JPRS ID: 9133 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L%9133
_ 9 June 1~~980
Sub-Saharar~ Africa Re ort.:
p
FOUO No. 678
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JPR5 L/9133
.
9 June 1980 �
~ SUB-SAI~ARAN AFRI CA REPORT
FOUO No. 678
~ CONTENTS .
INTER-ARRICAN AFFAIRS
Insolvency of African Nations Reported
(Sir~diou Diallo; JEUNE A~RIQUE, 19 Mar 80).......... 1
OAU Secretary General Explains Economic Policy
(Edem Kodjo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 23 Apr 80) 6
Realism of OAU Economic Summit Praised
(Editorial; MAR~iES TROPICAUX Er ME DITERRANEENS,
9 r~y 80) 8 -
Niger Foreign Policy Stresse.s Nig+erian, Libyan ~
Cooperation -
~Sylviane Kamara; .TEUNE AFRIQUE, 7 May 80) . . , . . . . . . . . 11
Military, Financial Aid Reviewed _
(Sennen Andriamirado f JEULdE AFRIQUE, 14 May 80) . 13 ~
Froblems of Francophone Movement Reviewed
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 14 Apr 80) 15
Francophone Movpment's Problems Examined, by
Elie Ramaro ~
ACCT Official, Di~-ko, Interviewed, Dan Mcko
. In te rview
Briefs
- Kenyan-~aandan Conference 22
Kenyan, Rwandan, Tanzanian Experts 22
- a- IIII - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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ANGOLA
- Briefs
Offshore Oil Ex~loration Loan 23
Swedish As ~istance Continued 23
Foreign Trade Balance 23
BENIN
Report Details Cotonou Port Traffic
(MARQiES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Apr 80)...... 24
CAPE VERDE~
Briefs
- Shipyard Financing 26
QiAD
Civil Conflict in Chad Analyzed
(JE.IJNE AFRIQiJE, 16 Apr 80) 27
Goukouni Between Camps, by Sennen Andriamirado
~ , Prospects for Continued Carnage, by Francois
Soudan
Neutrality of France in Crisis Said To Be Open To Doubt
(Ma.ryam Sysle; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 28 Apr~ll May 80)........ 32
French Paratroopers Withdraw
(Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 7 May 80)............ 35 ~
Briefs
' French Backing for Habre 37 ~
French Attitude Toward Libyans 37 ~
CON GO i
B'r~efs I
_ French Gift for Brazzaville 38 I
ETHIOPIA
Eritrean War Situation Described
(CAMBIO 16, 4 May 80) 39
Briefs
Norwegian Aid !+5
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GAB ON
Briefs
Mineral Production Statistics 46
Estimated Oil Search Cost 46 -
GHANA
Oil Output Down, Consumption Decrease Registered
(MAR(~iES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 2 May 80) . 47
Briefs
IDA Agricultural Credit 48
Renewed USSR Cooperation Viewed 48
GUINEA `
Briefs
Konkoure Dam Financing Reviewed 49
Delegation in China 49
Prospects for Fleet Developm~nt 50
GUINEA-BISSAU
Briefs �
FADEA Loan 51
Brazilian Livestock Cooperation 5tudied 51
~ I VO RY COAS T
Foreign Debt Figures Given
(MARQiES TRUPICAUX ET MEDIT~RRANEENS, 18 Apr 8Q)........ 52
LIBERIA
Iso~ation on African Scene, Internal Hardening Noted
(JEtTNE AFRIQUE, 7 May 80) 56
_ Nation's Economic Prospects Noted
(Jacques Latremoliere; MAR(~iES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS, 2 May 80) 57
New Regime Mus t End U.S. Economic Domination
(Fode Amadou; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 28 Apr-11 May 80)........... 61
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rv K OFFi CIAL US E~1LY
ti
MADAGAS Cl~ R
Mahajanga Faritany Economy Described
(MAR(~ES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 2 May 80)..~.. 64
Briefs -
- SECREN To Manufacture Pumps 65
MALAWI
Briefs
" Cooperation With Taiwan 66
MALI ~
Economic Future Reportedly in Doubt
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 14 Apr 80) 67
- Central Bank Publishes Economic Financial Statistics -
(MAR(~iES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 25 Apr 80)..... 69
M4ZAI~ IQUE
Ralance of Payments Dependent on Port, Railroad Receipts
(MARCi~ES TROPICAUX ET MEDITEkRANEENS, 25 Apr 80)...... 71
Briefs
Warehouses for Agricultural Products 74
Swedish Air Assistance ~q
NTGER
Release of D,jibo Bakery Commended
(Antonia Blia; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 28 Apr-11 May 80)........ 75
- RWAIJ DA
Report on Large Volume of International Aid
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 2 May 80)......~ 77
SOMALIA
Extent of Foreign Assistance~; Need for Army Ana],yzed
(Jacques Latremoliere; MARCHES TROPICAU'Y ET
MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Apr 80) 79
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UGAN DA
Briefs
_ British Aid 86
Fren ch Ai d 86
ZAIRE .
Briefs
Mining, Petroleum 8~
British Aid 88
ZIMBABWE
_ Outlook for Economic Growth Encouraging
(MARQiES TRUPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 9 May 80) 89
Briefs
Nkomo's Attack 91
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
INSOLVENCY OF AFRICAN NATIONS REPORTED
Paris JEUNE AFRI~UE in French 19 Mar 80 pp 42-45
[Article by Siradiou Diallo]
[Text] A century ago, Africa lost ita soul. With the emergence of the
colonial system following the partition stipulated at the Berlin European
~ Conference (1885), Africa bowed under the yoke of foreign domination,
yielding to constraints and force. However, 20 qears ago, there was the
dawn of independence and all hopes for freedom seemed licit. Concealing
a fabulous treasury of raw materials, such as copper, zinc, lead, tin,
phosphates, bauxite, ~angan~ae, uranium, gold and diamonds, would the
continent not emerge from the darkness of the colonial regime with invalu-
able ~rump cards to promote its own industrialization? And, consequently
be able to hasten its own development? Not only was tt?is to become the
general belief, but optimism became the ru~e throughout the area.
Costly F~anaticisms
i Euphoria was replaced by disenchantment. Long after losing their souls,
the Africans are now~ about to lose what is most dear and precious to them:
their joie de vivre. Admittedly the champagne still flows abundantly in
the opulent salons of Abidjan or Yaounde. In Kinshasa, as in Nairobi,
the nightclubs swarm with people aeven nights out of seven. In Cairo
as in Dakar, one frequently hears great, resounding bursts cf laughter
from groups lolling on cafe terraces or walking along the streets. Hence-
forth, everywhere, traffic 3ams constitute ~n integral part of~the urban
scene.
Yet, behind this facade, a sober reality is hidden. Of the 50 membQrs of
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), barely 10 have a healthy economy.
The state of the other 40 is truly alarming, further cc+mplicated by penury
of esaential goods, grave viol~tions of human righte and an appreciable
population increase. With the exception of the petroleum exporting coun-
tries, the economi.es are in a bad waq, if not actually on the brink of
bankruptcy.
Some were--and for that matter still are--battered by cruel civil wars,
born of fanaticisms as intantile as they are coatly: Somalia, Angola,
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Chad, Zaire, Mauritania, and Morocco. Others suffer the inconvenience of
the sinister practice of ~emagogery and intolerance by their lead~rs:
Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Conakry, Uganda and the Central African Republic.
The policy of the sword consists in liquidating anyone suspected of having
notoriety, wealth or education, and this has led to the massive exodus of
vital forces. Moreover, it has plunged the countries, little by little,
into economic and social chaos. But, in general, economic stagnation, not
to say recession of the growth rate and collapse of the production appa-
ratus, is now commonplace.
Food Deficit
This is particularly true in connection with food where, at the present
time, almost al]. the countries of Africa are facing a dramatic situation.
' To be sure, the desertification of the Sahel countries, where rainfall
shortages recur often over several consecutive years, explains in part the
_ drop in agricultural output. But only in part, because a food deficit is
also rampant in Central African countries where the rainfall is both regu-
- lar and abundant.
In his address to Congress on 12 February, Bob Bergland, the U.S. Secre- -
_ tar}~ of Agriculture, pointed out that food production continues to decline
in Africa and that its level per capita is now "Considerably lower than it
was 15 years ago." He also added that, "Without help from the United
States, together with donations from other sources, the unfortunate in-
habitants of these countries will suffer a great deal more."
Begging for Alms ~
The provis~.on of basic necessities in the way of food for the ma~or African -
population centers at the present time has created a real headache for the
governments involve3. At Kinshasa as in Brazzaville, in Accra as in Conakry,
_ one frequently finds officea and work sites totally deserted in full day.
The employees spend the better part of their time looking for some rice,
milk and manioc, needed daily for their families. When they are found on
the black market, the price is beyond ::heir reach.
In most of the capitals, consumer prices increased four and five times
between 1976 and 1980. In Kolwezi (Zaire), a~awoto mine worker remembers
a period when his daily income was easily enough to enab].e htm to buy his
beer ration for a whole month. Now, he says, he must spend the equivalent
of 10 days' work to purchase the same amount of beer. So, he acknowledges
with a slightly embarrassed air, "I`ve given up drinking beer!" And that,
given the custom of the region, is absolutely *_he worst possible fate.
_ Private individuals ar.e not the only ones to suffer the effects of the
rapid decline in purchasing power. The countries themselves apgear doomed -
' to succumb to poverty. Some have ended up discreetly requesting aid from -
the forner colonial power in order to maintain their operational budget.
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The truth is that increasingly, one encounters cases of countries where
the civil servants go days, sometimes a month or two, without being paid.
Heads of state who, ~ust a short while ago, raged againat colonialism and
imperialism, describing them as satanic, no longer hesitate to hold out
the beggar's bowl for aims from the directors of multinational corpora-
tions. They are looking for additional funds to pay their civil servants
and to provide food for their fellow citizens. For reasons of economy,
the governments of Bamako (Mali) and Ouagadougou (upper Volta) decided
to depriv~e civil servants of their service vehicles. Lacking the neces-
sary resources, the leaders of three countries (Benin, Congo and Guinea-
Conakry), designated by the OAU to constitute an intervention force in
Chad, have requested logistical aid from France whose eroops they are
supposed to~relieve at N'Djamena. Moreover, they reportedly made secret -
representations to President Giscard d'Estaing, seeking to dissuade him
from withdrawing his detachment based in Chad.
Budget Deficit
In a number of countries, highway repair programs have been abandoned.
Nor are the existing highway networks being maintained any longer. Every-
where, budget allocations for hospital and school equipment have been re-
duced. In Mauritania, the state expenditure for material has been cut ~
down by 50 percent in the 1980 budget and the budget itself is 7.5 percent
smaller than that for 1979.
~111 the grawth rates are in a free-fall. Over its 100-year history,
Liberia has never recorded a budgetary deficit equal to that rzcorded
� now: 140.8 million dollars (as against 224.9 million dollars of receipts).
Per capita national incose dropped 10 percent in 4 years, whereas consumer
prices rose 16 percent in 1979 alone.
According to experts, the Ivory Coast which has taken the prize, since its
- independence, for economic growth, in 1979 would register a mere 2 to 3
percent growth rate, as compared to 12 percent in 1976. After 4 years of
recession, wealthy Gabon itself expects a return of investments only by
means of a very rigid austerity policy.
- Forei.gn Debt
The constant rise in the cost of manufactured goods, together with the
progressive decline in the price of.�most raw materials, and higher energy -
pricing, laid bare the inadequacy of the economic structures inherited
from the colonial system. The nonpetroleum producing countries are all
more or less on the brink of bankru~tcy. At the rate prices are soaring,
_ one African expert told us, "the countries abls to pay their petroleum
bills will indeed be rare in 5 years."
Right now, Senegal is directing 25 percent of its budgetary revenue to
buying petroleum. Despite the Akosombo dam, which provides sufficient
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electricitti~ to meet its needs, Ghana will have to use almost 50 percent _
of the valt~e of its 1980 imports for petroleum. The lack of adequate
energy supplies means that the people of Bamoko and Conakry, day and night,
suffer prolonged power cut-offs every day, which disorganizes all the busi~
nes.s of these capitals. The Europeana periodically evoke the poseibility
of gas rationing, an African leader told us. In Africa, he went on to
say, "This decision figures among the categorical imperatives to which most
of our. responsible leaders will soon have to bow, unless they ber~efit from
the understanding attitude of their foreign creditors." Nowa3ays, there
are very few countries that do not show a deficit in their balance of pay-
_ c~ents. Even the Ivory Coast, which has never had a deficit since its
independence, showed only a very small surplus in 1978.
Nor can the results be expecteu to differ much in 1979. Although the ton-
nage of exports rises regularly, the mining and agricultural raw materials
exported are progressivPly less able to cover the cost of imports. As a
result, the magnttude of the foreign debt becomes truly disquietening.
With the exception of Cameroon, Niger, Upper Volta and Benin, which their
- leaders administer paternalistically, between 1976 and 1980, most of the _
African nations were fairly severely reprimanded by the intern~tional
financial institutions. -
A goocl deal has been said ab~ut the affairs of Egypt, Zaire, Zambia and
Ghana in this conne~tion. Y~: 3enegal, Togo, the Congo, Tanzani.a, Morocco
_ and Madagascar have not been able, either, to escape the vigilant watch-
dogs of the World Bank and the International MonEtary Fund. Even the
petroleum producing nations, such as Algeria, Nigeria and Gaban, are not
immune to the contagion; while prosperous countries, such as Kenya and
the Ivory Coast, are compelled to postpone--in not purely and simnly
abandon--a~nbitious equipment prr~ects planned during better times. Thus,
the Ivory Coast has only recently indefinitely dropped its plans, dating
- from some time back, ro build an enormous radio center, as well as a costly
project to provide ultra-modern equipment for nationwide radio and tele-
vision coverage. The same thing applies to the construction of the large
internaltional airport, designed. to replace the existing facility at Port-
Bouet, near Abidjan, where the clearing and excavation work had already
been started. At COFACE (French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade), a
very t~eil-informed businessman told us, "Fewer than 10 African countries
today are regarded as being really solvent. All the others are more or
less in the red."
Treasuries in Difficulty
Consequently, one observes a very well-defined decline of investments in
- all sectors, the slowdown of econ.omic growth, a sharp increase in bank-
ruptcies and a generalized stagnation of business activity. One sign of
the times is the fact that SCOA (West African Trading Company) established
- on the continent since the dawn of colonization, in 1979 for the first
time evPr recorded a deficit an3 thereupon closed a number of its branch
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offices. LAMCO (Liberian-t~nexican-Swedish Minerals Company), the prin-
cipal iron ore extraction enterprise in Liberia, showed a def.icit of more
than 26 million dollars for 1979 and plans the dismissal of 700 workers.
Similarly, for the firs~ time since its establishmen* in 1963, the income
statement of Air Afrique shows a deficit. The African Development Bank's
(ADB's) managers did not hide their concern over the failure of a number -
of its members to pay the3r quo*_as. The OAU itself is not unlfkely to
suffer the aft:.~r-effects of the predicament of these countries. Some
disaster victims, such as the Chad and Equatorial Guinea, did not hesitate
to ask for exemption from payment of their share. Others (and they are
quite numerous) without ownitig up to their treasury problems, acknowledge
that they are unable to honor their commitments. All of this recently led
, the Secretary-General of the OAU, Edem Kod~ o, to send his kindest reg~rds
to all the member-countries. Thus it is that, after businesses, admfnis-
trations and countries themselves, some Pan-African organizations as ~
prestigioua as Air Africa, the ADB and the OAU, run the risk, if not of
dying from ane~ia, of at least being seriously paralyzed.
Somber Clouds
All this is tantamount to suggesting that 20 yAars after their independence,
the feast of African nations is over, and the bright sun of bygone days is
now replaced by dark clouds. The situat~.on is all the more serious in that
the leaders insist on hiding the tragedy from their fellow citizens. And
they do it so well that with a very few exception~, Africans continue to
believe that the problem is one of regimes or personalities.
The truth is that Africa is now faced with a problem of survival, both at
the level of states threatened with collapse and of citizens whose human
dignity has been assailed. Fortunately, at a time when petroleum sets the
tempo for the lives.of nations and the destiny of all peoples, Africa proves -
to have some. Howe~;er, between its di3covery and exploitation, a great deal
of time may elapse. Time which, for Africa, may seem like an eternity.
And which, for that reason may prove fatal to Africa.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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INT~R-AFP�.ICAN AFFAIRS -
_ OAU SECRETt~RY GENER.AL EXPLAINS ECONOMIC POLICY
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 Apr 80 pp 23-24
[Statem~nt by OAU Secretary General Edem Kodjo to Professor Mahdi Elmandjira:
"The Last Chance"]
[Text] OAU Secretary General Edem Kodjo explains to
Professor Mahdi Elmand~ira why Africa has waited 20 years
before thinking about its economic future.
~ For the first time an OAU s~nmit devoted exclusively to Africa's economic
problems will be t~eld in Lagos (Nigeria) on 28 and 29 April 1980.
This decision was taken in July 1979 when the chiefs of state held a
conf erence in Monrovia.
Z~aenty years after independence, the African leaders stated at that time
that "Africa had remained the least advanced region in the world" and
"that the time had come to give serious consideration to the problems
of the socioeconomic transformation of the states (OAU members)".
In Addis Ababa in May 1973, the lOth summit of the organization had already
adopted an "African resolution for cooperation, development and economic
independence," which had paved the way for a"resolution pledging assistance
f~r African economic development," formulated in Monrovia in July 1979. ~
The object of the Lagos summit is specifically to "translate into action"
this last decZaration which goes beyond the one of 1973 and involves
rather radical reorientation of. the type of development followed by almost .
all the African states since their in~ependence.
Reorientation
The most serious problem is that of Africa's fragmentation into 50 states,
of which more than 40 have a population of less than 20 milli~n. In fact, -
there are only three African states (Nigeria, Egypt and Ethiopia) which
reach or exceed the world's average population of the UN member states,
which is 30 million. This balkanization of the continent dooms any endogenous
development from the outset and plays a double role. First, the absence -
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of a"critical mass" and an econo~;y of sc.ale forces the great majority of
the African states to maintain very strong ties with the old mother countrie~a.
Secondly, t.hese same ties are an obstacle to any real in.tegration on a
_ regional and continental level.
Moreover, with 25 countries whose income is equal or inferior to $300 per
~apita, where 80 percent are illiterate, 60 percent underfed or poorly
nourished, suffering from a 75 percent deficiency in a constantly dimin-
ishing diet, and 30 percent are unemployed or underemployed, which have
the highest mortality rate in the world (20/1,000), 0.6 percent of the
world's industrial production, and investments in res~arch and development
lower than 1 percent of the GNP, Africa has all the chances to remain the
planet's sick continent for many years to come, unless there is a fundamental
change in its course. This change can only happen with more intensive
inter-African coopE~-:ation, since no African country, with the exception
of four or five, has the slightest chance of truly developing outside of -
a much broader economic and politicai cohesion. This is not a question of
Pan-African sentimentalism, but of absolute necessity.
The sovereign powers' games and childish diseases and their obsession to
command admiration from abroad, in total contrast with reality, become signs
of selfishness and irresponsibility when one refus~s to forget them in
order to permit hundreds oF millions of human beings to accede to a minimum -
of well-being.
Minimum of Well-Being
There is enough change in the wind in the African political weather to make
it possible in Lagos to look for some of the heavy clouds to scatter, which
- would permit Africa to attain this needed turning-point.
The numbe~ of chiefs of state who will take the time to attend this first
continent,tl economic meeting wi~l be a test in itself of their genuine
interest tn dealing with the most vital questions for the future of their
country. If, on the contrary, the flow of words at the Lagos tr.eeting
prevails over the economic obligations, the African chiefs of state,
consciously or unconsciously, will have contributed to making the conjunc-
tion of economic underdevelopment and political instability more explosive.
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
REALISM OF OAU ECONOMIC SUMNtIT PRAISED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 May 80 p 1073
= [Editorial: "Realism At Last"]
[Text) For the first time in their history, all the African nations, with
the exceptian of Liberia and South Africa, met under the aegis of the OAU to ~
examine problems of economic development.
Seventeen years after the establishment of the Organization of African
Unity, which to date has devoted most of its activity to the achievement of
political objectives, Africa took an unbiased look at its economic progress.
Despite the sum of possibilities and achievements, the result is alarming
and OAU Secretary General Kod~o exclaimed that Africa is "confronting the
problems~ of its very survival."
- This cry of alarm is scarcely exaggerated despite its dramatization which
~ was probably intended. Too often in these columns we have exposed Africa's
anguishing problems of galloping population growth, inadequate food produc-
_ tion, unemployment, accelerated urbanization, indebtednesa, the consequences -
of i.ncreasing oil costs not compensated for by aid from producer countries,
the deterioration in terms of trade and the ill effects of internal and ex-
ternal inflation, for it to be necessary to repeat Edem Kod~o's demonstra-
tion.
I'rom his overall evaluation of failure, we have retained only a few signifi-
`ant figures: Africa has 18 out of the 25 poorest countries in the world.
The mortality rate (19 percent) is the highest and life expectancy the
shortest (47 compared with a world average of 55 years). The yield of
the main types of agricultural production: wheat, corn, rice, peanuts,
millat and sorghum has steadily dropped since the early 1960's, with the
exception of cotton, while world yields have increased. In 1970, the cost
of food imports made up 15 percent of the gross national product. Africa's
share of world production is almost insignificant: around .9 percent. In
1970, industrial production made up only 11.5 percent of Africa's GNP.
Systems of education are poorly adapted and result in a waste of human
resources and "an opposition between education, culture and employment."
Intra-African t:rade has dropped almost continuously since 1970.
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In view of this gloomy picture, it is paradoxical to note the wealth of the
African Continent, particularly with respect to mineral and energy resources
(1.3 percent of world cosl reserves, 27 to 40 percent of the world's hydro-
_ electric power potential).
A March 1980 UNDP document sums up Afr.ica's economic situation per.fectly:
"The past 20 years of the postcolonial period of political independence did
not bring the radical economic transformation that had been anticipated....
Despite vast natural resources and the praiseworthy efforts of its govern-
ments and peoples, Africa can show no noteworthy growth rate or satisfac-
tory index of general well-being. Its economy remains essentially under-
developed."
For several years, political leaders and economic and social planning ex-
perts have obvious tried to analyze the causes of such a situation and to
find ways of doing something about it. Several debates between Africans,
particularly the Monrovia Colloquium in February 1979, actually preceded
the Lagos Economic Summit Meeting.
The latter derives its importance and significance as much from the African
leaders' examination of their conscience and their new approach to develop-
ment problems as it does from the resolutions adopted.
The basic question underlying all these discussions is in fact this: What
type of development does Africa need? The answer to this question has had
light shed upon it by the evaluation of errors that must not be repeated.
The secretary general of the OAU noted, in fact, that the development
policy of the new nations following their accession to independence con-
tinued to be orfented toward the former colonial countries, that the Afri- ~
- can economies still depend to a great extent on those of the industrialized
world and that there has been a prevailing tendency to wait for solutions
to come from the outside, to imitate the Western pattern of development ar.d
to import Cechnology. In short, Africa has to date practiced "a strategy
of extroversion. Africa's development has been organized "toward the
outside and for the outside with respect to both concepts and products,"
notes Edem Kodjo. "With regard to concepts, it is time for Africa to draft
an appropriate economic development theory in keeping with its individual
needs, its own genius, its own authenticity," he adds.
This dependency of African economies on the outside world, this "vertical"
development from the south to the north and vice versa which has neglec'ted
"horizontal" development that i5, coordination and the complementary
nature of African economies among themselves are these things simply -
a legacy of colonization? Without denying the importance of the effects
of colonization, the secretary general of the OAU re~ects the facileness
of this excuse and is not contradicted by the heads of state and government.
Twenty years have passed since independence has been gained and yet, on
the whole, Africa has made no great effort to throw off the yoke.
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After the diagnosis comes the search for therapy. Here again, the spirit
iri which African political leaders at the highest level have proceeded
is significant: One must henceforth examine development problems with the
"seriousness" merited by the concern for improving the welfare of the
Af'rirc~n peopl.es as mu~h as by political problems. It is time ta consider
possible choices realistically, abandoning the distorting prism of ideo- _
logies. Africa must no longer expect an improvement in its fate only from
the progress of the industrialized world, its aid and the burdensome acquisi-
ticn of Western technology that is often poorly adapted to its own needs.
Before relying on others, Africa needs to rely on itself.
If, in the future, this new lang~iage is translated into concrete decisions,
Africa will truly undertake what the Nigerian president has called "the
second phase in the struggle for freedom" that is, the struggle for eco-
namic independence.
For the time being, the Lagos Summit Meeting has established the terms and
proposed long-term objectives. Over the next 10 years, Africa will try to
strengther. existing regional economic communities that is, essentially
ECOWAS in West Africa and to stimulate the setting up of similar groups
in Central Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa. .Wherever their estab-
lishment would be too difficult, as in North Africa, sectorial integration
on a continental level would be sought.
The reg9_onal approach seemed preferable,because it is more realistic, to the
more ambitious and overall solution proposed at the outset by the Guinean
president that is, the establishment of an economic community of the
entire African Continent. The latter remains the ob~ective for the year
2000 and a preliminary charter is to be presented to the chiefs of state
at the next economic summit meeting of the OAU, in principle, in 2 or 3
years. On the other hand, the secretary general of the OAU received a
mandate to continue studies and steps needed to bring about an African Com-
mon Ener~y Market by 1990.
The essential thing is that Africa is determined, over the next two decades,
to strengthen its integration in the agricultural and food domains, which
have recognized priority, and in the industrial, energy, transport and
cou~munications sectors, especially since it is resolved to rely above an
on its awn efforts and to choose its own paths to the future.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1980
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
NIGER F~REIGN POLICY STRESSES NIGERIAN, LIBYAN COOPERATION
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 May 80 p 41
[Article by Sylviane Kamara: "Betweeen ~ao Too Powerful Neighbors"j
[TextJ A Necessary But Difficult Co~peration Between Libya and Nigeria.
They had not been invited. They came anyway. By plane, from the north, and
in a procession of 504 blacks, from the south, Libyans and Nigerians landed
in Niamey on 13 April. ~Panic in the protocol service. One had not antic-
. ipated housing and feeding the prefect of Sebha (Libya) and above all not
49 Nigerians who had thought it a good idea to invite themselves to the
celebration of the 6th anniversary of the army's taking power.
"Our proximity is difficult," acknowledges a high Nigerian official, "this
surprise viait is proof of that, but we have to bear with it."
That is why Niger, a realist, is striving to develop wi.th its two powerful
neighbors--Nigeria and Libya--the best possible cooperation. Of course, with
ita 5 million people and its budget of 72 billion francs CRA (African
Financial Community), it is a little bit like Cinderella in the presence of
ita partners. But, as President Kountche atates, "Juat becauae Niger is
one of the poorest countries doea not mean we should not be reapected as a
sovereign state~" And to make itaelf respected by Libya is already a feat,
as much as there is between the two countries a border diapute. "The
present border," states Daouda Diallo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, "does
not satisfy either Niger or Libya, and a~oint co~isaion has been created
to find a solution to this problem."
Another delicate matter is that of the Nigerian uranium sold to Pakistan
(150 tons in 1978) and to Libya (300 tons in 1979). This issue was "deflated"
at the 23d session of the AIEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) in New
Delhi (December 1979) where it was conclusively proven that Niger certainly
_ sold uranium twice, in an entirely official way, to Libya. But if Niamey
informed the AIEA about this sale, Tripoli did not think it wise to point
out ita purchase to the agency...
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- With Nigeria, on the other hand, relations have never been as involved.
Niger, landloc~ced, sends a large part of its freight from tae ports of its
neighbors. Arter having bought its petroleum in Algeria (at a high price
and through Benin), then in Libya, it turned this year toward Nigeria, which
should deliver to Niger 400,000 tons.
Regarding mining, Nigeria, at the request of Niger, has taken a 16 percent
share in the company that is suppose3 to work the uranium beds in Techili. -
In agricultural development an agreement was signed on 12 April in Niamey by
the Nigerian secretary general of the ~oint Niger-Nigeria commisaion, Gabriel
Sam Akunwafor, with the FAO (Western Armed Forces) to put into operation the
Komadougou-Yobe basin. ~
Deatabilization
Certainly, right now, Niger along side Nigeria as well as Libya looks like -
a beggar. One is sometimes obliged at Niamey to accept unequal contracts,
lacking the power to negotiate as equals, and watchfulness has to be
exercised. On 15 April President Kountche asked his countrymen "to open
their eyes wide" in view of "destabilizing activities to which small
countries with unstable and uncertain borders are sub~ecte3." It is
difficult to refrain from looking toward the north and thinking that two
powerful neighbors, at last, are better than one,...
COPYRIGHT; Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1980
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
MILITARY, FINANCIAL AID REVIEWED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 May 80 p 17
[Article by Sennen Andriamir.ado: "France-Africa: Weapons and Money!"]
[Text] What evil curse ha~.struck the so-called French-African meetings?
~In April 1977, at the Dakar (Senegal) sunimit conference, one participant,
Zaire, was shaken by the first war in Shaba. In May 1978, it was the
second war in Shaba. In May 1979, the Kigali (Rwanda) summit meeting was
sullied by the Bokassa scandal. On 8-10 May 1980, the meeting in Nice will �
have taken place against the background of war: the Chadian tragedy and
the bloody events in Liberia. This time, however, no one will have lied.
The official communique emphasizes economic cooperation between France and
Africa and for once, the chiefs of state are right: Economic cooperation
is more than ever the order of the day.
Since the beginning of the year, phenomena of "destabilization" for economic
reasons have increased in number. Senegal, Mali and Zaire have experienced
- (and are still experiencing) disturbances in which the students are actually
only the ones to reveal .the economic malaise. Afr~.cans have found only
two parades: money and weapons.
Money? One has to have it. African chiefs of state meeting in Nice were
coming from the Lagos summit meeting (see page 22) "exclusively devoted
~ to the economy." They had their records: Africa is an economic disaster
and international cooperation has been scandalously inadequate. ~France �
was prepared. The 1980 budget of the Miniatry of Cooperation amounts to
4.3 billion French francs (over 200 billion CFA francs), or 23 percent
more than in 1979. What is more, France had put together a dossier on the
energv crisis in Africa. Accordfng to the study, the cost of imported oil
~ doubled in under 2 years and OPEC aid to 12 nations on the continent
(nonproducers) represented only 40 percent of their oil imports.
This reference to oil served as a diversion because France is not in a -
good position. Giscard d'Estaing's promises since 1975 on the eatablish-
ment of an International Solidarity Fund for Africa have not been kept:
The ACDA (Concerted Action for the Development of Africa), set up at the
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rux urr'1t;lAt, U5~ UNLY
end of 1979, only provides for "concertation" between developed countries
to coordinate their aid. No funds!
On the other hand, lacking money, France's friends will have arms and the
consolidation of "military cooperation." Officially, the famous Defenae
Pact was not on the agenda. But, by virtue of the bilateral agreements,
the 7,700 soldiers stationed in Africa (except for those fram Reunion) are
ready to fly to the aid of any chief of state in difficulty. Paris will
continue to equip the armies of its "satellites," which, according to
French sources, are demandiag more and more sophisticated war equipment and
- consequently, it is more and more costly. The French gun merchants have
even decided to "extend credit" to their African customers, but by being
- paid by the Paris government, which confirms rhe thought of French social-
ist Lionel Jospin: "Africa is at one and the same time coveted and forgotten
and the great powers have difficulty allowing it to become a subject of his-
tory."
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
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TNTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
~
PROBLEMS OF FRANCOPHONE MOVEMENT REVIEWED
Francophone Movement's Problems Examined
Paris AFRIQU~-ASIE in French 14 Apr 80 pp 66-67
(Article by Elie Ramaro: "The Instit�itional Francophone Movement in Crisis"] -
[Text] Half-paralyzed by the trench warfare that France
and Canada are waging, the Agency for Cultural and Tech- '
nical Cooperation (ACCT), which in Paris recently aban-
doned the principle of collegiality, is suffering a seri-
ous crisis of identity.
Brawling over the naming of the secretary general and his six statutory as-
sistants, more and more closed sessions so as to spare the members of the 30
delegations and the observers from the more vigorous duelling between the
French and Canadian ministers, the Weatern sponsors of an institution of
which they a~e at the same time the principal financiers: the six. confer-
' ence of the Agency of cultural and technical cooperation (ACCZ~, in Lome last
December, and the extraordinary session just held in Paris at the end of March
have lived up to the reputation for confuaion and futility held by this No 1
inatitution of the Francophone movement.
. The daily humor prevailing in Togo fu~ther enriched these championships of -
sterile jabbering:. "Oh, papa, oh, mamma, let me go see the well-beloved
Guide, E-ya-de-ma!" was sung at the top of their voices,to an accompaniment
of bongos and dancing, by "animation" brigades composed of several hundred
young Togolesh in multicolored uniforms, sent to punctuate all the heavy
moments of the mid-December conference. But this riot of behavior and slo-
gans proved at least--to the point of caricature--how the ACCT, known as
"Agecoop" in those parts, is receiyed in the capitals of most West African
coun~ries and~ in Quebec--the only~ones that incarnate the "popular Franco-
phone movement" which certain creators of the agency, founded in Niamey, Ni-
ger, in 1969, dreamed of.
"Soft" Cooperation
It is true that by the fact of its having been.expanded (see lists at end),
the institution appears to be better able to defend itself against the accu-
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sation of being rnly an instrument or "submarine" of French neocolonial pol-
icy as manifested particularly in Africa, and it is also true that the agen-
cy's aid programs--totaling 60 million French francs, not including the
"special budgets"--deserve bettier than the image the ACCT gives itself when
it meets in conference.. Although they do not always escape the reproach of
"sprinkling" readily leveled at them by countries that do "heavy" or
"linked" cooperation, such as France, they constitute a formula for "soft
cooperation" that is appreciated by its African or Asiatic users for its
flexibility, its variety, and at the same time its relative political, i~
not cultural, neutrality.
Thanks to the Agency, in fact, 1,200 professionals have been able to take
management training courses at the International School of Bordeaux, which
has been UperaEing for some 10 years. The linguists of the ACCT, anxious to
escape the ambient cultural imperialism, have taken up defense of the na-
tional languages, particularly in Africa: lexicons, atlases, collections of
oral tradition, design of transcription systems and learning~methods are be-
ginning to restore respectability to some of the principal languages spoken
on the continent. The same is the case for the Creole languages of the Car-
ibbean or of the Indiar~ Ocean. '
The ACCT has also oriented itself toward development of education, with an
interesting educational-television experiment in the Wolof language in Sene-
gal and a policy of harmonized productions involving a dozen television sys-
tems or educational-television centers throughout the world. The agency is
also doing a lot for the emergence of an independent African cinema: it has
helped some film-makers known throughout the world today, such as Sembene
Ousmane and Med Hondo, to produce and distribute their films, and finances
several Third World film festivals which are not without controversy. With-
out it, the folklore troupes and the artisans of the poor countries, as well
as the young writers of books and radio plays, would never have had the op-
portunity to present themselves to a public. ~ ~
Under the impulse of the African countries and Canada, the agency has also
gone into development action: the "green Sahel" operation; the Bamako hotel-
i training school; the creation of a special fund that makes it possible to
carry out 200 study or action missions in the neediest countries each year;
"horizontal cooperation" experiments opening the way to a"South-South" dia-
og, etc. It would be a shame fo'r.so creative an~ institution--no matter
what its management difficultiesl--to founder in a powerlessness to which
its principal"godfathers" would like to reduce it today if they cannot have
exclusive leadership.of the political "Francophone movement" to which they ~
aspire. It was in order to ward off this pressing danger that the extra-
1. The agency's accountants and auditors do not fail, on the occasion of
each statutory conference, to point out numerous irregularities in man-
agement. The latest crop includes, for example, nonapplication of per-
- sonnel regulations, commitment to expenditures without confirmation of
loans, use of budget. surpluses, thefts of cash and materials, etc.
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ordinary meeting concluded on 27 March formally declared that it wanted to
"giv~ a new impulse (to the ACCT by providing it with) even more effective
structures." The most tangible reslilt of this was the elimination of the
collegiality of the general secretariat, already greatly reduced, in 197$,
by Lhe secretary general, the Nigerien Dan Dicko.
Member State: Belgium, Benin, Burundi, Canada, Central African Republic, Co-
mores, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Dominica, France, Gabon, Haiti, Upper Volta, -
Le~anon, Luxembourg, Mali, Mauritius, Monaco, Niger, New Hebrides, Rwanda,
Senegal, Seychelles, Chad, Togo,.runisia, Vietnam, Zaire.
Associated States: Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau, Laos, Mauritania.
Participating Governments: New Brunswick, Quebec.
ACCT Official, Dicko, Interviewed
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14 Apr 80 pp 67-68
[Interview by Elie Ramaro with Dankoulodo Dan Dicko, secretary general of
the ACCT; date and place not given]
[Text] "One cannot do cultural things only. Everything
has to go forward together." Thus said the Nigerien Dan-
koulodo Dan Dicko, present secretary general of the ACCT ~
(Agecoop), who at the extraordinary conference in Paris
on 27 March was reelected to his position and relieved of
assistants from whom he had withdrawn a part of their func-
tions in 1978. "The big-brother type of Francophone move-
ment is dead," he adds--but with the limits implied by the
"patronage" of Agecoop by France and Canada, who would dear-
ly like to make it an instrument of cultural neocolonialism,
if not the all-purpose of neocolonialism pure and simple.
[Question] Is there really a difference between the type of cooperation
practiced by your agency and that which is done in a bilateral way, by coun-
tries with a"dominating" tendency, such as France, for example?
[Answer) We are actually complementary. I call this a sensitizing, cata-
lytic type of cooperation. We are helping in the pooling of ineans, in de-
velopment of awareness on the part of those involved that one project or an-
other is within the capacity of the population itself.
[Question) Is this what is meant by "horizontal cooperation"?
[Answer] Hexe is an example. In the matter of scientific research, we have
set up a network of exchanges which first involved Senegal and the Congo.
It then snowballed and stimulated Mali; and it was Mali that provided the
experts to set up something similar in Haiti. This is a case of action by a
"soft method," between two countries that have comparable levels of infra-
structure, without risks of imbalances.
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[Question] And in the case of educational television?
[Answer] There had been some experiments in Niger and in the Ivory Coast �
with~n the framework of French cooperation. The first one has closed down
for good; the second one reaches many young people, but it uses enormcus fa-
_ cilities to do so, and at a cost beyond the reach of many poor countries.
Nevertheless, with the help of the Senegalese authorities the Agency has
found an original approach: light and wel.l-suited equipment, reduced budget
in line with *_he country's capacity, local personnel, experimentation
phases following one anather in a prudent sequence. This works. And Dji-
bouti's educational television is presently starting up thanks to coopera-
tion from Dakar's educational TV.
[Question] Your last general conference, in Lome, gave an example of dis-
order, confusion, procedural battles dominated by the confrontation between
France and Canada, your principal backers, and all this in a riot of person-
ality cult. And in addition, you had to meet in an extraordinary conference ~
at the end of March, less than 4 months later, to settle the differences
left hanging at Lome. This is a crisis, isn'C it?
[Answer] You are hard. But it is true, there is a problem about amending
texts adopted 10 years ago, to serve as a charter for this Agency at the
time of its creation. You know that at its beginning the states of social-
ist tendency considered the ACCT a disguised reconstitution of the French
colonial empire--on the cultural level, in any case. But I believe that
since 1974--the year when i took on responsibility as secretary general--we
have shown by our actions themselves that we were not an instrument of cul-
tural imperialism.
I had ZO member countries; today there are 33. A certain adaptation of the
texts is needed to follow this dynamic development. We started out with a
collegial system, but it has been proved within the agency that this makes
it too difficult to take decisions. In such a system, there is a tendency
for everyQne to bring his own views of cooperation into the running of the
agency. Canada insists on social or economic development; France, on train-
ing; Belgium, on culture in the strict sense; for our part, we have stressed
the notion of overall development.
~Question] You the Africans?
[Answer] Yes, we the Africans. One cannot do cultural things only. Every-
thing has to go forward together. But this continues to collide ti~ith hab-
its; whence divisions in the management that have impeded the agen~y's work
--that is, its programs.
[Question] Then was Lome, with all its expenses, a conference for nothing? .
[Answer] If it had not existed, it would have been necessary to invent it.
- It made it possible to pose the problem. I regret the impassioned character
that it took on. I admit that discussion of the programs went dbwn the
drain, although this is what interests our peoples.
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But since November, new operations have started up in Vietnam, in Chad, in
Guinea-Bissau. As for cult of personality, as you say, it is not up to me
to judge this: we all accept one another as we are. And we are often very
different.
[Question] What unites you, then? The language?
~Answer] Yes, and it ia tremendous. It is a cement, a joint, 3 conver-
~ gence,:.even a way of feeling. And it does not belong only to France. In
this, the agency has a supplementary role to play which is not quantifiable:
a task of sensitizing and liaison among the Francophone delegations on the
stage of world diplomacy, especially on the occasion of conferences of the
. United Nations family, such as UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade
and Developmentj and a good many others.
(Question) For you, then, are the conditions that presided over the agen-
cy's formation, this politicization of the Francophone movement, this em-
phasis on the "moderate" countries as well-behaved spokesmen for a culture -
coming from somewhere else--is this forgotten?
,
[Answer] It is no longer a big-brother type of Francophone movement. Ten
years later, the Congo is still there; Vietnam and Laos have stayed with us;
Mauritania and Morocco are beginning to work with the agency. Socialist and
Portuguese-speaking Guinea-Bissau too.
[Question] But why Algeria's rejection and Madagascar's exit a few years
ago?
(Answer] At the beginnirig, the Algerians sometimes "poop-speakers"! But
we are not losing hope of rapprochement with them. The same with the Mala-
gasies, who quit the Agency mainly, I think, because they considered their
participation too expensive for the services received. In any case, I hope -
that the way of expansion will continue to be followed, and that this will
give a boost t~ horizontal cooperation between developing countries.
[Question] Do your personnel, the experts that you use, have a different
"profile" from those of the national cooperation systems?
[Answer] Our structure is quite small--some 100 agents--and everything is
known. Our policy is in line with our means; and contrary to what is some-
times said in the press or elsewhere, our operating expenses are lower than
those of many international organizations or of our agents' home govern-
ments.
As for the experts, we have had only two complaints about them, out of sev-
eral hundred missions organized since 1974. The characteristic thing about
them is that they do not feel they are sent by one particular country or an-
other. They are animated by an internationalist spirit. Often, the Agency
does not even see them: we have an idea, we put people in contact, we parti-
cipate in the financing of the missions and then we receive the reports.
But their circuit is horizontal.
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Thus, for example, we asked Upper Volta, which is very advanced in the area
of the rural press, to make someone available to Rwanda; in the same way, a -
coconut-plantation expert from the Ivory Coast went directly to the Sey-
chelles with the savoir-faire of his country's peop?e. In a different vein, -
we have an educational cooperation program in the Comores, which began in
~1976; there are still some 50 Belgian, Canadian, Senegalese, Beninese, Upper
Voltan, Tunisian teachers and doctors there--and this has never pased the
least problem.
(QuestionJ Nevertheles:~, all these programs are often eclipsed, in the de-
bates of your institutional bodies, by the Franco-Canadian confrontation,
which seems far-removed from them.
- [Answer) I know that these debates have left a bitter taste, and that they
have been viewed as political opposition between the agency's funders and
its users. I do not believe it is really that. Franre and Canada are fated
to remain in the agency, for various reasons. The Africans too, without
whom the or~;anization would be nothing. Cooperation means not only the .
selling of products. There is also an affective side that humanizes our
agency, pertiaps because of its cultural vocation. The ACCT is not the Com-
monwealth: it is an entirely voluntary matter.
[Question] But what do the African countries, for example, bring to this
r_ocperation; isn't it once again a one-way matter? ,
[Answer] There are presently some attempts--North-South dialog, trilog, etc
--to rid the relations between rich and poor countries of their natural cyn-
icism. Africa has the means to climb up the ladder with its raw materials,
at leas?: when it has them. And then, doubtlessly, the humanist side comes
increasingly from the South, whereas the North--partly because of the race
_ to technology and the consumer society--has somewhat lost sight of these
values. On ~he cultural level, we are helping the cinema, plays, Af'rican '
musical firo~lps, which are finding popular audiences, to "rise" toward Europe.
[QuestionJ Is your mission to defend the French language as such? ~
[Answer] Inasmuch as it is used by most of our member countries on a daily
basis, yes. But it is not the property o~ one country, nor is it an elitist
creation. Thus we defend the right to difference, to specific heritages. "
If dialects derived from French--such as the Creole tongues of the Carib-- ~
~ean, of the Indian Ocean or the Pacific, for example, or what is sometimes ~
acalled "African French" in its different regional variants--make it pos- ~
sible to retain a broad Francophone system, they are entitled to all our at-
tention and to our help. Bu~ in the face of the Engliah language, which has ~
progressed so fast, we should not be afraid of "Francophonizing" to the max-
imum: we have got certain English-speaking countries of Africa to specify !
French as a second language. We have also launched French-language programs
on island obtaining independence that beYong to the A.nglo-Saxon cultural
area, such as Daminica (in the Aritilles) and the New Hebrides (in the Pacif- ~
ic). The problem is that one sometimes has the feeling of defending the
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French language more than the French do themselves! One sees French scien-
tists publishing regularly in English, or using that language in confer- -
ences; and nowhere in Africa does one hear a broadcast like that of "English
by Radio," which the BBC broadcasts everywhere. -
(Question) But as for the African national languages, what is there place
in all this?
[Answer] We have a department directed specially toward study of the na-
tional languages, collection of oral traditions, the writing of dictionaries
_ and indexes. This is right in the agency's charter, and--with the exception
of some French associations wedded to the past, and a few individuals-- no
one dreams of going back to that. Even so, the road is a long one: I cannot
do a course in organic chemistry in Hausa, which is my language, but which I
do not manage to write. And even if I did manage to, my theoretical public -
would be limited to the Hausa cultural area, which would not take me very
far.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
11267
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
KENYAN-RWANDAN CONFERENCE--A mixed Rwandan-Kenyan conference was held
starting on 21 April at Kigali. Thie meeting, which was attended by experts
~ from both countries, tried to improve cooperation between Rwanda and Kenya
in the fielde of transportation, trade, telecommunicationa, cultural ex-
changes, agriculture, and animal husbandry, as well as juatice and immig~~ t.
ration. The participanta also examined a draft of an agreement pertaining
to Rwandan-Kenyan cooperation in secondary and university education. Rwanda
aseigned great importance to thia conference because Kenya is its firAt
trade partner in Africa; $0 percent of Rwandan importa transit through the
port of Mombasa. [Text) [Paria MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 2 May 80 p 1052] 5058
KENYAN, RWANDAN, T~4NZANIAN EXPERTS---Experts from Rwanda, Kenya, and Tanzania
met at Kigali at the end of April for the sixth time in order to try to
create a pyrethrum industry in the three countries. We note that pyrethrum
cultivatioa declined in 1979 in Rwanda where the villagera had often replaced
thia caeh crop with food crops. Rwanda's pyrethrin output came to 38 tona
in 1979 as against 46 tons during the year before that, Because of the
ahortage on the international market, prices were as high as $50 per kilogram
in 1979, ss against $30 in 1978. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MED-
ZTERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1052J 5058
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- ANGOLA
- BRIEFS
OFFSHORE OTL EXPLORATION LOAN--The American Export-~mport Bank has decided
to grant a~oan uf $96.9 million for an offshore petroleum exploitation
project in Angola. The loan, granted at an interest rate of 8.25 percent
to the SONANGOL and Cabinda Gulf Oil companies, will make it possible to
increase t~e petroleum output by 26.4 million barrels and the propane
output by 14.9 million barrels between 1981 and 1988. ~li'ese two companies
wi11 purchase equipment and services connected with the pro3ect from the
United Statea for $114 million, [TexC] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
I~DITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1056] 5058
SWEDISH ASSISTANCE CONTINUED--Sweden will participate in Angola's economic
development Co the tune of almoet F30 million over the next 2 years under
the eerms of an agre~ement which has ~ust been signed between the two
countries at Luanda. This aid will be used primarily in the field of
health and for the development of Che fishing industry, jText] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEiJS in French 2 May 80 p 1056] 5058
FOREIGN TRADE BALANCE--Angolan exports amounted to $684 million in 1973
against $474 million in exporta [as publiahed], presenting a positive balance
of $210 million. In 1974, a positive balance of $550 million was regie-
tered, with $1,114 million in e:~~".~ c7~diiibL $S6~i iI1~11.~.0I1 ~A importa. For
the first 2 yeara during which full estimates can be computed, the situa-
tion is the following: in 1977, exports amounted to $910 million and im-
porte to $681 million, with a positive balance of $229 million. In 1978,
exports rose to $1,100 million and imports to $750 million, with a positive
balance of $350 million. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 16 May 80 p 1169)
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BENIN
REPORT DETAILS COTONOU PORT TRAFP'IC
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Apr 80 p 928
[TextJ Traffic in the autonomous port of Cotonou in 1979 revealed the
following features;
Tonnage Figures
Number Net Groes
Tankera 192 1,935,567 3,143,332
Freighters 430 1 866 980 3 133 716
'T~sawlers 182 ~ 33,805 ~ 65,467 `
. Miacellaneous Vessels 11 6,733 9,670
Total 805 3,843,085 6,352,185
Tn the breakdown by vesael flags, Greece headed the list with 183 veasels
and 292,445 tons net and 452,586 tons gross. It is followed by France
with 92 vessels and 497,546 tons net as well as 870,445 tone gross. Great
Britain is in third place with 89 vesaels and 698,474 tons net and 1,172,326
_ tons groes. The USSR aent 53 vessels to this port with 306,210 tone net
and 569,716 tona groas. Benin sent 14 vessels with 13,524 tons net and
21,777 tone gross.
The year 1979 enebled the autonomous port of Cotonou to achieve a figure
of a litCle more than 1.5 million tons, which ie lees than in 1978 when the
figure wae close to 1.8 million tons. On the other hand, figurea for 1980
are growing constantly becauae both Niger and Benin made big investmente
requiring heavy imports. Moreo~a, in order to diveraify ita accesa to the
ees, Ma1i could step up the shipment of certain equipment through Cotonou.
In any caee, the two projecta for the extension of the port of Cotonou and
the port's productivity will make it possible to handle an ever-growing
traffic volume by making the infrastuncture facilities more piofitable.
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- 1979 General Goods Traffic (in Tone)
. Imports Exporta Total
Hydrocarbona 789,836 789,836
(including tranaloading) 627,747
Miecell~sneoue goods ~ 651,241 61,175 712,417
Total 1,441,077 61,176 1,502,253
Breakdown of Main Import Items, 1978 and 1979 (in Tons) -
_ 1979 1978
Hydrocarbons 789,836 309,304
Solid bulk goods 314,384 274,003
Construction materials 49,527 36,231
Cereals and similar products 79,790 124,815
Food products 70,037 111,678
Lubricanta and bituminous products 10,018 g,227
Fertilizer, insecticides 11,735 12,479
Equipment 21,873 23,823
Vehicles and parts . 9,834 11,585
Miecellaneous 84,043 93,874
Total 1,441,077 1,006,019
Breakdown of Main Export Itema, 1978 and 1979 (in Tons)
1979 1978
Vegetable oils 12,719 4,271~
Oil crops 17,351 11,443 '
Products 15,646 18,589
Textile fibers 4,476 7,481
Food producta (corn) 3,435
Equipment 789 186
Vehiclea and.parts 1,012 486
Miacellaneous 9,165 3,826
Total 61,151 49,717
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paria 1980
5058 _
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CAPE VERDE
BRIEFS
SHIPYARD FINANCING--Within the framework of the first Lome convention,
the BEI (European Investment Bank) gsanted a loan of 3.5 million account- _
ing unlts (1 ECU equals approximately F5.8) for the construction of a
repair facility for big ocean-going fishing vessels in the Bay of Mindelo,
the principal port in the Cape Verde island group. This operation too:c
the form of a conditional loan which was granted at an interest rate of
_ 2 percen~ for a term of up to 25 years; the loan was extend~d to the
Repuhlic of Cape Verde to help it in putting together the amounC of in-
house funding necessary to finance these infrastructure facilities. The
BAD (African Development Bank) likewise participates in the financing of
this nroject for which the BEI had already, in February 1979, granted
conditional loan of 80,000 accounting units earmarked for the financing
of the feasibility study. Maritime and fishing activities as we know are
the major factors capable of promoting the economic development of Cape
Verde which is at the center of one of the world's busiest fishing zones;
it is expected that this repair yard, which could become operational at ~
the end of 1982, wi11 provide something like 700 jobs and an annual net
foreign exchange gain of something like 3.5 million accounting units,
corresponding to close to 80 percent of the earnings from the export of
goods and services in 1978. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDIT-
ERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1037] 5058
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CHAD
CIVIL CONFLICT IN CHAD ANALYZED
Goukouni Between Camp~
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Apr 80 p 6
[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: ''Goukouni Between Sadat and Qadhdhafi"]
[Text] From the start of the nth Chadian civil war France had promised to
remain neutral. President Valery Giscard d'Estaing confirmed it in Paris
on 3 April 1980 to Edem Kod~o, secretary general of the Organization of
African Unity. The thing is that the French were (and are still) persuaded
that their potential adversary, Libya, would not intervene directly in the
conflict. ~!here were two reasone for this certainty.
The first is that the northern part of Chad bordering on Libya is controlled
by the FAP [Peaple's Armed Forces] of President Oueddei Goukouni, whose
troops--viscerally anti-Libyan--could have cut into shreds any column which
Col Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi might have had the imprudence or impudence to send
to intercene. The second reason is the ma~or one: diplomats from the
French Foreign Ministry assert i~ private that his surveil~lance of Libya's
border with Egypt demands too much of Qadhdhafi's attention to enable him
to afford committing a portion of his forces to a Chadian aclventure.
For Anwar al-Sadat and Mu'ammar Qadhdhsfi, who have reciprocally promised
to eliminate each other, have really decided to cross swords (see the analy-
sis of Abdelaziz Barouhi on page 18 of thia issue). And they have begun
their war using Chadians as their surrogates. Despite respective denial~
- it is indeed Egypt which is arming the FAN [I3orthern Armed Forcesj of
= Hiasein Habre and is training them in camps located around Kutum in Sudan.
And it is indeed Libya which has established an airlift to Moundou in
southern Chad to supply the commandos of the FAC [Common Action FrontJ of
Acyl Ahmat and the FAT [Chadian Armed Porces] of Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue
(see the report of Francois Soudan on page 22 of this issue [translated
below]).
Between the two camps stands a single individdal, President Oueddei Goukouni, -
theoretical head of a splintered state. Alone today because if he benefits
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from the support of Acyl Ahmat and Wadal Kamougue against his former ally,
Hissein Habre, it is because they fear the ambitions of the latter and he
has become the man to strike down. Alone tomorrow because, violently
opposed to Libyan control, Goukouni knows that should he win against Habre ~
he would owe this victory (at least in part) to the pro-Libyans.
And tomorrow, with or without Hissein Habre, the fire still threatens to
envelop Chad because Goukouni will be asked to "pay his debt." This is a
gesture of gratitude to Libya which Goukouni could not decide to make without
definitively tainting his only major strength--his intransigent nationalism.
It is a quality which will make him the new man to strike down.
Prospects for Continued Carnage
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Apr 80 pp 22-23
(Article by special correspondent Francois Soudan: "Down to the Last
Chadian"]
[Text] The dogs are fat in Ndjamena. The one which came to rub himself
against my leg at the edge of a shell hole had a greyish-yellow coat, the
color of this desert ~and which gives its tinge to the earth and the sky
but glistens with amber-colored brilliance. If they could talk, these dogs
which at one time used to be starving would place the beginning of their
proeperity in February 1979 when 4 days of fighting betw~en the troops ot .
former President Felix Malloum and those of his prime minister at the time,
a Toubou with eyes like embers named Hissein Habre, played havoc with the
native markets. That was the time of the first battle of Nd~amena.
The carnage started all over again 3 weeks ago and Hissein Habre, a godsend
to the dogs which do not distinguish at all between a corpse and a stall of
squashed fruit, is still in the game. The dogs are fat because men die:
- there were 1,500 killed and 3,500 wounded in 20 days of fighting.
When the incident which was to put a match to the powderkeg broke out at
dawn on Friday, 21 March 1980, four armies were in the contest in Chad.
Each of these has its warlord, each was gflrged with weapons. .
Sadat Trail
First the FAN, identified by the blue ribbons which they fasten to their
shoulder-straps. These Toubou warriors hailing from the north are under
- the orders of the most famous, the most intelligent, and the most ambitious
of the Chadian leaders: Hissein Habre (38 years old). A former student
at the School of Political Science in Paris, a former deputy prefect (and
later adversary) of Ngarta Tombalbaye, a former guerrilla fighter who ~oined
ex-P.resident Fe1ix Malloum in 1978, he has been minister of defense since
the establishment of a government of unity (November 1979). Habre has put
on a lot of weight but has lost none of his charisma and his consuming will
28
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to govern. Diabolically clever, he has managed to win the sympathy of the
Moslem petty bourgeoisie of Ndjamena and of its spiritual leader, Imam
Ibrahim Moussa. Hissein Habre controls all the African neighborhoods of
Nd3amena. H3.s command post, not far from Felix Eboue High School, is a
villa with bougainvilleas, surrounded by diaciplined men, regularly paid,
ttnd especially well trained.
The virulent anti-Qadhdhafism of Aissein Habre--who reproaches the Libyans
for occupying the border strip of Aouzou in northern Chad--has earned him
France's sympathies. Some of Habre's cadres were trained at the noncommis-
sioned officers' school in Montpellier at a time when he was Felix Malloum's
second-in-command and some of Habre's weapons are French. But this same
anti-Qadhdhafism has especially eaxned him the solid alliances of Egypt and
Sudan. Since early 1979 mortars, trucks, and ammunition from Cairo have
been reaching Ndjamena via Khartoum by crossing the towns of eastern and
central Chad controlled by Habre, namely, Abeche, Oum Hadjer, and Ati. This
"Sadat trail" brings only weapons, not (or not yet) advisers. But everyone
knows that the FAN have training camps in western Sudan. -
The second army, this one wearing white ribbons is the FAP of Oueddei
Goukouni. Numbering as many men as the FAN (10,000, of whom 3,000 are in
Ndjamena), the FAP are also made up of Toubou warriors. But this army has
not been given traditional training, has few cadres and therefore little
diacipline. The son of the "derdei," the spiritual head of the Toubous,
President Goukouni (33 years old) is a timid ascetic, the exact opposite of
Habre. Hia troops have no experience in urban guerrilla fighting.
Is Goukouni pro-Libyan? No, even though it is rumored that his entourage of
young fighters has been provided by the services of Tripoli. But, Qadhdhafi
has agreed only to provide Goukouni with arms, the balance being made up of
French supplies seized from Gen Felix Malloum's forces at the time of the
"southern offensive" in February-Maq 1978. In Ndjamena Goukouni, who con-
trols the entire northern part of the country, is not rooted at all in the
underprivileged districts. His troops control the European part of the city
and the enyirons of the air base where some 1,100 French paratroopers are
sCationed, troops who have maintained strict neutrality.
Lion of the Saras
The third armed group are the FAT of Col Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue, the
"southerner." His 5,000 men are based in the densely populated cotton-growing
- southwestern region. Their leader is the former head of the gendarmerie
driven out of Ndjamena by Habre in February 1979. This rotund officer,
wearing an American tunic, Soviet camouflage dungarees, the beret of a
French paratrooper and having the traditional fly-swatter in hand, calls ~
himself "the lion of the Saras" (Chadians of the south). He has a violent
hatred for Hissein Habre. Having fallen back to his fief of Moundou he has '
been receiving, starting in April 1979, ma.ssive Libyan aid brought in by an
airlift flown by Antonov-22 aircraft. His radio station--Radio Moundou--vio-
].ently charges France with supporting Hissein Habre. The fact remains that
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Kamougue's troops have a training and a motivation which are far from doing
justice to the caliber of their equipment...or that of their adversaries.
It is not training which the commandos of the fourth armed force of Chad is
lacking, that of the FAC of Acyl Ahmat. These are reportedly responsible
for the assassination of the Sudanese counsul in Nd~amena at the end of
- March 1980. Few in number (barely 2,000 men) but terribly efficient, the
FAC forces are the most pro-Libyan of all. They were trained in Libya
(more particularly, in Sebha Oasis) by East German instructors, according .
[o some sources. Their arms and uniforms come from Tripoli and many have
the "little green book" of Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi in their pockets. Barely
ensconced in Chad (they control a few zones in central Chad around Mongo)
and infiltrated in the direction of Ndjamena across the Ennedi desert, they
proposed a few months ago to Goukouni and Kamougue a"tactical alliance"
against their common enemy, Hissein Habre.
TndEed, everything began badly for the "derdei's" son. Because of some
pretty Chadian girls, a banal argument broke out around 0200 hours in the
morning on 21 March 1980 at Ndjamena's military policy headquarters between
the FAN and the FAP. TYiis headquarters is the Chadian tangle in miniature:
300 men belonging to the 11 national political factions have been brought
together to form the core of the new police force. This was a genuine
powderkeg. Abruptly Habre, who for some weeks had been feeling increasingly
threatened by the Goukouni-Kamougue-Ahmat alliance, decided to put an end
to the situation.
Habre's attack was launched at 0800 hours in the morning against the European ~
districts. His goals were to seize Goukouni's command post along the Shari
River and the gendarmerie camps north of the city, then to encircle the FAP
and destroy them. For a few hours Habre thought that he had been successful:
Goukouni's men were on the run. But Ahmat's farces, holding a second line,
hung on. For a week on the border of the neighburhoods abandoned by the
650 French citizens who lived there and while the Chad3an civilians were
crossing the Shari River by fording it or by pirogue toward Kousseri in
Cameraon where they soon totaled 100,000, the carnage continued with cold
steel. The front became stabilized. Habre seems to have lost, all the more .
so as one of Kamougue's columns from Bousso approached Ndjamena on a forced
march with 400 Ahmat commandos acting as cadres to attack Habre from the rear.
Burned Flesh
Habre then launched a second offensive in the downtown section around the
cathedral and Saint Martin basin. The FAP were turned back a second time,
losing 300 men in 3 days. An Habre group advancad to the Air district,
200 meters from the airport.
Hissein Habre was relieved. Yet, everything was to change~at dawn on
Thursday, 3 April 1980, as the second bloody week in Ndjamena was coming to
a close. The setting was the gendarmerie's central building which was '
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evacuated at 0600 hoursin the morning by the 550 terrorized Congalese troops
of the OAU`s "neutral force." Habre's FAN immediately secured the empty
premises. But at 1500 hours, thanks to a masterly counterattack effected
from the nef ghboring rooftops, Ahmat's commandos retrieved the site. Mopped
up wlth flamethrowers and grenades in a frightful atench of burned flesh,
the FAN fell back for the first time.
The front line of 21 March was practically re-established as was firing from
stationary positions. Only suicide commandos from both sides clashed. I
- saw 20 meters in front of ine on the Rue des Quarantes two men fighting each
other tooth and nail.
A Single Victor
On the afternoon of Saturday, 5 April 1980, when calm was becoming generai,
an airplane landed at Ndjamena's airport. On board was Togolese President
Gnassingbe Eyadema who had come to try a desperate mediation effort in the
- name of African fraternity. Dressed in impeccable garb, surrounded by 30
admirably gotten-up officials, Eyadema held talks for 3 days with dust-
covered guerrilla fighters, at times stained with blood. Eyadema was even -
seen crossing the Shari River in a pirogue, deafened by explosions and
blinded by smoke, to talk with Hissein Habre who was waiting for him,
adopting the posture of a head of state.
But the ceasefire which President Eyadema managed to impose on Monday,
7 April, did not last more than 4 hours. "One victor should emerge from
the fighting, a single one," Goukouni asserted, emerging from his reserve
on Saturday, 5 April. Down to the last Chadian? An old man in immaculate
native wear who had taken refuge in Kousseri looked from the Qther side of
the Shari River at immense black columns rising from Nd3amena. "In a few
days it will be 80 years ago that the father of all of us, Sultan Rabah,
died here, killed by the French, on the day of my birth. He should come
back. He alone could still save Chad."
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1980
2662
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CHAD
NEUTRALITY OF FRANCE IN CRISIS SAID TO BE OPEN TO DOUBT
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 28 Apr-11 May 80 p 41
[Article by M?ryam Sysle "The French Threat--Paris Talks Too Much About
N~n intervention: Who ~an Believe it When the French Are Sending Fresh
Troops to Ndjamena?"]
[Text] Each passing day swells the list of dead and wounded at Ndjamena
where the combatants continued, after 3 weeks of fighting, in carrying on
a war of attrition whose result none dared predict. And the failure of
the fifth attempt at a cease-fire, on 7 April, following the visit of the
Togolese chief of state, General Eyadema, gave adequate evidence that the .
time is past for bastard solutions.
To be sure, on the 21st day of the Nd~amena war, Hissein Habre and his
Armed Forces of the North (FAN) appeared more isolated than ever. On
10 April the Chadian armed forces under Col Abdelkader Wadel Kamogue, which
up to that time had contented themselves with pounding at the FAN positions
from a distance, around Chagoua Bridge, their targets being in the African ~
sections in the southern part of town, went on the offensive as if to show
that at the decisive moment they were ready to give battle seriously.
Hissein Habre's troops, thus caught in a pincers between the People's Armed
Forces (FAP) of Goukouni Oueddei, president of the Transitional Government
o� National Union (GUNT) in the north of the town, by the commandos of the
Front of Common Action (FAC) of Messrs Acyl Ahmat and Mahamat Abba Seid
(respectively foreign minister and minister of the interior) at the northeast,
and finally in the south by the Kamoueguist forces.
On the political level President Goukouni could count on the support of
nine of the 11 factions within the GUNT. On 11 April the People's Liberation _
Movement of Chad (whose soldiers are hased in the Lake Chad region) announced
his "firm support" to the ~resident of the GUNT in the legitimate struggle
being waged to protect the Lagos agreements. Up to now only Mr Had~ero
Senoussi's fundamental FROLINAT [Chadian National Liberation Front] had
taken a positi~n favoring Hissein Habre. At the same time progressive voices
began to be heard on the outside. Thus it was that the Steadfastness Front
conference that just met at Tripoli with the Libyan, Algerian, Syrian and
South Yemeni Heads of State, announced its intention of supporting the
p~resident of the Gi,TNT.
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In this conjunture the ins and outs of the new war of Ndjamena appeared with
more and more clarity, and it was no longer possible to stick with the facile
and misleading clich~ of the "war of the chiefs," and still less with the
explanation of r_onflicts between the north and the south, or between Muslims
and Christians. Breaking his silence, the president of the GUNT indicated
at a press conference held at his residence on 5 April that Hissein Habre--
whom he had characterized as a"Ypb~1 minister"--had attempted a coup in
violation of the Lagos Agreements of last 21 August, a coup prepared long
ago with attacks a~a.inst FAC positions in the center of the country.
Consequently, he said, Hissein Habre from now on represents a handicap to
national reconciliation. And a cease-fire under these conditions would
constitute "a lame solution that would lead to another confrontation tomorrow."
As a counter-proposal, the president of the GUNT declared himself in favor
of a new Lagos conference and the establishment of a neutral force.
In order for these plans to succeed this time around, the positions must be
clarified and one must not go around trying to glue the pieces together
so the situation can deteriorate further and allow the adversary to gather
and consolidate his forces.
Finally and above all, it would be naive to believe that the Chadians are to
be allowed to settle their problems amongst themselves. Already the press
campaigns carried ~n about the "Libyan threat"--a threat that the foreign
correspondents in Ndjamena call a"mirage"--show for what alternative it is
desired to prepare international public opinion. For the threat of direct
foreign interventi~n, which at any moment risks overturning the Chadian
ches~-board, very definitely exists. It is already present at Ndjamena,
symbolized by the French military base (where 1,100 soldiers are officially _
stationed, but probably in fact many more) established near the airport,
on the north flank of Goukouni Oueddei's FAP.
Of course the French Government loudly proclaims that it intends to remain
neutral. Tha minister of cooperation repeated once again on 10 April before
the Foreign Affairs Co~ittee of the National Assembly that "he does not
envisage the hypothesis according to which France could be brougYit to inter-
vene in the conflict." However, on the other hand, "Paris will seize every
opportunity to encourage the restoration of the unity and integrity of
Chad."
Irritation Increases
The experience and recent history of Chad right up to the most recent events
have sufficiently demonstrated what is hidden by this type of promise and
statement. Moreover, Mr Robert Galley himself does not appear at all sure
of what he is saying, since he adds: all that is anticipated "of course,
are the necessary means of defense." Defense of whom? Against whom? It
is no longer possible to invoke the pretext of protecting the expatriates,
since they have all left, except for those who expressed the wish to remain,
at their own risk and peril.
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It would be a question, then, of "protecting" the French Expedititionary
Corps, which the Lagos Agreements of 21 Augus~t, 8 months ago, called for
immediate removal. Now a state of irritation reigns at the French military
base, the commander in chief of which has let it be known according to
REUTEIt's, that his men would use their weapons if they are attacked. "If
l~rench soldiers are killed in bombardments, France will immediately send
substantial reinforcements," a high-ranking French officer even said. "We
roill not allow our men to be killed and do nothing about it."
When one realizes that fighting is going on all around the base, it is
uttderstood that a negligible incident, a simple provocation would be
enoUg}i for the shooting to start. Besides, fresh troops continue to be
sent to Chad, naturally without this piece of new being shouted from the
housetops. That tells one what to think of France's "strict neutrality.
The French are in fact holding themselves in readiness to move into action,
should the situation become too critical for Mr Hissein Habre whose troops
are incidentially being supplied in arms and ammunition by Egypt, via the
Sudan.
_ COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
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CHAD
FRENCH PARATROOPERS WITHDRAW
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 May 80 p 32
" [Article by Francois Soudan: "The Real Reasons for the Withdrawal of the
French"] _
[Text] Giscard: "We Are Evacuating If You Fight
, Qadhdhafi." Goukouni: "Granted, But I Am Dismissing
Habre." Agreement Concluded..
With the withdrawal of 1,100 French soldiers, paratroopers and engineering
specialists, the Chadian drama lost on Igonday, 28 April, one of its main
actors. Energetic prQtagonist or reserved, nursing or bambing, but present
for more than 10 years, the French troops are going away.
"Protection mission accom~lished," states of the official communique. What
protection? That of the French civiliar.s? There are nc longer any or -
hardly any in Nd~amena since 21 March. That of the Chadian civilians?
Bazooka shells continued ripping up the African neighborhoods. "Protection,"
then of the French interests in Chad? But one verified, mid-April i.n Paris,
that a unit of 500 Libyans armed to the teeth was descending on Nd~amena,
and that it was going to "be certainly necessary to defend oneself if one
was attacked." In fact, the French retreat is the result of 20 days of
bargaining.
Paris, Thursday, 3 April, preparatory meeting for the Franco-African summit, -
whi.ch is to take place on 8 and 9 May in Nice. Very clearly the French
declare their position: they want to withdraw from Chad. A military
intervention would have repercussions on domestic politics, the OAU would -
turn up its nose, and then not one of the principal parties appealed to
them officially.
.
Qadhdhafi's Bed
The "moderate" reprESentatives of French-speaking Africa are aurprised,
then worried. France, which successively supported to the limit Tombalbaye,
Malloum and Habre, is evidently preparing to turn around to Goukouni. But
_ would not this old guerrilla be in the process of getting ready Qadhdhafi's
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bed in Nd~amena? "If you leave Chad while the crazy man of Tripoli is
' coming in here, we will consider this a desertion of post," cried out,
that Thursday, 3 April, an African diplomat in the corridors of the
International Conference Center on Avenue Kleber in Paris. The curt answer
from Jean-Philippe Ricalens, cabinet director for the French Minsiter of
Cooperation: "Everyone is encouraging us to stay in Chad. But no one ia
meeting hia responsibilities. The result: it is Franch that is taking all
the blows. This can not last any longer."
Fortunately, "by chance" Ricalens will inform us, the secretary general
of the OAU, Edem Kodjo, is in Paris at the same time. He sees Giscard and
then certain African delegates and explains to them that the departure of
the French troops is perhaps the only chance for resolving the crisis. -
Supervised Freedom
Kod~o's idea: to place Chad under the guardianship of the UN and the OAU.
~ But the French in charge are not unamimous. Certain of them--especially at
the Ministry of Defense and among the soldiers stationed at Ndiamena--are
urging direct intervention along side Habre. "The only one,"~ they say, -
"who is not corrupted by Qadhdhafi," Moreover, when it is learned at
Nd~amena that Giscard's new adviser for African affairs, Maxtin Kirsch,
- is supposed to come to negotiate with Goukouni the withdrawal of French
- troops, one obligin.gly spreads the rumor that a Libyan unit is descending
on Ndjamena. But it is only a matter of some commandos of Acyl Ahmat--pro-
Libyan indeed--moreover. One hopes Lhat this bogeyman will force Paris to
recant its decision. But Martin Kirsch arrives hurriedly on Monday, 21 April,
in Ndjamena. He strikes his fist on the mess table, "scolc~s" the officers
and gnes off to bargain with Goukouni. As far as one can detPrmine: Kirsch
to Goukouni in short: "We are withdrawing all aid to Habre and we are
evacuating the base if you get involved in fighting Qadhdhafi." Answer:
"Granted, but let me first dismiss Habre as Minister of Defense. This will
be clearer for everyone." Agreement concluded: on Friday, 25 April, Habre
and two of his deputies, Mahamat Saleh and Hadjero Senoussi, are stripped
of their responsibilities. Two days later, on Sunday, the 27th, Paris
announces the_withdrawal of its troops. But the French paratroopers have
not gone very far away. France, everyone knows, has a base in Bouar, in
the northwest of the Central African Republic. From there she can keep Chad
under supervised freedom.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1980
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CHAD
= BRIEFS
FRENCH BACKING FOR HABRE--Hissein Habre is the only statesman among the
Chadian leaders. This is what French diplomats continue to assert at the
very time when it is held, at the French foreign ministry and the French
President's office, that France does not have any "favorites" in Chad.
(Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Apr 80 p 24] 2662 -
FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARD LIBYANS--Only the Libyans are still expected. Chad's
- Preaident.0ueddei Goukouni has reportedly called on them for help in a
message made public by Radio Tripoli. But what are the chances of aeeing
Libyan columns cross the 3,000 km [sic--read, 1,300 km] which separate the
border from Ndjamena? Slim. If, however, Col Mu'am~ar Qadhdhafi decided
to launch into this adventure, the 1,100 French paratroppers in Chad could
very easily relinquish their prudent neutrality to which the French President
has confined them since the beginning of this deadly struggle and emerge
_ from the ca~ttp near the airport where they are entrenched. Some 18 months ago
[French] Jaguar planes dropped napalm and pulverized an entire Libyan column
- which had imprudently advanced into the desert south of Tibesti. [Text]
[Paris L'EXFRESS in French 5-11 Apr SO p 93] 2662
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CONGO
BRIEFS
- F1tENCH GIFT FOR BRAZZAVILLE--France approved a grant of 3 billion CFA francs
for the Congo to spruce up Brazzaville on the occasion of the capital's
100th anniversary. The latter will thus be able to welcome President Valery
Giscard d'Estaing with dignity when he pays his official visit to that city
in October 1980. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Apr 80 p 24]
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ETHI~PIA
ERITREAN WAR SITUATION DESCRIBED
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 4 May 80 pp 75, 77, 79
[Text] Aa the war in Eritrea, which began in 1961 as a rebellion
against Emperor Haile Selasaie, neara its 20th anniversary, there are
glimpaee of a possible solution. All indications are that Moacow
is now taking the first steps so that Africa's longest war can one
day draw to a close.
Ethiopian policy, determined monolithically by the DERG [Armed Forces -
Coordinati~g Committee] and under the leadership of Colonel Mengistu,
thre.w itaelf into Moscow's arma, thus breaking an almost 25-year
tradition of pro-American leaninga. Eritrean independence fighters,
whose largest and most powerful armed wing, the EPLF [Eritrean
People's Liberation Front], calls itaelf Marxist-Leniniat, were forced
to battle an army outfitted with Soviet weapona and trained by
Cubana. Even though the DERG also claims that its policy ia Marxiat-
Leniniet, as far as ttie EPLF is concerned, it is a continuation of
the policy of .the deposed emperor against whom the Eritreana took up
arms two decades ago. After a military disaster in early 1980, the '
DERG spoke of the posaibility of aeeking a negotiated settlement.
"The DERG talks about negotiating, but always after a military
defeat. It is trying to gain time to prepare its next offenaive,"
says Mohamad Ramadan Nur, the aecretary general of the EPLF. CArBIO
16's Juan Gomez Puiggros apoke with Ramadan Nur in Khartoum and made
a 3-week tour of the zone controlled by the EPLF.
The EPLF would agree tm negotiate, according to its secretary general,
only on the basis of its territory's aelf-determination. "Moreover,
the USSR is making a serious miatake regarding the Eritrean queation,"
he adda.
In fact, (~owever, the USSR seems to have understood t:~at it ie
unlikely that either of the two rivals can win the Eritrean War, and
the notion that the two sidea are doomed to negotiate has been
gaining atrength. The DERG, furthermore, ie in a difficult poaition:
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Ethiopia is in total economic chaos, fueled by the war's financial -
drain. Successive military defeats have created aerious political
tenaione. Although the Addis Ababa hardlinera etill control the
machinery of power, the eymptome are becoming increasingly unmiatak-
able that an opposition faction in favor of hastening an end to the
war is consolidating within this machinery. Although no one ia
optimistic about such a hastening, Moscow has initiated very cordial
contacts with the ELF [Eritrean Liberation Front), the group that
headed up the first 10 years of the war. The ELF's Islamism presenta
Moacow with a favorable opportunity in the complicated chess game in
the so-called "arc of the crisis."
Meanwhile, the war continues to wreak havoc. All of the efforta of
~ the Eritrean Relief Aasociation (ERA), the organization that
centralizes international aid to the F.ritrean refugees and war-
wounded in Sudan, are insufficier~t. With funda from the International
Red Crosa, the ERA can meet only 25 percent of its real needa. Sudan
has taken in 200,000 Eritrean refugees (in addition, there are almoat
1 million exiles throughout the world), but the Sudaneae Government
itself and the UN, which have only 5 officials in Khartoum who are
apecifically in charge of aid work, also have to shelter another
200,000 refugees from Oman, Libya and Uganda. The Sudanese Govern-
ment, which ia neutral and a would-be negotiator in the conflict,
allows Eritrean convoys performing humanitarian tasks to pass
relatively freely though an e~ntern corridor in its territory.
Solomona, A School
The Solomona refugee camp liea almost 300 kilometers south of Port
Sudan and only 12 kilometers from the border. ~ao-thirds of the road
between Port Sudan and Solomona ia a bare desert in which the route
is marked only by the tracks of truck tires in the sand. All other
indications are hidden by the very fine, almoat dust-Iike sand that is -
wind-blown into ever-moving dunes. Becauae of the semifeudal organi-
zation in this area of the Sudanese desert, Eritrean convoys have to
ask each feudal lord in each town that they paea thraugh for a permit
reauthorizing their circulation permit iasued by the central govern-
ment. On the other side of the feudal border, the last atretch of
the road to Salomona is through the interior, in territory occupiec
by the Hashaira tribe, which is regarded as a group of bandita and
traffickers who smuggle goods between Saudi Arabia and Sudan. Their
main source of income is illegal ealea of tobacco, which ia in ahort �
- aupply throughout the country. In one of the world's poorest areas ~
a package of mild British cigarets coats $3 dollars. Thoae expenaive
cigarete and the enormous flocka of camels, up to 150 in aingle file,
are like ghosts watchiug over the myaterious solitude of the deaert.
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The Solomona camp is located in a mountainous zone covered with
dwarf treea and ve~etation that aeeme reluctant to turn green. It =
usually raina from 5 to 10 minutea every evening on this moiet eummit
of the desert. There are 12,000 refugees in the camp, which conaiate
of tenta spread over an area of aeveral kilometera. On thp day
before the visit by this paper's correapondent, Askalu, the woman who
runs the camp, suffered an attack of malaria, which is endemic in
the area. The refugee population, she relates, is composed mainly
of civiliane, orphana of combatanta and handicapped combatanta. A
revolutionary achool givea claeaee to some 3,000 children between
the agea of 7 and 14. One-fourth of the 100 teachera are women. On
fielde laid out by the studenta themaelvea, they engage in aporta like '
anywhere elae in the world. The revolutionary achool also takea in
Sudaneae children from the area and triea to alleviate the enormoua
nutritional problema of its infant population. Medical sid and
political inatruction are the main tasks of this precarioua achool
life. Yhemani, a 13-year old boy who is a member of Red Flowera, an
organization of pioneera, is interested in Spain's political system.
He mentiona that his parents died in 1978, at the time of the major
EPLF retreat. His brother wae one of the soldiers wounded at the
battle of Nafka, which was fought in January, and he ia looking forward
to his 14th birthday so that he can enter a training camp, although
if the war continues, he will not be allowed into combat until age 18.
Clinica in Containers
There are two hospitals, one for civilians and one for combatants.
Infant mortality, 200 per 1,000, ie the major plague at Solomona.
Malaria, malnutrition and tuberculoais also wreak havoc. The daily
meal at the camp is a ration of lentils and rice with a piece of
moiat, sour bread made from aorghum flour. Meat is eaten twice a
month.
Trsvel from Solomona to Eritrea, which meana another deecent into the
desert, muet take place at night to avoid the reconnaiasance flighta
by Soviet Migs. At the last Sudanese post before the border a nomad
about 50 years old came up to CAMBIO 16's special envoy, thinking that -
because he was white, he might also be a doctor. His wife, who was -
not even 20, had just aborted and was lying on a dirty atraw mattreas,
burning with fever and being eaten alive by flies. The nomad did not
underetand of what use the profesaion of newaman could be; he thought
it was uaeleas to have aomeone relate what he saw. It was imposaible
to take hia wife in the jeep that wae trying to get to Eritrea in the
dark. The EPLF men gave him a paea so that the aick woman could be
taken by truck to the Central Hospital. Returning to the war frant,
this correspondent found out that the woman had recovered.
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The face of disease, contrasted with the effortsof a:l those who were
trying to overcome it as if it were another enemy of war, again
appeared at the EPLF Central Hospital in Awale, a rugged, mountainous
zone eticking out of the deaert. The hospital has just received a -
fabuloua booty: $200,000 in medical equipment and materials captured
from the Ethiopian military hospital at Keren, where an EPLF unit
had receatly staged an attack. The Red Crosa ia the main supplier of
thia medical center, where all kinds of operations, except brain and
heart surgery, can be performed. Mobile clinics, improviaed from the -
containQre that a Belgian solidarity committee used to send food and
medicine, attempt to care for the sick throughout the occupied zone.
The risk is great, because whenever the Ethiopians have discovered one
of these clinics, they have executed all ita peraonnel. The ataff at
these clinica is given speeded.up inatruction regarding war wounds and
regional diaeases. ,
Twenty year old Kaflom ie one of thoae convalescing at Awale. Wounded
by a bullet on the Algena front in January, he has a broken thigh-bone.
He believes that in the long run Ethiopian soldiera will eventually
realize that they are being forced to fight for an unjust cauae, that
Ethiopiana and Eritreans are brothera and that the DERG is a foreign
element and cause. ,
Shirefon is an Ethiopian soldier; he is also at the hospital. He is
from Wollo, one of the most impoverished regions of Ethiopia. He did
not expect to ~e treated so well at the hospital. He is given the same
care as any Eritrean soldier. He says that they enliated him into the
army by telling him that the Arabs had invaded northern Ethiopia.
Before the war he worked as a bricklayer in Addis Ababa. He says that
he knows that if he returns to Ethiopia, he could be regarded as a
deaerter and executed. He ha~ heard that this has happened. That ie
why he wanta to leave for another country, his hope being that his
family will receive aome newa, even if from afar, that despite hia
current hospitalization he is well. Shirefon, somewhat saturated
with Marxist instruction, believes that Fidel Caetro and Karl Marx
are the same person. He recalls that there were Russians, but no
Cubans in his combat unit, '0I saw at least 10 of them; they were
always behind the soldiers, next to the commanders."
Harity is a 19-year old girl who was wounded at the battle of Nafka
when the EPLF tried to attack the Ethiopian general headquartera.
After the battle, her companions had to carry her on their shoulders
for 7 kilometera. There are 5~5 patients at the hoapital, and there
is supposedly enough roora and medical facilities for 300 more. There
are always enough lentils for the wounded, who are also aerved tea
three timea a day. The little milk that arrives in aparadic ehip-
ments is given to those auffering from anemia.
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Another nighttime trip alor~g the rugged slopea that run parallel to
the coastal etrip controlled by the Ethiopiana takea ue to the Central
Rear Guard Base. The base tenta are epread out around a 5-kilometer
axia and are perfectly camouflaged. The aerious problem entailed in
keeping 4,000 prisonera there ie alleviated through a policy of
gradually releasing ~hem once they have undergone a period of poli-
tical inetruction. Since 1974, more than 3,000 people have been given
their forced release. The 200 Ethiopian deserters houaed at the camp
graphically illustrate the wounds of this endlesa war.
Abderraman Aafoghi, a 38-year old man from the southern region of
Kaffa, relates that the DERG took away his amall coffee plantation
and turned it into a cooperative. Another deserter beside him
comments that the DERG gave him lands, but as soon as he became a land-
owner, he was sent to the front. A police lieutenant recalla that he
fought in Ogaden with Cubans and South Yemenis and that he served ae
an interpreter for the Rusaians during the Eritrean War after the
DERG had aent him to Bulgaria and Hungary to study.
The officers who have deserted often discuas the poasibili~y of a
movement within the army. A captain points out that one out of every
eix men in the Ethiopian Army is a police informer. The brutal
Prusaian attitude of the officere, moreover, whether they are loyal
to the current Addis Ababa establishment or not, completely rulea
out any attempt at independent thought.
One deserter, who did not reve~l his name becauae he still r,opea to
return to his home in the Tigrai region, tells how despite his 52
yeara (there is no age limit on draftees into the Ethiopian Army), they
came looking for him one night to force him to enliat in the
"Glarious Peasant Militia" that was going to fight the Arab invaders
from the north. He reaisted, saying that he was too old to fight in
a war and that his wife and children could not survive without his
help. The recruiting soldiera took him away as a prisoner. He was
in jail for 3 montha. Later, he received a month and a half of mili-
tary instruction on the outskirts of Addis Ababa. The instructors
were Cuban. Then Eritrea; then, desertion; then and now, fear.
The Northern Front
The so-called northern front is located in the Algena area, along a
mountainous, 40-kilometer long strip. Over the last 3 years of the
war, the Ethiopians, situated 10 kilometera from the Eritrean
trenchea and with an enormous plain at their backs, have lost more
than 10,000 men. The front is an impregnable atronghold.
"The enormous plain could become a gigantic tomb for the Ethiopians
if they try to attack us again," says Salef Suliman, a military chief.
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"To us the plain is dangerous terrain, and we do not intend to occupy
it." But the EPLF's military atrategy is not limited to repelling
disorderly attacka by an ememy who is unfamiliar with the terrain.
It alsa m~skes guerrilla raida. In both cases it uaea as little
ammunition as poesible, because it is in ahort aupply. "We have
excellent artillerymen," Salef Suliman says, "the kind t::at hit their
target every time they fire."
Leregherghis Gherenaie, a 19-year old girl, ~ives ~he normal life of
- a soldier at war, just like the other combatants, who are imbued with
th e idea of political camaraderie without discrimination becauae of
sex. She doea not think that the conflict can be resolved politically.
~ Mendragtu is the only married man in Gherensie's unit. Hia wife is
~ a doctor at a mobile clinic. He knowe that he will not be able t~
see her until he gets an official pase. They have crosaed each
other's paths occasionally at her clinic, merely saluting each other
like disciplined soldiers.
This correapondent was able to attend a triple wedding at the front
base, celebrated amid a tomb-like silence before a representative of
the EPLF Central Committee, who asked whether the bride and groom were
contracting matrimony of their own ~'ree will. After they said yea,
all kinds of weapons were fired into the air in a fren2ied squan-
dering of ammunition. Then came feverish dancing to music played over
a powerful loudspeaker. The brief truce was kept wet by aua, a
_ sour local beer made with sorghum and water.
The Holy City of the EFLF
Before the war broke out, Nafka was a city of almost 20,000 inhabi-
tanta. Bombings by the Ethiopian Air Force cauaed people to flee
towards the mountaina or to seek out refugee camps. Laet December
and January, Nafka was the scene of one of the fiercest battles of
the war. The Ethiopizns deployed 25,000 menr 63 tanks, four
batteriea of B-21 rocketa and 6 batteries of 120-millimeter guns.
They made intensive use of their air force; eome planea ch~lked up
as many as 50 runs a day. Opposing them were just 7,000 Eritreans,
3 tanks, ten 120-millimeter guns and light mortars.
The Ethiopians initiated the attack, for which eertain auccess was pre-
- dicted. On the second day of combat the Eritreans counterattacked.
Af ter 4 weeks they had killed 4,000 of their attackers and captured
an unt+elievable booty of 102 Soviet trucks, 11 tanks and a great
mar.y guns. Eritrean loases "were not extensive." The EPLF never
givea preciae figurea, this being part of ita morale-related
atrategy. The moat innocuous weapon of all in this strategy ia
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tombau, a tobacco that when chewed provides extra energy and eli~inatea
drowsinesa. With nothing other than zombau, 600 men were able to
endure a 2-day march during the battle of Nafka, which ended with
the would-be executionere fZeeing towarde Afabet.
The etatus of vanquiahed executionera ia cauaing perceptible demor- ~
alization among Ethiopian troops. Despite the gradual atrengthening
of the Eritreans' independen~ce myatique, their chances of a definitive
victory are practically nonF:xistent. All of this meana that Moacow's
already carefully assesaed notion thafi negotiation is the only
solution will have to be im,poaed sooner or later.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Infcrmacion y Reviatas, S.A.
8743
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ETHIOPIA
BRIEFS
NORWEGIAN AID--The Norwegian organization Redd Barna ("Save the Children")
on 21 April granted emergency aid in the amount of 500,000 crowns _
($100,000) to Ethiopia �or the fight against the conse~uences of the
drought. A representative from the organization is shortly to go there
to supervise the distribution of this aid, [Text~ [Paris MARCI~S
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1052] 5058 -
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- GABON -
BRIEFS
_ MINERAL PRODUCTION STATISTICS--The Gabonese Ministrq of Mining has just -
submitted an activity repurt for national mining operations in 1979, Last
year was marked by a definiLe reduction in manganese mineral sales which
had been declinix~g serious]~? for the past 2 years. Uranium output con-
tinu~d to grow in keeping wiCh forecasts, On the other hand, petroleum
prod~ction reveal~d another drop (7 percent) compared to the
year but the worthwhile results achieved through exploration overethegpast
2 years should make it possible to stop this decline rather quickly,
according to the Ministry of Mining. Exports of manganese mineral reached
a record figure of 2,304,656 tons for an output of 2,300,094 tons. COMILOG
(Ogooue Minin~ Company) took a preponderant part on the naCural dioxide
market with an output of 98,167 tons (60 percent). The increase in sales
in this mineral category is 7.5 percent compared to 1978, But while the
exported metallurgical mineral tonnages are going up, the price did not
follow the same trend and remained on a level very much lower than prior
to tlie crisis. As anticipated in its exploitation development program,
COMUF (Franceville Uranium Mining Company) in 1979 produced 1,100 tons of
uranium metal contained in 1,488 tons of concentrate. Work has begun on
the construction of new mineral treatment installati~ns which should make
it possible to reach a figure of 1,500 tons of uraniu~ metal in 1952. The
work should be finished by December 1981. Exports of uranium ooncentrate
came to 1,438 tons, containing 1,060 tons of uranium metal. The uranium
metal tonnage sold by COMUF throughout the year came to 1,251,8 tons. The
crude petroleum output came to 9,798,570 tons. The two refineries, SOGARA
(Gabonese Refining Company) and COGEM processed 1,241,000 tons of crude,
in other words, 28 percent less than in 1978, Exports came to 8,461,27p
tons or 4 percent less than in 1978, The Interna~ional Diamond Exchange in
Libreville, throughout the year,,exported 25,193.5 carats of diamonsls,
according to the Ministry of Mzning report. Text
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1046] 5058 l~Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ESTIMATED OIL SEARCH COST--A project in drilling for oil off the coast
of Gabon which has just been announced by an international consortium
operated by Burmah Oil (MTM 18 April 1980, page 933), could cost 15 million
pounds during the first two years, it is estimated in London oil circles
quoted by AFP, Burmah had already secured participation in Gabonese oil
~ production at the time af the signing of an agreement with the Libreville
government in 1978. Since then the company has performed several soundings
off the coast of Gabon. While the drillings undertaken last year by
British Petroleum in the same region did not meet with much success,
optimism nevertheless remains high with Burmah concerning the possibility
of discovering oil. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 25 Apr 80 p 988] 9498
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GHANA
OIi~ OUTPUT DOWN, CONSUMPTION DECR~ASE REGTSTERED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1042
[Text] The director of the department of geol~gical studies of Ghana,
- Mr G. 0. Kesae, reve~led in April that the local petroleum output had
- dropped itrom 3,000 down to 2,000 barrela per day with only one company--
Agri-Pttco International Inc., of the United States--working the deposits
at Saltpond. The company furthermore is facing technical difficulties.
Mr Kesse noted tb t the drilling work on the four new wells, which were to
be added to the six now being worked, has not yet been started. He also
added that the petroleum taken out at Saltpond, according to the agreement
with the United States, was to be shipped to that country in order to be
refined there. He likewise expressed the hope that this agreement would
be revisdd to Ghana's advantage.
Roughly at the same time, Professor George Benneh, minister of land,
natural resources, fuel, and energy, announced a decline in foreign pur-
chases of crude from 1.1 million tnns per year down to 1 million Cons only.
This measure had been predict~ble and Che miniater, on several occasions,
after the chief of state himaelf, had expressed his worry about the increase -
in Ghana's petroleum bill (~fARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 14 Dec 79,
. p 3466; 4 Jan� and 18 Jan 80, pp 27 and 144).
Mr Benneh welcomed the 20-percent drop in fuel consumption following the
restriction measures that were instituted and asked the population to
continue to display its sense of civic reaponsibility. He praiaed the con-+
tribution made by the distributing companies, especially Mobil, Shell, Ghana
Oi1, ared Texaco; he announced that a bill would soon be introduced into
parliament, creating an energy commission for the purgose ~f drafCing a
- long-term savings policy. He had already recommended that the government
adopt the proposal submitted by the ministry of transport and communications
aimed at the standardization of vehicles and he asked that the use o�
- bicycles, scooters, and motorcycles in place of veY:icles.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
~ 505 8
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GHANA
.
BRIEFS
IDA AGRICULTURAL CREDIT--The IDA (International Development Association), ~
a branch of the World B~nk, on 24 April approved a$29.5 million loan for
the Farmers' Services Company of Ghana, a government company which helps
the country's agriculture operators. [?'ext] [Paris Mt1RCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p Y042J 5058
RENEWED USSR COOPERATION VIEWED--The director of the Soviet cultural center
in Ghana, Mr Anatoli S. Kuzmenko, in opening a regional bureau of the
Ghanaian-Soviet Friendship Soe~t~y for the Haute Region at Navrongo in April,
announced tha t his country was once again seriously contemplating the
resumption of the 13 projects which had been started in the country and which
it had abandoned after the military coup d'etat in 1966 which ousted Dr
Nkrumah. The society's president, Dr A. B. Adda, welcomed the intenCions
of the USSR and in turn announced tha t he would soon lead a delegation to
Moacow in arder to conclude a 2-year bilateral cooperation agreement Chere. -
[TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICALnC ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1042~
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GUINEA
BRIEFS
KONKOURE DAM FINANCING REVIEWED--The project for the Konkoure dams, which
in April 1979 was designated as "top priority" among Che big pro3ects in
Guinea, by President Ahmed Sekou Toure, was the subject of a meeting on
29 and 30 April in Paris. This meeting was attended especially by Mr
_ N'Famara Keita, Guinean ~linister of dnergy and of Konkoure, and Mr Nfaly
Sangare, mi~ister-delegate to the EEC, ~ecretary of ~tate in charge of
international coopea8tion, Mr Marcel Cros, and the ambassadors of Guinea
and France, Weat Germany, the United States, and Saudi Arabia. The
meeting made it possible to finalize the financing for the pro3ect. The
project for the dam on.the Konkoure ia already quiCe old. The record
had been closed on the French side following the country's independence in
1958. Guinea then in vain tried to get the USSR and Italy to resume
working on the project. Finally, starting in March 1979, EDF (French
Electric Power Corporation) was given a contract to study the project,
This contrACt had a price tag of F25 million on it and its financing was
assured partly through a gift from the French government while the rest
was supplied equal7.y by guaranteed commercial loans and a loan from the
Central Economic Cooper'ation Fund, The electric pover furnished by the
two dams (65U Megawatts) should make it possible to complete the project
for the exploitation of bauxite (Ayekoye) by an Arab-Guinean company with
a production target of 150,000 tons of aluminum. Libya and Saudi Arabia
are supposed to contribute, respecCively, $58 uillio~t and $100 million as
the first installments toward the completion of the Konkoure project (aee
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 8 June 1979). For rhe Ayekoye project,
these two countries as well as the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Iraq
will be asaociated with Guinea in exploiting a bauxite deposit of 500 million
tons in the Northwest.~ [Text) [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 2 May 80 p 1038) 5058
DELEGATION IN CHINA--A trade delegation of the Guinean Government, led by
the Minister of Commerce, Mr Diao Balde, arrived in Beijing to negotiate
- with the Chinese minister of foreign trade the signing of the annual Sino-
Guinean trade protocol for 1980. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
- MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Apr 80 p 925] 9516
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PROSPECTS FOR FLEET DEVELOPMENT--Norwegian shipowner Torvald Klaveness of
Oslo and the Navis Corporation, a company registered in the Bahamas and
which operates on behalf of the American company US Steel are getting together
to create a Liberian-registered company, the West African Bulk Shipping,
whose purpose will be to participate actively in maritime traffic with the
west coast of Africa. Their goal would be to secure the transporting of
5 million tons of bauxite per year departing from the Guinean port of Kamsar ~
for destinations in Europe, North America, and the Caribbean. West African
Bulk Shipping is presently negotiating on acquisition of a SO percent capital
share in the Guinemar company which was set up last year between the Guinean
Government and Klaveness. Weat African Bulk Shipping was thus simultaneously
operating for Guinemar and on ita own account in the search for dargo for
its return voyages. One of the ob~ectives of the new partnership between
_ Guinemar and the new Liberian company would be to give Guinea a maritime
fleet, which it presently lacks. Guinea could lay claim to aid anticipated
for developing countries, whereas Navis and Klaveness would bring their
experience. A ship is presently under construction in the Danish shipyarc~
Burmeister et Wain. Orders for five to ten ships could ultimately follow.
The tonnage envisioned for these ships would not exceed 60,000. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET t�~DITERRANEENS in French 18 Apr 80 p 925] 9516
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~GUINEA-BISSAU
BRIEFS
k'ADEA LOAN--The FADEA (Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development) gr~nted
a loan of 12 million dirhams ($3.2 million, approximately) to the Republic
of Guinea-Bissau. This loan is intended to finance the opening of a road
and an industrial project and will be spread over 3 years. [TextJ [Paris
i MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1037] 5058
_ BRAZILIAN LIVESTOCK COOPERATION STUDIED--Great possibilities for cooper-
ation exist between Guinea-Bissau and Brazil regarding the development of
animal husbandry involving hogs a~nd poultry raising,.according to a
delegation from the Brazilian Agriculture Ministry visiCing Bissau in order
Co evaluate cooperation between the two countries. The Brazilian deleg-
ation was made up of two veterinarians, Mr Humberto Mancebo de Araujo and
Mr Hamilton Ricardo Farias. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER.~. ~
RANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1037] 5058 `
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IVORY COAST
FOREIGN DEBT FIGURES GIVEN
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Apr 80 pp 925-926
[Text] The CAA (Autonomous Sinking Fund) of the Ivory Coast recently
published its management report on the Ivorian public debt for the year
1978.
Looking at indebtedness, Che year 1978 marked a pause: the signatures on
foreign loans were reduced from 442,8 billion CFA [African Financi~l
Comomunity] in 1977 to 182.8 billioc~s, in other worda, a drop of 58.70
percent.
In 1978, the debt aervicing vc~lume (debt msnaged by CAA and debt not
menaged but guaranteed by the government) represented 14.70 percent of the
value of exports, as against 11.12 p~rcent in 1977.
Following governanent decisiona, the CAA became the only negotiating partner
for money lendere and th~ exclusive representative of the Ivorian government
and public companies in the matter of loans.
Here is the development of the foreign public debt of Ivory Coast stnce
the end of 1975 (in millions of CFA):
End 1975 End 1976 End 1977 End 1978
Debt outatanding 215,019 281,866 435,047 601,813
Liabilities 111,g20 236,662 492,228 366,800
Total 326,839 SI8,528 927,275 968,613
Overall, Che public foreign debt went up 4.5 percent ~n 1978, againat an
increase of 7~.8 percent in 1977. At the end of 1978, the debt managed
by the CAA came to 600.5 billion CFA (including 355.2 billions in liabil-
ities and 245.3 billions in co~itments) as against 563.5 billiona At the
end of 1977.
During the year, the drawinga toCalled 236.3 billion CFA (202.3 billions
. in 1977) and the aervicing of interest and annual installmente required
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- 93.7 billions (71.4 billiona in 1977).
Concerning the debt managed by the CAA, the liabilitiea and commitmenta
given in dollara came to 50.97 percent (60 percent in 1977), thoae expresaed
in French francs came to 22.27 percent (19.5 percent in 1977), and those
contracted in Swias francs accounted for 13.46 percent (7.9 percent in
1977); the other foreign exchange currencies were involved in smell per-
centages, such as Deutschemarks (4.65 percent); Canadian dollars (1.41
percent); lire (1.31 percent); yena (1.10 {~.llegible in photostat] per-
cent); florins (1.01 percent); apecial drawing rights (0.98 percent); ~
Belgian franca (0.52 percent); Daniah, Swedish and NorwegiAa~crowna, ~
Kuwaiti dinara and accotinting unita of the EEC and the African Development
Bank.
Looking at the debt not managed by the CAA (debt autstanding and foreign
Loan commitments obtained by public companies and mixed-management companies
as well ae private outfits, backed up by the government, the dollar accounted
for 38.50 percent (44.1 percent in 197"!), the French franc accounted for
17.48 percent (13.9 percent in 1977), the Belgian franc, 9,34 percent (9.3
percent in 1977), followed by Deutschemark wiCh 7.53 percent, the florin
with 5.84 percent, the Norwegian crown with 4.04 percent, and then the
Swiss franc (2.14 percent), the lira (1.68 percent), the Pound Sterling
(1.40 percent), the Austr~~n schilling and the EEC accounting unit.
Th~ total volume of obligatory loans of the CAA, placed on the French and
Ivorian financial markets, comes to 8.1 billion CFA; the loans of the
CenCral Economic Cooperation Fund total 5.6 billion; loans obtained from
K~J [Reconstruction Credit Institution, Loan Bank] account for 9.3 billions;
loans granted by th~ Wor1d Bank come to 32.2 billions, and loans taken
out with private French and international financing ouCfits add up to
119.5 billion CFA.
The Fund furthermore took over the consolidated loans for an equivalent of
115.7 billion CFA (loans from EEC, from Eximbank, in Eurodollars and from
varioua private financing organizations), while government loans accounted
zar 24.9 billions in the CAA; the payment of delayed-payment agreements
going to public worka and civil engineering compani~e amounted to 4.8 ~
billiona.
During 1978, the Ivorian government provided backing for 55.9 billion CFA
in loans taken out abroad by public companies and mixed-management companiea,
privaCe outfits and multinational organizations (including 15.2 billiona
in favor of Ciments de 1''Afrique de 1'Ouest).
.The foreign debt backed up by the government totalled 368.1 billion CFA
as o� 31 December 1978 (debt outstanding and commitments). The principal
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beneficiariea were the Society for the Development of Sugar:Cane Plant-
ations, Induatrial Proceseing and Sugar Sales (132 billions), the Houaing
Menagement and Financing Company (47.1 billiona), Ciments de 1'Afrique de
1'Ouest (32.9 billions), the Monopoly of the Abid~an-Niger Railroad
~ (21.3 billions), the Ivorian Industrial Development Bank (16.9 billiona),
the Society for the Development of Oil Palma (15.3 billiona), Air-Afrique
(12.1 billions), the Ivory CoasC Electric Power Corporation (11 billiona),
the Council of the Entente (8.5 billions), the Ivorian Industrislized
Construction Development Company (6.9 billiona), the National Agricultural
Development Bank (6.1 billions), the Netional Water Power Fund (6.1 billions),
the Poat and Telecommunications Office (4.2 billions), the Ivorian Real
Eetate Construction and Management Company (3.9 billions), InCernational
Telecommunications of Ivory Coast (3.6 billions), Che Coffee Industrial
Union (3.5 billions), the Ivory Coast Credit Company (3.3 billions), the
Multinational Company of Bitumens (3.2 billions), tihe AgriculCurel Products
Procesaing Plant (3.1 billions), the Government Company for the Production
of Frvits and Vegetables (2.6 billiona), the Abidjan Tranaportation Company
(2.5 billions), the Ivorian CoCton Company (2.5 billions), the Ivorian
Transportation Company (2.5 billions), the Real. Eatate Promotion Company
(2.4 billions), the National Petroleum Operations Company in ivory Coast -
(2.3 billions), and, in smaller amounte, the National Savings and Loan Bank,
the Ivorian Maritime Transport Company, the National Civil Engineering
Company, the Finance Company of Ivory Coast, miscellaneous coftee hulling
and proceasing companies, the African Hevea Pi~ntation Society, the Hotel -
and Tourist Society of the Bay of Banco, the Ivorian Grated Coconut Company,
the Ivorian Fishing and Outfitting Company, the Real Eatate Company of the
Lagoon, the Ivorian Refining Co~upany, the Ivorian Fertiliz~r Company, the
' Society for the Industrial Development of Conatruction, the Society of
Hotela of the African Riviera, and the Textile Industry Union of ~vory Coast. -
Ivorian indebtedness heaviiy contributed to the development of the country. -
Most of the money was uaed fo~ financing iafrastructure facilitiea, such ae
rhe porta of Abidjan and San Pedro, dams and hydroelectric power plants at
Kosaou, Taabo, and Buyo, highway programs, expanaion end modernization of =
telecou~unicationa, repaira on the Abid,jan-Niger railroad, housing, urpan
development, sanitation, and agricultural development, including coffee,
~ cocoa, cotton, rice, rubber planta and pal~ plantations, with induatrial
procesaing of by-products. Besides, the conmmitment of Ivory Coaet to the
financing of the cement plants at Tabligbo, belonging to the Weat African
Cement Company, a multinational outfit, was particularly significant.
The CAA ha8 been getting the benefit of tax revenues allocated to it, such
ae 49.7 billion CFA for the fiscal year we are looking at now, plus con-
tributions from the Agricultural Product Stabilization and Price Supports
Fund, to cover operatione carried out by that ager_cy to the tune of 9.6
billion CFA during the fiscal year.
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Independently of its role in managing the public debt, the Fund is getting _
deposite of public funds, especially the funds avail8ble to ~he Stabilization ~
Fund and the surpluses from the treasuriea of the Mixed Management Compenies. ~
As of 30 September 1978, all of theoe depoeite came to 94.2 billion CFA, an
. increase of 14 percent compared to the end of September 1977,
Out of these funds, the CAA, operating as a development bank, introduced -
loans exceeding 51 billion CFA (as against 28 billions during the~p~eceding
fiecal year) into the economic circuit through the public enterpriaea;
- this aid mainly benefitted the SODEPALM [Company for the Development and
Exploitation of Oil Palm] and the Abidjan Transport Company.
Moreover, the National Sanitation Fund and the National Water Power Fund,
managed by the CAA, dur3ng the fiscal year made investments amounting to
3.2 billion and 1b.5 billion CFA, reapectively.
The preaident of the CAA is Mr Abdoulaye Kone, miniater of economy, finances,
and planning, with Mr Leon Naka taking the job of general manager.
COFYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980 .
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LIBER.IA
ISOLATION ON AFRICAN SCENE, INTERNAL HARDENING NOTED
Paria JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 7 May 80 p 26
[Article: "Liberia: The Big Whitewash"]
[Text] Isolation on the African scene; hardening within. This is the
picture presented by the Liberia of the sergeants 1 month after the military
putsch.
Thia isolation (temporary) was made clear on 27 April when the Liberian
Minister for Foreign Affairs was refused entry at the Lagos airport.
Gabriel Bacchus 1Katthews was supposed to participate in the Nigerian
capital in f~e OAU economic summit. He was refused entry because officially,
due to his rank, he could not preside over a meeting of heads of state, since
Liberia is the functioning president of the OAU. Indeed, the death of
Ex-President William Tolbert on 12 April and the hasty execution 10 days
later of 13 ministers of the fallen gove~nment had offended. And no African
state, except for Libya, had then Yecognized the government of
Quartermast~r-Sergeant Samuel Doe.
Domestically, the PRC (Military Council for People's Redemption of 15 members)
ia increasingly taking the lead in the g~vemment. The eacecutions on 22 April
sanctified a dQfeat of the civilians who, in opposition to the soldiers, had
preached moderation. Since 25 April the PRC has been the country's legisla-
tive and executive body. First measures: annulment of the constitution,
declaration of martial law, threats against the foreign presa.
Finally, a people's court, depending on the PRC alone and appointed by it,
is replacing the military court. And, from 26 April a liet of 138 peraons
(including the executed criminals of 22 April) was made public. All are
accused of "high treason, unbridled corYnption and abuse of power." Among
them are directors of companies, including Americans and Englishmen and
Madame Neh Dukuly-Tolbert, Liberian Ambassador to Paris.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1980
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LIBERIA
~
NATION'S EGONOMIC PROSPECTS NOTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX.ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 8U pp 1U19, 1020
[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "After the coup d'Etat of Monrovia"~
[TextJ One might ask oneself why the neighboring governments of Liberia,
ready to express their solidarity for Mr William Tolbert in 1979, quite
apart frou~ any ideological consideration, allowed thems~lves to be taken
by surprise in'1980 by the coup d'etat, in spite of the growing agitaCion
maintained in the country for several months. The same question might be
addressed to the United States who, in the tradition of political, r~ligious,
and monetary sponsorship exerted over tropical Africa's oldest republic,
had increased contacts with it for a year, including exchange of official
visit~, creation, on the initiative of President Carter, of a special com-
mission charged with the development of American-Liberian relations, and
even certain moves designed to get Monrovia intereated--as a supplement to
the Camp David policy--in a diplomatic rapprochement by the liberal countries
of Africa Coward Israel.
The answer probably is that it is easier for friends to hel~ heal a disease
raCher than prevent it. One might undoubtedly say thaC Liberia, delayed
in terme of ita development by a historical evolt~bimn differenC from Chat of
the o ther states in the region, found itself fsced, by virtue of that fact,
with a certain delay as compared to those other countries, with the need for
tackling the problem of decolonization (to the extent that the deacendants
of th e Negro-American pioneers of the 19th century can be likened to the
- white $ettlers). But this kind of interpretation is better suited for ex-
plaining events rather than detecting Cheir premises. The responsible
- officials in the Liberian government in any case were bound to have only an
imperfece perception of that. In spite of certain shadowy areas, the
economic situation was far from catastrophic. The new political formaGions-- _
to whose actions one must attribute the recent social conflicts--were not
at a11 mysterious. They even seemed open toward negotiation and Mr Tolbert
had on several occasions tried to geC n~gotietions atarted with them. It
was entirely unforeseeable that the coup ahould come after all and that
th~se formations did not~tactically contribute to the overthrow of the
authorities except by playing a diversionary role of whic".z they were not
necessarily ~ware.
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Origin and Development of Social Agitation
The upriaings of April 1979, rahich ended with 80 dead, several hundred
wounded, and considerable damage, had in fact been caused by the untimely
decision made by agriculture minister Mrs Florence Chenoweth to raise
the price of a bag of rice from 22 to 30 dollars; this cereal constitutes
the basic food item for the workers in the ports, in industry, and in the
minea. Z'he scarcity of the product had done less to inspire this initiative
then the more or less articifical idea of holding down the flight of the
people from thQ countryside and s~owing down the urban concentrations by
diasuading the job applicanta from leaving their family plantatione.
Liberia doea not yet have self-sufficiency in food but it would be wrong
~o believe that the government was indifferent to the problem. On the
conCrary, between 1973 and 1978 it had made vary effective efforts for
~ agriculture in general and for rice cultivation in particular becauae,
during that p~riod of time, rice harvesta grew 15 percent. Of courae, -
that was at the expense of csssava but this;-~parzial aubstitution of one
product for another was precisely in keeping with the conversion of a
- portion of �the active population to wage ~aorkers.
Although the measure w~as rapidly cancelled and although the price for a
bag of rice was reduced belo~,r the level in March, it did produce a very
unfavorable echp among the workers in the iron m3nes who were already hard-
hit by inflation (17 perce~at in 1979~ and personnel layoffs following the
world sCeel crisis a~d the deficit r~gistered by the thr~ee major mineral
ex~raction compaaies, that is, Lamca (Liberian-American-Swedish Minera].s
Company), operated by the Swedish ~rangesberg group; the Bong Mining
Company, with Germen and Italian p~rticipation; and the National Iron Ore
Company, based on A~nerican capital. The atrikes that broke out in August
in the baein of the Nimba Mou~tains and the violence accompariying them
were a direct conaequence of that. These were strikea which served as a
trial run for the leaders af the PAL (Progressive Alliance of Liberia),
the initial ce11 0~ tl~e PPp (Pragreasiv~ People's Party), and, very
sketchily, the Moja (Mavement for Justice in Africa).
The paradox is that none of these organizations really eprang from the
auto~h*_honous and "colonized" maj~r~ty of the population but rather con-
sisted of American-Lib~rian studente and management personnel. It has
not yet been eatabliahed th~t thei.r 1ead~rs--moAt of whom by the way were
tn prison o~a 12 April--took an effective part in the preparation of the
coup d'eCst, even tho~ag'h fo~r PPP m3nisters and two miniaters from Moja
turned up on the ,government list drawn up an 14 April by Serge~ant-Ma~or.
Samuel K. Doe wha ia a real native.
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The Action of the New Parties
The PAI., founded in New York in 1975 by Mr Bacchus Matthews, a former
_ foreign office employee, with a small group of students or technicians
taking training courses, had progressively returned its members to
Liberia starting in 1976. It was at that time tolerated and President
Tolbert did not rule out the idea of admitting it--side by side with the
very gove:nmental True Whig Party--to the liat of approved formations,
provided it could justify its figure of 300 members. But the administration
believed that it could provide.an alibi for its own mistakes by designating
it as an oxganization of mutineers in April 1979 which had the immediate
effect of increasing its following.
Right after the uprising, posters showing portraits ~passage apparently
missing in photostat~--numerous operations of equipment supply are
currently the subject of guarantee requests trom COFACE jFrench Inaurance
Company for Foreign Trade].
But above all new prospecta were opened up for French initiatives by virtue
of the 1979 agreement, The local references of Dragages, which had built "
two big bridges over the Mesurado and Saint-Paul rivers, in particular
enabled the company, for a figure of F30 million, to get a contract for
the expanaion and restoration of the port of Greenville. The same company
submitted offers for the three big urodernization and expansion programs
for the port of Monrovia, with F160 million, in which financing from the
Central Fund could participate, both in terms of capital and for the
opening of e~:port loans. The Central Fund could also intervene, in
conjunction with the European Investment Bank, the Liberian government,
and Kuwait, in building a palm oil refinery for an amount of 12 million
dollars, to be erected on the Buto plantation. It is studying tbe pos-
sibility of helping in the development of coconut plantations in the
littoral zone, based on a study by SODEPALM [Company for the Development
and Exploitation of Oil Palms]. A basic agreement was worked out for the
construction of a small rolling mill (F60 million) and the supply of pre-
fabricated boats (30 million). The completion of two water treatment units
by a French company, with a price tag of F5U million, has also been mentioned. _
In addition to their intrinsic significance, theae projects would seem to
assure France's position in a country which often served as a bridgehead
for international competition in Africa and where, moreover, problems ot
reinbursement and payment have never come up until now.
If the authorities in pa,,er today should embark upon a profound tranafor-
mation of the financial mec(neniams involved in production, then the com-
pletion of these projecta obviously could only be delayed. Beyond that,
this could result in serious uncertainties--even though they may be
temporary--in the supply of Western Europe with iron mineral and the
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supply of the United States with rubber. The consequences of a nati~n-
alization of the crypto-Liberian shipping industry are even more difficult
to fathom. But above all it ie rather difficult to figure out what the
economic aurvival of a country could be if its investors, its auppliers,
ita custc;uera, and its currency are abruptly challenged.
Sergeant Samuel Doe in this respect was quick--between two blasts--to come
up with the usual statements of appeasement, noting that the Council of
Redemption was quickly to pass into the hands of the "civiliane." What we
know about the sociological origin of the liberals, whom he brought to
power, as well as their declared objectives, would make them look rather
like what, in Anglo-Saxon countriea, is called radicals, rather than
Marxists-Leninists. One might think that it would aeem more important
_ to them to let the Liberian population, which so far has been largely
excluded, share in the profita of the big ~gricultural and industrial
establishments, rather than stopping their operations and thus adding
to the misery of wage workers in a situation of underdevelopment in the
_ traditional sector.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
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LIBERIA '
NEW R~GIME MUST END U.S. ECONOMIC DOMINATION
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 28 Apr-11 May 80 pP 26~ z~
[Article by Fode Amadou: "The Test"]
[Text] In sweeping away the repressive old regime, the present rulers open
up new outloo~s for the country. Will they go so far as to attack the real
;~asters--the United States--for the ~ime being still there?
Life has once again become normal in Monrovia and in all the cities of
Liberia 2 weeks after the coup that overthrew President Willian Tolbert's
regime. The airports and seaports of the country have been reopened, and
the little street stands and a number of shops selling general merchandise
were taken over by the populatYOn by assault. The population applauded
the decision by the new Council of Ministers to freeze the prices of inerchan-
- dise sold in the country, both imported and of local manufacture, to double f
the minimum wage in the civil service and to raise soldiers' monthly pay
from $100 ta $250. _
The release of several hundred individuals imprisoned for minor offe-~ses and
of 86 militants from opposition parties, as well as the arrest of hundreds -
of government o�ficials, dignir_aries and politicians accused of corruption,
embezzl~~men~ and conversion of public property to their own use under the
Tubman snd Tolbert regimes, were interpreted as the first evident manifesta-
tion of the current regime's concern, in the words of the new head of state,
to "put tc use every means aime3 at reducing the cost of living, especially
in the domains of food, health, education, transportation and housing."
While the investigations were going on the new governmental and military -
a.uthorities maintained a state of alert in order to be prepared for any new -
attempt at rebellion within certain military units. But neither the attempted
insurrection that broke out among certain groups of soliders of the Presidential
Guard in Bong County northeast of the capita?--rapidly extinguished--nor -
- the death by ambush of the chief of artillery of the new re~ime, Ma~ Isaac
Jurwah, shook the sessiox:s of the National Council of People's Redemp~ion
made up of the princlpal organizers of the coup. This latter group constitutes
in effect a military ~unta of six sergeant:s, nine corporals and one private
first class, presided over by a sergeant-major: Samuel K. Doe, who proclaimed
himself chief of state and president of the Council of People's Redemption.
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Oppo~ition, several of whom had been arrested and imprisoned awaiting trial,
after having been accused of responsibility for the popular revolts of
14 April 1979 and 7 March of this year. Among them is Gabriel Bacchus Matthews,
president of the Progressive Party of the People (PPP), who was given the
post of foreign minister, and Togba Nah Tipoteh, president of the Movement
af Justice for Africa (f~10JA), one of the most brilliant economists of the
country, who has become the new minister of the plan and economic affairs.
The Afro-American "Families"
It is perhaps preraature to make serious predictions on the real political
and economic options that the new Liberian regime will pursue. There are
serious differences within the government, both political and socioeconomic
- in nature. They divide the two principal parties that participate in the
government. Though some consider the MaJA more "radical" than the PPP by
reason of its members and supporters among the workers, peasants and students,
and the fact that its positions have a leftist ideological basis, the PPP
leaders reject this distinctior. by specifying that their party follows an
"African Socialist" policy and that MOJA's refus~l to join in the mass a~^tion
of 7 March of this year was a serious political "error," even though it
- without any doubt precipitated the coup.
That is why the diplomatic observers of progressive and Socialist persuasion -
at Monrovia prefer to follow with justified prudence the evolution of the
new regime's policy before speaking out. All the time recognizing that
whatever the orientations of the junta may be, the overthrow of the unpopular,
repressive and neo-colonial Tolbert regime is an imp~rtant step achieved
along the path of liberation and emancipation of the Libsration people, who
for 111 years have been subject to the yoke of some dozen Afro-American families.
With that said, some points deserv~ to be emphasi~ed:
1. Two days after the coup the new junta turned to the American military
advisers to help maintain public order and to set up an "security force
capable of dealing with uprisings or public der~onstrations difficult to
control." ihus it was that Colonel Robert Gosny, the American military
adviser and the new Liberian Defense Minis~er Sa~uel Pearson perfected a
- precise plan for internal security measures.
2. The new regime did not terminate the duties of the American Military
Mission, which had been attached to its own Defense Ministry for a long
time. This Mission, made up af six high-ranking officers, has its office
in the Defense building and performs the duty of supplyin~ "al~. assistance
and advice" to the Liberian Gov~ernment.
3. Most of the .Liberian office~s were trained in the U'nited States.
Sergeant-Ma~or poe and most of the other members of the National Council
of Redemption were trained by U.S. Army Special Forces instructors invited
over by former President Tolbert.
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These facts do not fail to furnish substance to the rumor that the unit of
U.S. Army Special Forces might have "encouraged" the overthrow of the Tolbert
regime to make way for a more "liberal" governing team, to prevent a popular
revolt that could end by se:izure of powe.r by genuine revolutionaries. By
reaffirming their desire "to continue to maintain their treaties and their
' histori:. relations with the Liberian Government and people," the United States
was in fact responding t~ the address by new Chief of State Samuel K. Doe,
- who declared on last 14 April that he was making "an appeal to friendly
foreign investors to pursue and develop their ties with Liberia, which
intends to respect private property..." .
However that may be, the statements of the chief of the military junta (age 28)
hardZy contain any surprises. Needing as he does to consolidate the bases
of his own authority, he surely seeks to avoid any statement of position which
could arouse and mobilize the might of the United States aga.inst him. He
is aware tliat the United States has substantial economic interests in Liberia.
Since 1947 the Firestone Company has been running the largest individually
owned rubber plantation, and Bethlehem Steel owns 25 percent of the stock
and operates the largest African iron ore exporters, eleventh largest in
the world. A state within a State, Firestone has been unremittingly one of
the strongest bastions of American economic power in West Africa for the
past 35 years.
To all.ow this American economic domination to consolidate itself and develop,
to fail to take the measures called for to assure Liberia's authentic control
of its natural resources, is that not a perpetuation of the neo-colonial
_ status, poverty, exploitation, suffering and hunger of an entire people?
This is the crucial test which the new regime must deal with and resolve if
it is to win national confidence and popularity. '
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
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MADAGASCAR
_ MAHAJANGA FARITANY ECONOMY DESCRIBED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1053
[Text] The recent regular meeting of the People's Council of the Maha~anga
faritany [higher level of new adm~nistrativE pyramid] provided an opportun-
ity for Executive Committee chairmsn Ra~aofera to supply details on the
economic activities of the faritany, in particular, on the operation of the
port of Maha~anga (formerly Ma~unga). Documenting h~s report with figures,
he emphasized the solutions adopted in order to make port activities pro-
fitable.
Concerning loans from the BTM [National Bank for Rural Development], Ra~ao-
fera emphasized that peasants were somewhat reticent about paying back
loans. He noted that the situation has forced the BTM to suspend loans to -
some fokontany [village district]. Nevertheless, measures h~ve been taken
to put an end to theae irregularities. ~
Concerning production, the following figures are for the 1979 season:
rice, 144,540 tons from an area of 25,795 hectares; peanuts, 2,757 tons
from an area of 3,035 hectares; manioc, 51,460 tons from an area of 12,025
hectares; and corn, 7,360 tons from an area of 6,855 hectares. Chairman
Ra~aofera emphasized that experiments concerning rice growing on tanety
[translation unknown] enterprises in Andriameng were very conclusive.
In the field of education, the faritany have some 1,492 basic education
schools with 146,859 students; representing 59.6 percent of school-age
children. The faritany also have 68 basic secondary achools, 17 of which
were opened this year, 6 lycees and 2 professional schools.
The 1980 budget of the Mahajanga faritany totals 539.1 million Malagasy
francs, a 163-percent.increase over that of the previous fiscal year, essen- -
tially due to tax recei.pts and credits from the National Economic Develop-
ment Fund. A large portion of this sum will be devoted to investments,
aid to decentralized collectives and improving communications.
COPYRI(~iT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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- MADAGASCAR
BRIEFS
SECREN TO MANUFACTURE PU1~S--Zn 1979, SECREN (Naval Conatruction and Repair
Company), in Antsiranana (formerly Diego-Suarez), had a total turnover of
2 billion Malagasy francs, compared with 1.4 billion in 1978. Shipbuilding -
continuea to account for most of its activitiea (60 percent in 1979, with
the order of four LCT's for the Malagasy Government), but the company is
now diversifying its activities and has ~ust gon~ into pump manufacturing
with the aid of rlorth Korea which, within the framework of a cooperation .
agreement signed in Pyongyang in 1479, sent a team of technicians to Ant-
siranana in April 1979. SECREN is therefore now able to supply different
types of pumps: propeller�, self-priming, one-stage, double-action and .
centrifugal pumps adapted to local conditions for industrial and agricul-
tural uses. It recently presented a demonstration of these various models
on Dorodosy Lake, 10 kilometers south of Antananarivo. [Text] [Paris _
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1053] 11,464
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MALAWI
BRIE FS
COOPERATION WITH TAIWAN--Mr Sun Yun Suan, prime minister of Formosa, rec-
ently made an official visit to Malawi. This trip resulted in the sigr~ing
of a new copperation agreement between the tt~o countries. The Formosans
are participating in various agricultural development projects in the
country, such as rice cultivaCion, irrigation, vegetables, and agricultural
training, Taiwan is sending about 50 Cechnical agricultural cooperation
agents to Malawi. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MF.DITERRANEENS in
French 25 Apr 8U p 992] 5058
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MALI
ECONOMIC FUTURE REPORTEDLY IN DOUBT
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 211,14 Apr 80 p 39
[Text] Last February a new series of price increases in certain products
and services.arrived, affecting hydrocarbons (25 percent on top of an iden-
tical increase last November), flour (18.34 percent), water and electricity
(30 percent), and urban transport (40 percent).
And this is only to speak of the official prices. As the state does not
control the market, the real prices are much higher most of the time. For
example, in the urban transport ae~tor--in private hands--prices reach
double, even-triple those which the atate establishes. It is the same with
grains, unobtainable in the state-owned stores, and for which one must pay
315 Malian Fr. on the parallel market, compared to the official price of 175.
This succession af increases comes at a time when living conditions for the
population have already been profoundly impacted by the drain of higher
social costs, difficulties with aupply, and delays in payment of wages.
though only to the degree that was absolutely necessary. In mid-February,
workers in every category had not yet collected their January wages. And
many of them have seen nothing in three months.
It is this situation which provoked the strike of secondary schoolteachers
in the capital. The Treasury therefore had to get advances on its accounts
with certain,companies in order to meet its obligations, but this expedient
proved to be insufficient. In fact, the state finds itself unable to pay all
its wages at the same time.
It is necessary to understand this well: the public coffers are empty, and
the state is on the verge of bankruptcy. Certainly, most developing countries
are familiary with problems; but, to these general causes must be added here
particular causes, especially ~lie incoherent management of a political class
of which the least that one can say is that it has not been motivatied for
essentially a dozen years by a high sensitivity to the national interest.
For the only ones to escape the general misery are the privileged ones in
power and the bourgeois comprador class which competes against itself in
speculation while evading the taxes.
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The food situation is 3ust as gloomy for the overwhelming majority. Mali
is, of all the countries of the Sahel, the one which anticipated the biggest
grain deficit: some 257,000 tons, which it hopes will be aupplied by
international aid. For the etate cannot finance imports of thia acale. The
population will continue thus to endure the rule of the speculators. Moreover,
it has no choice: in the state stores, the allatted rations are barely enough
ro survive; according to the region, they range from 800 g to 3.5 kg of grain
per person per month.
_ This situation could get even worse in the months ahead. In fact, the
recovery plan proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)--whose
director general recently visited Bamako--is based on reduction of public
expenses, an increase in consumer prices, and increased fiscal pressure.
Now we have already witnessed such an increase in social costs that workers
of every kind are no longer prepared to meet the vital problems of daily
= sustenance, transport costs, health expenses, rents...
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie
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MALI
CENTRAL BANK PUBLISHES ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL STATISTICS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Apr 80 pp 978, 979
[Text] The Central Bank of Mali recently published its quarterly bulletin
(March 1980) of economic and financial statistics.
As of 31 December 1979 the bills and coins in circulation represented
76.9 billion Malian francs, compared to 63.3 billion one year previously.
~ As of the same date, end of December 1979, the Central Bank found itself
owing, in the way of foreign liabilities, the exchange value of 114.9
billion Malian francs (plus 5.3 billion from the end of December 1978)
as opposed to 2.9 billion Malian francs in counterpart credit in currency
and 15 billion Malian francs on deposit with the International Monetary
Fund (Il~4') .
The whole of deposits (on sight and at maturity) in the banking system
- amounted to 53 billion francs as of 31 December 1979 (plus 0.8 billion
from the end of December 1978).
Likewise at the end of December 1979 the volume of economy credit amounted
to 152.3 billion Malian franc~ compared to 133.1 billion a year previously;
_ seasonal credits for state production enterprises were recorded at 91.5
billion (plus 14.2 billion).
The general budget for 1980 was set at 71.3 billion Malian francs with
11.8 billion in income from foreign assistance, compared to 62.8 billion
for the 1979 budget (including 5.6 billion in foreign assistance).
~ During the year 1979 Mali's imports totaled 111.1 billion Malian francs
(including 23 billion in supplies of petroleum products) compared to 105
billion in 1978 (including 17 billion in supplies of petroleum products)
and 78 billion in 1978.
In 1979 Malian exports amounted to 47.1 billion Malian francs (including
27.8 billion in cotton fiber, seed and oil-cakes) compared to 42.5 billion
in I978 (including 25.8 billion for the cotton line).
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Thanks to a cuntribution of the exchange value of 42 billion Malian francs
in foreign public grants and loans, the balance of payments of the year
1979 presents a surplus of 10.1 billion Malian francs, compared to a
surplus of 10.5 billion entered in the accounts in 1978 (with 42.7 billion
in foreign assistance).
The marketing projections of the agricultural production from the 1979-1980
campaign cover 144,500 tons of seed cot~on (plus 17,800 tons from the
previous campaign, 52,000 tons of peanuts (plus 14,700 tons) and 80,400
tons of rice (plus 17,700 tons~. All producers' purchase prices were
recorded at the beginning of the campaign. Consequently agricultural
- income will represent 15.9 billion Malian francs for cotton (plus 4.4
billion) and 3.2 billian ror peanuts (plus 1 billion).
T~he general consumer p�rice index for the food gzoups stood at 562.7 at
the end of October 1979, compared to 491.6 at the end of October 1979 [sic]
(on a basis of 100 determined in 1962-1963), indexes recorded in consumer
cooperativAs; prices on the open market being considerably higher (from
20 to 25%).
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreu~ Cie Paris 1980
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' MOZAMBIQUE
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEPENDENT ON PORT, RAILROAD RECEIPTS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Apr 80 p 997
[Text] Three series of immediate problems to resolve to enable the
railways of Mozambique to insure railway services to the inland countries.
President Samora Machel's surprise visit tc the railway-har~or complex
of Maputo in mid-January, Mr Mugabe's victory in the Rhodesian elections
27-29 February and the independence of Zimbabwe wh~ch was a result of it,
matched with the reopening of the border with Mozambique, the summit
meetin~ in Lusaka, at the beginning of April, of the chiefs of state of
Mozambique, Tanzania, Angola, Botswana and Zambia which accented this
geographic area's need for access to the Indian Ocean and led to the
creation of a transportation and communications committee for southern
Africa, all these events highlight the importance of the railway and
harbor system of Mozambique.
When can traffic get back ta normal, a traffic which used to make possible
the flow of three-fourths of the foreign trade of the former Rhodesia and
a part of those of Zambia and Zaire? To this question Mr Ernest Kadungure,
Zimbabswean minister of transportation and energy who just went to
Mozambique to look into the problem, has replied: "Soon."
But at just about the same time the FINANCIAL TIMES showed greater reser-
vatians, and indicated that the resumption of traffic probably could not
come about before the end of the year because the damage caused before
the independence of Zimbabwe by the attacks of the Salisbury forces against -
the line ending in Maputo are turning out to be greater than had been
thought heretofore, and because repairs will last at least until November.
As for the tracks that terminate in Beira, they cannot insure any more
than 1,000 tons a day both ways because of lack of qualifications with
respect to personnel and lack of maintenance with respect to equipment.
We shall take a more detailed loqk at the problems relating to each of
tY~ese two lines.
On the Maputo line which crosses the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border at
Chicualacuala, 60 kilometers of tracks must be replaced on the Zimbabwe
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side and 80 kilometers must be checked on the Mozambique side at the rail
level as well as at the level of the crossties and fasteners. But an
alternate solution exists; it consists of having goods travel by South
African Railways via Komati Poort, and from there to Maputo. Komati
Poort is very well equipped for bulk shipments (sugar or steel). The
disadvantage of this method is that it increases the dependence of
Zimbabwe (as well as Zaire and Zambia) on South Africa. Moreover the
Komati Poort line is very congested during the months following the harvest
of corn and other agricultural products of the Transvaal.
On the other line (Umtali-Beira) the principal problem to be solved is
that of manpower. In 1975 at the time of independence, nearly 7,500
- railway employees, the majority of them Portuguese, left Mozambique and _
were replaced by 300 managers from Eastern Europe who made an effort to
train Mozambicans. Not fast enough and in too small a number. For that
reason, and even though exchanges of viewpoints between the leaders of
Salisbury and Maputo brought about a decision to run one train a day in
each direction between Umtali and Beira, the only traffic up to now covers
the coal from Wankie, which adds strength to the coal of Mozambique to
enable steam locomotives to keep moving. Copper from Zambia and Zaire,
tobacco from Zimbabwe on the way down, imported toods for these three
countries and neighboring Malawi on the way up, stil.l are not circulating.
An additional problem affects the resumption of traffic on one line as
well as on the other. In 1976 when Mozambique had decided to participate
in the sanctions against Rhodesia, Maputo had seized nearly 3,000 cars
of all kinds, including some pa~senger c1rs, two diesel locomotives and
three steam belonging to Rhodesia Rai?..~ays. This equipment is utilized
by the Mozambique railways. A political decision must be taken to put
an end to this seizure. But the replacement cost of this maCerial, for
Mozambique or for the new government of Zimbabwe, would have to be on
the order of $80 million.
Such are the immediate problems which the authorities of Maputo are facing.
In the longer term, if Mozambique wants to improve its balance of payments
(we emphasized in our issue number 1796 of 11 April, page 885, the fact
that transit is one of the three "invisible collections" making it possible
to support the state budget), it will have to develop its railways and
ports, a project which implies the widening and deepening of the access
channels in Maputo and Beira.
A study concerning Beira was done by the British company, Bertlin Partners,
the FINANCIAL TIMES points out. A feasibility study in greater depth,
costing $2 million, could be undertaken and financed by the EEC. This
question was supposed to be taken up in the discussion which Mr Cheysson
had with the Mozambique leaders during his recent stop in Maputo. The
total cost of the Beira project would stand somewhere between $120 and
$150 million.
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Aviation. Chartering of a Boeing 707. The Mozambique Deta airways company
has secured a second Boeing within the framework of a new subcontracting
deal worked out with the British Company, British Midlands Airways (BMA).
The contract is evaluated at 5.5 million pounds ($11 million). The BMA -
- had already chartered a first Boeing 707 which insurea regular service
from the departure point of Maputo for Deta's account. The British
company likewise provides the airship crews and maintenance personnel.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
9498
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MOZAI~IDIQUE
BRIEFS
WAREHOUSES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS--Following a study by rhe directorate
of domestic trade in the province of Sofala, according to which 10 dis-
trict warehouaes of a total capacity of 3,800 tons must be built, Mozambi-
can authorities have decided io build a warehouse in Chimbabava for the
- storage of 1,000 tons of agricultural products, and a second one, also in
Chimbabava, but smaller in size. A total of 8 warehouses will be distri-
buted thus:: 3 in Gorongosa, 2 in Chimba, 1 in Caia, l in~Cheringoma and
_ 1 in Buzi. Except for one of the warehouses in Gorongosa which will have
a capacity of 500 tons, the others will all have a capacity varying from
100 to 200 tong. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French lo May 80 p 1169]
SWEDI~H AIR ASSISTANCE--The Swedish domestic airline LINJEFLYG will soon
sign a contract with Mozambique in the amount of approximately 10 million
kronor (10 mill{on French francs), financed through the development assis- _
tance granted to Mozambique by Sweden. The Swedish assistance to Mozam-
bique for 1980-19r31 will amount to 180 million kronor. This makes Mozam-
bique the aecond-highest beneficiary of Swedish devel4pment assistance in
Africa after Tanzania. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in Fxench 16 May 80 p 1169]
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NIGER
RELEASE OF DJIBO BAKARY COMMENDED
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 28 Apr-11 May 8~ p 27
[Article by Antonia Bli,, "Djibo Bakary Fr~e At Last!--Release of the
eminent patriot starts new hopes at Niamey"]
[Text] President Senyi Kountche's decision to free the leader of the
Sawaba, Djibo Bakary, was well received by African and Third World public
opinion generally. There is great satisfaction with the gesture the Niger
chief of state has just performed for one of the greatest ?,frican patriots,
one of the best of those who dedicated their lives to the struggle for
, national liTieration and the fight against the colonial and neoco~onial
ascendancy in Afric;:.
- It was on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the overthrow of the
neocolonial regime of Hamani Diori, 15 April 1974, that President Seyni
Kountche announced the release of "the main body of the former political
personnel;" he made sure to emghasize that these measures were decided
"freely, without pressure of any sort, out of humanitarian concern," by
the Supreme Military Council. Wishing "to establish in depth an atmosnhere
of peace and detente between all N:Lger," President Kountche is adopting
a new tone which could no doubt open up particularly encouraging possibilities
in support of the inciependent and nonalined policy of.Niger and the creation -
of a political force made up of all the patriotic and progressive Niger
citizens. A political force one must hope will make a clear and precise
distinction between the reaction the Hamani Diori clique stands for--most ~
of the elements of which have also been set free--and the integral left of
which Djibo Bakary has always been the symbol. -
Moreover, the Ni~;er president seem~ perfectly aware of the problems that
exist in his country. It is necessary, he says, to c.lean up an atmo;3phere
characterized by influence-peddling within the government and the mal.aise
~f holding respon.sibility that afflicts the higher cadres. This is doubtless
the price that must be naid to fight the battle of the "Niger of tomorrow"
effectively.
There should be unal'~.oyed rejoicing at the freeing or I?jibo Bakary, whose
incarceration for 4 years and. 9 months had deeply disap~~ointed everyone in
Niger and throughout all Africa who had welcomed the overthrow of the
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unpopular regime of Hamani Diori by the young officex Seyni Kountche and
the declarations of intent by the new rulers as an announcement of changes
in depth. In Guinea-Conakry, where he had been in exile for many years,
D~ibo Bakary told us a few days after the overthrow of Diori that he had
confidence in the new regime and that he was quite prepared to work with it
without any hesitation: "I rush," so he told us, "to get back to my country,
my people. And I hope that after 14 years of neocolonial government Niger
will at last breathe the air of freedom and genuine political and economic
independence so that our national resources will be exploited in the
interests of our people..."
At the time President Ahmed Sekou Toure, his comrades of the Guinean
Democratic Party (PDG) and all the political and personal friends of
~jiho Bakary had counseled him to go back home and place himself at the
disposal of the new government. Several individuals assured him, on the
basis of information gathered at Niamey, that he would have nothing to worry
about.
Lying Accusations .
The leader of the Sawaba did in fact return home, and his modest residence
- was immediately invaded by a crowd of old Niger comrades and patriots who
lcnew that the name of Djibo was intimately linked with the history of
Niger's anti-colonial struggle. Everyone was pleased with the attitude of
the new Chief of State, who had pledged himself to work for "national ~econ-
ciliation." Unfortunately a conspirar_y, hatched by a colonial agent,
Colombany, who had already played a decisive role in the victory of "yes"
in General de Gaulle's 1958 refer~.idum, ended some months following Djibo _
Bakary's return on 2 August 1975 ~n the arrest of a number of militants
and sympathizers of the Sawaba Party. Djibo was even accused of participating
in a plot against the government, when all the world knew there was nothing ~
to it and that he had been the victim of French neocolonialist plotters who
lived in Niamey.`
A founder of rhe Democratic Unioii of Niger, then of the Sawaba Party, which
campaigned for the "no" in the De Gaulle refereneum (the only African party
, with the Guinean Democratic Party), Dj ibo had to leave the post of President
of the Council�of the Niger Government which he had held since 1957, yielding
it to Hamani Diori, following fraudulent elections that g~ve victory to the
advocates of "yes". IL is well known that as soon as he took over the Hamani
Diori regiII~e organized a regular -ai~ch hunt--sometimes going as far as
assassination--against the opposition; and it is known how this permanent
repression ~?d to the exile of the militants of the Sawaba Party who survived
this man-hunt.
The overthrow of the Hamani Diori regime on 1S April 1974 was to open a fresh
page in the history of Niger. And the freeing of Djibo Bakary gives rise
� to new hopes. We rejoice in 1t.
COP'IRIGHT: 19$0 Afrique-Asie
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RWANDA
REPORT ON LARGE VOLUME OF INTERNATIONAL AID
Paria MARCHES TF,~rl~aun ~T MEDITERR.ANEENS in French 2 May 80 p 1052
[Text] In its report for FY 1979, submitted on 23 April to the general
_ stockholder's meeting, the Belgian-Zairian Banic (Belgoleiae) neviewed the
economy of Rwanda,
Becauae of the difficult tranaportation situation, Air Rwanda in 19i9 purr ~
chased one Boeing 707 aircra~t which greatly contributed to handling
certain essential imports, ,
The reopening of the Mombasa road acrosa the Eastern part of Uganda toward
Kenya brought about an improveme~zt; but, althou~h the new Ugpndan author-
itiea took stepa to release the Rwandan trucks wnich had been held up at r
the time of hostilities with Tanzania, traffic is being restored only
gradually,
Export estimates for 1979 include 35,000 tona of coffee (including 9,500
tone from the earlier harveat), 4,100 tons of tea as well as 1,945 tons of
casaiterite, to which we can add 775 tons of tungsten,
I
_ On 24 April and 19 June 1979, USAID decided to grant Rwanda two loans in
the amounts of $5.2 million and $8.75 million, respectively,
, The first loan is earmarked for a second development and financing program
for industry to be implemented through the ent~rprise of the Rwanda
Development Bank, with an estimated total cost of S~5 million, of which
40 percent will be financed by the above-mentioned bank. The main objective
of these projects is the utilization of local resources and the substitution
of imported products with local food producta. The pro~ecte within the
framepork of the firat program had added up to S30 million and were concen-
trated on the light as well as coffee and Cea processing indust,r~es.
The second loan covers the aecond phase of the development of agriculCure
and animal husbandry at Mutara in the Northeastern part of Rwanda. Thia
pro~ect, whose cost has been estimated at $11.5 million, will include
collective liveatock ranches and ema11 farms.
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On the other hand, the Special Fund of the OPEC on 28 August 1979 granted
a loan of $4.5 million to the Republic of Rwanda for the improvement of
ite balance of payments.
At the end of the activities of the Mixed Belgian-Rwandan Commiasion in
October 1979 at Kigali, a cooperation agreement was concluded, covering
anout e hundred projects, over a period of S years. The financing program
ever a period of 5 years of Belgian cooperation in this development effort
involves an amount of 6 billion FB [Belgian FrancsJ.
Among the most important objectives we find saientific research in the field
of agricultural food production.
Belgium will take over the complete development of several rural areas
covering about 350,OOU inhabitants in order to promote food and industrial
product crops, animal husbandry, the fight against erosion, as we11 as the
development of cooperativea.
In the induatrial sector, efforts will be concentrated especially on the
production of inethane in Lake Kivu with the posaible collaborati~n of the
Belgian private sector, as well as the construction of a tea ~rocesaing
_ factory.
Looking at transportation, the Kanombe (Kigali) airport will be enlarged
so that it will be able to accommodate big aircraft.
The Repbulic of Rwanda will also benefit from financial intervention by the
FRG whose amount had been fixed at 3,718,U00,000 Rwanda francs for 1979-1980
under the terms of the meeting of the mixed German-Rwanda mission in Nov-
ember 1979 ($1 = 92.~4 Rwan3a francs), Among the most important projects
we have the Kigali-Ruhengeri road and the Ruhengeri-Giseny? high-voitege
power 1ine.
COPYRIGi~T: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
5053
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SOMALIA
EXTENT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, NEED FOR ARMY ANALYZED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Apr 80 pp 911-913
[Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "Has Somalia Chosen Sides?"]
[Text] The Democratic Republic of Somalia has constantly benefitted from a
currrent of sympathy within the countries of Western Europe, despite its
' past political positions, a current which historical factors make under-
standable in the case of ICaly, but which also existed within the EEC and
even in France at a time when the Djibouti affair was making Franco-Somali
relations especially difficult. The isolation of which it has unceasingly -
. complained since fighting in the Ogaden broke out in June 1977 seems
surprising.
This sympathy finds its origins in the quality of its elite, the courage
with which it has carried itself into operations as ambitious as the seden-
tarization of the nomads--undertaken thanks to Soviet trucks and /Antonovs/
following the droughts of 1973-1975--the results of which have been skillfully
exhibited to foreigners. The Italian-Moorish elegance of Mogadiscio's
decor has contributed to it. The irredentism it supports in the border -
provinces of neighboring states itself ineets with some understanding on the
part of observers; the ethnic and linguistic homogeneity of a united Somalia -
riding the four winds, is appealing at first glance, even if it is not
matched by any common historical tradition of a unitary solution.
Somalia's mistake is doubtless to have believed that this benevolence of
prtnciple, allied to the satisfaction of seeing it break off its alliance
with the USSR, would extend to [the Western countries] supporting it in an
armed action, at the risk of ~eopardizing the political stability not only
of the ~eographic region but to all African states; and the latter are
much more ati::~,ched.than~ the old colonizers ever were to the notion of the
sanctity of the colonial boundaries. The reluctance of the Western powers
to follow Somalia onto this ground was matched by the realization--already
made by Moscow--that because of its demography aizd its real or potential
resources, Ethiopia is the big player in this pai-t of the world. Created
by Gr~~at Britain at the end o~: Wor1d War ]:I, "pan-Somalism" was only of
interest to chancelleries to the degree that it was opposed to France's
sovereignty over Djibouti and to the regio~zal supremacy of an Ethiopian
empire in full decay.
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Once Djibouti was independent aad the Ethiopian empire, however colonial
its nature, was "pumped up" through the efforts of the USSR and Cuba, the
putrid growths which disturbed its borders were transformed suddenly into
a simple eczema, certainly an irritant, but no more justifying a third-
party intervention than a difference between ~witzerland and France over
the Jurassian cantons.
Such an assessment is ohviously as extreme as that of the aggressive capa-
cities of Somalia which had preceded it. Witness the continuing insecurity
in the Ogaden and the reappearance of the guerrillas in southern Ethiopia, -
not to speak of the international repercussions of the refugee problem--today
1.5 million people in a state of 3.3 million inhabitants,.and~whose support
requires annual gifts from the United Statee,, Saudi Arabia, the EEC, Italy
and France valued at $90 million. But it must be said that a certa~n laxity
in interpretation of events has been supported by the position of the
Somali Government.
Whatever justification it may make, this government cannot really deny its
initiating role in the 1977 war. As early as February of that year the
French services knew that it was preparing an offensive against the railroad
line between Diredawa and the TFAI [expansion unknown] border. In these
, circumstances, the daily denunciation, by Somali press and leaders, of the
imminence of a general attack of Ethiopian air and ground forces aimed at
Mogadisciu in order to cut the nation in two, arouses more a droll skepticism
than concern, even if the charge is not baseless altogether.
A certain way of re-writing history, in maintaining, for example, that the
ex-ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Somalia to Paris "had played a
great personal role in the peaceful settlement of the D~ibouti affair"--which
is exact in one sense, but not necessarily in the sense we are invited to
believe--has a comparable effect. If only for the sake of the credibility
of Somnli diplomacy, it would be preferable for Somalia to adopt the silent
aCtitude of the player who has gambled and lost and who prepares his revenge
with his teeth clenched. This was the attitude of Generai Siyad Barre at
the OAU summit in Monrovia, where it was generally accepted. His collaborators,
unfortunately, have not always shown the same discretion. `
~~nat is the Cause of Somali Isolation?
It is appropriate to inquire into the true nature of this isolation, or
claimed isolation, against which the authorities in Mogadiscio have reacted
- with extraordinary diplomatic activity, since, w~.th the exception of the
states of the Eastern Bloc, all the states in the Far East, Southeast Asia,
the Indian sub-continent, the Arab peninsula, the Middle E;ist, North Africa,
and even some in western Europe, received during 1979 a vif~tt by General
Siynd Barre or one of his principal ministers.
The favorable po~~ture ($8 million) of its balance of payments, while its
balance of trade fs chronically nearly $14~) million in deficit, tndicates
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in any case that foreign financial assistance, amounting to 80 percent of
- total revenue, has not been lacking, and that the assistance was provided
on sufficiently advantageous terms to maintain annual debt service at a
reasonable level (7 percent of export earninge, for a total of $360 U.S.),
while the external assets of the Central Bank are estimated, at the end of
1979, at $150 million. If the 1979 rate of inflation remains high, about
19 percent, and the /per capita/ GNP very weak ($110), the incentive to
foreign aid, born of the second factor, being thwarted by the effects of
the first, the total 1979-1981 Development Plan ($900 million), calculated
by extrapolating up to the present the previous support, is itself also
indicative of the variety ar.d abundance of the financial support available
to the country.
Imports from Primary Countries [of originJ
Value (millions of Somali shillings)
1973 1979
Italy 212.1 459.6
China 126.3 50.7
Great Britain 32.5 146.8
United States 16.5 38.6 -
FRG 35.4 159.7
Others ~ 215.0 663.5
TOTAL 637.8 1518.9
One observes a certain acceleration in the pace of international and multi-
lateral financial interventions, whether by the World Bank group (IBRD-IDA)
which has sponsored huge agricultural management projects and efforts to
ameliorate livestock conditions in the Hargeisha region, or by the European
Economic Community, the chief financial sponsor of the Bardera dam over the
Juba river and the irrigated perimeters downstream, for a total of $3 billion,
while in the framework of the 4th FED [expansion unknown] its activity was
in excess of 63 million European counting units. Jointly with the Islamic
Development Bank and OPEC, the African Development Fund participates in a
project valued at 12.5 million counting units for the evacuation of used
water from the capital. The UNDP, finally, subsidizes various educational
and agricultural operations.
The bilateral aid effort is on no smaller a scale, with Peoples China in
f.irst place, having in 1978, thanks to the work of 1,200 Chinese engineers
and foremen supervising 2,500 Somali workers, completed the Burao-Belet
4~ayn section of 970 km of the 2,524-km ~raalway line intended to connect
the agricultural regions of the sauth to t:h~~ pastoral zones of the north.
China is also present, fi.nancially and tec.hiiically, in several agricultural
p:rojects, municipal services (drilling ~ind water supply), sanitary infra-
s~:ructure, and in the cr~~ation of small in~iustries.
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1'he Arab oil states, like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf Emirates, have
assisted, since 1976, in the most varied fields: the road from Berbera to `
Burao, agri~�ulture, schools, urban electrification, etc., for a total of
$300 milJ.ion. Iraq, where the Baathist regime has .ttself puf some dietance
between itself and Moscow, is in this respect following with interest the
evolution of the Democratic Republic of Somalia and has financed, along with
the Mogadiscio refinery, with a capacity of 500,000 t, roads and various ~
agricultural experiments, representing an outlay of around $15 million per
year.
A ctLtain decline of Western assistance, apart from food assistance, was
observable starting in 1970. It picked up again, starting in 1977. Italy
to this day remains the most important [source], giving to Somalia 20 percent
of its Third World aid, supporting numerous technical advisers there and
_ assuming an especially significant role in the fields of health, education,
and culture, quite apart from the budget-balancing subsidy which after an _
interruption of several years it once again grants to the state. The Federal _
Republic of Germany weighs in with around 83 million Somali shillings* worth
of donated goods (vehicles, agricultural tools, radio materials) and training
pro~ects (agriculture and police). Great Britain brings limited cultural
and social assistance to Somalia, but on the other hand has agreed to sub-
stantial bank loans for completion of the sugar refineries at Djelib, near
Kisimaio.
The United States, finally, tends to increase each year the total of its
~ assistance, which in 1979 reached $26.2 million, of which $10 million was
far food, and will exceed $3~.5 million in 1980. The negotiations which .
continue between Washington and Mogadiscio could carry the figure to $100
million in 1981, not counting allowance:s and provisions of a kind not
difficult to imagine, if, as everything leads us to think, they should
result in an accord.
Franca-Somali Economic Relations
French assistance in Somali has suffered from historic handicaps on which
it is useless to dwell for many years, this country not relying on the
services of Rue Monsieur and having remained besides rather a stranger to
French industry. Beyond French participation in FED, nevertheless, our
assistance has provided for the placement of two experts in Sidam (the
Somali ENA [National School of Administration]), one a specialist in statis-
tical mathematics anci the other in administration, while a surgeon, a
radiologist, and a pneumo-physiologistwark with foreign and Somali doctors
in Mogadiscio's hospital, which was also brought into being by th~: FED and
�inally put into operation after many de.lays. More recently, Frarice has
furnished Somal~a two experts in date-palm cultivation.
A second stage of French coaperative ~ssistance was reached with t}te locating
in Somalia of Sogreah, [expansion/translation unknown], to which w~;s
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entrusted the study and bookkeeping of operations of the part of Mogadiscio,
which was al~o realized with European financing, through an Italian firm.
With this foot in the door, Sogreah wae able to obtain a new contract in the
agricultural and pastoral management pro~ects in Hargeiaha cited above, and
it is in line to be given others relating to harbor infrastructure and
fishing. Some French firms, Sofremer, Satec and Aquaservices are also
studying the possibility of activities in this field.
The establishment of the Central Bank for Economic Cooperation in Mogadiscio
in 1978 marks a third stage. The CBEC is involved, presently, in the
realization of the Berbera cement plant, for which two French pro3ects are
in competition, an additional study having been asked of Lafarge S.A. In
the Bardera affair, the CBEC envisages an investment of $2.6 million in
agricultural management in the Ba~aba valley, and perhaps in the dam itself.
A meeting on this sub~ect is scheduled in Brussels in June. Finally, an
agreement should soon be signed by the Minister of Planning and the Central
Bank for creation of a 1,000-hectare cotton experimental pro~ect at Balad.
Subsequent phases of this pro~ect, North Korean in origin, may involve
feasibility studies, extensions, and improvements in the Chebeli valley.
In other sectors, we must note the offer made by Thomson-CSF for establishing
a television network in Mogadiscio, an~ above all the mining survey made by
the Bureau of Geological and Mining Research (BGMR). Its efforts in the
field of hydro-geology have been the ob~ect of a French grant of 1 million
French francs, disbursement of which coincided with the visit of Mr Olivier
Stirn on 21 October 1979, on the occasion of the lOth anniversary of the
revolution.
This visit thus officially sealed the definitive reconciliation between
France and the Democratic Republic of Somalia, and the development of a new�
basis for the relations between the two countries. In 1979, French exports
to Somalia represented a value of 31 mil=ion French francs, compared to
15 million in Somali imports to France, this latter figure being an increase
of 11 million from 1978. Another aspect of this "new ball game" could be
participatio.n of the Somali Government at the upcoming Franco-African
conferences.
The tangle of Somali preoccupations
The involvement of the western and Arab states and China in the Democratic
Republic of Somalia has largely campensated for the effects af the break
with the USSR and the social:tst bloc--it being reca~!led in this c~onnection
that General Siad Barre still claims allegiance to socialism, but to a
. social.ism which he describes these days more willingly as national than
scientific. Russian activities in the eeonomic sector were ~.moreov~~r limited
to fish and meat canning, the massive personnel aid--nearly 3,i~00 people--
spread over the Soma:li services obviovsly having a more political and
ideological than tect~nical character.
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It is thus on the military plane that the divorce from Moscow appears to
have had the heaviest consequences, both with respect to its still-bloody
quarrel with Ethiopia and to internal political equilibrium.
The reverses suffered in the Ogaden have not in any way tempered Somalia's
demands for that province, where it is, after all, difficult to imagine
that the latest initiative of the guerrillas has not in some way received
Somali support. In a statement in March 1979, responding to a~oint commu-
nique from Kenya and Ethiopia which was ambiguous in tone, mentioning the
poesibility of peace subject to the payment of reparations, General Siad
Barre stated in the most categorical way that, as the Ogaden is a non-
autonomous territory peopled by Somalis, to renounce it would be equivalent
to recognizing its unjust conquest by Ethiopia; any demand for reparations,
on the other hand, would constitute a"veritable defiance of international
law." At that moment there is little chance that position will change.
Let us add that for either of the parties to express a willingness to resolve
peacefully the dispute would run the risk of appearing to their respective
arms purveyors to be entirely too lukewarm to 3ustify the assurance of
"outlays" for this secondary theater of operations.
Somalia thus cannot hope to receive modern weapons unless it appears deter-
mined to use them. This willingness is readily apparent from the fact that
an operational army is r?ot only indispensable to the liberatiion of the Ogaden,
it is thc essential condition for survival of the regime. It is, in reality,
the regime itself. The "centurion politics" practiced by the ?ussians can
have a sway which in the West has perhaps been insufficiently appreciated
over the population of a country as terribly deprived of natural resources
as Somalia. The French colonial tradition was acquainted with the "sharp-
shooter's trade" which thanks to the lev'.es exacted by the families, gave
- life to the southern provinces of Chad and part of Upper Volta. At Djibouti's
independence, it was to a solution of this kind that the leaders of the new
state quite naturally looked, at leaet in the short run, to get through that -
critiral period separating them from a still hypothetical economic develop-
ment. This state of mind explains why they not only accepted, but asked
Eor the coexistence on their territory of a French exped��tionary force and
a national army, which they would gladly have reinforced, had they only the
means, with civilian detachments. The systematization of the process by the
USSR results in something much different from guaranteeing a source of
revenue. To a young generatic?n without hope, in which the tribal warrior
traditions remain ;;trong, it brings the exaltaCion of the tank con~ander
or the MiG pilc~t. Onc:e savorecl, it is difficult to trade it in for the pale
charms of pastoral life in the desert.
The Soviet military ad~visers pr~,bably did not foresee, *ahen crea,ting the
Somali army from nothirtg, that t;,e logic of the ~ystem would condemn its
leaders--except those with a suicidal tendancy--to protect its viability
at all costs against ~heir old iiistructors. Equipped entirely with Russian
material, this only survives thanks to its Egyptian alli~s who provision
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it with isolated Soviet pieces, with which they are abundantly supplied.
But it is a precarious expedient, which pulls Mogadiscio excessively into
a network of alliances whose center is in Washington.
If General Siad Barre wants to maintain the unitary ideal he has establiahed
for his people and thus escape a coup more or less comouflaged, like the
previous one, under tribal rivalries--Mijertein against Marehar--but
supported, in reality, by those who regret the high degree of military
perfection obtained thanks to the Russian alliance or, on the contrary, by
those who believe that revenge must be sought with still more determination,
then there hardly remains anything for him to do but to move imperceptibly
from the Russian alliance to the American alliance. The new constitution,
adopted by referendum in August 1979, and the elections organized in December
to present to the world a democratic facade both prepare for and accompany
this movement. They have, in fact, the same significance as the old dicta-
torial structures, in an Africa which, not content to settle their internal
disputes with the machine-guns of the Whites, also insist on doing it with
the words of the Whites, in order to arrive, in short, at the constant
solutions whirh necessity imposes.
~ It is improbable that we will see, for all that, American "bases" arising
in Somalia and especially in Berbera. The term is obsolete, and the former
Soviet allies already declined. There will simply be more war vessels in
the ports and airplanes on more fields. The silhouette of the tanks will
change along with that of the instructors. It ~a~u~d be in vain to deplore
a transformation which the nature of the regime, on the one hand, and the
reshuffling of alliances resulting from the a~up in Kabul, on the other,
made inevitable. Instructed by the experienc~e of their predecessors, it
is moreover probable that the new allies will ;ake care that the equipment
entrusted to the Somali army is not utilized in fighting which diverges
from their own [aims].
This transformation, however, poses two problems. One can ask, first of
- all, whether it will stop at the borders of the Democratic Republic of
Somalia, whose leaders could decide, notwithstanding the shrewdness they
havF evidenced to date, that the material a~ivantages they could gain outweigh
the assurances of peace provided by a clever, but fragile, :.ombination
. balance between two ethnic groups, two states, and two blocs.
One can ask, then, about the chances for succ~ss of the reg;ional. conference
proposed by France, with the unwavering support of General Siad Barre, tu
,3ttempt to reach a peaceful seL�tlement in the "Horn of Afri~:a," �ahile thE:
~)gaden and even Eritrea, for which men continue to die, ris~: becoming no
niore than stage-props and alibis in the settling of accounts between the
supe.rpowers.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
~
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UGANDA
BRIEFS
BRITISH AID--Under the terms of an agreement signed in Kampala on 18 April,
Great Brisain has pledged this year to supply Uganda with 4 million Pounds
in credit, plus 1 million Pounds in aid under the heading of technical
assiatance. The 4-million Pound loan is to be used in purchasir~g British
goods and services especially for the renewal of the cotton industry, road
construction, preventive measurea in animal health, drinking water pfpelines,
~i~c~ waste wa~er evacuation. Last year, the total volume of aid given by
- Great Britain to Uganda came only to about 2 million Pounds. This year's
fncrease was decided upon during the meeting, in Paris, last November, by
the consultative group of the World Bank (MARCHES TOPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
iG Nov 79 p 3221). [Textj [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 25 Apr 8U p 1050] 5058
FRENCH AID--France is to give Uganda financial assistance in an amount of
F122 million, the Ugandan finance minister announced on 25 April. The
~greement, aigned in Paris thie manth, consists of a long-term loan, with
a period of grace of 10 years, as well as commercial loans guasanteed by
' the French government. This loan will be used especially for the purchase
of capital goods intended for the Ugandan Railroad Company as well as the
importing of equipment, trucks, and ambulances for the ministry of health.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITARRANEENS in French 25 Apr 80 ~
p 1U50] 5058 ~
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ZAIRE
� BRIEFS
MINING, PETROIEUM--The Belgian-Zairian Bank (Belgolaise) held its general
meeting on 23 April 1980. In its report, the board of directors indicated
- that the business volume handled by the bank, particularlq in the area of
trade relations with Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda, remained at a high level
in 1979. This report reviewed the evolution of Zaire's economy over the
past year. In 1979, the GECAMINES [General Quarries and Mines Campany] -
ceme to 336,000 tons of copper (391,300 tons in 1978) and 13,700 tons of
cobalt (13,100 tona in 1978), whose output was maintained because of its
high sales price at 1.62 million FR [Belgian Francs] per ton after 1 Feb-
ruary 1979. The general copper price performance was good in 1979. While
the maximum reached in 1978 for this metal had been 46,450 FB per ton as of
13 December, its price went up to 68,710 FB on 2 October 1979 and the
average price ~or the year went up quite considerably (58,187 FB as against
42,865). The shipment of the output and the transportation of supplies
continued to pose aerious problems. Following th~ disturbences ceused by
the evente of May 1978, t3ECAMINES durina FY 1979 concentrated ita efforts
primarily on the restoration of its equipment, the reconstitution of its
atocks, and the resumption of the expans3.on of its installaCions in the
Kolwezi group. It furthermore msde a major effort to increase its manpower
in order to return i::s output to the previous level as q~iickly as possible.
The output of crude petroleum in Zaire's mafitfine zone came to something
like 7.6 million barrels in 1979, a rather definite increase compared to E
the 1978 output which was 6 million barrels, a rather marked drop compared
to 1977. Looking at the railroad and highway transportation infrastruc.ture,
the contract for the conatruction of Che suspension bridge over the Zai.re
near Matadi wae completed by a consorfium of six Japanese companies. T!ie
coet of the construction work, whose financing was provided through the
Overseas Econo~i.c Cooperation Fund of Japan, will come to something like
5 billion FB and it will take about 5 years to finieh the 3ob. In 1979,
+ Belgolaiae recorded a profit of 216.8 million FB ro which we can add a
_ carry-over of 40.2 million from the preceding fiscal year. [Excerpta]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Apr 80 pp 988-989]
5058
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BRITISH AID--Great Britain in March gave Zaire a loan of 2 million Pounds
Sterling to aid that country's manufacturing industry. This aid is a
part of the international effort aimed at reviving the Zairian economy.
It will be used in purchasing, from Great Britain, spare parts and raw
materials needed by the Zairian branches of British firms, particularly
in the transportation and textile industries. jText] [Paris MARCHES
TRpPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Apr 8U p 989] 5058
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ZIMBABWE
OUTLOOK FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH ENCOURAGING ~
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 May 80 p 1107
[Text] The AGEFI special correspondent in Zimbabwe recently echoed the ,
satisfaction of business circles in Salisbury that welcome the conciliatory
statements made by Robert Mugabe to the effect that "it would appear that
a lesson has been learned from the disastrous exper~encP of Samora Machel
in Mozambique."
Our colleague notes that the Salisbury Stock Market and the S~anks have al-
ready evaluated the new situation and for the first tlme in 2 years, are.
recommending investments in ~ucal stock. There are in fact many companies -
- which anticipate substantial increases (as high as 25 percent) in their
profits for the fiscal year ending March-April 1980. .
In an interview granted to AGEFI, David Young, Zimbabwe's secretary of _
state for finance, confirmed thP optimism of business circles. Young be- -
lieves that in order to repair riamage caused to the economic structLre,
it is necessary to invest in agriculture (the sector hardest hit by guer-
_ illa warfare) between 50 and 75 million Zimbabwe dollars, 25 percent of
which could be found locally (1 Zimbabwe dollar = about .65 French franc).
Economic growth should reach 4 percent in 1980 and 8{iercent in 1981..
Among the urgent problems is rapid restoration of the rail line going to
Msputo via Malve.rnia. Next, it will be necessary, Young said, to repair
the irrigation system and the water supply indispensable to any increase
in agricultural production.
Minister of Agriculture Dennis Norman stated that agricuZtural production
(17 percent of the GNP) should double over the next 15 years in order to
follow the population curve. But, he added, it would be possible to reach .
the ob~ective in 5 years if adequate financial means were available.
Production will rise 4 percent in 1980. Coffee has made the most remark-
able progress and leads the list of products promis3ng great expanaion.
AGEFI nevertheless remarks: "It is likely that any future expansion will ~ -
have to reckon with a scarcity of skilled labor. In fact, it is expected ~
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that 10 to 15 percent of the Whites in the 25-30-year-old age group will
emigrate. Although the prime minister's policy is currently favorable to
Whites, one wonders what will be left of it in 3 to 5 years when his power
will be consolidated and the economy sufficiently developed.
In this connection, it must be pointed out that Mugabe's government ini- -
tiated a broad survey on the country's labor needs on 1 May (Labor Day
for the first time in the former Rhodesia).
E. Tekere, minister of labor planning and development, also stated that his
u~inistry intended to set up training programs for the "so-called semi-
skilled workers" as soon as possible. There are also plans to expand the
capacity of the Salisbury Polytechnic School and the Bulawayo Technical
School. A commercial school is reportedly to be set up in Gevelo and the
private sector will reportedly ~upply the financial means to build a tech-
nical school in Que Que in 1980.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
11,464 . ~
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ZIMBABWE
BRIEFS
NKOMO'S ATTACK--The discernible climate of tension that has existed for `
2 months between Prime Minister Robert Mugabe and Minister uf Interior
Joshua Nkomo, his former ally in the Patriotic Front, is beginning to look -
more and more like a confrontation. Deeply disturbed over the small place
given them within the new government, the most "har~-line" and~rhe most
pro-Soviet leaders from.the ZAPU (Nkomo's party) no longer conceal
- their opposition to Mugabe,.whom they accuse of "following a rightist
policy" and "extending has hand to the former colonists rather than to the
people." Mugabe's friends say that they are "frankly worried": Some
3,000 guerrilla fighters from zhe ZIPRA the armed branch of the ZAPU
are still in Zambia and 1,000 of them are reportedly preparing to infil-
trate western Zimbabwe, as during the hottest moments of the war against
Ian Smith. At the beginning of May, several searches at different ZAPU
headquarters led to the discovery of large stocks of arms. In Salisbury,
where alarmist rumors spread rapidly, there is no longer any hesitation
in speaking about a possible pro-Nkomo coup. This is certainly an unlikely
passibility, but it does express the crisis atmosphere, especially since the
last Mugabe-Nkomo meeting on Friday, 2 May, ended in complete failure and
since more strike movements, undoubtedly headed by ZAPU mtlitants, broke ~
out the following day in the main southern sugar mills. [Text] [Paris
JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 May 80 p 35] 11,464
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