JPRS ID: 9069 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 95
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000200080006-5
~ ~ . ~ } ~ F ~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ JPRS L/9069
= 5 May 1980
, -
- Sub-Sahara~ Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. 673
- ~BIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
,
FOR OFFICIA~. USE dNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are tr3nslated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclnsed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [ExcerptJ in the first line of each item, or following the =
last line of a brief, indicate how the original inf~rmation was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- -
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonerically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source. ~
= The contents of this publicati.on in no way represent the poli-
= cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. -
For further information on report content
call (703) 351-3165.
~ COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION -
OF THIS PUBLICATION i3E RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USR ONLY
JPRS L/9069
5 May 1980
SUB-~HiiARAN AFRI CA REPORT
FOUO No. 673
CONTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Soviet, American Involvement in Africa Diacussed
- (Various sources, various dates) 1
~ Africa Penetrated, by Siradiou Diallo
USSR Taking Root, by Philippe Simonnot ,
- An Imperial Power, by Marc Yared
Africa Penetrated--Part II, by Siradiou Diallo
Toward an African 'New Deal', by Sophie Bessis
Valuable Aces in the Tiol~ea, by Sopt~ie Bessis
~ U.S. Food Power, by Sophie Bessis
Blackmail by Raciets, by Francois Soudan
Survey of African Opinian on Current Goncerns
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 12 Mar 80) 19 _
_ FAC Allocationa for 1979 Listed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 29 Feb 80)........ 26 -
CCCE Commitmenta for 1979 Detailed
- (MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS, 29 Feb 80)........ 33
Comprehensive List of 1979 Arab Development Loans
(INDUSTRIES ET TRAVAUX D'OUTRE-MER, Mar 80) 49
Burundi, Tanzania Sign Cooperation Agreement
- (AFRIQUE-ASIE, 17 Mar 80) 57
Brief s
Guinea, Senegal Peanut Processing 58
_ ~
- a- IIII - NE & A- 120 FOUO] -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
CONTENTS (Continued) Page
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBT.IC
Briefs
Diplomatic Relations With Turkey 59
Po~tal Checka Reatored 59 -
M~asures Affecting Trainees Abroad 59
Soviet Professors Replaced 60
Minister Warns Lebanese 60
CONGO
Briefs
PCT Delegatian to USSR 61
ADB Railroad Loan 61
ADB Palm Oil Project ?.oan 61
Relations With Ecuador~ 62
CSC Secrerary's Return From Moscow 62
Petroleum Production to Increase 62
Classification of State Enterprises 63
Marxist Circles Set Up 63
Manganese Exports 63
- EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Ministerial Reshuffle Improves Political Climate
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Mar 80)........ 64
Briefs _
ADB Loan 66
GAMBIA
ADF Peanut Processing Loan Received
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Mar 80)........ 67
Briefs
ADB Road Project Loan 68
GUINEA-BISSAU
Briefs _
Port Cooperation With Brazil 69
KENYA -
Briefa ~ I
Drought Affects Stockraising 70
-b- -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CONTENTS (Continued) gage
' LIBERIA
Nation Said To Have Serioua Difficulties
= . (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS, 7 Mar 80)........ 71
Regime's Anti-Op~osition Measures May Harm Democracy -
(Mohamed Maige; JEUNE AFRIQUE, Z6 Mar 80) 73
MADAGASCAR
Stock-Raising Situation, Future Examined
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Mar 80)........ 75
Briefs ~
EEC Food Aid 77
Soviet Planes 77 -
MALI
Briefa
FRG Fleet Assistance 78
SENEGAL
PDS Proposes Round Table -
(MARCHES TROP'tCAUX ET MEDITERRANEEI~S, 29 Feb 80)....... 79
Deficit Trade Balance Reported for 1979
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 17-31 Mar 80) 81
Briefs
French-Senegalese Agreement 82 -
Argentinean-Pakistani Agreements 82
Fuel, Milk Price Increases . 82
Rice Cultivation Complex 83
Pakistani Trade Agreement 83
Forthcoming Swiss Credit Agreement 83
Strengthened Portuguese Relations 84
Shrimp Fishermen's Strike 84 =
TANZANIA
Briefs -
New French Credits 85
Dodoma Water Supply Project 85 -
a FED Loans 85
- -c- -
, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
F'%1R 0~'F?C rAZ. L'SE OI~n Y
CONTENTS (Continued) Page . ,
TOGO
Caffee, Cocoa Exports Earn Foreign Exchange ;
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS, 11 Apr 80)....... 86
ZIMBABWE '
Lessons To Be Derived From Elections Discuaszd
(Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AERIQUE, 19 Mar 80)........ 87
. ;
-d- ~
i
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY j
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS _
SOVIET, AMERICAN INVOLVE[~NT IN AFRICA DISCUSSED
Africa Penetrated
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Feb, 5 Mar 80
- [27 Feb 80, pp 60-61J ~ -
[Article by Siradiou Diallo]
[Text] For a long time the Soviet Union has wrapped i~aelf in the cloak of -
natural ally and unconditional, if not diaintereeted, def~ader of the peo-
plee of the Third World aad the Africaas in particular. As much by its
material aid and ~ilitary and diplomatic eupporL as bq ita position-talciag
in the iaternational areaa, the USSR has unquestionably contributed to ac-
celeratioa of the emancipation procesa of coloaized peoplea. -
From Natural Ally. . .
For their part, the Africane ware all the more eacouraged in their atruggle
because they were convinced that their "~ust cause" had the firm.aad to~al
eupport of the Soviet Union. The ultimatum addresaed bq the Rremliri in -
1956 to the French and British governmenta, following the Suez expedition,
beara witness 'co this. Similarly, the agreement by the USSR to eell Cz~ch
= arms to Egypt or to build the Aswan Dam at a time when, after having beea
called upon first, the United States had ahied away. Al1 of these actions
_ convinced the Africans that they were not ccndeaaied eternally to their
tete-a-tete with the West. And that, thenceforth, if Paris, Y~ondon or
Washington attempted blackmail, thep could spoataneously turn to Moscow
- with the assurance of ~ust reparation.
The Africans could not fail to be fascinated by thie mythical coloesus.
~ All the more so because it was a question of a faraway and practically un- -
knoum couatry. And also because the colonial powers, with their impressive
batteries of propaganda, did n~t atop attacicing the coloeaus.. Coneequently,
in the mythology of the era, Moacow Rt one and the same time represented
the goda of virtue and power, who~e alliance and, with greater reaeon, whoee
friendship of necessity would be translated thrnughout Africa into rapid -
and harmonious economic development, the end of social miaery and cultural
alienation. _
1
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
...to Imperial Power
However, with the acceasion of our countriea to independence, the cordon
of aecurity set up around the Soviet Union was not long in breaking. With
- many forms of exchange and cooperation assisting, the USSR is no longer -
the sanctuary envelaped by a halo of mystery that it was previously. -
Africa diecovered with stu,pefaction~ and not without bitterness, that the _
Soviet Union is acting juat like any other great powero And that it is _
more ready to procure arme, therefore, to contribute to political libera-
tion, than to build factories and, to say it all, to help in economic ;'.e-
~ velopmento More aerious than that, when the USSR engagea in economic com-
petition with the West, it +sses the same techniques and same methoda as
the latter. To attain the same objective; i. e., the delivery of our raw
materials at the lowest price. _
Of course, unlike the Western powers, the USSR does not have multinational
companies, oil fields or financial interests to defend in such or such Afri- _
can country. All the same, Moscow, ~ust like Washington, London or Paris,
has a need to carve out spheres of influence. Sn other words, to obtain
naval and air bases, to tnstall expeditionary corps, to place marionettea
at the head of our goveznments, by force if necessary. This can be seen in
Afghanistan today.
Thie great-power policys during the last few years, has deeply cut into
the Soviet Union's public imageo A policy which is so prejudicial to I~os-
cow that it tends to demonstrate that in Africa there ia no real difference �
between the USSR and the United States: each is seeking to implant itself
on our ~ontinent with the sole concern to preaerve and extend its political, ~
economic or financial interests there. ~
A Regrettable Image
That ia the conclusion reached by Marc Yared in the political-military sec-
tor and Philippe Si.monnot in the economic aector. This a regrettable image
which the Soviet Union hae every interest in improving at the ri~k of see-
ing the disappearance of the store of sympathy it built up at tre dawn of
African in~ependences.
- USSR Taking Root
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Feb 80 pp 62-63
[Article by Philippe Simonnot]
[Text] The Soviet Union is trying to increase its trade with Black Africa.
However, it also wiahes to take root there: by rationalization of the ma-
- terial bases of its presence, it has its aighta on making itself, as well
as its satellites within the socialist camp, attractive partners for the
Africans. That for economic reasons and no longer for military reasone.
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Such is the principal conc~usion of a one-of-a-kind study ~ust conducted
by Gerard Wild, of the Cer?ter for Prospective Studies and International
Information (CEPII-France): a document which ia about to be published in
- the COURRIER DES PAYS DE L'EST. _
Z"tie CEPII expert, who examined all the agreements made between the $ocialiet
camp and the countries of South Saharan Africa during the last few yeare, -
_ notes first that the period 1973-1978 wae a"good time" for the African
policy of the USSR, contrasting with the previous 5 years (1968-1973), _
when the USSR had concentrated its efforts on the Arab world and the Indian
peninsula, -
Thanks to Fortugal
This reorientation of the Third World atrategy of Moscow ie easily explained:
on the one hand bq the Soviet setbacks in the Near East, principally in
Egyp*, and on the other hand by the opportunities offered by the decomposi-
tion of the last European colonial emp;re. Of the six new partners which
the Soviet Union has won in Africa in tt~e last few years, three--Angola,
= Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau--are former Portuguese colonies. These coun-
- tries are also the "principal mainsprings" of Soviet-African trade. Simi-
larly, the CEPII recalls, the Soviet Union in 1958-1963 had profited from -
_ the breakup of the French empire, particularly in Guinea and Mali.
= T'~us, at first sight, Soviet progress in Black Africa seems to de based on
= a clasaical mode. Since politica by "nature" abhors a vacuum, the USSR~ in
' whole or in part~ ie talcing the place of those who are departing. As the
- CEPII study puta it: "It ie principally the demand of the African countries
_ which ie the origin of the developmant of relations: Soviet economic pene-
- tration is determined by the African partners themselveso"
- Also claseical is the fact that "the direct ho~d on the (African) elites, .
whether they be military or civilian, continues to be a privileged rela-
_ tion of the (Soviet) presenceo" In the military sector, the important role
played by the USSR in the training of cadrea is tied to deliveries of arms
_ ~rhich accompany the penetration (see the article by Marc Yared). "The~
student aector," the CEPII notes, "is also the sub~ect of particular ~tten- _
tion: more than 40 percent of the Third World's students trained in the
USSR are of African origin."
Soviet Diecretion
Also claseical is th.e exaltation of the big, presitgious pro~ects which
recalls the adventure of the high dam at Aswan in Egypt; exploitation of _
- diamond mines jn Guinea; extraction and enrichment of polymetallic orea in
- the Congo; irrigation works in Zambia, Mozambique and Ghana; hydroelectric
' power plant in Juba, Somalia; iron and steel plant in Kvara, Nigeria; road
,,-,j and railway infrastructures in Madagascar; port facilities in Angola.
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFIC~AL USE ONLY
Classical, finally, in the nature of the trade: the USSR exports machinery =
- and equipment and basically buys raw materials for food: coffee, cacao,
exotic fruita.
Therefore, it is with the weapons of trade that the USSR is now seeking to
counter the West and no longer with the apectacular economic aid to which
Moacow was accustomed for a long timeo Consequently, the USSR is being
more r~epectful of the economic realities of the countri~s. This is par- `
ticularly ture in Angola, where Moecow aeeme Co want to prevent thia coun- -
try from implementing a"too radical" economic policy which would thre~:t~en
to make it a"too burdeneome" partner, by disorganizing a atill fragile
economy.
Ite discretion goes to the point of respecting the intereats of Western
c~mpanies, particularly Gulf and other compaiiiea engaged in oil exploitation,
perhaps in this case because it does not have the mastery of offshore techni-
ques. Siuiilarly, in Mozambique and Madagascar, Soviet efforts are concen-
trated on the "vacuums to be filled" and not on "a brutal restructuring"
of the economy.
Moreover, the study notes an increase in the sale of raw materials 1n So-
viet purchases of African products. ~xcept for bauxite and tin, the USSR
_ has huge reserves. We m~ght also ask ourselves what interest it has in
encouraging production outside its territory. The CEPII providea three
hypotheses:
1. The USSR is engaged in a supply strategy similar to that of the United
States: in order to aubstitute foreign raw materials at bargain pricea
for national reaourcea at high extraction coata.
2. The USSR ~.s attempting to directly control its potential competitore _
on the world market for raw materials ~nd to thue enhance its own reaources,
= at the same time as those of its partners.
3. The USSR is seeking to draw as close as it can to the neighboring coun-
tries which are suppliers of the West (Zaire and South Africa) to deata- _
bilize them.
According to the CEPII, Moscow doubtless is playing on all three courts
at the same time, by favoring the insertion of its satellites ~nto ecnnomic '
relations with Africa. The USSR would tYaus see itself "progressi~;ely ~
charged" with responsibilities as the excluaive supplier of its European
satellites; its reserves of raw materials available for the Western mar- j
ket and convertible into atrong foreign currenciea would increase; in ~
exchange, the African countries "would benefit" from a market sufficiently
protected to asaure them of industrialization without excessive ~luctuatione,
Less political or militant, more rational and, in a nutehell, more intel-
ligent, Soviet imperialiam ie on the testing grounde of Black Africa, It i
. 4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200084406-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- remains to be seen whether, with the renewal of the cold war, its American -
_ competitor will aeek to contain the USSR, indeed to push it back. As for
the interest the Atricans have in this battle of giants in their territory,
it is problematic. Everything is proceediag as if theq crin no longer -
choose between the two cam~s to profit from their rivalry.
Juet ae if they were once again enlisted.
An Imperial Power
~ Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Feb 80 pp 63-66
fArticle by Marc Yared]
_ [Textj Oa 28 February 1955, the Israeli army launched a raid on the ter- -
ritory of Gaza, which was administered by Egypta Sixty-nine Egyptians
were killed. Incapable of hitting back, President Gamal Abd el-Naeser,
humiliated, asked the United 3tates for armso Washington set as a condi- -
tion the adherence of Egypt to the Baghdad Pact which was directed againat _
the USSR. At that point, Nasser *_urned to Moacaw, In June 1955, for the
first time in history, a atate in the Soviet bloc, Czechoslovakia, agr~ed
to d~liver arms to an African country, Egypto This agreement, which had -
formida~le echos in the Arab world and on the B~.ack Continent, was to serve -
' as a modei of Soviet-African military cooperation for 20 yeara.
When?
- First great constant: it is almoat always for the purpose of eacaping a
danger of subversion or invasion that African statea request or sccept
massive military aid from Moacow. For Egypt, we have aeen that the cataly-
tic element was first the Israeli raid in 1955 then, and above all~ the
Suez wax in 1956. Somalia folloWed the example of Egypt after the 1964 fle-
feat in the face of Ethiopia and to escape pro-Western encirclement
~ (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Renya). The Sudan needed arma to crueh the aepara-
tiat guerrillas in the south, who were active up to 1912. Algeria, which ~
was manhand~ed by the Moroccan army in 1963, was seeking to change the bal-
ance of forces in its favor. The power of the I~LA (Popular Movement for _
the Liberation of Angola) was threatened by pro-Western rival o~ganizations
in 1975o In 1977, revolution~ry Ethiopia was undermined by centrifugal
forcee which were seeking to reestablish the imperia] system or to split
= up the countrq. Mozambique which was harboring the guerrillas of southern
Africa, in 1977-1978 was sub~ect to fearful batterings by the Rhodeaian
army. The aocialist regime of Sao Tome and Principe in Febraur~r 1978 -
feased the imminent landing of "reactionary" mercenaries. Quite recently, -
in November 1979, Renneth Raunda's Zambia ordered a dozen Mig 21's from the
_ Soviet Union to defend itself against Rhodesian air raids.
wt~y?
Why does the Kremlin reapond to the appeal of these African etates? Doea
- it have a preestablished plan for implantation on the Black Continent? It
5
FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200084406-5
~
FOR OFFICIAL 'JSE OA1L:
is true that, in the 1950's and at the beginning of the 1960's, the Soviet
Union was seeking principally to defend itself, to stop the spread of all
those hostile alliancee (NATO, SEATOr th~ Baghdad Pact) created by the
United Stateso Moecow is satisfied with seizing opportunities to "fly to
' the rescue" of those who call upon it.
Thia ra ~
p gmatic, flexible attitude serves the interests of independent and
= nonalined Africa, -
Soviet military aid permits the breaking up of the arms delivery monopuly
held for a long time by the West. Ae acknowledged by Sadat, Soviet aid
_ "lifta Che mc~rale of Third World countries; they know they can now appeal
to someone in their struggle to rid themselves of the colonial hegemony
they have endured for centuries."
How Much?
Soviet military aid, subatantial if not decisive~ permits partial modifi-
cation of the balance of forces on behalf of the recipients, From 1970- -
1976, Moscow was the number one arms supglier--32 percent of the total--in
sub-Saharan Africa (South Africa excepted). In 1977, the Black Continent
_ received more than one third of Soviet arms deliveries to th~ Third World, ~
and the same year nearly 55 percent of the mi.litary personnel of develop-
ing countries trained in the USSR were Africanao
It ~s part~y than~CS to Sovipt advisere that Egyptian, Somali and Tanzan-
ian officera--some of whom were trained in Moacow military academies--
performed brilliantly on the field of battle: the Iaraeli-Arab war in Octo-
- ber 1973, the beginning of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict in 1977 and the
Uganda campaign in 1978-1979. -
Libya has become a gigantic arsenal accommodating 2,000 T-54, T-55, T-62
and T-72 tanks, as well as 100 missiles and 130 fighter planes made in the
USSR. And that is only the beginning. In 1980-1981, the Jamahiriya is to _
zeceive from Moscow 400 fighter planes, 10~Q00 armored care and 90 missile-
launching patrol boats.
Similarly, Algeria now has a cruahing superiority in air and armored for-
ces over its Moroccan rival. Iti has nearly 700 T-54, T-55, T-62 and T-72 -
tanka, missiles, 252 combat plan~s, 22 fast torpedo boats and 6 patrol
boats. _
How?
Up to the mid 1960's, Soviet military cooperation was all the more appre-
, ciated because it was complemented--at times--by a large contribution to
- the development of its African partnera. That was the situation with Egypt
which benefited from this complementary aid in the building of the giant
Aswan Dam.
6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200084406-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
What is more, Moscow does not couple ita military aid with political or
other conditions, which are capable of undermining the sovereignty of its
"clienta~" while the West imposea adherence to ite military pacta or free
dispoeition of basea, The Kremlin reapects the nonalinement of Naeser -
or Sekou Toure, feeling that they are natural alliea whose countries eooner
or later will ~oin "scientific socialiam." The Soviet Union goes so far
_ as to sacrifice--as in Egypt--communist Africans on behalf of "national
_ de~cratic regimes,"
This attitude has not kept the Kremlin from accumulating setbacks eince the
end of the 1960~s. One after another, Ghana in 19t~6, the St~dan in 1971,
Egqpt in 1975, Guinea in 1977, Uganda in 1978, and Equatorial Guinea in
_ Y979, put an end of their privileged relations with Moscow. The turnabout
of Egypt in particular, wh~re the Kremlin had invested considerable sums,
gave the Soviet Union a veritable trauma and caused a revision of the policy
_ followed up to then.
New Look
_ Now, Moscow is opting for military cooperation only, to the detriment of
economic assistance. Nonalined African governments are neglected in fa-
vor of '~Marxist" regimes. The dispatch to the reacue of the latter by
Cuban troops and East German advisers ie systematically encouraged by the
_ Kremin.
- In Angola, since 1975; in Ethiopia, since '1977, in Mozambique, since 1978
(see box); thoueands of communiet military advisers are working to estab-
lish a single par~y and to forge the apparatus of state, of the unions,
the army and the security services. This process of providing cadres for
allies in Africa, de3igned to guarantee their loyalty, has resulted (as
was the case in South Yemen and in Afghanistan in 1979) in tre liquidation
of chiefs of state judged not too aure, Even if certain rumors have
pointed up Soviet meddling at the time of the attempted putsch of Nito
_ Alves in Angola (May 1977). Or collusion between Havana and cert~,in Ethio-
pian Marxist leaders to the detriment of the chief of state, Haile-Mariam
Mengiatu.
Repreaeion and Expanaion
Another corisequence of the Soviet new look: to keep friendly governments
~ in place, troops of the Soviet bloc are d3rectly engaged in the repression
_ of guerrilla movements which benefit solid popular groups. That is par-
ticularly the case in Eritrea and the Ogaden where liberation fronta~ -
- which are clashing with EChiopian and Cuban troops, are increaaingly broad-
ening their base.
, From these three big African bastions, Moacow is making ready to apread
out to neighboring countries, Ethiopia is already harboring Sudanese,
Malian and D3ibouti opposition movements. Angola is serving as a sanctuary
7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
for Namibian guerillas--trained by Cuban and East German officers--and
since 1978 has had an expeditionary corps in Sao Tome and Principe led by
Soviets and Cubans. Mozambique is the rear base for guerrillas from Zim-
babwe and South Africa, who are inatructed by experts from Havana or East
Berlin. The ob~ectives of the Kremlin are cantrol over raw materials
- (aee map on page 64)~ energy aources~ the coastline of the Indian Ocean
_ (the oil route) and archipelagos.
_ With regard to its traditional nonalined partners, Moacow is becoming more
and mare demanding. It only agrees to supply them with sophisticated ~:rms
on condition that these remain under the control of Soviet experts, who are
the only ones with authority to determine when ti~ey are to be uaed. Thus -
in 1980-?.981, 5,500 Soviet advisera and 300 Czech advisers will supervise
the use of advanced materiel in Libya.
- An '~Imperial Power"
Moscow also exerts "friendly" but constant pressure so that "progressive"
African states will grant it fiahing rightsl--this was the case with Equa-
torial Guinea until the overthrow of the dictator, Macias Nguema--sign
- friendahip treaties and grant military facilities to the Soviet navy and
air force. At the end of 1979, the Mozambican president, Samora Machel,
still was refusing to grant auch faciliCies to the Red Army.
.
Wi.th a presence inside the atructures of Marxist atates, efforta to control
or r~presa liberation movements~ an unrelenting fight for influence with
the West for the control of oil and raw materials, military aid with in- -
_ creasing conditions: the Soviet Union is behaving in Afric~ today like a ~
great imperial power.
Africa Penetrated--Part II
Paria JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Mar 80 p 81
. [Article by Siradiou Diallo]
[Text] Relations between Africa and the United Sr_ates have gone through
various phaseso Kept in the background for a 1.ong time by the r_olonial
powers (Great Britain, France and Portugal), Uncle Sam burst forthrightly
into the continent during World War II. First in North Africa, where the ~
arrival ~f powerfully-arffied American soldiers was to�teach the 1oca1 popu-
lations that there was a country decidedly atronger than the colonial !
powers. Next in Black Afr~ca, where it was necess2ry to await the end of
the war and the return of the colonial troops to hear the Senegalese "in-
fantrymen" boast of the strength and wealth of the U, S. army, This myth
1) It is public knowledge that Soviet fishi:~g trawlers, whi~h ply their
way through the fishing areas of certain Third World countries, are of-
ten equipped with modern radars to detect the movements of naval and air
units and to intercept communications.
_ g
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
of wealth and comfort, in accordance with which the Africans wound up per-
eeiving the whole of American society, was to be accentuated by the movies.
Hollywood flooded Africa (ae it did other continente) with a profueion of
filme preeenting America as a veYitable land of plenty.
Iiowever, with the launching of the wara of liberation, the magic mirror wae
not long in ahattering. Based on the abetract thems of independence and
liberty~ the honeyed language of the American leadera did not in the least
fool the African natioaalieta. In Algeria as in the Congo, in Guinea-Biseau
_ as in southern Africa, the militants knew that America was remainiag in the
~ second line behind the French, Belgian and Portuguese colonial troops.
_ In the name of Western solidaritq in the fight against "communiam" and sub-
vereion, the United States supplied all the military and financail support
_ needed by the colonizers. And that contributed heavily to the tmrnishing
~ of the public tmage of Washington in the eyes of Africans. Every time a
guerrilla fell, the Africans knew that he was directly or indirectly the
victim of the arms if not the iogistical or financial means furnished by -
. the United Statea.
Similarly, the peraistence, not to mention the consolidation, of the apar-
- tiheid syetem in southern Africa, on the one hand, and the challenge for
the Arab world repreaented by Israel~ on the other hand, contributed to
increasingly day by day nourish a profound resentmenC of the Africans with
regard to the United Statea. In fact, no one ia unaware of the close and
varied ties which Washington is maintaining both with Pretoria and Tel Aviv.
- Are not American investments in South Africa alcne greater than in all the '
other countries of Black Africa combined? For a long time, everything was
proceeding as if only South Africa (because of its fabulous mining reaourcea)
was ~f intereat to the United States. The other countries were left in
custody of the European coloaizers.
However, for several years now Washington seems to be seeking a policy and
a strategy for Africa. First because it is necessary to thinlc about pro-
tecting and, if poeaible, developing the essentially mining investments
(oil, bawcite, copper, chromium, diamonds, gold) which were made here and
there by American multinational companies. But principally to react against
- t~e str~tegic breakthrough and the political successes brought off against
the Black Continent by the Soviet Union.
In any event, ta be successful in a real African policy, the technological
advances of America, ita food surplus, as well as the improvement in the
condition of black Americans and the policy of human rights, are so many
precious aces in the hole for the Africans.
Sophie Bessis and Francois Soudan present the ~multiple facets of Afro- .
American relationa in the following pagea,
9 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI.Y
Toward an African 'New Deal'
Parie JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Mar 80 pp 82-83
[Article by Sophie Beasie]
[Text] "If the Russians and Americane want to come here~ I wiah them well,"
General de Gaulle said in regard to Africa in 1963. Premonitioa? The Uni-
Ced States which, after 1960~ counted on the former colonial powera to keep
Africa in the Western sphere of influence, has during the last few years -
perceived that the European "umbrella" did not do much to stop Soviet pene-
tration from the ehorea of the Mediterranean L�o those of the Indian Ocean.
The imperatives of detente, the isolationist pursuasion of the United Statea
after the Indo-Chinese defeat, in part explain the weakness of American re-
- actions to the offeneive strategy of the Soviets in Africa since 1975.
At present, even if ft has certain military facilities in Monrovia, Mom-
basa, Berbera or Diego Garcia, the United States does no~ have a single
military base in Africa and not one Yankee boy is stationed there. As for
_ ita diplomacy, this is far from being spectacular despite the few overtures -
made by Andrew Young and President Carter's trip to Nigeria and Liberia in
April 1~78o Of course, American-African declarationa of aolidarity on the
community of interests between Africa and the United States are more fre-
quent than ever. American aid for development is more oriented toward Da-
kar, Ysounde or Ouagadougou than 10 yeara ago. U, S. IDA officials are be-
coming increasingly more familiar with cooperation dosaiers. However,
Waehington now seems to be hesitating between the implementation of a con-
tainment strategy and a certttin amount of laissez-faire which up to now hae
characterized ite policy. Doee the limited scale of its intereats on the
- continent explain thie hesitation to engage itself more deeply? Is the
United States confident of the virtuea of economic liberaliam and its mul-
- tinational companies to defend its positions? Or doea it believe that So- ' -
viet influence has not yet reached intolerable limits? ~
= Setting aside South Africa, which is a special case (see the article b;~
Francois Soudan on p 86), American-African relations are more important ~
- and more complex than one might believe. The United States has need
of Africa (aee the article on minerals on p 83) from which it receives 41 ~
percent of the oil it imports. 1~aenty percent of its total .imports of
oil comea from Nigeria which is the eecond largest aupplier uf the United
States after Saudi Arabia. Forty percent of Libyan hydrocarbon exports
are sent to American portao The United States also buys oil from Gabon
and Angola. As for Algeria, it sells a great part of its natural gas to ~
American companiea such as E1 Paso, Distrigas of Boaton, Trunkline ing
[1lquid natural gas] and Panhandle. The EXIMBANK has over $1 billion cre-
dits for Algeria which aends 56 percent of its total oil production to the
United States (8 percent of American imports)a
Dividing Line
One fact is clear in this listing: American-African trade does not follow
the dividing line between moderate and "progreasive" countries. On the
10
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
contrary, Algeria which half-heartedly criticized the "Kabul coup" is
_ one of the principal partners of the United States in Africa, while Mo-
rocco which ia resolutely positioned on the Western side is the number
oae African coa~ercial partner of the Soviet Union. Annther example:
apart from oil exports, Libya, reputed moreover to be a veritable rear
baee of the USSR, r~eceives private American investments with open arms:
_ in 1979~ several American companies, including General Electric and
- large agricultural companies, sign;ed a series of contracts with the Liby-
ane totaling in eacess of $400 million, The anti-imperialism of Colonel
Qadhdhafi is not keeping 5,000 Libyan studente from attending American -
univeraitiee with hia blessing. In southern Africa, Angola has been care-
ful not to ouet the Gulf Oil Company, the number oae oil company operating
in ita territory, which continues to conduct profitable busineas. Conakry,
= Guinea accepta and encourages American investments which are particularly
important in Fria bauxite. What is more, the country would have a hard
Cime surviving without American food aid which totaled nearly $75 million
_ in 1962-1979; contracts for the supplying of grains for 1979 alone totaled
$6 million.
For all ~hat, the United States has not abandoned its traditional posi-
tions in Africa: Liberia, of course, which in a way is Zike the "51st
' atate" of the Union, but also Zaire, Renya, Gabon where U. S. Steel ia one
of the biggest stockholdere in the COMILOG (Ogooue Mining Company) which
exploits the manganese of Moandao As for military assistanca and arms
- sales, it ie tl?e "sure" allies who benefit the most: Egypt is generally
at the head of the ligt since the signing of the peace treaty with Iarael,
followed by M~oroc~o and the Sudan which in 1978 was the largest African ~
buyer of American arms. In 1978, Zaire, Nigeria and Kenya also figuree
- among the principal clients of American arms industries.
Nonagonizing ReviBion
That eaid, private American investments in Africa, including South Africa,
, are not over 3 percent of their total overseas investments (aee table on -
p 84); i. e,, the same pescentage as in 1950. However, in the United Sta-
tes, taore and more politiciana are saying that Waehington hae every inter-
est in revising its African policy or rather elaborating a real policy
with regard to Africa. According to a growing number of experts, the time
has passed when the ~ob of "protecting the continent~~ could be le�t to
othera, aince, from Ethiopia to the former Portuguese empire, the USSR
- has at every opportunity taken advantage of the disintegration of Western
positions. Although the importance of the Western Mediterranean hae been
recognized for a long time by the Pentagon and the State Department, Af-
rica south of the Sahara is becoming one of the regions in which the Uni-
ted States has "vital intereats" to defend, if onlq because the "oil
ioute" almost completely follows ~�t?e contours of the continent. No one
~ in.Waehington, however, envisions a directly iaterventionist policy: no
matter what American power may be, it cannot deploy itaelf everywhere at
the aame time; and Asfa largely continues to be its priority, not to men-
tion Latin Americao But a aeries of actions would permit the United Statee,
while avoiding the accueation of "great, wicked imperialist wolf," to
11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
establiah a real community of interests with the African states. The main
points of this new deal propose, among other thinge, to increase develop-
ment aid which would total $2 billion per year, to encourage the countries
- to make a real economic development effort, to cooperate closely in African -
policy mattere with European etates~ particularly France and Belgium, and to _
foster rapprochement between moderate Arabs and Black Africao Tt is in
this perspective that we must in particular view the new role attributed
to the Egyptian army: freed from war, Egypt is being oriented by the Uni- -
ted States toward the defenae of Western intereats south of the Sahara.
However, the entire politfcal clasa is far from being convinced that Af-
_ rica is now an important stake for the United States. As for the problem
_ of South Africa, it is far from being aettledo The fact of the matter is,
if the Americans hsve "vital interests" to safeguard, it is nedeed in this
country that such intereats are to be found; and all Americans are aware of
this. Some think that pressure should be exerted on Pretoria to force it
to give up apartheid; others feel that in no event should a risk be taken
of breaking off with the southern statea In any case, it seems that hesi-
tations with respect to the attitude to be adopted toward the "pale power"
in part explain the absence of a real American strategy in Africa. Or is
this perhapa the supreme clevernesa? While the Soviets and their allies
are getting bogged down in operationa which make them unpopular everywhere,
. the Americans are little by little mak~.ng themaelves economically and tech- -
nically indiepensable in Africa. However, for several months, the chesa
game hae been epeeding up, That may well change things. Already new anti- -
Soviet alliances are being drawn up: the American secretary of defense,
Harold Brown, who was in Peking in January, spoke at length about Africa
with the Chinese representatives~
Valuable Acea in the Holes
- Parie JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Mar 80 pp 83-86
- [Article by Sophie Bessis]
[Text] By cutting off grain sales to the USSR to show ita opposition to
the invasion of Afghanistan by the Red Army, the United States officially
introduced food blackmail into the arsenal of weapona to be used against
countries which too blatantly oppose it. If they were confronted by auch
an ultimatum, many African countries would find themselvea in a moet un-
comfortable poaition, a position which could even be tragic for some of
" them. In fact, a number of African states depend upon foreign countries
- and particularly the United States for their supplies of foodstuffe. If
we add to ~hat the other means of American pressure, whether this be at the
level of world trade, its budgetary preponderance in international finan-
cial organizations for dev~lopment or through ita multinational companies,
we can meas~re the difficulties which Africa would encounter were it to
take exception to a future mandate by the United Stat~so
However, the world's number one power is not invulnerable, In order for ~
it to operate its enormous industrial and military machine, the Unite~ -
_ 12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Statea needs a certain n~ber of minerals which its subsoil has in insuf-
ficient quantities. In 1978, the United Statea imported 98 percent of its
manganeae consumption~ 97 percent of its cobalt, 93 percent of its baux-
ite. 92 perceat of ite chrome~ 48 percent of ita antimony, 50 percent of
ite tungsten, 62 percent of its zinc, 77 perceat of ita nickel~ 20 percent
_ of its copper~ etca Total nonferroue mineral importa amounted to $21 bil-
lion. The United States, therefore, is far from being aelf-sufficient
in the sectors ~udged to be atrategic. Thia aituation, moreover, can only
be accentuated to the extent that technological progress requirea increaeingly
sophisticated alloys in the various branches of the iron and ateel industry:
it ie already known that U, S, imports of copper and bauxite will increase
considerably in the next few years.
A Geological Scandal
Does Africa, the veritable reservoir of all kinds of minerals, have a card
to play in this sector in the event of conflict with the United States? ~
A mere glance at the continent's mine production and reserves shows that
it is not totally helpless in the present game of internationsl relations
in which the prncer struggle is dominant. Conakry, Guinea is in third place
worldwide in bauxite production; and, according to some estimates, its re-
aervea could be half the world total! Chromium, cobalt, copper and man-
ganeae are being extracted in conaiderable quantities from the subsoil of
Zimbabwe, Zaire, Zambia, Gabon and South Africao Africa is also present
to a lesser degree in world zinc, lead, nickel and tin production. This
inventorq could well remind one of Ali Baba's cave; however, it is strongly
tempered by the political realities: the richest couatries on the conti-
nent--is this by chance?--are solidly tied to the Westo This is particularly
true of South Africa which hae a near monopoly on the production of certain
- mfnerals: it ie in second place worldwide in the production of antimony,
after China; it provides 28 percent of world production of chromium, 2/3
of Africaa manganeae production, nearly half of African nickel production~
a not inconsiderable part of copper and platin~ production, not to mention
gold and diamonds, of which it hae the world's largest deposits. Of
course, it is one of the principal suppliers of rare metals to the United
_ States. Southern Africa as a whole has often been described as a"geo-
logical ecandal." There is some truth in this expression: between the two
of them, ~outh Africa and Zimbabwe have 97 percent of the world's chromium
reserveso Zimbabwe also has 31 percent of African nickel production
_ (eighth largest world producer), As for neighboring 2ambia, with nearly
10 percent of Lhe world copper production, it shares with Zaire (5.6 per-
cent of world copper) the copper belt which is one of greatest natural re-
sources of that part of the continento However, although Zambia is one
_ of the big suppliers of the United States, the latter also receives suppliss
from Canada, Chile, or course, and is itself one of the largest world
producers. With large production of other rare minerals, Zaire also holds =
- a prominent place among the great mining countries of Africa. As for man-
ganese, Gabon, Upper Volta, Morocco and Algeria have large reserves.
13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
Therefore, it is understandable that at this ~uncture the West ia concerned
about "destabilization" of the continent and will do everything in its power
to maintain the status quo. For this reason, it supported a solution in -
- Rhodesia-Zimbabwe in which the moderate wing of the black majority would
have a voice and on aeveral occasions eaved the pro-Western government of
Mobutu from bankruptcy~ The fact of the ma~tter is that the etakes are high.
Security Bases -
Although with regard to "strategic" minerala the large producers are rather
diaper'sed, which permits the United States to diversify its souzces of sup-
_ ply, American officials are worried about their too great dependence on a
continent which they consider a3 not too sureo One of them recently em-
phasized: "Consciously or not, we are in the pracess of undermining the
bases of our national security and placing ourselves for survival in the
hands of unstable, foreign countries which are sub~ect to many vicissitudes..."
- The situation is all the more worrisome because there is no way to remedy
it over the short term, The participation of American firms in the capi-
talization of the big companiea which control mining extraction in Africa
and their concern over "friendly" governments do not ahelter them from coupe
d'etat or the upaetting of allianceso This was aeen in Aeia and not too -
long ago. For the moment, their supplies are not threatened: the produc-
ing African states are still far from forming effective cartels. The di-
vergent interesCe of Third World countries often win out over that which
should bring them together; and the South African ia not ready to make way
- for the black ma~ority. However, there is awareneae in Waehington that the
United States no longer rules as master of the world and that coming politi-
cal changea will not all be to its advantage. That is why mining explora-
tion hae been stepped up in America itself: there was a recent diecovery
of new resexqes of platinum, manganese and aobalt. The government is not in
a hurry to exploit them: for the moment, they are a security etockpile
against the day when customary suppliers are lacking. What is more, the
government is awaiting the day when world prices are high enough to make ~
exploieation profitable. For, if the United States knows ite weaknesses,
it also knowa to what point the African countries have need of selling; ~
what would Zambia or Zaire do if they were no longer able to aell their cop-
- per? Where would Guinea be if no one bought ita bauxite? In order to have
- real pressure capabilitiea with respect to buying countries, theae states
should free themselves of their eituation as individual producers. Only ~
then wi11 they be able to begin to negotiate on a faoting of equality with
their clients in the affluent countries. Today, Africana are not in con-
trol of Che game. If they reach this point one day, the factore of the
equation will be seriously altered. The United States is aware of this xnd
is preparing for it. It is up to Africa to know how to use ite aces in the
hole. -
[aee next page for chart]
, 14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CHART
Direct, Private, American Investments in Africa (in millions of dollars) -
- 1960 1965 1970 1975 1976 1977
Total investments
abroad 32,778 49,217 78,178 124,212 137,244
Total investments
in Africa 925 1,904 3,482 3,996 4,467
- South Africa 286 528 868 1,582 1,665
Rest of Africa 639 1,376 2,614 2,414 2,802
Includiag: -
Libya 99 424 1,012 65 362
Liberia 139 201 1$7 334 348
_ Nigeria 535 341
Zaire 250
Gabon 170
Kenya 150
Figures not available
Source: "Africa and the United States" (New York, 1978)
Africa's Poai~ion in World Production of Nonferrous Minerals in 1977
Minerals x Use Principal African Producers -
Antimony 24X Automobile batter- South Africa
~ ies, fire extin-
guish~ra, chemical
~ products
Arsenic 18X Insecticides Namibia
Asbestos 15X Conatruction, South Africa
- surfacing
~ Bauxite 16X Aluminum Guinea
Chromium 54x Metallurgy, South Africa-Zimbabwe
chemical industrq
Cobalt 66X Metallurgy, aaire-Zambia-Morocco
magnete
Copper 22X Conatruction, Z~fre-Zambia-South Africa
- electricity
Industrial 88x Abrasives, Zaire-South Africa-
diamonda drilling equipment Botswana-Ghana
- Flourine 15X Steel, fluorine, South Africa
aluminum
Germanium ~ 52Z Electronics Zaire-Namibia
- Maaganese 52x Steel, alloys South Africa-Gabon
Phosphate 36X Fertilizers, Morocco-Tuniaia-Togo-
_ detergents Seaegal-South Africa
- 15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Minerals X Use Principal African Producers _
Platinum 87% Cataly~ers South Africa
Tantalum 27y Electronics, Mozambique-Nigeria-Zaire
superalloys
Uranium 26% Llectric energy South Africa-Namibia-Niger
~ Vanadium 52~ Metallurgy South Africa
(Percentage of world production, excepting the USSR, East Europe and China) _
Source: AEI, vol I, no 1, 1979
~ U. S. Food Power ~
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Mar 80 p 86 ~
[Article by Sophie Bessis]
[Text] The countries of the Sahel will8~i~tes ofPthe EZLSSy(Inter1State
tons of grain this year, according to e
Committee to Fight the Drought in thQ ~ahthe~Sudan19Moroccoeretc.iare large
more than 2 million tone abroad, Egyp , ~
importera, as are most of the countries north and sourchaseshofSfoodstufts~ ~
according to FAO and World Bank pro~ectio~o~ortionsPfrom now to the year
are threaten~.ng to increase in alarming p p
2000.
In 1979-1980, the United Statea will expox~he48verage~year,sitftakestcare '
corn, fodder grains and soybean~a During
of 50 percent of world exports of wheat, 60 percent of fodder grain ex-
ports~ 30 percent of rice exports, 50 percent of vegetable oil exports.
What is more, the United States has in its territory a large part of the
world's wheat stockpile. Nearly one-fourth of the country's agricultural ~
areas are producing for export; and the United States is today selling
- more grain tu foreign countries than all the other world exportera combined.
In 1979, total food exports brought it $32 billion. That is not all:
80 percent of total food aid to the Third World comes from the United Sta-
- tea. When we realize that even the membexs of the committee set up by
P~tesident Carter to atudy the problem of hunger acknawledge that American
aid ie conditioned by "a concept of national security~" and that euch aid -
is above all "an instrument designed to serve the short-term political
interests" of the United Statea, we are better able to measure ta what ,
_ point the dependence of African countries.with respect to America ie dan-
gerous. Food aid does not of necessity go to impoverished countries:
Morocco, Tunisia, Renya and Zaire have for a long tirie been among the
principal beneficiaries of American generosityo Since 1978, Egypt "de-
prived" of aid eince the 1967 war, is once again at the head of the list of
African countrieao However, Algeria and Nigeria, whose good graces the Uni-
ted States wishes tf c~8i~beca~unse~argosisinotethedonly~weaponare receiv- '
ing large amaunte o g
16 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
African leaders are beginning to understand what the Americans have known
for a long time: the political dimension of their food dependency with re-
gard to the big Western producers,
Blackmail by Racieta -
Paris JBUAS AF~RIQUE in French 5 Mar 80 pp 86-87
[Article by Francoie Soudan]
[Text] "South Africa nonalined? Why not?" This though~ expresaed bq a
diplomat accredited to Pr~toria is not exactly a~est: this country is of- -
ten called the African autpoat of the West and which deacribed itself as ~
the bastion of white capitaliam~ seems, todaq, mc+re than ever t~mpted by
the virtues of isolation and the games of trade-off, This is true to the
point that it is no longer poseible to consider South Africa as an uncon- _
ditional partner of the United Statea in Africa.
- Durban, 15 August 1979a Before delegates of the National Party, Prime
Miniater Pieter Botha, set forth the new principles of South Africa~s -
foreign policy; the "Botha line": "Everyone ahould know thie: we are
not definitely co~n3.~ted to the Western cause, The time has come to re-
examine our foreign relations. Since World War II, it seemed to go without
' saying that we could be counted upon as allies of the West in the event
- of conflict. Such an alinement impliee a certain degree of reciprocity.
- And the Westem countriea have shown themselves to be deceptive in our
regard..."
"Codes of Conduct"
This warning is only one facet c~f the "overall strategy" implemented by
- Pieter Boths and his advisers since the fall of the former prime minister, ~
Johannes Voreter, at the end of 1978. For them, a eingle tactic ia de
rigueur: the old reflex of the laager, that cir~le of wagona which the
first Boer colonista formed to protect themselves against attacka by Zulu
warriors. The pullback to the eouthern bastion. This survival strategy, ~
which in the internal sector is translated into a degree of relaxation of
apartheid, has three dimensions in foreign policy, The construction of
an autonomous~ nuclear defense designed to deter any aggressive impulge
on the part of the continental allies of the Soviet Union (Angola, Mosam-
_ bique and perhaps tomorrow Zimbabwe and Zambia); the strengthening of the
economic ties which make theae same countries dependent upon South Africa,
particularly in the sector of modern technologiea and commuaications net-
work (that is the basis of the plan far a"Southern Econo~mic Cc~unfty"
which was prepared by Pretoria); finally, use of the strategic and economic
blackmail weapon with regard to the West.
Strategic blackmail, first. The Cape route ia vital for the oil supplies
of Europe and the United Statee: 75 percent of the crude oil and 44 per-
cent of the freight making up the foreign trade of NATO countries round _
17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
the Cape of Good Hope. This role of sentinel of the communication routes,
of vital importance at thie time of strained detente, South Africa now -
indeed intends to make pay off. In exchange, for example, for a partial
lifting of the embargo on arms and a certain degree of indulgence with re-
spect to ite nuclear teata.
Strategic Blackmail
But most particularly blackmail in the economic sector and especially as
regards the supplying of minerals to the West. South Africa is one of
leading world producers of 24 so-called "strategic" minerals; number one
for gold, platinum, vanadium and antimony; second for chroinium and man-
ganese; third for diamonds, uranium and natural gaso Ninety-one percent
of the chromium imported by the United States, 52 percent of the vanadium,
27 percent of the gold and 25 percent of the platinum come from South Af-
rica. An even more accentuated depen3ence for the other Western countries,
particularly Japan (87 percent of the chromium and 62 percent of the vana-
dium) and the Federal Republic of Germany (52 percent of the manganese,
50 percent of the vanadium and antimony). The strategic implicaticns for ~
the Weat of this state of affairs are enormous because of the fact that,
outside South Africa, there are no large reserves of crucial minerals--such _
as gold, platinum, manganese and vanadium-~except in the Soviet Union. ,
For Pieter Botha and hie advisera, it is a question of an equal number of
aces in the hole to be used. Several timea in 1979, South AFrican offi-
cials brandished the minerals weapono The effect sought seems to have
been achieved: the Western attitude toward South Africa appears to have =
changed somewhat. The watchwords of economic boycott of the 1960's, pres-
surea designed to cause the disappearance of apartheid, the antiracist
_ "codes of conduct" demanded by their respective governments of the thousands
of Western companies located in South Africa are now almost nothing but mem- ~
ories. The Soweto riots in 1976, the pro-Soviet independences of Angola
and Mozambique, and the depressed prices of many minerals had at the time
weakened South Africa. However~ from the Cape to Pretoria, the winds of
- euphoria are blowing once again; white po~er impoaed its solution on Namibia
- and nothing is_possible without it in Zimbabwe. America consults and
courta white power. A"high risk" country as recently as 2 yeara ago, ~
South Africa has again become a blessed land for foreign investors. Noth-
ing astonishing in that: at a time when the average rates of profit of the
big Western companies is around 15 percent, the rate in South Africa is
25-29 percent.
"The United States wanted to govern here in our etead~" one of Botha's po-
litical advisers said a month ago. "But the day when Kiasinger said"--it
was in Lusaka on 27 April 1976--"that the whites in southern Africa
must yield or disappear is in the past. Today, it is up to the Americans '
to adapt. Our doctrine is conditional neutrality."
"Can ~e boycott South Africa?" This was the queation Western governments '
were asking themselves a few yeara ago. The question tomorrow might well ;
be: "How can we keep Pretoria from boycotting us?"
COf'YRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA, 1980 ~
8I43 I
CSO: 4400 18
FOR OFFICIAL USE OYLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY =
INTER-AFFcICAN AFFAIRS
SURVEY OF AFRICAN OPINION ON CURRh'NT CONCERNS
Paris 3EUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Irfar 80 pp 48-53
~Article by J.-L. B.: "Results of the Special Opinion Poll---Africans,
What Is It That Concerns You?"]
~Text] African public opinion, that fickle arbiter at once courted and
feared by sitting governments, has expressed itself thanks to JEUNE
AFRIQUE. Through our opinion poll, "Africans, what is it that concerns
you?" whose results we publiah below, we have an initial picture of it.
This picture will be completed and fleshed out over the months with new
public opinion polls.
Well then, who are these Africans of 1980? The numerous responsea that
_ we received indicate that they are moderately politicized, distrustful
of their leaders, aware of the importance of economic development, con-
cerned by social problems and the evolution of liber~ties, and worried
about the risks of conflict on the African continent. -
_ That is to say, they have their feet on the ground: Health (75 percent)
counts most for them (question No 1), ahead of family (48 percent) and
~ob security (33 percent). Cultural identity, a less concrete concern,
nevertheless occupies fourth place (31 percent). It comes ahead of money
(30 percent), love (29 percent), religion (19 percent), and--what is most
surprising--ahead~ of housing (only 16 percent). Social prestige and power
received very fe~a votes (11 percent and 7 per-cent, respectively).
Ttiere is a certain degree of realism, then, that one finds also in those
topics which interest Africans most (question No 2): Economic develop- -
ment (82 percent) azid the improvement of infrastructure (71 percent) dis-
tinctly head the list. Third place is a maj or revelation: 60 percent
- for human rights. This is undoubtedly a new aspiration which belies the
well-known thesis of the leaders according to which human rights is a
"Western" notion which could not be of concern before a country emerges
from underdevelopment. For African opinion the two concerns are not
_ contxadictory. Then comes inter-African cooperation (56 percent), a
hollow slogan in the mouth of politicians never followed by results. The
improvement of purchasing power was frequently mentioned (51 percent),
19
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
but uerhaps one would have expected as much in these times of crisis. _
Fairly far behind, one finds universal education (38 percent), the up-
holding of family atructure (26 percent), religious renewal (12 percent),
; and the reinforcement of the armed forces (11 percent). -
Were these focuses of interest shared by their fellow-citizens (question
No 3)? Not always, our readers answered. There is little difference as
regards economic development (72 percent), the improvement of infrastruc-
ture (67 percent), universal education (37 percent), the maintenance of
family structures (27 percent), and the strengtllening of the armed forces
(11 percent). But Africans feel that around them not enough interest is
taken in the defense of human rights (35 percent) or in inter-Afric~n -
_ cooperation (26 percent), but, in contrast, that there is too much con- -
cern with the improvement of purchasing power (68 percent) and religious
' renewal (17 percent). A highly significant result! It may be thought -
that the trend in favor of liberties and cooperation, since these are
indi�idual responses, is not aware of its strength. This prevents it -
from becoming a veritable public opinion movement. Let us hope that our
public opinion poll contributes to it.
- It is, however, necessary to qualify this conclusion. The discrepancies
in opinion about human rights and inter-African cooperation also stem _
From another fact: these queations are nf interest to an eli~e, the one
which reads JEUNE AFRIQUE, which is better informed, better educated,
_ more politicized, and better off than average (as indicated by the person-
al data accompanying the responses). But they are of less concern to so-
ciety overall. That is to say, it is often the elites, the economic and
political intellectuals, who initiate public opinion movements.
What are at present the principal aub~ects of concern to Africana (ques-
tion No 4)? First, social inequalities (56 percent), followed by foreign
interventions (51 percent) and the morality of leaders (34 percent), testi-
mony to the very relative confidence given to them. The slow pac~ of eco-
nomic development is of less concern (21 percent). The same is true of
the price of gasoline (21 percent), Africans being undisturbed by the -
alarmist campaigns on this score. The breakup of the traditional family
(14 percent), the escalation of religious movements (9 percent), and espe-
cially the strengthening of the armed forces (3 percentl) were mentioned ~
only by a minority of readers.
~aenty years after their independence, the fact of statehood is widely
taken for granted (question No 5). The matter of national borders is by
_ far, f~r 58 percent of our readers, the most important. Ethnic (11 per-
cent), inter-African language (10 percent), and religioua (9 percent)
discrimination seems secondary. The matter of the division between
Francophone and English-speaking peoples is even more marginal (5 percent). _
As for heads of state, none of them really imposes himself at the conti-
nental level (question No 6). Julius Nyerere, tre one most often men-
tioned as a leader "who plays an important role," polled barely 12 percent
20
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
of the vote. Then came Felix Houphouet-Boigny (11 percent), Anwar al-
Sadat (10 percent), Leopold Senghor (9 percent), Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi and
King Hassan II (8 percent), and Alha~i Shefiu Shagari (S percent). None
of them truly represente the aspirations of Africana, either: Senghor
polled only 11 percent~ Houphouet-Boigny 10 percent, as did Nyerere~
Hassan II 8 percent, Ahmadou Ahid~o 6 percent, Sadat and Didier Rataira?ca
. 4 percent. What can one deduce from these opinions? Their leaders do
not "send" the Africana. It should also be noted that among the moet
p~pular leaders caly those heada of state who are ideologically indif-
ferent (with the exception of Ratsiraka) were mentioned. For Sadat, it
, seems that Africans view the peace that he eigned with Israel as very
important but that his p~rsonality does not inspire great sympathy.
~ Concerned by the economic situation and foreign interv~ntions and dis-
trustful of their heads of state, the Africans are not optimistic. More
than half of them believe that things are "getting worse" (question No 8) .
in their country (54 percent) as well as their region (55 percent). And
_ $0 percent think that the risks of conflicts' multiplying or becoming
. more serious are "very great or fairly great" (question No 9). They men-
. tioned first the situation in the Sahara (55 percent), ahead of southern
- Africa (39 percent), the Horn of Africa (18 percent), and Chad (9 percent). -
- You will find these last two questions mentioned again in oux next polls,
as well ae that on the ranking of leaders. They are interesting, not
~uat for today's reaults, but also because their evolution which will en-
- able us to discover the ma~or trends in African public opinion..
Question 1: Would you indicate what is most important for you in tl~e _
following list?
Love 29
Money 30
Power 7
Family 48
Social prestige 11
Religion 19
Cultural identity 31
- Job security 33
Housing 16 _
Health 75 ~
The results of this table (the total of the three top choices for each
- response) varied little as a function of occupation, age, political lean-
ing, or geographic origin. In each of these categories, health came first,
as it did overall. The trend was more marked--which is not a surprise-- _
among those over 40 years of age: 90 percent listed health and 61 percent
listed family. Students were the only ones to place cultural identity in
second place ahead of family (53 percent compared to 47 percent). Those
leaning to the right assigned more importance to money than to the family
(48 percent compared to 47 percent). Finally, religion had greater impor-
tance north of the Sahara (31 percent) than in Black Africa (11 percent).
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Question 2: Here is a list of problems. Would you indicate which ones
interest yau most, personally?
The economic development of your country 82
Religious renewal 12
Ti~e defense of human rights 60 ~
Universal education 38
The maintenance of family structures 26
Improvement of purchasing power 51
Strengthening of the army in your country 11
Cooperation among African countries 56
The improvement of infrastruc~ure
- (schools, hospitals, transportation) 71
- There was a high degree of consistency in these responses. The senior
cadres and those over 40 were more interested than the overall group in
economic development (89 and 88 percent respectively). Intermediate-level _
= cadres, respondents between 30 and 40 years of age, and those leaning to
the right were the only ones to place the improvement of purchasing power -
- ahead of the defense of human rights, even before inter-African coopera-
tion. Purchasing power and cooperation were of greater interest in the
region south of the Sahara than in the Maghreb. Discrepancies between -
- personal focuses of interest and the presumed interests of fellow-citizens
" were significantly the same for all categories. _
Question 3: And in your opinion, which problems are of most concern to
your fellow-citizens?
The economic development of your country 72
Religious renewal 1~
The defense of human rights 35 _
Universal education 37
The maintenance of family structures 27
Improvement of purchasing power 68
- Strengthening of the army in your country 11
Cooperation among African countries 26
- The improvement of infrastructure
(schools, hospitals, transportation) 67
Question 4: Among the following problems which two are of most personal
concern to you?
The pric~ of gasoline 21
The escalation of religious movements 9
The breakup of the traditional family 14
The intervention of foreign powers in Africa 51
The strengthening of the army in your country 3 '
The morality of the leaders 34
The slow rate of economic development 21
_ Social inequalities 56
- Totals often exceed 100 aince several responses could indeed be given to
the same question.
- ~ 22 �
_ FOR OFFICIAL IISE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Only the senior cadres and students--whose responses were often close--
- were more concerned with foreign interventions (52 and 58 percent respec-
tively) than social inequalities (48 and 50 percent). Theq were also the
most severe when it came to the morality of leaders (40 and 35 percent).
The price of gaeoline ie of little concern to atudents (l0 percent), the _
_ sympathizera of the left (11 percent), and the yowr?g (15 percent), in
contrast to those over 40 years of age (28 percent) and those leanin~ to
the right (38 percent). The morality of the leaders and social inequali-
- ties were of less concern to the right than to the left. Between North
- Africa and sub-Saharan Africa the significant differences involved the
_ price of gasoline (16 percent and 25 percent), the marality of the leaders _
(28 percent and 37 percent), and social inequalities ~(65 percent and 50
percent).
Question 5: Among the fol~owing bordera, which, for you, has most impor- -
tance?
The national borders of your country 58
Religious borders 9
Ethnic borders 10
Linguistic border between Francophone and
Englieh-speaking peoples 5
Linguistic borders among African languages 11
No opinion 6
National borders were by far the most important for the great ma~ority of
- our readers. Students assigned more importance to ethnic borders than
others, namely white-collar workers (13 percent and 5 percent respectively).
Islam's strength tmdoubtedly led to the mention of religious borders much
more often in the Maghreb (18 percent) than in Black Africa (4 percent).
It was the other way around for African languages (5 percent and 14 percent -
respectively). ,
Question 6: At this time, which is the African head of atate who, in your
opinion, play3 the most important role in Africa (regardless of your per~-
- sonal sympathy)? -
Julius Nyerere 12
Felix Houphouet-Boigny 11 _
Anwar al-Sadat 10
Leopold Sedar Senghor 9 _
Mu`ammar Qadhdhafi 8
Hassan II 8
Shehu Shagari 5 -
Others 18 ,
None of them 19
More than one-third of the Ivorian respondents and a similar percentage of
_ Senegalese and Moroccans singled out their heads of state. This had ~he
~ 23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
" FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
effect of downgrading the performance of the other leaders. Sadat and
Senghor obtained more balanced results--as many responses from the right
as from the left, from citizens of the Maghreb states and Black African
statea. Nyerere and Houphouet-Boigny were mentioned especially south of
the Sahara while Iiaesan II was mention~d in the norCh. The former pro~ect- _
ed an image of the left while the latter pro~ected an image of the right.
Senghor had little aitraction for the young, but a great deal for those
over 40. Qadhdhafi acored best among respondents under 25 years of age
(13 percent). But he was outdone by Sadat (14 percent). Behind Shagari,
(Nigeria) few leaders polled significant percentages: 3 percent for Sekou
Toure, 2 percent for Chadli Bendjedid, William Tolbert, Habib Bourguiba,
Ahmadou Ahid~o, etc.
Question 7: Which African head of state meets your aspirations best?
= Leopold Sedar Senghor 11
- Felix Houphouet-Boigny 10
~ Julius Nyerere 10
Hassan II 8
Ahmadou Ahid~o 6
Anwar al-Sadat 4 `
Didier Ratsiraka 4 -
Others . 24
None of them 23
While, compared to the earlier question, some percentages are different in
this table which gauges the popularity of the heads of state, the internal
variations are the same: Senghor and Sadat are popular everywhere, whereas ;
_ Houphouet-Boigny and Nyerere do not "make it" in the Maghreb any more than
- Hassan II is popular south of the Sahara. Qadhdhafi's score dropped: He
did~not impress anyone, not even the young (5 percent). Ahid~o, Bourguiba,
and Ratsiraka made their appearance in this ranking, but it is essentially -
- in their own countries that they are relatively popular. With the excep-
tion of Sey.zi Kc~!ntche (4 perc_u~i, ~i~C v~i~Cr leaders had negligible scores.
_ Question 8: At this time, would you say that things are getting better or
worse?
In your country?
Gettin~ better 44
Getting worse 54
No opinion 2
In the countries of your region?
Getting better , 40
Getting worse 55
No opinion 5
24
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
The sympathizers of the right were th,e only ones to feel that things are
getting somewhat better in their country (52 percent) and in their region
(49 percent). South of the Sahara the opinions were divided regarding the
future of the region (49 percent againet 48 perceat) wheteae the peesi-
mietic tendency wae distinctly up in the Maghreb~ wiiere 66 percent of our
readers felt that things are getting worse. It will not be aurprising
that the Saharan conflict was the case moat often meationed (see question
9). _
Question 9: Do you think t~at at the present time the risks for the multi-
plication or aggravation of conflicts or wars in Africa are:
Very great 27
Fairly great 53
- Fairly small 15
Very small 4 _
No opin~on 1
Specifically, which conflicts do you have in mind?
Sahara 55
Southern Africa 39
Horn of Africa 18 ~
Chad 9
Angola 3
Zaire 2
Tunisia-Libya 2
Central African Republic 1 -
Students and senior cadrea headed the list of those for whom the risks of _
war were slight or very slight (21 percent in the two cases). The parti-
sans of the right were the most optimistic with 29 percent viewing eadst-
ing risks as '�s].ight or fairly slight." As in the case of the.precedin~ -
question, pessimism was greater north of the Sahara, 87 percent of our .
readers in the Maghreb perceiving the dangers of conflict to be "very
great or great."
COPYRIGHT: Jeuae Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
2662
CSO: 4400 ~
25
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS _
FAC ALLOCATIONS FOR 1979 LISTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 pp 490-491
[Text] FAC (Aid and Cooperation Fund) aid to the states of Africa and the
Indian Ocean duri.ng 1979 totaled 650.7 million French francs (compared to
515.5 million in 1978). To that amount should be added a 5-million-franc
- subsidy granted to the Republic of Haiti (dam canstruction and support for
rural development and mineral prospecting). 7.'hose operations are part of the
Title VI budget (investment expenditures) and thus do not include expenditures
_ for technical assistance, budgetary aid, research, or other operations for
- which the FAC has also taken responsibility.
The distribution by sector of�the Aid and Cooperation Fund's aid for 1978 and
1979 is shown below (in millions of French francs [ME'] and percentages).
- 1978 1979 ~
N~' ~ I~' $ ~
~
General studies 21.5 4.1 19.6 3.0 ~
Rural development 218.0 41.9 181.2 27.6 i
- Industrial and mining developoaent 50.6 9.7 63.6 9.7 -
Infrastructure 97.7 18.8 162.7 24.8 ;
Health and social facilities 35.2 6.8 41.2 6.3 ~
- Education and training 78.9 15.2 88.4 13.5 {
Cultural action and information 16.9 3.2 62.0 9.5
General and st~pervisory ~xpenditures 1.7 0.3 37.0 5.6 !
Total 520.6 655.7 ~
The chief allocations to the various state programs are shown below.
i
FAC 1979: Principal Allocations I
(in millions of French francs) ~
General studies ~
i
I-
Cape Verde ~
Air coverage of the archipelago 0.6 ~
Guinea-Bissau '
- Air coverage of urban centers 0.8 ;
26 '
i-
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Operations of general interest
Technical and economic studies 2.4
Studies of inethods for vacuum-packaqinq products 0.4
Subsidy to the National Geoqraphic Institute for basic
mapmaking equipment 4.0 .
Contribution to increased capital for the BCEOM [Central
Study Office for Overseas Equipatent] 0.9
Programs for the use of new forms of energy 8.5
Programs for exploiting qeothern?al sources 2.0 -
Rural Development
Benin ~ _
Aid to agricultural research 0.5
Support for rural development activitie~ 1.5
Contribution to completion of the Ouidah-Nord palmgrove 1.4
Burundi
Improvements for protection of the Kiriba Forest 1.8
Rpforestation 3.0
Cameroon _
Development of ricegrowing in the upper Noun Valley 2~0
Expansion of irrigated ricegrowing in the Yagoua region 5.4 -
Cape Verde
Exploration for underground water in Sao Nicolau 2.5
- Central African Republic
Support for the Technical Office for Agricultural Planning 1.7 -
- Development of cottonqrowing by the UCCA [Central African
Cotton Union] 3.2
Research in the devel~pment of cott~ongrowinq 4.3
Congo
Small-scale mechanization of farming in the Pool region 2.7
Restructuring of t,abacco production 1.7
Afforestation with eucalyptus in the Pointe Noire region 3.4
Agroindustrial complex in Mantsumba 1.5
Relaunching of agricultural research 1.5
- Iv~ory Coast
Development of animal production 0.8
Irxiustrial sheepraising in Zbumodi 1.0
Djibouti
Support for scientific research 0.5
Gabon
Food production programs at I,ambarene and Franceville 0.4
Afforestation with eucalyptus in Haut-Ogooue 1.0
Guinea-Bissau
Development of peanut growing 2.5
Upper Volta
Hydroagricultural dev~lopment of the Sourou Valley 2.0
Development of the Volta valleys 8.0
Development of ac~riculture 3.0
27
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Madagascar
Agricultural hydrology studies 2.5
Training of cadres for cotton production 1.0
Rural development study of the valleys south of Lake Alaotra 5.5
Mali _
Trucx farm production and canning industry in Baguineda 1.5
- Studies of irrigation areas 1.4
Construction of small dams in Dogon country 3.1
Reclamation of the Dire Plain 1.5
Nbpti rice operation 2.0
South Mali integrated development project 3.0
- Mauritius
Master plan for water resources development and management 2.5 -
Mauritania ~
Construction of the Kaedi agricultural research center 2.5
- Plant health protection for palmgroves 0.7 -
Irrigated areas in the Senegal Valley 3.5 -
Niger
Restoration of the Dallol-Maori "roneraie" 1.0
' Integrated development of the Dosso region 2.6
Relaunchinq of peanut growing 0.8
Rwanda
Development studies in the Bugarama region 1.5
Rural development in Buqesera-Est Giseka-Migonqo 3.0
Development of protein resources 1.6
Senegal
Sine-Saloum experimental units 1.0 -
- Support for the Seneqalese Agricultural Research Institute 1.0
Development of the Senegal River Valley 7.6
Technical assistance for rural development 2.4
Par~icipation in development of the Debi-Lampsar Project 2.0
Seychelles ~ .
Support for rural development 1.0
Participation in setting up a tuna fleet 12.0
Togo
Integrated de~velopment of the maritime region 2.1
Development of coffee ~nd cocoa production 0.9 '
Expansion of ~the co ttongrowing zone 5.3
Zaire '
Development of vegetable crops in the I~anza-Ngungu zone 1.3
Development of agricultural production in Western Kasai 0.6 -
Development of. truck �arming in Kinshasa 1.6 ~
_ Retraining of agricultural cadres 0.4
Operations of general intexest -
Contribution to privately sponsored rural programs 0.8
Interstate operations -
Contribution to the Inter-African Center for Aydraulic Studies 1.2
Subsidy to the Association for the Development of Ricegrowing -
in West Africa 2,g
28
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~ ,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Participation in the special antidrought program in the Sahel 20.0
Regional rice production program at Richard-Toll 2.0
Flood studies of the Niger River 2.7
Transportation of food aid 10.0
Industrial and Mining Development
Cameroon
Prospecting in Sud-Ouest 2.0 -
Inventory of hydroelectric sites 1.5
Central African Republic
Pilot workshop at Bakouma for processing uraniian 7.2
Congo
Electrification development 1.8
- Ivory doast
~ Sugar complex at Borotou 7.0
Guinea-Bissau
Prospecti.ng in Nord-Est 3.0
Mali
Phosphate project in Tilemsi 1.4
_ Mineral prospecting 0.9
S~udies of the iron deposit in Bafinq-Makana 2.0
Contribution to the capital of the Koutiala oilw~rks 4.0
Mauritius
Subsidy to the Bureau of Standards 0.5
= Mauritania
Copper exploration in Sud-Est 1.5
I~ianda
Preparation of a map of mineral sites 0.6
Zaire
Mineral exploration 2.0
Inventory of mining resources 1.5 -
Operations of general interest
Miscellaneous subsidies 0.5
Subsidy tA the Geoloqical and Mineral Prospecting Office 24.0
Contribution to i.ncreased capital for the Gabon Forest Company 1.4
Infrastructure
Benin
- Expansion of the port of Cotonou 4.0
Study and development work for setting up a growsd televom-
munications station 0.3
Burundi
Support for air navigatiorn 1.0 -
Establishment of a cell for development and town planning 2.0
Self-propelled vehicle for transportation on Lake Tanganyika 10.0
Cameroon
Realinement of the Douala-Edea railroad 3.5 -
Construction project for the port of Rpcher-du-Loup 5.0
~ 29
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Study and development work for telecottanunications 4.0
Advance to Air France for contributi.ng to the capital of
Cameroon Airlines 12.6
- Central African Republic
R,~ad proqrams 6.0
Equipment for the Central African Agency for River
Transportation ~ 3.0
Coiroro Islands
Support for civil aviation 3.0
Congo
Diversion o� the Congo-Ocean rail line to the potassium
mining zone 12.4
Realinement of the Congo-Ocean Railroad 13.0
Railroad equipment 3.5
Ivory Coast
Construction of the Abidjan postal sorting center 3.0
Gabon
Studies for the ore terminal at the port of Owendo 1.6
Upper Volta
Studies for the Ouagadougou-Tambao Tambap railroad project 1.2
Madagascar
Antananarivo telephone exchange 4.0
Raad link between Maintirano and Majunga 5.0
Mali
- Studies for completion of the Zbssaye Dam 0.8
Mauritius
Eliznination of solid w.~stes 2.0
Aid to the Construction and Public Works Laboratory 0.5
Niger
Dosso-Zinder microwave link 5.6 ~
Studies for the Kandadji Dam 1.3
Studies for extending the railroad from Parakou to Niamey 5.0
Rwanda
Cell for tow~n planning and housing 2.3
Support for air navigation 1.8 _
Seychelles
Establishment of a team for hydrography and rock removal 2.0 ~
Chad
_ Repairs to the Ndjamena Airport 10.0
Zaire
Support for air navigation 1.3
Assistance to the National Road Off ice 2.0
Support for the Urban Development Office 0.5
Interstate operations -
Contribution to the Di.ama Dam (an OMVS project) 15.0
Contribution to the outfitting expenses of ASECNA [Agency
for Air Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar] 15.0 -
30
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Social Development
Benin
Support for Benin television 2~4 `
Burundi
Outfitting and modernization of the University Hospital Center 2.0
Cameroon
Training of village personnel 2.4
Construction of the Ngaoundere Technological University 7.0
Cape Verde
Modernization of radio equipanent 4.0
- Central African Republic
Aid in the fight against major endemic diseases 0.7
Congo
Contribution to the literacy prograQn 1.3
Ivory Coast
- Training of w~rkers and supervisors 1.4
- Support for the National Office for the Promotion of
Ivorian Enterprises 2.5
Vocational training for the development of radio and television 1.0
Program for educational television 6.0
Djibouti
_ Antituberculosis campaign 1.5
Expansion of the Boulaos school oc>mplex 2.p
Construction of the teacher training school 5.2
Aid to radio and television 1.0
Gabo n
Vocational training (aqriculture and enerqy) 2.6
Support for the Moyabi International Decametric Wave Center 5.0
Upper Volta
Aid tA rural health 2.5
Aid to public health 10.0
Support for the Office for the Promotion of Upper Voltan
Enterprises 4.4
Training of young farmers 2.p
Expansion of the Ouagadougou Library 2~1 _
Madagascar
Support for the establishment of thorough studies in applied
biological sciences 1.0
Mali
Aid in the fight against major endemic diseases 0.4
Establishment af the Mali Museum 2.p
Mauritius
Support for technical education 3.5
Mauritania
Subsidy for outfitting the Nouakchott Technical Lycee 2.3
Niger
Support for school television 1.5
Niamey Higher School 3.3
Aid to Niger television 30.2
31
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Rwanda
= l~bderniLation of the Ruhengeri Hospital 7.5
Aid to primary craft education 2.2
Contribution to the transportation of export products 5.0
Senegal
~ Aid to public health 1.1 -
Training of village personnel 2.8
Training of Dakar-Marine personnel 1.0
Construction of St Louis University 10.0
Equipment for the National Criminal Investigation Police 1.2
Seychelles
Support for the hotel management school 1.5
Chad
Aid in the fight against major endemic diseases 1.5 -
_ Shop equignent for the vocational training center 1.2
F~ergency aid fox Chadian government administration 10.5
Togo
Support for the Center for the Promotion of 9na11 and
Medium-Sized Enterpri~es ]..3
Zaire
Equignent for the Kinshasa Technical Institute 2.8
Technical support for the Voice of Zaire complex 5.0
Supplying of a television ts ansmitter 1.7
Operations of qeneral interest
F~mergency health operations 1.3
Subsidy to Catholic Friendship and miscellaneous private
charitable organizations 3.7
Training of farmers in rural families 3.0
Schooling for French children 8.0
Technical equipment for various private charitable
organizations 8.4
Broadcasting of television programs by French Radio and
Television 3.7
Interstate operations
- Fight against onchocercosis 5~Q
Medical action against major end~nic diseases 4.0
- Training of road carriers at the Council of the Entente 1.5
Establishment of the Higher School for Railroad Cadres 1.0 -
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
11798
CSO: 4400
32
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- INT'r~-AFRICAN AFF'AIRS
CCCE COt~Ti'~NTS FOR 1979 DETAIL~D
Paris MARCI~S TROPICAIIX ET NIDI'~'RRAt~:NS in F`rench 29 Feb 80 pp 486-489, -
49~
[Passages in slantlines printed in italics or boldface~
[Text] In the course of its ~979 operations, the Central Hank for Eco-
nomic Cooperation increased the total number of ite /easy-term loans~ by
_ 24.3 percent, created a~new category of loans~ better ad.apted to the
needs of the poorest countries and for the first time granted aid to Cape
Verde, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Aaiti.*
The increa,se in operations contributing to rural development made it pos-
sible to allocate over a third of a11 investments to this seotor, while
a particular effort was ma~ie to improve the transport networks~ The in-
stitution has simultaneously stepped up the aid it contributes for the
stu~jring and realization of pro~ecta for the technical training of per~
sonnel. ~
While the number of operations has on the whole been coneiderably increas-
ing, some reduction in the implementation of three ma,jor pro~ects hae been -
noted, This has both limited the amounts of the loans that were granted _
at "secand-window'~ market terms and on the average expanded the role play-
ed by the Central Bank in the financing of each of the pro~ects.
Zmprovement of Loan Terme
Inveatments: After more than tripling between 1974 and 1976~ Central Bank
_ annual investments have increased at a mare moderate pa.ce during the past -
3 Yearss
~ For 19']8, compaxe MARCHES TROPICAIIX ET MEDIT~RR.ANE~~1S~ 23 February ~ 979,
p 495.
33
FOR QFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Amount Number of
(millions of francs) Operations
~ 975 655 +67~,6 55 ~
- ~ 976 1, 272 +94�r6 65
~977 1,339 + 5~ 73
~97e 1,493 +1296 88
~ 979 1, 602 + 7~,6 9a
Thie relative stability of real volume of investmente since 1977 in fact
conceale an increase in the number of operatione and especially a very
clearcut improvemen~ in the d3stribution of loaris between the two wirldowa, _
Central Bank Investments
(in millions of francs)
~974 ~975 ~976 ~977 1978 1979 _
Loans:
First window 372.5 482,6 650,9 800.4 965.6 1,200,4
second window 170 613.6 52~ 52~ 399.5
Joint ventures: 2.3 2.4 7.8 17.9 6.5 2.6 -
Totai 374.8 655 ~,272.3 ~,339.3 ~,493.~ ~,602,5 . ~
- So-cc~.lled /~~first-window"~ loans at preferential interest rates, which con-
stitute the chief function of the Central Bank, have in fact increased
over the past 5 years from over an average quarter of a11 loans each yeas
to 373 million franca in 1974 and to 1.2 billion in 1979, They will amount
- to 1.5 billion in 1980, thue having quadrupled aince 1974 in terms of our-
rent monetary value or will amount to 2.4 times as much in real terme. -
~"Second-wind~w"~ loans, advantageous because of the long term involved
but whose interest rates can only be mana,g~ed by the most highly industri-
alized countries or be contracted for particularly profitgble operatione,
did not aunount to as much as they did in prior years: 400 million francs
in 1979. The result is that the Central Bank's share of classical opera~-
tions, Whether loans at reduced interest rates or ~oint venture transacr-
_ tions were involved, rose from 52 percent of its investments in 1976 to
75 percent in 1979.
In addition to this favorable evolution of the distribution of aid grants
wae the creation within the first wi.ndow of a new category of loans, li-
_ mited to ~the poorest countriea~ or those sub~ected to exceptional diffi- _
cultiea. These loaris with a term of 30 years~ that is, twice as long as
~ the average term for other loana, are provided with a first payment due
date extended to 10 years (instead of 5) and bear interest at 1.5 percent ~
during that period and at 2 percent thereafter~ Theae terms mean that
the "gift element" contained in these loana comes to 70 pexcent of the �
~ amount of the loan. In ~979 arr installment of 148 million francs was
allocated for the granting of such loans.
34
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ At the same time and despite the general rise in interest rates, thanks
to aid provided by the Treasury, the Central Bank was able to kaintain
it~ uaual terms for other ~"firat-window"~ loana, for which the average
interest rate was set at 5.85 percent (as aga,inst 5.95 ~ 1978) and the -
average term at 15 and a half years. .
Depoaitss The growth in investmente since 1975 has continued to have re- _
percussions on deposits rather than on payments due to the 5-year grace
_ period generally granted borrowers~ This ha,s resulted in a new increase -
- in net disbursements which let us remember had multiplied tenfold
in 5 year~, bringin~ the Centra~ Bank's share of French public aid to
countries in ite operations zone to almost 20 percent.
r,volution of Central Barilc Disbursemente
(in millions of francs) ~
~974 1975 ~97d 1977 1978 ~979
~eposits 299 359 582 7~3 991 1,016 -
Payments 238 230 243 24~ 25~ 233
Net disbursements 61 129 339 552 738 783* -
Central Bank share of French ~
publi~ a.ia (g~) 2.9 5.5 ~4.2 18,4 ~a,g ~9.~*
- The comparison between 1979 deposits and investments made in prior yeaxs,
however, indicates that certain progr~,.ms, namely the biggest ones, axe
carried out over a fairly long period of time, often more than 3 years.
Central Bank inves~ments axe thus truly multiannual in nature in conformity
_ with the deaires of the developing co~antries. This explains the high
_ figure for "unpaa.d balances" at the end of each year,
"First and second-window'~ loan unpaid balances at year's end (millions of
_ francs):
r.~d of 1975 952
1976 ~~642 -
~977 2,196 -
- ~97e 2,684
, 1979* 3,257
More Favorable Distribution to Poorest Countries
Limited to' 14 countries until 1974, the Central Bank operations zone at
- present includes 31, since the institution was authorized to op~rate in
Ga.mbia, ~qura,toria3 ~Zinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1979. A11 told,
this involves over 120 million rather poor people, since in 1977 those
~ Esti.ruate,
35
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
countries with a per capita income of over $500 [a yeax] comprised only
8 percent of the population, as against 55 percent for those with an
average income of under $299~
Moreover, drought, low priaea for metals or political difficulties parti-
culaxly a.ffected tha poorest countrie~ of the zone in the 1970~s, such
tYia,t the3r GNP per person remained on the average unchanged between 1970
and 197?, On the contrary, it grew at the rate of about 1 peraent a year _
- on the average in those countries with incomes of from ~300 to ~500 and
3 percent in the upper incoane bracket countries,
This is wY~y, although the most highly industrialized countriea offer
better investment possibilitiea, in the geographical distribution of its
loans, the ientral Bank has made a point of making /more room for the
poorest countries over the past few yeaxs~. Ewen though figures for 1
yeax ase not always significant due to the existence or abaence of ma,jor
pro~ects in a given country, we ma,y note a very cleascut tendency toward
the growth of credit granted countries with per capita incnmes under $300,
since these loana have multiplied 6.4 times in 4 years and their sha,~e
of the total went from 16 percent in 1975 to 42 percent in 1979. ~
In 1979 th~s line of development was favored by the creation of the new, '
- easy-term loan categrory which hae ena.bled ~borrowers~ to finance operat
tiona of intereot to rural development in t,he poorest countries or those ~
_ that liave~ been the victims of drought over the past few yeaxs (Mauritania
and Senegal.). Moreover, of the 148 million francs allocated for these
special-term loans, 76 million have formed the ob3ect of an /exceptional -
aid grant to the countries of fihe Sahel/, which for each pro~ect shared
in a Central Bank loan on a 3/4 to 1/~. basis,
It was particularly in connection with this that the institution ex~ended
its first aid grant to Cape Verde, while the first transactions in Sierra
Leone, Somalia and Haiti consisted of ordinary first-window loans for a
water-supgly program, a stuc~y fAr a cement works and the construction of
a hotel complex, respectively.
And lastly, we may mention the importance of the loans granted Cameroon
(3~4 million francs) and Ni~er (246 million) as well as the resumption of ~
operations in Mad.a~a.scax (243 million in 2 years~ ~ince 1978.
36 ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~;,u,:.� ~ u~ r~~~: ( 2 ~
Engagainents annuels ~1 ~ ~`o=
160 de la Caisse Cent~ale : sp R~~Sy~~a^?~S ~3~ _
par le Tresor
dans les Etats d'Afrique 1493
- et de 1'Ocean Indien so
' 34! 2!quicnet ~4~
11~!
. l i ) 2 0
~20 4)1
411
1000 i 13
t~~yuiehet (5, _
80 ( Y wmpris
- i20~ pvtiapatior~
i55
60 ~~2
_ s~~ a~a =
40 ass ae: ~S9 _
u
~es .
2oa ~~s 3's '
1913 14 75 76 ]1 78 79
Keyt -
1. Annual Central Bank investments 3.n the countries of Africa and
the Indian Ocean. `
2. Niillions of francs, -
3. Loana guaranteed by the 'I'reasury,
4. Second window.
5. First window (including 3aint ventures)~
37 ~
FOR OFFICIAL T~SE Oh'LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ Geographical Distribution of Central Bank Aid Grants -
(countries alassified by avera.g~e income braokets in 1977)
(in milliona of franca) -
- 1975 ~ 976 ~ 977 ~ 978 ~ 979
From ~100 to $200: .
Niger 6.9 134,7 113.7 e~.? 245.7 582.7
r~a.1i ~ 4.8 55. ~ 44. 3 42. 3 57. 5 214
IIpper Volta 4.2 38.3 40,7 17,1 85,6 185.9
~ 21 50.6 11.6 12.8 ~2 96.2
xwand~, 5 26 1.2 54.3 g8.5
Zaire 20 22,6 10 12,2 64,8
Others~ .4 6.9 6.8 1.8 34.9 50.8
4-7. 3 310. 6 267.7 166.9 490.4 2e2.9
From $200 to $3oos
N1a.dagascar 26.5 2.9 6 149 94 278.4
Mauritania 31.1 158.9 6.6 196.6
Benin 2 ~ 13 21 39.9 40.1 115
Others 1 1.3 43.2 45.5 .
58.6 15.9 28 349.1 ~83.9 635.5
From ;~30o to $500:
Cameroon 88,5 267,6 241,8 453.8 314.3 1,366 .
- Senegal 9~.1 83.3 144.4 165.4 140,1 623.3
Cong~o 46 27 42 55.7 17~.7
- ~g~ ~0.2 72 3.2 32 9.4 126.8
D~ibouti 32 32
- ~~34.8 449.9 389.4 693.2 551.5 2,31e.8
- Over $500s
Ivory Coast 174 342.~ 410.5 202.6 174.2 1,303.4
Gs.bon 98,8 104.4 160 73.4 ~47 583.6
Mauritius 4~ 33 47 3.1 54 177.1
5eychelles 23.2 3 26.2
3~2.8 479.5 640.7 282.~ 375.2 2,090.3
Grand total3 653.5 1255.9 ~325.a ~491,3 1601 6327.5
- 1. Burundi, Sierra Leone, (~zinearBigsau, Cape Verd.e, Comoro Islands,
Somalia.
2. Guinea, Haiti, CAR.
3. Joint operations among several countries not included, ;
~
i
;
. 38
-
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY '
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Ma~.jor Aid Gra.nts for Rural Development and Transport
Since F`rench aid in other forms is laxgely oriented toward the development
of general education and facilities, over the past few yeaxs the Central `
&'~nk has devoted three-quaxters of its aid grants to directly productive
activities. Furthermore, the sectors involved, that of rural production
- in particular, axe the ones that doubtless pose the biggeat problems in
terms of initiative as well as the completion of projects.
In 1979, however, Y~ydroelectric power production having in the paet few
year~ required large Central Ba,nk inveatments, no ma,jor dam pro~ect was
l~unched, since the need for renovation and modernization of transport
networks had assumed emergency proportions.
_ This is wY~y the percentage of investments devoted to the production aector
was a bit lower than it was in 1979 (65 percent). Although all the whilo
developing its activities in the rural sector and also in the tourist -
sector, the institution devoted more of its resources to transport and
telecomrmanications equipment.
Rurs,l development: The implementation of new terms for loans consisting
of very lon~-term maturity and very low interest rates, better adapted to
the poverty of rural areas, enabled the Central Bank to considerably in-
crease its operations in this sector, operations which went from ~47.8
raillion francs in 1977 (26 percent of its investments~ to 559.'1 million
in 1979 (34.9 Percent),
Thus with this procedure, 24 operations could be launched in Cape Verde,
- Upper Volta, Mali, I~lauritania, Niger and Senegal for the development of
dxy farming of grains and fruits, the creation of sma11, irrigated areas,
_ the improvement of stockra,ising and forestry or to provide villages with
a water supply. . -
These aid gr-~ints are aimed at satisfying "essential needs" in a part of the
Sahel still plagued with drought, For the richer forest axea where, never- -
theless, the problem of providing protein-rich food arises~ loans have
been granted for both lake and coastal fiahing operations, in ivory Coast
- and Cameroon~ At the same time, ma,3or programs have been funded, in part =
at second-window terms, for the cultivation of cottor~, palms and hevea
in Cameroon (136 mi.llion) a.nd palms in Ga,bon (?03 million)~
The double standard the Central Bank is pursuing in its support for tradi-
- tional faxming and farming for export has been extended through the major
effort realized in 1979 to improve the firewood resources of the peoples
of the Sahel through [new] planta.tions as well as to protect the exploita-
tion of an Ivory Coast forest at present threatened.
Min3:ng, industry, electricity, tourisms The sum of 485 million francs,
or a bit legs than for rural development, has been allocated for the de-
- velopment of industry and tourism~ The biggest operation (140 million)
39
= FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
was the second-window advance granted the Niger Government to enable it
- to finance its participation in the Tassa N'Tagha,lgue Mine, the operation
of which ehould increase uranium production in the Arlit area from 4~200
to 5,700 tons. Qvera.ll investmenta now planned should come to 2~6 billion
francs. Two other loans, which will increase Central Bank aid for this
project to 460 raillion, are also planned~
T~foreover, 145~ million francs have been allocated to industries properly
speaking: expansion of a cement works9 a terrycloth factory in Cameroon,
a clinker-crushing mill and a compound fertilizer factory in ivory Coast~
More modest than in prior years (99 million), electricity sector programs
- will permit the development of thermal power production on Mauritius and -
~ i.n Niger.
Fight hotel-construction projects have at last been financed, thus filling -
the need for expanding tourism in Africa and increasing the number of big
commercial hotels. In Ma.li, the two construction projects planned for
Mopti and Timbuktu fall under the heading of a tourist network radiating
from t~a.ko,
Public facilities: The financing of public facilities was exceptionally
laxge i.n ~979: 184 million francs for the railroads; 122 million for
roads, ports and airports; 157 million for telecommunications; 43 million -
for water-supply systems. ~ -
In the doma.in of railroads and telecommunications, acquisitions of eq,uip-
ment Yiave often been pa.ired with actions aa.med at improving management
_ through the training and staffing of personnel and the organization of
maintenance services. In Congo, in particulax, where rail-traffic diffi-
culties encountered between Brazzaville and Pointe Noire ha,ve interfered
with the exporting of lumber, an emergency progra.m ha,s been set up for the -
restoration of 10 locomotives,
The modification of Burundian, Ma.lian and Rwandan airports should contri- _
bute toward making ther~ available to larg~e air-cargo carriers.
Distribution of Central Bank 1979 Operations by Sector
r~ti.llions % / -
of ~'rancs 1979 ~ 978 .
Rural development 559.~ 34.9 23.9
Minin~ 140,8 8~8 11,8
Cottage industries ~45.1 9.1 20.1 ;
Electricity 99,5 6,2 12,6 '
Tourism 99.5 6.2 2~5 ;
~
Production sector total 1~p44 (5~~ 7p~9 i
40
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Ra.ilroads 184,2 11.5 8.5
Roads, ports, airports 122.1 7.6 8.5
Teleco~unica.tions ~56,5 9~g g~~ -
Uxban facilities 43 2.7 .2
Public facil~t~es total 505.8 31.6 25.3
Financial operations total 52.7 3.3 3.8
Grand total 1,602.5 100 100 '
riethods of Operation
Cofiziancings During the past few yeaxs, the Central Bank has contributed
to the financing of very big pro~ects~ particularly xith the aid of Arab
~unds and banks,
~ ~979, however, programs that were retained were most often of average
size, such that the Central Bank was able to share in their financing to
a greater extent than it ordinarily does~ The Central Bank's ahare of
_ the 3,8 billion in investnnents was 41 percent in 19'19 (as agai.nst only
18 percent in 1978)~
Nate, however, fi.hat the Tassa N'Taghalgue uranium mine pro~ect is not in- -
cluded in the total becauae it represented only partial f~uiding, If it
had been included in ita entirety, the imestmente fluided would have
amounted to 6~2 billion francs and the Central Bank's sha,re would have
been reduced to 25 percent.
Pronotion of Pro~ects: While one of the Central Bank's esaential taske
_ is to contribute its aid to the technical and financial sha,ping of the
pro~eats submitted to it, more and more it has to exercise a function of
/promotion~~ The bank's creation of PROPARCO [expansion unlmown , an
in.dustrisl development compar~y that looks for investors and itae~f shares
in providing capital for new enterpriaes,`bears witness to this coric~rn.
~ 1979 two of the loans granted in ivory Coaat went to industries es-
ta.blished by PROPAe~CO. R~e Central Barik hae aleo explored ways of setting
up miziiglassworks aad miucanneries. ~
The ~fina~cing of studiea~ has more and more appeared to be necessary to _
permit the sha.ping of priority pro~ects. Thi.s proaedure, inauguxa,ted in -
1978, produced some dozen study operationa the following year, among which
we ma.y cites in Cameroon, the freeing of the Southeast Benoue region
from its isolation, an inventory of hydroelectric power resources aad
irrigation of the bana,na plaritations; in Guinea, a sug~ar-mi31 complex,
a hydroelectrio development pro~ect; in Burundi, development of
- Bu~umbura Airport; in ivory Coast, development of radio broadcasting and -
televiaion.
41
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFiCIAI. USE ONLY
And thirdly, the Central Bank nakes a point of very closel~ participatin~
in the reali~ation of limited pro~ects of an experimental nature or ~pilot
~ pro~ects~ to pave the way for later large-ecale investments. In 1979
several rural development prog~~~ams responded to this concern for techno~
logical innovation: the cultivation of wheat in IIpper Volta, of corn in
Ma.li, grain storag~e in Senegal, hograising in ivory Coast, modernization
c~ sheepraising in Nig~er, e;tperimenta with villag~e forestry in Mali and -
village water systema in that country. Central Bank participation in
providing capital for tYie Ivorian ~ropical Technology Company atems from
the same concern~
Aid for Manag~ement: Equipment programs achieve their goals only through
proper management of the installations that ha,ve been set up~ Central _
&~.nk supervisoxy missions keep watch over them and, if necessary, see to
it that the terma for caxrying out funded projects are modified~ When .
these axe given test runs, a follow-up evalua,tion mission learns from
perforinance, from failures as well as from successes.
From its experience, however, the Central Banlt ha.s drawn the conclusion
that management must prepare itself, particulaxly through the training
of personnel and the organization of equipment maintenance~ 7'hen too~
the t,iggest projects very often consist of a"training phase" and a"main-
tenance phase," The technical preparation of personnel is also the sub~ect
_ of financing, the importance of which was accentuated in 1979 (millions
of francs);
Forestry training in ivory Coast 27
National Rura1 Development Institute in Senegal 20
Center for Mechanical Occupational Training and Industrial.
Ma.intenarice in ivory Coast 36
_ Training centers for the handling of electricity and water-suppl;� ~
sy~tems in Ca.meroon 20
Loans Granted by Central Bank to African and Indian Ocean Countr~es
- (in thousands of French francs)
I, Yroduction Sectors
1, Rural development 559,~5~
- a. Food cropst 97,270 _
Gra.ins: 43,55~ -
Upper Volta: ~~r~xpeximental operation for wheat cultivation in
the Sourou 11~000
Upper Voltas Project for the intensified cultivation of food '
crops i.n the west 16, 00~
Ma1i: Project for the intensified cultivation of corn in the
south 10,000
I~,a].i: Operation for the reintegration of migrant workers 150 '
42
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY '
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
~
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
Senegal: Gra.in storage program (Kaolack~ Kaffrine, Diourbel,
Louga) 6,400
~its 26,6so _
_ Upper Volta: Pilot project for fruit production 19l6so
Niger: Fruit crop development pro~ect i.n the Ga,ya region 7,000
Miscellaneous cropss 6,880 -
_ Cape Verdes Agricultural pro~ects for Sa.o Nicolau and Santiago
Islands 4,800
Niauritania: Promotion of dry crops in the Assaba and Guidimaka
_ regions 1,200
Mauritania: Heiniorcement of crop peat control 880
Irrigated areass 20,160
Upper Volta: Bagre irrigated pilot area 9,400
T~'ia1i: Construction of Costes Canal by Niger Office 6,200
Mauritania: Creation of 10 irrigated axeas by drilli.ng in the
Tamourt en Naaj region 3,120 -
Mauritania: Creation of 1.0 village irrigation areas in the
Senegal River Va11ey 1~400
b, `r.~cport crops: 250, 300
Cotton: 45,200
Cameroon: Pro~ect to free the Southeast Benoue region from its
isolation and provide it with facilities (first phase) 43,200 =
Cameroons Study for the second pha,se of the project to free the
Southeast Benoue region from isolation and provide it with
facilitiea 2,000
Fruit, coffee, cacao: 12,400
Cameroont Study for a banana-plantation irrigation pro~ect in
the Cameroonian Ba,nana Org~anization's (OCB) zone of operation 2,OA0
Ma.lis Construction of a waxehouse for the preparation and
atorage of fruit destined for export (OPAM [Mal.ian Agricultural ~
Products Bureau~) 1,000
_ Togos Program or the development of coffee and caeao produetion
in the southwest 9,400
_ Oil palms, hevea: 192,700
Cameroons Expansion of Mukete Plantations I,imited oil-palm
and hevea plantations 10,700
Cameroont Hevea-planting program in the Kribi region (I~VECAM
_ [expansion unlrnown]):
First window 60,000
Second window 20,000
Ga,bons Oil-palm-planting program gn the Lambarene region
(AGROGABON [Agricultural Company of Ga,bon~):
First window 61,200 -
Second window 40,800 _
c. Stockraising: 10,800
Ivoxy Coast: Pilot project for hograisi.ng at Dimbokro
(AFRIPORC [expansion unlrnown]) 2,000 _
43
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Niger: Program for the modernization of sheepraising in the
Southern Tamesna region 8~800
- d. Agricultura,l industries: 75,600
Cameroont Srries Farm Palm Plantation Company (SPFS) expansion
prog~am (oil-palm pl.antations and oilworks) 25,400
Ivory Coast: Construction of a palm-oil oilworks at Ikobe in
the southwest (PALI~SINDUSTRIE) 27,000
Guineas Studies and operations for the construction of a ougar-
refining complex 11,G00 -
Zaira: Acquisition of a truck fleet for the shipment of faxm
products by Nogueira and Compar~y (second window) 4,500 -
e, Foreatrys 42,840
Ivory Coast: Forestry tra.ining program (centers at Bouake
and Banco 27,000
IIpper Volta: Construction of a forest-seed production center _
at Ouagadougou 2,640 -
Mali: Forest production and experim~ntation project 6,160
I~Ial.i: Pilot village reforestation pro3ect in the Fana region 2,240
Senegals Plantation program in the Kaffrine region 4,800 -
f~ Fishingt 3~,2~
Cameroon: Coastal fishing pr.o~ect 10,000 _
Ivory Coast: I~'ishing development pro3ect on the Buyo Dam lake 19~200
Ivory Coast: Completion of the second phase of the pilot opera-
tion for the development of sma11-scale maritime fishing set
in motion by ARSO [expansion unknown] 3,000
g~ Village water supplys 26,400
IIpper Voltas Supplying of public works equipment for the con-
struction and repair of village water-supply dams 400
Mali: Village wa.ter-supply pro~ect in the San region 'i4~000 -
Niger; Villag~e water-supply project in the I.iptako region ~,600 -
Senegal: Village water-supply project in three regions
(Fleuve, Louga, Diourbel) 6,400
h, 2~raining:
Senegal: Creat2on of a national institute for rural development
at Thies 20,24~
i. Credits: ,
Upper Volta: Volta Valleys Development Authority (AW) farm-
- credit operationa 3~400
2, Mini.ng 14~,771.8 '
- Niger; Share of stockholders' advances to be allowed the
Tassa N'Taghalgue Mining Company (ST~I'M' which the Niger Gover-
r~ent is responsible for (second window~ 140,000
44
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY '
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Seneg~.l.: Partial funding (stockholders' advances) of Ser~galese
Taiba Phosphates Company (CSPT) investment progxam 771.8
3, Industry 145,'~5~
a, Cementt 55~65p
- Camerooni Fourth Cameroon Cement Worlts Compar~y (CIMENCAM)
eacpansion program:
Firyt window ~9~~5p
- Second window 19~~5p
_ Cauieroont National Investment Compar~y participation in providing
- an increase in capital for CII
r+~CAM (second window) 5~000
- Ivory Coastt Installation of a clinker-crushing plant by the
Southwest Cement Compar~y (SOCIM) at Sa~n Pedro:
First window 6,000 -
Second r~indow 6, 000
Somalia: Comparative study of different solutions for the com-
p~etion and improvement of the Berbera Cement Works pro~ect 150
~ b~ Fertilizers:
Ivor.y Coast: ~pansion of Ivorian Fertilizer Company (SIVENG)
compound fertilizer plant at Vridi 22~000
c. Textiless
Cameroon: Cor~atruction of Cameroon Textile Compa~y for ~ouse-
r~old Linon (SOLICAM) terrycloth factory 14,500
d~ Miscellaneous industriess 13,000
Ivory Coast: Construction oF a plant for the manufacture of
- l.abels and packing stamps and ai.scellaneous prepackag3ng
materials by the Ivorian Industrial Printing Company at
Yopougron 6~000
Ivory Coast: Ivorian Plastics for F~rm IIse Compar~y SIMPAGRI~
pro~ect at Abid~an 2,000
Ga.bons Construction of a lubricant mixing plan~~ by the Pizo
Company for the manufacture of lubricants at Port Gentil 5,000
e. Training: 36,000
- Ivory Coast: Establishment of a mechanical occupational train-
ing and industrial maintenance center (CNII~) at Jacqueville 36,000
f~ Credits: 4~000
Madagascax: Across-the-board advance for the financi.ng of lon~-
term National Bank for Industrial Development (BNI) credit
operations 4,000
4~ ~lectricity 99,480 . -
a. Production: 79,480
Cameroons Inventory of hydroelectric resources of the central- -
aouthern regions, the coast arid ~the west 8,000
45
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
G~inea: Feasibility etudy of the harnessing of the Konkoure
River for hydroelectric power 12,230
Mauritiuss S~zpplying of two banks of thermal generators for the
_ Sa.i.nt Louis power plant 36, 500
Nigers Firat section of the Anou-Araxen thermal power plant
(~upplementaxy loan) (sQCOnd window) 22,750
b~ Training:
Cameroon: Establishment of Ombe Occupational Training Center
by Cameroonian National Electric Compar~y (SONEL~ 20,000
5. Tourism 9g~5pp .
Congo: Construction of an international-class hotel in Brazza-
ville 24,000
Congns~ Advance on Meridian Hotel Company frozen account to
Cong~o Hotel Company 1, 700
Djibouti: Construction of an international-class hotel in
D~ibouti 32,000
Haiti: Construction of a hotel complex at Pointe Labadie neax
Cap Haitien 20,000 -
Ma1it Construction of two tourist hotels in Mopti and Timbuktu 12,800
Nigers Construction of the Air Hotel Company hotel in Arlit 1,900
Rwanda: Construction of a hotel in Giaenyi (supplementary loan) 4,300 ~
Senegal: Expansion of VA-CAP [expansion unlmown] vacation village
at Cap Skirring 2 S00 -
~
Production sector total 1,043,95~.8
_ Composed ofs =
First window 777,951.8
Second window 266,000
II. Pu.blic Facilities
1, Z~anaport 306 290 ~
~
a. Ra,ilroadss 184~200
_ Benins OCBN [expansion unlrnown] 1979-1981 investment program 25~n00
Cameroon: Rc^,GIF~RCAM [Cameroonian Railway Administration~
equipment purchasing progra,m 20,000 _
Congro: ~nergency program for the restoration of Con~o Ocean
locomoti.ves 30, 000
- i~la.dagascas: RNCFM [I~lalagasy National Railway Administration~ _
1979-~982 investment prograta:
First installment 32,000
Second installment 58,000
Senegal: RCFS [Senegalese Railway Administration~ ec}ui.pment
pr~~~ . 19,200 -
b, Road transport: 34~p9p
Benin: Prelir.iin~a.~y study for the launching o� Trans-Benin Road
Corapar~y operations 90
46
FOR OFFICIAL USE OI3LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- Nig~er: Construction of an SNTN [expansion unlrnown~ operations
center at Lome 4,600
Sene~a.l: Cape Verde Joint Trarisport Company (SOTRAC~ equipment _
p~Q~~ 2g, 400
c. Ports: _
Cameroon: Practical utilization of long+-term warehousing areas
at the port of Douala 30,000
d. Airports: 58,000
Burundi: Detailed technical studies for the development of
Bu~wnbura Airport 3,000
I�",a.li: Vaxious modifications o� Bamako Airport 5~000
Rwanda; Modifica-tions of Kigali Airport 50,000
2. Telecommunications 'i56,500
Benins Automation progxam for district telephone exchanges 15,000 ~
~ Burundi: rTodernization program for na,tional telecommunications
_ network 12,000
Ivory Coast: Studies necessary to realization of the RTV [expan-
sion unlrnown~ deve].opment program:
First window 8,500
Second window 8,500
Gabon; Priority telecommunications development program:
First window 20,000
Second window 2~~000
_ Mauritius: Telecomm~nications development programt f3rat phase 17,500
Niger: Television and telecomanxnications development program -
(second win.dow) 55,000
3. Urban facilities 43, 000
C~meroon2 Modernization of Cameroonian National Water Company's -
(SNEC~ Bassa Occupational Training Center 5,000
Upper Volta: Water--supply program in vaxious urban centers 23,000
- Sierra Leane: Zdater-supply program at Freetown 159000
Public facilities total 505,790 _
Composed of:
~irst window 422~29p
Secon~i w3ndow 83, 500
I + II total. 1,549,741.8
Composed of:
First window ~~2pp~241~g
Second window 349,500
III. Financial Operations
1. Participations
_ Ivory C~ast: Ivorian Tropical Technology Company capital
paxticipation 2~E35
47
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY
SF~ne~al.: Yarticipation in increase of Industrial Co~any for _
~ Applications o� Solax ~ergy (SINA~S) capital ~35
Cha,~: Participation in increase of COTQNTCAAD ~Cotton Comp~ny _
of Chad~ capitai 200 -
Francc: Pasticipation in incroase of Company for l~conom~c ~nd
Social Development Studiea (Si~ES) capital 400
~ancet Participation in increase of French Foreign Trade
I3ank (B~'CE~ capital 900
~a.vancos 50,~00
~enegal,: Financing o~ a government investment p~ogram by the
~ene~alese National Development Bank (BI~IDS) (second window} 50t000 ~
France: Advances on current account to SIDES 100
Financial operations total 52,735 ~
Grand total (I + II f III) 1,602,476,8
Co~posed of:
First window 1,202,976.8
Second window 399,500
CO~YRIGAT: Rene P4oreux e~ Cie Paris 1980
11,466
CSO: 440~ -
48 ~ _
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYI ~
i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
COMPREHENSI~IE LIST OF 1979 ARAB DEVELOPMENT LGANS
~ Paris INDUSTRIES ET TRAVAUX D'OUTRE-MER in French Mar 80 pp 140-142
[Article: "Loans and Technical Assisrance of Arab Funds to De~reloping
_ Countries: Second, Third and Fo~rth Quarters of 1979"]
~ccezpt] During the second and third quarters of 1979,
- the Abu-Dhabi Fund for the Economic Development of
Arab Countries, the Islamic Development Bank, the
_ Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, th~
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, the
Iraki Fund for Foreign Development, the Kuwaiti
Fund for the Economic Development of Arab Countries,
tk~e OPEC Special Fund and the Saudi Development Fund _
have granted 60 loans, amounting to the equivalent
of U.S.$644 million. Technical assistance agreements, ~
in the form of feasibility studies, amount to
U.S.$5.08 million.
_ During the fourth quarter of 1979, various assistance
- organizations in Arab countries have granted 28 loans
_ to 21 developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin
America, amounting to the equivalent of U.S.$326 million,
to finance projects in connection with electric power,
sirports, roads and bridges, water supply and waste
water disposal systems, industry and agriculture. In
_ addi tion, a technical aid uf over U.S.$1 million has
been granted to one African country during that period.
On 31 December 1979, the Kuwaiti dinar was worth U.S.$3.64;
the Islamic [as published] dinar, U.S.$1.15; the Saudi
Arabian riyal, U.S.$0.30; and the United Arab Emirates
: dirham, U.S.$0.27.
49
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~ I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
'runisia -
Phosphate Fertilizers--Construction of 2 phosphoric acid plants with a
capacity of 1,000 tons per day, and 2 sulfuric acid plants saith a capacity
of 3,000 tons per day.
Total cost of the project: 800 million UAE dirhams. Amount of the loan:
218 million UAE dirhams, plus a 103 million capital investment. Terms of
the loan: 12 years including 4 years' deferment at 6 percent per year -
(Abu Dhabi Fund f~r the Economic Development of Arab Countries).
Tunisian Dairy Company--Capital investment of U.S.$1.31 million to increase ~
dairy production capacity. Terms not published (Islamic Development Bank).
Suselta Poultry Production Complex--Capitai investment of U.S.$1.80 million
to increase production to 45 million eggs and 625,000 chickens per year. _
Terms not published (Islamic Development Bank).
A1 Tawfiq Hospital--Capital investment of U.S.$1.93 million for the construc-
tion of a modern 115-bed hospital with 6 operating rooms. Terms not pub-
lished (Islamic Development Bank).
Gabes Water-Supply System--Water supply for the industrial zone northwest of
Gabes; constructior. of severL wells, a water-pipe system and a distribution
- system.
Tota1 cost of the project: 11.95 million Kuwaiti dinars. Amount of the loan:
3.30 million dinars. Terms of the loan: 20 years including 5 years' defer- _
ment, at 6 percent per year (Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development).
Morocco
Gharb Area Development--Increasing agricultural production through irriga-
- tion (construction of electricity distribution, irrigation and. drainage
syst~ms, and of regional development centers). _
Total cost of the project: 1,161 million UAE 3irhams. Amount of the lo�n: -
40 million UAE dirhams. Terms of the loan: 20 years including 5 years'
deferment at 4.5 percent per year (Abu-Dhabi Fund for the Economic Aevelop- -
ment of Arab Countries).
Tamazaourt Dam--Construction of the Tamazaourt Dam on Oued Issen, and of -
a model village. ~ '
Total cost of the projec:t: U.S.~177 million. Amount of the loan:
U.S.$5 million. Terms of the loan: 20 years including 5 years' deferment
at 4 percent per year (OPEC Special Fund).
50 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
Foreign Trade rinancing--Purchase of crude oil to cover emergencj require-
ments. Amount of the loan: U.S.$15 million. Terms of the loan not indi-
cated (I~lamic Development Bank).
Sudan
Kenana Sugar Production--Preparation of 3,400 hectares to be planted in
augar cane, installing and outfitting crushing and refining facilities to
_ produce 330,000 tons of granulated sugar per year.
Total cost of the project: 173.5 million Kuwaiti dinars. Amount of the loan: _
6 million dinars. Terms of the loan: 20 years incluc'.ing 5 years' deferment
at 4 percent per year (Kuwaiti Fund for the Economic Development of Arab
Countries).
Foreign Trade Financing--Importation of refined petroleum. Amount of the
loan: U.S.$11.718 million. Term.~ not published (Isla~uic Development Bank).
Foreign Trade Financing---Purchase of finished jute products to cover emer-
gency requirements. Amcunt of the loan: U.S.$16 milliun. Terms of the =
_ loan not indicated (Islamic Development Bank).
- Mauritania
Kiffa to Nema Road--Construction of a 436-km asphalt road, and supervision
of the works.
Total cost of the project: 505 million UAE dirhams. Amount of the loan:
40 million UAE dirhatns. Terms of the loan: 20 years including 5 years'
deferment at 3.5 percent per year (Abu-Dhabi Fund for the Economic Develop-
ment uf Arab Countries).
Guelbs Mining Project--In the Tiris area, production of 6 million ton~ of
iron ore durxng an initial phase of the project. The project :includes:
- ore enrichment, mining equipment, construction of a port,.a railroad, a
power plant; housing and training of personnel.
Total cost of the project: 1,832 million UAE dirhams. Amount of the loan:
80 million UAE dirhams. Terms of the loan:l5 years including 5 years'
deferment at 4.5 per year (Abu-Dhabi Fund for the Aevelopment of Arab -
Countries).
Amount of the loan: 10 million Kuwaiti dinars. Terms of the loan: 15 years
c~ith 5 year's deferment at 4 percent per year (Arab Fund for Economic and
Social Development).
- Am~unt of the loan: U.S.$22 million. Terms of the loan not indicated
(Iraki Fund for Foreign Development).
51
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
i
- Cape Verde
Balance of Payments--Aid to compensate the deficit of the balance of payments.
Amount of the loan: U.S.$1 milliun. Terms of the loan: 15 years including
- 5 years~ deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).
Gambia
Balance of Payments--Aid to compensate the deficit of the balance of paymenCs. _
_ Amount of the loan: U.S.$1 million. Terms of the loan: 15 years including
- 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).
Mali
Sevare to Gao Road--Amount of the loan: U.S.$7 million. Terms of the loan:
20 years including 5 years'deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund),
Guinea
Konakry Plastics Factory--Renovation and extension of the factory; technical
training of the personnel.
- Total cost of the project: U.S.$14 million. Amount of thE. loan: U.S.$6.5
million. Terms af the loan: 12 years including 5 years' deferment at 3 per-
_ cent p2r year (Iraki Fund for Foreign Development).
Konkoure Dam--Technical assistance for the supervision of engineering
atudies.
Amount of the loan: 100,000 Kuwaiti dinars. Terms not published (Kuwaiti
Fund �or the Economic Development of Arab Countries). .
Balance of Payments--Aid to compensate the deficit of.the balance of payments. .
Amount of t'ne loan: U.S.$2 million. Terms of. the loan: 15 years including
5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).
Renovation of the Road System--A 3 years' program including the procurement -
of equipment, ~pare parts, and road-znaintenance equipment, and preinvestment -
studies for the rebuilding of the Kona,kry to Mamou road (270 km).
- Total cost of the project: U.S.$26.8 million. Amount of the loan: U.S.$6
million. Terms of the loan: 16 years including 4 years' defermenr at
- 4 percent per year (Arab Bank for the Economic Development in Africa).
- 52
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Renovation and Maintenance of Road System--A program extending over 3 y~ars: -
training of supervisory personnel, procurement of equipment and spare parts,
preinvestment atudies.
Total coat of the project: U.S.$26.8 million. Amount of the loan: U.S.$6
million. Terms of the loan: 20 years with 4 years' deferment, at 4 percent
- per year (Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa). -
Upper Volta _
Aid to Balance of Payments--Importation of durable goods, spare parts, food
products and other consumer goods. Amount of the loan: U.S.$1.5 million.
Terms of the loan: 15 year_s with 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC
Special Fund).
Benin
Credit Line in Favor of the Development Bank--Amount of the loan:U.S.$4.5
million. Terms of the loan: 20 years including 5 years' deferment without
interest (OPEC Special Fund).
Niger
Foreign Trade Financing--Importation of refined petroleum. Amount of the
loan: U.S.$20 million. Termg not published (Islamic Development Bank).
Balance ot Payments--Aid to compensate the deficit of the balance of payments.
Amount of the loan: U.S.$3.85 million. Terms of the loan: 15 years includ-
ing 5 years' deferment at 4 percent per year (OPEC Special Fund).
Exploitation of Energy Sources--Exploitation of local coal reaources,
construction of a coal power plant to increase electricity production
and distribution in the Northwest.
Total cost of the project: U.S.$136 million. Amount of the loan: U.S.$7
million. Terms of the loan: 15 years including 5 years' deferment at
7 percent per year (Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa).
_ Development cf Electricity Froduction--Project affecting Northwest Niger,
and including two phases: coal utilization, cc~nstruction of a power plant,
of 20 and 132 kV powerlines, roadsf :water-supply~systems; and housing, -
and job training.
Total cost of the project: U.S.$136 million. Amount of the loan: U.S.$7
million. Terms of the loan: 15 years with 3 years' deferment at 7 percent
per year (Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa).
53
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
Niamey to Balayera,and Niamey to Fiiingue Roads--Road construction prcject,
to be completed within 18 months, to reduce to 430 lan the di5tance between
Niamey and Tahoua. Amount of the loan (technical assistance):~U.S.~~1 million.
Terms of the loan not indicatEd (Islamic Develogment Bank).
Cameroon ~
Cameroon Development Bank--Opening of a credit liiie. Amount of the loan:
- U.S.$4.5 million. Terms of the loan:20 years including 5 yeara' deferment
without interest (OPEC Special Fund).
_ Tchontchi to Guider Roads--Construction of a 30-km road and of paved side-
roads totalling ~.8 km.
Total cost of the project: ~i7.26 million Saudi Arabian riyals. Amount of
the loan: 12.3 million Saudi Arabian riyals. Terms of the loan not published -
(Saudi Developmenz Fund).
Guinea-Bissau -
Foreign Trade Financing--Importatxon of refined l~etroleum. :`::.ount of the
loan: U.S.$10 million. Terms not published (Islamic Development Bank).
Balance of Payments--Aid to compensate the deficit of the balance of paym~nts.
Amount of the loan: U.S.$1 million. Terms of the loan: 15 years including
5 years' deferment without interest (~PEC Sgecial Fund). ~
' Zaire
Railroad Project--(Loan already mentioned for the first quarter in INDUSTRIES
ET TRA'JAUX D'OUTRE-MER, August 1979, p 467, before the ~$reement had been -
signed).
- Amount of the loan: U.S.$7 million. Terms of the loan: 2~ years including
5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund). ,
- Rwanda -
Kitarama-Ruhingiri Road--Feasilibity study and main layouts. Amount of the
loan: 100,000 Kuwaiti dinars. Terms of the loan not published (Kuwaiti Fund
for the Economic Development of Arab Countries).
Balance of Payments--Aid to compensate the deficit ~f the balance of payments.
Amount of the loan: U S.$4.5 million. Terms of the loan: 15 years including
5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special i~und).
- 54
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Burundi
Balance of Payments--Two loans to compensate the deficit of the balance of
payments. Amount of the loans: U.S.$11.1 million. Terms of ~he loans: 15
ycars including 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).
Zambia
Railroad Project--Amount of the loan; U.S.$4.5 million. Terms of the loan:
20 years including 5 years' deferment at 4 percent per year (OPEC Special
Fund). _
Somalia
Importation of Cotton Yarns--Amount of the loan: U.S.$5.3 million. Terms
not published (Islamic I3evelopment Bank).
Somali Merchant Navy--Leasing two ships to Somali atSthari.ties. Amount of
the loan: U.S.$7 million. Terms of the loan not published (Islamic Develop-
ment Bank).
_ Balance of Payments--Aid to compensate the deficit of the balance of payments.
Amount of the loan: U.S.$5 million. Terms of the loan; 15 years including ~
5 years` deferment without interest (OPEC Special Fund).
Madagascar
Andekaleka Hydroelectric Project--Construction of a power plant having an
initial power of 54 MW, including: one concrete diversion dam, one water
- intake structure, one tunnel, two turbines, and equipment procurement. Total
cost of the praject: 38.34 million UAE dirhams. Amount of the loan: 16
million UAE dirhams. Terms of the loan: 15 years with 5 years' deferment ~
at 4.5 percent per year (Abu-Dhabi Fund for the Economic Development of Arab
Countries). -
Comoro Islands
Road Network Development and Maintenance--Constructior. of a 5.7-1~ paved
' road between Pomoni and Moya; construction of two bridges, two roadways, -
one drainage system, and one 90-m tunnel; procureme.nt of road-maintenance
equipment.
Total cost of the project: 1.5 million Kuwaiti dinars. Amount of the loan:
1.5 million Kuwaiti dinars. Terns of the loan: 40 years including 10 years' -
- deferment at 1 percent per year (Kuwaiti Fund for the Economic Development
of Arab Countries~.
55
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
L'V1\ vl'1'iV1t1L UJL' V1VL1
Seychelles
Balance of Payments---Aid to compensatP the deficit of the balance of payments
and permit the importation of durable goods, spare parts,and industrial and
agricultural equipment. Amount of the loan: U.S.$ 200,000. Terms of tlie , -
loan: 15 years including 5 years' deferment at 4 percent per year (OPEC _
Special Fund).
Power-Supply to Braslin Island--Construction of a 2 MW power plant, ef trans-
formers~ of a distribution network; civil engineering works. Total cost of
the project: 1.3 million UAE dirhams. Amount of the loan: 800,000 UAE dirhams.
Terms of the loan: 12 years wi.th 2 years' deferment at 5 percent per year -
(Abu-Dhabi Fund for the Economic Development of Arab Countries).
Botswana -
Protection of Animal Resources--Treatment of the fs~ot-and-mouth disease;
installation of complete laboratory facilities to produce 2 million doses _
o~f serum per year; construction of a laboratory at Gaborones, to produce 15
. million doses of serum per year.
Total cost of the project: U.S.$6.25 million. Amount of the loan: U.S.$2.2 -
million. Terms of the loan: 10 years including 3 years' deferment at 2 per-
cent per year (Arab Bank for Ecor.,omic Development in Africa). -
Aid to Balance of Payments--Importation of durable goods, spare parts, food
products and essential consumer goods. Amount of the loan: U.S.$2 ~illion.
Terms of the loan: 15 years with 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC
Special Fund).
Lesotho
Maseru International Airport--Amount of the loan: U.S.$3 million. Terms -
of the loan: 20 years including 5 years' deferment without interest (OPEC
Special Fund).
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1980 -
9294 .
CS0:4400
56
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BURUNDI, TANZANIA SIGN COOPERATION AGREEMENT
- Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 17 Mar 80 p 38
[Text] Pursuing diplomatic efforts with a view to making Burundi known
to the world and developing its international, and more particularly
interregional, relations, President Jean-Batiste Bagaza paid a four-day
visit to Tanzania in February. On that occasion, cooperation agreements
were signed calling for the building o� two roads, one leading from
Lake Nyanza in Burundi to Kigoma in Tanzania, and the other leading
from Muyinga in Burundi to Kobero in Tanzania. In addition, the road
from Muyinga [o Kibonbo via Kusulu will be repaired. Burundi will pur-
chase supplementary rolling stock for the railroad linking Dar es-
Salaam and Kigoma, on Lake Tanganika, in Tanzania, and will carry out
port work in Kigoma and Bujumbura.
These agreements, which come within the framework of the privileged
relations linking Bujumbura and Dar es-Salaam, should contribute to
developing access routes for Burundi, an entirely landlocked country
for which the main facility for egress abroad is the Tanzanian port of
Dar es-Salaam on the Inidan Ocean.
- Burundi al.so ma~ces use of the Kenyan p~rt of Mombasa, but this route,
which -rPquires transi~ through O~ganda and Rwanda, is longer and much
- more costly.
COPYRIGHT: 1y80 Afrique-Asie
- 5157
CSO: 4400
57
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
~ BRIEFS
GUINEA, SENEGAL PEANUT PROCESSING-According to the terms of a protocol
_ signad in Conakry on 2 April, a Senegalese company, the SEIB (Baol
Electric and Industrial Company) will establish a plant to refine peanut
oil and table oiI in Guinea. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MED-
ITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 864]
CSO: 4400 ~
58
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY -
CENrRAL AFRICAN R~PUBLIC ~
BRISFS ~
DIPIAMATIC REIATIONS WITH TURKEY--The,.governments of Turkey .
and Central African Republic have decided to establish diplom~tic
relations on the embassy level. [Text] jParis MARCf~SS TROPICAUX ~T =
- I~DITSRRAI~BNS in French 29 Feb 80 p 515] 5058 . L
POSTAI. G'F~CKS RESTORED--The 20 February 1978 ordinance, barring payment `
of public debts except through bank checks or in cash was repeaZed a:~ _
_ 6 February 1980. This regulation was aimed at preventing pa~n~e with
the help of postal checks; since deposits in the CCP jpostal checi~ing tundJ
are periodically used by the treasury, the postal checking service found
itself without any funds and the service had lost all of its credibility.
Today the goverament wants to restore the postal checking service network
and reinstitute the postal checking functions in order to re~tore the
confidence of the depositors. jText] jParis MARCHES TROPICAUR ET
MEDITSRRAI~BNS in French 29 Feb 80 p 515] 50,58
I~ASURES AFFECTING TRAiNSES ABRO~ID--A recent Central African cabinet ~
meeting decided to restore orde~ in the rather confused situation of
Central African civil servants taking training courses abroad. Some
trainees, as a matter of fact, stay abroad seemingly forever, taking all
kinds of uaiversity courses or swi.tching their special fields during their _
. t~aining courses. At this time, the Central African government main~nins
442 train~es and their families outside the country; most of them are in
France where some have been living for ~the past 16 years. The government
will therefore take four series of ineasurea: establishment of a couo~ie- =
sion charged with studying the situation of all trainees sbroad, case by
case, and to return on an emergency basis a11 of thoae who have finiehed
their training courses or who have started studies for which they were -
_ not initially intended; no more disordered or fun couraes; reduction of
training course duration and publication of regular report c~rds, other-
wise the individual will not get any pay and will be subj~cted to
disciplinary punishment; continued supervision of cours~ trainees by a -
- specialised section which will operate in conjunction with the miniateries
of finance and of planning. [TextJ [paris MARCHES TROpICAIAC ET I~D~IT_ ~
- ERRAI~ENS in French 29 Fe6 80 p 515] 5058
. 59
FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
- SOVIET PROFESSORS REPLACED--Mr Jean-Marie Bassia, doctor of physics,
~entral African professor at the University of Bangui, has been appointed
- dean of the school of sciences, replaci,ng Mr Karin, a soviet instructor.
The USSR as a matter of fact has atuck to its deciaion to recall all of -
ita technical assistance personnel in spite of the desire of the Central
African government to have the instructors remain following the break of
diplomatic relations between the two countries. There had been 84 Soviet
professors in the RCA [Central African RepublicJ, including 24 at the
university. Almost all of them were teaching scientific subjects. The _
departure of these inst�ructors creates serious problems for the Central
= African author~tiess ~~rticularly in the school of sciences, whichahas lost
- most of its ~eaching b~dy, and in the provinces, where the Soviets were
_ v~ry numerous. The Cer~~ral A.frican national education minister has asked
: Moro~co to receive 2nd-year and 3rd-year students from the school of
~ sciences and that cc,untry has agreed. He also asked Central African
- professcsrs in physi.cal e~ucation to teach courses in biology in the high _
- schoois and he asked some employees of the mini~try of agriculture to -
_ teacri courses in mathem$tLcs, physics, and chem�Lstry. jText] [Paris
- MARCHES TROPZCAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 pp 515, 516] 5058
MINISZ�ER WAItNS I,EBANESE--Central African Commerce Minister Kabylo recently
a~e~ with I,ebanese merchants in Bangui in order to warn them against un-
= lawful practices often observed amang Chem, such as ma~or violations of -
trade legislation, refusaR to keep p~eper accounts, and employment of non-
- existent manpower. Mr Kabylo asked �r.he Lebanese to work with the govern-
ment for the countr}r'~ r2covery< [xext] jParis MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
I~DIT~RRANEEN~ in ~'rench .2y FeG 8L p 516] 5058
CSO: 4400 =
60
FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CONGO
- BRIEFS
_ PCT DELEGATION TO USSR--Brazzaville, 7 Mar--In preparation for talks be-
tween the CPSU and PCT (Congolese Labor Party) soon to be held in 1~4oscow,
the politburo of the PCT in February examined "all the documents repre-
senting the party's contribution to this meeting." The PCT delegation to
Moscow will be headed by Mr J. P. Thystere Tchicaya, member of the polit-
buro for ldeology and Education; Messrs Lekoundzou, politburo member for
the PZan and Economy, Bongou, general secretary of the Presidency of the
Central Committee and Batheas-Mollomb, member of the Central Committee,
will accompany him. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCAES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 7 Mar 80 p 575] 2750 '
ADB RAILROAD LOAN--Brazzaville, 7 Mar--The ADB [African Development Bank]
has recently granted a supplemental loan of 2.80 million accounting units
(approximately 774 million CFA francs) to the Transcon~golese Communica-
tions Agency (ATC) to finance cost over-runs on the Congo-to-ocean rail-
- road pro~ect (COCO) financed by the ADB. This loan is repayable in 12
years after 4 yeare deferral of amortization. We recall that the realign- _
ment of the CFCO hae the purpose of eliminating the bottleneck in the sec-
- tion in the mountainous district of Mayombe, to increase the railroad's
capacity. This operation is also intended tn prevent substantial inter-
ruptions of railway threatened by precarious conditions in the main tunnel
and on certain bridges. The ADB has already granted 10 [sic] million ac-
count3ng units (15 million UC in 1976 and 5 million UC in 1978) for the
purchase of rails, laying of the track, and the telecommunication com-
_ ponents of the project, in all 7 percent of the pro3ect as a whole. The
project's cost as of 1975 prices was on the order of 33.48 billion CFA
francs. This cogt has been exceeded and reached 41.33 billion CFA francs
in January 1978, so that the financial packag~ had to be revised. Today
the cost amounts to 60 billion CFA franes. Thus there remains a shortfall
of 20 billion CFA francs to be found if the pro~ect is to be brought to
_ successful completion. Completion of construction is planned for December
1981. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERF,ANEENS in French 7 Mar
80 p 575] 2750
ADB PALM OIL PROJECT LOAN--Brazzaville, 7 Mar--A second A~B loan of 8 mil-
lion accounting units (approximately 2.16 billion CFA francs) was granted
61
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
to the Congo to finance that country's Palm Oil Project. Thi.s project
is aimed at the recovery of the Ouesso sector, principal prodLCtion zone -
of the RNPC [National Administration of Paim Plantations of the Congo]
~n order to increase the production of palm oil now in a decline and to
make possible the production of cabbage-palm which is at present no:~-
existent. Palm oil production will thus increase from 3,000 tons to 6,000 _
tons, and cabbage-palm production will attain the volume of 1,600 tons.
The project includes the renovation of non-existent [sic] plantations,
creation of new plantations on an industrial scale, and renovation of the
plantation's existing processing plant. The total cost will be 10.2 ;~il-
lion accounting units, of which 77.5 percent is in foreign exchange. The
pro~ect will be financed ~ointly by the ADB and the Congolese Government.
The ADB loan will serve to finance the costs in foreign exchange of all
the components and the costs in local currency related to new plantations.
- The execution of the work will extend over a period of 6 years. The agency ~
~ responsible for execution is the RNPC. This is the eighth loan granted by
the ADB to the Congolese People`s Republic. The total of previous financ-
ing by the ADB for that country's account is 27.6 million accounting units,
and is divided over 7 projects. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDI~ERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 575] 2750
REI.ATIONS WITH ECUADOR--On 13 February, diplomatic relations were estab-
_ lished between the People's Republic of the Congo and Ecuador. An
agreement along theQe lines was signed between the representatives of
_ these two countries in the offices of the United Natians Secretariat-
General in New York. [Text] tParis MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAT~ENS
in French 29 Feb 80 p Sx8] 5058
CSC SECRETARY'S RETURN FROM MOSCOW--Mr A. Ondonda, member, Central Com-
mittee, PCT (Congolese labor party), permanent secretary of CSC (Congolese -
trade union confederation), in charge of international relations, returned
to Brazzaville at the end of e journey that had taken him to Prague and
Moscow. In Prague, Mr Ondonda attended a meeting of the WFTU, the OATW, .
and the CSC with a view to preparing a pan-African seminar to be held in
Brazzaville next March. jText] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDI~ER-
R.4NEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 518] 5058
PETROIEUM PRODUCTION TO INCREASE--The petroleum output of Che Congo,
currently about 2 million tons per year, is to experience conaiderable
increase over the next several years. Confirming the recent suggestions
- of Mr Albin Chalandon (MTM [MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS),
1 February 1980, p 245) ELF [Gasoline and I,ubricants Company] - Congo
estimates that, according to~AGEFI, the exploitation of new deposits
should permit the country to increase its output to 5 million tons within
3 years and to 8 million tons by the end of this decade. Mr Albin
Chalandon, who has just been in the Congo, at which time he was received -
by president Sassou Nguesso, had an opportunity once again to express his -
confidence in the petroleum future of that country. jText] [Paris
riARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 618] 5058
62
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240080006-5
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CLASSIFICATION OF STATE ENTERPRISES--Following the Conference on Govern-
ment Enterprises (MTM [MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDIi'ERRANEENS] of 15 February
1980, p 391), further specific inforir:ation was ~upplied by Congolese
_ authorities on the classification of Congolese enterprises in three
categories: (1) Bnterprises to be developed (about 26). Those which are
_ in a relatively sound condition regarding organization, management,
treasury, and envirornnent, and which are able to pay for their exp~nsion
or cdntinue it (Hydro Congo, Congolese Lumber Office, Congo G1ass
Factory Company, ATC (Trans-Congolese'Communications Agen:y), (;ongo
Inaurance and Reinsurance, etc.). (2) Enterprises to be restored ~about
25). Thoae which, continuing with the same company ob~ective, preaent -
problems of organization, management, treas~ry, and environment that
could harm their balance or their sound expansion and whose situation
requires restoration (Loutete cement plant, Lina Congo, Congolese
~ Ammortization Fund, National Commerce Office, etc.). (3) Enterprises
to be reconsidered (about nine). Those whose marketing, management
organization, technalogy, and environmental problems can lead either to
- a change in their company objective or to a reorientation of their
- ~activities or to a reorganization with a view to their restoratinn and
development, or to their elimination (Nat~onal Z~Lvestock Company, National
I.umber Exploitation Company, National Palm Plantation Monopoly of the
_ Congo, Transportation Company of Brazzaville, etc.). [TextJ [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 518] 5058
MARXIST CIRCLES SET UP--"Marxist C1ubs" were opened 12 February
at Brazzaville by Congolese interior minister F. X. Katali. The "Marxist
Clubs" are seminars which are attended by all members of the PTC (Congol- -
ese Labor Party) who, with the help of these presentations, will receive
"knowledge in the acquisition of the political, ideological, and technical
conscience." [Text] [paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 2~3 Feb 80 p 518] 5058 _
MANGANESE EXPORTS--In 1979, COMILOG (Ogooue Mining Company), which operates
the mines at Moanda, in Gabon, shippPd 2,269,513 tons of manganese
, intended for ~xport via the CFCO (Congo-Ocean Railroad) over a distance a
_ of 200 kilome`_srs between Mont-Belo and Pointe-Noire. This tonnage has
not been obtained since 1964 (2,255,400 tons in 1976). In recent years,
this transit tr3ffic developed in the following manner (in terms of 1,000
tons): 1977--1,853; 1978--1,678 (down 9.4 percent); 1979--2,269 (up
35.2%). The decline in traffic between 1977 and 1978 was the result of
- a ma~iganese mineral sales loss on the world market at that time. The
. er.cellent traffic volume of COMILOG should favorably influence activities -
in the p~rt of Pointe-Noire in 19,'9, whose results are not yet known.
. ~.i'2Y.t' J [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80
_ F 51$] 5058 ~
~
_ CSO: 4400 -
63
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
-I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
MINISTERIAL RESHUFFLE IMPROVES POLITICAL CLTMATE
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 572
[Text] An Tmproved Political Atmosphere
- The reshuffling of the government of Equatorial Guinea resulted in a notice-
; able improvement, as of the beginning of February, in the country's polit-
- ical atmosghere, which had been fairly tense due to the comparisons that
could bP made between the dictatorial government of N.acias (or Macie)
Nguema, and the one that replaced it, since individuals who had badly com-
promised themselves with the former regime were able to maneuver so as to
remain in power.
The disgrace *_hat has ~ust assaulted them shows the good inter~tions gener-
ally ascribed to Lieut Col Obiang Nguema and other officers who played a
determining role in the coup, despite their affiliation with the Fang tribe,
_ and even with a lineage of this tribe to which the deposed dictator himself
belonged.
The second vice president of the military government, Captain Ela Nzeng,
was removed from office, probably for prevarication, and appointed ambas-
sador to Peking. He was replaced by Capt Eulogio Oyo Riquesa, a Bubi
(tribe from the island of Fernando Po, or Bioco, very much in a minority, -
making up about 10 percent of the country's population), which constitutes
a restoring of tribal balance without precedent since independence, comple-
mented by the arrival in the military cabinet of another Bubi, Capt Seriche
Bioco.
Capt Mba Ognane, military governor of Rio Muni, was also put out of office.

- The ~~ecial correspondent of the Gabonese newspaper L'UNION, Mba Nguema,
recently reported that "two ships loaded with foodstuffs and products of
~ first necessity, coming from Spain and destined for Rio Muni, were confis-
cated and put on a different course at Bata [principal town of Rio Muni] f
_ by local officials in power, to the detriment of a population that con- -
tinues to vegetate in a condition of want. _
Since Equatorial Guinea has the particular characteristic of having a mili-
tary government and a civil government (Junta technica), the political
= 64
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
housecleaning also touches the civil~,an team, some members of which hav-
ing had the reputation of involvement in the evil doings of Macie.
- Thus Mr Nguema Essono, former vice president under the dictator, who
prided himself in having kept Maci~ in an unsuspecting state while the
coup was being prepared, lost his post of techni~al aecretary (equals
minister) in the Office of External Affairs, being replaced by Mr Victor _
_ Ondo Mangue, a true opponent of Maci~ who had been imprisoned under the
old government. Mr Nguema Essono was appointed ambassador at Addis Ababa. -
Mr Batho Obama Nsuse, secretaxy for external affairs under Macie and tech-
nical secretary for security since the cou~, was also removed. He was
made charge d'affaires at Yaounde. -
New arrivals observed in the civil government are a Fernandino (crPole
from Fernando Po), Mr Federico Messas Bill Kongue, and a Bubi, Mr Ernesto
Calletano Tohorida, confirming the restoration of ethnic balance previously
mentioned.
We present the complete list of the government at Malabo whose purpose,
after the temporary period of the government of public safety constituted ,
after the coup of last August, is to re-establish government, to provide
better national representation in the exercise of autt~arity, and to show
the population that times h3ve really changed; in this connection, the
appointment of Captain Riquesa, second vice president and of Bubi origin,
_ is highly symbolic, since he acted as prosecutor during Macie's trial last
September, a trial which, as is known, resulted in a sentence of death and
the executi~n of the fallen dictator.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1980
2750
CSO: 4400
65
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
EQUATORIAI, GUINEA
BRIEFS
ADB IAAN--The BAD (African Development Bank) has just granted a loan
amounting to 500,000 accounting units (or about 124.42 million CFA
[African financial community]) to EquatoYial Guines with a view to
- fir.ancing studies relating to the moderni~ation of the Bata intern~tional
airport. The loan is repayable within 10 years, including a period of
grace of 3 years. The following objectives are contEmplated: by making
it more functional and operatioaal, enabling the Bata airport to play a -
real role in economic and social development for Equatorial Guinea which
' is in part insular and in part continental; to improve its infrastructure
facilities and its superstructure in successive stages s~ that the
installations will be in k~eping with the transportation demand at any ~
- moment. A report had been drawn up in 1968 on reinforcing the extension
_ of the exiating runway (200 meters) by SFDTP (French Dredging and Public
, Works Company). The BAD proposed the following in order to update that
report: (1). A master plan for the development of this airport for the
next 15-20 years, indicating the various reasonably possible phases;
('L) a technical, economic, and financial feasibility study. The results
of the study and the master plan will help in preparing an~implementation
- study and bidding invitations for an optimum work program to be carried
out, as part of the first phase, in order to improve this airport. The
estimated cost of this study is 500,000 UC [accounting units]. A period
of 12 months has been provided to pemnit consultants to submit final
offers. The coordinating body between the consulting engineers and the
various technical departments will be the department of transportation
of Equatorial Guinea whose officials constitute the counterpart team for
the consulting engineers. This is the second loan given by the BAD
- group to Equatorial Guinea; the bank had recently granted a loaa of 6.6
billion UC for the renovation of cocoa plantations. [Text] jParis
� MARCI~S TROPZCAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 516] 5058
CS0:4400
66
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
GAMBIA
- ADF PEANUT PROCESSING LOAN RECEIVED
- Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 564
[Text] Bathurst, 7 Mar--The Gambian peanut processing industry has re-
- ceived a loan from the ADF [African Development Fund] of 5 million ADF
accounting units, or dpproximately $5.5 million. The pro~ect thus being
financed ~as already received a loan from the EIB on the order of $3 mil-
lion. The plan, in its ft.rst phase, is to upgrade the handling and shell-
ing installations at Kawi, as w~ell as the handling, shelling and grocess-
ing installations at Denton Bridge. It will eliminate bottlenecks, incregse
the efficiency of the procedures, and will make possible the increase of
tonnages of ;inshelled peanuts processed by the plant aow in operation from
40,000 tons to the present volume of 65,000 tons.
The pro~ect includes the following: reconditioning the extraction presses
at Denton Bridge, construction of auxiliary warehousing and processing
buildings at Rawi and Denton Bridge, purchase and installation of electric
power generating units, addition of cyclones to the shelling machines, -
- purchase of vehicXes and office equipment, loan of the services of engi-
neer-advisers for implementation studies and supervision of the work.
_ Total cost of the pro~ect is estimated a~ in excess of $10 million. The
project will be financed jointly by the ADF, the EIB and the GPMB [Gambia
Produce Marketing Boar3]. Its execution will take 3 years: it will start
in 1980 and attain completion in 1982. The agency charged with execution
is the Gambia Produce Marketing Board. Required goods and services will
be obtained through international requests for bids, except for the general
reconditioning of presses and digesters, which will be handled by the manu-
facturer of the machinery.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1980
2750
- CSO: 4400
67
FOR OFFICIAL IISE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICYAL USE ONLY '
GAI~IA _
BRIEFS ~
AUB ROAD PROJECT LOAN--Bathurat, 7 Mar--The Banjul-Serrekunda road project '
in The Gambia which has been granted a loan on the order of a billion CFA
francs by the ADB, aims to increase the traffic capacity of this road, and
- make the pavement capable of handling increasingly heavy traffic. Increas-
ing the road'a capacity will facilitate acceas to and egress from the city
of Ban~ul for goods and nassengers traveling between Banjul and Kombo St.
Mary, a densely populatea zone and the economic and administrative cQnter ,
of The Gambia. The project includes the following: updating the existing
study; construction of a two-lane expressway separated by a divider from
_ Ban~ul to Serrekunda (11.6 kilometers), as well as lighting for the new
highway, loan of consultants and superviaion of the construction work. The
total cost of the project excluding taxes is estimated at 8 million ADB
_ accounting units (approximately $10.4 million). [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TYtOPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 564] 2750
CSO: 4400
68
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
GUINEA-BISSAL'
BRIEFS .
PORT COOPERATION WITH BRAZIL--Manuel dos Santos, state commisaioner for
transportation of Guinea-Bissau has left for Brazil. His visit ie aimed
at obtaining the participation of Brazilian firms in the dredging and ex-
tenaion pro~ects for the port of Biseau. Financed in equal parts by the
World Bank and the Kuwait Economic Fund, these pro~ects will total $25 =
million. Minister dos Santos will meet with Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro,
Brazilia~n minister of foreign affairs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 864]
CSO: 4400
~
69
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
KENYA
BRIEFS
DROUGHT AFFECTS STOCKRAISING--Nairobi, 7 Mar--The drought afflicting Kenya
for the past 9 years has reached al2rming proportions, due ~o the particu- .
larly scarce rainfall in 1979, causing a severe shortage in cereal grains,
according to the FRENCH PRESS AGENCY. The drought now affects the entire
tExritory and every sector of activity from hydroelectric power to agri-
culture. The country's only hydroelectric power station, on the Tana -
_ River, has had to cut down its output by half, because of the low water
- level in the dam. Consequently the country's induatries are operating
at half capacity. Stockraising and agriculture are the worst hit. Milk
deliveries have fallen from 700,000 to 410,000 liters per day and butter
production has dropped from 280 to 72 tons per month. The authorities
were compelled to import 2000 tons of butter from Europe for 3.4 million
Kenyan shillinga (approximately $500,000). As a further consequence of
- th~ scarce rainfall of 1979, ahortagea in corn, wheat and rice have reached
a critical level. Shortage of corn, the basic diet of Kenyans, was espe-
. cially felt in the last 3 months at Nairabi and Mombasa. Prices of theae
three cereals rose by more than 29 percent by direction of the authoritiea,
to encourage farmera to increase their production. Promised delivery of
60,000 tons of corn, 30,000 tons of wheat and 15,000 tons of rice which
President Arap Moi requested from the United States during his recent
visit there (MTM 29 Feb p 520) should enable Kenya to get by until the
next harvests in the course of the year. But everyone wonders whether
these harvesta will be any better than *_hose of last year, when the rains
that normally give the signal for sowing seeds have not yet made their -
appearance. [Excerpts] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 7 Mar 80 p 577] 2750 _
CSO: 4400
'0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
LIBERIA
- NATION SAID TO HAVE SERIOUS D"LFFICULTIES
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar $0 p 570
[Article: "Liberia, Development of Agriculture, an Imperative Necessity"]
[Text] As is knawn, in his annual message to Parliament delivered on
, 24 January (M'iT~i, 15 Feb p 386) President William Tolbert announced a series _
of ineasures favoring agriculture. These measures related in their goals
to "Operation Feed Yourself" in ~hana and "Operation Feed the Nation" in
_ Nigeria, since renamed "Green RQVOlution" (MTM 22 Feb p 446), as noted by
FRENCH PRESS AGENCY, mark a spectacular turning point in local economi~
policy.
This atep was in fact made necessary by the situation cur~ently prevailing
in the country, partly the cause of the serious disorders that ~ccurred
there last year.
The world crisis had substantial effects on the export of ~~ron ore and
rubber, the two products from whence Liberia gets most of its foreign ex-
change. In regard to iron ore, af which the country is No 1 exporter for
Africa and eleventh in the world, the minister of finance, Mrs Ellen John-
son-Sirleaf, quite recently made no secret the fact Xhat the future was
_ eapeciallq dark (MTM 22 Feb p 445). Iron ore exports, which used to repre-
sent 74.7 of total exports, now only make up 55.4 percent.
According to the lady minister, the three companies show some 50 million
�dollars of deficit, Lamco alone showing $26 million, and being at the point
of firing 700 out of the 4,500 workers it employs.
As for rubber, which made up 13.2 percent of eaports in 1977, though its
future is less dark, thanks to a rise in world ~arket pric~s which has
worked out to the advantage of Firestonz most of all, it suffers from Che
_ disappearance of a large number of small plantations, and the government
program for reviving this sector will require years. -
To sure, Liberia has no lack of potential mineral reaources: uranium, -
gold, barite, bauxite and even oil, for which there are encouraging indi-
= cations off the coasts. But exploitation of these will require time and
71
=
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
money. Also, for the short term, the country's salvation lies in agri- -
culture and in a return to the land by many of its citizens, as they are
being urged to do in the "Back to the Soil Movement." Development of
agriculture will confer a great advantag~ in apeeding the development of
the back country, too long neglected due to the concentration of activities
in the mining and rubber aectors. This development of agriculture, however,
will, if it really goes through, also require a certain amount of time, and
- it is not expected that the country will meet its requ~rements in rice this
year, a product of which it is a large consumer, and purchases of which on
the outside represent a heavy financial burden (even though production has
- practically doubled between 1964 and 1976, in the latter year reaching
250,000 tons, with outside purc.hases increasing regularly: 31,000 tons
in 1975, 37,000 tons'in 1976, 59,700 tons in 1977...).
In contrast, agricultural exports are already showing encouraging develop-
ments. The proportion of coffee in the export total has risen from 1.4
percent to 9.6 percent from 1976 to 1977. Cocoa and oil-palms are improv-
ing. Finally, great hopes are placed in lumber (see exports for 1978 in
MTM 20 Apr 1979, p 1007) thanks to a five-year plan begun in 1976 with the ,
assistance of West Germany. German~ is incidentally making regular new
contributions in this sector, as has been the case quite recently (MTM
28 Dec 1979 p 3680). -
It is, however, no less true that at the present time the country is in
serious difficulties, which have their effect at every financial, economic,
political and social level, and it was not without good reason that Presi-
dent Tolbert made a trip to Europe at the end of last year to ask for aid '
that Liberia will be able to count on (MTM, 21 and 28 Dec 1979, pp 3464
and 3680).
The external debt will figure at $661.3 n?~':.lion, the budget deficit, largest
in the country's history, will attain $140.8 million against $224.9 million -
in receipts, and the national per capita income, now about.$2589 will be
down ~y 10 percent in 4 years, while consumer prices will have increased by
_ 16 percent as of last year. Moreover, as the minister of finance pointed
out, "the expenses incurred for accommodation of the 16th OAU Summit Con-
ference last July have certainly exacerbated the deterioration of our econ--
cmy and our finances."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1980 -
2750
- CSO: 4400
72
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FUR UFFICIAL USE ONLY
LIBERIA
REGIME'S ANTI-OPPOSITION MEASURES MAY HARM DEMOCRACY
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Mar 80 p 41
[Articl.e by Mohamed Maige: "The Opposition Decapitated"]
[Text] Two months to the day after it was officially recognized
(8 January 1980), the opposition to the regime of Liberian President
- William Tolbert, the Progressive People's Party (PPP), previously a
_ simple movement within the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL), has
been decapitated. Some 100 of its leaders, inciuding the president and -
founder Gabriel Bacchus Matthews, were arrested and thrown in prison.
Accused of tre:~son and sedition (rebellion against the ~uthorities),
the majori[y are threatened with the death penalty or life imprisonment -
_ (Eor treason), or a minimum of 10 years in prison (for sedition).
This roundup, without precedent in scope, affected even government
circles. On 12 March, Georges Boley, in charge, with ministerial rank, -
of the administration at the Ministry of Education, c:~arged with com-
_ plicity with "those guilty of treason and sedition," joined them in
_ prison.
- The dismantling of the opposition is the culmination of a test of
strength which reached the point of no return on 6 March. Mr Matthews,
protesting against the mul.tiple arrests and the harassment to which his
party had been subjected, appealed in the course of. a public statement
for an unlimited general strike with a view [.o forcing t~~e president to
resign and achieving the establishment of a"popular regime." On
7 March, he asked the militants and sympathizers of the PPP to leave -
the people's settlements, in particular Kru New Town, and to come to
Monrovia~ to demonstrate their discontent peacefully to the chief of
state. Since the president proved to be absent, on a tour of the
_ interior of the co~ntry at that time, the demonstrators were dispersed
equally peacefully. But the next day, the army raided the headquarters
of. the PPP. And the "traitor" hunt had begun. _
73
FOR OFFICIr.,'.. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
On 11 March, Mr Tolbert stated that it was not a question of banishing
the opposition but only of ridding it of its "disturbing elements." In
reality, the confrontation between those in the government and those in
the opposition, latent since 1975, erupted brutally in the month of
April 1979 durin~ the viol.ent demonstrarions against the incre~se in
rhe prir_e of rice (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 956). Demanding "African Socialism"
and denouncing the political and economic pri~~ileges enjoyed by the
minority of Afro-American origin (3 percent of the 1.6 million Liberians)
the PAL succeeded in breaking the political mc~nopoly of the government's
True Whig Party (TWP) and winning a position on the political chessbo~rd. -
_ Pub~ic Order
The tension between the PAL and the TWP was such that the municipal
- elections which were to be held in Monrovia on 13 IVovember 1979 were
postponed until 10 June 1980. Officiai.Zy this was to allow the govern-
ment to abrogate the property clause authorizing owners only to vote.
In reality it was because the opposition candidate (then unknown) had
every chance of carrying the capital. At the same time, and for the
third time since the month of September, recognition of the PPP was
, delayed as a"threat to the public order." The army even surrounded
the premises of the PAL, where the ~QCretary general, Mr Oscar Quiah
(worker) had just escaped the bullets of a sharpshooter.
'Che PAL was then, in January, [ransformed into a party (PPP), but with- -
- out 1 doubt it did not await the proper moment nor did it play the
democratic game. Its appeal for a general strike and the events in
M~~rch auger the dawn of a hardening of the regime. To the detriment of
democr.~cy.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 2980
5157
CSO: 4400
74
FOR OFFICIr�'. USE UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ MADAGASC~R
STOCK--RAISING SITUATION, FUTURE EXAMINED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80 p 580
[Article: "Animal Husbandry in Madagascar: Condition and Prospects"]
[Text] Last 17 January, veterinary doctor J. J. Ribot presented, to the
Malagasy Academy in Tananarive, a report on the current condition of and
prospects for animal husbandry in Madagascar, based primarily on a stud~ -
carried out by the French company SEDES [gconomic and Social Development
Studies Company] at the request of the Malagasy government and paid for by
the Aid and Cooperation Fund.
The number of livestock cattle in Madagascar is estimated at over 10 mil-
lion head, including 3.15 million in the province of Toliary (Tulear) and
close to 3 million in the province of Mahajanga (Ma~unga). Ninety percent _
of the cattle are zebus. The exploitation rate is approximately 10.3 per-
cent, which corresponds to 1.05 million cattle slaughtered every qear, _
equal to 132,700 tons of carcass meat, 7,000 tons of which are exported.
The number of small-hoofed livestock is far from insignificant, with some
650,000 sheep and 1.3 million goats, including 6 percent of the latter
that are purebred Mohafrs, concentrated in the Ampanihy region. As far _
as pigs are concerned, th~ir number is estimated at approaimatelq 1 mil-
lion. The second, economic part of this report makes it possible to point
out some important facts: _
--Slaughterhouses supply ma~or cities with only 95,000 head. For example,
_ Tananarive gets 46.6 percent of its sup*~ly from slaughterhouses, 46.7 per-
cent frou~ trF suburbs, and 6.7 percent from transported meats.
_ --The price of animals on the hoof in the producing areas is between 90 -
and 115 Malagasy francs per kilo, live weight. Delivered to Tananarive, -
this price is approximately 150 I~ialagasy francs.
--The supplies from the Omby state farm to the capital's slaughterhouse
. showed a 380-million Malagasy franc deficit in 1978. The sale of butc.her -
meat at the official price, iacluding tax, by Tananarive's shops shows a
deficit, for the state farm, oa tht order of 3 percent of its business -
- volume.
75 .
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200084406-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- --On the b~sis of the market research study that was done, th~ report sug-
gests an ir.crease in the price of beef that would be raised to 350 Malagasy
francs per kilo for meat with bones and 420 Malagasy francs without bones.
--In other livestock, we note the slaughter of 492,000 young pigs, yield-
ing close to 37,000 tons of carcass meat, and the slaughter of over 575,000
sheep and goats, producing over 10,000 tons of carcass meat. -
--Exports of ineat, primarily beef, have, for several years, been in the
area of 7,000 tons. In the last few years, export business has show:~ a
deficit, representing for exporters a loss of approximately 6 percent of
their business volume, or approximately 65 Mala~asy francs per kilogram
- of Exported meat.
--Domestic meat consumption is 2U.06 kg per capita per year, consisting
of 14.65 kg of beef, 4.27 kg of pork, and 1.14 kg of goat meat and lamb.
In Tananarive, meat consumption--poultry and fish--has gone from 44.2 kg
per person in 1962 to 32 kg in 1978. -
_ In the future, with the prospect of a population reaching 16,500,000
inhabitants and consumption, 26 kg of ineat per person per year, we will
need to have 405,000 tons a year available towards the year 2000, in addi-
- tion to 200,000 tons of fish (12 kg per capita).
Consequently, we are going to have to encourage tt~e development and inten-
sification of animal husbandry. While, as far as pork and fo~,~l are con-
cerned, mass pro3uction unit projects can be set up and, as a matter of
fact, are being studied, things are much different as far a~ cattle are
concerned, because it now takes 5 to 6 years to produce an animal for =
slaughter. The best stimulation would appear to be a fairly substantial
increase in the price of ineat that would give farmers an incentive to
produce more. In addition, all the zebu breeding projects should be ac-
celerated in orler to expand the most productive breeders.
Above a11A we are going to have to set up and organize the collection,
storage, and distribution of products and food by-products used to feed
animals, without entering into competition with food for human consumption.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
9064 _
CSO: 4400
76
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240080006-5
I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- . MADAGASCAR
BRIErS
EEC FOOD AID--Food assistance from the European Economic Community to
Madagascar for 1979, in the form of 3,100 tons of rice worth approximately
- 280 million Malagasy francs, has ~ust arrived in Antsiranana (formerly
~ Diego-Suarez); 500 tons of powdered milk and 3,300 tons of flour are also
expected. The profit from the public sale of this gift from the EEC will -
help finr~nce de~~elopment pro~ects. For example, the revenue from the
previous sales of focd aid made it possible to finance the construction _
- of 47 sLOrage hangars, purchase trucks and highway maintenance machinery,
; and research the development of certain farm regions in Madagascar. ~
~ [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80
p 580] 9064
SOVIET PLANES--Ztao Soviet aircraft, which Madagascar bought from the USSR,
were delivered in Tananarive last 28 February. They are two me.dium-size
jet carrier aircraft: a"Yak-40" and an "Antonov-26." These sircraft,
although asaigned to the Malagasy Air Force, will also be used for trans~
port and to aupply areas that arQ difficult te reach overland. President
Ratsixaka declared, on this o~casion, thgt "the USSR has given us one
Yak-40 and we have bought one. She gave us an Antanov-26 and we bought -
four. She lent us an Antonov-12 for a year and it has now been in opera-
tion for 2 years, and when we bought 1,000 tractors from the USSR, shz
graciously preseated us with 200." [T~xt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 7~.ar 80 p 580] 9064
. CSU: 4400
� 77
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
- MALI
~ BRIEFS
FRG FLEET ASSISTANCE--The Federal Republic of Germany has granted Mali
financial assistance in the amount of DM 6 million (approximately 1,320
million Malian franca). This assistance is aimed at rebuilding the fleet
~ of the Malian Navigation Company. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 865]
CSO: 4400
78
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
SENEGAL _
PDS PROPOSES ROUND TABIE
Paris MARCEIES TROPICAUX LT MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 501 ~ -
jText] The first national convention of the Senegalese Democratic Party
(liberal opposition, represented in the National Assembly), through its
secretary-general, Master Abdoulaye Wade, on 22 February pro~osed a
round-table conference of all of ti~e Senegalese "active forces" in order
1Dto proceed to an objective and in-depth analysis ef the e aonomic and
financial crisis, to study the best solutions that are most in line with
the nation's short-term, medium-term, and long-term interests, so as to
surmount the crisis, to study structural, political, and institutional
reforms neceasitated by the current situation, and to prepare and super-
_ vise new, free and democratic elections." _
M~ster Wade recalled that the PDS [Senegalese Democrstic PartyJ in 1975
proposed the establishment of a nationel front consistf.ng of all of the -
political partiea for the purpose of carrying out a nati.onal program.
1979-1980 Fiscal Year Finance Cor~ection I,aw
On 19 February, the Senegalese National Assembly adopted a bill correcting
the finance law for FY 1979-198U. The corrected operating budget thus is
balanced in *.erms of revenues and expenditures at a figure of 110.16
billion francs CFA jAfrican Financial Co~munity], considering the ad~ust-
ments in expenditures which the Senegalese government must make for this -
- fiscal year.
_ Among these expenditures, we note an increase in salaries from January -
until June 1980, requiring 2,845.17 ~illion CFA, salary baclzpay following
the coordination of civil service lawa with 1.5 billion CFA, housing
allowances for teachers with 629 millions, the increase in higher-educ-
ation ccholarships and funds for the University projects Center with 555
millio... CFA, and government buildiag maintenance at a figure of 400
millions. On the other hand, the subsidies given the public ~..cablish-
- ments and the mixed-management companies will be cot~siderably boosted in
order to enable them to cope with tt:e difficulties in the semipublic
sector.
r..
79 ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Mr Christian Valentin, who delivered the general report of the Finance
and Economic Affairs Committee, indicated that financing these supplem- ~
entary expenditures will be assured through an amount of 6.8 billion
franca CFA from revenuea obtained without any tax increase and without
the creetion of any new tax but due to the higher revenuea and a reduc-
tion in public expenditures, in view of the austerity policy adopted by
, the goverr.ment, especially through the elimination of 1,172 joba, mostly
s~bordinate positione, as well as an effort at rationalizing and organ-
izing bll of the minieterial departmenta.
On the other hanfl, the Senegalese National Assembly adopted a bill con-
cerning the reduced rate of taxes on peanut oil which will be 5 percent
of the VAT, whereas peanut oil had been taxed at the standard rate of
18.50 percent. This measure will make it possible to bring the real sales
= price closer to the consumer sales price.
The institution of a skimoff to the benefit of the gove�-nment equipment -
budget from industrial and coumiercial profits, from the profits of non-
- commercia~ professions, and from the earnings of real properties, was -
_ also voted by the deputies, as was a bill establishing a skimoff from the
tax yield on the business volume to the benefit of the Autonomous Amor-
tization Fund and modifying the list of import and export duties rec:,rded
in the customs tariff. Customs duties for commodities originating in and
coming from countries included in the minimum tariff will be raised from
5% to 10%, whereas the rate will be kept at 5% for those commodities
which come from or originate in countries of the ECOWAS.
_ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
5058
CSQ: 4400
80
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SENEGAL
DEFICIT TRADE BALANCE REPORTED FOR 1979
_ Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French i7-31 Mar 80 p 38
[Text] The deficit in the Senegalese trade balance for 19i9 is reported
to be more than 50 billion CFA francs, despite the increase in the export
volume and a decrease in imports. This was announced by the Senegalese
_ prime minister, Abdou Diouf, although the head of the government told the
national assembly that a new economic and financial recovery plan will be
implemented in the next five years in order to reestablish the financial
balances. It will include relaunching public investment, the creation
of jobs, imQrovement of foreign trade, the balance of payments and
savings, and a reduction in the debt service.
Where public finance is concerned, this plan will also be designed to _
eliminate the present debt of 19 billion CFA francs which Dakar has can-
tracted with the monetary institutions. This is the reason the head of
_ the Senegalese government believes that an effort to relaunch productive
investment is necessary in agriculture, industry and minin~. If it is
true that an austerity policy must be pursued on the state level and that
imports will be maintained at the 1977 level, wage increases were due as -
of rhe early menths of 1980, ranging from 35 to 40 percent in the public
sector, as well as an increase of 25 percent in the SMIC [interoccupational
minimum growth wage] in the private sector.
COPYRIGHT: 1480 Afrique-Asie
5157
CSO; 4400
- 81
~ FOR OFFICIA;. L'SE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
= SENEGAL
BRIEFS
FRENCH-SENEGALESE AGREEMENT--Dakar, 7 Mar--According to an agreement signed
on 28 February at Dakar between France and Senegal, France will contribute
- to sea-rescue operations in the maritime zone surrounding ~al Airport in
Cape Verde: a French aircraft of the Breguet-Atlantique t~rpe, operating
out of Dakar, will provide assistance in such rescue operat:.ons at sea.
[Text] [Paris MARCIIES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEE~IS in Frenc}~ 7 Mar 80
p 563] 2750
- ARGENTIN EAN PAKISTANI AGREEMENTS--Dakar, 7 Mar--~tao cooperation agreements _
_ were signed on 25 February between Senegal on the one hand and Argentina
and Pakiatan on the other. These two agreements will permit Senegal to
restore equilibrium to its negative balance of trade with these two coun-
tries. Signing the trade agreement with the ambassador from Argentina, -
Mr Oavaldo Marcial Branah, the Senegalese minister of commerce, Mr Serigne
Lamine Diop, reviewed the trade balance aituation between Senegal and ~
Argentina. He noted that the latter country ie the twelfth largest sup-
plier to Senegal, with 4.121 billion francs CFA or 2.2 percent of the
Senegalese imports. On the contrary, in the matter of exports, Argentina
is nat even among the top ~0 customers of Senegal. Signing the second
agreement with the Pakistani charge d'affaires at Dakar, Mr I~ag Bukhari,
Mr Diop pointed out that Pakistan is the fifteenth largest supplier for -
his country, with 2 billion CFA francs, or 1.08 percent of Senegal's im-
ports. Yet it does not figure either among the top 25 of 5enegal's cus-
- tome~s. [Text) [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
- 7 Mar 80 p 564] 2750
_ ~'UEL, MILK PRICE INCREASES--Dakar, 7 Mar--The price of motor fuel increased
by 6 ~FA francs in Senegal on 27 February. Following the most recent in-
crease that took place last January, a liter of high test has gone up from
- 156 to 162 CFA francs, regular gasoline from 146 to 152, and the price of
gas-oil from 94 to 100 CFA francs. The new increase in the price of motor
fuel is explained from official sources as cauaed by increases decided
upon by the suppliers af crude oil to the Senegalese oil refinery (Iraq,
Algeria and Nigeria). The forecast for this year is that Senegal's oil -
bill will be on the order of 46 billion CFA francs, which represents 40
. percent of Senegal's export revenues. In another sector, the price of
82 -
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
milk also went up on 26 February. The new prices are as follows: 115 CFA
francs for a 397-gram container of sweetened concentrated milk; 95 francs
for a 410-gram container of unsweetened concEntrated milk; 140 francs for
the 530-gram container of sweetened concentrate; 50 francs for the 170-
gram unsweetened concentrate. Finally, the 412-gram sweetened sk3m-milk
concentrate container ta be marketed by Senlait will be sold at 105 CFA
francs. [Text] [Par~s MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
7 Mar 80 p 564 ] 275C~
RICE CULTIVATION COMPIEX--The SCET [central comnany for territorial
equipment] International is studying the establishment of an agribusineas
- complex essentially devoted to rice cultivation in the basin of Ajerba -
for the SAED (Senegal Delta land improvement and exploitation compeny).
This pro3ect on the one hand includes a study on hydroagricultural devel-
opment and industrial as well as small-scale cultivation methods; on the
other hand it involves the �restoration of a rice plantation at Richard- -
Toll, northesst of Saint-7,ouis, where rice production will be attempted
in the b~sin and the surrounding areas. This contract, involving F1
million, is financed by the FAC (Aid and Cooperation Fund). [Text]
jParis MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 502]
5058
PAKISTANI TRADE AGREEMENT--Senegal and Pakistan on 25 February signed a
trade agreement under whose terma the two countries grant each other moat-
_ favored nation statua which will permit Senegal to import light machinery,
rice, cotton, fabrica, pharmaceutical products, textiles and sports
material from Pakistan and export peanut products, phosphates, fertilizer,
hides and skins from that country. The balance of trade between these
two countries so far was in favor of Pakistan which, in 1979 in partic-
ular, sold rice to Senegal worth $30 million. [Text] [Paris Ml,RCHEg
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAIJEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 502J 5058
FORTHCOiMING SWISS CREDIT AGREEMENT--During his working visit to Bern
between 18 and 2Q February, in response to an invitation from the Swiss
government, Senegalese planning and cooperation minister Louis Alex-
andrenne was received by Mr Georges-Andre Chevallaz, confederation council
member and president o� Che Confederation, ss well as by federation
council member Honegger, head of the federation department af public
economy, with whom he reviewed the various aspects of economic cooperation
between Switzerland and Senegal. Mr Louis Alexandrenne, together with
ambassedor K. Jacobs, t.he xepresentative ~f the Confederation Council for
_ trade agreements, presided over the negotiations on the mixed loan agree-
ment invo2ving 24 million Swiss Francs (about 2.5 billion CFA), drafted
by the Swiss govercm~ent and a consortium of Swiss banks to the Republic
of Senegal. The loan agreement will be aigned at Dakar at a date to be
set. [Text] [Paris MARCf~g TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANSENS in French 29 Feb
$0 p 4J 5058
83
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
STRENGTHENED PORTUGUESE RELATIOIVS--Following the meetin;s of rhe second
large Senegalese-Portuguese commission, in Dakar from 18 to 21 February
(see this publication, 21 February, page 438), economic circles in Dakar
aeemed to be expecting a slow increase in trade between theae two
countriea which h~d remained rather small in spiCe of the 1977 trade
agreement. According to IMF statistics, Portugal, with $17 million per
= yea~, is Senegal's f'fth-ranking customer but sales to Senegal are
practically zero. This leads to a surplus, for Senegal, amounting ta
more than 3 billion CFA. The two countries also decided to develop tt?eir
relations ii~ various fields, such as tourism and culture, agriculture and
industry, fishing, urban growth, and housing. Regarding tourist coop-
_ eration, an implementation document was signed to carry out the agreement
which these two countries already have in this field. An appeal was
issued for the intensification of exchange of experience in the field of
cereal storage. With respect to industrial cooperation, the Port~guese
- side made a series of proposals designed to promote the assignment of its
economic operators to the ZFID (Dakar industrial free zone). The possib-
ility of creating mixed companies in the fishing sector were also studied. -
Senegalese promoters are to be the majority partners in the capital
holdings. Finally, the discussions on cultural co~peration made it possible
to look forward to reciprocal exchanges in this field and to look into the -
possible establishment of a system of diploma equivalency, exchange of
misaions ~nd journalista between the press organizations of both countriea, _
and finally the reciprocEl grant of advanced training acholarahipa and
postgraduate study scholarships. [TextJ [Paria MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Feb 80 p 502] 5U58
SHRIMP FISHERMEN'S STRIKE--The shrimp fishermen of 7.iguinchor, Senegal,
struck on 13 March, threatening to seize the shrimp processing plant
and the warehouses of a shrimp dealer. On the morning of 14 July, the
police took action against them. The demand remains: The fishermen,
after selling their Yamous Casamance shrimp for two years at the 400
CFA 1~rancs for two kilograms which the plants would give them, want
1,100 CFA francs. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE i.n French 26 Mar 80 p 50] ;
~157
I
CSO: 4400
84 -
_ ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ~NLX "
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
TANZANIA
- BRIEFS
NEW FRENCH CREDITS--On 19 February, Mr Mr~hmud Nasser Rattansey, ambas-
sador of Tan2ania in France, and Mr Philippe Lagayette, deputy director,
Directorate of the Treasury, French Ministry of Economy, signed a
financial document through which France makes F100 million available
in credits to Tanzania. This sum will be used to finance the construction
of a hollow glass [stemware] factory. It consists of treasury lo~ns on
favorable terms and private loans guaranteed by COFACE (French insurance
company for foreign trade). Follouring the financing made available to
Tanaania in 1979 for the modernisation of the Dar-Es-Salaam airport, this
_ document once again expresses the desire of both countries to develop
their mutual cooperation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET r~DITER-
RANEE[vS in French 29 Feb 80 p 520] 5058
DODOMA WATER SUPPLY PROJECT--A big water pipeline and sanitation project
is now being worked out for podoma, the future capital of Tanzania. This
project is supported by a loan from the BAD (African Development Bank)
granted last December and amounting to 7 million accounting units (or
about $9.2 million). The project (which involves the following main
elements: reservoir and pumping station, water pipelinea, sewage mains,
end conduits) is designed to give a population of 76,000 inhabitante ':he
benefit of caater pipeline and sanitation facilities now in exis~~nce.
At the seme time it is to promote the development of the capital'e down-
town area and the exposition area. The total cost of the pro~ect has been
estimated at 13.9 million accounting units (about $18.3 million). The
work is to start in 1980 and it is scheduled for completion early in 1983. _
The executive outfit is the Capital Development Auth~rity, P.O. Box 913,
Dodoma, telex: 53177 Mjimkuu. The purchase of goods and services
, financed from the SAD loan will be handled through internati.onal bidding
invitations. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 29 Feb 80 p 520J 5058
FF:D LOANS--The European Development Fund has ~ust granted Tanzania two
_ subsidies: (a) 11,400,000 ECU for construction of a blacktop road about
40 kilometres long, to be used by the future cellulose plant at Mufindi;
(b) 4,a50,000 ECU for the improvement of the port of Kigoma on Lake T~n-
ganyika. See details above under the heading "Mail from Brussels."
[Text] [Paris MACHES TROPICAU% ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 69 Feb 80
0520] 5058
CSO: 4400 85
FOR OFFICIp.I. USE OD~LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
TOGO
COFFEE, COCOA EXPORTS EARN FOREIGN EXCHANGE
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Apr 80 p 869 -
[Excer ts Des ite a dro in I
P ~ p p producti4n during the last 10 years, coffee
and cocoa still earned the Togolese economy a little over 20 billion CFA
[400 million French francs) in 1978. This amount is almost equal to the
earnings from phosphates (420 million French francs), the country's main
export. According to the most recent statistics of the Ministry of
_ Finance, Togo exported 22,700 tons of cocoa in 1978, for a total sum of
15.8 billion CFA. The main customers are the Benelux (14,102 tons for 8.9
billion CFA), the Federal Republic of Germany (3,876 tons for 2.9 billion
CFA), the USSR 91,604 t~ns for 1.4 billion CFA), Poland (1,050 tons for
874 billion CFA) and France (800 tons for 643 million GFA).
Coffee exports earned the country, according to the AFP, 5 billion CFA.
Benelux is the principal customer for Togolese coffee, with 4.101 tons;
France importe 2,116 tons, the U.S. 700 tona and Spain 500 tons.
In order to preserve this important aource of revenue, Togo launched
several years ago an important operation aimed at renovating coffee and
cocoa plantations, whose produ~tivity had been steadily declining for 10
years. This state of affairs was mainly due to the a-ing of the trees and
the. poor maintenance of the plantations.
A 1974-1980 development project, financed by the I' (Agricultural Devel-
- opment Institute) ($6 million), the FAC (Aid and Cooperatidn Fund) (425
million CFA) and the Togolese government (700 million CFA) met with
numerous difficulties, especially in regard to cocoa, mainly because of
drought conditione and the indifference of the peasants. Indeed, the _
pro~ect for the renovation of cocoa plantations only reached 59 p~rcent of
its g. .i. However, in the coffee sector, goals were exceeded, and nearly
6,~00 hectares were renovated or reopened.
Despite the fact that Togo is a small producer of coffee and cocoa, espe-
_ cially in relation to the Ivory Coast, Brazil or Ghana, it follows very
closely all international negotiations on these products.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
CSO: 4400 g~
FOR OFFICIAL TJSE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ZIMBABWF.
I.ES50NS TO BE DERIVED FROM ELECTIONS DISCUSSED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 19 Mar 80 p 25 _
~Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "The Lessons of Zimbabwe"]
[Text] The African leaders who are saluting the independence of Zimbabwe _
appear tn be en~oying the triumph more than the prime miniater, Robert _
Mugabe, himself. And yet the latest born of the African countries now
seems to be in the best position to give Africa and the rest of the world
several lessons.
The firat of these les5ons is the following: that the rifles placed in
Mugabe's hands have already given his party an unque$tionably atrong
political foundation. Only 2 years ago, as the leader of ZANU [Zimbab�ae
African National Union] he was held to be much less clever than his adver-
sary, Abel Muzorewa and also less popular than his comrade-in-arms, Joshua
Nkomo. The truth is that at the time, no one wanted elections, largely
because no candidate in a country where the voters had never been con-
- sulted, could claim ~sn arithm~tic preference, in the sense of greater popu-
larity. After 4 March 1980, the reason for this is clear: the people of
Zimbabwe voted for those who had the courage to struggle, to the detriment
of those who believed they could compose a ma~ority.
Second lesaon: An electoral victory can be complete without there being
any need to resort to a ridiculous 99 percent of the vote. What ia more,
RoberC Mugabe with 62.9 percent~ won, and to the point of preferring to
- bring people together rather than ostracising them, and going eo far ae
to make proposals to his former foes with regard to the formation of a
r.ational front. In paesing, it would be well to recall that British
maneuverings were required for Africa to record one of the most democratic -
elections in its history. Certain African chiefs of state made themselvea
ridiculous by refusing beforehand to accept the resulta of the election.
Later however, these same leaders became ecstatic in praising the orderli-
ness of the voting. All 3ecause Mugnbe won.
Third lesson: The con~uring up of a"diabolical Marxist" did not chase
- the African vo~ers away. This lesson should serve those who wiah to en-
aure the wellbeing aad happiness of the people despite themselves. For a
87
FOR aFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5
FOR OFFI~IAL USE ONLY
number of years, the whites in Rhodesia affirmed that "their blacks" were
happier than any others. The voting in Zimbabwe proved the contrary to be
the truth; those who it was believed were too fiappy to emancipate them-
selves or too stupid to liberate themselves clearly opted in favor of their
awn freedom.
The greatest lessons afforded by Zimbabwe are of universal import. Once
- again, the policy of spurious solutions failed. Abel Muzorewa, a pawn for �
Ian Smith and figurehead for the defenders of the "internal solution"--
such as the American Henry Kissinger--literally melted away. Like Lon Nol
in Cambodia. Like Thieu in Vietnam. Souti~ Africa should make a note of
_ this message: it is preferable to negotiate in good time with true na-
tionalists rather than give rise to belated vocations for a facade-like
nationalism.
There is a final lessan remaining, one of democracy that the whole of
Zimb3bwe teaches us. It is the accep~ance of the verdict handed down by ~
the ballot boxes. The leaders of yesterday have bowed before it. Joshua
Nkomo is too much of a nationalist and too good a politician not to ac-
knnwled~e B.obert Mugabe's victory. Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, a nation- _
alist s~nce the very firat hour before undertaking the cotmnitment, saluted
t:~e res~il.*.s with rectitude.
Even Ian Smith, putting a good face on his misfortune, today declared that
Mugabe was a"courageous and responsible" man. Abel Muzorewa resigned him-
self to silence. It is true that with only three little end seats in the
assembly, he will have no chance of making his party heard.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
~
I
7129
CSO: 4400 E~
88
FOR OFFICIAL IJ5E ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080006-5