JPRS ID: 9098 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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JPRS L/9098
20 May 1980
Near Ec~st North Af~r~ca Re ort
p
cFOUO 17iso~
F~IS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION S~RVICE
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JPRS L/9098
20 May 1980
NEAR Ef~ST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
OUO 17/80)
CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Impact of Iran Failures on Arab View of U.S. Discussed
(Muhammad Haykal; THE TIMES, 28 Apr 80) 1
PLO, Lebanese, Libyan Reaction to Iran Raid Cited
(Igor Man; LA STA1~A, 26 Apr 80) 5
PLO's 'Arafat Gives Interview to 'LA STAMPA'
(Yasir 'Arafat Interview; LA STAMl~i, 1 May 80) 6
'STE1tN' Interviews PLO's 'Arafat on Middle Eset Affaira
(Xaeir 'Arafat Interview; STERN, 8 May SO) 12
- Benjedid Meeting With Bourguiba Examined
(Souhayr Belhassen; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 16 Apr 80) 17
Activity of 'Radio-Gafsa Libre' Reported _
(JEUNE .AFRIQUE, 12 Mar 8Q) 19
Islamic Conference Official Previews Upcoming Sesaion
(Babib Chatti Interview; THE TIMES, 28 Apr 80) 22
AFGHANISTAN
Poison Gas: 'Absolute Weapon' Reportedly Uaed by Soviet Troope
(Pierre de Villemarest; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 24 Mar 80) 23
Afghanistan Political Situation A�ter Soviet Invaeion
Rev;ewed
iBadr al-Rajj; AL-WATAN AL-'A~tABI, 27.-27 May 80) 25
,
Bei3i.rig-Oriented Comiaunist L~ader Tamim Interviewed
(Tamim InLerview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARAAI, 21-27 Mar 8Q) . 31 =
r
- a - [III - NE & A - 121 FOUO] ~
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CONTENTS (Continued)
Foreign Minister Shah Muhammad Dost Interviewed ~
(Shah Muhaum~ad Dos*_ Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
21-27 Mar 80) 36
Oppoaition Groups Described
(Bard al-Hajj; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 21-27 Mar 80).. 40
Burhanuddin Rabbani Interviewed -
- (Burhanuddin Rabbani Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
21-27 Mar 80) .................o.................. 44
IRAN ,
UK Paper Reports on Iranian Oil Deals
(Simon Henderson, Anthony Robinson; FINANCIAL =
TIMES, 24 Apr 80) 52
TUNISIA
Trial of Gafsa Incident Men Viewed
(Souhayr Belhasaen; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 Apr 80) 54 -
Briefs
Mohamed Salah Flias Jailed 57
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
IMPACT OF IRAN FAILURES ON ARAB VIEW OF U.S. ~TSCUSSED
LD281011 London THE iIMES in English 28 Apr 80 p 14
[Article by Muhammad Haykal, former editor of Cairo AL-AHRAM: "Is This
American Failure One Too Many"]
[Text] It is as true in the Arab world as it is anywhere else that
nothing succeeds like success--and nothing f ails like failure. The
bungled American attempt to free the hostages by force, however, is much
more serious than an isolated case of failure from which, after ail,
no one is immuned. But when failure follows upon failure, the conviction
sets in that this pattern is the rule rather than the exception.
Even before his abortive bid to rescue the hostages from Tehran, President
Carter's poli~ies faced an acute crisis of credibility in the Arab world.
The Arab reaction to this latest f ailure can be understood only if we
pass in quick review over the reasons for this crisis. -
Most people in the Arab world which, because of oil has become une of
_ the most sensitive regions for the West, perceive Mr Carter's policies
in the following terms:
In Camp David, Mr Carter departed from what had until then been a basic
rule in American Mideast policy: not to push for a separate peace agree-
ment between Egypt and Israel. I remember Dr Henry Kissinger telling me
- when he was still secretary of state that "...The United States is
steadfastly opposed to a separate peace between Egypt and Israel for
three obvious reasons: first, such a peace would isolate Egypt from the
rest of the Arab world, which is detrimental to Egypt's interests,
secand, it would cancel Egypt's moderating influence over the other Arab
parties to the problem, which is as harmf ul to them as it is to the
United States, and third, it would not produce peace, because the conflict _
is not only between Egypt and Israel, but is sometlting wider. _
When Mr Carter, after 18 months in office, abruptly departed from that
rule, the only explanation the Arabs could see was that the American ~
President, whose policies were all coming unstuck, wanted to achieve a
quick victory in the Middle East crisis with an eye more on his own
electoral interests than on Uni.ted States strategic interests.
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Not only did the dangers that Dr Kissinger and others saw materialize,
but the Arabs found themselves under pressure b5� the Americans to back
the Camp David accords which for~them represented, quite apart from the
separate peace between Egypt and Israel, a complete abandonment of all
aspecte of the Paleatinian cauae.
The moderate Arab countries, already worried at this amputation of
Egypt from the Arab body, began to feel they were under pressure not
only to forget ab~~it the Palestinian cause but to endange~ the stability -
of their own regimes c~hich, in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, are
_ in fact not much more than families and tribes with flags. Their only
claim ro legitimacy lies on a half-traditional, half-religious basis and,
should they abandon their responsibilit3e5 towards the holy places of `
Islam--including Jerusalem--nothing much would be left of their basis
to legitimacy. Any American arm-twisting un this issue was doomed not
only to f ail but also to generate deep resentment and bitterness.
- American policy towards the revolution in Iran, especially as regards
the shah, eroded their confidence in the United States still further.
Quite apart from any value judgments on this regime or the methods it
_ employed, no Arab ruler could ignore the words of General Ruba'i, former
commander ~f the Iranian air force, before a revolutionary tribunal:
"The United States took the shah by the scruff of his neck and threw him
out of Iran like a dead mouse."
There is a measure of truth in what he said. After backing the shah uncon-
ditionally until as Zate as ,7aniiary 1979, the United States suddenly
dropped him in a Iast-ditch effort to save the army. But as the Iranian
revolution gained momentum, it swept Che whole deal along with it. Not
only was the shah discarded like a dead mouse, but the Iranian army
c:ollapsed--at least as a force on which the United Statea could rely and _
which it could u~e in any future designs.
And ~o every Arab ruler understood clearly that the United Sts'�.es would
not stand by any of its friends who faced an internal danger.
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan at the end ~f 1979 the Arab world
- saw the United States standing helplessly by as a Middle Eastern country
succumbed to a danger coming without. Some months ago I happened to
be in the Gulf area, when the advance units of the Llnited States Fifth
, Fleet, diverted from the Pacific across the Indian Ocean, steamed into
the Gulf . Cotmne:iting on the event, the Kuwai.*_3. foreign minister,
Sheykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, to~d ~ae: "The Russians are over there _
in Afghanistan, not here in the Gulf. If they wa~ited to fight them
that is where the Americans should hav~ g~ne, not here." Sheikh al-Sabah's
_ words express the viewpoint of the governments in the area, wrio have come
to believe that they can rely only or. themselves when a queUtion of
internal danger arises.
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As ~o danger5 from without, the oil producers cannot defend the oil -
fields agAinst the Soviet Union. Any auch confrontation must be under-
taken by the Americans.
To add insult to in~ury, the Americans were now exhorting the Arab world
against the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan in the name oi Islam. The
Arabs were simply not prepared to see Mr Carter in the role of protector
of Islam when tt was his policies which had led to the issue of Jerusalem,
- a holy shrine for Islam, being placed in cold storage at Camp David.
How could they respond to Mr Carter's battle cry in the name of Kabul,
which had been invaded for a matter of weeks, and forget Jerusalem
which has been under occupation for years, with no end in sight? They
refused all efforts to recruit them in an Islamic pact directed against
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, feeling that they were being asked
t~ fight with the Koran a battle which the U.S. refused to wage with
its arsenal of power.
This is where things stood before the hostage crisis became acute. In
an earlier stage most Arab countries could not keep up ;�rith the sabre-
rattling from Washington, which was rising to a crescendo days after the
hostages had been taken. They felt the situation was difficult for the ?
Americans. Armed intervention appeared impossible because it could spark
off an explosion extending far beyond the borders af Iran. Waging a
punitive strike would have been a sterile act, whose only purpose would
be to let off steam. A maritime blockade seemed equally unlikely, as it
would have led to complete chaos in one of the most sensitive areas of
the world.
But the Arabs could not shake off the feeling that something was going to
happen.
_ We must remember that Arab feelings towards the Islamic revolution in Iran
were ambivalent. Those who approved of its Islamic character disapproved
of its revolutionary fervour, while those who admired its revolutionary
fervour had their reservations about its religious character. It must
be said in all fairness that the thrust of Iranian revolution and the
violence that accomp3nied it did not make matters easy for the area
� surrounding it, who regarded what was happening in Iran with a mixture
of admiration and doubt, awe and fear. Added to that was the feeling
of waiting for the unknown to happen.
But whatev~r form the unknown could take, Arabs felt the Americans would
not resort to force. Th~y believed the time for force was past, if
only because activities in che political and diplomatic areas had led
- to some progress on the hostage question. Following efforts by the
_ United Nations, its secretary-general and the special coitm?ission he had
dispatched to Iran, Khomeyni had announced that the hostages would be the
tirst item on the agenda of the new Iranian parliament scheduled to meet
in Che second half of May.
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While the Americans did not object to this decision, President Carter ~
auddenly came up with the new demand that the hostages be transferred
from the authority of the students occupying the American Embassy to
that of the Revolutionary Council. As Mr Bani Sadr explained to all
mediators, neither he as an elected president nor the council could
keep hostages. If the students could defy international law by taking
hostages, the authority of the state could not. To the astonishment of
many people, President Carter persisted in his demand--not that the
hostages be released immediately but that they be transferred to the r
custody of the Revolutionary Council, It was clear that he was under
the pressures of the primaries. Most people in the Arab world thought
that these pressures would not push him much further than ps~?chological, -
economic or political warf are in collaboration with some of America's �
allies in the West. .
- As it happened, they were wroilgl Not only did he try to use military
force and fail lamentably--which was bad enough politically--but even
worse was the excuse he gave for this failure. The metaphysical belief
in American power and technology was badly shaken. Obviously a plan
~ ' of this importance and sensitivity had received the very best in the
way of America's human and material resources. In addition, the regional _
stage was all set, with American milirary bases throughout the region,
not to mention the naval units scatter.ed around the Gulf and the Indian
Ocean, in spite of that the operation failed "because 40 per cent nf the
equipment used at the most sensitive stage of the operation broke down--
three out of eight helicopters." In the ensuing confusion, "American
planes c~llid2d together" and the bodies of American marines killed in
. the operation were left behind. The general impression in the Arab
world--and even if it is only a fi~st impression its impact is baund to -
remain for a long time to come--that those who depend on American power
to protect them from external dangers are entitled, starting now, to
suFfer f rom inaomnia.
- The Arab world heard Ayatollah Khomeyni say that "Carter is trying to
imitate the lion, but he is not a lion." Mr Carter has proved to be
no fox either. He should perhaps have professor Brzezinski over to the
_ Oval Office for a second reading of Machiavelli's The Prince, particu-
larly the part in which he says:
"A prince be3.ng thus obliged to know well how to act as a beast must ~
imitate the fox and the 1ibn. For the lion cannot protect himself from
- traps, and the fox cannot defend himself from the wolves. One must, -
~ therefore, be a fox to recognize traps and a lion to fr3ghten wolves."
_ COPYRIGHT: Times Newspaper Limited, 1980
CSO: 4820
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
PLO, LEBANESE, LIBYAN REACTION T:, I~AN RAID CITED -
LD300945 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 26 Apr 80 p 1
[Dispatch by Igor. Man: "Quicksands of the Middle East"]
[Excerpts] Eeirut--The news of the failed U.S. blitz reached a Beirut
that has spent a sleepless night becausa of the state of alert: Israeli
" patrol boats were cruising along the Lebaaese coastlin.e. The first
reactions from the man in the street were shock and concern: because
of the heavy burden they have borne for years of warfare and destruction, -
the Lebanese are led to believe almost instinctively that any military
incident in the area "will sooner or later have repercuss~ons in Lebanon."
But let us leave aside the more than justified complexes of the Lebanese
and look at the reactions. PLO spokesman Mahmud Labadi told me: "This
attack is a provocation dictated by arrogance. The arrogance has been
punished but will the failure of the blitz make the Americans desist
from attempting f urther aggressions? T'nis is the point. ~Jbviously all
our solidarity goes to tt;e Iranian people, who will manage to repel other
attacks. But what has happened gravely endangers peace. The alternatives
- for the Americans are either another Vietnam, if they try again, or some-
~ thing even worse."
I asked him for his opinion on the hostages. "I do not want to comment
on the hostages' situation, especially at a moment such as t~is," he
replied. _
I encountered strict silence at the Foreign Ministry but one diplomat did
tell me in confidence that the blitz "is a great misfortune, because its -
failure diminishes U.S. credibility also on the military plane." One
Libyan source issued the following epigrammatic verdict: "A brutal
aggression, but carried out to an Egyptian standard," with an obvious
reference to the ill-fated Cyprus raid carried out by the Caixo para-
troopers.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editi~. LA STAMPA S.p.A
CSO: 4404 r -
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
PLO'S 'ARAFAT GIVES INTERVIEW TO 'LA STA1~A'
LD050959 Turin L~, STAI~A in Italian 1 May 80 p 3
~ [Interview with PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat, by Igor Man: "Let Us Talk
About Israel and the Red Brigades"--date not given]
[Text] Beirut--An 80-minute interview with Yasir 'Arafat is an extra-
ordinary experience. In some respects the PLO chairman is reminiscent of
Khrushchev, at least in character: Khrushchev spoke only the Russian of
_ Ukranian peasants, whereas 'Arafat knows not only English and French but
also Italian. Nevertheless, like the old Nikita, the Palestinians'
supreme leader moves from indignation--whether simulated or otheYwise--to -
calmnesa, from emotional feelings to invective, from oratorical emphasis
to concise discourse, from what one might term a detached meticulousness
_ to deliherate vagueness, from f].ashes of irony to zorrential eloquence.
- What follows is the essence of an 80-minute conversat3on--from 0100 to
0220--in his epartan office somewhere in Beirut, protected by youths
armed with AK-47 SS and watched over by a huge portrait of Khomeyni.
[Question] On what conditions would you Palestinians agree to negotiate
with Iarael at the same table? You are accused of hating the Jews, but
it is also true that you have had contacts with non-Zionist Israelis in
Frague and Rome, as well as with the Americans in Vienna. Perhaps this
charge stems from the f act that your national council [convenzione -
nazionale] envisages Israel's destruction....
_ Irritated, 'l~x'afat ~eized the end of the question and burst out: "I ~un -
- surprised and regret that even you, with your lengthy experience of the
Middle East, have proved to be a victim of the lie invented a long time
' ago now by Mr_ Harkabi (former Israeli secret service cliief--LA STAMPA
, editor's no~e) with this colossal lie Harkabi mounted a campaign against
the Palestinians and nurtured the war against us. I regret that the West, _
America and Western Europe, poisaned by the enormous lie, are still being '
diverted from our people's tragic fate.
~ "How can you have forgotten that for years we have been the victims of
ouCrages, continuous attacks and massacres? Can you have forgotten our
t~er:ible disperson? Some 60 percent of our people are in exile and
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40 percent suffer occupation. The Palestinians have no homeland, no
identity. Every day wa suffer, we suffer losses claimed by the most
= sophisticated weapons supplied to Israel by the United States in the
= occupiPd territories in South Lebanon, where Palestinians and Lebanese
die together. And after all this you come to us and repeat the lies
spread by a hanciful of racist Israeli soldiers who have a prime minister
and foreign minister wanted by,the British police for terrorism. And then -
you come and ask us to talk with people who say 'no' to the Palestinian
people, to a Palestinian state and to the PLO and who spread lies about
us in complete bad faith.
"We are struggling to gain a homeland, to give a home to our women and
children. Dues this make us terrorists? If that is the case and if words
- have any meaning, thei. paradoxically the whole of Europe is terrorist ~
because it combated Nazis~ and fascism. And the same applies to the whole
of Africa which has struggled to liberate itself from colonialism. Well,
if fighting for freedom and a homeland means carrying out terrorism, we
can conclude ~hat George Washington was a}errorist."
[Question] Chairman, please do not get angry. I am doing my ~ob as a
journalist: my questian is not a provocative one and I will repeat it.
On what conditions...
A Change , -
[Answer] We are looking ahead to a solution within the context of the
United Nations. This is the path which we are following. But Israel ,
refuses to implement the UN resolutions, forgetting that it owes its
creation precisely to the United Nations, though by on~ly one vote and
to the detriment of the Palestinlan people....
[Question] But you should not forget that the Soviets were the first to
recognize the state of Israel....
[Answer] Since then we have become a people without a homeland, a people
who have suffered and who are still suffering more than any other in the
world. Take South Afxica: there too the natives are oppressed, but at
least they live on their own territory. We, on the other hand...please
excuse my heated remarks, but they betray my suff ering, my bitterness--
- above 311 at Europe's hesitation to shoulder its historical and moral
responsibilities. Damn it: All you do is worry about Israel's security,
its prosperity, and so on and so forth, but do you e~ver think of us, the
vic t ims ?
[Question] Let us look again at the question of possible "relations" with
Israel on the basis of something more specific. Let us look at the five
points pre~ented in Europe a few days ago by three Palestinian delegations.
These f ive points were presented as a plan for resolving the Palestinian
problem. I quote Khalid al-Hasan and Na'im Khadar: "1. Israel must
w~+.thdraw to the borders which existed before the 1967 War; 2. The occupied
zones must pass under UN control for 6-12 months; 3. The United Nations
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must organize a referendum to show what kind of government the Palest~nians _
want; 4. If they opt for indep endence, a state will be established; 5. Then
negotiations will be opened under UN auspices, attended by the United
States, the USSR, the EEC countries and the other countries of the region,
including ttie government of the new state (Palestine) and Israel, to discu~ti
the refugees, the borders and other probi.ems." These pnints have prompted
much interest in Europe. Do you approve them? [question ends] -
Thouph containing reservations, 'Arafat's reply was positive on the whole.
Thi~, therefore, indicates an important turning point in Palest~nian policy.
This was his reply: "The five points are proposals aimed at promoting an
- EEC initiative to resolve the principal nub of the Mideast crisis--the "
Palestinian problem. They were put foxward by a delegation from our
National Council and as a whole reflect the decisions taken by the National
Council itself. They are aimed at gaining recognition of our rights: self-
determination, an independent state, and so forth, within the context of
the United Nations and in line with UNGA Resol~itions 3236 and 3237, with
the participation of the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR.
We believe that the United States cannot adopt any auconomous role: it
cannot and must not 'forget' the other major power, the Soviet Union.
"Now," 'Arafat continued, "we are awaiting our delegation's return for a
detailed accout?~ of the various European countries' reactions. But I can
already state that I consider the 24 April decision taken in Strasbourg
by the Council of Europe Assembly an important step, although as far as
~ we directly are concerned, I must add that our legitimate rights should be
specif ied more explicitly."
[Quest~on] S~ th~; proposals addressed to the Europe of the Nine are revised
ones. But in an interview with LA STAMPA 21 March, Begin said that Europe
needs Israel. He claimed that he will continue the policy of settlements.
He said that there wi11 never be a Palestinian state.
[AnswerJ Begin's remarks confirm what I have already said about this
sinister person. But there is something I would like to add: a situation
can be dominated by force--as Israel is doing--but not indefinitely. When
one is mov3ng against history, no strength is sufficient. History marches
ahead in step with the just, eventually crushing the arrogant. Athens, -
despite its great power, did not manage to conquer Rome, but Jesus of
Nazareth--a Palestinian like us-~did more ~han that: he entered the
hearts of all men of good will. We, too, are walking steadfastly with
history: this is why we will prevail over the arrogance and strength of
a handful of bellicose racists. We are not opposed to the Jews: our
National Council has taken a historic decision, which has opened up
the dialog with the non-Zionist Israelis. The dialog will continue with
the Rakah (Isra~'_i Communist Party--LA STAMPA editor's note), with men
like General Peled, just to mention one prestigious name. Strength does
n~t frighten us; we believe we are in the right; history is on our side.
[Question] If I have understood you properly, you ~io not hate the Jews.
You say that you do not want them to disappear. Nevertheless, Israeli
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propaganda has published a summary of an interview which you granted to the
Venezuelan paper EL MUNDO (11 February 1980). In tha.t interview, you
apparently said, among other things: "For us peace means the destruction
of Israel." What do you say to that?
[Anawer] I have the courage to defend my assertions. I have always done
so. But yet again thj.s is a shameful lie, an absurd manipulation. I
challenge anyone--Israeli propaganda, the author of the so-called inter-
view--to prove that I have ever said anything of the kind. I could not
have made such an assertion because it would have conflicted with the
decisions of our National Council, which we have just looked at. Damn it:
_ We are civilized people and are proud of it--we, the victims of Israeli
~,ggression and oppression.
[Question] Let us talk briefly about relations with Jordan. You have had
a reconciliation with King Husayn. Do you intend to have closer relations .
with Amman?
~Ai;swer] I was expectinQ this question. We are trying to carry on relations
with Palestinians and Jordanians. At the Baghdad summit a joint committee
was set up to gain Jordanian backing to support the Palestinians in the
- occupied areas. Following my meetit~gs with King Husayn I really do hope to
strengthen relations between ourselves and the Hashemite kingdom. Among
other things--let this be said without rhetoric--despite past tragic
situations, there is a close bond between our two peoples.
[Question] After 32 years in exile and 15 years' struggle are you looking
more towarcl the United States, the USSR or indeed Europe to resolve your
tragic situation f or a people without a homeland? What do you expect from
_ the EEC and Italy in particular?
[Answer] In our eyes the United States has lost al~ credibility. Carter's
~ withdrawal following the Security Council vote was followed by the
humiliating spectacle of the nomination of candidates hunting for votes
from the Jewish community, obviously at our expense. I wonder where the
"morality" they talk about so much is, where the famous "human rights"
preached by President Carter have gone? Did he not formerly condemn
the practice of settlements? Has it not proved a little too easy to
forget the Vance-Gromyko joint ~statement of October 1977? Is it possible
that merP election interests could e~rer divert a president who invokes
the Bible from the famous "human rights?" Under such cor.ditions, how can
you trust the United States? As for the USSR, it supports our sacrosanct
rights: Well then, how could we'fail to consider it a power close to
, ourselves?
Camp David
[Answer continues] As far as Europe is concerned, we acknowledge that many
steps forward have been taken. Generally by the EEC and in particular by
individual European politicians. In this connection emphasis should be
placed on Austrian Chancellor Kreisky's courage, the stance adopted by
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- Spanish Precnier Suar.ez and the Portuguese President. But we expect the
whole of th~ Europe of the Nine, and Ital;~ especially, to turn down the
_ path taken by Kreisky, after due cons3deration. The Italian Government
was the first to realistically demonstrate understanding toward us.
Unfortunately, the Italian leaders seem to have backtracked somewhat
recently. I refuse to believe that Ita1y is dominated by Ameri~a. We
= have many friends in Ita1y and can count on the support of aeveral political
forces and on the solidarity of broad sCrata of your public opinion. Above
nll, we trust President Pertini. The cons~itution:restricts his powers,
but tl~e charismatic strength of "Sandro," as the people call him, is such
~nd ao great that !.t can influence a broader political alinement in the
rtt3ht clirection.
[Question] In connection with Italy, as you well know, a member of the
- Red Brigades has announced that the Red Brigades have purchased weapons
from the Palestinians. He has said that Red Brigades members have been
trained in Palestinian camps. The PLO Rome office has denied this. If
you *.aill permit me, I would like to ask you--who with real courage l~ad
the man responsible for the riumicino [Rome airport] massacre in
December 1973, 'Abd al-Ghafur al.ias Abu Mahmud, sentenced; you who
sentenced Abu Nidal; you who conciemned Aldo Moro's assassination--why do
you not promote a thorough investigation--as you can do--to verify whether
those Red Brigades members' assertions are true or false?
[Answer] And who has told y, that I have not already taken action? As
soon as I heard of those stat~~~ients I immediately opened a thorough
investigation. Furthermore, I invited the Italian authorities to supply
me with all possible details so I could get to the bottom of the matter.
I am following it personally. I would like LA STANIPA, with its authorita-
tive voice, to exert pressure on th~ Italian authorities, to persuade them
to supply me--as far as is compatible with the secrecy covering preliminary
inveatigations--with all the information which I am still awaiting and which
will enable me to carry out a thorough investigation without fearing anyo}~,e.
~
I am af raid that one of the many "visitors"--they come f rom all over the
world--might ha~e managed to enter one of our training camps and, on the
basis of casual alleged "f riendships," might have tried to fabricate an
apparently plausib].e story. Be that as it may, I repeat: Let them supply
me with more information and I will act thoroughly and most decisively.
I tell you, in the name of Aldo Moro, Europe's foremost defender of our
rights, that anyone who has speculated on our good faith to attack demo-
cratic Italy's security and its people and most prominent men wi11 be
unmaske d .
[Question] Very good. Is 26 May an important date for you?
[Answer] No. A show is being staged in the wake of Camp David, starring
Carter, Begin and A1-Sadat. Th3s "sketch" envisages the greatest possible
insult to the Palestinian people, who have been so sorely tried and vexed.
What is Camp David for us if not a tragedy? What kind of autonomy is being
so haughtily proposed to us? The Israelis demancl to control everything,
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even the water sources. Give me one example anywhere in the world of a
village which does not control its own dr3nking water. Israel demands
_ bordere which no state has ever dreamed of demanding--defeneible,
historical, biblical and now even water bordera.... If it were not a
tragedy, it would be funny.
[Question] One final very topical question on South Lebanon, the West
Bank, AfghBnistan and Iran.... The danger of another war is nearer th~n
ever. Are you optimiatic or pessimistic?
[Answer] Definitely opt3~nisLic/ I am we11 acquainted with this g.eopolitical
area. I know its territory and its history, this is a land which has seen
prophets born, or at least pass by. It is rich in history, faith and
quicksands. The sand is useful for jword indist3ncr], but 3t can also
halt a war machine. This is why I say that while we can step confidently
on it, for advenCurist foreigners there is always the danger of sinking
into the quicksand. I will add no more. A few words suffice for the
intelligent.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editr. LA STAMPA S.p.A.
CSO: 4404
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
'STERN' INTERVIEWS PLO'S 'ARAFAT ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS ~
DW081057 Hamburg STERN in German 8 May 80 pp 286-289
[Interview with PLO Chief Yasir 'Arafat by Klaus Liedtke and Wibke Bruhne
at 'Araf at's off ice in a Beirut hotel; interview conducted in English
and partially in Arabic through an interpreter--date not given]
[Text] STERN: Mr 'Arafat, Foreign Minister Genscher 3s afraid that the
current world crisis will even aggravate in early eummner--when what is
now taking ehape will be certain, namely, that the talks between A1-Sadat
' and Begin on an autonomy for the Palestinians will fail. ~
'Arafat: Aggravate? I would rather say explode!
STERN: In what f orm?
'Arafats We will let the actions te11 their own ta1e. All I am saying
ie this: There will not be any calm in the Near and Middle East without
a solution of the Palestinian problem. This man Carter! He makes so
much noiae over Afghanistan and suddenly rides the Islamic horses! But
he forgeta that thia horae is tied up with one hoof to the Palestinian
cause. " '
STERN: Does this mean that you do no~ support the campaign of the
Islamic guerrillas in Afghanistan?
'Arafat: Suddenly you have discovered sympathy for Islam and for Afghanistan. _
But the Islam in occupied Jexusalem you have forgotten.
STERN: We are talking about Afghanistan at the moment. Are you on the
side of the Soviets there?
'Arafat: We advocate a peaceful solution of the problems in Afghanistan.
I diacussed that with Bani-Sadr, with Mrs Gandhi and with an envoy of
Castro. We prefer ~kacit diplomacy. ~ .
STERN : In Trsn as ~aell?
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'Arafat: The Iranians are my allies, my brothers. We are on their side
if and when they combat the actions of the Americans. America! What
kind of a"superpower" is that! What has become of it! This abertive
liberation attempt--was it not a scandal?
STERN: Is not the taking of hostagea the ecandal in the firet place?
'Arafat: You are talking about 50 Aa~erican hostages. In the territories
occupied by Israel we have 1.7 million Palest~lnian h~etagea.
STERN: What does the one have to do with the other? One injuetice does
not make the other any better.
~
'Arafat: Before the Americana speak about the violation of international
law they ought to make it clear that they themselves do noL violate it.
In the south of Lebanon the Israelis, with the help of the Americans, are
using internationally banned arms against us. Who is lamenting the
violation of international law in that cRSe2 And is the expulsion of
the Palestinians from their hamlets not a violation of international law?
STERN: Nevertheless, we would like to hear your opinion about the taking
of hoatagea in Teheran. Do you approve of it?
'Arafat: I suggest that we talk about the hoatages now who worry me most:
the milliona of Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories.
STERN: Well enough. The European Council has underscored the right to
self-determination of the Palestinians. It was promptly criticized ~
vehemently for it by Ieraeli Prime Miniater Begin. Yet, at the same time '
- the European Council has called:on the Palestinians to r~cognize Israel's
right to exiet. Are you prepared to do that?
'Arafat: Counterquestion: Why doea the Federal Republic not recognize
the PLO?
STERN: Thia will not be possible as long as you refuse the Israelis the
right to exist.
~ 'Arafat: You Germans have been neglecting us Palestinians for 32 years
now. You are ignoring the genocfde committed aga3nst us. You Just talk
about terrorista all the time. But you fa31 to see our tragedy. This
ie not my house in which I am sitting, this is not my home. Have you seen
the camps in which my people are penned in? You Germans are not culpable
for everyth3ng, becauae we are footing your bi11, we have to suffer for -
what you did to the Jews. All you worry about a11 the time is the security
~
of Israel, the future of Israel. And what about our future?
STERN: So, no recognition?
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'Arafat: We are not againat the Jews per se. And we hav~ already suggested
two solutiona to the problem. The first being a common state for Jewa,
Muslime and Christiana. The aecond the establishment of a Palestinian
state on every inch of aoil from which the Israelis withdrew or which is
~ liberated. You re~ect both poeaibilities. And what have you and the world
had to offer us? The Camp David agreement. A self-governmen~ under Iaraeli
- supremacy which does not even grant us the right to control our water
sources ourselves.
STERN: You are dodg~.ng the queetion about the recognition of Israel's
right to exist. Yet, this remaina the key to the Near East problEm. If
- you asaent to this right you will not only gain further recognition in
the world but you would also relieve the Israelis of the fear that you
pureue the destruction of their state.
'Arafat: I beg your pardonl Israel is the biggest military power in the
Near East. All Arab states are af raid of it. How could we Palestinians
deetroy Iarael? Should we ever get our state, then t~g� will need at least
. 15 years to build up this state, to set up schools and authorities, to
generate electricity, to build roads.
STERN: And what will happen after these 15 years?
'Arafat: After all, Ierael has at least 10 ot 15 atomic bomba. Do you
really believe we could... -
STERN: ...Whether you can is a different question. Do you want to? ~
'Arafat: Where in your queation is the neutrality of the ~ournaliats?
- You are a victim of Israeli propaganda. I am going by the resolution of
our National Congress in 1974. Under this resolution we pursue the
establishment of our state ~n each inch of soil from which the Israelis _
withdraw or which we liberate. And if the Israelis withdraw even from
Jericho we will hoist our flag there as well. Just look at your own _
constitution. You aspire to reunification which, after all, spells the
diesolution of the GDR.
STERN: Wrong. We aim for reunification, but we do not want to throw the
inhab~.tants of the GDR into the sea.
'Arafat: Who has told you that I want to throw the Israelis into the sea?
STERN: The Israeli Embassy in Bonn, for example, circulates quotations
from the conference of the so-called re3ection front of Arab states in
Libya. They supposedly ~oined A1-Qadhdhafi's call to f3ght for the
"disappearance of the Israelis from the map" and for the "return of the
Zionist invaders to their countries of origin."
'Arafat: Thia is an incredible lie. I have not said anything like that. .
Here (shows ex~itedly some papers in Arabic). That is the result of the
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conference signed by f ive state chiefs (shows the signatures). Nothing ,
~ like that stands there. The Israelis recently made a similar insinuation
with regard to me. In an interview with the Venezuelan paper EL MU1Vn0,
I was said to have spoken of the destruction of Israel. I have never
_ aeen a representative of that paper, nor have I ever heard of this paper.
The enormous propaganda machinery of the Israelis is behind it.
STERN: This "propaganda machine" also says that a Palestinian state in ~
this region would become a satellite of Moscow and a basis for terrorist
attacks on Israel.
'Arafat: I am a friend of the Soviet Union. We are backed by the socialist -
etates. But I am not a communist. The strongest grouping of the PLO, the
A1 Fatah, is not a communist organization. Of the 303 members of our
National Congress only five are communists. We are proud of our democracy.
STERN: And what will happen if murderous commandos attack Israel f rom -
- such a Palestinian state--maybe radical splinter groups not agreeing with
a moderate course of chief of state Yasir 'Aracat?
'Arafat: What did you do to the Baader-Meinhof group?
STERN: Locked it up.
'Arafat: Well you see? Everybody who violates the law in our state will
also naturally be locked up.
ST~RN: In the meantime, however, your terror fight against Israel continues,
and every new attack on civilians, such as in Hebron, stops at least
temporarily the sympathy for the fate of the Palestinians which is beginning
to sprou~+ in the whole world.
- 'Arafat: Hebron wa~, a legitimiate action of resistance against foreign
occupiers who have conf iscated the country, expelled its people and trampled
upon the religious and cultural values of our people. Look at the [word
indistinct] settlers of Gush-Emunim and what they are doing with our people.
They want Palestinian Hebron to become a Jewish town. And what do the
Israelis do to our civilians in Lebanon? But you do not like to write
about the murderous attempts made against us.
STERN: So you do not consider yourself a terrorist but a resistance
fighter?
'Arafat: If I am a terrorist, De Gaulle, who fought against the Germans, -
was also one, or George Washington who rebelled against England, or Mugabe,
thF new prime minister of Zimbabwe. In contrast to Begin and his foreign
miitister I have never killed. May I remind you of the UN resolution
gra~:ring suppressed peoples the right to act with political, economic and
military means against their occupiers. When the occupation has ended,
all these actions will also stop. ~
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STERN: The UN resolution only grants the right to fight against the occupiers
and not against uninvolved third parties. There have been Palestinian
attacks xn the whole world. Italian autherities have found out not that
the kidnappers of Moro, the Red Brigades, obtained their arms from the
Palestinians. _
'Arafat: That is incorrect. And we have never trained an Italia.n either.
I ha.ve asked the Itaiian Government for evidence.
- STERN: And what about all the other assa~tlts in the world that have been
carried out by the Palestinians in the name of Palestine?
'Arafat: That is none of my business. I can be held responsible only for
my sphere, for my area, for the PLO. You do not ?iold the Italian people
respcnsible for the actions of the Red Brigade, or the German people for
the Baader-Meinhof group, or the Spanish people for ETA.
STERN: We know that you approve only of such actions which take place
within the occupied areas or within Israel. But for many people abroad
it looks like an ideal, maybe even agreed on division of labor: The PLO,
which is trying to achieve diplomatic recognition, is only involved in
"clean" resistance fighting and the dirty terror is being done by the
other Palestinian organizations.
'Arafat: This is again such an Israeli lie. One could equally well say
that there is a division of labor in the Federal Republic between the
government and Baader-Meinhof.
STERN: Are you asking the other Palestinian organizations to stop their _
international terrorism?
'Arafat: Everybody acting against the decisions of our;National Council
will be held responsible.
STERN: For example?
'Arafat: When Abu Nidal started his actions....
STERN: ...Occupations of embassies, the taking of hostages, assassinations
in the Arabian Peninsula and Europe....
'Arafat: ...We excluded him immediately. We fight a11 who deviate from
our line.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Gruner + Jahr AG + Company
CSO: 4403
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
BENJEDID MEETING WITH BOURGUIBA EXAMINED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 16 Apr 80 p 27
[Article by Souhayr Belhassen]
[Text] On his first "excursion" into the Arab world, President Chadli
Ben~edid made a good ~ob of it. Between 23 March and 3 April, he paid
official visits to 12 countries*. Wherever he went, he advocated "the ~
assembling of the Arabs and the development of good neighbor relations."
Coming from a chief of state whose country is in a state of war with its
neighbor to the west, that seems to be a contradiction. A11 the more of a
contradiction because Gafsa was as much an Algerian-Tunisian affair as it -
wae a Tunisian-Libyan affair.
With Riyadh and Tunis, the Algerian president apoke about "the value ,
Algeria places on the stability of neighboring regimes." For the Saudis,
who are supporting Morocco in the Sahara affair, the attitude of President -
Chadli has to be taken seriously. The same is true of the Tunisians. With
this difference, however, that as regards Tunisia the statement of intent i
by the Algerian chief of state was a response. A response to the desire i
on the part of the Tunisian authorities to exonerate the Algerians in the
Gafsa affair, in order, as they have always maintained, "to keep Tunisia
from having to fight on two fronts." However, the erasing of an affair _
such as that of Gafsa in the period of 1 hour is fatally sweeping the
actual problems under the rug. These problems merit real working sessions.
Was that the reason President Bourguiba invited his guest to r~pend 24 hours
in Tunisia? The fact of the matter is Chat he immediately went to the
heart of the matter. "It is said that you do not care too much for us?"
That was the question he thruet at Mohamed Yahiaoui when the strong man of _
the FLN was introduced to him. "I am the dean of the chiefs of state whom -
~ you have visited," he told Chadli. "You should have started with me."
Bourguiba concealed even less his ill-humor which he had taken great pains
*Successively: Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, North Yeman, South
Yemen, Qatar, Bahrein, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Libya an3 Tunisia
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to contain since Gafsa. Chadli gave his word as a man and an officer that
_ we aas not up to date on what was being hatched (in his c~untry) against
Tunisia and renewed his assurance that Tunisia will not have problems with
Algeria.
It is known that in Tunia the Gafsa affair continues to cause stirrings in
the high Algerian political sectora. It is also known that the carda will
be dealt again. Thus, it seems that President Chadli decided to get rid
of a certain number of minor officials involved in the affair and to draw
closer other highly placed officials to neutralize them, such as Slimane
Hoffman, head of the GLN's foreign affairs section, who was moreover a -
member of the official delegation to Tunis.
While Bourguiba returned to the question of Gafsa, members of the gQVern-
ment took care to bypass it and speak of bilateral cooperation. The
Algerian side said that it was ready to reactivate such cooperation.
President Chadli even positioned himself as a mediator between Bourguiba _
and Qadhdhafi by bringing the former fraternal and respectful greetings
from the latter. "If what you say is true, how do you explain Gafsa?"
Bourguiba asked. _
Although there is still a cl-~ill between Tunisia and Libya, for Algeria it
ia a time for accolades; and one can only be pleased at this. However,
the Gafsa attack produced 48 dead and 100 wounded; and 15 commandos were
- sentenced to death. Although Tunisians could not be spared such an ordeal,
they have a right to know who was involved in the Gafsa coup and why.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
8143
- CSO: 4400
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
ACTIVITY OF 'RADIO-GAFSA LIBRE' REPORTED
Paria JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Mar 80 pp 24-25 _
[Text] Tunisia-Libya. Transmitting from Libyan territary,
"Free Radio Gafsa" batters the Tun isian population with
iinaginary news. Radio delirium. From our correspondent _
in Tun is, Souhayr Belhassen.
_ "50-3--From Ma,jed to Choaib...They are waiting for you at Bardo. Do not blow
up La Goulette" (port of Tunis). "30-6--Salem--Salem...The grasshoppers are
everywhere. Stay where you are...." These mysterious messages transmitted ~
by "Free Radio Gafsa" which broadcasts on medium waves are iimnensely
, successful in Tun isia. Static 3amming the broadcast? Just by turning the
knob you can again pick up: "This is Radio Gafsa, the voice of the revolu-
tionary movement for freeing Tunisia." "The Will to Live," a patriotic song
by the Tuniaian poet, Abou el-Kacem Chebbi, sung by the ~nisian wrnnan, Qulaya,
ie uaed as the call-sign for three daily broadcasts: 0700 to 0900, 1400 to
1700 and 1900 to 2300.
"Free Radio Gafsa"
Saturday, 23 February, 0700: the "Calls to the workers" are starting.
Firat the farmers who "are heading towards their hard labor while the
revellers who oppre~ss then and suck their blood are ~ust now ending their
drinking bouts and orgies...." There follows a tirade about the alliance
_ between "the upper middle class and the feudalists," in le~gue with each
other to dispossess the sma11 farmex, forced to se11 to the big farmer to ~
pay back loans from the bank. And so the raorkers are exploited by bosaes
"who have bank acco~mts in Switzerland," wh31e their union rights are diare-
garded by a"puppet UGTT (Tuniaian General Workers' Union)." Lastly "The
Young People's Broadcast" criticizes Tunisian education policy which "over-
looks the Arab-Moslem values, the political and union liberties of etudents
sub~ected to selection and oppression."
At the end of each broadcast there is a call for which the call-sign is th~
_ salute to the Tunisian flag: "Th3.s is the voice- of the people, it is our
revolution. Stay with us until total liberation. Citizens, attack police ~
_ atations, the national guard, the military barracks. Rise up against oppression,
in~ustice, humiliations."
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At 1400, the news. Example: "A lieutenant from the Tunisian Army has ~ oined
the ranks of the revolution. The fate of higher-ranking Tunisian officers
will be no better than that of the ehah." Thus with measages coded in ruimors,
mingling an ounce of truth with immense delirium, "Free Radio Gafea" eewe
disorder in people's minda~ e~?en though its exceases cause laughter. ~en
though it is lmown for a certainty that French airplanes and American
marinea are neither streaking acrosa Tuniaia's skies nor overrunning the -
streets of the capital. How can it be ae~ertained that such and such a ~
leader does not posse.sa the holdinge triat an announcer with a Tunieian accent
says he does?
Triumphalist News
"Free ~adio Gafsa" started its broadcasting ,on 6 February, i.e. 10 days after
the beginning of the attack on Gafsa. According to information from reliable -
sources, this pirate radio station is no other than...Radio Tripoli, and no
matter what it says, broadcasts from Libyan territory. This is not the first
feat of this kind carried out by Radio Tripoli. Thus it was that following
the abortive coup of 16 August 1972 against King Hassan II a broadcast entitled
"The Voice of the Liberation" with lrbroccan speakers was broadcast from
Libyan territory t~ MorDCCO.
Aa for Tunisia, after the attack on Gafsa and throughout the days that followed,
Radio Tripoli went on trumpeting chiefly imaginary and always triumphalist
"news." Samples provid e evidence; "Tunisian power is on its laet legs, it
is going to _fall in a matter of a few hours or a few days. The ~niaian
liberation arnny, having hemmed in Gafsa, Sfax, Gabes and other cities, is _
advancing on a besieged Tunis.--The sold-out power has found no help except
from the French paratroopers and the marines of the American Sixth Fleet. But
this power has already been dropped by its own soldiers and policemen who,
to a man, have abandoned a decayed regime to join forces with the liberation
army. The policemen have taken refuge in the mountains. Resistance is getting
organized, and Tunisia, w3thin the next few days, is going to become yet
another new tomb of imperialism...."
For a Faithful Listener
After the birth of "Free Radio Gafsa," which was supposed to put more truth
into these Libyan lucubrations there was no noticeable let-up in Radio
Z'ripoli's whackings. Sunday 24 February, for example, the news transmitted
at 2115 repeated: "Alt ercations between the Tunisian people and French sold iers
are still going on in the south of Tunisia." That occurred nearly a month
after the cessation of fighting in Gafsa, and when French airplanes and heli-
copters had left Tunisia 2 weeks previously. Detail work is not for Libyan
media. The official press agency, JANA, is still launching appeals for a
revolt in Tunisia, termed a"French protectorate." And all thie is not ~ust
the whim of some intellectual whipper-snappers. Next to Che army, the media,
especially Radio Tripoli, are the power instrument on which ~dhdhafi keeps
the cloaest tab. He mever goes anywhere without his transistnr. "He is the
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- moet faithful listener to the newe broadcasta," is what everybody in Tripoli
avows. If the colonel is all that assiduous, it is to make eure that his
inatructione are ~aell carried out. The director general of radio-television,
Mr Dhaw el-Humeid, is a lackluster civil servant. He receives his ordere
directYy from the "top command," that is from Qadhdhaf i's closest ass~ciates.
Furthermore, Radio Tripoli is one of the few carefully guarded government
buildin gs, or rather it is a radio barracks which likewise houses the JANA
agency. An army detachment is garrisoned there. Machine guns on the roofs.
Syateasatic personnel checks at a11 entrances and exits, searches....
Unsuccess=ul
The model is Egyptian radio as it was in Nasir's days: an appeal to "wlionist"
feelings uttered by a vibrant voice. Moreover, up to 1977 most of the
- announcers were Egyptians. But one day Colonel Qadhdhafi convened what few
Libyan ~ournalists there were to cast this astonishing reproach at them:
"Your news ie made by Arabs." And so a clean sweep occurs. From that point
- on in radio as in other commun ications media the only people left are Libyans.
The f ew "Arabs" remaining on duty are uaed in certain campaigna carried out
. through "The Voice of the Arab Party." That is the name that Radio Trlpoli ~
assumes every day after 2100, with a program whose ambition is to replace
"The Voice of the Arabs" which broadcasts from Cairo, but has lost much of
its impact aince Nasir's disappearance. In spite of that, adhdhaf i has had
little auccess. And for good reaeon.
COPYRIGHT: Jaune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
9498
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
ISLAMIC CONFERENCE OFFICIAL PREVIEWS liPCOMING SESSION
' 1.D281225 London THE TIMES in English 28 Apr 80 p 6
[Report by Edward Mortimer on an interview with Babib Chatti, secretary-
general of the Islamic conference in Jiddah on 27 Apri1 1980]
[Text] Proposals for a solution to the Afghanistan crisis, based on the
country's guaranteed neutrality, will be discussed at next month's
conference of Islamic foreign ministers in Islamabad. They may lead to
a~oint approach by the Muslim states to the United States and the
- Soviet Union.
Mr Habib Chatti~ secretary-general of the organization of the Islamic
conference, told me at his headquarters in Jiddah that Afghanistan would
again be the leading item on the agenda at next month's meeting. Last
January an extraordinary session of the conference condemned the Soviet -
intervention.
This time all Muslim states will be represented, including Syria and
South Yemen which boycotted the last one, and there will certainly be
a tussle between "hard" and "soft" liners.
But Mr Chatti hoped a compromise would emerge based on the neutrality of
Afghaniatan, to be guaranteed by Afghanistan itself in a treaty with both
the superpowers and with its neighbours--Pakistan, Iran and China--all of
which would commit themselves to respect its neutrality and independence.
Mr Chatti agreed that this propos~l presupposed a settlement of
Afghanistan's internal conflict and the existence of the Afghan Government
with broad national support--probablq a government of national unity
comprising elements both from the present Soviet-backed regime and from
the Muslim Mu~ahidin f ighting against it.
He believed a national reconciliation could be achieved if both the United
States and the Soviet Union would commit themselves to support such a
solution in principle. ~
Mr Chatti expressed grave concern about the Iranian crisis and condemned -
the American attempt to rescue the hostages by force. He said such
actions were not in the interests of the Un3.ted States or the West because
they were enabling the Soviet Union to pose as the supporter of Muslim
states.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspaper Limited, 1980 -
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AFGHANISTAN
POISON GAS: 'ABSOLUTE WEAPON' REPORTEDLY USED BY SOVIET TROOPS
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 24 Mar 80 p 34
[Article by Pierre de Villemareat] -
[Text] The Konar Valley in Afghanistan has been "mopped up" by the Russians
, using chemical warfare. This is one of the main pockets of Moslem resiatance
" in the eaetern part of the country. To capture this region, the Soviets have
resorted to napalm bombings and to spreading delayed-action gas, with the
- result Chat 30,000 people have been killed and that 130,000 refugees have
migrated to Pakiatan.
_ Chemical warfare--outlawed by treatiea signed ~ust after the first world war
and by a 1975 convenCion--is Yeparted to have already been used in 1978 and
1979 against Lao and Kampuchean ~esistance fightera. According to NATO
services, the Sovieta are believed to have decided in 1965 to include this
type of weaponry in their inventory and to have created a special cosnmsnd
_ force in 1970, which is preaently commanded by General Pikolov.
After th~ Yom Kippur War in 1973, it was noted that Soviet~nade tanka
captured from the Arab armies by the Israelis were equipped with an "anti-
CBN" syatem, i.e., protecting against the effects of chemical, bacteriological
- and nuclear warfare. In 1979, the Soviet stockpile of chemical-type weaponry
~ was estimated to be about 400,000 metric tons, and the personnel trained to
- handle it at 100,000 men.
Deaigned to be shot into enemy lines by shells or misailes or to be spread
by plane or helicopter, sametimes colorless and aom2times colored, the Soviet
gases can be basically classified as a half dozen or so different types:
soman (GD) and tabun (GA), sarin, VR-55, phosgene and hydrogen cyani.de (HCN).
- According to their type they attack the nervous or circulatory syst~m, the
reapiratory pathways, or the organs of sight. Some gasea kill in 10 minutes,
while others act only after several honrs.
The gas used in the Khunar Valley works by "impregnation," that is, when it
is.spread at cold temperatures (less than 10-15 degrees centigrade) it sticks
to clothing and to shoes without Yeaching the body directly. But as soon as
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the atmosphere warma up, or when the person wearing the contaminated clothing
gete close to a fire or enters a dwelling,the gas "wakes up." It is supposed
that the Soviete will take advantage of the daily warming trend in the spring
to wipe out a coneiderable part of the Afghan resiatance in thie manner.
The Red Army is equipped to occupy territory which has been hit by ch~~uical
warfare. Certain combat groupa, using maska and cfiemical-resistant suits,
can go in immediately after the attack. Light vehicles are assigned to
cordon off the contaminated areas.
_ A third clase of combatants then starts the decontamination process: TMS 65
devices are capable of "washing" tanka or trucks; the ARS 12 U and the ARS 14
can treat heavy tanks as well as artillery pieces. These weapons are mounted
on Zil 131 carriages, which are completely Soviet-ma3e, but have depended on
Western technological assistance for their own denelopment, especially
since 1972.
According to NATO, a third of Soviet missiles and rockets are furnished with
- chemical payloads. Half of these amounts are assigned to the Western front,
meaning Europe. The East German army ia also thought to be equipped and
erained for chemical warfare, if one may believe a study carried out in 1979
- by a Britieh expert, Professor John Erickson.
Although the NATO high command has issued aeveral warnings against the
Russian military "imrestment" in chemical weaponry (a report on this topic
wae published in January, 1980), ttie extent of preparation in the West ie
very weak. American army unite asainged to study problems of chemical
warfare comprise only about 2,OOQ men.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "Valeurs actualles"
8838
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AFGHANISTAN
AFGHANISTAN POLITICAL SITUATION AFTER SOVIET INVASION REVIEWED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 21-27 May 80 pp 38-39
[Article by Badr al-Haj~: "Amin Beheaded Singer Who Fell in Love with His
DaughtEr; U.S. Correspondents Mave Around with Chador; Gen Rabi' Leads ~
Holy War; Soviets and Karmal Exaggerate Amin's Responsibility for Maesacres"]
[Text] Before Badr al-Ha~~, the correspondent for AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI left
Afghanistan, he sent various other reports about the situation in the Mos~em
country that hae been occupied by the Soviets. He also sent political -
interviews. A report about the political situation af~er the foreign
invasion follows.
In Kabul one wakes up to the roar of the engines of military airplanes taking
off from the nearby airport almost every five minutes. No one can recognize
the truth about what is taking place. The news that is disseminated from
foreign broadcasta comes from press and broadcast agency correspondents who
are etaying at the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul. Those correspondents
receive their information from some taxicab drivers or from eome merchants
or workers in the hotel.
The ordera were clear on the day following my arrival. An official statement
directed to correspondents was posted at the entrance to the hotel. The
substance of this statement was that taking pictures was forbidden without
special permission. [To take a picture one'had to have] a card signed by
the Ministry of Interior and the director of the Security Division of the
Ministry of Information and Culture. The measures [one goes through] to
obtain this card require several days.
Why was this decision made? When one asks the employees at the Information
Center at the Ministry of Information and Culture, they say that a U.S.
correspondent wore a chador and sat beside an Afghan taxicab driver. At
every barricade the driver would claim that the person sitting beside him
was his wife. This continued until a Soviet patrol discovered the matter:
it confiscated the films and expelled the correspondent. A decision was
made to prevent foreign correspondents from leaving the city of Kabul without
prior official permission.
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When one aska where the Soviet soldiera are, the response is that they
rarely roam around. Security in the city falls under the ~urisdiction of
Afghan forcea. But one notices in some sensitive areas the presence of
Soviet troop carriere and eome Soviet eoldiers with their woolen hata, the
_ cossacks, bearing the communiat inaignia. They carry Kalashnikov gune and
eit on the sidewalka.
The only news about the fighting appears in the English newspaper, the KABUL
NEW TIMES. It features a daily article about the activities of the new
government and the conspiracies against afghanistan. After a few days it
becomes evident to one that all the partisai~s are focusing in their arguments
on the crimes of former president Hafizullah Amin and on the fact that the
current stage in Afghanistan was the stage of the Democratic National Revolu-
tioa and not that of the Socialist Revolution. All leftist slogans were
therefore removed from [public] squares and government departments. The new
Afghan president asked that the matter of changing the shape and color of
the current red flag be looked into. It seems that the purpose of this
activity is to contain the rancor and the campaign against the communists in
this country whose people are charact~rized by preserving their strong
religious feeling.
Periodic Slo gans
The new regime whose leaders assumed power on the 27th of last December
proposed new slogans that differ from those which were proposed in the past
by presidents Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin. During the period
of his rule Nur Muhammad Taraki proposed the slogan, "Protection, Law,
JuaCice." When Hafizullah overthrew Nur Muhamunad Taraki, he proposed a
new slogan: "Food, Clothing, Shelter." The current regime, however, has
proposed three slogans. They are:
* Establishing a national front to protect the homeland.
*[Initiating] a dialogue with the opposition forces to solve the crisis.
_ * Changing the color and the shape of the flag and holding a referendum for
the people on that matter.
The question now is this: What has been achieved from these slogans~ and
what are the difficulties that are facing the new regime?
It must be recognized that the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan is
not in fact an indication of power for the Soviets or for the rulers in
Kabul. Afghans consider these forces to be foreign forces who are
occupying their land. ,
The evidence for this lies in the strikes and tumultuous demonstrations
that took place in the cities of Kandahar and Kabul. These strike~ and
demonstrations farced Afghan and S~viet forces to interfere and to quell
the demonstrators by force.
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Although it has been claimed that U.S. and Pakistani intelligence agents -
were arrested, it is difficult to believe that 2 or 10 agents can persuade
tens of thousands of Afghans to go out into the streets and demonstrate.
What is accepted by everyone who visits Afghanistan is the fact that there
is a popular climate against Soviet presence in Afghaniatan. There are
numerous stories to confirm this. News is apreading in Kabul about sniper
- operations against the Soviets in the middle of the capital. Afghans
reaorted to another msthod also: any blond person who is suspected of
being a Soviet citizen is stabbed to death.
There is still news in the Afghan capital about the massacre that took place
near the city of Herat last March when about 2,000 soldiers in the Afghan
army rebelled and murdered Soviet experts and Afghan party officers. The
Soviets reaponded to this with a concentrated land and air attack in which
. MIG's and helicopters were used. It as being said that about 20,000 persons
were killed as a result of that campaign. _
Did the Soviets Sw~mnon Themselves?
But wha summoned the Soviet Union to enter into Afghanistan with such
concentration? It has been proven that it would be absolutely inconceivable
for Hafizullah Amin to have summoned these forces to overthrow him, especially
~ since Amin's relationa with the Soviets were very poor. But if Babrak Karmal
was the one who had summoned the Soviets, it has also been proven that Karmal
had no official government function. Whether Karmal was in Afghanistan on
the day Soviet troops entered the country or whether he was a political
refugee in Eastern Europe, the legal authority that summoned the Soviets
remain unknown. It is most likely that the Soviets summoned themselves to
interfere after they noticed that the situation was deteriorating and the
position of the regime that was friendly to them was precarious.
Regardless of the legality or illegality of the Soviet presence, the new
government is still facing difficulties in establishing a national front to
protect the homeland. The nature of the relations between the Parcham �
faction or the al-Rayah ruling faction and the supporters of the late
President Nur Muhammad Taraki is not yet known. It is also not yet known
whether there is in fact an agreement between the Khalq faction and the
Parcham faction. Numerous circles are saying that there are disputes within
the ranks of the present government.
On the other hand, it seems that the negotiations that are taking place to
form a national front with the group of Muhammad Tahir Badakhshi are still
in an early stage. An agreement between the two groups has not yet
emerged.
It is known thst Muhammad Tahir Badakhshi heads the Organization for the -
Oppressed Freedom Fighters and Toilers of Afghanistan. He was a member
of the Democratic People's Party, and then he broke away when the party
participated in the cabinet that was formed by Muhammad Daud following
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the overthrow of King Muhammad Zahir Shah in 1973. He led armed groups
that were active in the Province of Badakhshan near the northern borders of .
Afghanistan. Badakhshi attacked the policy of the Soviet Union and of the
People's Republic of China at the same time.
But there remains a question that needs full explanation: tt is the question
of Hafizullah Amin. Wae Hafizullah Amin as ugly and as brutal as the
official media portrayed him or not? The communiats are especially known
for exaggerating their portrayala of "their enemies" or of those whom they
had "purged" from their ranks.
What is the reason for this daily hysterical campaign against Amin even
~ though about 3 months have passed since his death?
There may be several reasons for this. Chief among those is that of holding
Amin responsible for the crimes that have been committed. But it also seems
that some Afghan officers are still loyal to Amin. Amin was very popular
at leaet among the armed forces, and it is also evident that he was the
regime's strong man even in the early days of Taraki's administration.
Hafizullah Amin was directly responsible for the military or~anization in
the Khalq faction. He also asaumed the very sensitive position of educating
the armed �orces during the rule of Muhammad Daud. Hence, there was strong
support for Hafizullah Amin in the army. This support grew after Am3n
aseumed power and isaued ordere to double the salaries of soldiers and
officers so that everyone would gain.
Inspite of Amin's success in gradually removing his enemies and adversaries
from government, he derived his power basically from the officer~ of the
air force who nominated him for the presidency instead of Nur kluhammad Taraki
after the coup of 27 April 1978.
But last September while he was in power, he was not able to preserve the
regime. Confidential sources of AL-WATAN AL-~ARABI have revealed that three
attempts against Amin were aborted during his shortlived regime. The fourth
attempt succeeded on 26 December for internal reasons and due to the Soviet
intervention.
On a personal level the ruling party lost a great leader and a revolutionary
torch after the death of Nur Muhammad Taraki. This affected the condition
of the party which had originally been unstable. Hafizullah Amin tried to
avoid this instability by launching a campaign of arresta and liquidations
within the ranks of the party. He sought the assistance of inembers of his
family, and this led the Parcham [faction] and various other oppoaition
members to accuse the regime of nepotism.
Ma~or errors were com~itted on the ideological level in the process of
distributing land and in the process of agrarian reform. There were also
ma~or errors committed against the clergy during the war. All these
errors, in addition to the purge campaigns that were conducted in the ranks
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of the party and the army, led to a clustering of numerous forces against
Hafizullah Amin.
Wait for Spring
It is'certain that Afghanistan has now entered into a stage that is more
~ bloody than the previous one. It is true that the Soviets, whoae forces
now number about 100,000 did choose a time that was suitable for their
military intervention when the anow was covering large areas of Afghanistan -
and making it impossible for the opposing forces to work effectively against
theirs; but it is nevertheless expected that Afghanistan will experience
next spring, and specifically,in April and May, violent fighting between
the Islamic and the Maoist forces on the one hand and the Afghan and Soviet -
forces on the other. Everybody in Kabul is saying, wait till spring.
Foreign embassies have ordered their sub~ects as of now to leave
Afghanistan.
It ie evident from my tours in the cities of Kandahar, Jalalabad and Herat
that batt~es in the real sense of the word are actually nonexistent. There
were only limited military operations against military vehicles. Moslem
insurgents resorted to setting up mobile barricades to trap military men.
Other gro ups blew up bridges to cut supplies from the military centers.
Three bridges were blown up, for example, in the area of the (Salan~) ~
Passes where the hilly nature of the terrain makes commando-style military
operations posaible.
Today, the two sides are preparing for the next round in the spring. The
Soviets have been quick to move their units to the confrontation points with
Pakiatan. In the city of Kandahar I was told that hundreds of Soviet tanks
had left the city to Spin Baldak Point on the Pakistana bordera. It seems
that the objective of taking up this position is to make preparations for
closing the bord~ers to infiltrators permanently.
The Soviets rely heavily on large armored helicopters which can carry 64
missiles. They use these helicopters to patrol principal roads, mountain
passes and the valleys. Not a day did go by while we were in Kabul without
seeing squadrons of these airplanes taking off from Kabul Airport in regular
sorties.
On the other hand, the Moslem insurgents also have some military advantages.
Afghan territory, and especially the areas on the Pakistani-Afghan borders,
is mountainous, rugged and ideal for guerilla warfare.
Moslem insurgents are saying, "We threw out numerous forces that occupied
our country, and we will also throw out the Soviets." On the other hand,
there is fear that if the Soviet forces were to be sub,jected to strong
strikes, they would resort to chemical warfare and to bombarding vast areas
of Afghanistan, thereby forcing the tribes to move to Pakistan. This would
cause disputes to arise in the Pakistani area where the Pashtu tribes also
reside.
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Observers here do not think it unlikely that the Soviets would bombard the
Pakiatani areas and the training bases where Afghans receive their training
if the noose around Soviet troops is tightened. This would be consistent
with the method used by the United States when it bombarded North Vietnam
during the Vietnam War. This in turn would create international complications
that no one would know how to deal with.
The fact is that matters now in Afghanistan have reached a point where
neither party will retreat one ince from its position. The Soviets will not
withdraw unless, as they say, "the foreign aggression from Pakistan, China
and the United States," ceases. The Afghan government is weak and submissive -
to the Soviets. It is not capable of disputing its position with the Islamic
and Maoist forces. At the same time the Islamic forces have announced "a
holy war against the comanunist infidels." -
- This is how Afghanistan is living the war. In Kandahar, which can only be
reached by convoya protected by tanks, one reads slogans in Pashtu such as,
"What are you doing here, sons of Lenin?" and "Wake up, you Moslems!" The
case is the same in Jalalabad, the city that is located on the principal
road between TCabul and the Pakistani city of Peshawar. Jalalabad is a quiet
and ordinary city in the day time. Occasionally, however, one hears the
~ounds of explosions and time bombs, and at night one hears the sounds of
gunfire in the distant hills. When the shopkeepers try to strike to comply
with the call of the Moslem insurgents, the Afghan army threatens to
coafiscate every shop that closes its doors.
When Kabul Staged Demonstrations
When Kabul staged strikes and demonstrations, the Soviets bombarded the
demonstrators and their sections with their helicopters. It is being said
that the dead, the wounded and the missing are estimated to be in the
hundreds.
In Afghan cities the life of every person with European features is in danger.
The ambassador of West Germany in Kabul told me, "The insurgents used to
discriminate and to ask about identities'. But now it seems that the war has
assumed the character of universal destruction. A German correspondent
was murdered even though he had the German flag on~his car. We have, there-
fore, asked all our sub~ects to leave immediately.
Afghanistan remains at the forefront of events. The Soviets are considering
their m~ves, and the West is considering its moves. Afghanistan, how~ever,
has become the victim of these considerations. As far as the Soviets are
c~ncerned, it seems that their choices were very limited: either the
existing regime would fall and a regime hostile to the Soviets would be
established on their border, and the implications of that were dangerous;
or the Soviets can set up a government in Afghanistan that supports them
and [thusJ move the confrontation to the borders of Afghanistan with Iran,
Pakistan and China.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
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AFGHANISTAN
BEIJINCrOREINTED COMMUNIST LEADER TAMIM INTERVIEWED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 21-27 Mar 80 pp 40-41
[Interview with Afghan Communist Party Leader, Tamim, by Badr al-Ha~~:
"Interview with the Beijing 'Hawks' on al-Dajaj [Chickens] Street;
Maoists Say, 'We Will Take Advantage of Conflict Between Gov~rnment and
Moslem Insurgents To Improve Our Military Condition and Condition of Our
Party ]
[Text] Tamim, one of the leaders of the Afghan Communist Party which is
loyal to Bei~ing told Badr al-Ha~~ that there was no conflict between
the Maoists and the Moslem insurgents, bu*_ that the fundamental conflict
was with the Soviets and that it was centered around the existence or
non-existence of Afghanistan.
On the basis of a previously scheduled appointment with Tamim I w~nt to
al-Dajaj Street, well-known as the place where Afghan furs and carpets
are sold. In one of the stores I met Ahmad, one of Tamim's assistants. I
walked with him for a long distance. We entered into alleys and narrow
streets in the middle of the capital, and Comrade Ahmad spoke only once and
said: "Follow meS"
After we had walked for about 10 minutes, Ahmad told ~ne, "WaiL here for a
while." He went into one of the alleys, and after a few minutes which
seemed to be to be long hours, he returned and said, "Comrade Tamim is _
waiting for you. You can go in now."
Ahmad and I entered into a humble home. There was a heater in one of the
- rooms, and near it was a fair amount of black stones. Tamim welcomed me
and said, "This is soft coal which we use for heating and cooking in _
the winter."
[Question] What is your analysis of the current situation in Afghanistan
and why did matters deteriorate to the point that pushed Afghanistan towards
a civil war?
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[Answer] We cannot analyze the cur?:ent situation without referring to 1973
when Muhammad Dawud overthrew the royal regime in Afghanistan~ Everyone
knew that Dawud was the Soviet's chief man in Afghanistan.
During the 5 years of Uaud's regime Afghanistan was a free market for
western and Soviet exploitation. The Soviets were and still are plundering
[ourJ natural gas, food prc~ducts, wool and cement. They have been exporting
weapons and military equipment to us, but they do nothing to build a single
factory.
On the other hand, western imperialist forces have been importing food and
ngricultural products~ and they have been exporting to us consumer goods _
through their feudalist and bourgeQis agents.
At the same time the rate of unemployment was growing in a dangerous way,
and production was declining to the point that tens of thousands of Afghans
felt compelled to i~nigrate to the countries cf the Gulf and to Iran [in
search o�] employment. The number of Afghans who immigrated to work abroad
between 1975 and 1977 is about 3 million.
[Question] What is your theoretical analysis of the split that took place
in the Democratic People's Party [and produced] the faction of Khalq and
Parcham, and why didn't the unity o� the two factions continue~after the 78
c~up inspite of the Russians' efforts?
(Answer] Theoretically speaking, we are convinced that the communist groups
which work undet the umbrella of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan or in the
Middle East are groups that do not rely on the masses as much as they rely
on Soviet support, The Afghan Democzatic People~s Party is an opportunist
party that participated in the government during the days of Daud. When
[its membersJ saw that the ship was drowning, they abandoned ship and ,joined
the opposition.
The dispute between the two factions of this party ia not ideological at
a11 because both factions receive their instructions from the Soviets.
The dispute is confined to this question: who is to assume the leadership
and the positions in the political bureau and the Central Committee?
It is amusing that the political correspondence between these two parties
contains blunt accusations they make against each other. They accuse each
other of having had relations with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,
and they are still accusing each other of this.
Maoists Exonerate Amin
[Question] But there are those who are affirming today that Hafizullah
Amin was a U.S. intelligence agent?!
[Answer] There is no basis of truth to that statement. We know quite
well that the Soviets supported Hafizullah Amin and undermined Parcham
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so as to establish the Soviet line firmly not only in Afghanistan, but also
in the entire area. Hafizullah Amir. is not the only one responsible for
the liquidation of the Parcham elements because the Soviets took part in
this operation. During the 18 months of the Taraki-Amin regime, the Soviets
supported thie regime 100 percent.
[QuestionJ Whg then did the Sovieta support Babrak Karmal as long as Amin
was supporting Soviet policy?
(Answer] What applied to Muhsmmad Daud applied to Hafizullah Amin. When
Amin completed his mission with failure, the soviets decided to replace him
with another figure.
[QuestionJ Karmal's regime is advocating the establishment of a national
front. Are you prepared to cooperate with him and to turn a new leaf?
[Answer] T:iis regime is totally unrelated to our people. It came [to
power] through the agenc} of Soviet guns and tanks, and it will not succeed
in establishing a national front because the entire nation with all its
groups is against it.
We have an ideological difference with the Moslem groups, but the difference
- we have with ttie Soviets is a question of existence or nonexistence.
We have an understanding with the Islamic groups about the need for fighting
the Soviets. The principal conflict during the present stage, as we see it,
lies with the Soviet Union, and the only way this conflict can be resolved
iq by force. But the canflict with the Islamic groups is secondary and can
be resolved thro ugh di~logue. Our comrades in the provinces have been in
fact fighting side by side with the Moslem groupa that are apposing the
Soviets. There is no difference between us on this sub~ect. ;i'
I must call attention here to an important matter which the Soviets are
trying to cover up. There is stron~ opposition from the group of -
Hafizullah Amin which is led by 'Arif 'Alim Yar. He is assisted by one
' of the leade rs of the commando units in the army. This group has ~
excellent weapons. And there is also a rebellion in the area of Paghman,
which is where Hafizullah Amin was born. -
A Marxist-Leninist Front ~
[Question] What do you think should be done with regard to the opposition
forces?
[Answer] Preliminary statistics indicate that about 500,000 Afghans were
killed as a regult of air and artillery bombardment. In approximately
20 months more than 3 million animals were destroyed, and about 50,000
. persons were executed. There are also about half a million refug~es in
Pakistan and Iran. It is the Soviets and their group who are responsible
for this situation.
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To those who are saying that the prisons in Afghanistan have become empty
after Karmal came to power, we say that there are approximately 5,000
political prisoners in the central prison of Kabul alone. Most of those
prisoners are from the progressive, democratic and Islamic forces. They
are profesaional physicians, teachers and engineera.
We strongly advocate the unity of the progressive opposition forces.
The Islamic opposition �orces proclaimed their unity weeks ago, and now we
have to face up to this new situation by establishing a Marxist-Leninist
front that would include all the groups on the scene. This is the focus of
our efforts at this stage.
[Question] What is your opinion of the political implications of the
Soviet invasion on the area as a whole?
[Answer] As far as the Arab area is concerned, it is our opinion that the
Soviet invasion has given the al-Sadat-Begin alliance an historical oppor-
tunity to intensify its attack on the Arab forces that are opposing the _
settlement. ~
The Soviet occupation of our country is also giving imperialism the
opportunity to talk about the security of the Gulf and to strengthen the
military bases in this area.
[Question] WhaC is the military situation now? What have the Soviets done -
on the military scene after they entered into Afghanistan? _
[Anawer] From a military standpoint we admit that military operations against _
the occupation forces are not as heav,~ as they should be. This is the case
- for various reasons primarily because this is the winter season and the
piled-up snow on the mountain prevents the easy movement of the fighters.
We are, therefore, taking advantage of the present situation and organizing
cells in all the areas so we can take action next spring.
The only thing that the Soviet army did after it entered into Afghanistan
was to occupy the major cities and ensure travel between these cities and
- the capital. This has so far cost the Soviets at least 3,500 soldiers. It -
has become evident to us that the Soviet forces cannot fight in the
mountainous areas and that the forces of the Afghan army can fight there
better. The Soviets so far have not been able to enter the mountainous _
areas in the northeast, in the central region and in the eastern region with
their tanks. Therefore, all of these areas are not yet undes their control.
We have destroyed Soviet tanks. The Soviets run away and leave their weapons
behind. The Afghan people have so far seized about 5,000 pieces of weapons,
and we coined the well known anecdote, "We have become masters of Che
Kalashnikov."
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Provisional Islamic Government .
[Question] What about the future of Afghanistan?
[Answer] The war will be a long one, but we will ultimately throw the
invaders out of our land. Our information affirms that the Islamic forces
will assume power sooner or later. We have to prepare ourselves for the
next stage, that is, the stage that will follow the defeat of the Soviets.
The Islamic forces are now allied, and they are insisting that they are
the sole legitimate representative of the people of Afghanistan. It seems
that in the next stage the Islamic forces will be focusing on liberating
the southeastern provinces where military bases and a~rovisional government
will be set up. This provisional government may be recognized by some
Islamic countries. '
We have no choice in a situation such as this but to take advantage of
the existing conflict between the Soviets and the government, on the one
haad, and zhe Islamic forces on the other, so that we can strengthen our ~
military position and our organizational structure and become capable of
facing all possibilities.
[Question] What about China's pos{.r_ion vis a vis all these conditions?
Do you approve of China providing arms to the Islamic forces?
[Answer] China is a friendly country that has no ambitions in Qur country.
The Chinese did not ir~terfere in Afghanistan the way the Soviets did. As
far ~s providing arms to the Islamic forces is concerned, w~ differ with
China on some of its foreign policy positions. This does not mean,
however, that we oppose China. Our position is clear: to fight red
imperialism, the enemy of nations. We must cooperate with the devil in
order to achieve that.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
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AFGHANISTAN
FOREIGN MINISTER SHAH MUHAMMAD DOST INTF.RVIEWED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-tARABI in Arabic 21-27 Mar 80 p 41
[Interview with Shah Muhammad Dost by Badr al-Hajj: "The Government Is
Prepared To Solve the Problem by Peaceful Means"]
[Text] At the Afghan Ministry of Foreig~n Affairs in Kabu1 I met with Mr
Shah Muhammad Dost, Afghan minister of foreign affairs and member of the
Central Committee of the Afghan Democratic People~s Party.
Mr post had held the posiCion of political adviser at the Afghan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs during the administration of former Afghan President _
Hafizullah Amin. But after Amin was overthrown, Mr post, who speaks English
fluently, assumed the position of minister of foreign affairs. He
represented his country at the emergency session of the U.N. Security Council
that was held in February to look inro the question of the Soviet military
presence in Afghanistan.
The text of the press interview follows: -
[Question] What is your analysis of the current situation in Afghanistan,
and how do you evaluate your relations with Pakistan and with the Arab �
countries now that new factors have come into the area following the~over-
~ throw of the regime of Hafizullah Amin?
[Answer] Unfor[unately there are some reactionary countries in the Middle
- East who are now siding with other reactionaries in the world and
principally U.S. imperia~tism, against Qur revolution. By comparison, we
are seeing that the Palestinian people and their revolution are also
facing the same enemies.
But first and foremost, I must say this openly: a re'volution in
tifghanistan was inevitable ~o that social progress [can be achievedJ.
As time went by, however, deviations from the party's basic political
course began to emerge. These deviations have not become so serious that
had we not undertaken to reform this matter, these deviations would have
led to the f ragmentation uf the country.
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The country exr2rienced a dangerous perzod during Amin~s regime, and
inhuman actions and crimes against ordinary citizens fro~ various sectors
were committed.
It wu9 necessary to correct the party's political course, and this is what
~c[ually happened on the 27th of December when the revolution in
Afghanistan ente red into a new stage. A new leaderehip als~~ came into
power. Comrade Babrak Karmal asaumed the position of chairman of the -
Revolutionary Council and prime minister, and a new government was
established.
The step that we undertook complemented the revolution of April 1978.
This is becauGe many of the people who had participated in the April
Revolution--and this includes those from the party, from the government or
from the Revolutionary Council--were the ones who corrected the course of
the revolution. It is for this reason that we called upon all the patriotic
fighters to work and to establish a national frcnt. We called upon a11
the qualified people and all those who mean well to serve the people.
[Question] Charges have been made that you are harassing Mos~.em
theologians!
[Answer] The declarations and the statements that we made on numerous
occzsions after the new leadership assumed ~ower indicate that ~ur citizens
t~t3ve every rig}~t to practice their religioua righta freely. I assure [you],
thereEore, that this sub~ect does not canstitute an issue with us. Islam
_ never was and never will be an issue of conflict with us in Afghanistan.
[Question] Does fighting inside the country justify your call for help
~ from the forces of a foreign country, and especially a superpower like the
Soviet Union?
[Answer] During the administration of the late President Nur Muhammad
Taraki, the first chairman of the Revolutionary Council and prime
minister, we realized how difficult it would be for Afghanistan, for its -
army and for its people to confront all these pressures and this armed
aggression. Therefore, we decided to ask the Soviet Union to send some
limited military units of its army to Afghanistan, and we repeated the
invitation during Amin's administration.
The Soviet Un~on hesitated, but it finally became convinced that the
independence and security of Afghanistan were in danger and that they _
were being threatened directly from abroad. They, therefore, decided
to comply with our request, and they sent us a few limited military
units from their army. I want to mention here that the Soviets had in
the past sent us a iew military units before the new stage of the
revolution.
When the new leadership assumed power, we renewed our request and we
affirmed that it was neces~ary for the Soviet Union to send a few limited
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Soviet units to Afghanistan, t~e did this in fact on the basis of the
friendship and neighhorliness ag-reement that we had signed with the Soviets
_ on the Sth of December 1978.
(Queation] It ie being said that Soviet troope are amasaing on the Iranian ,
hordera xnd thttt the Soviet~s' ultimate goal is the oil wells.
[Anewer] These charges which are being m~~de by U.S. imperialism and by the -
re~ctionary countries who revolve in iCs orbit are npt true at all. The
Soviets have denied these charges totally and severa~.ly.
There is nothing in fact to prevent the establishment of friendly relations
between us. We may have some disagreements with some of the figures in
Iran, but we are certain that we can overcome those disagreements and that
we can establish ways to build a strong relationship with Iran.
I believe that we can also establish friendly relat~ons not only with Iran,
but also with the Pakistani people.
We Will Not Interfere in the Baluchi and Pashtun Questi;~ns
[Question] Will Afghanistan resort to agitating the Baluchi and Pashtun
questions against Pakistan to respond to what you are saying is an effort
by Pakistan to arm Afghan rebels?
[AnswerJ I would like to indicate at the outset that our proclaimed policy
i~ a policy of friendehip and cooperation with all the countriea, and even
Pakistan. We do [in facC] have ~ murually strong relationehip with the
Pakistani people.
As far as ethnic matters in Pakistan are concerned, this question concerr~s
Pakistanis only. The Baluchis, the Pashtuns or the people of the Sind
Province, for example, do not have good relations with their government, �
but this is their business. T want to state here that we have fraternal
relations with the Baluchis and the Pashtuns, but that we have nothing
to do with their problems.
[Question] I heard here from informed sources that while attending the
Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Havana the late President Nur _
_ Muhammad Taraki had agreed in principle with Pakistani President !
Zia-ul-Haq and with Iran's [former] minister of foreign affairs Ibrahim
Yazdi on a peaceful solution to the question of Afghanistan based on
democratic principles.
[AnswerJ We have said repeatedly that we are prepared to solve all
problems and disputes peacefully and without resorting to force, but it
seems that they are not prepared to solve this problem from which they are -
benefiting for numerous reasons. _
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We welcome the return of Afghans who have been living in Pakistan, When
these people come back, they are coming back to their country and to their
- hc,mes. Let me say it quite openly that after this new stage for the
revolution in Afghanistan, the presen*. circumstances are quite appropriate
_ for the return of those who have been abroad. We will make our utmost
effort to persuade them to return. Ultimately, however, the question will
depend on them and how they will respond to our open invitation.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-ARAt3I .
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AFGHANISTAN
OPPOSITION GROUPS DESCRIBID
Paris AL-WATAN AL-~AR.ABI in Arabic 21-27 Mar 80 p 42
[Article by Badr al-Hajj: "The Political Map of the Opposition"]
[Text] When the Afghan political parties failed to coexist peacefully with
each other, they resorted to seeking aid from the 3.nflunece of strong,
neighboring foreign countries. Afghanistan was ruined as a result, and it
lost its independence. The correspondent of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI is making
a quick sketch of the map of political forces that are opposing the present
regime which is friendly to Moscow. He says that these forces are divided
into basic groups: (1) the Islamic forces; and (2) the Maoist forcea. Each
group is also divided into numerous factions which fight with each other
at the same time.
The Moslema
Islamic farces were organized fox the first time in 1965, the same year in
which the Afghan Democratic People~s Party which is now in power was born.
A few Afghan young men who had studied at al-Azhar University in Cairo had
taken the initiative to organiae these forces. They returned to Kabul and
to the Afghan cities to or�anize the Moslem Brotherhood Association. Some
of these young men had been studying at the College of Theology at the
University of Kabul before the April 1978 coup.
' The principal declared objective of these groups is "to fight communism and '
to establish an Islamic regime in Afghanistan."
During the first stage of Muhammad Daud's administration the Mosl~em
Brothers were sub~ected to severe persecution because of their opposition
to the fact that Daud was cooperating with the coimnunists and had made
them partners in his government.
When Muhamtaad Daud expelled the communists from his government, however,
and began a broad campaign to arrest and execute their leaders, it was the
Moslem Brothers to whom he turned.jfor support] during the last years
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of his administration. When the Maxxist Democratic People~s Party assumed
power in 1978, a new campaign against the Islamic forces that were led by
the Moslem Brothers began. These forces confronted the military campaign
against [hem with a guerilla war in the countryside. They were receiving
assistance from outside the country. The Moslem Brothers a~e [now] divided
into the fol.lowing divisions:
* Hizb-i Islami is led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and is considered the party
of the intellectuals. This party was supported by former Pakistani Prime
_ Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in return for the So`�iets' support for the _
Baluchi rebels in Pakistan.
* Jam'iyat-i Isl