JPRS ID: 9203 USSR REPORT AGRICULTURE

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200070034-5
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• Sequence Number: 34
• Content Type: REPORTS

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~L~ L. J ~ 3 1sFi~ E 1 ~

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JPRS L/9041
18 April 19~0
/ ~ -
(~e~ar East North Afr~ca Re ort
p
(FOUO 14/80) -
- F~IS FOREIGN ~ROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
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For further information on report con*_ent
. ca11 (703) 351-2833 fNear East); 351-2501
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JPRS L/9041
18 April 1980
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
_ (FOUO 14/~0)
CONT~NTS PAGE
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
French Weekly Cites PLO Gulf Spokesman on Near East
Possibilities
(Josette Alia; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, 17-23 Mar 80)... 1 _
Many Questions Surround Gafsa~Attack
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 18 Feb 80) 5
Libyan Participation, by Adel Wahid
Tunisian Illusion, by Hichem Moussa
- Repercuasions o.f Gafsa Attack Discussed
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 20 Feb 80) .........................e.. 15
_ Participation of Algerians, by Souhayr Belhassen
~ Qadhdhafi's Vertigo, by Bechir Ben Yahmed -
Briefs
Gafsa Incident Fal~out 25
~
AFGHANISTAN
Fifteen-Year History of the yKhalq' Party (PDPA)
- (Bouzid Kouza; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 18 Feb-2 Mar 80)........~ 26
Pro-Soviet Version of Afghanistan Crisis
- (Suleman Mehlati; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 18 Feb-2 Mar 8Q)...... 34
ALGERIA
Agriculture: Government's First Priority _
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Mar 80)....... 39
_ - a - [III -r]E &A-Z21FOU0] ~
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. va~ va a 1u1t1L ~JpL' ~f1~J~i
- CONTENTS (Continued)
IRAQ
British Companies Attracted to Developmental Pro~ects
(AIrWATAN AL-'ARABI, 29 Feb-6 Mar 80y 44
_ QATAR
Progress and Development of Nation Summarized
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 7-13 Mar 80) 45
SAUDI ARABIA
Finance Mi.nister Discusses Ma3or Economic Issues
(Muhammad Aba al-Khayl Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
22-2$ Feb 80) 49
Briefs
Saudis Build Huge Pipeline 55
Hi3az Railway Fro~ect Revived 5~
SYRIA
Briefs ~
Soviets Refuse 'Cover' Requeat 56
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
FRENCH WEEKLY CITES PLO GULF SPOKESMAN ON NEAR EAST POSSIBILITIES
LD011119 Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 17-23 Mar 80 pp 29, 30 LD
[Article by special correspondent Joset~e Alia: "After Giscard's Arab ~
Harves t . . .1� J
[Excerpts] The Saudi princes are pleased th2t the French president's -
tour ended at Riyadh, as this shows clearly that it is impoasible to
_ visit the Gulf without paying respects to the monarch. Was this a
courtes~ visit, or was it in the nature of a stocktakinA exercise, or wP~s
it the fireworks finale of the diplomatic process begun in Kuwait?
It certainly does not seem so. In fact, there is no doubt that the visit
to Riyadh marked the beginning of a second and more difficult and dis--
creet round of negotiations in which the PLO in its turn is taking a
cautious line. Indeed, after G~scard's departure, a strong, quiet m~3n �
stayed behind at the Intercontinental Hotel, where he held numerous
discussiona and consultations. This was Khalid al-Hasan, PLO representa-
_ tive in the Gulf countriES, who at present plays a role of the highest
importance. What does he s~y? First, he says, smiling, that if he were
- French, he would be satisfied with Giscard: the French Presider.t has
contributed relatively little on the diplomatic plane; (everything he
said had already been said; Lord Carrington apparently had the same
pro~ect up his sleeve). But he will certainly reap large Arab dividends-- ~
whether in the form of industrial projects or strong guarantees of oil
supplies. Well pl.ayed! Has not Giscard taken a risk, at least an
electoral one, in displeasing the French supporters of Israel? Khalid
smiled: "What ris~C? The Jewish vote does not count for much in France. -
There is no Jewish lobby in the American sense. There is Israeli =
influence, but it would appear to be stronger on the media than on the
voters. Besides, who could reproach Giscard for his Palestinian policy?
- Surely not the leftwing parties, whict? are all in agreement with the
expressed principle. Nor the rightwing parties, which are obliged in
the midst of the electoral campaign to support the one who is without
doubt their best candidate. So the risk is minimal and the atakes are
higher." But is what is a good measure for France also to the advantage
of the Palestinians?
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At first sight it is. They have just been given many gifts: self-
determination, recognition of PLO representation, and the new resolu-
_ tion in the United Nations--for once, France, Europe, Japan and the Arab
' states are in agreement in their support for their cause. Of course,
that is all in theory.
The Gold Markets _
Befare this can be realized it will be necessary to avercome the main
obstacle of the llmerican veto,'~and the~new resolution--discussion on
which is now underway among the Arab capitals- will have to be worked =
out slowly, step by step. This will, however, allow,the continued
_ occupation of territory pending the expiry of the two deadlines--of -
26 May ("the burial of Camp David," said a Pale~r~nian) 'and of:th2
American elections, (which are doubtless a pret~xt," ~sai$ Kttalid al-Hasan;
"this handicap must be removed"). But in the end, in a month`or in,a
year, it will certainly be necessary to set about serious discussion~ on
the basics. And that is where the Palestinians will have their backa
to the wall. That is where they are already anyway: since what could
the next stage be? That of a Palestinian "state," which will not be
a vague "homeland" but a well-defined concept. We are well aware, says
- Kahlid al-Hasan, that at that moment when tatk of a state begins, we will
have to pay a high political price."
Nobody in the PLO is in a hurry to solve the prc,blem, fraught with too
many d3ngers af an explosion, and the Israelis are being relied upon to
act in their cl~ssical mar.ner (Israelis! be the first to re~ect [a plan
for Palestine] so that [the PLO itself mav] avoid the need to take up a
stance. Only this time in the Gulf and at Riyadh, Giscard has precipi- _
tated things (possibly, it is said, with the support of some of Carter's
advisers). He has told 'Arafat to take it or leave it; yes, he will
receive h~m in Paris short~.y, as soon as possible, even as early as June,
but only on condition that 'Arafat at last makes this "significant gesture"
which will enable matters to advance and which, with everything else
already agreed, this can only be the recognition, however much disguised,
of the state of Israel.
This is the problem which the French and the Palestinians have been dis-
- cussing for some mot~ths. The first approach was a bad one: France was
demanding a Palestinian "gesture" on southern Leb~non, which the PLO
evidently refused. ("How can we decid.e the status of what we regard as
foreign territory, when this is exactly what we are reproaching Sadat
for doing?") This approach was abandcned and over the last few months _
another start has been made on a new basis, this time a Palestinian one. -
Two texts are ready, again far rem~ived from each other. But hope of an
early conclusion is not l~st, since time is short in the Near East now.
- Iran is vulnerable; Syria is foundering little by little in internal ~
disorder; Iraq is trying with difficulty to keep its distance from Moscow;
while in Saudi Arabia there is a clear feeling that dangers are emerging
' which one does not know how to stave off.
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A Recent Treaty
' What are the princea afraid of? Very simply: They feel threatened by
a Soviet advance in the Gulf, which they believe to be inevitable. ~ ~
Giscard waeted his breath explaining to them that Afghanistan is a Soviet -
"regional" problem, a question o� buffer zones; they do not believe a
� word of this. "We even know wher~ the next Soviet push will occur,"
said a Saudi official." It will be made in 3ran,.after the death of
Khomeyni. And even perhaps F~ell before this, on our southern frontier
in the Yemen. The West is ignoring the Yemen. Yet, it is there that
danger lurks: the South Yemen Army, staffed by East Germans, trained
by 2,000 Cubans, equipp`d with very sophisticated SovieL weapons, is
certainly the best army in the whole region--and Ethiopia, which is
devoted to Moscow, can easily secure its rear. A few months ago, San'a
. almost succumbed to its southern neighbor. Imagine what it would be
like to have a vast and finally reunited "Red" Yemen on the southern
flank of the peninsula. How then could we defend ourselves against an
attack which might appear to oe 'local,' but which would, in fact, be
Soviet, when, as you know, a recent treaty forbids southern Yemen from
' undertaking any military action without the agreement of N?oscow?" -
IC is true that against this type of attack, which is much more likely
tc~ occur than a real Soviet conquest, the United States offers no help. "
The United States has vaguely promised to defend vital American interests
in the region, but none of the requests made by the Saudis have gotten
them to specify any more precisely what sort of military assistance they
would furnish effectively. France is certainly there, and its presence
is increasing (there are already more French instructors than Amer.i~an).
But San'a is not Kolwezi. San'a is the weak spot, the coveted place: -
the Soviets have ~ust offered armaments to North Yemen practically gratis-- _
on condition that they admit Soviet instructors to the country. R~ther
- than see Soviet advisers arriving on its southern borders, Arabia has
preferred to pay for those Soviet tanks--but without the instructors. So
that North Yemen now finds itself equipped with Russian armaments, paid
for with petrodollars, but which nobody knows how to operate!
- The Saudi military, which knows that its army is too young and unreliable, -
is consoling itself with the thought that Is1am is, after all, the finest
bastion against the communist wave. Now North Yemen--which neither the
_ Ottoman empire, nor Abd al-'Az~'z, nor Faysal~~nor Abd-al-Nasir were able
to control--is fiercely Muslim, Allah be praised. Hence, the return to
Islam, the concern caused by the incident at Mecca, and the desire, now
become a necessit~~, to resolve all those tensions in the region which can
- be resolved, the ~hief of these being the Palestinian issue. It must be
done quickly, wh~le it is still possible, before the communist wave hits
them from outside, before the rise af Khomeynism wins over the youth
of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Arabia and even, yes even, the PLO whe.re religious -
fanaticism is now emerging among certain young mili*_ants. Will all these
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preseures and reaeone lead to peace through compromiae, which everyone
wants but still doea dare no~ speak about. It would be Giscard's dream
to be its architect, and to be able to invite both 'Arafat, and with
A1-Sadat, who might have already accepted this in principle. Will peace
in the Near East come via France? In his hotel room in Riyadh, Khalid
al-Hasan shrugs his.broad ahoulders: "I personally think it will be a -
long time, perhaps too long. However...let us agree to meet, perhaps,
this spring in Paris."
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
CSO: 4800
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
MANY QUESTIONS SURROUND GAFSA ATTACK
- . Libyan Participation
Paris AFRiQUE-ASIE in French 18 Feb 80 pp 11-13, 16
[Article by Adel Wahid, AFRIQUE-ASIE special correspondent in Tunisia]
[Text] The circumstances to which the people were reduced expiain their
- anger but, to explain the re~~ction of a government that had failed
Bourguiba needed a "Libyan intervention."
Do the Tunisians today have the feeling that they have bEen honestly and ~
Completely informed with respect to the armed people's explosion in Gafsa?
Have they been told of the ins and outs of this incident with consequences,
' both on thP domestic and foreign plane, that continue to be felt? Nothing ~
is lesa true. ~ecause, in this affair, the official version that has been
presented with a cop'_o*.~s supply of propaganda by the Tuniaian government
sins ae much by omission as hy excessivenesa. The haste with which the
Tunisian leaders blamea the reapcnsibility �or the "Gafea coup" on the
= Libyan a*thorities, after having first implicated Algeria, fs eminently
suspect.
The revolt in the mining city of Gafsa during the night of this past 26-27
January, when Bourguiba was less :han 60 kilometers from that place, has
profound and long-standing origins in matters of domestic policy, in apite ~
of the c~ntrary statements of the Tunisian leader8.
*`rhe version presented by the Tunisian authorities ia decidedly quite
muddled. Did they not ~ust atate that the "assailants" had first grrived
by ~lane in Algiers, whe>e they presented themselves ae part of aoe.
aports team!
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What is this serious accusation worth? Doea it not merit being examin.ed
- with a great deal of attention, especia~ly since "the hand of the foreigner,"
that has been denounced today, as the "imported ideologies" were yesterday,
.~as always been brandiehed by Bourguiba, Prim~ Miniater Hedi Nouira, and
the lead~Y~of the Destourian Partyq Moha~ed Sayah, each time that Tunisia
was upse~ b'y~p~bpula~C;~emonstrationa. This endlesa argument, repeated again
by the Tunieian leaders,~real`iy'no longer.hae any hold on a public that ia
confronted with the harah ~realibfes of� d~i,ly living:` ~ Is not the attribu-
tion of " thE Gafsa affair" to'foreigners a very corivenient a~ibi to ~uatify
the call for French military intervent~ion and for the armament so o.bliginglq
supplied by imperialist po~aers, in particular Was~ington and Paris?
Also numerous questions are being asked concerning the Gafsa events. In the
oginion of some, it was a question cf a suicide commando, since apparently
. it had not even bothered to provide a rear guard. Others see in it the
beginning of a vast military and psychological operation for the purpose of
causing successive violent clashes with the Tunisian government, leading to
the f inal collapse of the latter. Finally, there are those who think that
- this spectacular, in~oherent coup, organized by Tunisian militants who do
not belong to any of the knowm oppesitian movements, was meant t~ "abruptly
counter fear" and to ahow the country that it was poasible to bring about
J a military defeat of Bourguiba dictatorship.
However that may be, one thing is certain: there is not the ahadow of a
doubt that the affair was a purely Tunisian one.
- How could one fail first of all to call at~ention to the datQ? The 26th of -
January 1980 is the second anniversary of Black Thursday, the day of the -
massacres perpetrated by the Bourguiba government against workers and their
trade union organizatton, the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of '~abor]. -
The Tunisian government moreover greatly feared a commemorative action on
, the part of schools and universities. It had also decreed 26 January a
holiday for pupils, studenta, and the teaching staff, while at the same time
it reinfor~ed the disposition of police in Tunia and in the principal citiea
of the country--a fQar that was all the more ~ustified since the great
increase in the prices of staple foodstuffa, "compensated" by an abaurd in- _
- crease in salaries, a week before the Gafsa events had caused profound
discontent among the population throughout the country. Impressive demon-
strations were organized in Sfax (railroad strike), in Gafsa, in Zeramdine,
in Ouardanine, and in Tunis, where the workers of the National Transporta-
_ rion Company (SNT) carried out a general one-day stri.ke that blocked all
traff ic of busses in the capital. But it is in t~e South, an underprivileged
and forlorn region, that the explosion came, an explosion that encompassed
nearly the entire country and that shoo~ the government to its depths.
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It all began at 0200 hours, during the night of 26-27 ,Tanuary, when the -
city was aoundly asleep. An armed group consieting af almost 100 members -
(300 according to other credible sources) split into three small groups.
The first two simulaneously attacked the police station snd the national
- guard atation with light weapons. Explanations concerning the strategy -
of the operation differ. According to a direct source, claiming to belon~
~ to the "General Revolutionary Co~ittee for the Libexation of Tunisia"
(CRGLT), the purpose of this first attack was to cause a diversion in order -
to clear out the Ahmed-Tlili barracks, located in the periphery of the city,
and to take posaession of the stock of weapons that had been s~ared there.
The soldiers indeed then rushed in a body to bring aid to their companions.
Thr third group then laid siege to the barracks, neutralized the few sol-
diers that remained there (aome even followed them spontaneously), and took ,
- possession of the weapons that it feverishly distributed to Gafsa citizens
, while proclaiming revolutionary slogans, hostile to the government, over
loud speakers and exhorting the population to join it in order to "eacape
from the tyranny o.f Bourguiba." Other cases of weapons and of ammunition,
stored in ditches for many years, wese rapidly recovered. The operation
was thue carried out in minute detail by a group of Tunisians, for the _
moat party young, determined, apparently well-trained in guerrlla warfare,
_ and well acquainted with the topograpny of the region. The version of the
facts related in a cammunique, signed by the Tunisian Armed Resistas~ce, does
not menti~n the diversionary operation, but otherwise agrees with that of ~
_ the CRGLT. -
For more than 16 h~urs the commando was in control of the city. It was
only during Sunday afternoon that the Tunisian army, assisted by helicopters -
and pursuit planes, launched a violent c~unteroffen:zive to regain Gafsa.
The bombed city was the theater of fierce battles, 3nd it toolc more than
- 5 days to regain it, after several of the revolutionary militants had been
dispersed to surrounding oases and hills.
The Fish In Water
: ~ut haw could 50 assailants, according to the official figures given by Tunis,
' hold out all that timz, if they did not have incontestable support from the
= population of the city, as the majority of foreign diplomats and observers
pointed aut? S.till according to the General Revolutionary Committee for
the Liberation of Tunisia, the perpetrators of the attack took ahelter in
houses, after having rid themselves of their ~acks and their weapons, and -
then they mingled, "like fish in water," with the it,~habitants of the city
; wh~ kept the{.r identity secret. Why, when the fighting was over, according
to Tunis, did the Bourguiha government continue to silence Gafsa and to ban
accesg to foreign journalists, if not to cover up the fact of the resistance
of the population of the city, the violence of t&e confrontations, and to
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prevent any contact with the inhabitants who would have had a great deal
to say, especia2ly concerning the summary executions of militants, that -
many witneeses have recounted? And the official report of the operation--
40 dead and 111 wounded--~is very far from reality, the dead alone ~ei,.g
more than 300. ~
In any case, the Gafsa affai: once again showed the world the weakness
~ and unpopularity of a government that made of repression a means of govern-
ment and that, in order to maintain itself in power, did not hesitate to
- call on Western armies. Some Tunisians stated that they saw some billeting -
of French and Moroccan soldiers in Ksar Mouemsa, Hmadi (Zarzis), and in
E1 Aouinet (Gabes).
The fact that Tunisians took up arms and rose against a government, that ,
- they found positive support amang the massPS; that the government did not
hesitate to request armed protection from a former colonial power while the
memory of the Bizerte slaughter was still fresh in the minds of patriots; -
that some "Transalls" and other "Pumas" wexe dispatched to this country to
Rlaughter citizens; that the Bourguiba gov~rnment turned to the United
States, France, and Morocco for weapons and diplomatic and military
= support--in epite of the conaiderable risk that their intervention might
cauae the entire Maghreb--these are signs of the begir~ning of the end of
Bourguibism--and the proof of the failure of its liberal-capitalist policy. _
Neither appeals for immodest and unrestrained requests from the Tunisian
gevernment, specifically through the intermediary of its ambassador in
_ Paris, Hedi Mabrouk, nor the deployment of the French fleet to the Gulf of -
Gabes were able to weaken the determinati~n of a people and the desire of -
- its vanguard militants to resist a government imposed by force.
- Did not the government, by stifling all freedoms, by repressing any contra- �
dictory opinion, and by causing the unarmed masses to be fired upon on
- 26 January 1978, leave only one way out--armed conflict? In announcing the
"revision of political priorities" in the direction of greater au$terity
for the working class in order to "strengthen the defense of the country"
throug~ the massive pnr�chase of armament, the Tunisian government entered
a vicious circle that will even more rapidly precipitate its downfall,
now inevitable. That is the feeling that is shared today by the overwhelm-
ing ma~~rity of the oppressed Tuni~ian people.
~
A Statement From Ibrahim Tobal, leader of the Tun:Lsian National Op~osition
Movement
1 February 1980
Giscard d'Estaing's government has accustomed us to flagrant military
interference and interventions in order to support and to rescue d~cayed
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- and sub~ugated governments in their aphere of influence.
Faithful to this condemnable policy, the French government has ~uet
launched ite fleet, its aircraft, and ite parachutists to Tunieia to ~ea-
eue the Bourguiba government fram the anger ~f the arous~d people, behaving
in the same manner ae in Zaire, in Mauritania, in Chad, in Central Africa~
and in the Western Sahara.
= The French mili~ary intervention and the eventua~ intervention of the
American Sixth Fleet aim to ann.ihilate the revolutio*~ary desire of the
Tunisian people, impair its sovereignty, and to sfir up teneion in the
Arab Maghreb. They aim also to frustrate the struggle carried out for 20
yeare by our people againat neo-colonial sub~ection and oppression.
Th~ Tunisian National Opposition Movement stigmatizes and denouncea this
French military iiitervention against the Tunisian people that is contrary
to international laws and traditions. By the same token, it puts all the
parties concerned, in particular the fraternal and neighboring countries
of Tunisia, before their historical responsibilities, because their sover-
eignty and the security of the region as a whole cannot be considered
aeparately from the aovereignty and from ~he security of Tunisia.
The Tunisian National Opposition Movement calls on all international pro-
gresaive forces, in particular the French, to support the Tunisian people
- in the new ordeal. It exhoxts them to oppose this flagrant and dis~losed
intervention.
- It calls on the various progresai~e and democratic opposition movements
- of the Tunisian people and ita national armed forces to cloae ranks in
- order to combat with all possible means, including weapons, this French
~ military intervention and the government that has called on it.
Tunisian Illusion -
- Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 18 Feb 80 pp 14-15 -
jArticle by Hichem MoussaJ
[Text] The tragic Gafsa eventa are still too recent for one to appreciate =
their entire dimension and all of their implications. But, in spite of
intense Tunisian propaganda, relayed by a detersnined international press
that diatorts and deceivea, the essential story ia clear. -
1. The armed action carried out in Gafsa was the act of Tunisians.
Tunisians died in the violent confrontations. Tunisians were imprisioned -
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+ by the government. How did it happen that Tunisians took up arms againat ~
_ the government and conaented to sacrifice their livea and to expose their
own families to miefortunes and the riek of reprisals or of vengPance? -
- ~~Aid .Qadt~~fi supply them with weapons? But did Qadhafi convince them to ~
$o and get~~h'emselves kil~.ed--fbr hard,cash--or did he force them--by
blacl~ailing them with the thre$t of une~ploym2nt--as the government tries
to make one believe? Did~Qadhafi� also convincE'~th~ ~unis3~n~~apulation,
- in Gafsa and elsewhere, to e~cpress their~symp2thy, at leas~ to the.-"mercen-
ary assailants," as was definitely charged? '
- The explanations that the regime gives would necessarily imply that
Qadhafi had such power or such influence over Tunisians. That would, then,
- be very serious for the government. What can one in fact think of a
gavernment that loses political control to thi~ extent over its popula-
tion? That it doubtless is bankrupt. And if it were only a matter of the
- government! But, it is a question of Tunisia.
Vexy fortunately for Tunisia, it is not necessary to follow the fine logic
of the afficial propaganda in order to come to the same ~stablished fact.
The Tuniaian government is bankrupt. And if some Tunisians came to that,
it is because the government did everything to n~ake the solution of
counterviolence appear to more and more Tunisians as the only remaining ,
solution capable of changing matters in the country. _
In recent years the Bourguiba government continued to exercise increasing
and multiform violen.ce against the Tunisian people--econamic and social
violence through continued impoverishment of the masses, the frustrations
inf~.icted on the great ma~ority, and the accelerated and arrogant enrich-
ment of a minority of upstart speculators; the cultural and "civilization-
type" violence that systematically offends the Arab Moslem values, charac-
teristics and identity of the Tunisians that are assailed daily as a -
result of a harmful way of life; a"civilization-type" violence through a
deliberate and constant des~re to alienate Tunisia fram the Maghreb and
the Arab world to which it belongs; cultural violence through a selective
and discriminatory policy with regard to education; political violence
through total control of the means, not of "information," but of propaganda,
of intoxication, ~f drugs, and of anesthesia; violence again by the penaa-
nent monopolizing of power through illegal acts and plots; political vio- -
lence again through confiscation and the deformation of nativnal history,
humiliation and elimination of all those who hav~ served the country, and
- a limitless megalomania; finally political violence through the institu-
tionalization of a single party that no l~nger has anything to do with any
group whatsoever and that is dominated by professional flatterers, oppor-
_ tunists, climbers, and members of the milita; political, police, and -
physical violence, all at the same time, throu~~ repression and contempt
for any opposition, an increase in political trials, arrests, and arbitrary
detentions,the systematic use of torture and of police methods.
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The government paid no attention to any analysis of the opposition, any -
program, any profound aspiration of the peoplQ, any proposal, any compla~nt,
even if expresaed by some of ita own friends abroad. In the face of the
development of the domeatic crisis and of the diaeatiafaction of the peo- _
ple, in the face of the eacalation of social and political oppoeition, it
only wanted and wae able to reply through repeated cheating, ahabby poli-
tical maneuvers, manipulations of pu~lic opinion, Machiavellian traps, _
diversions and decepCive measures. Small maneuvers and speech~s concern-
ing "an opening" became the "openings." The preaidential malady for a `
long time has been the alibi of non-respon~ibility. A generalized corrup-
tion has become the means, not only of governing but of cantrolling society
and of plunging men into indignity and self-dissatiafaction, etc. The _
Tunisian government has gersisted in its b3.indness and its errors.
Nothing that has ~uat been said is exaggerated or excessive, either in
- form or in content. Nothing. And the government finally came to the
_ point--and fatally--of perpetrating, on the occasion of another plot against
the Tuniaian General Federation of Labor (UGTT), the massacres of 26 January .
1978. Since the police was not adequate, the government requeated the army
to fire on the people and involved it more closely with political life. In
causing Tunisian blood to gush forth, the government had croesed the _
Rubicon.
- In truth, it had inexorr~bly gone downhill to finally become an extremiat
and reckle~s government, one that fell out of the frying pan inr,.o the fire.
And yet the government had all the odds in its favor: climatic, economic,
and financial, in the 1970's. It misappropriated and aquandered these odds
through an irresponsible policy and administration. They were diverted to
the profit of a particularly voracious minority that wallowed in corrupt
pleaeures to the extent of re~aching the peaks of a shameful refinement -
while the masses lived in misery.
During that period, the gov~rnment did so much and so well that it tended
to reduce the choice of every worthy and logical patriot to a single
alternative: to accept helplessness, political paralysis, and in short to
keep quiet--that is, to resign--or, in no uncertain terms, to take up arms.
- ~etween a minor roie without reaponsibility or of submissivene$s and
bombing, the margin of maneuver for patriotic militanta and of the people -
continued to shrink. And at the same time dissatisfaction on the part of
the people and the impatience of the young people continued to spread.
How, then, can one be surprised that the Tunisians ~aere stimulated to
counterviolence which, under auch conditions,can even find a legitimate
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- basis in the people�a right to resist**ppression in Moslem public law* as -
well as in Western ind socialist law.
- 2. The Gafsa armed confrontations thus constituted the dramatic outcome
of a domeatic criais that became increasingly rotten, the general crisis
of a society that was frustrated and locked into more and more flagrant
~ in~usticea and diaparities.
' And what did the government da? It answered this aggravation of the domes-
tic criaie in an irre~poneible and unacceptable manner.
Firet of all, let us clearly condemn the Tunisian government for its
appeal--on the whole panic ~tricken--for foreign military forces aad sup-
port. Let us recall that Hsdi Nouira said that France i~tervened
"inatinctive~y." Clearly that means that the head of the government of a ~
c~untry tha~ is euppoaed to be independent implicitly acknowledged to a -
- foreign power a right of intervention--initial and spontaneous--in Tunisian
affairs. Bourguiba and his ambassador in Paris made similar statements.
We must vigorously denounce French military intervention in Tunieia and the -
_ development of the American military engagement in our c~untry. We must
condemn these demonstrations of French and American naval forces that bring
us ba~k to the period of the Treaty of Bardo (1881).
- The purpose was to intimidate the Tunisian people in their struggle for
- national and social liberation. These interventions aimed to maintain a
~ government that was already quite weakened. Bourguiba, who did not stop -
boasting that he carried out the strugg~.e against the French protectorate,
* See, for example, Louis Gardet, "The Moslem City" ("la Cite musulmane"),
- Paris, 1969, pp 37-38, and 175-176. To be noted is that the Iranian
revolution emphasized this right.
_ This right is consecrated by other texts, including French and American
constitutional texts. The Declaration of Independence af the United
~ Statea (1776) prescribes: "When a long train of abuses and usurpations,
pursuing invariably the same ob~ect, evinces a design to reduce them
' under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty to throw
off such government." Leon Duguit, eminent French ~urist whose courses
Bourguiba took during the 1920's, writes: "If people are oppressed by
tyrannical lawe, insurrection is a right, even a duty," (Treatise oa
Constitutional Law, 5 vol., Vol. II, 1928, pg 794). These passages by
- Duguit were analy~ed by Fidel Castro for his defense before the ~udgea
of the Cuban tyrant, Batista, after the attgck against the Moncada
barracks (1953). (See E. Castro, "Hiatory Will Absolve Me~" ("La Historia
me absolvera"), flavana, 1964, p 164).
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ii~ fact reatored that protectorate in its military form by adding another,
an American one thia time. That is how the man of 1 June 1955 who, for me -
as a child and an adcleacent, was the symbol of the liberation of Tunisia,
- in my eyes ae an adult, ended hia career as the under~eller of the father- -
land.
And now the gQVernment pretends to ca11 on Tunisians to "protect national
independence." What? Orze underael.ls the cotu~?try, one places Tuniaia
under a military protectorate, and ;:?:~n on has the inaol~nt audacity to
claim to embody and protect national ind~pendence?
Of course national sovereignty and independence must be protected in all
apheres, in the Weat as in the East, in the North as in the South; and
all foreign or external interference must be re~ected and opposed. But
how can one protect an independence that practically no longEr exists and
to which as a matter of fact one has ~ust deslt a coup de grace? It is no
longer a question of protecting, it hence~orth is a question of establish-
ing, national independence. No! That truly is impossible. The Tunisian
government has completely disqualified itaelf with regard to the matter of
patriotiem and, to tell the truth, tihat did not begin now. It cannot
lecture ar.yone on this sub~ect. Bourguiba and his people, on the contrary,
have aomething to learn from the Tusisian young people. So that, to par-
_ ticipate new in the orchestrated concert of a so-called n~tional unanimity--
it must be said--would be an act of anti-patriotism. It is true that at
the time of the foreign intervention, Mestiri and his liberal friends
rallied, hastily and without glory, round the g4vernment.
The maske came off and it was a good chance to hasten to som~e portfolioa -
_ that one had deapaired of obtaining. Doubtlees the oppoeition became a
~oke which had laeted only too long after having mystified some.
One must add that we do not want a nation~alism like Chang Kai-chek's,
"modernized like Formosa's. And neither do we want a Tunisian nationalism
that would be characterized by a visceral hostility toward Arsbs and Islam
at the same time that it shamefully grovpls before emirs and princea,
false devotees of obscurantism and corrupted by petxo-dollars, whisky,
women, and gambling.
With reapect to Libya, we must begin by recalling that it was Bourguiba,
himself, who had signed with Qadhafi a declaration of "amalgamation" of
- the two countries (12 January 1974), an amalgamation that was mysteriously
improvised and that did not gc beyond an interview between the two men.
In any case we must not participate in an operation that would tend to
make it seem that Libya is an enemy of Tunisia, and never will we play into
the hande of thoae who want to set the Tunisian people against the fraternal
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l~UK UY'1~1l;lAL Ubl~ UlU.Y
Libyan and Algerian peoples. Neverl Becauee it is precisely thus that we
view the Arab Maghreb.
One must add that progressive Tunisian leadere cannot be easily manipulated, _
nor can they yield to calct~lating or opportuniet petitione~ nor be ready t~o
- fall into step with no matter who in unve~rifiable undertakings. Let us say ~
this loudly and clearly: thoae w~ho would believe that Tunisia is Zaire,
Chad, or Central Africa would be making a big mistake. What fs more, they
would not be aware of the keen feeling of dignit}r in Tuni.eiane, the fiery
- patriotiam that b~at8 in our hearte and our entrails, and the high sense of _
political awareness in Tunisia. _
We refuse to think of Tuniaia as belonging to any sphere of influence
whatsoever. Tunisia must not be a stake for foreign forces. We must
� forcefully state our determination to prevent any foreign force whatsoever
from profiting from the domestic crisis or to exploit the national and
social interests of the Tunisian people for foreign purposes. Thus we must ,
oppose the criminal process that tends to internatianalize Tuniaian pro-
blema, to drown them, and to create a diversion in order to maintain the
people in a state of exploitation and servitude.
Finally, Franco-American intervention could set in motion an uncontrollable -
- entanglement in the region. It is essential that all Tunisian patriots
unite in order to put an end to this--without delay.
[Photo caption] A 35-year old Tunisian univeraity 3urist, Hichem Moussa
has been teaching public and administrative law at the University of Paris-II ,
for 11 years. He is also doing research on the general theory of the State -
and Law. He was a poung member of the Desturian Socialist Party, from
which he publicl.y resigned after the reactianary violent and illegal act
_ of 1969. After the eacape of Ahmed Ben Salah (February 1973), he parti-
cipated in the Movement of Popular Unity (MjJP) and became a militant. At
the MUP trial in August 1977, he was sentenced in absentia to 8 years in
_ prison. He lives in exile with his family. He expreasea his personal
opinion here.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Afrique-Asie .
8255
CSO: 4400
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
REPERCUSSIONS OF GAFSA ATTACK DISCUSSED _
Participation of Algeriane
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 20 Feb 80 pp 31, 32
[Article by Souhayr Belhassen, JEUNE AFRIQUE correspondent in Tunis] .
_ [TextJ In order to avoid fighting on two fronts, Tuniaia prefers to
ignore it, but...
In the near future, Gafsa risks causing more repercussions in Algiers
than in Tunis!" Is th~s remark that was made by a foreign diplomat
- stationed in Tunis ~ust a quip? The questioning of the commando prisoners
- and the information gathered from several sources seem to confirm an
Algerian participation. Of course the Tuaisian leaders, witk~ Preaident
Habib Bourguiba at taze head, are steadfastly trying to exonerate the
- Algiera regime. But the Tunisians obviously are not deluding themselves:
- they simply do not want to fight on two fronte.
There is something else: everyone, including the Tunisians, knows that
- Chadli's Algeria is not Boumedienne's--far from it. The reina of the -
- government are no longer in the hands of ~ust one man. And on the Algerian
political cheasboard Gafsa was an important element in the strugglea of
the political groups within the government. Not. at all becauae of Tunisia,
but rather Libya. If, because of his extravagancea, the leader of the -
- Jamahiriy~i causes reticence in Algeria, he nonetheless has partisans among =
progressivea of Marxiat tendency and in Moslem integrationiat cixcles.
Thie current is exploited and channeled by Mohammed Salah Yahiaoui, strong
r man of the FLN, for whom Colonel Qadhafi has never concealed his sympa-
thiea.
The Algerisn "Connection"
The Gafsa operation thus was able to benefit from Algerian compl~cfty to
the advantage of an internal political game. One can concede that, ~not
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having any "preoccupationa" in the east as they state, the Algeriana left
a paesage li'~e Bir Om Ali unprotected. But certain other details are
harder to dodge. Befure being eacorted by motor coach to Tebeaea
JA No 997), t~e 28 men of the "~?mr Ibn el-Ass brigade" were met at ~he -
- Algiers sirport: ~`The.y~also spent a night nesrby, in a villa made avail-
able to them by 'an Algerian.~ r. .
.
According to the disclosures made by the commsndos that were captured in
- Gafea, the man's paeudon~tm is p~obalrly Said or. Chakib. This person--
_ known to the POLISARIO--acted in the name of Commander Slimane',Hoffman, -
m~nber of the Central Coumiittee of the FLN, in charge of foreign relations,
more apecifically in charge ~f liberatior~ movements within ttie party. He,
' himself, is directly responaible to powerful Col Kasdi Merbah, director of
the dreaded SM (Military Security), who for several months has been secre-
tary general of the ministry of defense. _
~ Airplane tickets stubs, passports (not taken at the time of the passage of
the commandos to Algiers), confessions, all elements of proof of these
facts, exist. They constitute the esaential part of the dossier that eome
Tunisian persons have had to aubmit to several countries, first of all
Algeria, where Fouad Mbazaa, minister of information and of culture, went.
It is possible that other items will enlarge the dossier of the Algerian
connection--like the possible ro~,e of Brahim Tobbal, Tunisian opponent _
without any internal base, whom Algeria has been harboring for many years.
This same Tobbal who, on 1 February, called for a revolt againat the
Bourguiba government, is an old Youssefite, like Ezzedine Cherif, one of
the two leaders of the "Amr Ibn el-Ass brigade." The man is connected with
the PRPT (Tuniaian People's Revolutionary Party), 12 of whose members,
arrested in Tunisia in August 1977, have been accused of having (previously!) ~ _
"illegally crossed the Tunisian border," "illicitly carrying military
- weapons."
The Kremlin Game -
Their trial toak place in June 1979 (JA No 966). Brahim Tobbal was sen-
tenced in absentia to 6 years in prison. The PRPT, itself, emerged from
a scission that occurred in 1973 within the National Front of Tunisian "
Progressive Forces (FNFPT), constituted in Tripoli in 1972. The "Libyan"
- wing then (at the end of 1573) took the name of Popular Front for the
Liberation of Tunisia (FPLT), with Amara Dhaou and Ahmed Mergheni, who
prepared the "Gafsa coup," as leaders. On this occasion, moreover,
' Mezgheni took the pseudonym of "polisario"...The "Algerian" wing, connected
with Brahim Tobbal, chose that of the Tunisian People~s Revolutionary
Party. -
Was there a reconciliation between the two wings, the Algerian and the
Libyan, on the occasion of the Gafsa operation? This is not excluded. All
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the more so since on that occasion new identitiea (result of a compromiee?)
_ appeared in the co~uniquea of the organizationa that conducted the
attack: "Tunieian Arm~d Resistance" and "General Revolutionary Committee -
for the ~,iberation of Tuniaia."
Did the impli~a~ion of certain Alger{an circles check the reaction of the
other Arab countriea? Of course Tunisia had the right to an expreasion of
their sympathy. But one took the time tc arrange a simple meeting of dele-
gates in the headquarters of the Arab Leag.. for 16 February--a meeting
fram which the Tunisians moreover did not ~_:..pect much--because of the -
- attitude of refusal and the pro-Libyan attitude of the Soviet Union. Did
not the TASS agency preaent the Gafsa events as "a sequel to the anti-
governmental demonstrations of January 1978?" Everyone understood that -
L the Kremlin, which had nothing to lose by supporting Qadhafi, was not
unhappy at causing Tunisia to pay for its vote against the USSR in the
Afghan affair. In the same way that it indulged the Algerian government,
Tuniaia exerted itself to minimize the Soviet attitude. The ambaseador
~ fro~n Moscow to Tunis was not summoned; no explanation was requeated of
h~ --either concerning the origin of certain weapons found or, above
all, with res~ect to the TASS remark. "What we allow ouraelves to say to
our Soviet friends," said Mohammed Sayah to JA, "'18 that they would do
better to beware of Qadhafi's adventurous policy. We realize that one
wants to make a pawn of us in the confrontation among world powers."
_ Facpelled from Libya
Far from these strategic considerations, the average Tunisian is concerned
- about the fallout of the Gafsa affair on domestic policy. If one refers
to Bourguit~a's atatements, it indeed appears that today there will be no
change. On receiving Hedi Nouira on 9 February, for the first time since
the attack, the chief of State cangratulated him on hie behavior. And he -
added: "He wi11 be my prime minister as long as I live; then he will
succeed me." Obviously the president makes light of the tokens of support
given unaCintingly by various opponents. But, for the man in the street,
Gafsa has shown that, between a Bourguiba who rules over the country and
a priine minister who directs and manages,.the opposition has tried to
exisr.
For now, tl:z most significant consequence of the "Gafsa coup" is the mas-
sive retutn of workers expelled from Libya. They cross the border at the
~ Ras Jedir post each day--by the hundreds. In long lines, some with a
bundie, some with a suitcase, some with a TV on their shoudera, they turn
their backs on a huge poster that faces Tunisian territory and that
declares, oh, what irony, "The Green Book, universal victory of man!"
These expelled persons have been the ob~ect of strict sorting since their
arrival. The young natives of the governorship of Medenine (ad~acent to
Libya) are sent to the civilian service camp of Ababessia. The others, -
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a mixture of young and old, are sent to a camp located at Ben Garbane, not
_ far from there.
Amnesty
_ . � ;f, .
The government seems ready.'to d~fini~ic~~~.y ;clarify the aituation of thase `
80,000 nationals l~cated in Libya. It envisage's ,qui=~klX:~recalling, them
and President Bourguiba has~~even decided to give them a time;s.li,mit of
6 months to choose between returniYig to .the country and losi~ng Tunisian
- nationality. The arrival of these emigrants will pose an employment pro-
_ blem. An increase is expected in the unemployment that had already encour-
- aged some of these young people to leave Gafsa, with the consequence that -
one has come to lc~ow with respect to the Qadhafi commandos.
Those who were made prisoners in Gafsa will soon have to go before the
State's Criminal Investigation Court. On 13 February, in the National
Assembly, severa? deputies called for the death penalty. In any case, the
men of the "Amr Ibn el-Ase brigade" never had any illueions. From the
first day of the attack, they said to the people of Gafsa: "We know that _
we are going to die, but we are doing this for you." And Ezzedine Cherif,
whom the policemen promiaed to protect in exchange for full confessions, -
- replied: "Don't bother. I know that I am going to die...But I will teYl
- you everything. Gratis."
Qadhdhafi's Vertigo
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 20 Feb 80 pp 2$-30
[Article by Bechir Ben Yahmed: "What I Believe"]
_ [Text] Three weeks after the attack on the Tunisian city of Gafsa by a '
commando of some tens of Tunisians armed by Libya, the affair has not yet
been closed.
The Arab League, the OAU, and the Security Council knew, or know, some of
them. Therefore, for African opinion and even for that of the Tuniaians--
both ask many questions--we nust clarify the obscure points of this affair.
Chance
A~t the hour of drawin~ up a statement of affafrs, the Tunisian leaders
reviewed the errors committed on both sides and the manifestationa of _
friendahip--or support--received.
As in very a�fair of this kind, there are first of all the Qlements of
chance, the sum of imponderables. They favored the assailants, who did
not know how to profit fram them.
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1. It seema that they did not encaunter any ~omplication, since they were
- able to go through airports (Tripoli-Aame-Algiers), then the Tunisian
border, without any mishaps. Even in Gafsa theq were able to hide, find
their weapons and their accomplices without atitracting the att~ntion of
the aecurity services: the city wae practically completely empty.
2. Between the time of the first ahot fired by the assailants--about
0200 hours on Sunday, 27 January, and the arrival of the army at 1100 hours,
they had n,early 9 hours to occupy the city, to win over the population, -
to recruit, to entrench themselves. They wasted those precious hours, where ~
only a shock group of policemen, senr from Tunis in civilian airplanes -
- �equisitioned during the n~ght by the ~ecurity director, tried to contain
them. They wasted them by firing wildly at random, with a superiority of
. weapons and an abundance of ammunition. ~
- Their plan--not a bad one--was that each recruit was to immed~ately arm -
- and direct 10 of his previously located friends. The co~ando of 30 men
would thus be changed before da~ into 30 commandos of 10. The city ~
conquered by these 300 men--natives--would then become unassailable, except
_ that the Tunisian army had sufficient moral strength to reconqusr it quar-
ter by quarter, at the price of a thousand dead. It became above all a =
- center of activity, an echo chamber, this famed "point of departure" and
contagion expected by Tripoli to provide forceful and direct interven-
tion: ~ust as in the case of the Ruasians in Kabul! ~
The two commando chiefe who were arrested, the firat in the vicinity of
Gafsa on Tuesday, 29 January, the second very far away 2 days later,
realized that they had lost the opergtion during those first 9 hoursa -
3. It is clear that while they were not deaounced by anyone in the days
preceding the operation when they were hidden in the city--a wait-and-see
attutude on the part of the accamplices?--neither were they helped very
much or followed when they were in trouble. Mergheni, the second commando
chief, who was able to escape with two of his men and to cross the country
from weat to east, "remained in the maquis'~ only 4 days. Nowhere, it
seems, did he feel "like a fish in water" and, in order to obtain food, he
- and his coanpanions had to do violence.
The Error
The appeal for French (logistic) aid resulted in an emergency decision
which now--that matters have calmed down--is most criticized--both domes-
tically and abroad. Those who had to make the decision advance rhe argu-
m~:nt--not an insignificant one--that in a battle one must make provision
for the unexpect~d and summon up reserves in order to be in a position
to have them available. ~ _
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For my part, I believe that that reserve could have been maintained in...
P.aris. All the more so since, and this is not very well known, the two
Frehch=~p~an,es and the two helicoptera arrived on the site only on Tueaday,
- 29 January, ~hat-is, ;48 hours af ter the decision to send them and, in any
case, after.~,.th~~b$ttie. Add to that that the detail8 of their eventual
- use were the grourid`fo~~a~lively~discusaion between Paris and Tunis, and
you will conclude--a'p~os�~riori,. it is true-=that that particular charge -
should not l~ave been fir~d.
Very different from all points of view was Moroccan military aid. It was
not requested by Tunisia, but was offered~tt}e very first day in these terms -
by the king of Morocco: "Yau do not have to give me any ,explanation. I
have understood everything and I am taking the init~iatiue.to propose send-
- ing you, without delay or any condition, all that you~may_~eed and that I
_ posseas. I am ready to share my military resoi~rc~s with you.u
The Tunisiana, needing only means of tr.ansportation and aerial surveillance,
requested, as they did of France, two big transport planes and some heli-
copters. In the hours that followed acceptance of their request--the time
tio cross the western basin of the Mediterranean- Moro~can planes and heli-
copters were there--ready. ~'he French planes snd helicopter.a that arrived _
several hours later became only superfluous and an enbumbrance...
Disagreement -
Now that the Tunisian government on the one hand and Qadhafi on the other
have (abundantly) expressed their position in the press, that their respec-
tive dossiers have been co~nunicated to most of the chanceries of the
. world (Arab League, OAU, UN...), one knows the main facts concerning the
responsibility for this affair:
- . The assaillants were Tunisians (f rom Gafsa); insurgents, not mercenaries.
- Qadhafi reminds one of this and, in this regard, he is right. The Tuni-
sians on the whole do not deny it and in any case tihe public considers it
to be the truth. -
. Nevertheless, there is marked aggression on the part of Qadhafi against =
Tunisia, a neighboring country and a nember, like Libya, of the Arab
League, of the OAU, and of the UN. He armed, trained, and financed the
men who invaded Gafsa. They ha3 Libyan passports and Qadhafi received
_ their chiefs on the eve of their departure. His radio supported their
action to the end, and even beyond that. -
In recent years there has been no more clear-cut case of violation of -
international rules and of neighborly relations. And yet, nefther in the -
Arab League, nor in the OAU, nor in the Security Council, does condemnation
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of Qadh~~~i seem to be unequivocal and solid. And yet Qadhafi~s other
neighbors--the deaignated victimes of his maneuvers--prefer not to demon-
etrate. And yet, in the case of the Tunisiane, themselvea, a good part =
of the studenta, particularly in Paris, all of the Marxist leftists,
including the former minister of economy, Ahmed Ben Salah, refuse to pre-
vent the foreign aggression against their country because they see only
the miatakes of their government. And yet, in society, among the intellec-
tuals, there are persons like Roger Garaudy (philosopher!) who continue ~
to profess regard for the thinking and action of Qadhafi. ~
On these three planes--the international, Tunisian, and intellectual--
there is very serious disagrezment, a breach that will continue to widen
if une does not plug i~ up.
_ For Tunisia the disagreement will soon be serious. The complsints
addresaed by both the Tunisian or European extreme left to the government,
- repeated ~y Qadhafi, for the moat part are un~ust, un~ustified, or
excessive . But the government incurs a dual reproach which in my eyea
is much more serioua:
. Its propenaity to live with what has occurred and its inability to com-
municate (well), in particular with its young people, at least a good
part of them, whose languag~ it 3oes not understand and over whom it n~
longer has any influence.
. Its inability--an ins~itutional one--to elaborate a long-term domestic
and foreign policy.
- Having said that, the questions that one asks oneself ard that we are asked
_ everywhere--in the street and at the governmental level--both in Tunisia
aad in other Mediterranean countries, African and Arab, sre the following:
What is Q$dhafi going to do? Will he stop or continue? What will hia
next initiative be? Who will be his next victim? It's ~ ust that this man,
= whether he aucceeds or fails, is creating a psychosis.
EvaluaCion ~
In Tunisia, itself--and at the top--opinions are divided, indeed contra-
dictory: "muddled, incoherent, not disquieting," said Bourguiba who, to
prove it, continues to walk among palm trees during the day and to listen
* Example: "The (Gafsa) situation is due to the political and economic pol-
icies of the Bourguiba regime, valet of imperialism...We consider the
governmen t to be chiefly responsible for these e~vents"(1), according to a
leaflet written by some Tunisian students in Paris.
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to paema in the evening in the sh~de of the same palm treea. "The situa- ~
. tion is very aerious," maintained Prime Minister Hedi Nouira. "Qadhafi
~ie capable of anything...He will not stop at a first failure, such as
the~Gafsa coup." It ie.true that Nouira lives through the crisis in hie
office, where he has just read''fiTQadhafi tir~de: "We will not agree to
- any mediation, any peace; any~'armiatice in the.~struggle that has been set
� i~z motion by the Tunisian governmerit. Revolutiongry logic orders con-
tinuance of the attsck, even to the elimination o~ the Tunisia~ govern-
ment, which is hostile to the Libyan people's revolution." .
_ Midway between these two positions is tha*_ of Mohammed Sayah, leader of
the T~ulisian Single Party (PSD): "According to the meaning that the
_ Marxista give to this term Qadhafi ia an adventurer." The implication:
dangerous and contemptible...
- The Tunisians, neighbors of Qadhafi, who have been putting up with his
~ crazes, hav~ reason to speak as experts on Qadhafi whims. But, they do
not have enough room to recoil. And right now they are prone to consoli-
date a paychological war (against Qadhafi) and analysis.
In order to analyze this man and to deal with him, it is necessary to -
- stand back and give oneself a little room; a diagnosis is then relatively -
simple. In any case, this is mine. To begin with, Qadhafi has some sub-
stance. He is fairly well educated, is uncommunicative, and is very
stirred up by surrounding humiliations and in~usrice. He is inclined to
- action. What to do? How to do it? With whom? He does not know.
We have many men like him in the Third World. He is even a prototype... _
But he went even so far as a coup d'etat, succeeded, and came to power.
Very quickly--in lesa than 5 years--he was afflicted with a disease, a
disease that is well known in the Thixd World (and that will t+e even more
so in forthcoming years), that I will call vertigo, the vertigo of power. -
This disease--incurable--prcgresses inexorably in the brain of a person
who is afflicted with it, takes complete hold of him, and no lon~er leaves
him.
It more easily afflicts those who attain power, those who gain it suddenly,
without struggle, and thus without preparation. It just as easily strikes
~ those who,for one reason or another, suddenly see their military or finan-
cial power increase inordinately and who can use it without "warning" (an
applicable example indeed).
The more sudden the power, the more it is big and without limit, and the
more the holder is sub,ject to vertigo. To exp lain Qadhafi's case: he
attained power suddenly on 1 September 1969 and this power, as a result of
- thP quadrupling of the price of oil in 1974, suddenly became correspondingly
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imtnense. Qadhafi did not survive the second shock (oil).
The diaease of which I speak at the same time struck the Shah of Iran,
f inding in him a particularly fertile "ground," since Reza Pahlbvi was
also aic~k when the oil shock occurred in 1974. He succombed to tne disease ~
and wsa swept away in 5 years. People like Idi Amin, Bokassa, Macias
Nguema, having attained power in an unex~ected manner (for them and for
the othersj,, thus, attainers of power, were quickly afflicted by vertigo,
_ even though their power was slight. It is because they, while wily, were
naive, and thua more subject to vertigo ~y contagion.
The observer is obliged to put on the same plane--~ust to take Africa and
_ the Middle East as examples--Reza Pahlavi, Idi Amin, Macias Nguema, Bokassa,
and Qadhafi. They are attainers of power, contaminated more or less
quickly,more or less seriously, by vertigo. _
_ Qadhafi is an Idi Amin o.f the Meditierrar.ean, Idi Amin having b~an the
Qadhafi of the Indian Ocean, and Macias that. of the Atlantic, Bokasea
that of Central Africa, and Reza Pahlavi that of the Persian Gulf, in the
Middle East.
There are of couroe some variants among these sick people, owing to the
personal and national quotient of each: one afflicted by excess~ve indus- ,
_ trialization; the other, with the "third tneory;" all are in frantic and
pathetic search of power--whenc2 the unbridled purchase of armament--and
of regard. A common characteristic of all of these sick p~ople: they fa'1
out obligatorily and very quick~y with all of t:~eir nPighbors. All do
harm more or less soon: that depends on circumstances, their wiliness,
and...their adversaries. -
_ Naivety
Qadhafi, then, is neither the revolutionary that he proclaims himself to
be ar~d that certain intellectuals, fascinated by action, want to believe
him to be--the Habaches, Hawatmehs of the PLO, c2rtain leaders of the -
POLISARIO, some Tunisian leftists...the French philosopher (1), Roger
Garaudy--nor the"crazy man of Tripoli" that his adversaries or his victims
proclaim him to be.
He is a man who has won power and has lost self-control. Not having the -
- human (or intellectual) resources for his policy, he makes policy from
his financial resources. The intellectuals whom he fascinates as a result
, of the resources at his disposal and attracts by those that he puts at
their disposal will regret--but too late--not having recognized in Qad'~afi
the aigns of this deep-seated disease, vertigo.
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r� _
In the meantime, hie unfortunate neighbors should not overestimate him
or take hie "declarations of war" literally or, even less, change their ~
priorities, to becoffie pawns in his initiativea.
- In the face of inen who are afflicted with vertigo calm. ~igilance, and
concerted determination are of utamost importance.
~ COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1980
8255 -
CSO: 4400
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INTER-ARAB A~'FAIRS -
BRIEFS
GAFSA INCIDENT FAI~LOUT--The Gafsa coup has created some stirrings in Algiers,
where authorities are trading accusations about their complicity in the
affair. Lhzder fire, Col Rasdi Merbah, who is secretary general of the
Defense Ministry, to clear himself is contending that the coup was planned
in Houari Boumedienne's day. [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 19 Mar 80 p 50]
CSO: 4400
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AFGHANISTAN
FIFTEEN-YEAR FIISTORY 0~' THE 'KHALQ' PARTY (PDPA)
Paris AFRl:'~UE-ASIE in French 18 Feb-2 Mar 80 pp 47-52
[Article by Bouzid Kouza: "The PDPA: 15 Years of Turbulent His~tdry"]
[Text] Eatablishment of the PDPA -
In the last few months of 1964, a group of revolutionaries decided to take
advantage of King Zahir's policy of relative liberalization to found a
political party, the Afghan People's Democratic Party (PDPA). A secret
party congress was held, attended by 77 militants, 27 of whom wer�e mili-
tary personnel. The lst of January 1965 was fixed as the party's birtY?day,
and Taratti, Khaybar, Badanchair, and Rarmal were assigned the task of _
proclaiming its foundation. The congress adopted a program and statutes
for the party and defined its course of action which had but two esaential
elements: make maxfmum uee of the advantages ~f lawful activity, and closely
coordinate the latter with unlawful activity, particularly within the armed
forces.
Pursuant to a th~rough political analysis, the party was assigned the
goal of creating, as soon as possible, conditiona conducive to general
mobilization of the couintry's vital elements for the purpose of overthrowing
the monarchy and its supporting feudal atructure, and embarking Afghanistan
on a course of noncapitalistic development. Such was the meaning of the
watchword, "natianal and democratic revolution," whose program was based
on the participation of all political forces, organized or not, fighting
against the monarchy and imperialism, and on rallying the awakened masses
around a minimal political, economic, and social platform. _
Platform
'L'hat platform included the following watchwords: strengthen the public
sector, establish a planned economy, industrialize the country, control
_ foreign trade, initiate democratic agrarian reforms, combat illiteracy
- a~d ignorance, eliminate unemployment and underemployment so as to develop
a pol~.cy of social 3ustice. The ways and means of achieving these object-
ives were clearly defined: broad alliances including all social classes
- and democratic political forces desizing t~ put an end to feudalism and
extricate the country from its underdeveloped status.
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It was this "frontist" policy, adhering closely to the realities of
Afghanistan--and creating conditians conducive to raiaing exceasive expecta-
tiona and accelerating the procese--ttiat bpcame the target of criticism, aa
early as 1966, from a group wi~hin the p~rty, headed by Hafizullah Amin,
a member of parliament. More of an activiat than a politician, Amin was
conspicuous b~ his ultraradical views. He accused the "frontista" of
practicing c:lass collaboration and of being "liquidatdrs" of the party,
a party he had only recently ~oined by having himself appointed to the Cen-
' tral Commiittee under circumstances that are sti1Z obacure.
_ 'Pwo Wings
The party's social configuration predisposed it to a split. Composed mainly
of intellectuals, white-collar workers, and small craftamen, it surrounded
itael~ with a mass of unreliable lutnpenproletariat and uprooted, landless
peasants. The split eventually occurred cver differing strategic and tacti-
cal views, and social polarization accentuated the party's imbalance.
The Khalq wing, actually head~d from the very beg3nning by Amin, rallied ,
- around maximalist watchwords that part of the PDPA leadership advocating
unyielding opposition eo the monarchy, ruling out any possibility of
_ alliance and intermediate stages. Its views were favcrably received among
the lower middle class and lumpenproletariat. The Khalq's pure and hard
revolutionary language appealed to both of these elements because of its _
schematism which simplified to the ultimate degree the real ratio of
forces within the country, the complexity of the situation, and produced
methods of political action approximating thoae called activism among minori-
ties who make up for their ideological and organic weakness by redoubling
localized and violent efforts. This wing called "Khalq" because it became
organized around the party organ :~iALQ (the People), expressed to some
extent a revolutionary impatience resulting from numerous historical factors,
the most striking of which is a hasty assimilation of Marxism and a desire `
to implement mechanically those experiments conducted ~.n other countries,
_ principally in the Soviet Union.
The party's other wing, the Parcham (the Flag), named after the organ
around which the ma~ority "frontists" rallied, was composed of intellec-
tuals, small craftsmen, senior civil servants, military officers and non-
commissioned officers. The Parcham supported and followed a policy of ally- -
ing iCself with other antifeudal forces, including modernist and reform-
ist religious leaders. -
Controversies
The 10-year period of 1967-1977 was replete with ideolo~ical and political
controversies between the two wings, controversies in which were found,
_ transposed onto an organizational level, certain forms of divisive tribal
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~
and clannish patterns of Afghan society (patronal relations, blind
_ "tagalongism" and unconditionality, exacerbated sub~ectivism, etc.).
Amin asserted his leadership little by little in this volatile and complQx _
situation. Supported mainly by the party's military ttetwork for which he
was reaponsible, and by declassed individuals who ~oined the party because _
_ they strongly rejected Afghan society more than because they wanted to
transform it, Amin succeeded in neutralizing the party's politicians,
Taraki and Khaybar.
Reunification
- The latter, however, did play a decisive part in reconciling the two
_ wings. M~mbers of the Parcham demanded Amin's exclueion from the party,
accueing him, in 1967, of being a CIA agent. Failing to thwart reunifica-
tion of the party, Amin narrowly contrived to retain a position in the _
_ unified leadership established through the efforts of Khalq members as
well as Parcham members. This reconciliation, effected in July 1977,
involved solely the party's civilian organizationa, the military networks
remaining separate. In this way, Amin retained an ace in the hole, a card
he eventually played in Apxil 1978.
InCense political activity by the masses marked the year 1978. The upsurge
of religious fundamentalism fostered and manipulated by Pakiatan, Saudi
- Arabia, and CIA officials, plus the provocative agitation of Maoist
groups, furnished grist to the mill of the Daoud regime and its friends
at the U.S. Embasay in Kabul who, in Afghanistan's rugged political
terrain, very clearly saw the danger to be averted, namely a reunified
PDPA.
Khaybar's Assassination
A series of plots and attacks were organized to cripple the PDPA. Mir ~
Akbar Khaybar, the Parcham's theoretician and official responsible for its
military organization, was assassinated. This murder was attribu~ed to
Alemayar, a member of the Moslem Brotherhood. But it was actually perp~e-
trated at the instigation of Amin who had 3ust learned that a ma~ority of -
the members of the Central Committee had voted for his exclusion.
M~oving quickly, Amin launched--with the concurrence of the United States,
according to the current view in Kabul--a series of operations aimed at
starting a bloody repression that would liquidate the party with both its
wings. According to this plan, Rhaybar's assassination was supposed to "
incite the PDPA to retaliate frontally againat the Moslem Bro.therhood
supported behind the scenes by the government. In the feverish agitation
that followed Khaybar's murder, the PDPA deferred announcing Amin's exclu-
sion so as to project the image of a united party to the masses. The latter
transformed Khaybar's funeral into an imposing demonsLration againat the _
regime. The situation then became explosive, but not the way Amin's
group had expected. -
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Instead of indulging in isolated acts of reprisal, the party mobilized
~ the urban masses into a massive political protest movement of nascent
insurrectional though controlled character. In fact, did the power- '
aeizing revolutionary uprising have to be launched at once? How and under
what forms.ehould:it be started? Little is known of the discussions that
took place within the ~DPA~~at that time~ thua making it difficult to deter-
mine their chronology. What is certain, however, is that Amin, recognizing
- the newly created aituation, revised his plan. He relied on the maea move-
ment's ineurrectional core to t.ake_the initiative of armed opposition.
Postponed Arrest ~ .
This decision has to be viewed in relation to a series of events which
, took place at that time, disturbing events to say the least. The govern-
ment already had wind of a planned upxising. More than a 1,000 tifficers
were arrested and some were executed. '
Three men met on 25 April in Kabul's Zalmay restaurant: Prime Minister
Daoud, his defense minister, Rasuli, and the ~.~rican ambassador to
Afghanistan. They decided, inter alia, to arrest ai~ PDPA leaders. Amin
was on their list, but his arrest was poetponed one day. Time enough for ;
him to make necessary arrangementa for the revolt within the armed forces.
In point of fact, as soon as a number of PDPA were arrested, including
Karmal, Amin's home was surrounded be~t he was not arrested until the
evening of the 26th. Only to be released the following day with the other _
leaders, thus becoming one of the heroes of the revolutionary movemant in ;
_ the eyea of party members and the masaes.
27 April 1978 ' `
By taking the initiative of launching the insurrectional movement initially
with personnel of the military network he personally controlled, Amin forced
the party as a whole into having to make a highly difficult choice, one
that also had to be made quickly: either dissociate themselves from a
movement whoae adventurist and provocative character wa3 well-known to
the party leadership, or else support the movement and forcibly channel
it in a truly revolutionary direction. The first alternative involved
inordinately serious risks. First of all, there was no doubt that officers,
soldiers, and thousands of party members, who were not aware of this initia-
tive's hidden purpose and perceived solely its primary meaning--that of a
movement which anticipated their aspirations--would be slaughtered~ Then
there was the risk of immediately shattering the party and isolating it
from the masses seething with revolutioanry fervor. These two risks
combined could prove fatal to the PDPA and.the people's movement. Conse~:~~
quently the party leadership decided to throw all of its forces immediately
into the battle. The concerted action of popular demonstrations, armed mili-
tants, tanks, and aircraft succeeded in overthrowing the Daoud regime after
a day of fighting. _
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Among the organizers of the revolt, we must re:nember the names of General
Abdelquader who commanded the air force~ an~i Ma~or Rafie who commanded
the armored forces. Both were arrested by Amin in August 1978 and not
released until the evening of 27 December. Also to be remembered are the
names of Ouatan~an and Gholab Zaoui who went underground in September 1979
to lead the oppoaition to Amin's government and prepare his downfall.
Amin Growa 5tronger
We all kn,ow what happened after that. Bolstered by a triumphant revolution,
Amin managed to enhance his position and hold on. As he regained self- _
c~nfidence, he resumed his attacks on the unitary members of the Khalq and
the Parcham, accusing them of apinelessness and political indifference.
_ As proof, he pointed to "this revolution that would never have taken place
_ if we"--i:e. himself and his group of loyal supporters--"had not taken
the initiative." This was the argument he uaed to circumuent:'~araki and
' persuade him--and other leaders who were uneasy and still nat aware of the
dangers ahead for the revolution and themselves--to remove all those persons
considered to be really dangerous and likely to oppose him because they
clearly saw through his game.
The PDPA leadership--and Karmal first and foremost of all--affirm that
back in 1965 the CIA had assigned Amin the task of degtroying the nascent
_ Afghan revolutia~ary movement, discrediting the ideals of socialiem in
_ the eyes of the masses, and inciting the masses to oppose the Soviet Union.
The subaequent ob~ective in this chain of events was: create, as part of
a master strategy, conditions conducive to inatalling a regime like Zia-ul-
Haq's, directly threaten the Soviet Union's southern borders, crush anti-
imperialist Iran in a pincers, and ~oin forces with Pakistan, a country
that cannot conceal its role as reactionary bastion in the region.
Lenin's Appeal
- Afghanistan's economic, social, and political structures are such that,
unlike neighboring coim tries in which there is a national bourgeoisie,
no rightist force could, at that time, have seized power and replaced
- the monarchy. The intermediate classea, i.e. those between the big feudal
_ landlords-~-the backbone of the monarchy--on the one hand, and the poorer
classes on the other, were too fragmented to be able to express themselves
politically. Ever since the triutaph of the October Revolution, the
_ intellectual lower middle c3!ass has always been attracted by progreasive _
ideas. Lenin's appeal made to the Moslem peoples�of the East still
remains graven on their memory.
For the past 50 years, Afghans have had the possibility of comparing
various regimes in space and time. To take but one example, the Uzbek
- in Afghanistan knows that his cousin in the Soviet Union lives under much
- better conditions than he does.
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For these reasons, among others, it is stated in Kabul�that the only way
reactiona~y forces and imperialism could regain control of Afghanistan f
- was to infiltrate a Tro~an horse into the revolutionary government. Pend-
ing positive evidence capable of supporting this statement, we may consider _
that Hafizullah Amin's entire policy, during the year and a half he
wielded absolute power,tdid: gratify the wishes of imperialism and
reaction to the fullest. ~r ' . : =
Pro-Fascist Practices
How was this done? By simply implementin~ the party's prog~a~?. B~ut his
was a brutal, and extremist implementation of a series of economic at?d
social measures that were certainly desirable in the more or less longer �
- run but which, imposed indiscriminately, without explanation, and with
repression thrown in, could not help but discourage the democrati~c and ~
_ progressive classes and throw the bulk of the peasants and urban lower
classes back into the arms of the feudal landowners. Such pro-Fascist
practices in the name of socialism could not help but generate rebellion
in those persons it claimed to represent.
An iron-handed rule was clamped on the country which lived under a reign
of terror marked by nocturnal raids, the destruction of whole villages,
secret arrests and executiona. The targets of such measures? Party
members accused of being counterrevolutionaries, reltgious leaders _
- labeled members of tlie Moslem Brotherhood, intellectuals and youths ~
suspected of "dealings with foreign interests," landless peasants
ordered to take lands they could not cultivate for lack of resources,
landownera brutally expropriated, not to mention the armed forces who
were victims of the greatest bloodshed. In the space of a few montha,
the KAM (Proletarian Intelligence Service) played havoc with the country`s
elite in the name of socialism, the revolution, and Afghan-Soviet friend-
ship! The party, operating totally underground, 3nstructed certain of its
leaders to maintain positions within the country's governmental machinery
in conformity with the well-oiled and skillful coordination of lawful
operations with underground activity. -
Taraki Assassinated
The situation rapidly came to a head in the summer of 1979. Tarak~, fully
aware of the gravity of the situation, found himself virtually a prisoner -
of Amin's clique.
- The Soviet Government had repeatedly warned him of the dangers threatening
the April revolution, from within and without, as a result of the brutal
methods employed by his prime minister. _
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During hie brief etay in Moscow, upon his return from the conference of
nonallned countriea in Havana last September, the former president met
s=
~ with Karmal. Both men firmly agreed to eliminate Amin. The latter was
informed of thia meeting by one of Taraki's bodyguarda.
We know, if not the exact details, at ].east the outeome of the last
coup d'etat conducted by Amin, the third and final act of this bloody
tragedy: Taraki was assassinated in the People's Palace and several
hundred party cadres were arrested. Some were immediately executed.
Represaive measures against all classes of people were intensified, parti-
cularly in the central provinces (highlands of the Hazara3at) and border
- regions where war was already raging between the Afghan army and the
rebels.
Return to Clandestinfity ~
Z'he PDPA then went totelly underground. With its two wings, whose reuni- -
fication had been strengthened by the repression and by recognition of
the mortal danger facing the revolution, the PDPA moved into action. The
27 December uprising waa meticulously prepared. Why that particular date?
And what connection was there between the upriaing that ended Amin's regime
and the ~tailitary assistance furnished by the USSR at that sam~e time? Tt~o
~ facts explain both the choice nf date and its coinciding with the arrival
of Soviet assistance.
The region's geopolitical situation, and mainly the threats of aggression
which had hung over Afghanistan for the past year, prompted the former
- Kabul government to make several specific requests for aesistance from the
Soviet Union. The latter deferred its assistance because of several
factors, especially the fact that these requests came from a government
the head of which was partly to blame for the dangera of destabilization.
Government Problem
Government members hostile to Amin's policy very likely intended to retrieve
the situation in favor of thc~ Soviet Union. Had he wanted to oppose these
demands, Amin could not have done so for fear of prematurely unmasking -
_ himself. Zt is now suggested that he had even favored Soviet military
assistance, always in line with the part h~ was playing, that of a CIA
agent disguised as a radical revolutionary. In that case, the entry of
- Soviet troops would have been for him the culmination of a process aimed
at discrediting the Sovfet Union by falsifying the facts on the one hand
and playing upon national sentiment on the other.
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In the meantime, the PDPA had made the decision to settle, first of all
and in complete independence, the government problem which wae a domestic -
matter, and then call upon the Soviet Union to help cope with the foreign
~threats.. So~etime, in November, however, the Revolutionary Council, as
the Afghan state's,lawful authority, appointed Karmal president and sub-
mitted a request for assistance.
, , , .Lc,r'r:;~;
Whether Amin was or was not associated with theae request~+y~ he di~.ktio.w
for a fact, on or about 20 December, that the~Soviet Union was goingTto _
begin the famous airlift that put the imperialist West on tenterhooks.
End of Amin 1
_ Amin, therefore, vacated the People's Palace and entrenched himself, with
his bodyguards, in ~he Darlaman barracks. Inside that fortress, he pre-
pared, between 22 and 27 December, what was to become the final stage of a
venture bewildering in its complexity and its Florentine and Shakespearian
Machiavellianism, as informed circles in Kabul continue to ~teadily reiter-
ate. ~
1. Kill the PDPA leaders detained in Puli-Charkhi prison and then claim '
they were killed attempting to make a mass escape.
2. Form a new government composed of representatives from the small -
fundamentalist groups foaienting rebellion from Peshawar, Pakistan.
3. This new government was supposed to, inter alia, denounce the friend-
ship treaty with the USSR and call upon reactionaries in the region and
upon the United States. Such was the major outline of the pl~n the new
Afghan leadership has promised to reveal soon in meticulous detail. This -
plan was unable to succeed because the PDPA forestalled it and was helped
by the Soviet Union who secured Afghanistan's borders.
Within a few hours, it was all over.
And then a new battle began: the one currently being waged to redress the
economic and social situation, restore the people's confidEnce, reestablish
national unity, and extinguish the last counterrevolutioanry fires lit here
and there and fanned by Americans in concert with the Chinese and pseudo-
Moslems skilled in counting their beads and dollars.
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AFGHANISTAN
PRO-SOVIET VERSION OF AFGHANISTAN CRISIS _
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 18 Feb-2 Mar 80 pp 49-52
[Article by Suleman Mehlati: "Hypocrisy, the Supreme Stage of Imperialiem"]
[Text] Suleman Mehlati is a pseudonym chosen--for obvious
safety reasons--by a prominent Pakistani educator who for
the past 2 deca3es has closely followed developments in his
county's domestic and foreign p~licies, as well as such =
developmenXs throughout Central Asia. After a lengthy
period �Ln exile, he returned to Islamabad when Ali Bhutto � -
became president. Since then, Ali Bhutto has been executed
by the hangmen of Pakistan's current fascist preaident,
_ Zia-ul-Haq. From inside Pakistan, transformed into a vast
- concentration carap that a~so functions today as a base for
~ counterrevolutionary aggression, Suleman Mehlati was
anxious to make his views known.
' The entry of Soviet combat troops into Afghanistan gave the Weat the long-
sought opportunity to assert its "moral superiority" over communism and
its firm resolve to defend "freedom" everywhere in the world. As its -
immediate consequence, Soviet intervention has given ths United States
hope of altering the image of an "Islamic world up in arms against the
West" as pro~ected by Ayatollah Khomeyni's action, and also hope of turn-
_ ing "insurgent Islam's" whiplash against the USSR. Thirdly, and not -
least important, is the fact that Jimmy Carter felt the Afghanistan crisis
would get him out of a trap fram which he was unable to free himself, ~
namely the issue of diplomatic personnel held hostage inside the American
Embassy in Tehran.
The American response to the Afghanistan crisis pleased Westerners more--
because it gave them the opportunity to regain a bit of their prestige
that had fallen so low among Third World countries--than it prompted them -
to ponder the underlying causes and realities of this situation.
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~ .
In fact, the Western media's propaganda has missed the mark and lost all
sense of proportion in its commentaries on the situation in Afghaiiistan.
The arrival of Soviet troops was described as the "rape of Afghanistan," .
and the ov,e.rthrow of.Hafizullah Amin's regime was depicted as the disap-
pearance of a gove~nmeqt'tonsiflexed,cfor the sake of the cause, independent
- and democratic. With complet~.lack~of logic~~ the Western media have tried
to give the impression that a~"Western"lake" had~sudd~enly cha~ged ~nto a
"Soviet satellite." , _ , , ~ -
It is perfectly obvious that Jimmy Carter would definitel~y like to see the
Afghan question remain a burning issue until the presidential election
in November 1980. In the meantime, the "hard-line" he pretends to follow
is liable to lead him to make decisions that might well be extremely preju-
dicial to Western i~lterests in general and to American interests in parti-
cular, not to mention world geace and security. '
Friendly Relations
Such are undoubtedly the dangers France and a few other American allies
- see in the hysteria provoked by the situation in Afghanistan. Even
though they are disappointed in the boastful claims, that did not materi-
- ali~e, about the Afghan people's resistan~e to the Soviet forces and
mutiny within the Afghan armed forces, the media of the Western establish-
- ment still cannot bring themselves to tell the truth about the conflicts .
in Southwest Asia. Here, therefore, are the facts.
Afghanistan never has been a"Western lake." The many efforte made by
- the British to subjugate that country always ran into fierce resistance
from the Afghan people. And no Af~han can forget that if the West did
recognize Afghan sovereignty, it was primarily because the Bolsheviks
had previously recagnized it. Ever since the reign of Amanullah Khan,* -
Kabul has always maintained close and friendly ~elations with Moscow. In
geopolitical terms, Afghanistan, though nonalined, can be said to have -
always had special ties with the USSR. And we must emphasize that the
West had made no serious effort until then to put an end to this situation. =
~
Daoud Khan, whose regime was so narrowly hased that he feared being over-
thrown at any time, was the only one to change the balance in favor of the
West by drawing close to the West's local policeman a2 the time, namely
*King of Afghanistan who succeeded Amir Habibullah in 1919: He assumed
the title of king in 1924 and had to abdicate in 1929 under pressure
from an ultrareactionary religious opposition movement supported by the ~
British. -
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the Shah of Iran. And yet Daou3 was overthrown in April 1978 by a revolu-
- tion which even the U. S. Department of State did not dare to say had
been planned or guided by the USSR.
Nur Mohammad Taraki's government, ideologically closer to the USSR, _
followed a policy of closer cooperation with the USSR and signed a
20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow. Soviet military
advisers were then invited to come help the new government reorganize.
These advisers trained the Afghan armed forces and later helped them com-
bat armed resistance by mullaha and other reactionary elements opposed tc
the reforms advocated by the new government. The two succeeding govern-
ments maintained the treaty and sought Soviet military assistance.
An Infamous Mullah
The basic point of the Afghanistan crisis that has to be und~rstood is
- that the conflict did not arise because of increased Soviet influence
or as the result of any violations of religious freedom. The conflic*_
erupted because a regime determined to put an end to feudalism and tribalism
wanted to redistribute land~ abolish usury, emancipate women, conduct a -
_ mass literacy campaign, especially among the women. The first to rebel
against implementation of these reforms were members of the~family of the
_ mullah Shor Bazar, a mullat~ infamous for having oppoaed the modernization
program advocated by King Amanullah and having overthrown him in 1929
with the help of the British. The family's current political heir, Sigbatul-
lah Mujadaddi, visited the United States in 1978, raised funds, obtained
various assurances of support, and announced the formation of a so-called
National I,iberattion Front to combat the Taraki government's reforms.
A few months after the April revolution, many counterrevolutioaary grcups
were formed in Pakistan. They were arme+.d and trained by the Pakistani army
for sabotage operations. An orchestra.ted destabilization campaign was
launched, with Islamabad as its center and sanctu~ry, under Beijing's
supervision and with Washington's blessing. To confuae this .campaign with
what was happening in Iran, it was cleverly labeled the "Islamic Revolu-
tion" so as to justify these counterrevolutionary activities.
These activities evoked little echo in the Afghan people who generally
responded favorably to the revolution. Counterrevolutionaries gained no
significant victory over the Afghan armed forces stoutly loyal to the new
government. "Refugees" arriving on the Pakistani side of the border
were greeted with hostility by local populations who viewed them as
landowners and reviled usurers fleeing the Afghan people's wrath.
All of this began to change, however, when the ambitious Hafiaullah Amin,
the unscrupulous foreign minister, started maneuvering to seize power within
the~par't~ and the government. Internal rivalries and intrigue became the
primary concern of the party leadership, and enforcement of revolutionary
decrees was relegated to a position of secondary importanceo
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~
About March 1979, Amin had consolidated his power, using Taraki as a
- screen, and started an underhanded purge of all his op~onents. At
- that time, the party had ceased performing its role and the government
~ was loaing all touch with reality. Massive reprisals were conducted
against the people--who no longer understood the discrepancy between expec-
tations the new regime had raised and the everyday methode and dealinga
of some of its representatives--whereas a bit of patience would have made
such repression avoidable. Small groups of exilea started to materialize
_ and their ranks were swollen by innocent~victims of the terror among
which the counterrevolutionaries began recruiting. _
Nur Mohammad Taraki's overthrow and assassination in September 1979 and
Amin's accession to the presidency completed the isolation of the regime. _
Friends of the Afghan revolution~,both inside and~outside the country, had
lost much of their enthusiasm for it.
Enthusiastic or not, the:USSR was faced with a veritable nightmare. Loom-
ing ahead it saw the danger:of the establishment, at its very gates,
of an openly hostile, pro-American Afghanistan ruled by a government of -
religiou3 fanatics already committed to the cause of subverting the Soviet
Asiatic republics in the name of one of the most reactionary Islamic
fundamentalist movements. . -
The direct role of the United States in the outbreak c~f the Af~hanistan
"crisis" is not yet clearly known. It is significant, however, that it
was precisely at this moment that Pakistan, an American "client" state,
experienced such a strong desire to arm itself even more, and that Bei~ing,
Flashington's enthusiastic ally, adopted a policy toward Afghaniatan that,
in all log'c, could only lead to Soviet intervention.
As a great power, the United States, more than any other country, is
able to unders.*_and how another great power may feel when it finds itself
faced with a hostile government on its borders. Consequently, when a~overn-
ment that has perpetrated mod~rn history's most brutal war of aggressi.on
(in Vietnam) and that is accustomed to sending troops into Latin Ame:�ica--
- not to mention elsewhere--for a mere trifle, when such a government proclaims
its ''moral itidignation" at the "violation of the sovereignty of an indepen-
dent country," its hypocrisy becomes far too transparent and insolent.
_ As for the USSR, it did not find itself in an extremely comfortable situa-
tion, despite its own great-power logic, and even though the Afghan _
government had been continuously soliciting its help. Its ideological
commitment to support threatened progressive and anti-imperialist govern- _
ments inevitably prompted it +to help the Afghan revolut~.on. But the Amin
regime`s incompe~ence and insensitivity, coupled ~aith ttte continuous -
subuersive activity directed from outside the country, had opened the door
wide to destabilization of the central government and the Afghan revolution
while, at the same time, posing threats at the USSR's very borders.
- As a result, what began as fraternal assistance tio a revolutionary govern- -
_ ment was soon combined with action necessary to the USSR's own national
security. -
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_ Ponderous Saciological Factors
There is no doubt that the USSR ~s paying a price for this involvement
in the Afghan s~~aa~icSna.The "hammering" by the Western media did
unquestionably succeed in misleading certain Third World nonalined
leaders who aeke~ themselves questions. And althoug~ the !JSSR's prestige
may have suffered thereform it will regain that lost influence the quicker -
Babrah Karmal's government is able to demonstrate its competence and its -
sensitivity to the real problems of the Afghan people, and establiah its
credibility by maintaining unity among rival groups and individuals
within the Afghan People's Democratic Party.
The new government's ma~or asset will probably be its political program
for elimination of oppression and feudal exploitation. If such an
ob~ective is puraued with sincerity and efficiency, while giving due consi-
deration to the ponderous sociological factors that.sometimes vftiate
the best of intentions, the goverrament wil~ ultimately win the minds and
- hearts of the Afghan people. At that time, the Afghan government will
become a ma~or asset to the USSR which will have thus proved that its
atrategy and calculations were not unaound. -
Such obviously can never be the case with the United States which, unlike
the USSR, steadily supports ~.'hird World governments and regimes that continue
to cling, with all of their weight, to the hands of the clock of hiatory
in an effort to keep them from turning. This is why any parallel artifi-
cially drawn between American interventions and Soviet international assiet-
ance can only be fallacioae and have as its sole purpoae keeping peoples
ensnared in the toils of neocolonialism. _
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- ALGEftIA
AGRICULTUI~E: GOV~RNMENT'S FIRST PRIORITY
Paris MAftCIiES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in French 7 Mar 80
pp 547-548
~ext7 Confirming his tendency, already pointed out towards
~radual readjustments and systematic arrangements, President
Chadli nendjedid is the source of a governmental action pro-
gram presented during the meeti.ng of the Council of Mirnisters
on 17 Fdbruary. The main idea of the new program thus inau-
~ gurated lies in the desire to e~fectively coordinate the
operations handled b,y the various departments.
After an objective evaluation o~ the results already obtained
ancl of the defects which exist, a work undertaken several
months ago by the authorities and which seem to have already
allowed the president to get a more precise, general idea of
the sit~ia~ion, it is a question o~ improved management o~ _
continued development efforts, which have too often b~en
mark~d until now by certain extravagancies. The interest in '
better coordinatir~n is accompanied logically by an equal de-
- termination to institute a strict control, for which the
government, nnoreover, has outlined here and now the assign-
ments arld created the organizations.
The governraental action program drawn up~ taking into con-
_ sideration investment plans, the operational budget and import~
estimates, was explained on 17 February by the prime minister
and e,dopted "as a whole" after discussion, according to the
communique.
As described by a semiof~icial repA~t, this program would in-
- clude: flulfillment o~ planned programs, improvement of manage-
- ment, reorganization of enterprises, the continuance of decen-
tralization, the completion o~ texts of regulations, exercis-
ing control an~ maintenance, improvement of distrib~tion,
meeting citizens' basic needs, ef~icient utilization of per-
sonnel and training.
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On the other hand, it is envisaged that the Council of Min~s-
ters will examine the results achieved twice a year, and i.e
there is need ~or it, will consequently cha.nge the pro~ram of
one or the other ministerial departments.
Iiowever, we must point out these very genere,l directives do
not include any indication of priorities. But in this respect,
decisions already made previously are now antering the imple-
mentation sta~e.
There are Good Reasons to Give New Ih?petus to Agricultu~e
Agriculture is in the forefront of these governmen+., priorities.
It is now.clear today that for a country such as Algeria, the
importance oP agriculture is not only economic or even social,
but political to the first degree. The minister o~ agricul-
ture and agrarian reform, Selim Sa~.di, a member oP the FLN '
Central Committee, strongly emphasized this idea on 15 January, -
in addressing the leaders of the FLN agrarian revolution,
- agriculture ~,nd hydraulic subcommittees: "The f ood program,
. he said, is ~,ctually a weapon in the hands of the developed
~ countries." In 1979 Algeria imported more tha,n a third o~
its consumption of grains and milk, 80 percent of its oil con-
- sumption and almost all its sugar consumption. Population _
growth will only highlight theae shortages, if, moreover, they
are not corrected. For Saadi continues, agriculture lacks
skilled workers and has serious organizational and management
defects.
The agricultural area is disappearing rapidly and dangerously -
for the lack of a sufficiently prompt implementation of land
distribution. In Oran Governate, for exe,mple, between 1970
and 1976 the amount of good agricultural land absorbed either
by state institutions or domestic companies, in particular, to
be used ~or industrial zones, urban housing, roads or private
encroachments considerably exceeds 5,000 hectares, appropriated
f rom a useful rural area which hardly exceeds 80,000 hectares
now.
From now on the problems of land distribution will be the sub-
ject of studies which ~~ill be given extensive publi~ity and
thus will begin to affect public opinion. Consequently there
were successively held in Algiers in January a conference,
then a round table devoted to this multidisciplinary Pield of _
investigation and thou~ht.
: The congressmen's aims include,,~irst of all, increasing and
standardizing revenue so as to stabilize populations, then a
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development effort for each region ~,ccordin~; to its natural
resources and peculiarities, each investment based on a con-
- certed decision, so that it can be considexed as an integrated
plan a~fecting all economic sectors.
On its part, the UN1'A ~Tational Union oP Algerian Peasants7
has drawn up a preliminary plan for the status of the agricul-
- tural v~.llage and a statement df agricultural results since
1962. The minister, on his part, emphasized the need to con-
tinue vigorously the creation of new rural livin~ conditions:
Uut of i,000 socialist villages planned, he pointed out on
13 Februa.ry to leading workers in city planning, construction
and the environment, meeting in a seminar, only 200 have been _
finished and 200 others are in the process of completidn.
And the function itself of the socialist nillage is to be re-
- considered; once more, the minister explained the need to _
"decentralize" the future villages, whose center will only be
- _:;~.atructed by the public authorities ~,s a service area, and _
whose "clusters" the peasants will build themselves several
miles from there, with it all forming a sort of constellation.
- The 5tate's Objectives on the Sul~ject of Agriculture Will
Include a Strengthening of Administrative Organizations
- Un the other hand, Minister Selim Saadi met the leading work-
' ers of MARA ~'Iinistry of Agriculture and. Agrarian Reform7 on .
16 and 17 February to acquaint them in a general way with the
main objectives which the government intends to reach in agri- -
culture. These objectives are divided into four categories.
1) Improvement of general cadres in the agricultural aector.
2) Log,istic reorganization
3) Reorganization of the production machine
4) Modification of the training system
~ As regards general cadres, the reflorm is already in progress
� on the cammune level, where technicians have been assigned who
will draw up the local plans of agricultural development, will
give the necessary encouragement and advice and will supervise -
all agricultural operations.
On the Governate level the creation of new subadministrations
is also taking place (rural planning, general use of
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machines ftind technical supply~ ve~atable production~ stock
ra,isinq etc) wt~ict~ will strengthen the exist~ing orQanizations
and will allow a better approach to problems It is contem- '
plated creating on the same level a CAPC5 ~Gommunal Multi- -
Ser'vice Agriculture Cooperativ~ Association provided with
various facilities: a rural engineering unit, a transport park `
etc. Moreover, the CA~'CS will have to be reorganized. -
As regards production there will be continued rejuvenation of
rural labor, the staffing of operations with a view to improv- -
ing worker mana~ement, stabilization of rural populations
thanks to better living conditions achieved to a great extent
by worlcer construction. A particular effort will be made to
promote poultry raising, which has a low production. _
As for training, which should give~a new value to the human
factor, its practical effe~ctiveness wxll be increased by re-
_ quiring students in schools and,institutes connected with
agriculture to actually work in..agricultural operations. A
system of pilot farms will offer tlie peasan~ .mod.els of manage-
"ment and productivity. ~ ~
- Durin~ the discussions thus started by the minister, the prob-
lem of rural exodus come to the foreground, in fact it is
certain that the departure of young peasants for the city has
led to the overall aging of agricultural labor. Some fear '
that the measures taken until now are inadequate: granting
land, increase of agricultural wages, eff orts promoting rural
= living conditions etc; there is reason to continue and es-
pecially to diversify these efforts.
Alon~side the "socialist sector" there must besides be con-
sidered the "private sector": in agriculture itself where it
provides a considerable part of production and especially in
the marketing of fruits and vegetables, where the use~ulness -
of its operation is lessened by the abuae of speculation and
the lack of regulations.
_ The Agrarian Revolution: Still Serious ?~'ihortcomings
Nioreover, during these discussions, there did not pass un-
noticed the risk of increased bureaucratization, even o~ con- -
flicts of authority which could arise because of the prolif-
eration of new organizations, in particular on the Governate
level. But the establishment of these organizations will in-
volve the creation o~ numerous jobs, thus oPfering an oppor-
tunity to various types of university or technical graduates.
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Is it certain, on the other h~,nd, or simply probable, that the
essentially administrative and technicn,l measures which are
thus involved will be enough to change the present state of
_ aff~.irs? Although more than the defects in staffing and
technical advice, than the shorta,ge of equipment end even the
_ difficulties in marketing, it is in me,ny cases tho lack of -
morale in the rank and file which has caused the delays or
th~ failures of the agrarian revolution. The student volun-
teers of the last winter harvest again confirm it.
For example, in Djelfa Governate 8 years a~ter the payment for
the surplus lands, "many nationalizable owners have never been
disturbed and others,who had been affected by limitation or
nationalization measures,have continued cultivating lands
without anyone objecting. There where ~oundin~ of cooPera- _
tives have taken place, these activities only had a symbolic
_ nature, with some CAPRAs~ ricultural Production Cooperative
of the Agrarian Revolution~ having been set up un sand, at
Hassi ~3ahbah especially...the first and second stages have
- onl~ been slightly implemented...the third stage has not even -
entered the preparation phase. The mass organizations, whose
main purpose is to work for the application of the RA ~xpan-
sion unknown], are far from meeting the needs of one of the
- m~.in taslcs of the soci~,list revolution." At the basis of this
state of things, there is pointed out in particular "the
feudal mentality ...whose corolla,ry is an extraordinary men-
tality of abdicating local authority for the benefit of
mythical authority, which is exercised through men and organi- -
zations which have nothing to do with the organization of
authority as defined by the national charter, the constitution
_ and other codes of the commune and the.Governate...With the
exception of the representative of the national people's
army, the members of the appeals committee do not assume all
their responsibilities...when they do not stay away uncondi-
- tionally from the proceedings" (Mohamed Hamdi, EL MOiJliJAHIll,
15-16 February). 1~Ioreover~ it is assured that even in tnis
sector, things are in the process of change; for certain, it
is time enough:
, The creation of a High Commissariat for Pastoralism will make
it possible on the other hand, to start the third stage of
the agrarian revolution on the basis of the results af the
firs~ experiments; a sin~le bu~ Plexible authority, including
the various regional and local organizations, would seem in
fa,ct strictly necessary for carrying out the ambitious pro- -
grams of transformin~ the steppes.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
8490
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IRAQ
_ BRITISH COMPANIES ATTRACTED TO DEVELOPMENTAL PROJECTS
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 29 Feb-6 Mar 80 p 46
[T.ext] A British trade delegation led by (Baron Selsdon), chairman of the
Middle East Trade Commisaion, concluded its 5-day visit to Iraq. The dele-
gation aimed at examining the possibility of British firms participating in
a number of Iraqi construction and developmental projects.
This trip came about as a consequence of a marked improvement in relations
between the two countries following successive visits to Iraq by British -
officials in the past 2 years, including Lord Carrington, the British
foreign secretary, and Cecil Parkinson, the minister of trade.
Commercial relations between the two countries had been affected by the
political and diplomatic crises which occurred in 1978 and which led to
the decline in the value of British exports to Iraq from ~215.5 million in
1978 to b201.2 million in 1979.
The British say that one of the indications of the improvement in Iraqi-
_ British relations is the conclusion of a~14 million contract early this
past February for Iraq's import of 200 buses manufactured by the British
Leyland Company. They hope to win further Iraqi contracta this year for
the construction of railroad pro~ects as well as defense pro~ects.
Britain is currently showing great interest in improving its commercial
and political relations with Iraq. This is in consideration of Iraq's
_ position as the second largest oil producer in the Arab world after Saudi
Arabia (daily production 3.7 million barrels).
The British point out that Iraqi financial allocations for development this
year (the final year of the current 5-year plan) amount to $17.7 million.
This translates into a great opportunity for the industrialized countries
_ to win contracts relating to developmental pro~ects that Iraq intends to
carry out within the framework of the huge industrialization program it is
now implementing. The British estimate the Iraqi balance of payments sur-
plus for 1979 at 511.4 billion, with reserves f igured to be about $15 to �
20 billion. They estimate that Iraqi ail revenues in the same year were
$40 billion.
COPYRIGHT: Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI 1980
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QATAR
-
PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATION SUMMARIZED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 7-13 Mar 80 pp 50, 51
[Excerpts] On 22 February 1972, Shaykh Khalifah Bin-Hamad A1 Thani took ~
charge of the governrnent of Qatar. Since that day, the country has been
making swift progress in construction, education, agriculture, industry,
and other fields of modernization. -
~ The amir of the country said in the consultative council, '~You know that
the domestic policy of our country is based on scientific foundations and
relies on nationalistic values to which we turn for inspiration as we
work to join the march of progress and follow the course of development _
through tHe efforts ~hich we exert to exploit the resources of our boun-
teous land in the optimum manner, to diversify the sources of our income,
to develop our industrial capabilities, and to expand our area under cul-
- tivation to the full ~xtent of our capability.'�
- There are now more than 38,000 students of both sexes in the prima~y,
preparatory general, and secondary general grades, the religious ins~i-
tute, the teachers' college, and the technical industrial and mercantile
= schools.
_ The enrollment of adults of both sexes in the cente~rs for the eradicstion
of illiteracq has now reached 5,292, an increase of 983 over the previous
year.
The University of Qatar
The University of Qatar, in this seventh year of its existence, has
enrolled 2,500 students of both sexes. There were 2,793 students sent F
abroad for university and higher education studies in 1979, an increase
of 267 over the prec:eding year.
The Universit3+ of Qatar co:~sists of a college of education, a college of -
- sociology and social studies, a college of sciences, and a college of law -
and Islamic studies, and an intez~ational academi~ delegation is now pre
paring studies for the construction of a colleg~ for engineering.
The university also has a center for educational research and another for
scientific and natural research. '
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. ' _ a.r. ~~~Li ~
Youth Care
In January 1979, a royal edict was issued for the creation of the Higher
Youth Care Council under the leade~^sM~p ~ o~~ C,;q}~n Prince and Minister of
- Defense SHaykh Hamad Bin-Khalifah~A1 Thani.~ ~I'he first acts of the coun-
cil xere to create four new athletic clubs, to take charge of all other -
athletic sports,federat�ions, and to continue the expansion of the
Khalifah sports city, which has become one of the chief features of the
_ state of Qatar. '
;
Petroleum Resources =
The country's produ~tion,of pgtroleum amounts to 500,000 barrels per day, '
and this, in addition to~gas, has enabled Qatar to play an important role
in both the Organizat,iqn of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the
Organization of Arab 'Petroleum ~xporting Countries (OAPEC). _
~ ' r
Building an Industrial Society
Allotments to finance the industrial projects in this year"s budget have
- amounted to 1,665.2 million riyals, as compared with 1,064 million riyals
for the preceding year. A technical center for industrial development
has bean built and is engaging in studies and preparing plans which are
appropriate to the revenues and requirements of the industrial develop- "
ment in the country so as to bring about a balanced economy which will be
able to withstand technological, world, and political vicissitudes.
The gros~ production of the iron and steel mill in 1979 was 377,000 tona of
steel rails, whereas the plan called for the production of 337,000 tons.
The producti~fln of chemical fertilizers was 360,000 tons of ammonia and
475,000 tons of urea fertilizers in 1979, or abouC 40,000 tons of ammonia
and 60,000 tons of urea fertilizers above the amaunt called for in the
- plan.
The construction of a petroleum refinery with a capacity of SO,OQO bar- -
rels per day is now heing completed. It comprises an asphalt production
� unit which will m~et the country's construction and road-paving require-
ments. The country also has a refinery which was built in 1953 and one
which was built in 1974 with a capacity of 9,500 barrels per day, and the
three refineries together will be able tn supply the country's domestic
requirements ti11 1995.
The cement industry, which began with one kiln in 1969, now produces
- 300,Oa0 tons per year.
Other Industries
There is also an organic fertilizer plant, which began production in 1977
~ind is supervised by the ministry of municipzl affairs. There are also
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r
~
1
grain mills, a plastic film factory, and a national fishing company, and
numerous other pro~ects to build new industries.
Commerce and Pub lic Services
For the promotion of commerce, Qatar has created the Qatar currency estab-
lishment, which carries out the financial policy of the state and supervises
the banks, and also the Qatar chamber of commerce.
The minietry of communications has provided all necessary facilitations
in the airports and seaports. It also built and developed the wire and
radio communications �`s, to which 17,000 telephone lines were added during
3 years. The autoL Telex exchange, with a capacity of 600 subscribers
and 84 lines for wo. communication, was opened in 1976.
Through the space comm~unications ground station, telephone and telegraph -
- communications will be carried on directly with all countries. Studies are
now in progress for the construction of a ground station for space communi-
cations with the Atlantic Ocean to provide direct communication with Canada,
the U.S., and Latin America.. -
- Agriculture
The country has made allotments for the creation of experimental farms and
for the preparation of a comprehensive survey to find out what possibility
_ there is of making use of agricultural acreage and to find subterranean
= water and other sources of water for irrigation and afforestation.
There are five large hospitals in Doha. One of these, the Aamad General
Hospital, has the most modern and technologically advanced equipment in the
world.
There are clinics and medical centers scattered throughout Doha. There is
_ a hospital in al-Shimal and anather in al-Khawr. There is a health training
center in Doha to graduate male and female nurses and public sanitation in-
spectors, the first of its kind in the area.
_ Information
Radio Qatar has begun broadcasting from nine stations for 18 hours each day
in the Arabic and English languages.
The Qatar television system, which opened in 1974, broadcasts for an average -
of 9.5 hours per day, and the local program has begun to take up 40 percent
- of the broadcasting time. There are also several new pro~ects to develop the
television services. Among these are the construction of a large studio and
the installation of a second channel to be used for news, cultural programs,
and foreign programs. The work on these pro~ects will be completed in the
middle of the coming year. -
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The Qatar Newe Agency has continued to maintain correspondents in most of
the Arab countries and the Europegn and Asian capitals, and has acquired
posts in the large world capitals.
Foreign Policy .
- The policy of Qatar is based on supporting Arab solidarity to protect the
Arab nation from any danger which threatens its common security. -
. Foremost among the issues to which Qatar is co~nitted is the Palestine issue,
which the Amir of the country expressed as follows:
"Let us stand with all the capabilities which we possess at the side of our
Arab brothers to bear our share of the responsibility of regaini~ng our occu- _
pied Arab territory, at the head of which is holy Jerusalem, and regaining
the rights of the Arab Palestinian people to their state and their self-
determination on the land of this nation. Furthermore, we shall continue to
otfer all the support that we can offer to uphold and sustain the Palestine
Liberation Organization, considering it the sole legitimate representative
of our brother Palestinian people." -
_ Qatar is working to reinforce its solidarity with the Islamic nations.
Qatar has played host to the third world conference on the life and Sunnah ~
of the Prophet at the beginning of the 15th century of the Islamic calendar.
Among the most important recommendations which the conference issued was
one to consider the Palestine issue an Islamic issue, to consider the libera- -
tion of Palestine the responsibility of all Moslems, and to consider the holy
- war to liberate Palestine incumbent on every Moslem, and another to call atten-
- tion to what Moslems are suffering in the Philippin~s, Afghanistan, Eritrea,
- Cyprus and elsewhere.
Furthermore, the state of Qatar is greatly desirous of supporting the bonds
of cooperation and solidarity with the African nations, and considers that
a national requirement in view of the historic, cultural, and geographic ties
which link the Arab nation with the peoples of the continent of Africa. -
- It has stood by the side of the African peoples, who are suffering backward-
_ ness and enslavement; it has often denounced the policy of racial discri~mina-
tion to which they have been exposed; and it has offered aid to the friendly -
African nations to help them withstand the policies of racists.
~
COPYRIGHT: 1979 A1-Watan al-Arabi ~
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SAUDI ARABIA
FINANCE MINISTER DISCUSSES MAJOR ECONOMIC ISSUES -
~ Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 22-28 Feb 80 pp 46-47
[Interview with Muhammad Aba al-Khayl, the Saudi Minister of Finance, con- _
. ducted by Badr al-Ha~ in Riyadh; date of interview not given: "Saudi
Finance Minister Warns Arab Investors against Rushing to Buy Gold; Freezing
of Iranian Assets Impaired Confidence in International Banking System"]
[Text] Has the Ss,udi economy been adversely affected by
the incident of the Grand Mosque in Mecca and other events
in the region? How does Saudi Arab.'.a interpret the phe-
nomenal rise in gold prices and was ~his rise the result
of heavy buying by Arab investors? ~Jhy have the creditor -
Arab states complained to the IME about Egypt? What are
the consequences of the United States action of freezing
Iranian deposits? Those ma~or economic and financial _
issues were addressed by Saudi Arabia's Finance Minister _
Muhatrunad Aba al-Khayl in an interview with AL-WATAN
- AL-'AItABI. He answered the questions put to him thor-
oughly and precisely as can be clearly seen from his
remarks. The interview went as follows:
[Question] Has the incident of tl~e Grand Mosque in Mecca in any way affected
the economic and financial situation in Saudi Arabia?
[Answer] Not at all. You who are abroad have come to view the incident
through what was published in some European and American papers. These -
papers, and other media as well, have exaggerated the incident and inter-~
preted it in ways that are simply fzntastic. When Saudis read what is
published in those publications, th~y cannot help laughing. The incident -
has been magnified, and I think that you have been affected by those exag-
gerations. The flow of trade is continuing and the spate of foreign com-
panies that seek contracts and wish to operate in Saudi Arabia continues
undiminished. Huge numbers of foreign companies and contractors from all _
over the world still bid for government projects, and visitors, wheth~r
they be bankers or government officials, are still pouring into our country.
I reaffirm that the mosque incident has not had any impact on the economic
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situation. It was simply a transient incident. Do you believe that busi- -
nesamen or bankere who manage vast enterprises and analyze things carefuily
would be affected by a mere incident? Incidents occur every day in all
parts of the world, but the world does not stop and life goes on. At any
rate, yon~axe_~Qw in Saudi Axabia and you can ask any person or any busi-
nessman wh~ther~ his' bi3sineso_}~~s..b~en affected by what happened. His answer,
of course, will~be negative.~~.
Zionism Behind the ~Caia�aign ~ '
- [Question) Observers note that there has been an almost direct campaign
in the American press against Saudi Arabia in particular, both before and
after the incident of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The campaign has primarily
sought to distort the picture of economic stability in your country. How do
you explain that? ~
[Ans~~~er] I believe that every Arab country is liable to be expos~d to such '
a situation because of the influence of world Zionism. This is the only
explanation of what has happened. The impact on the Arab countries varies
f.rora time to time and from state to state, but whenever world Zionism f inds
an opportunity to hurt and def.ame an Arab country it would not hesitate to
_ do so for one minute. ~Je here in the kingdom are interested in development, -
and it is therefore the axis of our life. '~Je have accomplished a great deal, -
and a great deal more will be accomplished. We therefor~ do not pay atten-
tion to such machinations and lies. Our cooperation with the Arab states is
limitle~s, and the kingdom's efforts with regard to the Palestine question,
which is the Arabs' No. 1 question, are limitless too. Everyone in the king-
dom or ~he Arab counrries is wel? aware of oux development endeavors. The
state has to pay attention to domestic needs ana diligently strive to
explait resources--all resources--in order to raise the level of the citizen.
The state also has to take care of the Arab states to which we belong and to
coaperate with them politically or in terms of development and support. We
, should also work for the major issues and causes of the Arab states. I do -
not think that anything more than that can be expected of the kingdom and,
thank God, we are living up to what is expected of us.
[Question] Higher oil prices have adversely affected developing nations.
To what extent is the kingdom helping in development projects in the devel-
oping nations?
[Answer] In terms of funds and assistance provided to developing nations,
Saudi Arabia is second only to the United States. But in terms of the pro-
- portion of its foreign aid t~ its national income, Saudi Arabia is among
the top countries in that regard. Together with the endeavors of the $mal].
group of countries comprising Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE and others, it is
the highest percentage in the world. The level of aid provided by any
other group of nations has not reached the level nrovided by this group,
and I can say, quite simply, that it will not reach that level.
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Over the past 4 years, ~he kingdom has provided an average of 10 percent of
its gross national income in aid to other countries, primarily to Arab ,
states facing special circumstances, such as the confrontation s~ates. We ~
feel that asaisting those particular states ia a national duty required of
us by virtue of our belo~iging to one and the same homeland. Our develop-
ment aid is required t~y a moral responsibility toward the world, wh�~ch by
the way has become more interdependent. In giving aid ~o developing nations,
the kingdcm pays special attention to projects of useful economi~ return to
the people and pro~ects which have long-term benefits and effect, such as
- projects involving buildir.g roads and dams and agricultural and electricity
projects. Such pro~ects are the mainstay of de~-elopment. Without them
those nations cannot grow and progress. At the same time, tihose nations
cannot get financing for this kind of pro~ects through the commercial chan-
nels of the banking system, because the profi'_ return is not a dirPCt one.
If a developing nation wanted to set up a ceu.~nt plant, for example, it can
get financing from a bank because a cement plant makes a direct profit. But
if it wanted to build a road and it did not have enough resources ta do that,
then it has no other choice but to cooperate with other states. The kingdom
seeks to promote such a cooperation. This has been the pattern which we
_ have followed in giving aid. Our position on that matter derives from deep
conviction and we will continue to pursue it.
[Question] President Al-Sadat says repeatedly that the Arab aid given to
Egypt was miniscule and of no value. What is the volume and amount of aid
Saudi Arabia extended to Egypt before the signing of the Camp David accords?
[Answer] (Laughingly) This is a question which should be addressed to the
politicians.
Egypt's Debts
[Question] On what grounds did Saudi Arabia and other Arab states which
are among Egypt's creditors complain to the IMF about the Sadat government's
refusal to settle its debts and to pay the interests on the debts too? _
[Answer] First, as a matter of principle, I should point out that in 1952,
the IMF board of directors adopted a decision saying that any state which
- resorts to emergency and compulsory measures to protect its national
- ~ecurity can stop money transfers to abroad, whether those transfers were
- designed to satisfy debts or serve other purposes, provided that it first
notify the IMF as early as possible. If the IMF did not object after 30
days fro~: the date of notif ication, then its measures would be deemed by
_ the IMF to be sound and unimpeachable. In that case, the IMF accepts as
reasonable and permissible the considerations which have prompted that state
to take action.
_ This IMF decision has be~n actually invoked on a very few occasions since
_ 1952. In September, Egypt informed the IMF during the IMF's annual confer-
ence in Belgrade that it has decided to suspend the settlement of Egyptian
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debts to Arab countries for national security considerations. Egypt's
' action, it appears, only pertained to the Arab creditors and not to Egypt'~ .
debts in general, on the grounds that those Arab creditor states have boy-
cotted Egypt. In other words, the Egyptian regime felt that the Arab action
provided i~ wi~l} ;~he~~~ustification to stop the debt payments, by pleading
the Egyptian national `secuxity. The view of the Arab parties which are -
~gypt's creditors is that Egypt~ha~,.no le.~al grounds to refuse to pay off
its debts and the interest on them.- ' �
(As a result of the IME` s position on the matter, Egypt has modif'i~ci i~ts
position and agreed to pay the interests on the Arab debts, but it'still'
refuses to pay off tl~e debts--AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI.)
[Question] What are in your view the reasons for the recent rise in the
world price of gold?
[Answer] Actually, what is happening in the world go]~ market is perplexing.
I do not believe that there are any economic reasons for it. The world gold
_ market is small and the quantity of gold which is bought and sold is limited.
Therefore, it is easy to influence the prices in such a market. I mean that
any person or any speculator can play with the market and affect it upwards
or downwards. Also, any tendencies taken by investors, speculators or indi-
viduals can have an impact on the market of gold. There are no clear infor-
mation on who is buying and selling gold. There is only talk that Arab ~
investors are doing that. But this is mere speculation, because there is no
definite information on this matter. At any rate, what I worry about is that
all this may be a trap in which Arab investors have fallen. I believe that ~
such a trap is full of danger. I am also afraid that this meth~d is an
attempt to retrieve the high incomes which resulted from prosperity in the =
Arab region, in the sense that it is one of other methods flesigned to regain
th~se revenues. There is also a feeling that what has happened recently in
_ the gold market implies an attempt to divert those [Arab] capitals from the
dollar and other strong European currencies and refocus them on gold,
because the owners of European currencies do not wish to convert huge
_ dollar amounts into their currencies. In other words, there is an attempt
here to divert the attention of investors from those currencies to gold so
as to lessen the pressures on those currencies, I r~~lieve. In any case,
this abnormal situation might continue. Any country which thinks in terms
of the long term will wanL to avoid getting into this hassle, I believe. _
' [Question] What about the freezing of Iranian assets in American banks -
and the effect of that on Arab assets?
[Answer] It will be some time before the lessons to be learned from this
_ question become clear, as militarists would put it. It is certain, however,
that laur offices wi]_1 work on it for a long time. The problem involving
the freezing of the assets also involves the banks themselves. The problem
arose because Iranian assets were deposited in a limited number of b~nks.
At the same time, a large number of banks had participated in extending
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loans to Iran and Iranian establishr?ents. In other words, there are banks
which have extended loans to Iran but hold no Iranian deposits and there
are banks which hold Iranian deposits and have extended credits to Iran.
Therefore, there are many problems. It has been said that as a result of
all this, banks have scaled down their credits to states. This aituation
may continue for some ~ime.
On the other hand, the freezing of such ht~ge funds at once is unprecedEnted
and no one had expected it. Therefore, such incident cannot pass without
leaving an impact in its trail. To stop payment on enoru~ous loans to banka,
such as Iran's loans are, is a serious matter. It is bound to have contin-
uing effects. Added to this that the emergence of problems among the lend-
ing banks and the differences in their viewpoints are also a serious matter.
There is a controversy over the soundness of the American governmen~'s
action of instructing branches of American banks in othe1 countries to
freeze those funds, when those branciies fall under the authority of the
central banks in the countries in which the~ operate. All these questions -
have been raised and are pending in courts or in central banks. The answers
to them are difficult. But as to whether this situation has had an effect,
the answer is yes, it certainly has. How will this situation end? One
hopes that the problem of the hostages will end soon so that the situation
may be corrected and things may return to normal, God willing.
_ Risks Are There
[Question] Do not you think that there should be guarantees and safeguards -
- for nations which deposit their money in other nations?
[Answer] The fact of the matter is that freezing and other actions affect
confidence in the international banking system. It is not strange that the ~
world, with all its problems, should face some more problems and complica- _
tions such as the ones involved here. What matters, however, is to solve
those problems. I believe that the ability of the world--even the ability
of any one nation or any one society--to face those problems and devise
solutioas for them is a vast one. 4le should not be overly alarmed and look
at those enormous problems as if they spel.l the end of the world. Solutions
are bound to be found, and the world community is capable of producing those
solutions.
At any rate, there are risks in every financial transaction--be it a long-
term investment, deposits or even opening a credit account with a bank to
import from another country. There are risks in any economic enterprise
conducted in another country. When the m~ney of one country is in another, -
it is vulnerable. The degree of risk varies from one country to another
and from one set of circumstances to another. But things will always be
_ like this.
- It is clear, however, that states and individuals know that confidence is
essential if we are to live together and to cooperate with and benefit
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from each other. In other worda, the re-establishment of confidence and ;
trust is vital. I believe that iaany of th~ people who are concerned in
the world want to restore confidence and correct errors very much, because -
the continuation of such a situation is in no one's interest. Despite ite
- vastness, the world has become growingly interdependen;: as a result of
communications and the evolution of contemporary life. ~Therefore, coopera-
tion has become necessary, and so has the need to correct mistakes when _
they occur.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 A1-Watan al-'Arabi
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SAUDI AR4BIA .
BRIEFS
SAUDIS BUILD HUGE PIPELINE--RIYADH--Mobil Oil is not saying what fee it
~ will charge for supervising the operation of the oil pipeline which will
stretch across Saudi Arabia from the oil fields in the Eastern Province -
to Yanbu' on the Red Sea in the Western region--a distance of 750 miles.
The cost of building the pipeline is set at $1,600, but that outlay is
justified by the fact that the pipeline will be the largest in the world. -
It will have an initial capacity of 1.8 million barrels per day which can
be increased ~0 3.7 million barrels per day when the pipeline is expanded.
As is the case in Iraq's strategic pipelinE pro~ect, the Saudi pipeline
aims at diversifqing Saudi Arabia's export terminals, so that oil shipments
for export are not restricted to the Eastern region. Work on the project
had begun in 1977, and arrangements are being made to make the pipeline
operational in the first half of 1981. According to its agreement with
PETROMIN, Mobil Oil will supply a team of 200 experts to oversee the opera-
= tion of the pipeline. AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has learned that arrangements
are already being made to double the capacity of the pipeline as of the
_ second half of 1982. This would turn the new port of Yanbu' a ma~or oi1
terminal in the region. [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic
_ 15-21 Feb 80 p 48] 9254
HIJAZ RA?LWAY PROJECT REVIVED--Plans to reactivate the Hi~az railway
(Damascus to A1-Madinah) have entered a new phase when the German (Dorche)
consulting firm (Munich) won a$4.7 million contract to conduct a feasi-
bility study on the rebuilding and operation of. the line. The German com-
pany~s study will focus on the best ways to exploit this narrow gauge line,
- either by maintaining it as is, repairing the damaged sections and building
a parallel line in the same specifications or by building an altogether new
line with standard specifications, so that it may be linked up with Euro-
~
pean railway systems via Syria and Turkey. The Hijaz railway line, which
waa built toward the end of the last century, was severely damaged during
the battles which raged when the forces of the Arabian revolution marched
from Hijaz to Syria across east Jordan, parallel to the British forces
which marched from Egypt to Syria via Palestine. The famous British spy _
Lawrence played a major part in blowing up sections of the line when he
accompanied the advancing Arab forces. [Text] ~Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
in A.rabic 15-21 Feb 80 p 48] 9254
CSO: 4802 55
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SYRIA
BRIEFS
SOVIETS REFUSE ~CWER' REQUEST~~Syrian Cfiief of State Assad has asked
Leonid Brezfinev to have the Soviet air force "carver" Syria in the event
of conflict arith Israel. Brezhnev refused. "We arill send you aircraft~"
replied the Soviets~ "perhaps even some pilots to fly Syrian airplanes~
but there is no way we are going to send in tfie Soviet air force." A
confrontation between MiG aircraft flying the Red Star and Israeli air _
force planes would be a casua be11i and lead to war between the Superpowera. ;
jText] [Paris L'EXPRESS in French 29 Mar EO p 108 WA]
~
- CSO: 4800 END
56 ' `
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200070034-5