JPRS ID: 9460 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060041-7
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 41
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9460
30 December 1980
Nec~r East North Africa Re ort~
p
- (FOUO 44/80) _
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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other characteristics retained.
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[J are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] ~
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- enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
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JPRS L/9460
30 December 1980
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT ~
(FOUO 44/80)
CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AF'F'AIRS
Briefs
Timisians Enroll in Irsqi Militia 1
French Arms Dea1s 1
IRAN
Iran Reportedly Resuming Oil Exports to South Korea
(REUTER, 14 Rov 80) 2
- IRAQ
Tremendous Resilience of Domestic Econo~r Extolled
(AL-WATAN AS,-'ARE~BI, 2~+--30 Oct 80) 3
JORDAN
Iiupact of Iraq-Iran War on Palestine Assessed
_ (Adnea Abu 'Awdsh Intervietir; AL-WE.,TAN AL-'ARABI, 31 OCt-6 Nov 80) 5
LEB~ANON
Situation in Al-Nab atiyah Area Described as Tragic
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,,29 Aug-~+ Sep 80) 7
Ramifications of Is raeli Attacks on Palestinian Positions in South
Analyzed
- .(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 29 Aug-~ Sep 80) 14
Armed Violence Against Press Deplore d 19
MAURITANIA
Briefs
Closure ~f Ii+1APEC 29
Gorgol Noir Pm~ect Bids 29
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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Neutral Stand in War 30
Strengthening Senegalese Frontier Forces 30
QqTAR
Briefs
Purchase of Ships, Missiles 31
SAUDI ARABIA ~
French Industry Chosen To Modernize Navy
(Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 1 Nov 80) 32
SYRIA
Origins, Development of Muslim Brotherhood Detailed
(Ta.~am al-Barazi; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 31 Oct-6 Nov 80) 35
Relations With Iran, Iraq Examined
(Mohamed Selhami; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 5 Nov 80) ~+3
WESTERN SAHARA
Morocco Seeking Conciliation With Algeria Regaxdin~3 Sahara
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 5 Nov 80) ~+5
Algiers Denies Contacts With Morocco Regar@ing Sahara
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEE[v~, 7 Nov 80) 46
Briefs
SD'AR Embassy in Lome ~8
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
TUNISZAIIS ENROLL IN IRAQI MILITIA--An article in Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in ~rench on
3 December 1980, page 93, reports the deaths of two Tunisian students killed in the
- Iraq-Iran conflict "during a raid on Iraq." Both young men ~iad gone to Baghdad to
complete their studies. Neither hacl indicated to his parents any hint of personal
involvement in the conflict. The family of one of the stud~nts "wiS.l undoubtedly -
refuse the 1000 dinars offered by the ~Iraqi] embassy to any Tunisian family whose
- offspring has fallen in~Iraq." The same student's parents "have sent a telegram to
president Bourguiba beseeching him to protest to the Iraqi authorities the conscrip-
tion of young Tunisians in Saddam Hussein's army." In conclusion the article notes:
"200 to 300 young Tunisians are said to have voluntarily signed up for service in
Iraq's armed militia." [Editorial R,~port] [Paris JEUNE AFRT.QUE in French 3 Dec 80
p 93]
FRENCH ARMS ilEALS--Qatar, a Persian Gulf state, has ~ust contracted to buy 14 Mirage
F1 from France. It had acquired last year six training airplanes Alpha-Jet. With this
contract, Qatar becomes the fifth Middle East client of France for the Mirage F1,
following Iraq which bought 60, Libya 38, Jordan 36 and Kuwait 20. [Text] [Paris
VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 17-23 Nov 80 p 31]
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IRAN
IRAN REPORTEDLY RESUMING OIL EXPORTS TO SOUTH KOREA
WA141127 London REUTER in English 1107 GMT 14 Nov 80
[Text] Seoul, 14 Nov, REUTER--Iran is about to resume oil exports to South Korea
despite the continuing war with Iraq, officials of the South Korean Ssangyong
refinery said today.
The National Irar.ian Oil Comparry (NIOC) suspended exports to the Ssangyong and to
other buyers after Iraqi planes attacked Iran's main Khark Island oil loading
terrr.inal in late September.
~Jestern oil industry officials said they considered that total Iranian exports
of nearly one million barrels per day (BPD) of crude and products were lost t~
the world market, although the Iranians insisted they could get some oil out
despite ~r?e continued Khark Island shutdown.
None of Iran's buyers had disclosed any resumed shipments until Ssangyong officials
said today that NIOC had cabled to say it would send the company 900,000 barrels
between 15 anc~ 20 November.
The oil would be shipped from Lavan Island, south of the Gulf war zone, NIOC said.
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IRAQ
TREMENDOUS RESILIENCE OF DOI~STIC ECONOMY EXTOLLED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 24-30 Oct 80 p 44
/Article: "Iraq's Reserves Are Bnough for 4 Xears and Are 15 Tiuoes Greater Than
Those of All International Monetary Fund Countries"/
/Text/ It is well known that Iraq's reserves are being used to cover Iraq's needs
for varioua foreign currencies arising fro~ foreaeen and unforeseen imports.
Going by figures published by the InCernacional Monetary Fund, Iraq stands abeolute-
ly in the forefront of :.ountriea in terms of the solidity of its financial and
monetary etatus.
The governor of the Central Bank of Iraq declared that the ratio of foreign reservea
to total imports for the member countries ~f the International Monetary Fund as a
whole last year came to 26.8 percent and that the foreign reservea were adequate to
cover requirements for 3 months and 23 days.
_ He added that the ratio for Iraq, appYying the same criterion, came to 402.9 percent,
or 15 times the aat~o of all the countries in the International Monetary Fur.d, in
the past year. In other worda, Iraq's balance is adequate ta cover Iraq' imports of
all goods and services for a period of 48 months and 15 days:
Mr Hasan al-Najafi gave as evidence statistics bearing on member countries of the
- OPEC organization, stating that the ratios attest that Iraq is in first place, fol-
lowed by Libya, where the reservee ratio comes to 88.4 percent (enough to covex im-
ports for 10 months and 6 days), then Saudi Arabia, with 76.6 percent (enough to
cover imports for 6 months and 2 days), and Ruwait, 60.7 (enough to cover imports
for 7 months and~ 3 days) .
The governor of the Central Bank of Iraq safd that the figures for 1980, the cur-
rent year, underline the fact that Iraq's reserves ratio is increasing and exceed-
ing the figures mentioned above. He pointed out that the growth rate of Iraq's
foreign assets in the last l0 months came to abaut 73 percent.
Mr Hasan al-Najafi stressed that the process of re�evaluating Iraq's financial and
~nonetary condition after the start of the war, in the light of recent developments,
has shown that the remaining balance of general reserv~s of Ixaq's cash assets,
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after s~btracting the amounts allocated to cover transaction cnmmisvions, will be
enough ko cover expenses for a full year, starting now, assuming that oil ~xports ,
_ are entirely cut off.
He said that the Iraq's remaining foreign exchange aseets would be enough for a
whole year, assuming that expenditures continued at the sau~e level as last year.
The governor of the Central Bank of Iraq pointed to the presence of a number of
other factars which help consolidate Iraq's firm monetary situation. Among them
, are the foreign currency reserves of the al-Rafida}ni Bank, foreign remittances and
resources in the portfolio of foreign currency assets.
He stated that although Iraq enjoys the right to ~aithdraw the amounts needed for
financing from the Arab and international organizations which it belongs to, it
will not, in its current monetary situation, draw any amounts from these organiza-
tions next year or any future years.
The governor of the Central Ban~: of Iraq sai3 that available reports and figures -
on Iran before the war s:.~w that its financial situation is rapidly turning worse.
He add ed : -
~
"Iran's fnreign assets declined by $13,144,000,000 since L~st February and in com-
parison wiCh its s[atus at the end of 1979. The acce~.erated loss of oil revenues,
the carelessly studied depletion of foreign reserves, and the extensive process of
property c~nd capital smuggling have led to a weakening in the country's financial
powera, and the deteriorating situation in the financial and n~onetary spheres in
Iran will be among the factors hastening the fall of the Iranian regime."
COPYRT_GHT: 1980 AI,-WATAN AL-ARABI '
1L887
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JORDAN
IMPACT OF IRAQ-IRAN WAR QN PALESTINE ASSESSED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabi~ 31 Oct-6 Nov 80 ~p 16-17
[Interview with Minister of Information, Mr 'Adnan Abu 'Awdah:."War Will Not
Stop Action on Palestinian Scene;" in Amman, date not given]
[Text] The Jordani.~n minister of information, Mr 'Adnan Abu 'Awdah
assured the correspondent of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABE in Amman that the waz
in which the Arabs were presently engaged was a fair war that will not
affect the terms of actions on [he Palestinian scene.
[Question] What are the motives and the terms of Jordan's evident commit-
ment to the war in which Iraq is engaged?
[Answer] We are convinced that Iraq is engaged in a fair war. Iraq is
not an aggressor; it is merely warding off the danger that is surrounding
it, and it is askinR for legitimate rights that pertain [o two ma[ters:
1. Its rig5t for sovereignty on its land and its waters.
2. Its right to prevent foreign intervention in its internal affairs.
' These two rights are affirmed in official protocols that are recognized
by international protocols and documents. It is for these reasons that
we stand beside fraternal Iraq so it can regain its rights. We are
reaffirming that Jordan is supporting Iraq by [providing it with] all the
means it can possibly need~and by providing support in political, media
and diplomatic areas.
[Question] Some European media circles have been saying that the Iraqi-
Iranian war has obscured the Palestinian ques[ion, especially in the
media. What is your opinion a"uout that?
[Answer] The Iraqi-Iranian war did not and will not stop action on the
scene of the Palestinian question. We must not make the mistake of con-
fusing [he fact that the world press has turned and focused [its atten-
tion] at the present time to the Iraqi-Iranian war with the action that
is taking place on the internatfonal scene for the Palestinian question.
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The fact that the press is focusing on the Iraqi-Iranian conflict is .
natural because a war is going on, but this shift [in interest] does
not mean that Arab effort on the international scene and the world'~
interest ir, the Palestinian question have ceased or waned.
If we were to look at matters from another angle, we would see that media
at[ention always shifts to a more troubled area. By comparison, the Arab- _
Iranian strug~le reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle to regain
Palestinian rights. In both cases we find ourselves facing a common
question: a foreign power usurpinR the rights of another nation and
refusing [o recognize the legitimate rights of that nation. If injustice
continues, the use of armed force becomes in~vitable as is the case~now
- in the Iraqi-Iranian war.
' [Question] There are those who say that recapturing from the Iranians
the land around the Shatt al-'Arab ~aterway paves the way for recapturing
- Palestine from the Zionist enemy. How would you comment on this? _
_ [Answer] When Iraq is reassured about its ~ear front, it will mobilize -
its efforts and its capahilities to help the other Arab nations and to -
launch a common war of li.berar.ion against the Zionist enemy. There is no
doubt thar. today Israeli aggression is assuming new forms of expansion
and control at the expense of Arab land. We must rise to the level of
competent confrontation against Israel. This development will not come ~
about from a vacuum or from abstract hopes. The records of Arab wars
prnvide clear evidence that fraternal Iraq sent its fori:es whenever the
Arab area came under Israeli attack. Iraq sent its forces under circum-
stances that were difficult militarily. There have been vivid examples _
of this since 1948. In the city of Janin en the occupied West Bank the
graveyard of those who lost their lives in the Iraqi army attests to i
that. In 1967 pecple lost their lives again, and the evidence for that ~
lies in the graveyard in Wadi Shu'ayb in Jordan. In 1973 Iraq provided
_ vivid evidence of its pan-Arab hopes and sacrifices when i[ stood beside
Syria against the forces of Israel.
CopyriRht: 1980 "AL-WATAN AL-ARABI'' -
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LEBANON
SITUATION IN AL-NABATIYAH AREA DESCRIBED AS TRAGIC
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 29 Aug-4 Sep 80 pp 4-8 _
[Article: "That Tragedy of Southern Lebanon: City of Death; al-Nabatiyah Lives
Half of Its Day Under Ground Because of Indiscriminate Shelling; Destruction of
Houses and Fall of Dead and of Wounded Is 'Routine Sight -
[Text] Southern Lebanon's crisis has become fully known. The war there. is
stopped only to be resumed with ferocity. The citizens have become accustomed
to the Israeli shelling and to the absence of the Lebanese government, now that
the fall of the dead and the wounded and the destruction of homes has turned into
a routine daily sight.
What exactly is happening in this part of Lebanon? How do the citizens live
their daily lives?
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI correspondent takes you in this reportage to al-Nabatiyah area
in southern Lebanon to present to ;;,u examples of the tragedies and tribulations
taking part in :his area.
They call it the castle of steadfastness. It has endured more shells than any of
the other Lebanese cities. Hundreds of its houses have been destroyed and hun-
dreds of martyrs have fallen in it. It has lived with the state historical `
negligence and suppression~. Its people have a deep-rooted history of struggle.
It is al-Nabatiyah area that~has been dedicated throughout the past 5 years to .
resistance--a castle in the face of the Zionist enemy. A1-Nabatiyah area includes -
nearly 50 villages, in addition to the city of al-Nabatiyah which is the district
capital and which is considered the vital artery through which all the economic
relations and services pass to the surrounding villages. The city of al-Nabatiyah
has shouldered the.burden of this war and has gotten the lion's share of the
Zionist enemy's shells. A Palestinian refugee camp in this city has been com-
pletely destroyed by the [Israeli] air force and hundreds of civilians and mili-
tary men have fallen martyrs in it.
To give a complete picture of what is occurring in al-Nabatiyah, the consequences
resulting from what is happening and the dimensions of what is happening, we must
backtrack a little.
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Sin~e the independence era, al-Nabatiyah area has been suffering from deprivation,
misery and social and economic t;ac kwardness. The political history of this area
has seen, as a result of th~ eruption of the civil war, the domination of politi-
cal feudalism and the effacement of the area's public interest and its replacement
by individual interests. Consequently, development projects and plannii.tg have been
absent from the area and the social services have disappeared. The adoption of
this policy has led to abandoning the fateful issues, especially the defense of
the south. -
- A1-Nabatiyah in Figures
A1-Nabatiyah area, with its 95,000 inhabitants (before the war), lives on the
crops that agriculture produces--crops constituting the area's sole production
and comprised of tobacco, grains and olives. These are crops that rely on rain-
water and in which a state economic policy is absent. For a long time, no devel-
opment operation has been adopted for these agricultural sectors. Agricultural
exgloitation has continued to be an individual activity in which the family, an3
the labor it provides, play the fundamental role of production.
This economic policy has forced numerous families to emigrate from their villages
to the cities in search of a livelihood and of work outside the agricultural sec-
tor. This emigration has included broa,i groups of the young members of the middle
classes and this demographic movement has led to devoiding the area of its inhabi-
tants.
In the educational sphere, there was only one elementary school in the area until
].950. In the mid-1960's the number of schools rose to 40 substandard schools.
z.n 1967, an institute for male and female teachers was founded in the area. But
this institute has now been closed because of the war and its work is confin~d to
- graduating a small number of students from a 6-month course. This educational
situation has been coupled with numerous obstacles, including school buildings
at:d playground, shortage in teaching staffs, shortage in equipment, high fees ~n
the private schools, monopolization and high prices of textbooks.
In the sphere of health, al-Nabatiyah area has suffered from an enormous shortage -
in physicians, hospitals and clinics.
Before the outbreak of the civil war, there was only one state heal*_h clinic in
the city of al-Nabatiyah which served the inhabitants of all of al-Nabatiyah
area villages. This was in addition to two social welfare clinics operating in
the villages. With the entption of the civil war, these clinics were closed.
There were also in the area 12 [privateJ clinics, i.e. at the rate of one doctor
per 8,000 inhabitants--most of these clinics have now been closed--and only 3 -
pharmacies located in the city of al-Nabatiyah. There was also one hospital
which never operated in the required manner and which was closed during the events.
The city of al-Nabatiyah is distinguished by its geographic location which has
permitted it to be the strategic link for the exchange of goods and commodities.
The city has thus turned into a popular weekly market which is held every Monday.
However, this market has not been held cegularly because of the outbreak of
battles in southern Lebanon.
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. War Against al-Nabatiyah
After the 2-year war, the Mount Lebanon battles stopped and the fighting was
transferred to the South where the Zionist-isolationist alliance has open ed a
= constant and daily battlefront with the aim of devoiding the south of its inhabi-
tants and of striking its vital utilities. This has led to mass emigrat ion from
the area and this war has generated sharp social crises and vast destruct ion
among the broadest popular [poor~ sectors, especially the tobacco farmers. ~
- This reality which has charactarized the area has imposed a new kind of approach
on the national parties and the Palestinian resistance.
- In the sphere of health, the iVational Movement has taken the initiative ~and has
set up health clinics and has repaired the schools through the acrion of popular
committees in the villages and the axes. In this regard, the work of the Leban-
ese Popular Rescue Establishment in al-Nabatiyah area must be noted. Since the
war, this establishment has come tc represent the only health organization actually
present in the area--an organization that has made its services available under
the most difficult and explosive military conditions.
Death Triangle .
This talk about the city of al-Nabatiyah, wh ich lives under difficult ci rcumstances
" these days, remains general. The daily bread of this steadfast city and of some
neighboring villages has become the Zionist shells coming from various artillery
weapons.
A1-Nabatiyah is nearly 30 kilometers away from Sidon, the capital of the south.
_ To reach al-Nabatiyah, you have to pass through three roadblocks set up by the
- joint forces of the Lebanese ~ational Movement and the Palestinian resis t ance.
After the final roadblock at the entrance to the city, caution starts. Few cars
drive through speedily because at a few hundred meters of the roadblock is
located the triangle of death, as the inhabitants call it,~of al-Nabatiyah-Kafr
Rumman-Jabbush crossroad--a triangle constantly exposed to shelling.
Numerous victims have fallen on thi~y crossroad, beginning with the triang le and
proceeding along a broad and long autostrad filled with holes caused by shells.
On the sides of the autostrand, one can clearly see the evident effects of the
shelling on the buildings, houses and shops, most of which have been clos ed.
Incidentally, the premises of the Lebanese Popular Rescue, the only heal th organ-
ization in the area, is located in the city center. Ambulances and hundreds of
~ citizens seeking treatment gather in front of tris building and a few steps
away, there are several crossroads branching out into the various quarter s of
, al-Nabatiyah city which is facing the war. These crossroads meet to link with
- a long road leading to the city's main center--the commercial center. You can-
_ not believe the destruction you see. There isn't a house, an ordinary shop, a
wall or even an electricity pole that has not been hit by shrapnel and that does
not bear the traces of the shelling. You can see almost no inhabitants on the
balconies of buildings. The shops that have opened for business are almost empty
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of customers. y'ou move a little ahead along the long st.reet only to face a large
_ number of shops that have been destroyed and blackened by fires and by phosphoric
= shell.s. .
'fhe sole commercial center for the inhabitants of al-Nabatiyah area is located
in the city's main square. There, vegetable, clothing and sweets vendors gather
- and in this place, a man feels as if he is in a market of the 1940's. In this
place, you can see caution and fear in the eyes of the people who move around
quickly, carry their goods and leave hastily for their homes in fear of shelling.
Al.-Nabatiyah inhabitants are very few and they can notice any strange visitor
- amon~ them. You find them looking at such a visitor intently and with question
marks i.n their eyes, especially if the ~~isitor carries a camera. I was at a
loss as to how and with whom to start: With the destruction, with the sad streets
_ or with the (empty) balconies or with all of them at once. Suddenly, my trance
was interrupted by an armed man asking me: Where is your identity card? This is -
normal because the inhabitants of al-Nabatiyah are constantly cautious and they
look into any uncertain situation. After examining the identity card, the man
left me an~ went his way.
� Since the war erupted in the south, al-Nabatiyah has been exposed almost daily -
to the Zionist-isolationist shelling. In shelling the area, the Zionist entity
has used a11 kinds of internationally banned bombs, beginning with cluster and
fragmeiitation bombs and endin~ with napalm bombs o� various sizes and weights.
~ Today, there are quarters that can be considered completely destroyed quarters, _
such as al-Bayad, al-Salam, al-Saray and Khillat al-Hawa quarters.
Prom 1979 and until now, al-Nabatiyah area, especially the ciCy of al-Nabatiyah, _
has been subjected to indiscriminate shelling poured on the quarters, without -
- distinction between a military~position and a house. Moreover, the shelling has
hit Chri~,tian and Islamic religious places.
According to the reports of the political circles in charge of al~-Nabatiyah area,
th~ material losses have been estimated at hundreds of millions of [Lebanese]
pounds, including thousands of homes and vehicles, property, commercial markets,
fields and crops. The number of martyrs until 1980 has been estimated at 700
civiliar~ atid military martyrs. But regardless of how big the tragedy grows, and
regardl~ss of the destruction and woes inflicted upon this area in particular, _
the wi11 for steadfastness is stronger than everything and there are those who
have decided to stay on the land.
Area's Market
What is the real situation of al-Nabatiyah these days? How do the inhabitants
l~ve socially and economically? What is the internal and external security
situ atian? What is the role of the Lebanese gov2rnment in the areas and what is _
the role of the Lebanese National Movement and of the Palestinian resistance? -
These are questions answered by Muhammad 'Ali Nur-al-Din, the member of al-
Nabatiyah Area Provincial Political Council, who started his talk on the popula-
tion situation in the area, saying:
~
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The city of al-Nabatiyah is divided into sections. In some of these sections,
such as al-Saray and al-Bayad quarters, the population percentage has dropp~ed -
to 5 percent whereas in others this percentag~e still amounts to 80 or 90 per-
cent. The number of the present population does not exceed 10,000 whereas it
was 35,000 before the war. Moreover, the present population is not constant
and ranges from 40 to 80 percent at different times because evacuation occurs
in times of tension, and there is a return in times of stability. The citizens
come to the city in the morning to carry on with their commercial business and
then leave it in the afternoon. ~
There is also a large percentage of the population that has moved its business
outside the area.
Despite these conditions, the people have stood fast. The continued commercial
activity in the area has been helped by the inflow of money from immigrants in
Africa and the Arab countries. A1-Nabatiyah is considered the area's market and
the entire production of the neighboring villages is marketed through it. -
~
Regarding the security situation Nur al-Din has said: There is constant daily
shelling against al-Nabatiyah. Most of the shelling takes place in the evening
and this helps to keep down the losses in lives. The people have become used
to this situation and they say that the shelling is like the rain. When the
shelling starts the people hide and when it stops they come out as if nothing
has happened.
As for our relationship with the government agencies, such as the district offi- _
cer, it is good. Concerning our relationship with the Council for the South, we
have a clear position vis-a-vis its practices, considering that the inhabitants
get only a meage~r part of its assistance. Tnis council relies on an (opportunis-
tic) policy in its dealings with the area's inhabitants, as well as with the other
sou~hern areas.
Regarding the role of the Lebanese National Movement's Political Council in al-
Nabatiyah area, Muhammad 'Ali Nur al-Din has said: Since 1975, the council
has dealt with more than une issue, including water which it has been able to
supply to more than 85 percent of Che inhabitants despite the vast damage caused
to the water networks.
Nur al-Din added: The Political Council compensates the families of the martyrs -
and the wounded fallen as a result of the Zionist military operations. The y
council pays 1,500 pounds to the family of a martyr and 200-1,000 pounds to the
family of a wounded person. The council has also advanced substantial aid for
repairing and restoring a large number of the area's schools. As for the health -
services, the cauncil has ad~vanced nearly 30,000 pounds for the network of vil-
lage clinics. It also gives free medicines and in-kind aid to evacuees and to
needy families.
What Do Joint Forces Do?
How about the military situation?
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'fl~e only actual force in the area are the joint forces that obstruct the almost
daily Zionist atCempts to infiltrate and advance toward the area. When hostile
shelli.ng takes place, thesc forces. counter with v~olent shelling to silence the
enemy posi.tions. A1-Nabatiyah area is considered one of the main axes in the
southern area. With the presence of Arnun Castle, which the enemy has repeatedly,
but futilely, tried to occupy, this area is also a strategic area.
But what doss the citizen himself say regarding al-Nabatiyah's tragedy?
How does he live there?
lluring a brief tour of the commercial market, we met citizen Najib Nahlah who
asserted that "the situation is very bad and life is harsh. The shelling is
ceaseless and we live on our nerves because the shells may pour down on us at
any moment. Commerce has come to a halt and our economic situation is getting
worse by the day." -
Citizen Husayn Dahir: "The situation is as you see it. We adapt ourselves to
the circumstances which are altogether difficult. We feel that our condition is
not known and that the issues are jumbled. When there is shelling, we hide.
What is worse is the commercial situation and the disruption of water and elec-
tricity services. Our concern is for the situation to return to what it was
before and for the legitimate government to enter all parts of the south and not
just our areas."
'Ali Sallum: "The daily shelling and the tense situation. We, the inhabitants
of al-Nabatiyah, have suffered enormous losses and our life is constantly
Chreatened."
Merchant Hasib Sallum: "We open our shops from 0800 till 1100 and then fear and
caution start. We demand legitimacy [the presen~e of a legitimate governmentJ in -
the entire south." ~
'Ali Ha;~dar: "The Zionist shelling is what decides when we open our shops."
Rashid Kalut: "Nobody is satisfied with this abnormal situation. The shelling
has destroyed trade, happiness and everything."
Ra'if Badr al-Din: "We demand that the government enter the border strip. The
indiscriminate shelling has burnt us. The schools are interrupted and the estab-
lishmer.ts are brought to a halt. Were it not for the care that the resistance and
the National Movement give us, we would be in a tragic condition."
Citiaen Lubna Muruwwah: "The Zionist shelling has completely obstructed life in
the area. .4Jere it not for the will for steadfastness, you would not find a soul
here. We urge the entire world to exert efforts to stop the massacre to which we
are being exposed."
Jamal Fakhr al-Din: "I.ife in al-Nabatiyah is very hard. The criminals cto not
stop their indiscriminate shelling of the residential quarters. Our house
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has been hit several times. We have been fleeing to Sidon and Beirut and then
- returning because a man has nothing other than his land and his home. Why don't
they settle this problem whose consequences we are shouldering?"
To conclude, this is the tragedy in al-Nabatiyah area, especially in the city of
~ al-Nabatiyah itself, as told by a sample of the people. If the words of all the
inhabitants of the area were gatt~ered, we would be able to write a book that tells
tne painful story of this city--the city of death and of love at the same time.
Were it not for the people's attachment to their soil and their love for this
area, we would not find a single human being in it after all the acts of annihila-
tion that have taken place and are still taking place.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8494
CSO: 4802 -
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.e
LEBANON
RAMIFICATIONS OF ISRAELI ATTACKS ON PALESTINIAN POSITIONS IN SOUTH ANALYZED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'AR.ABI in Arabic 29 Aug-4 Sep 80 pp 27-30
[Article: "A1-Shuqayf [Beaufort] Castle Battle; Israel Exploits Arab Neutrality
To Liquidate Palestinian Resistance; Palestinian-Israeli War as It Appears
Through Lebanese Magnifying Glass; Fear of Palestinian Retreat Into Interior and
of Liberation Battle Launched by al-JuII+ayyil Against Franjiyah"]
(TextJ It [ttie situation] has subsided in Beirut and flared up in the north and
the south. Thus, Lebanon has been destined to live constantly in dark and bloody
days. In the south, the Palestinians have stood valiantly in the face of an
Israeli air and ground a~tack aimed at their artillery positions between al-Litani
and al-Zahrani rivers. Meanwhile, in the northern coastal city of Tripoli,
clashes have erupted between the armed organizations and many of the killed and
wounded have fallen as victims. But what about the military and strategic goals
of the Israel.i operation and what is the Ar.ab reply to an allout Israeli off en-
sive against Lebanon?
This is what is answered by two political and military reports which AL-WATAN
AL-'ARABI has received from its correspondents in Beirut and in the southern city
of al-Nabatiyah.
The state has �aatched the battle between the Palestinians and the Israelis with
binoculars. This report explains the Lebanese analyses and interpretations of
[he outcome of the battle and the political consequences resulting from this
battle or from an Israeli offensive at a larger scale.
Beirut--Under the impact of the violent shelling against the various southern
axes from Tyre to al-Nabatiyah, the Palestinian resistance and the joint forces
have been creating an epic of heroism in their steadfastness in the face of the
successive wa-~es of landing and of shelling. The Lebanese state has been mobiliz-
ing its diplomatic forces for fear that the aggressions would turn into an allout
offensive going beyond Is rael`s claim of its wish to stage deterrent attacks
against the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon to prevent it from staging opera-
tions against Israel in the occupied territories.
In view of the entwinement of the Israeli goals with the nature of the interna-
tional developments concerning Jerusalem and in view of the deadend reached by
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the Camp David negotiations, it has been difficult for the Palestinian leaders
and the Lebanese officia2s to believe that what has happened and is happening is
not the start of the comprehensive confrontation and the peak of the hot summer
anticipated by the various Arab snd international circles.
King Husayn of Jordan h as expected a large-scale Israeli offensive against
southern Lebanon and the Palestinian resistance has expected Israeli landing and
occupation attempts in the area between the two rivers in southern Lebanon where
the main forces of the Palestinian resistance are stationed. .
The Syrian officials have found that these attacks may develop into an allout war
against Syria and Lebanon and the western diplomats in Beirut have lost the real
link between what is a ctually happening and the assurances of their foreign minis- -
tries that it is unlikely that the situation will reach the point of an allout
explosion.
As for Israel, it has b een evident from the statements of its leaders that the
series of attacks against Lebanon will not stop and that these attac~~s are a
part of ineasures and dPCisions taken to block the path in the face of likely
activities by the Palestinian resistance.
Where does the informa tion meet regarding the enemy's objectives and what is the
_ extent which the cease less aggressions will reach? What are the direct effects
of these attacks on Lebanon and on the international movement concerning the
Middle East crisis?
State Fears New Invas ion
Ici the wake of the Is raeli l~nding operation in al-Nabatiyah area, John Gunther
Dean, the U.S. ambassa dor to Beirut, contacted Lebanese Prime Minister Dr Salim
al-Huss to inquire ab out the position of the Lebanese government.
Prime Minister al-Huss' position has been that the United States had to exert
concerted efforts to p revent the situation from deteriorating and to ebstruct the
start of a new Israeli occupation of the areas north of al-Latani River, namely
- the areas which Israel did not reach in its invasion of 1978.
Prime Minister al-Huss says that the Israeli landing and shelling operations have
taken place and have gone beyond the southern areas under the control of the UN
- peacekeeping fnrces, as they did 4 months ago, and that this confirms Israel's
desire to violate thes e new areas despite the UN Security Council resolutions.
A1-Huss also says that Israel resorted to this approach prior to its invasion
of the south in 1978 in order to prepare the public opinion to accept the inva-
sion as if it were a large-scale act of landing,shelling or retaliation.
Perhaps what has conf irmed these fears is Israel's declaration of its attack on
al-Nabatiyah as a preemptive measure against the resistance and then its subse-
quent announcement 8 hours later that it had suffered 15 casualties, dead and
wounded in the fierce batt~les that took place in al-Nabatiyah.
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The diplomatic ~bservers have in~:erpreted this declaration which was made by the
_ c}~ief of tt~e Israeli_ Army intelligence as a cover for continued and intensified
israeli attacks and as an indicati~n that Israel shells military targets as a ,
~ustification for the need to put an end to the Palestinian militsry presence
which ic.flicts losses in lives on Israel.
The press conference held by the Israeli intelligence head has intensified the -
official 1.ebanese fears and has created the inclination for calling upon the UN
Security Council to convene immediately. However, the diplomatic contacts,
especially the contacts with the U.S. ambassador, have allayed the fears and have
_ turned the request for the convocation of the Security Council into a strongly-
worded complaint presented as a documentary memorandum to the UN Security Council
members .
'I'he fact is that the official Lebanese measures do not constitute solutions that
can stand in the face of the Israeli attacks. But through these measures, Lebanon _
is trying to hold the Arab states and the major powers responsible for putting an
" end to the Israeli arrogance.
The fact is also that the Palestinian-Lebanese confrontation in the south cannot
stand in the face of a large-scale Israeli invasion. However, this confrontation
continues t~ be an indication of the steadfastnes~ and of the will to continue
t}ie struggle against the Tsraeli enemy. -
The continuation of this uncertain situation will inevitably reflect on Lebanon -
in new waves of evacuation, in sharp social crises, in Palestinian pressure on
Che Lebanese arena and in the subsequent negative effects ar~d consequences to the
existing political equations.
Dang~rs of Palestinian R~treat to Interior
The Palestini.an sources say that they are aware of the dangers that may result
. from a likely Israeli equation and from pushing the Palestinian for~es to the -
inr.erior, and aware of the subsequent pressure that such developments will mean
to the Lebanese arena.
However, these sources cannot find the practical solutions capable of dealing with
such results and effects. They believe that obstructing the liquidation of the
resistance continues to be the major goal of the Palestinian steadfastness, even ~
if s~.ict1 steadfastness leads to acts of harassment on the Lebanese arena.
These sources believe that the resistance cannot respond to all the given facts
when the essence of its destiny and survival are threatened because in such a
case the r.esistance finds itself face to face with priorities that it cannot
disregard or abandon.
Even though such statements are clear to the Lebanese state, this state's logic
continues to be different from that of the revolution. What is noteworthy in this
regard is the call mac~e by Fu'ad Butrus, the Lebanese minister of foreign affairs,
urging thP resistance to exercise self-restraint and to resort to political means
in its struggle. In this call, Butrus stresses the need to deescalate the military
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confrontation through Lebanon because this c~n~rontation exposes Lebanon to
the danger of Israeli invasion and does not lead to gains in the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
Lebanese official sources believe that the Palestinian political movement has
realized a large degree of success at the international level--a success that
exceeds by far the strength of th e military resistance in southern Lebanon.
These sources also believe that the resistance has gone beyond the stage of. em-
phasizing its armed struggle and that it is now in the phase of emphasizing its
struggle, legitimacy and politic al forces. Therefore, the resistance should re-
frain from losing military positions for fear that it may return to the narrow
confrontation after having surpassed this confrontation sometime ago.
The Lebanese official sources also believe that the resistance can exercise self-
restraint in the face of the Israeli aggressions. But these sources don't know
how the resistance can avoid military confrontation with the Israeli enemy who
launches his attacks under the pretext of the preemptive war which means preempt-
ing any Palestinian attempt to launch attacks against this enemy.
This situation has created turmo il in the Lebanese-Palestinian relations, as well
as in the Palestinian-Syrian relations.
The Palestinian resistance's relations with Damascus have been recently character-
- ized by periods of tepidir.y as a result of the importance that the resistance
attached to the European initiative, and to what it believed to be an inlet for
expanding the recognition of its legiti.macy, and of the independence of its deci-
sion at the international level.
The Palestinian sources say that the repeated Israeli attacks against the resis-
tance may compel it to reassess its expectations of any European initiatives to
solve the Middle East crisis in its favor.
These sources believe that the PLO may find itself forced to adopt a position of
inflexibility toward all the initiatives projected within the framework of the
Arab-Israeli conflict. There are those in the resistance circles who believe
that the PLO should not wait for an Israeli invasion to realize this alliance
[sic], especially since the expected developments concerning the area are still
remote and still waiting for the conclusion of the U.S. presidential elections.
Some of the resistance leaders go farther by saying that a turn by the Palestin-
ian resistance in this direction [sic] will inevitably block the path in the face
of the self-rule negotiations an d of the issue of representation of the Palestin-
ians.
These leaders believe that an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon will open the
door for the demand to include the Palestinians living home in the self-rule
negotiations, under the pretext of the absence of a Palestinian force abroad
capable of claiming that it represents the Palestinians.
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These le~.ders believe that such an alliance [sicJ can give the Palestinians
flexibility of niovement without turning the south into an obstacle ~~r into a _
poin~ of weakness in the Palestinian confrontation at the military and politi-
cal levels.
Fear of Loss of Yalestinian Independence
- What prevents some of the resistance leaders from discussing these possibilities
is their fear of losing independence of the Palestinian decision as a result of
joining under the banner of the Syrian position. These leaders believe that
- such 3n alliance cannot continue to be within the strategy of just supporting
the Palestinian struggle but will inevitably turn into a large-scale act of
adoption that denies the PLO the flexibility of movement and the ability to
deal witli the international situation as it is doing now.
It remains to be said that the aforementioned Palestinian fears of the goals of
the Israeli attacks lead to the belief that what is required at present is to
create a st~te of vacuum and confusion in Lebanon at both the Pa]_estinian level
and Lebanese official level, as well as at the level of the declared P4arunite
measures f.or partition. All this may be a prelude for projecting the cor.cepts
of resettlement, of actual partition and of sectarian mini-states in the area.
'I'he Phalangist sources i.n Beirut say that Bashir al-Jumayyil, commander of the
Phalanges Party militias, will declare war in northern Lebanon in preparation
for finding justifications for declaring an interior Phalangist coup against all
rhe forces that are still outside the control of this party. The sources say
~ that al-Jumayyil will do so under the (justif ication of the impact of the war
- in the north against ex-President Franjiyah and the justification of the need to
declare a state of emergency to deal with this war).
Tl~c i'halangist sources say that such a step will mean declaration of the final
rebellion against the Lebanese legitimate government and that the step may be -
� ti.med to coincide with the likely Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon so that
~ it mav appear as a precautionary step justified by the concern for Lebanon and
its saf.ety.
T'hough this information meets at the goals of the Israeli attacks against Lebanon
ancl at what is being planned within the framework of the Marunite mini-state, it
is diffi.cult to predict the results. It is also extremely difficult to conclude
the direction of the expected developments in Lebanon and in the Middle East.
- COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI -
8G94 .
CSO: 4802
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LEBANON
ARMED VIOLENCE AGAINST PRESS DEPLORED -
Paris AI,-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 15-21 Aug 80 pp 20-23
[Article: "Dialogue With Press With Bullets and Dynamite"]
[Text] In 1976, the premises of the Lebanese AL-MUHARRIR paper was surrounded by
a combat battalion armed to the teeth and was then shelled with machineguns and
rockets and set afire. 'I'he paper's chief editor was killed and a number of its
editors, employees and workers were wounded. The rest escaped by a miracle. A
few days ago, the office of AL-WATAN AIr'AFtABI, AL-MUHARRIR's sister paper, was
blown up with 50 kilograms of dynamite. Eight persons, most of them children, -
were wounded in the incident.
What happened to AL-MUHARRIR repeatedly and what AL-WATAN AL-'~BI has been
- exposed to in the past and at present reflects and embodies the tragedy of the
Arab press, particularly the Lebanese press, wi~h intimidation and terror. Despite
this, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI will not lose its courage and composure and wil.l persist
in its efforts to present the la~gest possible part of the truth to the Arab
public opinion. It will not lose its faith that the dialogue Frith the regimes
must someday tak.e place through the freedom of ex?~ression, through the mutual
respect of this freedom and through absolute adherence to democracy, regardless
of the difference in the viewpoints.
Beirut--Saturday, 31 January 1976: When the darkness of the evening fell over -
al-Shiyah Quarter in southeastern Beirut, a relative calm prevailed over the area
and only the intermitten spurts of remote machinegun fire was heard coming from
the direction of the line separating al-Shiyah from the Christian area of 'Ayn
al-Ru~mmanah .
The combatants on both sides of the line were tired. It was the last day of the
week, and the combatants needed to spend a short weekend behind the lines.
The editors in the offices of AL-MUHARRIR were also exhausted and were doing their
work lazily on that evening while dreaming of their weekend far from the tangential
line, the explosion of gr:_nades and the shrapnel of rockets, and also far from the
_ news and pictures of death, slaughtering and kidnapping.
The fact is that the premises was almost on vacation and only a small number of
editors, administrative personnel and workers were present in it. The lights were
off in most of the six floors fozm.ing the enormous building.
Suddenly, those present on the first floor heard noises, clamor and the clatter of
weapons at the entrance of the buildin~. However, they paid no attention because
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they had become accustomed to such activities from the armed elements spread all
over the streets.
But they ~umped quickly from behind their desks when tk~e doors of hell opened.
Their voices were l~st amidst the whizz of the bullets pouring through the windows
from all sides and directions. Then the roar or RPG rockets pounding the walls
and then exploding in the halls and offices, destroying glass, chairs and desks.
The editors gathered in the stairway of the main building for protection from the
flying bullets and shrapnel cahile others were daring enough to sneak a look from _
the rear windows to see shadows running around and vehicles moving.
The building was fully surrounded from all sides, including the cultivated land
behind it. The terror intensified because it became evident that the building
was being exposed to the attack of a complete combat unit with its infantrymen,
rocket launchers and vehicles which were mounted with heavy machineguns. Screams _
interspersin~ the whizz of bullets and rockets were being heard clearly and those
screams were orders given in a firm military tone. This means that the attack
was led by trained military officers.
The lights then went off in the building and the only light remaining was the light -
emanating from the flash of explosions.
Order to Storm Building
i'he editors and employees then heard an order for storming the building and all
became certain of their death. At this point, courage or the "sweetness of life,"
as it is commonly said, took charge of driver Abu-Mahammad and he walked to one
of t:1e balconies and fired a few shots from his pistol in the direction of one of
the advar~cing vehicZes~ The reply was swift. A heavy anti-aircraft [sic] machine-
gun opened fire and smashed the windows of the third floor; an RPG missile landed
- in the ofiice of colleague Shafiq al-Hut, the director of the PLO Office who was
in ,^_tiarge of supervising AL-MUHARRIR paper by virtue of his long affiliation with
the profession. ~
Ir is for~unate that Shafiq al-Hut was not in the room. However, he was in the
building and was attending an editorial meeting in the office of Walid Abu-Zahr, _
the establishment`s general manager.
It is also fortunate that the editors of the local section, led by colleague 'Awad
Sha'ban, were not in their lobby because a second missile followed the first one
and landed in the lobby, turning it upside down.
It seems that the few shots fired from the pistol of Abu-Muhammad, who survived the
massacre only to be killed by a stray bullet a year later, persuaded the heavily
ai-med attackers not to storm the building.
. The attack co~ander., and it is ~aid that he was an officer with the rank of colonel, _
changed his plan and thought of something else for these present in the building,
exceeding 30 editors, employees and workers in all.
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Some of the armed men then proceeded to the main gate of the building carrying
cans of kerosene which they started pouring inside the main lobby and then set the -
inflammable liquid afire and moved away. The co~ander had decided to burn the
building with all those in it because the paper which kept on speaking in the
name of the Lebanese National. Movement and of the pan-Arab movement and which had
, been committed to the Palestinian revolution's strife and struggle for more than
10 years deserved to be burnt: the pens which those editors had brandished through-
out that period and the editurs who had endure.d for their belief harassment and
pursuit beyond their endurance deserved to die with bullets and rockets.
Escaping Through Chimney
The tongues of flame extender. to cons~e everything and the internal stairway
turned into a chimney absorbi~:; the heat and smoke of large amounts of kerosene.
The editors trapped in the tr:i.rd and fourth floor of the stairway became aware of
what was intended for them. 7.'hey had no alternative but climb to the roof of the
building and accept the risk of dying tYeere with bullets or with the shrapnel of
exploding rockets. -
Walid Abu-Zahr and Shafiq al-i~~it took the risk a~d beat all others to the roof.
Colleague Geo~ge Karayan, the caricaturist in the London MIDDLE EAST paper at
present, led the second groug which groped its way to the roof in the darkness.
The black smoke rising from the fire had preceded all those present to the small
lobby in the upper floor where 25 persons had gathered and were feeling around for
the door to the roof without being able to find it.
The signs of suffocati~n staxtc~d to appear--watery eyes and coughing--and then a
voice shouted: "I hav~ f~uii~.ito This way," Then each colleague took hold of
the hand of the next collea~L.~ to step into safety.
However, the situation on the roof was not much better. The flames of fire that
had begun to consume the contents of the first, second and third floor were
emitting a dark black cloud which surrounded the entire building.
Amidst the uproar, all those in the bu~lding could hear the curses of the armed
attackers telling them to come aut of the building so that the attackers may
meet with their bullets, as they had done with their colleagues in the nearby
BAYRUT paper where one of the victims of the attack was the late Ib rahim 'Amir,
a capable Egyptian journalist.
The attack intensified, the ~moke bacame thicker and the fire was rising higher.
It became impossible to stay euen on the roof o� the building. The search for a
solution began. The only solution seemed to be death with the shrapnel of the
bullets and the rockets, burn~zg or suffocating to death from the advancing fire -
or co~unitting suicide by jumFzzo from that steep height.
As a resul.t of the search, one of the colleagues found that there was another
building adjacent to the newsnapex premises. But a distance of 2 metars separated =
the two buildings and o~.e had t~ ~ump this distance to reach a square window and
hang onto its si,ll, and then sneak from there to the building which was still
under construction.
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The darkness persuaded those who were reluctant to jump. Perhaps if it had been
daytime none of them would have dared to do so while seeing the deep ~ap separating ;
the two buildings.
The f irst to take the risk was colleague 'Awad Sha~ban. It was a magnificent leap.
'Awad clung to the window sill with bo~h hands and began his hard struggle to
squeeze his body through the window. His strength almost failed him more than ,
once. What made things more difficult is that he had forgotten to remove his heavy
overcoat before jumping.
As soon as 'Awad Sha'ban made it through the window after desperate efforts, shouts
rose f rom another colleague bringing the good news that he had found an easier way.
In one part of the big building, this colleague had found a cement link connecting
the two buildings and a ladder seC atop this link. Anybody clim~,ing the ladder,
if he managed to survive the bullets, could easily reach the roo~ of the neighbor- -
ing building and could proceed from there to safety. -
Climbing the wooden ladder and crossing to the neighborin~ building was quick and
easy. All survived the shrapnel by a miracle and sneaked through the neighbaring
building to a back street.
Count of losses I
In the meanwhile, the firing subsided and the attackers began to break up their _
seige and to withdraw their weapons and their vehicles. They removed the roadblocks
which they had set up at the crossroads leading to ~he premises of the fzmous paper,
perhaps after Chinking that it was certain that their bullets, rockets and fire ~
had finished all the "criminal" writers and journalists who did not deserve to ~
live and to en~oy the freedom, democracy and happiness which governments pour on
their citizens in tons. I
Ztao fire engines passed timidly in the face of the attackers to extinguish the fire ~
which, al.ong with the bullets and the rockets, had destroyed all the desks, chairs,
equipment, documents, archives, photography equipment and typesetting equipment in
the building.
BAYRIJT and AL-MUHARRIR then started to count their losses in lives. In addition -
to Ib rahim 'Amir, a number of editors and workers in the offices and printing
presses of both papers had been martyred or wounded in previous (attacks).
Several dozen editors and workers suffering from smoke inhalation were taken to
hospitals and they still suffer from the consequences of the kerosene fumes which
they inhaled on that calamitous day. '
It was a painful sight when the firmmen removed the debri.s in the passage of the
f irst floor to find under them the body of colleague Nayif (55 years), the chief
editar of AL-riUHARRIR.
Ivayif Shublaq, a member of a Palestinian family known for its struggle in Palestine,
had j oined AL-MUfiARRIR 2 years earlier when he felt that his heart was with it.
The man, may God's mercy rest upon his soul, was sincere, gentle, polite and
*ireless.
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Fate so willed it in those critical moments that Shublaq's feet lead him from the
~ third floor, where his of~ice is located, to the first floor. It seems that he
thou~ht he could sneak out through the main gate and escape the siege during a short ~
lull in the firing. �
But ttie attackers' arson caugtit him by surprise and the fire and kerosene smoke
_ caught him in the corridor. He tried to ~pen the door to one of the offices but
tlie dcor was closed. The man tried to use force, but futilely. His strength then
began to wane and disappear and he collapsed on the floor, leaving his unforgettable
fingerprints from the top to the bottom of the door before falling down and sur-
rendering to his fate.
This is how writers and journalists die in the Lebanese jungle where the hearts of
the armed men no longer know mercy, compassion or humanity.
This is how Nayif Shublaq died and how dozens of other journalists, correspondents
and press photographers died before and after him.
What is regrettable is that some of them have died with Arab bullets and weapons
and that their only crime was that they tried to earn a livelihood for themselves
and for their children in a paper whose political line cuntradicts or disagrees
with the line of the regime or of the organizatian that sends its fighters to
discipline a newspaper and to kill its editors and writers.
At his advanced age, Nayif Shublaq used to work more than 16 hours a day to divide
his energy between editing and translation in mpre than one sphere. He has left
behind a wife and children of school age whose arms are not yet strong enough to
- earn their own livelihood.
AL-itUHARRIR's History
AL-MUHAR.RIR was a struggling newspaper that was not born with a golden spoon in
its mouth, as most papers are born. It started as a weekly and when it turned into
a daily newspaper, the late Hisham Abu-Zahr, its owner, thought that this step was
a b ig risk.
Still, AL-INHARRIR established its feet firmly among its colleague papers at a
time when the Lebanese press reached the peak of its prosperity. After a while, it
became the paper speaking in the name of the deprived factions in the Lebanese
society, including the sons of the Islamic Shi'ite sect in the remote parts of the
- south and of al-Biqa'.
C?~ I~NHARF.IR was loyal to the message of its Arab nation through its commitment to
' the pan-Arab line adopted by Egypt under the chairmanship of the late President
Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir. It endured enormous material and psychological difficulties
and harassment because of this commitment.
But AL-MUHARRIR knew that this was its enly way. The national [man-in-the-] street
also knew that this was his paper and the paper committed to his line. Perhaps
there has been in Lebanon's history more exiciting, better and more capable papers
in journalistic terms. But no paper has attained the popular and political
influence attained by AL-MUHARRIR in the late 1960`s and early 1970's.
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Then came the Lebanese war wiCh all its whims, ugliness and massacres in 1975.
- AL-MUEiA.RRIR remained steadfast on the frontline, as if it had an appointment with
it, when it maved from its modest offices in Ra's al-Nab' area in the center of the
city to al-Shiyah Quarter where it occupied a big building vast enough for its
= plans and ita dreams.
Through its pages, AL-rNHARRIR struggled on the frontline alongside the National
Pfovement and the Palestinian resistance. It never closed an eye and never rested
_ It sufFered a lot and sacrificed a lot and was exposed to more than one attack and
explosion. A large number of its workers, employees and eidtors were killed or
wounded.
Clash With Syria
AL-MiJHARRIR became one of the war victims when it found itself before one oi two
options shortly after the entry of the Syrian forces to Lebanon: Either maintain
the line it had rollowed ~r succumb and accept the line dictated by force.
- AI.-MUHARRIR closed its doors in the face of its editors and workers and stopped
publication. But it opened its offices for the orphaned and poor Shi'ite refugees
evicted from the south to stay in it. Walid Abu-Zahr, the brother of Hisham who
died in 1970, used to say: "If we cannot continue to serve the deprived factions
for whom AL�-t~ITHAF,RIR has struggled on its pages, then we must open the doors of
its of.fices for them now that it has stopped publishing."
It is painful to see the free word lost amidst the tumult of force and violence.
AL-MUHARRIR was in disagreement with the position of President Hafiz al-Asad's
regime. But it did not think that the disagreement would develop to the point of
being settled with the force of arms. AL-MUHARRIR thought that its history,
struggle and positions would intercede on its behalf with this regime if the
opinions disagreed and the views differed.
Four years have passed since publication of AL-MLh3ARRIR was stopped. This paper
wa.s forced to disappear while in the peak of its youth and at the height of its
strength and popularity. Walid Abu-Zahr says that the success of the experiment of
issuing AL-4TATAN AL-'ARABI from exile in Paris and the fact that this paper has _
been able to occupy the top position among the Arab magazines in a short period _
and the passage of 4 years since the suspension of AL-MUHARRIR have eliminated alI
regret and sadness from the heart and have cleared it of all bitterness and hatred,
that is if there has been any hatred. A journalist doesn't know hatred because
the requir.ements of the profession, the fluctuations in the political conditions
and long experience teach the journalist to accept matters with their negative and -
positive aspects calmly, patiently, tolerantly and with self-confidence.
But the problem is not here and it is not with the press. The problem is always -
witti the Arab regimes, their agencies, their view of the press and their approach
is dealing with the press and the journalists.
Role of Lebanese Press
- In the 1950's, the Lebanese press enjoyed a degree of freedom which qualified it to
analyze, examine and deal in detail with a lot of what was happening on the Arab
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arena. It is no secret that the Lebanese press adopted various positions toward
the various regimes existing on the Arab political arena. -
- But this diversity of positions permitted this press to deal with issues from
their various angles, thus enabling the Arab reader to be fully familiarized with
the various positions through his reading of the Lebanese papers with their
various ideological and political affiliations and associations. _
Some regimes used to censure the Lebanese press for this enormous difference in its
positions and used to consider this difference as something shameful in democracy
and in the inclinations of the papers and the magazines. -
r
1[owever, this difference permitted to a large degree the Arab regimes to clarify
and explain their positions through what they presented and said by way of the
Lebanese papers. Moreover, in the late 1960's:, the regimes showed greater
acceptance of this big difference in the positions of the Lebanese papers and in
their news coverage of the details of the internal situation in any Arab country.
To day, the situation is completely different. The Lebanese war and the presence of
- 25 militias and armies in an area of no more than 10,000 square kilometers no
longer permit the press freedom to breathe.
In fact, more than one paper has been forced to close its doors and 3ournalists
and owners of successful press establishments have emigrated to publish their papers -
and to state their opinion from exile.
It seems that the Lebanese press is determined to continue to perform its role
despite all that it has endured. It is a role which this press believes to be as
much in its interest as it is in the interest of the Arab public opiniorl it
addresses, and even in the interest of the Arab regimes that have become distrubed
and are becoming disturbed by the freedom of the Lebanese press or its long tongue.
~ The truth is that it is difficult to discuss with any Arab "progressive" or
"conservative" regime its political principles. There is generally a feeling
among the Arab world journalists and thinkers that the regimes prefer to hear only -
their own voices which are reflected on the pages of their papers, and to se~ only
th eir pictures reflected on their small [television] scr~en. These regimes get
annoyed and complain if their voice is mixed with discordant voices or if another
image interferes with or distorts their image.
The fact is that the issue is not the issue of the press but the issue of Arab
public opinion which fsels today that it has a right to know more than what is
intended for it to know. The mail received by any Arab newspaper or magazine
overflows with that sweeping yearning to know what is happening in every country
and what thoughts and plans are occurring to the mind of every regime.
_ The Lebanese press, or rather the independent Arab press, if we may use the ex-
pression, cannot ignore thi.s strong yearning for knowing and for keeping up to -
date, otherwise it will lose the justifications for its existence and continuation.
Perhaps it is better for the regimes themselves to permit the independent Arab
press to perform and keep up its previous role. What the independent press publishes
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is tantamount to a real safety valve for every regime and such a regime must accept
this simply and as a matter of �act.
It is no disgrace for a labor or poTitical demonstration to be staged in any Arab
country. Demonstrations are staged in all countries of the world and riots do
occur. But such demonstrations and riots are mot ultimately the criterion for the
popularity of a ruler, otherwise we would consider the regime of (Anwar) Hoxha
i.n Albania the world's most democratic and popular regime and Thatcher's, Carter's
or Giscard d'Estaing's regimes the most dictatorial and most hostile to the masses.
The real fear for the future of the regimes must emanate from their negative con-
duct toward their press. Stifling the freedom of expression, intimidating a paper
~ and releasing the [security] agencies to pursue ~ournalists block the safety
valves. ~Ct is true that such conduct prevents the publication of what the regimes
consider unfair to them and to their reputation. But such conduct does not serve
the regimes in the end because blocking all the outlets in the face of the peoples
makES thera turn toward other outlets to express their political and social opinion,
thought and positions.
The danger lies in peoples turning to negativity and violence to express this
opinion. It must be said calmly here Chat the mistake is not the mistake of the
press ~~hich writes and publishes about what takes place. The mistake is in the
acCion of ~he political leadership.
AI.-WATAN AL-'liRAI3I, whose offices in Beirut were blown up last week, can still say
i~s piece and offer its advice without abandoning its mission or the policy it has
- adopted.
Ttie acts of t~lowing up, murder, assassination and terrorization do not constitute
an ever-lasti_ng solution to the problem of the freedom of expression or to silenc- _
ing the count~r apinion. It may be possible to intimidate a paper, silence another
and elim~.nate a journalist from the way.
3ut ult~mzLely, another solution must be sought. This solution must accept what is -
publishe3 with utter simplicity, even if what is published is unfair. There are
other means for correcting information and clarifying positions. Each regime
always has at its disposal adequate, and more than adequate, information media to
correct any tendentious report or opinion published by a paper. -
This acceptance of the counter opinion cannot be actually realized through taming
or ttirough the d.isplay of force by every regime. There are fundamental priorities
- and principles in which the Arabs must believe and upon whicr, they must actually
act.
Ultimately, democracy is the fundamental school of government. A paper's report
or opinion, for example, cannot be accepted if the opposed view or ~pinion of the
political, vocational and unionist bodies and organizations of the country cannot
be accepted.
When list~:ning to these opposed voices becomes an ordinary tradition in every
- regime, it will then become possible to listen to an opposed broadcasting station
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I
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or to read an opposition paper without letting the blood boil in anger and without
reaching for the holster to shoot. This is because the word is like air and it is
difficult to penetrate with bullets, regardless of how skillful the shooter is.
When the building doorman asked the two what their business was, they told him
with utter simplicity, while the back of one of them was straining under the weight
of the sack of explosives weighing almost 50 kilograms, that they wanted to visit
a relative in the fourth floor.
Less than half an hour later, the building doorman, his wife and two children and
four other children in the building were writhing on the floor, b leeding profusely '
from injuries sustained as a result of the horrible explosion. ,
The suite of the building occupied by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's offices had also turned
into a heap of rabble, debris and fallen wa11s.
We wish that the leader of every organization and agency, rather every Arab ruler
and official could find the time to have a look at the offices of AL-WATAN AI~-'ARABI
in the first floor of the highrise in Ra's al-Nab' Quarter which is overcrowded with
people and residents.
The building itself is narrow and j ammed with residential apartments occupied by
middle-class or poor families, each with no less than 5 or 6 children.
How, by what right, who is responsible and where is the humanitarian element and _
the moral ~ustification?
It seems ridiculous at times to discuss matters in this manner or to raise ques-
tions in this way in Lebanon--a country that no longer deals with logic or with
words.
The destroyed office of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Ra's al-Nab', small and modest as
it was, was the office from which AL-MUHARRIR had been issued. Its rooms contain
the memories of a number of the brightest stars of the Lebanese press in our time.
It is enough for us to note that Ghassan Kanafani, tl?~ Palestinian man of letters,
journalist and martyr, worked at one of the desks of Chese offices one day.
Finally, is the tragedy a tragedy of the Lebanese press? We do not at all think
so. It is the tragedy of all of us, we the Arabs, as establishments, regimes,
press, organizations, agencies, rulers, ruled, innocent and henchmen.
Where to? Nobody knows.
The tragedy will not push us to despair and it will not make us say, for example,
that Anwar al-Sadat's regime--towards which AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has directed its
cruellest arrows of criticism--has not yet sent anybody to blow up its offices. _
- The tragedy will not push us toward despair and frustration and will not makQ us
say that the limited democracy in Israel permits the left to demonstrate against
the most violent, cri.minal and radical Zionist forces and organizations. We, the
Arabs, are still scared, frightened and unable to Cell the regime "no," ~ust a
single servile, defeated, whispering and low "no."
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- Thanks
[Text] A deciaion has been issued by the Press Censorship of the Lebanese
General Security banning the entry of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI to the Lebanese
territories.
- The Lebanese censorship had permitted the entry of edition No 181 of A1-WATAN
- AL-'ARABI and allowed its distribution. But the patrols of the Syrian Deterrence
Forces confiscated this edition from the vendors, markets and bookshops 2 days
later.
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI does not blame the Lebanese censorship because this paper knows
- that the "heart is willing but the flesh is weak," as the saying goes. However,
the paper has no doubt that it will retum to the Arab reader in Lebanon soon.
Thanks to those who have banned the entry and distribution of AL-WATAN AL-'ARA~3I
anci thanks to those who have confiscated it from the markets. The ban decision
and the confiscation measures will let the paper enter the heart and mind of
_ every reader in Lebanon and throughout the greater homeland.
COPYRT.GHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8494 . ~
CSO: 4802
~I
~I
I
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MAURITANIA
BRIEFS
CLOSURE OF IMAPEC--The Spanish fishing company IMAPEC [Mauritanian Fi~hing Industries]
whose headquarters is located in Nouadhibou, decided on 27 October to permanently
- close its doors and to lay off all its Mauritanian employees (33 people who reportedly
have not been paid for several months). In connection with this, Sidi Ahmed Ould
Bnei~ra, the governor of Dakhlet Nouadhibou, stated that "the region's authorities
and the Ministry of Fishing will not agree in any event'to the blackmail that IMAPEC
has been p racticing for several months by waving the threat of laying off its em-
, ployees so as to force Mauritania to accept an agreement with the Spanish fishing
shipping business that is contrary to the new fishing policy." The governor explained _
that the leaders of the company are trying to establish a fait accompli by informing
the workers that they have decided to close the factory. "But," he added, "we have
already let these same leaders know that closing the factory goes through bankruptcy
proceedings and consequently therefore the filing of the company's balance sheet."
On 30 January, Mauritania condemned the fishing agreement previously reached with
Spain because of the new fishing policy that Mauritania proposes to enforce. In
spite of several contacts between the two countries, no agreement seems to be in
sight (se e MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 15 August 1980, p 2025). In recent
months, Mauritania has stopped and boarded several boats, mostly Spanish, that were
- fishing illegally in Mauritania's waters. Specialists estimate that the primary
catches in recent months in Mauritania's waters were unloaded at Las Palmas. Maur-
itania's Ministry of Fishing indicated (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS,
22 August) that Mauritania would n.ot allow boats to fish in its waters to offset
fees. This system of "fishi.ng licenses" that used to exist was abolished 2 years
ago because Mauritania considered the use to which it gave rise excessive. This
system was replaced by the setting up of mixed companies to ensure both fishing -
operations at sea and processing and packaging on land. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Oct 80 p 2549] 9064
GORGOL NOIR PROJECT BIDS--The office of research and development of SONADER
[National Rural Development Company] (P.O. Box 321, Nouakchott, Telex: 807 MTN)
is issuing an invitation for bids for technical assistance for the duration of the
- work (3 years) of installing irrigation in Gorgol Noir so as to ensure the super-
vision of this project that has been divided into three portions: A) construction
of an arched dam in reinforced concrete; B) construction of feeder channels; and
_ C) construction of a secondary irrigation system. This invitation is divided into
three par ts, two oF which are being offered to French companies: Part 1) pro3ect
director, open to everyone; Part 3) supervision of the construction work in portions
B and C, open to agencies approved by the Saudi funds. The specifications notebook
can be requested through CFCE in Paris. Cost: 5000 Mauritanian ouguiyas. Clos-
ing date: 30 October 1980. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
in French 17 Oct 80 p 2549] 9064
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NEUTRAL STAND IN WAR--At first resolutely pro-Iraq, Mauritania is now becoming
more neutral in tre Iraq-Iran war, This audden change was brought about by
President Chadli Hendjedid during the official visit to Algaria of the
Mauritanian Head of Stato, Lt Col Khouaa Ould 11~1~intte~ (~8 S~ptc~mber- 1 c?~t~~b~r).
(Tex[] [ Paria JE[1NE AFRICjUE in French 29 Oct 80 p 58] 9592
STRENGTHENING SENEGALESE FRONTIER FORCES--In the beginning of October, the _
Mauritanian Army strengthened Senegalese frontier forces. Namely in Kermassen,
Rkiz and facing the Senegalese town of Podor. Official motive: to prevent
infiltratione of inembers of the ADM, Che Alliance fox a Democratic Mauritania.
[TextJ [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Nov 80 p 32] 9592
CSO: 4400
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- QATAR
~ BRIEFS
PURCHASE OF SHIPS, MISSILES--LEMONDE reports that in late September, Qatar and
France signed a sales agreement covering naval-related equipment valued at 1.5
billion francs. The agreement calls for France to deliver to Qatar three
guided missile ships armed with Aerospatiale Exocet antiship missiles, plus
coastal batteries of Exocet surface-to-surface missiles. If this agreement is
confirmed, it will mark the �irst sale of the coastal-defense version of the
Exocet weapon system. [Text] [Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 18 Oct 80 p 76]
8041
CSO : 4800
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SAUDI ARABIA
~
. FRENCH INDUSTRY CHOSEN TO MODERNIZE NAVY
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 1 Nov 80 pp 39, 41, 43
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "Upgrading and Expansion of Saudi Navy"]
[Text] The large order received by France from Saudi Arabia for naval armanent
will serve to considerably strengthen the Saudi Navy which has been equipped
with small ships up to now.
The 14.4-billion franc Sawari contract covers essentially three major categories
of materiel and services: rapid-reaction frigates, rescue helicopters and heli-
copters armed with antiship missiles, and crew-training equipment plus logistical
support for the aforementioned materiel.
More specifically, the contract calls for France to supply the following over a
5-year period:
a. Two 10,800-ton replenishment fleet tankers. These are a lighter and simpli-
fied version of the 17,800-ton La Durance-class tanker. These support vessels
can replenish a group of small- or medium- tonnage ships at sea or in an anchor-
age. They will hold approximately 5,400 tons of liquid cargo and 400 tons of
dry cargo. Their main deck will accommodate one helicopter.
b. Four F-2000 frigates designed for antisubmarine, antiaircraft, and antiship
combat operations. They are 115 meters long and have a full load displacement
of 2,600 ~ons. They have a cruising range of 6,500 nautical miles at a speed of
18 knots (maximum speed: 30 knots at 2,200 tons). They will be armed with a
100-millimeter automatic turret, twin-barrel 40-millimeter guns, a battery of
8 naval Crotale surface-to-air missiles (range: +10 kilometers), a battery of
8 long-range--up to 180 kilometers--nava2 Otomat surface-to-surface missiles,
and 1 Dauphin 2 helicopter armed with 2 or 4 short-range--15 kilometers--
AS.15TT air-to-surface missiles.
c. Twenty-four SA 365F Dauphin 2 helicopters. Four of these are the search
and rescue version eq~ipped with an ORB-32 Omera radar, and will be delivered
first. The other 20 are the antiship version equipped with the Aigron 15 radar
and armed with AS.15TT missiles. These helicopters will operate from both land
bases and the frigates.
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d. Approximately 200 all-weather AS.15TT air-to-surface missiles.
This contract involves mainly eight French armament firms or agencies, not to
mention numerous subcontractors. These eight firms and agencies--some of which
exhibited Che materiel to be supplied Saudi Arabia at the 1~80 Naval Show--are:
a. DTCN [Technical Directorate for Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering]:
construction of the first of the four F-2000 frigates, and prime contractor for
all ships.
b. CNIM [Mediterranean Marine and Industrial Engineering Company]: construc-
tion of the 3 other F-2000 fr igates.
c. T.a Ciotat Shipyards: construction of the two replenishment fleet tankers.
d~ Thomson-CSF: prime contractor for weapon systems and the electronic equip-
� ment for the frigates.
e. Aerospatiale: prime contractor for the Dauphin 2-AS.15TT weapon system,
including supplying th e helicopters and missiles.
f. Matra: prime contractor for the Otomat weapon system in its new "compact"
version.
g. Sofresa: technical assistance and liaison with the Saudi Navy.
h. NAVMCO (Navy COFRA S): pe rsonnel training and equipmQnt maintenance, includ-
ing establishment of a military armament maintenance facility on one of the ;
Gulf's two maj or Saudi bases . ~
Most of the contracts awarded the French firms and agencies are fixed-price
contracts. The contract with NAVMCO is between 1.2 and 1.4 billion francs. !
Matra's contract represents about 10 percent of the am~unt of all contracts ~
combined, i.e. some 1.4 billion francs.
Saudi ~lrabia thus becomes the eighth country to have ordered the Otomat long-
range, antiship weapon system which Matra and OTO Melara of Italy developed
jointly with their own funds. The Saudi Navy was particularly impressed with ,
the Otomat's over-the-horizon targeting capabilities.
Aerospatiale's share of the overall Saudi contract amounts to 2 billion francs,
half of. ~ahich is for the Dauphin 2 helicopters produced by its helicopter diver-
sion, wi_th the remaining half for the AS.15TT missiles developed by its tactical
missiles division. Actually, the Saudi order wi11 enable Aer~ospatiale to finish
developing the AS.15TT weapon system. That development is currently 50 percent -
complere. The AS.15'rT is a follow-on to Aerospatiale's AS.12 antiship missile,
some 8,000 of which have been produced for 25 countries. Consideri:~g its price--
about 0.7 million francs--and its performance--accuracy of its radar guidance sys-
- tem--the AS.15TT is also expected to find success in the international market-
- place. Aerospatiale thus expects to sell from 8,000 to 10,000, perhaps 12,000 -
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- AS.15TT missiles over a 10-year period. Because of the prospects for expanded
use of armed helicopters in navies throughout the world--500 helicopters outside
the United States over a 15-year period--Aerospatiale is, therefore, currently
revising--downward--the price of its fire-control units in an eff ort to enhance
the AS.15TT's acceptance over its competitors.
Thomson-CSF, however, has become the most important French contractor in the
Saudi deal as a result of an agreement it signed on 17 October with the Ministry
of llefense. Under the terms of that agreement, Thomson-CSF is assigned a major
role in the implementation of the program's three principal categories of _
materiel and services.
It will be respons ible for all weapon systems and avionics systems aboard the
four F-2000 frigates. These systems include the following: the Sea Tiger IFF-
integrated search radars; navigation and helicopter data-collection radars; elec-
tronic countermeasures equipment; SENIT 6[Naval Tactical Data Handling System]
equipment for the processing and display of tactical information; new modular,
tactical information display consoles; Castor 2 gun fire control systems; Diodon
antisubmarine warfare sonars with fixed and towed bases; and naval Crotale weapon _
systems for a ir defense of the ships against armed aircraft and helicopters as
well as sea-skimming surface-to-surface missiles. Thomson-CSF is also supnlying
Agrion 15 radars for the Dauphin 2 helicopters. These radars will be used to
guide the AS.15TT missiles and provide over-the-horizon target detection and
designation for the Otomat missiles. It can also serve as a search radar and to
relay tactic al information to the ships. In addition, Thomson-CSF is supplying
such missile components as the Otomat's seeker and the AS.15TT's remote control
altimeter--receiver. The company is also responsible for equipping Saudi Navy
schools and logisticalsupport centers with complete sets of weapon systems and
other materiel similar to those installed on the ships and helicopters, plus
simulators for the training of operators and maintenance technicians.
COPYRIGHT: A. & C., 1980
8041
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SYRIA
F
ORIGINS, DEVEIAPN~TT OF MUSLIP~! BROTHERHOOD DEI'AILED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in A-rabic 31 Oct-6 Nov 80 pp 18-21
/Article by Tammam al-Barazi: "What Are They Fr eparing for the Next Stage?--The
Moslem Brothers in Syria"/
/Text/ There are no sources which give the detailed history of the growth of the
Moslem Brothers' Movement in Syria. Although there are dozens of books, sources
and documents on the history of [he brothers in Egypt from the thirties to today,
worka giving the history of the movement in Syri a are almost nonexistent. This
may be explained by a number of reasons, among them ~he fact that until recently
the movement in Syria did not leap into the foiefront of events through armed
struggle as did the movement in Egypt through its clash with Nasir since the
fiftiea, in epite of the political and intelleceual role Syria's brothers played
since they rose up in the thirties.
While in the past months this role has assumed the character of violence and direct ~
armed conflict with the Syrian regime, with the objective of bringing it down, for
numerous reasons we will address ourselves to pr esently, the Moslem Brothers' or-
ganfzation has in fact been present on the Syrian stage since the thirtieso
The growth of the movement of the brothers in Egypt was one of the factors encour-
aging and contributing to the formation of the organization in Syria (in this re-
gard see AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, issue 189, 26 September 1980, p 26.
"�9
At the beginning, the matter was restricted to small societies, s~ach as the Society
of the Young Men of Muhammad in Damascus, the Dar al-Arqam Society in ~?leppo, the
Islamic Society in Hamah and most particularly the Society of the Moslem Young in
Damascus, which played a growing role in the context of coordinating the various
Islamic societie�. The most prominent men in the Moslem Young were Salah-al-Din
al-Shash, one of the men who took over the society''s secretariat general, and
'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Azraq, who was one of the most praminent judges in Syria at that
_ time. _
In 1945 the Society of the Moslem Young changed its name to the Moslem Brothers;
thus the name of the movement appeared for the first time in the history of Syria. -
The reason for the new tit~e may be attributed to the contact between some leaders
of the Moslem Young (including Salah-al-Din al-Shash) and Imam Hasan a1~Banna in
Bgypt, who urged that the title "Nloslem Brothers" be endorsed,
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rvn vrrl~lx~, u~r, UNLY
Dr Mustafa a~-Siba'i (from Hums, a teacher of Islamic Law at the Faculty of Canon
and Isla?nic Law at Damascus University} was th~ fisst person to bear the name
"General Overseer11 of the movement in Syria (the movement in Egypt endorses the
title general guide rather than general overseer).
No one disp utes al-Siba'i's role in stimulating the movemento In this field he
played an i~ortant part. He participated in the armed rQSistance against France
in 1945 and the Palestine War of 1948. It is well known that the organization of
the brothers in Syria contributed a full brigade of volunteers to this war.
In 1947, the first legislative elections took place in the country. The Moslem
Brothers embarked on "the struggle" with a number of candidates, of whom only
Muhammad al-Mubarak, in Damascus, won.
The movement accuaed the government of rigging and interfering in the elections.
In the 1949 elections, Dr Mustafa al-Siba'i won as deputy from the city of Damascu~o
The name of Mr 'Ieam al-'Attar arose in 1945 when for the first time he was assigned
the responsibilities of the deputy general overseer as a result of Dr al-Siba'i's
trip to $urope on s study miseion. He assumed the Rame responaibilities again in
1957 after the general overseer came down with an illness which prevented him from
exercising his tasks. In 1958, with the declaration of the Syrian-Egyptian union,
political organizations, the Moslem Brothers among them, were dissolved.
The movemenr_ took a distinctive poaition on the union, announcing its support of
it in principl~, as it abstained from signing the secession declaration. However,
it op~os~ed 'Abd-al-Nasir's policiea and practices and accused Nasirism of "dictat- '
orship" and other harsh epithets. ~
~
- The first contact the brothers in Syria had with the Egyptian regime, 'Abd-al- ~
Nasiz~s ~egime specifically, goes back to 1956, after the nationalization of the
Suez Canal. At that time the Egyptian minister plenipotentiary in 3yria, Fathi i
Ridwan, met with aI-'Attar (in the presence of Mr Mahmud Riyad, at that time the
Egyptian ambassador to Syria), requesting that the brothers stand alongside Egypt
in the r.ationalization struggle and turn over a new leaf in their disputes with
'Abd-al-Nasir over the crisis with the brothers in Syria during that tense stage.
It is well kz?osm that thia crisis reached its peak at that time, especially after
the xrrest of large numbers of people and the execution of others, including
'Abd-al-Qadir �Awdah and Muhammad Farghali. ,
'
In ;act, at that time the brothers in Syria did issue a statement supporting the
naeionalization of the canal and their readiness to participate in war should Egypt '
be ~x~posed to a foreign invasion. However, their opppsition to Nasir suddenly re- !
emerged sh~rlsly after the dissoluti.on of the organization in 1958, when they re-
fused to enter the National Federation and decided to continue their activity in
_ aecr~r_;~.
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Secret Activity
Then the aecesaion occurred.
The wountry prepsred for new legislative elections.
' Isarn ~al'Attar entered the 1961 elections in Damascus at the head of a list includ-
ing Zuhayr al-Shawish, 'UII.ar 'Awdah al-Khatib and Sa'id Ramadan. The four won,
- al-'Attar wa8 elected general overseer of tht Moslem Brothera in Syria at that
time, in the presence and with the support of Dr Mustafa al-Siba'i, who died ae a
result of his silment in 1964. al-'Attar's star as a tough politician and conaum-
mate orator rose in that period. Then the 28 March 1962 military coup took place
(the coa~nander of the army at that time being 'Abd-al-Karim Zahr-xl-Din) o The
_ preaident, Nazim al-Qudsi, and the prime minister, Ma'ruf al-Dawalibi, were ar-
rested, ihe commander of the army tendered an invitation to 13 persons (including
Akram al-Hawrani, Bashir al-'Azmah, and 'Isam al-'Attar) to take the reins of power
and form a new government. The brothers severely opposed the plan to appoint
Bashir al-'Azmah to the premierehip.
The brothers launched an intense campaign against al-'Azmah in the mosques, through
Friday sermons in particular, warning of the "Communism" of the new premier and
r~fuaing to take part in the government.
After a while, the cabinet resigned. Toward the end of 1962 the government of
Khalid al-'Azm came in. 'Isam al-'Attar says that he was offered Che miniatry,
specifically the tasks of the depuCy prime miniater, representing the Islamic cur-
rent in the country, but declined. He nominated some peopZe who sympathized with
the brothers. Thus Hamid Mazhar al-'Azmah9 'Umar 'Awdah al-Xhatib and Dr Nabil
al-Tawil were chosen from this orientation.
The litany of events repeated itself. There was the 8 March 1963 coup which bro�sght
to power Law'i al-Atasi (head of the Revolutionary Command Council) and Salah al-
Bitar (premier). In 1964, al-'Attar left Syria to perform the pilgrimageo On hia
return he was prevented from entering hia country. He tried a number of timea, but
failed. He had to emigrate to Lebanon (a year after he was asked to leave the
country), then Jordan, then Belgium and Germany, specifi~ally the city of Aach~n,
- 85 kilometers from Cologne, from which he still runs the Moslem Brothers' organiza-
tion, and the Islamic Cultural Center and Eilal Mosque in th~e city.
In this regard al-'Attar says that he dcesn't know the reas~ns wY.y he was prevented
from gctng back. No specific charges were directed against him. H~ was taleen by
- surprise by th~ confiscation of his moveable and itrmoveable goodso
Theae, most succincCly, are the most important developments in the brothers' move-
ment and political positions prior to the latest "military movement" of confronta-
tion with President hafiz al-Asad's regime.
There is another story to this movement.
Armed Clash
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Before we take up the latest developments which ~he brothers' movement in Syria
h~d gone throu~h, it ia necessary to s hed some Light on their internal organiza-
tion an~ their goals as declared in the charter.
Membership ia divided into six ranks:
Aasiatant, member, worker, fighter, union chief and deputy.
One of the requirements of the first s tage is th at the member be proficient at re-
citing the t,oly Koran; he must study the life of the prophet and religious ritual
law and memorize 40 traditions from the biography of the prophet. Then comes the
, second stage; here the member must memorize the Kiranic chapter of al-Baqarah, as
well as studying books of religious jurisprudence and historyo
In the third stage, the member must sp ecialize i n the study of a specialized field
such as tl~e bases of religious jurisp rudence, semantic juriaprudence, history or
belief4.
The main admi.ni.strative bodies are:
1. T'he ~;eneral over.seer--the general head of the body, the Guidance Office and
the Fourid i.r,g Rodye
2. The C,~~neral G:iidance Office, which is the highest administrative body of the
brcthers; supervisor of the course of pr~pselytiz ation and th~ guide and director
o� iis pr~licy. �
- 3. The Four~ding Body, which is the ge neral cons ultative council of the brothers
and the general assembly of the gener~l guide's office. The general overseer must
1~e a member of tt~e Founding Body, must have spent 5 years as a member in it, and
must ciot b~ less ti:an 30 years old.
He must pc~~se~s scholarly and moral qualities and be chosen from the members of
the Foi~~~di.:~; Bociy at a meeting attended by at least four fifths of the body's mem-
bers. Ne must obtain three quarters of the votes of those presenta Aft~r the
general oversee~- is elected, he must resign from his private worko He is not per-
mitt~d eo participate in economic or commercial activities. If he violates his
duties Y;E ~nust withdraw from his position. The Founding Body may also decide to
excuse him by the agreement of three,;quarters o~ the members.
4. The ce7ters or the administrative comnittees in each center (the center of
Hamah, tha ~.ente-r of Latakia, the center of Aleppo, and so on) .
S. The activities co~nittees (cultural, athletic, media and other activities).
The organizing law is not secret; rat her, it is widely known and published. Read-
ing the law of cons~itution of the brothers' General Body iasued 8 September 1945,
and t~~e law on the general byL~ws issued in November 1950 will help define the
goals of. r.h~ society. Article Two of the law, for instance, states:
"The broChera are a comprehensive Isl amic body s triving to achieve the goals for
whose sake the pure Islam was revealed and topresent them in a manner consonant
wS.th the spirft of the age, bringing hearts and spirita together over these
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Koranic principles, bringing the viewpoints of various Islamic groups closer to-
gether, and atriving to raise the standard of living, to develop, protect, and
liberate national resources, to achieve social justice for every citizen and to
combat ignorance, disease, poverty and evil."
Article Three of the law states the meChoda which must be followed to achieve
these goals:
"Proselytizing through publications, the press, magazines, and books, sending out
delegations and missions domestically and abroad, observing up bringing, bringing
~bout the meaning of religious devotion in the practical sense not the verbal sense
in the spirits of brethren, and training them in a proper fashion, physically,
through sports, spiritually, through worship and intellectually, through scholar-
ship. It also aims at setting forth proper platforms in all affairs of society,
frrnr education to legislation, the judiciary, admf.nistration and economics, bring-
ing thece platforms to the legislative, representational and executive bodies so
that they may emerge from the context of theoretical qualification to the role of
practical application, and also to s~trive to establish economic, social, and schol-
arly religious organizations by establiehing mosques and schools."
If we refer to the Moslem Brothers' public statementa dealing with the goals of
their movement, these concentrate on a number of points, most prominent of which
are:
- Propagating Gai's call among the people in a manner which is pure, free of flaws,
and living and connected to the age and ita problems and to the present ~nd its
requirements.
Gathering together persons who have responded to the call to Islam, steeping them
in its culture, educating them in it as individuals and groups, making them capable
of bearing it, and organizing their efforts to work for it and wage holy war on its
behalf.
Facing modesn intellectual, social, economic, political, and moral cultural
challenges.
Getting sound genuine ~slamic movements and people sincerely working for Islam to
know one another, progressing toward unity and bringing the message of Islam to
the worZd.
These are general goals. What, however, are the brothers aiming at today in Syria?
- What are their goals or demands in this regard?
~ The brothers, with their varying tendencies (about which we will talk ahortly),
do not hide the fact that they are trying to bring down the Syrian regimeo They
express this through eight demands: �
1. A stop to arbitrary arrests, brutal torture, show trials, open and secret murd-
ers, all forms of repression and terror incompatible with God~s law and human rights,
- and the immediate release of political detainees and prisoners. ~
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2, An end to the war on Islam and various Islamic elements.
3. Blimination of the state of emergency declared in the country on 8 March 1963
(thaC is, more than 16 years ago).
4. Elimination of the exceptional courts which do not provide legal guarantees and
whoae judges are generally not eubject to the authority of the Higher Judiciary
- Council.
S. Respect for human rights and basic human freedoms, Islam and the divine re-
ligiona have codified them and as has ~een stated in the International Declaration
~f Human Rights dated 10 Decenber 1948 and other international statements and agree-
ments on that subject.
6. Graciting freedom of opinion in speech, writing and publicaCion and the freedom
to meet, d~r~onstrate and form parties.
, 7. Termination of dictatorial rule in its various individual, part}r, factional
and military forms.
8. Adoption of suitable whErewithal and measures to enable the people to make a
totally ~x~~e choice of their system of life and governm~nt by themselves and to
- take the reins of their affairs entirely in their hands in their present and futureo
Taday t~~ brothera are actually divided into three main tendencies (if we except
the extremi.st elements supporting the Islamic Liberation Party established by Taqi-
al-Din a1-!tiahbani in 195L):
1. 'Isam-~l-Din al-'Attar's wing.
2. Eng `Adnan 'Aq.lah's wfng.
3. Muh~mm~-~d 'Abd-al-Rahman Khalifah's wing.
Though t1~i.s breakdown is incorrect in em~hasizing "persons" alone, it in any case
expressES a specific actual situation. This is because al-'Attar has considered
- himself h~ad of the organization since his election as general overseer in 1961.
Today he is~ues a monthly magazine from Germany bearing the title AL-RA'ID, along
_ with othzr, publications in Arabic, Snglish, German and Turkisho He conaiders that _
the Fighting Vanguard (the mujahids), under the leadership of 'Adnan 'Aqlah, are
an offshoot of tt~e movement of the brothers as a whole. AL-RA'ID adopts the posi-
tione of the Fighting Vanguard but differs with the Moslem Brothers in Egypt (~Umar
al-Taimasani) on numerous points, among them their position on Camp David, since
_ a:-~Attar c~lls for a more hostile poaition toward al-Sadat's regime. I~uhammad
'Abd-al-Rahrnan Khalifah's wing (among whose most promiaent pillars is Sa'id Hawwi)
iseues the bulletin AL-NADHIR which publishes the milit~ry data on the Fighting
Vanguard and gives it material support.
Ttce AI,-NAAHIR group is very active in a number of Ar~b countries. It differs with '
al-'Attar and does not consider him a leader of the movementa It is in total
agreement with the brothers in Egypt and cooperates with them in the context of
' the international organization, which also includes the Moslem Brothers in Lebanon
(whose most prominent men are Fathi Yakan, Faysal Mawlawi and Muha~?ad 'Ali Dannawi).
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In the magazine AL-DA'WAH, which is the organ of the brothers in Egypt, the AL-
NADtiIR group published, under Che title "A Statement on the Truth" (No 45, February
1980, p 60), the atatement that al-'Attar "has not repreaented the Mo81em Brothers
clasely or remotely in Syria or any other country for years."
AL-NAllHIR also says that a general conference of brothers was held in Damaac~s in
1971 which declared the electian of a new general overseer, Mr 'Adnan Sa~d-al-Din
(SS years old, born in Hamah, now teaching in a Gulf state)> al-'Attar has not
responded to that, but he stresses that he is the historic leader of the brothers,
and his circles stre~s that the "disputes" are in the course of being resolved and
that an announcement will soon be made on total coordination among the various
tendencies in the context of the escalation of the campaign against the Syrian
regime.
The fact is that the brothers' latest military escalation in Syria was led by the
Fighting Vanguard (the mujahids) and that it has issued a n~agazine in its name,
AL-NASR, However, only one issue of that came out, since its offices were attacked
and 11 responsible figures in the media apparatus of the organization were killed.
The Fighting Vanguard is the military wing, if the statement is proper, of the
_ brothers' movement, and it is an organization which was derived from al-'Attar's
brothers. The late Marwan Hadid, the leader from Hamah, founded it; the mujahids
Appeared on the Syrian scene in 1975 when Hadid decided to take the movement into
Damascus to confront the exceases of the regime by armed force and assassination,
The movement gained organizational and leadership independence in the latter part
of 1975. It believes in a"holy war" of confrontation with the regime. Af ter
Hadid died in combat, Eng 'Adnan 'Aqlah (28) took over leadership of the vanguard.
T.his command is situated inside Syria. 'Aqlah is pursued night and day by the
by [he "special forces" and "defense companies." It is bruited about that Mr Rif'at
al-Asad promised to give a reward of 1 million Syrian pounds to anyone leading to
the discovery of 'Aqlah, dead or alive.
The Syrian newspaper TISHRIN has pubiished a picture of him, but the brothers'
circles assert that it is not a picture of him.
'Aqlah ia still alive and well and has never been arrested, in spite of the atat~-
menta some circles in Damascus have spread about. He leads the struggle "militrsr-
ily" from inside Syria.
How Is Contact Made Inside?
What is the number o� mujahid personnel? How is the brothers' movement abroad co-
ordinated with the brothers inside?
Naturally one cannot disclose the secrets and methods of the movement here. There
are people who say that the vanguard organization's srmed trained personnel present
inside Syria today are greater than 7,000. The regime's circles answer that the -
number is much exaggerated.
Meanwhile the circles of the venguard reply "The number is much greater than some
people imagine, especially when we take into consideration the material aid people
give the organization in one form or another."
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1 VL1 V1'1'1V1L1JJ UVi:J Vl\JJ1
What there is no doubt about is that the Fighting Vanguard organization has exten- -
sions in the aru~y which constitute a permanent vexation for the regime. Many
changes in reeponsibilities and a series of "purges" which resulted in the release
of a number of officers or their transfer to civilian sectors have been made with-
in tile military institution.
Arms are "smuggled" into Syria, through Lebanon in many cases, and the "cassettes"
or "recorded conversations" of the brothers' leader ' Isam al-'Attar are used as a
means of psychological mobilization. Secret publicati ons also enter Syria contin-
uously by numerous means. One can say that there is "p ermanent contact" between
the outside and the inside.
This question remains: has the Syrian regime succeeded in dealing the armed organ-
ization a conclusive blow? Why have the armed operations quieted down lately?
The Arres~ of Zunayr al-Shawish
Informed sources assert that the Syrian regime has failed to stifle the movement =
in spite of the can,~signs of torture, constant pursuit and methods of terrorization
and enticement.
The san;e saurces assert that the "arrests," "surrenders" and "withdrawals" from
the orgai~ization which the suthorities are announcing every day do not correspond
to reality, on gr~unds that they are not devoid of exaggeration and inflation.
Sources amon~ the brothers state that Syrian intelligence has resorted to various
means to unearth organization cells and leaders insfde the country, with no results.
Three months ago in Beirut, operatives of this intelligence force arreated Mr 8uhayr
al-Shawish (manager of the Islamic Office publishing h ouse and one of the brothers'
_ historic heads), aven though he had broken off with the organization years before
ai~d had devoted himself to commercial activity (publishing and distribution) . He
was taken blindfolded to Damascus. Through threats and enticements, he was re-
que~ted to give a talk oti Syrian television supporting President Hafiz al-Asad.
He refuse~ to do so, and refused to state one word during the investigation while
he was hli~ndfolded. He was ~eleased after intense Arab pressures at Che highest _
levels.
According to sources in the brothers, the "silence" which the brothers are keeping
today oii the dcmestic scene, may be ascribed to "tactics" during which some cards
are bei.ng shuffled, military mistakes of the past are evaluated, and plans for the
future are reworked, in the Light of developments which have newly arisen.
The fact is that the Moslem Brothers are not leading the opposition movement alone.
There are other political leaders who have effective weight and roles. These lead- -
ers are also holding the reins of many matt~ra in the context of political confron-
tat~Ion and movement, working in utmost secrecy, far removed fram media commotion. _
The process of ciiange cannot take place apart from them. Naturally, talk about
these leaders has many aspects, and does not lie within the scope of this file.
COPYRiGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
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- SYRIA
RELATIONS WITH IRAN, IRAQ EXAMINED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French S Nov 80 pp 36-37
[Article by Mohamed Selhami--passages between slantlines orgl.nally published in
- italics]
[Text] Damascus is no longer a pleasant city where one saunters along.breathing
deeply of the evening breeze. Today, pedestrians, their faces anxious, desert the
streets at sunset. Damascans are afraid. Afraid of the present and Qf the future.
Afrain of the "lunacy" of the Muslim Brothers. A fusillade here, a bomb there.
Even in the cinemas in the populous quarters. The police reta~iate. More and more
active, the police chase and ki11 terrorists wherever they can find them. The
Iraqi-Iranian war ha~ added to the tension. Iraq, a next-door neighbor, is tied
to Syria through history, through blood, and...through the socialist Arab Baath,
in power in both countries, though the "brothers" are "enemies." _
/"When Iraq sneezes, Syria is sick, and vice versa /"a high Syrian official tells
us. This is why the conflict over the Schatt-al-Arab has direct consequences for
Syria. On the economy, in particular, which is beginning to suffer from the clos-
ing of the frontier with Iraq. The people in the north can no longer trade with
their neighbors. Already, those in the south are no longer p,oing to Jordan and
they avoid Lebanon.
: To this geographic and economic isolation must be added the psychosis of a new war
with Israel. A war that the Syrians believe already doomed because of Sadat's
reversal and the unavailability of Iraq.
Do the leaders really regret this unavailability? In trutY!, the man on the street
is not unaware of it: they are encouraging it [Iraq's unavailability] by suppart- -
ing Iran politically even militarily. Mistrust requires it: 40,000 soldiers have
been dispatched to the border between Deir Ex-zor and Albu Kamal. s~?~iariy,
President Hafez el-Assad has allowed certain Iraqi opponents in exile in Damascus
to go to Tehran where they are helping the Iranians against Iraq. During this
time, the Syrian press daily accuses the Baghdad regime of hegemonism and e~ansion-
ism. And the man on the street wonders. -
/"We are with the Soviet Union. So is Iraq. Logic would dictate that-we support
Baghdad...,"/ says a disquaire [translation unknown] from the Hamidya quarter,
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quite taken aback. The Syrians, moreover, hardly support the official position.
They would prefer to remain neutral. /"To condemn Iraq is to condemn the future,"/
we are told by an army general who does not see how Baghdad could one day pardon
= Damascus for "straying." Not that he fears Iraqi vengenace--/"We are strong
- enough to defend ourselves"--but /"we need Iraq to be able to stand againsC Israel _
some day."/ This what nearly all Syrians are feeling who ob~ject to this war
/"because it aggravates the disunity of the Arab world."/ For the political lead-
ers, on the other hand: /"Iran has become, since the fall of the monarchy,
a powerful ally of the Arabs. We must help it to recover its o~ind."/ Is this
the real reason? /"Certainly not,"/ a professor tells us. /"The principal reason
is the fragility of our regime, which would be discomfited by an Iraqi victory.
For we can't forget the rivalry between the two Ba'ath regimes."/
But which of the two Ba'athist factions is the more fragile? That of Baghdad has
plimged itself into a suicidal war. That of Damascus is at the mercy of Muslim
extremists who are threatening its stability, And which an overly aggressive flir-
tation with Khomeyni can only encourage.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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WESTERN SAHARA
MOROCCO SEEICING CONCILIATION WITH ALGERIA REGARDING SAHARA
Paria JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Nov 80 p 27
[Text] Since July 1980, meetings have been taking place between Morocco and
Algeria in Geneva, Paris and Ryad. On Sunday 19 October a Iiaasan II aide-de-
camp, Col Skirej, went to Algiers, carrying a message fran the King to
President Chadli Bendjedid. The c ontent of this message has not yet been
disclosed, however, there is every indication that it contained a reconciliation
proposal.
Indeed, the Moroccan sovereign has incessantly multiplied his offers to make
peace with Algeria. For example, on the occasion of the reassembly of
_ Parliament (11 October), or following the earthquake in E1 Asnam (10 October),
then on the day of sacrifice (10 October). Hassan II even urged the Moroccans
to donate all the skins fram the sacrificed sheep Co the Algerian victims.
Thus, in Rabat, everything posaible is being done to effect a reconciliation
with the neighbor. Or almost everything for there remains the battle against
the POLISARIO. The POLISARIO and, of course, Libya, ita supporter, /"to the ,
detriment of Morocco but also of Algeria"/ [in italics]. The attack launched
by the Sahraouis against the locality of.M'Hamid, in the beginning of October,
- made Hassan II state that Algeria�/"could not conaent to an attack aimed at
a symbolic town"/ [in italics]. As a matter of fact, it is in M'Hamid,
� follawing the independence of 1956, that King Mohamed V called for the liberation
of the Sahara.
The POLISARIO, nonetheless, is not easily discouraged. On Sunday 26 October it
launched a new offensive in the Haouza region. Four days earlier, it had led
an attack around Ras el-Khanfra. In both cases, the fighting was hard and
required the intervention of the Moroccan afr force. The results of the attacks
are as usual contradictory, depending on whether they came from Rabat or Algiers.
~OPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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WESTLRN SAHARA
ALGIERS DENIES CONTACTS WITfi MOROCCO REGARDING SAH~iRA
Paris MA~tCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITER.RANEENS in French 7 Nov 80 p 2954
[TextJ Last 30 October, the NKTO General Assembly Decolonizacion Committee,
by 49 votes against 6, which included Morocco, and 44 abstentions, passed a -
resolution supported by some 40 countriea. Among the latter was Alger ia which
- reiterated "the inalienable right of the Western Saharan people to self-
determination and independence and the le gality of the stuggle they are waging
for the exercise of this right."
The resolution addresses a new appeal to Morocco "to join in the forceful peace
effort and put an end to the occupation of Western Sahara." It insistently
invites Morocco and the POLISARIO Front, "representative of the Western Saharan
people," to enter into immediate negotiations for the purpose of arriving at
a final settlement of the matter. Besides Morocco, Senegal, Zaire, Israel,
Guatemala and Guinea voted against this matter. '
The approved resolution also welcomes the QAU [Organization of Africa~x Unity]
endeavors, but, in addition, "reaffirnis the United Nation's resolution to '
cooperate fully with the OAU :.n order to enable the Western Saharan pe ople to '
exercise their right to selfdetermination and independence."
On the other hand, the committee rejected a Morocco-Senegalese resolution,
expressing satisfaction with the peace plan to which the OAU Co~nittee of Wise
~ Men is cammitted and asking all the statea to refrain from any activity which
= could interfere with this plan.
~ Although this new stand taken by the United Nation's fourth committee delighted
the Sahar~ns, it was a very keen disappointment for Rabat as it was very pleased
with the resolution on Western Sahara, proposing a mediation by the "Nine'0 between
Algeria and Morocco, which the European Parliament Policy Committee passed 2 weeks
ago. The Moroccan daily paper, OPINION, Istigal organ, whose leader is M'Hamed
Boucetta, minister of foreign affairs, regreta that the United Nation Coaimittee
had "jeopardized" the peace plan undertaken by the (k4U to find a peaceful solution ,
to the Saharan problem, by passing the resolution aponsored by Algeria on this
~ matter.
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After having emphasized that the real solution to the Saharan problem lay "in
the undertaking of negotiations between Rabat and Algeria," the paper stated that
"the res toration of Sahara to the mother country was irreveraible as it is
legitimate and in conforniity with the principles and norms of international right."
On the other hand, regarding the rimmors that are going round about the alleged
icrmediate and secret contacta, at a somewhat high level, between Algerians
and Moroccana on the Saharan affair, we notice that they were recently flatly
denied by the two countriea. In Parie, Mr Boucetta did so officially in a
atatement to the AFP [French Press Agency], adding however: "Our concern is
mainly to create a climate of trust and cooperation."
~ In Algiers, from a less official source, they stres~ed that Algeria's position
regarding the clash of interests over Western Sahara, which is setting the
POLISARIO Front against Morocco, has not changed. For the Algerian Government,
the Weatern Sahara affair is a decolonization problem with which the two main
partiee, the POI,ISARIO Front and Morocco, should come to grips. This attitude,
they repeat, ia in principle not at all inconsistent with the assistance given to
the Saharans for the same reason that it is given to other national liberation
movements.
The Algerian daily paper, EL MOUD3AHIU, on 2 November, has itself formally
denied the reports c aning from abroad regarding the existence of such contacts
between Algeria and Morocco. It clearly states that these "r~ors" were purely
deceptive measures intended to confuse and delude the world at the.very time
when the United Nations General Assembly was looking into the Western Saharan
records.
"As if Algeria were going to prove false to its principle~ and negotiate at the _
expense of the Saharan people," EL MOUDJAHID went on to say, and accuRing Morocco
of "persisting in ita deaire to delude the international community, while seeking
to make it believe that the Western Saharan problem is the result of an Algerian- _
Moroccan bilateral clash."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris 1980
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WESTERN SAHARA
BRIEFS
SDAR EMBASSY IN LOME--New SDAR Embassy [to be built?] in Lome. same 100 km from the ;
one in Cotonou (Benin). The POLISARIO thus seems to have more financial resources
at its disposal than several constituted states that prefer, as far as they are
concerned, to have one single agency for the region in one capital or another.
_ [TextJ [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 8 Oct 80 p 31] 9064 ~
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