JPRS ID: 9472 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300070007-4
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: REPORTS

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FOR OFFICIA~ USE ONLY
: JPRS L/9472
_ 6 January 1981
~
West E u rQ e Re ort
~ p
(FOUO 1 /81)
,
F~~$ FOREIGN BRO~DCAST INFORMAI'iON SERVICE
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JPRS L/9472
6 Januar.y 1981
WEST EUROPE REtORT
(FOUn i/8i)
CONTENTS ~
THFATER NUCLFAR FORCES
FR~iNCE
Nuclea.r-Powered Aircraft Carrier To Be Begun in 1983
(AIR ~ COSMOS, 8 Nov 80) 1
_ Ma.intenance of Strategic Nuclear Air Force Urged
(AIR & COSMOS, $ NOV �~~~~~~~~~~~.~~s~~~~~~.~~~~~o~~� 2
ENERGY ECOI~MICS
ITA.LY
; Industry Minister Interviewed on New Energy Plan
i (Antonio Bisaglia laterview; IA STA.P~A, 16 Nov 80) 3
I COUNTRY SECTION
i BEI.GIU]M
I Martens IV Government's Social Program Called Not Serious
~ (Jacques Schepmans; P~QRQUOI PAS?, 30 Oct 80) 7
~
New Government Members Portrayed, Assessed
(PUURQWI PAS?, 30 Oct 80) .........................o.... 10
FR~.NCE
Mitterrand's Risky Candidacy: Polls, PCF, Rocard Obstacles
(Robert Schneider; 15-21 Nov 80) 13
Summary of Past Year's Polls on Major Political Figures
_ (Jean-Luc Parodi; POUVOIRS, No 15; 198U) 16
New Book Describe's PCF's Inner Workings, History
(Philippe Robrieux Interview; 22-28 Nov 80) 28
- a- LIII - WE - 150 FOUO~
F(1R l1FFff'TAT iTCF (1Ni.Y
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SPAIN
Politicai Yarties Organize Peace Front in Basque Provinces
(CAMHIO 16, 17 Nov 80) a 34
Basque Unity, by ~orka Iandaburu
Incompetent Police Force, Editorial by Juan Tomas
de Salas
~
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
_ NUCLEAR-POWERED AIRCRAFT CARRIER TO BE BEGUN IN 1983
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 8 Nov 80 p 27
[Text] During discussion of the i981 defense budget draft, the Minister of
Defense, Joel Le Theule, told the deputies that "the next program bill will be
submitted for consideration by the Parliament during the spring 1982 session.
This bill will be dra~,�n up with the studies now under way of the economic con-
text, the political facts of the moment, and perhaps, also, scme considerations
of financing methods taken into account. We shall study means of elaborating a
more precise formula, less uncertain than the present one."
In addition the minister stated that "the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier which
will replace the Clemenceau will be built at Brest. The order will be placed in
1983.... A~propriate shops for the assembly of nuclear boilers for the aircraft
carrier will be necessary.... The funding entered in the 1981 budget is intended
for this canstruction work. At the same time the Foch will be progressively
modernized and its successor put on the ways later on. The date has not been
decided. In establishing the specifications for its construction the experience
gained by the Brest naval shipyard in building the first one will be taken into
account."
Bringirig up the subject of the "weapon with low side effects," improperly called
the "neutron bomb," the minister stressed the following ~oints: "We have at least
2 or 3 years before we must decide for it or against it.... Studies were begun
in the end of 1976....Construction of the weapon will be within our technical
, capability in the near term.... At this time the only decision which has been
made is to continue the. studies.... The concept for employment of our nuclea~
forces has not changed.... The main point is to know that a decision to produce
the weapon may be made about 1982 or 1983 in the configura~tions in which it is
now known, or a little later if other techniques are sought. In the case of an
affirmative decision the weapon will be only one of the possible elements of our
- atomic forces, an effective deterrent element in a defensive perspective."
COPYRIGHT: A. & C., 1980
11706
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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES FRANCE
MAINTENANCE OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR AIR FORCE URGED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 8 Nov 80 p 27
[Text) During debate i.n the National Assembly on the defense budget draft for
1981 Deputy Jean-Pierre Bechter ardently declared himself in favor of maintain-
ing, in the years 1985-1990 and be,;ond, a strategic air arm.
, Challenging the two objections most often stated to this third arm--low penetra-
tion capability and inadequate survival--he devoted himself to show the importance
of such a force as an indispensable complement to missile launching submarines
and ground-ground missiles, stationary today, but mobile tomorrow. In Bechter's
opinion, to consider tw~o components, one on the ground, the other submarine based
- sufficient to guarantee credibility of French deterrence while the Soviets and
the Americans, in contrast, sre providing themselves with a fourth strategic
~ component based upon satellites and orbiting stations, would be a backward step.
".We have no knowledge of any in-depth studies from which such a conclusion may
be drawn. Neither do we know of any studies which decisively sho~a inadequate
capability of surviva]. or penetration of a strategic air arm for 1990 and beyond."
The minister replied substantially: "We are only at the study phase. These
studies, it is true, are more directed toward the mobile ground-ground components
but the considerationsunder study exclude no possibility; in particular, the
capability for survival and pen~tration of the piloted component are under con-
sideration. For the time being the configurations of the Mirage IV aircraft--and
which will be enhanced with t:~e ASMP missile--give that component credibility.
In 1982 our ideas will be much more precise. Choices will have been made."
COPYRIGHT: A. & C., 1980
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ENERGY ECONOMICS ITALY
INDUSTRY MINISTER IlyTERVIEWED ON NEW ENERGY PLAN
Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 16 Nov 80 pp 1, 2 r
[Interview with Industry Minister Antonio Bisaglia by Mario Pirani]
[Text] Rome=-On Wednesday the Council of Ministers is to Ftpprove the energy plan. -
It is a thick volume of approximately 400 pages, subdivided into two periods, from
~ now ro 1990, with particular attention to the next 3 years, and from 1990 to 2000
(this second part is, however, still very vague):. Underlying the plan is the sim
_ of reducins~ within 10 years our dependency on oil, which today accounts for approx-
imately 70 percent of Italian consumption, to less than 50 ~~ercent.
Industry Minister Antonio Bisaglia is the autt~or of the plam and it is to him that
_ we turn, reminding him that the plan has been talked about for qeare ~rtthout anything
- coming of it.
_ [Question] Are you not afraid that once again things will fall fack into an nt~
proof of a purely paper whim?
[Answer] Tl:at is true. They have been talking about this plan for years and another _
plan, though not so elaborate as the present one, was even approved in December 1977.
Among other things, it provided for the creation of six nuclear power plants with a -
capacity of 2,000 megawatts each. Well, nothing was done and they did not even suc-
ceed in getting the Montaldo di Castro plant started, which was not only the first
in the program, but had been already decided upon at the end of 1974.
[Question] And, according to you, the government does not enter into this at all?
~
[Answer] The government has been incapable of creating the consensus which is
ne~essary to put an energy policy into practice. Furthermore, a negative public
opinion has crystalized, not because if: has fu11 knowledge of the danger of nuclear -
energy, as much as because this fear had been instilled in it and had influenced
local government bodies. Do you know how it is in Italy? If you want to ruin a
product, all you have to do is get a rumor started that it hae a bad effect on
virility. The antinuclear campaign has had the same emotional basis. In the new
plan, however, a heavy emphasis is being placed on coal.
[Question] And so this time you think you can do it?
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_ [AnswerJ Every year of delay will cost 240 billian per plant. Overall, the plan
provides for substantial political and financial cou~itments: 16,500 billion over
the first 3 years, compared, however, to an oil bill of 81,000 billion. During the
period 1984-1990, other investments of 47,000 billion are contemplated. It must
be clear that not reaching the proposed goals will reault inevitably in an increase
in oiI consumption and, therefore, the failure of the fundamental ob~ective. Given
this, I want to emphasize that the plan does not offer a magical solution: it is
a complex of hypotheses submitted to Parliament which should, then, be translated
into admin~strative and legislative decisions.
[Question] In the final analysis, a lot depends on Parliament? -
- [Answer] Certainly. Moreover, there are now already bills on the subject before
the Senate. A law concerning coal power plants has been approved but at this pofnt
the five regions involved have not taken steps to make the choices of their campe-
tency.
[QuestionJ The sore spot remains that of the locations, isn't that so?
[Answer~ Precisely for this reason we have taken steps to transmit to the Senate
a law, which we hope will be approved quickly, assuring the participation of the
local authoritieg; it guarantees, however, th~t the government can safeguard the
national interest.
[QuestionJ In spite of all this, you seem to be more optimistic than in the past
- about the plan's prospects. Where does this conviction come from?
[AnswerJ From two facts. In the first place, the link between our economic~mone-
tary situation and dependency on imported oil appears very clear by now to everyone.
- In 1979, the outlay was 15,000 billion and, as I have said, it is anticipated that
over the 3-year period 1981-83, it will exceed 80,000 billion provided that the
- prices do not receive new stimuli. If we do not reach our ob~ective, our industry
is destined to lose its campetitiveness, not only in the case of Japan, but also
with respect to the industrial countries of the East and of the West, which are com-
mitted to a nuclear and coal policy. The kilowatt-hour produced by oil. costs actu-
ally 47.42 lire, by coal 26.67 and by nuclear energy 20.76. Anyone who is concerned
_ about the competitiveness of Italian industry cannot fail to take this into~account.
It does not seem to me proper that affirming these things, ~ust as providing for
emergency plans, which are absolutely necessary given the political instability of
the oil sources--it is enough to think of the consequence of a prolonging of the
conflict between Iraq and Iran--should be ternned terrorism, as some have d~ne. If
a blockade of the oil supplies created a serious crisis for the West, for Italy
it would take on the character of a real economic catastrophe. These are hypotheses
which a responsible government must consider unless it wants to choose for Italy
a civilization by candlelight.
(Question] You spoke of a second element which makes you optimiatic about the approv-
al of the plan. To what were qou referring? -
[Answer] To the fact that on the fundamental choices there is a basic agreement be-
tween the government forces and the PCI, which should allow them to go forward quickly.
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[Question] Could not the rapprochement between the radicals, wh~ are decid~dly
antinuclear and the socialists lead, on the contrary, to a subsequent slowing up?
[Answer] Certainly within the PSI there is a faction sympathetic to the radicals'
reservations, but we must also recall that the party of Craxi has accepted loyally
the nuclear and coal choice contained in Fontani's presentation speech to the
Chamber.
[Question] Does not the em.phasis which, f;.nally, you have decided to place ~n the
energy questions contrast with the fact that, instead of concentrating the ENI
- National Hydrocarbons Agency] on these activities, you have bean burdeaing the
state apparatus with extraneous tasks, like the bail-out of the SIR and Liquichimica?
[Answer] We could not abandon the chemical industrq to its fate and we have chosen
this medium ground between the cam~;letely public and.the completely private.
It is certian, however, that we need to relieve the ENI af sectors which do not
belong to it, like textiles or newspapers.
[Question] In the plan, it is also stated that we must leave more room for the
large ~il companies and offer shares of the market to companies linked with the pro-
ducing countries. The previously supported necessity of assuring the state apparatus
40 percent of the supplies is also re~ected. Is there not a retreat here from the
public com^~itment?
[Answer] The ENI must be the guarantor of the reserves and expand its activities,
among other things, to coal.
[QuestionJ On the subject of coal energy, the plan provides for the tripling of
consumption within 10 years, increasing from 5 to 40 million tons. All this implies
enormous investments, without taking into account that coal, besides costing more
than nuclear energy, is much more polluting than the latter. Do not the �onsequences
of this option seem excessive to you?
[Answer] All this is true and it follows that we need to increase even more the nuc-
lear option, but it does not seem to me that with the state of affairs it is a like-
ly prospect.
[Question] Who will actually put this energy plan into practice, once the n~cessary
laws are approved?
[Answer] There are three possibilities: strengthening within the scope of the Min-
istry of Industry the currer.t management cf energy sources, creating an ad hoc
agency, deciding on creating a Ministry of Energy. The agency, on the other hand,
wo~~ld find itself facing the rivalry between the ENI and the ENEL [National Electric
Power Agency] which I, in part, helped reduce through an agreement which will be
signed on 29 November in which the ENEL pledges to buy all the coal produced by the
ENI, reserving the remaining share f4r the free market (the ENI, for its part,
agrees to be the sole supplier, gaining the eventual difference). As to the Minis-
try of Energy, it would displace the jurisdiction of the ministry of state-owned
co~epanies. However, I am for a firm aecision, in one direction or another, whatever
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it may be. The important thing is not to have everytHing in the air, otherwise
even this plan will be transiated into a book of dreams and it will certianly not
be by abolishing automobile traffic on Sundays or imposing it on alternate days
- that we will resolve the energy crisis.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editr. LA STAMPA S. p. A.
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COUNTRY SECTION BELGIUM
MARTENS IV GOVERNMENT'S SOCIAL PROGRAM CALLID NOT SERIOUS
Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 30 Oct 80 pp 12-13
[Article by Jacques Schepmans: "The Program? What Program'?"]
[Text] Who could pretend hereafter that Mr Martens overlooks
even the very slighest problem. Among the 70 pages in the govern-
ment accord, did he not after all provide for 20 l~nes to defend
the Cos lettuce growers? Thatis the kind of little detail that
you can recognize a real leader by! Mr Martens, in his fourth
- cabinet, will certainly also be forgiven if his government
program almost in its entirety reveals the nost complete vacuity.
We would like to laugh but there is every reason to believe that we will hardly
have the time to do so. The budget disaster, which we are discussing elsewhere,
is so tremendous that nothing else matters for the moment.
Now, we could hardly be any more reassured since, parallel to the financial
debacle, the economic program oc the Fourth Martens Cabinet is nothing but a long
litany of pious wishes. This declaration is not even an exercise in looking ahead;
it looks more like an ir.ventory prior to bankruptcy. Let us therefore look at
what, without laughter, we might call the "strong points" in the government
statement.
First of a11 we have this famous social coordination which is going to be geared
toward moderation in incomes. We have a7.ready revealed the rather odd reticence
on the part of the social partners, thus rendering this "National ~onference on
Labor" increasingly problematical. As for the moderation of incomes, if the
operation is to be successful, how could the administration impose a wage freeze
on the labor unions except by means of new fiscal provisions, by means of manda-
Cory loans to be repaid in the currency of Sainte-Farce or by putting up various
obstacles?
_ In declaring that "The administration will not hesitate to assume its responsi-~
bilities in order to take the necessary recovery measures," Mr Martens only
manages to get a sad smile out of us. Whom is he going to make believe that his
administration's socialist wing could effectively oppose the ill will of the
labor unions on that subject?
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This brings us to social security. Instead of taking the indisFensable and imme-
diate ateps so as to restore the financial situation in the pension area, in
health insurance and unemployment benefits, the administration is decreeing new
measures to hPlp the most disadvantaged. Everybody can only rejoice over these _
good provisions but, once again, where are they are going to find the necessary
money? Parallel to that, Mr Ma.rtens has made practically IIo provision (w~uld he
dare, anyway?) in order effectively to stop the many abuses which increasingly _
wipe out employment benefits and social security. We also find that nothin~ is
being done ~n order officially to establish tte necessary statute for immigrant
workers; by protecting them, this statute would also makc it possible to put an
end tio a series of scandalous abuses wt~ich are exasperating public opinion.
Certainly, one will not contribute to disarming this bomb by drowning the fish
_ or by benefiting from the sound reaction of public sensitivity against racism.
" Now we come to aid to the PME [Small and Medium-Size Businesses] and the enter-
prises. With a lucidity that could surprise us, Martens IV finally understood
" that the future of employment involves the PME. So, certain provisions have "
been made on this subject. But can one really consider them meaningful and
effective?
Where are they going to find the 3 billions necessary to implemenr these new
provisions? Besides, 1,5 billion sheuld h~ve ~ut into the Humblet Fund provided
for by the law of 16 May 1976--but does that sum not exl.st only for purposes of
listing in the balance sheet?
As for the other 1.5 billion, it should be recovered due to the restoration of the
ONSS [National Office of Social Security]. Having made this point, the government
declaration in this field contains three positive points: (1) The possibility for
the enterprises to create bonuses exempt from the 5-percent competition Cax on the
taxable profit; (2) Preferential tax treatment for spending by enterprises on
scientific research; (3) Encouragement of risk capital formation. Now, tne
doomsayers feel, on this subject, that, if we had not stuck to the calamitous _
previous real estate deduction, Belgium would not be at this point of exhaustion _
in the area of investments and risk capital. But nobody would ever have the
courage to exorcise this calamito~s doctrinaire phantom.
Possible extension of school attendance. This measure would involve at least an addi- -
tional 10 billions in expenditures. Here again, where are they going to find the _
money in this disastrous budget where, let us say it again, no real recovery and
restoration are provided?
The community aspects. Everybody, it seems, will be invited to discuss the future =
of Brussels. Does Mr Martens really believe that the CVP ~Social Christian Party]
is today determined to prove itself to be more c.omprehensive than yesterday, with
a Chabert put in Institutional Reform to watch over the hen house? As for the _
collaboration of the FDF [Francophone Democratic ~'ront], we may be forgiven if we -
just scratch our chins. Thus rudderless, the Spaakerette party imagines that it
could survive only by overemphasizing the linguistic aspect. In tI~at case, well...
National defense. It seems that, regarding the missiles, we will have to stick
to the government declaration of 19 SepCember. So be ~.t! Alas! Mr Van Miert -
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obviously interprets ~his text in a manner different from VDB ~Flemish Democratic
League] or t'oreign Affairs Minister Nothomb. Now, from next month onward, NATO
has the intention of getting us going again on that sub~ect in a very specific
i'ashion. Who, in the end, will turn out to have bnen ri~ht in this rather odd
, exegesis of texts? Mr Van Miert? It rem~ins to be seen.
~
Some Party!
_ So here we have the praof that the program of tne Fourth Martens Cabinet is
characterized above all by its lack of a serious approach but also by some rather
odd mirages. Does it not after all--under the pretext of aid to construction--
again talk about that right of preemption which gave the state a real right of . _
. dispossession in dealing with land owners? Is this not a question once again of
that Public Bank which, in the memory of the SNI [National Investment Company?],
the SRI [Regional Investment Company], and other public and polticized initiatives _
of this kind really does not tell us anything worthwhile?
Will the amendment of the law on lease contracts not essentially serve to do away
with the owners as such?
And what should we think about that modification of the supervision of the electric
power com~anies which, as we proved here the other week, will once again even more
- and uniquely penalize the user, that is to say, you and me?
Is therefore the satisfaction of som~ doctrinaire and technocratic obsessions
worth this kind of disbursement?
Mr Martens was thus right in concluding his government declaration as follows:
"We will move fast and resolutely!" -
Toward catastrophe.
Copyright:1980 POURQUOI PAS?
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BELGZUM
COUNT'RY SECTION
NEW GOVERNMENT MII~tBERS PORTRAYED, ASSESSED
Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 30 Oct 80 pp 14, 15
[Article by J.S.: "Wilfried's Gadgets"]
[Text] T.he Martens cabinets keep following each other and,
alas! they resemble each other but in spite of everything one
must pay homage to this hardy head of government. Each time
he discovers a gadget which, when he least expects it, will
_ make it possib le to divert attention from the mediocrity that _
is all around us. Once again, it will be the women who will
_ wind up on the other side of the coin. Once again he wi11
figure out subtle internal structures which, in a few weeks,
will precipitate paralysis. This time the Fourth Martens
- Cabinet, as in the case of the Fourth Republic--wanted to
accentuate youth, with the old team entirely sidelined. This
is somewhat like the dreamers who want to sell their Camelot,
saying: "You have something against young people?"
Here, then, is everything that Mr Martens has found. The average age of his
disciples is 47. What is that supposed to mean? As if a young imbecile is better
than an old one! Besides, the latter has some experience which perhaps will pre-
vent him from making the irreparable mistake.
_ But, well, if the lovable Wilfried thinks that it is going to work, let him try it.
~ In the meantime, in setting up his nice team, he seems aZready to have violated the
joyful regional and community provisions which were adopted by a vote in the month
of August, thus permitted the FDF [Francophone Democratic Front], which has not
much going for it anyway, to get everybody to talk about it. If Mr Martens gets
into trouble in the community sector; then there may be fiXeworks.
Nevertheless, he deserves well of Mother Flanders in spite of everything. When it
comes to the distribution of areas of influence, the French-speaking groups and
especially the socialists indeed look funny.
Need we go through the whole list of economic affairs (steel industry), public
works (Zeebrugge), agriculture (the t3oerenbond [Farmers` Association]), social
welfare, public health (Caritas Catholica), jobs and labor, post office, telegraph
and telephone, financesy national defense, and cooperation in development?
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With the exception of Middle Classes, Communications, and Foreign Trade, the
Francophones only will have prestige jobs auch as foreign affairs or ~obs thaC
create trouble, such as Civil Service or Pensions, buC also everything concerning
the maintenance of order. Mr Moureaux, the first minister of justice not to be a
jurist, after Fernand Coc~ in 1932, and the happy Mathot with Interior--will they
have'the courage to implement that policy which was decided upon and which is so
necessary in these troubled times. During this time we urill see the continuation
of the Flemingization of national defense, of the post office, telegraph and
telephone service, and of employment and labor as well as cooperation in develop-
ment. You, the heirs of Vondel can re3oice: There are nominations in the air.
Having said this, we would like to temper the pleasure of ttie new ministry
appointees, be they young Eliakim or experts in the eternal return. For once, we
will be full of indulgence in our portraits. Let us hope that this Fourth Martens
Cabinet will last.
Six Indulgent Ministerial Portraits
- Philippe Maystadt, 32, PSC [Social Christian Paxty] minister of civil service and
science policy. He looks sharp, he is a good father and husband, the kind all
mothers-in-law keep dreaming about. Discreet, austere, he drinks only water, is
very reserved and even timid to tell the truth and quickly discourages any anti-
- pathies. BuC let no one be mistaken about him. Sharp, malicious, ambitious, he
will use any means, especially his angelic physique.. He Grill go very far, as soon
as he has killed the father in the person of Alfred Califice. There are by the way
not many obstacles on his road before becoming the n~ber one man among the
ministry candidates in the PSC.
Philippe Busquin, 39, socialist minister of national education. A dynamic and
efficient young cadre, this brilliant scientist abundanCly denionstrated his cal-
culating abilities. A champion in the poliCical slalom, he magnificently
manuvered to remain the only possible ministry candidate for the Federation of
Charleroi, thus pulling way ahead of his little comrades. This time, he has his
foot in the stirrup and good luck to those who would some day like to ambush him.
Having said, this successful fellow is also charming, courteous, and quite high-
minded, something which is rare among the socialists. Besides, he reportedly
- has a sense of humor.
Melchiar Wathelet, 31, PCS secretary of state for the Walloon region. In spite of
the fact that he bears the first name of one of the Magi, it is he who seems to
be getting presents in his crib. He pretends to be the model for Philippe
Maystadt but in fact he is nothing but his carbon copy. Son of a local big-shot,
he is very well established in this corner of Verviers where respectability is so
- much in fashion. Austere, not to say sinisrer, he succeeded--perhaps without
knowing it--in getting everybody to interpret his silence and his inability to
have fun as a sign of great depth of spirit. Nobody undoubtedly imagined that he
might possibly have nothing at all to say in the first place.
Frank Swaelen, 50, minister of national defense. A machine man, clerical, devoted,
fanatical, without any imagination although endowed with a sense of humor that
sometimes has surprising aspects for the uninitiated. He patiently waited for his
turn on the list and now feels that he has been fairly recompensed. Some centuries
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ago, this elected representative from Antwerp, would gladly have run the Inquisi-
tion against the evil spirits. But those happy times are wer, unfortunately, and
he is satisfied with playing the eternal game of the school war. Is this the
bellicose spirit who is going to be appointed to national defense?
Lydia de Pauw, 51, but she really does not look it. This fugitive secretary of
state, as everybody has already forgotten, looks like a debutante. A feminist,
~ of Flemish background, stubborn, she is a kind of Gisele Halimi of Mother
Flanders. Quite wrongly, because she, at least, did not look down upon the
- others, nor did she have any pretense. A brilliant university graduate, amusing
and very feminine in spite of everything, she puts lots of water in her red wine,
even though she sometimes fancies herself side by side with Groucho Marx. She
speaks excellent French, which should cause some complex among her French-
speaking colleagues.
Daniel Coens, 42, CVP [Social Christian Party] minister of cooperation in develop-
ment. Self-effacing, somewhat ~inderhanded and a real hard worker in a research
office, this excellent young chap will never disappoint his constituents. An _
obscure militant in the Christian Worker Movement, he will perservere in Che
Flemingization of Cooperation with the same obstinancy wjth which he pursued his
impecunious career. His self-effacing attitude, his skimpy outfits, and his
sickly-looki.ng face will help him make it appear as though he were doing some-
_ thing. And so, arter the brilliant style of paradoxes, with Ma.rc Eyskens in
his bull~ighter's outfit, we will have Daniel Coens, at the head of Cooperation,
the minister who is just about as colorful as that wall over Chere.
Copyright:1980 POURQUOI PAS?
5058
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
MITTERRAND'S RISKY CANDIDACY: POLLS, PCF, ROCARD QBSTACLES
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 15-21 Nov 80 pp 101-102
~Article by Robert Schneider: "Mitterrand: Why Again?"~
, ~Text~ "He is running a considerable risk." "For him, the acid test is about to
begin." "He is taking on a fearful responsibility." These cortunents heard in the
halls of the National Assembly after the 8 September announcement of Francois
Mitterrand's candidacy were not those of Rocard's embittered followers. They were
the cotmnents of the PS [Socialist Party~ leader's friends. .Those who think -
first and foremost of him. They are worried. This candidacy, his third in 15
years, is a hazardous gamble.
Others of the PS first secretary's colleagues, heartened by the elimination of
Michel Rocard, are less pessimistic. If the latter are to be believed, Mitterrand
will bounce back once again. And he will face a depreciated Giscard, with a real
chance of winning. This is the official line, which no one, ho~tever, seems to
believe. Of genuine optimism, there is nonz. Of enthusiasm, there is even less.
Rather, there is an acute awareness of a difficult situation. It is as if
Rocard's abrupt withdrawal, in keeping with his Metz pledge not to challenge the
first secretary, has suddenly thrown light on a fact that had been forgotten in the
heat of fratricidal rivalries: Against Giscard, already a winner in 1974 and now
the incumbent with the formidable le.verage of the national apparatus at his
disposal, and against Georges Marchais and the PCF ~French Communist Party~ machine,
Mitterrand is ill-armed.
- In 1965 and 1974, riding the crest of a popularity wave, he carri~d the banner of
hope of the entire left as.its:sole candidate. Today, his only effective;support
- is tliat of a majority of his ow?? party alone.
Mitterrand is not unaware of the obstacles he faces. The first and perhapsrmost
worrisom~e is the fallen image of himself he sees mirroced. in the polls over the
past 3 years. In his book "Here and Now," he accuses this mirror of warping and
of being warped: "Polls genPrally favor those who control them. By this I mean
those who pay for them." Hea*! Hearl This antiquated man speaking in this out-
dated manner! Can it actually be he? Ccxne, now! This is precisely the light in
which the French ~eople now see him. And he knows it. With this as a handicap
from the start, how can he possibly cut a figure in as personalized an election as
the presidential one?
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The PS leader gives his own explanation of his drop in popularity. He believes it
is linked, as if inechanically, to the disunity of the left. "When all goes well in
the Union, I do well. When it does not, I do not." If what he says is true, his -
hape of regaining the top is slim. The Union will go fran bad to worse; Marchais
will see to that.
The second obs'cacle is the PCF. It will be his most implacabale foe. The day after
the announcement of Mitterrand's candidacy, L'HUMANITE-DIMANCHE set the keynote by _
~ commenting it as a confirmation of the PS's choice of a tack to the right. How then
can the infinite patience Mr Mitterrand displays when he utters his incantations _
to the Union of the Left fail to be perceived by public opinion as being, at best,
an astute tactic, and, at worst, a blind.
The third obstacle is named Rocard. The curt manner in which th~ Yvelit~es candidate
withdrew from the race on 8 tlovember makes it clear that this obstacle has not been
entirely removed: "Today, as tanorrow, I am at the service of the socialists and of
the French people, in any capacity they may accord me." Rocard has not given up. _
He has posited himself as the alternative. Mitterand knows that his rival was the
hope of many militants and of a large sector of ~ocialist voters and sympathizers.
The former are disappointed and bitter. How can he avoid appearing in their eyes
as the one who turned aside t:he socialist candidate with the best chances of
beating Giscard? How can the silent battle that has divided the PS for almost 3
years fail to leave its scars on the socialist electorate?
Add to these obstacles the econanic crisis and the international tensions that are
driving the voters of all the Western democrac:ies toward more conservative choices,
the de facto collusion between Giscard and Marchais, the deep disillusionment among
the voters of the left, the probable presence--which is likely to become easier--of
marginal candidates who can be expected to take votes away from the PS...
Why then has Mitterrand chosen to run, having only recently declared again: "I have
never had either the desire or the intention of being a candidate."? The fact is
that the first secretary has clecided irrevocably to remain as head of the party at
least until the 1983 legislative elections, so as to maintain the unity of the -
party and its leftist orientation. For him, it has never been a question of
accepting Rocard's amiable invitation to become the honorary chairman of a party he
himself had remolded in 1971. Did he actually think that to let it be understood--
as he did--that he would not run was the best way of continuing his hold after the
presidential elections? Was he seeking to dr~w Rocard to the point of declaring
his candidacy in order to oppose him forthwith? Be that as it may, the tone and
determination evident in his rival's bid, launched at Conflans-Sainte-Honorine on
19 October, left no question in Mitterrand's mind that Rocard's candidacy would
spell the end of his own reign of the party after 1981. His better chvice then was
to take the risk, big as it is, of a third candidacy.
Two further compelling reasons were behind his decision to run. The first was
political. In the first secretary's view, Rocard personifies the threat of
abandonment of the Union of the Left. This strategy, which Mitterrand claims to
have fathered, involved two gambles: the growth of the PS and the democratization
of the PCF. Only the first has been won. But Mitterrand, who does not give up
easily, still hopes to win the second, by forcing the PCF leaders to return to
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the Union or by cutting into their electorate in the first ballot. But is this not
contradictory? The more votes the PCF loses, the more exacerbate3 will become its
differences with the PS and the more it will be tempted by the ghetto.
Mitterrand's second reason is more personal: He is pursuing a dialog with history.
After all, says he, "Jaures never governed" and "Blum governed just once." Yet
their oontributions to socialism are significant. By fighting the right again and _
maintaining ancho rage in the left wing of the PS, he hopes to figure next to them
in socialism's gallery of "greats." -
Rocard: A Brief Desert Crossing?
Must we conclude that Mitterrand's candidacy is more for show than to win? His
choice of Carmaux, Jaures's hanetown, for his first speech as a candidate shows that
_ he considers the battle of the first ballot against the PCF the crucial one. For the
PS's future as well as his own. If he widens the gap between him and Marchais, he
will lead his par ty int~ the legislative elections that will follow. He will then _
be able to designate his own successor. If he is beaten or closed in on by the PCF
candidate, he will be immediately taken to task by his own party, and Rocard, after
a brief desert crossing, will gain control of the PS.
The logic of this battle of the first ballot against the PCF should impel Mitterrand
to conduct an ac tive, lef t-leaning campaign alonq the main lines of the 1978 Canmon
Platform. What better way would there be to show that he, Mitterrand, has not
changed, that he has not betrayed the left, and that Marchais bears the sole
responsibility for the split between the PCF and the PS? In short, the PS leader's
first priority wi 11 be to gain communist votes, even at the risk of losing some
center-left votes. And even though, once the PS's supremacy over the PCF will have
been established on khe first ballot, he will, at the second ballot, have to find
a way to reassure the moderates and the Gaullists disappointed by Giscard, b~,
switching themes and musical keys.
Should, moreover, national and international events between now and the psesidential
elections destabilize Giscard, Mitterrand's lengthy experience and his determination
not to give up, seen today as handicaps, could then become trump cards.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 S.A. Groupe Express
9399
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE '
SUNII~IARY OF PAST YEAR'S POLLS ON MAJOR POLITICAL FIGURES
Paris POUVOIRS in French No 15, 1�8~ pp 153-163
[Article by Jean-Luc Parodi "Chronicle of Public Opinion Profile of the Year
September 1979-August 1980]
[Text] As in the case of last year's annual evaluation (1) of publi~ opinion in
France, the only objective of this second evaluation is to recall what has been
from the viewpoint of polls, the political yeaY ~f September 1979 to August 1980,
its tempo and its specific character. For this pericd, which s~w no elections for
the first time is 5 years (2), but did have preelectoral polls (3), we observe, from
the great variety of public surveys, the return of the President of the Republic to
an uncertain status which opens the fourth phase of his 7-year term of office,
maintenance of the Prime Minister (in spite of the transient political effects of his
hospitalizakion) in a prevailing status of unpopularity which distinguishes him, the
continuation of general weakening of the scores of the political parties, the all-
time records of unpopularity of the Communist Party and the Rally for the People's
_ Republic and of their leaders since the creation of polls permitting their measure-
ment, the confirmed superiority of Michel Rocard in the Socialist Party and the
' general stability of the centrist hierarchy.
From among the profusion (some 220 polls and 2800 questions) and the variety of sur-
veys conducted and published during this period, ranging from infidelity (4) to
psychoanalysis (5) and including the most beautiful song of the century (6) as well
as superstition (7), we can distinguish several specific outstanding subjects such
as the economic crisis (8), the consequences of Russian intervention in Afghanistan
from the viewpoint of foreign policy (9) or the attitude with regard to the Olympic
games (10) as well as that of the communist party (11) (whose "iiupossible biography"
of its leader was also in the forefront of public opinion (12)) and the political
- class (13).
The assessment made by the French Public Opinion Institute of satisfaction with the
President of the Republic (seQ graph 1) indicates stabilization at a mediocre level
(14) following the September 1979 crisis (a drop of 8 points in the number of
satisfied individuals and an increase of 4 points in the number of dissatisfied
people) which brought Valerie Giscard d'Estaing to a negative balance for the first
time in 27 months. Reference to the general curve for the septennat {graph 2) seems
to indicate that after the steady level of the first 2 years, the drop from
September 1976 to July 1977, the constant rise during the prelegislative period and
maintenance of this assessment at a high level following the victory, a fourth phase
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of uncertain equilibrium between satisfaction and dissatisfaction (15) exists since
September 1979. The index for July 1980 (+4) is the worst one for the beginning of
the summer season during the president's 7-year term to date. Economic diff~culties
and dissension within the majority essentially explain the beginning of this new
period of the septennat. In general, judgment of the man is more favorable than
that of his policy and the latter is more negative in the economic and social areas.
The French Public Opinion Institute's assessment of satisfaction with the Prime
Minister (graph 3) confirms both this profile and this level. The September crisis
(decrease of 6 points for satisfaction, increase of 8 points for dissatisfaction)
which permitted Raymond Barre to establish the absolute record for unpopularity of
a prime minister under the fifth republic, with an index of minus 31, is followed
beyond the low point of November by a very slight recovery (17). With a figure of
31,9 for average annual satisfaction for the period considered, as compared with
34.9 for 1978-1979, 41.4 for 1977-1978 and 33.1 for 1976-1977, Raymond Barre increases
even more the majority of unsatisfied voters for which he is responsible and naturally
establishes the record for duration of this type of situation, namely, 26 consecutive
months of a nagative assessment which probably constitutes an international record.
The changes in this assessment, the unste3diness in the latter at the end of the
year, the degree of unpopularity which it reveals and the increasing difference in
his popularity with that of the president pose several problems. The first one re-
quires few co~nents: the spectacular and unprecedented rise in voters satisfied with
the prime minister from 28 percent to 41 percent in a single month (from Oczober
to November) was simply the result of a combination of three separate phenomena,
namely, an almost automatic increase after the record lows of September and October,,
an upward movement favored by the mobiliza:ion of opinion (only 9 percent of undecided
voters compared with 17 percent for the previous monLh and 15 percent the following
month) and above all *.he effect produced by hospitalization of the prime minister,
making it more difficult psyehologically for the voter to furnish a reply of "un-
satisfactory." The drop of 6 points the very next month and the fact that the poll
conducted by the French Opinion Polling Co~any with a somewhat greater lag after the
hospitalization (18) only recorded a rise of 5 points, which indicates clearly that
any such increase in the popularity vote was due purely to sympathy generated 'oy the
hospitalization and bore no r~elation at all to the political situation (19).
- This installation, unprecedented under the Fifth Republic (20), of a prime minister
in a classification of major discontent has proved to be so astonishing that the
well-disposed people close to Raymond Barre have interpreted it to be the automatic
result of a real manipulation of opinion by the press and the polling institutes
(21). In addition to the surprising m~sappreciation of the organization and mechanism
of public opinion revealed by this analysis, one is thunderstruck by the silence
that it attaches with respect to the only instruments which permit following the
, appearance of the phenomenon, of tracing its various stages and thereby deriving the
outlines of an explanation, namely, the monthly assessments of satisfaction (French
Public Opinion Institute) or of confidence (French Qpinion Poll~ng Company) with re-
_ gard to the prime minister, a silence which after all is hardly innocent since
examination of these barometers of opinion reveals that the overwhelming unpopularity
of Raymond Barre predates the surveys which are the subject of this analysis (22).
Truthfully, the problem has been incorrectly posed. The general parallelism of the
curves for the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister and the usual
difference between their satisfaction scores under the Fifth Republic consequently
makes it highly probable that the president's popularity should oscillate around
a mean value of SO percent while that of the prime minister should vary about a value
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of 40 percent and yield a negative balance. Therefore, the real question is to
understand why this difference is higher for Raymond Barre than it is for his prede-
cessors (23). Probably this is due to the effect of identification, for better or
for worse, of tre prime minister with the economic and social policy of the govern-
ment which is known to constitute the least apprecisted of the policies exercised by
the executive branch of the government (24). This is undeniably a success for the
present President of the Republic, who was in charge of the Ministry of the Economy -
- for such a long period and who, once installed in power and in a period of crisis,
induced the public to forget the factox which had contributed so heavily in a time
of prosperity to bringing him the presidency.
In general, the four principal political parties have seen their images continue to
deteriorate, which has been going on for several years (25). Each of thse parties
has reached its lowest score since the creation of the French Opinion Polling Company
index at the end of 1972. 1fie indices recently obtained were as follows: Socialist
Party: + 7(quarterly average) for the fourth quarter of 1979. French Democratic
Union: - 9 for the fourth quarter of 1979 and the second quarter of 1980. Rally for
the People's Republic: - 23.5 for the third quarter of 1979. Communist Party: - 42
- for the first quarter of 1980. We will discuss each of these separately below.
At the far left of the political spectrum, the scores obtained by the Communist Party
and its leader, G. Marchais, in the French Opinion Polling Company polls (see
graph 4) were characterized in 1979-1980 by the collapse provoked in their traditional
stability due to the position taken by G. Marchais with regard to the Afghanistan
invasion by the Soviet Union. The Communist Party owes its usual stability to its
- peripheral position which renders it organizationally very weak among the right wing
electorates (it can hardly fail to lose in this area), very strong, of course, within
its own electorate and consequently dependent principally on the changes in attitude
of the socialist voters and therefore on the condition of relations between the
,Communist and Socialist Parties~, Thus, the curve for the Communist Party follows
the vicissitudes of the leftist union. ~e results of the surveys, which ~aere already
low at the beginning of 1980 (27 percent entertained a good opinion of the Communist
Party wt~le 24 percentwished its leader, G. Marchais, good luck in the future) due to
the poor condition of these relations, collapsed in February and descended to the lowest
level ever reached in the his tory of these two polls : Only 18 percent had a~ood opinion of
the Communi~t Party and a mere 17 percent wished G. Marchais a successful political
future (26). Regaining its strength slowly but steadily during the succeeding
months, the Communist Party nevertheless remains at one of the lowest levels in its
history. These statistics coincide with the infoxmation available from the partial
cantonal surveys of the first quarter of 1980 or from the results of another survey
conducted by the French Opinion Poll Company in February 1980 (for a group of pro-
vincial newspapers) concerning "the image of the Communist Party as seen by the French
people" which reveals its general setback in public opinion since a preceding poll
taken in April 1979. The new data indicate the following: 51 percent (in contrast
w~th 44 percent a year earlier) would not vote for the Communist Party in any case,
49 percent (a drop of 14 percent) were in favor of having communist ministers in the
government, 21 percent (a decrease of 8 percent) favored a communist prime minister
and 14 percent (a drop of 7 percent) were in favor of seeing a communist become
president of the republic.
1fie evaluation of the Socialist Party hardly calls for lengthy comments (see graph
S). The curve for the party itself remained stable throughout the entire year at a
medium level which is simultaneously the highest for all of the political parties
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during this period and the lowest in the history of the Socialist Party since 1972.
We will not discuss the survey results with respect to the party leaders nor with
regard to the spectacularly aff irmed preeminence of Michel Rocard (28).
The evolution of the various varieties of centrism for 1979-1980 still shows the
hierarchy indicated here Last year (see graph 6). Curves are shown for the President
of the Republic, Simone Veil, then the Prime Minister and the French Democratic
Union and finally the titular president of the party, J. Lecanuet. The general
parallelism of the curves remains the dominant characteristic and reproduces the
periodic nature depicted above with regard to the results of the French Pi~blic Opinion
Institute polls, namely, the September crisis, the upswing during the winter, and the
return to a difficult situation in the spring. If the curves for Raymond Barre are
not exact copies of those for the President of the Republic, it is simply because
the two evaluations for December and January are biased in a similar fashion to those -
of the French Public Opinion Institute, although less so, by the psychological effects
of hospitalization for the prime minister. The steady decline of the curve for
good wishes for the future of Simone Veil is probably attributable to her disappear-
ance from the French political scene. Nevertheless, she remains in the group of
leading French politicians ranking just below Valexy Giscard d'Estaing and Michel
Rocard (29j:
~ Finally, J. Chirac, who, just as he seems abou� to reclaim the leadership of his .
party, obtains his lowest score ever for the month af December (see graph 7) and
drags down the Rally for the People's Republic with him. He then recovers a bit
during the first half of 1980, probably due to his increasing retreat from the daily
disputes of the majority and, for the first time since the end of 1977, reverses the
usual positions of the party and leader. Consequently, in the case of the two
rightest p~rties, the leaders outscor.ed the parties themselves, by a large margin
in the case of the French Democratic Union and by a small margin for the Rally for
the People's Republic, whereas the opposite was true for the leftist parties. Here,
the parties scored higher than their leaders, by a slight amount in the case of the
Communist party and by a spectacularly large margin for the Socialist Party.
1979 1980
_ % ix z xi x~i I i n m rv v vi Ni ix
50 SATISFAITS +9
�
47 `47
~ `46 46, ~
45/ � `15 ~5 45
45 ~q ~ ~4 ~ � �
~ I2 I2 42
~ ~ I
~ ' q ~ ~i ~~pr~ ~/1
a � ~0
~o ao y ~ ~ ~
39 ~
~ ~37
~ ~~,I~
35 MECONTENTS
?5
Graph 1. The popularity curve (IFOP) of the President of the Republic (September 1979
to September 1980). The drop of September 1979 and stabilization within an uncertain
zone. Key: A. Sattents = satisfied. B. Mecontents = dissatisfied.
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~ 1874 I 1975 I 1976 I 1977 I 1978 I 1979 I 1880
60 SATI S FAITS
50 ~~~,~~u~ -
1
40
30 pII~CONTEfdTS
20
17 phase 2~~
phase 3! phase 4~ p~� -
Juin 1974-Juil{et 1976 Sept78-Juil77 Sept.1977-Jui1.1978 Sept.1979...
Graph 2. The popularity curve (IFOP) of the President of the Republic since June
1974. The four phases of the 7-year term of office.
Key: '
A. Satisfied E. Third phase, September 1977 to July 1978
B. Dissatisfied F. Fourth phase, from September 1979 to end
C. First phase, June 1974 to July 1976. of 7-year term of office.
D. Second phase, September 1976 to July 1977.
' 1979 1980
~ ~x x x1 xu ~ n n1 Iv v v~ vll Ix
80 . MtCONTENTS
~ 57 66 -
55
55 53 5~ 53
52 ' 62
_ 50 49
~jQ 49
i
35
31
J~
J/ 32
30 30 31 30 31
?8 SATISFAITS
?6
Graph 3. The popularity curve (French Public Qpinion Institute) of the Prime Minis-
ter (September 1979 to September 1980). The absolute record of unpopularity, the
p sychological effec ts of hospitalization and the persistence of ma~ority dissatis-
faction. -
Key:
A, dfssatisfied
B, satisfied
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~ 1979 1980 - _ _
= 0 N 0 I J F M A M J .1 i
30 Ig 2g
?7 27 2l
26 Bonne opinion P. C.
25 Z~
25 2~ ?I
13
14 24
23 22 ?2
22
~0 21 1l y
APPe1 Zo
, de Moscou ra ~9 Avenir G. Marchais
15
Graph 4. Changes in popularity of the Communist Party and its leader (SOFRES).
_ Approval of entry of Russian forces into Af ghanistan and the record set for dis-
approving votes.
Key:
A. Call issued by the Soviet government to lend support to its invasion of Afghan-
istan.
B. Favorable opinion of the French Communis t Party.
C. Percentage of individuals polled who would like to have G.'Marchais in office.
1979 I 1980
3 0 M D J f M A M J J 5
55 sa 54 Bon ~ opinion P. S.
52~`52 51/-~`bZ~~~ 52 52
I?~.~~ 52 ?
~ 61 51
- 50 a~
49 50 50
47 ~@ ~ ~
Avanir M. Rocard
45
~3
~12
40
37
36 Avenir F Mittarrand
35 �?5 ~4 3t ~ 31
33 f~ 33 J3 33
~ ~ ~ ? 32
33 33 / 37 31 i~~
Y ~i 1~-- ~ 32 ~
30. Ji 31 9/ ~~yi~
30 JO
?9
Avenir P. Mauroy
Graph S. L'evolution du PS et de ses leaders (SOFRES)=Changes in popularity,of the
5ocialist Party and its leaders (SOFRES). Accentuation du decalage ent~e M. Rocard
et F. Mitterrand = Display of the difference in popularity of Michel Rocard and F.
Mitterrand. Bonne opinion P.S. = Favorable opinion of the Socialist Party. Avenir
M. Rocard=Percentage of individuals polled who would l~ke to have Michel Rocard in
office.
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1979 I 1980
% t 0 N D J F M A M J J t
B~ 5g ~
6e -
- ~ Coniiance
ss 66 y, Giscard d'Esteing
55
- 5~ 53 5I
5I 52 � /
50 5l 5t
49
47 47 17 ~
� ,6
�
45 ~ Avenir Simone Veii
~5 I6 \ _
43 ~3~~~2 ~2 _
� /
40 40 ~ ~
40
- sa as 3a sa
o-'~~ 37 Bonne opinion
35 35 ~ 1~? 35 5 D. F. 6
35 I / J6 3 ~I ~ � 3I 31~~ ~3~ _
~ ~
~3~ ~ ~ b ~ Cor3fiance
/ 33 ~ 33~?~i.Barre
/f~~~ / ~,QZ ~131
30 31 I,32 `d 31 3f ~~~b.i~ ~``b
~ 30 ~
29 Avenir R. Barre
25
!i
Z~ ~0 2~ 2~ Avenir J.Lecenuet ~
~ /zv.
i9 I9 19 f9 ~~9
~18
17
Graph 6. Cahnges in popularity of centrism and its leaders (SOFRES). Maintenance
of the hierarchy.
_ ~y .
A. Confidence in Valery Giscard d'Estaing.
B. Individuals who would like to have Simone Veil in office.
C. Favorable opinion of the French Democratic Union
D. Confidence in R. Barre
E. Individuals who want R. Barre in office
F. Individuals who want J. Lecanuet in office
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o~ 1979 I 1980
40 5 0 N D J F M A M J J i
35 35 ~5 Avenir Chirac 35
3I 34 J4
37 32
3z ~3
30 32 32
29 29 Jl 3l 3!
2B 3~
Z8 Bonne opinion ~R,P. R.
v z~
25 z6
?3
20
Graph 7. Changes in ~opularity of the Rally for the People's Republic and its leader
(poll conducted by Fr ench Opinion Po 11 ing Company). Records set for disapproving -
votes and reversal of the hierarchical order.
Key:
A. Individuals who would like to have Chirac in office.
Bonne opa_nion R.P.R. = Favorable opinion of the Rally for the People's Republic.
FOOTNOTES
1: Jean-Luc Parodi, "Annual History (September 1978 to August 1979)," POUVOIRS, -
number 11, ~ages 173 to 181.
2: With the excep tion of conciliation board elections : See "French Public Opinion
Institute," L'EXPRESS, 17 November 1979, Public SA, L'USINE NOUVELLE, 29 November
1979. Also see "the French and their unions, French Opinion Polling Company,"
L'EXPANSION, 7 Decemb er 1979 and "French Public Opinion Institute," LA VIE, 6 Decem-
ber 1919.
3: The frequency of preelectoral polls has increased during the first half of 1980.
Three French Public Opinion Institute polls conducted between 8 and 28 January 1980
(LE POINT, 2 February) between 31 March and 19 April, 1980 (LE POINT, 28 Aprii) and
between 28 May and 1 3 June (LE POINT, 23 June) respectively grant 16, 14 and 15 per-
cent to G. Marchais, 18, 18 and 18 percent to F. Mitterrand, 40, 37 and 38 percent
to Valery Giscard d'Estaing, 12, 15 and 14 percent to J. Chirac and 14, 16 and 15
percent to the other candidates while, ~.uider an identical hypothesis, Mici~el Rocard
obt~ined 21, 22 and 20 percent of the votes. On the second round, Valery Giscard
d'Estaing came out ahead under all of �the hypotheses. He scored 60 to 40 percent,
61 to 39 percent and 60 to 40 percent against F. Mitterrand, 55 to 45 percent, 55
to 45 percent and 56 to 44 percent against ~iichel Rocard and 70 to 30 percent, 71
to 29 percent and 70 to 30 percent against G. Marchais. A poll conducted by the -
French Opinion Polling Company from 23 to 29 April 1980, the results of which were
reported in the 8 May 1980 issue of SUD-OUEST, credited G. Marchais with 18 percenC _
of the total vote, F. Mitterrand with 19 percent, Valery Giscard d'Estaing with 35
percent, J. Chirac with 15 percent and the rest of the candidates with 13 percent.
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Under the same hypothesis, Michel Rocard obtained 25 percent. On the second round,
Valery Giscard d'Estaing won over F. Mitterrand with 57 to 43 percent and obtained
a tie of 50 percent with Michel Rocard. See also the six Public SA polls reported
in Paris Match (25 January, 29 February, 4 April, 16 May, 20 June and 25 July 1980)
which put a great deal of doubt on the surprising variations of the rate of "don't
know" replies plus "abstentions." These were 22 percent (as compared with 37 percent
in November), 29, 29, 26, 14 and 14 percent successively. For the preceding period,
the reader is referred to the report entitled "While waiting for 1981: the hypothet-
ical presidential elections" which appeared in issue number 12, pages 181 to 190
- of POWOIRS. It will be observed that a hypothesis of the anticipated legislative
elections (poll aonducted by French Opinion Polling Company and repprted in the
14 January 1980 issue of NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR) granted the left wing 50 percent of the
total vote on the first round (with 19 percent for the Communist Party, 5 percent
for the PSU-Ex. G., 25.5 percent for the PS-MRG and 0.5 percent for miscellaneous
left wing groups). The right wing obtained 46 percent of the total vote. This was
divided as follows: 24 percent for the French Democratic Union, 19 percent for the
Rally for the People's Republic and 3 percent for miscellaneous rightist groups.
The remaining 4 percent was split between the Ecological Movement (3 percent) and
small splinter groups (1 percent). However, once again the balance was reversed
with regard to whom the voter wished to see win; 42 percent rooted for the present
majority while only 39 percent backed the left wing and 19 percent voted "don't
k, aw."
4: French Public Opinion Institute poll reported in the 29 January 1980 issue of
ELLE.
- 5: "The French and Psychoanalysis," a report based on a French Opinion Polling Com-
pany survey which appeared in the 28 April 1980 issue of NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR.
6: The results of a survey conducted by the French Opinion ~olling Company and
broadcast on French T.V. network Antenna 2. The song "White Roses" won out by a
J margin over "The Sea," "The Ballad of Happy People" and "The Dead Leaves."
7: The survey on superstition was performed by the French Opinion Polling Company
and reported in the 28 July 1980 issue of ELLE.
8: Several surveys were conducted with respect to the French economic crisis. Re-
' sults of the Harris poll were published in L'EXPRESS of 1 September 1979. NOWEL -
OBSERVATEUft covered a survey conducted by the French Opinion Pollin~ Company in its
issue of 3 Sepetmber 1979. The 1 October 1979 issue of NOWEL ECONOMISTE was also
devoted in part to the French Opinion Polling Company Poll. An article on the
French Public Opinion Institute poll appeared in the 3 January 1980 issue of LA VIE.
Results of a French Opinion Polling Company survey appeared in LE POINT of 23 June
1980.
9: The French foreign policy with respect to intervention on the part of the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan constituted the subject of several surveys. Results of the
French Opinion Polling Company survey were printed in LE BERRY REPUBLICAIN of 12
February 1980 as well as in FIGARO-MAGAZINE of 15 March 1980. The reader is also
referred to "Public SA" appearing in PARIS MATCH of 8 February, 2 May and 9 May 1980.
10: With respect to the French attitude towards the Moscow Olympic games, the French -
Public Opinion Institute polls were covered in LE POINT of 28 January 1980 and in
- 24
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SPORT-TEL~ of 30 April 1980. The iesults of the Harris poll were dealt with in LE
MATIN oF 5 February 1980. LE FIGARO published the results of the French Opinion
Polling Company sur.vey in its 18 March 1980 issue. The article "Public SA" appeared
in the 1 February 1980 issue of PARIS MATCH.
11: The Public's attitude towards the Communist Party was measured in the following
~ surveys. The results of the Harris poll were reported in the 24 January 1980 issue
of LE MATIN. The French Opinion Polling Company conducted a survey on this sub~ect
from 22 to 27 February 1y80 for "a group of provincial newspapers."
12: "The French judge Marchais," an article in L'EXPRESS of S April 1980, based on
the Harris poll.
13: "The French people, politicians and the press," French Public Qpinion Institute
Poll, VSD, 10 November 1979; "The French people judge the political class," Harris
poll, L'EXPRESS, 17 November 1979.
14: It should be recalled that the maximum level of satisfied individuals (59 percent)
was reached in May 1975 and April 1978 and the maximum level of unsatisfied people
(47 percent) in December 1976 while the highest index 29) was obtained in April
1978 and the lowest index 18) in December 1976.
15: The question dealing with evaluation of the President's performance ("Valery
Giscard d'Estaing has been President of the Republic for 6 years. Would you consider
that, on the average, his performance has been positive or negative?"), which was
asked 6 times, confirms this periodization: April 1975: positive 56 percent, neg-
ative 29 percent; April 1976: positive 44 percent, negative 42 percent; May 1977: -
positive 41 percent, negative 42 percent; May 1978: positive 62 percent, negative
28 percent; April 1979: positive 49 percent, negative 38 percent; May 1980: positive
43 percent, negative 43 percent. French Opinion Polling Company survey, published
in SUD-OUEST, 8 May 1980.
16: Harris poll, published in L'EXPRESS of 10 May 1980. The question asked was
"Valery Giscard d'Estaing will soon have served as Preisdent of the Republic for
6 years. Would you say that, since this election, he has been a very good president,
- a fairly good president, a fairly poor president or a very poor president?" The
results obtained: a very good president: 9 percent; a fairly good president: 56
percent; a fairly poor president: 19 percent; a very poor president: 7 percent.
French Opinion Polling Company survey, published in SUD-OUEST of 8 May 1980. The
following questions were asked: "Do you think that the performance of Valery Giscard _
d'Estaing has been positive or negative with respect to cooperation with the develop- -
ing nations?" 1fie net score obtained was + 31 percent (that is, 52 percent positive,
21 percent negative). Question: "Do you think that the performance of Valery Giscard
d'Estaing has been positive or negative with regard to European construction?" Net
score: + 29 percent (53 percent positive, 24 percent negative). Question: "Do you
think that the performance of President Giscard d'Estaing has been positive or neg-
ative with respect to the search for peace in the Middle East?" Net score: + 19
percent (46 percent positive, 27 percent negative). Ques~.ion: "Do you think that ,
the performance of President Giscard d'Estaing has been positive or negative with
regard to the French policy in Africa?" Net score: + 10 percent (39 percent positive,
29 percent negative). Question: "Do vou think that the performance of Valery Gis-
card d'Estaing has been positive or negative with respect to the improvement of
relations between the majority in the government and the opposition?" Net score:
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- 24 percent (26 percent positive, SO percent negative). Question: "Do you think
that the performance of President Giscard d'Estaing has been positive or negative
- with regard to the reduction of social inequalities?" Net score: - 29 percent
(29 percent positive, 58 percent negat:lve). Queation: Do you think that the per-
formance of Valery Giscard d'Estaing has been positive or negative with respect to
the tnaintenance of purchasing power of salaried employees?" Net score: - 51 percent
(20 percent positive, 71 percent negative). Question: "Do you think that the
performance of President Giscard d'Estaing has been positive or negative with respect
to job stability?" Net score: - 59 percent (15 percent positi.ve, 74 percent neg-
_ ative).
17: It should be recalled that the maximum level of satisfied individuals (only
45 percent) was reached in February and April 1978 and the maximum level of dis-
satisfied individuals (58 percent!) in September 1978. Therefore, the highest index
- S) occurred in February 1977 and the lowest one (-31) in September 1979.
18: The prime minister was hospitalized from 18 to 27 October, the French Public
Opinion Institute Poll was cunducted from 6 to 13 November while the French Opinion -
Polling Company survey took place from 23 to 29 November.
19: Incidentially, according to a poll conducted by the French Public Opinion Insti-
tute and publicized in L'EXPRESS of 29 December 1979, 49 percent of the French people
believe that Raymond Barre will b e less popular in 1980 that he was in 1979, while
only 23 percent believe the reverse.
20: Michel Debre had never failed to command a majority of French public opinion for
more than 11 consecutive months.
21: See the two articles by Henri Mercillon entitled "A Point of view on the polls
dealing with the "unpopularity " of Raymond Barre" appearing in LE MONDE on 27 and
28 November 1979.
22: Of the 4 polls conducted by the French Public Opinion Institute in 1976 dealing
with the popularity of Raymond Barre, only one gave positive results for him. Of the
twelve surveys made in 1977, only one showed a positive balance in his favor, while
two others indicated that half of the French public was for Barre and half against
him, the remaining 9 surveys being unfavorable.
23: The difference in popularity of Raymond Barre and that of the President of the
Republic was 9.5 percent from September 1976 to August 1977, 12.6 percent from -
September 1977 to August 1978, 15.4 percent from September 1978 to August 1979 and
13.3 percent from September 1979 to August 1980, the last figure being slightly biased
by the Prime Minister for the months of November and December (following his hospi-
talization).
24~ See footnote 16. If we also consider that 40 percent of the French people be-
lieve that "The President of the Republic has surrendered a portion of his powers to
the prime minister and to the government," as was indicated by a Harris poll whose
results appeared in the 10 May 1980 issue of L'EXPRESS, we are in a better position -
to understand the consensus of opinion recorded in the Harris poll appearing in
L'EXPRESS of 1 September 1979. The question asked was "Raymond Barre l~as already
served three years as prime minister. Do you believe that he has succeeded or failed?"
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Only 2'_ percent thought that he had succeeded while an overwhelming 62 percent con-
sidered that he had f ailed in his job. It will be noted that, as a general rule,
this pessimistic assessment is not generally accompanied by a high degree of confi-
dence with regard to the potential successors to the prime minister and that the
personality of the prime minister is less wlnerable to adverse opinion than is his
policy. This fact is borne out by a survey conducetd by the French Opinion Polling
Company form 31 October to 7 November 1979 for a group of provincial newspapers. The
results indicated that 9 percent of the individuals polled believed that Raymond Barre
had been a very ~ood prime minister; 49 percent thought that he had been a fairly
good prime minister; 20 percent considered that he had been a fairly poor prime
minister and 10 percent thought that he had been a very poor prime minister.
_ 25: See "Public opinion with regard to the French political parties since 1972,"
POWOIRS, issue number 10, pages 153 to 163.
26: The communist Party had never before rated less than 24 percent in popularity _
(polls of December 1978) and G. Marchais had never before achieved a score of less
than 21 percent (polls conducted from Sep tember to December 1975). Their best
ratings were attained during June and July 1974 when the Co~unist Party scored 41
percent and G. Marchais 34 percent. Results of other surveys dealing with the
Communist Party will be found in footnotes 11 and 12.
27: Except for the Ecological Movement which owes its exceptionally high score (good
opinion = 70 percent, poor opinion = 11 percent) to its isolation from the conven-
tional party system. See the March 1980 issue of LE SAUVAGE for results of the
survey conducted by the French Opinion Polling Companyo
28: See POUVOIRS, issue number 13, pages 189 to 191.
29: See, for example, the 22 December 1979 issue of L'ERPRESS reporting on the re-
sults of the po11 conducted by the French Public Opinion Institute. Question:
"For each of the following political figures, state whether you have been pleasantly
surprised or disappointed." The results were: Michel Rocard, net score: + 16 per-
cent (that is, 40 percent positive, 24 percent negative); S. Veil, net score: + 10
percent (4 3 percent positive, 33 percent negative), Valery Giscard d'Estaing, net
score: - 1 percent (40 percent positive, 41 percent negative); G. Marchais, net
score: - 24 percent (21 percent positive, 45 percent negative); Raymond Barre, net
score: - 28 percent (25 percent positive, 53 percent negative); J. Chirac, net
score: - 33 percent (22 percent positive, 55 percent negative); F. Mitterrand, net
score: - 34 percent (17 percent positive, 51 percent negative).
COPYRIGHT: Presses Universitaires de France, 1980
7619
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
vEW BOOK DESCRIBES PCF'S INNER WORKINGS, HISTORY
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 22-28 Nov 80 pp 172,174,177,179,181,187,191-192
[Interview with author Philippe Robrieux: "The Secret History of the PCF," by
Christian Jelen, Sophie Lannes and Branko Lazitch; date and place not given]
[Excerpts] The zigzags of the French Communist Party are all
the more astounding because most often no one knows why and
how they have taken place. Everything is played out and de-
cided within the party, at the heart of the apparatus, out of
reach of inquisitive people, and certainly not in the meetings
of the Central Committee. Who decides, at the end of what
process? What exactly is the influence of relations with
Moscow? For the first time, Philippe Robrieux clearly
responds to these questions in a remarkable "Internal History
of the PCF," published at the end of November by Fayard. The
first vo>>~mP rn~~orS the period 192~-1945. The second, which
9 will come out next March, will go as far as 1980. Accreditecl -
in history, in charge of research at the CNRS [National Center -
for Scientific Research], Philippe Robrieux, 44, was general
secretary of the Communist Students in 1959 and 1960. In that
capacity he regularly attended Central Cormnittee meetings. On
several occasions he was called before the Politburo. Hence
his profound knowledge of the party, which had already enabled
him to write a brilliant "Maurice Thorez, Public Life and
Secret Life." fie answers questions from Christian Jelen,
Sophie Lannes and Branko Lazitch.
[QuestionJ What did you want to show, above all, in your history of the PCF, the
first in which communists appear as living beings?
[Answer] A world apart, in which fragile, contradictory hwna.n beings with fertile
minds evolve, where there is a tendency to perceive only hardliners and men who are
straight as a die. I described them with a lot of tenderness and a certain under-
standing. I am thinking in particular of Jacques Duclos, who was terribly trauma-
tized in his childhood by an alcoholic, insane father, and then marked for life by
the trenches of Verdun. This may partly explain how that devotee of Alexandre Dumas
and joyous companion of the 1920's was able to become the pitiless leader connected
with the Russian special services.
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1 -
[Question] How did you reconstruct the critical times in the PCF's history, and
reproduce the atmosphere?
[Answer] I had the benefit of many loyal friendships in the PCF. I read thousands
of pages of inemories, of inemoires, of internal documents and letters. I even suc-
ceeded in finding innumerable photographs, sketches and caricatures, including some
from the most withdrawn period. I can physically recall over 250 prewar leaders.
_ I picture them, I literally see them, with their loves, their enthusiasms, their
qualities and their little weaknesses, their beards or mustaches of the period,
- their talents, even their oratorical mannerisms.
I have made discoveries that astounded me.
[Question] Such as?
[Answer] I reconstructed, fully and minutely, as they were experienced, times that
were among the most controversial in this history, retaining only the incidents in
which police reports and internal communist sources coincided exactly. Examples: -
all the impoxtant biographies, the turn toward the Popular Front in 1934, the per.iod
of the Hitler-Stalin pact or certain hitherto unknown episodes of the Second World
_ War, such as the attack from the rear on the Bank of France in 1944 by the men of
the communist resistance and the "expropriation" at the time of 250,000,000 francs.
[QuestionJ And after the Second World War?
[Answer] Access to French police archives is forbidden. Very fortunately, there
are the archives of the American special services, made up of hundreds of biograph-
ical sheets taken directly from the files of General Information.
[Question] In the title of your book, "The Internal History of the French Communist
Party," the adjective "internal" is striking. Is there an internal and an external
history?
EAnswer] it is impossible to understand the policy of the PCF unless one knows how
the decisions are taken, by whom, at the end of what process, and how they are ex-
pressed. Everything is played out and decided within the party. It is necessary to _
try to penetrate to the real "secrets" buried at the heart of the system, away from
prying eye~.
[Question] But how, then, can we understand what Georges Marchais wants?
_ [Answer] Only one way: to seize the very special power mechanisms in the PCF. In-
_ stitutional power and actual power do not coincide there. First, com~nunist power
does not reside in the Central Committee or the Politburo, but in the general secre-
tariat. Hence the decisive importance of the re~lations mai.ntained by the French
general secretary and the intern3tional communist movement, with, at its head, the
Soviet Party (PCUS). Then there are several Cotnmunist Parties in one, fitted to-
gether but separated from each other by watertight compartments: the party of the
- volunteer rank and file, the party of the professionals, the "officials" of the ap-
paratus, and finally, buried deep, the "apparatus of the apparatus." There, around
the general secretary, lies the true power; the few key men gravitate there, often
unknown to the grassroots, who control the apparatus; while the rank and file staffs
and directs the militant party.
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(Question] What evidence do you have?
[Answer] At the time of the Popular Front, at the side of General Secretary
Maurice Thorez, there is Fried. This Caechoslovak communist went through Moscow and
the central apparatus of the Komintern; he may even have worked in Stalin's special
secretariat; his role is inferred from the title awarded him to accomplish his
duties--head of the administrative body of the French Communist Party. But at the
time he is totally unknown to journalists, the police and the government. Thirty
years later the principal historians are still unaware of his existence.
After the war another equally mysterious man succeedeci him at the party swmnits. He
called himself Jean Jerome. Until then his life had been a veritable novel. As
manager of the party's war treasury, he was arrested in March 1943. Despite his ac-
cent, which gave away those Polish and Jewish origins so detested by the Nazis, he
is able to remain peacefully in his cell until the liberation of Paris.
For very long years, always in the greatest secrecy, he is somehow the great finaiice
minister and police minister of the PCF. Only the "responsible" militants know his
foreign face, surmounted by a pince-nes, with this gimlet gaze, this glacial air,
these innuendos that speak volumes, this fanatic devotion and this intelligence. In
1975, suddenly, in L'HUMANITE, which is reporting on Jacques Duclos' funeral, the
name of Jean Jerome appears. He is quoted, in the party's immutable hierarchical
order--before the members of the Politburo are quoted. With retirement age ap-
proaching, now naturalized, the former instructor of the youth of the Communist In-
ternational Youth for 30 years finally appears in public. No observer notices it*.
The huge majority of observers, unaware of these fundamental and specific facts, ob-
sessed with the visible part and certain appearances of French communism, are contin-
ually making mistakes.
[Question] Is this why they did nnt predict, as you did, the rupture of the Union of
the Left?
[Answer] To really understand what Georges Marchais did, you have to go back to
1920 and look at how they went, after the Congress of Tours, from one Communist Par-
ty to another and from one Marxism to another, through successive militant genera-
tions--to end up with the PCF of 1980.
[Question] And the ties with Moscow?
[Answer] Up to the end of the war the question of ties with the Komintern is almost
clear. It is much less so for recent years; one finds only that the PCF is still a
part of the international communist movement directed by the F:.US. This means an
agreement on general strategy, but the~e has also been, at least from 1975 to 1977,
a breach, which was inconceivable in Stalin's time.
To define in one sentence the relations ~etween French communism and Russian commun-
ism, I would say that the 100-percent subordination relations of former days have
today become the relations of a big to a small power. The PCF being the little pow-
er that remains within the zone of influence of the immense Soviet Union.
[Question] Is there still a personality cult?
*Today Jean Jerome seems to be in semi-retirement.
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Today, although the margin for maneuvering of the general secretary has become much
more significant, his authority still rests on the fact that power is regarded as
sacred. However, many changes have occurred in the skill with which and the way in
which the general secretary is made sacred. In Thorez' time they were copying the
Russian model: there was Oriental-style adulation, with, as in the Orient, eulogies,
poems, song~ and anniversaries. Now there is American-s~yle adulation instead:
they have systematic recourse to television and all the publicity techniques. The
goal is to make Marchais a superstar of policy. But the party leadership still
evokes that of the Roman Empire. Officially, Rome remained a republic and the sen-
ate continued to govern. I,n practice, the power was in the hands of the emperor and
his cabinet. Finally, they resorted to the imperial cult in order to govern.
Similarly, in the PCF the party's senate has become a z~ecording chamber and stardom .
contributes powerfully toward cementing the party around the general secretary.
[Question] Is the PCF on the decline?
[Answer] Let's use only quantitative criteria: elections, number of inembers and
press circulation. If you make corresponding curves you see that from 1920 to 1945,
with sometimes sharp variations, the movement is upward. The years 145-1947 mark
the apogee. Shortly after the war the party has at least 800,000 members and has ob- -
tained 28.6 percent of the vote in the November 1946 legislative elections. Since
then the general tendency is downward. Today the party has just half the members it
had in 1945. It had 20.6 percent of the vote in the last legislative elections and
has only three dailies instead of 20, while L'HUMANITE's circulation has dropped by
500,000 copies to a little over 100,000. Having said that, let's not conclude that
this is an"historic" decline. Circumstances may change, and the party may go ahead
again.
[QuestionJ But what explains the continual fluctuations in the number of inembers?
[Answer] The first characteristic of communist human tissue resides in its extra-
ordinary ability to regenerate. Let's take the 21 members of the Politburo.
Georg~s Marchais, the oldest, got the title in 1961, while Georges Seguy and
Paul Laurent were mere deputies. All the others arrived later. Thirteen out of 21,
nearly two thirds, have had only ten years in the Politburo, and eight of them less
than four. Contrary to a received idea, everything regenerates, even on high. For
the lower level the demonstration is harder to make. One can, however, show that
- the average duration of militant life of a volunteer is short: it varies, depending _
on the period, between three and five years.
[Question] Md the middle officials?
[Answer] Let's consider two examples that are separated in time, but comparable. -
According to a communist source study dealing with 356 members of regional commit-
tees of the party in 1930 (of whom at least 81 were officials), 193 had joined be- -
tween 1925 and 1930. So the enormous majority of the professionals in 1930 had
lived through neither Tours nor the time of Lenin and Trotsky in the party.
You find the same phenomenon in 1970. Look at the internal documents relating to
the 12th Paris Federal Conference of the PCF from 30 January to 1 February. Out of
388 known delegates--including a large percentage of officials--237 joined after
1958 and 151 between 1963 and 1970. Thus, nearly two thirds of those who make up
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the communist framework in Paris in 1970 have lived througt. neither Stalin nor :
the 22nd Congress in the party; and over half have not lived through, as communists, -
the collapse of the Fourth Republic, the errors of analysis, the enoxmous troubles
and the sudden decline of the party's influence. To sum up, the party functions as
a true militant noria. At each great turning point a generation goes away and anoth-
er comes in. btight in front of our eyes the greatest part of those who had joined
the Common Program are leaving the party and the young people, often of "leftist"
sensibilities, are taking over.
[Question] Isn't there, in the long run, a certain deterioration of the human qual-
ity?
[Answ er~ It is hard to answer when one doesn't have available quantifiable criteria
or pr ecise measurements. At bottom, the communist is always defined by his militant
quality, devotion, a certain way of totally committing himself to the cause. You
really have to look at why one becomes a co~mnunist, how one remains a communist, and
also how one stops being one. Here, everything enters into it: t~te hope, sometimes
also the despair, that one invests in the party, the search for a reason for living,
the loves, the chilcihood, the social situation, the shocks, the wars. That heing
the case, reasoning on the basis of the large numbers, no militant, even if he is a
socialist, is the equivalent of a communist. With the sole exception of the
Trotskyite and maybe, during a certain time, the Maoist too.
[Qu estion] But isn't the human kind of apparatchik different?
[Answ er] He is both different and similar. The apparatus man begins by being a mil-
itant, and something of the militant always remains in him. Naturally, the pro-
port ion of militantism that liQS dormant in his heart varies according to the cir-
cumstances and individuals. However, the education and selection system has tended
for many years to reduce this spontaneity to the mini~um. In many of the leaders
who were eliminated during Stalinism, strong militant reflexes persisted. In my
_ opinion this was the case with the whole resistance generation, which today has dis-
appeared.
(Question] Isn't there a kind of Nomenklatura at the PCF summit today?
[Answer] A member of the Politburo clearly earns more than a member of the Central -
Committee, and the latter earns more than a federation official. After a certain
stage the leaders get an automobile, even a chauffeur. Depending on the case, a
maid may even be paid for for them, as well as rent and charges for more-or-less
spacious and comfortable housing. It also happens that the party helps them acquire
a secondary residence. At a certain level of the hierarchy, the direct~rs of the
PCF live like higher officials. At the highest level they live like the managers of
large capitalist companies.
[Question] In 60 years what determining changes have occurred in the communist en-
vironment?
[Answer] Many comununists are self-taught, which salutary in French political life,
but they were formed in isolation, by the schools of the PCF or Moscow and then in
~ internal meetings.
They were profoundly marked by an entire liturgy, by the interminable working ses-
sions, by texts and speeches repeated 100 times, by the stereotypes. All that is
also a decisive part of the communist phenomenon. There is an originality there, a
specificity, a special way of impregnating the individual. Let's not forget that
the present principal directors are reaching their sixties, and that they were form-
ed, basically, in Stalin's time.
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_
[QuestionJ Is that education responsible for the wooden language?
[Answer] The party has its own language. It was formed in the USSR. It has evolved
since then. Hours are still spent in putting together the least docwnent, in weigri-
ing tlie least adjective, in wondering at length whether to write "small shopkeeper"
or "small craftsman," because one wonders if "small shopkee'er" doesn't conform bet-
ter to the party line. This explains the dreary and repetitive nature of speeches.
Outside of the general se~retary, who is the only one with the right to innovate,
the others repeat. They ~tick to the original text. The result: the speeches are
~ interchangeable.
[Question] And how are future directors selected?
[Answer] Today the PCF congress is interrupted when it is ti.me to designate the
Politburo, the secretariat and the general secretary. The members of the new Central
Committee go to an adjoining room. They don't even have time to sit down. They
are given the list of the new Politburo, then the secretariat, and they approve them
by raised hands, without asking questions. They re-elect their general secretary in
the same wdy. The suspension of the session hasn't lasted 15 minutes.
[Question] Don't those men consider themselves to be deprived of the elementary
freedoms?
[Answer] No, except when they are in the grip of doubt. Otherwise their attitude
is comparable to that of the believer of the Middle Ages. No more than that be-
liever could have envisaged atheism, can those men imagine contradicting the general
secretary in front of the Central Committee. To rise and challenge the "leadership"
would be to violate the taboo of taboos on which the whole system rests. Then
formidable pressure would have to be confronted. For men to arrive at that situa-
tion, a real cataclysm would have to be produced in the life of the party.
[Question] Aren't there disabused people in the apparatus who continue to militate?
[Answer] Let's not forget that the PCF is very compartmentalized, that the higher
one climbs the less one discusses. The opposite of Lenin's time, when the higher
one climbed the more one discussed.
- Engels said, "Everything wants something different, but what happens is what no one
wanted." That formula swns up 60 years of party history. Every generation wanted
something. Today every member of the Central Co~ittee intez~nalizes in his own way
the formidable mental and physical pressure that enables the general secretariat
system to function. What happens is what no one wanted in the beginning.
[Question] How is the party going to react to your way of writing history? With
� silence, abuse or debate?
[Answer] I hope it will react with debate, because this book was written with two
directing ideas only. The first was to release the truth. The second was to bring
back to life that i~nense human adventure, the greatest in our century, and I be-
lieve I have done that, with a certain xenderness toward men and a great deal of
understanding.
Copyright 1980 by S.A. Groupe Express
894b
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COUNTRY SECTIbN SPAIN
POLITICAL PARTIES ORGANIZE PEACE FRONT IN BASQUE PROVINCES
Basque Unity
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 17 Nov 80 pp 35-45
[Article by Gorka Landaburu: "The Euskadi Front"]
[ExcerptsJ"Nowhere in the democratic world have violence and terrorism reached the
extent of savagery and irrationality that we are undergoing in Euskadi. Over 100
deaths thus far this year is a terrifying figure."
In protest over the latest assassinations in Eibar, last Friday, Jose Maria BenEgas,
secretary general of the Socialist Party of Euskadi (PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers
Party]), co~nented in this dramatic fashion on the dreadful escalation of terrorism.
At that very hour, 50 kilometers from the industrial town of Eibar, 10 men represent-
ing six Basque political parties were still meeting in the people's residence locat-
ed in the San Sebastian district of Gros. The "10 men for peace," namely, Jose
Antonio Maturana, Enrique Casas (PSE jSocialist Party of Euskadi], PSOE), Jaime
Mayor Ore~a, Gonzalo Quiroga (UCD [Democratic Center Union]), Roberto Lerchundi,
Ignacio Latierro (PCE-EPK [Basque Communist Party]), Jesus Maria Alkain, Antxon
Jaime (PNV [Basque Nationalist Party]), J. Garyalde (Euskadiko Ezkerra [Basque LeftJ
and Luis Ramon F. del Pino ( Carlist Party-EKA [Basque Carlist Party]), spent over
2 hours of intensive work, and were at the point of reaching the agreement so much
desired for the creation of a so-called "front for peace." The meeting, which was
regarded by some of the participants as historic, ended at 1945 hours, with great
success. Despite the satisfaction, no one re~oiced vociferously, and the usual
toastwas confined to a few sips of mineral water for tlfose who had smoked their
pack of cigarettes.
= Through the signing of a joint document, UCD, PNV, PSE-PSOE, PCE-EPK, Euskadi
Eskerra and EKA arrived at an agreement to "continue the campaign of awareness and
mobilization of all sectors of Basque society on behalf of pacif ication and the
repudiation of violence." The ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty GroupJ escalation
and the latest assassinations accomplished the first political agreement signed
jointly in the Basque Country by forces as different as UCD and Euskadiko Ezkerra.
After the heavily attended demonstration in San Sebastian last Sunday, and the
popular reaction in the locality of Zarauz following the assassination of five
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persons the previous day, the majority o� Basque political parties have now assumed
an unequivocal position against terrorism, thereby taking a major step for the poli-
tical future o~ this castigated country.
While the "1Q men for peace" took leave of one another with sincere handshakea in
front of a huge portr.ait of Pablo Iglesias, at the threshold of the people's resi-
dence in Donostia [San Sebastian] nearly 2,000 pepole were marching through Che
streets of Eibar in an impressive silent demonstration.
A few hours earlier, the national policeman Alberto Lisalde, aged 30, and his friend,
the barber Sotero Mazo Figueras, aged 35, had been shot down in the middle of the
garden walk of the Carmelite church in the gunsmith's town. The two young men from
the border area died instantly, having been hit by 11 shots, while two individuals
from a military ETA commando group fled in a stolen car.
Ttie popular reaction from the residents of Eibar was virtually unanimous. So, the
town hall officials, meeting in a plenary session that evening, immediately condemned
the attack in harsh terms: The mayor said, "This incident is based on the an*t-
popular and anti-Basque intention of suppressing, through bloodshed and fear, our
people~s desire to win peace and liberty." Except for the Herri Batasuna [Popular
- Unity] councilmen, the other parties called upon the citizens to give a popular
response, a response which could have been far greater that Friday if a large part
of the populace had not feared a repetition of the confrontations that occurred the
previous Sunday in San Sebastian.
Repelling the Attack
However, it was not long before the demonstrators came to blows with a small group
of individuals attempting to boycott the unified demonstration. tls on the previous
Sunday, Txiki Benegas, Ramon Rubial or Andoni Monforte were ready to resume the
battle to repel the ETA sympathizers.
The confrontation was avoided, near the Plaza de Unzaga, on Dos de Mayo Street. When
the 100 young people shouting in favor of ETA and amnesty saw the compact group of
demonstrators approaching about 30 meters away, they decided to turn around and head
for the Town Hall Plaza.
There, when the demonstrators had arrived, despite intervals of extreme tension
between the two groitps, the parties' contingent for preserving order, with great
skill, patience and cal~ess as well, managed to prevent any incident with the pro-
ETA group, which still continued to shout hysterically its slogan "promilis."
At 2030 hours, when the demonstration ended, the political leadersquickly went to
their respective party headquarters in the Eibar area to make telephone contact with
San Sebastian. A few minutes later, the joy was to be doubled. The goaZ had been
achieved: "Tac~ay may be an historic day," comment~d the old Socialist leader, Ramon
_ Rubial, president of PSOE, adding: "The people are beginning to mobilize against
- terrorism, and tonight's agreement will help enormously in that task."
In fact, less than 48 hours later, after Orio, San Sebastian, Elgoibar, Zarauz,
Bermeo and Eibar, the small fishing port of Guetaria led another act of solidarity -
against the threat received by the head of the Fishermen's Association, Jose Maria
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Silveti, a prominent UCD representative in the province of Guipuzcoa. In response _
to the threats that forced him to leave his residence 20 days earlier ("you will
be nex~," he Fras told by them on the telephone), he received the support of his
neighbors.
Political parties, popular associations and the Guetaria town hall itself prepared
a note in which they denounced the threats against the centrist leader: "We want
this situation to be exposed, so as to prevent the only response from being that
- of a posthumous tribute," stated the joint communique, before summoning the resi-
dents to a silent demonstration to back the return of the popular Silveti, one of -
the first to begin the exodus of UCD leaders.
At noon on Sunday, nearly 1,000 persons silently marched through the small paved
streets of the historic fish~ng town, the land of the legendary Juan Sebastian
Elcano. This time, the srontaneous convocation had regrouped everyone, including
many members of Herri Batasuna,as well as a brother of Jose Maria Silveti.
The Basque people have reacted and both the collective action of the past few weeks
and the many individual actions that have been occurring in Euskadi undoubtedly con-
tributed to this. However, it began earlier, when the assassination of a worker,
German Gonzalez, in Zumaya, during November 1979, was met with a general strike.
It continued when a lofty voice, the voice of a Basque to the core, Juan Alcorta,
caused a commotion among large sectors of Basque society with his "open letter from
a businessman threatened by ETA."
It went on with the courageous manifesto from 33 Basque intel.lectuals who raised _
their voices to caution: "We still have time;" and it continued with the resolute
position of the Basque Church, and the mayor of Usurbil, and the mass demonstration
last summer in Pamplona.
- At the same time, some of the political forces of Euskadi, such as PSE-PSOE, had
already been demanding for 2 years the creation of that front; an attempt which,
_ although it appears to have succeeded at present, failed on previous occasions for
lack of unified views, or because of the "intransigence of the Basque Nationalists
toward the Socialists." The Socialists claimed at the time that the "lendakarl"
= had opposed the joint communique at the last moment to prevent PSOE, the promoter
of the idea, "from scoring a point."
Neverthless, the idea of the front for pPace arose many months earlier, when Txiki
Benegas, still councillor of the interior on the Basque General Council, after the
failure of his attempt to negotiate with ETA (an attempt backed by Martin Villa,
then minister of interior), became convinced of the inefficiency of that strategy,
and directed his steps toward the possibility of a campaign "for peace and the
Statute."
At the end of 1978, the CGV's [Basque General Council] interior councillors of interi.-
or, through their human rights departments, submitted an ambitious report for this
campaign calling for many popular mobiliaations and those of performers, several
- roundtable discussions, talks with intellectuals, etc. The plan for these events
on behalf of peace could never be carried out, owing to the increasingly critical
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! _
~ situation in Euskadi, the constant election campaigns and the results of the elec-
tions of March and April 1979, after which the Socialists lost their ma~ority in
Euskadi.
~ Today, the PSE secretary general, Txiki Benegas, recalls the process to this maga-
zine with these comments: "Since the end of 1978, we Socialists had been claiming
that this state of violence and terrorism of necessity required the unity of all '
the democratic parties to mobilize the civil society against the terrorism. Sooner
or later (we said), the Basque people will react to the death and assassinations."
According to Benegas, the policy measures have been insuff icient, although not non-
existent, while every democratic gain has been met with a greater increase in ter- `
rorist action. The Basque deputy claims that, insofar as police measures are con-
cerned, whether because of inefficiency, ineptness or the presence of genuine tech-
n~cal difficulties hampering their progress, in view of the environment in which
they must take place, they have been unsuccessful thus far in deterring the escalation
of violence in the Basque Country.
In analyzing the lack of success on the part of the police in recent months, all the
political torces which signed the document last Friday agreed in asserting that
Madrid must hasten the process of assigning authority: "Now, neither Roson nor
Suarez can postpone the Security Junta and the autonomous police."
Incompetent Police Force
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 17 Nov 80 p 3
[Editorial by Juan Tomas de Salas]
[Text] The best Basque news for a long time is the creation of the front for peace,
in which parties representing nearly all kinds of opinion have formed a coalition
to struggle on behalf of the pacification of Euskadi. The news in itself is a
breath of hope in the stifling Basque universe, as well as palpable pro~f of the
increasing repudiation for ETA's savagery. But, a�ter so many years of grief,
conditions must b~ set before ringing the bells with complete joy.
,
Let us not deceive ourselves: the front for pe~ce could be the effective political
instrument for overcoming terrorism, but it could also become converted into another .
paving of the way to hell made of good intentions. If the front for peace begins
to nurture vain expectar.ions, if it abstractly condemns violence "whatever be its
origin, if it refuses to accuse the ETA outlaws, if it allows the ETA's victims
to continue "dying" instead of being "assassinated," if it talks ab~~ut amnesty
while the gunmen are ~hooting, if it flirts with the KAS [Patriotic Socialist
Coordination] alternative (backed by ETA) while the blood of Basqves is being shed,
if it acts in that way, with cowardice and ineptness, the front for pea~e cculd
- become a destructive disappointmer.t. It is to be hoped that this will not be the
case, and PNV and Euskadiko Esquerra have the say in this respect.
Applause on the one hand, conditions before tolling the bells on the other, and, .
- f.inally, a third point: Let no one have the illusion that the front for peace is
the final panacea for terrorism. The war of subversion is fought on two levels,
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the political and the police; and neither of the two can do the work of the other.
The political battle, the front for peace, is the strategic weapon against terror-
ism, but the strategy is of little worth if the heartless tacticians continue day
after day assassinating citizens with impunity. ETA will not be deterred, unfor-
- tunately, bq either speeches or words. Speeches did not deter Hitler either.
~ And at this point we enter ~~pon a difficult area: the police do not seem to be
equipped for their historic role in the antiterrorist struggle.
They are undergoing intolerable violence in their own ranks, but their reaction
- does not appear to be effective. To top it off, some of the members of the General -
Corps (whose investigative task should carry the essential weight in the antiterror-
ist struggle) are threatening strikes and defiance; which are bad~, but marked by
disagreement.
The courage of the front for peace will matter little if the police cannot cope with
the circumstances. ETA cannot continue to assassinate with impunity, nor can it
cullect its extorted funds and blackmail in the same or similar bars in the south
of France with impunity. War must be taken to the ETA in its own house; the initia-
[ive must be taken from it; it must be prevented rrom sleeping peacefully when it
wants, so as to wake up refreshed and co~nit its crimes. The main problem is the
duplicity of France (Ahd el Krim lasted long enought to destroy the first Spanish
democracy of this century, and he lasted precisely as long as France wished). But
there are great remedies for France. There is also an international policy to be
made. Felipe Gonzalez talks about it constantly.
Effective police and a harsh policy toward France are almost two fingers on the
same hand. With good intelligence, the French defiance would be less. If it is
necessary to make denunciations, they are made, if it is necessary to shuffie the
cards, they are shuffled,and if it is necessary to pay liege money, it is paid:
anything except tolerating an ETA safe haven in the south of France.
COPYRIGHT: 1979, Informacion y P.evistas, S.A.
- 2909
CSO: 3110 END
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