JPRS ID: 9430 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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JPRS L/943~ ~
_ 8 December 1980 -
- Near East ~lorth Africa Re ort
p
cFOUO a3iso~ `
_ Fg'~ FOREIGIV BROA[3~AST INFORMATION S~RVICE
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JPRS L/9430
8 December 1980
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 43/80)
CONTENTS -
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
_ S~habou Examines Pr~spects for Integrated Mahgreb
(Omar S~habou; JEUI~E AFRIQUE; 8 Oct 80) 1
FAYPT -
Oppoeitionist Sees Need for ~Rebellion~ Against SQda,t -
_ (Khalid Muhyi a1-Din Interview; AFRZQUE-ASIE, 10-23 Nov 80) 9
LI33YA
~ FRG Mr~gazine Interviewa Libya~s Qadhdhafi
(Mu ~ a~rnnar al-Qadhdhafi Interview; 5TERN, 20 Nov 80 1!~
_ MAURITANIA
~rief a
~ More Children Attending 3chool ~ 18
ROK Cooperation, Trade _
' Ecor.oi;~c Control Body Approved 18
RevSsion of Nouakchott Ac~ninistrative Breakdowns 18
r..
- SAUDI ARABIA
N~,va1 Arms AgreemEnt Signed i~th F.ranca
(Pierre iangereux; AIl~ ET CO~t05, 25 Oct 80) 19
SYRTA
Impliaations of 8oviet Treaty nn Relations With Libya Explored
(AZ-WATAN AL-~AR,ABI, 17-23 Oat 80) 21
TUNI3IA
_ About-Face in Tunisia's Internal Policies
- (Adel Wahid; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 29 Sep-13 Oct 80).............. 26
Opposition Leader Under House Arrest
- ~~i~E ~IQ~i~ 8 Oct 80) �~e~~~~~~~~~~s~~oo~~~~~~~~~~~~~� 2U
~ (;III -NE &A-121FOU0]
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
S'HABOU ~XAMTNF;S PROSPECTS FOR INTEGRATED MAHGREB
P~r:to JEUNE AF'RTQUE in French 8 Oct 80 pp 28-30
~~rti.cle by Omar S~haboul
[T~at~ During ~?n ot'ficinl viait to Algiora, th� Tunisian Prims
Miraietsr Mohamed M~ali atated, on ? S~p~~~~r, hia aouutry ~ a
will to build 1Pa oomxoon tuture" with ite Maghreb neigtibora.
For hie part, tha Algerian Preeident, Chadli Bend~~did, xhilo
rea.fPirmin~ his aupport of the Poliaario, msntioaed 4 t'ex days
le~ter the Moroccan bPOtl~er paople". Unity, the ritual in~aa-
tdtion, in a divide8 Maghreb4 An anaiant ids4 in sny case,
onae indeatruat~ble, still topiasl.
"~he Ma.ghrsb pro ~aet, " It ia not ar? abstract or empty~ exprAasion.
Twenty-two yeara ~go, in Apri] 1958, in Tangiers~ the leaders
ot the prinaipal political partiea of tha three countriea (the
Moroacan Ietiqlal, the Tuniaian Idao-Destour, the Algoriaa FLN
~National Liberation Fron~]) daoided solemnly to creste an
"edvisory Asaembly from the local nationel Aasembliea of Tunisi4
and Morocco and trom the Algeria~n National Revolutionary
Cour~oil" and to aont'er to thia ~eeembly "th~ aompetenc~ to
~ etud9 the quegtioaa oS aoimnon intererste e~xid to lorraulat� re~
- co~nandationa to th~ loca~l eaecutive organs."
5o the Maghreb w$s truly a pro3eat. Al1 the more credible
ginae it was ~ontinuing a proce8~ begun at tbe beginning o!
the century by North-Afriasn students living in Franoe. By
becoming aware both of belonging to the $ams geooultural area
Qnd of their oppoeition to the eame adveraary--colonialiam--
theee young people were lad to coryzbine their thoughts and
thair etforta. Tha charter oP their association, the firat
MQghreb institution in contemporary history (the Aesoaiation
ot' North-African Moalern studer~ta 192? ) today leavea ua drearning.
It prodlaim.a th4t North Atrias is one and indivieible; the?t it
is a nation wboee language, culture and aua~toma ehoul8 Qllow
the oreation oS a united Pront to enaure ite deten~e.
1
w~r ~+~~+r~~~t 1+r~r~ /~iTTft
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Aa pasaioaate sa those pro2'essions ot' faith ~aere, thay were not
without coiis~quence: since the libera~ion mov~ments oP the
three countriea, even iP th~g developed separately under the
atande~rd o1' their re~pective nation, were at the origia of
evente which concerned the entire Maghreb.
- On 20 November 1y37, the Tunisian Neo-Destour organiz~a a
general atrike to prote~?t agaiz~st the mesauree of reprea~ion
te.ksn by the colonial authori.ties in M~orocao and in Algeris.
In 1947, the leadera of the three principal nationalist partiea
of the three countrles meet again in axil~ in Cairo and craate
~he Co~rnnittee for the Liberation oS' ~,rab Maghrob, ~nir
Abdelkrim, the beletdd Mcroccan ~ountarpeurt oP Bbair Abdelkader,
ie ite honorarg preaident, Habib Bourguiba, the secret4ry
general and, among the other leaders, appear suah prestigioue
dignatiariee ae Moh!uned Khide~ (FLN) and aspeci4~ly A11a1 e].-
~ Fasai (Iatiqlal).
In 1952, bloody demonetrations take place in Cagablanca, right ,
after the aa~easeination, on 5 Dacember, of the Tunigi~n un~.on i
leader, F~rha* Hached.
i
A New Dimeneion ~
i
The idea of a Maghreb was thue able, in ha1P a century, to ~ake
on a content and a form which it had never known. The hletorian '
Mohamed Cherif
demonstrateal that ~he M~,ghreb, aeide from the
attempt at unif~.cation by the A].mot~ad~s2 in the 12th century,
was never mobilized around an ideal of unity by the "States
which admini~tered it over the centur3ea." The t'act ia that,
when indapendence xas achievad in their country, the intelleat-
: uals and the le~ders of ~he Maghreb politiaal movemante ao
longer thought solely in tarmm of narrux nationalism, but took
into acoount the Me~ghreb dimension. The proo! fa that the thre~
newly independent States soon inearibed in the preamble ot'
their regpective Conatitutians the oonatruetion of tbe Maghreb
ae an hiatorice,l ob~eative ~nd dutq.
Contradictions
The tranelation Sn~o Saot ot the burgeoning Maghreb �eeling,
whioh the pre-independence demonatra~ions oP solidsrity 1.et us
glimpse, hae not been eaa~. From complementarq, the ns~tional-
ietia motivation and the Maghrab intantion h~ve come to be, 3n
practice, Sn confllct. The Tangiers cont'eranae for thm unifica-
tion oP the Maghreb did recognize that th~ federal form w4o the
moat appropriate one. It did recoYmr~end, Qon~equ9ntly, the
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_ eetabliehment, during a period ot transit~on, of "exi advi.sory
Aseembly and oi' an eaecutive eecretariat Which wnuld be charged
- with coordinattng the eP~orta aimed at the aonstitution oP
thie federat3on."
= Now, not only did nothing enaue, but the three countriee ha,ve
- been regularly~ oppased in con~licts over eoverei~nty and
- doctrine. Algeria 4nd Morocco wen~ to war in 1963 because o~
- a border dispute. Nbrocao and Tunis3a had upa ~nd downs in
- thetr relationa, whiah were svea interrupted aPtar Tunisia~~
reoognition of Mauritania in 1961. A1ger3.4 and Tuniaia have
lived until the beginning of
the Sevantiea e~nd beceuse of a
bordar line, in a atate of
ten~ion whioh haa been m4re th4n
= verbal.
Aa Po: the doot~inea ot development adoptsd by the t}aree 8tatea,
they aould not favor, they were sa divmrgent, a aonverganae
towe~rd the Maghreb ob~ective= tor the Tun~,aian Neo-Destour,
ot' one exoepte the Ben Sslah epiaod~e, pr3vate property is not
en evil, prov~,ded thnt it tla.lt'illa 4 eofl~al tunc~ion and
$aaialiam must tand to reepond to the cspite~l-intelligaace-
= work parameter.
On tha other hand, the AlgeriRn charter considers prive~s
property ae the prinaipal causa o~ all the avils of aoc3ety
- and it advocatas ite disappearance, Wh3,lo Morocaan "monarohiatic
aocislism" aan be e~nalyzed praat3aally a~ "liv~ and ~et live."
It aould, in any aase, not be recognized in thi$ statemeat by
' Ben Hella, the firrt pre$ident of the Algerian Rapublics
' "9oQialiem is a broad fan ~ich range8 Prom the socialiem of
Fulbert Youlou to that ot' Fidel Castro. Ws have ahosen ~'ide1.;1�
I Cont'ltctg over sovareignty 4nd doctrinal dSvergdnoas aould thue
only nullify the dealarations oP intdntion ~d the numerou~
deaisiona made in conm~on by the Ma,ghreb aor~erenoea of the
minietera oP Foreign APfsira and ot' the miaiatera of the
; Ecoraomy.
In 1961~, the latter did decide tha creation ot the advieor~
~ Committee ot' tha Map;hreb (CCM). This important organization
wea chargad, in 1967, wSth prepa,ring a pro~act for the eaonomic
in~tegration ot' the N~aghreb Khich wa$ to be preceded b~ ~ period
of
interim harm~nization o~ 5 years. Recognized aa a me,atar-
piace oP its type by the UA1 ezperta, thie prolect wae reedy in
- 19?0. Not only was it not adapted, but the principal recommen-
datione, sound and log3aQ1 onea, which it aontained, havd beon
up to now contradicted.
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~ Neither the harmonization nf the protectionist measures toward
the third party countries, nor the lncrease in inter-Maghreb
trada in agricultural praduata, nor the areation o~ a multi-
lateral meahaniam �or payment to encourage regional trade, nor
the aompiling of a l.ist of industries whicla no countrg could
set up or~ its own t8rritory ~rit3zou~ previous consultation
of its partners, have beer~ carried out.
Better etill: the three countriea began at the same tims to
create their own ateel, textile, mechaniaaY, t'ertilizar, etc,
industriee. From oomplementery, the eaonomi.a apparata oP Algeria,
Morooco and Tunisia have become anarchicdlly competitive~ And,
- in 18 yeare oi' economia 3ndependence, the ~laghreb pro~ect ha.s
not a~va~t~aed, in Pa+~t, by ox?e iota, 0~ the aontrar'?.
Viaion~ oP Hegemon~ ~
The responsibility is Snaumbent upon everybody and nob~dg. One
= peraeivag this when attempting to untangle the web o~ e~rguments
~d eounteraxgumer~t~e on all gid~s.; : .
BeSore 1970, Algeria adhere~ fully to the "Maghreb ot' the 3tate$.!'
Tt aatively p~rticipated in ell the aor~arenaes aP the economic
minist~rs. It ao7laborated in the preparation oP the pro~ect of
eaonomia Sntegrat3on of 1970. But, wittiout explanation, it
re�ueed to adopt it. Along parallel line8, it smbarked on the
aonetruction of a heQVy induatry whiah nisibly sur~sasea the
- dimension$ of its market and xhiah turna Sts back on the logic
of N[~ghreb integretion.
xn 1974, the oau~e o~ the Sahra,oui which did not exiat pre-
nlouely, wae openly epongorad by Afgiers. Boumedienne axplained:
- "We uazit first oP all ta create an Algeria whiah ia economiaally
s~nd aulturtlly healthy and indegandent. 3ome day even, tha
pacples ot' the Maghreb will see for them~dlvee that ~hey farm
ona nation without anyone having to anxwurice a tus3on r~h~.cb
wee deaided ~rom above."
Moraover, there are many who, taki~ng inta aonsideration theee
t'aot~, aue~pect Algeria of having dreama ot' hegemony. This
accusa~tion ie aonSusadly but broadly spread through the other
two oountr3ea. It is not rare thet one hears it said that
Algeria hae ambit~on~ to play the role ot' Prusaia in the unifi-
ca,tion o~ aermany ~"It' euoh ie the case", atf~x~me the NZoroocan
miniater "well, Algiere has picksd the wrong time and the
~ wror~g ne~.glabors= Prusaia i~ ra~her the ' gre~t Morooao;"4
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- Aa tor the Tunisiana, they sre airaumspeat: "We will stick to
the t'aato," they saq. "The day Algeria presents the Tuni.sian
- market, f~r instanae, with an automobile, if it i$ ahee~par and
of better quality than the European or Ja,peulese produat, we
will buy it. Otherwiss, we will dealine the offer, politely
' but firmly. Firat ot all, beaauee our neighbor dSd not con~ult
ue bei'ore it aonatructed ita ~aatory, then beoause those ara
the rules of the market."
Fair's Fair
The Algerian 1sQders Qre not u.nawere o~ the ch~rgea being
brought againet them. Thay e~plain their country~a attitude by
the di~ferent conaeption which they have o~ the building of
the Maghreb~ For them, recent history having demonstr~rted that
unit9 ia not made by summSt agreements, it muet ba Sorged at the
bsae by "the solidarity and the cammon sation of tne popular
~ maaeee." Thay acaompa~ny thia n~otion with two rbstriative politi-
cal and i,daologiael conditions. They maintain, t'iret of' sll,
that the unity of the Maghreb could only b� acoompliehed in a
"aure and laating way, ~tith the oacluaiva partiaipatinn oF the
workars, ot' tha peeseu~ts and o~ the patriotia elementa." They
then ai'firm that the aatual economia integration aaruvet be
acaampli~hed "e~s long aa there aubsiat S~ thia region ~ot~ona
an6 aoaio-economic etru~burea which are Pounded not Par tha
benoPit ot the popular maaeea but ia the ssxvioe oi' int~rnation-
el aspltaliem."
In~ abart, and b~ analo~ witt? the current Suropean debate,
Algiars aontr~sta the ' Me~ghreb of the workers" wi~h tha "1K~~rhreb
oP oapital". ~his notion ia aompletely reepeotable. It ie
worthy ot' debata. It aould even have ~ad s greatar impaat on
an importe~nt part of the Moroca~??n and T~ani~ie~n elite, if aertain
Algerian pol~tical maneuver~ had not contrQdicted thi~, In May
1972, in Ket , Boumedianne proposed to Bourguiba a aompl~te
- union oP Tunieia and Algeria. The Tunisian ahief o2' ste~te
refueed rrith a~e~t: '~aive bQCk our Constaatinoia, then xe wi17.
mee about the union; i6
Worrieome Proepecte
. 91x yeara l~ter, in August 1978, Abdela~ia Bouteflika, ~hen
minister of Foreign Af'faira, ~ame ta see B~urguiba, aonvalescing
in Parie and argued on behal~' of an Arab union of Tuniaia,
Algeria and Libya. "Far the time being, young man'~, the T~?i$i,~n
preaident anawered, "it 1,8 I xt~?o, by sand3ng you ewery year a
Paw hundred proPessors, am teaching you to be Arabe,�beaau~e
you are not, yetj"
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� These maneuvers unquestionablp give the idea oP the "Maghreb
oi' tha people", whiah Algeria is advocatfng, ~ ho 17Low ring,
Can these aontradictions prove right thos~ who accuse Algeria
of aovering "Pru9eie~n" ambitione witn fallacious ideological
argu~~rre nt s R
- In any ce.se, A].giera h~s no monopoly on contradic't3ons. Hiator~
ians e~nd political experts are always pondering the profound
motivation$ which leci Presi~r~nt Bourguiba, w3th no previou~
- ~o~sulte~tion, to merge, if only for a day, Tunisia and L~.bya.
And th~a M~oroccana have never ur.derstood why, in Sep~embex 3g^j'?,
the Tuniaie~na c~lled for the constitution of a Meghreb aonf'e-
deration inaluding Mauri~ania ax~d Libya, but excluding...
Morooco. In any case, constraints from internal po liaiea or
geopolitiaal onea have led the Statea of tha Ma~hreb to drow'n
tha Maahreb pro~eat in an ocean of ultarior motives and
~,ssumptions.
Can we blame anyone? The responsibility must ba ahared. The
result is, howevor, that the Maghrab finds itaelf today, as a
Moroccan m3.nister told u~, "in a coma". We would hava even
Baid ~hat it was alreedy dead, i~ it were not for the worrieoma
proapects snd ruthlasa conetrainta oP the future.
Tha last quarter of the ~Oth ~Gentur9 ia marked by regional
- regroupinge. Nations Af the size of France, of tha FRQ and o~
as~eat 23ritein have already underetood that the implaaable
competition Por 1i~e imp~ies~tsmultinatianal e~nd multidimenaional
- integration. A firm o~ the ei$e of VolkewageA or Renault, t'or
- instanae, aen only make a profit, that 18, aurvi ve, wi~h the
contribution from the Poreign markets.
On the gaopolitical ~.ovel, tha small States are no longer eafe
S'rom a classia and unpuniahed invasion ~uch sa in the Middle
pgeal That is as true Por Catabodia or Vietnem a$ for the three
oauntrieg of the Maghreb.
Integration 18 Poseib].e
Now, the ob~eativa data on A1gerSa, M,~rocco and Tuniaia argue
S'or integration, at leQSt economics predominance in the three
countriee of tha state control aector in tlze netional eaonomy;
narrownen~ ot' the loaal maxlcets which conetituta a aer3ous
obBt~ele to any ePfort at d~velopment; tha 8ame etage ot'
- development or rather unde~developmen~. Integration would a~ke
immediately possible a poli~y of aft'oative investmet~t, a
greater ai~~orption of' labor ~'orae, tha aonatruction oP gre~t
industrial aomplexea, tha Qpplication ot saientiri.c methode
o~ economta msnagemeat, the creation of vaat and ~pecial~zed
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scientific ina~itutione, the rationalize~tion oi' tho proce~s of
production and trade, a more efPicient mase product3nn eys~em -
and bettar outlata. Whila on the stratagic and geopoli~iaal
level, a Ni~ghreb Army aould conatitute a not eo negligible
deterrent. -
~ To Live Togather
Before theae ob~eotive de,ta and theae tuture neede, We e~re,
thereSore, in the presencs of two idse~a e~nd two pro~acta: the
_ "Maghreb o!' the people" and the "Maghreb ot the States". Why ~
_ not studp thia debate more in depth, without ulterior motiveg?
"t3y confronting clearly and ~ionestl~ these two thesea, one could
reduae to nothing the miatrust, the $uspicions, the reaSprocal .
abuae. ~apeci411y if this debate were to be 4ccompanied by a
_ f'ew eimple but ePtective common act3ona such ae:
--the rehabilitation o2' Meghrabization Which, at'ter having
!'unctionad succeaafully st the beginning ot' the Sevanties e~nd
b~~ough+~ the threa publia opinione coneid~rably alosar, ceaeed
to eaist beca.use o! Algerian-I~oroccan tena3.on;
--the reeuzaption of inter-I~.ghreb aporta competitione, auapen-
ded for the ~ une reasone e~r~d ~he constitution ot Maghrsb eporta
teame in the gr~at international competitiona;
- --the introduation oF a greeter number o~' houra in the sahool
and uriivarsity aurrio~a Por the history a,r.d geography of the -
- Maghreb; -
In ~hort, we must le'?rn ta liva tog~ther, which con~f~adi~t8
neither the Ma.ghreb ot the psopie nor that ot' the States. And
the problema which are currently in abayanoe, including, and
_ e~pacially, the grave Sahara arieis, would be surpaseed by -
the reali$ation o2' the IKaghreb pro~ect.
FC)03`NOTE3 _
1. Mohamed Cherit: "Hi~toire de 1~Afriqua du Nord," Par3s,
Pub. CNR3, 1979.
2. TrSbea from Mauritania, whiah aste~bliahed dur3ng 60 year~
4 aentrel authority ovar the whole oP North A~rica.
3, Prusaia had opted t'or x compelling, even violent msneuver, -
to unit',y ~he indapendent aermanic 9tutaffi in 1871,
The "are~t Morocco't aovers, in the mind ot certain heira
oS Allal el-Fasgi, the ourrent M~oroooan territory, ~
Mauritania and the Moorieh territories of 3enega,l, ae far ~
- ae the river, the "natural !'rontier".
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5. ChieP town ot the governorate of Tunieia, very~ cloae to
the Algerie~xi border.
b. The Oonatp,ntinois Waa a part of H~faids Tuniai~ until the
'Purkiah oacupatioa in the lbth aentury. It waa the Qttoinana
- wha rsJoined the Constantinoia to the plgidrg Regmnap.
COP'YRI(~HTt Jeune Afrique (~rup~ia, 1980
~956
C30 s l~!}00
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EGYPT
OPPOSITIONIST 3EES NEED FOR 'REBELLION' AGAINST SADAT
LD191549 Parie AFRIQUE-ASTE in French 10-?.3 Nov 80 pp 23-25
[InCerview with ~gypt~an I~ational Progreeeive Unionie~t Party leader Khalid Muhyi
al-Din by Sobhi Chafik: "Time for the Alternative"--date and glace of interview -
_ not epecified]
[Text] [Queetion] Egypt is nooo at a critical point. Ita aociopolitical develop-
ment~ brutally called into quastion a few yeare ago, ie being hindered even further -
by the facilities which President as-Sadat hae granted to the United States. The ~
Pentagon hae atrengthened ite mil~tary baaes in upper Egygt to guarantee the aurvival
of the Cairo regime and the U.S. military presence in the Middle Ease. Ae leader
of the Nat~.onal Progreesive Unioniet Party [NPUP]--the only legal opposition, if
not revolutionary, body in Egypt--can you explain your party's present poeition? _
In addition do you intead to abide by the broad lines of your program which was
drawn up.in 1971 or are you contemplating altering the NPUP's atrategy?
Kha11d Muhyi al-Din: The aituation which prevailed, when we drew up our program '
hae clearly now changed. Egypt is nat only a military base; it forms part of U.S.
etrategy in the Gulf and in the Middle Eget. Under the exieting regime Egypt con-
etitutes a pertnanent threat to all Arab c~untries in the regian, however moderate.
The pea~e epeech delivered by as-Sadat in November 1977 has now been replaced by
a whnle series of aggreeaive actione: taking over the shah's role as Middle East
"gendarme"; warni.ng the United States about a poseible "Soviet invasion" of the -
Gulf oil powers; offering military basea and facilities to the Pentagon. In keeping
with this policy there will be ~ oint maneuvera by the U.S. and Egyptian air forcee
And navies Chroughout November.
Aa far as domestic policy is concarned, none of the promiaes made when the Camp
- D~vid Agreements were signed has been kept. Opening the door to the Weet has led
to infla~ion, price increaees, imports of aophisticated products to satiafy the
new rieing bourgeoiaie. Even the price of bread has trebled in ].ess than 2 yeare;
thie ia having repercuseione on daily life. Indeed, the middle classee and the
_ wnrking claeaee are now beginning to have 3ome awareness of the coneequences of
tt~e peace treaty with Israe]..
mhe polity of turning to the Weat in all apherea has not brought proeperity. Aa
early as 1977 as-Sadat began to include in his speeches a"sprinkling" of references
to the miracle which wae going to happen in 1980, holding up the lure of "proeperity~"
lower prices, technology placed at the service of each citizen ~nd a roof for each
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.
young couple by buildLng thousands and thousands of apartment blocks whoae apart-
ments would be disCribuCed with lcng-term credit. Today the image which the man -
in th~ etreet hae of as-Sadat's policy contrasts markedly with the official opi.nion
~~ut; nut by Che medi a, the leadere of the National Democratic Party, the government
party 1ed I~y ~s-Sadat himeolf, and top officials.
A11 proep~r.[s have been well and truly hidden. In Egypt it is daily experience
which d1.ce~tes the people'e behavior. It ia clear that everybody~ including aenior
i?r.my c~ff.ic~re~ the Liberal profeseione and university professors, is finding it
impo~~ible ta live a decent life with the pre~ent wages.
In nddttinn to that there is atagnation in the economic situation. Aside from the ~
multinatinnal enterprieen which belong to three ~amilles in power, any notion of
development hae been ruled out on the pretext that the ideas of a"plan," "indus-
trializatinn" and "nationalizatio?i" belong to an-Naeir'e laaguage. In the leaders'
eyes an-Nasir's language is impregnated k*ith Marxist language, ~3nd that is accused
of having htndered the developmer,t of the econo~ny.
- The immedtaCe cansequence of this argument is that the economy hae been sub~ected
to conditions imposed by the World Bank which t~ae instructed the regime to end the
etate eubeidy on esaential products auch ae bread, meat, flour, sugar, oil and so
forth. '1'h~ eecond consequencee ie that, in order to tackle the economi:c criaie,
the government constantly has to resort to loane. However as the overseas debt
tiB~e, intereaC rates increaee. This debt has reached 4,620 Egyptian pounds
($11,84b million) as againet 200 million Egyptian pounde in 1970. The difference
i~, however~ that in an-Naeir's day~ the money borrowed was invested in basic
induqtrielizatian~ economic and aocial development and hence in establishing an
- inf'raetxucture capable of booating Egygt's productivity while~ under as-Sadat
bnrrnwing co rresponds tu the need to construct new presidential reaidences and,
- in maeC cbees, Cairo ie borrowing to repay loana and interest.
[QuestionJ Breaking with the policy which has emerged from the Camp David Agree-
mente and praclaiming a halt in the negotiatione means~ ae you have ~uat clearly
explained, Chat the problem which mus~ now be solved is that of an "alternative" in '
both dome9tic end f.oreign policy. Is this problem at the center of the current
uttempts to alter the NPUP's etrategy?
Khalid Muhyi al-Din: AC prea~nt social tension seems to have increased to a level
at which it could have political repercuseior~s. The guiding principle behind the
NPUP's current policy involves transforminb the people's discontent into organized
palitical action; accepting an alliance with existing political forces which denounce
the preeent gavernment; expanding the grae6 ro~ts and drawing aupport from the
nntianal. and progreseive for.cee on the five continents.
_ [c2uestionJ What are the chances of thig policy succeeding?
Khall.d Muhyi a1-Din: Almoat all the nationalist movements have ~oined our ranks~
F'or inetance the WAFD--which is now trying to submit a new list of inembers to the
nuthorlties a�ter urging some of its members to prasecute the leadere who, in July
1918, agreed to dissolve the party~ protesting against the government's "feigned
democracy"--has ~pened dialogue with us. _
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(Questton] The WAFD, however, strongly condemned the an-Nasir era. Ite preeent
- l~nder Si.rn~ ad-Din, regarded ae continuing the work of Sa'd Zaghlul and Muetafa
en-Nahaae (note) (5a'd 7,aghiul, founder of the WAFD, the Egyptian Nationalist Party,
led r~trong opposition to the British occupation of the Nile Valley (Egypt and the
- 5ucinn). It was Muetafa an-Nahaae who succeeded him and on his death the WAFD,
banned under an-Naeir, gave its leaderehip to Siraj ad-Din. However the neo-WAFD ~
which emerged from the WAFD has moved toward a lesa ambiguoua palicy than that
which an-NAhaae' succes~ors originally intended it to follow) described the 1952
revoiutinn ae a"criminal revolution." In those circumstances how could you form
an allianc~ wtth the old Nationalist Party2
, Khalid Muhyi al-Din: Beware of intentions. What counta ie political action. The
prngram adopted by the WAFD and, more particularly, by the nec,-WAFD (for the old
WAFA ie now dieappearing, being the representative of classee which no longer exist
or which exist ae a minority without any real impact) comprises the continuation of
the 1952 revolution by carrying its reforme and achievements to their concluaion.
It wante competitive coexistence between th~ public aector and the general [as
publishedJ sector; it recognizes the atructures of the republic instituted in 1953;
- it ~dvocates nonalignment and ,joint Arab action in the foreign policy sphere. What
mnre can yau expect?
Th~t i~ not all, howev~r: we must also reckon with progresaive elements in the
YAlnmic groupa, While they re~ect any Westernization of the region they are none-
theleee n cnneiderable political forc~ capable of boosting the move toward joint
Arab acCion. In order to make an accurate a8aeasment of the political phenomenon
which hae emerged over the past few months and the degree to which it ia to be
~aund !n the varioue groupe, it ie tmportant to realize that it is being demonstrated
~bnv~ all by Che deaire to close ranks and rally the political forcea in joint -
ACC~US1. I will give you a specific example: during the pxamination of the law on
ehe "protection of values against immorality" in the People's Assembly in May 1980, -
Lhe prese, the Egyptian lawyers, the Magistrates Association, the Alexandri~
Univer.sity Teachers k'ederatioti adopted our atance on the promulgation of this -
~mergency legislation which was intended to silence the oppoaition while reducing
_ ehe ~udici.ary to one official, the "public prosecutor" appointed by the president
himeelf whose jab would consiat of atripping all those who oppose the regime's
structures of their political and civil rights, �
'~}ieee ~~int efforts are backed by the action of opposition parties, including the -
SncialtaC 7~tibor ParCy which as-Sadat formed in 2978 with the aim of representing -
th~ npposition ag the head of state seea it, but which has been forced to support
nur xction by ite members' dynamiam. In short the foraration of an extended national
front with the aim of propoeing an "alternative" is now an integral part of Egyptian
liEe and society. However do noC aak me to give details of izs urganization. All
I cen eay is that the opposftion groups have starCed to move closer together,
r~pecifically by action based on common struggles in order to radically change the
eituation whicti has been produced by the open-door policy and the Cemp David Agree- -
ments. ~
[QuestionJ Do you not expect ae-Sadat to uae hts usual method and resort to a new

-;~'t'"~ referendum and then, backed by the semblance of majority eupport, again open the �
'~.:Y prieone to liis opponents, while sheltering behind the "rule of law," eince the
"eocialiet public prosecutar.'s" powers are ati11 in force?
11
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- Khalid Muhyi al-Din: In view of rieing prices, corrupCion, the monopoly on esaen-
tial producte~ favoritism and economic dependence on U.S. monopo"lies, our ac~ion -
will find support among the entire population. Tell me which of us citizens vaill
agree, ae ae-SgdaC has suggested, to the U.S. arury general staff leading our ~
national nrmy? Do you think that our soldiers who, as soon as the oppor~unity
_ aroee, etruggled heroically �or a national cause, will. be able to ait back while
nn attempt ie made to turn Egypt into another South Vietnam or that the Egyptian
- urmy will serve to protect the imperialista against our Arab brothere in the Gulf?
_ (Question] Although the peace treaty with Israel is considered by Weatern opinion _
~n initial. step toward an all-embracing aettlement of the Iaraeli~Arab conflict, _
your party and most Arab leaders totally rejQCt the clauses of the Camp David
Agreements. How dn you think a definitive, radical and ~uat settlement to this
conflict cgn be envieaged?
Khalid Muttyi al-Din: Contrary to a widely-held opinion we are not oppoaed to a
peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict and we have no objection to the :
_ principle of negoCiations with Ierael. However what happened in March 1979 is
entirely different: the signing of a separate peace treaty in which no mention
ie made of Che Palestinian people'~ right to emancipation under the leaderahip of
tha PLO, which is their legitimate representative, suggests that, for the eigna-
tories af the Camp David Agreemente, the conflict was originally an Ieraeli-Egyptian
conflict. That is not the case; it ie clearly the Palestinian queation which is
the essentir~l point in thie conflict. Indeed the Caacp David Agreements by avoiding
the reaL causes of discord are only a:tmed at associating the Egyptian Government's
~ffnrte to the efforta Israel has been making since 1948 to maintain 40 percent of
the 4 mi].lian Parestinians within territoriea which are in fact occupied but in
whi.ch a eemblance of autonomy could be granted, and thie runs completely counter
_ to the UN Charter and the Geneva Convention on military occupation. -
- Nnnetheless I must add a few details on the atance adopted by the NPUP with regard
Ca the con�lict and t~ the developments in the negotiations since December 1977.
Withou: Egypt's alignment with the deciaiona taken during the Rabat Summit in 1974,
~ind without the PLO'e participation, any negotiations with Irarael would be likely _
to accentuate Egypt's isolation. _
Aside from the fact that the Camp David AgreemQnts cut Egypt off from ~oint Arab =
actinn~ they undermine the country's national intereBte and sovereignty. In -
addition they make provieion for abaolutely unacceptable eecurity measures, as if
it were Egypt and not Israel which had attacked its neighbors. That ia why we
advocate a halt in the negotiations with Ierael.
(Questionj However the United Statea coa~tinues to refuse to regard the PLO as a
valid and legitiAate interl~cutor. iiow, therefore, do you env~.sage the real solu-
tion to ehe conflict? Do you intend to abaadon the stance you defined in the NPUP
program which consiete of poaing acceptanca of UN Security Council Resolution 242
as a precondition to any agreemenC?
Khalid Muhyi al-Din: In my opinion everything dapends on the balance of forces
in Che region...as soon as the ~oint Arab action is capable of exerting all ita -
influence on tha eides cancerned ather prospecta will be opened up. At present
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r~l]. the problems hinge on one essential point: defeating the existing Egyptian
regime which ia the real inetigator of this separate peace and beare most respon-
eibility for the "erosion" of the United Arab Front. Ualess this is done no strong
poaition will be adopted and the margin for action which the Arab leaders will have
will be increasingly na,rrow. All in all I am optimietic: aeide from the as-Sadat -
regime's economi.c atagnation there are the aucceasive failurea in the negotiations
~ on PaleBttnian autonomy. In these circumstances there ie only one solution: rebel-
_ lion by the Egyptians againat as-Sadat and by the Palestinians in the occupied
, territorie~. When that hr~ppens the entire Arab nation will respond.
COF'YF~IGHT: 1980 AFRIQUE-ASIE
CSO: 4800
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LIBYA
FRG MAGt1ZTNE INTERVIEWS LIBYA'S QADHDHAFI ,
DW211104 Hamburg STE1tN in German 20 Nov 80 pp 6~+-68
- (Interview with Col Mu'ammar al-Qsdhdhafi, Libya chief of state, by reporters
Karl-Guenther Baxth and Gerhard Rrug at Sebha barracke, date not given]
[Text] STEItN: Colonel a~.-Qadhdhafi, you have ~ust painted the devil on the wall
�or your echolars, namely the A,mericane. Your greateet enemies liave electe~i a new
pre~ident. You called the old preeident "raive and ignorant:" Everything go~xug
ta be even woree now?
, A1-Qadhdhafi: I am moet content with the elections.
STERN: What do you mean? -
A1-QadhdhRF.i: Because Carter ie gone.
STERN: But Reagan ie much harder and more determined to uae T3.S. power.
A1-(~adhdhafi: If eomebody ie particularly disgusting, one is first of all happy -
to have gotten rid of him. After all, lt was Carter who brought ae-Sad~.t and Begin
tagether at Camp David.
STERN: But Reagan w~ill not discoatinue the agreement. Is he not even more friendly
toward Ierael than Carter wae?
A1-Qadhdhafi: Reagan is more serious than Carter. ~
STERN: How do you mean that? After all, Reagan has called the PLO, which you very
~ much eupport, a gang of murderers.
A1-Qadhdhafi: Well, it ie his character, his personality that makea the difference
~ between him and Carter. Moreover, the Republicans are closer to us than the DemoW
_ crata.
STERN: But you hired the brother of a prominent democrat, namely Billy Carter,
for eeveral hundred thousand dollars to mediate between Libya and the UnitQd States.
- A1-Qadhdhafi: We have asked him to pay everything back.
- 1!~
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STERN: How much wae it?
- Ai-Qadhdhafi: Y do not know exactly, but he will pay everything back.
A1-Qadhdhafi underetande Englieh very well; he aleo ~peaks in half aentences at
times. He has everything tranalated into Arabic, thus gaining time. Se makes long
pausea and almost presaes the words out, and the frog~all Arabe seem to have some-
wl~ere in their throata, aeems to be evea bigger with him than with othere. When-
ever he epeaks of the Americans it aeeme that his brown eyes reflect a persecution -
complex.
"The Americans," he says while poliahiag the br~ss handle of his stick with his
meaty right h~nd, "the Americans threaten us, and the threat is growing daily." _
STEPiN: And therefore you ara calling your compatriots to arms? ~
- A2-Qadhdhafi: Yea, we are mobiliziag, we expect an American invasion any day.
STERN: Where exactly doe~a the danger come from?
A1-Qadhdha~i: From everywhere. The Americans atand at the Egyptian border, and ~
they co~e fram the Mediterranean. '
An attack againet Libya would be about the laet thing the A~nericans could have in
mind in these difficult foreign policy times. But A1-Qadhdhafi etatea it quite
~eriouely~ snd it ie hard to tell where the plain propagaada enda aad wlzere the
pree~cution complex begina. H~ kaowa that he ia the world villian number one for
th~ Americane, next to Khomeyni.
We xeked him whether he had read the beetseller "The Fifth xider," the nov~1 by
Colline and Lapierre. A1-Qadhdhafi, the novel's main character, has an atomic bomb
hidden in New York, and threatene to explode it in 36 houra if the United States
_ dvea not eee to it that Israel withdraws from the Weat Bank and the Gaza Strip. ,
Al-Qadhdhafi gring, his ekin with its l~rge poree inflatea over both cheeks and
he ehows two rowe of pearl-white teet~.
"That ie a good story," he eays.
"Juet a etory?"
Now the man who once warned the oil-hungry auperpowere by saying "~ust one word and !
the whole world will explode," dares mab~e a~oke: "If that really doea happen some
day~ you ot STERN will be reeponeible--because you reminded me of it."
He becomes serioue again when we ask him: "Do you have the bomb?" A1-Qadhdhafi
aaewers epontaneousiy by ignoring the queetion: "We are againet the ~rgumeat of
the bomb. The atom should aerve only peaceful aims..."
A1-Qadhdhafi, all stateaman, denies hie striving for the bomb, denies cooperation
with Pnkistan in that aector. When we began discussing the half dozen states on
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the threehold of the nuclear bomb club, he hurriedly tried to cover up trie tracks:
"I do not believe Pakietan will have the bomb in the near future." When the situa-
Cion become~ critical, al-�Qadhdhafi flees into noncommital phrasea. He does not
hecame ldud and wild, ae he used to in earlier interviewe.
How about the 1,000-kilometer-long wall he wanted to build along the Egyptian
border?
"Juet a ~oke."
Whether he needed a wall after all around all of Libya, so that even more highly
qualified compatriots do not flee from hie paradise of partners?
"Why, everybody ia quite well off."
A1-Q~dhdhafi boldly ignorea the diseatiafaction in the country, admitting, if at
all~ eome early difficulties on the path toward Libyan socialism.
A few days earlier we had visited an enormous cement factory in Holms that was
~ equipped with German machines. There were no personael. We were told that all
the workers were fightir~g in Chad. While the tranalation was taking place,
~1-Qadhdhafi inquired about the factory. Then he said: "The workera had sessiona
in the people'e committee. You ought to go there once more, thea the workers will
be there." He adds a warning: "You fieh in dir~y waters."
Wa go on fiehing: "Here cloae by is a tomato factory--no work has been done there
- for 2 year~."
A1-Qsdhdhafi inq_uires again and says: "I will make inquires."
We say that the year-long fight against property is killing all peraonal initiative
in the country.
"r see that dif.f~rently," says al-Qadhdhafi. We say: "You ought to ask the taxi
driver a� Tripoli who you have ~ust deprived of two of his three taxis."
A1-Qadhdha�i: And you ought to sek the two slaves who worked for him and whom he
wae exploiting.
- It ie that eimple with aocialism a la Libya. A1-Qadhdhafi contests that frustration
existe in the country about the planning bureaucrats who build only supermarkets,
Chus eweeping emall dealers off the ehelves. He contests that there is ~ear of the
army bloodhound~ and the arbitrary canfiscation of automobiles for military purpoaea.
"Here," he eays, "only fear of reactionariea and imperialists exiata. Here the
people ruled."
What Rbout the oppoaition people who are sitting in ~ail?
A1-Qadhdhafi: A emall group that wae sentenced by the revolutionary court after
_ the 1969 revolution.
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STERN: How many?
_ A1-Qadhdhafi: A smell number.
STERN: Doee tha gmall number also contain those 2,000 pereone whom were arrested
after the attampted ae~aesination~ against you in Benghasi?
AY-Qndhdhafi nba'ndons hie casual attitude, he s~ta up straight, but tries it~ediately
to cov~r up tha uneaeinese, ,joking witt~ the armed ladies Fatima and Alima [body-
guards] as if he wanted to eay: "Who can do me any harm if you protect me?" He
denies the assaesination attempt, and he also deaiee the unrest in Tobruk thia
epring.
What about the many political emigrees who he gave an ultimatum to return to Libya?
A1-Qadhdhafi: They live like all the others.
STERN: And those who did not retum voluntarily? Many emigreea have been shot to
death in London, Rome, Athens and Bonn.
"One cannot be responeible for all rev4lutionary commandos," says Libya's leader,
trying to eaaction the murders: "Many of them were enemies of the people, insti-
gated by the U.S. Intelligence Service CIA."
SrERN: Did you give orders to ahoot the people without legal procedures?
- Al-Qadhdhafi: No, I wae againat tha~. That muet not happea any more.
5'TERN: Did you order the executions atopped?
A1-Qadhdhafi: No, that was beyond my sphere of influence. On the previous day in
- Sebha we seneed how tense the situation is in Libya. When STERN photographer Robert
Lebeck took eome picturea at a filling atation, a dozen Libyana ~umped at him and
tried to take hie ~amera away. A secret aervice man brought him to a police station
and took the f ilma away from him.
STERN: Why are people so fearful here?
A1-Qadhdhafi: The people have complexes. They are afr~id of new colonialiem.
Mayba you look too American. Sorry--you will get your filnis back.
"We have them back already," eays Lebeck, "but they were exposed."
We gsked al-Qadhdhafi whether he wanted to come to the Federal ReFublic after hia
vieit to the GDR in order to campaign ~or himself in the Western world. A1-Qadhdhafi
- gives e eign of refueal: "Ae long as the Rederal Republic is a satellite of the
Unit~d Statee no thanke."
After he had finiahed atating thie he hurried down the long corridox, passing the
gennral etaff room with its enormous map of Libya on an easel and th= mape of
_ neighboring countries on the walls. Iie aleo passed many green telephones as well
ae a bartender who only metea out orange juice and pepsi cola. He is protected
by Fetima and Alima who open the door of t1~e green BMW 733-I for him and off he
goes to the desert.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 GRUNER + Jahr Ag & Co.
CSa: 4403
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I~IURITANIA
' BRIEFS
MORE CHILDFtEN ATTENDING SCHOOIt-Education: the number of children~attending school
_ hae increased by 10 perceat. The total number of atudenta in ele~ne~tarq schoole
- h~a increaeed thie year by a little more than 10 percent. According to figurre of
the National Ministry of Education, the total number for the new echool year ie
93,730 etudents, up from 85,151 last year. The percentage of childr~en attending
schoole in the country is at present 23 percent. (Text] [Parie MARGHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDZTF.RRANEENS in French 24 Oct 80 p 2610] 8693
ROK COOPERATION, TRADE--Cooperatives-Commerce: the exchangea with Korea. Mauri-
tania hae had diplomatic relationa at the ambassadorial level with the Republic
of iCorea atnc~ 1979. Tt importa fabric and various commodities from Korea, while
Korea importe iron ore from Mauritania. Cooperation between the two countries in-
cludea fiehing, with the establishment of t~ao mixed fiehing companies a].r.eady
aperational according to the new policy on fiehing. Korean technicians will par-
ricipate in the conatruction nf dwellinge in the Zouerate region. Furthermore, the
Knrean~ Are training young Mauritanians in scientific methods, aepecially in regard
~ to fishing, rice-growing and textilea. [Text] (Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANE~NS in French 24 Oct 80 p 2610] 8693
-I ~CONOMIC CONTROL BODY APPROVED--Creation of an Lconomic Control. In add3tion, at
the meetin~ on 3 October 1980 the Cabinet approved three proposale for ordinances
' on the ereation of an organization for economic control. The Department of Commerce
will b~ granted the necessary inatrumente for the application of an effective con-
Cro]. policy. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUS ET MEDITERR~.NEENS in French
24 Oct 80 p 2611] 8693 �
REVXSION bF NOUAKCHOTT ADMINISTRATIVE BREAKDOWNS--Nouakchott: new administrative
divieions~. The Mauritanian Cabi.net approved an order terminating and replacing
- enother 1973 order creating districts in Nouakchott and sstting the powere of the
dietrict heads. The new order, approved by the government, will change the struc-
tures at the district level. New boundaries have been aet. Districts will no
longer have numbere. The final result of the new divieiona is an increase in the
geographical boundaries of districts. .There will still be six diatricts. But the
new organization will mean the expanaion of sotne of the new districts and the
abeorption of others which exieted under the old arrangement. The six new die-
tricts are as followa: the diatricts of Ksar, Tavrak Zeina, Tayaret, Tou~ounine,
Sebkha and E1 Mina. In its 11 and 12 October edition the daily paper CHAAB pub-
~ liahed the geographical boundaries of the new districts. [Text[ [Parie MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Freach 25 Oct 80 p 2611] 8693
CSO: 4400
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. SAUDI ARABIA
NAVAL ARMS AGREEMF~IT SIGNED WITH FRANCE
Parie AIR ET COSMOS in French 25 Oct 80 p 47
[Axticle by Pierre Langereuxs paseagee in slantlines originally printed in boldface]
[Text] France receatly eigned what could be the "contract of the centurq" with
- /5audi Arebia/ for naval arms. After 2~ years of negotiatione, the Rysd government
hae in fact ~uet eigned a contract for about 14 billion frsace (14.4 billion france~
- according Co some reporte) covering ehips, helicoptere ead aoeapoae eyeteme. This
contract followe that of /Qatar/ which wae signed a ehort time aarlier for the
delivery of /three patrol boute/ of the "La Combattante" type armed with /"EXOCET
MM40"/ aatieurface veseel miseilee from AEROSPATIALE [Natioaal Induetrial Aeroepace
Cotnpany] ~nd /two coaetal batteriee of "1~I40"/ for an c vsrall total of about 1.5
billioa francs (cf. AIR ET COSMOS, No 830). This comes to about 16 billion francs
= ia Freach coatracta eigned during the~last few months, representing over 8 million
- maahoure fo~..the ~rench arme induetry.
The contract which was signed (cf. AIR ET COSMOS, No 826)--undar the code name
"Sewari'~-provide!s f or the del ivery over a 5-year period of :
--/four 2.000-ton frigates/ armed with /antiaurface veasel Matra "Otomat" missilesl
aad /Thomeon-CSF antiaircraft/ "Crotale aaval" misailea/;
--/twa 17,000-ton/ "La Durance" type/refueling tankere/;
--a large number (there ie talk of 24) /carrier-borne/ ABRQ3PATIALE/ Dauphin 2/SA
365 helicopter~/, comparable to thoae ordered by the Americsn Coaet Guard; and
--AEROSPATIALE/ "AS15TT" air-~urface miseiles~ mounted on Dauphin 2 helicoptero.
The Dauphin 2 helicoptera will also be equipped with Thomson-CSF/ "Agrion 15" sur-
veillance and ob~ective designation radare which will simultaneously service the
firing of ehort-range "AS15TT" mieeiles (15 1~) and ob~ective deaignation relays
for the firing of "Otomat" antisurface ve~sel mieailes whose maximum range ie
180 lms (the longeat range by Matra to date was 135 km attained with a deaignation
of ob~ectives relay helicopter) (cf. AIA ET COSMOS, No 819).
/Thomeon-CSF ia the biggeet contractor in this market/ of which aboL~.t one-third
of the toral (nearly 5 billion france) will cover the eupplying of materiel pro-
duced by the group. The other principal contractors are /AEROSPATIALE, Matra/
and the naval shipyarda.
19
~+~w ~wwri.~~.
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Thi� order ie alao important for Matra (about 10 percent of the market) to the ex-
t~nt that Saudi Arabia hae selected the "Otomat."
- Thotneon-CSF ie~ in fact, reeponeible overall tor weapona eyateme and equipment.
Ao for the frigates~ this includee the entire /"Sea Tig~r"/ rada~ eurveillance
eystem end the tactical information procesaing and dieplay eystem. as well ae the
firing of the cannone (40 to 100 mm) bq ~`Cestor 2"/ radar fire. ThomBOn-CSF is
~leo eupplying the /"Crotale naval"/ short range, antiaircraft weapons ayrstema
(eight ramp-mounted miasiles per firing uait) and /"Diodon"/ sonare (one etation-
- ary in a bow-mounted dame and one tawed on each vesaely. The group is also taking
cara Af the integration of telecommuaicationa and navigation s~astems, as well as
the aupplying of the dual axis /homing devices/ for the "Otomat" miesiles.
Thomeon-CSF is also eupplying the /"Agrion 15"/ radara for the helicoptere, the
pereonnel training syetems (including a eimulation sy~tem) and logietics.
Ssudi Arabia ie~ theref ore. now one of the biggest clienCe for French anae and the
most important Arab client �or naval arme. It is aleo one of the leading clients
of arme from tha 7'homeon-CSF group which hae already sold Ryad /double-barreled,
30 tmn/ aatiaircraft canaone on AMX30~ /"Crotale" m3eeilee/ on land vehicles (cf.
AIR ET COSMO3~ No 775) and /"Shahine"~ miseilea on AI~C3a tanka (cf. AIR ET COSMOS,
- No 819). Saudi Arabia ie elgo the number one foraign client of the "Crotale naval"
--and of the "AS15TT." The Ryad govarnmernt has also purchaeed about 200/ArIX30 com-
bat tanke/ from France. Theae pravioue contracte repreaented about 12 billion
frar~ce worth of arme.
COPYRIGHT: A & C, 1980
~ 8143
- CSO: 4g00
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SYRIA
IMPI~ICA~IONS OF SOVIET T12EATY ON RELATIONS WITH LIBYA EXPLORED
Parie AL-WATAN AI.-'ARABI i,n Arabic 17-23 Oct 80 pp 3~4-35
[Article: "Is the Syrian Treaty with the Sovieta a Substitute for Unity with
al-Ja~mahiriyah?"j
tText] The month that had been desig~nated for setting up the institutions for the
merger between Syria and the Libyan Jamahiriyah went by and no announcement wae made

~ about the unity pro~ect. In fact~ Syrian President Hafiz al-Aead pre�erred to turn

' to Moecow to conclude a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the'Soviet Union.

~ Ie thie treaty then a eubstitute for unity with Libya~
The Cime ie the 9th of October 1980. -
Thia date was the date that had been designated for completing ~ha eatab].ishment _
of tha inst~tutions and the machinery for the immediate merger between the Syriaa
regime and Che Libyan regime. This is in accordance with the etipulations made in
the prnclamation of the two presidents in West Tripoli on the 10th of last September.
On th~t date, however, instead of traveling to Tripoli, Preaident al-Aead txaveled to
Moscow where he eigned a friendehip and cooperation treaty between Syria and Che
3oviet Union.
If the element of eurpriee in al-Aead's move to Moecow was that it occurred on the
eame date he was to have gone to West Tripoli, there was yet another aurprise. The
document c,*hich Brehznev and al-Asad signed was not a mutual military defenae treaty
or a~trategic all.iance against the U.S.-Israeli-Egyptian Camp David alliance se
officials in Damascua and the Syrian media claimed. It was merely a traditional .
treaty of friendehip and cooperntion of the kind which the Sovieta have had with a -
number of Third World countriea ever eince the eixties. This treaty is the fifth
in a eer~.es of eimilar treatiea: there was one between Mo~cow and Cairo in 1971--
thie treaty wae abragated by al-Sadat's regime i.n 1976;~there was one with Baghdad in
1972--it is eti21 in effecty with Mogadiahu (the Soma11 Republic) in 1974--it was
abrogated by S3ad Barre in 1977; and with Aden in 1979--it too is still in effect. _
In view of the fact that Che Syrian-Libyan merger did not take place on echedule and _
was replaced by a treaty with the Soviete [proclaimed) on the same date~ political =
obeerv~re are raising more than one queation.
For example, is the treaty with the Soviete a subati.tute �or unity witYc Libya?
~
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Obeprvere r~re trying to respond to that queation by saying that the fact of the mz~tter
ae well ae appearances etrongly suggest this impreseion.
Lf th~.s i~ a correct impresaion, there ie then no doubt that deep differences muat
hava orcurre~d during the month that was deaignatsd for the negotiatione between the
twn rmgitnes to Comple~Ce eetting up the lnetitutione for the merger. Or it may be that
Che twn partiee, at leaet after some give and take, were confronted with the im-
- poeeibility of fulf illing their promise in 1 month. They may have come to realize
the fundamental differencee that exiet in the natures of both regimes and that unity -
mean~ that one of them wculd diapose of the other and not unite with it.
Ooservera support this line of thought by noting the geographic gaps that the
establiehment of auch a state would face between its Aeian part and its African part
ae well as the nature of the preaidential regime in each one of them. Deapite the
~ fact that the presidential figure who has aole power remaina the center [of the
regimej in Syria and Libya, the Syrian Yegime ie set up on the basis of a ruling party -
_ besidc which emal~ friendly parties exist. The leadere of these parties ~oin together
in a front. Furthermore, there ia a people's assembly t~ which the government is
supposed to be accountable. At the same time the Libyan regime condemns partisanship
r~beolutel.y And coneidere "anyone who ~oins a party to be a traitor." In accordance
with the Third Theory devised by President al-Qadhdhafi, the Libyan regime doea not ;
� recognize a government, or a people's assembly. It rather aesumea that all power
[Rhould be vested] in the masses through what is~called revolutionary committeea.
Ob'servers da not stop at thia eharp discrepancy between the regimes of the two coun- _
Cries, but they add that a dieagreement must have taken place over who will be the
pr~eid~nt af the new united state: nl-Aead or A1-Qadhdhafi? What will happen to the _
- powers o� th~ one who does not win the preeidency? Will he become the com~nander of
the unity army? Thie wae the poaition which a1-Qadhdhafi had asked for in hia proposed
unity wiCh Egypt, but al-Sadat had turned that [ide:a] down. Did al-Qadhdhafi make
thi~ demand a~ain, and did al-Asad a8sume the same goeition that al-Sadat had assumed?
Observere are aleo inclined Co believe that there were eome disagreements about the
budget of the united sCate in the senee of combining the sources of oil-rich Libya ,
with thoee of Syria, which hae no oil, and merging them into a single fiscal system.
The Interim Month
~inally, observere think that in view of the fact that it was imposeible to establish
a marger between the two countriee within the month to which the two p~esidenta had
commitCed themeelves in front of the maseea, both presidents were extremely embarraesed.
Thie embarraeament was made plain by the inconaiatency between tine enthusiastic ~~ords
and promieee [that had been made) and the actual achievements. The way which the _
Syrian preeident chose for himself out of this situation was to haeten the slgning
of the treaty with the Soviete with the excuse that the treaty was of the utmoet
etrategi~ ~eceesity and could n~t be delayed, not even for unity. Pre~ident al-
(~adhdhafi remained in his predicament and in his embarrassment, making fiery atate-
~enta during the celebrationa comaaenarating Revnnge Day, the annivereary of the
_ evacuation of ~talian occupation from Libya.
" A1-Qadhdh~fi wae threatening death to everyone who oppoeed unity or wae lax in ea-
tablishing and supporting it. He did so without ~entioning a aingle word of apology
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ior the fecL th~t the merger had not been completed on achedule; nor did ~ie explain
th~ reaeone why the promiae had not been kept.
In the cnuree of thair analyeis of the course of events, observers go back [o raieing
que~tione. If the treaty with the Sovieta was a suhatitute to the Syrian~ for unity
with Libyc, wae it the eame for Libya?
In this regard obaervers call attention to the fact that al-Asad and Brezhne~' made no
reference whatsoever to the proposed merger between Syria and Libya in the welcoming
remarks they exchanged at the dinner banquet that followed the signing of the treaty.
Although the treaty was concluded with Syria as though the merger with Libya was
neither present nor [expected] in the foreseeable future, Libya, accordingly, becatise
- of the pnlitical reality and the provisiona of international law regarding treaties, -
wae n~t taken into consideration in the Syrian-Soviet treaty. =
Doe~ thie mean that Moecow and Datnascue do not view what has been broadcas* and pub- _
liehed about the Syrian-Libyan merger aeriously? Or does thie mean that Libya is
- now ob liged to accept thie treaty if it completes its merger with Syria succeasfully?
Such an obligation would mean approving of President al-Asad'a assesament of the
_ treaty. [That aeaeeament wae made] ia the political statement al-Aead made in
Moecow on the eve of the ceremony that was held to celebrate the sign~ng of the '
treety. A1-Aead suatimarized hie asseaement of the treaty by saying, "The documents
of thi~ treaty realize the inCerests of our people. [They serve] t~e intereste of the _
etruggle for peace in our area which ie based on ~uetice. T'his ie the peace that wi11
lead to the withdrawal of the aggr~esora from occupied Arab lands and the establish-
meat of firm rights for the Arab people of Palestine, and especially their right to
- return to their hameland, to deterznine their own deatiny and to establish t:?eir in-
dependent etate on the eoil of their homeland."
Thi~ ~esessment meane a commitment only to remove the effecta of the 1967 aggressior~, _
to eatablisl~ the Palestinian atate on the land that is liberated and not to encroach
upon the Iaraeli entity. Libya absolutely rejecta all of this. Col al-Qadhdhafi -
insists in all his apeeches on regaining all of Palestine and fully avenging the 1948
dieaster. He considers anything lees than thaC to be treason.
Bufi obaerv~era, on the other hand, are not unmindful of the fact thaC Soviet-Libyan
rel~tione are semi-favorable.
Nevertheless, Libya has not concluded a treaty of friendship and coo~eration with the
Soviets until today. In f act, Col ai-Qadhdhafi did more than once atrongly criticize ~
Iraq when it concluded a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. He also said
nothing when al-Sadat abrogated the treaty with r.he 5oviet Union.
In uddition to ita propoaed merger with Syria, Libya is, neverthelesa, an aesociate
of Syria in what ia called the Opposition and Confrontation Front. It wae at one of
Che mee ti.ngs of this front, the last one he attended before hie death, that the late
Algerj.ar? president~ Boumedienne propoeed a choice in confronting ~he Camp David -
alliance: a road of integrating the Arab countriea miiitarily, economically and
politically into an independent~ united foxce; and a road of polarization with the
5oviote through a atrategic alliance againat Che strategic alliance of Egypt and
Ierael set up by the tlnited States.
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Bnumediettnc had warned against hesitation and ambivalence about the two choicea and
not ntaking e firm decieion. He had etated that the underlying aesumptione for both
ehoicee did in �act exisC and that the decision that was required in this regard
would clarify for us the weys, the methode, goals as well as the time that wa~
neceeo~ry for actually making the choice. He affirmed that making the firet choice -
would remain the pref erred and the more effective choic~ e~ven though it would require
mnre time~ greater effort~ and self preparation eo that the neceseary sacrifices that
would be impoeed on every country could be borne. [He also affirmed] that by making
this first choice~ effective ati:~i iafluential relations With the Sovieta can be
_ establiehed without falling uader cheir standard.
If the eecond choice ie made~ it ~,'QUld mean that the doors to the first choice would
be cloaed permanently. One must tiien take into coneideration the fact that .a number
~ of Arab countriee other than Egypt wi11 be drawn in nne way or another to Che United -
5tatae. Cnneequeatly, chooeing polarization will make the battle naore vicious and
more difficult. Furthermore, the Soviets must be p~reuaded that they have a vital
. intereet in adopting all the Arab demands against the United States and Iarael.
- Ob~ervere remind ue that most me~abers of the Opposition and Corifrc+atation Front had
reoervatione about Boumedienne's proposal. President al-Asad and President al-
Qadhdhafi aeked for tiiae to think it over. ,
i
But after Bownedienne's death, there wae a rueh of events in the atrugglee that oc- -
curred between the Camp David front and the Baghdad Cos~ference front. Thia included -
the ptcoclamation of the pan-Arab Iraqi-Syrian [unit;/] and ite collapse after the
conspiracy agaiaBt the party and the regime in Iraq was discovered; the intense in-
~ teraal etrugglee in Syria and Libya; the eeta~liehment of the Khomeyni regime in _
Iran; and the threat the Khomeyni regime posed to the Arab character of the Gulf
are~. The ideae of Boumedienr~e were propoaed again at a meeting of the Opposition ~
and Confrontation Front, and a decieion waa made Co diecuas the etrategic alliance
opanly with the Soviete.
Preeident al-Qadhdhaf i was commissioned for this miaeion. He traveled to Mascow and
raturned from it to eay, "1'he Rueeiane are our friends, but they are ulCimately not
Arabe."
Z'he fxdnt etopped talking about the etrategic alliance until~.etate agencies and the
madia in Syria reopened the diecusaion about it around the middle of this y~ar by
tall:ing about Syria's special wieh "to establish this alliance with the Soviets."
Intarnal bloody confrontatione inside the country between the regime and the Moslem
Brother~ se well ee other oppoaition forcea had intensified.
Moecow e~nd Dasaeecus exchanged delegationa and studies until finally an ordinary treaty ;
- of friendehip and cooperation was groduced. It was one of those treaties which Che
Sovl.et Union concludee with Third World countries. Sudd~nly, after some hesitation~
Pr~eident al-Aead accepted the treaty anc~ agreed to ~i.gn it.
- It i~ here that observers pauee to raiee this question: Wea President al-qadhdhafi, -
- along wiCh the Soviete~ hoping for a strategic alliance against the Uni.ted States
and Ierael, and did he turn down the f rieadship and cooperetion treaty when it was
preeented to him whereae President al-Asad accepted it? Or is the concluaion ef -
thie trec~ty with Syria s pxeface to a[eimilar] treaty with Libya? Tf this is the
z~.
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caee~ why the rueh? Why weren't [the parties concerned] patient until th~~ merger
b~Cw~en Syria and Libya would have been completed and a treaty would then have been -
ri~n~d with ~ united state?
Fivc dbg~rvation
Observ~re ~re roaming the hallways of politic~J. life in the Arab hameland with these
qu~~tiona on their mi~ids, but they are not getting definitive answers to these
~ queation~. However, they do agree on recording some observationa that include ob-
jectiv~ facte about the aituation.
` The f.iret nbdervation ia that the fact that Syria concluded a treaty with the Soviete _
mede her brc~ak the date that had been aet for completir.g the merger with Libya.
The ~econd observatinn is that President al-Qadhdhafi made neither a positive nor a
negative comment on the Syrian-Soviet treaty. He 8~.lso did not offer an explanation
for the fact that the merger did not take place on r~chedule. President al-Asad too
d~d naC off~r such an explanation. ~
Th~: rhird obaervgCion is that the Syrian-Soviet treaty falls under traditional, or-
di.nc~r.y boundariee. It ie ae far as it can be from being the etrategic alliance which
nffic:inls 1n Damascus and in the media had been heralding.
'I'h~ f~urtti c~bservation is that the Syrian-Soviet treaty was eigned while the Iraqi-
Ir~nlan war wae being fought. [The treaty was aigned in the context of] the Iraqi
army muking progress in regaining Iraq's national sovereignty over Shatt al-~'Arab,
liberriting Irnq'e occupied lands and emerging as an effective, capable combat force
wha~c capability was growing on the ecene of battles in the Middle East and on the -
gcene of the Arab-Israeli struggle as well.
The ti'if:th observation is the fact that Chairman Brezhnev 8aid in the presence of
~ 1'regidenC nl-Asad an the eve of the aigning of the treaty, "T'he imperialiats are
i naw engr~g~d in further serious deception with regard to the war between Iraq and Iran.
1'he 1.mperialiste would very much like to deal a devastating blow to Arab unity."
~rez}~nev ~~ledged nan-interference in the ongoing struggle, declaring that his country
"would approve of the fastesC political settlement in this dispute. We are saying
tn oth~:re wiCh determination, 'Handa off these even~s! No country whateoever has
th~ r~ghC Co inter�ere in the Gulf or to present iteelf as its guardian.'"' _
I'rcqident al-Asad, however, made no direct or remote reference to the Iraqi-Iranian -
w~r in hl.A responae to ~rezhnev'e apeech.
COl'YKIGH'x: 1980 "AL-WATAN AL-ARABI"
8592
CSO: 4802
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TUNISIA
11AAtf'['-FA(,F, IN 'TUNI5IA' S INTERNAL POLICIES
P~rix AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 29 Sep-13 Oct SO p 33
CArticle by Adel Wahid: "Return t~ Zero"]
['fext] The single pzrty in power wishes to change its image.
Nawever~ it want9 r.o turn something old into something new.
rven thouRh the dealings wirh the legitimate leadership of the UGTT [Tunisian
C;~ner.nl Fc~d~rarton nf Labor] hav~ had their ups and downs after Mohamed Mzali became
- pr.ime minisrpr~ ir. ~hould be considered today that they have reached a dead point
end that t.h~y risk r.o maintain it for quite some time. In any case, this is the =
pr~~vailing feeling in Tunisia a�ter the chief of state himself clearly warned r_hat
"pea~lp s~ntpnced r.o jail term~s and forced labor have no right to assume trade union
r.~Kpc~ngibi.litiea." Thus Habib Bourguiba excludes almost all the members of the
= pxectitive buxeau and ove~r one-half of the members of the administrative c~mmission
nppoineed in M~r.ch 1977 et r.he trade union congress. In simple terms, he refuses
rn ~he whrkera the right to be represented by those they have elected quite freely
nnd who hevE~ proved~ both before and after the 26 January 1978 massacres, their.
cf~CPrminAti~n r.4 def.end the interpsts of the toiling masses. It is essentiall.y f~r
rhi~s rea5nn r.hat the genpral and unconditional amnesty never saw daylighr_ despite
r.he inh~.5f.ence wir.h which it was demanded by all popular circles. Loyal to himselE,
rhe Tuniwi,?r~ chief of star.e reserves himself the right to strike again at those he '
rele~~ed ye~r.er.day while, at the same time, depriving them of. their civil righr_s.
Sur,h ~ sudden dbour.-�ace clearly illustrates the limits of the detente appl.ied far
r,he pxsC fr.w months~ ha~tily described by some'as an "opening." In fact, whar is
rhr valu~ c~f releasing political and trade union prisoners when such release is
fall~wed by hauYe ar.rest and when they are denied the right to resume their work?
WherP ih r.he reapecr, for t}ie freedom of opinion officially acknowledged by the prime
rnf.nisr,er whpn r.he new5paper LE PHARE is confiscated at the printing press and r.hen
bAnnpd fnr rhree. m~nchs under. a flimsy pretext while it is, in fact, penalized for
hnving Eilwny5 suppor.Ced the workers' struggles and the legitimate leadership oi the
r.rAde union? In what way has the system truly changed allowing some people to give
- ths "benefir. of the d~ubr_~~ ta the "new" governmental team?
Naturelly, r;amP observers made a great deal of the purgea which Affected s~me high
c~ffir.ials ~f r.he nestourien Party such a~ Ameur Ben Aicha, who was depri.ved of his
mnnJr~r.e ,~s deputy and expelled fr.om tbe PSD [Destouorien Socialist Par.r_y~ fnr
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having "lnterf.ered in ~udi.ciary affairs," and Hassen Kacem, currently in jail for
hie participation in a fraud....back in 1975. At the time it had been commented in
the presq end h~d ended with the detention of several minor accomplices.
A~ thc~ K~rvtle r~nd intereated agents of a system which insured their political and
maCeriql fortunes, Nassen Kacem and Ameur Ben Aicha ~oth bear a severe responsi-
b~,lity for the 26 .lanuary 1978 massacres. They were also members of the State
Securiky Court which Hentenced to hanging 13 of the Gafsa insurgents lasr. 17 April.
ThPtr fHll f.rom gcace--temporar.y perhaps?--may be due as much to the struggle among
r.he cl~ns within the PSD, which is trying to gain a new breath, as to the desire of.
thp prim~ mini~ter and his collaborators to separate themselves from the most
rnrrupt elemenr,x of the system in order to attract those who have put a distance
b~r.wc~pn r.hPm and the 4ystem for a number of years. The abolishment of the position
c~f rst~rorney general of the republic, held for the past 25 years by Mohamed Farhat,
' brnth~r of Abdmllah Farhar., the former defense minister dismissed one year ago, ~ne
of. the motit important expertg in the Tunisian political process since its indepen-
dence nnd the executor of. Bourguiba's dirty deals, fits this logic equally well.
Qther headg may fall but, as usual, scapegoats will be found for the others.
The convocation of an extra~rdinary congress by the only party in power, requested ;
by Bou~guiba for next spr.ing, triggers a great deal of curiosity. In the best of i
cfiePr;~ Fuch a congresa could wind up the purge which is unwilling to mention his
nnme r~nd wishea to eradicate rhe sequels of "Nouirism" and shift governmental
t~ctiviti.e!; cl~aer r.o the center. For the time being, high officials are only claim-
_ Lng that [he ~ole purpose of this extraordinary congress will be "to study the
g~nsr~l lines of rhe 1981-1985 Five-Year Plan and the means to provide it with all
Ghe pRychnlogic~l and human factors needed for its success." HowevPr, no more than
the lAat c~ngres~~ heLd one year ago, will this congress be noted with granting the ,
baAi~ Eceeclams demanded by the broadest popular strata. Unquestionably, it will ~
' provi~~ r.h~ occaeion for. a new set[.lement of account at the summit which will re-
gulr, in the definir.ive removal of Hedi Nouira's supporters. Actually, the latter
are beg~lnnin~ to be more or less "thanked for their services." The latest, Hedi
Z~hal~ wAS dismisaed both from the Ministry of Youth and Sports and the Political
Aurenu, Nis succeASOr, Mohamed Kraiem is a former trade unionist who, thr~ughout ; ;
cl~e~e lx~t mAnth~, acted as a middleman between the government and Habib Achour in
~fEort r,o ffnd a Solution tA the trade union crisis. As a minister, Mohamed Kraiem ~
_ thuK pur, an end to the persistent rumors according to which he was eo become the -
UGTT ~er.rer.ary general. ,
Other "read~ustmenr.g" are planned as well. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
may ~oon hr~ve a new head. Furthermore, it is claimed that Sadok MokaddPm, National
Aas~mbly pr.esident for the past 16 years, may be dismis~sed as well. In additi~n,
the parliament could, in turn, be aff.ected by a wave o� purges which would allow
- thA "elecr.ion" ~f an aasembly where the supporters of the current governmental team
would h~Ld strong position. However, such settlements ~~f int~rnal accounts and
divisi~ns within a system which has turned them into ita golden rule of gavernment
~ are totally indif�erent to the_ population as long_as_th~.do not exacerbate the
_ profaund frustration of the working class whose great sacrifices, undertaken in
- January 1978, specifically, may be eliminated, yet once again, for in Tunisia, and
until a new order prevails, there is always a stick hidden behind the carrot.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
_ 5~.r7
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_ TllNISIA
OPPOSITION LEADER UNDER HOUSE ARREST
P~r15 JEl1NE AFRIQUE in French 8 Oct SO p 34
[Reparr,: "DecontrACtion Yes, But..."] ~ ~
(Texr.] 5rs~him Hayder, member of the Political Bureau of the Popular Unir_y Movement -
(MUP) wr~s placed under house arrest on 26 September in Jendouba, his native town
(in thn norr.hwest), which he w~s allowed to choose rather than at his residence in
Me~rimP (nnz far fr.~m Tunis). Hia passport had been withdrawn 2 weeks earlier,
Eoll~wing hia return f.rom Sweden where he had undergone surgery. On 28 July Hayder
- h~d held in his home a general conference of the MUP, whose aecretary general is
Ahmed Aen Salah, former minister of the economy, currently in foreign exile. it is
equ~lly tru~ thar. the tone o� the adopted resolutions was quite vigorous.
In xddfr.in~~ t:A the absence of "Comrade Ahmed Ben Salah, victim of repression," on
r.he p~litical level. thP "Etruggle among clans, which is nothing but the ref.lection
~f zhe cl~s5 struggle" was deplored. The principle of lifetime presidency was cnn-
demn~d ~3nd r.ha ~~~"tatrt~ggle of the toi ling masses" was supported.
i Sr~ndwir.hed between thp introduction and an abrupt conclusion, was a chapter on "the
d~sir.e for ch~nge." This is a measured text which, in fact, reflects the breach
_i wiChin Chp MUP. On the Ane hand, the "hard cor.e," which are in the majority, deny
~ny legitim~cy t~ r.hp system and reject anything which could support it even at r.he
c~gt nf re~c~ct:ing pluralism within the system for which they are struggling. As to
the moderntpR, eheir only representative in t.he MUP Political Bureau was Brahim
_ tinydcr. `
' FI~>wPVCr, in a m~tion r~scently made public, presenting the conditions of the demo-
cr~~r.ic dnvelopment of. a congress held by the General Union of Tunisian Students
(UGE'C), t:he movement described as "positive indicator~" the release of the lasr.
polir.ic~l prisoners and the elimination of ni~ht watchmen at the university. ThiS
_ opprr.r.iar.i~n waa found in the statement by Ahmed Mestiri, leader of one ~f the two
r.rend~ wi,r.hin the Movement ~f. Socialist Democrats. Following his 24 September.
meer.inp wir,h the prime minisr,er. he "confirmed" the "favorable prejudice" whicn he
himself ~nd hia colleagues had for Mohamed Mzali. Me~tiri is in the gover.nmenr.
, pAlac~ whi.lp Hayder is under house arreat: The will �or decontraction always gives
warning shots. .
COPYRICHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
5157
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