JPRS ID: 9118 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200090004-6
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9118
2 June 1980
~ Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
- Fouo No. s7~
~BIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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I
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JPRS L/9118
2 June 19 80
SUB-SAI~ARAN AFRI CA REPORT
FOUO No. 677
CONTEN7S
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
_ African Military Regimes F~camined
(Hamza Kaidi; JEUNE A~RIQUE, 26 Mar 80) 1
Briefs
Alg~rian Loan to Tanzania g_
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Trial c~f Bokassa Accomplices Possible Threat for Regime
- (Maryam Sysle; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 14-27 Apr 80) 10
French Political Support, Financial Aid Noted
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 4 Apr 80) 13
CHAD
Libyan, French Role in Chadian Crisis Noted
(Jos-Bla;ise Alima; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 9 Apr 80) 15 -
Nation Will Eanerge From Crisis 'More Vulnerable Than Ever'
(Ginette Cot; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 14-27 Apr 80) 17
Secessionism Said To Be At Its Height
(Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 30 Apr 80) 23
CONGO -
Briefs
Retinery Overhaul Agreement 25
GABON
Briefs
South Korea . in Uranium Research 26
Increase in GNP 26
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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GUINEA
Briefs
~ Military Delegation to GDR 27
Increased Cooperation With UK 27
LIBERIA
_ A3.most Nothing Known About New Regime's Program
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 Apr 80) 2g
Possibility That Doe May Seek U.S. Supp~rt Noted
(Mohamed Maiga; ,7EUNE AFRIQUE, 30 Apr 8~0) 32
MALI ~
Student Revolt Is Only Tip of Iceberg
(Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 Apr 80) 34
Briefs
British Training 37
NIGER - .
Sonichar Money Lenders' Meeting
(MARCHES TROFTCA,UX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 4 Apr 80) 38
SENEGAL ~
1980 Expected To Present Ecoaomic Difficulties
' (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 25 Apr 80) 39
French Technical, Economic Assistance Reported
_ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 25 Apr 80) 46
New Fuel, Electric Power Price Increases
_ (MARCHES TROPIC,~YUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 4 Apr 80) ..v..... 48
, Briefs
Polish Fishing Agreement 50
New Measures Aiding Women 50
SOMALIA
Briefs
IMF Assistance 51
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TANZANIA
Briefs
Higher Oil Import Cost 52
Cost of Liv~.ng Figurea 52
Cuban Aid 52
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
AFRICAN MILITARY RFGIMES EXAMINED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Mar 80 pp 24-29
[Article by Hamza Kaidi]
[Text] One can do anything with a bayonet except sit
on it. Some of the military who rule here have learned
this from experience. Many of ths:.r colleagues have
~ learned it at their own expense. Some of those who
remain have come to terms with the civilians. Or ~gain,
in turn, they have become "legal politicians." -
Why are the military attracted by political power?
_ Should the~ retain i.t? Or, under certain circumstances,
is military power a compulsory route toward democracy?
Hamza Kaidi carried out a long inquiry into this subject
_ and we will place before yoii his analysis--the first ~
of its kind--of military power in Africa.
Military Power in Africa
In 1978, we ascertained that in Africa, countries governed by civilians _
were becoming islands in a sea of khaki (See JEUNE AFRIQUE No 916); in
fact, military governments ruled in 22 nations. The year 19i9 saw,
without regrets, the addition of one more military regime: in Equatorial
Guinea the dictator Macias Ngu~ma was overthrown by Col Theodoro Obiang
Nguema. However, that same year, four soldier-presidents surrendered
' power tc~ civilians, namely in Uganda, Central African Republic, Nigeria,
and Ghana.
Zt,io of these departures were forced: it was even necessary to have recourse
to foreign "aid" to oust "Marshal" Amin Dada and "Emperor" Bokassa. In
contrast, Gen Olusegun Obasan3o handed the power over to civilians in
Nigeria, without really being constrained to do so and Jerry Rawlings, the _
- Ghanaian captain who snatched power from the military to hand it over to
civilians acted, above all, in response to the economic deterioration.
Could one then refer to the ebb of the "khaki tide"? These cases are
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too isolated to justify such a claim. Yet an analysis of the conditions
in which the "militarization" of the continent took place would appear
to be instructive.
From the dark barracks to the radian': halls of power is but a step. In
Africa, that step has been taken at least 50 times in the past 20 years
or so. Some infantry companies, backed by one or two squadrons of gendarmes,
a few tanks, or, lacking these, some light armored cards, and the show is
over within ~ust a few hours. Once the main strategic points are occupied
and the presidential palace surrounded, those responsible for the "Putsch"
have only to nab the head of state and the major dignitaries of the regime
before going to the radio station to read a proclamation addressed to the
people they "have just saved." "War is too serious an affair to be entrusted
to the military," Georges Clemenceau once said. Sixty years later, it
would seem that a goodly number of African military men have retorted that
the exercise of political power is too serious a thing to be left to the
civilians. _
- To what can one ascribe the progressive militarization of African govern-
ments and the attraction which politic$1 power exerts over the army? '1'0
tell the truth, the phenomenon is neither specifically African nor Latin
_ American, as some would have us believe....
Like many of their ancient colonists, when they gained independence, the
African countries took precautions to keep "the army out of politics _
and politics out of the army," according to the expression made famous by
Gen H. T. Alexander, first British commander of the Ghanaian army. On -
the average, however, after 3 years this principle was questioned anew _
- in many countries. That was the case in Togo in 1963 and in Algeria in
1965.
If foreign power, and above all the former mother countries were not
. strangers to a number of coups d'etat, it would be false to claim that
this was always the case. Inner considerations often served as a motive
for the Futschs. At the outset, because they were too young, or were
serving in the colonial armies, most of the African officers, who had -
played no Yole within the nationalist movements were barred from the
_ political contests. They were a cla~s apar~, living according to different -
standards from those of the society which surrounded them. Feeling closer
to the technicians than to the politicians, they were imbued with an
"apolitical" professional mystique. Yet, paradoxically, these officers
were often led into the arena of power by the very disgust they felt for -
politics: by virtue of their du~ies, they had actually long been mute
witnesses to the irresponsibil~ty of the governing groups. Zf the main
function of any army is the prote.ction.o~ the national territory against
any eventual foreign aggression,"its secondary function, in the eyes of
the military themselves, is the protection of the government against
internal threats. The first of these duties is readily accomplished in -
Africa, even by the most modest armies, not by reason of their own power
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but because of their neighbors' weakness. Thus the protection of the
government has become the African military's prime task and they express
_ toward society as a whole the same concern for order as they evidence
daily in the army. They impute thQ responsibility for the wrongs of that
_ society to the "politiciane," and choose as precious allies the technocrats
_ whose power is limited precisely ";y those same politicians.
~ A Warm Welcome
Thus, governments that believe they can monopolize the destiny of a country
by having themselves "elected" by 99 percent (or more) of the ballots
and by rejecting all of the avenues for recourse and prot~st, do no more
than open the doorway to "militsrization." The delays and hesitations
of the powers-that-be vis-a-vis the difficulties confronting the State
thus take on, from the military man's standpoint, the form of a danger _
which must immediately be eliminated. Wh~o other than the army, the sole
organized force, could save the country from "chaos"?
The ascent of the military to power is often welcomed. Since the civilian
goverr~ment had previously eliminated the different currents of opinion
and made the various pressure groups (trade unions, mass organizations,
etc.) toe the line, few are those who are ready to sacrifice themselves
for it. Therefore, the coup d'etat involves only a minimum of violence,
_ since it encounters little resistance. Modibo Keita in Mali and Kwame
_ Nkrumah in Ghana, experienced this. Generally, the military begin the
take ovar of power with strong criticis~ of their predecessors. TYley
promise the establishment of commissions of inquiry which will make the
former leaders accounta~le; but they rarely go beyond statements of intention.
Law of Silence -
It is often noticed that those who share a part of the responsibility for.
the situation created by the grevious regime in fact represent forces to
be treated considerately. Thus, resounding trials and acts of vengeance ~
which might strike at random are avoided, because it is a time for recon-
ciliation and national unity.
Often, "the law of silence" is chosen. The most visible leaders of the
former regime are placed in "protective custody" for more or less long
periods. A consolidated regime will soon free them. In contrast, a regime
less sure of itself and its foundations will let them rot in prison,
until such a time as they die or are forgotten.
, Contrary to what is generally thought, governmen~s made up solely of
~ military men are both rare and short-lived. The military are quick to
realize that one can do everything with bayonets except sit on them.
Therefore they seek an a~Iiance with the civil servants and the technocrats,
who are as concerned as themselves with matters of hierarchy and discipline.
Together they constitute what might well be described as a military-
administrative regime.
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Established in order to regenerate the society it rules, this regime seeks
to avoid the internal divisions which weakened its predecessor. It tends
to reject ideologies, except in the field ~f foreion policy, in order to -
= preserve the nation`s cohesion. Civil:~an and military groups do their
utmost to ensure that, in fact, their organization is apolotical, despite _
' the progessive~~or moderate coloring of the regime, generally aimed at
foreign consum~'tion.
The political par ty (or parties), the assembly, the constitution, every-
thing that symbolized the earlier power structure, are therefore dissolved
or abrogated during the hours immediately following the take-over by the
~ army. The military then try to establish other movements or revive older
ones. However, s ich attempts are alm~st always condemned to failure. At
worst, they adopt the previous situation as an example. A true emanation
of the state, the new parties or trade unions remain dependenr_ on the
State. Conceived solely to spread its directives and slogans, they cannot ~
undertake the mobilization of the masses which is theoretically assigned ~
to them.
For the military-administrative regimes, and those responsible for them,
development is no longer a"political" affair. ~t is regulated "in tha
interests of all" by technicians, planners, economists, etc., wro seek tc
apply scientific solutions to all manner of problems. However, more often
than not, the lack of experience will make itself felt. Wishing to progress
too quickly, ~,*anting to apply too literally those plans conceived for other
nations, those in authority do not take into account any huma~l or material
_ resistance entailed by such an upheaval. Generous notions and theoretically
perfect projects prove to be inefficient when put into practice.
A Sfrengthened Bourgeoisie
- In the ma~ority of the mi.litary-administrative states, with some differences
in detail, a public sector is established. It is directed by the bureaucracy
but at the same time it serves to strengthen the propertied classea.
The state apparatus in fact rests on a new petty bourgeoisie, and the
- greater the economic functions of the state, the more power will be
concentrated in the hands of that petty bourgeoisie. Although it does
not possess the means of production, it does command enormous power over
the utilization of resources. An ideological profession of faith then
_ becomes esential to justify its activities: the state will then proclaim
itself socialist and it will engender its own "apparatchiki."
The sine qua non f or survival of any bureaucratic-military regime is the
degree of autonomy of the masses. These represent a threat to the state
bureaucracy founded on corporatist and centralist principles. In the army ~
as well as in Che bureaucracy, the only good decisions are those taken
at the top of the ~yramid. They must be implemented without the slightest
discussion. The "success" of the enterprise depends on that. The military
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motto, to the effect that "there are no bad orders, there are only orders
badly carried out," can be seen in fu11 measure here. The one who executes
the orders is always to blame. One can therefore smile at the so-called -
attempts at decentralization or establishment of a dialogue with the base,
announced by certain bureaucratic or military regimes.
However, it wou1~3 be absurd to place the same labels on all the African
military regimes. The best example of democracy in Africa was given by
~ a military man: Gen ~~ngoule Lamizana of Upper Volta. In contrast, certain
civilian regimes have made gre4t use of terror and repression. The most
murderous dictatorship in Africa was undoubtedly that of a civilian:
Macias Nguema of Equatorial Africa.
The fact is that a number of Third World countries with civilian govern-
ments must ask themselves a fundamental question in connection with their
own future: "How can our military be prevented from taking over power.?"
In the developed countries, considerable thought was given to this, as
was done by Moshe Amin in "The Evolution of the Place and of the Role of ,
tne African Public Forces." He wrote, "The complexity and diversity of
the army corps constituted a restraining force for the initiatives of a
~ number of officers." The different corps (armored, navy, air force) are
_ a mutually counter-balancing factor.
Limited Confidence
In Africa, this differentiation has little value. The predominance of the
infantry, the essential part of the armed forces, renders the principle
inapplicable. Civilians therefore sought to counter the virtual power
of the army by creating paramilitary units (militias, gendarmerie, police)
which they often strengthened at its expense, believing they thus had an
antidote against coups d'etat. That was the case in the Ivory Coast, in
Gabon, in the Central Af rican Republic, in Liberia, in Si.erra Leone, ~n _
Mali and in Tanzania. There is something even more remarkable: it often
happens that.the paramilitary forces of cer~ain countries with a military
regime resulting from a caup d'etat (of which Zaire is an example), are
mcre important than the army itself.
Could the confidence of the soldier-presidents in their own armed forces
_ be limited? Actually, these paramilitary forces, regarded as the essential
instrument for prevention and for action against army intervention, end
up by constituting a threat to the established regimes. Therefore, certain ~
civilian governments have gone back on earlier deciaions of their own.
- A case in point is the Ivory Coast which from 1963 undertook to reduce its
army from 5,000 to 3,000 men, after the discovery of conspiracies in which
some military were involved. ~
The Ivory Coast army was broken up. The public forces were separated _
from the Army proper, into wh~.ch they had previously been integrated. The
- civilian service w~as detached from the army and the gendarmerie's funetion =
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- was enhance3. In 1968, the army of the Ivory Coast thus had 3,400 men
while the psblic forces numbered 5,800 men. (These unofficial figures
come from a cross-check of information published in the press.) A short
time later, however, the tendency was reversed, and in 1979, the army of
the Ivory Coast had 4,950 men while the paramilitary numbered 3,000.
Gabon shows similar trends. Af ter an attempted military Putsch failed in ~
1964, thanks to the intervention of the French troops, President Leon M'Ba -
strengthened the public forces to the detriment of the army. While the
Gabonese army had 300 men and the public forces 1,200 in 1965, 3 years
later, numbers stoo3 at 450 and 1,750 respectivel;, But beginning in -
February 1969, the army's prestige shot up. By virtue of a ministerial
reshuff ling (three officers were appointed to the Cabinet), the army was
"co-opted into power." This measure was designed to counter-balance the
opposition forces, whether civilian or military, to which President Bongo
addressed this warning: "All the sorcerer's apprentices, all the politi- -
cians left on the shelf, who always believed they would ultimately reach
nower well, to all of t:~em, I say that they are wasting their time -
_ liecause I have made the army in my own image, and as such, it ia my
prerogative, as commander-in-chief of the army, minister of National
Def ense and senior off icer in the highest ranks of the army, to issue the
orders to the military. What is more, the military know it."
_ In f ar_t, the numerical gap between the army and the public forces in
Gabor. has narrowed. Now the fortaer stands at 1,~00 men and the latter at
1,000. Moreover, tne Gabonese government can also count on S00 French
soldiers still stationed at Libreville, as well as un some Moroccan police- .
men to watch over...the President's security.
Settlement of Accounts
Nonetheless, the "experience" to which the Central Africans have been
subjected shows that the strength~ning of the public forces d.oes not always
constitute an efficient way to ferry coups d'etat. In view of the growing ~
ar~v inf luence, President David Dacko sought to neutralize it as early as
J.9b1. He detached the gendarmerie from the Ministry of Defense and put
it under the Ministry of Ir~terior. In January 1962, the Central African
guard, which had become the republican guard, was also put under the Interior -
riinistry and placed under the command of a gendarmerie officer. In
September 1963, an int~rnal security brigade was created and placed under
the direct orders of the president of the republic.
In 1965, the Central African par.amilitary forces were estimated at 1,600
men whereas the army had only 5~0. However, it was that small army unit
that on the night of 31 December 1965 to 1 January 1966 went into action
_ under the command of its Chief af Staff, Col Jean-Bedel Bokassa. The
revolt toak on the appearance of a settlement of accounts between the chiefs
the different factions. Gendarmerie commander Izamo was charged with
~ involvement in "a conspiracy fostered by China," and was promptly executed.
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The body of the director of the st3te :tnternal security brigade, Mr
Mounoubai, was "found" at the end of January at a site some kilometers
away from Bangui.
~ It has been proved true that those re$ponsible for carLying out a Putsch
can take advantage of the element of surprise to defeat loyalist troops
which may be numerically or materially greater. A few resolute men are
enough to capture the head of state and close members of his staff. -
Only in certain cases has it been possible to reverse the situation, thanka
to foreign intervention. This occurred when President M'Ba of Gabon was
saved by the French paratroops and General Nimeyri, of Sudan, was unable
to recover power in 1971 until the Egyptian troops intervened on his
- behalf.
Finally, what political role can our officers play, whe*_;er or not they
are in power? In countries where an. apolitical attitu~le is regarded as
- treason, to deprive the best organized force of the exercise of this right-- -
merely because mentors from the West have decreed it--seems to be the
height of political short-sightedness. That civilia~is should believe
- that they can hold the army for a long time away from the centers of _
decision is tolerable. But that military men should believe that they can -
brush aside their old colleagues from the political arPna is downright -
foolish. Because this rule was ignored, more than one soldier-president
has been tossed out bu the same army that placed him on the seat of power.
That is why, in Mali, the military are henceforth members of the party.
According to the officers, it is because they are "inilitants in uniforr,i."
According to the ci~ilians, it is because they are involved in all the
decisions (good and bad), and can no longer plead their non-responsibility
to perpetrate a coup d'eta*_. -
Whate~ier the nature of the established regime, ~i~a a*_-!ny can contribute
greatly to economic and social development. Participation of the army's
corps of engineer~ng in the construction of national inf rastructures--as
has been done since time immemorial--is essential in every coun~ry with a
- limited budget.
No Cure
Certain countries have gone even further and placed their armies in the
production sector. The National Directorate of Co~peratives (DNC) of the
Algerian army rivals the greatest industrial enterprises in the country.
Employing more than 20,000 civilian and military workers, it operates in
numerous production sector.s (including public works, construction, carpentry,
ready-made garments and several other industries). Finally, thanks to
- conscription, young people who missed schooling can acquire knowledge that
will be of use once they return to their homes. They learn to read and
write and they get s~me discipline and training which the schools often
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fail to provide. Rotation ~f the forces, however, must be quite rapid in
order to increase the number of beneficiaries. -
There are thus definite advantages to be derived from the army. But the
queation re~ains: is there any defense against Putschs? Even if some
therapies were to prove efficient, there would be no absalute cure for the
evil. As long as tyrants exist, others will be preparing to overthrow
= th~m. And then they, in turn, will rule as tyrants.
. COPYRIGHT: Jeune Af rique GRUPJIA 1980
7129
CSO: 4400
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
ALGERIAN LOAN TO TANZANIA--On 26 March, the Algerian and Tanzanian minis- -
ters of finance, M'hamed Yala and Amir Jamal, signed an agreement in Dar-es-
Salaam according to which Algeria will loan Tanzania 160 million Tanzanian
shillinga (80 million French francs) at a rate of 3.5 percent. The loan
will be used to finance various development pro~ecta in Tanzania. I~ is
considered by Algeria to be an example of its action on behalf of poorer
countries. [Text] [Earis MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
4 Apr 80 p 820] 11,464
CSO: 4400 `
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
~ TRIAL OF BOKASSA ACCOMPLICES POSSIBLE THREAT FOR REGIME
_ Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14-27 Apr 80 p 40
[Arti'cle by Maryam Sysle: "Bangui-Sur-Seine"]
_ [Text] David Dacko can relax: France is standing by.
However, there is this notorious trial. And it is
here that the new regime feels the ground cracking
under it.
Six months after he seized power in Bangui, on 20 September 1979,
traveling on a French army Transall, David Dacko can count on Paris'
"exceptional support." This was already known, but President Giscard
d'Estaing deemed it proper to publicly assure him of the fact in the
course of his "working state ~isit" to Paris, last 24, 25, and 26 March.
In terms of security as well, David Dacko can relax: The French para-
troopers who were sent to Bangui to overthrow Bokassa, who was already '
fleeing, will remain there as long as .there is no Central =
' African army.
As to the state treasury, it is being systematically filled. It is, _
therefore, no question of any discontent on the part of officials.
According to official figures, French aid reached 68 million French
francs ~or the last quarter of 1979, and 10 million for the first two
months of 1980. Finally, Le Bouder, Central African minister of
cooperation, who accom?anied his boss on his trip, submitted to his
interlocutors an ecoc~omic and social Flan--drafted by the French them-
selves--the financin~ of which will total 900 million French francs (or
45 billion CFA francs).
Nearly one-half (21 billion CFA francs) will be spent to improve the
transportation and commtinications infrastructures; 15 billion will be
used to develop food and industrial crops (coffee, cotton). Dacko who,
_ in addition to Prime Minister Barre, met with French industrialists and
bankers, is relying on Paris to help him draw foreign capital into
Central Africa. It goes without sa}~ing that the chances thaC his wishes
will be met are substantial, the more so since Bangui has accepted a
very strict austerity plan drafted jointly with the International
Monetary Fund and the French prime minister.
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Foun~ations and Legitimacy
Within the framework of this close "cooperation," some companies,
nationatized under the Bokassa regime, will be taken back by French or
international groups. Finally, the industrialists are already interested
in the development of the Central African uranium deposits, assessed at
8,000 tons. A meeting of investors could be held in Bangui as early as
June. David Dacko, therefore, has all the necessary reasons to be
satisfied. The Central African republic will not be a bandoned to its ~
fate. Yet. . . _
Yet, not everything is for the best within the new system. Certainly,
following the advice of his friends, Bokassa's successor is doing every-
thing possible to try to gain a certain legitimacy and lay his founda-
tions. A party, the Central African Democratic Union (UDC) was hastily -
created and held its constituent congress between 10 and 17 March. -
_ Reorganization of administrative institutions, economic decentralization,
and agricultural development constitute the party's "program," within
which "trends are not accepted, for this is not possible in Africa,"
but which is, nevertheless, again according to David Dacko, an organiza-
tion of "a liberal spirit, with multiple trends, and a broad opening.". .
Actually, the UDC is pursuing the single ob~ective of preparing the
holding of a constitutional referendum and a presidential election
(planned for 1981), for which a single candidate will be nominated.
This, it is assurned, will insure the continuity of the puppet system.
Meanwhile, David Dacko is watching. ThPre are detentions here and there,
and deportations. Since November Ange Patasse, the former prime
minister and president of the Liberation Movement of the Central
African~People (MLPC) has been detained in the Ngaragba prison, near
Bangui, under the pretext of having committed "common law crimes," and
a number of his close assistants have been sent away from the capital.
- More recently, the public salvation government detained and deported
two national officials of the Oubangi patriotic front (FPO);headed by
Dr Abel Goumba. They were Manuel Ma~eot, an official and a technician
of the radio and television system, and Cyriaque Bomba. Despite all
- such precautions, the ground is cracking under the footsteps of David
Dacko and his confederates who are caught in a dangerous contradiction: -
to make believe the dismantling of the Bokassa system without affecting
too much the structure inherited from the emperor for life.
It is thus that. ~ressured by public opinion (which was voiced,
specificdlly, in the course of the 22 September 1979 demonstrations),
and having done everything possible to delay it, Dacko and his accom-
plices were forced to accept the starting of a series of trials of
Bokassa's accomplices by the Bangui criminal court.
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In the cout�se of its first session, at the end of last February, the
court had ,entenced to death six collaborators of the ex-emperor, the
sentence to be considered by the supreme court. The criminal court was
scheduled to undertake soon the trial of one of Bokassa's sisters and
of Mrs Domitien, former prime minister. Initially, it was believed
that this would be a parroting of a trial, restricted to a few scape-
goats. Yet, as a reader writes us, "the rrials are the results of
popular pressure," and "the strictest indictments" resulting from the
sessions of the criminal court, "were welcomed with euphoria." Above
all, a process had been launched which, unless one watches out, risks
- the crushing of at least a few heads of the team currently in power.
The Trap '
It is thus that in the course of the trials a number of ministers have
been involved: Nenri Maidou, currently vice president of the republic
and prime minister at the time of the massacres of school children;
General Bozize, current minister delegate to the presidency, in charge
of defense, who accompanied David Dacko in his Paris trip; and Alphonse _
Koyamba, former minister of finance and current vice prime minister.
- On the request of the chief. investigative justice of the high instance
court of Bangui, Justice Minister Francois Gueret, had submitted to the
Council of Ministers a repor~ dated 19 January 1980, signed by him, in
which the charges against these high officials of the regime were stipu-
1 lated most specifically, parCicularly in terms of repression and mis-
~ appropriation of funds. The Council of Ministers had also been
"requested to authorize, by decree, the auditing of the members of the
government."
Curiously enough, six days before his deparL-ure for Paris, David Dacko
relieved Francois Gueret from his position as minister of justice. This,
in Dacko's thinking, was, unquestionably, a means for suppressing the
matter. However, the Central APrican magistrates objected vigorously.
And, despite the "exceptional support" given by Paris, it will definitely
= be quite difficult to stop a trial which seems to undermine, slowly but
surely perhaps, a system which has borrowed excessively from its -
predecessor and from which it borrowed a certain number of its members.
COPYRIGHT: 19$0 Afrique-Asie
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- CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
- FRENCH POLITICAL SUPPORT, FINANCIAL AID NOTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 815
[Excerpt] On 25 March, President Giscard d'Estaing received David Dacko at
the Elyaee Palace and told him: "You can count on exceptional backing from
our cauntry." ~
- The French chief of state also referred to "the overthrow of a regime that
had become brutal and contemptuous" thanks to French military intervention.
An official communique issued 27 MaXCh states that Dacko paid "homage to
the action of France and that of the president of the republic, which made
it possible to reestablish a humane and liberal republic and embark upon
the path of rebuilding democratic institutions."
It is a path politically difficult to take at a time when the Central Afri-
can chief of state has dismissed his minister of justice, Francois Gueret,
because, according to some sources, the investigations he wanted to make
- within the current government concerning complicity with Bokassa were con-
side=ed too dangerous, questioning personages such as Henri Maidou, now
vice president, who wae prime minister until the empire was overthrown.
- Other difficulties are economic and financial in origin. As AFP recently
recalled, the "change in regime has undoubtedly not yet convinced investors,
who are little inclined to trust a government in power for scarcely six
months."
The exceptional backing promised by Giscard d'Estaing was to make it possi- -
ble to solve precisely these difficulties, thanks to public intervention
and also by means of the effect such intervention might have on a private
sector reassured about the future of the Central African Republic.
- There is plenty of good will in the French parapublic sector to come to
the aid of the government in Bangui. In particular, one might cite the �
actions which could be undertaken on behalf of cotton by the GFDT (French
Company for the Development of Textile Fibers), which is already active
in Central Africa and which could set as its objective doubling the coun-
try's cotton production in 2 years. The oil company Tota]. would also tnter-
ven~ to ensure a regular supply of oil to the Central African Republic.
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During his stay in Paris, President Daeko met with Francois Giscard
d'Estaing, president of the BFCE (French Foreign Trade Bank). The meeting
he granted to a representative of the BIAO (International Bank for West -
Africa) also shows that international aid is expected to solve one of the
most serious problems of the Cefltral African Republic: its foreign debt,
on the order of 70 billi~n CFA francs (nearly three times its annual bud- -
get), which prevents it frvm gainir.a access to foreign credit.
The Central African delegation accompanying the chief of state, who had
reason to be content with his visit to France because of contacts made,
it is said, with business circles as well as with government officia]:s,
seems to have tried to avoid the French press, making it rather difficult
to appraise the results of the trip. .
This discretion is undoubtedly explained by the discontent caused in'Bangui
by the attitude of the foreign press, which has never fallen in line
with the official line of French policy since the coup d'etat of 21 Septem-
ber. Newamen have often given very pessimistic information about the situa-
tion in the Central African Republic. Furthermore, a~press campaign under-
- way for several months.in Paris was aimed at the preaident of the French
Republic as well as certain members of his family, who because of their -
very posts had business relations with Bangui over th~ years.
French Aid Program
A communique from the Elysee Palace dated 29 March emphasizes that the
f inancial assistance already given in the sector of transportation will be
continued and further states that French aid to the Central African Repub-
lic will particularly concern the relaunching of agricultural production
(cotton, coffee, food crops), development of mining research, the construc-
tion of an earth communications station and the normalization of postal
relations.
Among the other domains in which France will be active is the granting of
scholarships to Central African atudents in 1980, modernization of the
hospital center and expansion of the Bangui telephone network. The number
of technical assistants and high-level personnel in education, training
and management will be increased. ,
The communique also stated that through international organizations, France
will back development projeCts that might receiye,international aupport,
particularly the project to relaunch cotton production.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
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CHAD
LIBYAN, FRENCH ROLE IN CHADIAN CRISIS NOTED
Paris .JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 9 Apr 80 p 19
[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima: "Chad: The Death of a Country"]
[Text) Seven months after its conclusion, the Lagos agreement between the -
eleven Caadian factions is dead. Nor is it any surprise, for the Molotov
cocktail prepared in the Nigerian capital in August 1979 had to explode
some day.
In order for this not to be so, the different protagonists woul~ all have
had to demonstrate the political will to remain aloof from the influence of -
foreign countries under which the needs of the fight for power placed them,
but thia condition~was not fulfilled. The thirst for power finally won
out over the concern for pre$~rving the fragile equi~.ibrium of a territor-
- ial entity that was now a nation in name only. In short, the formation in
November 1979 of a pseudo government of national union did not succeed in -
masking the sad evidence: Chad one still has to call it that is .
- still living over a b~d of hot coals. .
Traumatized by a civil war which since February.1979 has been grafted onto
an imbroglio that had lasted over 12 years, have the Chadian politicians
ever realized that they were no longer the real ma~ters of the game? The ~
real strategists, those responsible for the current situation, are in Paris
and Tripoli.
It is France which, on.the pretext of opposing the expansionist aims of
Libya, put Hissein Habre into the action, a man considered to be a pure,
hard-line nationalist. For its part, Libya justifies its intervention in
Chad by its desire to fight French imperialism. Act~ally, each of the two
countries~exploits the situation for its own good: Libya, in order to
satisfy its ambition of extending Islam into Black Africa; and France,
in order to maintain its control over~a strategic region, without forget-
ting the prospect of working the substantial resources of the Chadian sub-
soil. And as the old~adage advises that one should "divide and conquer,"
the method used by both sides has always been to pit. the Muslim north
against the Christian or. animist south.
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Nor is the federalist f~rmula once recommended by France viable. Indeed,
what good would it do to have a northern, desert, nomadic nation without
the south, the "useful Chad" that is a reservoir of inen and economic
potential? A federal state would be so unbalanced that in the long run,
one part of the country.would finally absorb the other. Because Hissein
Habre and Abdelkader Wadal Kamougue are deeply marked by their origins,
Chad's interest lay in having these two diehard,enemies fade into the
background behind a third man who would be more level-headed and better
able to serve as a catalyst. ~ -
This role seemed to fit Goukouni Oueddei. By attacking him, Habre nulli-
fied the bargaining that from Ben~hazi to Lagos and including Kano had
established the premises of national reconciliation. Powerless, Africa
now witnesses the death of a country whose fate may set a dangerous prece-
_ dent for the rest of the continent.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA, 1980
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CHAD _
NATION WILL EMER~E FROM CRISIS 'MORE VULNERABLE THAN EVER'
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 14-27 Apr 80 pp 32-35
[Article by Ginette Cot: "The Chad Has Exploded"]
[Text] A new stage in the battle for economic-
strategic stakes in a country which France tends
to consider its private preserve.
After 15 days of fraticidal and particularly deadly fighting in Ndjamena,
left by one-half of its population, nothing at this beginning of April,
led to hope for even the slightest possibility to calm down. It was in
vain that a number of cease-fires, never effectively applied, had heen
proclaimed by the leaders of the two main warring forces, the A�rmed
_ Forces of the North (FAN) of Hissein Habre, minister of defense of the
Provisional Government of National Union (GUNT), and the People's Armed
Forces of Goukouni Queddei, president of the GUNT.
It was equally in vain that appeals for the cease-fire and for the open-
ing of new negotiations had multiplied, sent by the various African
capitals, the OAU, and the Urrited Nations. It was as though the dynamics -
of a war, Latent for months, despite the laborious 21 August 1979 Lagos
agreements, had definitively taken the upper hand. It was as though
the crisis of unprecedented violence, which had seized once again a
country already quite weakened and hurt in the torment, was unable,
_ this time, to find a denouement in a precarious bastard solution, but
in the decisive victory of one or the other camp. Actually, if one may _
say so, all restraints had been lifted from the freedom of action of
the fighters. The some 800 Europeans had been evacuated. The French
Embassy had been moved to a French military camp located near the air
field, where 1,100 soldiers are still officially,,tationed. The other
foreign diplomats, the Americans being the first, had left the country.
On 30 March the 550 Congolese soldiers, the only elements of the Neutral
Inter-African Force (NIF) ever to reach Ndjamena, who were billed in
the gendarmerie building near the airport without being able to under-
take their mission, had also begun to return to Brazzaville. Finally,
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as we know, in the first 15 days of the war, the civilian population in
the capital had escaped the horrors by crossing the Chari at a daily
rate of 8,000 to 10,000 people, seeking refuge in Cameroon. At the
beginning of April the small Cameroonian settlement of Kousseri was
already sheltering some 100,000 refugees.
As of [hat point, everything seemed organized in Ndjamena for total war,
for the decisive test.
But how was this point reached? A step to peace and reconciliation
seemed to have been taken with the GUNT 11 November 1979 Constitution,
the result of difficult and long negotiations. Providing, that is,
that one could question the viability of this heterogeneous team of 22
members recently divided by profound differences and even if one doubted
- the willingness of some among them to sacrifice personal ambitions to
national interest and safeguard Chad's integrity.
Actually, during the initial weeks and despite the meager possibilities
(the state treasury was empty, and the administration broken up follow-
ing the departure of the southern officials as a result of the first `
civil war of February 1979), the team seemed to have become operational.
A 200-men military police unit--which was to become the embryo of the
national army, as stipulated in the Lagos agreements--had been raised.
The government met regularly, and everything possible had been done to
minimize the importance of incidents which broke out here and there in
a city crowded with armed men.
Tension and Blocking
At the beginning of the year, however, while negotiations for the with-
drawal of the French intervention force were being initiated under the
_ guidance of Goukouni Oueddei, the tension rose suddenly: The fact was
that the process had been blocked, the GUNT had become paralyzed, and
the situation which prevailed on the eve of the Lagos agreements had
remained dangerously static, Today the responsibility of the minister
oE defense of the GUNT appears crushing. Hissein Habre had refused to
withdraw his forces from the capital and the key militarization of
_ Ndjamena, which was a sine qua non condition for the normalization of
_ the situation, whose deadline was 5 February, had been postponed sine
die.
Furthermore, the use of an inter-African neutral force, which was to
consist of Congolese, Benin, and Guinean troops, and was to help the
GUNT in its task, met with the fierce opposition of the minister of
defense. To justify his re..fusal, Hissein Habre questioned the neutrality
of this force, going so far as to claim that the Congolese contingent
consisted of Cubans, and that this would also be the case of the con-
tingent of the Benin troops, awaited in vain, and trained, according to
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him, by Soviets and Cubans. Finally, waving the Qadhdhafi scarecrow,
he accused his partners of favoring Tripoli's penetration, and was ready
to demand the closing down of the Libyan Embassy in Ndjamena. Minister
of Deferise Hissein Habre was thus multiplying the consequences of
favorable stat~ments concerning the keeping of French forces in Chad.
The Council of Ministers had not met since 9 February and, because of a
lack of understanding of the tendencies concerning a clear problem, the
general policy statement of the GUNT which was to be issued at the
beginning of December had not gone beyond the plan stage. By mid-March,
the radio station of Mondou, the stronghold of the Chadian Armed Forces,
commanded by Colonel Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue, vice president of the
GUNT, announced that an extraordinary meeting was to be held in the
Sahr by the political cadres of the southern part of the country. ~
New Steps
"Predictably," statedt~otmdou Radio,"those attending the conference will
proclaim failure. In effect, the GUNT has still not been able effectively
_ to demilitarize the capital and prisoners of was (2,000, held mainly in
the northern and eastern parts of the country) have not as yet been
released; even though the~Lagos agreements stipulated their release 15
days following the formation of a Transitional National Union Government.
Furthermore, the neutra? force is still not operational." Under those
conditions, Radio t~3Oanclou pointed out, it is not excluded that the Sahr
meeting may pravide the opportunity for a"new step toward the GUNT
asking for the implementation of the Lagos agreements on which the
south is basing its hope for establishing peace and security in the
~ountry."
However, matters developed quickly. On 16 March Hissein Habre's FAN
troops mounted an offensive against elements of the Joint Action Front
(FAC) headed by Mahamat Abba Seid, GUNT minister of the interior, in
Bokoro (~00 kilometers east of Nd~jamena), and then in Mongo, in the
Guera. Denouncing the assaults against his forces in the central and
eatern parts of the country as "a line equipped and supported, financially
and logistically, by a big power well established in the country--France
in this occurrence," Mahamat Abba Seid announced that the FAC would
withdraw from the GUNT if president Goukouni Oueddei would not assume
his responsibility to the nation and to international public opir~ion on
the implementation of the Lagos agreements which were being systematically
violated.
'ttaving hesitated a long time [o use his authority as president of the
GUNT, concerned with the preservation of a peace and consensus which
were becoming ever more precarious and illusory, Goukouni Oueddei was
summoned to action from all sides. A test of strength had become in- _
evitable. The spark which was to trigger a general fire was provided
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on 20 March, with the outbreak of incidents at the military police
station, involving eiements of Hissein Habre's FAN and Goukouni Oueddei's
FAP. The second civil war of Ndjamena, with its aftermath of pain and
death, had broken out. At the beginning of April there were casualties
by the hundreds (1,000 at least), and the number of wounded, many of ~
whom were to die unless attended, due to inadequate medical facilities,
in horrible conditions, was estimated into the thousands (at least _
2 , 000 ) .
Despite the complexity and the shifts in the Chadian puzzle, from the
very beginning, a rather clear cleavage had become apparent. The
isolated Hissein Habre saw that, in addition to Goukouni Oueddei's FAP,
two or three other groups possessing armed forces were turning against
_ him: Colonel Kamougue's FAT, deployed on the southern bank of the
Chari, a few kilometers away from the Chagoua Bridge, which commands the
southern entrance to the capital, i.e., the African districts where
Hissein Habre's forces are concentrated; and the FAC commanded by
Mahamat Abba Seid and Acyl Ahmat, whose forces were marching toward the
capital from the east. "For us," said Djona Golo, a spokesman for vice
president Kamougue, minister of justice, speaking to a French newspaper,
"the problem is simple. Hissein Habre has seceded from the legal
government of the Chad, based on the Lagos agreements accepted by the
11 Chadian groups. For this reason, we shall defend to the end the
authority and legitimacy of the state."
In turn, and in hi.s own way, Hissein Habre shed a rough light on the ,
traumatic events which, once again, are bleeding white the live forces
of the Chad. "This war is not a war between two men," he stated. "It
is a political battle between nationalist and countryless regressive
forces, the allies of Libya, remote-controlled by Libya, the Goukouni-
Kamougue-Acyl Ahmat coalition." Knowing that Hissein Habre was launched
in orbit by France, in August 1978, imposed on General Malloum as prime
minister, and knowing that his forces (following the withdrawal of
Goukouni Oueddei's FROLINAT, the ex-jailer of Mrs Claustre, in
September 1977) were rebuilt and supplied by that same power, one can
- understand, naturally, the significance of this cruel war. The Libyan
- scarecrow was brandished one more time only for the sake of confusing
the eve'nts and making international public opinion accept the "arbitra-
t ion" of France.
Therefore, even though the situation on the battlefield had not changed
in the least after 15 days of fighting (the FAT and FAN had equal force:
3,000 men on each side, while the FAT and the FAC had not as yet been
- truly committed to battle), the attention focused on the French military
base located on the northern flank of the FAT positions, holding the
EUropean district.
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Indeed, following a work meeting, chaired by Giscard d'Estaing in the
Elysee Palace, the French government had announced, on 25 March, that
the French intervention force would never intervene in the course of -
' these confrontations. It was specified that its sole mission was "to
insure the safety of the Europeans and to proceed with their evacuation" !
(which has already been done). However, the Elysee Palace added, "The
- French forces remain available to make an eventual contribution to the
- specific request of the Chadian authorities to engage in any action -
whose exclusive purpose would be to insure the implementation of the
cease-fire." This was a rather vague formula (which Chadian authority's
request would be answered, and what type of actions would be carried
out?), leaving any possibility open.
Indeed, it is equally clear that France has fallen into a particularly
explosive trap which it greatly contributed to building itself, and
from which it would have great trouble extricating itself. Yet, it is -
no less evident that Mr Giscard d'Estaing's government does not intend
to abandon the "fruits" of 20 years ~f presence in the Chad and of
permanent interferences in the affairs of that country. -
The manner in which the French forces directly intervened in Ndjamena
in February 1979, to give a hand to Hissein Habre's army, hurled against
- the FAT, commanded by General Malloum and Colonel Kamougue, has not been
forgotten. Yet, at that time as well, there sole official mission was
to "help to maintain the cease-fire.".
: At the beginning of April, while the French intervention force seemed
= to maintain a rather doubtful state of expectation, the material,
financial, and logistic aid which gave Hissein Habre's forces clear _
superiority in terms of organization and equipment were being constantly ~
denounced by all in the Chad, undoubtedly it was not a question of a
tactical attitude, awaiting a decisive change in the ratio of forces.
The Elysee Palace puppets, such as Omar Bongo, were already calling upon
France to assume its "responsibilities," as though all that they waited
for were African green lights to act if need be.
Actually, the stakes of this murderous war imposed upon the Chaciians
are considerable. For France it is a question of securing its seizure
- of the mining resources (uranium and petroleum) of that country,
cleverly presented as poor and lacking in resources. It was also a
question of preserving and strengthening French presence in this area
of major strategic importance, in the heart of Africa which the Elysee
Palace is considering, ever more openly, as its private preserve.
Weakened and maimed by this new blood-letting, whatever the outcome of
the current crisis, the Chad will come out of it even more vulnerable.
That is, unless an unpredictable change occurs in the situation and
unless a solid front is organized by all Chadian currents who truly wish
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to bring back peace into their country and sa�eguard its integrity and
independence, without which it would become the easy prey of imperialism. ~
Therefore, if we must say it, it is all of independent Africa that is
affected by the dramatic events shaking up Chad.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Af rique-Asie
5157
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CHAD
_ SECESSIONISM SAID TO BE AT ITS HEIGHT
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 80 p 31
[Article by Francois Soudan: "The Demons of Secession"]
[Text] The north is eating itself up while the south is organizing."
- Briefly, a young cadre of Cotonchad Textile Company sums up in this
sentence the factual division which has characterized from the begin-
ning, over one month ago, of the second Ndjamena battle: "The Toubous
(of the north) spent their lives fighting. This goes on from generation
to generation. How could you build anything with them!" He admits -
being one of the founders of the Southern United Front, which demands ~
the autonomy of the southern provences. He does not yet speak of
independence ~ut, obviously, this word is burning his lips.
Naturally, the secessionist current he represents is still in the
~ninority. However, it is no longer quite marginal. Last 22 March, Che -
representatives--most of them moderate personalities--of the four
, southern provences: Mayo Kebbi, Tandjile, Logone, and Middle Chari
held a congress in Sahr. Their demand was autonomous management.
Since then, by the force of events, they have obtained far more.
Nothing works in Ndjamena anymore: roads have been cut off, the air-
port has been closed down, and telecommunications have bee.n suspended.
There�ore, it became necessary for "the south to organize." Moundou
became the substitute capital, with its radio station, a permanent
council which acts as the government, its landing strip, and its armed
forces.
The French Interests
The armed forces? They consist of about 5,000 men, commanded by
Col Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue: "The lion of the Saras," as he likes to
be called. Some 40 years old, with a small belly, Kamougue is a former
student at the colonial military school in Brazzaville. A great lover
of American convertibles, he was the chief of the gendarmerie, and in
charge of Chadian diplomacy at the time of Felix Malloum. Only 15
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� months ago he was very pro-French. Expelled from the government in
August of 1978, he had not forgiven the forces of Ge~eral Forest for
having supported secretly the new prime minister at the time, Hissein
Habre, and were against President Malloum in Feburary 1979. Folding
b~3ck in the south, he has since engaged in strong f.lirtltion with
Liby~, going so far ~as to officer his troops with "Q~idhdh~xfisr" com-
mandos of Acyl Ahmat (see J.A., no 1007). Staffed by a team of young
intellectuals, "Radio Moundou" Hissein Habre the "false Mao" or the
"real Pinochet," and compares the action of the French army in Chad
"[o that of the OAS in Algeria."
Sould we conclude, therefore, that Kamougue, the uncontested chi~f of
the south, has become Qadhdhaffi's creature? No, at least not yet. `
The economic presence of French companies is vital to the south: The
French Company for !�he Development of Textiles (CFDT), for example,
operates the 22 plants of the Cotontchad and the spinning enterprises
of the Chad Textile Company. Yet cotton, the virtually single crop of
the south, is the support of some 600,000 planters and accounts for 75
percent of the country's total exports.
Regardless of his statements, Kamougue also appears to have retained
his close relations with the French Ministry of Cooperation. It is
whispered that this dates from the time when he was the "protege" of
Major Go~rvenec, head of tht: intelligence services of General Malloum
- and close to the "Rue Monsieur." Finally, the alliance with Qadhdhaffi
of a person who stated in 1977 that "we shall never yield to the imper-
ialism of Lihyan petrodollars," is too much "against nature" not to be
circumstantiaL. Hence, unquestionably, Kamougue's timid military inter-
ventions since the opening of Ndjamena battle: advance elements of his
_ army are satisfied, for the time being, with shelling Habre's positions
with rockets.
Naturally, the "wisdom" and "good will" shown by President Goukouni are
willingly ackowledged. Yet, it is being said, "what is taking place in
~ Ndjamena is a settlement of accounts amoung northerners. This is none
of our concern. Our problem is to eliminate Habre without supporting
Goukouni." Regularly invoked for over one year, the se~essionist demons
have never been so pressing.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1980 ~
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CONGO
BRIEFS
- REFINERY OVERHAUL AGREEMENT--According to the terma of an agreement signed .
in February 1980, the Congolese Miniatry of Energy and Mining has entrusted
a pro~ect to the Freneh company Technip for the overhaul and industrial
startup of the Pointe-Noire refinery. Built between~1973 and 1378 by the
Sybetra-Voest-Alpine-Sercobe partnership, the refinery has never gone into
operation and is the subject of litigation before the Court of Arbitration
of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris as the result of a suit
brought by the Congolese Government. The refinery has a processing capacity
of 1 million tons of crude oil a year. In the Congo, Technip has already
participated in the overhaul of the SOVERCO (Congo Glaes Company) plant in
Pointe-Noire. This plant was built in 1968 by two English companies
(Lambot and Company and Fitzpatrick) but could never be put into operation.
After an overhaul by Techn~.p, the plant commenced operations in June 1979
with the technical assistance of Saint-Gobain-Packing. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 817] 11=464 -
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GABON
~
I
- BRIEFS
SOUTH KOREA IN URANIUM RESEARCH--An agreement on exploration and eventual
exploitation of uranium in Gabon has 3ust been signed in Libreville. This
was announced by the General Nuclear Materials Company (COGEMA), an affil-
iate of the French Atomic Energy Commissariat (CEA). This agreement grcups
the Gaboneae state, the South Korean Electric Company and the French company.
The exploration zone covered in this agreement extends for approximately
5,600 square kms and ia located between the cities of Lastoursville and
Mounana, in the central region of Gabon. The COGEMA is in charge of the ~
mining operations. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS ~
in French 28 Mar 80 p 756] ~
INCREASE IN GNP--According to estimates from the general directorate of the
Gabonese economy, Gabon's gross na.tional product (PIB) for 1979 was 598 hil-
lion francs CFA, against 539 billion for the preceding year. This consti-
tutes an 11 percent increase, compared with a 21 percent drop in 1978 in
relation to 1977. The 1979 j.ncrease is essentially related to the increase _
in oil production. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS ~
in French 28 Mar 80 p 756] '
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GUINEA
BRIEFS -
MILITARY DELEGATION TO GDR--A Guinean military delegation led by Gen Lansana
Diane, minister of defense, made an official visit to the German Democratic
Republic from 6 to 13 March. Ge~eral Diane and the membe�rs of his delegation
were received by Erich Honecker, leader of the Cammunist Party and of the
East German state as well as by Gen Heinz Hoffman, minister of defense, who
h~d vieited Conakrq himself in May 1978. The Guinean delegation alao visited
many units and training centers of the East German National People's Army.
[Text] [Paris.MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Mar 80 p 745]
INCREASED COOPERATION WITH UK--The 7~member Guinean delegation led by Mamady
Kaba, ministry of industrq, signed a draft agreement in London on 24 March.
Thia draft agreement is related to a new schedule for long-term payments
by Guinea to the Export Crsdits Guarantee Department of Great Britain. The.
two eides agreed on the search for an acceptable solution, either on the
- basis of the 1976 agreement which required repayment fo the 6.25 million
Englisl, pounds until 1991 at a 6.5 rate of interest, or on the basis of a
new agreement. Moreover, Mamady Kaba declared on 17 March that Guinea,
which had broken off diplomatic relations with Britain in 1965 because of
- the Rhodeaian problem, now wishes to initiate a close cooperation with this
country. He added that British firms would be welcome to participate in the
exploitation of the rich Guinean mineral resourcea. During the past 6
months, two important British trade delegatione visited Guinea, the firat -
led by Michael Young of AMEY ROADSTONE and the other from the British Con-
sultancy Eureau. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 28 Mar 80 p 746J -
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- ~ LIBERIA
~ ALMOST NOTHING KNOWN ABOUT NEW REGIME'S PROGRAM
Paris MA~CHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRA.NEENS in French 18 Apr 80 pp 907-908
[Report: "The End of the American Dream"]
[Text] On 14 April, Dr William R. Tolbert, a Baptist minister and
_ Mason president, paid with his Life the brutal yet not unpredictable
advent of. an event which, even though unprecedented in Liberia, is
quite common in Africa: a military coup d'etat.
In a republic which dates from 1847, whose constitution is modeled on
that of the United States, where the American dollar has parity value,
and where:ties w:.th America in the political class even include the ~
drawl of the rural south, in addition to the stereotypes regarding free-
dom, democ`"racy, and religion, it is a"sin" which had undoubtedly had
to be considered twice before committing a military coup d'etat. The
_ paternal shadows of Washington and Monroe (who gave his name to Monrovia,
founded in 1822 by freed black slaves returned to their "homeland") must -
be shuddering.
However, the American dream was short. Liberia, with its 1.6 million
population, was practically controlled by a minority of a few tens of
~ thousands of descendants of the American blacks, holding the majority
of political and administrative positions. At the turn of the century
the exploitation of the Africans by these unique colonizers was shame-
less; Slavery was still extant. The main local ethnic groups, Kpelle
(over 200,000), the Bassa (170,000), the Wai, and the Kru, who were
related to the populations of the neighboring countries, lived separate- -
ly, while the Liberian American concentrated in the cities or their
farms. According to Maurice Delafosse, at that time French vice consul
in Monrovia, the announcement of the seizure of Samory in 1898 gave -
hope to the natives that "the. French were going to sweep off Liberia,"
i.e., put an end to the seizure of the country by the "Americans."
Between 1943 and 1971 President Tubman was the first to try to react
against this situation through his "open door" policy. Following his
election, he promised to develop the entire country. In 1945,~the
seventh constitutional amendment made possible, for the first time, a -
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parliamentary representation of the people of the interior. In 1947
(the eighth amendment) all Liberian citizens without discrimination,
other than the one based on the ownership of the house, were given the
right to vote. In 1963 the internal "provences" were made "counties"
on the American model, and the unification of the nation took the path
of expanding the dominant culture.
President Tolbert, the appointed successor of his predecessor, pursued
this policy even further. The injustice of the fact that it was he who
fell victim of the error piled up from 1822 to 1943, and even later,
prove, nevertheless, the impatience of subjects who were unwilling to
merely gather the crumbs dropping from the tables of their masters.
Breaking with well established traditions, indeed, Tolbert wanted to
draw closer to the rest of Africa. He exchanged his jacket for a white
uniform like that of his neighbor Seko Toure. While emphasis was put
on the "African nature" of the Liberians, for the first time a vice
president not of American origin was elected: Bennie Warner who,
ironically, was in the United States, attending a meeting of Methodist
- bishops, at the time of the coup d'etat. The peak of this policy was
the election of the Liberian president to the chairmanship of the OAU., -
_ for one year, at the Monrovia Summit, held last July. Shortly before
that, Tolbert had again displayed, on two separate occasions, his desire
for an opening to French-speaking countries, paying in March 1979, a
= state visit to Paris and, subsequently, at the time of the disturbances
whose anniversary coincided with the coup d'etat, receiving military
aid from Guinea. Liberia was to attend, as an observer, as it did last
year in Kigali, the forthcoming "Franco-African Summit" in Nice.
The mistake of the system, which brought about its overthrow, was that _
it merely retained the appearances of the American ideal while promoting
- n~3tional reconciliation. The students returning from the United States
- were even more sensitive than the rest of the population to the disparity
between the government's words and actions. That is what led them to
launch a movement hostile to the system and which led to the coup d'etat.
Like the United States, Liberia considered itself a democracy. In
reality, however, ever since 1878 the power had been monopolized by a
single party, the True Whig Party, whose obsolete name reflected its _
stagnation. All politicians were Masons. This was not open to everyone
merely by virtue of initiation costs.* Following the troubles of 1879,
an opposition party succeeded in gaining recognition, the Progressive
People's Party (PPP), whose president was Gabriel B3cchus Matthews.
* About $2,000 according to THE FINANCIAL TIMES, while World Bank ~
statistics show a median per capita income of $470.
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However, the party was banned last 29 March. Of late a nonrecognized
group, the MOJA (Movement for Justice in Africa) seemed to be facing a
worse future in the hands of the authorities who had strength~ned their
control over political life after the failure of demonstrations demand-
= ing President Tolbert's resignation. _
Let us emphasize the popular joy at the announcement of a successful
coup d'etat. The bulk of the population had reasons other than those
of the students for being dissatisfied with the system.
The disturbances of April 1979 had been caused by the food situation in
Monrovia: There was a shortage of rice. Imports increased despite a
_ policy of promoting the cultivation of food crops supported by the
chief of state. A stagnant annual production of 250,000 tons of rice
could not meet the needs of a growing urban population (Monrovia grew
from a population of 40,000 in 1950 to 170,000 in 1975. Following the
- announcement of a governmental plan to increase the price of rice, the
_ people of the capital rose answering the call of the PAL (Progressive
Alliance of Liberia), the ancestor of the PPL. The stores had been
looted (causing a damage of $40 million), and the army, helped by
- Guinean forces, put down the mutiny, leaving some 100 people dead.
Liberia wanted to be a single nation on the American model. However,
corruption was rampant, political speeches notwithstanding. Both
- presidents Tubman and Tolbert had promised to fight it while reveling _
in it. The murdered president had substantial private interests. A
brilliant political future seemed promised to his family along with an _
extended control of the state, in the order of things, even thou~h -
~ shared with a few other families. According to the MOJA, 3.4 percent
of the population still account for 60.4 percent of the national revenue.
Despite certain achievements, the country was stagnant. The scarcity
of foodstuffs and high prices had already become a Monrovian character-
- istic by the turn of the century, and one of the initial effects of
American black colonization was the disruption of domestic food
- production.
_ In the area Liberia remains the state which has invested the Least
efforts in education, as 80 percent of the population remains iLliterate.
The control which the Firestone Company has on Hevea plantations remains
the same, while 35 percent of the national labor force is employed in
Hevea growing. The ~pening of public jobs to a larger number of local
people, on the initiative of President Tolbert, had as its corollary
increased corruption. In 1972 indebtedness had already reached a sub-
stantial level (interest accounted for $19 million on a commercial
revenue of $60 million in 1977). It increased with the cost of organi-
zing the OAU summit meeting in Monrovia (estimated at $100 million).
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The necessary conclusion is that the army merely followed a path borrowed
elsewhere. Unquestionably, it considered that the gap between the
governing and the governed was too wide to be filled legally. It set
itself a"redemption" mission and has let the civilians, i.e., the old
opposition, play a large role in the new government.
However, the blood-shedding nature of the coup d'etat is undeniable.
This is no accident, it appears, but the hateful and brutal manifesta-
tion of a deep resentment.
This is not to say that Liberia, the loyal ally of the United States
and "moderate" countries, is about to change camps. Virtually nothing
' is known of the program of the new system. The originators of the coup
d'etat answered with violence the violence which was practiced by the
previous government.
In 1979 there were massacres, torture in the jails, and a price put on
the heads of the opposition, according to Amnesty International. What
the civilian opposition essentially wanted and what the people in the
country who could express themselves wished was respect for the demo-
cratic ideal proclaimed by the Liberian Americans who, in fact, were ~
violating it. The model of a small class had become popular.
Sometimes, a coup d'etat seems the only recourse against legal tyranny,
when institutions have been rigged for its benefit by a small privileged
cLass which intends to keep for itself most of the national wealth.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
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LIBERIA
POSSIBILITY THAT DOE MAY SEEK U.S. SUPPORT NOTED -
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 30 Apr 80 p 30
[Article by Mo~hamed Maiga: "An Obstacle Course for the Chief Sergeant"]
[Text] Three weeks after his putsch, the consolidation of the new sys-
tem is the objective which Chief Sergeant Samuel Doe has set himself.
Starting with 18 April, he had three soldiers and one civilian shot for
~ looting. Televised live, these executions took place on the beach of
Monrovia, in the presence of the chief of state and the minister of
defense, Lt Col Samuel Pearson. "This will serve as an example,�' stated
Ch~ief Sergeant Doe, adding that there would be no more a"mini-Far West"
Liberia where holdups and attacks were frequent. Having blocked, two
days previously, an attempted counter coup d'etat, Samuel Doe pledged
to be firm toward all "trouble makers." For the time being, however,
he has shown great moderation toward the losers, the 91 Tolbert
collaborators whose trial opened on 17 April in a military court of
justice.
Concerned with the presence of "Ivory Coast forces massed at the border,"
Samuel Doe had informed of this, two days after seizing the power, the
- United States charge d'affaires irt Monrovia. In turn, the diplomat had
gotten in touch with the American mission in Abidjan which obtained
'both the denial and the assurances given by President Felix Houphouet-
Boigny. It is believed that the American diplomats as well might have
tempered the zeal of the Guinean Ahmed Sekou Toure. The latter was
threateninp military intervent~on should the Tolbert family be en-
dangered, on the basis of a secret military pact he had concluded with
the deceased ex-president. For the time being, however, the Guinean
president merely asked for one minute of silence to honor the memory of
his (ex-) protege. This was in the course of the keeping of the National
Revolutionary Council (CNR), held mid-April in Conakry. ~
Does this mean that the new Liberian regime has taken its first steps
with Washington's help? The day following his putsch Samuel Doe
expressed his desire to strengthen the ties between the two countries.
It is equally true that American mili.tary experts posted in Monrovia
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took part in the reestablishment of the public order as early as
12 April. Washington holds sub.stantial trump cards in Liberia. The
5,000 soldiers of the Liberian army (known as the national guard) and
- their officers have been trained by American instructors. Military -
equipment comes exclusively from the United States. For the past three
years American military aid has been rising steadily: $6 million in
1977, $6.2 million in 1978, and $6.5 million in 1979.
Political Influence
Will Washington exert a political influence as well on the domestic
policies of the new Liberia? There are those who do not exclude it,
predicting outbreaks within the new leadership dominated by two rival
currents: the Progressive People's Party (PPP) of foreign affairs
minister Bacchus Matthews, and the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA)
of plan minister Dr Togba Na Tipoteh. Both claim to be "on the left,"
but the second has shown greater ideological coherence and less
"spontaneity" than the former. The MOJA, in addition to the support of -
the intelligentsia, has, above all, the support of the African peasant
population from which Dr Na Tipoteh comes. The PPP, headed by people
of "American" origin, such as Matthews, rely essentially on the un-
employed in the slums, and proclaims an "African socialism," close to
the American black ideology of the Black Panthers. It remains to be -
seen whether, between the two "lefts"--one American and the other
African--the young Samuel Doe will be able to keep an equal distance
between the two without Uncle Sam's support.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1980
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MALI
STUDENT REVOLT IS ONLY TIP OF ICEBERG
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1004, 2 Apr 80 pp 35, 36, 37, 39
[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Mali! Revolt and Repression"]
[Excerpts] Engulfed in turmoil, Mali, an African state, is on the verge of
collapse because of the 5-month old confrontation between students and
government.
The Malian crisis, however, is much worse. The malaise among students is
real enough, as it has always been. However, it is only the visible part
of a profound disruption. An official study published in October 1979
- went to the root of the problem: the Malian educational sys~em "is only
aimed at being a conduit for higher education." Thus, it increases the
number of students "admitted to universities." After that, it is a matter
_ of luck: either unemploym~ent, or the civil service, since the state is
practically the sole employer in Mali, since there is no productive activity ~
in Mali outside the state enterprises. Agriculture? It is made up of a
multitude of rural deveZopmen t operations (ODR) which, through lack of ineans
if not becauae of conceptual errors, have been agonizing for the last 15
yeara. International assistance? It took 20 yeaxs for international lend-
era to discover that the exp~loitation of a million hectares of irrigable
lsnd along the Niger River could eave the entire Sahel region from famine.
France, the World Bank, the EEC and the U.S. only declared themselves ready
- to invest in the cauatry in November 1978. The Soviet Union? A colony
of 3,000 Russians have been living in a ghetto in Kalana for 15 years, in-
volved in the exploitation of a gold mine, while Malians never even saw an
~ ounce of it. The oil-producing countries? They are financing the construc-
_ tion of mosques and at times grant a"budgetary aid" to pay civil servants.
The foreign investors? A high official of a French oil company stated to
us some months ago: "We shall exploit Malian oil resources. The grice
of crude is now high enough for the rapid amortization of investments."
And, finally, what about private Malian investors? They are rich (some-
times very rich), but they are "in business," (sometimes illegal traffic),
er they have estab~ished themselves in the Ivory Coast, Senegal or Kenya.
Thus, onlq the state is left. It provides unbounded support to moribund
companies crQated 20 years ago. Since November 1968, when the military -
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overthrew the socialist regime of the late Modibo Keita, no one has ever
dared attack the state enterprises, which remain the "people's gains." But
the gains of the people are a heavy burden. These enterprises register a
daily loas of 150 million FM (75 million CFA). Since most of them are prac-
tically bankrupt, they cannot honor their fiscal obligatione. As for priv-
ate individuals, they either pay no income taxea because they have no salar-
ies, or elae, being rich businessmen, they can bribe civil servants--whose
remunerati~on is almost non-existent--in order to declare less and thus pay
less.
The state continues to function because a state is needed. The 1980 budget
(77,811 billion FM, less than 40 billion F CFA) has not provided one single
franc or investments. Salaries alone require 55,143 billion. But these -
are only theoretical numbers: no receipts, no credits, therefore no salar-
ies, no grants. This is the Malian inferno exploding today through youth
revolts. How did Mali re3ch this low point? In truth, the country is the -
- victim both of past ineptitude and recent inertia, brutally thrust into the
limelight because of the international financial crisis. Who is responsible
for this state of affairs? Errors have been piling up in the 20 years since
independence. It is Modibo Keita who decided, in 1960, to entrust the ecc~n- _
omy to the state, in the name of socialism. When the military overthrew
Keita in November 1968, they promised a series of changes. They made
speeches, but nothing else. Within the ruling 3unta, young officers man-
euvered to stay in power and plotted against each other more than they
worried about financial management. In 10 years, the military allowed the _
economic situation--which they had already inherited in a lamentable state-
to rot still more. Moussa Traore was unable, despite his governmental re-
forms, to save Mali from disaster. He created a party which is supposed to
give him a popular foundation. And what happened to him is similar to what
happened to many other chiefs of state: the party has resounding slogans
but no ideas, and especially those needed to give new impetus to the economy.
Profound Frustrations
The many competent people among the intelligentsia are not blameless either.
Having welcomed the 1968 coup d'etat, they quickly lost their illusions,
retreating into the strict observance of time schedules, and even into gen-
uine, loyal opposition. Many a high official regrets today he did not take
the party in hand.
The opposition? Contrary to appearances, it does not exist, at least in the
sense that it never was considered an alternative, and also because it is
constituted by minuscule, isolated and divided groups.
It would be un~ust, however, to impute the responsibility for the present
_ Malian disaster solely to the Malians. If state enterprises cannot meet
their operating expenses, it is also because the cost of spare parts, fuel,
electricity and maintenance of old equipment is 5 or 10 times higher than
10 years ago.
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Thus, the atudent revolt has been left far behind. It only revealed a
generalized failure. As long as no one will admit that t~e Malian malaise
is economic befor~ it is political, all the revolts, all the coups d'etat,
all the changea in government will only be a temporary ou,let for deep
fruatrations.
- The Adventure
Under present circumstances, only a government of nati~nal salvation could
put order in ul~e chaos and re-plaster the walls of a crumbling state. The
solution for Ma.lians should be that, whether belonging to the party or not,
in a last ef~ort at dignity, they succeed in persuading themselves that it
is no longer a question of who should govern, but how to preserve Ma.li's
- " very existence. Only then would they be able to mobilize themselves. This
people, who national consciousness is doubtless one of the most solid in
Africa, has the ability to rebound. But they cannot act alone. At the
point they have reached, with only their pride left, they must receive
assiatance from abroad for everything, for the rebuilding of their economy
- through the influx of capital and an end to the territorial isolation of
their massive country.
As long as Malians remain convinced that their isolation leaves them out-
~ side the international economy, they will be obsessed by the ever-present
ghost: an o;~~ning to the sea. Every adventure then becomes possih~.e, and
this could endanger the regional balance in this part of Western ,~.rrica.
Mali is one of only two African countries (Guinea is the other) whose con-
stitution anticipates renouncing its sovereignty in the name of African
unity. Attempts at federation failed in the early years of independence,
_ but Malians never gave up the idea of a federation, in an attempt, among
other reasons, to gain access to th~ sea. -
Another obsession deriving from the first and wnich finds its source in
the collective remembrance of past glories: Malians today have inherited
- imperial pride from the ancient empires of Ouagadou, Manding or the Songhai,
to ~the pc~int that--it is no secret--certain of its neighbora suspect Mali
of still dreaming about domination. One must atimit that these suspicions -
do have a foundation in fact, when one refers to recent history. This is
unfortunately true; the proof resides iz the fact that in January 1975, -
_ at the time of his visit to Mali and at the request of other chiefs of
state in the region,-:Erench President Giscard d'Eataing insisted on receiving -
_ assurances from Malian leaders that they did not harbor velleities of hege-
monism. This is reason enough why it is vitally important for the entire
sub-region that Mali receive support in fighting chaos. Moreover, it is
_ dan~erous to let Mali seek renewed breath alone: it could well, then, -
look for it farther--and elsewhere.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980 ~
_ CSO: 4400 ~
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MALI
1 BRIEFS
BRITISH TRAINING--Mali had asked London to cede to it 2 HS 748 transport
planes. Arguing that the transacCion could only be effected on a"com-
mercial basis,10 the British Government nevertheless agreed to immediately
provide training for a Malian specialist in the maintenance of these ~
planes. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1011, 21 May 80 p 46]
CSO: 4400
;
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NIGER
_ SONICHAR MONEY LENDERS' MEETING
~ Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 811
[Text] The meeting of backers of the Niger Coal Company in Anou Araren
(SONICHAR) came to a close on 21 March following deliberations that lasted
2 days. The meeting was to decid~ on the financing of the second phase of
work for the startup of mining and the construction of a thermic power-
plant which would produce 100 million kilowatt~hours annually starting
in 1983.
_ The cost of the second phase is an estimated 24 billion CFA francs, with -
� the portion of funds supplied by the Niger Government amounting to 8 billion. -
The remaining 16 billion will be the subject of long-term ~financing. _
The African Development Bank, the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation
(France), the National Bank of Paris, two American banks (City Banic and
the Chase Bank), the Abu Dhabi Fund, the Kuwaiti Fund and OPEC all partici- -
pated in the meeting.
The company's purpose is to work a coal deposit near Agadez, estimated to
_ contain over 6 million tons, and to set up a thermic power~lant capable
of producing 100 million kilowatt-hours annually starting ~':n 1983.
According to Minister of Planning Mahamane, the total cost of the SONICHAR
project is now an estimated 64 billion CFA francs, including 40 billion
for the first phase of work. The cost of the first phase was covered by
the 11.7 billion CFA francs in capital and 28.3 billion francs in a long-
term loan.
_ Oyer the next 20 years, the SONICHAR thermal powerplant should enable Niger
to save 150 billion CFA.francs (1979 value).
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
11,464
= CSOf 4400
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SENEGAL
1980 EXPECTED TO PRESENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Fr~ench 25 Apr 80 pp 963-965
[Text] While the Senegalese economy revived somewhat during the first few
months of 1979--thanks to the favorable c~urse of the 1978-1979 harvest--
it wa~ confirmed early in the 8econd ~uarter of 1980 that the current year
will doubtless be difficult f~or Senegal.
The office of the president and the office of the pxime minister are per-
fectly aware of this, and last 19 September Mr Abdou Diouf, the prime minis-
ter, had already presented to the National Aasembly a plan of recov~ry and
correction. The known reeults of the peanut harvest of 1979-1980 were,
however, unfortunately poor and threaten to make an already worrisome fi-
nancial situation worae, while at the same time some social tension has
been observed recently.
Will the recovery plan of Mr Abdou Diouf enable Senegal to overcome its
preaent difficulties7 It is not impossible, for Senegal hae some trumps,
- as we emphasized in a previous article published on 5 October entitled "On
the Eve of the Counting of the Offera of Diama, A New Dimeneion for Sene-.
- gal." Among these trump carde are especially the great OMVS [Senegal River
Development Organization] and the completion of Dakar-Marine. But the bene-
~ fits o� the harneseing of the Senegal River will come only over the inter-
mediate term, while tihe induetrial inetallations of Daka.r-Marine, what~ver
- their economic interest, will be insufficient, when they are operational
at the end of 1980 or in early 1981, to reactivate the economy and refloat
Senegalese public finance.
_ In the meantime, in March, the saleable harvest of peanuta was about 400,000
tona, and it is estimated that the total harvest will not exceed 450,000
tons, a figure from which one must deduct about 130,000 to 140,000 tons -
of seed, leaving a.saleable balance of 300,000 tons. The 1977-1978 har-
~ vests yielded 442,000 and 182,U00 tons, reepectively, not counting seed.
_ While agricultural receipta will decline, the petroleum bill will increase
greatly, and is estimated for 1980 at 46/47 billion CFA francs, compared with ~
25/26 billion in 1979. This rise threatens to aggravate the deficit in the ~
balsnce of trade, which last year was 50 billion CFA francs.
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Thia is why a mission of the IMF visited Dakar from 17 February to 6 March,
and ite diagnosis will doubtless affect the financial policy of the Sene- ~
galese Government. The share of SDR's to Senegal would be raised from 42
to 63 million, however.
At this point it is permissible--in the intereats of Senegal itself--to ask
what are the deep causea of the "Senegalese disease", which reminds one,,to
some extent, of the "French disease", the clinical analysis of which was the
- sub~ect of a well-known work.
The Burden of the Feudal Groups
Never have the two feudal groupa which dominate Senegalese life--that of the
great marabouts and that of the government party--been so powerful. No so- ~
cial or political decision at whatever level, has a chance of being applied
- if it doea not have the support of the great marabouts. The Family Code,
promulgated in 1972, has remained a dead letter on many points, because it
went against certain Kor~nic or traditional rules. Prosecutions loudly
proclaimed againat the perpetrators of embezzlements and frauds, peter out .
when a particularXy well-protected "talibe" is found to be compromised.
Muridism ie atrengthening its position and is increasingly gaining the ap-
pearance of a religious nationalism. In the face of this competition the
Tid~ana have restored, since May 1979, a unity which had been compromised
aince 3.957 by problems of succession. Muslim intellectual circles are un-
easy over certain displays fanaticism as well as over the growing influence
of Arab countries which atrive to convince the masses that Islam is insepara- '
ble from Arabiam. !
For their own part, certain responsible party leaders tend too much to act !
like "feudal lords" when they feel protected by higher echelons which need '
rheir services as grand electors. The information media are almost entirely
at the aervice of the socialiet party, and the oppoaition is at the moment '
too divided to worry those in power. The Senegalese ~emocratic Party (PDS)
compriees mainly malcontents who did not get the advantages they hoped for
when they were in the Socialist Party (PS). The Senegaleee Republican Move- '
. ment (MRS), officially recognized early in 1979, preaents a resolutely con-
servative program which could en~oy the support of Muslim religious cir-
clea, but for the moment it makes little noise. The left is still divided, ~
deapite appeals for union, and ie recruited mainly from the intellectual
circles. j
\ ~ ~
Malcontent;s are nevertheless numerous in the country. While the student and
school pup~~':ls' atrikes and demonstrations often have very concrete motiva-
tions (abs~'nteeism of the teachers, poor living conditiona in the dormitor-
ies the resources of which are often embezzled, etc.), they increasingly re- ;
veal the worry of the young scholars in the face of an uncertain future. ~
Unemployed people with university degrees are not rare. And one may wonder ~
what ~obs the 350,000 pupils and 15,000 students of 1980 will have when they i
_ enter active life? ~
I
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President Senghor is not unaware of these realities, and this is without
doubt what ie making him delay his departure. But his conetant concern of
impoeing his image as a great writer and the priority often given to foreign
policy problems doubtless do not permit him to search actively for solu-
tions to economic and financial probleme.
He is nevertheless increasingly pushing to the forefront hie prime miniater
and boasts of his stateamanlike qualities. As designated crown prince,
Mr Abdou Diouf indeed has the abilities and will necessary to take charge
of the country. He will be able to do so if he relies on the young cadres
not yet apoiled by the exerciae of power and concerned for the common good.
But he will have to have a completely free hand and the "pontiffa" of the
party will have to refrain from raising obstacles to his actions.
It is sometimes said in "well-informed" circles of the capital that Presi-
dent Senghor will announce his departure during the visit which Valery Gis-
card d'Estaing proposes to make this year to Senegal. If true, 1980 will
be a turning point in the history of the country.
Short-Term Reaults of the Stabilization Plan
- On the economic side, as we have indicated, 1979 ended as a difficult year,
despite a good beginning. It was opened, on 1 February, with the preaenta-
tion of the short-term stabilization plan worked up by the government a~nd,
11 months later, the prime minister gave the results of this plan to the
National Assembly.
The first part was the tax reform, promulgated on 1 June. For importa,
customs dut3es were standardized at 5 p~rcent. Customs duty was eliminated
or ~educed to 10 percent for all importa enhancing Che development of local
industries, the ordinary rate being set at 35 percent. On the other hand
- dutiea of 45 percent and even 70 percent are levied on all luxury products -
and those which compete with local production. The common value added tax
was set at 18.5 percent and raised to 50 percent for luxury producta. The
tax on performance of services was standardized at 15 percent,.with a reduced
rate of 5 percent for activities of social application and at 12.5 percent
for tourism. The tax on exports is applied only to phosphates and peanut
products.
Operating expenses,~,~h a ceiTing of 99 billion CFA francs, actually amoun-
ted to 99.8 billion. Receipts reached 107 billion and their slight aur-
plus made it possible to apply 11 billion to investments, instead of the
9 billion planned.
- As we have already indicated, the deficit in the balance of trade in 1979
exceeded 50 billion CFA francs due to the bad peanut harvest of 1978-1979,
the 20 percent drop in world prices, and the increase of the price of petro-
, leum, average consumption of which is 800,000 tons per year. The bill rose
to 25 billion CFA francs in 1979, and, we have stressed, it wi11 be more
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than 45 billion in 1980. And starting a sho.rt time ago, the Senegalese have
been paying 165 CFA francs (3.30 French francs) per liter of super, and 155
CFA francs (3.10 French francs) per liter of regular gasoline.
As a result, the current balance of payments was negative at the end of
1979, amounting to 33.7 billion CFA francs, and also at the end of 1979
debt service stood at 15 percent of the value of exports and 19 percent of
that of tax receipts.
Unfortunately the new sources of energy are not yet ready to provide re-
lief. The Diama dam, the first stone of which was laid on 12 December i979,
is mainly destined to reclaim the lands of the delta of the Senegal River,
by preventing the rise of the saline water. And while the first stone of
the Manantali dam, on the upper Senegal, should in principle be laid before
the end of 1980, the completion of the hydroelectric plant has been put off
~ fur lack of financing.
Senegal is participating actively in research in the field of solar energy.
A solar pump, operating on photovoltaic cells, was inaugurated last 19 Sep-
tember at Aere-Lao, but that is etill only a very burdensome pilot opera-
tion.
Natural difficulties are added to the difficulties of foreign origin, for
nature did not come to the rescue of the government. The saleable peanut
crop in 1980 will probably be only 300,000 tons. This deficit is due to
lack of rain, to a reduction of the cultivated area (1,096,000 hectares com-
pared with 1,157,000 hectares in 1978), and to the quality and quantity
of seed distributed (127,300 tons instead of 147,800 tons in 1978). Cotton
production, which really began only in 1963, had reached 45,000 tons in 190'6-
1917, with a yield of more than 1000 kilograms per hectare. The 1978-1979
crop was 33,800 tona, with a yield of 700 kilogram per hectare. There is a
good chance that thie drop will accelerate: in 5 years the cost of produc-
tion rose by 77 percent (mainly because of insecticides), while Che purchase
price for cotton (49 CFA~francs a kilogram) exceeds only by 7.50 CFA francs
that of peanuts (instead of 12.05 in 1963-1964).
The harveat of millet and sorghum is estimated at 500,000 tons, that of rice
(paddy) at 120,000 tons. The food deficit therefore is reaching at least
- 225,000 tons, which must be distributed to 3 million uprooted peasants, and
eaving the cattle will require the sum of 4 billion CFA francs, 3 billion of
which is expected from international aid. A program of protection of seed
stocks and products in courae of processing, deterioiated by Che late rains
of the lasC two years, is estimated to cost 3,352 million CFA francs.
The government is once again struggling against brush firea, and 1970 was
a year of reforertation, thanks to vigorous propaganda ("one child, one
� tree", "one woman, one tree"...). Three million trees have been planted,
but rhe continuation of the program will cost 7 billion CFA francs.
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"A Society Which Cheats..." Said the Prime Minister
The activ~ities of the 27 public establishments and the 75 mixed ownership
companies represent 40 percent of the GDP and these o~rganizations employ
more than 25,000 people. But those whoae management is satiafactory are
rare. On 27 September 1979, the chief of state called a meeting of respon-
aible officials to denounce the evils afflicting this public and quasi-
public sector: disorder in bookkeeping, fantasy management, waste of assets,
excessive peraonnel, excessively high salaries, and interference by politi-
cians notablea. While accepting willy-nilly theae criticisms, the respon-
_ sible officials noted that one could add othera: flight of high level mana-
gers into the private sector, sluggishness of administration in allocation
of credits or aettlement of bills, and instability of directora. AI1 this
explains the present tendency of the state to rely more on private initiia-
tive.
Several public organizationa are particularly criticized. ONCAD [National
Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development] has become an exces-
sively heavy organization (4,167 agents, 2.5 billion CFA francs in salaries,
and a turnover of 100 billion), and therefore often inefficient and very
difficult to control. In a statement last 7 December, the minister of ru-
ral development admitted that "up to now ONCAD had served as a repository of
political patronage..." Since 10 October the office has had a new director-
general in the person of Mr Abdourahmane Toure, who proved himself by re- ~
establishing order in SIDEC [Senegalese Company for the Importation, Distri-
bution, and Exploitation of the Cinema] in three years. Mr Saliou Sarr,
ex-president-dir~ctor general of ONCAD, has found another ~ob as head of the -
new COSENAM [Senegalese Marine Shipbuilding Company] created with a capital
_ of 1 billion CFA france, of which the state holds 84 percent.
BUD-Senegal, which exported early vegetables to Europe, wae placed in liqui-
dation of 3 September 1979, putting 3,000 people out of work. It was the
victim of quite bad management: a good part of the means of production were
said to have been used on the personal estates of certain officials.
President Senghor himself denounced the misuse of the organizat~,ons which
are in ~:~inciple supposed to promote housing: SICAP [Cape Verde Real Es-
tate CompanyJ, and OHLM [0�fice of Low-Cost Rental Housing]. The rise in
the prices of construction materials does not entirely explain the far_t
that the cost of housing has risen 150 percent in 10 years. The establiah-
ment in Dakar of many inter-Afrl.can organizations, especially the head-
quarters of the Central Bank of West African States, caused frenzied specu- ~
lation in rental properties. SICAP and OHLM have not escaped this trend:
their latest completions are almost solely villas and apartments the luxury
or medium type which Senegalese officials get allocated to themselves, in
order to sublet them to international officials at profits of 50 Co 100
percent.
In his speech program of 19 December 1979 to the National Assembly, the prime
minister atigmatized the ills of Senegalese society which are the causes of
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poor management and increasingly numerous embezzlements (of which ther~~ have
been some in ONCAD, the Social Security, Rural Development, the Post Office, -
etc.): laziiiess, love of pleasure, laxfty, and waste are the most visible
_ manifestations of a society which cheats and proceeds in a happy-go-lucky
way." In three years 47 high officials have appeared before the court of
budgetary discipline, 49 were puniahed, and there were 48 casea of abuse
of trust in the private sector. Also on 5 December the National Asaembly
extended to the latter sector the law which increases the penalties for
those guilty of embezzlement.
The Plan for Recovery and Taxation
In his program sgeech, Mr Abdou Diouf gave the broad outlines of a recovery
plan which should accelerate growth within 5 years: continuation and main-
tenance of financial improvement, revival of investments in which the pro-
portion of public saving will have to rise from 15 to 25 percent by 1985
by the reduction of the rate of growth of the operating budget (12.5 per- `
cent for receipts and 10 percent for expenses).
A policy of truth in pricing and redistribution of income should make it
possible to increase private saving: at the begint~ing of 1980 the purchase
of prices of cotton and peanuts were raised, the salaries of administration
"were raised (by 4 percent to 34 percent), and the interoccupational guaran- _
teed minimum wage as well (25 percent). On 1 July the index point will be
raised by 7 percent.
The government is goi~zg to strive to reduce the deficit in the balance of .
trade by limiting the volume of imports (that of 1980 must not exceed that _
of 1977), by raiaing from 5 to 10 percent the customs duty on all imported -
products, and by encouraging exports.
Confirming and explaining the directives of the prime minister, the Minis-
ter of Finance, Mr Ouamane Seck, gave a very realistic review of the eco-
- nomic and financial situation of hia country on 19 March in Paris, before
the membere of tha CIAN [International Committee for Black Africa, the for-
mer AIAT], and the informational letter of CIAN, dated March 1980, contains
it.
Mr Ousmane Seck mentioned the three basic guidelines of the aczivity of the
government:
1) PrioriCy for better ~ob mobility so as to remedy the extremely serious
in;,onveniences caused by the impossibility of dismissals. The survival of
certain enterprises which can no longer bear certain personnel costs is at
stake.
2) In the field of prices, a new policy of truth in pricing, especiall.y
through a reduction of subsidies. Liberalization of prices and elimination
of the system of blocking should make poasible margins which provide more
incentive.
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3) Overhaul of taxation, which is considered relatively severe compared
with that practiced by other countries of black Africa, in the hope of crea-
ting more incentive to foreign investment.
- According to the statements of Mr Ousmane Seck to CIAN, a note concerning
taxation was submitted to Preaident Senghor on 24 March t980. It confirmed
that the tax burden is very heavy in Senegal, the direct ~ax being paid
, by a emall number of people, actually by salaried personnel in the modern
sector who represent less than 4 percent of the active population, a per-
_ centage which in practice should be reduced to 1 percent, for in the enter-
prises only 20 percent of the salaried workers pay the general tax on in-
come, because of their family burdens especially.
~ The note affirms, on the other hand, that the Senegalese tax system has not
been an incentive to inveatment b ~
y private parties. It streases that the
Senegalese citizen is either too poor to invest or he has an income so
heavily taxed that investment is either impossible or unattractive.
The study aubmitted to the chief o� state is not only critical, for it ad-
vances suggestions for more tax incentives, and the minister of the economy
and finance has already asked his services to study modifications of the
- Investment Code and to make concrete proposals which could in ~.ncluded in
the next finance law.
~ Along with this, and in the framework of the atisterity budget, expenses for
m~teriel will be considerably reduced, as well as Treasury subsidies to the
quasi-public sector, and taxation will be revised so as ~o penalize imports
which are not indispensable to the national economy. Finally, the special
accounte o~E the Treasury must be rebalanced, and the large deficit of the
_ Autonomous Amortization Fund will be covered by an increase in the value -
added tax.
,
In conclusion, while in Senegal as elsewhere the financial difficulties are
temporary: rising cost of energy, inflation (largely imported) and also
drought, a phenomenon alas peculiar to the Sahel countries, one cannot be
unaware that to the financial difficulties are added sociological burdens
which are the principal cauae of the "Senegalese disease" like others, in
France for example, khich have been feeding the "French disease" for a long
time.
So this advantage of the existence, very ola in Senegal, of a bourgeoisie
with a cultural level similar to the same social class in Europe, risks
being neutralized if the behavior of Senegalese social elite continuea to -
bee too egocentric, if the bourgeoisie forgets the pove~ty of the peasant
masses, if it does not reduce its prestige expenses, if it does not invest
enough of ita capital and intellectual resources in Senegal, and if it does
not aupport the economic plan in the most literal meaning of the word "support".
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
6108
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SENEGAL
' FRENCH TECHNICAL, ECOIIOMIC ASSISTANCE REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Apr 80 p 965 _
[Text]
In millions of -
French francs 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Total
BilaMeral aid...... 294 394 38k 470 536 600 2078
Including:
FAC (Aid and Co-
operation Fund)
Subsidies........ 62.5 66 74 63 93 90 448.5
Technical Asais-
tance............ 87 145
French technical assistance has stabilized in numbers and reached 1574
_ persons on 1 October 1979, divided as follows: general administration--47;
Ministry of Juetice--14; financial services--26; agricultural services--43;
Public works, equinment--57; post and telecommunications--5; health--86;
miscellaneous--11; primary education--33, general secondary education--620;
technical inatruction--239; professional training--88; higher education--305. -
The planned cost of technical assistance for 1980 is 160 million French
f rancs .
_ Ln 1979 the Aid and Cooperation Fund contributed 50 milli~n French francs,
mainly in the following operations: the Diama dam (first effect of the tri-
angular cooperation entrusted to Henry Jean-Baptiste); Dakar-Marine (all
~ of the installations of the naval shipyard were transferred to Senegal on
1 Januarq 1980; 36 French technicians remain assigned to it and 15 million
francs are envisaged for the peraonnel training plan); The Delta Harnessing
and Exploitation Company;.forest development; study of the iron deposit of
_ eastern Senegal; University (70 million francs over four yeara-~.
_ The aid has affected primarily (in millions of French francs): education--
24; gran~a for study and couraes abroad (650)--16; scientific research--32;
food aid--3; various equipment--50.
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Loans of the Central Economic Cooperation Fund in 1979 amounted to 160 mil-
lion French franca.
French investmenta, with a total of 260 million French franca, represen-
- ted 45 percent of the total in 1979.
There were 18,200 French citizens in Senegal, of whom a ~ittle leas than
6,000 were children of school age. A French achool has been operating fox
them for 2 years.
_ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et eie., Paris, 1980
6108
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SENEGAL
,
NEW FUEL, ELECTRIC POWER PRICE INCREASES
- Paris MARCHES TRCPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 806
[Text] On 26 March, the price of fuel rose 3 francs in Senegal. As a
- result, a liter of s~~per gasoline has now gone fr~m 162 to 165 CFA francs,
L�he price of regular gas has increased from 152 to 155 C~"A francs, and
finally, diesel fuel has risen from 1G0 to 103 CFA francs. `
The last fuel price increases came on 26 February. In mid 3anuaxy, other
increases had already occurred, bringing about a general increase in mass
tranportation rates. . -
Ousmane Seck, Senegalese minister of state for finance and economic af- -
fairs, explained that the increase in the cost of living in general and
- in the price of fuel in particular can mainly be explained by the higher
cost of oil. Seck said that the oil bill would exceed 40 billion CFA
francs, more than 50 percent over last year's figure.
Finally, the minister said that in order to pay for its oil, Senegal will
have to spend a sum equivalent to over 40 percent of its export receipts,
when 2 years ago, only 23 percent of these receipts covered oil purchases.
Furthermore, since January, SENELEC [presumably Senegalese ElPCtric Com-
- pany] has raised ratPS twice. The overall increase is an average of 6.5 per-
cent. It is expected that there will soon be a third increase on the order
of 8 percent.
SENELEC has in fact had~to face d ifferent increases. At the beginning of
January, increased wages meant an additional charge of 400 million CFA
francs and 300 million for equipment. The minister of industrial develop-
ment had granted a 4-percent rate hike.
In mid January, another increase was made necessary becaase of the higher
cost of oil products. In 1979, SENELEC used some 189,000 tons of heavy
fuel and 4,300 tons of diesel fuel. For 1980, it estimates it will need
19?,000 tons of heavy fuel and 8,400 tons of diesel fuel. Due to the
price increases, the additional charges will be an estimated 828 million -
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- CFA francs. A new request was submitted to the minister, who will accept
the recovery of only 400 million out of 828 million. This caused an
increase in rates on the order of 2.5 percent, applied at the end of
February.
Finally, on 25 February, a new increase in the pric~ of oil products
was to bring about additional charges on the order of 644 millien CFA
francs,, added to the 428 million that had not been recovered previously.
Consequently, SENELEC introduced a third request for a rate increase, which
may be on the order of 8 percent, in order to recover the loss caused by
this new charge of 1,073,000,000 CFA francs.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 198Q
11,464 -
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SENEGAL
BRIEFS
POLISH FISHING AGREEMENT--The Senegalese-Polish joint fishing commission
met in Dakar from 25 to 28 Marah. The delegation representing Senegal
was headed by Robert Sagna, secretary of state for deepsea fishing. Edwin
Vichnevsky, undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Trade and Maritime
Affairs, headed the Polish delegation. The meetin~, during which officials
evaluated compliance with the deepsea fishing agreement concluded between
_ Senegal and Poland in 1976 and valid until 1982, was deemed highly positive
by both sides. Technical cooperation will be intensified and new emphasis
will be placed on fishing training. In the near future, Poland will re-
ceive 45 Senegalese trainees. The programs will improve the competency
of persons working in the field of.fishing. [Text] [Paris MARCH~S TROPI-
- CAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p~805] 11,464
_ NF.T,1 MEASURES AIDING WOMEN--On 23 March, Senegalese Prime Minister Abdou
Diouf announced, in his address marking National Women's Weeks, that
effective on 1 July, working wompn will receive their entire wages during
their maternity leave. The measure changes the situation of wage-earning
women who to date have received only half of their pay during the entire
maternity leave. In addition, Mrs Maimouna Kane, secretary of state for _
human advancement, indicated that her office "has encouraged the estab-
= li4hment in our country of a private company that will provide ~obs for
1,~5~0 women and that in only 4 months has paid a minimum of 30,000 fr~ncs
per month to 630 Senegaleae." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDI-
TERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 805] 11,464
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SOMALIA
BRIEFS
IMF ASSISTANCE--At the end of February the International Monetary Fund ap-
proved an agreement authorizinz~ Somalia to make purchases amounting to a
maximum sum equivalent to 11.5 L~illion DTS [SDR] over thP next 12 months,
in ~upport of the financial program adopted by the government for 1980. Tfie
Somali economy is presently confroi~:'ted with serious difficulties because of
the prolonged 1973-1975 drought. As a result, public expenditures have in= _
creased rapidly, exports of agricultural products, which represpr:ced about
90 percent of the total exports, have diminished, inflationary tendencies
have intensified and the balance of payments has been considerably weakened.
At the same time, foreign assistance regiatered a significant decrease and -
political events aggravated the situation in the region. The government's
program for 1980; set up to improve the financial and economic situation, is
aimed at slowing inflation and reducing the deficit in foreign payments in
_ the years to come, through the adoption of ineasures tending to slow the
growth of the money in circu],ation and favoring the increased production of
agricultural foodatuffs, thus lessening the need for expensive imports of
food. Somalia's contribution to the IMF is 23 million DTS, and the total
amounZ of this country's debt to the IMF for previous operations and _
transactions amounts presently to 4.9 million DTS. [Excerpts] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Mar 80 p 760]
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~
'i'r'..NZANIti
BRIEFS -
HIGHER OIL IMPORT COST--According to Charles Nyirabu, governor of the Bank
of Tanzania, the cost of Tanzanian crude oil imports should be some 2.2 bil-
lion shillings in 1980 compared with 230.7 million in 1972. Consequently,
oil imports should represent 45 percent of the value of all Tanzanian ex- -
_ porta in 1980, a year when they ahould total some 5 billion shillings. In
1972, exports already amounted~to 2.27 billion shillings and the oil bill
therefore made up only about 10 percent of their value. The governor re-
called that Tanzania's trade balance showed a deficit of 1.68 billion
ahillings in 1977, with imports amounting to 6.19 billion. He added that
the def icit increased the following year (5.3 billion, with imports total-
ing 8.86 billion). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 4 Apr 80 p 820] 11,464
COST OF LIVING FIGURES--According to the Bureau of Statistics in Dar es .
Salaam, the consumer price index in Tanzania increased 13.3 percent between
the fourth quarter of 1978 and the corresponding period in 1979, going from
- 277.6 ~to 314.4 (base 100 = 1969). Food products increased only 8.3 percent
_ during the same period of time, beverages and tobacco 14.9 percent; and
clothing and shoes 23.8 percent. It should be pointed out that certain ob-
servers believe that inflation in Tanzania is much higher ~na~_these offi-
cial figures, allegedly amounting to 30 percent annually. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr 80 p 820] 11,464 ~
CUBAN AID--Mrs T. Siwala, Tanzanian minister of national education, recently -
thanked Cuban authorities publicly for their aid to Tanzania, particularly
- in the field of education. The minister said that Cuban aid has made it
p~ssible to build three secondary schools and that four more are being -
completed. There are 29 Cuban doctors working in Tanzania. A center of
artificial insemination has been set up in Butiama, near Musoma, by Cuban =
technical assistants. A delegation headed by A. Gomez Trueba, first deputy
chairman of the state committee for economic cooperation in Havana, tra-
veled'to Dar es Salaam to ~oin with Tanzanian authorities in examining ways -
of continuing Cuban aid. On 30 March, the delegation signed an agreement
for the sending of 15 Tanzanian teachers to Cuba:, where they will receive
agricultural training. Havana will also train teachers in the field of
fishing and will send fishing experts to Tanzania. The contract of Cuban
doctors in Tanzanian hosgitals will be renewed for 2 years. [Text] [Paris ~
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Apr ~fU p 820] 11,464
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