties these two African countriea have with the German Democratic Republic.
Cheysson called *his a"bilatera2" problem.
The AFP reported that despite the few reluctant feelings these difficulties may
have aroused on both sides, European diplomatic circles still conaider the dialog
opened in Maputo between Europe and Southern Africa as "being a good model" for
North-South relations.
A Positive Response From France
France was represented at the SADCC by Olivier Stirn, its aecretary of state to the
minister of foreign affairs. Stirn explained that Paris would respond in positive
fashion to the appeal of the Southern African "Nine." The minisCer made no mention
of any epecific French financial assistance for the 97 pro~ects submitted. These _
projecta will be assigned to experta for detailed study. He did state~ however,
that the cost of programs initiated or planned b~~ France in Southern Africa over
the past 18 months totaled nearly 1 billion French francs.
It will be recalled that a series of financial protocols were recently signed or
are being negotiated with Tanzania, Mozambique~ Malawi, Botswana, and Zimbabwe.
The Central Fund for Economic Cooperation is also now authorized to finance opera-
tions in Angola and Mozambique.
The French secreta.ry of state also noted the initiative taken by France jointly
with Belgium, Canada, the United States, the FRG and the United Kingdom to
establish a framework for "concerted action in behalf of development in Africa."
In fact, an ad hoc committee met in Bonn early thia year to discuss rail tranapor-
tation in Southern Africa.
In concluding his remarks, Stirn said that France wanted to see this region of the
globe "complete its liberation." He mentioned similarities between European and
Africana in their collective approach to problems.
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
The Fr~nch secretary of state was received on 26 November by President Samora
Machel with whom he discussed Southern Africa's ~rospects. It may be recalled
that Mozambique's foreign minister made an official visit to Paria a few
months ago.
COPYRIGHT: Rene More ux et Cie Paris 1980
8041
CSO: 4400
3
FOR OFPIC~AL USE ONL~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
rvn vrr~~.~r~t, uoe. Vl\Ll
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
RESULTS OF SADCC MAPUTO CONFERENCE REVIEWED
_ Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 22 Dec 80-4 Jan 81 p 31
[Article by Pierre Clary: "Ob~ective 90"]
[Excerpt] The conference held in Maputo on 27 and 28 November was exceptionally
well attencied: indeed, the South African Development Coordination Conference
(SADCC) gathered a large spectrum of representatives from various countriea and
international organizations. This conference, which was prepared by the 9 coun-
tries of Southern Africa, was a reault of the recomm~endationa of the Lusaka con-
ference, held last April. These countries were joined by Western countries, the _
EEC, Japan, India, Brazil, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the
African Devzlopment Bank, the Arab Bank for the Economic Development of Africa,
the COMECON...
The SADCC is requesting the establiahment of a regional center for research on
soil conservation, s3nce the only existing one is in South Africa. Within the
next few mcnths, Zimbabwe will organize a meeting to implement the regional pro-
gram for food security. In the industrial field, a conference will be held in
Dar es-Salam at the beginning of 1981 to review regional poasibilitiea and to
evenCually favor trade agreementa between the varioua countriea; however, it
seems certain as of now that the establishment of a free-trade zone will not be
retained. Within the first 6 months of 1981, Angola will organize a technical
conference on energy.
Aa for Zambia, it is scheduled to organize, also in 1981, a regional conference
on financing problems, and an institute for the study of regional projects
financing might be established as well; it is not likely that an institution
such as a development bank may be chosen. Finally, regional training poseibili-
ties will be reviewed at a conference organized by Swaziland.
What were the immediate reaults of the Maputo conference? Of the 2 billion
dollara representing the totality of the pro~ects for the next 5 years, 650
million have been obtained. Another 400 million will be granted by the African
Development Bank and 100 million will be provided by the EEC within the frame-
work of the Lome II agreement; the OPEC apecial fund and the Scandinavian coun-
tries will also make a contribution.
~l
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
The diacussions on financial pledges highlighted the reservations felt by
certain countries. Thus, the EEC stipulates that its contribution should not
finance investments in Mozambique and Angola since these two countries do not
subscribe to the Lome agreement. Nevertheless, the infrastructures defined
within a regional framework would mostly benefit the exchanges of landlocked
countries which have signed this agreement. At present, this important basic ~
issue has not been solved: it denotes, however, the true nature af the Lome
agreement, which is not as disinterested as some hav~ claimed.
Other Western countries, such as the United States, have not promised anything:
doubtlessly, financial aid from these sources will only be granted if it is
aecertained that setting up a regional economic force k~ll not threaten their
own investments in South Africa or this country's vital interests.
COPYRTGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
CSO: 4400
5
FOR OFFfCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
L~UK Ur'1'1l:lAL U~C UNLY
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS -
~UDAN ROSTS INTER-AFRICAN TRADE SYI~OSNM
I~artoum SUDANOW in Engliah Dec 80 pp 13, 14
[Text ] Forterirrg tke developn~ent oJ intm- trade so as to redua the importation
Afilcan trode, idPntifying its pnsent &am abroad of goads produced on the
undequacies ~ed ncon?mendirrg appra continent. Juan F. Laub, iTC advisor
- pr(oK tdW~ions ?+rnr the tha,re: oj the with ECA, empha~ised the necessity of
rrctnr lnrnr,AJtican 7tiade symposiwn organising exports on the national level.
lxld !n eo+t/unetion wlth the cunent placing particular suess on the creation
71rbr! All-AJNca Fa/i. O?janLted !n co!� in every African natlon of a specialisad -
bbo~don wrth the OAU, tht Economic corporadon de~gned to promote export
Conuntssfon ojAfsica (ECA/, ti~e lnter- trade. Hashim el Berir, chairman of the
ncNr.ncl ?lrndt Centre (/TCJ, Sudarr- Sudanese Exporters Union, spoke about
apo, and tlre Sridane,te Ministry oj tt?e wosk of his organiration and Abdel
Co~opemtion, Commerce and Supply Rahim Mohamed Abdel Rahim of the
_ m~d attended by moro than 60 npre- M~istry of Cooperation, Commerce and
senratives oj African nadons, the rym� Supply discusud the government's
posba~n wnt grven added impormnce by perspective on the problems of devetop-
the active participation of Afiican busi- ing Sudan's export sector. _
nestmen and bankert. ~Vvgi Sdiene
Boulis w+as also in attendance and f~led Considerable attention was devoted to
dris report. the uses of trade fairs as a stimulus to
- ex~.~ort growth and to the issue of
~S HOST, Sudan was elected to chair spreading trade-related information
the symoosium, with Seneg~l throughout the continent. Mr Mustafa,
occupying the position of vicechairman deputy d'uector of Sudanexpo,
and Kenya serving as rapporteur. infortned the audience of thc prepara-
Ahmed Salim, Sudane~e State Minister tions for the Thicd All-Africa Fair and
' ofCo-operation, Commerce and Supply, stressed the value of both general and
welcomed the rymposium participants specialised fairs. He was followed by
and expressed the hope that the R.H.C. Hammad, ITC Trade Fair _
gathering would turn its attenti~n to the Advisor in Sudan. who called for an
task of implementing the Lagos Plan of evaluation of the impact of the fair on
Action (see Sudanow, lune). His intro- the commercial deals that ue concluded
ductory speech was followed by the ~etween busir+essmen in attendance.
brief remarks of the Commissioner- Farid H. Nawas, lTC rep~esentative in
Cene~~l of the Third Al!�Africa Trade Sudan~ propagated the new, non-tradf-
Fair and Director-General of Sudan- tional African exports and urged that
expo, Rtd. Brigadier Sayed Omer they be fostered as a means uf earning
Mohamed Saeed. the hard currencies that� the continent
Symposium discussions concentrated so badly needs. He emphasised the
on the problems of development and necesaity of estabiishing jointexpo~t
the prospects for expamling intra- marketing groups for these new
Af~ican trade. Puticular att~ntion was products. Abdd Gadir Mansour. from
paid to the role of the Assc~ciation Sudan Commercial Bank, spoke abcut
of Afrkan Tra~le Promotiun Organisa- the financial dit~"~culties entailed in
tions (AATk'0), the wcxk� of which intca-African trade, stressing the
was describrd by Demeke Gewolde, importance uf seeking practical solu-
Felix Mosha, repreyenting the ECA, tions so as to promote Africa's
calle~ for the expansion of intr�r-African prosp~cts. Candida David, ITC TraJe
6
FOR OFFYCIAL USE OI~II,Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
= FOS OFtrICIAL IISE ONLY
Informatioa adviaor in Sudm, informed African tiade. st well u increasing
the audisnce zbout the conditioas and to export credit~guaianta
_ roqu~dta fc~r establi~ing succxsiful
trade informadon md doc~muntation e) The loag term soturion to t?.ie '
clarfig and payments problem should
Recommendstiau aen made in six be tha establishment of an intra-African
aress of cancera to the sympo:ium T~~ g~, ~e ahon~term wluaon to
- participants. this problem should be the establlsh-
Firrtly, t.hat OAU and ECA should ~t of b~lateral rxipra~l accougts
im~mediately inldata the axessary betwcea African countrias.
- machinery ~med at establlshing a union ~ Effotts to create institutiocu to
- of African [nteraatiowl Trade Fairs, coIlect and dissemiaate tiade informa-
which should be tesportrible for prog- iion for African countrks should be
rammtng, coordinating and enser~ng redoubled. Ia particular, the Reponal -
the efficient or~tion of national. T~ada (a{ormation studies, which ECA
sub~cegiQnal and All�African Trade ~ reportedly been contemplatiag,
- Ftirs. should be spaded up and auiataace ~
Secon~y, that the OAU and ECA, in should be provided to i~dividual Africxn
cooperation with ITC aad other specia- c~ut~tr~s in order to enabte them to
- liud agencies, should amnudiately carry ~d up national trade iafotmation
out the neces~uy studies aimed at ~uld be capable of
establishing selxted, specialized ~g regional aad global iaformation
aanual A~-Africa Trade Fairs in product ~~~eS. Partici~anu undertook to
_ aras ~.fiere Africa's supp~y poaition is malce such requests to the ~ternational
~e~~y. orgpniaa~iona for the aeanuy asais-
Thtrdly, the participants recognised tu,ux.
major deficier?cies with . cegard to F~~y~ ~~p~d
competitiveneas of Africu� exportable that they ue lly awue of the various
products both at the intr~�African trade co~v~ational obsticles wh~Ch hamper
Ievel and outside the candnent. the expa~sion of Intra�Africaa trade,
a) Individwi counMes stiould wc~ aa tiaasport and commumcations,
immediately request the services of wppty constraiats, iastitutiom! fiame-
ECA, to cdlabonte wlth [1'C ~nd other aorks for trade, andlnadequ ate export-
speci~lized agancie~ In undertaldn~ iaframuetunl facili~es. How~ever, the
detailed studies of setectsd nadonai pro- cricx~! as~Cts to a61eh the sium
ducts with high intn-African trade felt that it should addrds i~were
potendal so u to rxommend policy thox whic~ are ca~able of immediate
- measures nxes,wry for in~xearieg the imprevement. To rectify i!u diff~culties
intra-African uade ot such producu. the partiripaats decided as foiloara:
b) Specif;c commodities in whicli a) Exh appticant cauntry should
Africa does not uem to bave suppty or astablLh a for,~l export promotnn in-
competfcion problen~ ue stIIl not stitution with a stroag legal besis aad
substantially t~ded among Afi~f,caa soui?d ~taffing for the purpose of PWIy
c~untries relative to the effective expidting the exisdag potential fn
demand aad the avv7abk ma~icet in the iatra-Africaa trade.
_ region. ECA, in colhboration wtth fTC b) The exista?g export promotinn -
and other specializa! ~ageacias, should foal poiats in Afria, u wdl u t}wae
immed9ately undertalc4 necestary to be estabibhed, should focge a cloae
studies to deterraine the strategies coopecatien dn~mg thanselves including
which Afrlraa exporters and impo~ters a periodic exchange of trade
should pursue m ordar to max~ise informatioa
intn-African trade in theae vital Fifthly, the OAU ~ecretarlat ~hould
commod.itias. imraediately call upon thoee member
c) ECA, in coU~boratbn with (TC scatas that tnve not joUrod MTFa to
and ocher specialhed agancia, should do ao u aoon u poa~ible.
~ immediately undertake studies ~imed at Si~cthly, participauts felt the urgent
drtermiNng the f~asibility of ut~lizing aeed to conduct studies on border
= airfreight facil~ties for aa iacrra~ed trade betweta :~fiicaa countries, since
, number of commodities in intra�Africaa it forms aa esseatial part of iatia-
- trade. African trsde. These studies should
d) The OAU and ~CA shoutd spad ~ documentation and record�
~ up negotiatioas on payment arraage- m orda to ro~ke it easy to
menu for the expansion of the intia- ~ the voiume utd value of thia
COPYItZ(~T: All rights reserved SIID~ANOi1 1980
CSO: 4420
7
FOB OFFICIAL USE ONLX
r
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
? V~~ VL'L' 1Nli1L NalLi VL\U?
~ INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
- JAPANESE TRADE WITH AFRICA DETAILED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Dec 80 pp 3455-3458
- [TextJ In 1978 and 1979, Japan's foreign trade with the rest of the world showed
the following characteristics:
The overall volume of trade increased 25.5 percent in current value from one year to
the next.
The distribution of trade by continent is still clearly in favor of Asia. .
The direction of the overall balance was modified: + 23-percent cover of imports by
exports (in Japan's favor) in 1978; - 7 percent (against Japan) in 1979. This re-
versal in trend is of particular interest to a country whose coffi?ercial expansion is
often considered excessive and unbalanced.
If one closely observes import and export trade, one will note that it is especially
in Asia that Japan shows a deficit. This is understandable insofar as its purchases
of hydrocarbons are mainly fram Arab countries on the Gulf.
~wr-nfr~ ~
~
Ripanition du comme~u extMi~ur j~pon~is
pe~ contim~ 1)
fMlMiodi d~ y~nsl �
~n~ ~rn
Eapon ~moon boon imvort
Asi~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 E10.6 S 470~! ! 70~.~ 12 94~.9
Europ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ 799.~ 2 064.7 4 3/ S.7 2 684.1
MNripw du Nord a 35a.e 9 9a2,2 0 504,~ 5 012.8
AmMiqu~ du Sud 693,8 466.8 7&7 727.5
Afriaw . . . . . . . . . . .,y 1 34e.a IA4.~ 1 /47.2 ef~.7
Od~nN a diwn ...G~. 7fa.6 1 ~t9,! 7Ea.3 1 467.~
TNY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 fN.s 1~ 727.~ t2 fi1,i 24 24f.1
Key :
1. Distribution of Japanese Foreign
Trade by Continent (in billions of yen)
2. South Sea Islands and others
8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
. FOR OFFICI . ,
~~r-~s-a
Quelqua impon~Ms disiquilibra en v~iwr ~bsolue '
(P~ phroliM ~nba exclw) 1)
IM/Dl~d~ ar y~ni1
lm 1f7f
Ba1M~a B~7~rKv
~ P~ P~
E~on ~mport J~DOn E~at ~mport J~DOn
EtatWni~ ..3~ . 6 269 3 10l.7 + 2 160,3 5 772.5 � 48a.9 � 1 316,9
CwM du Sud . 1 206,2 6W.6 ~ 726,7 1 360.7 a31.7 . 628
Honp-Konq 6~6.9 103 . W2.Y e06.E 141,8 . sE0.8
Tstw~n 760.4 306 ~ 3e6.1 967.1 639.4 �?13.7
RFA ~b4.2 421,~ . 342,! 933 5E9.E + 369.4
Ub~ri~ ~6~.7 35.7 . 31e 209,6 90.E ~ 11Y.9
Slnp~pour bB,9 1l2.4 ? 30p,6 6l7,0 326.6 ~ 262.3
P~nartw . 300,1 17.6 a 2e2.E 196.4 ~7.1 + 169
VnrrsM 33E2 a7,4 + 2el,S 3A2,7 90,5 + 2)1.9
URSS 826,a 304,7 a 2Z0.9 636,3 419.1 ? 11E.2
Nlqai~ Q 209A 1.0 + 20Q,3 17e.9 Q,3 .~ea.e
Gnnd~-9mpnw ~90,E 2lp2 ? Y0p,4 e74,6 3EE.1 + 306,4
Grlc~ . . . . . . . . . . 197,3 7,2 ? t 90.1 1 d4.Y 10,2 ~ 1 ~8.7
.
Indor~w 443.1 1 110.7 - 6a7.0 ~d7,3 1 930.7 - 1 469.4
Awtnli~ SE4,9 1118,3 - 664.4 6E9.4 1378.4 - 909
Gn~d~ ` 396,4 e73 - 277.E 379,6 Q90.7 - 617.2
Sulsw g!. 139,J 207,7 - 69.4 103,Y 226.4 - 81.6
lull~........... 103 13e.7 - 33,7 1~9,0 2~e.~ - e~.t
Ghrna e.s Y2.1 - 13.6 7.6 24.e - 17.1
Key :
1. Major Imbalances in Absolute Value (Arab Oil Countries Excluded)
(in billions of yen)
2. Balance for Japan
3. United States
4. South Kozea
~ 5. Federal Republic of Germany -
6. Nether~ands
7. USSR
8. Great Britain
9. Switzerland
Percentages of cover (for Japan) by cantinent are as follows for 1978 and 1979:
1978 1979
Asia 90.2 67.8
Europe 184.9 160.3 -
America 159.6 119.7
Africa 290 164,2
South Sea Islands 54.3 46.1
One can see a very substantial reduction in the rate of cover of imports by exports
for the Asian continent, but also a very clear drop in Japanese commercial pressure
throughout the world: - 24.6 percent in Europe, - 39.9 percent in America, - 125.8
percent in Africa and - 8.2 percent in the South Sea Islands.
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
Nevertheless, the pressure remains and gives rise to legitimate concern in some
European or American nations, especially with reapect to certain categories of
gooda (automobiles, optics, photography, cinema, radio and aound equipment, and
so on) . .
7'he percentage distribution of Japanese imports and exports by continent in 1978
- and 1979 was as follows:
1978 1979
Import Export Import Export
Asia 50.6 37.2 53 38.6
America 26.4 34.3 26.2 33.7
Europe 12.3 18.5 11.1 19.2
Africa 2.8 6.6 2.9 5.1
South Sea Islands 7.9 3.4 6.8 3.4
As previously stated, Asia's enormous predominance with respect to imports (50.6
percent of overall value in 1978; 53 percent in 1979) is essentially due to the _
fact that Japan makes almost all of its oil purchases fram Middle Eastern nations.
- Consequently, among the first 15 suppliers, one finds: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait,
the United Arab Emirates and Iraq. As one will see belaw, African oil suppliers
play a relatively small role.
It is normal for Japan's trade to be very active with neighboring countries such
as the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines,
or Korea. In Table JAP-AF-B [preceding page], one can see that with most of these
countries, Japan is in the creditor's position and that the surplus of Japanese
~xports to South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan or Singapore, compared with purchases
made in those countries, amounts to several hundred billion yen. It is true that
the Japanese trade deficit vis-a-vis Indonesia alone was nearly 1,470,000,000,000
yen in 1979.
In Table JAP-AF-C [below], one can see the txtraordinary position of the United
States as a supplier, but especially as a customer of Japan. The following per-
centages for 1979 should make it clearer:
As a supplier: 18.4 percent of all Japan's imports. Turnover 1.68 times greater
- than that of Japan's second-ranking supplier, Saudi Arabia.
As a customer: 25.6 percent over one-fourth of Japan's total sales to other
countries. Turnover 4.25 times greater than that of Japan's second-ranking
customer, South Korea.
The vast majority of Japan's trade with Europe favors Tokyo, except with respect to
Switzerland, Italy (see Table JAP-AF-B [preceding page], ~nd sometimes Spain and
Denmark. The deficit of Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain vis-a-vis Japan
- is still substantial.
Africa's participation in Japan's foreign trade is insignificant with regard to
imports (2.8/2.9 percent) and very modest with respeet to exports (6.6/5.1 percent).
- It is easy to see this in Tab~.e JAP-AF-C [below], for one will not find one African
supplier or cuatomer among Japan's top 20 trading partners in the world.
10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
TBble JAP-AF-C. _
Principwx p~~ria~irp maNiwx du Jqan ~n 1879
~ , . ~~awrrd, a~ wn,~
~ ~.r. ~.~.w..~. r.r+ar.~a.
j 1) Euetunls ?a6e.9 11 EutWnM 677x,7
2) Anbl~ Moudla . . . . . . . . 2 6l0,1 t1 CorN du Sud . . . . . . . . . . 1 960,7
31 IMa+Mb . . . 1 Y~0.7 71 Tdw~n . . 963.1
41 AwtrNA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 37~.4 41 IIiA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933
( SI Inn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964.7 61 AnON Ma~u . . . . . . . . 840.7
~ 91 Kowdt 94t.7 E? Narp~KOep 806.A
c.~.e. . . . . . . . . . . . . eae.e n cnw+. oow+iw. . . . . . . . . eoa,e
Jt ei EMk.a..w.. . . ~.t e? o~nw.-e~N . e~~.a
{ 91 Ca~N du Sud . . . . . . . . . 731.e n sww.pww . . . . . . . . . . . . ee~.~
! 10) CNin~ popubM~ 647.) 10) AuiortlM 569.4
~ 111 RfA 643.6 ttl u11SS 536.3
~ 121 T~iw~n . . . . . . 639.4 121 I~MaNW . 467.3
~ 131 URSS 419.1 1~1 C~n~ 37Y,6
~ 111 SruMi 4f4.~ 141 ThMlwd~ 373.7
` 161 IrN 3M,6 ~e~ ~.v.-~.. ~e:.e I
~ ~ei o~.~,o.-e~�.~. s~e.~ 1~1 Ink ]66.4
' 171 S~Wh IMN ~YW) . . . . . ~6~.Y 171 rMNppie~ . . . . . . . . . . 36~.1
; t~l ?AUbv~~n ~1E.2 1~1 Rr~ 306.J i
~ 191 SMp~pou� . . . . . . . . . . ~20.0 191 MWyW . . . . . . . . . . . . 2S6
j zo? a+~.~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2~z,~ to? u~oivw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . sa~.e
Key:
1. Japan's Main Trading Partners in 1979 (in billions of yen)
2. Suppliers 11. Customers
3. United States 12. United Statea
4. Saudi Arabia 13. South Korea
S. United Arab Emirates 14. Federal Republic of Germany
6. South Korea 15. Saudi Arabia
_ 7. People's Republic of China 16. People's Republic of China ;
8. Federal Republic of Germany 17. Great Britain
9. USSR 18. IISSR ~
10. Great Britain 19. Netherlands
South Africa, which leads Japan's African trading partnera in imports and exports,
is only 22d or 23d when compared with a12 countries in the world. Its sales to
Japan are 16 times lower than those to the United States and its purchases are
27 times more modest. Actually, Japan's total purchases fram the entire African
continent were nearly comparable to those made by that country from the People's
Republic of China, the tenth-ranking supplier to Japan, and 6.5 times lawer than
those made from the United States alone. Regarding exports, turnover for all of
Africa is a little higher than that for Taiwan and five times less than the figure
f or the United States.
Japanese Imports From Africa
Table JAP-AF-E [below] provides the distribution of African imports by sections ~
using the Brussels nomenclature. Outside of parcel post (00), which represents
11.3 percent of all traffic, the main Japanese purchases involved mineral products,
including oil products (26.2 percent), co~on metals and manufactured products
(20.43 percent) and unprocessed plant products (11.80 percent).
11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
l~ Co~Nrp utlri~~~ JAP_ AF_ 1 Key '
JA?ON ~A 1!1! 1) 1. Japan's Foreign Trade in 1979
(in billions of yen)
( mrlliord~ d~ Y~na 1 2. Imports
IM1I~TAT1/Nt 2) 3. South Sea Islands
~ Z4.~45.4 4. Exports
^.,~r~~~~a r
~'ASIE~'x-
;.'~"S~t~~~ ~a' -.~s
rE.~URO~PE
~ ~
~ f AI O U E
; uijy;i` i's";:a: p1.1
lii~i~ i;;ILii~u ,.u~: ~ii !ii`:i;,h'
i;;;.~MER10Ut
I;i::...li;. ~j::~~;~:! '
~ ~~r~,:!
::5::_~sN.t;;~::~; 3~
~i~,E^!;::::,::;::~ y
:..I�r.::��:: i~r::lr;.;::'
'~f~::;..;,:;.~[~~ CAMI
Ex11~TATI1Nf 4) ~
tt.s=1,5
- ASiE
EuROV~
4i1~ _
i 1 I~~iL:ji: l~F R 10 U E
i~fi: : .
{i,,:;N;~~ ~ ~N,,:
cu~fill'~~~':~IL!~itj. ~h~j1.,~jC,.,
,iii~:'~ M[ A i 0 U E,;;~';
;:r ;i~~ ; ~ ~
ij:;r~ ~:;~;>>iq.lf~�::-�:;;;
:;::;a:. t':a, ,i,:::
~~i,~a;_:
'"~~`~t~4i~;k::~~ar~ QCEANIE
_;:~ti;:::~ 1N.2
,.:i~~;'i~ir
Y.
Imports of mineral products are distributed as follows:
Chapter 26, metallic ores (iron, copper, manganese, lead, zinc, chrome):
82,615,900,000 yen. Suppliers: Swaziland: 956,796 tons; Mauritania, 195,792 tona;
Liberia, 357,438 tons; Gabon, 124,064 tons; plus 16~832 tons going through the
Congo; Zaire, 95,129 tons; Mozambique, 86,609 tons; Madagascar, 62,180 tons
(chromite); Ghana, 30,746 tons; Nigeria, 146 tons, and eo on.
Chapter 27, energy products (oil, coal): 73,762,300,000 yen. Suppliers: Libya,
19,111.3 million yen (441,651 cubic meters); Algeria, 12,038,700,000 yen
(349,693 cubic meters); Angola, 11,837,000,000 yen (257,984 cubic meters); Nigeria,
5,490,000,000 yen (117,245 cubic meters); South Africa, 25,043,700,000 yen
(2.4 million tons of coal and coke).
12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
~ JA/-A/A
Princip~ux p~rtm~ira afric~int du J~pon m 1978
~ rMnar.~d, a. w~,~ 1)
_ ~ ~
`j ~n~~'r~
e~s�a...3?..... se3a n~i?~+aw6a~a~a...7.)...... z,~.s ~
jj~ z? uw~. oo.e s~ ~e�i. sos.e ~ ,
~ 31 Z~m01~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 04~ 3) Nlprh . . 17E.9
41 Zain 26.~ 4) Lbl� 119.7
' ` SI Gh~n~ 24.0 6) E9YPb e6.3
' e? u~. . x~.s e? e ~aa
~ 71 EQypn 20.4 7) Cnwlw A~...... 30.9 ,
' BI Muoe . . . . . . . . . . ~i . . . 16.3 K�ry~ . . . . . . . . . . . 2l.7
's 91 COt~ d'Ivalti . . . . . ~ . . . . . 14.1 CdM d'iwY~ . . . . ~ . . . . . 1 e.E
~ i01 Mpd~ 13.0 10) Sq~dM~................. tE.4
~ 111 Alphi~ 12,e 11) T~ner~M 16.7 i
i 141 Oup~nda 11.3 12) TwiNb 16.6 '
; t 31 Soud~n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 13) Cwt~lllA W W . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.7 ~
f u? Hiy.d� ~~1 M.d.o..c� ~~,6 ~
? t61 Gm~rwn S.4 161 EtliioPb 11 ~
~ ' lel M~~mbbu~ e.Z tal ZMiOM Y
3 171 MW~qs~ear e.1 17) CMn~o~n S.4
� ~ei N,mro+. e.e ~n M.~oo.........1Q}.... e.~
+e? r.nn~+. e.~ ~ol c~n.n. ~.e
~ io1 E+Moo~. s.~ =01 e.e ,
Key: ~
1. Japan's Main African Partners in 6. Customers '
1979 (in billions of yen) 7. South Africa
2. Suppliers 8. Canary Islands ,
3. South Africa 9. Ivory Coast ;
4. Morocco 10. Morocco
5. Ivory Coast '
~
Chapter 25, nonmetallic, nonoil mineral products: 26,712,600,000 yen (phosphates, '
clays, asbestos, mica, porphyry, coloring earths). Suppliers: South Africa, '
16,089,700,000 ~en; Morocco, 8,219,600,000 yen;=Senegal, 1,146,200,000 yen
(74,566 tons of phosphates); Madagascar, 4$5,700,000 yen; Swaziland, 296,700,000
yen; Namibia, 145,400,000 yen; Kenya, 139,100,000 yen; Mozambique, 64,600,000 yen; i
Togo, 35,600,000 yen, and so on. ,
With regard to common metals, it is Chapter 74 (copper and manufactured products) ~
that is easily in the lead, coming ahead of Chapter 73 (iron, reduced metal, steel)
and Chapter 76 (aluminum). '
Chapter 74: 84~586,700,000 yen. Suppliers: Zambia, 63,103,000,000 yen (158,889 ;
tons); South Africa, 11,005,600,000 yen (27,936 tons); Namibia, 5,286,100,000 yen ,
(11,203 tons); Zaire, 5,040,400,OOO~yen (12~848 tons); and so on. ~
Chapter 73: 27,$13,700,000 yen. Suppliers: South Africa, 27,612,500,000 yen; ;
Liberia, 181,500,000 yen. .
Chapter 76: 18,292,900,000 yen. Suppliers: Ghana, 8,809,900,000 yen; Egypt,
4,515,100,000 yen; South Africa, 3,895,100,000 yen; Cameroon, 956,400,000 yen, and ~
so on. ~
~
I
~
I
13 I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I
;
i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
rvc~ vrri~ieu. vir~.~
_ .
- L~s �~fll~~n ~~Mo~~iM: ~ ~fMe~i~s JA~IN e 1l111-~~_ ~F_ ~
( millia~da d~ Ytna 1 1~
~rawuc ou suo 2) ~ M 1 T ~ T I 1 N t 3
21~.7 ~
ueEaiA ~e1E . aie~~~ 4)
!Li ~ 2 ~r~~,uerearvh -
_ :M ~ t1~4
~.t.itia~~+~c~at~ 1~.~
5> �
I EX ~1 ATAT 11 M t6)
7
=e~n~rAC.rva~
t~ M
~:�ti�: k'-�
�i}: � 8
: ~ ~car~rs )
uere ~~3
NieEaw ~ ~~'3 9~ 1~3,4
AFRIOUE DU SUD ue~ 111~!
211,5 21~.5
y. -
Key : �
1. Japan's Top-Ranking African Partners in 1979 (in billions of yen)
2. South Africa
3. Imports
4. Others
5. Morocco, Ivory Coast
6. Exports
7. Ivory Coast
8. Canary Islands
9. Others
Chapter 75 (nickel): 2,243,000,000 yen. Supplier: South Africa.
The unprocessed plant products (for food) most frequently purchased by Japan from
Africa are coffee and s~ices (Chapter 9), unprocessed grain (Chapter 10) and
oil-yielding seed (Chapter 12).
Chapter 9: 39,637,600,000 yen. Coffee suppliers: Uganda, 14,274 tons; Ivory
Coast, 13,795 tons; Ethiopia, 6,683 tons; Tanzania, 4,144 tons; Cameroon, 2,636
tons; Angola, 2,337 tons; Madagascar, 2,024 tons; Rwanda, 1,514 tons; Burundi, _
650 tona; Kenya, ~13 tons; Mozambique, 241 tone; Leaotho, 98 tons, and so on.
Chapter 10: 32,256,300,000 yen. Suppliers: South Africa, 961,332 tons;
Mozambique, 103,872 tona; Kenya, 65,950 tons.
].1~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ,
JAP-AF-E. Japan's African Imports Based on Brusaels Nomenclature (V = billions
of yen)
v x
00. Parcel post and undetermined items 79 11.31
O1. Animals and animal products 30.6 4.38
02. Unprocessed plant products 82.5 11.80
04. Products from food industries 44.5 6.37
05. Mineral products (including oil) 183.1 26.20
06. Chemical products 16.4 2.35
09. Wood and manufactured items 11.4 1.63
11. Textiles and manufactured items 44.8 6.42
14. Gems and precious metals 44.8 6.42 -
15. Co~on metals and manufactured 142.8 20.43 ;
producte
17. Traneport equlpment 10.4 1.49
Other sectiona, each representing less
than 1 percent 8.4 1.20
698.7 100.00
Chapter 12: 5,816,500,000 yen. Suppliers of peanuts, sesame seed, cottonseed and
so on. Sudan: 11,882 tons; Mali, 10,462 tons; Togo, 5,525 tons; South Africa,
- 4,386 tons; Tanzania, 4,357 tons; Ivory Coast, 3,688 tons; Benin, 3,602 tone;
Kenya, 2,466 tons; Mozambique, 2,303 tons; Nigeria, 2,070 tona; Upper Volta~ 1,881
tons; Ethfopia, 816 tons, and so on.
Imports of animal products mainly included fresh fish (Chapter 3):
Chapter 3: 21,778,400,000 yen. Suppliers: Morocco, 9,780 tons; Senegal, 3,365
tons; Libya, 2~414 tons; South Africa, 2,346 tons; Madagascar, 1,791 tons; Mozam-
bique, 1,564 tons; Mauritania, 1,020 tone; Canary Islands, 829 tons; Nigeria,
565 tons; Ghana, 456 tons; Namibia, 190 tons; Liberia, 181 tona; Cameroon, 171
tons; Sierra Leone, 43 tons, and ao on.
Purchases of augar for 24~616,800,000 yen (484,938 tona) were all made from South
Africa.
One does not see substantial cacao purchases except from Ghana. Total purchases:
15,499,500,000 yen, including Ghana for 14,352,600,000 yen (16,480 tons); Ivory
Coast, 990 tons; Cameroon, 410 tons; and Nigeria, 60 tons. ~
Japan bought 12,343,000,000 yen worth of inorganic chemical products (mainly phos-
phoric acid) from South Africa.
Wood (11,390,900,000 yen) comes from Cameroon: 51,973 tons; South Africa, 24,966
tons; the Ivory Coast, 13,394 tans; Gabon, 12,358 tons; the Congo, 10,127 tons;
Liberia, 7,707 tons; Mozambique, 6,739 tons; Zaire, 2,901 tons; Ghana, 475 tons;
Kenya, 465 tons, and so on.
15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
rva~ vrri~ina. u.,u v.~L.
In the textile field, only three chaptera include subatantial imports:
Chapter S5, cotton: 34,856,700,000 yen. Suppliers: Egypt, 25,068 tons; Sudan,
16,853 tons; South Africa, 7,220 tons; Chad, 6,823 tons; Cameroon, 4,341 tons;
Nigeria, 4,193 tons; Ivory Coast, 3,051 tons; Mali, 2,810 tona; Upper Volta, 2,098
tons; Central African Republic, 1,750 tons; Ethiopia, 999 tons.
Chapter 53, wool: 7,615,400,000 yen. Supplier: South Africa, 6,450 tons.
Chapter 57, fibers for sack-making, mainly sisal: 1,605,500,000 yen. Suppliers:
Kenya, 6,290 tons; Tanzania, 5,145 tons.
Gems and precious metals (44,831,000,000 yen) are purchased by Japan from some
15 countries, mainly including South Africa, 43,281,400,000 yen; Ghana, 726,700,000
yen; Zaire, 360,700,000 yen; Zambia, 192,700,000 yen; Kenya, 102,500,000 yen, and
so on.
Japaneae Exports to Africa
.Japan's highly varied exporta to its 20 front-ranking African customere (94.1 per-
cen[ of the total) are distributed as shown in Table JAP-AF-F [below]. One will
note the considerable position occupied by the section of tranaport equipment,
machinery and electrical or other equipment and of common metals and manufactured
goods (81.94 percent of total Japanese exporta in value).
JAP-AF-F. Japan's Exports to Its 20 Front-Ranking African G~stamera in 1979
(94.1 percent of total exports in value to Africa) Based on the Sections of the
Bruasels Nomenclature (V = billions of yen)
V %
04. Food industry products 18.6 1.73
06. Chemical products 17.5 1.62
07. Plastic and ruber materials 29.2 2.71
11. Textilea and manufactured items 48.8 4.52
15. Common metals and manufactured products 156 14.45
- 16. Electrical and other machinery and 264.9 24.54
equipment
17. Transport equipment 463.7 42.95
18. Optical equipment, measuring and 46.7 4.32
precision instruments
Other sections each representing less 34.1 3.16
than 1 percent
1,079 613.5 100
Table JAP-AF-F shows the amount of purchases in value of the 20 countriea concerned
for the other chapters with the highest values, including (in billions of yen):
Chapter 87, 238.1; Chapter 89, 211.3; Chapter 85, 154.6; Chapter 73, 143.7;
Chapter 84, 110.4. 110,364 [sic]
South Africa alone bought over 82 billion yen worth of road transport equipment
and Nigeria over 56 billion. Purchases of electrical equipment mainly include
16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
radios and television sets. The vast majority of all ships sold go to Liberia
(194.7 out of 211.3 billion yen).
Other noteworthy chaptere among exporta are the following (over 5 billion yen), from
O1 to 99:
Chapter 03, freah fish: 5,949,900,000 yen (Canary Islanda, 2,252,300,000 yen;
South Africa, 2,034,200,000; Ghana, 1,480,100,000).
Chapter 16, canned meat or fish: 18,191,000,000 (Nigeria, 11,984,000,000; Egypt, -
1,536,300,000; Libya, 1,527,000,000; Ghana, 1,019,500,000; South Africa, 777,800,000,
and so on).
Chapter 29, organic chemical producta: 5,138,200,000 yen (South Africa,
3,718,500,000; Nigeria, 500,700,000; Ivory Coast, 333,700,000).
Chapter 39, plastics: 9,409,400,000 yen (South Africa, 4,087,700,000; Nigeria,
3,094,100,000; Algeria, 564,000,000; Egypt, 465,400.000).
Chapter 40, rubber: 19,838,300,000 yen (Algeria, 5,125,200,000; Egypt,
3,964,400,000; South Africa, 3,228,100,000; Sudan, 1,796,700,000; Libya,
1,451,900,000).
Chapter 51, continuous synthetic textiles: 17,102,800,000 yen (South Africa,
8,040,900,000; Nigerfa, 2,213,300,000; Sudan, 2,171,600,000; Egypt, 1,260,600,000).
Chapter 56, s}mthetic or artificial textiles, pieces: 17,904,400,000 yen (South
Africa, 8,319,000,000; Nigeria, 3,033,100,000; Alger~.a, 2,363,100,000; Kenya,
1,056,900,000; Egypt, 1,005,300,000).
Chapter 82, tools, cutlery: 5,749,500,000 yen South Africa, 2.49 billion;
Egypt, 1,025,700,000; Nigeria, 785,600,000; Libya, 620,800,000).
Chapter 86, railroad rolling atock: 14,313,200,000 (Egypt, 7,096,600,000; South
Africa, 4,430,300,000; Zambia, 2,595,900,000).
Chapter 90, optics, measuring and precision instruments: 16,023,900,000 yea
(South Africa, 6,480,400,000; Canary Islands, 1,754,100,000; Egypt, 1,605,500,000;
Nigeria, 1,491,200,000; Libya, 864,200,000).
Chapter 91, clocks and watches: 7,708,900,000 yen (Canary Islands, 2,933,000,000;
Egypt, 1,792,600,000; Ceuta and Melilla, 1,111,700,000; South Africa, 1,043,900,000).
Chapter 92, music and sound equipment: 22,941,500,000 yen (Libya, 12,822,700,000;
South Africa, 3,957,000,000; Canary Islands, 1,641,800,000; Nigeria, 1,622,700,000;
Egypt, 1,010,100,000).
[Table JAP-AF-G next page]
17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
rvn ~rrl~.lrw uuc VI~LI
~ ~
~ JAr~+Ai-0 j
1 Cleaaemertt de~ ucportnion: du J~pon wn I'Aftiqw f
~ en 1979 pour qudqua ch~pitra nm~~qu~bla (20 p~~n)
(MlMioni d~ wnal ~
~ 2 5 ~wi 6;
j r 3 4 F., u.r ewMn ~
~ hM~fb Wt~IMI M~e~ W~ M AMIYr {
~ iwer~ weuip~ w~ Me~iww rw+yr w Ilwid
: - - - - ~
u,.a awa a~w a~.n a~a
~ - - - - -
~ csunMdlll~ 3~~.7 eos~.e ~oe,e s~,s - ~
; Gnvies . . ~ . . . . . . S 330,! 9498,1 2 896.3 6E9,2 11,2 ~
f M~~oe 8.. 21d2 1254,2 1022.6 1337 -
i AIpMi~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 W 1.E 6 930 22 879.5 2E 471,8 3 970.3
~ Tunlsl~ a24,3 39E.4 483.8 e~z4.e 7232.8
; liby~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 60A.0 49 801 3 966.1 10 612.~ 21.5 ~
~ Egypu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13180.8 22 116.7 9 076,b 12 630,7 1 9~0.1
~ Soud~n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 064.3 1 266.4 3 tOd.4 3 024,6 -
; Llbsris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 628.9 420.3 199,7 912.1 194 71t,2
~ CA~~ d'Ivain ...9. 9 2682 2 262.E 1 158.5 1 723.E Y
� Gh~n~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 568,2 1 ~47.7 832.8 96I.7 488 .
` N{ps~1~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6E 27E.7 26 401.a 21 644 ~9 066.3 2.3
~ Cam~roun . . . . . . . . . . . . . S 4~4.8 4+Z.6 63E.9 930.1 -
~ Ethiopi� . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 129.e 1 06e,2 857 2 7E9.1 -
K~m~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E 707 2 104.E 3 274.1 11 246.1 -
~ T~ru~nl~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 142.5 3 413.7 3 290.9 3 233,0 -
f Anpob . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6d1.7 E46.7 647.E 1 36~.4 _
f 2~mbl~ 2 28e.1 966,2 722 1 037.E
Ahiqu~ du Sud ..1.0. e2 26a 17 1 E2.7 32 I~0,3 1 E 876.4 6.6
M~dppesr . . . . . . . . . . . 973.7 2 906,6 644~~ 2 410. t 3 268.2 .
Toql . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . 2~ OM,~ 1M R0.7 110 7M /17 Mi,~ 211 ~,1 .
Key :
1. Classification of Certain Remarkable Categories of Japanese Exports to
Africa in 1979 (20 countries) (in millions of yen)
2. Road transport equipment
3. Electrical equipment
4. Nonelectrical machinery
5. Iron, reduced metal, steel and manufactured items
6. Ocean or river transport equipment
7. Canary Islands
8. Morocco
9. Ivory Coast
10. South Africa
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1980
~~04644400
18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
~
AFRICAN COUNTRIES CONCERNID ABOUT LIBYAN ROLE IN CHAD ,
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 pp 24-28 '
[Article by Mohamed Selhami and Abdelaziz Barouhi--passages between slantlines
originally published in italics]
[Text~ With the conquest of Chad, the Libyan leader thinks ,
the hour has struck for him to realize a gre,st dream, the
United States of the Sahel, of whic:h he would be the ruler. '
Monday, 20 October. The Sebha air base (800 km south of Tripoli). Several
hundred soldiers are trying to cram themselves into the big tranaport aircraft:
two Ilyushin 76, three Antonovs (two of them borrowed from Syria), four Hercules ~
C-130's. Also being loaded aboard are arms (machine-guns and artillery), ~
munitions chests, light armored materiel (Brazilian Cascavels, British Ferret
automatic machineguns).
i
Col Khalifa Mouftah is directing operations. Destination: Faya-Largeau, in Chad,
400 km from the border. /"Responding to the appeal of his brother and counCerpart ~
Goukouni Oueddei,"/ president of the GUNT (Transitional National Union Government), ~
Mu'ammar Zadhdhafi throws himself into the conquest of his neighbor to the south, ;
a part of which, the Aouzou Strip (114,000 square kilometers) he has already
been occupying for years. The prime ob3ective: to finish off the "dissident"
Hissein Habre, leader of the FAN (Northern Armed Forces). And then?
_ For several weeks the Libyan leader has had the green light from the Soviets for
his military adventure. He is paying for the arms that Syria (which merged with ;
the Jamahiriya on 1 September) buys from Moscow. In exchange for his support to
the USSR's special partner in the Middle East, he hae obtained carte blanche for
his African schemes. And above all--an indispensable technical condition--the
cover provided for the Chad offensive by the Soviet and East German advisers
present in Libya.
Forty-eight hours before D-Day, Qadhdhafi calls together, in the presence of Soviet
experts, his principal officers: Maj Abd-al-Salam Jallud, the leader's deputy;
Gen Abu-Bakr Jabir Yunis, commander in chief of the armed forces; Lt Col Kharubi,
head of the /Moukhabarat/ (secret services) and of the military branch of the
Bureau of Arab Liaison; Col Muha~nad (Lamgarif), inspector general of the forces; ,
19
- FOR OFP'ICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
Ma~ Khuwaylidi al-Hamidi, head of the "People's Resistance" (militia); Col Muhammad
Bar~jati, commandant of the Cyrenaica military region; Lt Col Sayf Kaddaf Adam~ head
of the bureau for exportation of the revolution; Col Khalifah Muftah. Z~ao members
of the People's General Congress (Assembly) are also there.
The final details of "Operation Chad" are honed. Col Khalifah Muftah, age 40,
trained in the USSR, has been named to lead the operation to "final victory."
Before a map of the region he explains how the Libyan Army is going to be deployed.
Nearly 4,000 men will be engaged (including 1,500 already stationed in the Aouzou
Strip), all heading for Faya-Largeau. From there, 1,600 will disperse into
northeast Chad; 400 will head for the Doubou base; the remainder (about 2,000 men)
will descend even further south, toward Ndjamena, under the orders of Muhammad Brahim.
The road is open. The Jamahiriya cannot fail in Chad. And afterwards, why not
Niger, then Mali...Qadhdhafi already has glimpses of the realization of his dream,
that United States of the Sahel of which he would be the ruler (JEUNE AFRIQUE
No 975). With the help of his over-equipped army, for which he is presently
spending about $4 billion per year. Forgotten now are the disappointments of the
past! In truth, [this means onlyJ the Ugandan expedition. For, despite the
thundering pronouncements of their leader, the Libyans have never engaged their
forces in the Middle East theater of operations.
In April 1979, shortly before the fall of Kampala, 2,000 men had been sent--
without being previously informed--to the rescue of Marshal Idi Amin Dada. Total
defeat: 400 dead or wounded, 600 prisoners taken by the Tanzanians, who drove a
hard bargain for their return. Among them, many non-Libyan Arabs, particularly
Tunisians, trained in camps in the Jamahiriya and in Lebanon. T'hey were "lacking
in fighting spirit, it is said these days in Tripoli to explain the defeat. It
is also true that they were far from their bases and on terrain with which they
were completely unfamiliar.
In any case, the men participating in "Operation Chad" would be much more highly
motivated. ~hree-fourths of them are Libyans~ the others being Syrians, South
Yemenis, and Palestinians (members of al-Sa'iqah, the pro-Syrian organization).
"Revolutionaries" who have opted for Libyan aationality and beerc generously
rewarded for it.
These shock troops apart, the Libyan army is still far from being equal to the
ambitions and objectives of its leader. Overwhelmed by the last word in weaponry,
the soldiers still have much to learn about handling these sophisticated arms.
Nomads for the most part, often illiterate, the men in the ranks are not battle-
hardened veterans. I11-disciplined, fond of parading--carrying themselves
jauntily with their Kalashnikovs slung across their backs--through the streets of
Tripoli or Benghazi, they are barely able even to march in step.
� One understands why the Libyan Army still needs experts and advisers from the
"fraternal countries" of the socialist bloc (who are not for all that engaged in
Chad) and foreign pilots (North Koreans, Syrians, South Yemenis...)
20
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ,
But even so, the "1980 model" is visibly better organized than in past years. A
result of the training provided by the foreign advisers. A result also of the
growing militarization of the society. For Qadhdhafi has transformed his country
into one huge barracks.
Up to this point, secondary and colle~ students of course underwent periods of
military training in order to serve in aray transport and as "missiliers"
[translation unknown] in case of need. Fr~~m now on, they will receive their
- training in arms at school. Already, in T�t.ipoli, primary schoolchildren are j
accoutered in combat dress and marching in step.
The fac[ories too will be transformed to meet the requirements of the army. To tell
the truth, Libyan workers already played a small enough part in production. ;
Henceforth, they wi.ll report to their work-places in military dress and armed,
and will '~e trained on-site.
But the finest success is the organizati.on of the womec? into brigades. There are
vast numbers of them in the armed forces, and they have the opportunity to achieve
officer-grade status. The militar~~ academy has been opened up to them. One sees
them in town, in their paramilitary uniforms, elegant, proud, and provocative. -
But woe to the "wolf." An over-enterprising young man found biting the dust in
the middle of the street in Tripoli following an exhibition of ~udo. Qadhdhafi's
revolutionary speeches have more impact on these women than on the men. And for ~
good reason. For them the army acts as a means of emancipation. The barracks
and authority (sometimes over the men) rather than confinement within the four walls
of the family house and submission to relatives.
And after all, since commercial activities were banned (1979), the status of
soldier has become a profitable one. Apart from the 3 months of intensive
instruction at the sta:t, one reports to the barracks ~ust as another reports to
the office. Unless one has guard duty, one goes home every evening when one`s
- duties are accomplished. A young recruit's pay is 80 dinars (1,200 French francs)
and is the owner of his own house. The soldier, like the officer, benefits from
the concessionary pricing on all purchases in army stores (50 percent less
expensive than prices in the city). on everything from furniture to electric
gadgets, not to mention food products.
But this militarization cum social pro~?otion is one thing, while war and its _
consequences are something else. For instance, there are these coffins which,
_ since the Chad offensive started, have been deposited at dawn on the doorsteps
of homes. When they are not put straight into the ground in the village cemetary.
The Libyans will not fail to react to this. But even so, it will not be eventual
shifts in public opinion that will stop Qadhdhafi. Especially since, as of 24
November, barely a month after the unleashing of the Chad offensive, victory seemed
at hand. After having forced ttieir way along the Ndjamena-Ati-Abeche axix (see
report from our special correspondent on page 28), the Libyans built a base at
Douguia (60 km north of the capital). From there, they could support a final
_ offensive against Habre's FAN, at the time when the FAT southerners of Col Wadal
Abdelkader Kamougue were beginning to show their strength against Goukouni Oueddei's ~
men entrenched at Farcha (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1037). -
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
Hissein Habre has good soldiers. But no airplanes or armored vehicles. The
balance of forces is overwhelmingly in favor of Qadhdhafi and the GUNT. And the
rAN gets no external support comparable to ~hat received by Goukouni. Certainly,
the Egyptians have been helping out for several months. But they do not like
being committed so far beyond their borders. And will France, which had an
understanding with Qadhdhafi on the sharing of influence in Chad (JEUNE AFRIQUE
No 1037), close its eyes indefinitely?
Many African countries, increasingly nervous, are pressing the French. Morocco,
which is being pressed by Libya through the POLISARIO: Tunisia, threatened on its
bordera by some 10,000 men, two superbly equipped divisions (435 tanks; 10 battalions
of infrantry, one of commandos; 40 Mirage F-1 and Mirage 5 aircraft; Tupolev-22
bombers; some 20 helicopters): both are denouncing Libyan expansioniam.

~ Egypt, on which are targeted the Scud-S missiles, is doing the same. Mali and ~
Niger. with limited defensive capabilities, potential victims of Qadhdhafi's
Sahara acheme--Qadhdhaif maintains opposition commandos in Libya--take refuge in
diacretion. Only Senegal, which has had (in its own "ayayollah", Ahmed I~alifa
Nyasse) a foretaste of Qadhdhafian subversion, has spoken out strongly through its
president, Leopold Sedar Senghor. But other countries have let Paris know that
the "Libyan invasion" was threatenitg the equilibrium of the region. On 24 November,
the Quai d'Orsay stated that /"the arrival of sizeable armed elements from the
outside gives a new dimension"/ to the civil war. More than a month after the
start of Libya's massive intervention, that is certainly an understatement!
In fact, without breaking its tacit accord with Tripoli, the government in Paris
must have given assurances to its friends in the region. In particular to those
most directly threatened (Niger and Mali): Qadhdhafi will not go further than Chad.
- France up to now was conceivable betting on a Libyan defeat after the elimination
of Hissein Habre. For Qadhdhafi's troops would have a hard time as an occupation
army exposed to the hostility of a majority of Chadians and to a guerrilla
movement on its own ground. But most Africans think the devil has been too much
indulged. 'Thanks to them, there is movement toward creation of a new inter-African
force under the banners of the United Nations. Under these conditions, the Soviets
woiild have no entry. And Qadhdhafi would be left with no choice but to withdraw.
This is how "Operation Chad" could end. But the Qadhdhafi "threat" remains. and
his expansionist, revolutionalry, and pan-Islamic ambitions. By throwing his army
into the conquest of Chad, he proved that nothing would stop him. Except, perhaps,
an "Operation Libya" mounted by some of his adversaries.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1980
951b
CSO: 4400
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICxAL USE ONLY ;
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
CHADIAN NATIONAL FEELING AGATNST LIBYA ARISING
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 28
[Article by Christian Grain--passages between slantlines originally published
iti italacs]
[Text] After Faya-Largeau, Dalait, Oum Chalouba and Biltine, Abeche has become the
basic ob,jective of Qadhdhafi's cohorts. This traditional and religious town in the
east, 100 km from the Sudanese frontier, is in reality the real arsenal of the FAN
[Northern Armed ForcesJ. Thls is where Hissein Habre's men store the arms they
capture from the enemy. It is through this point that the munitions bought on the
international market--whether in Sudan, Egypt, or in one or two other countries
that are willing to serve as intermediaries--are channeled. So it is from this
point that the goods needed in Ndjamena set out on their 750-km journey over roads
and trails.
Since 5 November, the Abeche-Ati-Jdjamena trail has been bombarded daily by the 22
Libyan Tupolevs. Hissein Habre told me several days ago: /"If the FAN disappeared,
the shock waves would be felt throughout Sahelian and central Africa. Nothing will
stop Libya. The French, who are looking at the short term, are deceiving themselves
thinking they are duping Libya. You cannot outfox Qadhdhafi."/ _
And Hissein Habre continues to fight. As a guerrilla. He fears he will lose Abeche
and be strangled in the capital. But he believes that if the Libyans bombed and
took Abeche, it would probably turn.against them and their allies. For Abeche is
not his fiefdom. He went there in February 1979 and reorganized the town for the
benefit of the population and particularly of the tradesmen. But most of the
children of Abeche are fighting in the ranke of Goukouni Oueddei and Acyl Ahmat.
If their town were taken by the Libyans and destroyed, they would certainly turn
against their ally of today once he became the invader.
It remains that Qadhdhafi's new strategy--carrying the struggle to the interior,
where he encounters the feeblest resistance--holds more dangers for the country as
- a whole than does~the possible taking of Abeche: habituation to the Libyan
presence on Chadian territory and on the borders of Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon.
T~ao months ago, a three-engine Tupolev-22 began dropping--2 or 3~imes a week, from
high altitude, and blindly--some bombs on Pldjamena.
23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
� V~\ VL L 1~J1LW V VL~ V~\Y~
Today, Chinook helicopters of American design (but manufacture~ll under license in
Italy and equipped by the French firm Thomson CSr) as well as small propeller-
driven aircraft resembling T-6's send salvos of rockets 4 or 5 times a day.
Without their activities being coordinated with a real ground offensive.
One has even gotten accustomed to the three Tupolev-22's vio lating Cameroonian
airspace every day in an east-west direction, between 1030 and 1200 hours, passing
over Kousseri and Ndjamen.a to come back along the Jd~amena-Abeche trail.
And to the Libyan helicopter teams playing tourist in Bongor, in southern Chad,
where they come to search out Colonel Kamougue's soldiers to bring them back up to
Farcha, the rotation of DC-4's from the Libyan squadron no longer sufficing.
I have met several members of Goukouni's FAP who are still j ust as opposed to
Hissein Habre, but manifestly shaken as to the justice of their fight. It is
above all the southerners who are disturbed: their fear and their hatred of
Hissein Habre are beginning to yield to their fear of having to learn Qadhdhaf i's
green Book by heart.
It certainly would seem that, in the face of Libyan ambitions, the birth of a -
Chadian national feeling might just be under way. But is it already too late?
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1980
9516
CSO: 4400
21~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
REVITALIZATION OF NORTH-SOUTH DIALOG REPORTID
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRArTEII~iS in French 5 Dec 8o pp 3326-3327
~Article by Jean-Claude Lucass "Seventh Plenary Session of the Club of Dakar
Sousse, 24-26 November)i A Contribution to the Revival of the North-South Dialogue"j
LText] To cause social and economic antagonisms today xhich are so threatening to
the ideal of squaring the '~virtuous circle" of participatory development is cer-
tainly very difficult: Yet. hoKever contradictory they may seem among themselves,
the often stubbornly held positions taken by the protagonists of the crisis that
is to say the industrialized nations~ xhether liberal or socialist~ the oil produ-
cing countries, whether or not members of OPDC~ the developing countries taken as
an excessively undifferentiated whole xould xell and truly t~ing together the _
logical conditions for a dynamic b~eakthrough if they were to decide that they real]y
want to "get out of it." It was precisely these conditions xhich the Qub of Dakar~
following the example of others~ planned to reconcile by the end of its seventh
plenary session xhich met from 24 to 26 November in Pert EL Ka~ntaoui, near Sousse,
with the resolute intention of shoxing hox the fulfilment of the intereats of each
of the three components of the world comnunity furthers the peace and dignity of its
peoples. It was a matter then of making a contribution to the revival of the North-
South dialogue,which fortunately proceeds outside the narrow paths of official insti-
tutions in which it has alread.y become fairly well bogged down.
But a1 though, stepping back~ the report on deficiencies and potentials becomes
easier to draw up and virtually banal, although the analyses of the causes, taking
into account elements of passion~ laings out a nonetheless complex explanation of
the crisis and enriches the theory of the exchanges of nex concepts (interdependence~
compensated balance, f1oK of factors~ national preferences for structures...~~ the
egoism and awkwardness of human groups put a b~ake, for the t~.ms.being, on the imple-
mentation of international economic relations finally committed to justice, equality
and "greater welfare," relations inspired by a real joint responsibility xhich
people to a large degree~ with an excess of paralyzing meanings~ still perceive as
being alxays quicker t4 give in to the seduction of deceptive myths.
This is the summary of the approach determined from the outset* and Kh~ch~ for
lack of.really original conclusive proposals~ has opened the way toward study and
thought perspectives which are encouraging. Rather than the somewhat vain and
* An approach introduced in the opening statements of Messrs Diaxara~ I~loncef Bel _
Hadj Amor~ minister attached to the prime minister for Civil Service and Adminis-
trative Reform, of ~nisia~ and Alfred Sauvy~ grofessor at the College of F~ance.
25
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
?Va\ Vl'L'lVl[1L V~1L vL\L~
especially unnecessarily polished statements in diplomatic language which ia far
too cautious, what will bexetnembered of the activities of this last plenary aession
is that part ma.ybe the best xhere the thoughts of the participants shared
- aloud were to be found~ that part wher~ they dare to go further and deeper, which
nourishes the "tune of the times" with its ideas~ in short that part which deserves
more from the Club of Dakar than the excessive formality of the procedures a,~~d the
scholasticism which one might have feared it Hould succwnb to~ a victim of the am-
biguities and paradoxes of its formula or of its size, if not of its success.
~ Here then, distributed among the six fa.milies of adopted proposals~ is an overview
of the debatea.
I. Investment of Surplus Capital -
For the oil producing countries with a balance of payments surplus, the incitement
to invest is largely a function of the guarantees of security and return likely to
protect their financial assets~ specifically from monetary erosion. Hence, the .
idea of an indexing of the value of capital. Such an arrangement would~ in prin-
ciple, be compensated by an agreement to moderate the development of the price of
oil and~ on the other hand~ be accompanied~ xith regasd to the borrowers~ by condi-
tions strictly adapted to their needs and ca,p&,bilities.
Several ideas were brought forwaxd during the deba.te, which would improve by being
considered during possible exploratoryr studies at a later date. For example, the
recommendation picked up from the Brandt Comiaission aimed at modifying the
statutes of the World Bank in order to authorize it to agree to loans representing
doul~le its social capital. This measure alone would free an added capacity of
80 billion dollars. Moreover} the precedent created by the IMF of selling gold
reserves at auction of whi~h t.hA fixst agreement, comrlAtely imnlemented, d3d _
~ not lead to a renewal could inspire countries which dispose of reseives to trans-
form a part (10 percent, for exa.mple~ at the current commercial market price, but
it is not possible to make even an approximate evaluation of the effects of this
system.
II. Increased Free Financial ~ansfers
Tn its general form, public aid no longer seems separate from energy prohlems, and
- it is unfortunate that during the sixtles the industrialized countries missed the
opportunity to earmark part of the oil returns they xere enjoying at the time, for
the developing countries. The worrisome case of Mauritania illustrates this remark:
it is experiencing a shortage of drinking water because it can no longer distill sea
water in the quantities it needs due to the prohibitive technical costs.
On this subject, the Club of Dakar pursued the thought it ha.d started developing
during its meeting in Abidjan ~n 1976. It involved moving towards basing aid on a
tax on the order of a"world solidarity tax." Three possitile bases for this assess-
ment are being considered: a) an automatic contribution by the rich countries based
on their national income; b) on the trade of energy products; c~ on the trade of
military material s. _
The working hypothesis of the establishment of a preferential price for petroleum,
granted by the exporting oil producing countries to the nonexporting oil producing
countries, was abandoned because it raised nwnerous objections concerning
26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY .
difficulties of implementation. Its formulation in itself was already an obstacle
to a preliminary study. All the sa.me~ this arrangement should not be completely
ruled out from consideration. As a raatter of fact, the examples of Venezuela and
Mexico have been cited to back it up. These countries have committed themselves
to supply 9 member countries of the Andean Community xith 160~000 barrels of crude
a day in return for the following payment agreement: 70 percent of the price is
subject to a normal agreement and 30 percent to yment spread over 5 yeass. This
30 percent ma.y be subject to long term (25 years~transformation according to normal
loan conditions. This point undoubtedly feeds numerous controversies, particularly
among those who see it as an additional incitement to the consumption of this non-
renewable raw ma.terial~ the maaiagement of which it rrould be desirable to organize:
hydrocarbons are indispensable to the production of 23,800 products, and these pro-
ducts should be given priority in the use of hydrocarbons.
It is well known that public aid constitutes an imperfect and quantitatively insuf-
ficient instrument (overall~ 0.3tI~ percent of the affected GNP for the member coun-
tries of the OECD~ as against a rate initially set at 1 percentj. Ftizrthermore, the
aid resulting f~om bilateral cooperation between countries generally takes the form
of a relationship of dependence~ which erodes its effects, if it does not invalidate
them. Finally, the critical situation of endebtedness of the developing countries
the analysis of which shows an extreme diversity of structures requires a
renegotiation which would not simply be an extension of credits over time, while
the industri~.7. countries of the OECD no longer dispose of surplusses which would
a11ow them to respond to the financial needs of the developing countries, surplusses
which ase virtually a11 in the hands of the petroleum producing countries with po-
sitive balances of payment. This point touches on one of the aspects of the inter-
dependence of situ.ations which necessitate the definition of a financial and mone- _
taxy economic order reconstructed on thoroughly modified hases.
This observation introduces one of the most urgent proposals to be implemen~ed,
specifically a just payment for raw ma.terials for which it should be possihle to
guaxantee export receipts in real terms. If the principle does not raise any con-
troversy~ the compensatory mechanisms assuming tha.t the current conditions of
price setting are maintained ca11 for a reform going substantially beyond the
usual stopgap measures. This approach leads to a program of local industrial de-
velopment of the products, which is the only way to b~ing out the indispensable
- added value by which countries have a hold on their oxn future by controlLing an
endogenous and self-centered development. Hence, the action is directed towaxds
the causes and not the results.
The following proposals are divided into these two groups of ineasnres.
III. Strategic Development Options
Efforts must be made to increase agricultural production by giving the latter the
priority role of satisfying food needs. This orienta,tion cannot keep the developing
countries from paxticipating in the process of applied research in the new fields
which constitute the technological stakes for the 1980's~ such as agrobiology and
- nonconventional energy. Access to technology and the obstacles which slow down or
virtually prohibit its transfer, constitute a particularly open theme for thought
among the relevant parties.
27
+ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
rv~~ Vlr1\.Lt1L u.~c V1~Ll
~
IV. Development of Horizontal Cooperation
In the case of Africa~ regional integration in particular and cooperation at the
level of technological research should drax on the achievements attained by the
economic communities of Latin America (Andean Treaty) and of South-East Asia (Asean~.
V. Less Developed Countries
In order to contribute its own ideas to the xork of the United Nations Conference
on less developed countries~ to be held in Paris in September 1981, the Club of
Dakar has set the objective of introducing "concrete groposals" on the subject as
early as the first half of 1981. It would involve defining those means which would
a11ow the most disadvantaged na.tions (the number of which is 30~ 24 of which are
African~ to reach a minimum income level.
VI. Start of Global Negotiations
A suggestion was made to the effect tha.t participation of the developing countries
- in decision making within the IMF, specifically in matters of allocations~ should
reflect a real democratization.
Fina1 Comments
The Club of Dakar is changing its puhlic image. The strategy of development~ it is
true, requires an understanding of the phenomena and the imagination to produce so-
lutions comparable in their processes to Keynesian theory~ according to which the
genera.l interest does not equal the sum of particular interests. In order to take
action it will obviously be necessary to understand the direction of the develop-
ments which~ in a scattered way~ Kork in depth toward the emergence of new inter-
national economic relations which some people, perpetually behind the times~ will
a1 ways look upon as '~the world turned upside down." By hreaking through its re-
gional framework~ the Club of Dakar gives a symbolic scope to its gesture: Africa,
which for a long time was kept behind developments~ is indicating its desire to
participate, through its potential xeight, through its originality, in the develop- _
r ment of the contemporary world.
By presenting, in the next few weeks, the six proposals xhich have just been
adopted, to the secretaxy general of the United Nations~ to the president of the
World Ba.nk and to the director general of the IMF, I~ Diawara, president of the
Club of Da3car, will confirm the desire to reopen the North-South negotiations on
the ba.sis of far-reaching thoughts and not in the spirit of "everyone for himself,"
which alone leads to catastrophe. The Club of Dakar Wi7.1 ha.ve shown the xay.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie~ Paris~ 1980
84~63 -
CSO: 4400
2$
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
i
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
REPORTAGE ON LOME I PROJECTS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 5 Dec 80 pp 3328, 29
[Report from Brussels by a special correspondent: "Lome I and ~he Pro~ects of
Regional Cooperation"]
[Taxt] The Lome I Agreement reserved explicitly for regional cooperation an amount
of approximately 10 percent of the credits, or 300 million European currency units
(1 ECU = about 5.5 FFr). What is the status of the use of these crediCs? As of
1 December 1980, the situation is the following: nearly 77 percent of the avail- H
able credits have been allotted, or more than 230 million ECU's. Of this total,
around a third have actually been spent.
Africa accounts for the largest part of the allotments, with more than 158 million.
Bq large zones, the dfstribution for the pro~ects is the following: West Africa,
80.8 million; East Africa, 40.9 million; Central Africa, 8.1 million; southern
Africa, 25 million; to which is added 7.5 million for studies and 6.5 million for
technical assiatance and training. The Caribbean has received nearly 20 million .
and the Pacific countries 10 million. Finally, operations of general technical
cooperation have absorbed more than 32 million: com~ercial promotion, budget of
the "Center for Industrial Development," furniehing experts to the secretariat
general of the ACP's [African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries], etc.
Among the aid projects, the /transportation/ [in boldface] sector is predominant:
more than 100 million ECU's, including 40 million allotted in eastern Africa, 26
million in West Africa, 8 million in central Africa, 18 million in southern Africa,
more than 6 million in the Caribbean and more than 5 million in the Pacific. The
number of pro~ects is quite high, and mostly concern works of a very significant
financial amount: 10 million ECU's for the Abid~an-Accra axis, 20 million for the
Lusahunga-Bukumbe highway, more than 12 million for the Butare-Kayenza highway,
10 million for the Botswana-Zambia highway, etc.
The second sector is perhaps more surprising: it concerns /training institutions/
[in boldface] such as the "Veterinary Institute of Dakar" (4.5 million ECU's), the
"University of the South Pacific" (3.2 million), for a total of nearly 28 million
which concerns mostly West Africa and southern Africa, the Caribbean and the
Pacific.
Next comes the domain of /large dams/ [in boldface] which with only two pro~ects
totals 20 million ECU's, in West Africa: "Senegal River Development Organization"
29
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
(OMVS) and "Mano River Union," not to mention the studies. Finally, the fourth
sector in order of financial importance is that of /industry/ [in boldface] which _
with the "Cimao" pro,ject [West African Cement Company] already accounts for 18
million ECU's, not counting the "Center for Induatrial Development," etc.
These four sectors total nearly 200 million ECU's, or 87 percent of the all~:tments.
This diatribution clearly shows the need, felt by the different States involved,
to put regional integration in a priority position on an organized, modern network
of lines of communfcation between them. It might perhaps be tempting to regret
the absence, among the important sectors, of regional research (agricultural
~ research, solar or wind energy, etc.), which should have made a better showing,
but perhaps the Sth EDF [European Development Fund] will balance the 4th on this
point.
The European Commission has just decided upon a apecial aid package of one million
ECU's in favor of the following countries: Benin, Ghana, Upper Volta, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Togo. Thie aid responds to the call
directed to the EEC by the "International Office of Epizooties" (OIE) and by the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) for the institution of an emergency program
intended to combat cattle disease of which several outbreaks have recently reappeared
in five countries of the region with danger of propagation. The total cost of this
program is eatimated at 5.142 million ECU's.
The Commission also decided upon a special aid package of 150 thousand ECU's in
favor of the Central African Republic for the purchase of essential goode intended
for the populations of the Northeast affected by the famine.
/Next Seminar at Lome on the Center for Industrial Development/ [in boldface] "The
Center for Industrial Development (ACP-EEC Agreement of Lome) is organizing on
9, 10 and 11 December 1980 at Lome, a seminar to attract the attention of the
- countries of West Africa on the functions of the CID and in particular the new
aspects as defined in the new Lome Agreement. This seminar will bring together
three participants from each country chosea from ministries of industry or planning,
from development organizations, from banks or private industry, from technical
ministries, agencies or institutions. Also present will be representaCives of the
Commission of European Communities, of the European Investment Bank, of the Council
of Ministers, of the ACP secretariat, of the ACP-EEC Committee for Industrial
Cooperation, of the local branches of the CID, of regional organizations of the
ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African StaCes] and of the European Office of
Patents.
The seminar will be presided over by Mr Peter A. Afolabi, co-president of the
ACP-EEC Committee for Industrial Cooperation. -
The agenda will allow for, among others, sessions of dialogue in the course of
which the two following points will be discussed: promotion of the CID for the
establishment of new industrial enterprises in the countries of West Africa with
the intervention of EEC industry; potential assistance of the CID in the adaptation
of technology and assistance to the existing industries.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
9508
CSO: 4400
3~ .
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS ~
INTERNATIONAL COCOA ACCORD EXAMINID
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3133
- [Editorial: "Economic or Political Priorities"] ,
[TextJ We must no doubt rejoice that it was possible to arrive at an international
agreement on cocoa in Geneva. Naturally, dialog between producers and consumers
is always preferable to absence of negotiations, no matter how difficult the
latter. Nevertheless, in spite of the conclusion of the talks which were staggered
over 2 yearg, questions remain. Without discussing in detail the technical
provisions it is significant that two of the countries most directly concerned
have refused to sign. One, the Ivory Coast is the chief cocoa producer, the other, -
the United States, the chief consumer.
Their principles are simple and typical of the misunderstanding prevailing between ;
the rich countries of the industrialized world and the poor countries producing the
- basic products or raw materials.
The Ivory Coast states that its present marketing prices do not permit the suitable
� remuneration of the planters, and that the totally erratic fluctuations of the
rates on the world market are to be explained not by economic considerations, but
by the interplay of unbridled international speculation which precludes any
- reasonable planning of its development. Such a situation can only lead to the
land being abandoned by discouraged farmers, who come and increase the population
of the suburbs of the large cities and the number of unemployed, with all the risks ~
of internal "destabilization" resulting in the country. The Ivory Coast is
therefore attempting to obtain the guarantee for the regular and negotiated
increase of the sale prices for export, in the same way exactly as the consumers,
the industrialized nations, wish to obtain from the oil producing countries an
engagement on progressive price increases fixed by common agreement. The Geneva
accord did not seem to the Ivory Coast to be accomplishing this objective, so it
refused to be associated therewith, and it is extremely probable, as it asserts,
that its evaluation of the agreement is ahared by other producers. On the contrary,
- the United States, and to a lesser degree, the Federal Republic of Germany and
Great Britain maintain that price fluctuatione are caused by the phenomenon of the
ad~ustment of s~xpply and demand according to the laws of a liberal economy. The
* The broad lines of the contract may be found in MARCHES TROPICAUX of 21 November i
1980, p 3116 I
i
~
~
. ,
31
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
world stocks now amount to about 450,000 tons, and the cocoa crop is abundant for
the fourth consecutive year. It is therefore not surprising that the market is
on a downward trend. Being faithful to the principles of liberalism, the iJnited
States who have nevertheless ~ust ratified the accord on the Funds of Stabilization
of Raw Materials, are hardly favorably inclined towards agreements which distort
the market interplay. By the way, they had signed neither of the two previous
international accords on cocoa, of 1972 and 1975. On the other hand, the United
States point out that cocoa is not an indispensable product and that the democratic
governments have no means of c~mpelling their industrialista to give up the use of
the synthetic products which may be taken as cocoa substitutes. What can the
producers do then? Try to change the volume of the production offered on the
market? It is impossible for them to reduce the production, unlike the oil
producers, whose resources are maintained intact in their subsoil, in this case
lack of maintenance of cocoa plantations leads to their premature aging and has an
adverse effect on their future production capacity. Should they store some of
their crop? Storage costs are high, since the proper preservation of cocoa requires
costly solutions. Should they establish a cartel and use the regulating funds
created in the execution of the two previous agreements, and which amounts today
to about $230 million? At present rates, the fund would permit the purchase of
about 100,000 tons, that is an amount insufficient by far to affect the rates.
After the expiry of the second international agreement in March 1980, the
producing countries had agreed, in a spirit of conciliation, not to demand, as they
were entitled, the dissolution of this fund and the reimbursement to the producing
countries of the 90 percent to which they were entitled, desiring thus to leave
the chance of arriving at another international agreement. The Ivory Coast now
considers that it has been very poorly paid for its good faith. Actually, to be
able to affect effectively the rates, the cartel of producers should have at its
disposal a mass of financial resources which they do not possess today. Unless
they request the countries which have an eccess of available capital, such as
certain OPEC countries, or the cocoa producing countries should discover oil
deposits on their own territories--that is the case of the Ivory Coast--and should
use their oi1 resources to maintain the cocoa rates...
Since a~t the present time, cocoa is not a strategic product, the producers are
practically disarmed, and after a rear guard struggle for the sake of their honor,
have no solution other than to bow to the law of the mighty. Therein lies
precisely the core of the problems of development. In all the international forums,
the representatives of the governments of the industrialized countries proclaim
loudly their solidarity with the 'I'hird World countries, and acknowledge the
imperious need to raise the standard of living of their populations, if only to
facilitate the creation of a market for their manufactured products. These same
industrialized countries are prepared to accomplish non negligible efforts to
help the Third World countries to restore the equilibrium in their balance of
- payments, and to achieve progress in the setting up of infrastructures, the
improvement of the productivity of agriculture, basic education and professional
training. But the industrial world does not seem capable of understanding that "
the most rational means of permitting the Third World to achieve these objectives
is to guarantee it the receipt of stable export income, especially when these
revenues come from a single product, such as is the case for many developing
countries. It is quite apparent that the simple interplay of the laws of the market
32
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
between unequal partners, even if it is not distorted by purely spectulative i
maneuvers, cannot assure this stability of resources.
It is therefore the prerogatives of the governments to choose between the immediate
interests of their industrialists, in this case, the chocolate manufacturers--
but cocoa is only taken as an example here--and their long term interest, that is,
their economic and political relations with the whole of the developing world,
which holds a considerable part of the basic products and raw materials, not to
mention oil, indispensable to the industries of the developed countries of the
world. It is essentially a political choice which represents a heavy future
commitment. A real desire to help the development is manifested at least as much
in the positions adopted in the secret negotiations in Geneva or elsewhere, in
connection with any agreement on products as in the declarations naturally
impregnated with the greatest understanding aad deepest generosity at the tribune
of the United Nations, but which have hardly any other merit than that of being _
non-binding.
It is inconsistent to denounce the risks of destabilization of the Third World in
Africa in particular, and at the same tir~e to contribute to this very destabilization
by removing from the local governments the means of fighting against it by
improving the lot of their people. The example of the international accord on
_ cocoa is a timely reminder for us of this fact.
Not all the governments of the Nine Nations of the EEC have as yet become aware of
this. On the other hand, it should be mentioned that the officials of the
Brussels Coa�nission, whom it is fashionable in certain circles to refer to as
"technocrats" prove to be more far-seeing politicians in the area of this
type of problems.
COPURIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
9018
CSO: 4400
i
i�
I
i'
33
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
i
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
PROGRESSIVE FORCES GROUPING--The creation of a"grouping of African progressive ,
forces" was central to Soviet-Ethiopisn discussions from the beginning of the off i-
c ial visit by Lt Col Mengistu Haile Mariam to Moscow (where he arrived 27 October).
Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Liberia would be membera. But not Guinea
or Guinea-Bissau. (Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE ia FYench 19 Nov 80 p 41] 9693
CSO: 4400
34
FOR OFFICI~IL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OF .
_ ANGOLA
" WEST ADVISED TO ABANDON HOSTILE 4TTITUDE
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in F`rench 19 Nov 80 p 36
[Article by Francois Soudan: "The Time of the Co~issioners"]
� [TextJ Independence saas achieved 5 years ago on 11 November,
but the ann~vereary was not a euphoric one.
The Angolan file, the reaults of 5 yeara of independence, reads a bit like a court
case. With the indictment, the defense, and the extenuating circumstances. Those
who see Angola as a state on probation stress that noti~.ing, or almost nothing,
has changed there since 1975, and that 5 years later, this state still does not
control its territory: 20,000 Cuban soldiera are permanently stat ioned between
Cabinda and Benguela, and insecurity continues to reign in the four southern pro-
- v inces (Moxico, Bie, Cuando-Cuhango, f~nene) where UNITA's (the rebellion move-
- ment's) forces continue to operate with varying results.
- Their chief, Jonas Savimbi, who benefits from the discreet support of Ga~~n, the
Ivory Coast, and particularly of Senegal (he claims to support "b~ack socialism"),
has established hia general's tieadquarters in the north of Namibia. His troops are
armed by South Africa, but also--Savimbi recently repeated this--by the People's
Republic of China.
' Ir:dictment
~ To the north, the enclave of Cabinda is atso agitated by autonomist rumblings,
while the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclav~i has been deprived of ita
leadership by the death of its "historic leader" N'Zita Henriques Tiago at the be-
ginn ing of September, no doubt the victim of a settling of accounts.
Reconciliation policies seem to be excluded, since during the month of August, again,
25 antagonists were executed.
Others, the "advocates", note, however, the successes in the areas of education and
of health, ae well as the "spirit of democracy" which rQigns at the time of the
iimninent replacement of the Council of the Revolution by a popularly elected as-
sembly. Above all, they feel that the true source of all the probleme is the con-
stant intervention of the South African Army. These many territorial violations,
~
i
i
i
35 '
FOR OFFICIAL USE 0!JLY .
t
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
which culm3nated at the beginning of June with the "operation Smokeshell" (J.A.
No 1016) have obliged the Angolan government to devote almoet half of its budget
to national defense.
Nothing is untrue in this indictment, or in the defense, except that to the list
_ of handicaps must be added the death of Agostinho Neto, a little more than a year -
ago, on 11 September 1979. The cautious attempts at internal and extemal political
openness, 3nitiated during the last m~onths of his life by the one that was affec-
tionately called "Netinho" have since been blocked. Only Neto, no doubt, had suf-
- ficient authority and charisma to criticize his own errors. His successor, Jose
Eduardo dos Santos, is primarily a puppet, around whom men like the minister of
security, Kundi Payama, the head of defense, Pedro Maria Tonha (who replaced Iko
Carreira in this post) , and the head of the party organization, Iucio Lara, p~ay an
all-powerful role. This is without counting the 17 provincial commiseioners who,
with ministerial rank, practically constitute a parallel government.
On the Cond it ion
This tendency towards extreme militarization and "sovietization" of the country
_ will only be reinforced if the West continues to adopt its frankly hostile at-
titude towards Angola. Recall that, in 1978, returning from a visit to Luanda,
- the European development commissioner, Claude Cheysson, strongly recommended large-
scale economic assietance. Nothing, or little, since has come from the West.
The ihiited States, who still have not recognized Angola, even risk turning their
hostility into open de�iance. At the end of June, in fact, the senate in ~ash-
ingtoa decided to aanul the "Clark ammea.dment" which, since 1976, has prohibited
the CIA from intervening with the FNLA, and particularly with ZJNITA. T'he pro-
Savimbi "lobby" (which includes such prestigious names as Henry Kissinger, Henry
Jacksan, Thomas 0'Neill, and Stansfield Terner) thus hopes--and they are not hiding
it--to make the Soviets pay for the invasion of Afghanistan. On the condition, of
course, that they will have an attentive ear in the White House. Ronald Reagan's,
for example.
COPYRIGHT : Jeune Afrique GRUPJLA 1980 _
9693
CSO; k400
. 36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY !
i
ANGOLA
i
i
NEW EQUIPMENT, IMPROVEAiENTS FOR BENGUELA RAILROAD
Par is MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French S Dec 80 p 3258 ~
[Te xt] The question of whether the Benguela Railroad did or did not provide domes- !
tic seYVice, even sporadically, during the period 1976-1978 can be argued ad
infinitum. One thing is certain, however, na.mely that the railroad was closed
to international traffic during that period. Furthermore, this denial of access '
to the port of Lobito was financially detrimental to Zaire and Zambia. This
situation has now--November 1978--returned to normal, but the feeling of insecurity
persists all along that section~of the railroad in areas still controlled by
UNITA [Natianal Union for the Total Independence of AngolaJ. Nevertheless, the ~
shipping of copper has resumed via this line which~ all things considered, governa
the future development of regional railroad projects.
Fears expressed about inevitable competition from the TAZARA [Tanzania-Zambia
Railway Authority] railroad once that liae became o~erational, have proved to be '
highly exaggerated, inasmuch as Zambian copper contin.~s to be exported mainly via '
Atlantic ports. Moreover, there is apparently no reas~~n to believe such fears
would revive if a new railway line connecting Kinshasa to Ilebo were to become a ~
real ity . ~ . ;
Consequently investment funds are once again being granted the Bengue3a railroad
for the purpose of enhancing its operating efficiency. The EEC, for example,
recently approved financial aid designed to further dieselize the railroad's
locomotive fleet (18 diesel locomotives) and increase its freight carrying capacity
(900 freight cars). This EEC assistance amounts to 8 million dollars. In addi-
tion, an agreement recently signed with the Arab Bank for African Economic .
- Development will enable Angola to have 10 million dollars for capital expenditures.
The railroad unquestionably has major requirements both for infrastructure facili-
ties and equipment. The infrastructure requirements are topped only by the priority ;
need to replace and qualitatively improve equipment. These requirements are expres-
sed in financial terms in the 1980 equipment budget's goals. This budget totals _
some 45 million pounds sterling, including 9.2 million for the purchase of locomo-
tives (17 road diesel-elactric locomotives and 12 diesel-hydraulic switch engines),
28 million for railroad cars (52 passenger cars and 900 freight cars), and 3.7
million for track repairs and improvements.
I
i
~ I
37
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ i
~
~
i
I
I
~
I
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
Angola's three main railroada all nationalized, are not connected one to the other.
This disadvantage is a recurrent major topic of discussion. Interconnecting these
three lines would, among other advantages, provide better distribution of the
traffic load among each of the ports whose current capacitiea are not flexible
enough to handle variations in the volume and rate of traffic. A north-south line
--Luanda-Benguela/Lobito-Mocamedes--will probably be the sub~ect of very detailed
and rather long-range study. If funding for this long-awaited pro~ect can be
ob tained, it will undoubtedly become a reality. Mining of Zambia's rich uranium
depoaita would condition, at least in party, any development of the western rail
line of that country's Atlantic outlet.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
8041
CSO: 4400
_a
.
38
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
ANGOLA
BRIEFS
USSR AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION--USSR specialists recently visited Angola to make
a profitability study co.ncerning the establishment of agricultural companies
for cotton and wheat cultivation. Regardictg cotton, the area under consideration
measures about 30,000 hectares for the production of approximately 80,000 tons.
The cultivation of cotton ia on an upswing in Angola and should become very
important in an economic and social context during the next 5 years. Established
� in 1978-1979 ~n a modest scale, cotton plantations reach ed 9,000 hectares in
1979-1980 and 13,000 hectares for the 1980-1981 season, with an estimated produc-
tion of 13,000 tons. Increased production will thus satisfy the needs of the
domestic textile industry. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 28 Nov 80 p 3179]
CSO: 4G00
,
39
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
BENIN
UNRF�.ST IVITIIIN LABOR GR~UpS EXAMINED
Paris PIARCHES TROPICAUX TiT TICDITERRANEfiNS in French 5 Dec 80 p 3346
[Text] The labor world o.f Benin is undergoing a crisis due to conflicts of in-
fluences and interests and to partisan clashes. All these conflicts make it
difficult to viea~ with con~idence and serenity the situation that prevails at the
present time. Nevertheless, it is possible to recall certain lines of fc~rce of
the union movement since th~ accession of President Kerekou's r~qime 8 years a,v,o.
- The advent of President Kerekou's r~gime was not a union move, but the unions
c~uickly gave him their support and cooperation. Nevertheless, in 1975 the
National Federation of Unions succeeded in removing from its secretariat P1r (;h~zo,
who had been a member of that secretariat for many years. IVhen P~r (fiezo was ex-
pelled, an open~crisis arose in the union movement. The faction led by D1r ~h~zo
remained loyal to him, and P1r Ghezo found himself secretary general o~ the manag-
ing office of the National Federation of Workers Unions of Benin (UNSTB). That
orqanization became one of the basic organizations of the party. But certain
local cells called in vain for the summoning of a clarification congress which
never took place. On the contrary, these cells were centered around elements ~
favorable to the so-called "oPportunist" line. As these groupings made possible
a strict control, it was decided to hold a congress in December 1980, whereas it
was suPposed to have been held after at least 4 years. That explains the excite-
ment that has been observed; for the last 3 or 4 months local cells of. the ~h~zo
faction of the UNSTB have been holdino mini-congresses every week end. But, con-
trary to what might have been hoped, unanimity has not been achieved.
For after having eliminated, in 1975, the purist unionist faction, which might be
called Leftists in European terms, the UNSTB has been encountering within the
Revolutionary Party of Benin itself, of which the UNSTB forr?s a part, resistance by -
opposition groups which do not recognize the present managing office run by Mr
Gh~zo. These oppositions have led to the formation of ou�law unions, of paral~el
unions. F.xpulsions have already been announced and arrests made. It is useless
to say that yesterday's "leftist" faction should be rubbing their hands today.
The situation is such that President Mathieu Kerekou's arbitration will be f.ound
necessary. And if in addition to the economic problems due to improvisations and
to chaotic and irrational management of the state corporations, he must confront
union agitation and turmoil among the members of his own party, he runs the risk
of not bein~; master o~ the situation for long.
Tl~e shortcomings of the UNSTB arise from the erosion of its leadership, from their
continual compromisin; with all the regimes that have replaced each other in the
L~0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
country, which has led to a lack of credibility among the rank and file, who
judge somewhat severely the concentration of roles and the plurality of of~ices
that they observe in union o~ficials. Thus one may be both cabinet minister and
secretary general of. a union; one may be retired and resume office in a field
that is not his own; one may remain secretary general in his sector, in which he
has been allowed to take advantage of his retirement rights; or still better, one
may be vice president of the Revolutionary Ceneral Assembly, director general of
the Benin Social Security Office, and secretary general of the union...
Mother tragedy of the UhST6 is not having provided itself with any known nroQrar~,
having bound itself to international union institutions when its everyday concern
should be the training of its members and staff. This lack has been remarked upon
several times by the chief of state in the course of his visits to the corpora-
tions, when he observed that when the workers do not even know their rip,hts, it
is useless to demand that they meet their obli~ations.
The ?,�orker in Benin holds industry congresses because it is demanded of him. He
also looks on impassively at the leaders' squabbles. He certainly considers that
he has not yet been given the floor. And the unanimity that is observed at these _
cong~:esses conceals much too much resentment in a country where the labor world -
is �raditionally undisciplined and rebellious. It is said at Cotonou that criti-
ci~m should be voiced at all stages. It might be use�ul, by way of suiting the
action to the word and in order to get in out of the storm, to allow the real
worker to speak, as the higher echelons were allowed to do in October 1979...
ACEC: RePresentative at Cotonou for !Vest Africa
The Charleroi Electrical Engineering Shops (ACEC) have just installed a represent-
ative at Cotonou for the countries of Plest Africa. He is Mr Francis T~onin, and
. may be contacted at BP 1881, Cotonou 1 or by Telex N� 5085.
COPYRIGHT: Ren~ riorPux et Cie, Paris 1980
$$15
CSO: 4400
~1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
CAPE VERDE
COUNTRY SUITED TO NEW ENERGY SOURCES RESEARCA
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 10 Nov 80 p 36
[Article by Augusta Conchiglia]
[Text] Diversification and augmeatatioa of foreign assist-
- ance have become a vital necessity.
ThQ visit which Pedro Pires, prime minister of the Republic of Cape Verde, made to
Paris at the end of October--where he met his French counterpart, Raymond Barre,
as well as the ministers of foreign affairs and of cooperation, Jean Francois-Poncet
and Robert Galley, respectively--was concluded by the guarantee on France's part of
an increase in the sid supplied to the archipelago.
New Energy Sources
France is also involved in projects of national interest, such as the installa-
tion of an inland station for radio coverage of the whole archipelago, and establish-
ment of~a center for applied research iato new energy sources. The latter project,
which would be f inanced and implemented within the framework of the Inter-State Com-
mittee to Fight the Drought in the Sahel, should eaable eacploration of new tech-
nologies for the use of solar and wind energy.
Cape Verde, exposed throughout the year to the sun and to violent winds, in fact
constitutes an ideal location for experiments ia the f ield of research of "energies
of the future". Petroleum bills are becaming iasupportable for this small country
which is deprived of signif icant natural reaources. Thus, we muat profit from
scientific progress in this area," remarked the Cape Verdian prime minister during
a preas conference in Paris. Tn this regard, he indicated, there are proapects
for development of economic relations with Nigeria, which is interested in 3mport-
ing salt--of which Cape Verde is a large producer--and in cooperation in the area
of f ishing. On the other hand, Lagos could supply oil.
While awaittng or, better, while looking at, the future, Cape Verde wants to be a
pilot country for nonconventional energies. As the archipelago is of volcanic
origin, the applied research could also bring results in tne area of geothermal
energy. Sweden and Belgium, moreover, have undertaken. studies in this area.
� .
- 1~2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
To counteract the effects and also, in part, the causes of drought, Cape Verde,
since ite independence, has launched a spectacular campaign to retimber and to work
on the "protection and restoration of soils" on all the ielands. In 1979, 1 mi111on
treea were planted, and hundrede of dikes and miles of terracea were built to
"anchor" the mountains and protect the fertile lands which the rains, as rare as
they are violent, have carried towards the sea for decades.
Absorption of Unemployment
The results of this work are already visible in the increase in agricultural pro-
duction over the past few years. Progress in collecting undergroimd water as, for
example, on the island of San Nicolau, which will soon have large water reserves
for both consumption and irrigation, is encouraging and assures, at the very least,
a better existence for the people. Let us also note that +the work for soil pro-
- tection and the rearrangement of the agriculture, also achieved by means of funds
from foreign food aid, have enabled maximum employment, with Praia thus absorbing
_ the chronic une~ployment which, for almost half a century, has compelled mass mi-
gration of Cape Verdians.
However, Cape Verde is still far from being able to depend on its own resources,
and it must go abroad to cover its essential needs.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie '
9693
CSO: 4400
43
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~ CAPE VERDE
BRIEFS
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION DOWN--The total volume of Cape Verde's agricultural
production for the present year will only be 14 percent of an average year
(with 7,164 tons (because of the drought which has again affected the country,
- the Cape Verdian Ministry of Rural Development indicated on 19 December.
A team from donor countries and organizations has just visited Cape Verde
and has reco~ended that emergency foodstuffs assistance be granted, as well
as assistance aimed at the regiona under irrigated cultivation. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Dec 80 p 3533]
BADEA FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT LOAN--The Arab Bank for African Economic Devel-
opment (BADEA) has granted Cape Verde a 2.4 million dollar loan to finance
~ a pro~ect aimed at the development of the fishing sector. According to the
terms of an agreement signed on 21 December in Khartoum between the ambassa-
dor of Cape Vetde in Senegal and the deputy director general of the BADEA,
this loan is reimbLYSable in 12 years following a grade period of 3 years,
at an annual interest rate of 4 percent. The total assistance granted Cape
Verde by the BADEA amounts to 11,464 million dollars in the form of emergency
ai~. (Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Dec 80
p 3533]
CSO: 4400
~
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
CCCE AID TO TRANSPORT, INFRASTRUCTURE, TELECOP4tiJNICATIONS REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3416
[Text] Following the official visit to CAR [Central African Republic] by Robert
Galley, French minister of cooperation, from 27 November to 2 December, France
granted a loan of 1 billion CFA [African Financial Conmaunity] francs (20 million
French francs) to CAR. This loan was made by the Central Fund for Economic
Cooperation (CCCE) for the purchase of an oil fleet made up of barges and tugboats
for the transport of hydrocarbons from Kinshasa and Brazzaville.
In addition, an agreement in principle was reached for the granting of financial
aid of 450 million CFA francs for the purchase of materials and the operation of
a light piece of machinery for the maintenance of the Berberat~-Carnot-Baoro road
(202 kilometers).
In the rural development sector, an agreement in principle was also reached for
continuation of research and development of cotton cultivation, as the current
_ program is about to expire.
As regards infrastructures, a credit of 25 million CFA francs was granted for a
modernization study of the Bangui-Mpoko Airport with a view to the accommodation
of heavy cargo planes. Also, two negotiations involving 580 million CFA francs
are in progress for the supplying of equipment and the renovating of river trans-
port facilities.
The present status of renovation of the Bangui urban telephone network, with the
cooperation of the BDEAC (Development Bank of the Central African States) (240
million CFA francs) and the FAC (Aid and Cooperation Fund) (100 million CFA francs)
was the sub3ect of long discussion as was the project to expand the Bangui tele-
phone network which was studied by SOFRECOM [?French Communications Company].
Agreement was reached on the need for postponing the implementation of this impor-
tant telecommunications program, provisionally estimated at 3.5 billion CFA francs,
until the Central African Office of Posts and Teleco~nunications has been restored
to operation. =
Finally, an agreement was reached on the need for periodically sending technical
- aesistance to all sectors, concomitant with the growth of needs and the trair~ing
of Central African cadres.
45
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
Additionally, shortly after Galley's visit, the director for economic development
of the French Ministry of Cooperation, Mr Joudiou, was received by President Dacko
with whom he discussed the technical financial assistance given by France to Central
Africa and also studied the resources needed for the economic recovery ~f Central _
Africa.
Finally, it was learned on 8 December that France would supply the Central African
Republic with a shipment of repair kits for the 100 kilowatt short-wave receiver
installed in Bimbo and spare parts for the Bangui production center. The agree-
ment amounting to 60 million CFA francs also covers the supplying of supplementary
repair kits for the equipment and maintenance of low and high frequency radio
gear. French aid will also be used for equipping a low frequency recording studio.
The two countries also signed an agreement covering a share by France in studies
on the Central African section of the Mombasa-Lagos Trans-African road. French _
aid, which totals 29 million CFA francs, will be available in the form of FAC
grants.
This aid from France will permit in particular the building of the Sibut/Kaga-
Bandoro/Sido roads and the access roads to Mbres and Batangafo in the firat 6
months of 1981.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
8143
CSO: 4400
1~6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
BRIEFS
BOKASSA AIDES QUIT--1tao of ex-Emporor Bokassa's companions in exile have recently
left him. And not the least araong them, since they were the former chief of
protocol, Eugene Makouta, and former aide-de-camp, Colonel Bongo. The former
- sovereign also suspects one of them to have carried off some papers bearing his
- personal s ignature. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 37] 9516
RELEASE OF OPPOSITION r~ERS--Several political activists of the Central African
People's Liberation Movement (MLPC) of Ange Patasse, the Ubangi Patriotic Front
(FRO) of Abel Goumga and the Ubangi Liberation Front (FLO) of Sylvestre Bangui,
who were arrested or confined to their residence for the crime of dissidence, have
been released. [Text) ~Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 12
Dec 80 p 3416] 8143
CSO: 4400
47
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CHAD
HABRE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF CONTINUING GUERRILLA WAR AGAINST GOUKOUNI
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 22 Nov 80 p 116
[Article by Christian Hoche: "Chad: A Trap for Qadhdhafi? Libya� Co~nits
Its Commandoes to Chad. Danger for Africa or a Trap for the Overweening
Colonel?"]
- [Text] "In the old days the Arabs sold the Blacks. Today, they buy
them..." Must one see only impertinence in the declarations of this dip-
lomat who is evoking the recent participation of Libyan units in the
fighting ravaging the north and central regions of Chad? -
Of course, not. It was in mid-Oc~ober when the head of state, Goukouni
Oueddei, who only had shreds of suthority left, appealed for Libya's mili-
tary aid. This was in application of an aid agreement signed in June with
Tripoli. The opportunity was j ust too beautiful for Colonel Mu`a~aar Qadh-
dhafi, who dreams of a Saharian republic stretching all the way from the
Atlantic Ocean to the frontiers o� Egypt.
The military situation, at the end of October, wae clearly in favor of
the Defense Minister Hiasein Habre~s FAN [Northern .
Armed Forc2sl� They repelled to the north of Ndjamena the sol-
diers of the President, the so-called FAP [Peoples Armed
Forces], and for months had been holding Faya-Largeau, a key town of
Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti area. On 3 November, in a joint co~unique published
in Tripoli, Goukouni Oueddei thanked Qadhdhafi for his "unconditional sup-
port." The following day, the two men made a whole inspectio~n tour to
Faya-Largesu, which fell into the hands of the FAP and of the Libyan units,
which came overrunning from the Aouzou band. There is no longer any doubt:
in the central part of the country Libyan "Islamic legionnaires," brought
to Nd~amena by plane, fight by the side of Goukouni's men. In the north,
they "aweep out" the last FAN pockets of resistance. Aow many are they,
theae "Islamic brigades" accompanied by their artillerq and antiaircraft
defense force? According to different calculations, one thousaad mea
are at work in the Chad capital aad almoet three thousand are operating at
600 kilometers to the north. Their ~b~ective? It is to chase Hissein
_ Habre and his partisans from their defense positions aad put an end to
!~8 =
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
the "duality of power." Up to now, the ancient jailer af Francoibe
Claustre is resisting. But his forcea, weakened, dispersed and ~aspecially
not having any heavy equipment, are risking very much being chased out of
the capital.
At once people are getting nervous in the neighboring countriea of Chad.
From the Mali to Niger, from the Cameroon to Central Africa, and also -
from Tunisia to Egypt, people demand the respect of the Lagos armistice
agreements while condemning the "foreign interference." Some heads of
state, not only among the less important ones, apparently have asked that
France intervene in order to stop the Islamic crusade of Qadhdhafi. For
the moment, Paris keeps to a most prudent course. Not without after- -
thoughts. At6months away from the presidential elections it is incon-
ceivable that one would go trap oneself again in Chad: let Qadhdhafi trap
himaelf in there," declares one expert at the Quai d'Orsay with a com-
plice's smile, Alone against everybody, it is thought Hissein Habre
would still be capable of leading a harassment war against the occupying
force. Moreover, he can also benefit from the acti~�e support of several
African states which considered him, only yesterday, a"Marxist adven-
turer."
~a
Thus, one will have to follow attentively the meeting of the Niger River
Commission which takes place, since 20~November, in Conak.ry. Thirteen
heads of state are expected, among whom Nigeria's, whom his peers repor-
tedly have asked for an energetic condeIImation of the "Libyan coup." It's -
a voice which Che colonel should not ignore if he recalls his sad venture
in Uganda. After Kampala, will it be Ndjamena? -
COPYRIGHT: 1980 S.A. Groupe Express
1751
CSO: 4400
~
- 49
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CHAD -
BRIEFS
NEW CHAD FLIGHTS--Air Afrique may soon once again be serving Chad. At least in
partnership with a small airline that would assure connections between the cities
of Moundou and Sarh, in the south, the only region that is relatively stable.
[TextJ [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 37] 9516
CSO: 4400 ~
~
50
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
. CONGO
BRIEFS
CABINET DECISIONS--The Congolese Council of Ministers which met in Brazzaville
on 3 December made the following decisions: It decided to continue cooperation
with Cuba in the sectors of rural economy, public works, national education,
health and social affairs, labor and justice. The Council also examined the
mining research dossier and on this score Minist~r of Mines Rodolphe Adaga was
instructed to continue negotiations with a view to intensification of exploration
- and mining exploitation. Finally, the Council approved a project authorizing the ~
state to grant a credit of 900 million CFA [African Financial Communit~] francs
for the realinement of the Congo-Ocean Railway. [Text~ [Paris MAR'''iES TROPICAUX
ET MEDIT~RRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3417] 8143
FRENCH FINANCING AGREEMENT--On 1 December, Congo and France signed a financing
- agreement in Brazzaville amounting to 185 million CFA francs for construction of
the port of Oyo, in the northern part of the People's Republic of the Congo.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3417]
8143
- WEST GERMAN SENTENCED--A West German, citizen, accused of economic and indus-
trial espionage, has just been given a 2-year suspended sentence and a fine of ~
2.4 million CFA francs by the Congolese courts. Gunter Runge, an engineer of
, the Austrian Voest Alpine company and Pointe No ire, had ta set up an inventory
of the repair work to be done on the Congolese national petroleum refinery built
by that company. According to the indictu~~ent, he is said to have gathered in-
formation on this refinery which he communicated to his company despite the can-
- cellation of its contract with the Congolese Government. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80 p 3105] 6108
CSO: 4400
51
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
i'
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
FRENCH ECONOMIC AID NOT~D
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Nov 80 p 35
[Text] After visiting Spain, Morocco and its neighbors Cameroon and Gabon,
Lt. Col Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo was in France from 13-17 November.
The new man, very much Equatorial Guinean, met with Vale~-y Giscard d'Estaing and
various French ministers. Besides the projects that are in progress since the
November 1979 cooperation agreement (a total of 11 million francs for fishing,
mine prospecting and improvements of the Malabo harbor), there was discussion
concerning France's financing of a hydro-electric power station of 8 billion
watts and cooperation in the oil industry.
France is taking its place in this country that has for a long time been reserved
- for the Spanish, then the Soviets. Which will no doubt suit Elf Aquitaine and ,
the Bureau of Geological and Mining Exploration (BGME). The assets of the French:
an ambiguous attitude at the time of the Macias dictatorship (maintaining a
diplomatic representation helped preserve the ties): the large number of Equatoriol
Guineans who today speak Moliere's language, after being forced to go to neighboring
_ French-speaking countries in search of work that the dictatorship was refusing them
in their own country.
This return of refugees, political and economical, remains in fact the weak point
in the new regime: many still do not trust the leaders who collaborated with
' Macias before overthrowing him and who are in no hurry to initiate democratic
institutions.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1980
9592
CSO: 4400
52
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
GABON ~
.
DATA ON CURRENT, PROJECTED STATUS OF TRANSGABONESE RAILROAD
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITEFcRANEENS in F~ench S Dec 80 pp 3254-3255 I'
[E~ccerpt] The Transgabonese Railroad was inaugurated on 27 December 1978. It ~
:?as been open to traffic since May 1979, but anly on its 182-kilometer Owendo-
Ndjole section. This section is obviously the first stage in a much larger pro~ect ~
that is still under construction. ~
The line is to be extended to the rail junction of Booue, PR325 [325 kilometers
from start of lineJ, and will then continue on to its terminus in Franceville, ,
PK680. At Booue, the line will split into two branch lines, conetruction of which
is scheduled to begin simultaneously: a 320-kilometer branch line to Franceville
and a 240-kilometer branch line to Belinga.
The Booue-Belinga section justified the original pro~ect by providing rail service ,
to the mineral resources of the Mekambo region with ita estimated iron ore reserves ;
of 1.2 million tons of hematite combined with magnetite and goethite~ incluaing ,
600 million tons assaying at 65 percents When these rich deposits are mined,
their output is to be hauled by rail to the future ore port of Santa Clara--pro-
cessing capacity of more than 10 million tons per year; estimated cost of construc- ~
tion and equipment: 68 million CFA francs--via a 35-kilometer spur line star:ing ~
from the timber port of Owendo. Definitive studies of these railroad pro~ects have
now been completed.
Construction of the Booue-Franceville branch line is justified by the magnitude of
the mining operations at Moanda. The Moanda mine ranks as the world's third
largest producer of manganese. Promoters of the Transgabonese ~ailroad believe
this new branch line will stimulate production which could, as a result, increase
to 4 million tons per year--estimated reserves of 90 million tons-compared with the
current 2.4 million tons per year, the maximum carrying capacity of the Congo-Ocean
Railroad (CFCO). The terminus of this section ie situat~d in a uranium-bearing
region--the Mounana deposit--whose annual production is close to 1,000 tons from an
eatimated reserve of 20,000 tons. The Franceville branch line nay also increase
thia mine's annual output.
Work on the Ndjole-Booue sectian is continuing. The stretch from Nd~ole to Ayem
(PK257), half-way between Ndjole and Booue, will probably be completed in 1981 and ~ _
the stretch from Ayem to Booue in 1982. Deforestation and grading work is practi-
cally finished between Ndjole and Ayem. At the project's current rate of progress,
track-laying operations could resume in June 1981, unless construction is deliberate-
ly slowed for financial reasons, as was the case this year. Roadbed construction
work which started in Franceville has advanced approximately 30 kilomeCers and all
53
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
.
work which atarted in Franceville has adv~nced approximately 30 kilometers and all
grading was completed on that atretch last September.
When the Transgabonese Railroad is completed, ocean-bound traffic on the railroad
as s whole is expected to consiat mainly of timber~ manganeae ore, ferromanganese
ore, manufactured goods (batteries), foodstuffs, and sugar. Inland-bound traffic
is expected to consist mainly of staple commodities, supplies necessary to the min-
ing industry and forest products industry, hydrocarbons, cement, building materials,
and capital goods. _
Operating res ults on the section now open to traffic have not yet confirmed these
- expectations. It will not be possible to really assess this railroad's importance
_ until it is fully operational. In 1979, however, the line carried an average
of 5,000 passengers per month, but freight traffic remained at its initial very low
level despite the decision granting the railroad the monopoly on transporting tim-
ber, a decision which timber firms claim is designed to forcibly make the railroad
show a profit at their expense. ~ -
On the other hand, the railroad's positive aspect as an instrument of regional ~
development and economic expansion has already been confirmed by the establishmsnt
of industrial firms along its route: the cement plant in Ntoum, the crossties
manufacturing plant in Essara, and the gravel quarry in Makora.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1980
8041
CSO: 4400
51~ -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
GABON
BRAZILZAN AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES FUTURE COOPERATION
Paris MARCHE~ TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Nov 80 p 3170
[Report on statement by Joao Areias Neto, Brazilian ambassador to Gabon, made in
Libreville--date not specified]
[Text] Mr Joao Areias Neto, Brazilian ambassador to Gabon, confirming that Brazil
will henceforth import 46,000 barrels of oil per day (2,300,000 metric tons per year)
from Gabon, expressed the opinion in Libreville that the imbalance in trade exchange
between the two countries (Brazil currently sells Gabon $30 million worth of goods
' a year) w~ll be soon corrected by the arrival of Brazilian company of the "Engexco"
group, charged with increasing trade exchange with Gabon. Such will be the case
with the "Enplanta" company which, by building sheds and houses for the presidential
guard, will use up part of the $25-million line of credit granted to Gabon by Brazil;
this credit has allowed the Gabonese Government to purchase from Brazil four
"Bandeirante"-type planes and public transport buses.
The Brazilian Government has also granted to Gabon another line of.credit for $10
billion. This has been used by the Gabonese Government and semigovernmental enter- �
prises such as CODEV (Commercial and Development) to purchase electric appliances,
furniture, vehicles, buses, and recently vedette boats, which were presented to the
_ public during the parade held last 17 August.
Another line of Brazilian credit worth $140 million, granted in 1978, has n~t been
used as a result of the austerity policy decreed in 1977.
Technological cooperation will enter a new phase with the approaching arrival of
Brazilian technicians in Libreville to evaluate Gabon's possibilities to produce
alcohol from cassava and sugar cane.
The ambassador also announced the imm~inent opening in Libreville of a branch of the
"Banco Real," a private Brazilian bank, which should be foZlowed sometime in 1981
by a branch of the "Agencia do Brasil," a publicly owned Brazilian bank.
According to Mr Joao Areias Neto, Gabon and Brazil also intend to develop their
trade exchange and to create a joint commission for cooperation.
~ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1980
9627
CSO: 4400
55
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY
GUINEA-BISSAU
BRIEFS
COMMISSIONS FORMED--Five commissions have been created on 16 December by the
Council of the Revolution in power ia Guinea-Bissau since 1~: November; they
will be responsible for supezvising the activities of the government. nao of
them, the defense and security camm~ission and the economy and finance coffinis-
eion will be under Gen Joao Bernardo Vieira, chairman of the Council of the _
Revolution. The commission for interior, information and culture will be
under Victor Saude Maria, deputy chairman of the Council of the Revolution
and state commissioner for foreign affairs. The commission for education,
health and social affairs is headed by Samba Lamine Mane, state commissioner
for natural resources. Finally, the coa~ission for justice and administration
is presided by Manuel Saturnino da Costa, state co~nissioner for interior.
[Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Dec 80 _
pp 3532-3533]
CSO: 4400
.
56
FOF OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
IVORY COAST
STRUGGLE FOR SUCCESSION TO PRESIDENCY DISCUSSED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 pp 32-34 ~
[Article by special correspondent Sennen Andriamirado: "New Successor Sought--after
the elections, a struggle is going on to rule the roost; but the assembly president
will no longer be the chief of state's constitutional successor"]
[Text] During nearly one month's time oniy once did I see the forces of law and
order get edgy. It was on 23 November, at t'~e time of the second round of ballotting
for the legislative elections, in the Gbagba polling station courtyard in Bingerville.
A soldier, machinegun slung across his shoulder and a black beret sitting awry on ;
his head, was laying into a band of young people who were trying to cut in line: -
"They have to get in line," he explained to me, "I am going to hit them. There is
more than enough chaos like that."
The chaos in Abidja~ as well as other places early that morning made you think tha~t ,
voter participation was going to be greater than at the time of the first ballot
on 9 November. All the people running polling stations I ran into that Sunday,
23 November, were optimistic about that. ~
That was because the candidates, just like the government, had spared no expense. ~ ~
At Bouna, for ~xample, journalist Jean Kambire, wha was in second place coming out ,
of the first ballot, got himself elected because he was the best organized: sup-
porCers had rented buses or borrowed trucks to set up a ahuttle service between the
voters' villages and the voting centers. ~
Between the time of the two ballots, cand~dates everywhere outdid each other in ,
passion to ~onvince their voters to get their identity cards, which are required for
voting, issued to them by election day.
But the statistics were to show that the participation level barely exceeded SO per-
cent. Of ccurse in certain districts greater political consciousness improved the '
percentage.
Thus, at Aboisso, 47.63 percent of those registered voted (as against 44.19 percent '
on the first ballot). At Abobo, on the outskirts of Abidjan, the level went from
19.22 percent to 21.29 percent. But these slight improvements did little to compen-
sate for spectacular reverses such as that at Adzope where, compared to 46.07 per- i
cent at the time of the first ballot, only 33.35 percent of the registered voters
voted on 23 November.
I
57
~OR OFFICIAL USE t~NLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
rvK urr~~.~At, u,G vivt,Y
Some polling places were still closed during a good part of the morning because the
ballots had not arrived on time, the voter lists had disappeared, or the polling
place officiale had gotten lost in town.
Some people were pt~t off because their names had mysteriously disappeared from the �
. voting registera between the first and second ballots. At Treichville some young
voters were challenged because, according to the polling place officials, "a student
card is not proof of identity."
And students definitely wanted to vote. Y.J., who had abstained in 1975 and who this
time was turned back from a Treichville polling place, cried out to me: "Voting or
not voting in 1975 amounted to the same thing. Today there is a chance to come and
choose a candidate. Even if he's no good." Lecause '4ae enjoy seeing all these people
coming nowadays bowing and scraping before us in ord~er to have our petty little
votes. It is our revenge." Revenge? Yes. Voters' revenge. The second ballot con-
. firmed that incumben~s with expiring terms were being re~ected. The turnover in the
assembly was 81.63 percent. Out of 147 deputies, 120 aYe new. Of the 80 with ex-
piring terms who stood for election, only 27 were brought back.
So the veterans literally bit the dust. Thus Mrs Gladys Anoma (50 years old),
secretary-general of the Association of Ivorian Women (AFI) for 15 years and vice
president of the National Assembly, lost in Cocody. In her defeat she joins -
another assembly vice president, Maurice Oulate, and questeur Tiebla Ouattara.
= When choosing among several veterans the voters sometimes preferred the one who
smacked the least of the establishment. At Dimbokro the battle among three members
whose terms were expiring ended in victory for the young~st, Amon Leon. But it was
a tough one since the patriarchal Samba Ambroise Kone lost by a margin of only 427
votes. And only one minister (out of the six who stood as candidates) remained
in the running: Etienne Ahin (Soc~al Affairs) in Bingerville. He was defeated.
Democratic Process
The verdict was final: Ivorians wanted to replace their politicians. Now comes _
waiting for the new assembly's leadership to be inatalled, which cannot be done un-
til the day after 19 December, The date on which the present chamber's mandate ex-
pires. But, fed by changing rumors; s~:ife among political followings, which is the
functional equivalent of ideological debate here, has been heating up the political
contest. And the "Old Man" had certainly kept up the suspense. Before the second
round of balloting, he had allowed the stakes to rise among the pretenders to the
thro~ne. A friend of Philippe Yace's--Yace being the outgoing president of the
Natj.onal Assembly--was still saying to me 2 weeks ago: "It is the party's Political
BurEau which is as usual going to designate candidates for the assembly leadership.
~
And since there is only one party, there will be no surprises. Democracy is all
very weli but it has to stop at so~e point."
"It" has not stopped. On 24 November, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the party's sole _
boss, held a meeting of the Political Bureau in order to make his recommendations.
He had told me 2 days beforehand at Yamoussoukro: "I do not want to interfere.
The democratic process must be fully played out. From now on, the parliamentarians
will elect their leadership. Without party interference."
58
FOR OFFICIA~L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY
As I was asking him if he were not afraid of a proliferation of candidates among
the 147 deputies wanting to rule the roost, he answered me with a smile: "Don't
worry. They know each other. There will be two or three candidates. No more." ;
Ztao possible candidates are in any case already well known. First, Philippe Yace, ,
60 years old, assembly president for 20 years, reelected in Jacqueville on the
first round of balloting and who hia friends contend is "too much of a fighter" to '
be content with ~ust being a deputy like the rest.
Then there is Henri Konan Bedie, 46 years old, ("I am actually a couple years older,"
he confided to me), former minister of economy (1965-1977), elected at Daoukro as of
9 November, and of whom it is said that he "didn't resign from the World Bank (1918-
1980) ~ust to have a minor role in the National Assembly."
The two of them, Philippe Yace and Henri Konan Bedie, embody the atrife among political ~
followings and the quarrel between oldtimers and newcomers. Except that a third or
a fourth may emerge who can keep the new assembly from aplitting into two implacably
opposed camps. Besides which any and all candidates for chamber president may back
out, faced with the prospect of not being the chief of state's official successor.
Elected Vice President
For President Houphouet is definite on this point: for a long time he has been -
thinking about eliminating Article 11 of the constitution which entrusts the pr.eai-
dency of the republic, in case that office is vacated, to the president of the
National Assembly on an interim basis. -
In a display of consu~ate political skill, Felix Houphouet-Boigny on 25 November gave
the outgoing assembly the responsibilitS of changing the constitutiun. At the end ~
of a turbulent night session, the outgoing deputies passed a bill introduced by the ,
government, that is to say by the president, providing that the interim period, in ~
case of death, resignatiou or total impairment would be handled by a vice president
elected at the same time as the chief of state and designated to replace him auto-
matically. Only here we are: the president of the republic was reelected for 5
years on 12 October, and only the president, without any vice president.
We would bet that before long the "Old Man" will find a way to fill the position
before the 1985 presidential election. Above all, let us bear in mind for the
moment that the National Assembly president no longer is or will be the constitu-
tional "dauphin." But from now on the withdrawal of anyone in contention to rule
that roost would be disgraceful. A Philippe Yace would be revealing that the assembly
- presidency only interested him to the extent that it would make him the "dauphin," _
a Henry Konan Bedie that he only aspired to the position in order to become the
"dauphin."
COPYRI~HT: Jeune Af rique GRUPJIA 1980
9631 ~
CSO: 4400 i~
I
~
I
I
59 ~
i
FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY I
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
IVORY COAST
HOUPHOUET'S STAND ON COCOA PRICE ASSESSED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Dec 80 p 43
[Article by Philippe Simonnot: "Cocoa: Houphouet's Aardheadedness"]
[Text] Has the o~l gone up to his head? That is the question being asked
� a little all over in the international economic and financial world when
it comes to the case of President Houphouet-Boigny. T'he Ivory Coast is
atill not decided to sign the new international agreement on cocoa which
has been concluded by the other producers since the end of November in
Ganeva (JEUNR AFRIQUE No 1040), aad the instigator, the strategist of this -
irritating and disQuieting hardheaded stand is no doubt Houphouet himself.
As the Ivory Coast stands a good chance to become a net exporter of oil
in a few years, it is giving itself the luxury, it seems, tD upaet the cocoa
agreement a little bit.
To ~ustify its attitude, the Ivory Coast invokes one stipulation of the
agreement signed in Geneva which foresees the situation where, in certain
conditions, the key prices on the international market could be revised
downward as a function of the situation. The Ivory Coast repreaentatives
see this clause as unacceptable insofar as it forcea the producer countries
- to run an unbearable risk.
Compromise .
Now all the other great producers of cocoa, notably Brazil, Nigeria and
Ghana, have accepted this clause as a compromise solution. It is true
that the prospects of the market are not looking good. The =ormidable
price rises of the last few years (27 cents in American doilar terms in
1970-71; 66 cents in 1973-74; 165 cents in 1976-77; 159 cents in 1978-79)
have led the producer countries, and in the first place the Ivory Coast,
to increase considerably their plantation acreage, whereas during the
same time, the consumption of cocoa has ceased to increase due precisely
to the same price climb.
Bold Game
The result--a classical one for the economist--of this contradictory move-
ment of the supply and demand is the appearance of more and more enourmous
60
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ment of the supply and demand is the appearance of more and more enormous
aurpluaea and... a drop in the price: the price of cocoa today is a little
und~r 100 cents per kilogram .
In an attempt to contravent the fall in price, the Ivory~Coast has decided
to store at great cost (for the conservation of this product is costly)
~ large quantities of cocoa, using up the finances of the Stabilization Fund
which is now in the red. This is an operation made all the more costly
by the fact that the production cost of the Ivorian cocoa, given the im-
prudences that had gone in the investments, is on the average higher than
that of the other producers.
- In playing this bold game, the Ivory Coast has, it is remarked by the
above-mentioned sources, it seems lost "tens of million of dollars."
It seems very doubtful that the Ivorians would in this manner succeed in
making the price of cocoa go up, the very existence of the stocks in their
warehouses weighing heavily on the market. "One oL these days," it is
further remarked, "they will have to put these stocks on the market."
The other producers are not the only ones irritated by the hardheadedness
of the Ivorians. Claude Cheysson, member of the European Common Market
Commission in charge of Cooperation ar.d Development, whose mandate has
just been renewed, has recently written to Houphouet-Boigny to make known
his concern. It is better to have a not altogether satisfactory agreement
than not to have any, he has said in effect. At the European Co~ission
people are even more surprised by the attitude of the Ivorian President
since in the past he was the one to attach a great deal of importance to
the conclusion of a cocoa agreement; for according to him, what was at
stake was the stability of this whole part of Africa where the fate of the ~
peasantry is strategic politically speaking.
French Aid
" On the other hand it is remembered also that the Ivory Coast has negotiated
_ with the French Treasury a f inancial aid. The French Treasury has sent
the request to the banks. The Ivorians who began by noting their unhappi-
neas and disappointment (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1033) hgd in the end accepted
the loan proposed to them at market condition: 600 million francs, aimed
at consolidating their external debt. In fact, the French banks are not
taking a great risk here aince they have in hand a"letter of intention"
from the Treasury equivalent to a government warranty.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
1751
CSO: 4400
61
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
MALI
BRIEFS
DIFFICULT EC~NOMIC SITUATION--Mali must import 50,000 tons of cereals
(10 billion Malian francs) to face a food deficit in the country estimated at
more than 12d,000 tons," the Ministry�of Finance and Co~erce announced in
- Bamako on 20 December. Because of this aerious economic aituation, Malian
leaders met on 21 December eo review the 1980-81 budget. Despite official
determination to restore economic and financial health, receipts for the 1980
budget (77.8 billion Malian francs) did not reach expected levels and the bud-
get is being implemented in a climate of auster3.ty and tension. The Ministry
- of Finance announces that this fs due to the fact that the country is land-
locked and is affected by drought, world inf lation and by the rise in oil
prices. The Ministry specified that Mali's oil bill will amount to 48 billion
- Malian francs in 1981, compared to 33 billion for the preaent year. [Text]
- (Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 26 Dec 80 p 3533)
CSO; 4400
62
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040340070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
S ENEGAL -
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE DEFENDS TREATMENT OF MAMADOU DIA
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 21 -
[Letter to the Editors from Mr Djibo Ka, director of the cabinet in the office
of the president of the Republic of Senegal--passages b etween slantlines originally
published in italics]
[Text] The weekly JEUNE AFRIQUE published in its 12 November 1980 edition (No 1036)
an article Siradiou Diallo cited Mamadou Dia, ex-president of the Council of
Senegal, in his enumeration of /"personalities in Africa who have been victims
of arbitrary actions."/
_ Because of Senegal's regard for JEUNE AFRIQUE and because of our concern always
to remain faithful to the facts, I would like to bring to your attention the
following facts with regard to the statement by Siradiou Diallo.
1. Mamadou Dia was not the victim of arbitrary action_ In fact, as you know, he
tried, on 12 December 1962, to overthrow by force the instiCutions of the
Republic of Senegal.
- 2. Mr Dia was tried before the High Court of Justice o f Senegal, in accordance
with the Senegalese constitution.
3. Mr Mamadou Dia had the right to a defense.
4. He was convicted, at the conclusion of the trial, which /"unfolded without
restraints"/ according to LE MONDE of 14 May 1963.
At the conclusion of the trial, which took four days, Mr Philippe Decraene, the -
LE MdNNJE r.orr.espondent, concluded: /"Harsh justice, but justice all the same."/
. Moreover, Mr Dia was given a reprieve, and later amnes ty, by the president of the
Republic of Senegal.
Such are the facts. ~
Irom the preceding it is clear that Mr Mamadou Dia was not the victim of
arbitrary action.
Senc~gal is a country of law, of freed~m, and its political regime is foun~ied on
democratir_ principles.
63
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
In thanking you for your willingness to publish my letter in your next edition of
JEUNE AFRIQUE, I beg you to accept, Mr Editor, the assurance of my highest
consideration.
/Answer:/ If JEUNE AFRIQUE militated for the release of Mr Mamadou Dia, I
nevertheless recognize that, of all the personalities cited in the article in
question, the ex-president of the Council of Senegal is the only one who may have
had the right (in 1962) to a regular trial. And, above all, that ~he Senegalese
regime is not founded on arbitrary [or despotic] action. S.D:
~ COPYRIGHT: Jeune A~e'ique. GRUPJIA 1980
9516
CSO: 4400
64
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SENEGAL
POWER STRUGG~E, POSSIBLE INCREASED AUTF~ORITARIANISM EXPEGTED
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 22 Dec 80-4~Jan 81 pp 24-25
[Article by Mariam Sysle: "Senghor's 'Exit
~Text] True or false, it is the signal for a power strug-
glc~ witli, at the end, a potential strengthening of the re-
gime's authoritarianism--unless the opposition is able to
- express the aspirations of the popular n?asses.
So the Senegalese president, Leopold Sedar Senghor, has decided to leave the govern-
ment, or at least his official duties as chief of state. But when such an all-pow-
erful monarch designates a successor to his tl-.rone, it is so he can install in his -
place in the presidency his heir and prime minister for 10 years, Abdou Diouf.
That is to say, it is also so in the same stroke he can assure the continuation of
his policy, which for 20 years has been dragging the country into a total economic
- and social paralysis and leading it into a political impasse, while also making it
one of the principal strongholds of French rneocolonialism in Africa.
Finally, as is well known, the Senegalese were not the first to hear the news, which
was of major importance to them above all others. Those who got wind of the affair,
at the same time as the whole world, were a minority of Dakarians who are able to
buy and read the foreign press--the French daily LE MONDE of 2 December--or those
who can catch the international Radio-France. Confirmation was not given them un-
til four days later, through the governmental newspaper LE SOLEIL and the national
radio. It will still be necessary to wait until the end of the year to hear what
explanations Leopold Senghor himself will want to give to all of his fellow citizens.
It goes without saying that this way of proceeding was resented by everyone in Sen-
egal as a bitter humiliation, which underlines at a crucial time the profound dis-
trust in which the exalter of "negritude" and "universal civilization," whose gaze
- has always remained fixed on the West, holds his people. The Senegalese president
will even have managed that tour de force of alienating the powerful religious
brotherhoods, whose support in the past had enabled him to surmount several grave
crises, but whose leaders, this time, were not even consulted and learned the news
of the chief of state's resignation in the same circumstances as all the rest of the
~ country.
Irritation and malaise are so profound and widespread that the government newspaper
has really tried to repair the damage, but it could do nothing, other than to sink
65
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
deeper into increasing contradictions. In this way, in its 4 December edition, an-
nouncing "President Senghor is Leaving," it attributed the news that appeared in the
_ newspaper LE MONDE (30 October and 2 December) to "indiscretions deliberately re-
ported so that their author (the correspondent of the French daily in Dakar) could
- derive some advantage from them." And LE SOLEIL saw fit to state that the president -
had nevertheless warned his prime minister, his closest associates and the principal
leaders and dignitaries of the regime. But on 6 December, in a commentary signed by
Abdou Salam hane, the editor in chief of L�UNITE AFRICAINE, the organ of the
Senghorian Socialist Party, LE SOLEIL asserted: "It was not by chance or out of in-
nocence that the president, as part of a conversation, confirmed his approaching re-
tirement to LE MONDE's correspondent." But that in this way "the shock of the news
to Senegalese public opinion was considerably diminished."
In reality it can be said here and now that Leopold Sedar Senghor, who, if his
eulogists can be believed was dreaming of a departure worthy of an ancient tragedy,
missed his exit, pretended or real, and brought to nothing the efforts of those who
praised his regime, who were trying to demonstrate that the Senegalese president's
initiative was exemplary.
in addition, everyone--or nearly everyone--remains skeptical about President
- Senghor's real intentions, and is wondering whether it.is not again a question of
- the final role-playing of a chief of state whose extreme manipulative cleverness is
no longer to be demonstrated. Be that as it may, it appears that the resigned chief
of state in the shadow of the government, after the enthronement of his successor--
which should occur in January 1981. According to his own statement, he will return
after a brief vacation, not only to occupy himself with setting up the African So-
cialist Internationale, but he will carry on his task as secretary general of his _
party, the Socialist Party. Thus a two-headed government is in danger of being cre-
ated, unless, as is more likely, Leopold Senghor, whether he is in Dakar or in -
France, continues to pull the strings in the game and to be the initiator of the
most important decisions. Finally, one can no longer completely rule out the hypo-
thesis according to which, despite his great age (74), the Senegalese president may
be preparing, in case the situation of crisis, upheavals and fights that are al- -
ready raging in his country should come to reach a critical threshold, to return as
the nation's indispensable savior.
~ A Scenario
For now, one cannot help but see, too, that by organizing his departure--three years
before *_he end of his term--in such a way that the presidency falls upon his consti-
- tutional successor, Abdou Diouf, Senghor dealt the last thrust to the democratic
image he had wanted or had been forced to give to his regime. In fact, this scenar-
io is known to have founded on the constitutional modifications adopted in 1976, when
the governmental party alone was represented in Parliament, without the people hav-
~ ing been consulted in une way or another, and against the unanimous opinion of the
opposition. �
Geals and Maneuvers
By acting like an absolute monarch, in defiance of the most ele,nentary principles of
democracy, which would require at the very minimum organizing an advance election
free of any constraint and any discrimination, Leopold Senghor precipitated his
country into a situation of acute crisis. Whatever the real intentions of the
66
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
departing president may be, the lines are in fact broken. In the Socialist Party,
which is in complete collapse and leaking like a sieve, the deals and maneuvers
have already begun, and it is predictable that the struggle for position will be pit-
iless. While the old removed "barons" are in danger of emerging from their
"exile," one expects with Abdou Diouf and his entourage (the men being gresented for
the post of prime minister are, like him, technocrats of the party's right wing) a
marked accentuation of the regime's authoritarian character.
As for the unrecognized legal opposition forces, whose commentaries and positions
upon the announcement of Senghor's resignation support each other, today they are
faced with their responsibilities. On their capacity to surmount their differences,
to express the aspiraticns of the popular masses and to come to an understanding
around a common political platform and strategy, the evolution of the situation in
large measure depends.
But this is a delicate period, and any false step could be fatal. In this complete-
ly unsettled economic situation, Giscardian Fr.ance seems for the moment to be rest-
ing in a state of uncertainty, as if it were waiting for the puzzle to become more
clearly apparent before making its choice or choices. In the coming weeks and
months anything, even the most unpredictable, can happen.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie.
8946
CSO: 4400
67
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
SENEGAL
REACTION OF OPPOSITION TO SENGHOR'S RESIGNATION NOTED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Dec 80 pp 18-19, 20, 21 -
[Article by Siradious Diallo: "Senegal--What Does the Opposition Do When An African
President Goes?"]
[Text] Senghor has surprised everybody, starting with his ad-
versaries, who did not always react as one might have expected
them to do in their capacity as convinced democrats.
The announcement of the early retirement of President Senghor caused a ver itable
armed uprising in the opposition. Oddly enough, those who had kept shouting "Seng-
hor, resign!" or who had sworn that they would bring him down, suddenly seem to be
quite ill at ease. To be sure, the dream which they had been cherishing f or a
long time, that is to say, a Senegal without Senghor, is about to come true--but
without them and, even more seriously, against them.
The paradox in Senegal is that the president-poet's partisans and enemies never,
until the very last moment, believed rumors regarding his resignation. In spite
of his repeated allusions, the calculated leaks, and the little confidences drop-
ped here and there, the political class remained strangely skeptical. Accustomed
to all kinds of maneuvering, trickery, and other acrobatics connected with this
man who has been dominating the national political scene for about 30 years, it
could not imagine him in any other role--especially through simple retirement. _
The fact is, even though it may not have said so, the opposition did need Senghor--
as much by habit as by convenience! What as a matter of fact would be easier than
to denounce that "troubador of negritude," that "Christian who is a challenge to
the Muslim majority of Senegal," that "black-skinned fellow with the white mask,"
"that man married to a French woman," who "each year spends his vacation in France"
and "all of whose actions and moves express a profound complex with respect to
the white man."
On the topic of the cultural identity and of the political loyalty toward the for-
mer colonial power, the chief of state was a favorite target which the opp osition
would fire on constantly and permanently. But now this easy target has d isappeared.
That quite suddenly deprives his adversaries of their usual propaganda themes,
their sweeping slogans, and their most caustic caricatures.
68
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
~
~1
With Abdou Diouf, the current prime minister, it will be necessary to find some-
thing else because, on the topic of Africanism and nationalism, the future chief .
of stzte will not be vulnerable to attack, no more so than the team he will build
around Moustapha Niasse, Daouda Saw, Ousmane Seck, Sheikb Iiamidou Kane, Ousu~ane
Camara, etc.
- These are cadres in whose eyes French education and training constitute not so much
a source of cultural assimilation but rather a technique and a prescription for
developing their country. Although they remained in power for a long time, one
cannot accuse them of having enriched themselves.
Apart from some well known cases in Dakar, the political pillars of the edifice,
upon which "Abdou" is expected to rest, carefully made sure that they would not be
compromised in any kind of affair or business. They undoubtedly benefitted from
their ,jobs in govern~ent but they did so to broaden and strengthen their political
base, rather than to make money.
The fact remains that the team is made up of inen who have the kind of record and
who hold the kind of convictions that tie them to a very specific model of society,
the model of democratic socialism. That might be expressed by a society based on
free enterprise but guided and controlled by the state. In other words, while
retaining his own personality and style, the future Senegalese ch3ef of state,
loyal to his predecessor's philosophy, will resolutely continue to face toward the
West.
The opposition is perfectly justified in challenging these choices. As in any demo-
cratic regime, with many parties and freedom of speech, the administration's ad-
versaries have the right and even the duty to criticize.
It is certain that the Senegalese opposition will not refrain from dning just that.
But, for the time being, it reacted in a rather unexpected fashion, feeling trapped
and still shocked by the announcement of Senghor's resigaation. It called for elec-
tions under the control of the army, as did, for example, the PDS (Senegalese Demo-
cratic Party)--practically by demanding that the army intervene.
How can the convinced partisans of deffiocracy seek the intervention of the army in
the nation's political affairs? That might be understood in the case of a country
with u single party where any posaibility of expresaion and, a fortiori, a turn-
over in tt~e government ~are impossible.
But in a country such as Senegal today, where all legal and clandestine political
formations with impun:Cty publicize their fighting platforms, would not the appeal
to the army be a mistake?
That makes one think that the egperi2nce of democracy in Africa is far from perfec~.
As we saw in Upper Volta, where the opposition recentlq did not hesitate to turn to
the Praetorian Guard, politicians do not aeem to be in favor of this type of govern-
ment, except when it is good for them.
But the moment it does not permit them to come to power, they do not hesitate to
- overturn it. Better (or worse) to throw the constitution out the window, if not to
trample it underfoot.
69
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
A dangerous proceduxe indeed. Not only does it inevi.tahly hri.ng in the mi.litary
but it rarely benefi~ts the opposition, Even when, as in the case o~ Senegal, it
includes personalities of talent, culture, and eloquence. And that includes Abdou-
laye Wade, whose PDS is represented in the National Assembly by 17 deputies; Bou-
bacar Gueye, the famous lawyer of the Dakar bar, gresident of the Senegalese Repub- .
lican Movement; or the secretary-general of the PAI (African Independence Party),
Mahjmout Diop, a pharmacist--all of whom are perfectly fami'liary with the possi-
bilities and implicatians of democracy.
The same goes for former prime minister Mamadou Dia, the man behind the journal
ANDE SOPI, and the eminent Egyptologist, Sheikh Anta Diop, leader of the RND
- (National Democratic Rally}. Both of them represent political currents which are
not off icially recognized but which are active just the same.
It is clear that if these different formations were to overcome their rivalries,
- the opp osition could constitute a serious threat to the team of Abdou Diouf. Also,
benef itting from the current situation, they would go into action in order to
arrive at a minimum understanding, After having unanimously condemned the announce-
ment of the chief of state's retirement through a foreign newspaper (JEUNE AFRIQUE,
No 1040), their various leaders consulted with each other-to organize protest
demonstrations and, if pcssible, to hammer out a joint fighting platform.
The big unknown obviously remains the attitude of the religious leaders. Their in-
fluence in rural areas is so great that nobody could aspire to national off~ce with-
out seeking their blessing.
In part icular, that of the pawerful khalif of the Mourides, Abdoul Lakhat Mbacke.
This is why all political leaders, both those in power and those in the oppoaition,
have f or several days been trooping to the holy city of Touba where he lives. Here
we have seen Master Abdoulaye Wade, Prime Minister Abdou Diouf, as well as President
Senghor, not to mention those who had to go there furtively.
However, the grand khalif is entirely too aware of his spiritual responsibilities
to comp romise his authority with one or the other political leader. While trying
to get his support, the pilgrims, on their return from Touba, really do not know
whether they should laugh or cry.
In other words, the troubles of the opposition are not over. Although the decision
of President Senghor does give the opposition the unique opportunity for getting
together, shoulder to shoulder, it knows that it cannot count on anything except
its own f orces .
Under these conditions, everything will depend on Abdou Diouf. Will he manage to
maneuver with sufficient firmness so as not to allow himself to be overwhelmed
while d isplaying the necessary skill in order to assemble all aces in his hand?
In this delicate phase of his career, the advice of the old wolves of the PS (the
6ocialist Party, the party in power) will not be superfluous. They have fought
more difficult battles and they went through periods that were just as stormy,
so that they certair?ly have something to say at this crucial moment in Senegal's
history.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1980
5058 ~
CSO: 4400 -
70
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8
FOR OFFICIAL U; .
SENEGAL
OPPOSITION ATTEMPTING JOINT ACTION AGAINST ABDOU DIOUF
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Dec 80 pp 20, 21
[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "Wade: 'Democracy is Finished."']
[Text] One cannot detect any feverish atmosphere or any excitement in Dakar upon
the approach of president Leopold Sedar Senghor's resignation.
The only perceptible tension involves the presence of armed police officers in
front of some government buildings. At no time was there any call for violence
- from certain opposition leaders. "We wanted to maintain free access to these
buildings by way of pr~vention. We have to protect government property."
~ For the moment, violence remains verbal and it suff ices to read the opposition
newspapers to realize that freedom of expression is still a fact in reality. Some
new magazines have come out in recent months, such as VERITE, the organ of ChP pro-
Soviet Marxists, or JAAY DOOLE BI, the organ of the Maoists.
This violence however can be found among the Socialist Party (the party in power). i
TEius, CAAXAN FAAXEE responded with the same kind of aggressiveness but mostly tur-
ned against TAXAW, the journal of Sheikh Anta Diop, and ANDE SOPI, the mouthpiece
of Mamadou Dia.
The last one to get involved certainly was Master Abdoulaye Wade, the leader of the
main opposition party, the PDS (Senegalese Democratic Party). Upon the announcement
of the imminent resignation of the president on 2 December, Wade published a com-
munique comparing "this hasty departure by Senghor to the flight of Louis XVI to
Varennes or the departure of Reza Pahlavi to Morocco." ,
Wade above all went after Abdou Diouf who "wants to play Shahpur Bakhtiar"; a man
of good will, of course, but he has "no new ideas" nor any "popular support."
He urges Diouf as qutckly as possible to run in the presidentia~ elections under '
the surveillance of the army. Otherwise, "that army might someday be f orced to
intervene."
These statements created a certain i11 feeling even among the members of the PDS.
Wade took it upon himself to sign this declaration by himself alone. Many people
saw this as a form of spite for not having been called upou or consulted.
71
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL~'
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
I went to see the PDS leader in his law office where about 30 men and women, held
in check by three secretaries, were waiting patiently. I asked: "Do you not think
that you went too far in comparing Senghor to the Shah of Iran?"
He replied without hesitation: "An opposition party lives on the hope of someday
coming to power. It believes in turnover in government. But the current adminis- _
tration has demonstrated the opposite. Democracy is finished--hence the appeal to
t :e army."
This was a strategic response to conceal a certain degree of worry. Then he said:
"The Senegalese military have no political appetite. There are some very high-
ranking officers in our army who have a high concept of neutrality. I do not think
for a single moment that they would be attracted by power. Unless of course the
crisis gets worse. I will call them in as arbiters."
At Dakar, people have the fceling that the change in government will trigger a new
and big wave of wrath. So far, we have had here the eternal debate between two
intellectuals, Senghor and Sheikh Anta Diop, who hated each other cordially, They
are now going to be replaced by the team of Abdou Diouf and Abdoulaye Wade and
the damages might well be much more serious.
' How is Abdou Diouf preparing himself? "This is going to be very tough but the game
can be played and it can certainly be won," he told me in his prime minister's
office on the ninth and tenth floors of the Administration Building.
After 10 years ir_ training, this big government official has acquired assurance in .
his gestures and proposals. For the moment he seemed to be doing rather well in
resisting the attacks from his adversaries and he seemed mainly concerned with ~
what will happen within his party, the PS, the moment "the Old Man" relinquishes
the helm.
This is especially true since Abdou Diouf will inherit the full confidence of
President Senghor. As a matter of fact, and contrary to many rumoars, Sengiior will
no longer remain at the head of the Senegalese Socialist Party either. He would
not want to have a two-headed administration: that of the party and that ~f the
government. He must thus entrust the office of secretary-general of the PS to
Abdou Diouf.
For the moment, he is rather hobbled. To begin with, by the round-table of all of -
the opposition groups summoned to Dakar on Saturday, 13 December. Objective: to
get together on joint action with a view to fighting the accession of Abdou Diouf
to the presidency. That of course involves all opposition groups, the three legal
parties, other than the PS, that is, the PDS of Master Wade; the PAI (African
Independence Party) of Mahjmout Diop; and the MRS (Senegalese Republican Movement)
of Boubacar Gueye; and the parties that are not legal, especially the RND (Nat-
ional Democratic Rally) of Sheikh Anta Diop; the MSA (Socialist Self-Management
Movement) of former prime minister Mamadou Dia; the ODP (Proletarian Democratic
Organization) of Abdoulaye Ly; the underground PAI; the (pro-Soviet) Democratic
League; and the Maoist current.
72
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
For the record, there was a question of excluding the MRS because of its right-
wing leanings. Finally, the movement was accepted after the declaration by Mr
Gueye, accusing Senghor of behaving like a monarch who hands his succession to his
heir. Mamadou Dia wanted to be considered as the principal leader of COSU (Coo~din-
ation of the United Senegalese Opposition). The others turned him down.
After these issues of procedure and hierarchy had been settled, it was necessary to
determine how to talk a common language and what political platform to start from.
At the point where they are now, the obstacle represented by that coalition is net
yet very serious as far as the future chief of state is concerned.
_ COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1980
5058
CSO: 4400
~
;
I
~
~
73 ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
SENEGAL
BRIEFS
DAKAR JOB CRISIS--In Dakar, 40 percent of the employees of ONCAD jNational Office
of Cooperation and Assistance for Development] whose positions were eliminated
in August, could not be resettled in the three companies that replace the former
state company (responsible for marketing of ground-nuts and grains). Those still
without poaitions continue to stay on the work-site, but as the Senegalese government
has decided to freeze hiring in the public sector, as an economy measure, their
future is bleak. [TextJ [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 3] 9516
CSO: 4400
74
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
SIERRA LEONE
DISCOVERY OF LARGE GOLD DEPOSITS EXPECTID TO AID ECONOMY
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Nov 80 p 43
[Article by Carlos Moore: "Gold! Gold!")
[Text] The discovery of a large gold deposit could help in pulling Sierra Leone--
which is undergoing a severe economic crisis~-0ut of the "cluster of the twenty-fo~ar"
poorest countries on this planet.
Discovered in an abandoned diamond-yielding mine in the southern forest region, the
Baomahun deposit might even be "superior (in grade by ton of ore) to that of the
best mines in South Africa", if one is to believe the Sierra Leonean experts.
They have nut forth the fact that the great exploitation of Black Mountains in
South Africa-put inCo operation in 1980-has a product~on capacity of 1.1 million
tons of gold ore. In 1979, Pretoria extracted 83,529 million tons of ore with an
average grade of 8.19 grams per ton.
Baomahun in itself would have the capacity for approximately 20 million tons of
gold ore with an average grade sometimes exceeding 8.78 grams. This would en~ure
an annual production of 1.5 million tons of gold ore for 15 years, according to the
most conservative estimates. In a way, it is like manna fallen from the sky for
a country whose economy is on its last leg.
The economy of Sierra Leone--70 percent of which depends on its subsoil--is based
on the exportation of mining products of which the reserves and the production are
rapidly decreasing. The diamond mines, which produce 60 percent of its foreign
currency ($97.1 million per year) will run dry before 1990 and, already, production
has decreased from 732,000 carats in 1975 to only 316,000 carats in 1979. The
production of bauxite--second product exported--is constantly on the decline: from
727,000 tons in 1975, it has decreased to 673,000 tons in 1979.
Until the closing of r.he Marampa mine in 1975 (considered at the time unprofitable
by the American company Delco), Sierra Leone was one of the major world producers
of iron ore. The exploitation of this mine was resumed only in Noveml~er 1979
with the modest goal of 100,000 tons per year.
To this decrease in production has been add~d a budgetary def icit of $126 million,
woraened aince July 1980 by the invoice thnt Freetown received from the summit
75
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
i
LVl\ VL'1'1VlAL VNL VL\V?
meeting of the Organization of Af rican Unity (OAU): an investment of nearly $200
million (ref. JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1027). And this in spite of a reconmmendation b~ the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) not to exceed a ceiling of $100 million i.~ this
- prestigious operation.
Already in 1979, IMF had strongly recommended a 20 percent devaluation of the
- leone (national currency equivalent to the dollar). The government turned down
this recommendation, fearing that the increase in prices--at least on the surface--
might create a social unrest similar to the one that swept through William Tolbert's
regime in Liberia in April 1979.
The discovery of the Baomahun gold-bearing deposit thus came just at the right
- moment. According to the estimates, its exploitation will make a profit of $100
million per year, of which the state will no doubt get half. "The situation could
not be better: it is a golden opportunity", said good humoured Adolph Lundin,
president of Eurocan Ventures, a small Swiss-Canadian mining enterprise that
discovered the deposit and is considering its exploitation. However, Freetown
is not readily persuaded and has not yet granted the exploitation license. But
the American giant, Diamond Distributors--which already markets diamonds from
Sierra Leone and exploits those of Guinea--seems to be in a good position to ,
receive the license. It has already signed an agreement with Eurocan whereby
it a~~propriates 40 perc~nt of the shares of the company that will exploit r_he
deposit as soon as the State grants the go-ahead. The heavy equipment is already
on site and a camp to house the workers is under construction. The rush has
already begun.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1980
9592
CSO: 4400
~
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
TANZANIA
BADEA ROAD CONSTRUCTION, REALIGNMENT LOAN
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 8 0 p 3180
[Text] At the close of its 18th meeting, held on 28 and 29 October 1980 at
Khartoum, tt~e board of directors of the BADEA [Arab Bank for African Economic
Development] approved the financing of a loan to Tanzania of $8 million (or
21.8 percent of the total cost) reimbursable in 20 years, with 4 years grace
period and bearing an annual interest rate of S percent, for the realignment
and construction of the Bukombe-Isaka Road.
Tt~e EDF [European Development Fund] and USAID will aid the financing with con-
tributions $14 million (of which $2.27 million will be in lo cal currency) and
$5 million, resoectively. The Tanzanian Government will assume the local cur-
- rency financing needs, or $9.65 million. The total cost is estimated at $36.65
- million.
This project consists of asphalting the 3d sectio~ of the regional Rusumo-Isaka
Road axis connecting Rawanda and Tanzania, thereby opening the Isaka railhead
not only to local rraffic but also to trade movements with Rwanda and Burundi.
"I'he f irst section of the axis connecting Rusumo with Lusahunga is at present
~,i~er construction, and the second, c~nnecting Lusahunga with Bukombe, is about
to be pu*_ under construction. The object of the BADEA contribution is the co-
financing of the realignment and construction of the 3d section (112.5 kilo-
meters) connecting Bukombe with Isaka and the services of the consulting
en~ineers who have to supervise the work. The road, which wilJ. have a surface
width of 9.5 meters, will be covered with asphalz for a width of 6.5 meters.
- Th{s project aims at assuring Rwanda and Burundi access to the port of Dar-es-
Salaam. It is obviously of regional importance. At the present time 85 and 26
_ percent of the impurts of Rwanda and Burundi, respectively, transit through the
Kenyan port of Mombasa and are trucked through the whole of the territory of Kenya
and URanda. With the opening of the new road axis between Rusumo and Isaka,
Rwanda and Burundi will be able to uGe a transport route about 385 kilometers
� shorter and thus achieve considerable economies in transport and maintenance
costs. tn addition the pro~ect will make it possible to link to the Isaka
railheaci (itself connected in the center af the country) the economic system of
vast reKions of western Tanzania, with a population estimated at almost 2.4
million and tr~de evaluated in 1976 at about 300,000 tons of agricultural pro-
ducts. The quantifiable economic yields of the project may be summarized as
follows, according to BADEA: reduc~ion of the cost of transport for Rwanda;
?7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8
.
reduction of the expenses of vehicle operation for Tanzania, Rwanda, and
Burundi; reduction of road maintenance costs; harnessing the potentials of a
vast agricultural ar~a.
The completion of the project, which will take 30 months starting in August
1981, will be placed under the supervision of the roads administration of the
Ministry of Public Works of Tanzania.
COPY RIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1980.
6108 ~
CSO: 4400
78
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8
~ ,
TANZANIA
BR IEFS
ELECTRIC POWER RATIONING--Electricity must henceforth be rationed for several
large cr.nsumers in the regions of Dar-es-Salaan, Tanga, Arusha, Moshi, and
Morogore. Forty-eight plants will be closed for 4 weeks in these sector.s as
a consequence of the abnormally large drop in the waterflow at the Kidatu Dam,
the Tanzanian DAILY NEWS said on 10 November. According to the paper, the
plants affected by the rationing, cert ain of which could be halted provision-
ally, were selected on the basis of es~encial needs. Industries of national
interest, such as the National Milling Company (NMC) will not be closed. On
- 12 November, the daily published a correction announcing that 6 enterprises, out
of a total of 48, we re authorized to operate at reduced capacity, instead of
stopping all product i on as previously planned. The companies benefiting from
this decision are Tanganyika Packers, Tegri Plastics, Simba Plastics, Metal Box
and Yuasa Battery at Dar-es-Salaam, and Tanganyika Coffee Curing Compsny at
Moshi. These compani es were authorized by TANESCO, the state electricity
authority, to continue their activities bp~ause they provided essential serv-
ices. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80
p 3107] 6108
YUCOSLAV AGRICULTiJRAL AID--Yugoslavia has just offered Tanzania agricultural
equipment with a tot a 1 value of 6.7 million Tanzanian shillings. The package
includes 10 tractors, 2 harvester threshers, 2 jeeps, and a bulldozer, This `
gift is destined for the 1,000-hectare Morogoro palm oil plantation known as
"Project Dakawa II." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ~.T MEDITERRANEENS in
French 21 Nov 80 p 3 1 08] 61Q8
SWISS ROAD NET~'ORK AID--The Swiss and Tanzanian governments recently signed at -
Dar-es-Salaam an agreement providing for assistance of 42 million shillings from
Switzerland for tt?e Tanzanian road netw~rk in the districts of Ulanga and Kilom-
bero. [Text] (Pari s MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 21 Nov 80
p 3108] 6108
AFFORESTATION CAMPAIGN--President Nyerere received rorestry experts in Dar-ea-Salaam
on 26 November to prepare a vast affores tation campaign at the national level which
will be initiated in mi d 1981. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 12 Dec 80 p 3421] 8143
~ ADDITT.OivAL NETHERLANDS AID--Tanzania ar.d Kenya will each receive supplementary aid '
for devel.opment from th e Netherlands amounting to 7 million florins ($3.5 million),
according to statements made by the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs at The Hague. `
This sum will be a9ded to the 1Q5 million flor.ins and 58 million florins which the
Netherlands has already offered to Tanzania and Kenya, respectively, in 1980.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Dec 80 p 3421] 8143
CSO: 4k00 79 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UGANDPI
EYEWITNESS ACCAUNTS OF MII~1I-INVASION; REFUGEE STATISTICS
I~artoum SUUPINOW in English Dec 80 p 20
~Text~
Regional and worad pness reports ncendy way to the town, which cvas t~ed with an
,suggest~d that supponers ojex-Ug~edan air of expectation. Indeed Amia~s soldiers
Pnside?it G~era! !dt Amin had bunched were expected at any moment, 7n t':~
on irrvasion of norrheni Ug~nda aimed at lOth, that aftemoon, about three to four
tuppling that country s present provi- youths, a+ho called themselves ~n's
sional leoders. In rerrospect, tiuse 9oldiers, started shooting into the air with
accounu appear to have conrained co?~si- rifks. I ocdend the few policemen still
derabJe exaggerction as regods the a~ towu to disarm them, but they did not
rttunber of '~voders ; the degrre ojjtglit- react. The number of Amin's soldiers
v~g, and the purpose oJthe mintlrrvation. incnaaed as the day progressed. In the
Whct ts cesrab+ though, rs thct thls {ate after~oon they came to my house
eprsode has jurrher ~racerbated the and ordered me to give them guns. I told
Southem Region ~ nfiugrt probJtm. them that the sotdie~s had talcen all the
lxob Akol vi,sited the a~ra and tpoke weapons afien they departed. They ded
borh with those caught up in the conjHet Ipy hands be6ind my back and started to
over the ba+der in Uganda and with those beat me, aII the time demanding that I
on this side oj the border respo~uible for give them guas. They used sticks - any-
dealing with the conseqriences of thrs thing they could find, At last they gave
bnst d~st~rrbmece� up hope of getting any guns out of ine
AT FIRST I thought he was not in and then I knew I was t3nished as the
any condition to talk. But Dridci beati~g bec~me intenu. though I could
gFmoii, Diatdct Commluioaer of b4oyo~ no tonger feel the pain, I lost conscioua-
Uganda, sat up in his Yei hoapiW bed neu. An o(d man woke me up at about
desp~'te a broken acm and sa+onen face 3 o�ciock on the momia~t of l lth. I wa~
and lips. 'Is thero tea? I~n very thirsty,~ ai t!�,e buah and the old man told me that
he said feebly, trying to focus on me . they had kR me for dead, He told me to
After a sip he s~id, now more ckarty: `I come with him to Sudan. On the way, the
' had gone to the E~t Bank of the Nile mob caught up with us late in the
aad was expacted back in Moyo, but morniqg. They tied my hands behind my
because of the 6-to-6 curfew on the ferry baclc ~gain and beat me as I walked to
[ had to spend the night on the Eut K~jokaj~ in Sudan.'
Bank. We heard shots durmg the night, A Democratic Parry of~3cia1 on his way
but on investigation the foUowing to Nairobi told Sudcnow in Juba: 'What
moming we discovered that the cause was happeaed in Moyo district was that the
a drunken soldier. Upon leaving for Moyo gover~nent sobiiers made a tactical
I discovered that the soldiera post~d at aithdrawal because they thought their
the ferry had withdrawn towards Gulu. numbers insufficient to meet any large
Further, on my way I mec over 400 fo~ce. When ex-Amin sddias heard of
~ldie~ going south. They tol~i me that the a+ithdrawal they walked into Moyo
they a~cpecud Amin's soldien to invade _ facing no opposition. The � fdlowing
Moyo town and that they were makiag a day it was nimoured that govrmment
cactical ~+ithdrawal. I r~ntinued on my troops were retuming in force and
' , Amin ~ wppoRecs then began pulling out ,
i
- 80
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY , ~
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
of the town and the countryside. Then 5~~. ~~y were expect�~g a good pro-
was no fig,ht at all. but the government ortion of these refugees to rerurn to
_ soldiers were shooting indiscriminate~Y. before the ekctions and many
In K~jok~ji we could still see smoke rising of than were in the process of leaving
from houses sCt on fire by the soldiars. when the trouble started agam. Now the -
The situation as descnbed by those ~d goings ak~ng the vast
two eye.aritnesses differed from that u~~~ border has become so
in Acua, west ~f Moyo. [n Arua, there confused that even the UNHCR office
was a prolonged Sgi~t. Ex�Ugandan f~~ it hard to keep track, ~Nobody
Brigadier Hassan Marele, who reportedly ~eems to know exactty how many
led the rebe( group in the invasion of ~~gas have gone back and how many
Arua, was killed just outside the town. have come,' said Andy Stea?ard of the
The involvement of Manle, who, long refugee office, ~ut it iscertairr that more
before Amin feQ, had left the country have come ihsn gone, We just cannoi say
and had become whac one Sudanese how many yet,~ At least 17,000 more
- official called 'a mini-rnillionaire' in Yd n~~ ~ye came through regiutration
District, kd many people to believe that points ai Kaya, Kajokaji and Nanule.
former General Amin miaht not have Un~e the Tanranian invasion of .
been behind the recer?t moves to disrupt U~~ ~ pp~ ~t year, when there was
ekctions in Uganda, Sudanese security a iot of sympathy for Amin~s sflldiers in
personne( have hinted that the rebels Southern Sudan, there is little sympac~?Y
might have had some links with the for what the Regional authoricies have
Nairobi-based Ugandan polidcisns, ~alyed `a mad ventun' that will hefp no
though this could noc be substanriated. one, Nineteen people, including Amin's
Indeed it is doubtful that Genera! Amin focmer Vxe Presdent Hustafa Idrisi and
and his badly demoralised men would h~ former Minister of Foreign Affairs
have had the organisational ahility to Jiuna Oris, aere promptly arrested an~
attempt an invasion, even one as aimless p~ed under detention by the Regional
as it was doomed to failure, government. Furthermore, the Canmis-
The resutt of this venrure has been an ap ~~m Equatoria Province,
influx of thousands of refugees inro Mr Vapancio Loro has been directed by
Sudan, an additionat burden the Southern the President of 'the High Executive
Region can iIl afford, By June of this Coune~ Mr Abel Alier to ciear the border
year the Southem Region office of the of all nfugees, settled or recentty arrived~
UIYHCR repoRed 40,000 rcfugees in the
COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved 3udanow 1980
CSO : 4420
~
81-82
FOR OFFICIAL IISE ONLY
i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
UPPER VOLTA
NEW LEADERSHIP'S ABILITY TO RECTIFY ILLS gXAMINED
Pari s AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 22 Dec 80 pp 28-30
[Article by Ginette Cot: "The Dying Country"]
[TextJ Will the new Military Committee move on from words to
actions and extricate the people of Upper Volta from its neo-
colonial troubles?
Less than 15 months after it took power, on 25 November of lasti year, at Ouagadou-
gou, the CMRPN (Military Committee of recovery for National Progress), formed a
17-member government, presided over by Col Saye Zerbo who in addition also holds
the j ob of chief of state, minister of defense and of veterans affairs, and chief
of s t aff of the armed forces (see AFRIQUE-ASIE, No 228, 8 December 1980). Among
the s even other army leaders who have joined the new government we might mention
espe c ially Lt Col Bademble Nezien (interior and security)~ Lt Col Felix Tiemtaraboum
(for e ign affairs and cooperation), and the Military Quartermaster Ma.madou Sanio
(economy, planning, in.dustry, and mining) . The latter two had been members of the
mili t ary government of General Lamizana between 1974 and 1978, the f irst of them an
minis ter of youth and sports and the latter as minister of finance. None of the
nine civilians who completed the government ever held any ministerial posts under
the defunct regime. They are nevertheless known for being sympathizers of the op-
pos it ion parties which existed under the Third Republic that emerged from the 1978
elections .
Afte r the first President of Upper Volta, Maurice Yameogo, ousted on 3 January 1966
by a popular uprising, for whom the "historic proclamation of 25 November 1980"
mar ke d"the end of a nightmare," it is the traditional chiefs--whose control over
the c ountry's political, economic, and social life was far from negligible--who
saved the coup d'etat of Col Saye Zerbo. In a message to the CMRPN, the "wise men
of the imperial court of Moro Naba" expressed the opinion in effect that "the event
cons t itutes an unexpected opportunity for the country and the people."
Card inal Paul Zoungrana, the archbishop of Ouagadougou, congratulated the president
and the other members of the Military Committee for "having been the agents of pro-
- vidence of a God who loves Upper Volta." Support committees were established in
cer ta in localities and, pending the announcement of the new regime's options, it
was n oted that the first initiatives taken by the CMRPN were expressed by gestures
of appeasement and conciliation.
- i
83
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8
Thus it was decided to release all af the Octobez and November salaries for teachers,
whose strike had served to *.rigger the crisis leadi.ng to the downfall of the Lami-
zana regime. Moreover, two of the demands of the strikers were met. The resulta
of the last competition for the assignment of trainees to the National School Ad-
ministration Institute in Paris--which had been challenged--were annulled. And
the two teachers who had been transferred because of their union activities, were
returned to their original positions.
On the other hand, expressing its concern for appeasing the discontent caused by
the social injustices and lack of care on the part of the old regime, the CMRPN
decided to dispatch emergency aid to the three departments in the north of the
country whose harvests had been ravaged by invasions of grasshoppers and where it
had not rained since August.
Finnlly, the fact that the Military Co~ittee pledged to respecC individual, group,
and labor union freedoms and that no obstacles were created for freedom of the
press--was taken as an encouraging sign, showing that the new government seems con-
cerned with taking into account the specific democratic gains of the people of ,
Upper Volta. The presence, within the Mi.litary Committee, of enlisted men, in-
cluding one state trooper lst class, further strengthens this assumption.
Nevertheless, it goes without saying that, after a score of years of having been
kicked around, the population of Upper Volta--especially the urban population, which
has developed a high degree of political awareness through constant labor union
struggles--will remain more vigilant than ever before. It expects, if not miracles,
then at least profound changes, first of all, in the management of public affairs
and the distribution of the national income. Thus, the CSV (Voltan Trade Union
Confederation), the country's most dynamic labor union, as a requirement for its
participation in the Military Co~ittee's recovery program, demanded "the very
detailed determination of the fortunes that were wrongfully acquire~ by the former
leaders and the management of public affairs, before anybody can demand any sacri-
fices of the workers." Other disclosures were furthermore expected, concerning
the discovery of a big arms traffic operation supposedly involving men connected
with the PDV-RDA (Voltan Democratic Union--African Democratic Rally), the former
party in power.
Under these conditions, the 25 November coup d'etat seems to sound the death knell
for the Craditional parties of the generation of independence which, in spite of
the popular uprising in 1966, had recovered and definitely made the laws behind
the reg~me of General Lamizana whose laxity, recognized today, allowed room for
all kinds of manipulations and, finally, the law of the jungle.
Of course, nobody entertains any illusions. The leeway of the new leaders, regard-
less of what their undertakings are, is rather tight. Categoxized among the
world's most deprived countries, stricken by 10 years of drought, further reducing
its already limited possibilities and potential, suffering the restrictions de-
riving from its landlocked location that multiplies the effects of imported infla-
tion, Upper Volta must face a situation whose outcome nobody can visualize--except
through miraculous solutions.
8i~
- FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
FOR ( ~
Under these condi.tions~ one cannot see how a xeal nat7~ona1 zecovety e�fort could
be undertaken---apart from an expansion and in~depth development of democracy, a ~
really popular democracy this time--without at the same time making a real attempt
at gaining control of foreign aid and development projects.
The Traditional Chiefdoms
The 1978 legislative and presidential elections were significant regarding the first
point. The thing that emerged after these elections is the lack of interest on the
part of a very large majority of the population--esFecially the people in the rural
areas who account for almost 90 percent of the country's population--with regard to
- the political game wh~_ch was restricted to the capital and parliament. The heavy
abstention rate--which came to 60 percent of the registered voters (the latter
Eurthermore represent only two-thirds of the population of voting age) during the
legislative elections and 65 percent during the presidential elections (although
General Lamizana, already running during the first round of elections, in reality
was elected only by less than 20 percent of the citizens)--cannot be explained,
as people tried to do at that time, merely by the hard work everybody has to do out
in the rural areas but rather by a profound disaffection toward a regime which had
failed in doing its job.
Besides, the election campaign had also shown the bankruptcy of the existing poli-
tical parties whose number (nine, in the beginning) rather poorly concealed the
absence of any specific project for the future. With the exception perhaps of the
party of professor Ki-Zerbo--the former MNR [National Movement for Renewal] which
became the UPV [Voltan Progressive Union] and then the FPV [Voltan Progressive
- FrontJ, which talked about a general socialist blueprint but which alienated a
large portion of the left because of its participation in a Lamizana administration
and above all later on because of its alliance with the return of the old political
war horses, such as Joseph Ouedraogo--the existing parties had hardly any slogans
other than "return the civilians to power`.'; but that was far from enough to make up
a government program.
The most politically aware strata of the population likewise had become increasingly
aware of the need for a broadening and in-depth development of the democratjc debate
~ by getting especially the peasant masses-which so far are still tightly "controlled"
by the traditional chiefdoms--to participate. The LIPAD (Patriotic League for
Development) worked especially along those lines but, it goes without say ing, that
it was bitterly opposed by the government. And the CSV in turn was fighting for
the establishment of a vast anti-imperialist front.
Concerning the second point, it is true that the Lamizana regime had made an effort
to restore public finances after the dilapidation of government funds which had
caused the downfall of its predecessor. But the easy-going attitude, the absence ,
of any initiative~-which had left the f ield to tl:e upstarts and to shady operators
most of all--had characterized all of the administrations which followed each ~
other during the era of General Lamizana. The economic development program of the
PDV-RDA--the party in power under the Third Republic--consisted, all in all, of
these three words: government-controlled liberal capitalism. ~
!
!
85 i
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8
In fact, "governAent control" ~tas tqtally absent. yi,tal pzojects for the country
remained dormant in the drawers for many years; they i.ncluded the WoXk~ng of the
manganese depost at Tambao or the reopening of the Poura gold mine, while foreign
investors had a.free hand in pushing through programs designed bq them and for
them amid the most complete anarchy. Tfiis got so bad that irritation began to
take hold of the Voltan cadres and technicians who were aware of the waste and the
growing alienation pro~~ted by such practices.
~oreign control is expressed for example by such an ambitious project as the AW
(Development of the Valleys of the Three Voltas). This vast operation, whose
start goes back to 1973, initially called for the settlement, within 15 years, of
55,000 peasant families (about 600,000 persons) in an area of 47,400 square kilo- _
meters (about 17 percent of the territory), following the eradicatio~ of onchocer-
ciasis, and, by the end of the project, an output of 150,000 tons of cereal crops,
70,000 tons of cotton, 50,000 tons of sugar cane, and 40,000 tons of peanuts. It
is today in doubt not only in terms of its ba~ic guidelines but also in terms of
its objectives.
Ita implementation as a matter of fact is running into difficulties of all kinds,
inherent in the pro~ect itself, and the money suppliers think that the cost of
settling a migrant is too high. As a matter of fact, as the LIPAD underscored in
a study of the situation of rural areas in Upper Volta, this experiment is indica-
tive of the orientation of the regime's development policy. Depending almost exclu-
sively on foreign financing, in other words, the goodwill of money suppliers, "the
- AW essentially is aimed at the promotion of income-producing crops."
The Voltan "Sharpshooters"
In the meantime, the rural areas as a whole seem to have been abandoned. To visua-
lize the vast misery of the Voltan peasant masses, we might look at the following
two figures. While the average life expectancy, already generally reduced, is 41
years in the urban ar~as, it drops to 32 years in the rural areas. And while, of-
ficially, the monthly minimum earnings of a wage worker come to less than 15,000
francs CFA [African Financial Community] (F300), the income of a peasant family
is 18,200 francs CFA (F364) per year.
In spite of the fact that the Voltan peasant consumes a portion of hi~ output him-
self, he must--in order to meet his family's food needs (at least half a score of
personsj--spend almost 50 percent of that small money income for food. "In spite
of everything," according to the bulletin LE PATRIOTE, put out by LIPAD, "the Voltan
peasant, especially in the country's central region, cannot afford more than a
single meal per day, essentially based on millet and surghum. During years with
little rainfall, where annual cereal crop requirements are estimated at 250 kilograms
per person. ~n the average, the harvests in certair,. regions yield only 60 kilograms
_ per person and sometimes even much less."
How should one then be astonished, under these conditions, that the ancient "tradi-
tions" persist? As during colonial times, wtzen the country was treated as a reser- _
voir of civilian and military manpower (the 200,000 "Senegalese Sharpshooters," re-
cruited during World War I, for the most part came from Upper Volta), the Voltans,
86
FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
famous for the great value of thei.r work, axe ~orced by the hundreds o~ thousands
to go seek a pittance in neighboring countries, such as Ghana, but above all in
Ivory Coast, where they are employ~ed in the plantations, the fa ctories, and in
domestic service. Nor is it astonishing tfiat the poung people flee from the rural
areas in vast numbers, prefering to take their chances in the capital and in urban
areas where however they do not find anything to do and only serve to awell the
ranks of the unemployed.
We can imagine how this situation creates problems of delinquency and potential
revolts. Of course, these are common tendencies in many countries but the crying
shortages in social terms, as demonstrated by all of the administrations that suc-
ceeded each other since independence at Ouagadougou, even more dangerously accen-
tuate the imbalances and seriously threaten the verq future of the country.
Two examples will suffice to illustrate this observation. While no serious educa-
tion reform has ever been undertaken and while 90 percent of the population are
illiterates, the school attendance rate of children of school age is barely more
than 10 percent. Out of 1,127,300 children of school age in 1975, only 133,660
were actually in school; just 3 years later, progress was ins ignificant since the
number of childreii attending school had risen only to 160,528, out of a total num-
ber of school-age children of 1,187,600. We must also note that the expenditures
of Che parents of these students are very high since they come to 60,000 and even
70,OQ0 francs CFA (F1,200-1,300) per year. As for high schools, not a single one
has been put up since 1966. At the start of the 6th year, in 1979, there were
only 1,820 places for 17,000 applicants. The country has 37 high schools, only
14 of which are public while the remaining 23 are private, in other words, they
require tuition.
Doctors and Midwives
In terms of health, it suffices to realize that, in 1977 (and there have hardly
been any major changes since then), the country had a grand total of 51 doctors
(in other words one doctor f or every 118,000 inhabitants, wher eas the proportion _
considered necessary by the WHO is one doctor for every 10,000). Besides, out of
those 51 Voltan doctors, 41 were practicing at Ouagadougou or Bobo-Dioulasso; only
thx�ee of them were wnrking in the regional centers. There were also 120 midwives,
in other words, one for every 50,000 inhabitants (as against on.e for every 5,000
according to the figures accepted by the W[i0), plus 355 government male nurses
(one for ~very 17,000 inhabitants) and 946 r~agistered male nurses (one for every
6,350).
ThA remark made concerning the territorial distribution of doctors also applies to
the other health workers, especially midwives, two-thirds of whom are stationed in
Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. The very thin medical supFort structure and the
prohibitive costs of inedical care given there explain why the vast majority of the
population (75 percent) and more particularly the peasant mass es are getting no
modern medical care at all. Now, when one realizes that no promotion and dEVelop-
ment effort is being made in support of traditional medicine, when one realizes
also that scour.ges such as malaria and po].io are particularly virulent, chen one
can understand that it is the very survival of a people which is at stake here.
- i
I-
i
87 ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
i
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
~
Finally, concerning inte~rnati.onal relat~.ons, nothing ox' a].ioost noth.ing has changed
since the first years after independence. Regardless o� athether we look at rela~
tions with Ivory Coast, whicfi seem sometimes to consist mostly of relations between
the father-state and the dependent-state, rather than a situation of cooperation
between equal states; or witether we look at relations with France which, through
ity subsidies, its "aid~" its investments, and trade, etc., maintaine almost com-
plete control over the country-everything has remained what it always was. Of
course, the policy of going along with all of this, pursued by the Lamizana regime,
caused more and more rumblings and discontent. At the beginning of the year, prime
minister Conombo said that the revision of the cooperation agreements with France
was necessary. But all of this of course remained on the level of the vagueness
so characteristic of the PVD-RDA politicians.
In view of this situation, the first condition for a real recovery involves a fight
against the dilapidation of public funds, embezzlement, mismanagement, and ill-
considered expenditures. The decision announced on 10 December by Col Saye Zerbo,
~o create a special investigating commaission, "charged with casting light on the
management of public affairs under the Third Republic," does respond to the demand
of the CSV and leads us to hope for a real change in the practice and orientation
of the new regime. While the options of the Q~tPN have not yet been clearly ex-
plained, this impression is strengthened by the other intention~ that have been
proclaimed. "The moment has come to build a real dem4cracy," the new chief of -
state declared and on the other hand he also announced "the necessary reorRaniza-
tion of the aciministration" and he asserted that priority would be given in econo-
mic terms to rural development and protection of cattle in order to guarantee food
self-sufficiency.
Of course, this is an objective that has been proclaimed everywhere. But the thing
that particularly attracts our attention is that the CMRPN has declared that it is
determined to review the policy of iadustrial crops in order to make room for food
crops. And it also wants to step up mining prospecting (which so far has been
neg~ected, although the Voltan subsoil is not devoid of potential) in order to pro-
mote industrial development.
While a minimum of caution is necessary in waiting for the promises to turn into
real efforts, one may nevertheless hope that a new day is about to dawn over this
country which so long has been left to itself.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Af rique-Asie
5058
CSO: 4400
88 �
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
UPPER VOLTA
LAMIZANA'S DOWNFALL ANTICLIMACTIC
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 31
[Article by Siradiou Diallo: "A Putsch That Was Almost Dull--General Lamizana
Overtaken by Events; A Military Recovery Comm'_ttee Puts an End To Democratic
EMperlence"]
[Te~:tJ Africa has just recorded its Sth military coup in 11 months. Af ter ,
Ma~tiritania (4 January) , Liberia (12 April) , Uganda (13 May) , and Guinea-Bissau
(14 November), Upper Voltan power is changing hands. At dawn on 25 November
Ouagadougou was the scene of a putsch that was almost dull.
Gen Sangoule Lamizana, in power for nearly 16 years, was overthrown--painlessly,
and, above all, without bloodshed. A"Military Recovery Committee For National
Progress seized power, dissolved the National Assembly and thP government, and
suspended the constitution and political activity.
Calm and Authoritarian
This did not prevent that committee from proclaiming its intention to set up a
"real democracy," bringing together all the nat ion's active forces and insuring
individual and collective freedoms "other than political ones."
The new strong man in Ouagadougou is not quite an unknown in the corridors of
power. Saye Zerbo, the colonel who chairs the Military Committee, was in fact
General Lamizana's minister of foreign affairs between February 1974 and February
1976. That was in the "national renewal" government set up following the political
crisis which :~a~ ~roken ouc ~n 22 January 1974 setting Gerard Kango Ouedraogo,
the prime minister, 3gainst Joseph Ouedraogo, president of the National Assembly.
A~!~eteran of the Indochina and Algeria wars, Col Saye Zerbo comes from Tougan, in
western U~per Volta. From the Samo tribe like Gen Sangoule Lamizana, he took the
Frejus (France) officer training school course in 1958 before attending staff school
and staff college in Paris. Most recently he held the jobs of commander of the
Ouagadougou combined service xegiment and head of the studies office at staff
_ headquarters. Calm and authoritarian, he is 48 years old.
Why this coup in a country envied by the rest of Africa for its democratic
experience and which prided itself on respecting individual and collective
liberties, while gradually getting used to tolerar.'_ng things like a free country ,
89
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
does? Because life for Upper Voltans was getting worse and because of political
confusion, the new leaders maintain.
To be sure, since the start of the new school year, the unions, in collaboration
with the opposition parties, kept things increasingly tense (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1038). _
But can democracy live without clashes and struggles?
A Man Who Was Finished
In truth, the Upper Voltans were fed up with Lamizana. Worn out by 16 years of
power, the general (as he is commonly called in Ouagadougou) seemed to be
increasingly overtaken by events.
Faced with unrest among some and the intrigues of others, he took refuge in a
wait-and-see approach which bordered on resignation. "Lamizana is finished," one
of his colleagues confided to us recently, indignant at the inability of the Upper
Voltan chief of state to resolve the crisis brought on by the openended strike
activity of the unions. "I cannot conceive," added the person we were talking to,
"of a president of the Republic who, having met with the union members, would let
them go at it again without having made a decision." In the same way, opposition
leaders like Joseph Ki-Zerbo, secretary-general of the FPV (Upper Voltan Progres-
sive Front), were constantly denouncing the paralysis and i.action of the officials
in charge. "Lamizana," they would say, "is like a corpse at the summit of power.
He does not act or react, whatever you do."
in the face of their chief's ineffectiveness and good-naturedness, the Upper
Voltans clearly needed a change and particularly to be ruled by a self-confident
head and a f irm hand, provided that their new strongman does not carry that too
far. The Upper Voltans, spoiled rotten by Lamizana's laissez-faire approach,
might before long become disillusioned and, who knows, react in turn.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
9631
CSO: 4400
9~ _
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
UPPER VOLTA
l
LABOR UNREST PRECEDING RECENT COUP DISCUSSED
- Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French S Dec 80 pp 37-39
[Article by Ginette Cot: "The End of a Myth"]
[Text] The 25 November coup d'etat put an end to the reign of General Sangoule
Lamizar~a and his entourage, a regime that had retained but the outward trappings
o f democ racy .
What for months had appeared to be an increasxngly definite probability became
an actual fact on 25 November 1980 in Quagadougou where a bloodless coup led by
Colonel Sayo Zerbo overth rew General Sangoule L~mizana's regime which had governed
Upper 4olta since January 1966. The coup was englneered b~ the Inter-Service and
Support Regiment (RIA) commanded by Colonel Zerbo and the Par atrooper-Commando
~ Regiment (RPC) normally stationed in Dedegou some 230 kilometers northeast of Oua-
gadougou. The coup was followed by the arrest of several of the former regime's
leaders. These included: President Lamizana; Gerard Kango Ouedraogo, president
of the National Assembly and secretary general of the Voltan Democratic Party-
African Demoeratic Rally (PDV-RDA), the new version of the old tJDV-RDA [Voltan
Democratic Union-African Democratic Party], approved by the March 1980 party congress;
Casimir Tapsoba, leader of the PDV-RDA in the capital; General Baba Sy, former army
chief of staff, and General Jean Bila, former armed forces chief of stafE. .A11
peryons arrested were taken to the new military camp in the western section of -
the capital.
A 31-member Military Committee of Recovery for National Pro~ress (CMRPN) was
established with Colonel Saye Zerbo a~ chairman. A nine-member steering committee
has been formed within the CMRPN and some 10 civil servants have been appointed to
handle current business in the various ministries pending formation of a new govern-
tnent. The new leaders said their actioxi~aas 3ustified by the country's political
and economic situation "marked by the deterioration of the social cli~;ate and all
s ectors of national life." In what is now a standard procedure, the new leader-
ship~s first decision was to dissolve all of the country's institutions, suapend
the present constitution ar?d a11 political parties.
� The CMRPN asserted it would abide by all of the ousted regime's international
obligations. It also gave assurance that "individual and collective freedoms
o ther than political will bE guaranteed." It announced that its objective was
" to establish a real democracy in which all of the nation's vital elements are
partners." This statement is much too broad and too ambiguous to allow us to
speculate in any way, at this early date, about the new government's real intentions.
- 91
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
There are, however, two facts that must be noted, even though they shed no r~ore
, light on what the future holds than the above statement does. The first fact is
that the military coup ~ccurred 5 days after the National Union of African Teachers
~ of Upper Volta (SNEAHV) and the Sole Voltan Union of Teachers of Secondary and
- Higher Education (SUVESS), meeting in extraordinary session, had decided to suspend
their effort to force a shawdown with the government of Prime Minister Joseph Conombo
who is also the assistant secretary general of the PDV-RDA. This attempted showdown
had resulted in a strike of indefinite durati~on by elementary school teachers. This -
strike, begun on 1 October, the first day of the new school year, was in support
of several demands, one of which--revision of the administrative status af teachers--
had previously triggered a 5-day work stoppage in February 1980. The other demands
t~ad to do with ~icreased housing allowances for teachers, and with two special cases:
reinstatement of two union members transferred because of their involvement in strike
action, and the recall to Upper Volta of several trainees sent to the National Insti-
= tute of School Administration in Paris under conditions the SNEAHV considers irregu-
lar.
With every passing day the con~lict had expanded and stiffened as the SUVESS and
other labor federatior~sjoined the dispute. For instance~ on 14 October, the Voltan
Trade Union Confederation ',CSV), the country's most militant union, staged a 72-
hour "sympathy and protest" strike which paralyzed sir traffic, banks, and the cus-
toms service. On 4 November, another 48-hour general strike was called, this time
by the Eour Upper Voltan 1�^bor federations: the National Confederation of Voltan
Workers (CNTV), Voltan Organization of Free Trade Unions (OVSL), Voltan Workers
Trade Union Federation (USTB), and the CSV.
Motion of No-Confidence
While later the CSV was threatening to call for a general strike of indefinite
duration to protest the arrest of several union membera, the "illegal freezing of
wages, and all forms of ir.justice perpetrated by the regime," a motion of no-con-
fidence in the government--the first such motion since the country became independent
in 1960--was filed on 11 November by 24 of the National Assembly's 57 member.s. Those
members supporting the motion were from the following opposition parties: the
National Union for the Defense of Democracy (UNDD) headed by Professor Ammanuel
Zoma and former presider~t Maurice Yameogo, ousted in 1966, and the Voltan Progres-
sive Fron[ (FPV) headed by Professor Joseph Ki-Zerbo and Joseph Ouedraogo. Under
rlte terms of this motion, event~ally defeated by 33 votes to 24, the opposition
accused the government of not respecting the Cflnstitution and mismanaging public
~ f~cnds. It blamed the government for the deterioration of the political, economic,
and social clLmate, for the insecurity of citizens, and for the country's inade-
quate food supplies, particularly in the drought-stricken regions. The motion con-
cluded by calling for the constitution of a government of national unity.
;he government had become panic-stricken and its Iast statements and actions
reflected its inabili~y to quell the crisis and find solutions. On 12 November, for
example, it promulgated a decree prohibiting demonstrations in public places and,
strangely enough, the wearing of military uniforms by persons not belonging to
the Upper Voltan Armed Forces and paramilitary organizations. To jvstify this
measure, General Lamizana explained that "a small group, under a labor union cover,
had oroanized a veritable armed militia with wea~ons and ~miforn~s furnished by the
92
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8
.
real directors of the operation." He added that the elementary school teachers'
strike had been "largely taken over and diverted by disparate coalitiona whoae sole
common objective was to foment disorder and confusion."
While Gerard Kango Ouedraogo, president of the National Assei~.,ly and secretary
gene ral of the PDV-RL'A~ was accusing his lifelong foe: and rival, his "brother"
Joseph Ouedraogo--former leader of the UDV-RDA, founder of the RDA Denial Front
durin g the 1978 election campaign, and recently affiliated with Professor Ki-Zerbo's
movement--of being the chief instigator of thecrisi.s, Prime Minister Joseph Conombo
pers onally went so far as to hold "a foreign power" responsible, a power he claimed
hed financially backed some tradQ union leaders.
With L'tmoa t Calm
It was under these conditions of total deadlock, and at a time when the PDV-RDA
pres idential ma~ority was preparing to throw off its democratic masks once and for
all, that, on 21 November, the two tea~hers' unions decided to suspend their strike
ackion while stating that they intended to continue their struggle, coordinate their
demands ar.d submit them to the government.
The second notewor[hy fact is that the people received the news of Colonel Saye
Zerh o's coup d'etnt with utmoet calm, without any agitation. There was even
no recorded reaction from officials of the trade union opposition or polltical
oppo sition inside or outside the country. This wany perhaps have been an indica- ~
tiozt of necessary caution, but also perhaps the expression oi a wait-and-see atti-
tude. The only reactions noted were the almoat unanimous lamentations of the French
- pres s and pro-Western African newspapers who viewed the overthrow of General Sangoule
Lami zana's regime as the end of an experiment "unique in Africa." The French and
pro-Western African media had always depicted Lamizana as a good-natured and concili-
aCory person, and had eomewhat prematurely hailed him ae the father of the French-
, aCyle democracy ~rhi~h reigned in Ouagadougou.
It is true that everyone in the Upper Voltan capital could apparently freely voice
the ir opinions, and ti~at a foreign observer ran no risk whenever he sought to inter-
vie w any member of the opposition. There was no lack of oratorical jousts and rows,
but these could serve as an outlet for frust.rations as well as a means of satisfying
those persons who Zike to criticize ~d challenge authority. It is also true that
rep ressive violence, torture, or political assasaination have been practically
unknown in Upper ilolta up to now. This characteristic is, of course, particularly
important.
Yet upon closer examination, it is quite clear that this relative democracy, so
high ly praised outside the country, had to be doggedly defended everyday agaixist
the regime's supporters, and that it owed its existence primarily to the bitter
struggle waged by workers. The entire history of the past 14 years is groof of this.
Md all politicians from Joseph Ouedraogo to Joseph Conombo have been forced to
recognize it and by turns ac~ accordingly.
Mas s demonstrations organized by labor unions forced Maurice Yameogo, Upper Volta's
fir st president, to step down on 3 January 1966. He had been involved in a series
of financial scandals. Furthermore, his government had followed a fundamentally
93
FOR OFFZCIAL USE OI~LX
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8
antisocial policy and truckled to the furmer mother country and its satellites.
In 1975, the labor federations again had to nip one of~neral Lamizana's plans in
the bud. On 29 Uovember, the chief of state had announced his intention to impose
a single party loyal to him. namely the National Movement for Renewal. But the
very next day, thousands of workers responded to a call from the four labor federa- �
tions--CSV, OVSL, C[~ITV, and USTV--and demonstrated their indignation in Labor
Exchange Square. A general strike of unprecedented success was staged on 17-18
December in support of four demands: return to normal constitutional life, higher
wages, settlement of claims resulting from misappropriation of relief aid destined
for drought victims in the Sahel region and also from misappropriation of social
securi[y ftmds.
A "Cimmick" ~
1fie chief of state, forced to backtrack, evaded the difficulty by a"gimmick." With
the help of all the country's politicians, he formed a special commission entrusted
with the task of drafting a constitution. At the same time, this enabled him to
dodge demands for an investigation of the aforementioned misappropriation. Con-
trary to the enthusiastic foreign reception given the constitution approved by
referendum in November 1977, that document actually marked a regression from the
prevailing de facto situation in the country where, without waiting for official _
permission, political and labor organizations were already openly working together
because the n~w law specified that only the three parties receiving the most votes
in the 1978 parliamentary elections would henceforth be considered lawful. In fact,
th~s law accounts for the sometimes strange regroupings and alliances made, after
the elections, within~the oppositian as well as in the presidential ma~ority. For
instance, in late 1979, the Voltan Progressive Front (FPV), an opposition party, was
actually a coalition of Frofessor Ki-Zerbo's Voltan Progressive Union (UPV), Joseph
Ouedraogo's RDA Denial Front, the Independents, and elements of the Af:ican Republi-
can Party (PRA).
~f the parties having cast their votes for General Lamizana as president, only the
UDV-RDA emerged as a lawful party. At its Ma.rch 1980 congress, the UDV-RDA incor-
porated elements of other s~uall organizations and on ~hat occasion changed its desig-
nation to PDV-RDA. This move strengthened the precarious presidential majority in
the National Assembly--33 of the 57 members--and restored respect for constitutional
principles (several members of one of those small parties favorable to Lamizana,
but defeated in the elections, were already members of the Conombo government). And
ttie proceedings of the PDV-RDA Congress consisted almost entirely of behind-the-~
sceneG wheeling and dealing for a share of appointments and honorary positions (the
party of the presidential majoriCy has no less than 100 members in its political
buremu) .
Corruption~ Lure of Easy Money
Though General Lamizana's Upper Volta could pride itself on having no person impri~
soned for political or labor union related offenses, it also owed this record to the
~ vigilance of Upper Voltan workers. The many labor protests throughout 1979 confirm
this fact. On 22 May, three OVSL officials were confined in the civilian prison
at Gnoko for having denounced, at a union rally, the expansian of regionalism since
196G and the misappropriation of public funds with which tile entire capital was
91~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8
charging n~neruus key government leaders. As soon as news of this incarceration
= became known, the four labor federations staged a general strike without waiting foi
the 15--day cooling-off period prescribed by law. The strike lasted 7 da~ys, from
24 :4xy to 31 ?~[ay, and despite all kinds of intimidation--including the arrest of.
' aeveral leaders of the merchants union, and the occupatirm of the Workers Education
Center and the Labor Exchange by repressive forces--the strike movement attained
its goal: on 31 May, all arrested tmian members and officials were releseed and
all charges against them were dropped.
Again the lab~r unions were behind the sudden cuncern expressed on 21 February
1980 by General Lamizana about "::he countless disorders plaguing the IIpper Voltan
civil seruice." In addressing a meeting of key govemment staffers, he told them:
_ "Corruption, the lure of easy money, disrespect for public service, and the ten-
dency of cer[ain officials to allow business to intrude into politics are apparently
_ becoming a way of life." He then announced the imminent impletr,entation "of a set
of ineasures designed to successfully carry out indispensable reforms." As for this
"set of ineasures," it would appear that they consisted of nothing more than the
decision to create, as recom~ended by the national administzative reform cotmnittee
established in February 1979, a single government inspector general's office for
the entire country in place of rhe present "plethoric and anarchic" series of
general inspectorates operating in each ministerfal departments.
But the labor federations--CNTV, CSV, and OVSL--which. in an open letter to the
President of the Republic on 5 Septzmber 1979, had drawn the chief'of state's
a:ention to various irregularities noted in the management of public affairs,
were hardly prepared to let this matter be forgotten. Especially since each time
uni.ons submitted demands, they were accused of warking towards selfish goals and
trying, as it were, to bring about the downfall of a country whose destitution
is still exacerbated by 10 years of drought. Actually, such accusations were an
attempt to set Che city workers ~nions against the immense peasant ma~ority
stagnating on the edge of destitution. This situation prompted Prime Minister
Conombo to say quite tactlessly one day, in an outburst of demagogic f..eeling,
that whenever he was faced with wage earners' demands, he personally considered him-
self to be the leader of a peasant trade imion with 7 million members:
Leeches
But in their letter, the three labor federations not only reiterated their wage
demands but also let it be clearly understood that funds could be found wilh which
to improve the living conditians of wage earners without hurting anyone, provided,
however, the corridors of powera were not filled with so many leeches absorbing
public funds. Glith supporting evidence, the three federations denounced the
following instanr_es of the waste in the management of public affairs: numerous
missiona with inflated delegations; modernizat3ron at government expense of the private
homea of cabinet members and other officials; misappropriations and malfeasance by
government pereonnel; manipulation of public funds for dishonest purposes; opening
of special government-funded accounts and programs for the National Assembly, the
ministries, and other public institutions, while keeping the actual use of these
funds secret; corruption of ministers and other national officials; systematized
favoritism and nepotism resulting i.n favors granted citizens supgortive of the presi-
dential majority, such as, for example, the awarding of government contracts to
95
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300074449-8
friends and relatives of natianal officials; incliision in the national budget
of more than 100 agents and civil servants for whom no derinite functions are
specified; the e~iormity of the salaries paid managers af ~emip.ubl.~~:comFanies, etc. .
Lastly, workers must also be given credit for the surreptitious but specta~ular
wiChdrawal from the National Assembly's agenda ot a bill limiting the right to
st�cike. As soon as newe of th~s bill leaked out, the CSV organized a day of
protest on 17 January 1980. The bill also promised to create quite a stir in the
ranks of the opposition. Consequently no further mention was ever made of it. The
special session of the National Assembly called to consider the bill was cancelled
withouC any explanation. And ever since then, no government official ;zas dared �
even to ~;cknowledge that such a bill ever existed.
NeverCheless, the governmental crisis had b~come more pronounced these past few
months despite the advent of the Third Republic, the "democratic" ~lections of
1978 and the "patched-up" peace that followed. The deadlock resulted from two
traits which have characteriaed the economic and social policy of President Lami-
~ zana's successive gove~nments for nearly 15 years, namely Iaissez-faire and an
- excessive tendency to concj.liate. Unable to find solutions, supporters of the presi-
dential majority became more and more arrogant.
EveryChing was happening as i�, "having neither learned nor forgotten anything,"
they expected, despi'te all contraindicationS, to bring ;mions and opposition parties
to heei, so as Co impase a noncumbersome made-to-order "democracy." In any event,
the seizures of newspapers, instances of haraGSment, and Lransfers of civil ser-
vants belonging to oppoeition parties continued to :Increase.
These roeasures faited, however, to halt the process of the regime's disintegration.
And people waited in vain for the municipal electiona prescribed by the Constitution.
But these elections were clearly postponed sine die.
A CSV oLficial told us a few months ago: "In reallty, President Lamizana and his
PDV-RDA majority are trapped in an inextricab].e contradiction. Our leaders take
great pride in saying: 'Look at our country, here we have democracy.' For them,
in facr, denocracy bo ils down ta a public relattons campaign aimed at the outside
world. I'or inside the country, our leaders speak an altogether di~ferent language
znd deny full expression to all of the components of that democracy~ and organiZed
- labor is one such component. These leaders pose as champions of democracy as ~f
tti~~y had invented it. It is essential, however, that it be fu11y understood on the
inte rnational level that the men of the present presidential majority--those very
same men who were already grouped together as members of the single official party
of Maurice Yameogo's First Republic--certainly have no hand in the relative freedom
we enjoy. It must be realized that when the general wanted to eatablish his own
single party in 1979, these men did not even react.
'Good Family Man'
"Our democrntic attainments; which we have to defend in a daily unremitting struggle,
were actually achieved by the Upper Voltan people and workers. Moreover, we believe
that there will be no real der,iocracy as long as a n~inority can continue to monopo-
lize the fruits of collective labor, as long as we have not succeeded in establishing
economic and social democracy. Outsiders tell us: you have Africa's most generous
96
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8
general. a good family man who has presented you with democracy. This is a perni- -
cious line of reasoning that further juatifies the possibility of repreasion the
uament it is felt we are exaggerating, because the number of strikes will increase
and that, it seems, is not possible in ~ poor country. Therein lies the danger
that threatena us and is liable to jQOpardize our progress toward democracy.
Because if our leaders manage to deceive international public opinion, one morning
they will be able to reprees us with the blesaing or silent complicity of part of -
that opinion...."
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
8041 -
CSO: 4400 ~D -
97 t
FOR OFFICIAL USE ~NLX
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070049-8