JPRS ID: 9433 WORLDWIDE REPORT NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERATION

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JPRS L/9433
9 December 1980
_ Worldwide Re ~rt -
p
NJ~LEAR DEVELOPME%i i AND PRl7LIFERATION -
CFOUO 12/80)
F~IS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVI~E
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;
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JPRS L/9433
9 December 1980
- WORLDWIDE REPORT -
_ NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERATION !
(FOUO 12/80)
CONTENTS
ASIA
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Chinese Nuclear Strate~y Discussed
(Georges Tan Eng Sok; STRATEGIQUE, No 3, 1980) 1
EAST EUROPE
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Data, Material Used on Nuclear Power Station Given
- (TECHNICKY TYDENNIK, 23 Sep 80) 31 -
- NEAR EAST AND NOR1'H A~'RICA
IRAQ
Damage to C~irak Dome Reported
(L'EXPRESS, 18 Oct 80) 33
SUB-SAAARAN AFRICA .
NIGER
Meeti.ng on Uranium Price Decline
(MARCHES TROPICAIJX ET I~DITERRANEENS, 10 Oct 80) 35
� - a - ~III - WW - 141 FOUO] -
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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
CHINESE NUCLEAR STRATEGY I~iSCU3SED ~
Paris STRATEGIQUE in French No 3,1480 pp 26-62 -
~Article by Georges Tan Eng Bak*a
~Text1 This article does not deal wi.th China's positions in _
- regard to nuclear proiiferation or to arms control, these two
topica being themsclves the subjec~ of another asticle.
Sources:
We have worked solely with documentati~n drawn from the public
domain suct, as press dispatches and radio broadcasts.
_ To not buxden the text needlessly with tao many bibliographical
references, we i.ndiaate below the principal s~urce materials =or
this article; _
_ 1) The Fei--ch' ing Nien-pao (~'aipei ) 1967 and 1968 Yearbooks, and
those of their successors, Chung-kung Nien-pao from 1969 onward;
2) 29 issues of the GONGZUO TONGXUN ~Bulletin o� Activities~ .
covering the first half o� 1961. These are internal documerits
intended only for officers of the P]'.A CPeoples bib:eration ~r;ny~
from regimental commanders up. Released ~n August 1963 by the
- State Department of the United Sta~es, these documen~s are a
treasure house of information and, above all, of details that
appear not to have sufferecl the erosions of time. They moreover
provide an insight into thE state of mind and preoccupations of
' the BLA cadres before the Gultusal Revolution;
3) The magazine CHUNG-ItUNG Y~N-CHIU (Taipei) published a major
study by Xiang Zhuanshu on the Chinese potential and nuclear
strategy, sezialxzed in seeen issi~es beginni.ng in April 1979.
We extracted from it a aubs't~ntiai compila~ion of raw data.
* Georges Tan Eng Bok (].951) has already pablished one article: "Mili.tary System
and PolitiCal System in Communist China" in STRATEGIQUE No 2.
, 1.
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Abbreviations;
DN ~DEFENSE NATIONALE~ -
FEER ~FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVI~W~
IS CISSUES AND STUDIES~
JFJB ~JIEFANGJUN BAOa
NCNA ~NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY~
RMRB ~RENMUN RIBAO~
SCMP ~SURVEY OF MAINLAND CHINA PRESS~
CY ~CHUNG-KUNG YEN-CHIU~
In China, the development of r~uclear weapons responds to pol~tical ends. China's
leaders are bent on ~quipping the nation with the indispensable material means for
ensuring its national independence ard territorial integtity. They ars also
making clear their rejection of the nuclear duopoly that enables the United States _
and the USSR to impose a bipolar international system. In the context of recent .
years--the end o~ the 1950's and beginning of the 1960's--this bipolar system
- signified the impossibility of a national reunification, since the American zone
_ of influence included Taiwan. By becodning a"nuclear power," China delivered
itself fro;,~ Soviet guardianship and pr.otected itself from an American aggression
that its leaders deemed probable at the time.l _
~ China's currently inverted perception of these threats does not change ~he under-
~ying principles of its nuclear power. But the qualitative evolution of nucZear _
- weapons technology is eroding its "accession-emancipation"2 character. We have in
mind, of course, the advent of accurate ballistic weapons systems that, by _
enabling selective attacks, tend to alter the absolutist nature of nuclear deter-
rence.
Without going so far as to consider it from the standpoint of a counterforces ~
capability, and even assuming it remains in the nature of a deterrent by a weaker
- power against the stronger, it appears evident to us nevertheless that China's
nuclear deterrent capability cannot hope to maintain its credibility in the -
- absence of certain material improvements. But will evolution of ~ts equipment
alone be sufficient? Will it not also be necessary to teconsider certain aspects
~ of its use which, in our opinion, still includes 5ome obscure points?
2
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Its Means
- Basic Research "
Personnel
China's personnel withstands comparison at the international level. Most of its
experts are graduates of Western universities, among which Caltech and MIT pre-
dominate. Some of th2m have taught in thoae universities and carried on re~earch
in them,
In accordance with the objective;~ of the Chinese nuclear program, these experts
pertain to three disciplines: nuclear physics, of course, but also aeronautics and
s4tomation. Well known figures such as Qian Sanqiang, Qian Weichang, Qian Xeusen,
Wang Gangchang and Zhou Peiyuan need no introduction from us; the many studies
dealing with the Chinese nuclear potential cite them frequently.3 We would like
to~point out, however,two reports that appeared recently in the Chinese press: -
--In its July 1978 issue, LA CHINE EN CONSTRUCTION published a highly laudatory
article on Wou Tchong-houa, direator of the Institute of Mechanics of the Academy
of Sciences. In 1950, Wou Tchonq-houa presented a theory on three-dimensional =
= subaonic and supErsonic flows in turbojet engines at an annual meeting of the
- American Society of Mechanical Engineers. This theary makes i~ possible t~ design -
high-performance jet engines. It was the basis for the design o~ the Rolls Royce
' Spey engine mounted on the Trident airliner and the Phantom F-4K; the T-69 enqine i
on American radio-controlled aircraft; and the Bneing 747 engine;4
--In November 1978, the NCNA reported the admission of Wang Daheng, director of
the Institute of Precision Optical Apparatus in Changchun, into the Chinese
Communist Party. During the 1960's, he developed the first Chinese laser.5 =
Research
Research is carried out through the combined efforts of three major sectors:
the Army, the Academy of Sciences, and certain mini~stries for the mechanical
industries. Within the PLA, three centers are involved in the nuclear pro- .
gram: the Academy of ,ilitary Sciences, the National Defense Commission on
Science and Technology, and certain sections of the Zone of Interior Services
Department. Within the Academy of Sciences, at least five institutes participate
in the research effort: the Institute of Hi.gh-Atmospheric Physics, the Electronics
Institute, the Institute of Automation, the Institute of Nuclear Energy, and thE
institute of Mechanics.
Aside from these institutes, the contributions c: certain highly scientific com-
panies, such as the Chinese Aeronautics Company, the Chis?ese Electronics Company,
the Chinese Mechanics Company, and the Chinese Automation Company, sheuld not be
overlooked, as also the role played by the University of Science an~ Technology.
Three ministries for mechanical industries contribute their knovr-hows and poten- -
- tials: the Second, for nuclear energy; the Fourth for ele~:tronics; and the Seventh
for ballistic missiles.
3
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Locations of Centers
In this regard, we note a concentration in the Northwest:6
--at Lanzhou, a complex of three centers to which power is supplied by two hydro-
electric dams: one producing 600,000 kia and the other 1,225,000 kW; one gaseous- .
diffusion isotope separation ccnter that went into operation in 1963 and is
producing 100 kq of uranium-235 a year, with a peak production of 500 kg in 1967;
. an adjoining plant, the Helan Shan one, using the centri�uqe process a~nd producing
400 kg of uranium-235 annually.
--the Huangyuan plant in Qinghai: c~npZeted in 1962, it has included, since 1965,
an underground section at ~ depth of 30 neters, where thermonuclear weapons are -
being manufactured;
--the Yumen plant in ~ansu: since the end of 1966, it has been producing 200 kg
of plutonium 239 a year;
--~he Baotou plant in Shanxi: In service since 1964, it is equipped with two
large nuclear reactors and i::s production is estimated at 40 kg of plutonium-239
a year.~
Nuclear Testing
Si,nce 1964, China has carried out 25 tests.8 From the outset of each test, foreign
observers have not failed to express, on each occasion, their surprise at the
level of techni~al expertise the Chinese had attained in the short intervening
times. 1'he first explosion was charactecized by two major features: the use of
enriched uranium-235, which had necessi~tated a gaseous-diffusion process starting
from uranium-238, marking an advance over the methods that had been chosen by the ~
_ French and the English; and detonation by implosion. The second test, 7 months
later, consisted of a bomb of some 30 kilotons dropped from a TU-4. The following
year, the Chinese exploded a 200-kiloton bomb doped with lithium-6 and dr~pped
from a TU-16. The fourth test, 5 months later, also failed to pass unnoticed:
"The experiment was unprecedented, since it was the first time that a rocket and
the warhead it is designed to deliver have been tested simultaneously."9 Finally,
in 1967, a 3-megaton thermonuclear bomb was exploded using fihe 3 F principle
(fission-fusion-fission). On this occasion, China expressed its well-earned pride:
"China has taken only 2 years and 8 months between the explosion of its first
atomic bomb in October 1964 and the successful test o� its hydroqen bomb. To
accomplish i;he same thing the United States 7 years and 4 months, the Soviet Union
4 years, and Great Britain 4 years and 7 months. China's time was therefore the
world's fastest."10 This exoeriment, however, appears to have marked an apogee,
following which China's advances begar: to slow down, particularly as regards the
development of missiles. Economic imperatives intervened at that point, and
~ China's political climate over the last decade has not tended to produce great _
ecanomic strides. But leti us beware of hasty conclusions, for, since 1976, China's
economy and its sciences have followed new and very encouraging directions in
this regard.
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Current Nuclear Weapons Systems Development
Development is proceeding in three directions: ICBM's ~Intercontinental Ballistic
Miasiles~, SNLE's ~Missile-Launching Nuclear Submarines~ and SLBM's ~Submarine-
Launched Ballistic Missiles~, and ANT's ~Tactical Nuclear Weapons~. Since 1472,
these programs have stagnated. Among the possible different reasons, the diffi-
culties encountered by the Chinese in the development of so].id fuels may have
played an essential role.
ICBM
In an interesting article on Chinese space activities, published in DEFENSE
NATIONALE,11 P. Herpaix has pointed out the close kinship that exists between
- ballistic missiles and satellite launchers, and neither the United States nor the
USSR, nor China now, can escape that common kinship. In September 1973, it was
learned that China had tested a missile with a 5,600-km range. Subsequer~tly
identified as the CSS-3, it ser~ed also as the satellite 3.auncher for China's
third, fourth and fifth space trials. Because of its range, the CSS-3 represents ~
a first stage in China's ICBM development program. 1975-1~76 saw the start of
experimentation on a longer-range missile: the CSS-X-4. According to indic:ations
by Ren.Xinmin, director of the Chinese Space Institute, while visiting Japan in
1978,12 this missile, tchis 200-ton, liquid-fuel propelled missile consists of
three stages and would appear to resemble the Titan-2 or the So-9. Its range
appears to be 10,000-~11,C00 km. A Japanese source attributes to it an explosive ~
torce of 1 megaton.l3
Two experimental launchings of the CSS-X-4 took place in 1979.14 Two others were
- recently carried out between 18 and 21 May 1980. But not until the Chinese suc-
ceed in d~veloping adequate solid propellants,15 will their program experience a
substantial advance. Sound financial considerations evidently keep them from
c~evoting major resources to the c?evelopment of first-generation ballistic missiles.
Reversal of threats serves their purpose equally well: Their ICBM's were aimed _
, specifically at the United States while the USSR is within range of their IRBM's
~Intermediate-Ranqe Rallistic Missiles~.
In our opinion, the Spring 1980 tests are to be interpreted in four ways. From
a general standpoint, the Chinese must maintain their research potential. Con-
sidering the presence of observation ships in the planned impact zone, the launch-
ings probabl.y had to do with the system of guidance and the accuracy of the
missile. Similarly, we cannot exclude the development of solid propellants. And
lastly, these tests preceded by only a few days the visit of Geng Biao, chairman
of the Central Committee's Commission on Military Affairs, to the United States,
responding to Harold Brown'a visit to China. It was impc~rtant for the Chinese
delegation not to arrive empty-handed for their talks on miZitary matters with
their hosts.
SNLE and SLBM
The plan to build a nuclear submarine goes back to 1965. Initial experiments
began in June 1968 in the F,ed Flag Shipbuilding establishment in Dalian. Jane's
1975-1976 Y~arbook reported that this submarine would be called the "Han." An
5
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in-depth study by Ti Chung-heng, which appeared in the April ~.~77 issue of
MING-PAO YACIi-K'AN, indicated that tests of the "Han," beginning in 1974, had
revealed a number of defects sur,h that, currently, it is often berthed: The
nuclear boiler is not yet fully~tried and tested, and the "Han" cannot be taken
to its i,ntended cruising range,
Thus, China has encountered at least �our obstacles: the prop~lsion problems just
mentioned in the case of the "Han"; th.e advance~ technology of underw~~.ter tele-
communications; the dQVelopment of soYid fuels or, strictly speaking, stockable
liquid fuels; and mastery of the tEChniques af cold launches. If China seeks to
develop an SNLE to patrol in the vicinity of its coasts, it will also have to have
an SI.BM of a ranqe equivalent to that of the American Trident. The technical
diffi.culties and the financial cosk of such a project pla~ce it out of China's
reach, For the time being at least. If China settles for an SNLE to patrol the
Arct:ic or the Indian Ocean, it can limit the range of its SLBM to that of an IRBM.
But in the latter case, the operational distance away from the Chinese coasts
raises additional problems. To keep two submarines on continuous patrol would _
rectuire, according to a study by E. Luttwak presented at the 7th Chinese-American
Conference on the Chinese Continent, oryanized aL Taipeh under the auspices of
the IIR ~expansion unknown~,l~ at least six SLNE's of this class; hence, a far
- from negligible zinancial burden. Telecommunications with submarines raises other
problems as well. In principle, "the intensit~� of the received field decreases
exponentially with depth and varies inver.sely with distance from the transmitter
and with f.requency";18 hence, the advantages of very long wavelengths (VLF) ~very
1ow frequen:ies~, subject, however, to resolving the problem of adequately high-
- powered transmitters, and miniaturization and protection of antennas. Multi-
plicity of stations is perhaps a solution if we disregard the dissuasive aspect -
of f~nancial cost: The United States has 10 stations it can use for its submarines,
and the USSR 9(9 in Siberia, 3 in European Russia and 2 on the North Sea).
_ Lastly, in the inverse direction, namely, transmissions from submaric?e.to surface,
the Chinese must also overcome the risks of goniometric lo~ation of emission~ and
consequently that of the transmitting submarine. By way of information, we point
out that, in 1967 and 1977, China sent some oceanographic research ships into the
Pacific to carry out various tests, including experiments on communications to
land,l9
ANT
We use the term ANT here to designate a type of weapon based on the energy it
releases, disregarding its possible employments. Within the terms of this defini-
tion, certain scientific works publisned in communist China are indicative of
_ that country's interest in Enhanced-radiation weapons.
_ In 1978, W. Ruper~ translated, in a specialized Viennese magazine,20 an article
published in the December 1977 issue of KEXUE SHIJIAN ~Scientific Experimentation~.
This ~rticle, signed by Zhanq Mengjun and titled "The Neutron Bomb," deals with
_ the principles and applications of this weapon. According to the reference notes,
this study was bas~d mainly on an article by Fred M. Kaplan: "Enhanced-Radiation
Weapons appearing in the May 1977 issue of SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN. Among these
notes, we think it desirable to point out an important passage concerning the
Lance. -
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More recently, in the August 1979 issue of a magazine published in Shanghai, -
HEJISHU ~Nuclear T~:chniques~, an article dealt with "measurement of the explosive ~
force o� shells based on detonation by fast neutrons."21 This article, a purely
technical one in nature, discusses the determination of the ratio between fast and
sls~w neutrons. It deals also with the initiation of the fusion reaction. Can we
deduce from this that China is in the process of developing neutron artillery
shells?
' If thzs is so, the slowdown perceived in the development of nuclear weapons would _
only be masking a long-term program dealing with the design and production of
weapons of anather technological level. This possibility has also been addressed,
by Thomas W. Etzold, professar of strategy at the United States Naval College,
during a canference held in Tai~ei in June 1978.22 In this case, it could be a
matter of a choice between present needs arising from the sole Soviet threat and ~
the future needs of a nation bent on surpassing its merely regional influence. _
To the extent the latter needs prevail, the Chinese leadership could settle for
a minimal security accompanied by a more flexible policy toward the USSR. This
approach seems to us the more logical, for, in the pzesent state of its economic
a~~d scientific capabilities, China oould not produce other than equi~ment of a
past generation. This is equally true of its ICBM's and SLBM's.
' The Second Artillery
The Second Artillery gr.oups the ChinesF nuclear forces. It has been known by
several successive designations.
Histarical
Upon coming into power, the communists immediately showed an interest in the
applications of nuclear physics. True, they were already endowed with s~ientists `
- of renown. But research for military ends did not start until after 1957.
In 1957, a high-ranking Chinese military delegation arrived in Moscow to take part
in the festivities of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution. Headed by
Peng Dehuai, Ye Jianying and Su Yu, this 20-member delegation was invited ta visit
the Red Army Academy and the principal military applied scientific research
centers. It was subsequently Zearned that China and the USSR had just signed an
"agreement on new national defense techniques" covering 122 categories of coopera-
tion.
From that point on, the pace of events quickened. In February 1958, the Second
Ministry for Mechanical Industry, which since its creation in 1952 had been res-
ponsible for weapons production, took charge of nuclear weapons. The following
month, an Academy of Military Sciences was opened in Peking. It was intended to
familiarize the higher-level cadres of.the PLA with the problems of nuclear -
strategy. And surely in accordance with the 1957 agreement, the Soviets began
delivering missiles ~o the PLA. They were no doubt short-range missiles,23
probably Frog-1's. The first launch trials took place beginning in 1959 at
Qilianshan in Qinghai and at Shuang-nhengzi in Gansu.
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GONGZUO TONGXUri mentioned, in 1961, the existence of "Special Techniques Units"
(tezhong budui) recommending that youths with college degrees in the sciences
be assigned to it. The qualifications being sought indicated the role of these
units in the missiles field. The Special Techniques Units were thus the precur-
sors of the Second Artillery. Then, between 1962 and 1964, "Units 83" (Basan
budui) were displayed in Peking, Luoyang (Henan), Zhangzi (Shanxi), Datong at
S kilometers south of Tianjin, and in the district of Conghua (Guangdong). In
1965, a 4-digit number was assigned to the units of the PLA. Units 83 must have
been includEd in this change, because no further~men~ion was made of this designa-
tion. This did not halt the continuation of experimentation: 4n 24 October 1966,
the fourth Chinese nuclear test was carried out using a Soviet Sandal SS-4 missile.
On ttie occasion of the 46th anniversary of the fou nding of the CCP (20 June 1967),
mention was made, for the first time, of a"Second Artillery" (di'er paobing),
sparking intensive interest.. Militar~ ana2ysts were quick to identify the
Second Artillery with the Chinese nuclear forces. But to date, to the best of
our knowledye, no Chinese source has ever confirmed or denied this assertion. On
the other hand, a recent RADtO-PEKING broadcast indicated that the National
Defense Commission on Science and Technology also has missile units. These, -
however, probably serve only .an experimental purpose.
Organization
The or5anization of the Second Artillery consists of two eche'ons. The central
~~chelon includes the general staff, the Policy Department and the Department of
Zone of Interior Services. At the regional level there is a Major Military
Regional Command.
Tactically, the ~attalion is the basic unit. The internal structure of the
battalion varies according to the nature of the equipment in service. According
to estimates by Taiwanese services, there are 4 types of surface-surface missile _
battalions:
--SRBM of 30-100 km range: 1 battalion of 3 batteries, each battery equipped with
around 6 rnissiles;
--5RBM of up to 300 km range: 1 battalion of 3 batteries, 1 launching ramp per
battery;
MRBM of 1,000-1,500 km range: 1 battalion of 3 batteries at most, 2 of which
equipped with 1 launching ramp per battery;
- --IRBM of over 1,500 km range: 1 battalion equipped with 1 launching ramp.
't'he Second Arti~lery also includes surface-air missile units. The surface-air
missile units are organized as Eollows: 1 communications section, 1 headquarters
and ~A~dquarters company, 1 engineer section, 1 transportation section, 1 Fan
Song L~ or Gin Sling radar section, and 3 surface-air missite batteries. Each
battery is equipped with from 4 to 6 type CSA-1 missiles (SA-2 Guideline).
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Potential
Its strategic nuclear forces consist o�:
a) Ballistic missiles
--MRBM: 30 to 40 type CSS-1 (1,100 km range);
--IRBM: 50 to 70 type CSS-2/5andal SS-4 (1,.fi00-1,800 km ranqe dependnng on warhead);.
--reduced-range ICBM: 3 type CSS-3 (5,600 km range).
b) Aircraft-deliverabl.e missiles
--80 to 90 Badger TU-16 subsonic (cruising range 2,500 km).
~
- According to tests carried out,25 the missiles can carry 20-kt warheaus, and the
Badger TU-16 one 10- to 200-ton atomic bamb or a 3-MT thermonuclear bomb. In its -
"Handbook on the Chinese Armed Forces" published in 1976, the DIA {Defense Inte1-
ligence Agency) of the United States estimates that the CSS-2 uses stockable
liquid propellant and can deliver a 2- to 3-MT yield.
The composition of its tactical nuclear weapons is less known, but they probably
include:
a) Nuclear artillery shells
According to Jane's,26 China has received type 5-23 180-mm shells from the USSR.
This type of we3pon is known for its ability to deliver nuclear yields of 1 to 5
kt.
b) SRBM
Under the 1957 Sino-Soviet agreement, the USSR is committed to furnish SRBM's to
China. The type of missile actually furnished is unknown, but the Soviet SRBM's
in service at that time were the Frog-1 and Scud-A. CHUNG-KUO YEN-CHIU has
mentioned a Chinese SRBM with a range of around 1Q0 km, the 2`-5.27 -
c) Aircraft-deliverable missiles: the Qiang-5, derived from the Mig-19, is capable
of delivering a tactical nuclear bornb.
Operational Capabilities
We refer here to the theoretical capability. The CSS-1 could reach the Soviet -
West; the CSS-2, eastern Asia and central Asia; the CSS-3, all of Asia, part of
European Russia, Australia and part of the Middle East. The CSS-4, under experi-
mentation, could reach the United States. Howev~�r, all of these missiles have the _
- disadvantage of being liquid-propelled, which means a delay of several hours bet-
ween the decision to detonate it and the actual firing. During this rather long
interval exposed to the open air, these missiles offer a target for an enemy
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counterforces strike, against which they are able to guard until then owing to
their semimobility or by remaininy shelt?red in natural uavities fitted out f.or
_ the purpose. Silos would reduce this vulnerability,28 but does China have them?
_ In sum, ~hinese missiles represent only an anticity capability.
- U~es
Compariny Chinese p~blic statements on tne use of nuclear weapons with certain
passages in GONG2U0 TONGXUN, an internal bulletin reslricted to the rather hiyh-
level cadres of the APL, Jonathan D. Pollac suggests the idea of a sharp disparity
between these two points of view.29 The reference materials he has used actually
_ bear him out. However, in our opinion, he has compared sources of a different
nature and, above a~l, of different hierarchic levels. The public statements
' issue Lrom the supreme policy body charged with defining the overall policy guide-
lir.es, whereas those to whome GONGZUO TONGXUN is addressed must concern themselves
with mi.litary operations based on these guidFlines. A similar distinction, gener-
- ally speaking, is found in the Soviet tJnion as well, between doctrine and the art
of war: Doctrine sums up the ~irectives of the Central Committee which the Army
must apply within the terms of reference of the military arts. Under these
conditions, a distinction should be d:awn between the principle and its modes of
use.
The Princ.iple
T:~e ^!':nciple emerges from an overall strategy that is at one and the same time
political, diplomatzc, economic and military in the service of a single aim: to
preserve ~ational independence. In accordance with this aim, Chinese military
; doctrine is essentially defensive: "Our preparations in anticipation of an eventual
war are entirely defensive. If we are not attacked, we will not attack; but if
we are attacked, we wi11 counterattack. This is our con~istent, reasonable and
solemn position."30 This statement, dating back to 1971, has not taken on any
wrinkles: It was reaffirmed during China's conflict with Vietnam in February 1979.
, It defines the principle of China's eventual use of nuclear weapons. On 16
October 1~64, tPie day of its first nuclear test, the Chinese government issued the
Pollowing statement:
"The developmen t of nuclear weapon~ in China ensures its defense and the protection
- of the Chinese people... On the question of nuclear weapons, China will never
commit the errai 3~ irresponsibility, nor that of irresolution. The Chinese people
can be believed."
It adds to this its total refusal to be the first to use the weapon: "The Chinese
government solemnly declares that,at no time and under no circumstances will China
be the first to use nuclear weapons."
The principle governing the u~e of nuclear weapons by China could thus be summar-
ized as follows: For the needs of its defense, China will not hesitate, in case
_ of a nuclear aggression, to respond using weapons of the same nature.
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= The Modes
Before addressing the modes, it seems to us well to recall so:~e general nelevant
concepts defined by Mao Zedang.
1) War takes on a class character: "War, which began with the advent of private
property pertaining to classes, is the supreme form of struggle to resolve, at a _
- given point in their development, the contradictions between classes. If one does
not underskand the conditions of war, its character, its relationship to other
phenomena, one does not know the laws of war, does not know how to conduct it, and
is incapable of winning it."32 _
2)It is not only a ma~ter of winning the battle, but also of annihilating the _
aggressor: "The blows dealt to the enemy must aim to annihilate him; otherwise,
they make nc sense.33 In case of an attack on the enemy and to the extent that
' conditions enable us to beat him, our party will automatically take the position
of legitimate c3efense to annihilate him .*.esolutely, radically, integrally and
totally."34 Sir.ce the Pek~~~y leadershi~, bases itself on Marxism-Leninism, we must _
complete the first of these statements concerning the class character of war with -
this analysis, by Lenin, of international relations: "The period of modern
capitalism shows us that among capitalist groups there becoane_ established
certain relationships based on an economic division of the world, and .
that concurrently and consequently, araong political groups, among states, there
become established relationships based on a territorial division of the world, on
_ a struggle for colonies, on a strugglefor economic territories."35 In sum, only
imperialism yesterday and socioimperialism today nurture warlike intentions in
regard to China, not to control a territory, but to add to~their economic
potential. -
Under these conditions, the Chinese leadership does not shrink back from the
principle of a strategic bombardment, fully aware though it is of its destructive
effects. The ultimate aini of war being the acquisition of an economic potential,
the reason for being of such bombardment is, in their view, dim. Thus, the
development of an aggression against China would necessarily end up in conventional
type confrontations: "Although atomic bombs are very powerful, they serve only to
destroy the centQrs and economic reserves of the enemy during the strateqic bom-
- bardment phase. Thereafter, the~ serve mainly as supporting fire in preparation
for the assault, In any case, armies and conventional weapons are necessary to
finish a war, destroy the enemy, occupy territories,.and win victory. To count~~36
on armies and conventional weapons means according primacy to the human factor.
, Furthermore, the sparse concentration of Chinese economic objectives would lessen
their vulnerability in case of strategic bombardment: Nuclear weapons are
more of a threat t~ imperialist and socioimperialist countries, where industry and
populations are more concentrated. Our national economy has agriculture as its
base and industry as a dominant factor. A policy canbining industry and agricul-
ture, cities with the countr.yside, large enterprises with small and medium ones,
and peacetime work.with preparedness for,war fears neither modern weapons nor
bombardments."37
In addition, a sustained policy of civil de�ense was put into operation beginning
in 1973. That year, the joint editocial of the RENMIN RIBAO, the HONGQI and the
LIEFANGJUN BAO for the feast of the New Xear used Mao ~edong's directive: "Dig
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- deep underground shelters, store vast reserves of grain everywhere, and never act -
like a superpower." Very recently, the NCNA revealed the existence of an urbaniza- _
tion and civil defense plan ~or Peking covering the period 1979-1985.38 From a '
more general standpoint, Marshal Ye Jianying advocated, during the 3rd National
Conrerence for Antiaircraft Defense of the People, the adaptation of urban and _
infrastruc~ural constructions to the imperatives of civil defense,39 -
On tne ether hand, the Chinese leadership devotes a great deal of interest to the _
possible uses of the tactical nuclear weapon. "Although the atomic bomb is a
paper tiger, it is no less true that atomic weapons are u real danger. Their
destructive capability is relatively substantial, and while we may ~isregard them
from a strategic standpoint, we must take them very seriously into account from
the tactical standpoint. If we tvish to overcome the nuclear forces of imperialism _
and soci~i4perialism, we too must develop our own nuclear and conventional
- arsenals." D ~
This statement is of recent date: 1977. Moreover, the officers of the PLA have
- been schooled for a long time on the battlefield uses of chemical and bacterio-
logical weapons:
"When launching an attack, we must be able to concentrate rapidly our manpower -
and firepower on the lines of advance of our offensive and exploit the effects of
a nuclear strike. WY:en the situation demands it, we must also be capable of
dispersing and camouflaging ourselves rapidly. In a defensive situation, we must
have the capability of concentrating our manpower and firepower at essential
points, and of organizing4~nd protecting ourselves against nuclear, chemical and
bact.eriological weapons.
This text dates back to 1961, a period in which China did not yet have nuclear
, weapons. In this regarc:, it should be noted that in 1958 there appeared in China
a collection of studies on nuclear weapons: "Yuanzi Wuqi Lunwen Ji."42 It was the
translation of a Soviet treatise published in 1955, dealing with the following
~oints: bases af nuclear physics, causes of the destructive effects of an atomic
war, aerial bombardments and civil defense.
In 1961, the units of the PLA on a regi.mental level and above received instruction
not only in NBC ~nuclear, bacteriological, chemical~ defense but also in the =
principles of the use of these weapons. But although the leaders of the PLA _
~ sustain the principle of a nuclear strike, such an eventuality would not supervene _
except within tY,e terms of a battle to defend China against an aggression. It is
not a.matter, therefore, as J. D. Pollack would have it, of a concept of use that
departs from the official viewpoints. Moreover, since the military engag~ment .
aims at the annihilation of invasion forces, a recourse to.nuclear weapons in no
way implies their use without the use of conventianal weapons. The recourse to
nuclear weapons must be interpreted within a combination of all the means neces- _
sary to destr.oy "resolutely, radically, integrally and totally" the aggressors.
This pr.oposition could cast light on the designation "Second Artillery" given to
the Chinese nuclear forces. However, from a semantic viewpoint, a Second Artil-
- lery would in~ply the existence of a First Artillery. If this were the case, would
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not the Second Artillery comprise a?1 those weapons in their entirety which, _
though being comparable with those of the First Artillery, or the traditional
- artillery, as regards their mode of use, nevertheless differed from the latter
in their technical characteristics? The Second Artillery does in fact include
' also the surface-air missile units. Furthermore, it could include Styx SRBM
- battalions a5signed to coastal defenae. We advance this hypothesis for two
reasons: ~ertain phot~graphs published by the NCNA show Styx batteries on the sea-
coast, but the tactical organization of the coast artillery divisions, under the
~ Navy,43 do not, to our knowledge~ include Styx units.
Critical Analysis
These principles and modes of application call, in our apinion, for some comments: -
1) The Chinese argiiments in support of the scarce probability of strategic bom- "
bardments appears to us soundly based, In this regard, one cannot avoid linking
them with the slowdown noted in the ICBi~, SNLE and.SLBM p~:ograms, since,.under
these conditions, the latter wPapons would lose their priority status, at least
for the time bei;~g. These arguments also recall those developed by Samuel T.
Cohen and by Colonel Geneste i.n favor of a nuclear barrage. Tn particular, t~e
latter writes:
Bombardment alone does not conquer; it only enables the conquest that
must be effected by the army and the maintaining of infantrymen and tanks on the
objective.'~44
However, in the event of a Soviet-Chinese conflict, there is nothing t~ indicate
that the USSR would follow this reasoning. As Alain Besancon has so wisely
~ remarked: purely strategic reasoning is sterile if it is not subjected to
poli~ical reasoning. This is the way the Soviets proceed.�45
Under these conditions, although the USSR may be interested in the economic
potential of Western Europe, it need not be sparing of China for the same reasons: _
"China is neither controllable--too vast--nor exploitable--too poor--nor decisive
- in the overriding socialism-versus-nonsocialism conflict."46
= Besides, the concept of Sc~iet strategic bombardments with coercive aims cannot be
disregarded as long as the credibility of a Chinese nuclear deterrent remains in
doubt.
During one of the conferences mentioned above, Edward N. Luttwak developed a
scenario in the following sense. According to him, 140 ss-20's would be amply
sufficient for a counterforces strike on 200 Chinese objectives that would include
China's missile sites, its warhead depots, and its principal industrial and
scientific centers. This hypothesis assumes the widest dispersion possible of the
Chinese TU-16's. The Soviet attack could be carried out in two waves of 70
55-20's, each delivering 210 independently targeted, hiqh-accuracy warheads.
E. Luttwak also remarks that the Soviets would have no need to resort to their
ICBM's. According to these figures, 28 objectives could survive the first attack
and 6 could survive the second. In the event Chinese missiles were among the
survivors, no rational attitude would counsel their use: On the one hand, no
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major Chinese urban center would have been destroyed during the two attacks; on
the other hand, the Soviets would have maintained such an overkill capability that
the few surviving Chinese missiles would inevitably lose their significance. This
is obviously only a theoretical acenario: It describes a technical possibility but
does not integrate the political motivations that could induce the Soviet leader-
ship to arrive at such a decision.
2) The tactical use of Chinese nuclear weapons, for example to stop the advance
of invasion forces, would tend to underestimate the consequences of certain tech-
nological advances such as the increased accuracy of theater ballistic missiles.
- Soviet advances in this domain put them in a position to disarm at a distance the
- forces that would oppose their offensive: The circular error. of the SS-20 probat,ly
does not exceed 300 meters. This capability moreover falls under the "preemptive"
type of attacks in the Soviet "art of war" and entails another consequence: The
Chinese troops could no longer hope to contact the enemy troops to protect them-
selves from an enemy nuclear strike,4i the enemy haviny used its nuclear fire at
the start of +:.he conflict and limited its conventional forces to occupation of
the terrain thus neutralized. Thus, an eventual 5oviet-Chinese duel would substan-
tiate the situation described by General~Galois: The gap is widening between
the c~ountries equipped with mobile nuci~ar weapons--such as missile-launching
subma.rines and very long-range bombers --and those that rely on traditional forces.
"The fornier retain the advantage of invulnerability to direct sttikes or, at least, -
the privilege they enjoy of not being subject to being invaded unless the aggres- _
- sor is ~i.lling to take considerable risks in doing so. The latter countries, on
the other hand can only submit their defense arsenals to being destroyed with no
meana for demanding a high price in return. In reality. ~hey are defenseless."48
Within the terms of this ~definition and consi.dering the means currently at its ~
disposal, Chirna falls into the second category of nations. It does not yet
possess the necessary nuclear deterrent capability--a second strike capability--
to shelter itself from possible nuclear attacks by its big northern neighbor.
Facing Realities
' A mere comparison or arsenals suffices to dispel all doubt: A difference of levels
exists for the moment between China's nuclear ballistic weapons and those of the
major powers. China has remained at the first-generati.on, very vulnerable
weapons level, while the wESpons of the other powers have evolved considerably.
True, tne notions of balance or equivalence--of nuclear parity--play no part in
nuclear deterrence by a weaker power against a stronger one. However, the weaker
power cannot maintain the credibility of its threat of nuclear response unless
- its weapons systems continue to convince the stronger power of the prohibitive
level of risk their destructive capability represents. General Poiries reminds us
- in this regard that: "The art of deterrence is not to constrain--as in war--but to
convince. Belief is not a static condition: One who takes a threat
serio~asly at a given mament may no longer believe it under other circumstances."49
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In the Chinese view, nuclear forces alone will not suffice to win a war. Their _
use together will the o~her forces must also be considered. Generally speaking,
Chinese miiitary doctrine takes as starting hypotheses the tw4 following constants:
recognition of China's material inferiority by comparison with their potential
aggressors; but primacy of the human factoX over the material one. As a corollary,
it advocates exploitation of the enemy's possible weaknesses. The advent of
nuclear weapons has not upset these hypotheses.
Initially, the atomic bomb was considered by China a paper tiger.50 B~t the _
puerility of this representation masked an incisive analysis of the limits being _
imposed by the United States, the leading atomic power at the time, on the use
of nuclear weapons. Without entering iato detail, we believe the Chinese leaders -
had, unlike their Soviet counterparts, foreseen the passage af American nuclear
strategy from the principle o~ "massive retaliation" to that of the "graduated
response": 'Ptze Korean war revealed that, despite their nuclea* superiority, the
United States was unable either to prevent a conflict from erupting or to even
resolve it in its own favor.51 From China's viewpoint, that American superiority
~oncealed an exploitable weakness.
On the international level, Peking's leaders decided to depart from the prudence
of the Kremlin's masters and posit itself as the champion of Third world revolu-
tionary movements. From another standpoint, in their obsession with the notion
of an American invasion, which,seemed a possibility as the situation evolved in
- Indochina, the top leaders of the PLA drew up, near the end of 1960, a new two-
point strategy: abandon the concept of a stopping blow at its borders and allow
the invasion forces to penetrate deeply into Chinese territory until they bogged
down; press contact with enemy troops so that their command would not be tempted
to resort to nuclear weapons.
_ When China joined the atomic club, its military doctrine underwent no concurrent .
_ change. Although they represented twc~ extremes, the principles of a~"peoples'
war" and eventual recourse to nuclear weapons appeared complementary. A peoples'
war is aimed at deterring any attempt to occupy China by resorting to prolonged
guerrilla warfare, relying, in principle, on the support of the pop~lation as a
whole. For their part, niaclear weapons would safeguard China from an attack by
weapons of the same nature. -
- But what would happen if a potential aggressor were to discard this preconceived
scheme? If, for example, instaad of seeking to occupy China, he were to limit
himself to creating an accomplished fact in the form of a military incursion of
brief duration, limited in space, but decisive by way of the means utilized. The
fact is that the conquest of China would entail more disadvantages than any
benefits it might produce: vast and ~ensely popu~.ated as it is, its occupation
would immobilize such immense resources as to divert the power undertaking this
i.nitiative from its other objective. By contrast, limited actions, like a"surgical
strike" or a"political lesson," would be more of a threat to China. A"surgical
strike" would seek the destruction of its military-industrial co~?iplex, which is
concentrated in a geographically very vulnerable region: natural obstacles that
are easily overcome, a vast plain made to order for maneuvers by large armored
and mechanized units, sparsely populated. A"political lesson" would serve
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essentially to ~lemonstrate to th< Peking leadership the futility of certain of its
r.urrent foreign orientations. Under these conditions, and once the potential
~ aggressor has been identified, what becomes o~ the preparations called for by the
Chinese doctrine?
The Potential Enemy
The material possibility of a Soviet attack does not necessarily indicate its
probability. This eventuality,~however, is not to be neglected. Soviet military
doctrine lends itself to such initiatives, 2specially when they are mandated by
"objective reasons."
Provisions of Soviet Doctrine
As far as can be gleaned from Soviet writi.ngs on the subject, two themes dominate -
Soviet military doctrine. The first is none other than a paraphrase of Clausewitz
by Lenin: War is the extension of policy by another means. Every war is indis-
solubly linked to the political regime from which it ensues." Thus, for the
Saviets, war results only from the bellicose actions of imperialism. In "Marxism-
Leninism on War and the Army," published in 1976, a group of Soviet officers
affirms: "It is with the utmost secrecy, but in a deliberate manner and in
accordance with a plan that has matured over a period of many years, indeed
decades, that r_he exploiting classes prepare their wars of aggression, and it is
with equal conscientiousness that their governments and their parties unleash
those wars when they judye the moment timely and most advantageous."5~
Tne Red Army therefore cannot be other than defensive. But this conception of
defense goes beyond the national territorial boundaries, as Marshal Gretchko's
writings perceive it: "The historic function of the Soviet Armed Forces is not
limited solely to the defense of the motherland and the other socialist countries.
In its foreign policy activities, the Soviet state actively and intentionally
opposes the exportation of counterrevolution and political oppression; it aids
the struggle f~r national liberation and resolutely opposes imperialist aggression
in wha~ever distant region of the planet it may manifest itself."54
- Thus, we could or?e day see the Soviet Armed Forc~s aiding "FUSNK" ~Kitaii National
Salvatiori Front~ to "liberate" the Chinese people from the "Maoist dictatorship"
being sustained by "world imperialism and reaction."
- 'Objective Reasons' for an Attack
We see three: the "clefense of the gains achieved by socialism," the new trend of
Chinese-American relations, and the time factor.
- The Soviets identify their intErests with those of socialism. Every time it has
become necessary, they have taken the required measures to "safeguard the gains
of sor..ialism." The inhabitants of East Berlin, Budapest and Prague have learned
this at cost to them. The vigor of ~he Soviet rea~tion is explained by their
- refusai to retreat from socialism. This attitude provides an understanding of -
the moderation Moscow has shown until now in its behavior toward the Chinese. In
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effect, without overlooking in the background some of its national aspects, the
Chinese-Soviet conflict has mainly taken i:he form of divergences over determina-
tion of the international communist movement line. And it is our opinion that
- as long as the disagreement between the two countries remains on an essentially
doctrinal level the Soviets will adjust as i~ to the lesser of possible evils.
On the other hand, they would certainly modifytheir attitude if the Chinese were
to abandon khe doctrinal character of their grievances. Actually, Peking's ~
current behavior lacks clarity, and its references to the "polar bear" are not
designed to reassure Moscow.
Moreover, the new trend of Chinese-American relations is adding to Soviet concerns.
- A genuine Chinese card" psychosis has overtaken the Soviets. In November 1978,
Boris Ponomarev expressed to visiting American senators his concern over certain _
implications in the normalization of Chinese-American relations: The fact
that some circles in your country are seeking to strengthen Chinese-American ties
on the basis of anti-Sovietism cannot be other than disturbing."55
_ Far from bringing appeasement into the situati4n, the subsequent unfolding of
events exacerbated the fears cf the Soviets, who we*_-e already tending toward a
fear-of-the-besieged complex. In October 1979, tne NEW YORK TIMES revealed the
existence of a study ordered by the Pentagon56 on the possibility of aiding China
to defend itself in the event of a large-scale Soviet attack. In the wake of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and less than 2 months after requesting it, China
obtained an agreement with the United States granting it most-favored~nation
status, a status the Soviets have been seeking for years.
Time is the third reason. Certain circles in the USSR estimate that a mili-
tary incursion into China beyond the latter half of the 1980's would be too costly
in relation to ~he results that could be obtained. This evaluation takes the
following form:
--1976: Witt-~ the death of Mao Zedong, the "Four" were eliminated. A major hin-
drance to the modernization o:. China disappeared.
--1977/1978: Political and economic re~rganization with the return of Denq
Xiaopin7 to power.
--1978/1979: The "New Long March" commences. As viewed from the outside, the
results appear less unsatisfactory than had been predicted.
--1980/1985: If development continues at the same rate, the 1976-1985 10-year plan _
will provide a solid base for the realization of the "four modernizations."
Soviet Concepts
While Soviet doctrine espousPS the defensive, the Soviet art of war, on the _
contrary, teaches the offensive or, more exactly, the preemptive action. Despite
the seeming contradiction, the preemptive action is designed to head off the
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enemy's attack. This being so, the preemptive action must be decisive to accom-
plish its purpose. Consequently, any preemptive attack must be executed under the
conditions most favoiable to the obtaining of decision: superiority and the
combined use of all necessary means.
Based on the three "objective reasons" we have just set forth, a Soviet preemptive
action agains China co~ld take the form of a"lesson" or of a"surgical strike."
These two types of action could also be nrought to a conclusion.
The masters of the Kremlin would have no compunctions about displaying theix
pedagogic talents if the evolution of Sino-American relation~ were to strengthen
their "Chinzse card" obsession. The fact is that during the next 5 years--a
period in which the probabilities of a Soviet attack against China seem high--
the American nuclea~ commitment to defend Western Europe will be problematical,
given the Euro-strategic and conventional superiority of the Soviets and the
balance between the American and Soviet central systems. Alevertheless, there is
an institutional framework of Atlantic solidarity, a framework that is absent as
of now from the relations between the two Pacific powers. A preemptive action
would demonstrate to the Peking l.eadership the illusory nature of seeking a Sino-
F+merican convergence.
The Soviet intent to undertake a"surgical strike" ayainst the Chinese military-
industrial potential is not new. It was expressed in 1969, when Soviet military
attaches stationed in Tokyo and Canberra stated it to their American counter-
parts.57 In the context of that period, they could have been seeking to head off
the start of a Chinese-American dialog. The Americans, if advised of the Soviet
threat hanging over China, could conceivably be induced to make such demands
as would discourage the Chinese. Currently, the danger is greater. In April 1978,
Brezhnev's presence at the Red Army's large-sca]:e maneuvers in Siberia coincided
with the arrival of Sir Neil Cameron in China. On both sides, these events
- assumed a symbolic character of the first order: Sir Neil Cameron was in fact the
first chief of staff of the army of a member of the integrated NATO command to
visit China. It turned out, by way of this occasion, that Great Britain was the
only country, among several that had been approached, to agree to supply China
with reactors capable of equipping a new type of fighter plane being developed.
In our opinion, the Soviet warning was crystal clear and unmistakable: The USSR
will not stand by without reacting toward a China that, even as it draws closer
to NATO, strengthens its own military potea~tial. -
Flaws in the Chinese Doctrine
Mao Zedong developed the principles of the "people's war" as part of the "war of
anti-Japanese resistance." Subsequently, the Military Affairs Commission, toward
the end of 1960, based its preparations against an American invasion on similar
pcinciples. Soviet designs would diff_er from those of the Japanese and from those
ascribed to the Americans. In addition, they would be favored by geography.
Under these conditions, the PLA's margin for maneuver would be small, whether or
not it resorts to nuclear weapons.
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A Failina Doctrine
In invading China, Japan sought a colony. The Japanese presence was thus intended
to asaume a durable character. Besides, geographi cal constraints compelled the
,7apanese to effect their penetration from East to West. The Japanese army thus
landed on Chineae territory from the sea. In doing this, it penetrated into
China's overpopulated area, which has always grouped three quarters of China's
� population in 23.5 percent of its territory. This population density was there-
fore.capable of becoming fhe breeding ground necessary to the pursuit of a"pro- .
- longed war." But this w~s all in theory. The fact is that the Japanese army
never lost its full freedom of strategic action th roughout the hostilities.
Actually, the zones occupied by the Chinese communiats were never considered 3
priority by the Japanese.58 In the North, these zones were either contained by
the general line of ~he Japanese front or we~re ou tside the main railway axes
controlled by the Japanese. In central China, the Japanese forces virtually
ignored the hinterland.
Be that ~s it may, the Soviets would enter from the North, descending upon the
Manchurian plain. They would thus penetrate a very sparsely populated region, if
- one judges from the following densities:
--43 inhabitants per square kilometQr in the Heilonqjiang region:
--90 inhabitants per square kilomPter in the Jilin region;
_ --215 inhabitants per square kilometer in the Liaoning region.
It must be recalled that the mean national density is 297 inhabitants per square
kilometer. Moreover, a"prolonged war" would have no purpose unless the Soviets
were to pursue their penetration. This seems very unlikely. On the other hand,
- the Soviets could maintain themselves in Manchuri a if they wanted to.
A Geography Favorable to the Aggressor
Geography fa~rors the Soviet designs. Let us consider the theater of operations.
~ The Sino-Soviet frontier between Vladivostok and the Pamir plateau aompares in
length with the distance between Paris and Bombay, that is, 7,200 kilometers. This
gigantic front is divided, however, into three sectors of approximately equal
lengths but sharply different geostrateqically, one from the other:
--the western sector, made up of mountainous rock masses, some of them reaching
altitudes of 8,000 meters;
--the central sector, extending over sparsely populated regions of Mongolia, the
_ Gobi desert;
--the eastern sector, comprising the coastal provinces of Siberia and Manchuria,
which present a terrain that is sometimes flat, sometimes mammilated with groups
- of inedium-sized, easi].y crossed mountains. _
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The latter secto~: is in northeastern Cr,ina, that is, the eparsely populated but -
highly industrialized Manchurian plain. This plain lends itself admirably to
maneuvers by the Soviet large armored and mechanized units. These are currentZy
equipped to advance 75 kilometers a c~ay againat NATO units. Against the PLA
units, their advance would be even raore rapid. They have a sustained combat range
of three days. Let us not forget, alsa, that since 1972, the Soviets have been
building a gigantic logistical complex consisting of airparts, supply dumps,
hospitals, roads, and pipelines to sustain an eventu al military incursion into
China. Aside from the new Soviet air transport capa bility, let us also recall
that the doubling of the trans-Siberian rail line will be completed very soon.
Thus, the Soviets could, in a matter of a few days, take over an essential ~rt of
China, without even.penetrating toward the inte~~ior of the country. To carry out
a"lesson" of a political nature, they would need mer ely to pursue their advance
on Peking.
To prevent this, the PLA would have to be able to stop the invas~on forces at the
frontier. But, as of now, Chinese military doctrine excludes this type of preven-
tive strike in favor of drawing the invader into the interior of its territory.
Conclusion
There are nurnerous indications that a change is in progress. The extent of this
evolutian can be assessed from the decisions taken by the Military Affairs Com-
mission: -ind especially its Bureau of Training Manual Revisions, in 1961.59 Sub-
ject to th~ usual cautions, the following passage from the article by Marshal
Xu Xiangqi~an, published in HONGQI on the occasion of the 51st anniversary of the
founding of the PLA (1 August 1978), appears to us h ighly significant: "Marxism
will not stagnate, but will develop as practice prog regses. The same holds true
for the th~ory of ~eople's war. It will advance as history evolves; modern war
differs from the ancient in many respects. Our enemy has experienced major
changes, and our own country is very different from what it was. This requires ,
that we li.nk more closely the theory of people's wa~ enunciated by President Mao :
with the new hist~ric conditions, that we study the new characteristics and the .
lawa of that war, and that we intensify our preparations in all domains
Defending ourselves actively and drawing the the enemy deep within our territory
are the fundamental strategic principles that will en able us to win.
Drawing the enemy deep within our territory does not mean allowing him to go where
he wishes, but rather constraining him to expose him self to our blows. We must
concentrate pnwerful defenses at a few key points to prevent penetration by the
en2my and to lead him to the battlefield we will have prepared, to annihilate
him."60
The fact is that China's perception of the source of its dan~ers has changed from
the United States to the USSR, modifying the geographic aspects of its potential
engagements. The PLA's top leaders therefore have a keen interest in being able
to halt an invasion from the Northeast before it can cause too much devastation.
- From the standpoint of nuclear strategy. it appears vain to us to think in terms -
of chanyPJ in the absence of a prior technological p rogress that would raise
China's rnearrs to current international levels. Thi s would of course involve the
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- development of mobile reprisal weapons capable of escaping a preemptive strike
or, at least, of minimizing its effects. With this technical constraint as a point
of departure, we could consider a two-phase approach: for the short term, gain time
by developing a minimal deterrent based on present capabilities; favor the long
term by preparing, starting now, the design of new generations of weapons.
The first phase hinges on political action. In recent years, Chinese leadErs shown
shown alarm over the inevitability of a new world war, as when, at the 23d session
of the UN General Assembly (28 September 1978), Huang Hua applied heavy shading to =
this view. Huang Hua went even further to stress China's peaceful aspirations:
"Step by step, as the rivalry between the two superpowers intensifies and planetary
strategic deployments of social-imperialism spread, local wars are becoming more
numerous and the danger of world war is increasin~. To delay the start of this _
world war and maintain international peace represents at this very moment an
important task for the peoples of the different countries The Chinese people
ardently desire peace and oppose all that is leading to a new world war. Besides,
we nend an international situation of peace over a long period, to rebuild our
country."61
These state;nents were reiterated some days later by Hua Guofeng i~n his speech for
the 1 October national feast day. Despite their general character, they appear
to be addressed particularly t.o the USSR. In the current evolution of the Sino-
Sovi2t conflict, the turn being taken by the China-United States-USSR triangular
relationships is proving dangerous. Although the United States occupies the
privileged position of arbite.r, the rigidity of Sino-Soviet relations induces an
escalation in the systematic search for reciprocal checks and balances that could
accidentally result in a war. Also, although we have spoken at length of the -
Soviet threat perceived by China, let us not forget that the Soviets, for their
part, feel threatened by the objective rapprochemer.t that has developed among _
Cnina, the United States and Japan. Thus, China, by maintaining a certain dialog
~h the USSR, is trying to minimize the dangers of armed confrontations.
The fact is that China's military doctrine is currently inadequate, for China
does not have the means to back its policy. As regards the long term, the Peking
leadership is counting heavily on the development of ineans to strengthen the -
credibility of China's nuclear deterrent capability. Although it is still too
early to judge, we can at least discern its intention in this regard as reflected
in this statement by Su Yu on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the founding
of the PLA: "We have decided to constantly improve our weapons and equipment and, "
through our own efforts, to possess the same weaponry that our enemies have,
indeed to invent new weapons."62
As regards these new weapons, two trends may actually be.taking shape. The first
would be bearing on the development of enhanced-radiation weapons, as we have -
already mentioned. In our opinion, because of their nature and possible uses,
this type of weapons would be extremely well suited to an essentially defensive
doctrine as is that af the "people's war." However, we are aware of certain
limitations: the very small area covered by each weapon would necessitate a large
stock of them so that their action would not result marginal and lack decisive
Pffects on the battle;63 the risk of remotre disarmament would also, for that
21
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matter, not be resolved. To chis effect, we must underscore the importance
being accorded to particle physics, which is one of the eight priority sectors of
the National Scientific and TechnicaL Development Program (1978-1985). Is China
also Concentrating on the development of particle-beam weagons designed for ABM
- ~Anti-Ballistic Missile~ defense?
Annexes:
~ 1. Location of Missile Product.ion and Test Centers.
2. Second Artillery - Organization Chart.
3. Second Artillery - Top Leaders.
4. Missile Sites By Major Military Regians.
1. Location of Missile Production and Test Centers ~see map next paae~:
1) Weapons test centers and launching test centers: Six: Shanghai, BaotouP Jining,
' vicinity of Yinchuan, Qilian Shan, Shuang-chengzi (Gansu);
2) Missile manufacturing plants: Five: Zhenxi Plant (Xinjiang), Yinchuan Plant
(Ningr.ia}, Shibao Plant (Gansu), Gansu Military Plant, Xi'an Weapons Plant;
3) Experimental production centers: Eight: Peking, Tianjin, Shenyang, Harbin,
- Shanghai, Wuhan, Cnongqing, Xining;
4) Missile engine �ac~ories: Four: Peking, Taiyuan, Xi'an, Gansu~
5) biissile warhead, body and launching ramp factories: Four: Shenyang, Harbin,
Taiyuan, Chengdu;
6) Solid propellants: Three: Taiyuan, Shenyang, Xiangxiang;
7) Liquid propellants: Three: Xi'an, Lanzhou, Luda;
8) Guidance sys tems factories: One; Peking.
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- 3. Second Artillery - Top Leaders -
(as identified in 1978/1979)
_ ~
- Commander Li Shuiqing
Commissar Chen Heqi.~o `
Deputy commander Liao Ch~ngmei
Fu Xianhui
Wang Ting
Yan Jia'an
He Jinheng
Liu Lifeng
Cha Guozhen
Deputy commissar Liu Youguang
Wang Wenjie
Wang Zonqhai
Sheng Zhihua
Lu Yishan
Biography of Li Shuiqing
He was born in 19 19 at Jiangxi. He participated in the Long March as the
commissar of a regiment of the lst Red Army. During the Anti-Japanese War of
Resistance, he served in a unit of the 115th Division commanded by Yang Chengwu.
In the Spring of 1942, he was political commissar of an anti-Japanese resistance
~ base west of Peking. In 1948, he caamanded the 4th Division of the llth Army
(Ma Long) pertaining to the Northern China Field Army (Nie Rongzhen). During the
Korean War, he commanded 199 th Division of the 67th Army (Ma Long). At that time, -
he was considered one of the PLA's best experts on combined operations as well as
one of the leaders of the Armed Eorces roodeznization movement. At the conclusion
of the Korean War he was given command of the 67th A~:my. From 1961 to 1963, he
headed the Qingdao Garrison. The Cultural Revolution appears not to have gone
- against him: From deputy ~hieE-o~:staff of the Major Military Region of Jinan in
1968, he was pramoted to deputy commander in December 1968; meanwhile, he had
entered the Central Comiaittee as a regular member during the 9th congress. In
March 1971, he occupied ~he position of first minister of inechanical industry.
Between 1971 and 1974, his functions took him to the following countries:
- --November 1971: Pakistan;
--July 1972: Alqeria;
--September 1972: Sweden, Norway and Finland;
--October 1974: Algeria. "
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In January 1975, Zhou Zijian replaced him in that position. He was identified as
the deputy commander of the Major Military Region of Nanking in July 1976. In
August 1977, he was reelected as a reqular member of the Central Committee that
resul ted from the llth congress. Since 19 June 1978, he has commanded the Second
Artillery. ~
(Sources:Huang Chen-hsia. "Chung-Kung Chun-jen Chih." Hong Kong: Research Institute
of Contemporary History, 1968, p 754; "Chung-Kung-jen Mi_ng-lu Taipei": Institute
of International Relations, 1978, p 168.)
4. Missile Sites by Major Military Regions _
. -
i '
.
:
.
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!imites des Etats
~ 2~ limites des Grandes r~glons miiltalres -
( 3} e site de missile
( 9) 18 nombre de sites de missilea par Grande r~gion militalre
Key:
1. National boundaries.
2. Major military regional boundaries. -
3. Missile site.
4. N~~nber of missile sites in each major military region.
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F00't'NOTES
1. In the view of the Chinese leaders at the time, this p:obability could become
a reality with escalation of the American action in Vietnam. To appease these _
apprehensions, the American r~pre9entative, during the 25 February and 22 April -
1965 meetings if the Sino-American ~alks in Warsaw, reaffirmed that his
country's intentions were to limit its operations to the Gulf o� Tonkin (cf. J.
Cheng: "More on the Chinese Strategic Debate, 1965-1966," ASIA QUARTERLY,
1977-3? PP 202-222e
2. ?'his term is borrowed from Leo Hamon: "The Art of War in the Nuclear Age,"
DN April 1968, p 617.
3. In French, consult the two books by J.P. Brule: "La Chine a vingt ans" ~China
20 Years Latex~. Paris, Fa ard, 1969, pp 159-198, and "Demain 1'Armee chinoise"
~The Chinese Army Tomorrow~, Paris, Balland, 1974, pp 205-216.
4. Ho Houang-Piao: "Wou Tchong-houa, An Outstanding Thermodynamics Expert," CHINA
UNDER CONSTRUCTION Juiy 1978, pp 6-8.
5. NCNA, 18 t~ovember 1978.
6. CY XIII (7), July 1979, pp 140, 141. -
7. Zr.itially, it produced 10 kg of plutonium 239 annually; Liu Yeh-Yun: "China as
a Nuclear Power in World Politics," London, Mac Millan, 1972, p 39.
8. For details, see K'ang ti: "Chung-Kung Kuo-fang K'o-chi Fa-chan Hsien-K'uang"
~Insight into the Development of the Sciences and Defense Technologies in -
Communist China~, CY XI (4), April 1977, pp 81-90.
9. ~.P� Brule: "La Chine a vingt ans," op. cite, p 195.
10. "A Brilli~nt Victory for Mao Tse-tung's Thought," JFJB, 17 June 1967 (SCMP
3964, p 3).
11. P. Herpaix: "Chinese Space Activity," DN July 1976, p 124.
12. R. Spurr: "Stepping Up the Space Race," FEER 102 (41), 13 October 1978, pp 13,
- 14.
13. AGENCE KYODO 7 September 1978.
14. RADIO-PEKING 19 June 1979 and LE MONDE 7 September 1979.
15. Interviewed by the daily A5AHI SHIMBUN during their visit to Japan in July
1�79, Xu Ming arid Chan Fanqyun stated, without indicating precise dates, that
during certain trials of weather observation rockets solid propellants were
used. The weight of these rockets, however, wa~ only 100-300 kg (ASF.HI SHII~UN
8 July 1979). For other d~tails concerning this Chinese mission to Japan, see
Chung Mou: "Chung-Kung T'ai-K'ung K'o-chi Fa-chan Ch'ing-K'uang" ~The Point of
Communist China's Development of Space Technologies~ CY XIII (11), November

- 1979, gp 102-110.
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16. Ti Chung-heng: "Kuo Kunq Hai-chun te Pien-chih yu Chan-li" ~Organization and
Potential of the Nationalist and Communist Navies~ MING-PAO YUEA-K'AN 136,
- April 1977, p 27.
17. IS XIV (7), July 1978, p 64.
18. Lieutenant-Commander Dupont-Nivet: "Telecommunications With Submarines" ON
January 1976, p 65. -
19. NCNA 6 July 1976 and 20 July 1977.
20. W. Ruppert: "Die Neotronen Bombe aus Inner Chinesischer Sicht," CHINA REPORT
(Vienna), 44/1978 pp 21-25.
21. Pan Hongjin, Xu Xinlong, Xie Kuanzhon and Pan Haochang: "Kual Zhongzi Huohuafa
Hfuohuafa Celiang Paodan Zhayao Midu" ~Yield Measurements or, Shells Detonated by
Fast Neutrons~, HEJISHU 3, August 1979 pp 42-46.
22. IS XIV (7), July 1978, p 73.
23. Hsiang Chuan-shu: "Chun -Kung te Ho-tzu Cheng-ts'e - Chung-Kung tui Ho-tzu
- Wu-ch'i te Chin -ying" ~Communist China's Nuclear Policy - Development of
Nuclear weapons~, CY XIII (7), July 1979 p 132.
24. RADIO-PEKING, 21 May 1978.
25. K'ang Ti: previously cited article, pp 81-90.
26. C.F.~Foss: "Jane'3 Pocket Book of Towed Artillery," 1.8, London, Macdonald.
& Jane's, 1977, p 197. -
27. Iisiang Chuan-shu: "Chung-kung te Ho-tzu Cheng-ts'e - Chung-Kung Ho-tzu Fei-tan
Pu-tui te Chian-li Yu Lien-yung" ~Communist China's Nuclear Policy - Organiza-
tion and Missions of Nuclear Missile Units~, CY XIII (8), August 1979, pp 125-
131.
28. For a development of this topic, refer to the article by J.B. Margeride: "Tech-
nical Aspects of Counterforce Strategy," STRATEGIQUE No. 1, lst quarter 1979, -
pp 95-144.
29. J.D. Pollack: "Chinese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons, 1964-69," CHINA
QUARTERLY 50, April-June 1972, p 268. -
30. Statement for the 44th anniversary of the founding of the PLA, 1 August 1971.
31. SCMP 3322, p 2 (emphasis provided by us).
32. Mao 2edong: "Strategic Problems of Revolutionary War in China" (December 1936),
"rsilitary Writings," Peking, ELE, 1969, p 84.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ~ .
33. Mao Zedonq: "Stra:tegic Problems...," op. cit., p 163.
34. Mao Zec]ong, "Circular Issued by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee
- Regarding Peace Negotiations with the Guomindang" (26 August 1945).
35. Lenin: "Imperialism, Supreme Evolutionary Stage of Capitalism," Peking, ELE,
1966, pp 88,89.
36. Ye Jianying, speech to Conference on Organized Instruction Through the Com-
mission on Military Affairs (end of January 1961), GONGZUO TONGXUN, 10,
20 February 1961.
37. Su Yu: "Great Victory for Chairman Mao's Guideline on War," RMRB, 6 August
1977, in SCMP, 6406. -
38. NCNA, 1 Nuvember 1978.
- 39. NCNA, 1 Navember 1978 (SWB FE/5960/B 11/1, 4 November 1978).
40. Iisie Tchan:"The Atom Bomb, A Paper Tiger," PEKIN-INFORMATIONS 30, 25 July 1977,
p 18 (emphdsis grovided by us). -
41. "Our Army's Combat rules and Regulations Are the Product of Mao Zedong's Mili-
tary Thought," CONGZUO TONGXUN 29, 1 August 1961.
- 42. Lin San and others (Translation by): "Yuanzi Wuqi Lunwen Ji," Peking, Guofang ~
Shupanshe, 1958, 227 p.
4:s . ~l'1 Chuny-he~g : ar ti~la ~ r~ ~ io~sly ci ce~, p 25.
44. M. Geneste: "From Anticity to Antiforce," DN December 1979 in the column
"Libre-opinion" p 37. See also Samuel T. Cohen and Marc Geneste: "Echec a la
guerre, la banbe a neutrons" ~Checkmate to War, the Neutron Bomb~, Ed.Copernic,
Paris, 1980.
45. A. Besancon, in: "Deba~e, What Does Brezhnev Want?", LE POINT, 369, 15 October
1979, p 83.
46. A. Besancon:.article previously cited, p 85.
47. This idea was developed by Ye Jianying at the Conference on Organized instruc-
tion Through the Commission on Military Affairs, article previously cited, see
note 36.
48. P.M. Gallois, "Defeat Without Corabat," POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE 2, Winter 1978/
1979, p 211.
49. L. Poirier:"Des strategies nucleaires" CNuclear Strategies', Paris, Hachette
(Essais), 1977, ~ 178.
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50. "The atomic bomb is a paper tiger which the American reactionaries are using
to frighten people. It looks terrifyinq, but it is not. Of course, the atomic
bomb can produce widespread massacres, but it is the people who wi11 decide a
war and not one or two new weapons...", Mao Zedong, "Conversations with Anna-
Louise Strong" (August 1946),in "Oeuvres choisies" ~Selected Works~, Peking,
ELE, 1972, Vol IV, p 101.
51. A. Giradet: "Problemes contemporains de defense nationale" ~Contemporary Prob-
lems of National Defense~, Paris, Dalloz (Etudes politiques, econamiques et
sociales) CPolitical, Economic and Social Studies Series~, 1974, pp 42-49.
F. Fejto: "Chine/URSS. De 1'alliance au conflit, 1950/1972" ~China and the
- USSR. From Alliance To Conflict, 1950-].972~, Paris, Seuil (Politique), 1978,
pp 116,117.
52. See note 36.
53. Cited by C. Durand-Berger; "Le defi sovietique" ~The Soviet Challenge~, Paris,
1979, p 28. -
54. In "Les problemes de 1'histoire du PCUS" ~Problems in the History of the CPSU~,
1974.
55. LE MONDE, 17 November 1978.
56. In his contribution to the 7th Sino-American Conference on the Chinese Con-
tinent, E. Luttwak had already, in view of the enormous financial outlay
required for a modernization of the PLA, advanced the idea of a"lend-lease"
program in the event of American military aid (article previously cited, note
17, p 65.). _
57. J. Alsop: "To Go or Not To Go There," DN, December 1973, p 8. -
- 58. J. Guillermaz: "Histoire du Parti communiste chinois. 2. de Yenan a la conquete
du pouvoir (1935-1949)" ~History of the Chinese Communist Party. 2. From Yenan
to the conquest of power (1935-1949)~ first edition, Payot (Bibliotheque his- _
torique), 1968, Paris, Payot (PBP), 1975, pp 309-327.
59. GONG2U0 TONGXUN, 5, 12, 25, 26, 27 and 29 of 1961 (respectively: 17 January,
10 March, 28 June, 13 July, 25 July and 1 August).
60. Reproduced in PEKIN-INFORMATIONS 32, 24 August 1978, p 10.
61. Reproduced in PEKIN-INFORMATIONS 41, 16 October 1978, pp 11, 17.
62. Article previously cited, note 37. -
63. Passage borrowed from J.B. Margeride: "What is the Neutron Weapon?", DN,
December 1978, p 104.
COPYR7GHT: STRATEGIQUE 1980
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a
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
DATA, MATERIAL USID ON NUCLEAR POWER STATION GIVEN
Prague TECHNICKY' TYDENNIK in Czech 23 Sep 80 p 11
[Text] A press conference regarding the construction af the nuclear
power plant in Jaslovske i3ohunice was held recently in Bratislava.
The presentation included a summary of technical data.
The second nuclear power plant in this locality bearing the designation V-2 is of the
condensing type, with two WER-440 type reactors and an overall output of 880
megawatts. It produces annually 5,950 gigawatthours, delivering 5,499 gigawatthours;~
of electric power into the net. Overall construction cost according to pro~ect
documentation is 8,262 million koruna, of which 1,878 million koruaa is for building
operations. According to an updated preliminary plan, the cost is envisioned to
increase.
The preparatory stage coAnnenced in March 197i, and a resolution of the presidium of
the government stipulates that the first reactor block be completed by December 1982,
the second block by�December 1983. The project investor is the specialized concern
Capital Construction of Slovak Power Engineering, the general developer for the
project is Energopro~ekt Prague. The principal equipment supplier is the Skoda
plant in Pilsen, construction contractor is Hydrostav Bratislava.
WER-440 type reactors burn slightly enriched uranium moderated and cooled by
chemically treated condensate. Removal of thermal energy reieased in one reactor
occurs through six circulation loops of the primary circuit, each of which contains a
steam generator, a core circuit slide valve, two cut-off fittings and interconnecting
conduit Js 500 millimeters. The primary condensate is cooled from 299 degrees
Celsius and the released heat is used to produce secondary saturated steam of 4.6
MPa which drives two condensation turbines. Primary equipment is of Soviet design,
secondary equipment comes largely from domestic plants.
During operation the power plant consumes approximately 28 metric tons of enriched
uranium and replaces 5.2 million metric tons of coal used by orthodox thermal power
plants. It uses up 22 million cubic meters of service water per reactor.
Structurally, power plant V-2 differs from the configuration of V-1 in volume and
Che system used in construction of the main producCion block. The volume is
~ustified by increased nuclear safety requirements; the construction system was
derived from Soviet projects. This system can be principally classified as an open
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i�vn vrri~ini, uou vlvl.i
system of construction with maximum utilization of prefabricated concrete elements
_ (ceilings) and components made of rolled profiles and reinforcing bars. In the
_ hermetic zone the components are lined on one or both sides by carbon or stainless
steel sheets. This system poses high demands on welding operations. In view of
the requisite precision, the work i~ievitably had to be contracted for with
engineering plants. A problem for manufacturers of both concrete and steel
cosponents is delivery and mounting of built-in parts, a task particularly taxing
due to the requisite accuracy.
The selected system of construction called for utilization of heavy Potain-type
cranes with 20 tons of lifting capaciCy and a radius of 50 meters.
Outl.ine of the volumes of construction operations: excavations 3.2 million cubic
meters, backfills 1.7 million cubic meters, ordinary concrete 72,000 cubic meters,
reinforced concrete 364,000 cubic meters, masonry 19,000 cubic meters, partitions
20,000 square meters, coatings 300,000 square meters, plaster 390,000 square meters,
pipelines 100,~00 metric tons, steel structures 14,30Q metric tons, lining, facing
and panelling 95,000 square meters, concrete reinforcing bars 37,000 metric tons.
Full operation started on the site last year, the current year is of key
importance for the project.
Copyright: 1980 - URO, Prague
8204
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~ IRAQ
DAMAGE TO OSIRAK DOME REPORTED
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 18 Gct 80 p 125
[Textj Is Osirak undamaged? In thie exclusive photograph taken on Wedneaday,
1 October, with telelenses, at a distance of 800 meters from the French-Iraqi nuclear
reaearch center of Tamuz, the huge mass of concrete which houses the research reac-
tor does not seem to hav~ suffered any damage.
One muet not rely on appearances. In spite of the fact that since their return
the 75 French technicians, who were there when the bombing took place, have been
en~oined to remain silent, some information has leaked. The Osirak pro~ect is going
to be at least 1 year behind schedule. And probably much more than that. To quote
one of the top French intelligence sources, the flyers who carried out the air raid �
were "magnificent pilots." Flying at a very low altitude, they aimed their de-
vices--probably American made air-to-surface Shrike missiles--against the lower
part of the concrete dome.
The result: on the outside some unspectacular damage which led nuclear physicists
to conclude rather hastily that the bombing had failed. But people who specialize
in concrete construction were quick to understand. The explosions caused cracks
and a genera.l weakening of the building. The reactor core is undamaged but the en-
tire atructure will have to be underpinned. And perhaps one will have to start all
over again.
What was the nationality of those "magn3ficent pilots?" Israeli, as was rumored
_ on the very day o� the attack.
Today, it is known from more reliable sources that the two Israeli Phantom places
took the shortest route and did not hesitate to fly over southern Syria before
penetrating at low altitude towards Baghdad. Neither the Israeli official denials
strangely made on the day afte:r the raid ("antisemitic slanders") nor the alertness -
of the military censure in Tel. Aviv have been able to conceal this essential fact:
Israel took advantage oi the war which is going on in the Gulf to win time and de-
lay the threat of t~ie "Arab bomb." Its cammandos had already sabotaged the core
of the La Seyne reactor near Toulon.
This now unavoida~~e setback in the Osirak project has prompted mild reactions in
Paris. The anger of some officials is strongly neutralizQd by the relief felt by
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by some highranki.ng diplomats and by many t~chnic3aas from the Atomic Energy Co~is-
sion. They were t~aving serious misgivings as the date when the research reactor
would go into service came nearer; a reactor which could rapidly give nuclear mili-
tary capability to Iraq. This, in apite of all the officials denials. .
COPYRIGHT: 1980 S.A. Groupe Express
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,
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NIGER
MEETTNG ON URANIUM PRICE DECLINE
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 80 p 2480
~Article: "Uranium: The Problem of Price Drop"]
~Text) The chief of ~tate, Colonel Seyni Rountche, received in audience
on 2 October a mining group made up of the president-director general of
Somair, of the heads af Cogema~and Rominak. The president of Somair,
Jac4ues Giscard d'Estaing, said on behalf of the group that they came to
report to the chief of state the results of the working session they had _
with the minister of mines. He added that they had come to Niamey on the
invitation of the Niger miaiater of mines to participate in a discussion
which takea place every year at about the same time in order to review
. together the uranium market situation and study the decisions having to
do with the price determination of uraaium during 1981.
On his part, the Cogema. director Gobert indicated that the price drop
that one observes on the international uranium market is due to a produc-
tion capacity surplus as compared to the capacity for absorption or con-
sumption in the world. The reason for this, he said, is that a nwmber of
electronuclear programs in aome countries have been delaqed while others
have beea reduced in scale or even cancelled altogether. Gobert exp ressed
the hope that this steep price drop could be reversed at a future date
which he hoped to see as soon as possible.
1751
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