JPRS ID: 9457 LATIN AMERICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300060038-1
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 38
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9457
24 December 1980
Lat~n America Re ort
p
cFOUO 22i~o~
, FBIS FOREIuN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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~PRS L/9457
24 Dec~mber 1980
,
LATIN AMERICA REPORT
(FOUO 22/80)
CONTENTS
ENERGY ECONOMICS
BRAZIL
PETROBRAS President Assesses Impact of Fuel Imports on Brazil
(Shigeaki Ueki; LATIN A~rtERICA DAILY POST, 13 Dec 80)......... 1
COUNTRY SECTION
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
Columnist Views Progress To:,~ard Latin American Integration
(Sergio Ceron; LA OPINION, 7 Nov 80) 4
- Briefs
Human Rights Federatidn 9
Agreement With Cuba 9
= Technicians to Cuba 9
Uruguayan Plebiscite Protested 9
ARGENTINA
UK Suggests Transfer of Falklands' Sovereignty
(Michael Frenchman; THE TIMES, 26 Nov 80) 10
COLOMBIA
Military Strength Versus Internal Problems Discussed
~Alberto Carbone; DEFENSA, Jun 80) 12 ~
CURA
UN Envoy Says West Provokes Flow of Refugees
. (PRFI,A, 2 Dec 80) 15
Doctor States 700 'Specialists' Working in Angola
~PRELA, 9 Dec 80) 17
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Western Media Attack on IOJ Criticized
(Pedro Garcia; PRELA, 14 Dec 80) 18
Five Years of Commur~ications Projects Reviewed
(Gregorzo Hernandez; BOHEMIA, 31 Oct 80) 20
EL SALVADOR .
Canadian Fx-Minister Among Last To See Nuns
~PRELA, 6 Dec 8Q) 31
GRENADA
Briefs
GDR Delegation Visits 33
GUATEMALA
Briefs
Embassy Bombing 34
VENEZUELA
- Minister on Efforts To Deal With Terrorism
~ ~PRELA, 18 Nov 80) 35
- Briefs
Foreign Investment 36
Polish Leaders To Arrive 36
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ENERGY ECONOMICS . BRAZIL
PETROBRAS PRESIDENT ASSESSES IMPACT OF FUEL IMPORTS ON BRAZIL
PY151905 Rio de Janeiro LATIN AMERICA DAILY POST in English 13 Dec 80 p 8
[Special for the DAILY POST by PETROBRAS President Shigeaki Ueki]
[Text] Rio de Janeiro--The sudden and unexpected oil price hikes, from year-end 1973
onwards, jumping to US$11/bbl from US$3, have provoked a great change in the inter-
national economy, aggravating even more the world' econ~~mic and financial imbalance
which had become evident at the end of the 60's.
Consequently, energy assumed a predominant role in the development strategies of the
countries, with special emphasis on those in the economic deve:loping stage which
are dependent on oil imports, given their increasing rate of energy consumption,
a remarkable characteristic of th2ir development.
Adjustments of these economies to the new international situation have beccme very
difficult because, in addition to the impact caused by increase oil costs, they
also suffered the effects of the recession and of the policy for the equilibrium of
payment balances of industrialized countries--protecti~nism and oil price increase
pass-through by way of prices o� their export products.
In Brazil, as a developing country, energy consumption is hard to re~train, due to
the need of its economic expansion, compatible with the increasin~ labor supply and
with the national objective or reducing our distance from more advanced countries.
Thus, in view of the new conditions of the internat~~nal economy, the country was
forced to rearrange strategies and plans. In tr,e 1974-1977 period, the policies for
expansion-diversification of exports, for import replacements and reduced dependence
on foreign energy sources, allied to a certain stabilization of the real oil price,
played a positive contribution for Brazil to recover equilibrium in its commercial
balance in 1977.
Investments required to keep a minimum growth rate began to demand a higher finan-
cial participation abroad to complement the formation of domestic capital.
This is how the country could be developed at an annual GDP rate of 7 psercent,
though supported by external resources permitted by the country's reliability and
credibility in the international financial markets. As a result, the net foreign
debt rose to.US$24.8 billion in 1977 from US$6.2 billion in 1973.
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It is worth mentioning that, in the said period, even though the vdlue of exports -
doubled, the net foreign debt/export ratio changed from 1 to 2.
When the world seemed to return a fair equilibrium, with the near disappearance
of current account surplu~es of the GPEC countries, the situation was reaggravated -
in 1979. Another oil price escalation, f:-om L'S$12/bbl to US$32.00/bbl in 1980
in less than a year, resulted in significant current account deficits for oil im-
porters, increasing their foreign debts, partly to meet commitments previously as-
sumed. The det~ts themselves grew higher resulting from increased interest rates,
rea~hing levels never reached before.
It should be observed that the absolute oil price hike was almost JS$20/bbl, with
no exaggeration intended, if compared to the increase of US$8/bbl registered in
the so-much-talked-about 1973 oil crisis.
_ It is imnortant to emphasize that the new situation does not permit a solution simply
in terms of foreign trade or of a policy for energy alternatives, which demand ef-
fectively more time for their execution. In a short and medium term, the matter is
directly linked to the recycling of international financial resources and to our
capac9.ty to absorb them. _
:
On ~his table, awareness of nature of the Brazilian foreign debt makes indispensable
the utilization of ather concepts, besides rhe traditional ones, to infer their ~
real meaning. One of the more evident ways would be to appra~.se foreign commitment
thruugh the medium itself which has been generating a new international economic
order: petroleum.
The ner debt in 1970 was of the order of US$4.1 billion and corresponded to 2.7 bil-
lion bbl of crude at import prices on that occasion. Today our debt of US$50 billion
corresponds to 1.563 million bbl of crude, showing a decrease of more than 40 per-
cent.
Another form of anal.vsis shows that the Brazilian recoverable reserves of oil and
gas at year-end 1970 (1.0 billion bbl) represented about one-third of the net debt
at that time, while such reserves in June 1980 (1.582 million bbl) exceed the exist-
ing debt, 4lways thinking in terms of barrels of petroleum.
Although the aational economic patriomony and its annual flow--the world's eighth
largest gross domestic product--�by themselves give us a favorable position, the pres- .
ent situation leads to a ~omparison in terms of what could be agreed upon as the
latest international monetary standard--petroleum--a comparison, as we have seen,
also presenting a favorable result as for the possibilities for us to continue hav-
ing access to the world financial system.
i
(Shigeaki Ueki is the president of PETROBRAS, Brazil's state oil company, and a ~
- former energy ininister of Brazil.)
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Brazil-Foxeign Debt in Terms of Petroleum -
Foreign Debt/US$ Million ;,Ave va- Net Debt National ktserve
lue FOB Shown in Hydro- /net debt
. Otl Im- million bbl Carbon Ratio
1~orts Reserves
Years Gross Reserves Net L''S$/BBL of oil in million bbl percent -
1970 5.294 1.186 4.108 1.51 2.721 1.025 38
- 1971 6.022 1.723 4.899 1.88 2.606 1.021 39
1972 9.521 4.183 5.338 1.99 2.682 962 36
, 1973 12.582 6.416~ 6.166 2.79 2.21Q 937 42
1974 17.166 5.269 11.897 11.10 1.072 944 88
- 1975 21.171 4.040 17.131 10.48 1.635 946 58 -
- 1976 25.985 6.544 19.441 11.50 1.691 1.091 65
- 1977 32.037 7.256 24.781 12.31 2.013 1.362 68
- 1978 43.511 11.895 31.616 12.44 2.541 1.423 56
. ~ 1979 49.904 9.689 40.215 17.11 2.350 1.548 66
1980 56.500 6.500 50.000 32.00 1.563 1.582 (1) 101
- (1) Unti1 June 1980. ~
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COUNTRY SECTION INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
Ji
COLUNINIST VIEWS PROGRESS TOWARD LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION
Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 2 Nov 80 p 12 _
[Article by Sergio Ceron: "Argentina and Uruguay Set Courses in the Southern CarLe"]
[Text] According to what leaked out last Wednesday in official circles, the agree-
ment for the establishment of a free trade zone between Argentina and Uruguay will
probably be signed during this week. The putting of this initiative in concretP
form provides reasons for reflecting on bilateral relations and also on the trerd `
being observed in Latin America toward integration of the region as a geopolitical
_ and geoeconomic space capable of taking on a leading role in the world as a whole in
the next century.
This agreemen;. would be the first one to take concrete form in the framework of the
Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), an institution that replaces the
Latin American Free Trade Association (LF~FTA), whose structure revealed its obso-
- lescence with regard to the new problemG raised by complex, con.flicting present-day
economy. -
- Of course, it is not easy to reconcile int~rests that are opposed, in both nations,
to the economic c~mplementariness implied by the agreement. It is log~,cal and even -
legitimate for sectoral groups to feel the impact of a relati~~ely revolutionary mea-
sure, k~ut it is also necessary to realize that Latin American integration, the maxi-
mum objective of the nations in the region in the remainder of the 20th century, en--
tails not only clearsigntednesa but also a minimum spirit of sacrifice and under-
s~anding. At this point in the events, it is impossible to move backwards or to
bring the incipient r.ontinental integratiori movoment to a standstill. Latin America
cannot lose the rate of development or agree to continue passively in the role of
_ an eternal subordinate of the central powers. ' ~
This rapprochement between Argentina and Uruquay, therefore, becomes the first con- _
crete step toward the maximum objective and ideal of Latin American unity.
It is not by chance that the two countries in the Plata region are precisely the
ones to open fire. There are so many ties of legal origin, common culture, blood
and interests that unite them, that it is often heard that we Argentinians and Uru- -
guayans are actually one single nation organized in twa independent, sovereign
states.
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An Exampie of Cooperation
In the decade of the 1970's, starting with the signing of the Treaty of Rio de La -
Plata, which put an end to bounc~ary controversies,'the process of rapprochement
moved along at an increasingly accelerated rate. The high point of that policy of '
fraternal understanding was set, undoubtedly, by the harn:onious coexistence on the
Joint Salto Grande Bilateral Commission. The manner in which the representatives of
both countries were able to overcome difficulties and even differences of opinion
and devoted their enthusiasm and talent to materialization of the first Latin Ameri-
~ can hydroelectric powerplant shared by two states on the same river has frequently
been displayed as an example of international cooFeration. -
When the last turbine in tne comrlex delivers its power, Salte Grande will provide
1,890,000 kilowatts as a contribution to th~ region's economic development, bene-
fiting the surrounding inhabitants anc? niaking its contribution to supplying the
large indusi;rial concentrat~on centered around Buen~s Aires and Montevideo. But not -
~ only this aspect is important. The contribution of the dam to navigation on the
- Uruguay River, the formation of a large lake, turned into a piscicultural re~ervoir _
and an unquestionable tourist attraction should be stressed. MorEOVer, the United
Nations has set up the San~o Grande project as an example of a concern for main-
taining ecological equilibrium so often altered in other regions by the accomplish-
ment of large infrastructure jobs, to whose objectives only materiai interests have
been dsvoted. Argentina and Uruguay, on the other hand, are concerned over maintain-
ing and, i� possible, increasina~ the quality of living by offering their people an
adequate natural setting,
Wher. the dam is crested, both nations will soon be able to unite their railroad and
hiqhway network. With regard to highways, the two bridges over the Uruguay River
the one joining Colon with Paysandu and the one connecting Pu2rto Unzue and Fray -
Bentos had already established that connection long awaited for generations. But
n~w, for the first ti~~ne, the Urquiza Railroad line will be linked with Uruguayan ;
railroads that h~ve the same track gage. When the Posadas-Encarnacion bridge is
built, between Argent;.ne and Paraguayan territory, the railroads of the three na-
- tions will be complementary. a singularly important achievement in the undertaking
to integr.ate their respective economies. That job, which is in the bidding stage,
already has a"green light" from the Buenos Aires and Asun.:ion governments. Mean-
while, the ferry?~oat system will facilitate the movement of trains between both
nanks of ~he Parana River.
3as Exports
We must point out, in this brief review of bilateral relations between Rio de La
Plata dwellers, the possibility that Argentina will make a definite contribution
to alleviating the total lack of energy sources of their own suffered by our neigh-
bors. Experts on both sides of the river are giving the final touches to the pre-
feasibility study for construction of a gas pipeline that would make it possible
- to export Argentine fluid to Uruguay. When the Center-West gas piFeline that will
_ transport gas from the Neuquen Basin deposits to Argentina's industrial coast goes
into oper.ation in 198~, a considerable volume will be available for sale abroad.
- It is believed, in principle, that Uruguay will probably request daily delivery
of 1 million cubic meters. It will be necessaYy, for that purpose, to have a gas
pipeline hetween Montevideo and the area borderi.ng on R~sario where the Center-West
gas pipeline will connect with the national network.
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Another amount much larger because of the different size of the market wil 1 -
- be for Brazil, if the incipient agreements between the two nations prosper. Argen-
tina would provi~e 15 million cubic meters of gas a day to the industries in the
Porto Alegre r~gion and possibly Sao Paulo, with the exception of periods durin g
_ whicY~ domestic demand peaks would make it necessazy to r~duce deliveries circumstan-
~ially.
In short, establishment of the free tr~de zone would complement and crown a policy
of friendship and cooperation that is not free fr.om mutual effort and renunciation,
but that will definitely help both Argentina anc3 Uruguay to reduce their dependence
on the industrialized nations and will guarantee for them a grEater decision-making
capability.
In the middle of 1979, we dis~ussed several times, in the pages of LA OPINION, the
visit made b~ the former foreign.minister of Venezuela, Dr Aristides Calvani, to
Buecios Aires. At that time, we said that Argentine politicians and analysts who
nad an opportunity to talk with him observed that the image of a stateman and of
a visionary came together in his person. Calvani proclaimed the absolute, pressing
need for Latin American integration and proposed that this acticn should star~ with
the Spanish-speaking countries to add Brazil later, as a balance of Dotential. He
believed that the neighboririg country's calling as an emerging power required that
Hispano America be united first, for an equitable negotiation of regional integra-
tion. But he made it very clear that this proposal in no way implied an attempt to
exclude Brazil, or, much less, to form an opposing bloc. Neither Brazil nor the
rest of Latin America Calvani mainta.ined in his Buenos Aires talks coula af-
ford the luxury ot remaining disunited. Because, on the assumption that Latin Amer-
ica do~s not integrate, the nations making it up would be easy prey to the ambitions
and prepotency of a conflicting, merciless world.
There was no lac,: of voices that raised an ideological problem. Was it possible to
move ahead in the integration of a region in which there were democratic regimes
with military governments having autocratic characteristics? Calvani, whose de-
mocratic vocation is beyond question, stated that it was possible and he also added
that the process of economic and cultural integration would help to accelerate a
return to the republican way of life of those nations in which, owing to necessity
of circumstances, autocracies prevailed. That reasonable opinion was put to test
recently, when the r~ridean Pact countries refused to recognize the Bolivian govern-
ment of Gen Luis Garcia Meza. Nevertheless, so far La Paz has not carried out its
threat to withdraw from the Andean Group and it would seem tnat the moderate posi-
_ tion of the president of Peru, Fernando Belaunde Terxy, will facilitate some kind
of solution in the medium term.
Nevertheless, there is some truth in ti?e warning that the existence of de facto
governments in Latin America may delay the process of integration, as long as the
existence of a process directed toward normalizing the institutional situation is
not in sight. Moreover, the military government leaders in the Southern Cone have
realized this. In different ways and with a different handling of timing ad-
justed to the idio:yncrasy of each nation they intend to recreate conditions
for a democratic way of life.
- 'I'he Uruguayan military are qetting ready to confirm, by means of a constitutional
reform, the establishment of a new legal structure that will provide them with re-
assurance against regression of Uruguayan society into anarchy and terrorist
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, violence. The instrument chosen is the powers being proposed for the National Se- .
curity Council (C_~SENA) that would permit a kind of institutionalization of the
Armed Forces as custodian of the country's political normality. In Chile, President
Auqusto Pinochet is setting the limit for the autocratic conception of political
action. Nevertheless, he felt a need to confirm his position by means of a pleb- .
iscite that, with all the observations that it deserves as a procedure for consult-
ing the will of the people, indicates, at least, the intention to obtain an expli-
citly expressed consensus.
- The Case of Brazil
The presidency of :Toan Baptista de Figueiredo in Brazil was received as the transi-
tion stage toward a more open democratic regi::e. Up to now, a"half-way democracy"
- preva.ils, in wnicn th2 military authority has decisive weight. But everything in-
dicates that, unless a nolitical disturbance m~.kes the present regime fall, the
neighborizg nation is moving toward its institutional normalization. Of course,
- we must not overlook tne risks confronting Brazil. The increase in inflation, the
energy shortage that forces it to import 85 percent of the oil tha~ it consumes, the
increasing amount of its foreign debt and the recession prevailing on the world's
markets raise a serious doubt on the viability of its economic model. Any slip in
this respect implies an economic and social crisis in the short term, which, in
turn, woulci involve the almost fatal need for freezing the process of democratiza-
tion to cor.centrate tne power again in the Armed Forces.
`I'he case of Argentina is differ~nt. Our country is one of the few exceptions that
- the political and economic leaders of the industrial powers observe at present.
Let us see why. Practically at the brink of energy self-sufficiency, it has a great
potential for increasing production and export of foodstuffs. In today's world,
countric~s with great industrial development depend, in their majority, on imported
_ energy for mair.':._ining their standard of living. The oil exporting nations, with
a very .few exceptions, have to import foodstuffs and manufactured products. Ar-
gen~ina has oil ^_serves for 13 years, gas for 50 years, with excellent possibilities
- oT cloub~it'~g.. then~ in tne short term. It is self-sufficierit in uranium and it is
stiJ.l far from havi:ig e~austed its prospects for producing hydroelectric power,
~ e~:en after buildii:g Yacyreta, Corpus and tdiddle Parana.
Experts of tile multinational corporations participating in offshore exportation by
;nF:ans of alcatory contracts on the underwater continental shelf believe that there
are very qood possibilities of locating hydrocarbons in marketable amounts in the
South Atlantic region. Opinions vary from the optimists who talk of possible re-
sertres or. the order to 200 billion barrels to the more cautious ones who believ~
that i~ is feasible to locate deposits that will make it possible to export oil to
Brazil, Uruguay an~~ Chile and perhaps to industrialized countries, by the end of
the cle cade .
t~ut there is a third factor that does not generally enter into this kind ot analysis
and that, nev?rtheless, the executives of the large foreign corporations take into �
account te advise a large-scale investment policy in Argentina as the firmness, co-
herencE. and continuity of the political process is observed. That factor is the hu-
man resource, ui~doubtedly the one with the highest relative level on the continent,
even in spite of the qualitative deterioratian undergone in the last three decades
by our education.
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To summarize, both the repeatedly expressed desire of the Armed Forces and the call-
ing of the civilians and our country's objective~cranditions indicate that the road
is cleared for moving toward the democratization of our institutions. Of course, the
success of this undertaking requires a fine handling of timing, awareness by all
Argentinians that it is not po.^,sible to take a false step and that they have to be
aure that they are waking on firm groun3 at each step. If this desire is accompanied -
by an undarstanding of the Argentine phenomenon by the larqe Westerr. industrial na-
tions, we cannot doubt the final result. Argentina will consolidate its republican
inatitutione ~nd its influence will also help tre process of d~mocratization to :nove
forward in the Southern Cone.
COFYRIGHT: LA OPINION, 1980 - -
10,042
CSO: 3010 _
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STATINTEL
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COUNTRY SECTION ARGENTINA
UK Si1GGESTS TRANSFER OF FALKLANDS` SOVEREIGNTY
LD26130 3 London THE TIMES in English 26 Nov 80 p 1 -
[Report by Michael Frenchman: "Transfer of Falklands Sovereignty Proposed"]
[Text] Britain is suggesting that the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands
be transferred to Argentina, accurding to a report reaching London last
night, The islands, which are in the South Atlantic some 450 miles off the
coast of Argentina, have been the subject of a 100-year-old disPute between
Argentina and Britain.
This is said to be one of a number of options which are being put to the
- i::lander.s by Mr Nicholas Ridley, minister of state in the foreign office,
_ responsible for Latin America, who is now in the Falklands.
According to Air Commodore B. G. Frow, of the Falkland�Island office in _
London, Tir Ridley addressed a meeting of the islands' sheepowners
association and told them that Argentina was getting impatient at the lack
of progress in the attempts to solve the problem.
Mr Ridley suggested that it would be in the islanders' best interest if they -
agreed to a transfer of sovereignty. The other options are a 25-year-freeze
over the sovereignty issue, and a lease of the islands similar to that in
force for Hong Kong.
Air Commodore Fro~a said that the lease-back solution, which has been raised
before, is the one which is preferred by lJhitehall.
A spokesman at the foreign office said last night that he could neither
confirm nor deny the reports as they were awaiting a report themselves
on the 'results of rir Ridley's talks .
He continued: "There are no proposals as such, The government has been
considering since the ~pril exploratory talks with the Argentine republic
ho~o best to achieve a solution of this difficult problem which would be
acceptable to all parties. Mr Ridley is now consulting the islanders to
estab lish their views on a basis for further talks with the Argentines."
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When asked if Britain intended to cede the sovereignty of the islands to
Argentina the ~pokesman said they were looking for a solution which everyone
could live wiCh.
He added: "The lmportant thing is the wishes of the islanders. If they ~
agree, we can explore the possible basis for a solution. However; ne
solution can be finally agreed without the endorsement of the islanders
and parliament," -
Tt~e island's legislative council is to meet to discuss the propositions.
. This is the first time that such a package of alternatives has been put
to the islanders publicly.
During his meeting with the sheepo~oners, Mr Ridley said that another option
would be to break off talks altogether but he felt that this might antagonize
- the Argentine Government.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspspers Limited, 1980
CSO: 3020 .
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COUNTRY SECTION COLOMBIA
MILITARY STRENGTFi VERSUS INTERNAL PROBLEMS DISCUSSED
- Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish 3un 80 p 60-61
[Article by Alberto Carbone] -
[Text] Colombia is one of the four Latin American countries--the others are
Brazil, Mexico and Cuba--whose armed forces have taken part in military opera-
tions outside the continent.* The Colombian armed forces (FAC) were part of
the UN forces during the Korean War; and the Colombian na;ry sent a ship, the
frigate "Almirante Padilla," which, with a 140-man crew under the command of Capt
Julio Cesar Reyes Canal, formed part of the UN Naval Forces in charge of surveil-
lance and blockade in the Sea of Japan. The army furnishe-' a battalion (1,012 -
soldiers and 42 officers) under the command of Lt Col Jaime ~'olonia Puyo, also a
writer and historian. This Colombian battalion played an important part in the
battle for Old Baldy Hill near the present armistice line which separates the two
Koreas. Colombian casualties during the Korean War were 140 dead and 517 wounded
~ and missing. _
Before the Korean War, the FAC fought an international war on the continent,
when they confronted Peru between 1932 and 1933 for the possession of the Leticia
Trapezoid. (See DEFENSA No 21) Since 1948, the year when liberal leader Jorge
_ Eliecer Gaitan was assassinated, the Colombian army has waged a continuous battle
against guerrillas. The assassination of Gaitan set off a bloody conflict between
~ the two main parties in Colombia--the liberal~ and the conservatives--which ended
10 years later with an estimated total of 200,000 deaths. This period is known
in Colombia by the name of "La Violencia."
The 1958 agreement between liberals and conservatives to alternate in power put
an end to the civil war, but new forces took up guerrilla warfare. At present the
FAC is fighting against guerrilla movements with pro-Castro, pro-Soviet and pro-
Chinese ideologies. These prolonged campaigns to secure domestic order have
given the Colombian army profound experience in counterinsurgency, which is sum-
marized in a doctrine worked out by the Infantry School. The Colombian army's
antiguerrilla policy can be summed up in these four points:
* Brazil with an expeditionary force during World War II which was integrated into
the U.S. Sth Army in Italy; Mexico with a squadron of P-47s which took part in
the closing months of the war in the Pacific in the Philippine theater; Cuba
in recent years with contingents in the wars in Aiigola and Ethiopia. -
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1, `I'he guerrilla lives off the civilian population of the affected area. He -
rece ives svpplies and information and is hidden by this population, which protects
him through sympathy or fear. Conclusion: it is essential to deprive him of the
support of the civilian population.
2, The guerrilla operates in combat by conditioning his actions to those of Che
regular armu, watching for its mistakes, weaknesses, carelessness or lacl~ of
flexibility in order to strike at wlnerable points with his forces. Conclusion; _
it is essential to become irregular, to depart from routine, to lighten equipment,
to adapt ones own actions to those of the enemy, all Che while preserving the
advantages of regular units.
3. The guerrilla seeks to compensate for his material disadvantages by detailed
knowledge of the terrain and the protection of night. Conclusion: the troops
should know the terrain as thoroughly as the enemy, and move him out of it, both
_ by n ight and by day.
_ 4, The guerrilla, the armed band, is not a cause, but a result. Therefore the
cause must be discovered, and made to disappear. The specialized antiguerrilla ~
nucleus of the Colombian arnty is made up of a"ranger" battalion in the garrison
of Tolemaida, some 100-kilometers to the southeast of Bogota. The Colombian
troops receive instruction in counterinsurgency. Soldiers from Ecuador and
Venezuela are also trained in that establishment.
_ However, th2 FAC, since the decade of the 1960's, has acquired certain equipment
designed for use in case of major conflict; if there should be a worsening in the
disagresment existing between Colombia and Venezuela over the demarcation of the
cont inental shelf of both countries in the Gulf of Maracaibo. The Guajira Penin-
sula is a quadrangle 100 km wide by 120 km long, which closes off the Gulf of ,
Venezuela to the west in the oil-rich area of Mar~caibo. Some 12,000 square kilo-
meters belong to Colombia, and 2,600 to Venezuela. The cause of the tension is
the oil deposits of Lake Maracaibo�--thanks to which Venezuela is one of the leading
- oil producers of the world--which probably extend under the waters of the gulf.
If is important for Colombia to secure a wider expanse of its territorial waters
along the Guajira peninsula. Venezuela considers the gulf to be an inland sea . _
which it owiis completely. Negotiations have been dragging on for years, with '
periodic peaks of tension. Finally, the FAC is in charge of the struggle against
tlie drug traffic.
General Information on the Country
Population: 26,520,000
hiilitary Service: 2 years
Total Armed Forces : 67, 500
Gros s National Product: $19.3 billion (estimated)
Defense Costs: $215 million in 1979
Artav :
'I'roops : 55 , 000
11 infantry brigades (regional brigades)
1 Presidential guard
1 ranger battalion
4 airborne battalions
1 AA artillery battalion
6 battalions of inechanized cavalry
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26 of infantry, 7 of artillery
6 engineer units
Armament:
M4-A3 medium tanks, M-3 A1 light tanks
M-8 and M-20 armored vehicles
~ 48 ZOS mm M-101 howitzers, 40 M-1 40 mm cannon
Navy :
_ Troops: 8,000 (including 2,800 naval riflemen) _
2 Type 209 submarines
2 SX-506 pocket submarines, less than 100 tons '
3 destroyers (2 Halland, 1 ex-U.S. Sumner)
6 ex-U.S. frigates (1 APD, 1 Courtney, 4 Asheville)
lb patrol boats of less than 100 tons -
2 Battalions of marines
Bases: Cartagena, Buenaventura
Air ~orce:
4,500 men, 18 combat aircraft
- 1 combat and reconnaissance squadron with 14 Mirages-500A, 4 SCORD/D ~
Transport: 2 C-130Bs, 5 C-54s, 19 C-47s, 2 HS�-748s, 1 F-28, 10 DHC-2s, 3 Piper
PA-23s
Helicopters: 13 AH-lAs, 3 UH-1Bs, 6 UEi-1Hs, 1 UH-1N, 20 OH-6As, 8 OH-13s
R.530 air-to-ground missiles
Paramilitary Forces: ~
National.Police: 50,000 troops -
COPYRIGHT: Ediciones Defensa, S.A. Madrid 1980
8131
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COUNTRY SECTION
CLBA
UN ENVOY SAYS WEST PROVOKES FLOW OF REFUGEES
PA022225 Havana PRELA in English 1812 GMT 2 Dec 80
[TextJ United Nations, 3 Dec (PL)--Cuba denounced the Western countries'
attempts to meddle in the internal affairs of the developing countries
through so-called "inCernational cooperation to prevent a new flow of
refugees."
Cuba's permanent representative Raul Roa Kouri censured the FRG and the
United States for attempting to create an international body which "wi11
control the flow of refugees" ~ahich the capitalist countries themselves
have provoked with the e~ploitatiun of the so-called Third World and their
support of repressive (?forces).
When addressing the special political commission related to the topic pro-
posed by the FRG, Roa Kouri pointed out that the Western countries are trying
to legalize a mechanism which will protect them from any eeonomic affectian
produced by the emigration which they themselves have promoted.
The Cuban ambassador rated the attempt as an "insult to the intelligence of -
our peoples" and "shamefaced [few words indistinct] sovereignty and their
human rights." _
In his address he also denounced the attempts of the U.S, delegation to rate
as "refugees" the emigrants who left Cuba legally and voluntarily with their
[word indistinct] visas and passports and in accordance with the Cuban
migration laws.
Roa Kouri rPcalled that for 20 years the United States has been encouraging
the illegal departure of Cuban citizens through hijackings of planes and
ships, and that in the first years of the revolution it received war criminals
� with open arms and provoked the departure of professionals and technicians
from Cuba.
"Those who f.or years kept Cuba in a state of underdevelopment, illiteracy and
ill-health, striving afterwards to block our independent development, to even
destroy our revolution, are greatly responsible for the existence of conditions
- which still lead to potential or real emigrations in CLba and all the under-
developed countries. _
.
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~ The Cuban representative drew Che delegations' attention to the fact tr~at
: the repentant cc~ncern for the f.low of refugees on the par*_ of the Western i
countries practically ignores the real problems of refugees caused ~y the
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existence of regimes like those of South Africa and Israel. ~
I
i~e �lso underlined that those same k'estern countxies are reluctant to note ~
the urgent need of taking steps leading to the new international economic i
order, "of f inding a peaceful and caise solution to the injustices and !
inequalities between the world of opulence and the world of hunger," as a way ~
to contain one world migration phenomenon.
i`
In his address Roa Kouri also pointed out that the FRG's proposal makes no I
reference to the brain drain, inasmuch as it is in the interest of the ;
ldestern countries to promote the exodus of highly qualified personnel from '
the d~veloping countries with the utilization of inethods of a migratory,
- wage 3I1C1 ideologicaZ nature. I
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COUNTRY SECTION CUBA
DOCTOR STATES 700 'SPECIALISTS' WORKING IN ANGOLA ~
PA092008 Havana PRELA in English 1924 GMT 9 Dec 80
[Text] Luanda, 10 De~ (PL)--[date as receivedJ The head of the Cuban medical mis-
sion in Ang~la, Doctor Saidel Sanchez, said that there are hundreds of specialists
and health workers from the largest of the Antilles working in this country.
At an interview granted to PF,ENSA LATINA, Sanchez underlined the importance of a
scientific meeting held in this capital on December 3, and which'was attended by
250 delegates.
_ During that meeting, he recalled, 90 scientific papers were discussed, eight of
which obtained awards and o~her~ mentions.
Questioned about Cuban medical collaboration with Angola, Sanchez stated that this
dates back to the middle of 1967, and there are now close to 700 specialists (300
of them technical personnel} working in 17 of the 18 Angolan provinces.
- He added that next year that contingent will be increased by 50 new members.
When speaking about the teaching aspect of the medical collaboration, the head of
the group of Cuban health workers stressed that this is applied with a high scien-
tific level in surgery, pediatrics, obstetrics and general medicine, specialties
which have four university profes~ors. .
Another 42 specialist instructors of intermediate level technicians give classes
in provincial capitals, in disciplines such as dietitics and microbiology, among
others, he said.
The Cuban official underlined the work of the internationalist doctors when attend-
ing the victims of South Africa's systematic armed attacks against this country.
_ When listing the achievements of Cuban medical collaboration in Angola, during the
last 5 years, Sanchez referred in particular to the results of the preventlve work,
as well as the high valoratian given by this people to the work of the Antillean
doctors..
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COUNTRY SECTION CUBA
- WESTERN MEDIA ATTACK ON IOJ CRITICIZED
PA141805 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1440 GMT 14 Dec 80
- (By Pedro Garcia of PRENSA LATINA]
[Text] [No r~nteline received] Th~ open sabotage and destabiliza'tion being promoted
_ and intensifie:d through the so-called free flow of information by the United States
_ and the Western powers against the socialist nations, is currently acquiring dan-
- gerous dimensions. -
The intensified propaganda campaign against the socialist community is centralized
in Europe and quite particularly on the work being performed by the International
- Organization of Journalists (IOJ), that is headquartered in Prague.
This is by no means accidental, according to the principal Western publicity spokes-
men, and is due to the .fact that the organization is seated in a socialist country
and that most of its views have been heeded by the underdeveloped nati,~ns, the UN~SCO
and other specialized UN entities.
It was precisely on the recommendation of the IOJ and the nonaligned nation~, with
the socialist states' s~xpport, that the so-called free flow of information started. ~
However it is claimed that it is free only on the side of the capitalist nation~.
_ The fundamental objectives of such a strategy of misinformation are to divide the
nonaligned nations, neutralize IOJ efforts and discredit the socialist nations,
as has been exposed by recent documents released by that international organization.
The true facts, however, published by the United Nations and by the IOJ belie such
claims. It was precisely the developed capitalist nationsy particularly the United
States, which openly used pressure and blackmail to force the closing the UNESCO's .
- communications branch as such and the return of its functions to the organization's
cultural sector, taking away its legal status, decisionmaking power and influence
Elsewhere, 95 percent of that alleged free flow is handled through the capitalist
- logic and depends on the market and the commercial values of 130 publicity agencies
in 45 countries, all of which are mostly financed by U.S. capital, or totally owned
by that nation's transnationals.
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Thus, it is impossible to be?ieve the editors of ORBIS, organ of the Research
Institute on Foreign Affairs of Tuft University, in the United States, which in
- its executive staff includes William Kintner, Robert Strauss and Nils Wessels, form-
er officials and advisers of the State Department, and some members of the CIA such
as Richard Bissell, one of the operation chiefs of the aggression on Playa Gir~n,
in Cuba~, in 1961.
This publication, as has been stressed by the IOJ in its various documents, en-
- courages and leads a systematic campaign charging the socialist bloc with trying to
control information international channels.
ORBIS and its ideologists, also suppored by U.S. foundations such as Ford, Carnegie
and Guggenheim, claim that the Marxist-Leninist IOJ members act as spokesmen for the
' socialist bloc in the growing and ever more sharp confrontation of the so-called
- Third World with the pressumed free Western press.
In recent years, such a policy emphasizes on the "sensationalist defense of the so-
called socialist nations' dissidents" which, according to the IOJ, is the same as
ignoring the real problems affecting the true human rights of 75 percent of the
world's population, threatening the climate of detente and the possibilities of peace
created with great effort by the Helsinki Conference.
To the IOJ, such a free flow of information "does not try to establish social justice,
but tries to improve the international image of go~~ernments that resort systemati-
cally to violence in order to defend class privileges and remain indefinitely in
power.'' It also tries to divide, discredit and destabilize demands for a new in-
~ ternational informat=on order.
CSO: 3010
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rvn vrr l~tt~L u~a vivLr
COUtdTRY S~CTI011 ~JgA
FIVE YEARS COr~i1UVICATIONS PROJECTS REVIEWED
- Havana BOHEMIA in Spanish 31 Oct ~0 pp 16-23 ;
. [Article by Gregorio Hernandez: "Five Years of Cuban Communications"] -
[Te:ct]. With the date of the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba draw- ;
ing near, we have aanted to make a general review in this article of the work ~
done in the past 5-year period in the communications branch in our country.
Coaxial Cable ~
~
There are several areas of information to be discussed. Before that, however, we ~
shall start with the most important work of infrastructure undertaken, the ~
coaxial cable, following that with other subjects which range from television, ~
radio, telephones and international co~nunications, to postal, telegraph and press ~
distribution services, among others. j
"We must advance as much as possible in the installation of 1,800 kilometers of
_ coaxial cable, a service which guarantees the introduction of national telephone
dialing during the ~-year period. At the same time, the long-distance network
must prepare to absorb the increase in traffic during that period."
This is what is stated textually in the resolution on transportation and communi-
cations anproved by the First Party Congress.
We can state, therefore, that the objective of the coaxial cable consists of
satisfying the needs for telephone, telegraph, data transmission and long-distance I
channels for radiobroadcasting in our country. It will also be used as a reserve ~
for one television channel in case of a breakdown in the existing National
:~icrowave vetwork. Moreover, the coaxial cab~e can serve as a means of press
. transmission via facsimile, eliminating the need for its transportation by air to .
other provinces.
First of all let us say that at the beginning of the 70's the governments of the
L'nion of Soviet Socialist Republics and Cuba, respectively, signed a technical-
econonic cooperation agreement, and among the agreements reached, was the planning,
construction, installation and placing in operation of a cable com~unications line. ~
This line will join the 14 provincial capitals from Pinar del Rio to Guantanamo,
with branches to other large cities: San Cristobal, Artemisa, Guanajay, Guines, -
San Antonio de los Banos, San Jose de las Lajas, ~layari and Palma Soriano. -
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Although the entire system will be completed in the next 5-}~ear period, its
- execution had been scheduled in such a way that it could be used in sections,
that is, when two points have been linked and they have the necessary equipment,
planned telephone channels or links between those points could be put into ser~ic~.
Cooperation With the USSR ,
From the beginning, Soviet help has been decisive. At first Cuban technicians
did not kz?ow this new system and it was necessary to obtain ~oviet help and the
necessary vehicles and machinery. In this 1973-1974 period, ~he technical con-
tribution of 40 Soviet specialists (.communications engineers, civil engineers,
architECts, geologists, topographers) who worked with Cuban technicians was out-
~ standing. In this aspect th ey traveled and studied many variants of routes for
the coaxial cable.
On the basis of this work, the technical and execution plans of the technological
part of the project were prepared in the USSR and contracts began to be signed
for the shipment of machinery, transportation, technological and electrical power
supply equipment, cables, materials, and diesel plants, which made up the complete
equipment for the construction and installation activity of the coaxial cable..
Cable Installations
A1.1 this complex of installations, which are now being built, is to continue
under construction during the next 5-year period of 1981-1985. At this time
around 20 Soviet technicians are in Cuba to provide help in the construction and
laying of the cable, installation of repeater houses and the installation of
technological equipment. A large quantity of machinery has come from the Soviet
Union for this purpose: bulldozers, tractors, excavators, cranes and cable-
laying machines, all necessary for the execution of a project of such large
- scope. The quantity of material received reaches some 6,000 tons, with a value
of 12 million pesos.
On the Cuban side, work is going on in t~he construction of 11 exchanges, of which
three have been practically completed, and five of a total of 46 installations
to be completed have already been delivered. This year it was proposed that nine
more installations be initiated, which will provide great possibilities for long-
distance service.
Parallel with civil construction work, there is the digging of trenches and the
laying of 380 kilometers of symmetrical coaxial cable of a total of 2,179
kilometers. In the construction of telephone ducts, which total 80 kilometers, 30
of them are already available. The installation as such has run into difficul-
ties such as 650 highway crossings, 235 river and dam crossings, construction
of 250 unattended repeater houses, as well as the installation and placing in
operation of the equipment necessary in each unattended telephone exchange,
semi-terminal and repeater station,
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Present Status
As of 1978, with the creation of the First Front in the municipality of San Jose
de las Lajas, cable excavation and installation work began. In 3979, the Second
- Front was inauguxated in the municipality of Ranchuelo.
Up to date, nearly 400 kilometers of cable have been inst alled and 35 kilometers
of ducts are available. There are 28 repeater station houses in the process of
installation. So far this year, a good boost has been given to civil construction
by the :Ytinistry of Constr~ction, with contracts for 27 installations distributed -
to 11 provi.nces. .
Telephone Distribution _
� Going on to this subject, which is always of much interest, we can show as a
statistical figure that at the end of 1975 the number of telephones existiag in
the count ry was 3.18 instruments per 100 inhabitants, this figure being affected
- by the City of Havana, which had around 11 instruments p er 100 inhabitants.
In the S years between 1975 and 1979,the number of automatic switching telaphone
exchanges increased by 94, which represented an 87-percent increase in growth,
~ ma.king it possible to offer this service to localities and towns, primarily in -
rural zon.es, whose communications in some cases were manual and in others were -
entirely lacking. As is logical to conclude, the increase in telephone exchanges _
brought wiCh it an increase in the availability of equipped subscriber lines,
broadening the possibilities of providing this service to a larger population in
keeping with the economic development of the country. The installation or auto-
mation of 57 exchanges of this type was planned for 1980.
As a result of the increase in the number of automatic telephone exchanges ir, use,
� the number of equipped lines increased by 41,600 in the 1975-1979 period, which
meant a growth. of 14.8 percent. The foregoing has allowed a substantial increase
in facilities for facing the growing demand for telephone service in the state
and resi~ential sectors, depending on existing priorities.
Thesz installaCions also m3de it possible to increase automatic telephone lines by
458,000 nationally, an increase in growth of seven percent between 1975 and 1979.
This year, according to schedule, this figure will increase by 12,100 new auto-
matic tel2phone lines installed. By the end of this year, this will allow a
level or telephone service automation in the country of about 97.7 percent.
, Telephone terminals in service, which include every type of instrument in use--
main sets, extensions, public telephones, and so forth--have experienced an
increase of 58,800 new instruments from 1975 to 1979, which means an increase of
19.7 percenC. The installation of 29,200 new terminals is planned for this year.
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- The result of all the foregoing demonstrates thdt the number of telephones, which
at the end of 1975 was 3.18 instruments per 100 inh