JPRS ID: 9185 USSR REPORT POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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JPRS L/9185
8 July 1980
~
~ USSR Re ort -
p
PO~ITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
. -
CFOUO 13/80)
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JPRS L/9185
~ July 19 80
USSR REPORT
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
(FOUO 13/80 )
CONTENTS
INTERNATIOAIAL
Hum~n Rights: UN Conventions, Soviet Law
(Otto Luchterhandt; BEkI(HTE DES BUNDESINSTITUTS FUR
OSTWISSENSCHeFT~IC~iE UND INTERNATIONALE STUDIEN, No 7,
1980) 1
NATIONAL
Genesal Grigorenko Comments on Soviet Intentions
(Piotr G. Grigorenko Interview; L'EUROPEO,
13 May 80) 44
REGIONAL
Free Estonian Radio Station, in Sweden Offers Topical Issues
(A. Milits; POSEV~ Apr 80) 52
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- a - [III - US5R - 35 FOUO]
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INTERNATIONAL
HLR''1AN RIQiTS; UN CONVENTIaIJS, SOVIET LAW
Cologne SERICHTE DES BUNDFSIIJSTITUTS FUR OSTWI$SII~TSCHAFTLICHE UAID INTER-
NATIONALE ST[mIEN in Ge=ma~ No 7, 1980 pp I-III, 1-68
[Report by Otto Luchterha~dt]
[Text] The apinians expressed in the publications issued
by the Fecleral Institute foz Eastern and International
5tudies reflect the author's interpretations exclusively.
Stammary
The Con~lusions of the Study
1. The Saviet Union sig~ned and rati~i.ed all important UN conv~entians on
hiunan rights a~c~-if wie disregard the se jectian of inte;~ational instit~
tions for legal protectioir-did so without reservations. It is also one of ~
the most energetic supp~orters of tl~e preparation of further canventions.
- Here, cansona~t with its self-appraisal, it e~mphasizes ~ocioecon~ic rights
and rights i.nvolving equalityy while at the sane time att.empting to uphold
ideological reservatians with regard to polit:i.cal rights. In this context
it pursues entirely foreign policy objectives (see article 29 of the Unian
Constitution), that is the conaolidation of its political unity of action
with the Third World, the intea~natianal legitimation of itis claim to exer- ~
cise leadership and defen,se against Western influences.
2. The Soviet Union does not intend to adjust its legal system to the hLmman
- rights agreements. The progress nevertheless objectivaly discernible in
this direction is the result of many yeazs of discussions and ~ockeying for
position within the 5oviet Union it~elf.
3. Basic and obviaus contrsdictions persist between the UN human rights
agreements of 16 AecEmber 1966 and Sovi.et law:
a) Regarding the substantiation of htmma~ rights, the concept of the ind~vid-
ual and the view of the relationship between citizen and state;
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b) Reoarding possibly admissible restrictions of h~an rights (c~uties of
_ the individual), and
c) Regarding the scope of the principle of equality.
4. ~,ccording to tX?e pre~nbles to the agreements htunan rights are based on
the dignity of the individual capable of autonamy (universality), that is
they are imposed upon and a prior conditian for the state. In all aspects
of life (sectors of the la~a), tl~erefore, we have a relata.onship of recipro-
cal superordination and subordination (coordination) between the state and
the citizen.
According to the Soviet Constitution constitutianal rights are the product
of natianal, class-detexmined ecanamic-political progress (particularity of
~ights) achieved with the guid~ce of the party. The nature of the individ-
ual as such is deemed imperfect; his freedan amd dignity are realized only
in the classless society; the "new man" will be the end product of the pro-
cess of social change consciously directed by party az?d state. The rela-
tionship between party/state and citizen, therefore, must basically be that
of subordination or tutelage which, in sgecial instanaes (to be settled by
special legal prwisians respecting the enforcement of subjective rights of
the citizen vz.s-a-vis the state) only, yields to a relationship of coordina-
tion.
5. With regard to the limits of hianaa~ rights, the agreements allow restric-
- tions only in the public interest; at the s~ne ti.me these may not extir~guish
the indi~ridual's freedan to e~cercise his rights in a different manner (neg~
tive duties). The constitutianal reservations of the Soviet Constitution,
on the other hand, ca*iprehensively im~pose obligations on the citizen with
respect to social interests which are arbitrarily defined (negative and posi-
tive duties), making it possible to abolish constitutional rights or repi~~ce
� them by duties.
6. While the htunan rights conventions prescribe full equality and proscribe
discrimination for, among others, politica~, religious or other views, the
Soviet state basically insists on the political prerogative of the party
and discrimination against political dissidence and religion. In everyday
life discrimination by reasan of nationality is added to the foxtner catego-
ries.
7. Consonant with their nature as actual standards of competence, socioeco-
namic rights (the right to wor~, to education, and so on) authorize the
- Soviet state to adopt extensive structural and precautionary weasures. They
do not really pravide a justification for well defined services outside cer-
tain contractual relations (labor code, housing legislation, and so on). In
addition to the natural limitations imposea by its gen~eral capacity, the
state maintair,ts a wid~e scope of discretion in the distributian of the goods
proc~uced.
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8. ldith the exception of the right of participation in existing institu-
tions ~d organizations of the Swiet state by, for exaanple, the exercise
of the right to petition or join labor imions, and so on, the Soviet citi-
zen has no political rights whatsoever. Freedom of opinian, freedom of the
press, freedam of association and demonstration are all bann~ed. If deemed
expedient this ba~ may be suspended in certain exceptional circ~.unstances.
The lack of rights in the sector of politics involves all otlzer aspects of
life in that dissidents are denied the opportunity for legal ciefense grant-
ed here: No protection against dismissal, cc~mpulsory employment (labor code);
expulsion frcm institutes of higher eclucation and exclusion from scientific
careers (education law); loss of housing and ban on residence (housing law); -
reduction or deprivation of social wielfare benefits earned; dimini.shed pro-
tection against interference in personal freedam, in particular the inviol~
bility of the person, of residence and the loss of privacy with regard to
mail and the telephane, and so on, as a c~sequence of the total lack of
protection vis-~vis the imrestigating authority in matters of state securi-
ty (KGl3), bias in legal proceedings, also discrimi.nation suffered by politi-
cal prisoners during and after their term of imprisormient.
9. On the other haa~d, the citizen who conforms benefits from cautious ad-
v ances i.n the protection of the courts with regard to personaJ. freedans and
impraved socioeconomic services.
10. IJot recognized in Soviet law are the right to strike, tlle right to enter -
and leave the country, the right to religious education and the prohibition
of discrimination for political or other views.
A. General Section: Main Contradictions
- In the organizations and coami.ttees of the United Nations the Soviet Union
has long been one of the driving forces with regard to the preparation of
h~an rights conventions. It proudly stresses this fact in its propaganda
materisl. The USSR therefore sign~ed and ratified the most important UN hu-
_ man rights crnzventions, to begin with the Internatianal Agree~ment on Civil
and Political Rights (Civil Rights ~greement) of 16 December 1966, and the
International Agreement on Economi.c, Social and Cultural Rights (Social
- Rights Agreeu~ent) of the same date, both of which took effect in 1976 and
have the natvre of a comprehensive htanan rights code. There are also many
conventions, in particular those spansored by the International Labor Org~
nization (ILO) and UNF,SCO, which in many respects flesh out these agreements. -
The most important o�nes are:
The convention against discrimination in the field of education of 14 De-
cember 1960
The convention for the elimination of any kind of racial discrim:ination
of 21 December 1965
The c~nvention on women's political rights of 21 March 1953
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The convention on the freedam of assembly and its protection of 17 June
194fs
The convention on forced labor of 10 June 1930
The convention on equal pay for equal work whether done by men or women
of 6 June 1951
The crnzvention on discrimination in employment an,d the professions af
4 3une 1958
The convention on policies in the em~loyment field of 17 June 1964.
This activism contrasts rather oddly with the Saviet Union's rigidly defen-
siv~e attitude in international himnaon rights debates. It foxmal.ly re jects _
any irYVestigation of its domestic h~i rights gractice as an infringement
of the international principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of
_ a state and materially defends itself by the general assertion that the re-
alization of h~mman rights had historically advanced farthest in the Sovi.et
state, because that state had abolished the exploitation of ma~ by man.
At least formally its self-appraisal accords with the fact that, when rati-
fying the various canventians, it raised reservations only with regard to
international. institutions for legal protection; it did not object to the
actual content of hiunan rights guara~tees. Still, this attitude is sam~what
surprising becaouse the comrentions make assertio~s and include provisions
which m~re or less openly contradict the ideal.~gi~a1 self-appraisal of tlze '
USSR and its political system; in fact we might claim that the relationship
between the lnanan rights conventians and 5oviet law or its application pri-
mari.ly features contradictions.
I. The First riain Contradiction: The Justification of Hianan Rights
Contradictions emerge at the early stage of the preambles to the htiunan rights
agreements of 1966, which--with regard to the just~fication of h~a.rights--
unanimously note that they "derive fram man's innate dignity" and that the
"recognition of the innate dignity, freedom an~d inalienable rights of all
members of the htmman society represents the basis of freedam, justice and
world peace.~' Accordingly the dignity of th~e individual. is both the origin
- and the core of h~ rights--that is a quality gexmane to each and everym.~.e
simply because ~e/she is alive, and which carnwt be lost, yielded or sold.
This dignity is expressed in the freedam which, in principle, is enjoyed by
each and everyone, regardless of its possibly different realization in the
life of the individual. H~an rights are therefore universal in their appli-
cation; they do not awe anything to the whim of the state with the corollary
of possible crnmtermand, i.n fact the reverse is true: They are imposed upon
and a prior condition for the state.
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]3y vistue of these concepts tlze agreements are rooted in the traditional
Luropean philosophy of the law (the law of nature). So far the Soviet
Union has re~ected this doctri.ne and, consequently, its practical conse-
quences. On the basis of riarxism~Leninism it contemplates aiiother image of ~
the individual, which in fact shows up in the preamble to its new constitu-
tion. Here the individual is not ccrosidered in the abstract, tmi.v~ersally,
a free person equal a~vd even superior to the state; actually, historically ~
and particularly t~he individual is seen as the product of certain social
conditions and political plannin~. His full freedam will anly be achi.eved
in the future, in ca~ttuiism--and that is why the "education of ma~n in the
classless society," "new man," is proclaimed the "main task" of the Soviet
state. Cansequently the Saviet state holds sovereignty over Soviet man not
only foxmally but by virtue of its qualitative superiority. The constitu-
tion therefore does not "recogni.ze" the universal htanan rights as basic
rights; instead "the Soviet people, guided by the ideals of scientific cam-
uamism..."--in other words by the party--"determi.nes (ustanavlivaet) the
_ rights, freedoms and c~.ities of citi.zens... and proclai.ms them in this con-
, stitution" (end of the prea~ble).
- At the smme time some Saviet juxists champion interpretatians which came
close to the justification of h~1 rights in the agreewents. We should
also note that, in a polemic against the INT~IATIONAL H~2AI.D TRIBUNE, hwn~ri
rights specialist V.A. Kartashkin recently asserted that "the constitution
of the Saviet state does not reject the doctrin~e of natural and inalienable
_ hiun~ rights. It does ass~e, though, that h~,~ rights clepend on the mate-
rial living conditions in society, a~d that theix real content ~d the gu~
- raa~tee of their reali.zation are ultimately determined by the nature of the
socioeconaeic ~ystem in the states." Hawever iz~teresting such views may be,
_ these authors have not yet penetrated to the core of the hi~u~,ian rights prob- -
lem becaaxse the justification of the rights of the individual as arising
fram his dignity is not ~ust a legalistic debating point but a point of de-
parture for the legal demand on the state under no circiunstances to infringe -
the himi~ rights subst~ce of constitutional rights, in other w~rds to gu~
raaltee their unconditional observ~ce by the effectiv~e protection of the
courts. This canclusian is reflected primarily in the agreement on civil
_ rights because the classical liberal human rights s~munarized in it are at
one and the s~ne time negative standards of state authority, prescribing
omissions--in other words interference in the citizen's sphere of freedam.
V.A. Patyulin has been just abaut t1~E only one to articulate these concepts
i.n the Soviet discussian of basic rights. Stil.l, these early stirrings of ~
progressive thought cannot disgui.se the fact that in Soviet law the legal
guarantees of political and personal righ~s proclaimed in the agreement on =
civil rights are in their infancy.
t~foreover, fran the aspect of hwnan rights, the function of the state does
not end with the guarantee of freedam by omissian, The agreement on social
rights in fact assigns the state the task by appropriate action to help its
citizens enjoy the social security and the cultural and educaticnal stanc~
ards indispens~ble for a life liv~ed independently and responsibly. Iiiversely, -
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therefore, econaaic, social and cultural rights are laorgely positive stancl-
ards for the co~petence of the state; they draw ug social progr~s, for
instance for the production and distri.bution of jobs, for educational fa,ci-
lities, housing, and so on, in ordpr to be able to satisfy the citizen's
e:cpectatians with regard to stafie services. Admittedly, the agreement an
social rights was compelled to leav~e it to national legislation ta set~le
how the citizen is to arrive at the enjoyment of the produced goocls, and in
how far ne may make enforceable clauns an them; here the state must neces-
sarily be alla.wed wide discretion.
The Soviet state indeed apprwes the cancept of the soci:31 and ec~ucational
state, cansonant with its self-imposed aim of creating tY.s material and iri-
tellectual foundations of "coaammism." In the international debate on hu-
man rights the USSR therefore stresses the importance of social rights aaid
its "achievements" i.n this field. '~'ith camplete logic these rights head
~he section on basic rights in tl~e Union Constitution, b~eginning with the
right to w~ork (articI.e 40).
Generally we may agree that Soviet legislation has more or less exhaustively
- regulated and Frocedurally org~nized the choice of profession, full employ-
ment and remuneration, schooling, wcational arul professional traini.r~; and
further education, social security for retirees, medical care, recreation,
hausing and cultural enterprise. On the other hand the citizen normally
does not obtain actual~y enforceable claims on services dixectly fraa le-
gislation, let alone the constitution. These claims arise only fran addi-
tirmal ac~ninistrative actions (for ex~cple the assig~rmlent of accoa~nodation)
or contracts (for exa�nple jobs); only in Pxceptional i.nstances can the state
be compelled to origina.te and. canclud~e these. In fact the Saviet state
does provi~ion and affer security to its citizens--albeit, especially in
view of the efforts made, at a rather law level~-and to that extent observes
the social rights agreement.
II. The Second I~Sain Contradiction: The Restrictions on Iiwnaal Rights
;-Iawever, the ~:ocial rights agreement also includes rights which Saviet laca
either ignores (such as the right to strike), or does not guarantee (such as
_ the ri~ht freely to establish labor unions--article 8). This is lin.U.ed to
the central problem Pncotmter~d with regard to politic~l. rights, in other
w~ords with the question in haw far the conventions authorize the state to
inter�ere in constitutianal rights. The anst,~er to that question xlms as fol-
" laws: ~Jith the e~.ception of the properly proclaimed state of ~emergency the
agreer~ents pezmit only a limited authority for the issue of decrees while
the Soviet Constitution claims unlimited authority, in other words the right
to repeal rights.
The civil riglzts agreement empawers the state by legislation to restrict
freedam of movement, freedam of entry and departure (article 12), freedom of
religion (article 18), freedom of apinion (article 15), freedoma of as~embly
- (articl.e 21) and freedam of association (article 22), and to do so
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_ In the interest of r~ational or public~security,
In the interest of public order,
- In the interest of public morality, or
To protect the rights and freedams of others.
These legal terms are indeteiminate ~d may therefore be subject to very `
. different interpretations. Still, th~ey do not ~thorize arbitrary interfe-
rence by the state, merely the "restriction" of rights. The agreements _
_ therefore unanimously and explicitly ban such other restrictions as have
not be~n provic~ed for, most certairil.y the "abolitian of rights and freedan~s"
(article 5), Article 4 of the sacial rights agreement additionally approv~es
_ of only such "restrictions as are legally provided for and recancilable with
~he nature of these laws, aud ex,clusively aumed at pramoting the coaanon weal
in a democratic society."
It is thus the nature of the reservations that they restrict the citizen's
constitutionally affirmed opportimity for self-determina.tion by banning be-
havior injurious to the co~uunity without, how~ver, nailing him to a textva.l-
ly determi.ned usage of basic rights. The Soviet Constitution, on tbe otlier
hand, restricts basic rights not only fram the autside, that is negatively-
prohibitiv~ely, but also, fram the inside, furnishes a positive-coatpelling
- control and ptupose at the discretion of party directives. It achieves this -
purpose by three general reservations witlz respect to duties, relevant to
basic rights, in additian ta rwmerous special duties. These are:
A clause regard3ng t11e avoidance of damage or abuse (negativ~e duty): "The
exercise of rights and freedoms by the citiaens may not datnage the interi
ests of society and the state nor the riglats of other citizens." (Ar-
_ ticie 39 paragraph 2),
- A state pramotion or state defer.se clause (abstract positive duty): "The
_ citi2en of the USSR is obligated to defend the i.nterests ~f the Soviet
state and to contribute to the consolidation of its po~wer and authority."
(Article 62 paragraph 1), ar~d
A compelli.ng purpose clause (actual positive duty), which ties art and
science (article 47) and th~e freedam of association (article 51) to -
"agreement with the goals of c~,mist construction" and grants freedam
of speech, freedam of the press, freed~m af assembly and demonstration
(article 50) only "consonant with the interests of the people and for the
purpose of the consolidation and development of the socialist order." -
Consequen~ly the controlling purpose of fihe exercise of basic political
rights is the sole interest of state and society as arbitrarily defined by
the CPSU without subjection to any legal restraints (article 6, Union Con-
_ stitution). Totally caupelled to follaw party instructions, in other w~ords
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3eprived of political seli�-determination, every citizen bec;omes a"builder
of cv~uzism." Z+Tith the exceptian of marginal rights of participation his
political rights are sus~nded. The penal and aciministrative codes shaw
haw this is technically h~dlecl case by case. -
IIZ. The Third r:ai.n Contradiction: The Right to Equality
The contradiction betweer. the hiunan rights conventi~ns and Soviet ].a~v is
most glaring i.n the case of the right to equality. By way of article 2 of
both agrecments the USSR obligated itself to guarantee the respective rights
' taithout any discrimina.tion, especially t~ disregard "national ori~in, reli- -
- gian, political and other views." The new U~ion Constitutian fonnal.ly
agrees with these precepts with the exception af political and other views
(articles 34-36). The exclusion of "politics" appears logical because,
given the CPSU's constitutionally fixed leadership monopoly, po]itica' in-
equality is well lmawn to be an essential feature of the Soviet state.
Ilowever, discrimination exists not only wi~tYi regard to norrparty members
- and �i.th reference to politics; in the case of dissidents it involves other
aspects of daily life also, because--for the purpose of disciplining the~n--
_ they ae largely if not campletely deprived of legal protection as guaranteed
by the constitution and, consequently of their rights generally. This de-
privation includes, for ex~tple, inadmissible dismissal for political re~
sons and co~mpulsory employment i.n other professions (labor code); exnu7.sion
from an educational i.nstitution or the prohibition of the pursuit of a
career in science (educational right); the loss of acco~nodation and the ban
on residence (hous~.ng la~w} ; the diminution or denial of earned clai.ns on
social security; furthermore powerlessness vis-a-vis possible infringements
' of the law by investigating agen~cies in state security ma.tters (KGB), by
which--~ong others--the inviolabi.lity of the person, his residence, persrnr
~ al property or health is interfered with; also discrimina.tion in court pro-
ceedings, restrictions an legal defense, discrimination against political
prisoners as compared to "co~man" criminals, and finally cliscrimination
a.gainst former prisoners once they are released. .
The Uan on discri.mination for religiaus reasons has naw been incorporated
in the constitution but, given its unchanged hostility to religion, the p~r-
ty has no intention of lceeping this promise. -
In politics believers sufier constitutional discrinination bec.~use the staff-- -
ing of senior positions in the state and in s~ciety is reserve~i to Party
r~eml~ers who must be atheists (article 6 in conjunction with article 2 1< t
ter d of the party statute). In the field of econanics they are disadva~
taged by the refusal to grant them access to seni.or positions, actual.ly t~~
entire c~eers (state apparatus, science, the educatiana~l. system, anc'.
so on). Their freedom of professiansl. choice (ax~:.cle 40) is therefore e~
trenely limited; they are confranted with a long list of "career bans." Oth-
er aspects of this uni.versal discrimination are the special handicaps im-
posed on religious information, the special restrictions on the right of
- parents to insist on raligious instruction (by the ban on compulsion and the
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_ delegation of the exercise of this parental right), the special restrictions
on the movement of clergycaen. -
In practice the actual disc~ m;nation reflected in legal regulations is
joined by cliscrimination against citizens of certain nationalities. For ex-
a~le the Volga Germans, Crimean latars and Turkish speaking Mes'chetes, com-
pulsorily resettled by Stali.n, were refused permission to return to their
hamel~ds, in other wnrds are disadvantaged from the natianal aspect with re-
spect to their choice of damicile. ~
As to the detailed relation of lnunan rights to Soviet law, this study is ne-
cessarily restricted to a selection, because it is impossible in this parti-
cular framework syste~atically to deal with all him~n rights. I have been
trying to resolve this difficulty by choosir~g fram the group of socioeconamic,
political and personal rights sev~eral of special importance and dealing with ~
them in greater detail.
B. Specific Section -
I. The Right to Work
According to article 6 of the social rights ag~eement the right to wurlc is
equated with "the opportunity to earn one's liv.i.ng by freely chosen or ac-
cepted worlc." The state is obligated "to talce sIl steps suitable to protect
this right," (see article 6 paragraph 2) by, for exa~nple,
Setting up tectuzi.cal and vocatianal counseli.ng and traini.ng progr~ns,
~stablishing procedures to aahieve steady econaaii.c and social development,
~d
Strive for "produ~ctive full employment in conditians whicl~ protect the -
basic political and econom.i.c freeclans of the individual."
The state thus must enable its citi.zens to worlc, not at any price, but tal:ing
into accrnmt the pri.n~ciple of productivity as w~ell as the freedom o~ the in-
divi.dual. Ttie term "basic freedoms" procla:ims ~that indicated here are not
on].y the n~ rights mentioned in the agreements but also constitutional
rights i,i their national viersions. That is the reason why the right to pro-
perty ownership may also be an (independQnt) general condition of fihe r:i.ght
to worlc. On the other h~d this is not a definite requirement, and, despite
the nation2].ization of the me~s of production (articles 10-12 of the consti-
tution), the USSR is therefore not in clirect contraventian of article 6 of
the social rights agreement. Incidentally, the freedan of profession and the
right to wnrlc are also regulated by tY~e ILO canventians mentianed easlier;
they will be dealt ~aith in greater detail i.n the appropriate context.
Article 40 of the Soviet Canstitution also proclaims the "right to choose a
profession, typp of employment ~d job" consanant with in~clina,tians, skills,
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trainin~, educationa.l status and "talcing into account social needs." It is
taore eraphatic than the agree~ent in stressing tlie "right to obtain ~uaran
teed employment." ,
a) I~ reecla~ of Choice of Proi'essi~n
The frcedan af choosing a career, that is the riglit of the citizen to be
trained for and e~+ercise the profession of his cY~oice, is also an aspect of
the right to education. '3'his freedan is greater the more varied tl~e choice
of jobs offered i.n society arul, consequently, the r~ore sophisticated and ac-
cessible (professianal) ec~uc;atian. In the USSR the variety of jobs ~rew
from 10,370 (1926) to about 30,00Q (1959). The follac~ri.n~ survey of profes-
sional training may help demonstrate hrna the citizen is prepared for "his"
c areer.
Professiona.l training is in the hands of the state e:cclusively. It is di�- -
vided (accordir~ to the sequence of quantitative significance) into
- "occupatiana].-technical education," that is na=xawly specialized slcilled
- workp_s training for the mass inc~ustrial occupations. Ttiis training is ac-
qu~.,red either by 6 manths apprentice training in enterprises (and that ag-
plies in abaut 50 percent) or by 1-2 years of trainin~ in vocatianal-tecYuLi-
cal schools" (vocational scho~ls). The second division is represented by
"3.ntern~ediate specialized training" at advan~ced technical schools for highe~
ranlced careers in the econcxny, the cultural and educationa7. system and ad-
ministration, the third by "college education" at imiversities, academies,
and so a~. The efforts of the party and state leadership are bent an offer-
ing the school leaver at least v~ocationat training, qualitatively to ap-
proach this to intermediate special traini.ng and facilitate worlcer access to
im7.ti~ersity education.
It is at this third division that the problem o� a.ccess is particularly
acute, because the state centsally decides haw many educaticmal pl~ce~ are
to be macle avai.lable (basing this decision an the estima.ted demand), while
the rush for higher educatior~-c~ue to its great social. pxestige--far e~ceeds
availability (rnm~erus clausus). The most iurportant prerequisites for the
applicant are a braduation certificate shoRring appropriate averages, a chari-
acter reference issued by his school or enterprise and inwlving party,
I�~amsocuol azxl lahor im.i.on organs, ancl. a pass in the admission testa In addi- _
tion to Performance criteria there xe saroe other, legally standardized pre-
ferences of a social nature, �or i.nstan~ce for citizens who have worlced in
manufacturing izzdustry, are veterans of the armed foxces or tl~e sta~e secu-
rity service, or have excelled in sociopolitical fi.eld such as the I:c~msamol.
_ Admittedly the ai.m, proclaimed especially by Krushchev, to open the tuzi.vers-
sities to workers children to the extent of the share of their class in the
total population c~e to grief as the result of the insuperable startis~ ad-
vantages of children of better eclwcated white collar worlcers, especially ?:he
political bureaaacracy and the intelligentsia. Still, the worlcers share
ranges from 30-40 percent.
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- l:~or ~ractical purposes the strong cor~petitive pressuxe and freqiient laclc of
clarity of the lieterogeneous admissian criteria favor the manipulation of
a:chnission procedures: Extra tuition, private cr~.ing course~, personal cor~
_ n~ections a~d bribery are widespread.
~ The legislative slant of the curricultun 2�id the students to I~farxi.st Leni.nist
criteria results in disadvantages for Sovie~ citizens who are clissidents on
either religiaus or political graunds; they are barred from access to ~i-
versities and advanced technical schools--and consequently any careers de-
pending an advanced educational levels. Anyone who, in the caurse of his
studies, attracts attention by dissident oPi.ni.ons, must be prepared to be
e.Ypelled from the institutian. Expulsions for this reason are a daily oc-
currence.
This practice violates article 142 of the RSF5R's penal code (and the s~ne
reguZations in the other republics), which prohibits thi.s type of discrimi-
, nation. At the s~ne ti.m~e it represents a violation of article 5 of the
_ (UIaZSCO) convention against discrimination in the educational system, ar-
~ ticle 18 paragraph 4 of the civil rights a~,~reement and article 13 paragraph 1
of the social rights abreement. _
b) ~ii~ Li~its of the Choice of Profession and Job
Article ~}0 of the constitution lists the conditions for the e:~ercise of the
freeda~ of profession, which are systetn-neutral and matter of fact. Thcy -
are cac~lemented in article 60 by the reservatian: "Conscientious labor in
the chosen field of socially useful wurlc and the observance of labor disci-
pline are the duty and an affair of honor for every USSR citizen ca~able of
woricir~;. The ref.usal of socially useful labor is incoa~patible with the prin-
ciples of the socialist society." Thi.s gives rise to two limitatians:
1. It is not up to the free decision of the Soviet citi.zen whether or not to
worL; this is decided for hi.m Uy the legal prescription of the duty to
Z~~rlc;
- 2. fiis choice of profession and anployment is limited to "socially useful
worl:.
T'ne latter texr.~ is derived fram tlze so-called parasite le~islation which,
until 1975, pex~i.tted the authorities to catnpel to tal:e jobs in factorics,
an con~tsuction sites, and so on, "a,dult citizens capable of taorlcing who re-
�u~e to dischar~e the rwst important constitutional duty--honestly to ~~ror1~
in accordance 4rith their capacities--, taithdraw from socially useful work
~d indulge in an antisocial parasitical lifestyle," that is obtain income
from proscribed or moxally reprehensible sources. ~dilful refusal to oUey
was ptuzished (article 209 RST5R penal code).
T'he TLO censured this legally enforceable decree concerning the general duty
- to VrorY. as being a violation of articles 1 and 2 of the corYVention on f.orced
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labor oi 1~ June 1930. Inside the Soviet Union also, not least in dissi-
dent circles, there h.QS been an eYtretnely critical c~iscussion of the juri-
- dical quality and international canpatibility of the parasite le~islation. `
Uoubtlessly, tlierefore, it was a considerable aclvance wl~:n this le~islatian
~aas arnlulled in 1975 and the co~tencc of the admii~istrative authoritie~
lifted. Hawever, still liaxile to prosecution are those wlio (such as be~-
~ars and tramps) "pursu.e ~n otherwi.se parasitical lifestyle for sowe coxr
siderable time." This pravision also has met reservations at the ILO.
47Yien we scrutinize the practice of "combating parasitisin," woe notice that
this vague term i.ncludes, in addition to tYi~ laclc of the tai.ll ta worlc or ~
idle life at the expense of others, -
The misuse of personal property (apartment, automobile, amd so on) to
nake Yaoney;
Unduly high wabes demands at times of manpower shortage;
P�Iinor busin~ess speculations,
Prostitutian and piinping,
Fortune telling, and _
Services to unauthorized religious associations.
In conjunction with the provisians of the penal code regardir~g employment in
a banned trade (articles 162-164 RSF5R penal code) the blanket provision 209
of the penal code i~ concern~d mainly to res~rrict independent private busi- -
- ness. The latter, albeit in narrow limits, is in fact permitted to Soviet
citizens by article 17 of the canstitution, either individually ar as a f~
- mily associatiorr--for exanple craft occupations, farming and services. The
poor perfonnance of, especially, collective farming ar~d state repair enter-
prises here coritinues to pronwte the toleration of pri.vate i.na.tiative.
- The centrally plaauied employment from the aspect of "social needs" of uni-
versity and technical college graduates entering the.professions involves a
restriction of the free choice of jobs. Yrnu~ graduates are obligated to
worlc on the jobs assi~ed them in proctuetion for at least 3 years. This
concept d.erives fram tYie prin,ciple of coherent practical professional e:cpe-
rience and also from the reasoning that, having financed tYieir expensive
education, the state is entitled to exercise at least limited cantrol of the
yotmg people.
In actual fact not all school leavers really talce up their assierm~ents,
rlany successfully avoid going to regions where living and supply conditions
are lmo~m to be poor. This is made all the easier because, upon refusin,~
to take up the assigned job, they anly have to repay ths fare.
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The majority of entra~ts, including graduates of vocational schools, are in
any case not subject to central distribution.
Yet another aspect of the free choice of jobs is protection fran being shift-
ed from one job to another. In principle shifts require the consent of the
employee affected, which may be disregarded only in specific instances, due
- to the pressure of circtunstances.
The tremendous dimension of a~nual job changes among Soviet employees d.emon-
strates that, in contrast to the Stalin era, the broad masses are quite free
to choose their jobs.
c) The Right to a Job
I3y contrast to a mixed private-public econamic system such as prevails in
the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviet state is authorized to dispose
of all jobs, so that the cnnditions for the actual reaZization of the right
to w~rk appear considerab?.y more fav~orable. Hawever, Soviet law does not
guarantee its citizens this right. Apparantely contrary statements in
Soviet technical literature try to but cmznot disguise this fact because--
upon closer scrutiny--they also merely assign the state the "moral" and "po-
litical" obligation to provide same ~ob for each citizen. That alone is
signified by~ the "right to obtain guaranteed e~ploym~ent" (article 40 of the
constitution). From the purely legalistic aspect this means no mnre than
the citizen's right to call on the state employment office to notify him of
job openings. Logically, therefore, the "systems of occupational guidance
and employment development" are mentioned aanon~ the guarantees of the right -
to work (article 40 paragraph 2). Set up in the late 1960's in the shage of
"offices for employment develap~nent and public information about the need of
enterprises, construction sites and organizations for blue a~cl white collar
workers," the system is still in the test stage, though (Kaluga experiment,
and so on), and in 1974/1975 accounted for anly about 10 percent of the jobs
to be filled in industry. The overwYielming ma~ority of hirings 3.s due to
the personal initiative of employees, excepting the state job assigrnnents
for specialists mentioned earlier.
This explanation fram the legal and actual aspects does not change the fact
that full employment is largely realized. Nothing else would really make
sense, because the state would contradict itself by proclaiming the duty to
work for all while on the other hmld preventing the fulfillment of this duty
by the refusal to provide jobs. However, the fate of the dissidents shows
that in fact there are many such cases which, cynically, end with the prose-
cutian as "parasites" of those affected.
d)'Productive' Full Employment
Closer scrutiny of Soviet life soon reveals that it has not solved the pro}r
lem of productive full employment in the meaning of article 6 of the social
rights agreement. Depending an the region and sector there are indeed i.u~
bal~ces in the employment of the population capable and willin,g to work.
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Irrvolved here is the prot~lem of a dyn~nic industrial society where certain
industries cut their 1.~1bor force due to technical ad~vances, while in other
sectors of the economy the demand for trained workers cannot be met. "Pro-
ductive" full employment stands and falls with the system's ability to cope ~
with the changes in deu~.and by further education, retraining, and so on. An
additianal problem is that of balancing the econamic structure so as to of-
fer sufficient employment in the region and make it largely unnecessary for
the residents to migrate.
These have been familiar difficulties in m.~st i.ndustrial countries certainly
since the early 1970's. They also confront the USSTt and are ev~en more se-
rious there, due to the size of the country, the iuiwieldiness of the plan-
ning system, the slow rate of innovation and job security. I will deal with
this i.n greater detail when talking of protection from dismissal.
In the 1960's the lack of information and the structural wealmesses i.n pro-
fessional traini.ng tended to produce creeping youth unemployment; noted at
the saaue time was ~deremployment anong wamen. In the meantime these weak-
nesses have been greatly reduced. Especially female irnrolvement in the eco-
nomy has been e~phasized so much that lately unforttu~e consequences for fa-
mily life have become a threat, and another policy change is under way naw.
There is still a certain reservoir of female employees in the Central Asian
- republics with strong Islmmic features; hawever, traditional. attitudes, very
- ry high birth rates and the poor mobility of the population there impoae
firm limits on the greater i.nvolve~ment of these women in professional life.
Disregarding so-called frictional unemployment (see further on), included in
which must be unemployment among, school lea~vers, w~e may assert that no more
manpower reserves are to be d.iscovered in certain population groups. Now~
days, therefore, it is possible to meet the demand only by shifting or free-
ing mmzpower. Such me~s, though, seem to encounter stsong resistance. The
so-called Shchekino method, for example, introduced for that purpose in 1967,
is still confined to the chemical industry. On the other ha~d, if this si-
tuatian were to change, we would get the well-lmown problems of open unem-
ployment.
In 1973 Manevich wrote: "To ensure the freeing of manpawer and achieve its
ratianal employment, it will be n~ecess~ry to carry out same other econamic
and legal measures. Of the utmost importance, for example, is the settle-
ment of the old issue of the material security of freed employees. In the
conditions of socialism the regular process of freeing and shifting blue and
white collar workers may not ~v~ersely affect the standard of living of eu~
ployees and their fmmilies." -
The author here alludes to the "frictianal" unemployment occurring in the
course of transition fram one to the other.~ob. In that period of time the -
employee receives a once-only "bridging payment" equivalent to average earn-
ings in a 2-wieek period, ~d this only if the loss of the job is due entire-
ly to enterprise policy.
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If taken ill at this time, the Employee does n~ot receive arry mo~ney fram
social insurance funds to compensate for his temporary inability to work.
_ There is no state or private unemployment insurance for such cases. lie is
therefore compelled alone to shoulder any risk. The warker is thus delibe-
rately exposed to strong economic pressure in order to compel him as qua.ck-
ly as possible to take a new job. This method is likely in fact to be more
effective than tr~ provision on parasitism.
In practice, therefore, imemployment is usually of relatively short duration,
about 1 month. Hawever, depending on the age, sex or residence of the work-
er, it may exceed this period by a good deal. A change of job almost always
results in fi.nancial loss.
Incidentally, this pressure produces highly unfavorable social and economic
side effects, because many people decide far too quickly to take on a job
_ which soon turns out to bz unsatisfactorq. This is one of the causes of
the high rate of job turnwer, which speaks voltunes about the poor quality
of worlcing conditions.
e) Access to Public Office
As per article 25 of the civil rights agreement the Soviet Union is obligated
to guarantee its citizens ~cess to public office free of any discrimina,tion
and "frvm the aspect of general equality." Co~npared to "public service" the
texm "public office" has a narro~w~er meaning. It involves, for exaanple, jobs
signifying that their "official" holders hold sovereign powers.
Though the labor code applies generally to all gainfully employed persons in
the Soviet state, special provisions are in force for so-called office hold-
- ers (dolzhnostnoe lico) as le functionaries, especially in gover~ent
service (gosudarstvennaya sluzhba . These special pravisions clearly demor~
strate to outsiders their quasi-civil service status. As a rule such posi-
tions are filled by "appointrnent." Candidates or applicants must be appro-
priately educated and politically reliable. Subject to im~estigation is the
extent of their "ideological a~d political strength," that is their devotion
to the party and the cause of ca~nmism. ~xcluded, as a consequence, are
religious citizens: Set aside thereby for office holders is article 9 par~
graph 2 of the basic labor code, which forbids such discrimination.
I t is virtually a matter of caurse that public service ~obs are similarly _
closed to political dissidents. When I discuss protection against dismissal,
I will deal with their situation in greater detaa.l.
Concerning the details of state perso~nnel policies ("cadres"), especially the
notorious namenclature system, I refer to the pertinent literature.
f) Job Security
~iardly less important than getting a job is protection agai.nst its loss. The
Soviet labor code provides for the following reasons for dismissal (in cacr
junction wlth their respective frequency before the courts in 1975):
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1. vissolution of the employing facility or a cut in the jobs available
_ zrithout the possibility of providing another job for the re~pective
employee in the same facility (16.9 percent),
2. Laclc of skills or poor health of the employee (5.6 percent),
3. Systematic dereliction of duty not ~nenable to disciplinary measures
- (13.5 percent),
4. Un~ustified absenteeism or reporting for w~rk drunk (32.3 percent),
5. I'our months of absence due to temporary incapacity (except for pregnancy
leave), imless caused by an accident at work, -
6. Reinstatement of the person who previously held the job,
7. Loss of trust (in the case of cashiers, and so an) (9.5 percent).
Also cited in the 1976 survey by the Supreme Court of the USSR on caurt
practice in dismissal disputes are
The ~uoral behavior of teaching personnel (1.2 percent),
7.`ransfers (7.2 percent), and
"Others" (13.8 percent).
Incidentally, fram the formal aspect a dismissal is effective only if ap-
proved by the respective labor uni.on co~i.ttee. However, such approval is
- required anly for lower rmnlced blue and white collar workers. Senior em-
ployees do not en~oy this protection. Nor do th~ey have the right to appeal
to the courts; they may only submit a complai.nt to the superior agency. The
legal remedy is so weak that they are actually at.the mercy of their supe-
riors. Their consequent insecurity and anxiety about their career repre-
sents an effective instr~ent of discipli.ne, not least to co~m~el unconditio~
al political and personal loyalty.
Court practice and reports shaw that enterprise managements frequently vio-
late the protective provisions regarding disaaissal: In 1975 ~ average of
54.9 gercent of complaints all aver the cauntry were successful, in Uzbek-
istan as many as 70 percent. Six~t�y-eight percent of dismissals ascribed to
manpow~r cuts were reversed. Thaugh these and other figures are evidence
~ of the efficacy of court protection, they also demonstrate the wealmess of
the l~bor union coa~ittees which often neglect to exercise their supervisory
function with regard to the director. In many cases (and this has been the
subject of obviously disregarded criticism for many years), the labor tmian
committee is not consulted about the dismissal. Evidently management--in
consideration of the subservience of the ,average Soviet citizeir--accepts the
risk of certain defeat if th,e matter sY?auld go to caurt.
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' llismissals for political or antireligious-ideological ressons represent a
particular problem. Thousands of such dismissals have oc.~urred since the
emergence of the civil rights movement in the 1960's. The loss of job is
one of the first gaverctment measures against citizens who reveal themselves
to be dissidents or apply for ~ exit vi.sa. By rigorously ex~erting this -
pressure and noi: ev~en refraining from imposing manifest economic disabili-
ties, the state has---no doubt successfully--limited any readiness to shaw
outright solidarity witi; the victims of political persecution.
As those affected are frequently members of the intelligentsia ar~d occupy
senior positions, their dismissal rarely offers any legal difficulties.
Workers and law ranking emplayees dismissed for political reasons are usual-
ly imsuccessful when ~ppealing to the caurts. By practicing job deprivation
for political reasons the Soviet Union contsaven~es ILO Convention No 111 on
discrimination in employment a~d profession. In signing this convention the
USSR had obligated itself by the appropriate measures to preclude "any dis-
crimination, excZusion or preferential treatment for...religious reasons,
political opi.nions, national descent..., resulting in the rev~ocation or ob-
struction of the equatity of opportunity or treatment in employment or,pro-
fession."
Despite the system-related practice of professional bans we must aclawwledge
that the adjusted and obedient Soviet citizen does get a job and is adequate- -
ly protected against the loss of that job.
g) The Right to RemLmeration
The Soviet Constitution (article 40 paragraph 2; article 35 paragraph 2, ar-
- ticles 53 and 23) and the basic labor code guarantee the right to appropriate
pay, equal pay for equal worlc and the appropriate livelihood of the fa~?ily as
proclai.med in article 7 of the social rights agreement. It w~ould need a mono-
graph to establish the extent mid standard of actual compliance with this
guarantee. Here I must confine myself to the description of same basic fea-
tures and an outline of so~?e pa~:ticularly important problems.
The Soviet wages system basically distinguishes between "blue" and "white"
_ collax workers. Blut collar workers get standard wages based on the follo~- -
ing co~putation procedure: The operations (jobs) are divided into "skill
groups" on the basis of a description of the l~owledge or skills needed to
carry then out and graded according to ciifficulty. Specific "standard wage
groups" correspond to ~hese "skill groups." Consonant with the performancP
principle remuneration rises fram graup to group on the basis of a specific
standard rate for the first graup, multiplied by th~e tariff multiplier of
the respective higher graup up to about 22 times in the ultimate standard
wage group. Standard rates vary in accordance with time or piece rates,
working conditions, and so on.
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White collar workers have "service jobs" which are listed in a standardized
_ "namen~clature." These jobs are generally subdivided into "neads," "special-
- ists" and "tecl~ical persann~l" and, wi.thin these classifications, by quali-
fications or type of wnrk. Remuneration consists of monthly salaries, and
the anaunt involved is determix~d by salary groups or the tables of organi-
zat.i.on of the enterprises, agencies, and so on.
Particulaxly iIIportant ar highly qualified employees may get salary bonuses
(of up to 30 percent) or be awarded special salaries fram special funds.
Premii~ns are added to wages or salaries when set production targets or plans
- are fulfilled. Special tariffs apply to wertime, holiday or night w~orlc.
In the case of illness tlze employee receives social insurance payments for -
the duration of the incapacity attested by a physician. Insurance payments -
e:qual the fu11 aQnount of wages in case of an accident at work, job-related
aickness and after at least 8 years of employment in the enterprise; 50 per-
cent of wages after n~o more than 3 years, 60 percent after 4 years aa~d
$0 percent by up to 8 years of employment in the enterprise. Taken into ac-
cotuit here is only the "bare" standard wage without the usual additional
payments.
The monthly pay of blue and white collar wurkers may not fall belaw the mini-
rnun set by the state (article 40 of the constitution, article 36 of the gen-
eral labor code). In the course of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-1975) the
r~ini.mtiun wage was raised to R70, a rate which is below subsistence level.
The corresponding adjusiinent o� the low~r wages groups was not concluded lm-
til 1977.
in 1975 the monthly av+erage income of employees amounted to R146, substan-
tially above the minimimm. Dy 1980 it is supposed to rise to F170, although
it is not at all certain whether this will happen. The average canceals the
fact that wage and salary levels differ wi.dely anong the various sectors of
the econarry. Constructian, at R170 (1974), leads the ranking, while wa;es
in the services sector, at about R105, are well below the average.
The difference between i.ncanes in industry and farming is sigaificant. In
1975 a w~orker household had a~ average disposable incame of R263, the f~ni.ly
_ of a kolkhoz farmer anly R186 (equaling 71 percent), including earnings from
its private holding. If we add services fran the so-called consi~ption
ftimds, in other words such things as "free" social, health, culture and edu-
cation services, tlze average ineame of the employee is increased by about
one third.
Particular attention is due the child allawance, introduced in 1974. This
is granted in the amount of up to R12 per child until its 8th year, provided _
that the family's per capita incame is belaw R50. The circle of recipients
of this aid is considerable. The state appropriates R1.8 billion per armiun.
At the top rate this means that at least 15 mi.llion children or about the _
sa~e nwnber of families receive the allawance. We thus see haw many Soviet
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fanilies of 3-4 members must malce do with no uiore than R150-200 manthly
(that is live in poverty), unless they obtain additional revenues by any
means available (and in fact this is mostly fi1~e case).
h) Equality of Wages With Respect to Sex
As far as w~e lmaw the Soviet labor code does not allaw ~equal payment for
male and female e~mpYoyees iti tY1e same standard wage or salary group.
Overall, ho~wever, and as a matter of fact wamen do have lawer incomes be-
cause they are working largely in those sectors of the econamy, which are
at the lowier end of the wages scale ~d decidedly underrepresented in the
better paid sectors, aa~d/or because they hold less skilled jobs. In 1974
avierage wages in the health care system amounted to about R99, in retailing
and the hotel and restaurmzt trade to R104.5 (76 percent women), in housing
and municipal ac~nini.stratian as w~ll as senrices to R105 (53 percent women),
in posts and teleco~,mications to R117.~ (68 percent w~omen), in the culture
and education sector to R122 (72 percent women) and in farming to about R94
(with the addition of extra income to R124); here also women are largely
employed in se~mi.skilled jobs.
In industry the situation is rather different (R155); the women's share
here is nearly 49 percent. They are far closer to equality in this sector,
Pr~vidi-ng 40 percent of engineers and 32 percent of management staffs in
proc~uction.
The value placed on professions and entire sectors of the ecoriomy i.n the mat
_ ter of wage c~putation depends on many aspects--ecanamic, social, psychola-
gical and historical. Z'~ie equality of women is evidently univ+ersal and
system-neutral problem which the USSR appears no better able to settle than
the ~lestern industrial countries.
The structural disadvantages suffered by wanen certainly do not represent a
violation of the social rights agreement. Still, it does not a~pear compat-
ible with the image projected by Saviet propaganda regardin~g the situation
of female workers. The same applies to incame differences betwoeen the various
groups and strata of the coimtry, which are quite substantial.
Ranking first on the salary scale are the marshals of the Soviet Union who
_ receive R2,000 monthly. On the basis of various sociological coffiputatio~ns
riervyiz Matthews estima.tes at about 227,000 persons the strati,mm of senior
(iwmenclature) func tionaries i.n the party, mini.stries, the economy, the mili- -
tary, the state security service and social organizations, who earn more
than R450 per month and have access to substantial additional b~enefits.
These additional benefits are the tmdiluted reflectian of their privileged
positian, beca~use they affect ma.terial goods and services which are either -
exceedingly short or available to the average citizen in very poor quality
only.
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'['he aforementioned group of people, or at least some of them, enjoy the fol-
lowing perks (which are som~etunes described as "Kremlin ratians"):
Monthly bonuses of up to 100 percent of salary;
Special stores stocking quality goods and lwcuxy goocL: produced at hane
aaid abroad (deficitnye tavary) at prices which are more or less (this
depends on the ranlc of the purchaser) belaw official sales prices--
asstmaing that they are available in normal state stores;
Service enterprises (repair workshops, tailoring establisYunents, and so
on) not open to the general public;
Preferentially supplied dining roams and stores in the central party and
goverrnnent institutions in rIoscow, the major provincial cities and the
capitals of the Union republics;
Payment of part of their salaries in "certificate rubles" which--ranlcing .
equal with foreign exchange--entitle them to buy in the Swiet intershop
stores (beretska);
Entitlement to hold several public jobs (sovmestitle'stvo);
The allocation of spacious, solidly constructed and furnished apartments
and dachas;
The allocatian of official vehicles and pexmission to use the~m for pri-
vate purposes as well as priority supplies of private automobiles with-
out waiting lists;
Access to the special hospitals and rehabili.tation centers of their
- agency or institution ("Kremlin hospital," and so on);
Priority allocation of vacation places, sanatori~ sojourns, and so on;
Foreign travel;
Access to special cultural ev~ents.
Addir~ all these privile~es, the ruling strattun enjoys a lifestyle which dif-
fers fundamentally fram the more or less poor living conditians of the broad
masses.
II. Freedam of Upinion
Article 18 and 19 of the civil rights agreement provide a coarprehensive gu~-
rantee for the freedaa of the h~?an spirit. The freedam of thought guaran-
teed in article 18, aaong others, is underlined by article 19 para~raph 1,
citing the "right to unimpeded freedan of opinian" which is extended in p~
_ ragra~h 2 to include fille "free expression of opinions."
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Article 19 para;raph 3 emvhasizes the special responsibility and obligatian
_ in the use of the freedam of opinion and therefore permits its restriction
by law
To respect the rights and reputation of oi~er citizens,
To protect nat~onal security, public order, public morality or public
heaTth.
Thes~ are reservations already dealt with fram the aspect of their general
significaa~ce (see p 7) .
Altogether Uanned by article 20 are "warmanger3.ng" and "advocacy of natior~
al, racial or reli,ious hatred serving to incite discrimination, hostility
or violen,ce."
The Saviet Constitution (ffiticle 28 paragraph 3; article 36 paragraph 3;
article 52 paragraph 1) includes similar prohibitions, reinforced by the ap-
- propriate penal provisians (see article 73 of the RSFSR p~na~l code},
In article 50 the constitution moreover guarantees the freedom of speech and
of the press (as mentioned earlier on p 8) with the special reservation of
"coincidence with the interests of the people and for the consolida.tion and
_ development of the socialist order." For art and the sciences as aspects of
the freedom of r:pinion article 47 guarantees "freedam of scientific, tecYuii-
cal and artistic creation" with the siniilar reservation "consonant with the
goals of caffin,mist constniction."
The interpretation of the freedam of opinion may be decided in Soviet law
either negatively (that is by penal provisions) or positively (in the spirit
of the reservations cited).
a) Limits of the Freedam of Opinion
The pertinent p.~na:i provisians aze represented by articles 70 and 1901 of
the RSFSR penal code ,~nd the corresponding provisions in the other Union re-
publics, and in the fie'ld of re].igion by article 142 RSFSR penal code in the
vers~on of 18 riarch 196~5 which penalizes "the production for the purpose of
t7ass distsibution c= *_he actual mass distribution of petitions, letters,
leaflets and othFr cioc~~ents which ca11 for the nonfulfillment of th,e legis-
lation affectink= religious cults."
1. Agitation or Propaganda Coriducted to Undeimine or SJeaken the Soviet Power
"Agitation" is defined as the oral distribution of certai.n views am~ong a
large circle of people. "Propaganda," on the other hand, is deemed to be
any passing on of views, even if anly.to one other person. Haw broadly this
may be interpreted is shawn by the case of S.I~ Itaravanskiy who produced -
manuscripts writtin in invisible ink. These were intercepted by the KGB and
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read by me~s of a special grocess cahich did not involve makir~; the writing
visible. tlithout ar.tually havi.ng read the tetit the court found I:aravanskiy
~uilty according to article 70 as per the indict~ent produced by the KG~3.
The tere~s "unde~in'n~" or "weakening of the Soviet power" demonstrate the
vagueness quite typical of state security regulations. Soviet penal lite-
rature offers few explanations, and what there is tends to be tautological.
Attacked samehaw must be the "political foundations of the Soviet state and
social order." These include especially "the social structure of the social- -
ist society ) and its political (state) organizatian," the status aa~d role
of the CPSU and, ~therefore, ths ideology it happens to procnote at the time,
"the basic lines of d~vmestic and foreign policy as well as the achievements
of the socialist rewlution."
2. Agitation or Propagancia for the Ca~ni.ssion of "Particularly Dangerous
Crimes Against the State," that is crimes dealt with by the RSFSR penal
code: Hi~h treason (article 64, espionage (article 65), acts of terrorism
(articles 66 and 67), diversion (article 68), infliction of (econ~omic) d~~-
age (article 69) and warmongering (article 71).
3. In practice the third variant of article 70 is the most importaa~t, that
is "agitation or propaganda co~mmitted by way of the dissemination of :
slanderous myths which def~ne tlle Soviet state and social order." Here
also must be addec~-fram the subjective aspect -the intention of undennining
or weakening the Soviet pawer.
In 1966, during a~d after tY?e trial of writers Sinyavslciy and Damiel' , many
citizens--especially intellectuals--appealed to the party, the government
and the public by way of petitions, open letters, ~d so on, to warn of re-
Stalinization. To counter this budding civil ri~h,ts movement, the party
and goverrmient leadership introduced article 190 as a somewhat milder ver-
sian of article 70 in order to be able more flexibly to react to the wave of
protest.
Disregazding the severity of penalties, article 1901 differs fram tlie thi.rd -
variant of article 70 by not asstnning the direct intention of subverting or
weakening the Soviet power. Still, this limitation does not amrnmt to much
even from the theoretical standpoint, because the deliberate lbelittlemeat
of the Soviet state and social order" mentioned in article 194 may always
be interpreted ~s deliberate "wieakening of the Saviet pow+er." Ultimately,
therefore, it is up to the discretion of the prosecuting authorities whether
to issue the indict~nent as per article 70 (m~~~~ penalty 7 years rigorous
i~uprisornnent and 5 years of exile) or as per article 1901 (maxim~u penalty
3 years or 1 year of forced labor).
~'s all this involves political attitudes ar~d the (ideological) offender in
his capacity as recidivist is constantly threatened with another conviction,
the danger of a sentence for recidivi.sm is particuZarly acute (m~~rim+~ pen-
alty 10 years ar~d 5 years of exi.le).
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The terrorizing nat~r~ of these penal provisions is all too plainly reflect-
ed in the arbitrary range of the penalties--fram fines of less than R200
(article 190 to 12 years jail (article 70).
At fi.rst glance it seems surprising that "slander" is of such iaportance in
the prosecution of dissidents, because the court must -after all--prave to
the defendant that his assertions are wrong and he, the defendant is aware
of that fact ("deliberately"). Involved here, therefore, are not just
opinions, personal views and the apparaisal of facts but the truth of the
facts per se.
'1'he use of articles 1901 and 70 by the state security organs, prosecutors
and courts, though, totally contradicts the entirely unequivocal letter of
the law. The authorities consistently refuse to review the txuth or false-
hood of the factual allegations described in the indictment as'~nti-Soviet
slander."
Fran the ~rtple dociunentation to hand let me cite tt~e followi.ng case to il-
lustrate the abov+e:
In 1970 Vladimi.r Bukovskiy granted ~ intervie~v to the WASHINGT~I POST, in
the caurse of which he talked about his li.fe, particularly his experiences
in the Leningrad special psychiatric clinic and in the camps. After publi-
cation he was called in by the Moscow's prosecutor's office, and the follaw~ -
ing dialog took pla,ce between him and prosecutor Vankovich (aaong others):
[Vamlcovich] Point out to yau that your interview is rife t~i.th slander
of tl~e Soviet state, and that -unless ynu cease and desi.st--
have the ri~t to call you to account as per article 1901 of
the penal cocle.
[Bukovskiy] You mean you believ~e that the facts reported in my interview
are not ~tru,e?
[Va~kovi.ch] I do!
[Bul:ovskiy] In that case I intend to call upon all these people and a1Z
those who can confirm the truth of ury assertions, so that they
may stsengthen my statement. I~n in tauch with them. Do yau
wish them to produce evidence? _
[V~l:ov~.ch] Certainly not. That is quite taulecessary.
[Bulcovsltiiy] t~mat actually are my slanderous r~narlcs?
[Vankovich] I do not intend to give you any detailed explanations.
[Bukovskiy] In that case your assertian is Luzfounded. .
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[Vanl:ovich] You lmaw, we ~rill always l~e able fio prove your ~uilt. And ue-
sides: Do you really aclmowledge tlie 5oviet po~~rer?
I3y this question the prosecu~or comes to tiie real. nub, that is the suspi-
cion of Bulcovskiy as a person, the suspician of his attitude. That is all
whicl~ matters in ~oliti~al trials.
Practice shc~ws that "slander" is equated with "i.nsult" or "defamation."
The Soviet state considers insulting any remarlcs which do "not suit it" for
socne reason, generally because they do not canfo~ to the official linguist-
ic fonmil.as on specific political and ideological issues, interpret facts
"on their awn" or brealc one of the innLUnerable taboos. They are "anti-
Soviet" because they cantradict the image which the official propaganda ap-
paratus ha.S proclair~ed as the obligatory "Saviet reality." Consequently
the accusation of "slander of Soviet rea.Lity" re~l.arly recurs in these
trials.
I'or the system their. suitability for discretionary use in a,ccordance with '
political ~xpediency represents the meaning and value of these empty formu-
1as. They mak.e it possible to puni.sh for ~nti-Soviet propaganda, for et
a~ple, anyone asserting that it is in practice impossible for the Unirnz re-
publics to secede fram tlze state federation of the USSR (after all, the
right to secession is spelled out in the constitution: Article 72), as we11
as anyotle who cites this right to advocate the secession of, say, the r
Ukraine ("bourgeois nationalism") as in the case of L.G. Luk'yanenlco who,
in 1961, was sentenced to death as a"traitor to his country" for this rea-
son, though this sentence was later coamuted to 15 years imprisoriment.
- The e.ctent of arbitrariness liable to be achieved here is demonstrated by
the ex~nple of the Cri.mean Tatars: When Tatar spokesmen, armed t~rith mass
petitions ~d so on, appealed to the Twenty-Third Party Cangress (April
1966) and the Soviet leadership, asking for the complete rehabilitation of
- their people and perau.ssion for them to return to the Cri.mea, they were re-
ceived on 21 July 1967 by, amot~ others, KGB chief Andropov, Interior t�Iinis-
ter Shchelokav ancl Prosecutor Genera7. Rudenlco, who prami.sed to study the _
petitions. Their justification was conclusively aclmowledged by the decree
of the Presiditun of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 5 September 1967, which reha-
bilitated the Cri.mean Tatars. This, however, did not ston the Uzbek courts'
fran convicting activists ~nong the Crimean Tatars--at the saane time and
later--a.s per articles 70 and 1901 and the correspandi.ng provisions of the
Uzbel-: penal code for just these petitions.
The definition of "anti-Sovi.et slander" is subject to fluctuations in time
and spacE. In 1974 I{ronid Lyubarslciy wrote: "Seized during searches of ~y _
apartrnent, for ex~le , were books such as the ' Requietn' by t#1cYtmatova,
' 5talin's fieirs,' a Freudian anal.ysis of novels by ICochetov and Shevicav.
I t~as not prosecuted for having them. In Odessa, on the ott~er har?d,
R. Palatnilc was tried for having the ' Requiem,' and so was I~iel' ni.k in Lenin-
- grad for possessing 'Stalin's Heirs.' In the latter case it was not only
the s~e book, it was actually the same copy! "
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4. Thc last variant of alleged offenses prosecuted as per article 70 con-
cerns the "disfiribution, production and storage" of ai_�I-Soviet "lite-
rature" which is interpreted as "all written ffiul graphic materials
_ (books, newspapers, Periodicals and other printed matter, letters, manu-
scripts, leaflets, drawimgs, songs, graffiti., mou~ted photographs and
other works)." The scope of this term sharply underscores the targets
of article 70: The state intends baldly to include any ty;~e, a~y means of
e:cpressian of the intellect.
"Storage" is to be cansidered a crim~e an].y if the respective literature is
intended to be passed on. In practice, however, and contsary to the letter
- of the law, it is not a taatter of intent but whether the prosecuting author-
_ ities consider the material objectively suitable for passing on. It is
therefore i.n the free discretion of the state security service (ICGB), which -
is the ixivestigating agency in matters of state security, whether storage
is to be cansidered a matter for indictment. The trea~trnent of diary entries
Uy t~e gosecutin.g agencies e.tiemplifies this claim. The practice of seizure
in the course of searches of residences discloses that the irxvestigatinb
agents may consider any piece of writin~ whatever to be infecfied and th~ere-
fore "anti-Soviet literature," simply by relation to its awner who is sus-
pect of anti-Soviet opinions. Seized in the apartment of Oksana rieshlco, a
member of the Ulcrainian Iielsinlci graup an 5 February 1977, for ex~nple, was
the Gerieral Declaration of Hu~an Rights, camplaints and petitions addressed
to Soviet authorities about her son, her etichange of letters with deputies
to the Supreme Swiet, boolcs issu~ed by Saviet publishing hauses, personal
letters fram relatives, letters to the graup fraa other citizens concerning
infringements of their persona]. rights, and personal jottings.
Against the reproach that it daes not gttarantee its citizens any political
freedam of opinion the USSR usually defends itself by asserting that dissi-
dents are prosecufied not for their deviar.t opi.nions but exclusively for
criminal actions. Cri.mi.nolo~ical literature inforns us what the difference
consists in: "~Iowever liable to condemnation the thoughts and opinions of
an individuai, intrinsically th~ey carmot be included in the sphere of ac-
tions in tl~e rieanir~ of the Penal code. Accordin,u to the pertinent reflec-
tions by Kar1I~Iarx legal codes or courts cannot affect the wnrld of ideas.
Consequently the thoughts of an individual, provi.ded they are not oUjective- -
ly reflected in specific actions or amissions, carmot meet the facts of the
raatter of ~nti-Saviet a~itation and propaganda or any other cri.me. The i.n-
vestigating organs and Saviet courts are guided in their worl, by these i.~r-
portant theoretical sta~ements."
- P.ecited here ~~i.th a rhetoric bordering unon the ridiculous anci with pseudo-
liberal bathos is no ~ore than the popular sayin~ "thrn.z~hts a~re free" or
"nobody can look into another's brain." They are the natural limits of
state prosecution and surely represent.no merit a,cquired by a legal state.
Soviet cri.mi.nologists are obvi.ously uncomfortable at having to a,dmit that
the liability to punishn2ent for opinions may arise on].y if they are ex-
pressed ,a~ if it is possible to note them, and that dissidents are there-
fore firied onl.y for holdin~ opinions and for their attitude.
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That the issue of lial~ility to ptnzisYm~ent as per articles 70 or 1901 is
concerned Precisely with attitudes clearly eraerges frau Soviet cruuinolobi-
cal literature: "'.~he correct political approach ) in tr.e inves~igation
and assessment of the personality of the offender is one of the canditions
~Jhich hel~ clisti.nguish the facts of the matter under investi~ation (ar-
ticle 190 ) on the an.e hand from anti-Soviet a~itation and propaganda, on ,
_ the other fran remarks by politically iuanature petty Uour~eois trhich
_ are not subjeet to penalties. In the latter case we are dealing with per-
sons wiio do not reflect on the im;~lications of somethin; they rsay have over-
heard and who, for the salce of idle gossip, may tend to boast about their
inside lmowledge. Uith reference to such petty bourgeoi~ it is nece~sary
anly to use preventive r.ieasures. llero~atory, imhealthy or politically de-
fective remarl:s due to general political bacl:wardness and 1a,clc of education
cannot be co~nsidered anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Ign~orance, ,
therefore, protects the indivi.duals ~ancerned from pLmisY~ent, while a mem-
' bcr of the intelligentsia may expect to suffer sev~eral years of imprisorrr~ent.
u) The (Positive) t~Ieanii~ of Freeciom of Opini.on
According to article 50 of the constitution the citizen must use his freedrnn
of opinian "in agreement with the interests of the people and for the consa-
lida.tion and clevelopment of tlze socialist order." As e~:plained before this
canjunction of interests signifies the citizen's political subordination to
the CPSU. He uwst form his opinion on the basis and in the spixit of party
resolutions or directives which, for their part, are aUove criticisni. De-
pending whether the par~Ly decrees a rigid line of opinion or leaves room for
discussion, the citizen nay have same scope for his own opinians. However,
such expres~ions of opinian must serve the consolidation of the system, in
_ otltier words they must be basically affiimative and optimistic.
That appliss to an even ~reater extent whenever the Soviet citizen feels i.m~-
pelled to criticize. Follo~wiY~ the ey.ample of party resolutions he ntust
first stress the praiset~orthy aspects ar~d intimate his profaund conviction
that party and state are already using the correct approach to the resolut:ion
of the respective problem. The subsequent critique may involve only some
"defects" and "errors," in other words criticize d.etails only. Any general
critique is the prerogative of the paxty leadership at the respective level
or other organizations and institutions controlled by the party. The citi-
zen, for his part, must be careful not to evaluate the defects of society
- and the "systen" according to plan or independenfily draaa coherent conclu-
sions.
This interpretation is repeated in article 49 of the constitutian, accord-
inU to which the citizen has the xi~ht to "criticize defects" in the w~rk of _
state organs and social organizatians (paragraph 1), ~~hile paragraph 3 ex-
plicitly prohibits persecution for criticism e:cpressed, that is for criticism
of details, not for general critiques.
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YII. rreedan of Information and PuUlicatian
~s~icle 19 paragraph 2 of the civil rights agreement taltes into accoun~ the
inherent cannection between freed~oam of information and freedom of opinion.
It states that the right to the expression of opinion includ,es the freedom
"disregarding national borders, to acquire, receive and pass an infonnation
and ideas of any lcind orally, i.n manuscript or in print, by works of art or
eny other means of ane's aam choice."
Though article 50 0~ the Soviet Constitution cioes not e.~plicitly cite free-
dom of information, it does guarantee "freedam of the press" and, in par~ _
graph 2, safeguards "political liberties" by "the comprehensive disseminar
tion of infoimation and mal:ing possible the use of the press, television and
radio." Article 46 is aimed in the same dixection; it guarantees the "right
_ to cultural a,chievements" by the "clevelopment of televisio~n, radio, publish-
ing and the periodical press as well as a netta~rk of free libraries.
Tk~ difference between the civil rights agreement and Soviet law is evident:
~Jhile article 19 is conceived as the right of the indi.vidual and its sub-
ject ma.tter very precisely defi.ned, articles 50 and 4b indicate the opera-
tion and accessibility of institutionalized mass media. Of caurse we do not
necessarily have a cantradiction here, because individual and i.nstitu~C3.onal
aspects together provide camprehensive freedom of publication and infoxm~
tion. P~everthe].ess the Soviet Constitution's eutphasis is highly suggestive.
A closer study stows that this is not accidental, either.
a) The Aspect of Individual Rights
In the US5R anly the party, the state and social organizations, that is pub-
lic institutions, are permitted to issue printed matter, films and any other
sources of information. Though the law does not exp].icitly say so, the fact
is evident as demonstrated i.n a series of decrees.
Fram the economic angle the 5oviet state as the sole own~er of ~the means of
production (article 10 of the constitution) is alon~e authorized to dispose af
all printing presses and copyi.ng machines. The personal property right of -
the citizen d.oes not apply to them (article 13 of the constitution, article 25
~eneral civil cocie).
The citizen is further prohibited from the gain.ful use of printing and simi-
- lar devices, becanse the private operation of a"polygraphic business" is
banned by law.
Admittedly, the publication and distribution of writings in S~nizdat is not
rsentioned in so many ~mrds, because the material in question issuQS ~'ror~ _
typewriters, tape recorclers and caaneras, that is personal property rather
than means of production, nor is it prod.uced for coaanercial purposes.
The inac~nissibility of Sami.zdat derives fram the provisians on copyright and
in conjunction wi.th achnini.strative law, and--conipletnentary thereto--the penal
code. 2~
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Accordin; to article 479 of the RS1,SR civil code the author of a woric has
the ri~ht to publication, reproductio~n and distribution by any procedure
permitted by law. This equates the prin,ciple of everything Ueing prohibited,
which is not explicitly permitted. Soviet law does not aclcnowledge the
right of ~ author to publish anything on his own. Nor ~ay the author ca11
on the services of public publishing hauses for private rionco~ercial. pur~
poses (as he may in Hungary, for exataple). He is tYierefore com~elled to .
turn to the publishing houses ri,m by the party, the state or social organi-
zations. His r;i.glit to publication, though, does not aaount to a claim on
these enterprises; it merely entitles him to decide whether he does or does
not wish to publish Iiis work. "tahether it should be published is a question
decided by the socialist organizations who are charged Frith the choice and
distribution of useful worlts in this or that sector. Publishing, thea-
trical ~ui similar operations are outside the scope of the citizen's legal
cc7mpetence." In the publishinb houses the authori-to cite Kamyshev--is con-
i'ronted by an "editor who analyzes the wnrl~ fran ideological., political,
scientific and artistic aspects and is empawered to remove anythir~; contra-
dicting the principle of party coQaai.tznent in literature, the ideologica]
tasl.s of our party and the interests of the Soviet state. I-Io~wever, by vir-
tue of the author's right to the inviolability of his warlt, t.~1e editor may
i~ake insertions only with the appraval of the author."
'~o escape this cantrol the Saviet citizen may try to nublisii his manuscript -
ai~road, on his own responsibility, and ever since Sinyavs~a.y and Uani.eZ' many
have adopted this approach. It is not legal, though. When Znores I~Iedvedev,
for e-:~le, wished to send same lecture notes to the United States, the
postal clerk told hi.m: "We accept manuscripts of essays only fram (public)
institutions and as per form 13a." That foYm is issued to scientists, ~or
instance, anly after a threefold review by the Ac2.demy and when passed by
the Glavlit censorship authority--prwided the m2nuscript does not reveal
~y state or defense secrets rwr cause ~y political or ecanomic dama~e to
the country.
Actua].ly nonobservance o~ the prescribed publication procedure cloes not auto-
matically signify culpability. Nor are there arry l~awn penalties for such
fox~al offenses. tIowever, this is no nore than a tlzeoretical gaP. In prac-
tice it is almost always closed by the sweeping a~Flicat~an of the state se-
curity provisions mentioned earlier (articles 70 ~d 190 penal code), r~ore
rarely u~ed is article 162 penal code ("operating a banned trad~~ or 1r-
- ticle 206 I~na.l code ("hoolibanism"). In the final analysis, therefore, and
des~ite their na.teri.al features, the penal provision.s regardin~ opinions have
t~ie sole task of ~uaranteeing the observance of the formaZ publication proce-
dures, in other ~aords prevent the evasion of censorsllip in any circtiunst~ces
whatsoever. For a S~nizdat product to be cl~ssified "anti-Soviet" the can-
tent clues not rsatter; at issue is only the procedural offense of its distri-
bution. As the pre~ceding section shawed, it does not take a particular ef-
fort thus to prove "anti-Savietism."
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In fact, therefore, the Soviet citizen's freedo~m of publicatian is tanta-
r~rnmt to a b~n on publication, which ~ay l~e lifted at the discretion of
- party or state. This unilateral authority of the state is quite incampat-
ible with tlze provisions on the bal.ance of interests betwe~n citizen and
state as establislzed in this respect by the civil rigl;ts a~reem~ent.
b) The Institutional Aspect
- The individual entitlement of the Soviet citizen is thus legally confined
to the subRnission of writings or sources of infor~aation to public institu-
tions ~d to the use of public infoxmation systems. Of caurse as a ru].e
the scope of the citizen of liberal-deuwcratic canstitutional crnmtries
does not go any further eith,er. In nwd.ern conditions of public media opera-
tians (revolutionary tecYuwlogies, concentrati.on, and so on) the i.nternal
= order of the media is crucial. ~chnittedly this is n~ot directly mentioned
in the agreements. Still, from the corsnection with the camprehensiv~e pro-
scription of discri.mination by article 2 civil rights agreement we may ger~
erally conclude that, witllin the limits of the liberal and social value sys-
tem established by the agreement (article 5), the media must allaw access
to information and its dissemination to all citizens, ind~pendent of their
- political, ideological or religiaus tendencies and social status, and so on.
Of course this is an ideal unl.ikely to be completely met by any crnmtry.
That is not the point anyway. Decisive ~or o~a inquiry is the question
wi~ether the legal and actual system of the press and infarmation services
in the USSR reflects a serious att~mpt at realizing such principles.
In the Soviet Union it does not. Its press and information system is charac-
terized by feat~es which mal:e it impossible i.n many areas for citizens to
infoxTa themselves extensively and factually, or to foxv~ their awn judgment "
without prior indoctrinatian. These features are
Control of informa.tion ar~d
Supnression of information which operates on the principles of
Party-mindcdness and ideological one-sidec~iess
Education by a~itation and prapaganda. -
Central direction froa above
Deliberate inequality of a,ccess to information, in the fina.l analysis for
the purposc of securing the powers of the politburo's apparatus; the e:~
tent and emphasis of conscious m~ipulation may vary
T,lith re~ard te political informa,tion (newspapers, radi.o, television, and
so on)
Literature ~nd art
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liumanities, and
Technical and natural sciences.
The control and suppression of information are indissolubly linked, because
any controlling issue of information is necessarily coupled with the amis-
sion of information. The standardized politico-ideological orientation of
the press and information organization means that censorship is its basic
feature, adopting various guises. (Factual) censorship set up to prevent
the publication of certain facts, personified by a dour bureaucrat wielding
a red pencil to delete anything ci,eemed undesirable, here represents a se-
condary though not unimportant instr~unent of control.
1. Party-mindedness and Educational F~nction
idodern Soviet information doctrine is still rooted in Lenin's concept of the
press. He renresented the newspaper as the party's tool for agitation, pro-
paganda and organization. For the Marxist-Leninist any possibility of "ob-
jective" information is excluded initially fran the theoretical standpoint,
because the spreading of infoimation is claimed to be entirely dependent on
the class interests of the intermediary. Information has neither an intrin-
sic value nor an intrinsic weaning, it demonstrates or obtains both fram the
st~dpoint of Soviet ideology. Propaganda consequently is nothing disrepu-
- table. At the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress (1971) Brezhnev comanented: "In
the great and difficult cause of shaping the new man, in the ideological
struggle with the world of capitalisui, the me~s of mass informatian and
propaganda...are an important tool of the party. In the period under re- -
view the Central Cotmmittee repeatedly discussed operational problems of ir~
formation and propaganda media in ~Che endeavor to ensure the improvement of
these med~a's quality of work and their influence on ever broader masses of
the public." Soviet media expert Sirotin has s~?arized that which is ulti-
_ uiately at issue: "Political infoxmatian is one of the means for the ideolo--
gical-political education of the working people, oriented to shaping their
i�iarxist-Leninist ideals and the ca~mu~ist attitude to work. It allows for -
the farthest reaching consolidation of the socialist society by educ~
_ ting the Soviet people to be convinced of and devoted to the cause of couunu-
nism, and helping them to be active fighters ag~inst foreign ideologies."
This stater~ent could not put it nore baldly: Political information (informa-
ciya) becoRUes the raw material of political lmocaledge (in~ormirovanye) which
results in the political formation (formirovanye) of the citizen of a formed
society.
The practical result of this media doctrine is the well known laclc of infor-
ma.tion and topicality of, especially, the Soviet press, The few newspaper
pages are filled with stereotyped reports about output and harvests,speech-
es by politicians, I:remlin bulletins and i~tnensely dull editorials which re-
flect quite accurately the party lea~ership's demands on the people but
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hardly the topical political developments in the country. Reports are
slightly more frank and problem-oriented with respect to sane social issues
su~ch as enviroranental control, supplies, careers, the situation of wamen,
old people or juvenile crime, especially in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA and the
local press. At the seane time the rnmmerous taboos prevailing in these
fields also are rarely touched upon.
2. Central Information Control a~d Unequal Access to Information
Central infonaatian cantrol and Luiequal access to information are indivi-
sibly linked with pa~ct~y-mindedness and the educatianal function; in fact
they postulate one another. Access to info~ation is carefully graded in
accordance with the citizen's political and bureaucratic-institutional
rank. Head:ing the rankings are the Politburo and the Central Co~�nittee
Secretariat, the propaganda department of which is campetent for the daily
control of the news media and closely cooperates with the TASS news agency
and the etlitorial offices of the tmion newspapers, in parfiicular PRAVDA,
the official organ of the Central Committee.
TASS, holding the rank of a state cammittee at the USSR Council of l~inis-
~ ters, is the only source of foreign news for nearly all media. It also do-
minates the collection and distribution of domestic news. ~
TASS issues special bulletins, and the information included in these de-
- creases with its respective coloration (red, white, gree, blue) and the
nimmber of copies; they are distributed in accordance with specific lists of
recipients. TASS provides the best and most cvmprehensive information for _
the party le~rship, followed by the senior cadres of the Uni.on and the
republics. The internal wreekly ATLAS provides foreign news for the army of
party propagandists and political informants.
These special inforn~ation services related primarily to foreign events are
complemented by a system of damestic party information, that is an appara-
tus of information collection and reporting from below to above, which has
expanded greatly in recent years. It is complemented by computerized pro-
cessian and evaluation, which is carried out by sociologically trained -
staffs. The interest focuses on the attitudes aiui opinions of the public,
inssofar as general political aspects are involved on "the reactions of
working people to the most important events at hame and abroad, and to the
resolutions of the Co~unist Party and the Soviet Government"; also "infor-
mation of a negative na.ture, that is data on the attendance in religious
institutions and the dynami.c of their revenues, the performance of reli-
gious rites, the status of crime especially anong juveniles, violations of
labor disciplin,e (such infonnatian is regularly received by the party or-
gans...).
Among the main sources of information are letters of camplaint and inqui-
ries from citizens, questians fran the audience at political meetings, ix~
timate conversations, ma.terials published in the local press, ongoing data
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from the econani.c and statistical organs and social organi.zations. Cample-
mented by regular reports fran the ministries and subordinate authorities,
the prosecutors offices and courts as well as, last not least, the state
security service (KGB), a v~eritable mountain of information rises up in the
apparatus of the Central Co~�mittee. Except for possible defects in evalux~
tion, this should pravide the leadership with a largely unvarnished image
of "Soviet reality."
In the Soviet state planning is not confined to the socioeconomic sector.
I t includes--or at least clai.ms to include--all areas of life including
political propaganda, literature, art and science. Planning and control at
state level are carried out by the Coim~cil of Ministers, especially the
- State Coamittee for Publishi~g Houses, Printing Plants an~d the Book Trade,
the State Camiittee fox Television and Radio Broadcasting, (~ai.th respect to
art) thz USSA rfinistry of Culture and the State Coa~nittee for Cinema.togra-
phy, and (wi.th respect to the sciences) by the Academy of 5ciences, the
~ State Coamittee for Science and Technology and some major imi.versities �
(l~ioscow, Leningrad, Novosibir~k).
Let me now turn to the State Co~mittee for Publishing Houses which plans al-
most the entire print output of the country (newspapers, magazines, books,
and so on). Qn the basis of the program drafts submitted to it by all pub-
lishing houses and editorial offices, incorporated in the standard values
of the economic plan, th~e coam~ittee drafts armual and long-term plans which
not only d,ecide the pres~e~i demand for pa~er, machines, established posts,
and so on, but are linked at tY~e sa~?e time wit-h tlie politico-ideological
control of publishing ~d editorial progra~ns. Among the co~nittee's mai.n
fimctions therefore are "the guarantee of a literary output at a high ideo-
logical, t~heoretical and professional standard, the impravement of its effi-
cacy in the accamplishment of the tasks of co~mmist construction, the im-
plenien~a~tion of the centralization and specialization of publishing" as
well as "supervision of the realizatian of party and governroent resolutions."
_ The key program points ("profiles") issued by the ca~ittee represent
"orders" (prikatsy) mandatory on the publishing hou,ses. Ex~empt fran text-
ual supervision are "the n~ewspaper and magazine publishers of the party or-
- gans," (such as the central publishing house PRAVDA). This follows upon
the superiority and absence of accountability enjoyed by the party vis-~-
vis the state apparatus. Also exempt are the publication plans of the Ac~
demy of Sciences, which the coQmittee may anly revi~ew formally "for the
purpose of (plan) coordination," and the plans of scientific-technical ir~
foxmation. This reflects a certain independence of scien~ce. �
T'he co~mittee receives copies of the crnmtry's entxre print output, analyzes
the non-periodical literature a~d canpiles surveys regarding the topics ~
dealt with.
In ac~ditian to the technical-econamic direction and aciministration of the
publishing trade, the functian of the state cammi.ttee thus consists ma:i.nly
in reviewing the plans--by the light of Central C;o~mmittee guidelines--and
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ensuring th~t the profile of the publishing prograns reflects the lce~t sub-
jects listed by the party,
The other state cammittees mentioned have basically the sa~ne fimctionso
- With respect to political propaganda, literature arnd art, the professional
associations of journalists, writers, artists, musicians, architects, film
makers and actors represent additional mana,gement and control i.nstrimlents
of the party, and so does the populsr science propaganda society "Knowledge:'
In their charters all of them acimo~,aledge the supremacy and the ideological
claims of the party.
3. Suppression of Infoxmation (Factual Censorship)
The system of guidance and the concamitant control of infor~uation is co~
- Fleted by the prior and final censorship of all and any publications. lte-
sponsible for this is the main a,c~ninistration for the defense of s~cate se-
crets in the press at the USSR Cotimcil of Ministers, a special agen~cy which
has its o~,m adrninistrative infrastsucture dawn to city and la~ay level.
.~stablished in its present foYm in August 1966, it can look back to nearly
60 years of aperation and is still knawn by the tra,clitional designation
"Glavlit." Its current statute is un~mawn. The decree issued by the Coun-
cil of Peoples Co~rmissars on 6 June 1931 "On the main administration for
the affairs of literature and publishing houses in the RSFSR (Glavlit) and
its local organs" was certainly superseded in the course of the reorganiz~
tion of the media in the mic~1960's. This does not mean that the decree is
completely obsolete as to subject matter. Our lmawledge of the current
modus operandi of Glavlit indeed entitles us to ass~aae that the actual core
of the 1931 statute persists. It may therefore provic1e the basis of tlze
follo~ring description. Admittedly, the State Committee for Publishing took
ov~er some of Glavlit's responsibilities since 1966, the time the two agen-
cies were separated.
Glavlit's pvwers of supervision extend to all materials intended for publi-
cation by publishing houses, radio and television stations, exhibitions,
and so on. The censor may ban their distribution and seize them if they
"a) Represent agitation and propaganda against the Soviet power and the
dictatorship of the proletariat (nowadays knawn as the 'state of the
entire people');
b) Betray state secrets;
c) Incite to nationalist or religious fanaticism;
d) Are of a pornographic na.ture~
I was unable to find out for certain in haw far publications by party pub..
lishing houses are subject to Glavlit supervision. I assume that its
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campetence in this instance is restricted to the protection of secrets. In-
formation to be k,ept secret, baYmed topics, institutions and so on, are
listed in a"register" which has the di.mensions of a heavy book, is annual-
ly campiled by Glavlit ar~d the respective offices so directed by the Central
Camu.ttee, and supplemented regularly in the course of the year.
Glavlit exercises only general factual censorship. Technical publications
are subject also to special censoxship (aYmed forces, KGB, nuclear agency,
space agency, and so on).
Access to legal regulations is an extremely important aspect of the suppres-
sian of informatian in the Soviet state. Published without any cuts are
only the (formal) legislation ~d resolutions adopted by the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR and the Union republics. As a rule, haw~ever, these merely in-
clude general pravisions so that the subsequent implementing regulations
are of the utmost importar~ce and l~owledge of fiYiese at least as vital. Mo-
reover, there are actually rather few legislative acts because, by decrees
and resolutions, the Presidiwn of the Supreme Saviet has largely preempted
legislation (ex~cepting by the Co~uncil of 2~sinisters). Decrees by the Presi-
diimm, hawever, need not be published "unless they have general application
or are of a n~ozmative nature." This way of putting it ensures virtually
discretionazy powers to the Presiditmm.
The s~e applies to the no less important decrees issued by the Council of
1�Iinisters of the USSR and the various Union republics. These decrees also
are nev+er published. Publication of directiv~es, orders, circul.ars and other
standard instructions (often decisive for day-to-day ac~ninistration) is not
subject to any general rule; it is entirely at the discretion of the more
th~ 50 ministries and state ca~ittees which constitute the USSR Council of
Diini~ters. Only two of them have their own gazette. The slight monthly
_ GAZ~'I'I'E OF 5TAI~IDARD INSTRUCTIONS OF AffNISTRIES AND CENTl2AI. A(~1CIE5 OF THE
USSR is used almost exclusively by the econ,amic supexvisory organs (State
Plarming Cauaittee, State Committee for Construction Affa3.rs, State Bank,
State Ca~aittee for Supply) to pramul.gate their most 3mportant decisions.
Otherwise it is the exception and more or less by accident if ministerial
and other decrees are published although (or possibly just because) they
often exert a profound effect not only on the internal operations of the re-
spective agency but the lives of many citizens. That holds good especially
for the authority to interfere with the classic civil liberties, that is the
inviolability of the person, of residence, of the mail and telec~m~cation
secret, with freedom of religion, assembly and association anc~-not least-- -
freedam of information.
Krwwledge of published legal doctianents is made difficult if not impossible
by the rather smal.l editians of the official gazettes and the lack of clari-
ty of the inforuiaticm provi.ded. There are no loose-leaf supplements regu-
larly advising of the version of decrees currently in effect. The irregu-
larly published texts and commentaries referring to specific areas of
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legislation (in any case rare in the USSP.) are issued in such small rnuubers
that they do not even suffice to supply all official agencies (party, achni-
nistration, justice, labor unions, azid so an); they are also quickly obso-
lete and often full of gaps. If they ever go on sale, they are immediately
sold out.
The state of affairs is most satisfactory with regard to the labor, social,
civil and economic cod.es. Here info~a.tion has much i.mproved since the
Stalin era, and the party leadership has actually promised further i.mprove-
ment. This includes the "Collection of Laws" naw in preparatian. Neverthe-
less, even when that is published, the USSR will sti11 lag far behind the
standard of legal i.nformation nozmal for a constitutional state, especially
in the specifically political matters of state ar~d ac~ninistrative law. V.M.
Chchikvadze, former president of the Soviet Academy Institute for Political
Science and Jurisprudence, worte in 1971 that the subjective rights of citi-
zens could be realized anly insofar as the m~embers cf society were fully in-
forme~ about that area and that sphere in which they intended to ex,ercise
thei.r rights. Infoxmation and publicity were an indispensable aspect of -
socialist democracy. Talcing this as a criterion, the cuxrent status of
publication of Saviet legislation in effect largely aanoLmts to a denial of
rights.
This comprehensive politico-ideological control, factual censorship and
educational fixn,ction do not merely exceed the restrictions permitted by the
civil rights agreement in thA public interest. Actually they canfer on the
Saviet information a qualitatively different nature which has nothing at
all in co~mon wi th freedam of information. Instead we see a perfectly or-
ganized system of disinformation though, in the actual conditions of the
age of technology and worldwide canmunications, this has turned out to be
a giant and ultimately ineffective anachranism. It has certainly been uxr
able to prevent the growing influ,ence of foreign radio trans~missions or the
caunterinformation and co~uunication system with has emerged in conjunction
~ui.th the civil rights movement. Un tl~?e contrary, the competitive strength
of these other systems has been reinforced. Despite the many attempts at
suppression, S~izda,t--swnrn to stick to the facts--has becane a solid
force in Soviet society, and its disappearance can hardly be cantemplated.
IV. Freedam of Assembly
Article 21 of the civil rights agreement aclmawledges the "right to peace-
ful assembly" and permits restrictions only by law and from the aspect of
the public interest as earlier described.
Article 50 of the Soviet Constitution guarantees "the freedan of assembly,
the freedom of d~monstration, the freedam to march through the streets"
with the reservation anly of the need for "its coincidence with the inter-
ests of the people and for the cansolidation and development of the social-
ist order (paragraph 1). For t1~e purpose of exrercising these rights "pub-
- lic buildings, streets and squares are at the disposal of the working peo-
ple and their organizations" (paragraph 2).
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Unless the Soviet citizen is willing to consult the penal code, the laws
do not provide any detai.ls on the freedom of assembly. There are no laws _
of either the Union or the republics dealing with assembly, and therefore
no general rules of procedure for the notification and approval of indoor -
= or outdoor m~eetinos, disregarding altogether the special problem of reli-
= gious celebrations.
The only exception is the Ukraine where--at least on paper--the administra-
tiv~e code of 12 October 1927 is still in force and regulates the conduct of
_ meetings, marches and demonstrations. It dist; shes betw~een ev~ents re-
oui.ring simple notification and those n~eeding permission. Noti.fication is
required for meetings organized by state organs, party organizations and
other social organizations (articles 325, 336). Other associations and iir
dividual citizens, on the other hand, must obtain perwission fran the admi-
nistrative agencies, giving the da.te, the progrffin and the nanes of the or-
gaali.zers (articles 325 ff; 338 ff). Perinission may be refused if the pur- -
pose, the topic of discussion and the canposit3on of the organizers and
participants at the meetings run caunter to the constitution or the laws
(articie 328). The refusal must be issued n,o later than 24 hours before
the proposed meeting. Similar regulations apply to outdoor meetings and
demonstrations which, incidentally, ~y be prohibited if they "are lilcely
to obstruct the safety of road traffic" (article 341).
The constitutional and political change from the NEP [n~ew economic policy]
to Stali.nism left only one principle in place acnor~g these regulations: Oxil.y
party organs, state institutions and social org~nization have the right to
carrvoke meetings an,d organize de~monstrations. And that is how it has re-
mained to tliis day. The Soviet citizen's freedam of assembly is thus re-
duced to attendan,ce at the above menfiioned events. He may, for ex~nple, at-
tend meetings of his basic organization in his capacity as member of a labor
tmion or the Kamsamol, go to election meetings or put in an appearance at
the staff ineetings cal.led by the labor union coaenittees. On ceremanial oc-
casions and state holida.ys the party regul.arly fulfills his possible wi.sh
to participate in demonstrations.
It is not up to the Soviet citi2en to decide whether or not to attend such
meetings or demonstrations. As, due to the status of the organizers, public
events aze absoluteZy in the public interest whi~h the citizen is duty bound
Uy the constitution to attend (article 62), nanattendance wou].d amount to
- dereliction of duty and a"misinterpretation of freeclom" (article 59 of the
constitation: Unity of right and duty!). Though neglect of this duty is not
subject to official penalties, it is pimished--hardly less effectively in
ury oninion--by "social action" (obshchestvennoye votsdeystvye) such as "ac~
monitions," the loss of trade unian ar enterprise benefits, ancl so on. The
freedom of assembly c1escribed i.n article 50 of the Soviet Constitution, and
so on, amounts in la~w and in fact to the citizen's duty to participate. In-
cidentally, interpretation of thi.s duty is almost completely arbitrary. Ar-
ticle 21 of the civil rights agreem~nt is certainly not implemented.
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In literal terms the fact that the constitution dces not guar~tee freedom
- o~ assembly for the Soviet citizen leav~es open the question whether he is
definitely prohibited fran assembling peacefully with otY~rs on his own in-
itiative. A co~clclusive prohibition could be deduced fran the conatitution-
al provision anly if the principle were in force that everything is prohi-
bited unless explicitly peimitted. Soviet law dces not aclmawledge such a -
principle but the broad interpretation and gen~erous application of politi-
cal penal laaa suffices to let this concept become reality as an unwritten
law.
Parallel to the prohibitions imposed an freedom of opinion (articles 1901
and 70 RSFSR penal code), articles 1903 and 72 of the penal code stop free-
dan of assembly by penalizixig
1. "Active involvement in group a~ctions which grossly violate the social
order or are linked to evic1ent rwncompliance with the legal requirements
of the representatives of the state pawer" (article 1903), and
2. "Organizational activity directed to the preparation or ca~i.ssion of
particularly d~?gerous crim~es against the state or the establishment of
an orgaaLi.zation which aims to commit such crimes, as well as particip~
tion in an anti-Soviet organization" (article 72).
In Saviet interpretatian the essence of an offense as per article 1903, its
"social nature," is the allegation that group actions ~tmt to the attempt
"to op~ose a noiwfficial order to the organized official system or order."
This also represents an attack on the "authority of the (state) pawer"
(avtoritet vlasti). The placement of the citizen imder the tutelage of the
nil.ir~g apparatus could hardly be more plainly expressed. As a result any
meeting not foimally approved by the authori.ties may be prosecuted in the _
coists. The same applies here as for the restraint of th~e freedam of opir~
ion: Th,e real criterion of crimi.nal intent in that sphere ia absence of per-
mi.ssion, involving especially offenses against the state prerogative of cen-
sorship, in other w~rds rebelliari against the ane party state's claim to
total power as such. In this instance also th,e only point at issue is the
formal fact of lacldng state perniission, not the possibly anti-Saviet na.ture
of the meeting, and that fonna]. fact suffices to cause the militia or the
state security service to interven~e.
V. Freedan of Association
As per article 22 of the civil rights agxeement "everyone is entitled freely
to associate with others and to establish labor unions to protect his inter�-
ests." Applicable here also are the usual reservations about the public irr-
terest.
Article 51 of the Saviet Canstitution defines freedan of association as fol-
laws: "In agree~ment with the aims of cammtmist construction USSR citizens
have the right to associate in social organizations which contribute to the
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develo~nnent of political activism and initiative as well as the satisfac-
tion of their various interests."
The Saviet citizen.'s freedam of associ3tion is subject to two reservations
which, in fact, ~nount to a b~ on association with same exceptions. One
is a material reservation referring to the purpose of association, wh:~-ch
has been analyzed already, the other a foxmal reservation. The latter is
concerned with the fact that, in accordance with its constitutionally
aclmowledged leadershi monopoly in all "state and social organizations"
(article 6 paragraph 1~, the CPSU also holds the organizational monopoly in
the Sotizet state. As the party provides the ''leadership nucleus" of every
new or e;ci.sting social organization, no social organization can be cansti-
tionally established without its involvement. Both reservations thus have
the sane result: The nullification of the freedam of association.
t~ioreover, the orientation to "ca~unism" of any fowzsler of an association
is incompatible with aticle 2 of the civil rights agreement azid the social
rights agreement, because the USSR therein obligated itself "to guarantee"
freedan of associatian "without distinctlon...of political or other vi.e~os."
This constitutional situa.tion is underscored by general legislative provi-
sions. Social. organizations are established either with or without state -
involvement (article 22 RSFSP, civil corle). The provisions are moot in the
case of mass or~ani.zations (labor tmions, Komsomol, and so on) whicYr-sulr
ordinated to the party rather than the state--are authorized Uy their sta-
tutes to establish suborganizations.
If the sta~e is inv~lved in the establishment the concessionary system a~-
plies, that is the social organization is established and acl,~-nowledged a
1ega1 entity once the competent authority has confirmed its statutes (ar-
ticle 26 paragra~h 7_ RSFSIt civil code).
The legislative regulations ~overning the establishr~ent, operation and dis-
solution of social organizations are vague, incvmplete and, to san~e extent,
oosolete. Only a few of fihe Union republics have administrative regula-
tions fram the early years of the Stalin era; among tl~em is the order on
~ voluntary societies in the RSF'SR of 10 July 1932, and it is the most signi-
ficant.
According to this order the establisl~nent of an association requires an ap-
plication fra~ at least 10 adult citizens, accamp~i.ed by a draft statute.
All organizations are obligated to contribute to the building o!~ social.ism
o~n the basis of I�Iar;ris~-Leninism and the econocnic plan (articl~~s 1 and 3 of
the order) . The state supervi.sory authority reviews the legality ~ w~ii
as the appropriaten,ess of the establishment (article 12), so that a claim
to a~knission, that is any subjective right of association, is definitely ex-
clucled.
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The principle of united organizata.on applies, so that the simultaneoua ex-
isten~ce of ~lie s~ne type of association is not ger~nissible (article 2), Ac-
cordinU to Bryanskiy double establisYIInents result on1.y in the "useloss waste
of hwnan energy and malce the adminisfiration of social life more d.ifficult."
The founders are explicity prohibited fran calling fiheix organization "l~
bor unions" (article 8). The marwpoly of th,e existing labor unicizs is
thereby legally safeguarded.
The monopoly of the labor Lmi.ons ruled by the party contradicts article S
of the social rights agreement, which acltnawledges the right of every indi-
v3.dua1 (n,ot anly labor union organs) to set up a trade ta,ion. The refusal
of the authorities to register th,e "free workers association" organized on
1 February 1978 therefore a~otmted to a violation of the agreements. The
same applies mutatis mutandi. to the many other associations which have
arisen since the early 1970's within the civil rights mavement and like,
for exanple, the Soviet section of Aamesty International, are vainly ende~
voring to obtain formal recognition.
The ban on associations with the above~e ntioned ex~ceptions is buttressed
in the RSFSR penal code by articles 190' and 72 which have already been
dealt with in the section on freedam of assembly.
VI. Protection of Privacy
Article 17 of the civil rights agreement comprehensiv~e aclawwledges the irr~
violability of privacy: "Nobody may be exposed to arbitrary or illegal irr-
_ terference in his private life, f~nily lifP, residence and mail, or to il-
legal injury to his honor and reputiation. Everybody is entitled to legal
protection against auch interference or in~ury."
The article also provides for state protection a~ainst external interfer-
ence wi.th privately held property, whether objects or premi.ses or of an
iuanaterial na,ture; emphasized here are the i.nviolability of the residence
and of the mails, the latter a texm which stands for all modern methods of
co~nuzication. '
a) The Inviolability of the Residence
- Asticle 55 of the Soviet Constitution guarantees the citizen the "inviol~
bility of his resiclence. Nobody has the right without legal warrant to err-
ter a residence again~t the ~~i.sh of ~he occupiers." The state organs are
entitled at their discretion to enter the residen~ce of a citizen onl.y if the
following canditions are met:
1. Police Powers
j~lithi.n the scope of its gen~era]. assignment "to ensure the defense of public
order in the cotmtry," the militia (ordinary police)--even without the iri-
v~olvement of the public prosecutor's office--may "enter resid.ential premises
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...when pursuing persons suspected of havin~ caaanitted offenses, or to pre-
vent crimes or offenses threatenir~ the social order or the personal safety
of citizens; .,.they may also as a rule enter premises in the d~rtime ~o
checlc the observance of passport regulations, if there is credible indicFr-
tion that these regulations have been violated."
The limits of these powers are v~ery widely drawn because interven~ion is
peitnitted not only to prevent crimes but ~y aclmi.nistrative offenses, so
that it is virtually impossible for th.e citizen to ascertai.n whether the
militia entered his residence rightfully or not.
Tn fact, though, the militia is largely restricted to the arrest or pursui.t
of peoPle, in other w~ords not empowered to search residential premises. Spe-
cific procedural prerequi.sites apply to searches, and this limitation is
usually observed.
2. Cri.minal Procedures
The codes of criminal procedure in the Union republics stress the inviolabi-
lity of the residence. They permit searches within the scope of crimi.nal
pursuit ox~l.y i.f
The senior investigating officer has good reason to believe that wanter
persons or objects and tools of criminal provenance or "ofiher objects
and dociunents are harbored, which may be gennane to the case,"
A well substantiated decision by the senior investigating officer (in
state security matters this is the KGB) and -
Its canfinnation by the public prosecutor are to hand.
In emergencies the confirmat:ion may be omitted. In that case, though, the
public prosecutor must be notified of the searclz within 24 hours.
The seazch must at all times be carried out in the presence of the house-
holder or one of his dependents; should they be absent, in the presence of
the ~anitor or (in rural areas) a vl.llage official. The affected person
must be infonned about his right to be present to witness all actians of ~~he
senior searcher and to be allawed to make a written statement. Searches at
night, that is fran 22.00-06.00 hours, are pezmitted only in emergencies.
The senior searcher may, if necessary, use force to obtain the objects o~
tY~ search; he, may also remove "objects and doc~ents barmed to free traf-
fic," even if tmrelated to the crime.
Th,ese provisians stick largely to the framework of custamary practice in
constitutional states. Pdoitnally they are observed, even in the course of
political investiga~.ions, but often jus~ formally 2nd without takir~; into
account their "intent" whi.ch is to offer protection.
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In political i.nvestigations the KGB is nearly always concerned to camb the _
premises of suspect dissidents for "proscribed doc~unents" of whatever lcind,
and this often hanpens at night -using so~ue pretext or otheri--, wl.thout {
the natter beir~ really urgent. On 22 October 1973, for examaple, the t4os-
caw residen~ce of AI.M. Panl~atov was searched after 23.00 hour~ because he
was suspected of havi.ng forged a st~ in his work boolc. In fact the ;
search inwlv+ed mainly the property of gwests who happened to be present; :
r~any nanuscripts belonging to them were seized. Even more flagrant was tlie %
case of the priest P.A. Adel'geym, Tash~.,ent ObZast. Here a search warrant
taas issued on 12 December 1969 because he was suspected of having systema- ~
tically inflicted bodily harm an sameone Th~e search iumediately ir~ :
volved his library, and the investigators seized so~me 30 boolcs ar~d manu-
scripts as well as the clergyman's savings -
~ven Sakharov learned on more than one occasion that the TCGB searches resi-
clential premises in the absence of their o~wners. On,e of these occasions
was 29 November 1978. ' ~
Still, it is to be accotmted a success of *he civil rights activi.sts expe-
rien,ced in criminal proceedings that the prosecuting organs at least forma].-
ly tend to observie the legal regulations. This represents a significant
change by comparison to the 5talin era. Of course the protective effect is -
very limited because--c~ue to its de facto superiority to the public prose-
cutors offices-, the KGB has no trouble at all in obtaini.ng any document
- required in matters which affect state security.
It is therefore a hopeless undertalcing for any Soviet citizen to try ancl
cor.ipel vis-~vis the state organs the legal protection with regard to the
inviolability of his residence (article 136 ItSFSF, penal cod.e). In fact
this provision is merely dixected against a breach of the dane~stic peace by
private persons. It is therefore a testimanial to exemplary legal ~a?ambi-
guity for the Uzbek penal cod.e (the only ane) to state in article 139:
"The tml.awful search, the vnlaa~ful ~viction (from the residence) or other
actions vi:,iating the irniolability of the residence of the citizen and not
(1) conducted or ca~itted by officials, will be ...p~ished i.f, due to such
actions, earlier measures of admina.strative or social compulsian have been
used, "
b),The Protection of ~l~e Postal Secret
Article 56 of the Soviet Constitution prov~i.des for the protection of the
"laj~" for the "private life of the citizen as well as for the ~ostal, tele-
phone and telegr~h secret."
This provision so~ds paxticularly liberal because it o~i.ts the le~al reser-
vati.ons usual in liberal-constitutional doc~unents which allaw for certain
restrictions. Tlze legislative elaboration also provided in article 56 is
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supposcd only to serve the protection of this right. IJevertheless the
Soviet citizen ~x~uld deceive himself if he were to canclude ~hat protec-
tion is absolute. Restrictions certainly do exi.st, albeit outside the
scope of the constitution. By remaining silent about this circtunstance
article 56 cleceives the citizen with regard to the compelling farce of his
- right.
;3y law the postal secret -analogaus to the i.nviolability of the person--is
restricted by preventive police pawersand cruninal procedural pawers.
1. Police Powers
In accordance wi.th its camprehensive authority in state security matters -
the state security service is em~aered to institute surveillmtice of the
private life of any citizen who sanehaw arouses suspicion, open his letters,
tap his telephane, and so on. The legal bas3s, prestmiably the KGB statute,
i, of course a secret.
jJe clo, though, have some indication of I~GB pawers by means of article 74 of
the USSR co~anuni.cation decree of 27 Tsay 1971. On 31 August 1972 (within
the framewc7rk of an entire lnmdle of legislative measures for strengthenix~
the more severe dissident persecution decided in late 1971 by the party
leadership) a secand paragraph was added, reading as follaws: "T'h,e use of
telephone lines (bet-ween or within cities and villages) for purposes run-
ning caunter to state interests and the social ox~der is prohibited." If a
subscriber contraven~es this provision," the ac~ni.nistration of the co~ica-
tian system may te~nporarily bloclc his telephone or di~corinect it altoge~Cher."
This provi.sion necessarily pres~anes the authority of the security agencies
for preventively checking the content of telephone conversatians~ The cri-
teria for tapping or cutting off perfectly de~onstrate the general preven-
tiv~e and security police-related clauses with respect to interventior~-they
are so ~nbiguaus as to leave the KGB a campletely free hand. If tha.t
agency notes "misuse," the telecarscnazication agencies must, in obedience,
ta~.e steps af;ainst the subscriber. Daily practice offers aanple illustra-
tions.
Caaplaints are answ~red--at most--by an oral reference to article 74, ob-
viously in ord,er not to let exanples of this practice by official agencies
become public lmowledge.
, Doubtlessly the s~ne applies to the surveillance of letters and telegr~ns,
especially to and fran foreign crnmtries.
2. Criminal Procedu.re
As per article 174 RSFSR penal code the senior irn~estigating officer may or-
der the seizure of the correspondence of a suspect or its special sorting
- and censoring, if he considers such a step "necessary�" Quite formal.ly he
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_ is l~owul i.n writing to ~ustify his ciecision and asl: for the approval of the
public prosecutor. The ].etters are to be looked over in the presence of
postal and telegraph officials. The senior investigating officer lifts the
seizure o~ier when he deems it proper to do so.
The criterion of "necessity" subjects the sei.~^ure order to the arbitrary de-
cision of the I:GB. The need .for the public prosecutor's approval offers no
security to thE citizen, because the public prosecutor is not authorized to
review the reasons for KGB decisions with a view to che~cing on their justi-
fication.
The provision is tai.lored entirely to letters and telegraans. It seems not
_ to a~ply to the ta~pi~r~g of telephone coriversations. Soviet cananentaries are
silent on that point.
3. Police and criminal procedural powers of intervention are so far reach-
in~ that it is i~ossible to spea~c of protection of the postal and teleccx~
r.*~m.ication secret, that is the citizen's right to privacy vis-a-vis the
state. Tt~.is appreciation is essential for the interpretation of article 135
P.S:
Sf', penal code a~d articles 12 and 55 of the statute of the telecaanmmica-
tion system, iahich subject the violation of tlze correspondence secret to
penalties. The oril.y possible offenciers considered here by Soviet co~entx
tors axe letter carriers or private persans actir~ an their awn initiative.
T'ne protection oF the Soviet citizen's privacy is thus so substantially
breached that the prov-isions are quite incanpatiNe with article 17 of the
c ivil rights a~,~*reersent.
VII. Conclusion
In vicw of the partly ol7vi.ous contradictions between the hwnan rights co~zYVen-
tion~ ~zd Saviet la~~~ o:Le mig,zt e~.~ect the Soviet Union to have accecled to
filzc~.i onl~ with th,e corresponding re~ervations. After all, any adaptatioiz of
it~ CO11Stl.ti1~1011 to the a~reements is altogetner impossible, because this
t,~uld aQnoun~ to a char~;e in its political system. Unreserved ratification
t:ierefoxe allows only the conclusion that the T7SSP, uses these canventions to
_ pursue merely foreign policy ~oals, designed to improve the conditions for
- icleolodical-political tuzity of action with the Third ~Jorld, legitimize its
clu~l for lcadershi~ at the international level and counteract ~tlie political
inf:Luence of the tTester~z denocracies. This internretation is reinforced by
article 29 of the Union Constitution which declares "respect for htnnan ri;hts
ancl basic freedrnas" a principle of Sovi.et foreign policy.
CQF`~'~;I~iT: Bundesinstitut fuer Ost-~�~i.ssenschaftliche und Internationale
Studien, Colo~n~e, 1980.
11693
, CSO: 3020/1266 43
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NATIONAL
GENERAL GRIGORENKO COAQiENTS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS
Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 13 May 80 pp 120-132
(Interview with former Soviet General Piotr G. Grigorenko by Jacques Lebeau:
"There Will Be War Before the End of 1980"]
[Textj In this exclusive interview, Piotr G. Grigorenko, tormer general of
the Red Army, warns Europe. The USSR is ready to attack: Afghanistan was
also a full-scale exercise for the use of bacteriological weapons.
Piotr G. Grigorenko was a member of the Soviet Communist Party for 32 years,
a general of the Red Army, assistant chief of staff during World War II,
- 73 years old, Ukrainian. His criticism of the Soviet regime began in 1964.
He was often arrested and interned in mental hospitals. It was 1977 before
he succeeded in being exiled. He was stripped of his Soviet citizenship by
order of Brezhnev who said of him: "They released him from the mental
hospital too soon." From New York where he lives with his wife and one of
his five children, he loses no opportunity to grant interviews supporting
dissidence.
[Question] Did your position in favor of the rights of man and your protests
against the genocide of the Tartar people begin when you were still a general
in the Red Army? ~
[AnswerJ Yes, I still~held a position as a superior officer when I began to
be aware of the reality of the regime and decided to protest. At that time,
I talked in the Frunze Military Academy where despite considerable opposition
I succeeded in creating a chair of military cybernetics. One day I said
what I thought about the cult of personality. Immediately, I was cashiered
from the army and sent to the eastern region where I struggled along as a
truck driver under the permanent surveillance of two men and one woman of
the KGB. However, I was able to continue my ac:tivities against the regime -
by drafting and distributing leaflets whenever I had the chance. I created
an organization that I called "Union of the Struggle for the Rebirth of
Leninism," and I was arrested. Yet, at that time, my activity was more
anti-Stalinist than anticommunist.
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[Question] And today do you still have procommunist convictions?
[Answer] No, because the phenomena in Russia have not happened at all by
chance. In reality, communism has no shadings whatever. In the future
there will be only one type of communism whose model of reference will be
that which reigns today as the enlightened despot at Moscow. My wife and
I have belonged to the communist party for more than 30 years yet gradually
_ the idea grew that unknowingly we were under the spell of a certain number
of slogans. The greatest danger for the West does not come f rom the threat
of nuclear war but from the real domination of the ideological weapon, a
real cancer for the free world, which spreads its diseases thro ughout culture,
the political class, the media, educational institutions, at times even through
the police and the army. The greatest fraud of communism is to promote -
everything without having anything to pay off.
[Question] Do you know other cases of Red Army superior officers who might
have tried challenges like yours?
[Answer] I can cite the case of Colonel Davidovic who taugh+t at the Kharkov
Military Academy and who was sentenced to 3 years at hard labor becauGe he
_ publicly criticized the regime. There is also the case of Lieutenant Colonel
Yliev who, in 1967 tried to assassinate Leonid Brezhnev and who was imprisoned
in Kazan Psychiatric Hospital where he was driven insane by rep eated
_ interrogations. More recently, in 1976, there was a mutiny aboard a missile-
launching destroyer on patrol in the Baltic Sea. The mutineers tried to
reach a port in Western Europe, but things ended badly: The officers and
seamen were captured and executed by firing squad. -
[Question] Do you consider the Afghanistan invasion a pure and simple
military incident for the West or the beginning of a new serious crisis?
[Answer] It can be the detonator of a war with incalcuable consequences for
_ the free world. My theory is that the Soviets intervened directly in
Afghanistan to test the capacity for reaction of the various Western nations
in response tu a military intervention conducted solely by Red Army troops.
It was a successful operation: Disunity and weakness in the Western camp,
ineffective "loud cries" from the more courageous. We know the results:
The Soviet troops are 500 kilometers from the Persian Gulf.
[Question] What kind of war do you foresee?
[Answer) Obviously, it seems to me, the third world war. It is not always
a good idea to make historical comparisons, but I find that the invasion..~f
Afghanistan recalls the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Hitler. The West
waited to react only after the invasion of Poland, but it was too late.
[Question] What do you think is the most credible hypothesis in case Soviet
. troops decide to intervene militarily against Western Europe?
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[Answer] It is very difficult to foresee the attacks and how they will
take place. They will attack where they feel there is divisiveness and
weakness. In Africa they have already occupied a certain number of key
countries with the immediate effect of practically separating Europe from
- the United States. In order to gain total control of the sea routes, there
are only three or four nations left to subdue: Zaire, Rhodesia, South Africa.
The first ob~ective will be Rhodesia. Parallel to this African action, they
will try by every means to strengthen their positions in the Persian Gulf. -
I think that if the Soviets have been able to take so many risks with
Afghanistan, this is due to the scorn with which they view Western public
opinion and that of Eur_~pe particularly. This aggressive attitude cannot
be changed by boycotting the Olympic Games in Moscow. I believe, however,
that there will be a Soviet intervention in Europe in a very short time,
before the end of 1980. Then there could be a verification of the theory
that Soviet troops can cross Germany in 3 hours; Berlin could tempt the
Soviets. Supporting my hypothesis, it seems that for several weeks very ~
heavy troop movements have been observed in Czechoslovakia, the equivalent
of six divisions, in addition to two divisions of artillery. All this was
done by order of Army General Mikhailovich Maiorov. But the most significant
fact in recent weeks was the visit of Admiral Gorchkov to the German Democratic
Republic. He is the head of the Soviet Fleet and he went to oversee the ~oint
maneuvers of the two military allies. The most important part of the exercise
was the amphibious operation which could be the full-scale rehearsal for an
attempt to reach the North Sea by forcing the Western belt defenses. For
some weeks there also have been increasingly more specific threats by Soviet
media directed toward Norway. Everywhere~ in Poland, in Hungry, "something"
is being prepared. I am crushed by Western public opinion which is indifferent, _
anesthetized. ~
[Question] Could you tell us what the army of a superpower like the USSR
- consists of and how it compares specifically with other armies of the world?
[Answer] I define the Soviet State as a"mystical, bureaucratic-military
feudalism." It is not a question of dualism between the party which is
its incarnation and the army which is its instrument. The Soviet Army is
the work, the living st~ength of the party which is also that which differ-
entiates it from the Nazi army which existed before the party. Created to
defend socialist "conquests," that is to say the party's conquests, it then
assumed the defense of the "socialist bastion" annexing to it, among other
things, a certain number of populations whose armies were united under the
Warsaw Pact.
- The real commander in chief of the army is not 3ust any marshal, the
minister of defense, but the party leader, whether he be a dictator like
Stalin or the spokesman for a group leadership like Brezhnev. The three
supports of feudalism, the party apparatus, the army and the police complement
one another.
[QuestionJ Could you describe the organization of the Soviet Army from the ~
highest position down to simple soldier?
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[Answer] Obviously, as in the past, it is the party's Central Committee
Presidium which in effect is the head of the entire defense organization.
Regarding this there is a real deception since if this task officially is
entrusted to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers chaired by Brezhnev,
the fictitious authority is con.ferred on the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
which is purely decorative. The present defense minister is not a member of
the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and he is consulted only rarely
and always for technical reasons. The same can be said for the ministries
of industry and interior. Hav;ng said this, the true head of the Soviet -
_ Armed Forces is the defense minister. The minister is surrounded by an
executive group consisting of the military cauncil, whose subordinates are
the general staff of the Soviet Army and Navy, the commanders in chief of
the various forces; the general command staffs and individual commanders.
In addition, the council controls the technical command of the Warsaw Pact
forces, the political executive and counterespionage. The generai staff of
the Soviet Army and Navy is articulated in eight coummands: The first two are
named the principal commands. In order, their titles are as follows: _
1. Glavnoye operativnoye upravlenie (GOU), which is an interarmy command
responsible for handling all operational matters of ~Ehe armed forces and
to verify the work of the general staffs of the various forces. All this is
in close liaison with the rear guard general staff and the civil air fleet.
2. Glavnoye razve dyvatelnoye upravlenie (GRU), which is the main command
for information and which is also an interarmy command which is concerned
with directly controlling all matters of research and administration of
information.
3. The transmission command, which is at the head of monitoring services.
4. Mobilization and organization command and a general research office,
_ which involves all the armed forces.
5. Comanunications command.
6. The code command, which is concerned with security for military secrets,
encoding and decodireg.
7. Topographical comtnand.
8. Historical command, which has the task of synthesizing and organizing
re:~eazr.h anri utilization of military history and which thus constitutes
a center for interarmy documentatian of prime importance. It also publishes
a magaz~ne: VIONNAIA MYSL [Military Thought].
The supreme commands of the land, air, naval and antiaircraft forces each
has a ch~~f of staff and eight divisions as well as a weapons and services -
command. The main ones are:
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1. The rear guard command, which is concerned with logistics and security
of rear areas as well as a part of the national security on the domestic
level, in liaison with counterespionage.
2. The general affairs command of the ministry which is concerned with
administrative questions to which recently was added the central office for
scientific research for military applications.
3. Personnel command, which technically comes under the party personnel
office.
4. Military construction command, which uses special troops.
5. Military education command, which at the Voroshilov Academy oversees
interarmy higher education.
6. Military justice command, which technically comes under the USSR Supreme
Court and which has all the armed forces under its ~urisdiction. -
7. The special devices command executive.
[Question] What power does the Red Army Military Police have?
[Answer) The police and counterespionage are other aspects of party influence
over the army. In the battalion, for example, there is a lieutenant who is
not on the roster because he is assigned to the co~ander by his superiors.
This lieutenant wears the same uniform as other officers even thought he is
not a military man. He is a member both of the KGB [State Security Committee)
cadres as well as of the GUKR [Counterespionage General Command). By habit
they continue to call him Double 0(abbreviation of Ossobyi Otdiel, Special
Section) or also Ossobniak which in ~argon means...private building. Double 0
- is the most feared person in the battalion because he is the most powerful.
His relations, which are secret, can bring about the worst punishment for
soldiers and officers. The division's counterespionage section, of which
Double 0 is an antenna, can at any moment carry out an incursion, facing the
command with an accomplished fact. Actions of this kind, carried out with
total impunity, often have caused death or deportation for� many youths who
opposed the regime. A network of secret informers, of Seksots, constantly _
reports even the smallest events in the battalion. The fate oc every Soviet
soldier is to ask himself constantly if his words will be reported to the
Special Section by his best friend, to fear a report by a malevolent subordin-
ate, to no longer trust anyone. Yet this systen is losing effectiveness
because by living for years in a permanent nightmare, the average Soviet
soldier has become used to it.
[Question] Don't you have the impression that the problem facing the Soviets
today is no longer to decide whether to make war, but rather where to make it?
[Answer] Believe me, the Soviets know where to make war. The entire universe
is their battlefield. You Westerners are ingenuous if you believe that.
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Soviet expansionism will stop. Take for example what is happening ri~ht
now in Zaire. Do you believe that it is by chance that the Soviets have
sent an "armada" to the ex-Portuguese [sic] colongy composed of 25,800
Cubans, 9,000 East Germans, Hungarians and Czechs, and more than 6,000
Soviet soldiers? To this impressive figure must be added 475 KGB agents
and 720 officers, of whom 11 are Soviet generals. If Europe depends to a
large degree on Africa for its raw materials, the USSR takes from the
African continent almost all of its uranium, its cobalt and manganese,
its oleaginous products, and coffee. Zaire, is therefore, the basic African
outpost for_ the USSR. Perhaps the entire future of the West is being gambled
down Chere. And you do not seem to be aware of it.
[Question] Can you cite other cases of attempts at destabilization tried by
the USSR?
~Answer] For example, the USSR recen~ly began negotiations to install a
fleet of fishing boats on the Cook Islands. I have learned that about 50
Cubans recruited by the Soviets are training a popular revolutionary army on
the, island of Grenada; deliveries are being made of weapons to be installed
near Saint Georges, the capital. It is not by chance that the Soviets have
just completed a 440-kilometer-long railway between southern Yacoutia and
the embarkation ports of the Pacific Coast. And again what is to be said of
the Soviet nuclear submarines that patrol the waters around the Azores in
large numt~ers? This is precisely where the Americans possess a military
airbase for the defense of Europe. Furthermore, it is known that the Russians
have every interest in %inlandizing Western Europe in order to gain the
necessary time to reinforce their southern flank. The present 43 divisions
that control the Amur, Mongolia and the Ussuri are insufficient in case of
a classical war considering the 200 Chinese divisions concentrated along
Siberia and in the Far East. Everything serves to check this temporary lack
of military power. An example: Along the entire frontier with China, the
USSR is erecting a true wall of iron and cement. The Red Army, not knowing
~ what to do with the immense stock of old T34 and T10 tanks, has poured them
into reinforced cement with only the turret emerging and they have tied this
into a radar system to control the trajectory of weapons. This line of tanks,
which is 3 kilometers inside Soviet territory, makes it possible to establish
an actual barrier of fire in case of a Chinese attack. -
In order to be ready in 1982, or 1983, the So~niE~ts must be able to partially
dismantle the western front, to build communication roads and to create new
bases. However, the conventional Soviet Army is always three times more
powerful than that of the West with its 40,000 assault tanks against the 10,000
of the United States. The deployment of new SS-24 missiles in the German
Democratic Republic, which are added to the SS-21s and to the backfire
bombers which have a flight range of 9,000 kilometers and the 2,500 inter-
continental strategic weapons, permit the USSR to have 12,000 nuclear warheads.
To this must be added the 60 atomic submarines, potential launchers of 740
MSBS atomic ballastic missiles. I will not even speak of the innumerable
squadrons equipped ~aith very recent MIG 25s or o f the T-72 heavy armored
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units. From this can be deduced the incontestable numerical and qualitative -
superiority of the Soviet Army in case of a conflict.
i
[Question] The USSR also is faced by 4r.atomic threat. In case of a nuclear
war do they fear the conseqiiences of what this would involve?
[Answer] I believe the Sovier_s fear these possible consequences increasingly
less, both because of their power and because of the internal contradictior.s
of the West. Their aim is only that of making the atomic advent a psychopoliti-
cal weapon. In order for this weapon to be useful, they need not only to have
available an impressive stock of devices, but also armed forces who believe
and are morally ready. From this point of view the Soviet Army is perfect.
_ [Questionj What kind of research is now being done in the USSR that could
constitute military variations on a classic or atomic war?
[Answer] They are numerous, amazing and impressive. The Soviet Army is
perfectly trained for this kind of conflict and the Western armies are beginning
only now to become aware of it. In case of chemical warfare there is Sarin.
The lethal dose is 0.01 milligrams per kilo of body weight. The adult dose
can be absorbed in a few minutes if the concentration of Sarin is from 0.1 to
0.3 milligrams per liter of air. On this basis it is easy to realize that
in order to achieve a lethal concentration in the atmosphere of a city like
Rome, it would be necessary to disperse 200 tons of Sarin, which is possible
if it is considered that this weight can be easily transported by about 20
bombers or by the equivalent in mi~siles. According to latest information
available to me, it seems that the Soviet troops have available strategic
weapons that can carry chemical or bacteriological warheads. The USSR is
not concei-ned about international agreements banning this kind of weapon:
Today, in Afghanistan, the Soviet troops do not hesitate to bombard the rebels
and civilians with a vaporized chemical gas, Soman, which causes paralysis
of the nervous system, insanity or death. Actually the USSR has available
350,000 tons of various chemical weapons compared with 40,000 tons possessed
by the Americans...! Another field of research for Soviet laboratories
_ involves psychomimetic drugs, for example derivatives of atropine or of
tropane, as well as ethers composed of piperidyl such as Ditran. In short,
these substances act like LSD25, that is, they czuse a momentary state of
schizophrenia. It is, thereforey possible to poison an entire country and
to create a psychotic state, vaporizing psychomimetic compounds, and to put
an army or a crowd into a~mentary st ate of immobility or temporary or
permament mental incapacity. The money spent by the Soviets for this
demential research is on the order of 30 billion [currency not given] per
year.
In regard to biological res~arch, the Soviets accentuate studies for *_he -
destruction of crops shortly before the harvest by explosion of hydrogen
bombs at high altitude. But another " clean" possibility is gaining ground.
The scientists are trying to create a"hole" in the ozone stratum of the
atmosphere above enemy territory because this ozone stratum is necessary for
the existence of life on earth.
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[Question] Does the appearance of China on the world military scene and
preferential agreements that Chinese leaders seem to extend to Western nations
depend on an opportunist strategy or are they a part of a long-term plan
that could rebound against the West?
[Answer] Personally, I have become totally anticommunist and I have no
faith of any kind in one communism rather than another. I find Chinese
coffinunism particularly dangerous. I consider that China, like the USSR, will
in the future not respect the agreements that it signs today with the West.
I am much more categorical in my ~udgments since I have the deep conviction
that if the USSR fears the Chinese like a plague, there is the fact, however,
that Chinese expansionism is directed to the south or to the west, but
certainly not to the north.
[Question] If as a man and a military person, you had to give the West,
or more specifically Europe, advice concerning Soviet expansionism, what would
it be?
[Answer] Some years ago, thousands of persons screamed in the camps and
mental institutions of the East. They asked for help and you remained silent.
Even children were arrested. You knew it. We ran all kinds of risks to
inform you of it. And you shamefully continued to remain silent. Today you -
continue not to react. As a military man, I consider it fundamental to
prevent this war which is coming closer with great strides and which will
be terrible for everyone. You must not content yourself with emitting
simple criticism, or making threats that you will never carry out. Look at
how the people are treated who live under communism. It is necessary that
_ the nations of the free world demand of the USSR a general amnesty, the
application of the Helsinki accords, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan, the revision of the agreemen~s between Hitler and Stalin which,
after 30 years from the end of World War II are still in effect and which
make Moldavia, the Ukraine, and Ryelorussia the slaves of the Soviet Union.
If a united front is presented to the USSR and if, on the level of the
highest international representation, the USSR is presented with a demand to
respect the agreements that the USSR signs, then war can still be avoided.
In the opposite case, the least retreat, the least concession will become
the detonator of a third world war that the USSR hopes for, since it will _
be the only means to mask the failure of communism in the nations that it
grips in its talons.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Rizzoli Editore
6034
CSO: 3104
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RE GIONAL
FREE ESTONIAN RADIO STATION IN SWEDEN OFFERS TOPICAL ISSUES
- Frankfurt POSEV in Russian No Apr 80 pp 13-15
[Article by A, Milits, POSEV correspondent: "Three Hundred Kilometers
from S1;ockholm to Tallinn..."]
[Text] Stockholm, March.
It is ~ust 300 km frQm Stockholm to Tallinn~. This is tY~e closest fbreign
capital. Nevertheless, the Swedes, like other Europeans, know little
about the situation in Estonia. The Estonians living in Sweden know much
more, but of course, not everything. There are around 25,000 of them in
the country, and approxi.mately 10,000 live in Stockholm (for a state with
a population of a little more than 8 million persons, this is not so few).
The Estonians are members of various societies and organizations including
cultural, religious, political and sports.... One of the smallest organi-
zations (,just 144 members) is the Estonian Union in Stockholm. But pre-
; cisely it has been able to set up the first free Estonian radio station.
R~.dio Free Estonia ~
It is a fact that civil defense transmitters are located over all of Sweden,
and until recently these could not broadcast anything except their call
numbers. Their operations were planned for the event of w~,rtime. Last
year, the Swedish authorities decided that before the verdict is in, these
- transmitters could be used by local organizations. Now, having received
the appropriate permission, and in paying 2,000 kroner per year and equipped
a studio at one's own expense, it is possible to hook up to the nearest
transmitter. And thus in Sweuen broadcasts by the most diverse religious, _
political, sports, and cultural (and even noncultural) organizations have
been put on the airways. Cer+air.emigre associations also have programs
in their own langua,ges .
Having seen this, our sma11 union which receives aid from no one outside
decided to act, and while others were talking, as is often the case, we at
a very low price rented oPfices from one of the members of the organization,
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~
~ the owner of a radio store, and during off hours, sometimes at r~-ht, we -
built a studio. We also rented the equipment from him. We ~.�i~ed the
radio station "Estonian Radio--Stockholm." The editor-in-chief of the
E~stonian broadcasts is the chairman of the Estonian Unio.., he is also tYie
POSEV correspondent, and the author of these lines. Naturally the studio
is shorthanded. In addition to the editor, it employs a young technician
who a year ago illegally left Estonia, a young man who for several years _
was an announcer on Voice of America, and a woman who worked as an an-
nouncer on 7~7.1inn television. Everyone works without pay and is pleased
with the first successes of their radio which went on the airways for the
first time on February and provides four half-hour broadcasts a week.~
"We Are Living As If. Each Day Were Our Lasti"
And there already axe successes. The problem is that the guaranteed range
of the station is a circle with a diameter of 50 km which would include ~
Stockholm and its suburbs. But recently we received news from Estonia
- that we had been received by receivers the antennas of which had been
adapted for listening to Finnish broadcasts, and our Monday evening pro- -
grams (and they are politically the most important) had even been taped.
Of course, it is still too early to ,judge whether this will always be the
range, but this has already produced results. The editors have established
contact with the homeland, and recently the first report from Tallin was
received.
~ As might be expected, the talk there is presently primarily about Afghani- .
stan. This occupation reminds the Estonians of 1940 when the Soviet troops
occupied their country along with Latvia and Lithuania.
There has been no mobilization, but many men, even ~+0 years of age, have
received news that they must soon report for training. Many are afraid of
a war, particularly seeing how a portion of the older generation of the
Russian party members has gradually been seized by something similar to a
- war psychosis. Many of these "elders" are giving aggressive speeches say-
ing that Brezhnev should now make a decisive strike against Carter. Since
the report emphasizes the age of these "warriors," obviously the younger
Russian party members are not saying such things. The Estonian party mem-
bers are more concerned with a national question. In seeing anti-Russian
moods growing among the Estonians, many Estonian party members, either
opportunistically or possibly sincerely, are proudly proclaiming themselves
nationalists.
~On Mondays from 0930 to 1000 and from 2300 to 2330 hours, on Tuesdays from
1245 to 1315 hours and on Thursdays from 1515 to 1545 hours at Stockholm
time on the USW of 88 megahertz. On Mondays there is a review of news and
_ a"panorama," political commentaries, interviews and reports; on Tuesdays
there is a program for children, and on Thursdays, for young people. -
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There ha~-e been constant rumors that around 40 zinc-lined coffins with the
bodies of. dead sergeants and officers have arrived in Estonia from Afghani-
stan. The rank-and-file, it is said, are buried on the spot, in Afgrani-
stan. Persons arriving from Tashkent have said that at present this city
is off-limits, and that in the local hospitals there axe about 1,300
- servicemen who were wounded in Afghanistan.
Prior to the invasion of Afghanistan, overseas mail took an average of 10
days to reach Tallinn. Now letters take much longer, and arrive in a form
making it clear that the censors are overworked and in a hurry, and possi-
bly are leaving traces to intimidate so that they do not write ''too much."
There has also been closer inspection (at the port of Tallinn, ~aggage is
X-rayed) and arriving passengers are isolated (for example, local residents
are not permitted at all in the Intourist Vira).
At present a great deal of ineat has appeared in the stores: beef is 1 ruhle
50 kopecks, pork is 2 rubles and chicken 3 rubles 50 kopecks. But this is
actually a menacing sign. The livestock is being slaughtered and dressed
due to a shortage of feed; they say that things will soon grow worse than _
before. There is only enough vodka, both in the stores and from the ille-
gal distillers. E~reryone drinks, both at home and on the job. A young
engineer said: "We live as if each day were our last. War will soon break
out."
We were told of a demonstration on Independence Day. 24 December, beside `
the grave of a hero in the war for Estonian liberati~n ~.z 19~~, Lt
Kuper'yanov, but POSEV (No 2) has already reported on this. It can merely
be added that after the demonstration, many students and school children
were summoned for interrogation to the KGB [State Security Committee].
Two students who had arrived from Tallinn,were particularl,y questioned, as .
they were suspected of distributing leaflets.
Although in the stores of ~stonia much is lacking (in paxticular, there is
neither cloth, tliread nor other dressmaking supplies), in Tal linn they live
better than in the other Soviet cities. The people of Tallum.even send
clothing to their friends in Leningrad, and various managers arrive in
Tallinn from other republics in order to order suits. It is a fact that
many Estonian tailors before the war were trained in England. Now they
of course are already growing old, but they are handing on thei.r skills
to the new generation.
Interview with Yuriy Kukk
At present Estonians admire the chemist Yuriy Kukk from Tari,u as one of
their heroes. Obviously, the authorities felt that he would "give hope,"
. and he was sent to study for a year in France on a scholarship. But upon
returning to Estonia, he left the Communist Party as a sign of protest _
against the suppression of freedom in his country. He was dismissed from
work and threatened with imprisonment.
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On Sunday~, the 2d of March, from our studio we placed a telephone call to
Kukk. We had to wait a long time, but when the ca11 went through, Kukk
immediately expressed certainty that the delay had not been accidental.
It turned out that in waiting for our call, a~ his apartment many prominent
Estonian dissidents, including Mart Niklus, Enn Tarto, Erik Ud.am, and
others, had assembled. Unable to wait any longer, they left and then the
call went through.
Kukk said that on 24 December, on the occasion of Independence Day, there
had been demonstrations not only in Tartu but throughout Estonia. In many
places the blue-black-white national Estonian flags had been hung up. In
some places they were hung up so cleverly that it took several hours for -
the police to take them down. During this time many people assembled in
front of the flags.
In Tartu, the stlidents organized a firework display, but they were able to
set off only a sc:ore of rockets as the police and volunteer militia inter-
vened. Kukk also described the demonstration by Kuper'yanov's grave, and
said that in Tartu on the wall of the central prison thPre was written
"Gestapo," and neax the university "Long Live Independence Day!" and "Al1
Troops Out of Afghanistan!"
Kukk said that the KGB had begun to persecute his wife and himself. They
wauld arrive home and be summoned for "talks." They wanted his wife to
state that he needed compulsory treatment. All of this did not bother Kukk:
"But really, what difference is it if I am in prison or a mental hospital?"
he said, and sent cordial greetings to our radio listeners from himself and
from all friends a,nd supporters.
COPYRIGHT: POSSEV-VERLAG
D-6230 Frankfurt/M. 80
Flurscheideweg 15
10272
CSO: 1$0~ END
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