JPRS ID: 9483 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9483 _
13 J~anuary 1981 -
Near East Nort~ Africa Re ort -
p
(FOUO 2/81)
Fg~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST I~FORMATION SERVICE -
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JPRS L/9483
- 13 January 1981
- NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
' cFOUO 2/si)
. CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFF'AIRS
Bri ef s
I,ibyan Troops Near ~inisia 1
Military Assistance 1
Tunisian Baath Party Member 1
ISZAI~IIC AFFAIRS
Streetcorner Preachers of Competing Sects Attract Crowds in Sudan
(SIIDANOW, Nov 80) . 2
IRAN
Causes of Iranian Ttevolution Analyzed
(Eric Rouleau; BEFRSIUNG, Fall 1980) ....o.........a...... 5
SUDAN
Islamic University Elections Pass Peacefully
(SUDANOW, Nov 80) ........e.o ...................o...o..... 19
Parallel Maxket Regulations Help Tmprove Econa~y
(SUDAN(JW, Nov 80) .........o 22
Large Scale Development Underway at Port Sudan
~?SU~LNQW~ NOV 8~~ �~~~~o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~a~~a~~o~~~~~~o~~~o~� 2�
Raad Constructian Moves Forward at Brisk Pace
(SUDANOW, Nov 80) ......s ................o................ 27
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
r
LIBYAN TROOPS NEAR TUNISIA--Libyan secretary of foreign affairs Ali Abdesselam Triki
will soon be leaving for Tunis. Th~Ls was suggested by Libya's leadership during a _
meeting in Tripoli in early December with secretary general of the Arab League
Ch.edli Klibi. The Tunisian Governmeat quickly e~ended the invitation to him. -
Meantime heavily equipped Libyan troops hav~ masaed along the border with Tunisia:
a total of 10,000 troops with equipment ranging from 435 Canks, 40 Mirage F1 and
V, Tupolev 22 bombers, to about 20 assault helicopters and batteries of ground-to
ground missiles (Frog 7 and Scud B) as well as surface-to-air mi.ssiles SAM 6.
Going from north to south the Libyan troops are situated right along the border at:
i Bouka~ach (where there is a launching ramp for Frog ground-to-ground missiles;)
E1 Assa (with 45 tanks and artillery); Ouazen; Nalout (30 tauks);Ourzod and Ghadames.
The bulk of the *_roops is situated in a secorid line close enough to reach the bor-
der without delay. E1 Ouatia (about 20 km from the border in the northern aector)
appears to be the main baae (40 Mirage F1 and Mirage V are located there along with
19 MT 24 assault helicopters and two troop transport helicopters). A launching
ramp for Frog or Scud ground-to-ground missiles and two Crotale air defense bat-
~ teries round out the arms stock at Ouatia where there are also two battalions,
motorized infantry and artillery. Z~ao additional tank battalions (60 armored ve-
hicles) and one ground artillery battalion are situated at Zeltan. Zouara has two
tank battalions. Further back, about 100 km from the border, there are forces
situated at: Sabratah (8 battalions including 4 units consisting of 120 tanks);
Zawia (3 battalions); Yeffren (1 battalion); Ghariane (3 battalions plus one spe-
cial forces unit). It's a foregone conclusion that Abdesselam Triki will have -
some explaining to do during his trip to Tunis. After all it wae only in November
that Co].onel Qadhdhafi asserted that there were no I.ibyan troops along the Tunisian
border. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 llec 80 p 25]
MILiTARY ASSISTANCE--A military assistance agree~ent between Malta, on the one side,
and Tunisia and Algeria, on the other side? Malta's prime minister pom Mintoff
tendered this proposal in Tunis and Algiers on his mid-December visit in those '
capital cities. It is linked Lo the plan guaranteeing Malta's neutrality so cher-
ished by Dom Mintoff. Nor does he neglect seeir,g to it that Malta's relations with
. Libya do not deteriorate too much. [Text) [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Dec 80
p 38 ]
TUNISIAN B,AATH PARTY MEhiBER-�-A Tunisian is a member of the Baath ParCy's national
- cammand governing Syri.a. Ife is 40 year old Mphamed Salah Hermassi a former high-
school headmaster in 'i'wiis. He is responsible for Baath dealings ~aith the Maghreb
region. [Text] [Faris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Dec 80 p 38]
CSO: 4400
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ISIAMIC AFF'AIRS
STREETCORI~ER PREACHERS OF COMPETING SECTS ATTRACT CROWDS IN SUDAN
Khartoum SUDANOW in English Nov 80 pp 40-41
~ Text ~ In recent ye~s. conJlict betK+eae rhe X'lany u~ the }ireacheis fiarp
vmious Islamic sects tn Suda~t has taken on motal v~lues and questions, perhaps
:n tht streen In an effon to prexh not worried by the threat to the `moral base'
onty the Woad, but their own interpreta of thtir societY Posed by the rapid
~ tion of the Wo~d, corcflicting ,Nuslim interferatce of new values. Bec~uae of
grvupJ have bee~r kee~r to take the cl:mece this, notes Dr Bilal, such discussions are
to ge out on the streets ond plead for ~arely hdd in rural areas, where the threat
suyport for thrir own particular case. is more distant. Street-corner diacussions
l.art month. ~eporta Azhmi Abde! are also a fairly e~'icient me~ns of
Rahman found out who ?Has saytng wiwt, broadcastiug new ideas, and they tend to
how thty had started and what the reach a wlder and poorer audieace than
relevmet outlwritia had to say abeut it the more 'elitd media of nevvspapars and
tie[evision.
'NHABiTANI'S STROLLING around ~�r a'xdemic Islamic scholars have
the Three Towns - or in anb other of a~�d ~ Bilal, noting that ~t
- the major cities throughoat tiu country P~~s of npld economic and sociel
change, reforming figures have oRen
- will probably have noticed an increase ap~~ ~ l~e numbers, clauning
in the number of s~nall crowds surround- ~t there has been a deviation from the
ing preachers haranguing the public from ~~~c faith, and callin~ foc a
- mosque-corners or in the strats return to purity, to the Qw~n xn elSunna.
~e~~~' The appearance of street~corner
People who make up these gatherings preachera in the view of Abdelsalaam Sid
are either seriousiy~ interested in what the p~~~ ~otha scholu, is due to the
prr�acher has to say, or have just come fact that tt~e ~uestion of Isiamisation of
- along through idle curiosity. Perhaps not the state has not yet been setded in
~~~~Y~ ~o~ ~~B~Y Sudan, polnting out that street�preachecs
organised, and tactically arransed by are not common in other lslamic
competing Muslim r3roups - on the one countries whae the isaue has already
- hand, the Ans~ el Sunna, and on the been decided. Different groups are
other, t?:e Republican Brothers. As one a:guing for a different constitutional role
memb~,r of the Ansar el Sunna told for Islam, but unlike Saudi Arabla, Iran
Sudi~now, preaching-sessions within the and ~a~istan~ no one specific doctrine hss
Thnx Toans conform to a strict been constrtutionally acctpted.
schedule. The preachers thamselves use the strat-
There are many theories as to how and ~~tings to exprats their
why these al ' fresco sermons have grown diffetences with their rival groups and to
comirece theu audience of tha teous-
up. Dr El Hag Bflal, of the Afm-Asian ~ of their own beliefs. Accod to
Studies Institute, in the University of ~8
Khartoum, believes that changing social AbdeLsalsam Sid Ahmed, the religious
conditions and che emergence of wes:ern conflict can be traced back W the original
trends have all coetributed to their ~m, at the turn of the century, which
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divided the Sufu from the o~thodox merely ~sa"iang to improve the conditioni
believers. tslam entaed Sudan, ir. the of their felMw studenta aad thad their
main, through the large nunbers of Suf: brand of Sbftsm, S~n~ Sr~fts~n, does
groups who believed that the tombs and not proh~bit tlxir puticipation m day-to-
relics of religious figures wae as much a day affa}rs.
signif~cant symbol of faith as the mosque 'The .4n~, the orthodox bederro~,
itself. This contradicted the taching of were repocbediy iarited ia W the IRC,
the orthodox believas, a+~o grew up at but no ragty aras c'eoe~v~d� Given the
the tum of the century unda the t~aditiooal rnratry behveen the Ans~ and
inQuena of the Egyptian el Azhar reH� the Kl~tntiyy~a, and tlie 5ct that sa~ce .
gious school. the days of tha Mahdist ~tate (1885-
So the Ansar Swuw . octhodox 1898), the Ar~sar hre baa out of favour -
:~luslims, a~oup which was famed in witf~ ill the otha t~~a in the country,
the I930s, use the strat-cornas to ~~~tY ~~P~S�
launch. heavy religiou~ attacks on the O~e of the Ansr~ el Sunna told ~
Sufu. The Republican Brothers, on the ~dmtow that their rt~aat Purpose at the
other hand, who appeared for the first montieni wa:, through preachittg in the
time in ihe 1940s, uu the streets for ttt+eets and ia the mos4ues, to put ova
talks on a wide-ranging ulection of md stra~gthen the coscxPt of Ta?~+leeed,
topics: politics, celigion and sociology. belief in one God. Tktis vonctpt neBates
The Republican Brothers, in fact, have the existesct of ury mediaior between
, been baru~ed from preaching in the God and caan. and is aa indirect attack
mosques, although one member of the on Sujism In reply, a sufr told Sudano`w
_ Brotherhood, Ahmed Dali, told Sudanow on]y Suh Islam could survive in Sudan,
i that if they could avoid a public ~~~y ~p~oy the kind of popular
disturbance, they would try to preach in teachings and ideas that suits Ssdanest
- the mosques sometime in the future. culture.
In 1~978, following sevecal viru(ent The Repubucan Brothers, in particular,
attacks by the orthodox movement, aze not afcaid to discuss political issues; _
many of the Sufi organisations banded in fact ch^y are loathe to separate
' together to form the Islamic Revival political ann religious issues, and this has
Committa (IRC). The initiative for this brought them into conflict with the
~ move came from Mohamed Osrnan government on several occasions. In
el Mirghani, the ?eader of the Khatmiyya 1977, Mahmoud ?Nohamed Taha, the
~ seci, who toured the central puts of ;ounder of the Repubiican movement,
~ Sudan that yar seeking the support of was put under detention for a month,
~ the Sujt ta~iqoa kaders u? the provin~ces. although no official reason was given for
; The IRC is now particularly active in the chis, and many Brotherhood supporters
' universities and work-places throughout see this as only one linlc in a chain of
~p~� attempts from fundamentalists to halt -
The four rr~in tcriqa in the couniry, theic movement. Most impoRant of th~e
Tigania, Shazalia, Ghadria and Idre~esya, attempts was, say Republican Brothers, _
and their branches, are all represehted on the 1968 trial and conviction of
the IRC. To many observers, this is Mzhmoud Moh~a?e� Taha for `Defecting
- hi4torically an important move on the from Lslatn.
part of the Sufis; changing, as they have, Other Sufc groups are quick to point
from mild competition with adi other to out the differences betwsen themselves
a unified sect, airengthened in their and the Republican Brothars, one
defiance to the attacJcs of octhodoz Republlcsn Brother told Sudanow, _
~ fo(lowers. ~peCially � afttr the Muslim &others,
' The IRC took an adive rok in the a stroag orthodax sect, ag~eed to a poiicy
, reant Omdurman hlamic (3niversity of reconcsliation with the govermnent.
j student elations. When Sridmww a,~iced ManY P~P1e believe that because the
~ 9ome of the IRC studentyaaders how Republian &others support the govetn-
~ they could particip~te in ekctions whea ment no attempt has officizlly ban m~de
~ this d'uectly conflicted with the tenets to hslt theic adhrfties, but Atuaed Dolf is
of their faith, they replied th~t they were oomi~ed the~t relatiomhip ~vftbi the
3
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government deprnds on hnw mudi s~vay
thar relRgious rivals rea1~Y haee Mith the .
adnniaidcation.
S~ far, the street~corna p~ ~v'~
esppod 'mtufereace fmm the zutbri?is
- coocarned - wh~o could prnhibit them ,
tmder Artic~e 115 of tt~c Peaa1 Code,
ptoiv'bitmg umuihorned as9emblies -
bxause theY ha~e `reli~us covtr.' Mr
Inmei Att'rya, Director of Kt~artoum
Provina Poiiu, told Sudmww it is a
_ matta of Infe~pretation u to what con-
siitutes an `umuthorised asumbly.'
But Besi~ir Abbu, of the High Coun-
c~l for Religious Affairs and Endow-
ments, believes these strat~comer
meeting should be stopped by the
authorities. since, in his opinion, ckey
l~ave becomt an umbrella for anti-Islamic
activities. Answering che question of why,
therefore, the Council has not already ,
taken action. ~tr Abbas said thst the
Council has to work through all religio:u
sects in the cou.ntry. and cannot involve
itself in dir~t contlict with any particular
group.
All groups engaged in stratcoma
preaching wi11 be lozthe to gi~x it uP,
maintaining the justaeas of the~ir cau9e u
being irrefutabk, and thaefore for the
nament at least tt+e fite ot the street-
corner preacha a4P~~ ~17 ~eaue. �
COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved SUIY~NOW 1980
C~O: 4820
~
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IRAN
CAUSES OF IRANIAN REVOLUTION ANALYZED
'~Jest Berlin BEF'REIU~IG in German No 19~21J~ Fall 1980, pp 129-143
~I~rticle by Eric Rouleau: "The Islamic Revolution i.n Iran: A Path ~au ht ~rith
_ Pitfalls"; translated from LF, MONDE DIPIAMATI~UF~ Oct 80, by Gisela Jus~
~ext] The war betueen Iraq and Iran is not aimply another episode
in the ~'centuries-old enmityn betWeen the two nations, as one might
_ suspect. There have slso beeri long periods of peaceful co~xi.st~;na,e
and even close cooperation for the two states. Nor is it a question
of the normal escalation of a border dispute into an armed conflict.
- The treaty signed between Baghdad and Tehran in June 1975 called
for a series of inechanisms aimed at the amicable settlement o� all
difficulties that might arise in the proceas of realizing agree-
ments obtained in lengthy negotiation~. Thus~ the treaty provides
that the Iraqi government must enter into negotiations instead of
resorting to ueapons, and in the event that these talks should fail,
it would be obligated to request arbitration from foreign poWers
friendly to both oax~ties to the talks chiefly Algeris~ which had
chaired the reconciliation negotiations in 1975.
The treaty was definitely viewed at that time not as a"dictate~"
but as a settlement that uas fair to both sides. Both Iraq and
Iran claimed sovereignty over the entire Shatt al Arab estuary.
~ The treaty declared this estuary an international Waterway belong-
ing in equal measure to both parties to thc. treaty, so the boundary
line coincided with the line do~rn the middle. Both statea could
thus guarantee safe navigation in their orm territorial waters and
access to ~he open sea. The national pride of both sides Was sim-
ilarly preservad.
It thereforc aee~s clear that the main causes of the war must be
sought elsEti~:~ ere. The Iraqi Ba~ ath government had made its peace
with the shah; from the beginning, it had taken a hostile position
toward the revolutionary movement that was intended to sueep away
Pahlevi cio;~inatiori in Iran. The Imam Khomeyni had had to flee to
F'rance aiter having been expelled by Iraq in the fall of 197g.
- F'ollo~ri.ng the overthrow of the monarchy in January 1979, Ba~hdad
provided generous support to all opponents of the young Islamic
Republic to monarchists as well as the "moderate~~ republicans;
to Arabs ~om Kur:listan as well as the Kurdish autonomists.
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- The Iraqi armed forces r~peatedly provoked border incidP.nts~ while
the Iranian army which uas itself in the nrocess of falling
apart attempted to maintain order inside the country.
The government of Saddam Hussein could not havo chosen a better time
for a generel attack on Iran. The power struggle i.n Tehran aeemed ~
to be nearing ar~ end~ and the formation of a homogeneaus government
w~s immi.n~t. The Islamic Republic wante3 to turn its attention to
the task of freeing itself from isolation. The ~rar broke out at~ a
time vhen Iran could count on no outside suppor~ to speak of. Con-
sidering the Soviet Union? s declared hoatility toward the top Iran-
ian leaders and its own alliance with Iraq~ ~ t could do nothing but
deelare its "neutrality." The problem is obviously eT~en more com-
plex �or the United States. After Washington had been unable either
to free its hostages or destabilize the regime - which merely by
virtue of its er~.stence represents a pgronanent threat to American "
interesLS in the Middle East it vot~ld have had every reason to
be happy about the iraqi ooup~ ~specially if it ware to lead to the
downfall of the Islamic Republic.
The revolution in Iran ca.~not be equated with any other; it is one of a ki.nd. Hence
the difficulty in compreh~ding its day- ~o-da,y development.
The Shiite clergy's rise to power is roo~ed in ita history and ideology. Since the
disappearance of the 12th Imari in the 9th cgntury A.D.~ the clergy has held that no
seculax power in the world is legitimate or just. Justice will be restored in the
t�tus].im community only after the end of the "Great Darknesa" and the return to earth
of the hidden imam. And ~~hen the legal scholars (ulemas) called for the election
of a parliament at the beginnin~ of this century~ they named it the ~~House of Jus�~ _
t;ice~~ (adal~,tkhane). Any ruler is a priori a usurper because he is taking the place
_ of the 12th Imam, the only or_e capable of making himself the ins~rument of divine
will. It is for this reason that the Shiite clergy has had a natural inclination to
question the authori.ty and conduct of ~~he various dynasties that have ruled Persia
since then and to fight the monarchy wherever it set out to open up the country to
outside in~'luences that threater.ed. to "pcrvert" Islam~ er went about ~nstituting
customs that ran counter to Zduslin culture and its traditions. Thus, thc: Shiite
novement has sho~Jn itself to be "anti-imperialist" in the literal sense since the
beginnin~ of th~ 19tn century. In 1826 the ulemas declare holy uar on Russia;
3 years later they tzre behind the assassination of the me~mbers of rin official dele-
gation from Petersburg. They succeed in rescinding the astonishing monopoly granted
- in 1872 to Baron Julius de Reuter over mining~ timber~ railroads~ banks~ customs du-
ties and t elegraph communications. The ban on the use of tobacco proclaimed i.n 189:1
a boycott that 4ras widely supported by the people leads to revocation of the
monopoly granted the year before to a certain Mr Talbot. And when some of the clergy
- take an active part in the 1906 revolution aimed at inatalling a constitutional gov-
ernment~ they do it not in the nane of democracy a~'Weste~rn~' concept that was
loathsome even then but to gain ~reater control over a monarchy which is support-
ing the c.uropean encroachment. It is for this same rea5ron th~t a oonsiderable num- -
ber of the clergy~ led by Ayatollah Katchani~ back Mossadegh in 1951 when he nation- -
- alizes the petroleum insta.llations belonging to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
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Legacy of Imperial Rule
Foreign domination, despoti~, injustice the three most important targets of the
- clergy are the very same three evils under which the Iranians suffer during the
rule of Mohammad fteza Sfiah. Land refonn~ as he applies it~ be.nefits only a minority
of the farm~:rs; they, for their part, snon fall under the control of large corporar
tions which farm on an industrial scale. The massive imports of agricultural prod-
ucts chiefly wheat from the United States and the lack or minimel level of
- protective tariffs contributes to the ru.i.n of numerous small farmers and inereases
unemployment and migration from rural areas. The s11ah~ s"modernization pxo~ram"
very shortly enriche~ the members of the royal family and the court~ the 6ntrepr~n-
eurs (almost exclusively' licensees of large lJestern firms)~ the major Bazaar mer-
chflnts who import the spare parts ar_d consumer goods and the speculators who axe
aided by an almost classic ~~rampant capitali~n" that would be worthy of the 19th
century. By contrast, suffezing under this program are the emall producers and the
craftsmen tirho are pressed by the foreign competztion, the uorkers (who are neverthe-
less well pai.d), the tremendously expanding middl.e classes and the milliona of wage
eurners who se purchasing poWer i s being eaten up by a galloping inflation rate (more
than 50 percent ir~ the last 2 yeaxs preceding the fall of the monarchy). The re-
cession tYiat comes to Ir~n in 1976 strengthens the antipathy toward the regime.
The declining oil exports and increases in the cost of imported goods force the shah
to make substantial cuts in the credits allocated for development measurea; disillu-
sionment follows the powerful hopes aroused by the 1~~3-71~ oil boom. The economy -
measures that are decreed appear all the less justified since the sheh continues to
spend nillions of dollars on the purchase of armaments (chi.efly from the United
States) which pile up in the arsenals while ~here is no cloar idea of their actual
future uae. -
ihe midcile classes back a constitutional regime which is supposed to assure them the _
material security and political stability th~.t is threatened by arbitrary royal pow-
- er, An end to tr,e terror perpetrateci by SAV1K is de~manded by the entire population.
In the 37 years of Mohammad Reza Shah~ s rule, an estimated 500~000 people were ar-
rested ~nd cii.sa.pp~ared for a short time~ or ior many yerirs~ i.n prisons or internment
camps. Thousands of enenies of tne regime or those who were considered enemies
became th~ victims of special courts, executions without trials and assassination
attempts; or they died as a re,,ult of the torture that was universally used.
t4ost Irani.ans were only too ready to lump to;ether the regime that was oppressing
them ~rith t~:~ United States, which was accu~ed of having restored the shah to the
tt~rone in 1953 and of having given nim political, economic~ military and police -
support.
It is from this ar.~le also that the t~.rin thrust of the insurrection of 1q78-79 can
be better understood, on~~ tiiat Was directed as much agai.nst ~'American imperialismn
as a~;ainst the ty-_?~anny of Mohannad Reza Shah; the tuo were regarded as twu sides of
the same coin. Lead~r:~~ip of the largely spontan~us movement could very well have
_ bF~en a~sumed by 1�tar2o.sts or nationalists of the seme cut as a Mossadegh. But re-
pr~:,~; sio~~ succeeded in ~ashing the nonreligious groupings, The IJational I~ont was
only~ a collection of r~ilcLly ag~*ressive inclividuals uho had long since lo~t the lus-
tre of hiossadegh, whor~ t}iey had tr~ken as their model. Tha leftist par~ies such as
the Pfople~ s i4ojahedin (~}rogressive Muslims) or the People~ s Fedayin (Marxiats-
Leninists) had concent-rated too much on urban guerrilla actions and had had to take
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_ too many losses to still be able to play a politically significant role. Then at
the right moment the ~iite clergy offered leadershi~ and organization in addition
to its mobilizing ideology; this leadership and organization was to bring success _
to a venture tnat other~ri.se would have been doomed to failure. _
`!'he cler~;y plays a role i.n Iranian society +hat is not to be ignored. More so than
the Sunnite sheikh tirno is generally appointed and paid by the state~ the mullah
lives off tlle donations of the faithful, whose prosperity~ poverty~ ;joy or sor.row
he shares. The most varied issues that ccncern the cotn~nunity are discussed in the
nosque or a~, tra.ditional r~eetings in private homes, attended by the mullah; religion
and politics a.re inse~arably bound ug ~,rith one another in Islam~ as they axe in
~Tuciais-r~. ihe mullah can tnus be friend~ confidant~ adviser or leader to his faith-
lul flo~k to whom ;ives moral support i.n case of misfortune.
'.iith the aid of ~onetime: ~uite substantial means (the faithful are called upon to
~~ionate u; to on3-fifth o`~ their incone), the clergy had established schools and
social or humanit~sian fa.cilities for the needy duri.ng the shah~ s regime. Some
cler~y~men criticizF~d the ;oci~I injustices, the customs~ the corruption (meaning the
rulin~ family and it;, Anerican al)_ies) and preached a return to the true Islam as .
the ~-ra;~ to deiend virttie and r.ation~l identity from violation by Western technology.
~ nunber of cleric~ ~;ot to ]rnow the shah~ s dungeons: Suffering torture by SAVAK
agents were, for exac.ple, the ayatollahs Talegnsni (who died a ferr months ago);
i~iuntazeri~ wrLo is cor_sidered the successor to Imam Khomeyni; and Rafsanjani~ who ~
last Juiy was electec:t soeak.er of the parliament.
Ffter the Inam Khoc~eyni had fled the holy city of ilajaf in Ixaq~ he ec>ntinued to
be a distant symbol ef this diffuse resistance. The politica.l. vacuum made him by _
turns the standard-bearery the catalyst and uitimately the leader of the revolu-
~tion. His stat~nents during his 15-year exile made him the embodiment of the hopes
heid by the most varied ~roups among the population. Shortly before he 41&S ex-
pelled �rom Iran iri 196~, he ~ecame renocmed for publiclv criticizing both the
shah~ s disregard for the constitution and trie granta.ng of diplomatic status to
American civilian and military advisers and their families. "They have torn our
_ independence out by the roots," he wrote from Najaf to Prime Minister Hoveida in
- 19 ~7.
This letter~ which like many others was tap~-recorded~ circulates in ~cret in the ~
cities and the rural arE ~.s. In it the imem describes the United 5tates as the ~~head ~
of the imperia~is~ snake'r; he accuses the monopolies of' "plundering~' Iran's resour-
ces; he complains of the "ascendancy" of �oreign capital, of the ~uandering of pub-
lic monies on massive as~as purchases. On the occasion of the spectacular festivi-
ties in Persepolis in 19?l, celebrating the 2~ 500-year exi.stence of the monarchy~ -
he conder~ the "shameles:; luxury" in which the shah and his family live. From the
beginning o� the popular uprisin~ he calls upon the people to continue the struggle
until Reza Shah has fallen ~,rithout the force of arms~ hot~ever~ contrary to the
counsel of so~ae of his advisers. He stresses repeatedly that the Shiite f~ith will
ultimately be victorious over brute force. His judgments prove to be substantiated:
The imperial army ~hose str~ngth is second to Israel~ s in the Middle East
capitulates a year later to the "bare-handed revolutionaries" after the latter had
sacrificed tens of thousands of martyrs.
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A Transition Premier
Shortly after the re~urn of the Imam Khomeyni to Iran i.n February 1979, the second
phase of the revoluti~n begins the period of "snarchy~tt as it is called in the _
West; The "holy alliance" that had been formed out of a commori interest the fall
of the monarchy in this case breaks up (a cl~ssic phenomenon that manifests it-
self over and over again) under the pressure of opposing forces which reflect the
interests~ expectations ~nd obj ectives of various groups among the population. Life
resumes its normal course, so to speak. The ethnic minorities of the old Persian
empire Kurds~ Arabi~~eaking groups~ Baluchi~ Turkomans are all the more
forceful in demanding the right of self-determination now that they do not belong
_ to the Shiite community. The Marxi.sts - orthodox communists, Maoists~ Trotzkyites
and se forth who had demonstrated under the green flag of Islam, Allah~ s name on
their lips, open their own "shops" and put up the hammer and sickle. The "bour-
geoisie," w~ith its ',Jestern education~ raises the banner for a secular government
( separate fxom the Shiite clergy) by calling for the preservation of a liberal or
social-d~ocratic economic order and the establishnent of a parliamentary system
modeled after those of the West. The Muslims themselves split into rightist, mod-
erate and leftist groups~ ezch led by an ayatollah ~rith corresponcling convictions.
Despite its seemingly uniform aevotion to the Imam Khomeyni, the Shiite clergy is
just as divided as the secular political circles of whic,h the clergy is more or less
a direct reflection.
- It has frequently been writtm ~hat the Imam Khomeyni is an unyielding men who, by
virtue of conviction and temperament, permits no halfway measures. Had he not re-
j ected every offer of a compromise with tiie shah, despite the ir~sistence of many of
his supporters? ~ad he not Fil.so turned down all proposals to form a government of
r.ational unity after the fall of the monarchy, a government that Would have spared
the economy unproiitable disruptions? However, the Imam Khomeyni does not identify
himself ~rith Iran in the same way General de Gaulle used to mistake hi~nself for
~ F`rance. As head of ~iite Islam, he could not and cannot enter into any "tactieal
alliances" with groups which question or indeed assail the dogmas which it is his
duty to c~efend. The "leader of the Islamic revolution~~ has nevertheless demonstra-
ted many a tine tihat he, just like any "secular" po~itician, is capable of issorting
to polit,ical naneuvers or directly to tr~icks that he believes are indispensable if
he is to achieve his goals in roundabout u~ys. The appointment on 5 February 1979
~ of Mehdi ?3azargan as head of the Provisionary Goverrlment was perY:aps one of these
g~unbit,s. !~1hat else would 'nave made the Imam Khomeyr.i choose a ~r.an whose ideas wero
so fas renloved from his own?
- It is true that Bazargan had been incarcerated four times under the previous regime
because of his opposition to the shah, and he descr' bed himself as a supgorter of
' the ~aan who had ~one into e~.le an Naj af. He neveri.heless did not profess to be a
revolutionary, iie had gone to Pleauphle-l~-Chateau i o plead for a policy "of small
steps" that also included retention of the monarchy. In other words~ he pledged to
follow a course also chosen by Bakh~iar~ a~~friendn whom he was never prepared to
cozideru-~ as a~~ counterrevolutionary" or "traitor," by the way.
i~azargan~ s governnent is ~harply conservative in tor~e. His ministers belong to the
moderate win.~ of the Idational I'ront; they are Mossa~legh followers who are despised
by Kriomeyni; they are representatives of the bourgeoisie that grew wealthy under the
- shah or axe iormer members of the imperial army. A:; prime ministex~ Bazargan
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~
~nnounces publicly from tne very begin.~ing his abhorrence oi the institutions born
: of th~ revoluti.on: the I slanic ~~ittees and militias as well r~.s the levolutionary
tribunals ~~~:iic!~ do their ~est tc condsmn the .formar imperial dignitaries and 5AVAK
+~r~:entors. The su~.^~a.M~ courts-martiay and immedio.te executions are revoltir.g to
hi~a. ~azar~an is a. nan of order: He seeks to nreserve intact the tools of the old
re~ine ru~y, police~ ttle machinery of government by orderin~ only very minor
- pur~cs so as :zot to rob hi~self of "highly estecmed and irreplaceable~' cadre.
- t1s ~.aorthy r~presentative oF t11c Bazaar~ the heaci of the Provisionary Government
also doe~ not ~rish to alter the foundations o� tne economy~ and the effect is soma-
~:rnat a,gonizin;; ti~hen he decrees the nationalization of the banks, inuurance cor~panies
and ~ar~e ind.us~.risl cor~:lexes. Ne tries in vain to resist the ~'wild" occupation of
lar~~:: estates by !'armer~ ~:rho own no 1a.nd and the election o� "workers' councils"
~.~nich ta.ke over maria~~;r~ent of the �actories.
Although Bazargan, ~,rlio e:~~ned 'nis ~gineering de~ree in thermodynamics f~om the
~,cole Centrale de Paris, is a relibious and practicing rtuslim~ he nonetheless does
not share the Imam K:~ome,~nit s view that nlslam is moxe important than Iran," and he
deplores the insidious saturation of the government with "ignorant and arrogant"
mullahs. ~Ie had voted for establishment of the "Islamic Republic~~~ but shortly be-
fore resigning he ac~~~nits to Italian ,;ournalist Oriana Fa.].laci that he feass a"di~
tator:~lip of t:.e clPr~y." Two "capital offenses" lead to his downfall: He opposes
the I sl~mic constitution which had been drafted by an "assembly of experts" con-
sisting almost er.clusively of cler~enr and he works to normalize relations be-
tween Iran and the United States the ~great Satan~" according to Khomeyni.
At Khomeyni~ s command he is forced to break off diplomatic relationa with Egypt
following the signing of. the peac~ a.greement between Cairo and Jerusalem. He makes
- virtually no protest ~.rh~,n the shah is aclmitted to a Idew York hospital, and he does
not consider it of any use to issue a public demand that the former ruler be extra-
dited. A week later in Algeria he begins cordial talks ~rith Brzeainski aimed among
other things at the resutaption of arms and spare parts deliveries for the Iranian
army. Four days later this causes some 1~00 "Islamic students who fellow the imau~~ s
- line" to occupy the American embassy and take i.ts diplomats hostage. It is in this
way that the I~am Khoneyni, who had a~parently been informed of the forthcoming
action~ had forced Bazargan to xesign. .~`hy had he waited for 9 months? Was he not
aware from the beginnin~ that his prir~e minister was neither a"revolutionary" nor
an enemy of the ~~great Satan"? All indications axe that the d ecision to install
Bazargan as premier was clictated by tactical considerations. Having just zeturned to
- Iran~ at this point the imam is ~raid of losing c;ontrol over the situation. The
imperial arm~r was aopar~tly still intact at the time (it did not collapse until
12 February~ a ~reek after the Provisionary Govern~ent was formed)~ as were the pol-
ice~ the constabulary and the nachinery of government. The Marxist parties most
narticularly the I'eople~ s Fedayin and the People~ s Mojahedin were armed to the
teeth and seeking to ~o b~yond the Islamic movement~ which was indeed firmly rooted
am~ng the people but had no nechanisms of any kind at its disposrl (the Islamic
comnittees and r~ilii~ias were not institutionalized until later). Phe midclle clas~-
es, which ~~rere influential i.n the economy and the government ~p:: ~~tus~ were threa~
enin~ to lapse into a dangerous passivity or to cross over and join the camp of the
itational Frontt s moderate parties.
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On"ly F3azar.gan sec:mcd to oe in a poSltl0I1 to counter all these impending dangers.
He tiad the loyalty of the t~tuslim and relai:i~rely conservative Bazaar. The l~ftis~;
~roups (particularly the Mojahedin) oelieve~~ they could count on his liberali~ ~to ~
preserve their ri~ht ~to Gxist in the yourig re~ublic. A number of higher-ranking
_ o�ficers some of whora had secretly negotiated a compromise with him were
confidont ~h~.t h~~~ would clear t7ie ~y ior a:,mooth transition for the ~rny $~om the
monarchy to the r~ublic, '~y appointing Bazar.gan as premier~ the Imam Khomeyni had
wanted to ~in tiu e~ t~u~e he needed if he were to be able to form a�true revolution-
c~f ~overnmente" l~ut h_ had o� course nct ,;iven him rea.l power: Bazargan could
- issue statem~nts and protests over radio and television as often as he wished, but
+he import~nt decisions uere nonetheless made by the Revolution~.ry Council which
� ttas comnosed c,hie~l;,~ of cler~,~men. In his intervi~w ~rith Oriana Fallaci~ Bazargan
hiu+s^lf drew a ver,~ convin.cing picture cf his situation; "They put a knife in my
h~.nd~ nut they only gave r~e the handle; others have the blade."
- 'ihe C~..rter Govermm~ait~ s 1~iistake
- ihe takin~ oi Americ~n cLiclomats as hostage~ in Tehran~ an act which meant the end
of the I3azasgan ~;o~rernment, a1.~ cau,~ed an oPen eruption of the latesit conflict be-
t~aeen Iran azid the Lnited ~tates that had existed since the collapse of the mon- ~
archy. Ayatoliah i~ont~~mi had not ~or~iven tne seven presidents who had succeeded
onc anoth~;r in tr.e 4~~itc :iouse ov^r ti~:~~ last !~0 years for tneir unswerving support
of tdohr~mmad Reza ~han Pahlevi ~,~ho, iri the eyes oi ~ost Iraniens, was a bloody des.-
pot. The imam ~ras elso :~ot prepared to iorget that Carter had wanted right up to
the end to sa.ve ti,e YaY~levi dynasty. The ~,ct that the shah was granted permission
on 22 Octoher 1971 to entcr tne Unitea States had confirmed his suspicion that the
Arierican ~overnment intc:nded to heJ_p the fallen emi eror return to power. This ,ges-
tux�c~ whicn was terr,~ed "humanita.riar:" and coura.geous" in the ldest, ~;a: viewed in
Tehran a.s a new and intolerable provoc~tion� Said Sadegh Ghotbzadeh: "It is as
thou~h i~ranco~ s Snain haci off.:red ri~ht afi;er ~~lorld ~;lar II to cure Hitler of can-
cer." ;l~ou{rh ~;his ca.rica.ture seems cxcessi.vc, it nevertheless illustrated the dis.-
illusionmcnt and ~rratY: oi the Iranian people as well as the deeper motivations
ut~derlying 1~he Tf'VOZUt1.OTi.
7i, i_^ '~i)r nn7.ri7.~t1 ~r 1'lft'~�; n}).�.~I-VE'I'~ ~r?~ 't;~lE' rFl7't;eT QOVET7:~IDeI1't r~ade tfle SaJtl@ ID1S-
t~,'r.c bc`'or�c~ .~c1.7. af'~f,r:r� t.;;~, host:~rr~ ~jr~mr~: Tt believed it could settle the
Ir. ~~-i ^~r ~~~,,,r~; ~t ,,~~T~~`-.~ ~tir ,:~~t,h t.ne nodcrat~; leaders in Tehran; first
uit,i_~ ~3~~.~r.�,~n ~.~~,1 ai.. .~-n; ~-�~r:-, ~n~' 7.a-:~r wit~, President Rani-Sadr and roreio
r,J, n..: .L ~ ' ~J. r ' L.
?'].i 7.. tl'~ ~~;a , .^,hi.`i. . -~~:~t.~"h~ ~ !i^. t ~ho.,~:ri t~~?C' most practicable TOUt2~
1Il I''.'CL1.:~~~~ y :IO;i _."_S'~ i. U~, ~ q.1.:~C:~:'.';). ':1~;~~ }:,'8.C1 Oi~ ~pVE:I'11I11E??li~ QTLC~ fLl, foreign
- l:ilill:'1~T ~~7_'j =?l(~~ ~~.1~;??.�'r�~~'~r: Oi~ ~:�f1'_ T,' C:~.U~~ti1t.:7~ occunation of. the American
~ ,r ~i ' ' ` - - ^ ~ ~
;,i, a~... ,~nt.~tc, . ;~r . , l.:izatioi: o.~ 7 t with the
_ . r. a ion ~
iJn;~;,l~ ^.ut t,~~�:.,_ ,,~r;i~. ,~oc;; ,;;,~:r,t,_ioii~ cost thcm the credit they had
^T?.~0~ '"=C3 ',.'ltll ~~(1~~ TC!P.:"i ~,:^.r?:*lr~ft~l '~.r1C~ 3t L~~- ."?iT!E' ~'i.1.1:IC: W4:~~ene~j their poS1t7011 Vlsll.-
v~ ,~~I ll~~ ^,QnFi'..i. :,/.�1.~ ~.~~.i' ~.I'~.^~Iir .i C~.~.'_ .r o
i ~ .i i_~ I 'j ^ ti~C~ SUCCC;S::i 11
't~: -~i c~ :r;x~, ~ ~.�o;.~l. ~,i. ~.1. ;,:t,.,l_ .:a-~ , "'ull er the moder-
~
~t.~.~.. h:i;~ . , t: . _ r:~~, , . ,zt.,~: cc;nc~~.~s~i.ar;s ~;hat. td~uld have
giv! n 1~~: :~r~ c?�~~:i i.1 ` ~ ~,i~ t:t; ~.~~=~n~i F,-~ n;,;;.'. ~ Fre~ident Bani-~~c:r hacl ~r:frained
r,�, , - . ~~,f,- ;Z-.~~1~ ;n ~e~;:urn, however, he did c~mand that tiie
iitli.~, .c;. :'F ,~.r?r;;..'~, i:. ,..,Tf.l'. i.~; tl~~.. c,?~~.mcs committed by the shah and that it
;.'1 ~ . -~,.c: i r r � . � i i i.'. ~ ~ i,. ' ~i.~ � FiJ 7'~;. ~{t_ :.t GCEll AG'C.^.~.)t ECi~ ti~'1@
li
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offer which is esscntial.ly no clifierent ~om the one made in September by the Imem
Knomey~ni himself could havc becn at least the beginning of a dialog if not a
basis for neootia~ion. But Yresident Carter dicl not want even to dissociate him-
s~~1-f $~om the coup d~ etat crith which the CIA had helped Reza Shah re~ain po~.~er i.n
1~53. If it is true that a great potirer cannot afford ~tto humble itself,~~ then one
mu~t ask ~.rhy the United States Was seeking to negotiate a compromise which it coul.d
logically not concluc;e without acceptin~ the minimum demands of the other side.
41as it hopino to be able to iree th~ hostag~s without giving something i.nzeturn?
_ rreCUently offered as an e:cplanation ior the failure to reach a satisfactory solu-
tion is that the multiplicity of centers of power in Tehran made a genuine dia7.og
impossible. Tf tiiat is truly the case, however~ why were negotiations begun ~.rith
only one of the exi stin~ ~rouos without waiting until the internal : truggles had
beer. brought to an end by the installation of a homogesieous and responsible govern-
~aent? It aQpears that the cautious stance that has been adopted by the TJnited
States since rlay when its Tabas expedition failed is the product of a reali-
zation that could 'nave been substantiated as long ago as Piovember: The takeover of
the rlmeric~n enbassy Uy Islaiaic studeuts was at least just as much a domestic polit-
ical maneuver if not more so - as it ~ass a maneuver directed ~ainst the United
Ststes.
P.fter the pooular upris:~ng a.g~.nst imperial ru1.e and the establishment of the Isl.am-
ic Republic led by a Provisionary Government, Bazargan~ s resignation initiated the
t~ird phase of the revolution follouing the ho stage-taking, the Imam Khomeyiv.
declares it the "second zevolution." To be sure~ the patriarch of Qom quite appan-
ently was of the opinion that his loyal prime minister had served his puroose: The
imperial arny, which had meanwhile been relieved of its leaders and purged no
longer posed a threat to the rc~ublic; the upper-middle class had been dislodged
- fron its positions of economic rower by a va,riety of ineasures~ including massive
nationalizations. It reraaincd only to neutralize the representatives of the middle
c_lasses~ the moderat~ nationalists~ whc ~rere characterized in popular ~logans as
~~4lesternized liberals" ~r'no were prepared "to cotae to terms with imperialism."
Charged with thc tas~ of clrivin~ out this new enany were the Islamic students. The~
~rere enjoyinC a double hclping oi popularity in the land at that time: They had
challenged mighty America a role that ~ras elevated still ~ore by virtue of the
importance ~.scrib~d ~o ther~ by the nass ~edia and the government in the United
Stat~s and, moreover, they were rcpresentinb themselves as the conscience as well
as the instrument o� the ~volutionaz^,~ mc,ve~:ent. They were now in a position
under the unobtrusive lea~'ers:zip of ~::~e Tnan Khone,~ni to proceed gradually to
eli~inate the opponents of tlie Islamic _ e~ime 4rhich they were 'rying to consolidate.
_ ~~li~n the ai.d_ of nore or les: unequivoca. docunents which were only all the more
_ iMj:~ressivc in tr,at ~~iey rau co~e from th ; srcret file~ of the ^,r~erican embassy the
I;l.~aic ~tudents :,erc notir in a positian to cliscredit or have arrested a great nur,l-
ber of p~rties an~_ ~ oliticians that wer considered pro-~~lestern in the context of
tn~ Islamic revolution. f^.~ir ~:ntezar.~, ,~ice-prenier under Bazargan and then ambas-
sador in StockhoZr~, is ~eized as an"ag~:nt of the CI4." Accused of the satae mons~-
trous d~ed, ~iasan I;azieh~ �ormer direclwr of the IiIOC (Ilational Iranian Oil Com-
pany)~ and Rah.natoll~ i~~cqaddam-~.ia,ra.ehi~ head of the tiCmall Radical Party, were
~orced to leave the country; both oi these had suppurted if not instigated the
Tabriz uprising in December 1979. Ayatollah Sheriat--Madari~ a rightist libexal in
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wilose name the rebellion in Azerbaijan took place~ was silenced when ~~compromising
documents" made the rounds mysteriously in Tehran. The Republican Party~ ~ eaded by
t;adari~ s son~ had to close its doors a�ter dozens of its members were shot to death
or arrested. Several. elocted c~puties tiere re~ieved of their positions ~rith the help
of docur~e,nts that were similarly found in the Americ~n embassy; these doCUments
made it possible to accuse the cbputies of ~~intelligc.mce connections with the enemy.~~
- Removed f~oa the political scene in this manner were men like Khosrow Qashqai~ chief
of the tribe of tlie ~me name~ and Admiral rlhmad Madani~ a moderate uho had ~received
2 mil7.ion votes in the elections of last January.
The list o� the I~lalaic students' victims~ too long to nane each one separately~
_ testifies to the important role of these students in the ~'second zevolution" and
proves that the efforts by President Carter and Bani-Sadr to end the occupation of
the American embasry in Tehran were preanature.
The Rift 4lidens
In terms of do~aestic politics, the hosta,ge ~ama very soon proves to~ ~;he point on
_ which the right and ti~e left agrae the le~.st; Those r~ho support the Islamic stu-
dents are among tre ~~good guys" who are a~ainst i~oerialism and infa.vor of the
revolution; all others are oounted a~ong the ~'bad guys" and can be stamped as pxo-
'destern counterrevolutionaries. It is for this reason that since ~en there have
been only a fe~r rrho have dared speak out p.ublicly against th~ embassy takeover. It
is true that the Peo~le~ s Idoja~i~di.n wrich actually ~rould have preferred the
for~al cancellation of tY.e circa >00 ~.greer~ents and treaties which~ as they sa~}r~
- still lin'_ IrGn ~~ith t~~e Uniied States - applauc?ed the events of Ilovember 1979,
- but ~hcy then bec~e r~ore an~~ ~ore vehemtnt in their cxitici~ of the conduct of
thc I:la..~ic revolutior~.
!~lfter sor~c very con~;:icuou~ nesitation by the P~o~:l~~~ s~~ edayin, who in the first
non~l.s of the revoiution had ric:icule~? Ipara hho~eynit s superficial anti-inperi-
�al.i~.n, thcy positioncd, th~:;ns~lves on th~ side of the occupiers of the esnbassy. t~lost
of the r~oaerate r~:rties and politic~ ans cither said nothi.ng at ~1 or took a position
_ that ~:rwN ,~ufficientl;; iuzzf to prot.~ct them ff~om th~ reproach of having defended the
Unitc~l ;tates. ~incc 6 I?ovcc~ber, o.lly Bani-Sadr has had the coura~e or the im-
pruaence ~o r~ar:e ~t kno~�rn and t,o repeat at every opportunity that he disapproves
af the ho ~ta~c.-t~,ing on the ~ rounds of I~lanic morality anc: in the interests of
- th ~ r ~volution.
- Para.doxically enou~,:~, '3a.ni-Saczr i~ i�ursu~r~ a policy that is not unlike the one
~arich was ~azargan~ s undoing and for k~hich he ~~~as r~ost violently attacked by Bany
Sadr ~rhil~ he was sti11 l~ading the Provision~sy Govern~ent. IIe thus offered an
open flar~: to his oppon~_nts r~ainly the Islanic Republican Paxty led by Ayatollah
;~~,~esnti and the;; very quic~cly placed hin in the less th~n honorable eamp of the
~~liberals." They o~ course reoroached hin for his conciliatory attitude to~Jard the
United S~ta;es, but aiso for his "illusions" about possible close cooperation b e-
tween Iran on the one h~nct and ~urope and Japan on tlie otY?er. Even his emphatic
condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Af~hanistan ~ras considered suspect
even thou~;h this rras corpletely in line with the militant clergy~ s dogtna of ~~neither
3~.ast nor rlest.11 ;1as he not perhaps attempting in this way to justify a norma2iza~-
tion with the idest as imperative in order to petter avert the impending danger from
the ~ast?
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In terms of domestic poli~y Bani-Sadr proved to be a man of order like Bazargan.
- On tne day after his election as ~resident of the ~public on 25 ~anuary 1980, he
announced that he ~aould be d.isbanding the I slamic committees and the "protectors of
the revolution~~ (Republic militias) as soon as he had ~teoxganized the amed forces~
the constabulary and thP police. Two uee,ks later he ordered theielease of Minachi,
the nationally oriented minister who had been arrested as an "agent of the CIA" at
the denand of the I~lamic students. In the ensuing period Bani-Sadr tried, although
in ~~ain, to protect other moderates - Admiral Ahmad Madani, ior example, and
- Khosrow Qashqa'i, chief of the Qashqa'i tribe. A8 $n crppo~eQt in principle of polit~.-
cel force, he remarked on 27 July: "Denunciations~ vilifications, torture~ vio-
lence, massacres and prisons are nothi.ng but the marks of a Stalinist society.~~
Bani-Sadr a good hluslim, but, like Bazargan, influenced by F`rench thought has
mixed emotions about the :~iite clergy. In the "assembly o� experts" that was
charged with ux~iting a new constitution, he surprised fr~enc~_ and foc by comin~ out _
strongly against the proposal to grant comprehensive powers to the Faqih Creligious
guardian- jurisprudent or the Imam Rhom~eyni] . Although he repeatedly denied it,
he was ultimately accused of having absta3.ned from votfng on the conatitutional arti-
- - _ _ . _
- ~ cle concerning the rights of the faguih even though these rights had already been
reduced in comparison with the original draft. I~o matter rrhether he did or not~
Bani-Sadr spoke out uneauivocally in ~vor of a separation of powers, of noninterfer-
ence by the clergy ir. afrairs of state, and he w ent so far as to poke fun at the
"Richelieu and Mazarin who populate Iran ' s political scene." After his election as -
president of the ieoublic, rie r~arked that he ~Towed his victory to the people, and
only then did he add tha~ he also thanked �"the lower levels among the clergy for
their support." It k~as ~.is view that the higher-ranking clergymen had supported the ~
Islamic Republican Party of the Ayatollah Beheshti~ whose political ~~demise~' he
prophesied upon assu~ing the highest office.
3ani~adr~ s optimism at t:zat time was not unfounded. The Ayatollsh Beheshti had
just had to endure tY:r~e substantial setbacks: He had intended to be a candidate _
for the presidency, ~ut t!~e Imam Khomeyn~ nad decided that no spiritual leader
should run for this c�fic~,; he then Froposed Jalaleciin Farsi as a candidate~ but
his kfghan origins x~,:led ~�:im out; he �inally supported the candidacy of Hasan.
Habibi~ who ~ceived anly ~0 percent o" the vote~ while Bani-,5adr garnered 70 per-
cent. He thus believed in ;lanuary that the party had made a final decision in
his favor. He asked the Imam Khomeyni for permission to form a second provisionary
government �or the p~~riod preceding the elections. This would have given him the
opportunity to get out frcm under the control of the Revolutionary Council, the
majority o� which wa~ cor~,r,osed of friends ~f the Ayatollah Beheshti, and to implem-
- ent political. and econo~ic reforms of his :;wn choosing.
But the Imam Khomeyni reiused. his request, and Bani~adr had to be contmt with the
mea.gre "privilege" oi chairing the meetings of the Revolutionary Council~ which 41&S
controlled by his principal foe. The ch~,.irman of the Islamic Republican Party took
advantage of this oprortunity to dash the initiatives of the preaident of the reput~-
lic as often as po ssible and lay the : oundations for hia own power. He arranged
(in t~tarct~ 19~0) for ris party to be aWarded a majority of the seats in parliament
and had himself appointed president of the Supreme Court. Once he had thus griined
control over the judi.ciary and Zebislative branches, he also set out to acquire
r;xecutive power with his demand that the candidate for the chairmanship of the
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Revolutionary Co;ulcil be required to have the prior approval of his party; would
thus have reduc~ed tne role of pres~ dent to that of a fi~urehead.
Bani-;adr resisted on every point, c?e challenged the results of the parliamentary
electivns; the Imam Knoc~e;~ni held th~n to be ~'fair." He spoke out against renewed
- purges in tY~e ~overnm~nt and in the various or~anizations assigned to keep order
the pur~es having bcen c~e~anded by the Islar.iic Republican Party but he was forced
to give in when the imam called for a~'cultural r~vol~ution~' which the state auld
use to rid itself o� '~counterrevolutionaries" and ~~!desternized liberals." In any
event~ aft~r the E~.merican expedition ne,:s Tabas on 25 April 1q~0, a radicalization
of the Islar.iic R~ubl~ c coui.d no longer be avoided. This operation had illustrated
the inaction, or as was ?laintained even the complicity, of a part o� the armed
iorces. Tn the first ~ ~eks follotiring the iabas o,~~ration~ seven different con-
spiracies were uncovcred, ti everal hundred o~ficers ~.rr?sted and a fel�r dozen executed.
I~iain Froble~s and ~conotti~ Difficulties
- The d,~xi~crs ti13t YlOV~I'E~Cl over the Islamic Republic in this fa11 ~ason (1980) were
no fi6*ments ol the ina~itiation but :~ere ju~t as rea1. as the ~eneral worsening of the
poli~ical, econonic and social situation. In chance encounters~ journfzlists came to
.zear only complaints `~on a1i se~ents of the r_o;~ulation from the affluent as
~:rE11 a~ t11~ ~oor, i*~ ~'r_e cit;~ as !J~ll c~.s ~nc rural ~reas. 7'he new agrarian reform
decreed in tYie ~iiltcr o`' 1;'7~ had. not y~t been started in s~veral ~arts of the coun-
try. Goverrunent i.nv~:-~t,zer.t, rave ecli~~ed by 20 percent in ~riculture and 50 per-
cent in industry a: co~; ased to thos~ �or the year before the revolution. 4lithout
canital aid, ~parc : a.rt; ( a consequence of the 1lestcrn embargo) and mpable leaders,
th~� enterpris~s oi t'r.~ public ~cc~or are operatin~ at only 50 percent of their
capacity at best~ and most of ~,'siem have sub~ta.ntial deficits.
rhe er,act unenplo~R:: ~r_t �i`ure i s no t kno~.m. It i s estimated at between 2 and 4 mil-
1i~n out o~ 1i.5 :~i~lion r~~o~;1~ of srorking aoe. ihe state provides about 800,000
of the u.riennloyed ~.;ith a;;a.ltr~y~ contribution to their livelihood; the others live by
doin~ odd jobs or are ~u; _:crtcd by rel~.tives. '~'he ~ate oi inflation between 25
and 30 p~rcent _s alreacy hi~ii ~r than that Grhich had seti the middle classes
at~a.inst the shah; it amounts to norc than 50 percent for the ~~market basketn of the
~~midcll.~class housenold." Rents, ~,~hich iiad declined. considerably after thefall of
_ tl.e monarch,y, havc rebour:ded ;.n Tehran today ~lmost to $ie 1977-7~ level. There have
been sll~ price increa.ses ~or : o~e fooclstuffs fresh vegetables~ flour~ meat and
fruit.
'~1'l;e incre~sf~d li�ri co~ts hit t;~ie r~icicll.e classe~ harder than others because oi
t~~eir consur.i-~tion ~~abi~;. ~alari~d employees anc~ Ftage ea,rners as wel.l ~ g~vernment
Worlcers (l.~ million oeo,~le, including ttie a;:ied forces) are seeing a substantial de-
cli.ne in f~~::ir ~urci:asir.~ poiac~r~ not only as axesult of inflation but ~lso of the
50-pcrcent cutbac:: in ~h ~ unj, ~r salar-J levels~ the elimination of overtime and di-
vers~ payr,ients-ir.-}_i.n~ a11 of ~rhich are measures taken for reasons of economy or
uriifo~nity. ,^;incc thz cur~in~ o� oil exrorts~ the ~ate has actually been running a
de;iicit. Statc rev~nues o�iicially estimated at 21 billion this yeax are
r_ot evrn r,nou~;h to ,.ay ~o-: ~in.-~nr.t sal.aries. ~ince the state could not export more
(fu~l), it finall~ :~ad to obtain loans or t~p its ~serves, which had shrunk to about
7 r,illion a.fter Irzn' s ass~ts ( circa ~ biilion) in American accounts had been
irozen,
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Thus~ the economic situatioii had clearly worsened ~ince the ~11 of the Bazargan
government c~spite Khomeyni~ s icamediate order to the authorities to see "to the we1-
fare of the mostaz'efin [the oppressed]. The imam had thought it better
not to appoint a new govern~ent~ thus giving a free hand to the Revolutionary Coun-
cil and the high-level clerical dignitaries �.~ho enjoyed ' his confidence. Mullahs
were bE:ing appointed everyti;here now and given thetask of keeping tabs on those in
- responsible positi~ns who were not of the cl{ r~y: in the ~med forces, the police,
the la.rge industrial ente~r~_ses and virtual~ y all ministries. Anarchy thereby
o ew worse, and "no one obeyed anyone anymorc:~~ as a highly placed individual
t,~ld us.
The mac'ninery oF governnent rras virtually crippled as a result of the intentional
or unintentional ir.action on the part of gov~rnm~nt employees, many of whom doubt-
less wanted to undernine the zegime. Strikes occurred with increasing frequency in
the enterprises and the civil service. Interruptions in the electricity andtiater
supply cau~ed ~~ouble every day for the residents of Tehran and other cities. The
pasdaran (Isl~mic milit~ amen), ~aho carne under a number of different decisionmaking
centers, acted only too often at the~r own di scretion. Certair. army units r efused to
fi~ht the Kurdish iebels. Durin~ the summer the ~,at~~ found itself in A ccndition of
progressive dissolution, while at the same time a number of militPSy conspiracies
uith 1i.nks to political circles uerc discove.red. The most serious consideration~
however~ ~ra~ that the publie~ s clissatisiaetion was ~Lhreatening to clireet itself
against the clergy as a wnole, which was being held ~esponsible for the worsening
- of the situation. This r~r~kes it easier to understar~.d what the Im~un Khomeyni meant
r~hen he announced: "I?ot a sin~le one of the presen'., ministers is revolutionary
) and if the ne~t government iesenbles our preser~t one~ we can b egin the funeral
ri.tes ror the Islamic Republic~ because We snal.l have been defeated.~' Moreover~ one
- unaerst~as the ~~ni.iicance of the massive p~arges~ thc arests, the mass executions,
the attaclss on tne office~ of ri~htist as wel . as leftist political parties in
other words~ of those who could have profite i from the collapse of the Islamic
Republic.
The moderate nation~?.ists~ t'.~e main t~sget of the "cultural revolution" that was
initiated in July~ wcre cor.sidered the o eat~~st thr ~.at. In fa.ct, their influence
extends to t:ne economic centers, the ms.chinery of government, the armed f~rces and
the universities, ~h~ ciiaracter of whiciz is marked en the whole oy the "Western-
ized" cadre, ~~hose traditional origi.ns li~ ir. ~he middle classes, people who axe
very mucn opposed ~o tr:e po~~er o~ the cler~f end economic and ;~ci31. ieforms. This
in~lu~~'nc~ is indeed pre~ent ~11 over the cot;ntry~ but it is conce:ntrated chiefly
~rith the opnosition ~roups that have emi~rated abroad, some of ~rhich have a.lso found
refuge in Iraq. Tiie people listen i`requently to the two raclio pro~rams broadcast
- daily fron Iraqi soil 'oy a"clandesti.ne t�r~r:s~itter," one of the: broadcasts in the
name of C'~eneral Oveissi, the other in the n~ne of ~apur ~akhtia.r. It is an open
secret that these ~~ro nen, like some o~tners, maintain regular contact with ind.ivid-
ua1 etr_nic brouFs as ~re11 as s~ith civilir~n and nilitary rircles in Irr~n; under more
favoraole condi.tions, thcse o
oups could lrir_~ the ~,ir~e do~~m.
~t least for th~~ ~or~seeable future~ this does not apnly a: o ~he ~ cft despite the
considera~l~ ~ro~res~ it has nan~ed ~ r~~:e in zecrnt nonths. In contrast to 'tne
ri~ht~ it , so ci21 c~ase s zelativel;~ n~rro~r. Ur,til evidence ta Lh .r,~ contraz^,~ is
fort?~co~in~, th~ Isla~'~ic ~1ove~ent personificd b~ the zmam Kho!~eyni na;; no~ lost tize
supnort of the lo,re~t l~vels anon~ the ~onulation~ even thou~h they have e~erienced
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ma,ny clisappointmFnts and frustrations since the ~ oundino of the Islamic Republic.
The workers have not for~otten that their Wages have in many cases doubled since
tne revolution. The far~.iers are receiving ~enerous subsidies they average 50
percent more than durin~ the shah' s r egime and the faru~ers who own no land have
not yet given up hope of profiting from later agrarian ~forms. The abundant ~:in-
fall in tlte winter and sprin~ will cause harvest yi,elds to be en estimated 20 per-
cent to 30 percent larger than last year's. 24oreover~ the "mostaz'efin" have tha
- feeling of living in "their� own repub:lic and under the protection of the Imam
Khorneyni.
- Nevertheless, the Poople~ s Mojahedin, a Moslem movement uith a very radical ideol-
ogy, was able within a few !~onths to evolve into a party of the masses, one which
the Imam Khoneyni se~ms to �ear r~ost especially, as can be deduced from his condemn-
ation of the "Islatao-I~farxists." In June the leader o� this movement, Masoud Rajavi,
brought together in Tehra^_ 150,000 members and supporters at a public rally that
had not even been ~nnounced by the press. The t~ojahedin have a good reputation
because, for one thing, they had carried on an armed struggle against the imperial
government and, for another, they unmistakaLly place themselves on the side of the
unpropertied, However, their opportunities for action are li.mited at the m~ment by
reason of the youth and inexperience of their leaders as uell as political mistskes
they have made.
Party Without a Program
The communist Tudeh Party iias a significantly scualier organization and following~
but its influence has pr~ven to be significantly more decisive on various occasioris.
Its cadre largely trained in the Last bloc countries are of high quelity.
They are brilli~antly informed regardin~ the international situation and are capable
of marking out a clear strategy and tactics .rhich they put into practice with aston-
ishing discipline. For instance, they made use of the anti-American rrave spilling
over Ir~n to ~r~ke friends and allies reaching all the way into the clergy, even
though the latter re~~in;: extre~ely suspicious of them. It is a conspicuous fact
that the I~am Khomeyni has never attacked the Tudeh by name. When he condemns the
communists, whom he describes on occasion as the ~'Arierican left,~~ he mainly has his
eye on the People~ s eda;,~in (Marxist~Leninists) who had taken up arms against the
gavernment in Kurdistan ~nd elsewhere. Ifis obvious forbearance with the orthodox
cor~munists is explic~.ble ~'or at least three reasons: They have always supported
him sincc he went into ex.ile in 1~6~ (using ~heir "clandestine transmitter" probably
locate~? in th~ GDP~, they r~~~;l:larly bxoadcast hi~ statements that were recorded in
the Iraqi city of iia`af); iikc Khomeymi himself, they ~re resolved "to pull American
imperialism out by the rcots in Iran"; and they offer support for the defense and
consolidation of the Islrmic Republic.
~vents that tool: ~;lace l~st J~ne have exoanded -.heir room to maneuver: These events
involve :iitf~:re:ic~s of o,;inion that gradually s~.parated the People~ s:'edayin ana the
Kux~dish Democratic Party. The majori~y of thE~ "eda~in leadership decided af'ter loiig
_ and arduous dcbatc to 3do;;t an "anti imperialist~' policy that is virtually identical
to that of the Tudeh. i~~c sar!e thing took place ~rithin the Kurdish Democratic ,
_ Paxty, 4rhere a rainority ~rlit with the majority led by Abdel Rahman Ghassemlu and
accu~~d th~ :~ajoritr of -.oon~:ratin~ ~rith Iraq ~r.d I~!~i0. These two divisions have
de facto increaseu t}:e moral authority of the ir,deh and consequently also multiplied
its negotiating tr~am~: ca.rd~.
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It is indisputable that t:ie Imam Khomeyni intends under no circwnstances to be
depemdent upon a non-Islamic group~ cer~ainly not one which takea Marxism as its -
authority. �
His actions since the be~innings of his struggle ind.icate that he intends to reserve
- trie power monopoly for tYie "true ~'~u~lims." The only question is whether he will be
able to achieve this end. The Islr~mic Republica~ Party~ upon which he apparently
intends to rely~ is not a structured p$rty of the masses but is more of a collection
of ind.ividuals from the spiritual and ~cules worlda as well as different even
conflicting groupings and trends. It is for this reason that the party of
Ayatollah Beheshti was unable at anv point to provide itself with a political,
economic and socia]. program such as~ is indi~ensable for a ruling party. Above all,
it cannot fall back on a sufficient number of cadre which could be used to help run
the government. The Iranian intelligentsia, rrhich from the very beginning had
adopted a negative or ho stile stance toward the Islamic regime, belongs in part to
the liberal right ~nd in part to the (Marxist or non-Marxist) left. In the event
tnat there is no spectacular about-face, the Imam Khomeyni will not bring either one
of these two political currents into the government. The path uhich he has chosen
, will undoubtedly be a long and difficult one to follorr because it is fraught with
pitfalls; and given the present balance of forces~ it threatens to lead to catas-
troph e.
COPYRIGHT: DEFREIUPIG~ ISSIi No. 0343-2327. ,
7455
CsO: /~403
I
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SUUAN
ISIAMIC UNIVERSITY ELEGTIONS PASS PEACEFULLY
Rhartoum SUII~NOW in En~lish Nov 80 pp 19-20
~Text~ -
Readers of Sudanow will be ax~o~e of the Khaddam,Unionists and Anrar, in a ritio
political tensions in our university systern of 16:7:7. Although this balance was
(Cl~~rent affairs, May). The unseemly politically designed, posts in the ten man
duputes of the last academic year, which executrve cortrmittee (4:3:3) were
culmrnated in the tragically unnecessa~y ailegedly filled solely on the basis of
deat.4 oj a University of Khanoum personal qualification. The E[S has itself
student, introduced an unpleasant air oj formed a coordinating committee to
suspense to the opening of the new guide the activities of the Front and its
academic tem~. The recent student-body components.
electron at Omdurrnan Islamic University The margin of F1S' vic~tory was
was thought to be a possible occasion for substantial, with its leading candidate -
- the ~esumption of violerrce In jact, ra;eiving 519 votes compared to the 427
however, it passed ~ff peacefu!!y, votes received by the leading MB -
notwithstanding an unlookec~fo~ revetsal candidate. Most of the FIS' votes came
of forncnes jo~ the hitheno dominant from the 397 students of the Arts
faction of th.e .tifuslim Brothers. Azhari faculty. Support for the MB primarIly
Abdel Rahman ~epo~ts cairte from the thrce departments of the
HE ~vtUSLIM BROTHERS (MB), faculty of Lslamic Studies, which numbers
- ~ which had dominated the 245 students, most of whom are admitted
OmduRnan (slamic liniversity students' from religious institutes (Ma'ahid). As
union since its establishment in 1967, last well, the MB received very strong support
month failed to place a single nominee on frorn the 115 male scholarship students
the thirty member union council. Of the , from other Islamic countries. Mohamed
1042 male students 901 exercised their Hussein el Managra, the Syrian ex-
right to vote and unexpectedly gave a president of their association, told -
newly formed coalition, the Focces of Sudanow that they used to remain
Islamic Sotidarity (FIS), all thirty of the neutral in Sudanese affairs but, after
- council's seats. analysing the situation, decided to
The FIS, sole opponent of the MB in ~pPort the MB. These foreign students
the October election, was formed in represent 23 nationalities . and have
September as a coalition of the Associa- arrived at the University through two
tion of Independent Students, the Ansar, channels: either state to state schotar-
the Democ:acic Unionists and the [slamic ships offered through the National
Revival Committee. Although directing Council for Higher Education or through
its adherents to vote for the FIS slate of scholarships offered by the University to
candidates, the Islamic Revival ~~c groups around the worid.
~ Committee, a newly formed group Several explanations have been offered
~ composed oFdifferent Sufi tariqas (sects), for the unprecedented transformation of
did not have any representatives standing the University's student council. Abdel
- for election. The new union council is Fatah Farah, leading MB proponent,
thua composed of independents, argued that such a shift of popular
includin~ its prardent Hussein S~l~? ~PPon ~s, at some point along the line,
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-inevitable in view of the 13 years oP MB -~e programme speaks only of fuRhering
dominance. This view was supported by the social, intellectual, and academic
Dr Abdel Aziz ;Kohamed Osman, dean of ~dards of the Universiry,
student affairs, who observed that, `A 'Therc are, however, underlying political
trend for change is a characteristic of any differer.xs which might, in unfortunate
collection of students.' circumstances, tie-in with differences
Dr Abdel Aziz went on, however, to between political forces at the national
suggest a further, more specific factor - level. The October election, for example,
the MB rejection of a role for regional was the fuu to be held since the banning
students' associations. These associations, (for alleged `anti-Lslamic activities') of the
which unite students from a particular p~~~tic Front and the Students'
region, first appeared on the University ~~gg(e Front, a coalition of Nasserites
of Khartoum campus, spreading and Baathists. This ban was not
thereafter to other universities and in- challenged by the FIS, nor raised in any
stitutes oF higher learning. The MB form during the election campaigning,
-
, affed student council at Omdurman but it is thoug~t l~cely by both Abdel
Islamic Universiry refused to officially Fatah Farah and Hussein Sa1~sKhaddam
- rocognise or deal with these associations. that the former supporters of these
A final factor in the outcome of the ~aups voted for the FIS.
election was the students' unrequited Furthermore the :biB charge that the
desire for v~rious administrative and FIS is composed of groups which are
academic changes. Eor the past two ap~~d to the government's national
years both staff and students have bcen reconciliation initiative and that some of
pressing for changes in the cuaiculum ~e FIS' electoral slogans hinted at
and the teaching system, but despite
sepuaSe stafF and student conferencea, objections, if not opposition, to the
which forwarded various recommenda- government. They go on to raise
tions, no substantial changes have tt?us far suspicions about the external-to�the-
~ been effected. University source of the FIS' financial
' There were few apparent differences of supPort, arguing that a coalition
composed of such different groupings
i opinion between the ~1B and FIS slates. could not have reconc~7ed their
i The FIS programme, for example, was diffaeeices except under external
- j~1ent on the issue of che foanal scpara� pleuure. This charge seems to have no
j tion oF the sexes at the Univasity, an ~~a y.~b~r.ce than t~e suddenne~�a
- ~ arrangement endorsed by the MB. In the q,~h the FIS formed aad the
recent staff and siudent conferences the ~~~,Nhict~ it campaigned�
view was expressed that effective academic ~ however, do not think that
reform requires mixed studies. Thus far, ~e union will be transformed into azi
; howtver, this demand has not been oppo~tinn front sina the FIS' pra
~ backed by any of che officially recognised ~me is resolutely inciined toward
studcnt groupings. Abdel Bagi Ahmed, ~ ~dent affairs rather than politics. Dr
MB adherent, denied that there was any pbdel Aziz shsres this judgement. Indeed
signif~cant difference regarding the a t~~formation would sam ruled
religious point of view and argued that out not only by the leading role of the
the contest had been conducted around ~d~dent forces, but also by the sharp
che details of the functioning of the ~{f~~ ~tween Unionists and Ansar.
student union. [n general FIS supporters Furthermore, since any eruption of
concurred in this assessment, stressing F~ differences would likely
that their approach might be called 'trade r~turn the students' counct7 to MB
unionist' rather than `political'. The FIS ~ntrol, such a dramatic alteration of FIS
sees itself as a front `embracing the fo~ces pu~u would appear unlikely.
that are fighting for the University and its Naturally Hussein Salh Khaddam re-
students within the framework of the j~ted these MB allegations. Indeed ac-
Lslamic faitt'. Its pro~ar.~me mentioned ~rding to the FIS the r~al t~veat of an
potitics only in the most general way, ~warrented injection of politicx into the
` arguing that the union would participate U~e~sity system arises from the pre-
in national activities that promoted the ~nce of the 1dB faction on campus, since
Sudanese identity and Islam. Otherwise
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- it is claimed = this group is subordinate
to the national MB leadership and the
l,~tter has in the past explated its student
j~ontingents to further its owa interests.
Tha possibility of unpleasant disrup-
tion remains. Khaddam expressed the
view that the events of the Univerrty of
Khartoum would not be dupllcated o0
the Omdurrnan Islamic Utuversity campus
because there was agreeme~i between the
FIS and the MB on the consritutional
procedure applicable to student elections. -
MB leaders acknowleciged that there was
thit constitutional agfeement but azgued
that this was not necessar~y the real
source of troubk, noting that the com-
ponents of the Proportional Representa-
tion Forces of the University of
Khartoum are (excepting the banned
Democradc Front and the Studenis'
Suuggie Eront) the same as those of the
FIS. It w11 thus be some time before we
know whether this elecdon heralds a new
era or merely another round of battle. ~
COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved SUD~P,NOW 1980
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SUDAN
PARALLEL MARKET REGUTATIONS HELP IMPROVE ECONOMY
- Khartoum SUDANUW in English Nov 80 p 29
~Text~ Almr,st r,n~> ~~car ro the dai~ ~r~~ru the Explaining the advantages of transfer-
rntrcxluctiu,; uf the paralle( market mle, ring al1 exports except cotton to the
a1 K%icfr t/;e Sudanrse puun~i e_rchanges parallel rate, Korne6o Kuriom, deputy
at 80 pt per GS dullur rsther than at the director of the foreigi exchange control
.i0 pt uJ' t/te ~:tficial e.rc�hvnge ~Qte, department of the Bank of Sudan, said:
_ ~Kiniste~ uj Fi~roncr and :Votivna! �This is an encouragement to producers
F_'c�unvmi~ Badr el Dirr Suleiman and exporte~s because they will have a ,
u?r~rotrncrd ~hvt a!! eYpnrts e.rrept cvltavt 60% ~ncrease in revenue in the parallel
a?x! all inrp~~rts e,rcepr wlreat, /lour, market. We hope that this will boost pro-
pet~uleum v~rc! rts reJ'uted pralurts, ductiun.'
~~ga~, d~ugs, and pow~lered milk, had ln fact. things are not quite so simple;
been tmnsferred tu the parallel rate aj for example, the government has impc~ed
~rchange. This alteradon jollows, by~ two in erport tax which will claw back some
munths, the :tifurister's btrdgcr speech ~f the tinancial advantages that exporters
(Cune~rt, ltrne/, rrr which he menteoned will derive from this expansion of cover-
- thot 1he porllle! ma~krt K~rx~ld be c~nsuli� sge of ihe pxrallel rate. Responding to
dated, and means tlmt h~ry uJall ~Yporrs this point. Mr A?8i1 observed,'The export
and ,i6% vj al! inrports ore ~row ~ax was created so that exporters do not
cha~tnelled rh~ouQf? the prarallel nrarket. ~ealise sudden windfall protits, thereby
Aljred Lu,qu~ie Taban reports.� inflating the economy an~i undermining ~
~~E WANT cu currect certain ills our efforts to control the money s~ipp:y.
like inllation in uur ecunvmy. We But the export tax is small. as compared
want to balance the quantity of muney to the benefits tu them under the parallel
wlth the quantity uf goods, so that prices rate; the tax may absorb 20�30`/~ while
don't rise because too much muney is the increase in revenue will be about
chasing after tou few goods. By transfer� 6pr'a.'
ring most ir,iported gcw~is tu the parallel The original purpuse of the parallel rate
market we are making the dollar mure is a matter of d'upute. An official of the
expensive, even for the ;ovemment, and Bank of Sudan ~~ffere~ the view that,
thereby withdrawirig excess muney from `The measure arnounted to nothing but a
an economy with to~~ few :,vailabk devaluation of the Sudanese pound. The
gouds; was the explanacion offered by government did not want to admit this
Agil M. Abdel ~ianan, deputy under. because it would be politically dangerous
secretary of the hlinistn uf Finance and to devalue a currency twice in the same
Nationa! Econo:ny. year.' Two months prior to the Septem-
`The rate of exchange should be deter- ber 1979 creation of the parallet rate the
mined by our rate oF productivity. With government had devalued the pound 209'0.
our low productivity w�e should have had T'}le govemment, th.ough acknowledging
a high rate of exchar.ge. This didn't the devalueing effect of its policy, argues
happen because the rate was artificially th~: its p~.~rpose was !o imp?ove Sudan's
fixed. The fact is, the paratlel market balance ut' payments deticit. And, indeed
matches our low productivity,' Mr Agil in the t:rst ycar oF [iir ope~atio~~ ~i~is
continued. lu, Sudan's reserve cr~dit rose to S84
t~ ~ ~y
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nulliun as com ared to the 56 million of
P 1979 the rate of
'tnflation was 33.6�,'0,
the previous 12 months. l;nfortunately, Wh~e during the same period this year the
however, no such level of improvement rate dropped to 4.6%a.' These figures,
has been registered in the current and however, are aubject to dispute since, ~s
trade accounts deficits. The current ~~specror of statistics in the Ministry -
account deftcit rose from Ls8.8m in acknowledged, the former figure is a 12
19761%7 to L~133.8m in 1979j80, while ~nth average while the latter is applic-
the trade acccunt fep from Ls8.''m sur- ahle to only a brief ~ve month period. -
plus to Ls199.3m deticit in the same rne ~linistry insists that its acgument is
period. hloreover, in this year oar balance ~~id and that only the prices of clothes
of payments deficit actually worsened; and footwear have risen sharply, while
from S675m to a projected 51b. those of food and drinks have remained
However. the parallel rate has been ' more or less stab~e.
credited aith creating 3n atmosphere ut The government appears determined to
contidence among Sudanese working see ~he parallel market take hold and suc-
abroad as evidenced in the S7~lm tl~ey cee~. Although :t provides subsidies only
have remitted. ln total. S3~9m was in- for those imported goods on the official
vested in the parallel rate in the Frst year rate of exchange, thereby shifting the
of its operatiun. :~nancial bu~den of the parallel rate to
Once again, huwever, the benefits bring commercial banks and the black�market.
in their wake corollarv alterations which the Bank of Sudan has put more than
are less advantageous, like an increase in 530m into circulation in order to support
domestic prices. 'Since the dollar is now the commerciai banks' resources, so as to
very expensive because ot the paraltel rate, meet t,1e citizenry's requirements I'or
so too have imports become more imported commodities and the demand
expensive,' noted one banker. titinistry for equipment and spare parts made by
ofPicials insist, however. that this rise will local industry.
be temporary. 'Prices will rise for awhile,' The parallel rate can serve many
Mr Agil claimed, 'but as more goods purposes. from curtailing inflation tu con�
~each the mar!cet and find less money, so'~datinb rates of exchange (and thereby
they will;radually decline.' taking a step tuwards zndme the bl~~k�
[ndeed the 1~linister has already claimed market for Financiat transacti~r~s). In th.
success in reducing intlation rates: `Sudan fina] analysis, however, only a substantial
increase in the productivity uf lahuur and
has scored tangible success in fighting in- capital investment can turn Sudan's
flation. Durin� the period January-hlay economy around. �
COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved SUDANOW 1980
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~ SUDiAN
~
LARGE SCALE DEVELOPMENT UAIDERWAY AT PORT SULIAN
Khartoum SUDr4NOW in English Nov 80 pp 38-39
~ CText]
All of ri:e goods that truvel to and fiom Tl~e system of transporting goods from
Sudan by sea are hmidled at Sudan's only the docks by rail has been one of the
- port, apciy named Pon Sudan. The pon primarY reasons for the bottlenecks for
is currently unde~oing a'redevelopment which Port Sudan s famous. This system
programme' under which it should consumes great amounts of both space
achieve the capacity to handle the and time. C`umbetsome railway tracks are
growing volume oj imports and ezports being uprooted and replaced by asphalt
which rs expected to increrrse shmpty in roads to ease the mov~ment and clearance
the n=.:t siz years. of goods from the port s docks.
The prog~amme, which rs broken into In its present stage, Port Sudan is
three stages, wrll, among orher thin3s, incapable of m~eting the demands
quadruple the poit's handling capa.tity generated by economic development
m~d rn the hopes of many, less~n tht thtoughout the country. The comple-
bottlenecks often expe~ienced at the tion of Stage One is expected to increase
port. Also in the plans is the revitalisa- the poR's capacity to deal with the
tion ojSuakin. Mustaja el Sunni reports: p~~uction increases expected over the
UDAN'S ONE and only porc, Port next six yeazs. After the port has been
S Sudan is under oin redevelo ment m�dernised and expanded, its handling
8 8 P capaciry stzould be increased to some 13
so that it might be brought into line with million tonnes per year from its present
_ international standards. capacity of 3.8 million tonnes per year.
The process was initiated in ;~fay of ~e u ose of Stage One is to
1978 as part of a three-tiered develop- p~ ~ b ~y~~ln the
ment scheme inauguratad by the winners reorganise the Po Y 8 ~
of the tender for Stage One, the British potential of existing facilities and to in- ;
company Nazples and Ridgeway. troduce madern mechanical cargo-
The firm w:ll modernise berths 17 and handlin8 equipment. A personnel training
18, increasing their capacity of vessel centre is to be established sa that
acceptance to 50,000 tonnes. The berths employees can be trained to handle the ~
will also be able to handle container new equipment and properly manage port ;
ships. :~larples and Ridgeway will alter operations. ,
the construction of berth 16 so that roll- `If this modification is completed, there
onlroll~off vessels mi~ht be introduced. w~l be no dela~? for incoming and
Also included in Stage One are the con- outgoing vessds, and goods can be
struction of two wharf faces, roads,an o~1 handled quickly,' asserted Dirdiri el
terminal and a coniainer-park. Sawi, head of the new Projects Depart-
Marples and itidgeway, whose work is ment of the Sea Ports Corporation.
well under way, has imported the Other benefits are inctuded in Stage
equipment and machinery for all phases ~e: if a grant from Garmany receives
of Stage One. The firr:~ estirnates that this final aPproval, work will begin on a
fust stage of the redeveiopment process h~P~~� P~~acies and a social
will be completed by 1981. centre.
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Local financing for Stage One amouats '~e third and final stage of the project
to some fs8 million, and is comple� � ~~n set aside for the completion of
mented by a S22 million loan from the ~ P~ ~riated during the first and
World Bank which, along with other second stages.
t`inancial institutions, is considering pt present, Port Sudan has sufficient
financing Stage 'fw�o. West Germany con- faclidas to assist vessels entering and
tnbuted with an 88 Q00 DM technical aid leaving the port. The port maintains
- grant in l 97', /78 and a commodity ex� rescue and fire services and the entire
- change loan totalling one m;llion DM. An ~n ~ access to clean drinking water,
additional one million DM in West which is supplied to sll vessels in t::e port
German aid was tr�ranted for the cost of by launches with capacities of some
tugs and is now being applied towards the 150 tonnes.
cost of two cranes imported from West A total of 7,322 vessels passed tluough
- ~ Germany and currently in use at the port. the port between 1972 and 1979, wtule
; some 207,599.967 m~lion tonnes of
Some �5.7 million was put into the ~~rt~ g~s were handled from 1970
i project by the &itish Overseas Develop- ~ough 1979. Exports during the same
!;nent Ministry. Ihe money is to be p~riod amounted to 10,237,086 tonnes.
' ' allocated towards the promotion of the A financial push has been aimed at the
shunting operation at the port and for port with the approval of a new tariff in
miscellaneous equipment. February and an Apn1 decision to acapt
~ Consultants for the overall developmant ships' duties in hard curnncy.
- ~ programme, Liversy & Henderson, Not wishing to put all of its eggs in one
i completed a traffic forecast in 1977 and basket, the Sea Ports Corporation is also
~ submitted the development plan which pursuing plans to revive the old port at
extends throughout the year 2000. The Suakin. Based on the conclusions of a
Projects Department of the Sea Ports half-m~llion dollar EEC-financed
Corporation and Liversy & Henderson feastibility study, authorities estimate that
began working together in late 1975 and Suakin could be expanded to an e~cport
L& H continues to supply the projects capacity of one million tonnes per year.
department with experts and handle aIl Other plans for Suakin include its
- of the consultancies. functioning as a floating dockyard for the
Stage Two of the redevelopment ptan is maintaining and serving of vessels in port.
an extension of the first stage. Hoaevet; The abundant supply of fish in the uea
it ir.cludes further construction - thne incma9es further the scope of possib~L'ty
new berths at numbers 12, 13 and 14 and for the now defunct port.
new wharf faces on berths l 7 and 18 - Once Suakin is operating, it w~71 be used
that will give the port access to even specifically for vessels coming from the
larger vessel~ than covered by Stage One. -Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Work is
~ Stage Two also covers the construction of scheduled to begin immediately following
_ all civil wori:s - for example, offices and the announcement of the winner of tha
roads - and includes the provisions for a tender, but w~l obviously not be
generator. The generator should. alonE completed for some time. �
- with the replacement of railway tracks
by roads, make a great contribution Milked for what it~s worth
towards increasing the efficiency and DAILY DAIRY PRODUCTION in
productivity of the port. Khartoum may soon increase as a result
_ The port's grain stores will be expanded of the expansion in size and an improve-
from the present holding capacity ut" ment of.equipment at the Kuku Coopera-
25,000 tor~nes to 100,OQ0 tonnes. 'I1?e tive, Dairy. With the addition of 1036
provisions of Stage 'Iwo aiso allow for the feddans to its present utilized azea of
- establishment of the headquarters of the ~OOO feddans and w~ith almost $1 million
Sea Ports Corporation at the port, where from a Saudi Arabian grant to spend on
it will move from its present offices in new boilers, spare parts, a can�v~~ashing
Rhartoum. machine and a stand-by generator~ the
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hope is that the cooperative can To improve its financial base, the
overcome the pn~blems ~f out~of+date ~~~~,e ~~~i~ted negotiations~
equipment and inadequate administrative ~e Sudan Development Corporation
= supervision. 1 in order 'to form, a milk reconstitution
The Kuku project, originally firranced ~t, '!7~ unit ~vould utilise powdered
by American aid, opened its doors in donated by the UN for putposes
1962. For the first ~wo years of its opera� of disaster~elief to raise the capital"s
tion it was administered by American ~~~ption levfl.
personnel. `This was the golden' era for p~ ~ need of improvement is the
the project,' accord.ng to Mr Mohamed el administration ~ of the cooperative's -
Fateh of the Pu~lic Corpontion for ~~rs, formerly Batahin nomads who
pnimal Product~on, which now ~e aow uttled as cammercial peasants.
administers the cooperative. ; Following ~ of thq cooperative's farmers is
the departure of the American adminis- 10 feddans and 12 coa+s. Daily
trators the project rapidly deteriorated. ~r p,~~uction i.s supposed to
At present, for example, very little butter ~ 20 pounds but because farmers have
or chase is produced and much of the ~y~d their herd sizes to as many as 70
m~11c is lost because the cooperativda head, withQut a commensurate increase in
machinery is 20 years old. 1 g~~.z~g s.rea or fodder, per cow -
The project's reurganisation began in production has dropped to 10 pounds a
1972 when Saudi Arabia loaned SS day y~ collected from the
million through the agency of the Food farmers and prepared and packaged in a
and Agricultural Organisation of the nearby laboratory. Returns from sales are
- Unitul Nations. Crucial to the present distributed twice monthly to each fam~er
stage of r~eorganisation is the expansion ac~ording to the Ievel of production.
of the cooperative's staff of ttchnicians. qt present Khartoum's daily milk con-
Since 1962 only four trained technicians ~ption is about 225,000 rottles, of
have worked at Kuku. Project manage- which Kuku contnbutes about 34,06~. It
ment intends to expind trainiug, both is:hoped that this figure will more thu~?
Iocally and abroad; some trainees, for double as the Saudi-financed reorganisa-
example, w~l be sent to Kenya and pon takes hold.
. F'uiland for advanced coucxs.
COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved SUDiANOW 1980
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SULIAN
ROAD CONSTRUCTION I~YJVES I'ORWARD AT BRISK PACE
Khartoum SUDANOW in English Nov 80 pp 9-13
[Text~ _ _ _ _
!n a cae~ntry oj Sudan's size, what is the throu~ an ei~t-inch pipe from Coz
best way ro nansport goods, by road os Rajab, near Atbara, some ~35 k~lometres
rrrill Sudan has rvicently emba~ked on away. These factors, compounded by the
a mQSSive rocd-c�onctruction p~ottramme, country's other more cammon problems
the fa~st srage of which was openPd by - transport delays, fuel shortages and
_ the F~st Vice Hesident early last neonth. foreign exchange d'.fficulties - delayed
So f~ tl~e progrranme is progressirrg the ccxnpletion date of the ra4d by ovet a
diead of schedule, but some questions year and increased the final cost of tTe
still remain a6out the fmsibiliry oj the project, which has yet to be ft~Ily com-
project. Are roads rea/ly berter for the put~d,
country than rurTwuys? ffow much ntoney According to engjneer Enrico Recchi,
ir bang spent? Who is pJanns~g them? who spoke on be~alf of all the contiac-
Berhmie Woldegabriel imestigates. to~s at the opening ceremony, the Kas-
HE LAST SECTION to be completed sala-HaiYs twalane siretch - seven
T of the 1,200 lulometre Khartoum- metres wide with a one.und-a�half inetre -
Port Sudan high.vay - the 3501a7ometre hard~t?oulder either side _ consvmed
Kassala.Haiya stretch - waa operyed on some �s7 m~lion worth uf petroleum pra
tf?e third of last month by the Firtt Via ducts and �s8 million worth of sparc
President, General Abdel Mapd Hamid parts in its construction, 70 bridges and
Khaiil. 560 box~ulverts inclusive. However, l~ir
Most of the 1900~nember workforce K~~ says they have received no pay-
employed on this last section - a number ment for the work they have done since
which rose to 2,~00 during the heigbt of hst September, never mind the addi�
the construction work - were Eritrean tional costs due to unforseen factors and
refugees, and thz joint venture between the �s10 rtullion Kasti bridge which was
the three ltalian companies Recchi, opened by the President last January.
Imprest and L,odigian, took some five According to the contractual agFee�
years to compl-te. Indeed, `this most ment, Mr Recchi claims that his company
difficult road,' to quote Road and Bridges was entided to stop work if 90 days pas� .
Public Curporation (RPBC) project sed without payment. `But there were
c;irector E1 Mahdi Abdel Rahman, was orher considerations to take into -
- laid down under the most adverse of con- account,' he said, `chiefly, the 17 vears
ditions. Proper materials foc the embank- of fricnd.~h~'p and ;ooperation bet-
ments were not easy to come by, the ween us and the Sudanese people. Be-
asphalt proved very difficult tc? handle in sides, abandoning a project such as
the hot sun and working conditions this would be like stabbing a friend in the
generally deteriorated as the blazing heat back. We hzve a saying in Italy: A friend
of the desert - up to 50� Centig~ade - in need is a friend indeed,' Mr Recchi _
and haboubs - heavy dust storms - told Sudvnow that his company, of which
beg~n to take their toll. Water was scarce he is a directoc, is oaed over fs20 mil-
in the desert ar;d had to be pumped lioa. `Up unt~ Lzst l~u?e,' he said, `the
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total cost of the project was some �s26b ~~ey had to do was blow hdes in the
million, plus �s20S million in hard cur- pipe with their Kalashnikovs and there
rency. We kept on worldng. We have con- was a plentiful supply of cleaa, running
stantly been promised by the top ~ta� aaeing their beasts and themselves
a~ horities that the financial problems 8 Sp klometre sweat throu~? the de~ert
will be ironed out, and that we will be ta some doubtful watet-hole.
paidin ttie near future.' $arty in 1978, undar pcassute from pro-
The claims for payment have yet to be ject directors, Rashaide ch~efsheid a meet�
setded because the full Sgure is not inQ to elect one supreme chief from
known ; increases in commercial interest- ~~g to negotiate a settlemerit ~
rates incurred due to the lack of p~y- b~~ Rashaidn and Recchi. `as
ments have yet to be caiculated. po~ice and arnry efforts to salve the pro-
`Buf we are not newcomers.' The Itali~n blem proved unacctPtable,' the ltaliza
engineer went on. `We came here in 1973 director said.
when we bu~1t the Shambat bridge for the Thus it was that the two cultures came
Kassala-Haiya section and we're stQ1 together and shook hands. 'Despite dis-
working there replacing joints,' he crepancies in technology and culture,
conrinued. men are basically reasoning beings, and
But more dif6cult even than the finan- common sense is su11 binding.' said Mr
cial problems, were the human problems Recchi. `We told them there was enou~
caused by the construction of the road� water for aIl in the pipe, and we wou d
problems, in fact, Mr Recchi has been construct water-paints and hajfvs all
able to tam to good use by composing a along the pipe,and in turn they promised
filr,~-script around them. to re&ain from breaking it open.' During
Firstly, the young Italian director the agreement the supreme chief was told
pointed out, there were the pro~lems that his men should not have broken the
within the Italian community ~tsaf. pe on the gounds that the welfare of
Imagine,a small Italian town transplanted ~s at stake, and thus their welfare
in the middle of the dese~rt, artificially ~~ll�
created to be sure, but containing vir- `~t S~d will the road do us if
tually all the goingsvn of a smaIl Italian ~r ~ of thirst. the cltief re.
_ vIIlage, iruluding love and betrayal. ~~d�
= Derudeb, again according to :~ir Recchi, `We are both rig}if ~given tlie standaids
was such a town, and more. Every italian of our two civ~lisarions, explained Mr
living there, regardless of social stature, R~cchi.
drank in the same bar, swam in the same But a d.angerous precedent has been set.
pool, watched the same fdms in the same The Rashida have now left their tradi-
cinema, all under the blazing sun of an tional water-holes to the desert and the
African desert; a real challenge to human blowing dust. Thousands of beasts and
survival. Conventions and sen9tivides now rely on the pipe for their
were siripped away by the harsh en- evcyday supplies of water, and the pipe
vironment, the ability to `muck-in~ and has now passed under the control of the
make the best of it became more im- regional authorities. What would happen
portant than the status of rank and ~~~+ater suddenty stopped flowing is
- these qualities proved an irresistable ~Y~~'s gttess.
magnet to the fairer sex, resulting in love T7'?e strategically important P~rt Sudan-
and betrayal or, indeed, betcayal and ~rtoum Highway - Port Sudan being
love. Sudan's only real trade gateway to the
Then there were the problams with the rest of the wodd - is only one road in a -
local communities. The local tnbe, the ~~twork planned by the Sudanese
Rashida - a Red Sea nomadic tribe ori- ~ U~on (SStn tue body wi~ich -
ginally from Saudi Arabia - are lrnown ~ids overall reponsibility for transport
more for their numerous ramels than for P~~B ~oughout the country.
their accumulation of Fiats, and they `Road planning, like other state
were more gcateful for the water.pipe activ~ties, emanates from the people and
than for the road itself. They continuatly is brought to the attention of their
broke ihe pipe, not to sabotage the pra representatives at the National Congress
jxt but to gain access to the water who meet to discuss overall planning
supply. Having relinquished their spears strategy once every three years,' an SSU
and swords after the iroubles in Eritna, official told Sudanow. The SSIJ, acting
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upon the decisions of the Congtess, then and finally category (C); roads where the
organises working bodies of experts to design was still un~inished and the finan�
look into the feasibIlity of the projects; cial arrangements had yet to be con�
experts whose work is overseen by the cluded at the onset of thE pl~n.'
poliric~l burrau who make certain the Category (A) comprises the Port Sudan
project coincides with the country's _ g}i~oum - Kosti - Medani - Sennar
overall strategic needs. In fact, most ~~~y, categury (Bl. the Sennat -
tranSpoct planning is worked out in deta~7 Kosti - Sinja - EI Damazin - Nyala -
by the Ministry of Planning, wture the ~~.~~,ge - Jebd Awlia El Dueim -
txhnical problems aze ironed out, and ~bak road; and category C. Gedaref -
. then goe,s through the Councl7 of Wad El Huri - Sam Sam -
- Ministers for other considerations - gab~ Kadugli - Talodi.
political, social and so on - before `It is true to say that roads in catego�
fmally being rubber-stamped by tha ries A and B have almost all been
People's Assembly. completed,' Mr El Mahdl continued,
The RBPC has a planning unit of its ~o~y ~e last section in category B, the
own, but the supervision and control of ~ pu~ _ Rabak stretch, has to be
day-to-day transport opaations w~71 lie, fu?ished, and we are now evaluating
in theory at least, with the Technical tenders. Deta~ed engineering plans have
Office of the Ministry of Transport. been drawn up for most of Category C
Work on the Office has not yet begun, roads; their tcnder documents have been
despite a 4 million gu~7der grant from ~mp{eted, and they are just waiting for
Holland and technical assiscance from the financial go�ahead:
West Germany. Indeed, progress has The road-transport development plan is
deteriorated at the Office since the fust ~y ~head of schedule. But much of the
moves were made to set it up in 1977. success of the road-construction
`firansport experts are exuemely ~ be explained by the
expensive,' said Mr Azhari Fadl Abdel budgei allowances. In 1969~
Karim, director of the Central Ranning 70 the budget of the RBPC was
Bureau in the Ministry of Transpori, fs59S,704, rising to �s54 million in
`and without the West German and Dutch 1977/78 and an expected expenditure of
fechnical assistance it would have been ~ion for the current year,
impoaible for a proper office to luve 43.5 million of which has already been
bcen formed.' But, ironicallY~ approved. Deta~s of freight capacities on
higtily-experienced Sudancse transport ~d and ra~1 over the last ten years are
- 4ffci~lc w~+~ Office for the ~+elow.
o- ~ -
last few years have recently left for ~audi p~rding to the Six Year Plan, pubt~c
Aratia: iavestrnent in ra~1waYs was calculated to
`We can't compete with Saudi Arabia,' ~ount to some fs78 rnillion over the
said Mr Azhari wistfully. six year period, wh~le investment ~n roads
`T'he formation of the Technical Office ~ q~~~ted to be around some �s249
would mean the recruitment of sk7led m7lion, including the �s125 million
personnel from our ministry,' said Mr ~h y~ ~~d will be invested by the
Abdel Rahman ~fohamed Hassan, private stctor - investments such as the
Director of Transport and Communica- ~wagi road which was opened
tions in the ~iinistry of Planning. `How- by the First ~ce President last month.
ever, the ministry i~self is understaffed ~weva, more than the total allocation
and we can spare no ~~ne.' of funds for the Sac Year P1an has already
The core of Sudar's road-construction been spent in tlie first three years, and
strategy, indeed tr: nsport strateBY in w,}~t effect this wiil have on the
general, is the Six Year Pian, which began remaining road-projects in the plan is
in 1977. '1~Vhen the Six Year Plan was uncertain. `But what is for sure,' said an
focmulated, road-pr~~jects were divided official in the Ministry of Transp~rt, `is
into thret categor~e~. said Mr El Mahdi ~at there wil] be no new projects until
Abdel Ratunan, RBPC project d'uector. after 1982.'
`Firstly, category (A), composing those But why is there this emphasis on
roads whic:~ were under construction at roads and why are the railways, .
the time the Plan ~as formulated. Then seemingly being `run down~ The carry�
category (B). those roads whose detailed ing capacity of Sudan Railways has
designs and financial arrangements had declined from three million tonnes in
bcen settled before the plan toofc effect. 1970/71 to 1.9 million in 197811979.
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Road haulage, conversely, has been on supervision of the project is being under~
the increase. , taken by a joint technical committee of
`It is a question of idealogy,' said an ~ K~y~ ~d o~"xials, and the
official in the Ministry of Transport. .ori~~ ~b~ty study rvas completed
After all, rail transport is cheaper than by ~e Nocwegian firm of Norconsult,
roads, it is more popular wi~h the low ~ Who have also just finished a further
income groups and the revenue from che ~ study on the category (C) Kosti.Umm
railroada goes strai$ht into the public ~ Ruwaba 140 kilomeve stretch. Con-
-neasury. Also ra~ways benefit from theu yultants would not necessarHy be picked
centralised nature by making easier the ft~ ~o~ ~~panies a3ready working in
controls and regulations governments can gu~, '~e World Banic has agreed t~
place upon them. The fust programme ~~ce the construction of this 150 la7a
of action of 1973, first developed an metn category (C) hi~way.
- incerest in road-planning and was bitterly 'I'he total cost of the 110 k~7ometre
opposed by the Russian transport experts ~wo-lane Rabak-El Dueim road ~ not yet
who planned the tust Five Yrr,ar Plan. ~o,~, 'rne Yugoslav construction com-
pany Partizaeski Put have submitted the
`There is another point of view,' said bW~~ bid at S33.3 tnillion, the highest
blinistry of Planning Director of ~~8 g~ plfred McAlpine's Sbl rtuillion,
- Transport and Communications, Mr Consultants to the project ~re Lcwis
Mohamed Hassan, 'There h~s been a Berger from the United States and
bottle-neck in the transport of goods Kdmpsax Intemational of Denmark, A
from Port Sudan that the ra~7ways have ~~urce in the RBPC said that the tendecs
just bcen unable to handle. tt is are being evaluated at the mument, but
physically impossible ior them. Ra~7ways ~t~at no ~ecision has been announced yet.
have had their fair share and now it is T1ie Arab Fund fur Ecunumic and
absolutely � essential for roads to be S~xi:,l Ik~eiopmtm (AFFSD) and the
constructed.' Afrkan Develupment Bank (ABD) have
So whik~work has f:nished on the Port bcrn asl:e~ tu finance thr l,'00 kilo-
Sudan-Khartuum hi ~hway, for the ~,nr~rr UmJtum~n-Dungula�Aswan hig~�
moment at leasc, elsw ehere construction ~y, but accotditig to Mr E] Mahdi, theze
continues apace. Wor~ should be starting has been no response from them. Italy
this month on the drunage stcucture of has alreadygranted some 30~ million lire,
the 582 kilomeUe 3~enyaSudan road� ~d ~he Netherlands some 5 million
link, 335 lu7ometres of which fall in gu~7ders, towards the initial feasibiliry
Sudan. study.
'The Ls24 million grant, joindy Finally, work ~an the Nyala�Kas~7alingi
donated by the EEC .:nd USAID for the section of the Massawa-Ndjemena trans-
construction of a main drainage system African hi~way, a Z10 kilometre suetch,
and for the improvement of some began In earty 1979 and is on schedule
sections of the road, ~.vill have to be uti- for completiton in 1983. The road, all
lised before the be~nning of 1981,' said ~phalt and seven metres wide, is being
one RBPC official. The execution and bwlt by the West Cerrnan Heid and Frank
Mode 1970/71 1975l76 1978l79 1982/83 ta~pets
R~ilwsys 2.7 billio~ 26 biliion 1.8 billio~ 4.5 billion
= ton/km ton/km ton/km toMkm
- 1.5 billion
passe~gers/km
Roads� 0.9 billion , 2.6 billio~ n/s although 4.98 billion
�koaa nYU~,ee ttsures ue d?n?eu~t w esuma~r 3 billion ton/km
breause unllke Sudan R~llwaY~ - a sln~lr ton/km ~~.7 b~lion
`uvernment Corporatba wh~ch rebaae~ r:act ~t~TBt@~
!?risht ti~urn - therr h no f1Y~d numbrr ut passengers/km
' ~uvrmment and D~~at~ ur~anlartiona Involved
in thr exrrylnQ uf road~trrlrhl.
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construction compa~y. Although the ~e the 420 Idlomeire Khartoum-
tender cost is some 529.2 million, due to ~~f road has already been asphalted,
ies distance from Port Sudan, and thus ~~y Aothing at ~II has ban done on
high transport costs, plus the high cost of ~e Gedaref.C.allabat section. This stretch
l~bour and materials, the actual cost of
the road will probably be much higher was designed by.the Egyptian Roads and
said RBPC's project director. ' Bridges Corporation in 1972, but the
_ The project is being joindy financed by African Development Bank did not
- the Saudi Development Bank - 1235 respond to requests for funds when plans
miQion riyals - the Islamic Development f~ the road were initially laid down.
Bank - 4.5 million dinars _ the West ~?~new its requests subsequent
German Kreditanstalc fuer Wiederaufban to the warrning of retations between
- DM83 million - and by the govem� Sudan and Ethiopia; ~thiopia is also
ment, who wi11 pick up the res*_ of the btll interested in the project and both
which amounts to 30 per cent of the total countries have sig~ed an agreement to
cost, open tr~c over tha border throuRh the
The Nyala-Kas-Zalin~ road is only one existing dry-weather Gedaref-Gondar
road of many in Sudan which will one road via Gallabat and Metemma.
day become part of the pan-African high� Northwards~ � in 1974 both Egypt and
way ryscem. A meeting of the Ministerfal Sudan applied to (ABD) and the
Committee of the Economic Commission (AFESD) for funds to finance a road-
for Africa (ECA) held in Addis Abab~ ~ between the two countries. Althou~
back in 1971, decided that African link was in the context of the pan-
countries should be connected by a net- African hi~way programme, the concern
~ of the two countries to forge such a link
work of international highways. 1984~ Was attn'butea more to theu economic
1990 should be the decade of roads in ~d cultural integration programmz than
Africa,' declared the commission. Eight to any commitment to the ECA plan.
transcontinental highways were planned: pgD and AFFSD were asked to put up
Al~ers-Mali, Mombassa-Lagos, Ndjamena- S~e S 172 million, which in 1974 was
_ Dakar, Nouakchott-Lagos, Massawa- ~~ated would cover the cost of studies,
Ndjamena, Cairo-Nouakchott, Cairo� designs and cortstruction. `We had no ra
Gabon, Tripoii-Ndjamena, The ECA have Spanse, trom them,' said Mr El Mahdi,
pledged to canvas international bankers '~ut we did get a grant of 5150,000 from
to support the scheme, and have recom- ~}ie Italian govemr~xnt to finance the ini.
mended that African states give full tial feasibility study,' he added,
priority fo those roads wfiich Ft in with
the planned network. The other major pan-African highway
Mr El Mahdi from t~ze RBPC, a frequent to pass throug~ Sudan is the Massawa.
member of the Sudmese dalegation to Ndjamena sa:tion; which w~11 draw a
ECA meaings told Sudmeow: ~For- 2,l 59 kilometre Line from Sudan's eastern
tunately, a good part of Sudan's road border town of Kassala to the western
construction programme falls within the borda town of Adri. The highway w~11
pan.African plan.' pass [hrou~ Gedaref, Wad Medani,
_ Two of the trans-.~.frican highways - Sennar, Kosti, EI Obeid, EI N~ud, El
- the Cairo-Gabon and the ldassawa�Ndja- Fasher, Nyala, Zalinge and Jenena, The
mena roads - pass t'~orugh Sudan. The 557 ~cilometre section from Kassala to
Mombassa-Lagos saccion, althougt? not Sennar is at this moment being con-
passing direcdy through Sudan, will be structed, and the RBPC hope to lay the
met at IYaizobi by the KenyaSudan link. tarmac at the end of next year. Detailed
Of the Cairo-Gabon stretch, 1,452 }dlo- designs for the Kositi-El Obeid section,
metres is in Sudan. The hi~way pas~es some 310 kilometres, will be drawn up at
tluough Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, the beginning of next year - the Kosti-
Tanzania, Zambia and finishes in ~mm Ruwaba stretch is in the hands of
Botswana. Within Sudan, the stction is an ~lorconsult, while the Umm Ruwaba-El
important part of ttAe country's develop- Obeid section is bei,lg studied by the
ment project; passing throu~ Wadi Halfa, Japanese consultancy fir,n Mitsui.
Dongola, Kllartoum, Wad Medani, ~~p until now, almost no work at all
Gedaref and Gallabat, and then on into has been compkted on the El Obeid-El
Ethiopia. N~hud-El Fasher road, but , 5t is becom-
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ing increasingly attractive,' said Mr El ltank-Ratiak road, started Iast year, was
Mahdi, t?ot only in terms of the larg~ planned as much for its strategic use in
amounts of gum arabic found in the ana, ynking the souih and the north, as for
but chiefly in terms of the proximity of the economic benefits it might bring.
the pruposed road to the petroleum ex- gut it looks as though, tor the next [~w
ploration area.' year~ tt least, ro~d construction will
'Ihe EEC is being asked to finance the continue at a heady rate throughout the
12~ kilometre ZalingeJenena stretch country. Whether or not this will lead to
from funds allocated tov~rards road con- a rapid increase in ihe country's fuel-bill,
struction during the second Lome con� ~d the sight of multinational com�
vention. The p Fasher�Nyala section is at panies' hautage fleets cutting up thc
present being improved by a Dutch newly laid tarmac before it has had a
government loan and the last section in chance to dry, is too soon to say. But
the highway, the 30 kilomeue Jenena� there has been a clear lack in the infra-
Adri stretch, will hopefully be financed structure. of a well-coordinated transport
by the ECA themselves; although wi~~ network which could provide econorruc
Lhe civil war in Qiad, many observers feel and strategic incentives to foreign and
there is no particular rush for this section. domestic investors. �'hether the present
If the ECA could convince enough road programme will tit the bill is still not
internationa] bankers of the sound clear. It is certainly a gamble. but a
economic, social and cultural reasons for gamble which Sudan must take some time
the pan-African hi~hway programme, a or other, and at the moment, the fact
great deal of money could be saved on that the programme is ahead of schedule
these costly feasibility studies. it is more may mean this is just the right time t.
than a question of economics. The El gamble.
COPYRIGHT: All rights reserved SUDANOW 1980
CSO: 4820 END
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