JPRS ID: 9575 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 58
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9575
26 Feb ruary 1981
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FOREIGN BROAI~CAST INFORMATION SERVICE -
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2G February 1981
~'OTL FROi~t 1~-IE DIRTCTUR, FI3IS: .
Forty years ago, the U. S. Goverivnent inaugurated a new
se~ vice to monitor foreign public broadcasts, A few years later
a sirnilar group was established to exploit the foreign press.
rrom thc r,ierger of these organizations evolved the present-ddy
I~131S. Qur constant goal tlirougilout has been to provide our readers -
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JPRS L/9575 -
26 February 1981
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO ii/$i)
CONTENTS
COUNTRY SECTI4N
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Soviets Accused of Training, Equipping Terrorists
_
~ (Robert Moss; PARIS MATCH, 30 Jan 81).......... .....o.. 1
Coffinercial Economic, Technolegical Impact of Space Research -
(Patrice Brendle, et al.; FUTURIBLES, Nov 80) 6
~
FRANCE
PCF, PSF, Leftists: Power Balance, Strategy in 1981 Election
(Pierre Kende; COMr1EDTTAIRE, j73nter Z980-81) ~ . . . . 2Q -
Poll: Giscard, Mitterrand Even, But Former Expected To Win
(PARIS MATCH, 23 Jan 81) ................................o......0 27 -
Mitterrand Interview: 1981 Elecrian, Economy, USSR Policies
(Francois Mitterrand Interview; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 19 Jan 81)... 33
Senate Approves i981 Defense Budget
(AIR & QOSMOS, 13 Dec 80)............R 39 -
I:~tellectuals Dissent Within PCF Seen Growing
, (Irene Allier; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 12 Jan 81)...0............ 43
Nation's Overseas Arms Sales Cqntinue To Grow
(Francois d'Orcival; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 12 Jan 81) 46
Sitixation Seen Positive by Aerospatiale Board -
(AIR & COSI~S, 13 Dec 80) 50
ITALY
.
PCI's Nat~a Inr.ervieweci on Political Situation
(Alessandro ftatta Interview; CORRIERE DELI.A SERA, 30 Dec 80).... 52
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
- FnR nFFiC'TAL USE 6NLZ~
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iVew PCI Intellectual Publication Annotmced
_ (CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 28 Dec 80) .....................o......... 57
5W~ I~N
Wage Earner Fimd Proposals To Be Bitter Issue in 1982 Vote
(Aice Lanquist; VECKANS AFFARER, 11 Dec 8U) 58
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COUNTRY SECTION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
~
SOVIETS ACCUSED OF TRAINING, EQUIPPING TERRORISTS ~
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 30 Jan 81 pp 62-63s 78
[Article by Robert Moss: "`rerrorists Remora-Ccntrolled by Moscow--Red Brigade
Leaders Trained in Soviet Camps"]
[Text] Soviet Russia maintains and finances terrorism in Europe and par.ticularly
- in Italy. The Itnlians are becoming increasingly sure of tha~. Recent documents
confirm that opinion. This confirmation above a"1 comes from the voluminous files
of the CIA on the secret activities of the USSR, dated 6 February and submitted
to the United States Senate Investigating Committee on Espionage. It states that
the USSR spends about 90 billion centimes per yea~ to support terrorist movements
outside its sphere. Very recently, a senior officer of the intelligence services
in Rome, Constantino Belluscio, declared in an interview that "At lea.at four of
the top leaders of the Red Brigades and a couple of dozen of their supporters were
trained in Chechoslovak camps." The Italian intelligence service for a long time
has been giving the defense minister the names of certain Italian terrorist~ who
had spent some time in Czechoslovakia (most often at the center in Karlovy Vary,
controlled by the KGB [State Security Committee]). The same report described con-
tacts between the extreme left-wing Italians and KGB agents assigned to the Soviet
Embassy in Rome and demanded the expulsion of 22 accredited diplomats. In spite
of the fact that the defense L~inister at the time, Franco Restivo, and Foreign
- Affairs Minister Aldo Moro had given tneir approval, Prime Minister Giulio
.Andreotti turned the request down (which did not prevent Aldo Moro, after becoming
~rime Minister, to be kidnapped and then executed by the Red Brigades in 1978).
The secret CIA report of 6 February estimates at several thousand the number of
recruits who came from Europe, the Arab countries, Africa, or Latin America to
receive training in guerrilla warfare, sabotage, assassination, and street fight-
ing in the Soviet bloc. These course are given particularly at the military
- academy in Simfer~pol.
Contact with Terrorists via Satellite
Most of the weapons used by the European terrorists come from the Soviet bloc.
The submachinegun wh~ch killed Aldo Moro was a Skorpion made in Czechoslovakia.
The FPLP has been using Russian-made honing AA missiles (the SAM-7) in connection
with a series of attarks against civilian aircraft in Italy which failed. The _
guerrilla fighters of the ZAPU of Joshua Nkomo likewise made good use of SAM-7
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missiles to down. two civilian aircraft last year. In 1978, Spanish security offi-
cers discovered that a Basque nationalist group, the ETA [Basque Fatherland and
Liberty Group], had new special ammunition, made for the Czechoslovak Army, which
unCil then had never been used outside the Soviet bloc. Numerous middlemen p1.ay -
an active role in the national arms t�raffic and one of the most eminent is Col
Muammar Al-Qadhdhafi, the versatile chief of state of Libya who, in 1976, con-
cluded with the Soviet Union what undoubtedly was the biggest arms deal in history.
Accorcling to the London Conflict Analysis Institute, Libya served as secret
channel for shipping Soviet weapons going to the IRA, the Baader-Meinhof group in
West Germany, the Italian Red Br9.gades, the Red Army in Japan, the Arm of the Arab
Revolution (the group of Carlos), as well as revo'lutjonaries in Turkey, Yemen,
_ Ch~Lle, the Philippines, and other countries.
The countries of the Soviet bloc also directly delivered arms to t2rrorist organi-
zal.ions. Zehdi Terzi revealed that the PLO received arms and explosives from the _
USSR without any middlemen. The Soviet arcns inventory in the possession of the
PLO right now includes T-34 and T-54 tanks and medium artillery. According to
information a Western source, PLO leader Yasser'Arafat signed an agreement during
hIs visit to Moscow in March 1979 to keep up a direct flow of weapons with the
. Soviet Union.
In Oc~tober 1971, the Dutch authorities seized a big shipme~t of arms destined for
the IRA, sent through the Czech Omnipol agency. I~ast year, the Greek police dis-
covered a large quantity ~f arms and explosives, including Kalashnikov assault
rifles, assault grenades and bazookas of Soviet make, plus remote-controlled de-
tonators and hundreds of kilograms of plastic, hidden in a mansion on the out-
skir.ts ~f Athens. Investigators were able to establish that this armament was
_ part of a bigger shipment that was smuggled from Bulgaria by truck and destined -
for the extreme left-wing Turkish terrorists. ~
_ Secret Support from Cuba
The Sol~iet iJnion delegates a large portion of t'~e delicate task of maintaining
contact with the terrorist groups to its satellites. Most of the Eastern European
inte~l.i~ence services, such as the MfS (East German State Security Ministry),
oPerate entirely under Soviet direction; others may not be always as tightly
- controlled but like~vise are very valuable; chief among them are Cuba, the Arab
- countries of the "Re~ection Front" and the omnipresent PLO.
E1 CCA report dated 2 May 1979, releas~d by the press last year, in detail exposes
the secret support given by Cuba to the Sandinista National Liberation Front in
~1.icaLagua (which played an important role in bringing down the government of -
former president Anastasio Somoza Debayle in July 1979), as well as other similar
movements in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. This support includes weapons,
tr~i.ning, military advisors, and secret agents in the f.ieln.
PLU Activities Beyond I~'rontiers
The close relations existing today between Moscow and the PLO go back to the summer
of. 1974, the date of an official visit by Yasser Arafat to Moscow. Now, regular
contact between the USSR and the PLO leaders is handled through the Soviet Embassy
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in Eeirut which serves as a cover for the biggest KGB in the Middle East. (Out of
Che 88 Soviet diplomats accredited in Beirut, 37 were identified by Western in-
telligencP services as being KGB officers.)
The key man in contacts between the Soviet Union and the PLO is Aleksandr Soldatov,
the Soviet ambassador who arrived in Lebanon in 3eptember 1974 after having carried
out a secret mission in Cuba, which was to bring Castro back in line after he had
made independence noises.
Thanks to the close collaboration provided by Yasser Arafat, Soidatov was able to
establish a solld "Soviet lobby" inside the PLO; the l,stter has broken up into
rival factions, some of which sympathize more with the Muslim Brotherhood, the
conservative munarchies of the Persian Gulf or with the Chinese, rather than with
the Soviet Union. Deserters from the PLO and important prisoners, interrogated
by the Ysraelis revealed that, right now, Ara�at and Soldatov meet about once a
week and Arafat ~:onsults the Soviet ambassador before authorizing any terrorist
_ operation or major political move. Western diplomats, who have been keeping close
track of Soldatov's activities in Beirut found that, within a span of 6 weeks, at
the start of the year, the two men met at length at least seven times. According
to information from intelligence services, during one of those meetings, on 15 �
March, Araf.at presented a bri.efing on the results of the visit af Abu Yihad, chief
of espionage in the PLO, to Kuwait, Aden, and Yemen. These same sources asserted
- that Abu Yihad had studied the possibilities of extending the PLO's underground
activities to the Palestinian communities in the region of the Gulf. The PLO
cel's in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf emirates depend on the operations services
in Beirut, directed by Abu Yihad. According to information from a Western source,
the secret meeting on 15 March between Arafat and Soldatov concerned a project
for boosting the policy of destabilizing the conservative Arab monarchies in the
Gulf. Vladimir N. Sakharov, a Middle East specialist, a refugee from the KGB in
- 1971, revealed that tlie USSR had stepped up its participatiun in subversive opera-
tions on the Arabian Peninsula. When he G*as at Sanaa, in Yemen, Sakharov served
as interpreter during meetings between KGB officers and "the leaders of revolu-
tionary groups operating on the Arabian Peninsula and in the emigrates along the
Persian Gulf." He asserted that some of the terrorists, who participated in the
occupation of the G~and Mosque o� Mecca last November--an operation carried out
very professionally, shaking national and international confidence in Saudi
- royalty--were members of the People's Front of the Arabian Peninsula, an organi-
zation sponsored by the Sovi.et linion. Information coming from Western Europe
revealed that some of the insurgents at Mecca (whose battle plan called for a
- series of mutinies at Medinay Taif, and Riyad) have been trained by Cuban and
East Germa.n instructors in a center close to Lahe3 in South Yemen, where the
People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine often picked its recruits. The
interesr which the USSR devotes to the PLO, as the revolutionary vanguard in the
- Gulf region, is further enhaaced by the fact ehat it has so far not succeeded
in forming an effective Saudi communist par~y; the party created in 1975 has re-
mained semi-dormant.
The PLO right now has very close relationships with some of the leaders of the
- Iranian revolution who came to power with the ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni on.
One of the most surprising delegates to the Fatah conference in Damascus toward -
the end of May was Arbas-Agha Zahani, whose cover name is Abu Sharif.
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West Does Not Seem Interested -
_ The r.elationship between Abu Sharif and Arafat, Abu Yihad, and other PLO leaders
goes back to the early Seventies when he was getting guerrilla training in the
F'atah camp in Lebanon. After the fall of the shah, Abu Sharif was charged w3.th
organizing a new secret police and replacing the shah's famous SAVAK [Intelli-
get~ce and Security Agency]. A suecial brigade of the PLO, whose members re-
ceived secret agent training in the Soviet Union, was dispatched to Tehran to -
he1P spot the "counterrevolutionaries." Abu Sharif repaid his personal debt to
- the PLO by helping to collect--among other things with tl~e help of one of the
grandsons of the Ayat~llah--a large Iranian contribution to *_he Palestinian war
chest and by sending more than 200 Iranian "volunteers" to fight side by side
with the PLO in the south of Lebanon.
After the start of the caar between Iraq and Iran in September, the PLO sided with
Iran, which introduces the possibility that the Palestinians might cause trouble
in ce-rtaln Arab countries, especially in :iordan which sided with Iraq. (There
are about 1,127,000 Palestinians in Jordan and 180,000 in Saudi Arabia.)
r~r the Soviet Union, the usefulness o� the PLO goes far beyond the borders of
the ~t:iddle East. In the training centers of the Fatah and the FPLP in Lebanon,
in S}~ria9 in South Yemen and in I,ibya--where one can find numerous instructors
from the Soviet b1oc--Western revolutionaries arrive regularly and they come -
both from Holland and from Australia.
Accocdiug to information from a reliable Arab source, the non-Arab recruits in _
the Hauriya camp (south of Damascus) includes four members from the Red Army
Faction of West Germany, six members of the italian Red Brigades, three Spaniards
associated with the Basque ETA, four members of the Red Army of Japan, 32
Filippinos and miscellaneous Asians, 180 Africans, 170 Iranians, 28 Argentinians
(most of them belonging to the guerrilla organization called Peronista
riontonero movement), 12 Brazilians, including several members of the Extreme
Left-Wing People's Revolutionary Movement--and 130 Turks, including members of _
the People~s Liberatioti Army.
P~elatlons Uetween the FPLP and the underground revolutionary groups in Italy
_ go beyond the simple use of Italian transit facilities and logistic support for
Palestinian operations.
On 7 November 1979, the Italian police stopped a vehicle for speeding on a high-
way along the Adriatic coast. The police officers found that the vehicle's
occupants were members ot the Red Brigade and werE transporting two SA,M-7 _
missiles. These missiles had come from the FPLP which had smuggled them on
boar.d a small boat with a Syrian crew, the "Sidon." The Italian intelligence
ser.vices think that the SAM-7 missiles were to be used in political attacks in
Italy al.though the FPLP had declared that the weapons were to be transported
elsewliere. That would tally with the conclusions of investiga.tors in the FRG
- who think that the assassins of Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro ~aere in contact
with the Palestinians.
An overall picture of Soviet support for international terrorism is necessarily
incomplete and will remain so unless Ambassador Aleksandr Soldatov or some other
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- agent of equal importance decides t~ defect to the West and tell his story. Few
Western governments seem sufficiently interested in the problem of terrorism
supported by the Soviet Union to include it on their foreign policy agendas. The
reasons for this reluctance are debatable. For those who persist in believing--
in spite of the events in Afghanistan--that the Soviet leaders are in favor of
"detente," this is perhaps a natural psychological reluctance in having to face
the facts which are so contrary to their hopes. For those who are convinced that
recognition of the PLO and the creation of a Palestinian state are the conditions
necessary for the maintenance of peace in the Middle East and reasonable petro-
leum prices, this is perhaps a desire similar to ignoring every evidence that
could shake their conviction. But, regardless of the partisan or ideological
_ tendencies, any realistic debate on the line of conduct which the West should
adopt r.oward the Soviet Union must absolutely take into account the militant
support for terrorism.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 par Cogedipresse S.A.
5058
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
� COI~IERCIAL ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACT OF SPACE RESEARCH
Paris EUTURIBLES in French no 3 8, Nov 80 pp 67-86
[Article by Patrice Brendle, Patrick Cohend~t and Regis Larue de Tournemine,
Bureau of Theoretical and Applied Economics, Louis Paseeur University, Strasbourg:
"F.caiiomic Impact of European Space Projects"]
, (Excerpks] Over the past 20 years the European countries have in- -
i vested in space projects close to 50 billion francs. Since the
direct application of space is now well-known (telecommunications,
r_eledetection, etc.), we have the righi. to question the effects of -
space research on the economic fabric. The sr_udy conducted by the
' Burea~i of Theoretical and Applied Economics of Strasbourg University
on the impact of the projects of the European Space Agency tries to
- answer this question. In addition to the obtained results the
study provides the opp ortunity of analyzing the origins of an
original innovation process financed with public funds.
The European countries gave their industry an original impetus with their decision
te engage i.n the implementation of space projects. The European space programs
shuw, in eFFect, rhe following ~haracteristics through their various objectives,
whether political, ~trategic, economic or military:
So far they have been entirely financed out of public funds;
They have i.mplied the need for a comprehensive industrial organization which com-
bine~ r_he efforts of European c ompanies which had previously never collaborated -
on this level;
They are r.esorting to advanced technological applications requiring the steady
support oF applied atid basic research;
They mobilize a particularly sk illed manpower.
- It is thus that such characteriskics give space projects the nature of original
public aid to industr.ial innovar_ion. A look at what was happening 20 years ago
in terms oE the initial space achievements in Europe enables us today to judge
che economic resulr_s of the public effort in the area of space.
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A recent sr_udy conducted by the Bureau of Theoretical and Applied Economics of
Louis Pasteur Uni~ersity in Strasbourg has specifically attempted ro assess these
economic results. The study was limited to the program of the European Space
Agency, but to the extent to which they account for a large share of the European
space effort. The results could be considered a first approximation extended to
the projects of the national agencies.
The study is based on investiga[ions conducted at 130 companies involved in space
projects. The surveyed officials of each company were asked to identify the
various efEects which space work had triggered (expansion of scientific and techni-
cal knowledge, technological improvements, training, etc.) and tu link, to the -
extent of the possible, each noted effect with its economic consequences (creation -
of added value in the case of the development of new products, increased productiv- -
ity as the result of know-how improvements, etc.).
Beyond the resulting figures which show that the economic results of space expendi-
tUres have been substantial, the study provided the opportunity to observe the
= type of inechanisms through which a public research program could disseminate its
effects thrnughout the economic fabric. The purpose of the present article is,
pr.ecisely, to describe such mechanisms. The latter show the wealth and complexity
of the innovation process stemming from space research. In order to understand
them better it seemed to us, to begin with, that it was important clearly to de-
fine the starting point of the process: the technological development and the
industrial organization of a space project.
Technology and Organization of a Space Project
Strictly speaking, space is not a true industrial sector. Extensively relying
on the experience of military activities, space projects appear rather like a
"technological crossroads" which requires the synthesis of advanced technologies
in a great variety of sectors. This feature, combined with the concern for the
implementation of the projects within the stipulated time and cost limits, re-
- quires a strict industrial organi~,;tion. These two features of the space effort--
technological requirements and organization--are the two starting noints of the
innovation process result~.ng from space research. Following is the study of each
- such characteristic.
Technology
The implementation of any space program presumes the use of an extreme variety
oE technologies: structures, me~hanisms, telecommunications, instrumentation,
data storage and handling, attitude and stabilization control, heat control, _
optics, energy conditioning and storage, structural materials, solar generators _
and propulsion. As we shall see, the technological developments used to advance
space technology quite frequently converge with the various econoinic requirements
of strictly spatial applications: this convergence is at the origin of a transfer
of technologies from the space area to other sectors of economic activity.
There are three types of most frequently required characteristics of space
"products," namely:
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. Eligh reliability: 1'o the extent to which, for the time being, "maiTitenance" work -
l.il oucer space is impossible, each separate component (electronics, optical,
mechanical, etc.), and each system and subsystem must provide a virtually a?~solute
_ guaratitee of proper functioning over a five-year minimum period. This reliai.~ility
requirement helps to improve the quality of. the products and to introduce in the
enterprises specif.ic "guaranteed quality" procedures.
Lightness: The building oE a satellite presumes an optimum overall weight which
demands the characr.eristics of lightness not only on the structural level but also
on the payload. 'fhis presumes the development and utilization of new materials
for the structures (carbo~i fiber mixtures, Kevl�r, etc.) and the miniaturization
- of payload cumponenrs (electronic, optical).
High performance: This requirement, on the performance level, is manif.ested iti
the var.ier.y of. required technologies. Thus, in the "data storage and handling,"
the mass oE inf.orma~:ion r_o be handled aboard the sarellite and on the ground is
frequently considerable and the required performance is important in [erms of r_he
sysr_em of information handling (informatics) and information transfer (telecommuni- -
- car_ions). ITi the s,~me manner, in the case of "etiergy storage and conditioning," ~
the perfor.matice of space batteries is being steadily improved with the help of
- specif.ic research and development programs and are oriented toward meeting the -
requi.rements oE future space programs. -
7 'rhese r_nree technological characterisCics of spatial products: reliability, light-
~ ilt?SS an~i high performance, frequently lead to new requirements governing nonspace
appli.c�tions and cons~itute a base for the transfer of rechnology from space to
other i~~dustr.ial act.ivities. We must specify that the required specifications -
- are sucl-~ that space prod~cts are very costly. The extent of tratisfers of tech-
nalogy o~_itside space, therefore, is condition~d by the search for a compromise _
betwee~i r_he "advanced specifications" for space projects and "price limitations"
governin~ nonspace markets.
The Icldustrialization Organization
_ A compi~~r_e sr_udy of rhe economic effects induced by space programs would lead to
r_he irnportanr conclusion that these major programs have economic effects which _
are r~ot restricted r_o technological innovation alone. The importance of these
_ programs is revealed by a f.ar more comprehensive influence in terms of the indus-
tria] strucruring of ar~ et~tire set of involved companies. Indeed, in order to
meet r_he specifications of European space programs, the European companies must
set up a complex organization whose gurPnse is tn oprimize their industrial collab-
oratiori on an ir~ternational level. The implementation of space programs, conse- -
quenrly, requires a great master.y of international management techniques for com-
plex pr.ojects, planning, rationalization and coordination methods (the PERT method, _
defitiir_ion of tasks iii ter.ms of systems analysis), quality guarantees, etc. The
Euncr.ioninb of such kinds of organizations implies a high level of. exchange of ~
information among involved companies. This inf.ormation exchange takes place within
- the coi~sortit~ms which have been organized on the basis of the European programs.
The strucr.ure of a consortium enables the main contractor to coordinate tasks with-
in a sr_ipulated deadline. Each project requires a consc,-tium consisting of about
50 compat~i.es: head contractor, main contractors, subcontractors, and punctual
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suppliers. The main contractor manages the overall ~roject. He is in charge
of the co:iceptualization of the system, the in~egration of the various elements,
the tests, and quality control. His responsibility ext2nds also to the sum total
of technologies used to implement the space program. The main contractor is in
touch with the members of the consortium. Nis position presumes the vpdating of
the knowledge of space personnel paralleling the development of space technologies.
The contractors and subcontractors are responsible for specific systems or sub-
systems of the space program (satellite design, solar generar.ors, solar cells,
batteries, electronic equipment in tne satellite or on the ground, and thermal
conditioning). Therefore, generally speaking, these companies are more special-
ized in a specific area (electronics, optics, mechanics). Their research and
_ development strate~y is to specialize in specific 2echnologies. The~ are assisted
through study and research conr.racts which parallel the specific space program.
The suppliers are selected on the basis of their competence and know-how in very
specialized areas.
Therefore, each individual space program is based on a specific o:ganization with
clearly defined technical responsibilities. The coordination of such responsi-
bilities is achieved on the overall level by the main contractor and, on the l.evel
of systems anci subsystems, by main contractors and subcontractors. The historical
development of- the European apace programs over the past 15 years shows a twin
movement of specialization and extension of the technical range of competence of
the individual companies. Such a"structui~ing" of the European space industry,
thereEore, is the result of a double causality:
The policy of companies which focus their own research. and development efforts
within the framework of their long-term strategy in order to achieve a technologi-
cal advance in their chosen area. The objective of the companies, therefore, is
to strengthen their position in tendering bids;
The choice of contracting companies by the European Space Agency or by national
agenci.es in the course of the bidding procedures.
Such chGracteristics of space programs suggest that their economic impact is that
of an original method for providing public assistance to industrial innovation
which can improve the competiveness of European industry throughout the world and
influence its structural development.
The interviews conducted in European industrial enterprises to determine the impor-
tance of this economic impact and trace its influence on and dissemination within
the European industrial structures have enabled us to note a number of cases which
illustrate the creation of economic results based on space programs. The descrip-
- tion of these speciEic cases made a synthesis necessary. This was carried out
on the basis of a differentiation among four main categories of induced economic
results: technolo~ical advantages (product innovations and diversification pro-
cesses), advantages benefitting organization and methods (innova~ions in indus-
trial procedures, organization and management), commercial advantages (increased
sales without determining technological innovations), and advantages accruing to
enterprise personnel. This classification, which combines all the constituent
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func~ions of the enterprises, will be the structure of the overall results hereby
described.
Technological Effects
Here is an example which would provide a better illustra[ion of. the w~y in which
space technology requirements resulted in the development of new products: in
order to meet the requirements of a space tel.escope, one of the companies had to
- develop a camera which would make it possible to reproduce celestial charts with
a very long exposure time. The enterprise developed a system for the reconstruc- -
_ tion of the image with the help of a computer linked with the camera. The com-
, puter records the number of photons for each point of the picture. The reconstitu-
_ tion of the thus obtained ~icture is extremely accurate. The operational
- principle is similar to that of the human eye. However, the reconstitution is
obtained analytically by coupling the camera with the computer. The structure
oE the photographic area is entirely reconstituted by the system which makes it
possible to note any occurring structural change by comparing the different condi- _
tions of the observed photographed area. This new product can be applied in the
following areas: '
Autom~ted diagtiosis of urban traffic and urban traffic control;
- Surveillance of premises; -
Control of mobile operations in the course of industrial processes di.rectly and
in real ti.me throu~h imaKe analysis.
Consi.d~rin~ such a variety oi industrial applications, this example illustrates -
the new products engendered by the space effort.
'1'he sum total of new products (to which we must add the improved quality of goods
and diversification processes) covers a very broad range of sectors which have
beneficed from the "by-products" of space research: motor vehicles with kinetic
- energy-sr.cring facilities, robotics with optical control procedures, telecontrols
with fscili.ties for data transfer and storage, the petroleum industry with carbon
fiber pipes, the l.eisure-time industry with synthetic fibers for skis or tennis
racquets, etc.
The weal.th of such examples, however, should be interpreted cautiously: actually,
eve~ t.hou~h space has triggered a progress in a number of technological areas, .
- the economic significance of noted technological effects, measured in terms of
_ added value, remains limited: so far '_t ca~ be more or less compared to the
amotint oE money invested in space research. The reason for th:s is that the pro-
_ ducts d~rived f.rom t:he space industry remain sophisticated and, with rare excep-
tions, usable in a sti11 restricted market. Very few cases may be found in which ~
~ appli.cations based on space techniques have influenced regular consumer goods.
A number oE products have even remained on the level of simple projects, so that
i.t would be more accurate to say that space has nourished a real "reservoir of
_ [echnological ideas" which is a gain for the future rather Chan a question of tech-
noLogical changes in the industrial fabric resulting from space research. The
essential reaso~l for this phenomenon is the specific nature of space products
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whose price remains too high for more extensive marketing, even though a rather
substantial share of technologi~al effects has already exceeded the framework of
space applicotion.
Cvnversely, what seems striking among the observed technological results is the ~
close convergence between the characteristics of products resulti~ig from space
research and the characteristics demanded today of society: energy conservation, ~
conservation of materials, lightness, reliability, etc. These conversions,
naturally, can be explained to a lar~e extent by the technological requirements _
of the space projects we emphasized. This phenomenon, however, reveals its full
- significance if we accept that the major part of space technologies is based on
two essential functions which are currently the focal point of social concern:
mastery of information and mastery of energy. ~
Examples of Transfers of Space Technology to Other Activity Sectors
The several examples given here, established in the course of the investigation
conducted by the Bureau of Theoretical and Applied Economics of Strasbourg Univer-
_ sity in European space indus[ry give an idea of the wealth of applications of
space techniques, already achieved or planned for the balance of the economy.
Sector bene-
f.iting from
~ technological .
~ transfer Space Origin Nature of Innovation _
Automobile Satellite stabilization Inertial wheels for the conservation
Welding of satellite of vehicular energy consumption
- materials Technique for the welding of automobile
Space electronics parts through bombardment with ion
Materials of satellites beams
and launchers Data table indicating the point of
vehicle breakdown
Possible manufacturing of brake
shoes made of carbon fiber
Robotics Space optics Automatic control systems for
electronics industrial production
- Maritime Propulsion Submarine propulsion
Navigation Space electronics Visual display eqquipment
Intership communications -
Propulsion Submarine ballast release system
Aerial Space electronics Aircraft electronic gears
Navigation Ariane Possible use, in a few years, of
liquid ergols (used in the Ariane
rocket) for airplane propulsion
Satellite materials Use of carbon fiber in airplane
manufacturing
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SecLor bene-
fiting from ~
technological
t ransfer Space Origin Nature of Innovation
New Tapping solar Solar cells and photovoltaic solar power
energies energies plants
Satellite materials Wind blades made of synthetic fibers
- Project management Nuclear power plant control
I nformatics Spaceinformatics New components, computer cooling,
= Meteorological computer coupling, "bilingual"
_ satellites computers
Data filing system
B anks Space optics- Systems for the automatic classification
- electronics of bank notes
Fishing Space optics- Detection of fish schools
electronics
Ltrban Satellite altitude Urban circulation control
_ traEfic control
Electric Power storage Emergency storage with kinetic wheels
powe: stora~e Batteri.es Miniaturization of electric batteries
(calculators)
C onstruction Space optics- Dete~c~on of heat escapes through walls
electronics and roofs
Medicine Satellite materials Artificial ].imbs -
Space informatics Medical information for cardiological,
S~ace optics- lung, and other examinations
electronics Low-risk X-ray systems
Roads and Satellite heat Heating of roads and bridges with heat
bridges control pipes
- 'I'elecontrol Transmission of Developr~.~nt of data transmission grids
space data
Petrol.eum Sat.ellite materials Cylindrical structure made of a steel-
industry Space electronics aluminum alloy for refineries
Communications among offshore platforms
Publir_ Satellite control Simulation of subway automated operations
transport Satellite materials Materials for railroad cars
City Organization of Management of large cities
management space projects
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Sector bene-
fiting from
technological
transfer Space Origin Nature of Innovation
- S[ruggle Space optics- Control of polluted areas in the North
against electronics Sea
pollution
Security Space informatics Information system for control of techno-
Space optics- logical risks (chemical, offshore,
electronics fires, etc)
Detection of resiaence intruders
Leisure Space materials Synthetic fiber skis and tennis racuets
industries
~ Instruments Space instruments Ultrasound meters measuring the level
of liuids in tanks (petroleum)
Data presentation system
Antivibracion systems
- Food Satellite and Stainless beer barrels
industry launcher materials
_ Television Space electronics Electronic components, tubes
Telephone Satellite stabilization Emergency power for telephone switch-
boards
Effect of Organization and Methods
_ The interviews conducted in industry proved that the space programs eually entail
procedur.al innovations, i.e., improvements in production and organization methods.
One of the characteristics of the space programs is that the procedural innova-
tions which they induce are essentially manifested in terms of new management
methods or methods governing the organization of major projects and apply relative-
ly little to the introduction of new equipment or industrial systems. In other
words, it seems that in this area procedural innovations apply more to the organi-
zational rather than the capital factor. The explanation of this phenomenon is
as follows: whereas space programs have effectively required the use of new equip-
ment, by virtue of its specialized nature, such equipment has been mostly reused
in other space pro~,r.ams, for which reason other industrial areas have not been
the beneficiaries (in very specific cases installations specifically designed for
space projects have been used in aeronautics). Conversely, the implementation
of space programs requires a high mastery of probiems of international project
mana~ement and planning. It requires the use of very advanced rationalization
and organizational methods and the use of "quality control" procedures which are
frequently usable by the contracting parties in other projects. Such procedural
innovations, which correspond to an increase in know -how in the fields of organiza-
tion and methods, lead to productivity increases when applied to programs other
than spatial (or by other departments within the same enterprise).
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~
The following case described by a contractor for the European Space Agency shows
the development and increased productivity as the re~ult of the space work done
- by a company.
In this example, the enterprise we saw had regular productivity improvements start- -
~ ing with its work for the Euro~ean Space Aoency, thanks to "know-how" in the
management oE programs, a know-how which ~t has been steadily increasing in the
course of the development of the project.
A detailed study of this dev~lopment has shown that such gains, after having rapid-
ly increased, have slowed down, leveling off at about 15 percent. In fact, follow-
ing the apprenticeship stage in which space methods were advantageous, they ended
up by representing a limitation which tends to increase costs and, therefore, to
_ lower positive results. We must emphasize, therefore, that whereas space activi-
ties, despite their substantial positive results, could end up, because of their
excessive use, in efficiency losses, something which was taken into consideration.
'rhe space restrictions also create a conflicting relationship between the enter-
prises and the agency in charge of promoting research projects. Such conflict
possibilities appear virtually inevitable when the problem arises of converting
from rhe research stage (manufacturing of a prototype and of a small series) to -
more extensive and more standardized output.
Other. I:Cfc.cts of Space Projects
In additi.on to their technological and industrial orgar,ization effects, the space
programs yield other types of advantages as well: commercial advantages and
advanta~;es benefitting enterprise personnel.
Commercial Effects
'fhe space programs provide the concerned companies with a certain number of direct
and indirect commercial effects. Such advantages are translated into increased
sales wittiout decisive technological innovations.
- Such zdvantages could be the result, first of all, of the very nature of ~ome
space programs and of their direct commercial implications. A project such as
~Ieteosat:, for example, could be of interest to a large number of countries within
the zone covered by the satellite as an instrument for meteorological forecasting.
The companies entrusted by the European Space Agency to develop ground stations
for thc~ users r_hus acyuire a large potential market.
Spacf~ contracts equally yield indirect commercial results benefitting the contract-
in~ companies, for a variety of reasons: the first is that the sophistication
- of space programs ~based on reliability, performance and other requirements) is
tr.anslar.c~d by a space quality label to which industrialists working in this area
can reEer. Occasionally, such a label proves to be the decisive argument in
making a sale. The second is the industrial structure of space research in Europe
which presumes a high degree of cooperation among companies of different sectors
and nationalities. The thus established contacts, based on European programs,
_ Ereyuently lead the involved enterprises to establish close ties which, occasion-
ally, result in the implementation of joi~~t projects outside the space context
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(or wi.thin the framPwork oE national or bilateral space programs). Finally, the
third reason is the fact that some European companies have been able ~o cooperate
in the implementation of European programs, which has enabled them to participate
, in national and international space programs (as is the case with the Nordsat
satellite, Intelsat or Comsat), offering them, by this token, new market oppor-
tunities.
A particularly positive aspect of the commercial impact of space programs is their
importance in terms of exports and import substitutions. In some cases the con-
tracting companies have been able to utilize the reference and space qualifica-
tions acquired through the European programs significantly to increase their sales
in countries where opening a market is difficult (such as the United States) or
assume a dominant position on some markets of developing countries. -
i
For the same reasons the European markets usually reserved to American or Japanese
companies (in areas such as the information industry or precise electronics, for
example) have been successfully attacked by European companies. This double posi-
tive effect on rhe commercial balance of the European countries (increased exports
and reduced imports), added to the effect of technological achievements, proves
the positive result of spac~ "activities" in the search for a greater technologi-
cal independence of F.urope.
Effects on Enterprise Personnel
_ According to a large number of surveyed industrialists, the advantages resulting
from space activities are largely transmitted through the personnel of the in-
volved enterprises. The space department is considered an area in which the per-
sonnel increases its knowledge: such advantages are translated, in terms of the
enterprises, into the increased know-of [he personnel and the development of high-
ly technical crews. Improvements in personnel know-how leads either to increased
added value, as a result of increased sales, or cost reductions as the result of
higher efficiency.
Furthermore, one of the immediate and important advantages of space programs is
that of preservinK within some contracting enterprises a"critical mass" of highly
skilled engineers. This "critical mass" insures them strong research and develop- _
ment activities and enables them [o attack complex markets under good competitive
and credibility conditions, and to consider diversifications. By virtue of their
nature, however, this kind of effects is closely linked to the amount of European '
national programs. Therefore, the fluctuation of such activities directly affect
employmenr_ in participatin~ enterprises; any possibility that such programs may
be slowed down (as was the case starting with 1975, for example) faces them with
the problems of retaining their full space teams in the expectation of future
eventual contracts. Let us add that whereas in some cases the very high skills
_ of space teams ofEers unquestionable advantages, in other cases it could act as
a handicap. 'fhis is particularly true when an enterprise converts from the stage
of prototypes or small series production (characterizing space activities) to more
extensive production where commercial considerations predominate.
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Quan[ification of Econ~mic Effects
_ In order to obtain a numerical estimate of the economic impact of space projects,
- the Bu~-eau of Theoretical and Applied Economics of Louis Pasteur University in
Strasbourg asked the European industrialists who took part in the projects of the
Furopean Space Agency (ESA) to quantif~ the various economic eEfects they had
noted in their respective enterprises. To this effect they were asked to compare
~he factual situation in their enterprise at the time of the survey against a hypo-
thetical situation considered as the level of activity and a configuration of the
rnost li.kely costs had the enterprise not been under contract with the ESA. ihe
gap between the two situations was expressed in terms of added value variations. _
'fhis quantification criterion requires the following remarks:
IIy its very nature it allows us to take into consideration only the positive or
negar.ive eEEec[s oE ESA contracts which have already been economically concretized;
It enables us to avoid the breakdown between price and quantity which is illusory
if. we. wish r.o determine the qualitative changes which have resulted from research
and development projects (assessment of supply and ~lemand curves for new products
- which, as we know, involve difficulties); -
The determination, through the added value, is cumulative and allows an overall
evaluation based on a large number of partial data.
Before we present the results of the study it would be suitable to determine the
relative value oE the extent of the quantitative conclusions we reached. For,
i.t was the very existence of indirect economic effects of ESA contr.acts that we
- liad to establish, more than their quantitative volume. The essential result of
_ the stuciy meets this requirement: economic advantages unsuspected by the public
wc~re identified and it was possible to relate them in hierarchical order. Let
us emphasi.ze in this connection that this hierarchical order should be considered
a mi.nimum estimate of the factual economic results benefitting the recipients of
- ESA contracts. Actually, even though the European industrialists showed remark-
abke cooper.ati_on, a certain amount of data inevitably escaped the investigations
Eor a variety oE reasons (reticence on the part of the industrialists to divulge
some strategic information, observance of the secrecy related to some military _
markets, memory slips, and so on).
Overall Results
'1'he study was essentially retrospective or prospective in the short-term and
I~nked ESA expendi.tures incurred between 1964 and 1977 with their effect on the
1964-]982 f~eriod (this choice implies the renunciation of the long-term effects
oE ES:1 pr.ograms which would require a different methodology). The overall results
were as Eollows:
[i~~tw~>en 1964 and 1977 the ESA made its contractors a total of 1,390,000,000
f~uropeart accounting units (MUC). 'Che net total economic results generated by such
conrracts was 4,014,000,000 MUC. The overall induced economic results which could
bc expressed in fiKures were thus superior by a factor of three to the overall
amount of expenditures. This last result could be considered the synthetic indi-
- cator. of overall results. It means that an expenditure of 100 units on the part
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ot the ESA average induced results of 300 units to the benefit of ESA contractors
and their suppliers in the course of the period under consideration. Whatever
the s~~nthetic power oE this indicator may be, we should not interpret it as an
instrument of usable economic policy in terms of predictions concerning other r.e-
search programs. This sta[ement will be hacked by the deeper study of results.
- The consideration of the two curves in the graph [not shown] proves the existence
? of a reaction delay between space expenditures and resulting economic effects.
'I'he detailed study of the resulting effects is requiredin order to det~rmine the
cotrelation between the temporal development of the two cuYves [not shown].
The followin~ graphs [not given] show the development of the various noted eco-
- nomic eEfects: technological, organizational, commercial, and manpower. These
graphs show that the impact. of a major program such as the one formulated by the
- ESA is manifested in a differentiated way in terms of importance and character-
istics and in accordance with the type of related effects. Thus, the technologi-
cal advantages appear after a substantial reaction delay averaging about 6 years
and follow an exponential development, whereas the commercial advantage5 show up
_ morequiclcly and their evolution is closely dependent on the volume and rhythm of
_ space contr.acts. The effects on the organization and the methods grow slowly and
appear to level off starting with the 1980s. The effects on manpower (quantita-
tively the most important in the period under study) seem quite dependent on space
- expenditures. The slowdown of space expenditures as of i975, therefore, lowered
the efEect on the manpower, for the European enterprises were faced, at that time,
with the problem of maintaining their production crews.
The information acquired from F.uropean industry leads to the conclusion that space
research i.s a major impact on the economic fabric. The importance of the results ~
which were noted, however, does not seem to justify the space expenditures which
have been made by the European countries, fur, on the one hand, space research
involves a large number of criteria other than economic profitability; on the
~ other, the problem of the "cost of opportunity" (a comparison with other possibili-
~ ties for social investmen[) has not been considered in the present study. Con-
versely, the very special nature of the innovation process based on space research
is worth underlining: by mixing the most advanced technologies in various indus-
trial areas.~ space research played the role of a real "catalizer" of industrial
innovation. The impulse thus given to the economic system is characterized by
the close convergence among space requirements and some of the most topical con-
- cerns of society (conservation of energy, mastery of information problems, conserva-
tion of resources, etc.). The present coincidence between the development oE space
and economic problems had been anticipated, some 15 years ago, by the economist
Kenneth Boulding. Announcing the end of an economic system based on the notion
of unlimited resources, the latter had predicted the advance of a qualitatively
diff.erent economic age dominated by problems close to those raised by the running
- of a"spaceship:" "The closed economy of the future could be described as the
'economy of. the astrotiaut,' in which earth is no more than a simple spaceship lack-
ing an unlimited supply of matters needed for extraction or pollution and, conse-
- quently, within which man must find his own phase within the ecological cycle,
able to insure his continuing reprodu~tion in a material farm even if he cannot
do without external energy supplies."
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Boulding's pre:nonition seems a plausible explanation of the facts which may be
noted today: the numerous technological developments, industrial organization
methods, and personnel competences which, originally, were oriented toward space
applications are now contributing to the solution of economic problems facing the
earth....
FOOTNOTES
1. Sce "Economic Effects Stemming from Contracts Issued by the European Space
- Agency," by P. Brendle, P. Cohendet and R. Larue de Tournemine. Study
directed by J. P. Fitoussi. and read at the April 1980 Colloquium on, "Economic
Effects of Space and Other Advanced Technology," in Strasbourg, at the Council
of Europe.
2. Figures shown at the end of this article. -
3. For the past 20 years the amount invested in all space projects in Europe has
been assessed at about 50 billion 1980 francs.
4. In addition to technological requirements specifically geared to space pro- -
- jects, the other developments which, as the result of space projects, have
- led to technological innovations, according to the industrialists, are the
following:
The convergence, more or less close between the orientation of the financing
oE space research and technological investment programs of enterprises within
the framework of their own marketing targets;
1'he broadening of technological competences of the enterprises resulting from
the conceptualization of major systems which cnmbine elements based on
diCferent technologies (electronics, optics, thermal structure and control,
etc.);
Information and knowledge exchanges amor~g engineers of contracting companies;
Fortuitous discoveries on the level of basic or applied research.
'rhe positive efEect on the balance of trade of the European countries from
space projects may be interpreted through a"foreign trade multiplication co-
- efEicient" assessed as 1.5 per study prototype.
6. A prototype submitted by 128 European enterprises, accounting for over 85 per-
cent of the expenditures incurred by the European Space Agency, was carefully
selected. The study was limited exclusively to the contractors with the -
~i~;ency and, more specifically, to the overall indirect economic effects identi-
- fied by the latker as a result of their work for the agency, for whereas the
c~conomic effects of a major research program could be disseminated throughout
- the entire economic structure, it is obviously on the level of the direct con-
tractors wi[h the ESA that the short-term effects originate and their economic
concreti2ing can be established.
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7. This expression was used by N. htignot in the article "The Place of Space in
the Industrial Group," presenred at the International Colloquium in Strasbourg
on "Advanced Technologies," in April 1980.
8. K. Boulding, "The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth," in "Environmental
Quality in a Growing Gconomy," edited by H. Jarret, J. Hopkins Press, 1964.
, Copyright Association Internationale Futuribles 1980
5157
~ CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION -
FRANCE
PCF, PSF, LEFTISTS: POWER BAIANCE, STRATEGY IN 1981 ELECTION
Paris COMMENTAIRE in French No 12 Winter 1980-81 pp 545-550
~Article by Pierre Kendes "Disorderly Retreat of the French Left"~ ~
_ ~Text~ ~Author's postscript added at the end of the article~ This =
article was written long before the gif t which Mitterrand made of =
himself to the Socialist Party, putting an e nd to Michel Rocard�s
try. The latter's failure proves in all respects the interpreta-
tion of the French lef t I have suggested.
Allow a democrat from Eastern Europe to express most frankly what bothers him on _
the subject of the French left. This is not a question of getting something off =
my ehest but of expressing my concerns which are substantial, considering the
extent to which this left is leaving behind anything which could make political =
sense, or simply sense, at the beginning of- the 1980�s.
Naturally, the concern of someone who is a friend of France is not limited to the =
left. French society is being gnawed at by a number of ills, quite familiar to _
us, i~.ls which no spiritual family seems to be concerned with excessively. A low =
- birth rate, weakening of ties of solidarity and civic feeling, clumsiness and =
- irresponsibility of administrative authorities, asphyxiation of initiative-minded
economic forces, need we go on? The persistence of such ills is affecting France ~
in its most original and most attractive areas. The observer asks himself whether -
it is possible that, in the long run, the subsrance may become affected. -
However, all these ills are worsened and, in a way, made immutable by a particularly -
French feature which is the ,~3:ocking of the political system. Here again responsi-
bilities are split: it would be unfair to char ge them all to the left. For example, -
there is the tremendous blocking force represented by the Gaullist party. It is
as though, following it~; 1974 failure, the latter has had no more urgent concern
than that of undermining the legitimacy of the powers that be (ever since it has ~
not ruled them) . There is also the PCF CFrenen Comrn~nis.t Ear~ty~ which,with the
strength~of its strategic positions, hinders the left in regaining~its stand as
a governing foree and which thus blocks any possibility of alternating. This double -
blocking perturbs the normal functioning of democratic institutions and leads to the
accumulation of frustrations and hatreds. It also explains the sterility of French
political life. A number of necessary raforms could become possible if a coalition _
of actors a coalition which changes according to the case were not to play at
the policy of the worst. The policy of going one better in nationalism is another _
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ccnseque:ice of this situation. It has reached a s ~upeiying degree in terms of its
aberra.tions, the anti-European ones in paxticular (why is it that France does not
love Europe which loves it?). Above all~ it is effectively separated from the -
threats which France must indeed face.
I,et me repeat that responsibilities in all these areas are quite widely shared.
Why then men~tion ~them in a discussion of the left? Because it is the situation _
of the lef t that is in the center of the blocEcing.
The Domination of The PCF
I,ooking from the outside, one cannot but thinK that the situation is dominated by
the 1'CF. This is not a question of m~.th2matics but uf organization and ideological
influence. If the lefi; is idling (meaning the non-communist left), it is because
_ it is unable to set itself free from the domination of the communist party. Better `
orga.nized i.n -terms of milita.ncy, and more stubborn than its rivals and more sure of
itself, it is the YCF that leads the game~ even though it ma.y appear to be playing
secoricl ficldle. Sometimes it makes use of the fact that it is more radical, more
- plebeian, and rnore revolutionary than the others; sometimes it uses its ability to .
t.ake a daring turn without being emba,rrassed by principles which, however, it vigi- -
1~.ntly demands of its partners. These facts are well [{nown and ma.y be easily noted
today :in the cam aign which the commu:~ists are waging with such zeal aga.inst the PS
~Socialist Party~ in which, once again, the socialists accept with a feeling of res-
ignatiori the onslaughts of ill faith of their former allies. This domination, whose
ideological reasons will be analyzed later, would not have been so serious had the -
PCF been s incerely involved in the play of democratic institutions (as was assumed,
- only a short while ago, by the socialists). This, however~ is far from being the
case, By this token, the piay is heavily listing to the left, What, according to
the socialists, is an unfair, irritati.ng, and, perhaps, even tragic marking time is
a success , when considered from the communist viewpoint. A success? Yes, if the
purpose iti to prevent the rema,inder of the left to seize the power and to explore
the field of possible reforms. Yea, if it is a question of protecting intact the
- possibili+,ies of the PCF of imposing one day its own policy, i. e., to turn France
in-to yet another site of Leninist experimenta.tion. Thus considered, the marKing of
time is the price paid by the non-communist left in order that nothing may spoil the
~hancF.s of the commuriist party. France, in its totality, is contributing to the suc-
cess of this underta[~ing through the (relative~ pa.ralysis of its institutions.
The "i'GF play would be doomed io failure had it not been favored by a certain number
of sE~vere contradictions within the socialist left,. Ideologically, the latter is
mor~ and more h~l.ndered by the fa~t that it does not have a separate war to wage. A
comba.t which would be specific in its case (socialism~ is not entirely its own,
- g~ver. the ambiguity of the term (does not France describe as "socialist" the coun-
tries of the Soviet bloc? Furthermore, this f ight turns around a target which is =
' bcc:oming less and less credible in the eyes of French and European public opinion.
BaTtles which could mobilize a large segment of the public (the feminist and eco-
logical movements, the defense of category or regional interest, etc.~ are even less _
- so the fi~+s of the socialists, for such ca.uses are not specifically "leftist." _
Politically, the socialist fight is paralyzed either beca.use it is systematica,lly
countered b~ the communist paxty or b~cause~ in the eyes of public opinion, it is
besmi.r.ched b,y the frightful risk of being ta.ken over by the communists ~ should they
- succeed, Natura~ly, this risk is related to the ratios of forces, particularly in
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workers' trade unions . Yet, there is nothing in paxticular to indicate that this
_ ratio could be changed in the short or medium term. Under such circumstances~
anything gained by the left on the local level, 3n enterprises or cultural insti-
tution~, risEcs being ta[:en over by the PC,F, paxticularly during periods of "unity."
:~ocialist Alienation
It has become clear since 1969, the yeax of the missed revolution and~ even more so,
_ since 1977, which marked the end of the ~zrocommunist period, that the equation pre-
sented by the F:rench left cannot be resolved. It ca.nnot accede to power without
_ communist support. Nor could it through an alliance with them. The 1969 tumble
was an illustration of the first pa,rt of the theorem. Mitterrand's second adven- -
ture (1972-1978) provided an irrefutable proof of the second point. All the rest
is just words.
In itself, the second proof is no misfortune for France or for the socialists whose
joint vict~ry would have subordinated them to the communists irremediably. In ef-
fect, in the case of the PCF', the unity policy ha.s one meaning onlyt that of tying
socialists to commitments which would be subsequently impossible to abandon. From
this viewpoint the 1977 break, i. e., the weariness of the communi.st headquarters
_ ( one swallow does not make th~ spring: offered a unique opportunity both to France
, and the socialists, The final "no" voiced by Mitterrand had a pathetic quality to
it, for he was compromising a game in which the PS had invested five years of efforts
and refined ambiguity. The fact is that, at the very last minute, the socialists
realized that the price of victory would have become exorbitant.
Conversely, what affects everyone most seriously is the first pa.rt of this state-
ment. The left, at least as it is today, cannot become the majority without com- -
munist support. In this France is different from the rest of democratic Europe,
Italy excepted. What is even more worrisome is that ever since their Epinay trans-
. formation, the socialists have behaved as though they wanted to perpetuate their
dependence on the ~'CF . They seem to be experiencing a sense of malaise faced with
the autonomy which their party regained, quite involuntarily, in the face of the
- 1981 presidential elections. It is as though their only hope for the ~uture is to -
reestablish the alliance (to "impose it," as they say, displaying an astounding _
naivete). Ewerything they do seems to be dic~ated by the concern for not compro-
mising this future, the only futuxe they allow themselves. Hence the reintroduc-
tion of a certain self-censorship as a tribute paid ~.lmost automatically to the ex-
and future ally and ideological master. (Of the entire institutional left the
CFDT ~French Democratic Confederation of Labor] alone has decided to abandon this
practice~. There is a striking contrast between what the socialist leaders say in
public and what they say in private. They have become so used to this double-talk
that tney do not even realize the fact that they have become i~ts captives. "What
would the communists say?" concerns them more than the truth itself o
Reflexes of The Feople on The Left
To a certain extent such reflexes are understandable. The truth of the current
s ituation is diff icult to endure. All it offers is impa.sses . A guaranteed victory
of the non-communist left would presuppose that the latter would become dominant~
not only numerically but in terms of inembership, etc, Since this condition cannot
be met by virtue of the reasons alrea,dy mentioned, the only conceivable possibility -
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would be a short-term ambiguous victory of the left based on an allia.nce with the
P~F' and on the ideological positions imposed by the latter. Or els.,, it would face
the discouraging prospect of a so-called "autonomous' stz~.tegy which would imply
the double discom~ort of prolonged opposition and a ba.ttle with the former ally
- with no possibility of retre at. This is all right for the opposition but if such
a strate ~}r were to have a meaning, it would have to f ind a new and fresh vocabulary
which would no-t be confused with that of the communists. That is what conflicts
with the reflexes of the "people on the left" to whom the opponent~ the true op-
ponent, can only be on the right. All o~uestions of indoctrination aside, there is
here a logic:al point. If one hesita.tes to consider communi~m an opponent as or more
danger.ous than "the right," it can seem to the "people on thE left" to be only a
reserve ally. It is diff icult to f ight someone without acknowledging him as the
enemy. Yet, fighting in such terms (i. e. ~ turning full swing bac[c to the doctrine
of Viricent Auriol, Ramadier, or Guy Mollet~ is an idea which th2 "people on the
left" of today would f ind it hard to adop t. By th~s token, the autonomy strategy
oecomes trapped from the inside. Actually, as everyone [{nows, it would be unable
to resist ~or more than ten seconds a new offer for unity on the part of the PCF~
as long as it is accompanied by the necessary dose of smiles and verbal concessions.
Therezore, no truly independent strategy ~.s possible. ~~~~en in the case of socialist
leaders who are its convinced supporters~ such a strate~,}r would be valuable only
wer�e it to lead to a reunion with the lost brothers, this time, however, only on
thE:lx.si_s of a decisive superiority. This is yet one more error. Nothing leads us
to believe that ~the positions of the PCF' could be wea(cened simply by following the
old leftist trac~s. Has the time not come to consider the lessons of the failure -
of T~Iitterra.nd's strategy? The cards have been dealt in such a way that any numeri.-
cal progress of the non-communist left is paid for with ideological gains going to
the Leninist current and to its ramif ications. Cons idering the current conditioning
of the people on the lef t~" wh ich begins in schoolo, a battle which would be spe-
cif'ically "lef tist" can only strengthen the ideological hold of the communists.
Th~ auestion is~ therefore, to determine whether or not the French left is sentenced
to perish or if it has other possibilities ba.sed on a regrouping of French political
forces . This is a question which, actually, brings us to the question of the gen-
eral crisis of the French political system, for everything seems to indicate that ~
such a regrouping could no~t be limited to the left alone.
Before giving an answer (entirely hypothetical~ of course) to this question, we
should s~cify Vrhich is the precise meaning here of the term "left" if not the
ritua.l one of "laic republican" concerned "as much with freedoms as with socialism,"
and whose vocation is to be the responsible, moderate, and imaginative ally of the
conmuni.sts? In effect, coul.d ( in France) one be "on the left," outsiQ~a~.ledh~rom
ima.ge? Wasn't the gxeat weakness� of the innova~ive eu~reats ~thich pr
19~b ~to 1980 that they were unable, among other things, to renovate the image of
the 7_ef t? The consequence was that almost all of them, some of them reluctantly~
endcd up b,y re joining the socialist ritual, without which they would have found
thF.mselves pushed toward the right. The point is that the French left, particularly
among the educators, is dominated by a conformism which rejects ex~iseconformism
avoids any discussion of the F~li~ht~ners' ideological lega.cy.
is b~zsed on the nostalgia for a purity which should not be disturbed by any con-
t~ngEncy. One p-roclaims oneself proudly a supporter of "socialism in ireedom," and
should anyone express doubt as to the probability or the viability of this formula,
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- all one has to c~o is to cla.ssify him as belonging "to the right," and that would be
all.
The Left as a Prisoner of Its Past
~ Therefore, would it not be wiser and politically more productive, bearing past ex-
perience in mind, to free the left from the dogmas which are making its life so
diff icult and to try to def ine it in terms of its ambitions rather than a doctrine?
~ To defend the interests of the wea[c, to limit the power of the strong, and to fight
for a more equal distributiont would those not be leftist ambitions regardless of
the measures selected for their implementation? I Icnow that this is not all, that
allergies remain on the subject of inercantile activities which separates the people
on the left from those on the right. Nevertheless, a pro gram based on the need of
the weak is no t an absurdity as conf irmed by the durable success of the German
social-democratic movement. There is also the further advanta.ge of not considering
- a priori inconceivable the necessary regrouping of political forces which oppose
conservatism libera.lism as much as communist despotism.
The trouble is, however, that such a regrouping is obstructed by the communists,
For nearly 60 years the preferred PC,F tactic tuward the socialists has been to ac-
cuse them of treason whenever they try to define a new way for themselves. Actu-
ally, its logic is excelleat~ for suffering from a deep complex by virtue of their
poor following among the workers, the socialists are desperately trying to ~ive
themselves ~,n image of revolutionary purity (as far ba.cfc as Guy Mollet:~. Actually,
this is a poWerful reason for imp-risoning them in the leftist ghetto.
~ Practically, the greatest success achieved by the communists is that of having
blocEced the socialists in a defensive positiono The PCF does not deem it necessary
to explain a communism which lead to the disaster of the peoples of Indochina, the
genocides of Tibet and Erythrea, the nightmare of Ma.o's "cultural" revolution, or
the massacres ~~f Afghanistan; it is not up to the PCF to disenga.ge itself from the
- tremendous mess of the Soviet system, or of a socialism which is unable even properly
to feed the nations which it has subjected to its dogmatic dictatorshipc it is the
PS which must constantly prove its revolutionary will and apologize for its pa,st,
as though there were a common measure applicable to the tribulations of a person
li ke Guy Mollet and the millions of skeletons loc[ced in the closets of the inter-
nati.onal communist movement:
On a different level, the French left is continuing to live on the legacy of the
1930's. In its subconscience Zola's "J'accuse" [I Accuse] and D imitrov's appeal
to the anti-fascist front enjoy a virtually identical moral status. Nothing in-
fringes on the respectability of this front which~ however, the communists dese-
- crated as early as 1939 (at the time of the German-5oviet pact~ and which they
buried forever as of 194~6 with the systematic elimination of their Christian,
liberal, socialist, and other former allies in Eastern E~Zrope. Al1 this is being
kept under wraps. Conversely, mention is made of an anti-communist-fascist connec-
tion as though we were still in the 1930's, anci as though the cri.ticism of Bolshev- _
ism would bring about complicity with Franco and Mussolini and as though communism _
shol~ld be re jected only from the right: The people on the left have the astounding
~ ability to abandon the defense of freedoms in the East in the name of an anti-an~i-
communis t cliche:
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What. m~.kes this confusion even more ir[csome to a European democrat from the East is
_ that it agrees with the self-justifying speeches of the Soviet systems. Generally
speaking, the French tone of voice concerning the USSR smacks of censorship. Take
as an example the long oratory precautions which our politicians, whatever their
affi.liation, adopt before voicing even the slightest criticism of the USSR. Ques-
tioning the Communist cause as such is not even considered~ as the very word commun-
ism has been banished from the French vocabulary. On the subject of the Gulag, the
convention is either to denounce an anomaly which is "unworthy of socialism" or to
shout about the "fascist degeneracy" before appealing to the sense of responsibility
of the people in -che Kremlin, their understa.nding~ or their clemency ...(I may be
mildl,y exaggerating~. The key word in this entire spe2ch is "fascism." One would
_ rather vituperate than admit that a"revolutionary" "people's" regime could act
thusly, as a function of its proper nature.
The confusion which prevails in the Pantheon of the French lef t is certainly not a
s~tranger to such linguistic contortions. Have the ancestors of f'reedom ever been
separated from the prophets of revolutionary violence? Quite to the contrary, they
are represented as the two sources of a single democracy on the mar.ch. Bolshevism
has no difficulty in inserting itself within them and is being blarned for no mo~e
than accidental f~.ults. Hence the delirious way with which the go~~d news of Euro-
commun.'LSm was welcomed, as it was finally proclaimed by the archar.gels Enrico,
Sar~ti~,~o, and Giorgio. Conversely~ woe to the "new philosopherss" not becawse their
thesis is brief (could one be insulted for so little?~, but because they suggest a
lin[~ bt.~tirei:n contemporary Evil and the legacy of the F~lighteners.
The Anti.-Imperiali.st Rhetoric
The confusion of our left climbs to its peak in the field of foreign policy while,
actual]_y, reflecting thE nationalist and anti-E~zropean derailment of the majority _
view. One-third inspired by a leftist Gaullism and by a ba,sic Marxism for the rest,
our l~ft has ta[~en as its main enemy a ghost [cnown as Imperialism (naturally, with
. capita.l "I"~, which is a ready-made enemy for it is shared with the Third World. -
Nat.u.rally, this ghost is American and there is an entire socialist literature whose
quality is as good as Moscow's publications, in trying to prove that France today is
t.nrFatened, above all, by the "multinationals." By de~'inition, this enemy cannot be
ca.ptured, as the result of which it could be accused of all our misfortunes, ranging
irom inf lation to univPrsal success. Etren a person lifce Mitterrand offers ponderous
dissertations about international capitalism which is strangulating us and hints
that everything would be better were we to belong to another zone of influence. The
question is, which one? -
To the lef t, as to France~ the consequences of this ideological sliding are ca.tas- _
trophic. Their result is that a self-respecting leftist party cannot choose the
c~.m~ of wc:stern solidarity. At most, should the opportunity present itself and very
temporarily, i~ could accept the "traditional French alliances," but only wi-th a
feeling of shame and the view that, at the right time, it would rejoin the "anti-
- ~mperialist" camp.
Naturally, as a politician, one does not even conceive of it, As a militant,
on~ is given daily proof. The weaKening is achieved througk~ a type of Marxism
rrhich socially leads nowhere (look at Eastern E~zrope~ and which politically serves
only to whitewash the USSR (see Fidel Castro). Therefore, the moment we adopt it by -
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subscribing to the theory of the ca.pita.].ism-imnerialism couple~ it is no longer a
question of qualifying the USSR as imperialistic in the "true" meaning of the termt
at most, one could question its regrettable Russian traditions or denounce its col-
- lusion with "the other superpower." In either case the specific nature of SoViet
imperj.alism is rejected as is, on another level~ the denunciation of the "struc-
tural" violence which leads to the acceptance of revolutionary vtolence, From there
to the justification of expansionism serving a good ca.use is a very small st�ep.
Equally difficult is the allergy of any political left--unlifce the intellectual
_ left--toward the dissidents in Soviet Europe (in this respect France is unlike even
Italy): since their message so strongly contradicts the great hopes drawn from the
best sources of ideas , they are cons idered spoilers or else reduced to the status of
grave victims whose ideas do not matter. After all, are these people not "emigres?"
How could the French left go so far? Could we look for the reasons for its imperme-
ability to a new experience exclusively in history or the intellectual tra.ditions
which we have mentioned throug~out our analysis, adding, eventually, a character
- factor: the French tendency of self-sufficiency? Or else, should we assign a cer-
tain role to more specif;.c factors such as textboo6cs (full of leniency, not to say
admiration, toward the USSR), the leftist currents (major promoters of Ma.rxist ter-
minology even though they atta.ck the institutional left~ ~ or, t'inally, the Soviet
propaganda off ices (whose existence, I Imow, would ~e indecent to mention)? Tn the
- face of this combination of truly sxceptional circumstances, I must acknowledge my
perplexity.
'I'he big question, naturally, is to [cnow how to take the left out of its curr_ent
- rout . It is not even necessary to be a leftist to recognize that this is a vita.l
probyem ior France. It is obvious that French democracy is sick. It is clear that
salvation can come neither from a tired center nor an out-of-breath Gaullism, The
renovation of French democracy could come only from the left, a lef t rid of its anti-
capita.list obsessions and of the idee fixe of a socialism committed to regula.ting
- everything. This would be a lef t which would accept, without complexes, ta.~cing over
a democratic state. A lef t which, f inally, would aclmowl~dge that, th ings being as
- they are, its most dangerous opponents are t~e eommunists, A left which, instead of
hurrying to climb aboard the train to Utopia, would be prepaxed for changes as they
come and to underta[~e what is possible.
I know that my easy-to-formulate postulates entirely conflict with the sta.te of mind
prevailing in thE left. I have absolutely no prescription which would maKe it pos-
- sible to eliminate or even to attenuate this diff iculty. Nor do I conceive of the
existence of a magic formula which would possess all the virtues of the social demo-
cratic way with none of its faults. History is less inven-tive than it is believed to
be: the limitations of the industrial society narrow the choices considera.bly.
However} there is one thing I do knows unless our lef t manages to renovate itself it
is bound to experience a slow degr'a.dation which will end ei-ther in a BolsheviEc vic-
tory or the ossification of a sta.tus quo less a.nd less favorable to freedoms. Demo-
cracy would have failed because of tha inabili~;y for self-renovation of the left.
COPYRIC~T : 1981 S. A. Commentaire
5157
cso:~oo
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COUN TRY S ECTION FRADiCE
~ POLL: GISCARll, MITTERRAND EVEN, BUT FORMER ~XPECTED TO WIi1
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 23 Jan 81 pp 52-53
[Article: "Thirteenth PARIS MATCH-Public Opinion Poll For the Presidential
Elections: Giscard and Mitterrand Even But 52 Percent of the People Polled
Expect the Incumbent President To Win"]
[Text) The 13th PARIS MATCH-Public opinion poll shows
that, 6 months before the presidential election, as
_ many people intend to vote for Francois Mitterrand as
_ do for the incumbent presidenL. Since we started these
- polls in October 1979, the socialist leader had never -
reached the 50 percent mark (Michel Rocard, on the
contrary, had reached it 5 times). This confirms
Mitterrand's recovery (which started last month) at
the expense of Valery Giscard d'Estaing. However, when
the people polled are asked, not for whom they intend
to vote, but who they expect will win, the president
is named as the winner (52 percent), far ahead of
Mitterrand (21 ~,crcent). Among sucialist sympachize~~, -
37 percent of those polled are predicting this result.
The positions of the other candidate: after the first
round show little or no change. Finally, 23 percent of
the voters may still change their mind on how to vote.
Who Will Be Electea? Giscard
Regardless of how you intend to vote, who do you think will be elected?
Of 100 sympathizers
Toget-Fier PC PS RPR UDF
Val~ry Giscard d'Eataing 52 27 37 ~~66 84
Fron~Ola Mitterrand 21 38 43 6 2
Jacquea Chirac 2 1 1 8 1 -
Georgas Marcfiala 2 16 - - -
- Do not know 22 18 19 20 13
PC: Communist Party RPR: Rally for the Republic
' PS: Socialis~ Party ' UDF: French Democratic Union
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First Round: Giscard And The Three Gaullist Candidates
If the first round of the presidential election were to take place today,
with the following candide.tes, for whom would you vote in each of the
following instances?
Of 100 sympathizers
Dec. Jan.' PC ~ PS RPR UDF
Val6ry Giscard d'Estaing 30 28 1 3 19 85
Franyroia Mitterrand 23 24 2 18 1 -
Georgas Marchala 17 ig 93 2 - -
Jacquea Chirac 12 11 0 1 53 4
Mlchel0eb~ 5 6 - 3 20 5
` Marie�France Gar~ud 4 4 - 3 5 3
1 ecologist 6 6 - 7 - 2
- 1 ext.-left cand. 2 3 4 1 - -
1 ext.-right cand. 1 1 - - 1 1
INichel Cr~peau - ~ _ Z 1 -
No answer 10 11 1 7 5 6
Would not vote 6 5 1 3 2 2
Without Debre
- Of 100 sympathizers
Dec . Jan PC P RFr IInF
Val~ry Glacard d'Eataing 31 3p 1 3 2q 89
Franr~la Mitterrand 2q 2g 2 80 ~ ~
Georgea Marchals 17 16 93 3 - -
acquea Chirac ~g 13 _ 1 ~ 4
Marie-France Garaud 5 g _ 4 $ 3
1 ecoloqist 7 6 - 6 1 2
1 ext.-left cand. 2 3 4 1 - _ -
1 ext.-riqht cand. 1 1 - - - 1
~ Michel Cr~peau - ~ - 2 1
No answer 11 13 3 8 7
Would not vote 6
- 5 S 1 3 2 1
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Without Chirac
Of 100 sympathizers
Dec. Jan. PC PS RPR UDF
Yalbry 6lscard d'E:~ing 33 31 1 3 36 88
- Fran~Ola Mltter~and 26 25 2 79 4 1
Georgea M~rchais 17 17 93 3 1 - _
Michel0eb~ 9 10 - 2 47 5
Marie-Franca Garaud 6 6 1 4 10 3
1 ecoloqist 6 B - 6 1 3
1 extr.-left cand. 2 3 3 - - -
1 extr.-right cand.l 1 - 1 -
- Michel Cr~peau - 1 - 2 1 -
No answer 12 13 1 8 16 6
Would not vote 6 6 2 3 5 2
With Chirac As the Only Gaullist Candidate
Of 100 sympathizers
Dec. Jan. PC PS RPR UDF
Val~ry Giacard d'Estaing 32 31 1 4 25 92
Fran~ola Mitterrand 26 26 3 81 3 1
Georgea Marchala 17 17 93 3 1 -
Jacquea Chirac 13 13 - - 69 4
- 1 ecologist 8 8 - 9 1 3
1 extr.-left cand. 3 3 3 1 - - _
1 extr.-right cand.l 1 - - - - -
Michel CrApeau - 1 - 2 1 - .
~vo answer 12 13 2 8 10 7
Would not vote 6 6 2 3 2 2
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- With Debre As the Only Gaullist Candidate =
Of 100 syr~~pathizers
~ec . Jan . ''C ~'S r.PR UDF
_ Valbry Giscard d'Eslafng 34 33 1 4 41 92
Fran~ois Mitterrond 27 26 2 79 3 1
Georpes Marchals 17 17 93 3 1 -
Michal Debr~ 10 10 - 1 51 4
1 ecologist 9 9 - 10 2 3
1 extr.le~t cand. 2 3 4 1 - - _
1 extr.right cand. 1 1 - - - -
Michel Cr~peau - 1 - 2 2 -
No answer 13 14 2 7 17 6
Would not vote 7 6 2 3 1 2
Second Round: Giscard and Mitterrand Even
If the following candidates were leading after the first round, for whom
would you vote on the second round?
- Of 100 s~pathizers
Dec. Jan. PC PS RPR UD'r' ~
- Ilal~ry Giscard d'Estaing 52 50 5 6 91 99 .
- Fran~ols Mttterrand 48 50 95 94 9 1
No answer 10 11 16 2 10 3
Would not vote 14 14 23 6 10 4
OCT NOY DECJANV FEY MARS AVAIL MAI JUINJUIL SEPT OCT NOV OEC JANV
60 -
_ UGE 51 57 56 ~ 58 57
~ 53 51
~ 52
50
- 47, ~ 4J
.43... ~ ~ 42: �.42
MITTEA AND
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rux ~rr~tt;ttw u~n U1VLY
Mitterrar:d Beats Chirac
Of 100 sympathizers
Dec. Jan. PC PS RPR UDF
Jacques Chirac 42 40 5 5 89 82
- Fran~als Mitierrond 58 60 95 95 11 18
tJo answer 14 16 17 2 9 22
Would not vote 18 16 24 5 6 15
- Still 23 Percent Undecided
Is your decision final?
Of 100 sympathizers
- Jan . PC PS RPR UDF
Ye s 65 74 77 68 67
- No 23 16 19 21 19
- No answer 12 10 4 11 14.
Is France a Monarchy? No
Several newspapers, especially foreion newspapers, have written that,
between two presidential elections, the French regime is practically a
monarchy. Do you agree with this opinion or not?
- Of 100 sympathizer~
Tog . pC PS RPR [JDF
~qree fully 17 36 22 10 5
= Tend ta agree 22 19 34 22 14
Tend to disaqree 21 16 17 24 28
no not agree at all 22 11 16 30 36
- Do not know 18 18 11 14 17
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The figures given here are the result of a poll taken on 8, 9 and 10 _
January 1981, of a national sample of 1,000 people representative of
the French population aged 18 and over. The sample was obtained by
the method of quotas. The following criteria were taken into account:
- sex; age, occupation of the head of household, size of the community,
region (Zeat). Public S.A. wishes to draw the attention of the readers -
and commentators on the following points: since there are still three
months before the elections, the country is not yet in the actual Folitical
and psychological situation corresponding to a presidential election.
- The results for the whole French people, therefore, must. be interpreted
in the light of this remark.
Polls Commission
In the poll concerning the presidential elections which we published in -
our Number 1648, typographical errors occurred in printing the figures
of tY.e table entitled "Gaullist Pri.maries." At the request of the Polls
Cammission, we are publishing the corrected table. .
Of 100 s athizers
Tog . C UD
Michel 0ebr~ - ~ 2j ~ 28
Jacqued Chinc 3~ g ~ p3 61 30
Olivier Guichud _ - - 3 - 4 - ~ ~ 5
J. Chaban�Uelmas _ - - ~8 - ~ ~p ~9 8 z~
Marie~France Garaud ~ j~ j 19 -4 6
Alam Peyrelllle -3- 4---z 2
Pierre Measmer _ 3 - 2 -2 2 -
No answer 54 80 S2 9 31
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Paris Match
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
MITTERRAND INTERVIEW; 1981 ELECTION, ECONOMY, USSR POLICIES
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 19 Jan 81 pp 17-22
[Interview with Francois Mitterrand, socialist candidate for president, by Michel _
Chamard, Claude Jacquemart, Michel Gurfinkiel and Francois d'Orcival; date and
_ place not given]
[Excerpts] Out of respect for his office, we shall speak with Giscard d'Estaing
after he has declared his candidacy. We have already interviewed the president of
the UDF [French Democratic Union], Jean Lecanuet (our issue of 14 July 1980) and
the president of the RPR [Rally for the Republic], Jacques Chirac (our issue of
- 3 November).
The f.ollowing is our interview with Mitterrand. We were grateful for the courtesy
= with which he granted it and for the frankness with which he answered our questions.
[Question~ You have a 50-50 chance of being elected president in May. What is
your own evaluation?
[Answer] There are t~ao forces in France, the right and the left, which for several
years have achieved a balance at about 45 percent, the rest being made up of vari- _
ous marginal groups. Giscard d'Estaing should be careful because only a small
- shift would be enough to change everything. Now then, there is perhaps a wave of
rejection in the making for him. If the ar_tion of the outgoing president had jus- -
tified the creation of an opinion movement going beyond the traditional po].iticaZ
boundaries, he could, by virtue of hts very office and the authority that goes with
it, have found himself in the same situation as General de Gaulle in 1958, who -
had the backing of a great historic trust. But that movementdid not come about.
The accumul;~tion of failures (employment, prices, foreign policy, purchasing power,
_ the crushing of low wage earners, the malaise of upper-level personnel, the diffi-
culties of independent workers and farmers, a worsening of inequalities, to speak -
only about domestic policy) resulted in a general feeling of discontent preventing
him from hoping to bring the French people together. He has been and remains the
president of the privileged. He has made unrestrained use of the instrument
conferred on him by his office. With him, the French people have gone hungry,
there can be no mistake about it.
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Naturally, another element has b een added: Each camp has now split. The main
political families are now more involved in their civil wars than in confronting ~
the opposite camp.
I have deplored and continue to deplore the division of the leftist parties, but
the communist voters, who understood the destructive game of their party leaders,
have now largely overcome their initial problems. This was confirmed by the re-
cent partial legislative elections. The unity of the pe~ple at the grass-roots
level retains its strength and vigor.
To date, these internecine struggles were less obvious, less visible on the right
than on the left, despite the RPR insurrection. They will emerge in broad daylight
when Jacques Chirac is a candidate. The crisis of the left remains but its effects _
are dissipating. The crisis on the right is just beginning.
Beyond these factors, if the socialist candidate properly expresses the thrust h~
- represents, the adaptation of his proposals to the interests of France and the -
French, his chances will steadily grow.
One more thing: Giscard and Barre are one and the same, except that one has the
courage to take responsibility f or the catastrophic policies he is following on
behalf of the other, who is hav ing more and more trouble washing his hands of them. -
[Question] If you are elected by one half of the French people against the other
half, how do you intend to respect the rights of the minority?
(Answer] Those rights are engraved in our tradition, in our institutions. It is
the duty of the president of the republic to bring all French people together on _
the country's major options, not give way to the spoils system which, as we are
seeing today, delivers France over to a clan. And what a clan! The chateaus and
- the strongboxes!
The idea that I have an office separates me completely from the current president.
- He has taken over the Executive and Legislative branches; he controls the judicial
machine. He holds power over audio-visual information. That is why I constantly
repeat that we no longer have a republic at all, that we have tiptoed toward a
monarchy. As far as I am concerned, I do not confuse executive powers and the
presidency. Interpreted properly, the constitution has established the separation
of powers. We are too far from that. If l years is too much, 14 is even worse!
[Question] You have already said that if elected, you would immediately dissolve
the Assembly. But two questions must then be asked; What about the period of
transition and what would you do with the new Assembly?
[Answer] Once elected, yes, one should dissolve that Assembly which has lasted
much longer than has been good f or France's health! What will the existing govern- _
= ment do between~the presidential and lagislative elections? Constitutionally
- speaking, nothing forces it to resign if it has not been censured by the Assembly. �
I can therefore try to remain. But political wisdom and reality will require
that the period of transition b e handled by a government along the line of the
= people's movement which will have grown stronger, one providing all the guarantees
of a free election campaign.
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The nzw president of the republi~ can only expreso his wishes in keeping with the
conunitments that got him elected. As for election and government agreements, they
will be the business of the parties. .
[Question] The newly elected Assemb ly will not be able to be dissolved for a
year. It will therefore be imposed on you.
[Answer] "Imposed" is a big word. Every institution has its role to play. As for -
the L-uture majority, there are many hypotheses covering the field of historical
realities peculiar to our country. You know the line of action to which I have
devoted my political life: the rallying of the people around a gr~at national
_ ambition. The election of a socialist president will give shape to that prospect.
_ But if the French people find pleasure in not being logical with themselves, their
choice must be respected. That could have happened in 1978 if the left had won
the legislative elections. We have here the main constitutional flaw, which to
date has been used as an argument by the right in power to reject alternation.
But let us not go further and let us not read the future in our tea leaves. The
socialists are going to try to crystallize the great movement which, beyond the
presidential election, will for a long time win the support of the French.
[Question] A president from the left and a majority of the right, that would be
a Portu~uese-type situation.
. [Answer] Soemthing like it. At any rate, even before the modifications that
will be necessary, the correct application of the constitution will lead to a
regime different from that of Giscard d'Estaing, for he has divert~d and denatured
- out institutions by accentuating the path taken by nis predecessors. I knew that
that would happen one day. It was because I foresaw such practices that I voted
against the consti.tution in 1958. I voted against the context more than against
the text. �
[Questi.on] Given the economic situation in which we shall find ourselves this
- year, do you not believe that we need a formula such as a government of public
sa.lvation of which Debre speaks?
[Answer] The expression "public salvation" belongs to the f irst French Revolution. -
It has changed in meaning somewhat s ince that time. But, one cannot save France
wictioiit or in spite of the French. All those who appeal for the public salvation
without calling for a spirit of justice, a reduction in inequalities, national _
solidarlty, are on the wrong track. There will be no national leap unless the
majority oF the French cease being in the hand of a minority, much of whose power
stems from the economic structure~, production relationships, the basic inequality _
- of conditions. The right has lost the righ.t (if indeed it ever had it!) to speak
of the public salvation. It is up to Debre and others to understand this. _
I would add: The right does not practice the economic strictness of which it is
always talking. It never strikes its own but only the dominated social classes.
It practices social strictness. The economic strictness of Giscard and Bai�re
only affects only the social classes to which neither the outgoing president nor
- the prime minister nor *_heir feudal lords belong. One cannot always ask the same
people to sacrifice.
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. [Question] Do you believe that nationalizations will truly bring a solution?
[Answer] It is part of the whole. It is not a question of obeying the establish-
ment spirit or of proceeding blindly, but the nationalizations proposed by the -
socialists should become a reality. They are aimed at monopolies or productions
_ that are vital to the nation. They will broaden the public sector wherever it
would be fitting to follow a different economic policy when would it not be!
than that of big capital.
If you are dreaming of a socialist who would not practice socialism, then count me
out. Our socialism is faithful to the history of the workers' movement whicti is,
remember it well, a liberating movement that tends toward a classless society. It
bases its future on the creative mind and the liberat'ion of intelligence and
elzergies~ In order to do so, it intends to put an end to the various forms of the
exploitation of man by man. And since you speak about nationalizations as if you
_ were evoking a spectre, I would tell you that by nationalizing a limited number of
gigantic enterprises where competition has disappeared because of them, we shall
help to loosen the screw that is stifling the small and medium-size enterprises
that we should on the contrary be helping to overcome the crisis.
[Question~ To get back to your election, it is frequently said, by Edgar raure in -
- particular, that in order to be elected to the Elysee Palace, one must have the
- neutrality of Moscow.
[Answer] I have the impression that Giscard also believes in the existence of a
"Russian vote." For my part, I do not believe in it very much. As for myself, -
I would say to Moscow, without worrying about the consequences on the election,
that which I believe to be useful to peace, that which appears to me to be good
for France, on Afghanistan, on Poland, on the SS 20's. But I hope for a good
agreement with the USSR on collective security in Europe. I shall not go looking -
- for France's security i.n Moscow or in Washington, but in ourselves. That language
will be understood, 1 assure you.
In the most recent partial elect.ions, I was not surprised by the good reports of
communist voters. I never doubt~.d them. But on the day when I said aboutGiscard _
and Marchais that they were "as thick as thieves," everyone understood what that -
~ meant,
' [Question] In your opinion, when Giscard d'Estaing placed flowers on Lenin's
, tomb, it was just a matter of being obliging?
[Answer] That gesture did not shock me. It is part of the acts of courtesy of
a foreign chief of state to honor the :~ymbolic heroes of the country he visits.
- But the image of tY~e anticommunist Giscard, who was born with a silver spoon in
his mouth, standing with bowed head before the mummy of the "head devil" is very -
amusing. If he could only go back between now and the month of April! He would
get down on his knees this time!
_ [QuestionJ You sap that foreign policy is the heart of your demonstration. And
- you were very harsh on ~he Warsaw meeting and the Conference of the Eight in Venice
(in June).
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- [Answer] Our foreign policy is characterized by a mixture of vanity and timidity. _
That meeting in Veuice was a comedy. Valery Giscard d'Estaing helped deceive
international opinion. He wanted to impress his partners, letting them suppose
- that he had the assurance of a gradual withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan,
thanks to a telegr.am sent on the eve of the conference from Moscow. What a
sight; the president of the republic as a little telegraph messenger!
[Questian] What is your conception of our alliances?
[Answer] Tt is ur~ent that France decide between two strategies that risk being
- contradictory: that of dissuasion, which would have us move only when the national
sanctuary is threatened, and that of alliance, which would have us come to the aid
- of allies whom we in turn expect to help us. No governmental statement indicates
- our exact policy on this point.
As Eor those who grow indignant over a future summit conference between the members
- oF the Alliance, I expect they will use the same vigor in denauncing the permanent -
concertation of the Warsaw Pact, more than ever based ~n �Soviet strategy. I -
Fervently want disarmament and in the final analysis, the dissolution of blocs,
_ of military pacts, provided that~ it be simultaneous. There will be no negotiation
or r.eturn to detente unless there is a balance of~torces~ _
[Question] For us, would the most fearful thing not be a new German neutralism,
a new Rapallo?
[9nswer] A ~livided Germany: Many Germans want an end to it. Eut the state of
affairs brought about in 1945 remains a major contradiction to peace in Europe. I
do not know whether one can use the term "neutralism" to describe the legitimate
caution of those who know how dearly they would have to pay for another war.
_ Germany, in between two superpowers, will only escape from this dialectic by
strengthening its European vocation. -
[Question] What do yau think ~~f Russian expansionism?
- [:'~nswer] Z do not believe in a Soviet Union expansionistic at any price. It
mer.ely ~akes advantage of the failings of others. Look at Afghanistan: The
Russians played their hand 2 years before their military intervention. Who re-
sisted them? What did Che West say? Soviet diplomacy probes weak points. If i.t
comes up against a determination, it accommodates it. I am thinking of Portugal.
'1'here a1so, attempts were made, but the Russians.do not want war. Their sacrifices
~aere immense in the last world conflict. One must discuss, negotiate with them,
but bein~ careful not to have any weakness.
[Question] What defense should France have?
[Answer] We are for a nat~on21 defense and there would no longer be any defense
if we were to go back on the strategy of dissuasion. I am not sure that that
c:hoice had to be made in the beginning. But the choice was made and our defense
r.ests ~n it.
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As for the balance of f~rces, I do not understand why I should remain silent when
I see 150 Soviet SS 20 missiles which in a quarter of an hour could destroy the
entire Western military apparatus in Europe from Norway to Italy, without threaten-
ing the United States, which is out of their range 5,000 kilometers away. Giscard
d'~staing is very discreet on this sLbject.
This does not mean that I support the i~stallation of American Pershing missiles
- in ~urope, which are not needed in the United States to ensure their security...and
ours far from it! And let us not hear the subtle distinction between strategic
weapons and tactical weapons. If one day those missiles and their bombs fall on
our heads, the effect will be the same, whether they are strategic or tactical!
_ Having said that much, we must properly evaluate our own capabilities. It is not
merely a matter of having a president capable of pressing the button to drop the f
atomic bomb, but also of having a president who is capable of setting in motion ,
a type of diplomacy and strategy that are wise enough and strong enough so that
we do not have to press the button.
- Actually, the dream of Reagan and Brezhnev would be to renew Yal~a on a planetary
scale. That is not in our interest. I have already observed that when the two
great powers come to an understanding, it is not good for us and wher. they do not
get along, it is worse. There must be policies enabling us to break that vicious
cyc le ~
[Question] In the Near East, France used the formula of "safe, recognized and
gtiaranteed" borders for Israel. Guaranteed by what?
[Answer] When the current president is in the Emirates, he says nothing about
- Israel and what is worse, he looks at that country from a Jordanian fort. When I
am in Algiers or Cairo, I explain that Israel has tne right to exist, that it
- must have the means to do so. When I am in Israel, I urge authorities to take the -
P alestinian situation, the right of the Pal~stinians to have a homeland, into
- account. Peace is one.
For us socialists, there is only one rule: speak the same languagp to everyone.
As For the "guarantees," i see them especially in the agreements that will be
made by today's antagonists. That is why I approved Camp David. The international,
guarantee may be useful to boot but not take the the place of direct negotiations.
[Question] One word on Poland. Marxism-Leninism presumes cohesion between the
_ Communist Party and the working class. Has that cohesion been lost?
[Answer] The Polish example is ample proof of the original Error of Marxism-
Leninism. Socialism wins freedom. If it stifles it, let us not call it socialism.
That is the lesson of tt~e workers' revolt in Poland.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Valeurs Actuelles -
11,464
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTTON FRANCE
SENATE A~PROVES 1981 DF~'ENSE BUDGET
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 13 Dec 80 pp 11-12 -
- [Text] The Senate devoted two long sessions on 2 and 3 December 7.980 to the
- discussion of defense plans for 1981.
Among the many reporters who par~~.c3.pated at the beg3.nning of the session, .Albert
Vollquin, information chairman of the conun3.ttee on foreign affairs, defense
and armed forces, analyzed the ~ppropriations of the "Air Section,~~ insisting -
particularly on supplementary expenditures for fue1,
"The budg~t for the Air Fo~ce," rem3nded the reporters, "amounts to 22,188
. million francs, 10,398 million under Tit1e 3 and 11,79Q million under Tit1e
5. The total amount of program authorizations is 19,175 mi111on francs, in-
_ cluding 17,800 million under Tit1e 5, which represents an increase of 19.65 per-
cent in a defense budget which has increased by 17.88 percent. Nevertheless,
- this share represents only 21.84 percent instead of the 22.6 percent predicted.
Besides, tliis relative increase is due ta the growfih of the "operational fuels"
category, speciiied Mr. Vollquin, "which is increasing by 80.64 percent. Remove
_ the allotment for ~uels and you w~11 obtain an increase of only 15.6 percent.
T'he ri,se Qbserved appears due to the contributing 3ncreases. Th3.s portion 3.n-
creased from 12 percent ~n 1973, w3,th a volusne of 995,000 cub~c meters, to 18.8
percent i.n 1981, with a vo~.ume of 840,000 cubic meters." _
- "A supplementary appropriation of 600 million francs," continued Mr. Vollquin, -
_ "is necessary to saeisfy requi.rements: 310 million francs have been allotted -
to the Air Fozce buclget, 100 million francs to the joint section and 200 million
francs to special appropriations (see issue 837 of "A~r and Cosmos").
Enumerat~,ng the list of aircraft ordered by the Air Force in the budget for 1981,
the reporter conf~.rmed that the last nine A1pha Jet orders would be approved in _
1.981, thus end~.ng a program, which has in~.tially been planned for 200 airplanes,
wi,th only 175 aircraft, possessing character3,stics recognized by the French
Air Force as we11 as by the Unified States Navy."
Aircraft Carriers .
Max Le~eune, i.nformation chairman of the same committee, but under the heading
of the "Navy" section, issued the following comments on the dec:lsion made last -
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summer in the defense council regarding the supply o~ aircraf~ carr3.~rs for
the nation's navy: _
"The decision made last 23 September 1980 in the defense council to ~inally acquixe -
- two aircraft carriers weighing 32,000 and 35,000 tons in place of three platform
shi.ps weighing from 20,000 to 22,000 tons, which would only have been able to
carry unconventional aircraft, seems interesting to us from several po3nts of
view.
~~It w~11 permit tak~,ng advantage of the present a~rcraft park consist3.ng of -
ne~r air equipment which has just been placed in service.
"Tt endows the naval a~.r groups with a very high conventional and nuclear
cagability. -
"It provi,des for the future by avoid~tng the premature l.aunch~g in the stil'1
uncertain direction of rhe unconventional aircraft, while sti11. retain~.ng the
possibilifiy of modifyin~ �-he des3,gn of the second platform (whlch was not
supposed to be ordered before 1989) in case the technologi~al breakthrough of the =
~ short or vertical takeoff airplane took place soon~r than is now planned."
The Air Component of Deterrent Force
Jean Lecanuet, chairman o~ the foxe3,gn a~fairs commi.ttee, bxought up the subject
of "the problem of the air component of our deterrent force. I believe that our
Air Force needs a low level invasion aircraft having a longer radius of action
than it now possesses.... Doesn't the Air Force require a new vPh3.c1e to
complement the rest of the deterrent ~orce? Should not the French aerona.utical
i,ndustry acquixe this new vehicle?"
Success of the M4 Program
lacques Genton, 3,nformation chairman of the same committee, but und~x the ~o~nt
_ sect~on, brought up at length the sub~ect oP the "maintenance of French nuclear -
_ capabi,lity" and quoted from an extract of the French Atomic Energy Comm3,ss~on's
- ac~tivi.ty report, gublished last summer and summarizing, among other matters, _
the activ~.ty of the military applicati,ons d~,vision. The portion of this extract
_ dea ling urith the M4 wi11 be apprec3ated a11 the more since the min~ster was to
reveal the next day during his speech that the first firing of the M4, which took
pla ce 2 weeks before, had been successful. We quote below from the AEC's
sta temerit: "The weapons now in semt3.ce (bombs for Mirage 4 aircraft, warheads
for the S2 missi,les on the deck of the Albion, taet~cal waxheads that equip the _
_ Pluto ground-to-ground m~ssiles and bombs for the Mira.ge 3 and Jaguar aircraf t)
have been ma~nta~.ned at a very high level of readiness.
"Th e last lot of semi-megation warheads for m~ss~le-Iaunching nuclear submarines
was reti,red from service while a supplementary 1ot of inegaton warheads was
de1 ivered simultaneously. The latter now equip the MSBS of a11 the missile-
launching nuclear submarines ~,n service. At the same time, preparation o~
equipment of mi,ssiles for the Alh~on deck w~,th s~,milar megat3,on waxheads has
been carr3,ed on.
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"The M4, a multiple warhead strategic ballistic missile which w3.11 enter service
_ in 1985, constitutes a very important stage for France. With regard to a11 of
its aspects (mass, volume, hardening) it represents a considerab~;Q ~umpt with
respect to the preceding generation. The year 1979 was marked by a set of very
satisfactory results: The nuclear formula was validated with performance
chara~teristics superior to those which had been requested. The flight tests
were performed successfully. The high 1eve1 set for hardening was atta3ned.
- Erom now on, we can be certain that the M4 missile wi11 furnish our strategic
- nuclear force with a deterrence capability ~hat is greater than ever despite ~he
foreseeable advance of defensive systems.
"At the same time, development of the warhead ~or the ASMP missil.e pxoceded
satisfactor~l~ in accordance with the planned sehedule, which was des~,gned so
as not to interfere with manufacture of the first lot of M4 m3ssiles.
"Upon request of the French Government, studies have begun on the successor to the
- M4 inissile and o:Z the replacement of pre~ent tact~cal weapons. The results obtained
with the M4 and ASMP missiles have permitted devoting appreciable backing to these
studies and several nuclear experiments have opened the way to the design of new
generat3,ons of weapons for the last decade of this century."
What the Minister Had to Say
a. Kegarding Nuclear Programs are increasing by 16.2 percent in program
authorizations and by 15.19 percent 3n payment cred~ts and their ratio is
maintair~ed at 30 percent of the Tit1e 5 equipment budget in payment credits and a
little more than 25 percent in Program authorizations. These credits sha11 be
assigned to the pursuit of modernization of the strategic oceanic force so that
~he M4 missile may be placed in operational service by 1485 on board the sixth
missile launching nuclear submar3ne, the "Inflexible." The technology required
for the construction of these ri4 systems are now available in France. The results
- of experiments have shown ~hat the ob~ectives that we had set for ourselves have
been very exactly achieved. I am thinking of the parti.cularly sign~ficant
experiment which was conducted less than 2 weeks ago at the Landes Test Center
and which confi.rmed our predictions. This situation admits France to the club
- of the ttiree nations which p~ssess multiple warhead missiles." (See issue 837
of "ATR ~nd CQSrI05."
b, Regarding the Mirage 2000
On this subject, the minister made the following st4tement: "7.tao weeks ago, T
called a full day meeting with the presidents of Dassault-Breguet, Thomson, ErID
ancl the National Society for Research and Construction of Aircraft Engines (SNECMA).
I can assure the Senate that the information regarding .*_he release date Por the
weapon systern furnished by the chairmen wi11 b~ adhered to. Arrangements have
been made to this end and better coordination wi11 be achieved."
c. Regard~.ng Helicopters for the National Police Force:
mod~rn.~,zat~.on program was begun 7.as~ year. Gradua7. rep~,acem~nt o~ T~axk 2
by Squirrel a3.rcraft should furnish the nat3,ona1 pol~ce force with he7,3copters
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having bettex performance Gharacter3.st3,cs. A Squixrel helicopter was delivered
to the national police force and two more were ordered last year. Dur~.ng 1981, _
an addit3.ona1 aircraft will be ordered and two wi11 be delivered. Later on, _
orders wi11 be made on a regular basis at a rate not less than that of this _
year."
d, Regard3.ng Coznponent Systems of the Strategic Nuclear Force
The dei~~se min~,ster emphasized that 3.t was out of the question to base the
French deterrt.:~ ^apability entirely on the navy component system alone, as has
- been done by the Brit~sh, since a technological breakthrough in ~he area of -
~ submar~ne detec~ion is a possib3,lity which it would not be wise to exelude
from consideration for the future. Consequently, we must plan for one or perhaps _
- two other component sy~tems providing the necessary backup in the areas of survival
and penetration. For the time being, only the decision to undertake the
preparation of a mob~l.e ai.r-to-air ba1l~,stic missile system has been made. We
will discuss the entire matter dur~.ng the spring of 1982." With rsgard to the
~nedium range air-to-graund weapon, the defense minister said that 3t is planned
for 1985 for the purpose of equ3.pping the Mirage 2000 and some Mirage 4 units
of the A~.r Force as we11 as the Super Banner of naval aviation but that it is _
also capable of b~ing employed for strategic m3ss:tons.
_ e, Regaxd~.ng the High Leve1 Radiation Weapon
The defense min3.ster stated that no decis3.on to produce th3s weapon had been made
and mentioned that "any decision to employ this weapon would be based on political -
rather than m3,13,tary considerations." -
- COPYRTGHT: A. & C., 1.980
7619
- CSO: 3~,00
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
INTELLECTUALS DISSENT WITHIN PCF SEEN GROWING
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 12 Jan 81 pp 17-18
- [Article by Irene Allier: "Communist Party Leaders Stand Accused"]
_ [Text] For several of the communist intellectuals, the Vitry
bulldozer has crushed the very last hope.
- "So iong as this was still an ideological disagreement, one could still. hope, one _
could expect the situation to change. But the whole thing became insupportable
when they went into action. Antoine Spire is not happy; he is the former managing
editor. of Editions sociales who has just left the Communist Party. He has been in
disagreement for the past 3 years on everything or almost everything with his
party's leaders. But, after all, the Communist Party was still his family. When _
he saw the officials of the Val-de-Marne federation and the militants of Vitry cut
off ~he water, the gas, and the electricity to the building in which 300 Ma.lian
workers had just been put up, when he saw the steamshovel operated by communists
trying to stop them from entering, he suddenly realized that he was an orphan.
- "Vitry is the straw that broke the camel's back. There may be the best reasons in
the world behind this whole thing but it is not tolerable." For Raymond Jean, a
novellist and teacher, the camel's back had been broken a long time ago. But it
- was the Vitry affair which made him decide. Just like Georges Mounin, an eminent
:tinguist at the Aix-en-Provence school. Both of them left the party. Along with
the poet Eugene Guillevic who did not pick up his membership card after Afghanis-
~ tan, along with writer Robert Merle, the lady novellist Helene Parmelin, who re-
signed several weeks ago, they had to draft a kind of nanifesto over the last
weekend to respond to Georges Marchais who had accused them in a body, during the
60th anniv~rsary of the Communist Party, of "forgetting the ABCs of the class
struggle under the pressure of the adversary." Observed Guillevic: "The pressure _
- of the adversary I resisted already in 1942 when it was a little bit stronger than
today and when you were risking your skin. But we are now pulling out under pres-
sure from our conscience."
Until Wednesday, 7 January, one could still believe that--making the best of a bad
situation--the Communist Party leadership was somehow trying to stifle an attempt _
by the rank and file which it considered rather unfortunate. L'HUMANITE of 3 Jan-
uary of course did demand a demonstration but spoke of "regrettable incidents,"
"deplorable acts" which had accompanied it.
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Spokesman
But, following the rather laborious response from Georges Marchais to Si Hamza
_ Boubakeur, the rector of the Paris mosque, who had asked him to condemn the oper~
_ ation, one must observP that the Communist Party confirmed the whisperings in
townships with a strong innnigrant population segment. And it was also discovereti
that it had made itself the spokesman of the most spontaneous racist reflexes.
"I tell you quite frankly: yes, the truth of the matter makes me approve, without
_ reservation, the reply given by my friend Paul Mercieca, mayor of Vitry, to the
racist aggression by the Giscardian mayor of Saint-M,aur," wrote Georges Marchais.
(This involved the transfer of the Malians from an old building in Saint-Maur t~
a restored building in Vitry which the city government had planned to refurbish
for the benefit of young Vitry citizens.) "More generally, I approve his refusal
to allow the already large number of immigrant workers to be increased in his com-
munity."
Well, here we are. Georges Marchais furthermore explained himself in clear lan-
guage: "When the concentration becomes very heavy--which has nothing to do with
the rather unscientific and racist idea of the so-called 'tolerance threshold' which
we never talk about anyway--then the housing crisis becomes real serious. The low-
cost housing programs are a cruel failure and many French families cannot even get
in. The social welfare costs necessary for immigrant families living in misery
- are becoming insupportable for the budget of communities populated with blue-collar
_ workers and white-collar employees. The schools are unable to handle the situation
, and children of both immigrants and French citizens are falling behind in their
- schooling."
"That is possible," replies a communist from a worker suburb. "But that does not
explain or excuse the presence of the bulldozer, nor what happened among the
leadership of the communists who cut the water, the gas, and the electricity off
to that building in Vitry."
The fact is that the presence of heavy concentrations of immigrants in the communi-
ties with a high low-cost housing density index--in other words, mostly communist
_ and socialist--poses problems which nobody denies. But the concentration--which
the Communist Party rather incorrectly refers to as a ghetto--is tied to the very
phenomenon of i_mmigration. All immigrants, regardless of where they come from,
where they settle, gather in the form of communities to preserve their way of life,
perhaps their culture, but in any case to survive. Did anybody talk about a ghetto
when heavy concentrations of repatriated north African settlers were formed in
Toulouse, in Marseille or when there were heavy concentrations of White Russians in
the region of Sainte-Genevieve-des-Bois, or when there were heavy concentrations
of Jews on Rosiers Street or at Montmartre?
Unacceptable Operation
To tell the truth--and the Communist Party cannot ignore that--the problems posed
by immigrant workers are much less of an ethnic origin and much more of an economic
origin. These are problems which spring from any kind of subproletariat on the
social, health, and school levels, in other words, on the leve of delinquency. The
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' French do not need their immigrants to see, in their own suburbs, the fallout of
poverty, lack of adaptation, and segregation by money.
So, why does the Communist Party accept the risk of finding itself in the dock?
Why, under the acceptable pretext of a fairer distribution of burdens in the com-
_ munities, does it go along with such an unacceptable operation which involves i~
posing an unacceptable quota upon its townships, possibly by force, such as at
Vitry? "Ttiis is a low-leve.l political operation," confessed a disheartened mili-
tant. "The Co~nunist Party is losing momentum in these sectors. It simply goes
- along with the voters and it bas nothing to lose." So, the Communist Party simply
makes do with what it has. While the Co~unist Party daily L'HUMANITE pursues
its campaign against th e"forceful move by the mayor of Saint-Maur," its weekly
magazine REVOLUTION keeps harping on the old issue of insecurity. "We do not want
to wake up tomorrow in a France where there are as many little Harlems as there are
little Chicagos," summarizes Guy Hermier, member, Political Bureau.
Stoleru and Peyrefitte did IlOt say it any better or any worse. They, too, had
everything to gain in electo~ral terms. The Communist Party however did have o,ie
thing to lose: respect. And that is a fact.
- CUPYRIGHT: 1981 "Le Nouvel Observateur"
565 8
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
NATION'S OVERSEAS ARMS SALES CONTINUE TO GROW
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 12 J an 81 pp 26-29 _
[Article ~y Francois d'Orcival: "Weapons to the Highest Bidder"]
['I'ext] French arms exports have quadrupled in 10 years.
They are equal to one quarter of the oil bill. But this -
is a precarious sector.
The compliment appeared on the front page of the Y~ALL STREET JOURNAL: "No one any
longer disputes the success encountered by French sales of helicopters, missiles and
fighter planes abroad. France is the third largest exporter of arms in the world, -
after the United States and the Soviet Union, and its share on the foreign market
has only increased." (Fact: the United States and the USSR represent 75 percent of
= the market, France 12 percer.t.)
To whom is the compliment addressed? To the 280,000 persons working for the arma-
ment industries, 65 billion turnover, nsarly 30 billion of it for export. And to
- two men in particular, General Engineer Jean Martre, general delegate for armament
for almost 4 years, and his international affairs director, Gerard Hibon. The first
orders, the second exports.
Very, very cle~~~er salesmen, says an American military attache.
'Their technology i~ constantly improving, a representative of the Lockheed firm
acknowledges in the same daily.
Lasting success or precarious success? "These exports depend on an international
situation on which we don't have much of a grip," notes Jacques Cressard, the RPR
[Rally for the Republic] deputy from Ille-et-Vilaine and military credits reporter
for the Finance Committee. In any case, success is necessary: these exports are -
paying one fourth of the oil bill (a little over 100 billion francs), they diminish
in proportion to the deficit. -
In 10 years, the value of these exports expressed in constant francs has quadrupled.
_ But during the same time, our foreign trade was doubling. In other words, the share
of the arms trade in these exports has only doubled.
Since 1970 the government trade has been in the hands of three men. The first,
Hugues de L'Estoile, a Paris Polytechnic graduate and aeronautical engineer, was ap-
pointed director of international affairs ~t 38. He was to be talked about for 4
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years, especially in Arabia and the Emirates. He doubled sales. He is now inter- _
national director at Dassault. A military man, General Engineer Paul Assens, suc-
ceeded him, from 1974 to 1977, at the same level, while also trying to double his
starting figure.
It was a diplomat from France overseas who took over from him: Gerard Hibon, who is
now 54, the man of the contract signed last 14 October with Saudi Arabia for nearly
16 billion francs' worth of orders for ships, missiles and helicopters. A contract
to which he will~have devoted 25 missions in 2 years.
With him are 100 men, lodged on the fifth floor of a modern building built between
the old buildings of the Defense Ministry, in offices that are discreetly luxurious
and functional. Superior officers studying their markets as if they were theaters
of operations, armament engineers acting at one and the same time as technicians and _
commercial agents and civilian administrators, in order to watch over contracts in
progress and to come. Clausewitz said that the profession closest to the art of war
was commerce. Here, they merge.
This team clarifies and launches operations on which the representatives of every
industry, every business firm, public or private, will then concentrate. All of _
- them using the services of a demonstrator and an after-sales service of great
weight: the French Army, which in its turns forms the foreign "customers."
The military complained. Their army was being transformed into a show-window for
the armament industry; was that its role? Arms exports, on the contrary, from the
beginning (the Armament Delegation was created in 1961) had a military justifica-
tion:
To be able to build the nuclear force, recalls an armament engineer, an ultra-
modern industry capa.ble of manufacturing high-technology materials was re-
quired.
Ultra-modern ind~astry means credits for study and development. This commits large
siuns. And it is necessary to know that between the United States and France, for
example, the ratio of these study credits is b to 1. But there are critical thresh-
olds:
A study bure au of 1,200 to 1,500 engineers and technicians is enough for the
designing of an arms plane. But it cannot be done with 300, says the same
e~igineer. A delay of 3 to 4 years behind American technology is tolerable,
but no more than that.
'Thus exports have made it possible to make research and investment profitable, to
extend the series. In a classic sales contract, the seller extends credit to the
customer; in a military export contract, especially with the oil states, it is just
_ the opposite: th e customer finances his own purchase.
But to ttiis are added more political reasons: support for employment (100,000 per-
sons are working for arms export activities), foreign trade balance, France's dip-
lomatic influence.
Result: the armamecits industry, more than any other, has sought to design products
~ in terms of the world market an.d no longer just for the domestic market. "Export"
quality has become a major criterion for our armaments. Too much so.
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Thus, abandoning t}ie twin-engine Mirage in 1977 (which the Air Force had written in-
to its plans) was justified in one sentence: this plane would not be exported be-
cause it was too expensive. (Since then Mr Dassault has sought to produce this
Mirage 4000 with Arabia.) _
"The aeronautical industry in itself (105,000 salaried workers) accounts for 59 per-
cent of our military exports," J acques Cressard comments. At Aerospatiale, 52 per-
cent of 1979 sales went for export (80 percent of the helicopters and 70 percent of
the engines); at Dassault, this share is 70 percent; at SNECMA [expansion unknown],
the builder of airplane engines, it is 50 percent; at Thomson-CSF [General Radio
Company], 70 percent of the military turnover (nearly 6 billion) is exported; the
proportion is the same at Matra (1.8 billion of military sales); for Panhard it is
100 percent.
In the public, nationalized or private sector, everything is government fc~eign
- t~ade. A dozen general auditors from the armies participate as go?ernment represen-
tatives on the boards of directors of the companies working for armament. Their
mission: to inform the administration. In the United States, export contracts are
. subject to the approval of Congress, in France to that of the administration. Some
French leaders complain that they have to endure an additional delay of six months
in relation to their foreign rivals in establishing a contract, because of adminis-
- trative restraints.
A British competitor of Mr Hibon's teams, quoted by the WALL STREET JOURNAL, as-
serts, "If I were to give just one reason why the French aeronautical industry has _
_ taken such a position in the Middle East, I would say that it owes it to the gov-
ernment's action in its favor. That makes all the difference.
But that is no guarantee. Arms exportation remains a fragile profession. The rea-
- sons are political and technical.
- The ranges of materiel are changing. Two examples, the AMX 30 tank and the Mirage. -
Our industry has manufactured so many of them: about 2,000 iri 15 years. We have
exported half of the AMX and three quarters of the Mirages, Now, both are hardly
_ selling any more. Only two of these planes this year: to the Swiss Air Force (re- _
placing damaged equipment). The customers are waiting for the successors to the AMX
- and the Mirages.
One tank, reports an armament engineer, consists of armor plating, a chassis,
an engine, a gearbox and a firing system. The French are excellent for the _
firing system, as good as any for the chassis and the armor plating. But too
expensive for the engine and behind the rest in the gearbox.
- 'flie best tanks are German. So the French have sought an agreement with them to build
- a combat tank jointly. The agreement in principle is already more than a year old .
and no real staz~t oti execution has occurred. German industrialists, aware that they
have a good product, would r.ather manufacture and sell their Leopard alone. The
French are wondering if they are going to take their own project out of their boxes.
in the meantime, time is going by and the markets are escaping. Order-taking is al-
ready down. _
The next member of the Mirage family has been christened the Mirage 2000. Several '
prototypes are flying. But a plane, besides its airframe and its jet engine, is a
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rvc~ vrrt~ieu, u~~ vnl,i
weapons system: carrier-based electronics, fire-control radar. The weapons system
of the 2000 is not perfected. It will be in two years, at best. What will be sold
in the interval? Gen Mitterrand, the president of SNIAS [expansion unknown], speaks
modestly (see below) of sales "settling down."
New competitors are arriving: the Germans, not only for their armored vehicles, but
now fo;: their submarines (in Latin America); the Brazilians or the Israelis for ar-
- mored vehicles or planes, the Japanese or the Kor eans for military electronics.
Finally, and especially, the customers are capricious. There is the danger of too -
big a customer where political revolution is the equivalent of filing for bankrupt-
- cy: Iran, for the United States. An identical risk with Iraq for France (which has
- delivered to Iraq, or is still to deliver, AMX tanks, Mirages, helicopters and mis- _
_ siles). But here, the war with Iran has added a new risk.
T1ie publicity for the Mirage had been provided by the Israeli Air Force during its
battles against Irab Migs in 1967. In the ease of Iraq, the present war may have
the opposite effect--counter-publicity. For that country has urgently asked France
for equipment (to replace destroyed equipment) that our industry d~es not have the
capacity to supply.
For ex~unple, the Iraqis have spoken of 200 Crotale anti-aircraft missile batteries.
An expert comment, "It is as if you had asked SN IAS to bring 25 Concordes off its
assernbly lines." (In all, the rrench Army itself has only receive~ 16 Crotale bat-
teries in 3 years.)
The French factories cannot build more than S00 armored vehicles of all categories
(from t}ie small armored car to the heavy tank) per year, ~ne foiirth of which the _
Iranians and the Iraqis are in the process of consuming~ These capacity limits ap-
ply tliroughout the industry. Gen Mitterrand said it: flexioility is American and -
Russian, because of their size. _
To surmcknt these handicaps, Gerard Hibon has concentrated his forces on a weak sec-
~or of our exports: naval armament. France is counting heavily on the new needs
createct by t}ie extension of the economic zones to 200 miles from the coasts. Of the
16 billion in the Saudian contract, 14 will go to ships. The year 1980 has been
c}lriste~iecl the "blue year."
COPYRIGFI'T: 1981 "Valeurs actuelles"
u946
- CSO: 31U0
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CO'UNTRY SECTTON FRANCE
SITUATION SEEN POS~TTVE BY AEROSPATTALE BOARD
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 13 Dec 80 p 9
[Text] In a statement issued duri,ng its meeting of 3 Dece~bex, the ~,erospace
Tndustry Central Committee observed that the financ~al status vf the national
corporation, which appears to be undergoing econom3c recovery, evidences an
upward trend and, for the first time, has permitted top managemenC to present -
a substantial midterm program which would a1s~ be applicabie over the long term.
Expansion of the Line of Products and Cooperati~n
The Aerospace Tndustry Central Committee (AICC) considers that, ~.n order to avoid
experiencing periodic depress3.ons, it is absol,utely necessary to broaden the range
of products and to devote itself to penetration of the international market. _
In order to protect the future of the workers as we11 as that of the corporation,
such an objective absolutely ca11s ~or broadening of European cooperation to meet
the aggressiveness of American competitors, Furthermore, it is absolutely necessary
- that the corporation affirm its own personality by way of one of its producfis
wh~ch requires a research and dev~lopment effort by the corporation, (The AS 35
project would be a suitable one). Furth~rmore, it is important that investments ~
be made in the ~,ndustrial area as well as wiCh regard to the facilit3es employed
for the rapi,d preparat3on oQ complementary programs. These progr~ms should also
be reflected in an improvement of work3ng cond~.tions.
Contract3ng and Hiring Policy
The A~CC reminds us th~t it would be dangerous to the future of the co~p.any and
of its employees to put into practise an excessive policy of subcontracting. Tn -
fact, if the subcontracting policy reached such extremes, the company would
- eventually Pind itself deprived of a portion of its production facilities which
it wou].d be difficult to conpensate for in case there was a fallure in the program
that required transPerring foreign production to France. The results of such
_ a situati.on would be to endanger employraent security. The AICC considers that
applicati.on of new techniques and new technologies con.stitute means that permit
� lowering production costs wh3.ch, by becom3ng more competitive, improve marketing
' pos~ibilities. Consequently, the ATCC rejects tnE concept of profita~illty
attr3butable to subcontracting and curtailment of the advantages obtained by
means of the contractual procedure. The future, which dependsonrhe mastery
and employ~ment of new techniques and technologies requires hiring of personnel by -
the campany. Therefore, in view of the need to restore manpower, it is desirable
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I
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that the steps which permitted curtailment af personnel may be reversed, s~ius -
demonstrating the will of the company to solve the present unemployment s3.tuation.
~ The qteps taken to convert a few closed-end contracts into open-end contracts
are clearly inadequa~e. The committee c~nsiders that only open-end contracts
~ are capable of motivating new hirings. Consequently, the AICC strongly reaffirms
ies request that a11 the employees of the corporation have the same contiacta
by converting the closed-end type to the open-end type.
- Situation of Affiliates
The AICC has particularly attracted the attention of top management to the =
presen~ situation of a few affiliates of the corporation and has called Fox an
_ urgent examinatian of this situat3on as well as of qu~.cic solut3ons t�:~ pratect
their futureo -
Coordin.ation
Moreover, the ATCC requests the board of d~,rectors to furna.sh it w~.~h all ~,n-
~ format:i.on of an econom~.c and soc~al nature. Tn fact, it observes that the
, cott�ni.tmen~s made at the highest levels by government officials and the board of
- directors huve been completely thwarted and it attracts ~ttention of the board -
nf d-trectors to the facr that any attempt to w~,thhold in.formation so as to
_ igrere the representat3ve trade un~ons would produce unfor~unate reactions. In
fact, the condit~ons of the d~.alogue would b,a modified, which would not fail to
produce d~ter3.orat:~.on of the social climate,
The ATCC is aware of. tY?e efforts wh3ch are requested of the personnel of the
corporat_lon anct ~hese efforts are accepted and rtalized. Therefore, it wi11
- be necessary that the board of directors recognize the fact that, at the time
that al1 of the divisions of the corporation have entered an active period of
industcialization, it w311 oecome absolutely necessary that it be able to satisfy
a11 the d~mands of the employees that wi11 be formulated during the next negot3--
ations of the incoming key and non~key personnel ~tn accordance w~ith the corpo-
rations a;reement of 21 October 1970. ~
COPYRTGHT: A. & C., 1980
7619
CSO : 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
PCI'S NATTA INTERVIEWED ON POLITICAL SITUATION
_ Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 30 Dec 80 pp 1, 2
[Interview with PCI Alessandro Natta, by Alberto Sensini, of CORRIERE DELLA SERA;
date and place not given: "Natta" The ~ommunists Are Again Proposing Themselves
As a Force in the Government"]
_ [Text] Rome--Alessandro Natta, for many years leader of the comanunist deputies
and now a representativz of the most authoritative ones in the secretariat, is
~ "on duty" at the Botteghe Oscure. In the big building, quiet and tidy as a clinic,
Natta "covers" the office and keeps in telephone contact with other party leaders,
in accordance with the custom of the PCI, which never demobilize:: its apparatus,
not even during holidays.
[Question] We asked him e~ght questions regarding the Italian pelitical situation,
cor_tinuing with our series of interviews with Italian leaders. One month after
the 27 November proposal of the leadership--generally called the Salerno turning -
- poiz~t--how do you judge the negative reactions of the other parties? we asked Natta.
[AnswerJ "The conduct of the government and of the majority concerning the dramatic
interlacing of problems, up to the most recent contradictory and serious decision -
on Asinara, confirms a serious lacic:. a preoccupying crisis, in the political leader-
ship of the country. Therefore when we proposed a democratic alternative we were
responding to a real need; we were complying with a national duty and responsibil- -
_ ity. Ours was an appeal that was addressed to the country, and I believe that it
has already been notably listened to, and that it may provoke interest and growing
- adherence. It is true that some political forces have attempted to shun a serious
examination of our proposal or to exorcize it with some convenient interpretation. -
But it is always more difficult to maintain that there is no possibility of change,
that the political and parliamentary bases for an administration are lacking, that
it no longer hinges on the DC [Christian Democratic Party], that if "centrality," ~
the DC power system, is called in question, there is a risk of precipitating another
dissolution of the parliamentary houses, or worse, a governmental crisis and a -
crisis with respect to democratic institutions. This does not hold up, since =
the Honorable Forlani has to again appeal for national cohesion; in short, to ask
the PCI to forgo telling the bitter truth about scandals, the earthquake, inconsis-
tencies, disputes, signs of weakness in~ the fight against terrorism, and to
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accomplish its opposition task.
The embarrassed and contradictory reactions do not discourage or stop us. More-
over, a discussion has been started; other proposals--even if less valid and
realistic--have been formulated. All of this is an indication that the need for
= new political guidance is obvious; that there are possibilities for the development
of our initiative and for our fight."
[Question] The DC of the preamble agreed with Andreotti ancl the internal leftists.
How do you appraise this new fact?
[Answer] "The line of the 'preatnble' arrived in brief stages, at a critical point,
also for the open and clean f ight that the PCI conducted against an attempt at
- moderate stabilization, which was in contrast with the need for reform and for
- the revival of our society. But it does not seem that the agreement among the
various trends of the I3C has represented a significant change in direction, the
beginning of a surmounting of the moral and political crisis that has been con-
stricting the DC party for some time. It is sufficient to think of the painful
attempt to reduce the "moral question" to a sort of obscure conspiracy, of
instrumental aggression, when the DC leaders know quite well that in question are
_ a concept and a practice regarding authority that have strangled the democratic
regime and damaged public life and the functioning of the state."
"Thus there is the unresolved contradiction between the stressed impossibility of
any cooperation with the PCI and insistence on a policy of solidarity, which the
DC erroneously has scuttled; between the acknowledgment of the "alternative"
character of the PCI, of the legitimacy of our recent proposal, and the statement
that an alternative would be dangerous to democracy and freedom. It is not pos-
sible to emerge from the general lines that the DC identifies in the state, that
- does not permit alliances if noti through cooptations of a subordinate type, that
- does not see beyond the horizon of 'centrality,' itself. But this is precisely
the prime cause of the political instability and uncertainty of this past decade,
of the sclerosis of the leadership groups, of the eclipse of the democratic and
- popular characteristics of the DC, itself. There is room for hope, and we certainly
will not wait around, but c�~ill act in a resolute and coherent manner to keep the
, DC from castling in defense of a system and of a method of power that is no
longer able to rule and of disqualified groups and individuals. But even now our
severe judgment does not confuse good with bad. We believe that in the DC, too,
there are democratic forces that are aware of the seriousness of the situation.
They must understand that, along with the lot of the nation, the lot of their party
is also at stake."
[Question] In 1980 there was an abundant outcropping of institutional proposals
on the part of the PCI, too. What is your appraisal in this regard?
[Answer] It must be emphasized that the Italian crisis has political origins,
causes, and responsibilities. It would be a serious error to conceive of it as a
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pre-Qminently institutional fact, and there are tendencies of this type. It is
n ecessary, then, to warn against a search for remedies in a change of the consti-
tu tional mod~l, in constraints at the level of electoral laws, or in clever
mechanisms to 'simplify' the system of the parties, to guarantee the stability of
the executive. I have often said, and I am still of tnis opinion, that it is not
a question of rebuilding the republic or of rewriting the constitution. But the
e lements of a crisis, at the level of institutions, are quite obvious, and we
repeat the proposals that have already been advanced regarding a serious and cour-
ageous reform. It is not necessary to repeat that we are in favor not only of
revising the rule~ of the chamber of deputies, but also of a different statement of
the functions of the two branches of parliament, even including the hypothesis of
monocameralism; conceiving the government as a unitary organ, based on well defined
p rograms, with the ability to decide, apart from the criteria of the considered _
d ivisions and the reasoning of the various trends. Our commitment in behalf of
our proposal and initiative will be developed along these great themes and on
- t hose of ttie reform of public administration, of the achievement of the autonomist
- system."
[Q uestion] There is a strong tendency to resolve the moral question with technical-
legislative innovations regarding the financing of parties, the preference vote,
. the patrimonial registry office. What does the PCI think of this?
[Answer] The moral question, as I have mentioned, suggests that there is a poli-
t ical crucial point, and in order to truly restore public life, the functioning of _
mechanisms, the economic and financial centers of the state, the custom and the
conduct of the governing parties, i_t is necessary to resolve it. This does not
mean that specific moral measures, more thorough control of party finances and of
the income and property of politicians should not be adopted. We are in agreement
on this. I see that you again bring up the matter of preferences; in connection,
i t seems, with the deterioration of the trends. These are misfortunes which our
party has not experienced, and is not experiencing, but we of course are not against
dealing with this kind of problem, too. Wp always start from the consideration
that democracy cannot exist without the parties. The parties of course cannot be
the only expression of commitment and political life; parties are confronted with
the need of a revival of their relationship with society and with the institutions,
~ but it is necessary to reject and to combat vague and confused attacks against
'partyism,' the 'party system.' There are historical data in the Italian political
reality which it is not possible to leave out of consideration. There are distinc-
~ions and differences among the parties that canr~ot be ignored and underestimated.
The PCI intends to be itself and wants to be judged for what it is, for its
, policy."
[Question] Do you or do you not favor juridical regulation of parties? If you do,
how can that regulation be reconciled with the principles of democratic centralism?
[Answer] "It really does not seem that democratic centralism can constitute an
obstacle to the definition of rules regarding rhe democratic behavior of parties.
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Just the opposite. Nevertheless I do not see how there can be any juridical
ragulation. For example, regulation through law of the propriety of enrolment?
- 'The democratization of decisions? This would require outside control, but ii:
~,aould also exert a limitation on autonomy and, in short, a change in the nature and
- function of the parties. There are statutes which, as far as I know, are gen~:rally
inspired by a democratic establishment. Respect for rules is a matter of a p~~li-
= tical fight within individual parties and between parties, in the face of pub:Lic
opinion." �
[QuestionJ Public opinion is against "special justice" for politicianso Are
you available when it comes to eliminating the system of iffinunities and the
examining magis trate?
[Answer] "We communists, too, are against any 'special treatment' which up to now
has protected the men of the governing parties. For example, in the case of
warrants, we have for some time consistently followed the criterion o� granting -
them when it is a question, in the case of parliamentarians, of charges involving
common crimes. As for the examining magistrate, we have already presented a pro-
posal that reduces his action only to cases involving an attempt against the
constitution and that transfers the trial of any other evpntual ministerial crime .
to an ordinary court." -
[Question] How do you judge the action of the Forlani government? And the d'Urso
case'?
[Answer] "The judgment is clearly critical. In the light of the evidence of ~
facts, c~r.tainly also of unexpected and catastrophic ones, it does not seem possi-
ble to find either clear ideas, or opportune and vigorous decisions, or firm and
coherent leadership. Furthermore this severe appraisal is not only ours. It seems `
that it also apgears in comments on the press conference of the Honorable Forlani.
I do not think that it is a question of chance, or that one can impute to obscure
maneuvers, to polemical irritations, or to misfortunes the fact that 2 months after ~
its formation the present ministry appears to be a weak union that is not at all
cotiesive, that is unable to control events and to administer the country at a time
of uncertainty and seriousness. Nor can one really think that governability, -
governmental stability, can be defended and guaranteed by paying burdensome prices,
_ like that paid in answer to the recent demands made in connection with the
~ kidnapping of d'Urso.The error lies in the uncertainty and ambiguity of the line of
conduct; inthe lack, or the postponement, of a reply that would immediately stop
'olaclanail on the part of the BR [Red Brigades], that is, made under the pressure
of Craxi's unilateral initiative. It is very difficult to justify this act
as an autonomous and already foreseen decision which, because of these times and
methods, risks--as is occurring--giving a second wind to destructive and terrorist
- groups."
[QuestlonJ I,ast question: which is better--the 10 referendums or early elections?
[Answer) We have always believed that the referendum strategy of the radicals
is wr.ong: not the recourse to the democratic instr~ent of a referendum, but the
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- idea or reviving society and the state with 8 or 10 referendwms at a tir.?e. We -
therefore have neither provided support nor guarantses for this initiative. We
are convinced, for example, that the abortion law is valid and positive and that
- it was an error to promote referendiuns in order to distort it one way or another.
We think that it would be better to finally and earnestly make a serious commitment
- to realize an energy plan, rather than to involve the question of nuclear power _
_ plants in an electoral contest. But we of course do not intend to encourage
avoidance of referendimms. Besides, it is an initiative that ~the elections would `
not annul, but would only postpone. It is better to face it. We are against
early elections. We nevertheless cannot let ourselves to intimidated by those who
threaten them."
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s. _
8255
CSO: 3104
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r�ux ~rrzc;i~. us~ ot~t.Y
COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
NEW PCI INTELLECTUAL PUBLICATION ANNOUNCED _
rrila~~ CORRIEKE DELLA SERA in Italian 28 Dec 80 p 2
[Ter.t] Rome--In about 1 month the first issue of LABORATORIO POLITICO [POLITICAL
T~ BURATORY] wil7. be published. This is a new monthly periodical thu~ will be
publis hed by ~inaudi. It will be edited by a group of PCI intellectuals, like
Aris Accomero, Alberto Asor Rosa, Angelo Bolaffi, Massimo Cacciari, Rita Di Leo,
Gzaccmo Marramao, Stefano Rodota, Umberto Romagnoli, Carlo Donolo, Gian Enrico
Rusconi.
hiario Tronti. explained that "this initiative certainly does not mean that we
intend to withdraw from politics. We are not returning to studies; there is no
flight, no ebb. It is an attempt to win back a more mature political level. And
LABOFtt~TORIO POLITICO will be a real structure for research, the result of a col-
lective. intelligznce that should begin to function."
"FurtYiermore, I hasten to say," added Tronti, "that the new periodical will not be
the wo rk of dissidence with respect to the PCI. On the contrary, the preoccupation
of th~ leadership group of the party that we~are moving away from the life of the ~
pa-rt~ andfrom the cultural and political discussion introduced in PCI publications
in reality does not exist."
Thro~lgF~out 1981, each issue of the periodical will be devoted to only one topic.
The subject o~ the first will be "Governments and Governors: Kind, Staff, Tech-
niques, Structures"; of the second, "Plan and Program: Leftist Parties in the -
Government or Not," while the third will be devoted to trade unionism. It is
anticipated that after the first year, there will be an English language edition,
_ w~th contributions from foreign intellectuals, such as Suzanne Berger, James
0'Connor, Michael Priore, Claus Offe, and Sidney Tarrow. -
COPY RIGHT.: 1980 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
8255
- CSO : 310~F
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COUNTRY SECTION SWEDEN
WAGE EARNER FUND PROPOSALS TO BE ~ITTER ISSUE IN 1982 VOTE
Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 11 Dec 80 pp 34-37
(Article by Ake Lanquist: "The 10 Years of the Wage Earner Funds: The Explosive ~
Question that Will Be an Election Bomb in 1982"]
[Text] After 10 years in the wage earner fund question--he himself wrote the First
LO [National Federation of Labor Unions] motion in 1971--the chairman Allan Larsson
will sit with an analysis proposal without a majority. The Liberal Party's right-
about-face robbed the LO and the Social Democrats of majority influence and gathered
the parties of the center around the demand of the economy and the Moderates for
voluntary saving. The result: 6 different proposals, which have al.ready split
~ th~ government and will become a hot question in the 1982 election.
"The men of the center and the economy have come closer to one another. They speak
a common language. If one closes one's eyes and listens it is difficult to say
whether it is Bert Levin Erland Waldenstrom who is speaking. The political situa-
tion is completely changed."
This was said by one of the 12 members (13, including chairman Allan Larsson) of _
the wage earner fund committee to VECKANS AFFARER. The statement shows the gist
of the change of scene that has taken place in the matter of the wage earner fund.
The Liberal Party--always the key party--has made a right-about-face in its attitude
~ toward the fund.
The entire analysis of wage earner funds (official name: Analysis of Wage Earners
and Capital Growth) is an outcome of the Haga agreement in 1974 between the then
Social Democratic government and the Liberal Party. In January 1975, Finance
Minister Gunnar Strang wrote the directive af ter consultation with the Liberal
?a rty.
At first, the Liberal Party took a line on the matter close to that of the wage
earner organizations, the LO and the TCO [Central Organization of Salaried
Employees]. The Liberal Party working group under Carl Tham advocated financing
via prof it sharing and a wage tax. 'There were to be many funds (fund pluralism), _
and attempts were to be made for an appropri~te individual connection. Over the
_ longer term there was the possibility of a political settlement between the Social
Democrats and the Liberal Party, supported by the LO and the TCO.
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This was not an attractive prospect for the ec~nomy. On that side, the strategy
was developed of not entering into a confrontation but being constructive and
presenting alternatives, the so-called Waldenstrom report.
The Liberal Party has been exposed to hard pressure from "lobbyists" from the
- economy. An acrimonious debate has also been carried on internally in the party.
As a consequence the Liberal Party has changed its position in the wage earner fund
matter. The idea of profit sharir~g has been abandoned. Shares in the fund are to
be individually owned, but not disposable prior to a saving term of 5 years. The
savin~s remain obligatory. This obligation is the most important difference from -
the proposal by spokesmen for the economy (though from the point of view of the
individual a collective agreem.ent can also be seen as an obligation.)
The I.iberal Party's Strange Position before the Election
Ttie t,ibera"1 Party has been able to make the Center go along with this obligation
in the middle-of-the-road proposal that was patched together in the late summer .
and early fall. The Center had earlier advocated voluntary saving. However, the
mairi point is that the middle parties stand closer to the economy spokesmen than
to the TCO and LO wage earner organizations.
T~ao contributing factors may have caused the Liberal Party to change its position:
Its position as one of three governing nonsocialist parties. The Moderates, pri-
maril.y, have criticized the Liberal Party for "faltering" in the question of wage
earner funds, and for not adequately having defended the market economy.
Severe internal criticism following the nuclear energy referendum. Many Liberal
Party members thought the intimate cooperation with the Social Democrats might _
hurt the party. It was necessary to indicate a distance, to keep the line of
demarkati.on clear toward the Left. Taking a position close to that of the Social
Dem~crats in the wage earner fund question in the 1982 election could be destruc-
tive to the nonsocialist coalition's chances of winning the election.
An interesting theory explains the Liberal Party's about-face: Earlier, the Liberal
Party Y~as often noted how close to the TCO the party stands on the wage earner fund
q~iestion. Ttiat time is now past. The new Liheral Party line may be the conse-
quence of a speculation to the effect that the TCO leadership could be "run over"
by tt~e TCO congress, to be held in the summer of 1982 (just prior to the election).
; In that case, the Liberal Party stand will coincide with that of the TCO members,
but not with that of the TCO leadership.
If tYiis "running over" does not take place, the Liberal Party will f ind itself in
a strange position before the election (in which the wage earner fund question will
be a big one): The party will back a fund proposal that neither_ the TCO nor the LO
wants. A member of the committee comments: "The Liberal Party can hardly gain more
voters among 'the Managers' than among the wage earners in the 1982 election."
a~~'' After 6 years of discussion, the committee has, as the most important result of its
work, produced a political constellation: the Liberal Party and the Center have gone
together on a joint proposal. The 10 praposals of 10 June have become 6, as the
committee nears the finish line. The most important thing, however, is that this
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middle-of-the-road constellation has taken a position c~.ose to that of the leaders
of the economy.
This has led to the wage earner fund group of the economic leaders now thinking
- that the job ha~ been done. "Since the memb ers of the committee this summer pre-
sented six different proposals, which, it seems, cannot be further amalgamated,
- one can probably assert that the race has b een run as far as the analysis is con-
cerned," wrote Erland Waldenstrom, the Indu stry Association's representative on
the committee, in the Association's journal SI-NYTT.
Others in the industry group express the matter even more unreservedly: "The
committee has been passed by. What now rema ins is a play to the gallery. The
important job is being done in contacts made outside the committee. The target is
1981, prior to the report. The purpose is reaching an agreement in the interest
of th~ whole country. This work has begun."
_ That this work has been begun is something the c:ommittee members say they know
nothin~ about. "Is an attempt being made to pat:ch something together outside
of the committee: That sounds incredible," said a member. "Private negotiations
are under way, to be sure--but no attempts to twist together a solution, as far as
I know," said another member.
From the point of view of business and industry, the acute threat of wage earner
funds represented by the Social Democratic-Liberal Party constellation has been
_ cleared away. Instead of new collective and "socialist" roads to renewed industrial
growth, business and industry counts on being able to resolve the economic crisis
and gain economic stability in the classicai--or rather neoclassical (before
Keynes)--way. What business and industry scent in the midst of the economic crisis
is a solution to the capital formation prob lem in a voluntary way via collective
agreements (and an end to the support policy).
"The LO and the TCO Attitude without Misgiv ings"
A member of the wage earner fund committee utters a word of warning, however: "A
- solution via collective agreements requires an interested counterpart. The LO and
the TCO are not. This is an attitude with no misgivings."
Even though the race may be said to have b een run for the wage earner fund cou~nit-
tee, the report will be completed, at the end of January at the earliest. "The
new time schedule runs out at the end of January," says the Committee chairman,
Allan Larsson. At that time the report will be finally adjusted and published.
On the political level the matter was decided in that the middle parties presented
their joir.t proposal. Thereby the constellations were given and the positions
clear. Th is, however, did not prevent dramatic events in t~?e committee.
- In business and industry irritation had grown f or a long time over what was
~~iescribed as lack of neutrality in the committee's material. In the criticism it
was charged that the background material f avored funds of the LO/SAP type. But
for tactical reasons the representatives of business and industry did not show
their dissatisfaction in the committee. The construc~ive line was carried forwarc~.
- Business and industry representatives stood firm on their alternatives to LO/SAP
proposals.
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It was when thA proposal by the middle parties received the distinction of becoming -
an a].ternative (demand: at least two members or sides to be behind a model) that -
business and industry reacted. In a letter of 3 October to committee chairman
- Al.lan Larsson, the 3 business and industry members (Erland Waldenstrom of the
Industrial Association, Hans Werthen, SAF, and Robert Alderin, SHIO Family Enter-
prises) stated that theirs was not to be presented as one of the committee's models
for wage earner funds.
_ The main reason given was that the d ivision into categories of what the letter
referred t.o as "contributions by parties to the matter" seemed both arbitrary and
unfair. "It is even more risky that such a grouping is likely to cause misunder-
standing of the real content of the standpoints of the various sides," states the =
lett:er.
"Risk oE Misunderstanding Great"
"The risk of misunderstanding increa sed when the Center and the Liberal Party pre- �
sented their mode].. Few have the opportunity to delve into the matter, and the risk
of misunderstanding is therefore great," says Robert Alderin. On the business and
:Lndustry side it is claimed that experiences after 3 October show that the action
was cor.recl. What was avoided was this: if business and industry had presented -
t~"l�11' own al.ternative it could have been interpreted as acceptance of the wage -
earne~r. fund idea, and that the rest was only a matter of technicalities (meaning
the form of these funds).
In fact, nowever, business and industry stiands by its proposal of 10 June. That =
gr.ouE~ now speaks of the proposal as "our reservation." This means that business and
industry now put themselves in a reservation position together with the Moderates.
i'his am~unts to a declaration of distinction in relation to SACO [Swedish Confedera-
tion oF Professional Associations], SR [National Federation of Government Employees]
and 1C0 [Cen~ral Organization of Salaried Employees] which will present special
~ sr_atements (meaning that they presen t no reservations). "It is not yet def initely
clear whether or not we shall write a reservaCion or a special statement," says
TCO :~~presentntive Karl-Erik Nilsson.
't'i~e ne::t dramatic eruption in the committee came when Bert Levin of the Liberal
Parr.y "r.evol.ted" against the background description. In his opinion it was formu-
1:3ted :i~ a~aay that led to the LO/SAP proposal "on rails." This Bert Levin could
not acc~pt. The committee secretariat has for weeks been engaged in rewriting the
back;ro~_~nd mater.ial in Chapter 6, which deals with the basic principles of wage -
earner Etind systems--financing, organization and placement [of funds] policy. The
purport oE the rewriting is apparen t from the following comment by a member of one
of the stibconmittees: "Now the background is adjusted to suit even Liberals. It
tail_1 be a schizophrenic drawing of the background material, but it wi11 make it
- Possib:le for both sides (the middle and LO/SAP) to present their proposals against
tlle new backgraun~l."
The rewriting caused the internal time schedule to break down. Instead o~ -
19 December, the new final date is now the end of February or early March. However,
severa7. m~^mbers question whether the final report will be ready even then. On the ~
other hand, the committee will stick to the time schedule given in the directive,
ar_cording to which the final report shall be ready in good time before the 1982
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election. In practice, this means that the work must be completed in good time
before the LO and SAP congresses in 1981. The TCO and SA-CR congresses will not
be held until 1982.
Business and Industry: "The Committee Has Been Left Astern" _
The position in the final phase is apparent from the model descriptions (see below).
Comments follow:
LO/SAP. Kjell-Olof Feldt concerning tt?e status of the proposal: "The 1978 congress
wanted a detailed proposal. A working group was set up with me as chairman. In
January it will present a report to the party and LO organizations. Thereafter the -
party board and the national secretariat will present a final evaluation to the
~ongresses. The report is thus a link in this work. Nothing can be said today
about the final proposal."
The Middle Parties: Their proposal contains an obligatory feature: wage earners _
are to save an amount set by the Riksdag. Thereby they separate themselves from
the third nonsocialist coalition party, the Moderates, who advocate a voluntary
stock saving. The government parties proceed along two distinctly different lines.
The TCO: Still advocates a diffuse proposal. Karl-Erik Nilsson: "The question of
cohether we are to have individual funds must be held open until our congress meets.
My statement should not be interpreted as my binding the TCO. It is possible, how-
ever, to administer the funds collectively, with an element of individual right of
disposition." This would involve the TCO differentiating between the power and the
money, meaning that influence is exercised collectively, while the money can be
disposed over individually.
SACO/SR: The new member Jan Broms (former head of th~. Industrial Association's
economic-political section) is more active in the committee work than any of his
predecessors. He will present his own proposal, different from TCO/SR's current
proposal. Jan Brom's proposal is not yet ready: "I shall emphasize one point--if
a lot of money is collected in the funds, it should r..~t be invested solely in the _
stock market. The administrator should be atle to put it into bonds and other
things at firm rates of interest." -
~3usiness and Industry: Now actively work~ng to patch together a solution during
the peziod following the committee report, the committee being regarded as "left
astern."
The Moderates: The Moderates have all the time the committee has been at work
_ laid down a drumfire of arguments for why the funds are not needed. Lars Tobisson
and the Moderates reject obligatory savings based on wages and obligatory prof it
sharing. The Moderates wish to expand tax fund savings. The line of the Moderates
is that of solving the problems of the directive in other ways than through wage
_ earner funds. The basic view of the Moderates is that the funds will be a check
, upon willingness to invest, and in their existence, even in the preparation stage, _
run counter to their purpose. _
62
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~
rvec urr~trl.a?1. ~1JC, I.~IVLY
New Cloud in the Government's Cloudy Skies
Some t~me in January or February the wage earner fund committee will present its
f ina7. regcrt. It will include six proposals: two alternatives to the committee
models (LO/SAP and the middle),two statements (TCO and SACO/SR) and two reserva-
tions (business and. industry and the Moderates). None of the proposals is backed
by a m.ajority. The L~/SAP proposal is supported by four members (possibly also by "
chai.r_man Allnn Larsson, but he is formally the committee's impartial chairman), the
middle proposal by three and the business and industry reservation by three mem- -
_ bers.
- This is a very unusual result. What value can be assigned to it? Robert Alderin:
"One can possibly draw the following conclusion: there is a majority opposed to
profit sharing and collective funds. This majority consists ef the nonsocialist -
parties, business and industry, and the SA-CO/SR." Kjell-Ol~f Feldt: "Not easy
to say. Normal.ly, cae have a majority proposal. Here none was produced."
When the report is placed on Finance Minister Gosta Bohman's desk a new cloud of -
unrest wi].l ap~~ear on the government's far-from-cloudless sky. The government
will have to t3ke a position on how the committee work is to be continued. The
Liberal P�_~.rty =~r.d the Moderates stand behind one of the report's main alternatives.
In ~t~ei~ opirti_on wage earner funds are needed, while in the opinion of Gosta Bohman,
tormally re:}po~:sihl.e f~r the report, and his party, the funds are not needed. _
Thus th~~ govf~rnm~nt is split on this question as well.
- S:ince. Lhe Sta*_-r. in 1976, only 3 of 13 M~embers Remain
_ The ~n.~u~hers o1 ihe ~aage earner fund committee have come and gone. Since then
= finance m~n~ster Cunnar Strang set up the committee in January 1975, no less than
30 persens have participated in the work, secretaries and experts not included. _
Tnc first members ~aere Hjalmar Mehrs, chairman, Maj-Lis Landberg (social democrat),
_ Rudolt: Meidnar {L,0) , Karl-Erik Nilsson (TCO) , Kjell Nilsson (SD) , Rolf Ramgard
(C), i;rland [duldenstrom (Industrial Association), Rolf Wirten (Liberal), and Karl- -
Eri.lc O:~ne~jo (SA~') .
Tri t:tlc: cour.~.e oi the years the following personnel changes have taken place:
1.976: Ro1f GJirten quits in February. Carl Tham comes in for the Liberal Party.
_ 7_977: '!'t~e new nonsocialist government expands the committee by f.our members. In
.Ju7y Stig SteFa.nsson (SHIO) and Bertil af Ugglas (M) come in. T.ater in July
Beri:ii af Ugglas (deceased) is replaced by Ulf Adelsohn. In October Osborne
Bartley (SACO/SR) and Per-OI.OF EDIN (Nietal Workers Union) ~nter the committee. -
'1'he cornmitte~ now has 13 members.
_ 1975; I17_f: Ade7_sohn leaves the committee and is replaced by Anders Wijkman. The
nunsoc:ialist coalition resigns; the Liberal minority government takes o~er. Tn
T:~~vernber Carl Tnam leaves the committee (to become coordination and energy minist~.r) ; -
~ he is replaceci by Hans Bergstrom. In December Anders Wijkman leaves the committee
(to become he~d of the Red Cross). He is replaced by then Riksdag member Staffan
_ Burenstam I~inder.
63
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FOR OFFICIAL IJSE ONI.Y
1979: In January, Kje21 Nilssoii leaves the committee and is replaced by Kjell-Olof
Feldt. In February Osborne Bartley resigns. Hans Sar~debring is the new SACO/SR
member. In the summer twc important matters occur in the committee: Rudolf
Meidner retires; a very symbolic name leaves the committee. LO secretary Rune Molin
_ is the replacement.
- Later in the summer Hjalmar Mehs resigns as chairman following a long illness. The
Liberal Party government appoints Allan Larsson new chairman; chief editor of the
journal VI, and the man who in 1971 wrote the Metal Workers' Union's first motion in
~ the wage earner fund question.
In November a number of personnel changr�_s take place in the committee. Staffan
l3urenstam Linder once more becomes minister of trade and is replaced by Lars
Tob~sson, secretary of the Moderate party. Stig Stefansson, representative of the
SHIO Family Enterprises, was replaced by Robert Alderin. SACO/SR also changed
representatives, Hans Sandebring being replaced by Monica Ulfhielm (who had been a
committee expert).
In December Rolf Ramgard leaves the committee to become "sports minister." Riksdag
' memb er Tage Sundkvist becomes the new Center party member. Hans Bergstrom becomes
chief editor of Nerike's ALLEHANDA; Ingemar Eliasson new chief of the Liberal
Party's coordination office, comes in.
1980: In January the:e was a noteworthy change in personnel: Hans Werthen becomes
AF's representative after having gone to the press with his own proposal for stock -
_ savings. During the summer budget minister Ingemar Mundebo leaves politics to
become a provincial governor. Rolf Wirten becomes budget minister and is succeeded
as labor market minister by Ingemar Eliasson. �
Bert Levin, the Liberal Party's new chief of the coordination office, replaces
Ingemar Eliasson in the co~nittee. In 6 months, the Liberal Party has had three
different persons in the committee. Still another new name appears in October, when
Monica Ulfhielm is re~laced by SACO/SR's new representative Jan Broms (of the Indus-
trial Association).
. Of ttie committee's ~resent 13 members only 3 have been members from the start: _
- Maj-Lis Landberg (S), Karl-Erik Nilsson (TCO), and Erland Waldenstrom (Industrial
Association).
A11an Larsson's 10 Years with the Wage Earner Funds
How the debate on Swedish wage earner funds began: In 1971, Allan Larsson, then in F.~
cY~arge of the wage earner fund question in the Metal Workers' Union, wrote a motion
for the 197~ LO congress. Ten years later he is to attempt to gather the com-
mittee report into a politically usable proposal--but the work has been delayed
and the committee members are deeply split before the 1982 election.
~ 64
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r~K urhll.'lAL U,~ UNLY
F ~~~~~~_F~ ~ A ~
StAndpunkterna avgea i
~uni, Fp och c g9r ihop om
fbrslag i september. "Okta En diakussion om branach-
berrevolution" - nNringeli- fonder inom LO resulterar i
vet kovUnder, ip ~qvolterar. att nAgra motioner f8re-
Omiettande omskrivningar I&ggs LO-kongresaen. Den
ev materialet. Tidsschemat viktigaste, Metalls, akrivs
sprAcks - men utred- ev utredningschefen Allan
ningen hAller, trots allt. Larsson. LO-forskaren Hu-
dolf Meidner fAr i uppdrag
att utreda frAgen.
i
r
g"
di.
E + ' ~
rL i! L ~ . ~ B
~ ~ i
Utrednin en av er sin t~~~'~;
g 9 s y.,~ Gunnar StrNng tillsUtter ut-
f8rata, delrapport, Ru do H ~'f~ redningen om IEntagarna
Meitlner gAr i pension. Hjal- ,tT; , och kapiteltillvAxten (en
ma~ Mehr avg~r och era9tta tbijd av Hagebverllggning-
av Allan Lenaon. Direkti- ; ';j~ arna med�tolk ertietl, Ru-
: ~ P
_ ven kompletteraa muntligt ,;a;;; ` dolf Meidnere bok kommer
av Ingemar Mundebo. Kapi- ut, "Lbntagario~der" (med-
talhildnin en blir det f Arde ja
g 1 far,_ttare Ar Anne Hedborg
delm~let. x'- och Gu~aner Fondl.
irr.;,
.
D ~ ~ .
En erbetsgrupp inom LO/ Meidners bok omarbetas tiil
SAP kommer med ett nytt kongressrapport -"Kollek-
ibrslag; "l8ntagarfonder tiv kapitalbildning genom
och kapitaibildning".Ingre- Inntagarionder" (vinstdei-
- dienser: vinstdelning och ning p~ 20 procentl, TCO
o!vecklingsfonder fbr kol- kammer med en rapport,
_ lektivt sparande, TCO kom- liksom SAF och IndustritCr-
me~ med debattskrih (och bundet - den s k Welde;r
- mots48ndet j9ser hos SIFI. str0mska rapporten.
A. 1971_. A discussion on branch funds in the LO resu]_ts in some motions being
presented to the LO congress. The most important, that of the Meral Workers'
- Union, is written by Allan Larsson. LO researcher Rudolf Meidner is assigned the
task of analyziug the question.
1975. Gunnar Strang appoints the committee to analyze the question of wage
earners and capital growth (a consequence of the Haga deliberations with the
Liberal
65
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FOR OFFICIAL C~:~E ONLY
Liberal Party). Rudolf Meidner's book, "Wage Earner Funds" (coauthors Anna
Hedborg and Gunnar Fond) is published.
- C. 1976. Meidner's book is revised to a congress report, "Collective Capital
Formation through Wage Earner Funds" (20 percent profit sharing). The TCO pub-
- lishes a report, as do the SAF and the Industrial Association, the so-called
Waldenstrom report.
D. 1978. An LO/SAP working group presents a new proposal: "Wage Earner Funds
and Capital Forniation." Ingredients: profit sharing and development funds for
collective savings. The TCO presents a debate paper (and resistance rises in the
SIF [5wedish Industrial Association]).
E. 1979. The commit*_ee issues its first report. Rudolf Meidner retires.
Hjalmar Mehr resigns and is replaced by Allan Larsson. The directive is orally
supplemented by Ingemar Mundebo. Capital formation becomes the fourth part of
the goal.'
F. 1980. Standpoints are presented in June. The Liberal Party and the Center
join in a proposal in September. "The October Revolution"--business and industry
_ reverse position, the Liberal Party revolts. Extensive rewriting of ~che material.
T~me schedules are disrupted--but the committee stays in business despite every-
_ thing.
66
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