JPRS ID: 9170 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 56
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9
~ I L ~
~~F' I T~L I ~T ~T~T~~=' ~'E~=:E~~Ta
F~TU~E 1~F~~f~~ I ~~E~ t~~~~ I ~=E~~ ~~F

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLI'
JPRS L/9170
30 J~ne 1980 ~
USSR Re ort
p
MILITARY AFFAIRS
- CFOUO 13/80)
CAPITALIST STATES' RECENT,
FUTURE SUBMARINES DESCRIBED
FBIS F4REIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE .
� FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign _
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are txanslated; those from English-language sources
are transcrihed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [TextJ
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each iter.~, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original informa.tion was
_ processed. Where no processing indicator is giver., the infor-
mation was summ~rized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names render~d phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclo~ed in psrentheses were not clear in the ~
original but have 'been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes with in the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source. -
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. _
For further information on report content
call (703) 351-2938 (economic); 3468
(political, sociological, military); 2726
(life sciences); 2725 (physical sciences).
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
" MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION -
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/9170
3Q ,7une ].980
- USSR REPORT
MI LITARY AFFAI RS
(FOUO 13/80)
CAPITALIST STATES~ RI:CENT, FUTURE SUBMARINES DESCRIBED
UDC 629. 827 (4/9:104) "71"
Moscow RAZVITIYE ZARUBEZHNIKH PODVODNYKH LODOK I IKH TAKTIKI in
Russian 1979 signed to press 12 Jun 79 pp 2, 82-150
[Annotation, table of contents, last two chapters, conclusion
and bibliography from the book, "Razvitiye zarubezhnykh:'podvodnykh
lodok ~ ikh taktiki" [The Development of Foreign Submarines and
Their Tactics] by Lev Petrovich Khiyaynen, Voyenizdat, 15,000
copies, 150 pages]
[Text] The mission of the submarines of capitalist states and the tasks
they perfarmed in world wars I and II. Change in their tactics as a func-
tion of the development of tactical and technical characteristics. The
influence of their ac~:ivity on the development of other naval forces. The
construction and modernization of submarines of the principal capitalist
countries in the postwar pe;riod and developmental trends. -
, Written in accordance with information from the open domestic and foreign
press.
Intended for VMF [Navy] personnel and a broad group af readers who are
inteiested in ~;he development of submarines and their� tactics.
~ Contents
Page -
The Submarines of ~:he Capitalist States in World War I........... 3
The purpose of the submarines and ~he missions they performed... 5
The main TTE's [tactical and technical characteristics] and the
construction of submarines 6
Submarine tactics 8
- The results of submarine tactical operations 12
The influence of submarine tactical operations on the develop-
ment of navies and their tactics 13 -
The Submarines of the Capitalist States in World War II.......... 18
The purpose of the submarines and the missions they performed.. 22 ~
The main TTE's of the submarines 25
1
[ III - USSR - FOUO ]
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Submarine construction 34
Submarine tactics 37
Peculiarities of the tactics of midget submarines............ ?U
The results of submarine tactical operations 71
The influence of submarine tactical operations on the devel-
opment of navies and the organization of shipping.......... 74
The Submarines of the Capitalist States after World War II..... 82 (2l
The main TTE's of submarines built after 1954 85 [5]
The c istruction, modernization and repair of submarines dur-
ing the postwar period 103 [18) -
- The organization, operations and tactics of' nuclear-powered
subm~rines 108 L22J
The role of submarines in the future and their influence on
the development of navies and on the tactics of other ser-
vices of navies 115 [27~
Trends in the Development of Submarines of the Main Capitalist
5tates 130 ~38~
Trends in the developmen-t of SSNB's [nuclear-powered ballis-
tic-missile --ubmarines] and of submarines with cruise
missiles.. 13~. [38l
Trends in the.development�of.nuclear�attack.submarines ?:nd
other submarines 135 L41~
Trends in the development of weapons and technical equipment. 137 [43]
Trends in the development of control facilities 142 [47]
Conclusi~~n 144 [48~
Bibliography 148 L501
The Submarines of the Capitalist States After World War II
The mightiest power of the capitalist world is the United States. It has
created powerful armed forces and is actively promoting the creation of
the armed forces of its allies. The nuclear weapon, which was tried at
the end of World War II on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
has become the USA's main offensive weapon. .
American specialists consider that navies are capable of performing the
following tasks in a nuclear war:
1. Destroying strategie and industrial targets and administrative cen-
ters on the enemy's territory.
2. Destroying his oceanic and sea communications.
3. Landing troops on his territory.
4. Defending its ow~. territory from strikes by the enemy's navy and its
landing forces.
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
5. Defending its own oceanic and sea lines of communication.
6. Defending its own nuclear-missile strike forces that operate in the
oceans and seds. -
U.S. and NATO strategists assume that the navy`s subinarines will have to
participate in an all-out nuclear war, in a war with the limited use of
nuclear weapons, or in wars in which the nuclear weapon will not be used.
In conducting a war without the use of nuclear weapons, the U.S. Navy,
maintaining its nuclear forces in the highest degree of readiness at sea,
pr~bably will be able to execute tasks 2-6 completely. Task 1 can be per-
formed in a limited way with the forces of carrier aviation. The United
States is gradually reducing the number of nuclear warheads on its terri-
tory and is incx~easing the number thereof on ships. Thus, it is trying to
disperse strategic nuclear weapons and, in case an all-out nuclear war
starts, to safeguard its own territor,y from nuclear strikes.
In considering that a nuclear war can be started suddenly, the Americans
are already, in peacetime, maintaining their nuclear forces in high readi-
ness, for which purpose a large portion of the SSN's are constantly at sea.
Specialists of the main capitalist countries consider that submarines sup-
plied with modern equipment and weaponry can accomplish the strategic
tasks set for their navies during the postwar period m~re effectively and
at less expense. Research connected with increasing submerged speeds and
the range and duration of underwater navigation, diving depth, and the op-
erating range of underwater means of observation, communications and weap-
onry, as well as the precision of marine navigation, has been going on in
these countries since the end of the 1940's.
~rhe main task of many US submarines buil{: during the war and right after
the war was the testing of new equipment, weapons and hulls, in order to
obtain the data necessary for later submarine construction.
The year 1955 became a turning point in the history of submarine construc-
tion abroad: the first nuclear submarine, the "Nautilus" (U.S.), went
into operation. A qualitative leap in the development of submarines by
the capitalist states had occurred. First came the construction of ex-
perimental and then of combat SSBN's armed with ballistic missiles, ASW
missiles and torpedoes,and of nuclear-powered attack submarines armed with
torpedoes, ASW missiles and mines.
The SSBN's of the United States, Great Britain and France, in the opinion
of foreign specialists, are desi.gned to destroy important strategic tar-
gets on the enemy's territory (that is, to execute the navies' main offen-
~ sive task in an all-out nuclear-missile war). It is these ships, using
, their secrecy, great navigational range, operational independence, mobili-
ty and relative~invulnerability that are the best carriers of ballistic
missiles capable of inflicting nuclear strikes on the enemy. In the
United States, SSBN's are included in the strategic mission forces, along
with intercontinental missiles and strategic aviation. -
3
FOR OFFICIAL LTSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- In the opinion of U.S. specialists, SSBN's have enabled the participation
of their navy, along with other forces, in the peacetime "strategic deter-
rent" forces that, will be effective if a probable aggressor knows t.h~it.
his proposed enemy has at his disposal sufficient meana for a retaliai.ary
strike and that these means will not suffer seriously from a surprise
st rike. One of the basic requirements laid on a delivery system is
inwlnerability. This is provided by dispersion, defensive measures, se-
crecy, maneuverability, survivability and defensibility, and also by long-
range observation and early warning. The sea-based underwater Polaris-
Poseidon strategic nuclear missile system already created in the United
States and the Trident* system that is being created answer this require-
ment most completely. The SSBN's of these systems should be in constant
re adiness to inflict a pre-emptive nuclear-missile strike.
Nuclear-powered attack submarines are intended for destruction of the ene-
my's underwater and surface ships, the destruction of his oceanic and sea
communications, the defense of SSBN's and large surface ships operating in
the oceans, particularly the undersea protection of aircraft carriers, the
conduct of reconnaissance, and support of the fleet by performing other
tasks.
The main task of nuclear-powered attack submarines of the United States
and Great Britain is considered to be to deal with the enemy's submarines,
since they will be more effective for this purpose and the sole means for
performing this mission under the polar ice.
The construction of combat diesel submarines ceased in 1960 in the United
States and in 1967 in Great Britain, and it was to end in France in the
1970's. �
The appearance of SSN's in the navies of the United States, Great Britain _
and France and the cessation of the construction of diesel submarines is
explained by the fact that, in the opinion of these countries' specialists,
nuclear submarines that meet the requirements of the times can operate ef-
fectively in performing practically all the main tasks of their navies at
present and in the foreseeable future, and diesel submarines no longer
meet these requirements .
~ * In t e United States, a weapons system is a complex of elements capable
of performing a definite mission. The Polaris-Poseidon system includes
Polar and Poseidon ballistic missiles and their carriers--SSBN's of the
"Lafdyette," "Ethan A11en" and George Washington" classes. Auxiliary
systems that support the fulfillment of these tasks by submarines include
communications, control and servicing resources.
The Trident system includes the Trident ballistic missile, "Ohio" Class
SSBN's that are being built, and the appropriate auxiliary systems.--
Author' s note . �
4
FOR OFFICIAI. IISE QNLY .
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
I
FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY
Aside from combat submarines, ~he U. S. Pdavy has experimental submarines,
both nuclear snd diesel, for studying problems connected with the creation
of deepwater, hi.gh-speed, low-noise SSN's.
The Main TTE's iTact.ical and Technical Characteristics] of Submarines
� Built after 1954
The main TTE's combat diesel submarines of postwar construction
(table 6) have experienced essentially no change in cumoarison with the
TTE's of the submarines of World War II. .
Displacement has inereased by 21 percent, operational depth by 19 percent.
Underwater speed (except for the Barbel and Albacore submarines) rem~ins
unchanged, as do the cruising range and time at full speed. The reason
~ is the limited capacity of their ba~tter~.es. The increase in submerged
speeds of the Barbel and Albacore to 'L5 and 30 kriots for a short period
was abtaine~ by improving the hull configuration, increasing the power of
. the electric motors to 3,100 hp, and installing a single screw.
The TTE's of SSN's greatly exceed those of diesel submarines. Nuclear
- power has enabled submarines to solve all the tasks peculiar to
them, by cruising under water without surfacing. This provides for secre -
- cy of operutions and the surprise element of strikes. Nuclear and missile
weapons enable SSN's to uperate not only against ships and craft at sea
_ and at bases, but also against enemy surface targets located both in
coastal regions and in the depths of enemy territory. �
The displacement of SSN's is almost triple that of the largest diesel sub-
� marines. The inerease in displacement is explained by the increase in
weight and size of the power plant, weapon systems, complexes and systems
for observation, communication and navigation, hulls (an increase in
strengtri), and the equipment that provides for habitability, The engine
power of 5SN's is 2.5-fold that of diesel submarine engines. The SS1~'s'
engines for running submerged or surfaced have been steam turbines,
_ and the nuclear reactors the energy sources. The SSN's'nuclear fuel re-
` serves enable them to run for several years without recharging the reac-
tors, i.o have~ high underwater speeds and to refrain from surfacing.
This distinguishes them radically from di.esel submarines.
The weapons have undergone major changes. SSBN's have received, instead
of artillery w~apons with a firing range of less than 10 km, solid-
_ propellant Polaris and Poseidon ballistic missiles ~;hat are intended for
' th~ destruction of surface targets and are lau.~ched from below the sur-
faoe. The Polaris A-3 has a flight range of 4,600 km and it has a sep-
arating nuclear payload that splits up into three warheads with a total
yield of 1 megaton; the Poseidon, H.ith a flight range of 5,200 km, has a
payload that ~plits up into 10-14 war~heads with a power of 50 kilotons
each. Each separate final warhead that emanates from the initial payload -
- should fly to its own target on a separate trajectory, greatly complicat-
ing antimissile defense.
5
FOR OFFICIAL L'SE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
3 p r' 'n
N l~ ~ d' d' M l~
~ t~ G. ~ ~ ~ ~ -
~ ~ U N N N
H I
in I 'U -
O
'O ~ ~ ~ cC c~D � � 0 ~
_ . W c~ u~ ~ 'b ,
m _
~ I ^ O ~ t~ I
:a v~ o ~ o ~
~
~ o ~ �
i � o ~ ~ � ~ o �
v> > ~ o cd 4-~
z ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3 L~. G~, ~
~
� I o0
O ~
(d N�~~-I O. Q O ~ N N
O. y ~ N
�rl O cQ T!
a
td 'U ~ 0 I p `p I
U N~, M lao ~n I O I !
y N.-I N N N N M N
.'S'
~ a,,,
~ ~ ~
a~
~
~
a~ o t �a'.Q
~
,f~ fa ~ Ul
~F-1 ~ U ~ ~ ~r ~i Qi ~
v1 tn 6 O~~ N ~ ~ ~ v1 ~ O c5 ~
q O U~ 9 N ~
r~-i .Q
~ 1 UI ~ V1 ~ ~ fr N
r-�'i oc~o�~'~ `i'r~'n ~ ~u~ ~ v~ ~zs�- o
cn a.a i d�~+ i a�~ i v, a~ v, a ~d i
~ v~ t m r~ ~ 6 o a~ n. e a~ o ~ r~
~ ~ cn ~n 8 ~n r~ ~n c~ ~n o ~ ~3 o a M
u~ ~n ca ~n v ~n �d o o ~ ~
p ~ 6 ~ 6 c~ .n ~n a~ ~o u, ~ o
ca v, v~ c~ a~ ~n cd v, a c~ ~
~v ~ ~ - ~ q ~ - ~ ~n � ~ t+ ~ E v
v. ~ avi o ~n d o a~ d o�~ m d o a~ ~ 8.~ ao ~
o w H a+~ v~ H a r, a~ H+~ c~ o i+~ ~ H
' a~ A tn z tn u~ z r-i r1 z a~ ~ M U tn I z
3 ca o�~ ~c >,�rt ~ c~ o0 3 co ~ o+~ x
O .-i 'd ri d' U1 ~ A tA d' .-i O d' in O f, ~
R.~
~ ~ .
~
~ cn cd ~
N~ ~ O ~ ra
i O
W a U O � O U O
v z ~ ~n z ~
U W ~ ~
-
I v~ 'Cy ,b
~ U O d6V 00 00 00 00
~d a+~ N N d~ in O o~ rn O ~n in
w w ~
lC �rl ~ 00 l~- 00 l~ T t~ t0 c0 d' M
A ~ N N
r-i
(d ^ ~
N
�rl cd O 7~
cUd A 4+ O~ c~`O �r~-1 c~D ~ ti ~ ~
H 4+ O �rl ~ ~ O~ ~F-~ O~ ~ ~ ~ N r
O ~ O N ~ ~ � ~-I -4~ N
~ N U U 7~, I ~ I af ~ I U ~ ~ d, ~ -
~ f., ~ �i M O o0 O~-~I C e0
c~ �t t, 'LS 4+ cn ~ u~ co t~ cd rn t~ 6 t~
~ a�'~ a~a~'a a~+w aOQi~ vi�.~'m~
6
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
P'OR OFFICtt~L USE ONLY
3
Ts a~ ti O oo ~ O c~~ ti o
~ L~ l~ c0 N l` tn N
~ J .-i
C
~1-> i 'd
U 'O U~y ~ ~ c0 ~ ~ � ~ ~ � O �
' ~ ~ C4 V1 y 'O
W 8
t0 ~ r-+ a
I ^ � ~ -
~ cd v~ r-,
r~ GO G' ~ N C, d'
~t~ ~ � p' o � �I� �I� �I� �I�
E'~' ~ ~ f, .
~ .a; M O
'i ~
t+ ~ ~ ^ O O O
a~�~+ a~ N � � o � � o ~
q. ~ ~r rn
O cd ~ ~
~ L1.
N~ N I`"~ N O~ �--I I.--I .-i I� ~ I~ ~ I N � N I�
ul .-i O
~ ~ ~
o i �a' ~ ~ C7
~s ~ .n Ts s.
~ U CT' fti N cd
~ ~g m N a~i a~~i ~ ~ ~ ,n 3 � � ~ � �
u~i E o q~ oi aai N
.n o a~ s~ a~ ~
O U Q ~ ~ q ~
~ A ~
m a~ I ~
~ ~
�c.~' ~ u~ ~ v, a~i ~ a, a~i a~i ~
G ~ M O N M ~ Cl, ~ U X M..x O
~ $ M tfl O M O ~C I �~-1 ~ M U'i7
O tn in 'ti tn 'U a~ M tn O~
~ a _ a~ _ . - a~ M u~ � � a
~ ~n ~n v~ ~n c~ b ~n z7 ~n f~
a Q a o~ d d o t~, Q ~ r~ ~ ~ o-�N
u~ E-~ E-~ E-~ H+~ ~ E~ cd ~ G~ E+ i~
a~ z z ~ x 3 z ~ r+ ~ z.a 3
o 0 0 ~ ~ ~n
q co d~ c~ cc cv r~ p, ao~` ~r ~n a ~r cn Q
' rl N U ~ ~y
tn y t; af cC
N^ O O 00 O O v1 O~~ ~ O 00 ~
~ a ~n o 0 0 0 0o a~ ~n ao s, a~ o 0 0 0
oo co co o cc ~ E c~ co o t~ o � �
~]Q v w w w w w w Q w~ (n ~ (p w w
W M~i' d' M t0 M e-I O~ O N ~ e-i
~ ~ ~
N ~ ~ b
U O OA ~ in O in O O O O O O O O
cC f~ ~ o~ ~n N tn ~ M in O O ~n O O a0 O
~ ~ y~ oo t~ d' d' O N I O � 00 00 in � I O . d' a0
~ ~ w w ~ w w w w w w ~ w
N N '-1 '-I N N M ~-i c~ ln
Ca Q vi ~ I
~
~ ~
~ u~ � R' I
- oc�~ ~ ~ ao
w ~
4. o~ vi ~ ~ c~ cn vi a~ ~ vi
4-~ o ~ ~ ~x rn ~ ~ r~ t~ ~ ~ T1 ~
o o ~ ~d a~ ~ r+ ~ o s~
m U ~ u~ v o ~ c~ ..q c~ ~ o~ ~ cv ~
~ fr ~ ~ f/l cp ~ ~ .--I -F~ S]. 00 ~ t0 Cd M ~ .a U d'
cd ~d i~ ~n o t~ N co ~ co Q ~c .n in ~ c~ t~
a~ ~ cd rn an rn~, ..fl rn t, o rn cn rn~ rn a rn ~ o~ rn
E-~ cn ao 4�-~ r=.~ o.-i c~ A�-+ ~ c5 d�-~ Z.-~ ~7 o a~ .-i
~ 7
~'~R OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY
~ ~
~ ~
~ a~
~ a~i + ~ N
V in ~ ~ ~ ~
N
O ir ~ I ~ v! ~ . .C
U ~ U ~ C1D ~ ~ ~
~
v ~ V1 ~ "d ~ Ul
c~ W ~ . ~ ~ ~
r~1 I ^ ~ ~ ~
~ 00 ~ ~N O ~ -
~ ~
E~ 7~O ~ r~-1 N ~ ~y Cp
Z ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ U O
I oD .C ~ ~--1 ~ .
N� r~i !2. F's ~ t]D .C V
O~'U v ~ ~ i~ N N
U1 �
~
~ � ri
a~ `DI~ a~i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~ a~
~ q a~i c~d ~~n ~ c~d ~ -
o i�ai ~�~'cdti~
cd ~Ab ~ u~i � -
U Cf' ~ ~
c~! �ri ~ tA OD N �
O U 'b O N ~ ~+~-t
v~i 8 0~ 8 ~ ' a~ R. ~ 3
O U ~ q ~
~ 0~0 'v ~ x.~c c~ r--i ~ s~,
N ~ w
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~i ~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
.
v, ~ a~i ~ d-�d c~n a~ a
~ ~ ~q'' . m N a~ ~
e td ~ ~
cd ~ �C~i . ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ � ~ O ~ ~
~ ~ ~ N t~n t'~n ~ ~ ~n ~ 3
M d� u, avoo`~a~'ia~i~~'~~
v, ~ ~ ~ �v N c~
~ a, ~ o ~ C~ N o~n ~ a~ s~ ~ ~
a~ y~ ~ a~ cd c~ c~ G. ~ q~ cd ~
~n .c � ~ -N ~ c~ v, a - > a vi ~
~ ~ ~ M ~ ~ ~ m cd V1 O ~ .C ~ N .a O O
O^+~ O~ r1 ~i �rl tA U~'d ~ O d0 N tA ~ O
W � �ri Ul 'Ly ~ rl N rl w
~ n~ O a~ cd cd r-1 00 ^ G~ tn A~'t7 U~ O~� r~l
~ - ~ sz v a s~ ~ a~, o a~ a~ a~ v, ~ a�.~ ~ ti
a~a~s~~s~nea~�~a+~ aa~~dtina oa~e M
a~ ~ abi 'd ao+~ a o ~ o+~ oo cC Lr m ~d ~
a~ s~ a�~ o c~ t~ a~ x a~ v~ ao x
0o ao~ v,o o cd c~wa~ �cdr,~n8 a~~naox~
a~'i~ ~o ~sb+~~ ~,s~~s~x~aga�~~ �.~~~e~ i ~ -
~a~ c,c.cc a~ ~ ti o~8~,~a+>�~~n io
a+~ 6~, ~ a3a~ c~~~z~o oA�~ ~o~ ~n a~+�.~oti ~n
V1 ~ ~.1 ~ r-I f~ O~ ~ O O ,C,' ~ ~ V! U~ 'O ~ c~ S~ tn N N
~A ~ cd O.D tA O tA V1 ~ U~ N�~-I Vi i~ 'd f~ p
1 I tA i i I~ I,~ r-I cd ~~d J~
� ~ o I I I I I I 1 I ~ N 3 6~'O ~ N''~
dd ~ cn a ~ a �o a~i ~r~-+~~y~'.-~i o�~nN
~ o +~dHHdd~.~aq~ ~ .
~ u z `.+C CS C5 C'3 v~ [7 �~-I dD cd Cy r-~ ctf o
' .Or U i.~" " u ld ~ ~ ~ ~ ^ ~ t~A ~ ~ r-i ~
-F~ ~i ~ U ~ G~ U1 ~ ~ ~ ~ 00 tD N
4-~ O�~ ~ cd Rf O O .l: .L" '.3 �rl O I 1 i
~ tn U U tD ~ N U A 4-~ f=+ 4-~ d' E~ E~ tn A A 1 I I
H~~ ~ N� H ~ ~ N M d' tn tD 00
~ �
FAR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIA.L USE ONL`I
Great Britain has the Slim ZUR [short-range antiaircraft missileJ, which
is intended for firing from submarines at periscope depth agains{, low- -
flying antisubmarine helicopters and airplanes. This is a two-statc
solid-propellant missile with contact and proximit;v !'uzes and with a~:ra-
cer. The warhead is high-explosive. The launch installation has six mis-
siles. Firing range is 3 km. The weight is 14 kg. Angle of fire is 360
degrees a.bout the horizontal and from -10 ~;o +90 degrees about thc veri;ical..
For destroying enemy submarines, U.S. submarines are armed with antisubma-
rine general-purpose Subroc rockets, and, for destroying surface ships and
craft, Harpoon rockets that are released from torpedo tubes (table 7).
� The,yi~ld of the nuclear charge of Subroc rockets is 80-fold that of World
War II torpedoes. Its flight range is 8-fold the range of the latter.
Each nuclear torpedo submarine has up to six such missiles.
_ Madern torpedoes are intended for firing against both submerged targets
(which was not the case during World War II) and surface targets. They
have ordinary and nuclear charges. Torpedoes with a nuclear charge yield a
TNT equivalent of 2.5 kilotons and can sink an enemy submarine when deton-
ated at a distance of 915 meters from it, while in order to sink the same
- boat with an ordinary charge, detonation of a 2-ton charge at a distance
of not more than 11 me*ers from its hull is required. The range of tor-
pedoes has increased 4-fold. All modern submarine torpedoes have target-
seeking apparatus and proximity fuzes.
_ The most modern torpedoes in the United States are the MK-48, the MK-45
(Astor) and the MK-45F (Freedom) gene ral-purpose torpedoes. The MK-48
- Model 1 torpedo began to arrive in the fleet in 1973. Serial production
began in January 1975 of the MK-48 model 3 torpedo, which has two-way com-
~ munication with the firing submarine, which receives data about the tor-
pedoe's mechanical trajectory and the status of its on-board systems, and,
after switching on the homing head, information about the target's maneuv-
ers. The MK-48 is guided by the submarine's GAK [sonar complex] on fre-
quencies of 2,000 and 5,000 Hz. The coord.inates of ~:he target and the
torpecio and the course and speed of the firing ship enter the torpedo-
firing computer complex, which works out the torpedo's co~i,.~~P on ~;his
- basis and provides for its encounter with the target.
The United States has active (MK-45F) and combined (active and passive)
target-seeking (MK-48) systems, which have a reaction range of up to 1,500
_ meters on a frequency of 30-60 kHz. In the search mode, with homingy the
MK-48 torpedo's trajectory at a running depth of less than 50 meters is
sinusoida~, and at more than 50 meters it is helical. After target detec-
tion by the homing apparatus, control by wire ceases and the torpedo pro-
. ceeds according to homing commands. Remote control provides a higher hit
probability and enables time for preparing for the shot to be reduced. -
According to data of the foreign press, all types of the U.S.'s submarine
~orpedoes will be replaced by the MK-48. By 1976 about half of the subma-
rine's had already been armed with them.
9
FOR OFFICIAI. LTSE ONLY _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ti o o
~n o o ~ m
~ OA CO M O i o0 ~O
~ ~ ~
0
~ U 3v ~ ~ ~
E� o ~
~ O
f{"'~ N
T
~ O ~ ~ ~
v x m
n, ~ o o ao o ~n o
� R' ~ ~ c�~ ,~r.~ .-a ~n ~ a~i
~ v, ~u, C~i s~ . .x
~ O
~ A c 4r ~ � U
V~ f~
C O
. ~ ~ ~ G, p ~ N ~ ~ cd O
~y
~ a
fC ~ ~ 8 U E3 t~C~ � � ~ ~ V1 ~ �
i, v.~ a~i v.-i �o 'ti C~. ~ x
cn a ' o ~
~ N x ~ a~ ..~C
~
I
tn 4-,
~ ~ O O
~ ~ > ~ o 0 3 ~ 0~0 a~ ~
~ o o e v~i ~ ~ ~ u~ ~ ~n ~ 3 c~'c �o K ao ~
x ~ ~ -1~ cd ~ O O ~ . ~ f~-i � ~ ~ 'n ~ c~d N ~
^d ~ 'b ~ R. ~ ~ U U . ~ p ~ ~ .1] z fa ~ U
~ ~ ~ v1 ~ d0 O ~ ~ O O � T! ~
O C7 ~ C+' fH d-~ .Li 'L~ U'LS N tJ1 ~ N
y V ~Q ~ 6 8 'd ~ ~
vo d.�[�o a a~ a~ ~o
~
~ ~ ~
~
~ aNi b o a~
' [-~i ~ ~ t0 ~ ~ �'U.{ U ~ ..C'.
E-~ a ~ ~ c~n u~i ~ � ~ -i~
t/) O O O
. ~ ~p ~n d' d' . $ ~
~
o~~ a q ~ N ~ i t
H ~~a~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
I ~ ~ 3 ~
c~ M ~ i~ .9C > ~
~d ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ u
A q 9 U L~i fr ^ O.~ ~ ~ N a
u~
U 4-~ .O ~ ~ x ~ i~~i ~ M ~ t', ir ~ cd
'b W.1] f~r c~ " cd �rl cd �r1 S~
U~ W t~ll ~ z v �~~-1 t~i1 4~-r
E'' ~ O U 't7 O O . ~ ~ � ~ ~ -
~ a ^ a~ ~
a~''i y ~ ~ ca
~ v~j ,SC t/~ O U
o ~ ~ sa,' ~ t�', ~ ~ ~ a ~ ~ ~
~ o i I ~ i ~
~ a~ v~i ~ a' a~r v~i ~.x ~ c, o'
a~i o c~c o c~c o Q c~v q o N ~ tN,
U 3 8 N~ Np N ~ O. N o~�~ V~ 1 VI
t~' a~i c,' a~i ti ~ a~i ta, ao �p' �3 A 6
~ H~ H~ H x N~~ i~e i~e
C~
1~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The basic tactical and technical data of the Subroc and Harpoon rockets,
as well as the MK-48, MK-~!5 and MK-45F torpedoes, are cited in table 7.
The rapidity of tor~pedo firi.ng has been increased thanks to the cre~Lion
of devices for the rapid reloading oF torpedo tubes, enabling them to bc -
- loaded in 4 minutes. This allows submarines to fire several salvo;; dur-
i.ng a single attack and, during an attack on a formai;ion or convoy, to
5trike a number of targets. High-speed computers enable several targets
to be fired at simultaneously.
The use of devices for ejecting torpedoes from the tubes without the use
of air, as well as the use of track-free electrical and steam torpedoes,
has increased secrecy of firing.
The SINBADS torpedo-firing control system,developed in the Netherlands,
makes it possible to observe surface and underwater environments, detect
and track targets, select the type of torpedo, feed data into the tor-
_ pedoes, and guide as many as three wire-controlled torpedoes to the tar-
get. The system depicts the situation on an indicator screen,tracks up
to five targets from passive sonar installation data, and works out firing
data simultaneously for three targets.
The torpedo tubes of some U.S. nuclear attaclc submarines are situated in -
the middle portion of the hull at an angle of 10~20 degrees to the diame-
~ tral plane, while the bow part remains free for the placement of GAK
antennas.
Modern foreign ~;orpedoes can be fired from any depth of submarine submer-
~ence. Their effectiveness has become much higher thaii that of World
War II torpedoes. A torpedo costs one-eighth to one-ten-th as much as a ~
missile.
Anchored and bottom influence mines, which are laid from the torpedo tubes,
are intended for action against submarines and surface ships and craft.
In the U.S. Navy these mines include the MK-57 influence antisubmarine
mine, an anchored delayed-rising mine that lies on the bottom until the
arming-delay and ship-eounting devices are triggered, and also the self-
transporting MK-27 mine (based upon the obsolete M-27 electric torpedo.
After traveling ~ prescribed distance at low speed, the MK-~27 lies on the
bottom and is transformed into a bottom mine. Depth of laying is less
_ than 200 meters for bottom mines, up to 300 meters for anchored mines.
I~oreign specialists consider that the weaponry of SSN's corresponds to
their mission and, along the nuclear power systems, helps to transform
, them into a general-purpose branch of the naval forces.
An enormous leap has occurxed in the development of observational gear.
U.S. SSN's equipped with the AN/BQQ -2 ancl AN/BQQ-5 sonar complexes can
detect surface ships at distances of up ~to 220 km in passive listening
modes and up to 56 km (under favorable hydrological conditions) in echo- -
ranging modes, determine their coordinates, and observe them for long time
~1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
periods. The distance at which submarines are detected in the passive-
listening mode is from i to 160 km, depending upon hydrological condi-
tions and the submarines' noisiness.
The AN/BQR-21 passive sonar installation, with which search can be made by
a narrow directional beam, enabling detection of submarines at distances
of up to 160 km, is beiag introduced into the U.S.'s SSN's. All U.S.
SSBN's should be equipped with them during current repair or overhaul. _
Twenty-six U.S. SSBN's have been equipped with AN/BQR-15 sonar. These
sets are also supposed to be mounted on nuclear attack submarines. The
installations have a towed antenna. The cable-hawser is 800 meters long
and 12 mm in diameter. The antenna is 82.5 mm in diameter. The winch's
drive is hydraulic. The installation operates in the 2 Hz to 6.5 kHz band.
The system for measuring the distance to noise-emitting targets by the
passive method (PVFFS, U.S.) enables firing according to computed data
without the use of active sonar. It includes three r~ceiving transducers,
which are situated along the length of the submarine's h~:ll. The target's
location is computed electronically, according to the time difference in
arrival of the sound at these transducers, and the data goes to the fire-
control system.
Gquipment for classifying detected targets enables them to be identified.
- The equipment for classifying a contact enables a detected submarine to be
identified by means of spectral analysis.
The detection systems of operating U.S. sonars enable submarines to detect -
ASW forces and to evade detection themselves or to create interference
with ASW operations (the distance at which active sonar operation is de-
tected is greater than the operating range of the sonars):.
Mine-detection equipment is installed on all SSN's.
Very great importance is attributed to reducing the submarine's own noise.
This is explained by the fact that in the modern era only low-noise subma-
rines can operate secretly and their sonar complexes alone provide the
necessary range of de~;ection of the enemy and observation of him (their
own clutter is not greater), thereby enabling the submarines to use weap-
onry in good time or to evade the enemy.
Abroad they have begun to install not three-bladed but five-bladed and
six-bladed screws on submarines (Britain is making seven-bladed screws),
since a submarine with five -bladed screws has cavitation, which
cause s a sharp rise in noise,and it is not observed throughout almost the
entire speed range. Noise intensity, in the foreign specialists' opinion,
rises with increase in the number of screws, so single-shaft boats with a -
low screw rpm are being built abroad.
A submarine's hull also is a source of noise. In order to reduce noise
from the flow of the water, the hulls are given a more streamlined shape,
12
FOR OFFICIAL iiSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
with a length-to-width ratio of 6-7, in the shape oI' a body of revolution
with the detachable or r~etractable protruding parts placed insidc t.hc hc-
tween-hulls space. I3ecause noise increases at high specds (aboui: 30
knots), even where protruding seams are welded, and whc:re poor painLing
and poor state of coatings and the slightest unevenness and roughness are
reduced to the minimum, all orifices in the false hull are, insofar as
- possible, covered or placed outside of sections with Qreat pressure dif-
ferentials, and the sonar installation fairings are integrated with the
false hull.
In order to reduce noise from rudder reverses, the rudders are placed
ahead of or about the screw.
The most reliable method for reducing the submarine's internal noise is
thought to be exclusion of the noisier mechanisms from the equipment make-
up. The United States built the experimental nuclear submarines "Narwhal"
and "Glenard P. Lipscomb" with r~eactors that circulate the coolant natur-
ally without main circulation pumps for the primary circuit. This reduces
their noisiness considerably. A small, low-noise reactor and outboard
submersible electric motor were tested on the experimental NR-1 SSN. On a
"Los Angeles"-type nuclear attack submarine, the main power plant was sus-
pended on an internal ring that was connected with the pressure hull by
shock absorbers, and the main turbogear assembly was submerged in oil. A
submarine with direct-drive reducer-free turbine and coaxial propellers
also has been built. Noisemaking mechanisms are installea on sl:ock ab-
sorbers, and noise-absorbing branch pipes are installed in pipelines and
steam lines of inechanisms equipped with shock absorbers. More than 800
flexible branch pipes designed for high pressure have been installed on
each U.S. SSN. Vibration-damping coatings are used for seatings. The air
noise of inechanisms is fought by applying sound-absorbent coatings and in-
stalling sound-absorbing screens.
In the United States, newly constructed submarines are inspected for noise
prior to transfer to the fleet. The number of ineasurements made during a
check comes to 2,000. During operation, measurements are made at'least
twice per month. Each boat is checked for noise prior to a cruise. If
- the noise level exceeds the permissible limit, going to sea is prohibit-
ed. Noise is measured also while under way by noise meters installed on
the false hull (their indicators are at the sonar posts).
Foreign submarines have radars that are used while navigating at peri-
scope depth or on the surface.
In Great Britain RDL-1BCS and RDL-4BCS electronic-reconnaissance equip-
ments designed for searching for and finding directions on enemy operat-
, ing radars and distinguished by high-speed operation have been created
for submarines. The first set operates in the 3-15 cm waveband, the sec-
ond in the 1.5-12 cm waveband. They also enable determination of the fre-
quency of the signal from a radar whose direction :ias been found. Moreov-
er, small British submarines have an RWR-1 set for warning of illumina-
tion by enemy radar.
13
FOR OFFICIt1'L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
In the United States a thermal direction-finder has been developed spe-
cially for installation on submarines.
Television equipment is used while cruising under water,for the purpose of
observing the water's surface or the ice cover. The AN/BQX-1 television
(U.S.) observes the icefield while the submarine cruises at a depth of 120
meters, at ice thicknesses of 15 meters, under lunar illumina~:ion.
~
Periscopes with telescopic optics and a television attachment enable sev-
eral sectors of the horizon to be observed simultaneously. -
' Thus, the observation resources of modern submarines have been sharply in-
creased over the observation equipment of World War II submarines, espe-
cially the sonar, whose operating range has increased 10-fold.
In order to increase secrecy and defense against acoustic homing torpefloes,
submarines are equipped with sonar countermeasures. In order to create
interference against active sonar, there are drifting self-propelled and
ship-based interference equipments, and for screening there are simula-
tors that create in the water a cloud of gas bubbles that imitate a sub-
marine. Submarine simulators reproduce their noise and the reflected
acoustic fields and create a ship's wake that reflects sonar transmissions.
These imitators can maneuver in course and depth for about 2 hours at a
speed of 8-10 knots.
Antisonar coatings are used on hulls to reduce detectability by sonar.
A device for the jamming of sonars that was developed in the United States,
based on a small electric torpedo, imitates submarine noises in the 0.1-1
kHz band and maneuvers at depths of 15-120 meters. When signals are re-
ceived from an ASW surface ship, it amplifies them and retransmits them
back.
Modern foreign:underwater acoustic communication and identification gear
criabl.es submarines to communicate with each other at distances of up to 20
km and to perform identification.
The U.5.'s hydroacoustic submarine communications equipment AN/BQA-2,
which is included in the AN/BQQ-2 sonar complex, generates specially
formed signals that make submarine detection difficult for the enemy, aid-
~ng ~:hc secrecy of the communicating submarines and the secrecy of the
communications.
The 2010 attachment to the 2008 (British) hydroacoustic communications in-
stallation has been developed, during tests of which 98 percent of text
- transmitted was received at a high transmission rate without distortion.
This was achieved by using a self-correcting code that enabled observation
and correction of errors as well as automatic printing of the messages re-
ceived. It is considered that the 2010 attachment will enable information
exchange between submarines to be increased severalfold and the range of
their communications with surface ships to be increased. It will provide
14
- FOR OFFICIA'L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
far operation of the communications equipment in character-printing, tele-
graph and telephone modes.
Radio communications equipment enables submarines i:o have two-way radio
communieation with shore CP's and surface ships and bettiveen submarines.
The equipment includes radio receivers and transmitters, as well as ultra-
short wave transceivers that are used with retractable and towed antennas
under the water and on the surface. Radio receptian is accomplished on =
ultrashort-waves,short waves, medium wa~es, long waves and superlong wave~,
while radio trarismissions are made on ultrashort waves, short waves and
, medium waves.
In order to increase the secrecy of communications, superhigh-speed devi-
ces that increase transmission speeds to 1,000 words per minute and copy-
ing units that receive radiograms transmitted at high speed are being cre-
ated abroad. Frame and loop antennas and long-wave receivers enable sub -
marines to hold radio reception at depths of up to 25 meters. In order to
communicate with surface ships and aircraft, buoy antennas that float to
' the surface are used under water, while under way or~ while dead in the
water. In order to communicate with aircraft, use is made of hydroacous-
tic radio -sonar buoys, which receive radio messages from aircraft and
- transmit them under water on a hydroacoustic circuit, and, vice versa,
which receive tt~e submarine's hydroacoustic messages and transmit them by
radio to the aircraft. For radio transmissions to submarines that are
submerged to depths of 12-30 meters, ground-based superlong-wave radios
with an output power of up to 2 MW have been created. They operate on
frequencies of 10-20 kHz. The U. S. Navy has such stations in Japan, the
Hawaiian Islands, the Panama Canal region and other places. Moreover, the
United States uses Earth satellites (ISZ's) as relay stations in systems
for communicating with submarines,as well as reconnaissance ISZ's for de-
tecting sea targets for and ~issuing target designations to submarines.
The impossibility of radio communication with submarines while they
cruise at great depths is a deficiency of radio communi.cations.
Navigation complexes include: ship inertial navigation sys~;ems, which
provide for storage af the sh~ip's current coordinates and indication of
the course and which make up t~e main complex; radio direction finde~s;
reception displays for phase, impulse and phase-impulse difference mea- _
suring systems; astronavigation systems; radiosextants; gyrocompasses,
- gyroazimuths; logs; acoustic depth finders; under-ice upward-scanning
_ fathometers; ice -lane indicators; iceberg detectors; and an-board systems
for using Transit-type satellit~ navigation systems.
~ ~ In order for a submarine to determine its position in the ocean without
surfacing, the Pilotfish system of hydroacoustic responder buoys is in-
stalled. Navdac -type computers process the data that arrive from the com-
plex's system and monitar the operation of its elements. The navigation
complexes enable the ship to fix its position at sea with a pr.ecision of
+1.6 km. .
15
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The surface speed of submarines of the imperialist states does not exceed
20 knots, but the underwater speed oP SSN's reaches 30 knots. This is two
to three times greater than the full surface speed of diesel submarines,
whi.ch ~an proceed at these speeds for no more than 1.5-2 hours without
charging their storage batteries. High underwater speeds enable SSN's:
to secretly cover the areas assigned to them in a short time and to spend
a greater portion of submerged endurance on patrol, to spend less time
than diesels on passage, and, consequently, to accomplish the mission with
a smaller number of submarines; to attack ships maneuvering at high speeds
even under conditions unfavorable to the submarine at the start of the at-
tack; to track detected high-speed targets for a long time; and to success-
fully evade observation, break off from an attack and evade weapons
launched by antisubmarine forces. In stormy weather SSN's have a speed
advantage over surface ships, since the latter are forced to reduce speed
when waves are high.
The cruising distance of submerged SSN's has increased to 400,000 miles,
which exceeds the cruising range of submerged diesels (without recharging
~:heir storage batteries) by 1,000-fold, and of surfaced diesels by 28-fold.
The underwater endurance of SSN's has reached 100 days, during which they
can stay submerged. The reserves of fuel, lubricants and provisions do
not limit their endurance. The main factor that determines endurance has
been habitability, which, in the opinion of foreign specialists, is deter-
mined by:
the radiation dosage,which is maintained at a level safe for people
(there are radio-chemical laboratories on U.S. SSN's for monitoring the
radiation level); -
a microclimate that provides normal life-support conditions with regener- -
ating and air-conditioning systems;
the noise level in the premises;
a rational layout of battle stations and living premises;
improvement of equipment and the finish of compartments; and
rational organization of work, recreation, eating and medical services for
the crew. .
The operating submergence depth of U.S. SSN's has reached 270 meters
- (twice the depth of submergence of 21-series German submarines of military
construction), and the maximum is 487 meters (France's SSN's). The great
range of submergence depths enable SSN's to choose that depth at which
their sonar will have the greatest operating range and at which the proba-
bility of detection and destruction of them by enemy weapons will be least.
Crews on SSBN's (which do not exceed 150) are larger than on diesel boats
but are only a small fraction of those on surface ships that are equal to
16
FOR QFFICI~ USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
them in displacement (for example, the crew of the nuclear-powered cruis-
er "Bainbridge," with a displacement of 7,000 tons,numbers 451). liowever,
in order to attain a high coefficient of operational burden for combat
patrolling~ all SSi3N's have two crews, which go to sea alt.ernately for
patrol and combat training o~ thc very same: ship.
Modern submarines differ sharply from those of World War II in the availa-
bility of autoRiated equipment. The use of automated equipment has caused,
in foreign specialists' opinion, a great rise in speed of the processes
associated with the use of modern weapons and equipment and an increase in
the amount of inforTnatian, given which, the timely adoption of correct de-
cisions and their implementation often exceed man's potential. The large
amount oF automated equipment has enabled the number of people in the crew
to be reduced.
Automated equipment is used in systems for missile and torpedo weapons,
target designation and counteraction, detection, classification and obser-
vation, power-supply control, communications and identificati_on, naviga-
tion, control of maneuvers, and support of habitabi]_ity and crew training. ~
The installation of systems for comprehensive aut:omation, in which contin-
uous-action computers (mocleling compu~:ers), the unifying element of the
system, are used, has started on foreign submarines. Comprehensive mech-
anization requires very high reliabi.lity of the material aspect of the
submarine. Control of the ver~;ical and horizontal rudders is combined--
they are controlled by one person. The Conalog telPVision screen depicts
the movements of the ship in space.
High underwater speeds and crui.sing distances, great submergence dep~;hs
ar~ct underwater endurance, good habitability, lo~a noise level and de-
teci:abi.lity, great operating range and secrecy of the observing gear
and of communications under water, high-yield rapid -firing long-range
weaponry used secretively under water, hydroacoustic equipment for count-
ermeasures against enemy observation and weaponry, navigational equipment
that provides for high precision in underwater cruising, and the automa-
tion of many processes have transformed the modern submarine into a truly
underwater ship and greatly increased its combat potential and combat
stability over those of World War II submarines.
However, despiL-e the improved equipment, ~;he accident rate of the United
States' SSN's remains high. ror example, as a result of a dive to a depth
beyond the limit, the "Thresher" sank in April 1963 (the whole crew of
129 was lost) and in May 1966 the "Scorpion" and its crew of 99 were lost.
The causes of acciden~;s on U.S. submarines were failures of power-supply
installations and their auxiliary equipment (33 percent of them caused
high radioactivity in the compartments), fires and explosions, navigation-
al errors, leaky pipelines, damage to the hull and retractable devices,
and malfunctions of hydraulic systems.
Cases were noted of collisi.ons of submarines with surface ships and craft,
submarines getting into fishermen's nets and collisions with other
17
FOR OFFICIAI; USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
submarines, which testify either to the poor condition of the sonar com-
plexes or other obse rvational gear or to poor crew training.
The United States has developed a buoy (and so have Great Britain, France,
Canada and Sweden) with a.cable 6,000 meters long and a telephone for com-
munications that automatically surfaces from a sunken submarine. On the
buoy is an inflatable balloon with a radar reflector for detection by air-
craft and ship radars. The buoy rises with a strong jarring of the subma-
rine, or when it is submerged to a depth beyand the limit.
Foreign submariners have individual and collective rescue equipment. Crew
members are supplied with individual radio transmitters that enable their
position on the sea surface to be determined. T:~e U.S. has built two
deepwater rescue equipments--the D5R-1 and DSR-2 (the weight of each when
fully loaded is 63 tons, the depth of submergence is 1,500 meters, under-
- water speed is 5 knots, and each has a crew of 3; one equipment can re-
ceive 24 men simultaneously; it can be mated with a sunken submarine when
its list is 45 de grees; and it is moved to the SSN on a transport
airplane or a rescue ship). The FRG has developed a chamber that accom-
modates 24 people and rises from the submarine.
The United States is studying the possibility of creating a submarine that
consists of several uninhabited compartments and one inhabited compartment, _
the latter capable of being separated from a sunken ship and of rising to
the surface by means of its own engine installation.
The Construction, Modernization and Repair of Submarines During the
Postwar Period ~
While doing research necessary to develop the submarine fleet, the United
States has built and is building experimental submarines and small series
of them. The submarine "Barracuda" was built in 1951 in connection with
. research to develop new observation gear. In order to study the possi-
bility of using the Regulus cruise missile on submarines, two diesel sub-
marines were refitted in 1952 and then the special diesel submarines
"Grayback" and "Growler" were built. In 1953 research for selection of
the most suitable configurations of hull and screws, conditions for oper-
, ation of the sonar and systems for controlling the ship's maneuvering
was starl,ed on the specially built high-speed "Albacore." Moreover, soon
after the war 10 submarines were reequipped and two diesel submarines were
built for radar picket work and the development of radar equipment.
Thus, a small number of diesel submarines was built in the United States
during the postwar period for research connected with converting the sub-
marine fleet to new power systems and weapons. There was no large-series
construction of combat diesel submarines in the United States after World
War II.
~ Nuclear attack submarines were built in the United States:
=-in 1955, the "Nautilus," with a water-moderated water-cooled reactor;
and 18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
--in 1957, the "Seawolf," with a reactor that used liquid-metal as the
heat-transfer agent.
Both were built basically for tests ~f nuclear reactors. The react~~i~ on
the "Seawolf" did not withstand the tests and was replaced by a w~tsr~-m~~d -
erated water-cooled reactor. The radar picket SSN "Tri.ton" was bu.ilt :in
1959. In 1960 it was converted to the attack subclass of submarines, and
later it was transferred to the i�eserve. In 1958-1959 the United States
built the nuclear attack submarines "Skate,""Seadi~agon," "Sargo" and
"Swordfish," and in 1960 the "Halibut" and "Tullibee." The "Halibut,"
which was armed with Regulus cruise missiles, ~vas converted in 1965 to ~;he
attack subclass, since its Regulus rockets were recognized as unpromis-
ing. The "T.ullibee," ~ low-noise submarine built as a hunter-killer, was
equipped with new sonar and had a turboelectric drive for the propel-
ler. In 1961 it was converted to the attack subclass of submarine. This
concluded construction of nine experimental SSN's of the first generation.
New experimental ships ~aere and are being built for research and the solu-
tion of new problems.
The United States built (in 1965) and is operating the low-noise SSN
"Jack" with direct-action nonreduction-drive turbine and coaxial propel-
1ers; for research connected with creating deepwater submarines, a test
diesel submarine, the "Dolphin,'' was built with an operating depth of sub-
mergence of 900 meters, and small experimental deepwater submarines were
built: the nuclear-p~wered NR-1 and the diesel-powered "Lirs," which
had a degth of submergence of 2,500 meters. In 1959 the submarines
"George Washing~on" and "Skipjack"--prototypes of the main subclasses of
nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines and nuclear-powered attack sub- -
marines --went into operation.
After building 41 SSBN's, the USA in 1967 temporarily stopped construc-
tion of them.
The U.S.'s long-range shipbuilding program calls for the construction of 30
"Ohio"-class SSBN's for the Trident system and their introduction into
operation to replace 10 "George Washington" and "Ethan Allen"-class
Polaris -Poseidon SSBN's. The construction of 5 Trident-system SSBN's and
12 nuclear attack submarines is planned for the five-year program of 1976-
1980 (the keel of the first "Ohio" SSBN was laid in April 1976, and its
introduction into the fleet is planned for 1979; the keel of the second
SSBN, the "Michigan," was laid at the end of 1976). The 1972--1982 program
plans the launching of 46 nuclear attack and 14 missile-carrying subma-
rines (2 of them carrying cruise missiles). The construction costs of the
Trident-series SSBN's is 1.2 billion dollars.
~
When the United States modernized its SSBN's, the Polaris missiles were
replaced by Poseidon missiles on 31 "Lafayette" and "Madison"-class
submarines.
19
FOR OFFICIAL LSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
During SSBN modernization, Polaris A-3 missiles were installed on 10
SSBN's (of the "George Washington" and "Ethan Allen" classes) that had
previously been equipped with the Polaris A-2. A series of 31 "Los Ange-
les" class SSN units is being built--an improved variant of t.hc "tit;ur-
~i~n," and the prototype was accepted by the navy in 1976. It is pro-
posed to bring the number of nuclear-powered attack submarines up to 72
units by 1979 and to build 90 units altogether, excluding all diesels
from the navy by 1980.
It is proposed to arm a~l SSBN's with antisubmarine Subroc rockets,
to .increase their combat stzbility, and to replace 4-year service-life
reactors with 8-year service-life reactors.
SSN's are built in the United States by the sectional method. The con-
struction period for Polaris-Poseidon system SSBN's averaged 25 months.
Britain and France are building SSBN's and nuclear attack submarines, the
TTE's of which are similar to those of American in-service submarines.
The keel of France's first nuclear attack submarine was laid in 1976, and
its introduction is planned for 1980 (its main TTE's: a surface di.splace-
ment of 2,385 tons, a submerged displacement of 2,670 tons, two turbogen-
erators of 2,400 kw each, a submerged speed of 25 knots, four 550~-mm tor-
pedo tubes, and a crew of 66). In 1978 France concluded construction of
the last series of diesel submarines--four "Agosta"-class submarines.
In order to carry out special tasks and to provide for combat training,
Great Britain has plans to revive the construction of diesel-powered sub-
mar~ines. It is planned that they will replace the old ones being with-
drawn from the fleet. One of the reasons for this decision was their
lower cost in comparison with nuclear submarines (10 and 25 million
pounds sterling, respectively).
The FRG, Japan and Sweden are building small series of diesel attack sub-
marines, mainly for ASW in coastal areas and for the combat training of
ASW forces.
Italy and Japan are doing research on the creation of SSN's.
Canada, the FRG, Sweden and the Netherlands are examining the question
of building SSN's.
Tab1e 8 shows the makeup of the submarines of the main capitalist states.
The matter of building 5 SSBN's is being discussed in Great Britain.
France is planning to complete construction of .a fifth SSBN in 1979 -1980.
The United States plans to overhaul up to 10 SSBN's annually. Simultane-
ous with overhaul, the submarines are being partially or completely mod-
dernized. In the United States, modernization of SS,:N's is combined with
overhaul, recharging of nuclear reactors and the installation of a new
20
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
system for missile firing, sonar complexes, radio and electronic equipment
and auxiliary mechanisms. Average time for modernizing each U.S. SSBN
under the Polaris A-3 program was 18-19 months, under the Poseidon program
it was 15 months. Time between SSN overhauls is 4.5-5 years in the Uni.Led
States, 3-4 years in GrPat liritain, and 2.5-3 years in France. The ovcr-
haul of British nuclear attack submarines takes 25 -28 months, of British
SSBN's 12 -15 months.
Table 8
Number of Submarines in the ~I,S., British and French Navies on 31 July 1978
Country Submarines in operation Submarines being built
Nuclear Nuc ear
Diesel
~ssx e Torpedo Missile Torpedo
United States........... 41 68 8 7 2g
Great Britain........... 4 10 17 - 3 -
France 4 - 23 1 1
Total.. 49 78 48 8 32
U. S. SSN's are overhauled after combat patrol by the forces and resources
of tenders at advanced bases by the unit method, under which components
and modules that require repair are removed and replaced by spares avail-
able on the tenders.
An increase in the number of U.S. Navy submarines caused an expansion of
their repair base in the 1970's. There are 9 shipyards, at which
85,000 people work, for overhauling submarines. Strict monitoring of the
vibration level of submarine mechana.sms has been established at shipbuild-
ing and ship-repair yards in the Unitc:d St~.tes, and this is accomplished
by means of sonar monitoring stations at piers that are located in areas
with low levels of natural and industrial hydroacoustic clutter. The mech-
anisms for the various op erating regimes on the submarine being checked
are switched on in sequence. Measurement lasts 10 hour~s. Air noise,
machinery vibration, seatings, hull structure, the level of the acoustic
near field in the area of the operating mechanisms, and the levels of the
~ acoustic far field at distances of some hundreds of ineters are measured. -
The measurements are comp ared with earlier readings and with the maximum
permissible readings. A submarine with an underwater noise level of more
than 72 dB may not go to sea. Frequently, ~fter the measurements subma,
rines have to be returned to the shipyard for steps to be taken to reduce
the noisiness. Special attention is paid to balancing the propellers--to
~heir geometry, the status of the blade edges and the fineness of their
machining finish. When necessary, blade surfaces and hubs are buffed.
When the acoustic-vibration characteristics do not meet the appropriate
requirements, the mechanism is replaced by a new one.
Great importance is a~tached to the organizational aspect of overhaul. As
the American press reports, speci~l computer programs are prepared that
issue recommendations ab out the direction of the work and define the de~
gree of its execution (the Transsim program). ~
21
FOR OFFICIAL LTSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Vibration characteristics during the detection o~ defects in mechanisms
avert the unsubstantiated stripping of inechanisms (about 80 percent of _
the mechanisms whose repair is called for actually do not need repair,
which their vibration characteristics confirm).
The use of engineering diagnostics systems, in the opinion of foreign spe-
cialists, enables the time between overhauls of inechanisms and systems to
be extended.
The Organization, Operations and Tactics of S5N's
The Organization, Operations and Tactics of SSBN's. U.S. SSBN's are or-
ganized into squadrons. Under organizational documents, each squadron
consists of 9-11 submarines (actually, sometimes there are more, some-
times less), a tender, a flaating dock, high-speed transport, and repair
ships. The squadrons, under routine organization, are subordinate to the
commanders-in-chief of the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. The Joint Board
for Strategic Planning of the United States selects targets for them. The -
_ order to launch missiles can be issued only by the President of the United
States.
SSBN's are based at bases on U.S. territory and at advanced bases, close
to the regions of their patrolling-- Holy Loch (Great Britain), Rota
(Spain) and Apra (on the island of Guam, in the Pacific Ocean}. This pro-
vides the greatest operational utilization factor for them and reduces the
probability of destruction of the U.S.'s own territory by enemy nuclear
blows aimed at destroying the submarines at bases. Basing at advanced
points is provided by mobile basing resources. It is envisaged that they
wi11 go to sea or to previously selected sheltered anchorages where, if a
threat of war arises, they can load the SSBN's with missiles, replenish
the reserves of torpedoes and all types of supplies, conduct current re-
pair and provide for crew change. Each tender supports 10 SSBN's.
Upon completion of a combat patrol an SSBN goes to an advanced base for
restoration of combat capability, which lasts for about 1 month. During
this period the crew is changed, reserves are replenished, preventive
inspection and repair of systems are performed, and a portion of the mis-
siles is replaced. SSBN's are closely guarded at the basing point.
Every 4 hours aqualung personnel inspect the underwater portion of the
hull.
Rear-area bases for the U.S.'s SSBN's are at the navy bases of Charleston,
New London and Pearl Harbor and the estuary of the Hooper River (in the
U.S.). In addition to ship-repair yar.ds, warehouses, arsenals and hospi-
tals, training centers and crew-manni,ng centers are located at the U.S.'s
rear bases for SSBN's.
Great Britain's SSBN's are�made up into a squadron, whose personnel are
stationed at the naval base of Faslane in the Shetlands.
22
FOR OFFICIAL LTSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
France's SSBN's form a squadron, are part of the naval strategic forces
. and are based at the Ile-Long (Atlantic Coast) base. The commander of
France's strategic naval forces is directly subordinate to the president
of the republic in matters of SSBN use. The crews of France's SSBN's are
made up only of those who want to serve on them (a crew eonsists of 15 of-
ficers, 102 ~cLty c~i'f'icers and 18 seamer,). The crc~~'s main training is
performed in specialized training centers, where simulators are widely _
used. This saves SSBN resources and reduces the time for drilling a crew
in combat training tasks. Crews are formed over a period of 2.5 years:
this starts lcng before launch of the SSBN being built and ends prior to
its entry into the combat-ready forces.
The U.S.'s SSBN's have been patrolling the oceans and seas that wash
Europe's and Asia's shores since 1960, Britain's SSBN's since 1968 and
France's 5SBN's since the start of the 197n's. Each sortie lasts 60-70
days, and the interval between cruises is 90-110 days. The main task dux�-
ing patrolling is to be in the highest readiness to execute nuclear-mis -
sile strikes nn previously designated targets on the probable enemy's ter-
ritory, wii:h the observance of maximum secrecy. The SSBN's maneuver in
vast, highly secreL- regions of the oceans and seas, from which strikes on
the previously designated targets can be inflicted. Knowledge of one's
position with the precision necessary for the strike is provicled by the
inertial system of the navigational compl~x, and also by regular position
determination by celestial fixes and shore-based and space radio-naviga-
tion system, and by hydroacoustic beacons. It is considered that SSBN's
can begin to launch missiles within 15 minutes af~:er receiving the order
to execute a strike and complete it within 15 minutes after start of the
launch, releasing all 16 missiles at intervals of 1 minute each.
SSBN's follow these tactical measure in order to observe maximum secrecy
while patrolling areas and during sea passages:
--they cruise at submergence depths that will provide for the greatest
operational radius of the sonar equipment that observes the enemy's ASW
forces most dangerous to them, and for the shortest operating ranges of
the enemy's means for observing them;
' --they use low-noise speeds, which do not exceed an average of 5 knots;
--they evade ships, craft and aircraft that have been detected, develop-
ing fu11 speed, when necessary, to break away from them;
--they use sonar countermeasures; and
--l;hey use observation andcommunications gear only in a passive mode and
retractable devices mainly at night. ~
When evading a surface ship, an SSBN turns on its on-board jamming device
for suppressing the receiving circuit of the ship's active sonar, it
aligns its jamming devices, and, maneuvering in depth, course and speed,
makes it difficult for the ship to determine the submarine's coordinates,
23
FdR OFFICTAI. LISE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
and, in warti.me, it uses its weapons. At the start of combat operations,
SSBN use uf torpedoes and antisubmarine missiles prior to launch of the
ballistic missiles is prohibited. After launch of all the ballistic mis-
s.iles, return of thc submarine to its base is envisioned.
The operational utilization faetor of the U.S.'s SSBN's on patrol reaches
0.7; this is provided for by the high reliability of the operation of
their materiel and by the existence of two crews for each SSBN. In 12
years the SSBN's have made 1,000 combat-patrol sorties. In the 4.5 years -
that the SSBN "George Washington" spent in operational components, it made
15 patral sorties and, in so doing, traveled 100,000 miles uncler water in
1,020 days.
In the opinion of American specialists, inadequate range of the missiles,
weak defense of combat patrol areas from the enemy's antisubmarine forces,
remoteness of the patrol regions from the U.S. and the resulting necessi+.,y
for expensive advanced bases, and difficulty in controlling SSBN's at sea
at great distances from command posts are inherent in the Polaris-Poseidon
system.
The Organization, Operations and Tactics of Nuclear-Powered Attack Subma-
rines. Under routine organization, these American submarines are assigned
to flotillas that consist of 3~5 squadrons each. A squadron consists of
5-10 boats. Under an operational-type of organization, flotillas are as -
signed to the operational fleets and to the antisubmarine forces of the
Atlantic and Pacific theaters.
The leadership of the U.S. and British navies considers the struggle
against the enemy's submarines, primarily SSBN's, to be the most impor{;ant
mission of nuclear-powered attack submarines.
It is considered that nuclear attack submarines, when executing antisubma-
rine warfare tasks, can operate in areas close to the eriemy's submarine
bases, on h~i.s sea passage routes (within the antisubmarine forces' boun-
daries), in areas where the enemy's SSBN's proba.bly are patrolling, in -
regions of combat operations of friendly surface ships, and on the sea
- passage routes of friendly SSBN's for the purpose of destroying the
enemy's antisubmarine submarines.
ASW submarines seek out the enemy at low speeds, when their own noise is
least. They can operate separately or in groups, as well as in coordina-
tion with land-based patrol aviation and ASW groups. Sometimes they are
assigned to an ASW group.
Foreign specialists consider that the struggle with enemy submarines can
be more effective with the close coordination of diversified ASW forces
- and equipment, but the joint action of ASW submarines and aircraft can be
successful only where there are reliable two-way communications between sub-
maranc ar~d z:irplane (or helicopter), reliable high-speed means of identifi-
cai:ior~ on them, a precise knowledge of their own locations at sea, the
24 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
' ~OR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
existence of a pvtential for mutual urieiitation, and high developmenl; of
their coord.ination. Viola~:.ion of these r~equiremenLs, they consider, can
lead to acciderctal ~ittaclts on their own submari.nes by their own aircraft
and helicopters. T}~ese requirement:s cannoi: at present be satisf'ied because
af the short distance and poor rel:iabi.l i ty of communications wi tih submerged
submarines , as well as inadequatc developtnent of inethods for join~: opera-
tions with other furces.
However, the coordinat.ion of nuclear a~Ll:ack submarines with av.iation and
_ surface ships is being perfected. ~xercises for ASW barriers, vrhich con-
sist of ASW groupw~, nuc].ear and diesel submarines, patrol aircr~aft, and
surface ships are conducted systematically. During exercises the subma-
rines maneuver in a strip of probable enemy submarine movement. '!'he
width of the maneuver areas is determined on the basis of ~the presumed
width of the strip of probable movement of submarines and of i;he number of
ASW submarines. During the search, eacli ASW nuclear attack submarine ma-
neuvers so as tc provide for the lowest level of its own noise and the
best conditions for direct listening. During i:he exercises, nuclear at-
tack submarines with AN/BQQ,2 sonar complexes have opera~ted successfully,
having detected "enemy" submarines within a band 60 mi).es wide (a subma-
_ rine of the "Los Angeles" type, according to the Amer;cans' computations,
can reliably monitor a region of 60x60 miles). In order to grevent acci-
dental attacks on each other, each nuclear attaclt submarine is prohibited
from leaving its own position, since the reliability of ineans of identifi-
~ cation is s~ill inadequate. A submarine detected within the boundaries of
another submarine's station is considered an "enemy." During the exer- -
cises, the passage of their own submarines through ASW positions was
worked out. In so doing, the submarine that was completing the passage
obtained authorization of the ASW forces to enter the ASW posi~:ion that
was located on the route, and the latter was warned about this. In ~the
in{;erests of safety, it was prohibited that weapons be used duri.ng the
, passage, and both suhmarines were assign~d to different submergence depths.
It is considered that a.n time of war ASW nuclear at:tack submarines will
use tlie positioning method m~st effec~tively at approa~,hes i:,o the land
base~ of the enemy's submarines, in the regions where they patrol, in
area, of the launch positions an.d at A5W barriers. These suU?narines can
be used in an ASW escort of units of large surface ships, primarily nucle-
ar-powered aircraft carriers--this is one of the missions of ~;he "Los An-
geles"-class submarine (at the same time, doubts are expressed about the
potential of this type of coordination between submarines and surface for-
ces because of the inadequate developrnent of ineans of communica-L-ion and -
identificatiom) . It is thought that ASW submarines can inves~;igate
regions where maneuvering of their aircraft carriers is planned and can
be used to lay mines on the enemy submarines' passage routes.
During combat training, U.S, nuclear attack submarines are included in the `
escort of carrier strixe groups, and they search for ~~enemy" submarines
' at di.stances of 72-160 km from the carrier. -
25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090056-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200094456-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The Americans are training in the use of nuclear ai:tack submarinesin joint
c~rc,r