JPRS ID: 9177 USSR REPORT AGRICULTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200070007-5
• Release Decision: RIP
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9014 ~
- 3 April 1980
Latin Amprica Re ort
p _
CFOUO 7/SO)
FBIS FO~EIGN BROADCAST iNFORMATI~N SER`VICE
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NOTE
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ne~aspapers, periodicais and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated;,those from English-language sources
- are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
[J are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text)
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
- Iasti line of a brief, indicate how the original informa.tion was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- ~
mation was summarized or extracted. -
~ Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or ~ransliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names prece~~d by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
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Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the s~urce. Times within items are as
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The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
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JPRS L/9014
3 April 1980
LATIN AMERICA REPORT
(FOUO 7/80) -
_ CONTENTS PAGE
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
Briefs
Nuclear Agreement Approved 1
EL SALVADOR
Archbishop Criticizes PDC Role in Government, U.S. Aid
(PRELA, ~9 Mar 80) 2
'PRELA' Interviews PCES Secretary General Handal
(PRELA, 14, 1~, 17 Mar 80) 4 -
= First Interview,Jorge Shafick Handal
Second Interview
- Third Interview
'PRELA' Interviews FARN.Secretary General Jovel
(Ernesto Jovel Inter�view; PRELA, 25 Mar 80) 18
GRENADA
'PRELA' Reports on Commemoration of Revolution's Anniversary
_ (PRELA, 16 Mar 80) 22
GUATEMALA
Political Crisis in Country Discussed
(CAI~IO 16, ?'Mar 80) 25
- NICARAGUA
~
Finance Minister Views U.S. Aid, European Tour
(Angel V. Ruoc~co; PRELA, 16 Mar 80) 31
- a- jIII - LA - 144 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
Labor Minister Promis~es 100,000 New Jobs This Year
(PRELA, 18 MP: 80) 33
Nunez Comments on NIDN, Ziteracy Campaign
_ (PRELA, 18 Mar 80) 34
PERU
Government Seeks Measures To Check Typhoid Fever Outbreaks
(PRELA, 14 Mar 80) 36
URUGUAY
Briefs
British Envoy 3;'
Advance Release Bill Passed 37
Exports to Hungary 37
Expart-Import Figures 37 -
VENEZUELA
- Briefs
Oil Prospecting Scored 38
~
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INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
~
,
BRIEFS
NUCLEAR AGREEMENT APPROVED-- Montevideo, 20 Mar (DPA)--The Uruguayan
Council of State has approved the agreement on cooperation for the peace-
ful use of nuclear energy which Uruguay has signed with Chile. [PY212229
Montevideo DPA in Spanish 1430 GMT 20 Mar 80 PY] .
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~L SALVADOR
~
~
ARCHBISHOP CRITICIZES PDC ROLE IN GOVERNMENT, U.S. AID
PA192327 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1750 GMT 19 Mar 80 PA
[Text] Caracas, 19 Mar (PL)--Msgr Oscar Arnulfo Romero, archbishop of
San Salvador, has questioned the role being played by the Christian
Democratic Party (PDC) in his country, saying that "it is becoming an
accomplice to the abuse being co~itted agai~st the people."
In an interview published by the morning paper EL DIARIO DE CARACAS,
Romero said although he is not an expert politician, he agrees with
analysts who bel3eve Chat Che PDC is taking a serious risk by being a
part of the government that is involved in "great repression."
He asked newamen who visit E1 Salvador to reporc that the Christian
_ @emocracy exists [as received] and that reforms are being,carried out,
- but al:so that "all the people are receiving is terrible represeion,"
- which can "only be explained if its intettt is to dEStroy popular
organizations." -
Asked whether the PDC is acting in a Christian manner at this time,
Romero said the term Christian in a political party does not mean that
it is Christian. "The important thing," he said, "ia not the name, but
the facts and you (newsmen) can ~udge for yourselves."
The archbishop said he had received a visit from U.S. Embassy officials
who came to explain that the $50 million in military aid was not
actually for the security corps but for equipment which the army needed.
Romero said he asked the U.S. officials who could guarantee that the
money will noC be used to increase repression by the security corps,
since they come under the ~urisdiction of the Defense Ministry. He
added that the officials tried to explain that the money was to help
- the people, but that he asked them to be more objective and suggested -
- that they tie the aid to other things, "because aid for repression is
- not aid fr~r our people."
Referring to the cooperation of the United States and possibly other
countries with the present PDC-military government, the archbishop said:
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~ "If this involves interference in the people's lives," it is not aid
and, therefore, promotes plans against the people.
Monsignor Romero praised the program of government subscribed to by the
people's revolutionary bloc, the 28 February People's Leagues, the
United Popular Action Front and the Nationalist Democratic Union and
said he considers these popular organizations to be "a sounding board
- for the people."
- He said that in E1 Salvador official repression is greatly out of pro-
partion to the people's armed defense and mentioned that the rumor ~s
that "10 civilians must die for every soldier killed."
The combative archbishop reiterated that Che church calls for recon-
ciliation, but if this is unsuccessful, there is ~ustification for a
~ popular insurrection "that the church condones when all peaceful means
have been exhausted." He asked for "understanding of our rewlsion
toward the violence of the government and the right, because reforms
- are not compatible with repression of the p~eople."
Romera said that the right definitely represents secial in~ustice, while
the left represents "the people's organizations and its demands are the
people's demands."
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EL SALVADOR
"PRELA' INTERVIEWS PCES SECRETARY GENERAL HANDAL
First Interview
PA152328 Havana PRELA in Spaniah 0138 GMT 14 Mar 80 PA
[Interview with Jorge Shafick Handal, Communist Party of E1 Salvador
- secretary general, by PRELA correspondent Mario Menendez Rodriguez]
[Excerpts] SomewhEre in E1 Salvador, 11 Mar (PL)--A historical decision
of imm?ediate significance and of well-defined atrategic pro~ections, the
determined incorporation of the Communist Party of E1 Salvador (PCES) to
the armed struggle--"convinced as it is that this is the only path to a
real solution of the national crisis on behalf of the working masses
- and the people in general"--has,given notable impulse to the development
of the Salvadoran revolution, which these days is militarily hitting the
forces of the 14 families and their allies in the capital.
"It has been a somewhat delayed decision, but...still timely," PCES
Secretary General Jorge Shafick Handal stated during an historical inter-
view With this agency.
"Still timely," as the outstanding theoretician on fascism in Latin
_ America has said, constitutes a~ust appreciation,`an undeniable truth,
because the dec~sion was made at a decisive moment of revolutionary
~ fervor and inability on the parC of the privileged minority to continue
_ governing as in the past, when it was evident to one and all that a mere
reformist solution would not be able to resolve the problems of starva-
tion, misery, exploitation and repression affecting this country.
The moment, the presence of the PCES in the revolutionary coordinating
- board of the masses, established to direct Che people's war, is one of
the main reasons why important democratic sectors hailing from what is
known as the "middle class" are currently connected with the revolu-
tionary political and military nrganizations.
For the past 11 years, the PCES has participated in one way or another,
either directly or indirectly, in three presidential electiona and six
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elections for deputies and mayors alongside democratic forces, which did
not think Che electoral path was closed in E1 Salvador and which had
hopes of transforming the situation by means of cabinet reorganizations
and con~titutional reforms. More recently, in a last effort, the PCES
also formed part of the first government ~unta, which was organized after f
the fall of Gen Carlos Humberto Romero's genocidal regime.
~ The PCES has played an important part in the commitments acquired from
its allies. Its decision to ~oin the armed struggle in order to eradi-
cate the system of injustice that prevails in E1 Salvador was made only
after it was shown that the power of the recalcitrant oligarchy and the
forces in charge of guaranteeing that power--sponsored by the Pentagon -
~ and the large transnational corporations--were not then~and are not now ~
willing to allow thorc~ugh reforms. In any case, past events confirm
- that the 14 families are the ones who determine how far the government -
can go with its superficial and fragmentary changes.
- That is why quite a few of those people in the democratic sectors, which
trod that path alongside the PCES and learned. in the school of persona~
experience have now joined the armed struggle as well.
The PCES decision was not an easy one. It was not prepaxed to take a
qualitative ~ ump toward a superior form of struggle and reither did it
have time to engage in a previous process of adaptat:ion. More than 87
percent of its members ~oined during the years of participation in the _
open and legal political struggle. During that time, habits, custom.a,
ideological concepts, method~ and systems of work and of living were
developed which were alien to those normally acquired during a political
and military process ruled by strict rules and security measures estab- -
lished to g;~ara.~tee revolutionary clandestinity.
The PCES' directorate's ability to rectify its course and convictions
_ which it holds because it is immersed in a revolutionary process, the
lucidity, firmness and deCermination of the party's secretary general,
and the solidarity of other political-military organizations of the
Salvadoran revolution, however, have enabled the PCES to ad~ust and
qutckly adapt to a path untrodden by most of its militants. This, of
course, implies difficulties and obstacles--falls reaulting from
inexperience; the torture and sure death of valuable cadres, as was the =
case of well-known sociologist Roberto Castellanos only a few days ago;
the loss of "sanctuaries" and other problems of various kinds. But -
advances are made in spite of the hindrances because aside from the
cooperation received from the other revolutionary f_orces, a climate of
confidence, understanding and respect prevails among Salvadoran rebela
and because the PCES militants are convinced that unity of action i~
necessary to speed up the termination of the present shameful regime.
It was under tlnese conditions that this agency interviewed Shafick Handal, ~
an honest leader open to all trsnds of progressive thought, who enjoys -
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well-deserved prestige among national and international intellectual
circles for his research in the area of social science. -
[PA152339] Both theory and practice are identified with the PCES aecre- -
tary general, who on Friday, 28 March, at the threshold of popular vic-
tory [worda indistinct] in Aguetin Farabundo Marti's fatherland.
"It Is Not a Last Minute Turnabout"
Could you explain the PCES' reasons for choosing the armed path as the
only alternative to a true solution of Che national crisis?
_ "Practicallq frcm the outset, the PCES posCulated that the revolutionary
armed path is the most probable path to victory... Founded on 28 March
1930, before it was 2 years old, that is, in January 1932, it led a grea~
mass insurrection, a great popular revolution, comprised mostly of
peasants...unlike many other parties, Che PCES was not organized by a
_ group of intellectuals, but emerged from within the extraordinary workers
movement in both the cities and rural areas. Its first leaders were .
workers...the PCES resulted from the mass movement and thus its tradi-
tional and notable connection with them...that is precisely one of the
Salvadoran revolutionary movement's characteristics..."
How does the ~CES interpret its choice of the armed struggle?
"The PCES' determined incorporation into the arc~ed struggle--convinced `
_ as it is that this is the only path Co a real solution of the national
- crisis on behalf of the working masses and the people in general--does
not constitute an improvised action or a last minute turnabout. Rather,
it is the expression of an entire history of struggle... It is the
result of a line drawn by the organization many years ago...but experi-
ence has shown that it is not enough to draw a correct line. It is also
necessary to make great, very conaistent, firm and solid efforts and
carry them out with conviction in order to take the very important atep _
of leading the party in the implementation of superior forms of class
struggle... The armed struggle has existed in E1 Salvador since before
1977--and by this I do not mean to say that is when we emerged... The
armed organizations emerged into the Salvadoran scene in 1970... None-
theless, the common root of those organizations was basically the PCES,
even though there were other contributing forces that stemmed from the =
_ radical Social Christian sector, the student sector and the Christian
Democratic Party... Moreover, the PCES secretary general resigned from
the directorate and the party itself to dedicate himself to the organi-
zation and formation of the Farabund~ Marti Popular Liberati.on Forces... ~
_ ' If I sCress the date February 1977, it iQ only because once the electoral
path was closed, this was the precise moment of the great masses' turn
toward armed struggle... Until then, the massea had believed in the
electoral path...because otherwise one would not be able to explain the _
national opposition party's br.oad victory in the 1977 elections, an even
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bi gger victory than that of 1972... Before that, it is true that to some ~
degree, the armed organi2ations were successful in some regions, par-
ticularly in certain peasant areas seriously hit by the proletarization
process and the expan~ion of capitalism into agriculture... These armed
organizations were influential and had support in certain rural areas,
but at the same time their ties were weak, as was their aupport in the
cities among the working class and in other parts of the country... In
general, until February 1977, there was some confusion about the armed
struggle... Among we11-meaning people, among the workers who have now
~oined the revolutionary struggle, reports circulated that guerrilla
activities were organized by the enemy to ~ustify the repression of the -
opposition...but after February 1y77, these confusions were completely
brought to an end. And this, too, is a sign of what we call the general `
~ turnabout of the ma~ority of the people... During your visits through-
out the country, in the cities and in the rural areas...you may have
ob served that the great maj ority of the people support the armed strug-
gle... This is then the logic of our decision. And I repeat, we
acknowledge our mistakes and we do so publicly... Our party has been
self-critical and has been so in public... Our decision to join the _
armed struggle in determined fashion has been made somewhat belatedly,
but...it is still timely."
_ Division Was Untenable
And what about the process of unification? WhaC are its prospects?
- This procese will soon unite all the people, all their forces and revo-
_ lutionary and democraCic trends... The announcemenC that unity had veen
= achieved elicited an explos ion of popular joy, which shows that division
was untenable... The rank and file of our organizations, the great
masses we influence, were shou].dering this division as an un3ustifiabl~
i.ll... It was a load shouldered because of the discipline of the mili- `
tants in each organization... That is why, when the establishment of
the national revolutionary coordinating board of the masses was announced,
the ~oy was indescribable; people hugged each other and expressed their
solidarity eloquently. Division, nonetheless, can be historically
explained--not justified--but .[word indistinct] intentions did not exist
on any one side... Now, the most immediate antecedent, the one which,
- so to speak, somehow hastened the agreement on Salvadoran unity, was the
unity of the three currents that comprised the Sandinist National Lib-
eration Front, which led to the victory of the Nicaraguan revolution...
Unity and victory, that relationship, that precise combination that led
to the Nicaraguan people's victory, had strong impact in E1 Salvador and
the cause of unity turned into a banner for all... Without being exces-
sive, iC could be stated that in the wake of the Nicar~guan revolution's -
vi ctory, the cause of unity turned into a cause truly embraced by the
- masses, masses which kept asking us: "And what about you companeros?
When are you going to unite?"... In truth, there was great pressure...
' Yes, division was untenable...
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A Single Revolutionary Party
"Now we have reached an agreement for unity which sets in motion a procese
aimed, ae the PCES aees it, at the creation of a united revolutionary
directorate, a united palitical and military directorate... Furthermore=
it leads to the formation of a single Marxist-Leninist party of the
Salvadoran revolution... That is the prospect under which all of us
work... We think that the common struggle will unite us much more than
analyzing our country's problems together would have--the problems of the
revolution and its development... And the shedding of blood in combat ~
_ for the same cause unites us much more... A single revolutionary
directorate lies in the near future and the creation of a single party
can be glimpsed a bit further away."
Second Interview
- PA181616 Havana PRELA in Span{sh 2100 GMT 15 Mar 80 PA
[Znterview with Jorge Shafick Handal, Communist Party of E1 Salvador
secretary general, by PRELA correspondent Mario Menendez Rodriguez,
"somewhere in El Salvador"; date not given--quotation marks as received]
[Text] Somewhere in E1 Salvador, 15 Mar (PL)--In an excluaive interview
granted to PRELA, Jorge Shafick Handal, aecretary general of the Communiet
Party of E1 Salvador [PC~,S], satd: "There is no possibility for a reform-
ist solution to the national crisis because the revolutionary movement
~ cannot be halted. The revolutionary movement has its roots in a people
whose historic struggle has been carried ou~t under the bloody blows of
the oligarchy. The machinery of repreasion built half a century ago -
can~ot be ad~usted to a democratic-bourgeois process. Another reason
why the reformist solution is not possible is that the Salvadoran oligarchy
_ and almost all the bourgeoisie which have deep and old agrarian roots aud
have a Prussian ideology are emphatically opposed to in-depth reforms and _
social changes." , -
_ In his analysis of the current situation of the Salv~idoran;proceas, the
prominent theoretician said that, viewed from the sociaii~t viewpoint,
"the only truly revolutionary position which the PCES could have adopted -
was that of recognizin~, as a natural consequence of the delayed develop-
ment of a dependent capitalist society, the plurality of revolutionary
organizations with a social and stable basis in E1 Salvador. In addition,
it could only view the problem of the vanguard of the Salvadoran revolu-
tion as something to bt solved through the unity of the revolutionary
organizations. In other words, the single vanguard is formed through a
process of progressive unity." ~
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- HisCorical Reasons for the Divisions =
['.~uestion] In your opinion what were the reasons for the divisions among _
the Salvadoran rev~lutionary organiaations?
~ [Anawer] That is an intereating questi~n because the sub~ect of unity
- is inseparably linked to that of division and the reasons for it. Theae
sub~ecCs form part of a procesa which developed amid contradictions...
_ Since we carried out an in-depth study of the reasona and characteristice
, of the phenomenon of [word indistinct] we were prepared for unity... As
we have indicated, the PCES was founded in 1930 and it waa not until
1970 when the nuc~ei, which gave rise to the armec~ revolutionary
organizations, emerged. This means that the PCES was a solitary combatant
for the cause of the democratic revolution and social{sm in Chat 40-year ,
period. The PCES was the only Marxist-Leninist organization in the
country. It was fought by the enemy and remained isolated from broad
- sectors of the middle class and the workers for a long time... To give
you an idea of the situation that prevailed for years in E1 Salvador,
it is enough to say that when the communists [words indistinct] militancy -
- in public it was considered a serious charge and when it was made we
replied with another charge: "Are you a policeman?"... The masses did
not know which communists led their sCruggles. There was much pre~udice.
This led to traumas among our militants and deviations in the work
- methodology... Now then, why was the PCES alone for such a long time?
If this is studied in depth, iC might be believed, to cite some auper-
ficial arguments, that this was because the PCES exercised a monopoly of .
Che left and did not leave political room for anyone else or that ita
political line was correct during 40 years and mistaken beginning in -
1970... That is to say, the armed revolutionary organizations emerged
10 years ago due to the mistakes of the PCES and tihe fact that the PCES'
monopoly over the left could not be maintained... We believe those argu-
ments hold some truth but are not entirely correct..."
Industrialization and the Social Changes
- "In the 1950's, an industrialization process began in E1 Salvador. Thie
- process had already begun in the South American countries 20 years _
before... The military dictaCorship which seized power after the defeat ~
of the 1932 insurrection consolidated the hegemonic and absolute power
of the coffee producing-exporting oligarchy... The state, the laws, the
official economic policy, the social struc~ure, everything revolved to
benefit that coffee producing-exporting oligarchy. Moreover, the instal-
lation of factories was prohibited in E1 Salvador... Only after WoFld
War II and the;coup of the army majors in December 1948 did the indus-
trialization process gradually begin. In the 1960's that industrializa- _
tion process was intensified under the Central American Common Market...
that is the period of the peneCration of the big monopolies of the United
States and Japan, particularly the North Americans... The industrializa-
tion process brought substantial changes in the structure of the -
.
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Salvadoran social classes... Until 1950 the working class was asso- ~
ciated with workshops which because of their methods and production,
: were of the crafts type... There were few factories in E1 Salvador.
A manufacturing proletariat ther~ began to emerge. IC wa3 recruited
from the rural areas and from the urban towna in the interior of the
country. It was a proletariat without experience in class struggle.
_ The typical process ot dependent capitalist societies in Latin America
thus began to develop..~ It is a process in which the large masses,
par.Cicularly those of peasant origins, form a marginal population which
aettles in urban centers... At the same time, due to the need of the ~
industrialization process, tha education system is expanded and with it
_ the suffering of an extremely large sector of unj.versity studente and
- intellectuals. This group, as in all the dependent capitalist countries,
form a mass which, to a certain degree, is also marginal because it can- -
not be absorbed by the industrial development process and lacks a future
in E1 Salvador... In 1903 [date as received] for example when the ~
movement for university reform was begun, headed by the PCES in alliance
with a distinguished group of intellectuals, including Dr Carlos Alfaro
Castillo, there was only one university, that of the state, with 3,000
students... In 1930, there were more than 35,000 university studenCs
and [words indistinctJ the growth is higher than that of the industrial ~
' workers class.
[PA181617] If to these sectors we add the factory worker3 recruited in -
the rural areas and based in the urban centers, as well as the prole-
tariat comprised~of those who, because of their numbers and techn3cal
, qualifications, cannot be absorbed by the industrial expansion process,
then the marginal,massea phenomenon acquired an extraordinary dimension...
Besides, in the sixties and early seventies dependent capitalism in El
- Salvador experienced a notable projection into,agriculture... Thuo, the
peasants who used to rent land in exchange for a payment in crops or in
cash were eradicated from the scene by modern capitalism which, o:~
imposing itself, proletarianized them and introduced technique...with an.
eye set on exports... A class struggle then began, new conflicts emerged,
_ and this expansion of dependent capitalism in E1 Salvadc~r created a social
_ basie that made it necessary for various types of revolutionary organiza-
tions to emerge. This new social basis also offered the possibility of
. various ideological and political persuasions within the Salvadoran
left... It is no mere coincidence, therefore, that when the ir.idustrial.i-
zation development model enCered a period of criais...based on the
Central American Common Market--whose bankruptcy is intimatelv connected
wiCh the war between E1 Salvador and Honduras in 1969--what we describe
as the mature phase of the structural crisis of dependent capiCalism in
our country was also precipitated. The crisis in the political scheme
- supported by the PCES occurred simultaneously. This crisis was aggravated
bq the mistakes committed in connection with the war w3th Honduras.
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_ The "Europeans Mistakes
"The PCES' mistakea allowed the oth~r revolutia:~ary organizations to
emerge, but the roots, the causes have a social and historical basie...
In this procesa, the PCES does noC merely see a confrontation of ideo-
logica:t concepts and an alleged monopoly of the revolutionary vanguard...
It also believes that under Latin America's social development condi-
tions, the emergence of the working and other classes, groups and social
- atrata--as well as Che equally varied conformation of Chese classes--
repeats itself.
The social class emergence is decisively influenced and marked by Che -
characteristics of independent capitalism... As a result of this, _
there is sufficient social basis for th~ emergence of not only one, but
- aeveral revolutionary organizations within a single country... ,
- It is true that in the beginnirig serious ideological differences emerged
and positions were adopted in connect,ion with the ideological struggle _
which, viewed under the light of the European experience, might be
understood in light of their specific names--left, revisionism, and so
forth. However, the very development of the process gradually shows that,
even under those ideological labels, and in spiCe of those doctrinal
positions, in facC it is not really the same, it is not a matter of
results generaCed for identical causes...and although by definition Chay
_ are the same classes, they do not share the characteriatics of the classas
typical to classic, independenC capitalist development... For this rea- ~
son, and precisely for this reason, these revolutionary currente in Latin
America's dependent capitalist countries area..lasting currents... They _
are not affected by the childish disease of a left overcome by the -
maturity of the working class parties. No. These currents emerge time
after time, are defeated time after time, but again emerge because they
have a stable social basis, continuous in its development and expansion...
The Vanguard's Problem
"That is why we concluded that the only truly revolutionary position the =
PCES could adopt was that of recognizing as a natural consequence of the
belated development of a dependent capiCalist society the plurality of
the renolutionary organizations with a stable social basis of their own
in El Salvador, and presenting the problem of the Salvadoran revolutionary
vanguard as something that had to be reaolved on the basis of the unity
_ of the revolutionary organizations. In other words: The single vanguard -
is organized through a process of progressive unity... Those are the most
profound bases of our policy of...unity, of our line of revalutionary
- forces unity..."
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Crisis of Social Formation as a Whole -
"It represents a sCrong attempt... There is no possibility of a reformist
solutiion to the national crisie... There ie no possibility of such a
solution for the following reaeons; Firet~ the revol~itianr~ry movemBnC ir~
unstoppable, deeply rooted as it ia among a people whose heroic struggle
has developed under the bloody blows which it has been dealt by the
oligarchy... Second, the repressive machinery, built 50 years ago, -
cannot even be ad~usted to a democratic-bourgeois process... 'rhis machin-
ery is complex and involves not only the armed forces, but thousanda of
- people who have been trained t~ placa their intelligence at the service
of counterrevolution, to torture and assassinate the people... 4]ithout -
destroying this machinery, there can be no process of real democratiza-
tion... When in fact...a reformist solution necessitates, at least, Che
- need to solve two problems--democratization and structural changes by
means of reforms..~El Salvado.r is afflicted not only with a crisis of iCs
political syatem, but with a profound structural crisis, a crisis of the
socioeconomic formation as a whole... Third, the Salvadoran oligarchy
and almost all of the bourgeoisie, which have profound and ancient
agrarian roots and ahare a Prussian ideology, categorically oppose .
thorough reforms and social transformations. Thus, none of the three
poinCs explained can be resolved by means of reforms, by means o� evolu-
tion. There is only one path: the revolutionary path...
_ [PA181618] Unity Must Be Broad in Order To Achieve Vi.ctory
Why then did the PCES participate in the first government ~unta?
"The PCES participated because the Salvadoran revolution also needs the
democratic forces... By itself the revolutionary movement cannot win.,e
- And at that time, at ttie tiime of the fall of Gen Carlos Humberto Romero's
regime, the democratic currents, the progressive sectors offered their
support and joined the governmenC ~unta... As the PCES was the revolu- -
tionary organization with the oldest ties with the democratic forces,
forces with which in the past it had developed a policy of a113ances,
it was necessary to (?accompany~) them, to go to their side until the
_ pro~ect failed in order to avoid a breakup after the defeat and be able _
to immediately connect them with the revolutionary movement... In the
second place, because although the coup staged on 15 October 1979 con-
stituted a maneuver and a pretense by imperialism and the Salvadoran
right, a patriotic and progreas3ve current of young military officers,
unaware of the ob~ectives of our principal enemy, was involved. In
truth they had pinned their hopes on that solution to the national
crisis... Now, the paChs have also been defined for those military _
officers and there is the historic poss3bility that a part of the arnry
may 3oin the people and their revolutionary movement... The PCES feels -
that this is a beautiful po~sibility, even though it also stresses that
the revolution is an irreversible process and tihat its victory does not -
depend on whether or not a part of the army participates... Nonetheless,
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- it is also true that the incorporation of the patriotic military officers ~
would result in reduced social costs and we revolutionaries are the first
to ~ry ta avoid violence and its tragic consequences... Meanwhile, reac-
tion is trying to present us communists as if we were carrying out
infiltration work and were participating in a plot to divide the army...
and that ia totally untrue. What is happening, though, is that most
_ Salvadoran soldiers are peasants, agricultural and other typea of workersr
and their officers and classes come from the various middle class aectors,
all of them involved in the country's current process... Therefore,
_ despite the institutional divisions...and the divisions ~aused by the
reactionary command and U.S. influence, the Salvadoran people's gen- .
eralized and heroic struggle, of which they, Coo, are a part,.necessarily
reflects itself and influences the headquarters... Those military offi-
_ cers are also aware of the urgent need for radical changes and the PCES
feels it is necessary for them to take their own path, to learn on the
path of experience and to let them realize for themselves that there is
only one path open to a true solution of the problems---the revolutionary
path... Besiaes, as regards our participation in the first government
~unta, it is necessary to stress that ~he PCES did not limit itself to
a, shall we say, superficial presence; no, it was the only politica3.
- force that issued a platform and a program of political and structural
changes in accordance with the popular interests... This is precisely
- the prograffi which, mutilated, is now making way with the second govern-
ment ~unta... We note that it has been mutilated because the political
changes aimed at expelling Che fascists from the state apparatus were not
implemented and that repression did not cease. In addition, political
prisoners were not released, assassins and torturers were not punished
nor was the paramilitary corps eliminated--and all of this has creaCed a
new crieis... The first government 3unta failed, just as the PCES had
expected, and it constituted a defeat for the fascista, because the
democratic forces withdrew, dealing them forceful blows... That is how -
it was for imperialism, the oligarchy and its allies. The only truly
realistic option for them is fascism, the fasciat counterrevolution, the
destruction of the Salvac~oran revolution, which at this point ia already _
impossible... Alternatively, there is another realistic and historical
option: the armed revolutionary option... Moreover, and despite the
fact that the Christian democracy is participating in the present govern-
ment ~unta, it is necessary to note that within it there are progressive
currents and that to the extent that the class struggle is intensified,
_ it will gradually 3oin the people and the revolutionary movement, which
is not closing its doors to them... ~
The National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) Is W~flh the People
What is the PCES' opinion on social democracy? _
In E1 Salvador, social democracy has a specific [word indistinct]:
the MNR, 2 years ago joined the Socialist International... It is a
party that comprises a sector of prestigious intellectuals...sympathetic
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to the people's cause. Despite their militance in the Socialist Inter-
national, the MNR retains its vanguard positions, its couunitment to the
Salvadoran people's movement... In addition for the past IO years, the .
PCES and the MNR have been participating together in the political
- proceasea and have trodden the same [word indiatinctJ. Even though this -
is not the time to analyze the Socialiat International, where various
currents move, it is advisable to stresa that in Latin America, social
democracy followa a policy oppoaed to fasciam and for the defense of
freedom and human rights. This constitutes a real and effective con-
tribution to the Latin American peoples' cause. Here in E1 Salvador,
the MNR is on the side of pflpular, democratic and revolutionary unity."
Third Interview
PA191510 Havana PRELA in Spanish 2030 GMT 17 Mar 80 PA _
[Interview with Jorge Shafick Handal, Communist Party of E1 Salvador
secretary general, by PRELA correspondent Mario Menendez Rodriquez
"somewhere in E1 Salvador"; no date given--quotation marks as received]
[Text] Somewhere in E1 Salvacior, 16 Mar (PL)--"We have entered the last
� phase, the homestretch, the period of the great fight for power..." assured
the secretary general of the Conoanunist Party of E1 Salvador, Jorge Shafick
Handal, in an excluaive interview to PRELA, and added:
"The Salvadoran revolution is demacratic and anti-imperialist becauae
its fundamental objectives a.re freedom and respect of human righte, a
profound agrarian reform that will definitely so1.-�e the problems of the
peasantry, and authentic national independence." `
. It all recalls the Nicaragua of 1977...
- "It is not a matter of a direct socialist revolution. However, since
independent capitalism is already histoiically impossible in our country, -
and since we also believe.in Latin America, and Chat the power will be
assumed by the popular majorities, then the democratin and anti- .
imperialist tasks and ob~ectives become the first phase of a unique
revolution wh~:ch is absolutely socialist in essence." The communist
leader noted, "One of the revolution's characteristics ie to speak
frankly so that nobody may be deceived which, in po?itical practice, has
paid dividends. It has allowed the PCES to establish solid and lasting -
. alliances with organizations such as the NaCional Revolutionary MovemenC--
social democratic--which has always known the policy, ob~ectives and forma
of struggle of the PCES and which it considers its 'ally."` '
The Revolution Is Not Imposed by Decree
What is the strategy of the PCES and what are their immediate ob~ectives?
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Jorge ~=nafick Handal answers PRELA: "The PCES strategy lies within the
framework of the democratic and anti-imperialist revolution and in the -
option for armed struggle to achieve po~er. Power is achieved through
the unity of. action of the revolutionary and democratic forces.~. It is
not a matter, then, of a direct socialist revolution...and it is not -
imposed by d~cree from some force that~tries to speed up the historic
procesa, but becauae it corresponds Co the Salvadoran reality... The
democratic and anCi-~.mperialist revolution un3erway in our country cor-
responds to a capitalist dependent society of inedium development, i� ~
compared wiCh the other nations of dependent capitalism... The PCES
establishes three fundamental tasks and ob~ectives of the Salvadoran
revolution: First, freedom and respect of human rights, because for the
pasC half century a repressive and bloodthirsty dictatorship has ruled;
second, a profound agrarian reform thaC will make those who work the land
the owner of that land and its fruits in order to definitely solve the _
problems of the peasantry; third, authentic national independence, whose
need today is not as evident for the large majority of the population as
the two previous ones, but in the measure in which the process advances
and imperialism makes efforts to stop it, wi11 be explained to the masses
and will become a strong motivation... National independence i.nvolves
a number of economic, political, ideological, and other connotations.
Without it, it is impossible to offer real solutions to the Salvadoran
- general crisis, stigmatized by dependence..."
_ The Revolution's Main Problem .
In the present inCernational siCuation, does the PCES believe that these
democratic and anti-imperialist tasks and ob~ectives will be acc4mplished
without heading directly toward socialiam?
"No, it is impossible. To begin with, the revolution's main problem is _
the problem of power... Once victory is achieved, the proletarian popu-
lar majorities in general, the peasantry, the middle classes--will
destroy the old machinery of repression and establish the revolutionary
power... Then, the democratic and anti-imperialist tasks and ob3ectives -
will become the first phase of a unique revolutio:,, which is absolutiely -
socialist in essence..."
How long does a phase take and how does one go from one to the other?
"That question cannot be answered beforehand; it is related to the
specific national and international conditions that serve as the frame-
work of the revolutionary victory... The important thing is that the
- Salvadoran revolutionaries win over poaer and start the process of
changes and that the vanguard be sufficiently mature to establish an `
- adequate pace to the process of changes--a pace that should conform to
the popular interests and,the defense and advance of the revolution...
_ That phase may be brief or long...viol.ent or relatively peaceful... In
~ Cuba, for exarnple, the defense of the revolution demanded a rapid move
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toward socialism; in Nicaragua, it is still to be seen... There are no
- decrees, and least of all can any abstract or advanced solutions be
affered... That is why the PCES states that the nature of the Salvadoran
~ revolution is democratic and anti--imperialist, and this fact permits the
organization of a broad front of forces~ not only revolutionary, but also
democratic... Each force advances to ite ob~ectives with ita program.
Along the way, it will try to influence the historic process, and that is
legitimate... We are in our exposition... The PCES does not deceive or
lead the democratic forcea into any trap... To say this is to offend the
groups of political talent and ability that head the democratic forces
and who know perfectly well the bonds existing between the democratj.c
revolution and the socialist one..."
[PA191511] What is the attftude of the PCES toward the Salvadoran
bourgeoisie?
"When the PCES refers to the wheels behind the Salvadoran revolution, it
= does not include any.sector of the bourgeoisie... However, we believe
that some isolated sectors or perhaps whole sectors may, at a given
moment, adopt an attitude favorable to the process...
This policy is in line with the PCES theory that states that independent
capitalism is already historically impossible in E1 Salvador and, we
believe, in Latin America. Therefore, no sector of the bourgeoisie can,
because of its condition, its nature and very class orientation, comply
and be conaiatent with anti-imperialist tasks, tasks which are very
definitely the ones that determine the fate of the revolution and its
democratic ob~ectives...because in it there cannot exist true democracy
- for the great Salvadoran masaes, nor can there exist an effective solu-
tion for the problems of the land within the framework of dependence...
- No dependent capitalist country can be--nor will it be--a model for
resolving these problems...so Chat there is no sector of the bourgeoisie
that can go against imperialism because there is no longer any possibility
of independent capitalism... The only capitalism that there can be is
. capitalism that is dependent on imperialism under any of its modalities...
In this, there is a great difference in the role of the national bour-
- geoisie in the colonies... Thie has to do with the progress of class
development, which has been different in the coionies and in Latin
America... The issue of whether capitalism will triumph or not is noti
about to be decided in our countries, because what already exists is a
dependent capitalist society. It is this type of scciety that is in
_ crisis and not precapitalist remnanta... What has reached a crisis in
E1 Salvador is the enCire structure of dependent capitalist societyy
and without resolving this structural crisis there can be no real solu-
tion for problems of a democratic naCure... Now then,.when a revolu-
tionary situation matures and a crisis becomes extremely acute, the
bourgeoisie divides and there are sectors which in trying to find a way
_ out or a way of ruling, may at a given moment adopt a position favorab].e
to the revolution... This was very evident in Nicaragua... The PCES
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believes that this has nothing ta do with the historical role and atti-
tude of the bourgeoisie during and in the face of a revolution... It is
the result of the political crisi~ stemming from a revolutionary situa-
tlon..."
To Deepen Internationalism
What is the PCES' international policy?
"Our party...believes imperialism is the basic enemy... Hence, our
international policy is in ~avor of world peace, detente, peoples' -
struggle for social liberation and against all forms of oppression and .
exploitation... The PCES in solidarity with Vietnam, Kampuchea and
Laos condemns the criminal, treacherous and divisionist activity of the
Chinese Government leadership and the improperly labeled Communist Party
of China; supports the nonalined nations' movement; and idenCifies with
~ the Cuban revolution, whose defense is also a matter of principle...but.
in addiCion to this international posit3on, the PCES is a determined
, supporter of unity of action among communist parties and all revolu- ~
tionary organizations that also strugg].e in Latin America, in tHe same
manner and the same form as has occurred in E1 Salvador... The PCES
considers that [passage indistinct] any doubt, this is the year of great
deployment of Che revolutionary struggle... Unity does not only add, but
iC also multiplies... The alliance of the revolutionary and democratic
forces generates great social energies and although it cannot be assured '
that the triumph will be achieved during the course of the next few
monChs, it can be said that we are entering the final stretch, into the
period of great battles for power... In order to better explain today's
Salvadoran picture, it would be advisable to draw a parallel with the
Nicaraguan process... I think it is legitimate to mark October 1977 as
the beginning of the final phase, when the Sandinist National Liberation
Front began a series of assaults and attacks to occupy forts and military
garrisons...and from Cctober 1977 to July 1979, a course was followed that
was historically brief, but it was a course in which there was progress
and defeats. They went through great general strikes and the extraordi-
nary insurrection of September 1978, although victory was not achieved. ;
There was a falling back, but there was also a counteroffensive until
victory was achieved through the joining of a general popular 3nsurrec-
� tion, guerrilla warfare, movements and positions, in the midst of the
participation of hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans, especially youths.
- There was a greaC international effort, as well as the support of progres-
sive peoples and gov_ernments... The Salvadoran period can be prolonged
; or brief... We have~entered into the last phase, the final etretch, which
~ can also be long..."
;
CSO: 3010
~
~ 1~
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EL SAI,VA~OR
'PRELA' INTERVIEWS FARN SECRETARY GENERAL JOVEL
PA261945 Havana PRELA in Spanish 0035 GMT 25 Mar 80 PA
~ [Interview with Ernesto Jovel, secretary general of the Armed Forces of
- National Resistance, conducted by PRELA correspondent Mario Menendez
Rodriguez, on 24 March "somewhere in E1 Salvador"]
[Text] Ernesto Jovel, secretary general of the National Resistance Party
and top leader of the Armed. Forces of National Resistance [FARN], has told
PRENSA LATIN that "it's time the sector of honest an~ patriotic young
officers.in the reactionary armed forces took its place in the people's
revolutionarp movement; it's time for it to immediate7.y abandon the fascist
leaders who have now intensified the mass killing of the Salvadoran people
- to protect the interests of the oligarchy and imperialism."
The textile worker was accompanied by two other young people who are members
of the [movement's] national executive directorafie and who have been temper-
ed in the crucible of adversity. Their lives symbolize the history of the
revolutionary political and military organization. They are Ferman Cienfuegos,
a former university student who ranks second in tfie movement, and social
. workers Julio Rodriguez.
- Jovel noted that "the church of the poor, represented by San Sal~vador
Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero plays a progressive and brave role in the
people's struggle and has a place in the Salvadoran democratic revolution."
. Meanwhile, conflicts are growing worse. The regime has militarized large
_ rural areas and it conunits serious acts of violence and murders d~zens of
peasants every other day. In the cities--and most particularly in
San Salvador--a11 youths are arrested in the streets, regardless of their
sex, by the repressive corps, which carefully scrutinizes their identifica-
tion papers and everything they carry in their handbags and pockets. Each
. one of those youths is viewed as possible revolutionary activist or
sympathizer of the people's movement...combing operations are carried out
throughout the land...searches are made for insurgent "sanctuaries"...there
is a strict censorship on the mass media and any infringement entails a very
- high price. High-powered bombs.silence people and anyone who has committed
"the crime of reporting the truth" is sentenced to death. One of those
sentenced is precisely the San Salvador Archb3shop.
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National Resistaiice
These two words have a marked political and military connotation. The
Salvadoran people view the national resistance [movement] as one of the
solid bastions af the revolutionary process...the national resistance
- results fr~m the selfless work initiated by a sma11 but courageous group
of young workers and students. It was established in 1975 as an organiza- -
' tion independent from the People's Revolutionary Army [ERP]. It undertook
to establish ties with the dispose~ sectors and the difficult task of
building a party with a military structure--~nilitias, guerrillas, army--and
a front of the masses in order to be able to tackle successfully the strug-
gle against the military dictatorship of the 14 families supported by the
United States.
A scant 5 years later, and following difficult and complex efforts which
have taken a toll of sacrifice and death, the national resistance now
enjoys significant influence among the workers and among the largest
people's sectors and organizations. Together with the Salvadoran Communist
Party, the "Farabundo Marti" popular liberation forces and 5alvadoran
_ Revolutionary Party-ERP, it is prepared to "crush the fascists." The
single-leadership party directs the political and military affairs."
Democratic and Revolutionary Government
What is the national resistance's strategy and what do the close-range and
medium-range objec*_ives of its armed wing consist of? ,
Cienfuegos said:
"The objective at~this stage of the struggle is to achieve power and estab-
lish a government of workers and peasants in alliance with the middle class, _
which means that it wi11 be a democratic and revolutionary government with -
support from the revolutionary and democratic forces.
[PA261946] Several problems were considered in our line of strategy...one
. of them, that of the party's unity has become a problem with tactical
characteristics due to the unity established by the Revolutionary Coordinat-
ing Board.
We feel tha~ with the process of uniting the sectors which until yesterday
were divided, the single vanguard of the Salvadoran revolution is beginning ~
to become a concrete reality...as to the problem of construction of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces, we also believe the fundamental steps have been
, taken...one of them is the popular army under a speedy process of formation;
- another is the arming of the Salvadoran masses..a few years ago, arming the
masses was a theoretical problem; today it is a problem that is being solved
in practice...thus, the strategic and i~nediate factors ar~~ united, linked. -
We also considered that the unity of the popular movement was a strategic _
problem, but the Revolutionary Coordinating Board of the masses, which
groups the principal mass organizations--although some still remain to ~oin -
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the movement--reduced the problem to an i~nediate task. Then, in that respect
we consider that due to progress obtained, the strategic points have been
included in the order of the day and are problems of an i~r.ediate nature.
That in part reflects the maturity of the democratic and revolutionary
government that begins in fact to take shape. It will be the instrument thfit -
will serve to build the new society; without misery, illiteracy or sickness,
_ a society of justice and peace, built for a11 Salvadorans. That society
' will be the new relation between the Salvadorans and the fatherland and it
_ will be built in the process of the democratic and popular revolution, during
the transition period toward socialism."
The People's Hour Has,..Ar~ived
What perspectives does the national resistance see to an alliance between
~ the armed forces and Christian democracy?
Julia Rodriguez, the young woman with the skin toasted by the sun of the
cotton and cornfields, supplies the answer: "This alliance constitutes
the second emergency government which imperialism and the oligarchy have
; utilized in a fruitless effort to find a solution to the national crisis
and keep power from falling into the hands of the Salvadoran people. Its
_ duration will depend on the revolutionary and democratic forces and we feel
_ the time of the people has arrived, the time in which power must fa11 into
, their hands." -
; Has the possibility of a peaceful solution of the present problems been
considered?
i
Ferman Cienfuegos, second in coAUnand of the politico-military organization,
' replies: "We want peace and a just solution of the national problems. It ~ F,
! is the oligarchy and *he guardians of their wealth, as we11 as imperialism,
who have infiltrated everywhere: in the reactionary armed forces, in the
government, everywhere. They do not want peace or a so7.ution to the problems
on behalf of the working people. The people have tried every peaceful
' solution and have exhausted all possibilities offered by the Constitution,
; and the answer~has been merciless repression. Now, the only way left to
~ gain social liberation is through armed action." -
Has the national resistance no hope at all of enlisting the aid of any
specific sector of the government's armed for~es?
' Ernesto Jovel, FARN's top leader, notes:
"There is a sector of young honest and patriot3c officers within the
reactionary armed forces whom, through PRELA, we exhort to immediately
abandon the fascist leaders who today have intensified the massacre of the
j working people of E1 Salvador to protect the interests of the oligarchy and
! imperialism. It is time for that democratic sector to occupy its rightful
; place in the people's revolutionary movement. This is their last opportunity
` because the commitments now acquired with the fascists have an irrevers3ble
~ nature..." -
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What is the national resistance's policy concerning the church?
The party's secretary general says: "Our policy concerning the church is
clear, precise and defined: We respect the freedom of cu1t, the freedom _
of religion. And, especially, we feel that the church of the poor, the
church represented by the archbishop of San Salvador, Mnsgr Oscar Arnulfo
Romero, plays a progressive, courageous role in the people's struggle and
has its place in the Salvadoran democratic revolution. Yes, definitely,
that church will have to share with us many of the tasks in the democratic
revolutionary process..." _
Ours Is a Salvadoran Revolution
; Ref erring to the revolutionary processes, the international reactionary
forces invariably claim that the leadership, the economic and logistic
support, the training of the rebels, and ~o forth, originates in countries
where socialism is being deve:loped."
What is the national resistance's opinion in that respect? -
Julia Rodriguez affirms: "Ours is very much a Salvadoran revolution; nobody
~ can tell us what we must do, or how and when we must do it. However, that
does not mean that we must discard the experience of other peoples who
today are the owners of their destiny. On the contrary, we must try to
learn from others' experience. We identify ourselves with the struggles
of the oppressed and the exploited, particularly with the struggle of our
Central American brothers. This domestic independence must necessarily
reflect in international policy, that is why we also identify ourselves
with the nonalined movement and with democratic governme~ts such as those
of Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama and the member nations of the Andean Pact,
all of which have assumed anti-imperialist positions and have prevented
U.S. intervention in Nicaragua...we are certain that such solidarity wi11
also be offered to E1 Salvador, where U.S. intervention is a fact..." _
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GRENADA
'PRELA' REPORTS ON COMMEMORATION OF REVOLUTION~S ANNIVERSARY
PA171505 Havana pRELA in Spanish 0057 GMT 16 Mar 80 PA
[Text] St Georges, 15 Mar (PL)--Grenada will never forego its principles
and will always be on the side of oppressed peoples anywhere in the world
regardless of the consequences, Maurice Bishop said at the event com-
memorating the first anniversary of the country's revolution.
The "struggles for freedom and national independence will always have
true friends, true allies in Grenada," the prime minister stated while
addressing 20,000 Grenada people and hundreds of foreign. guests gathered
at Queen's Park in this capital.
Presiding over the event alongside Bishop were guests of honor Jamaican
Prime Minister Michael Manley and Comm,ander Daniel Ortega Saavedra, a
member o� the Nicaraguan National Reconstruction Government Junta and of
the Sandinist National LiberaCion Front, as well as other membera of the
Revolutionary People's Government of Grenada.
Bishop referred to Manley as "our dear friend and sincere ally" and ~
recalled that in the first hours of the revolution, Jamaica "immediately
and without reservation" promised its full support to Grenada.
Bishop then saluted Daniel Ortega as "one of the most outstanding com-
manders of the Nicaraguan revolution" in whose presence "we can feel the
spirit and the inspiration of that great patriot, Sandino."
_ He also extended a special welcome to Jesus Montane Oropesa, head of the
Cuban delegation attending the event and a member of the Communiet Party -
of Cuba's Central Cammittee.
Further on, Bishop described the relations between Cuba and Grenada as
- on.e of the p"rincipal sources of inspiration for the revolution in Grenada
and stressed the Cuban Government's and people's contribution to the
advancement of the revolutionary process in this country. "Most impor-
tant," he stressed, "is the fact that without a Cuban revolution in 1959,
- there could have been no revolution" in Grenada in 1979e
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In Grenada, the prime minister said., the revolution was waged in order to
achieve democracy, ~ustice and the egalitarian participation of the
people who, he added, "had never been as united and full of energy." ~
_ He then indicated that only when there are institutions and mechanisms ~
_ through which the people can express their problems, ideas and views
can there be talk about true democracy. He added: "There is a right I _
clearly said we were going to abolish once and for all, and that right =
is the right to exploit."
- Still, he stressed, the forces of imperialism and reaction will try to
destabilize the revolution, frustrate its achievements and make it .
reCreat, because those forces are not interested in seeing the peoples
advance with dignity and consCruct societies that respond to their needs.
"There are those who still believe the United States or certain elements `
in that country have the right to regard this Caribbean Sea as their -
private lake, as an extension of the United States, as their backyard.
_ We say 'no' to the 'backyard' thsory." Bishop then underscored that
the American peoples "have the right to develop their own societies and
- have the right to decide who should be their friends."
Bishop also proposed five fundamental principles which should regulate
the area's international relations. The five points are: Respecting the
Caribbean Sea as a peace zone, banning military shock troops, dismantling
a1L the military bases, putting an end to the Monroe Doctrine and
_ respecting the right to free determination of the peoples in the area--
including the 25 colonies that still exist--as well as the principle of ~
ideological pluralism. The five points also inclsde putting an end to
the finar.cing, support and impetus given to mercenaries and counter-
revolutionaries, to the policy of assassination, isolation, di*~ision and
arms race, and respecting the sovereignty, legal equality and Cerritorial -
- integrity of countries in the area.
He also proclaimed respect for tb.e right to 3oin other exploited coun-
tries in order to form organizations to demand a new international -
economic order.
, Bishop expressed his solidarity with the struggle being waged by ttie
peoples of Haiti, the Palestine Liberation Front and the POLISARIO FronC, ~
Chile, Puerto Rico, Belize and Panama. He expressed his support for the
_ r~unification efforts being made by the peoples of Yemen and Koreay sent
a special greeting to the people of Vietnam and thanked Algeria, Iraq, ~
Libya and Syria for their econamic aid. , ~
Bishop saluted the Cuban Government and people, "who have been on our
side during the past 12 months," particularly that "living legend, that ~
great and indomitable leader, Fidel Castro."
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In his speech, Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manlay described the
Grenada revolution as "a victory of the peoples of the world." "I am
impressed with the feeling of unity, seriousness and determination I see
- everywhere," he commented, and suggested that those achievements and _
"the flame of the revolution" be well cared for.
He called for ,joint efforta and for a surge in LaCin America and the
Caribbean toward unity and solidarity. He also stresaed the role played
by the continent's independence heroes and underscored: "There ia a man
who occupies a epecial place in the hearte of all those interested in
freedom: Fidel Castro."
Daniel Ortega, for his part, said Grenada plays a very important role in _
the struggle for the unity of the peoples and stressed Latin America's
solidarity against U.S. attempts Co intervene in Nicaragua.
- "The enemies of our peoples, the Gairys, the Somozas and those who gave
orders to those criminals, sought to erect a barrier among the poor
- peoples of Latin America and the oppressed and exploited peoples of
- Central America and the Cnribbean," the Nicaraguan leader said.
"Our peoples knew how to quickly identify each other, because we shared
a~ust and common cause, because we were all being oppressed and exploited
and because in imperialism we had a common enemy."
According to the Sandinist leader, it was no mere coincidence that their -
two peoples had been liberated in the same year and he added Chat Che -
- Sandiniats had been inspired by the victory of Grenada for, "through your
_ example you helped us achieve victory."
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( GUATEMALA
,
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-y ~
~I POLITICAL CRISIS IN COUNTRY DISCUSSED
~I
-i Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 2 Mar 8G pp 44, 45, 47
; [Text] "Did you know that President Romeo Lucas was attacked yesterday?
; ~ He was stopped at a traffic light in his car when someor.e on a bicycle
i threw a dictionary at him through the window." -
i -
I The joke is one of the thousands about the president of the country that -
~ circulate in Guatemala. CAMBIO 16's special correspondent Pedro Paramo
~ is reporting from Guatemala. The jokes are the pressure release valve
i for people who on paper enjoy every freedom, whereas the reality is that
the only law in effect is that of might, whereby a human life means
nothing. -
Romeo Lucas now has ~he might in Guatemala. Brought out of the shadows
in 1978 by the Congress ir? a way that no one has been able to convincingly
explain, this obscure mestizo military man, who speaks Kekchi (a Mayan
dialect) whenever he can because he has not mastered Spanish, is managing
~ the country with such a rough i.ron hand that he has drawn the attention
i of the world toward that segment of America's waist where terror reigns.
~
"The killing of the 39 people occupying the Spanish Embassy was no -
~ accident. It is simply another monstrous sign of the government's
; repression of everything that does not help to advance its plans," a
student leader told CAMBIO 15. "Can there be greater disregard for -
! man and civilization than they showed with Gregorio Juya, the surviving
peasant, who they took out of the hospital to kill and then dumped here,
i in front of the university?� ~
i Romeo Lucas was elected president by the Congress over the candidate of
; the National Liberation Movement (MLN), the Guatemalan ultra-right, with -
~ an ideoloqy similar to that�of New Force in Spain, which was the party
-j that actually received the highest number of votes in the 1978 election.
j The party did not attain the presidency because the Guatemalan Constitu- _
; tion qrants the Congress the privilege of naming the president, and,
,i as has been shown in the last two elections, in which tradition was
ignored, it can do it without respecting the results of the popular voting.
~
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Those, then, were the two major choices that the country had in 1978.
- Romeo Lucas represented the more "progressive" choice, and his present -
government is composed of a coalition including groups ranging from the
extreme right, such as the Democratic Institutional Party (PID), '~d the
"extreme left," represented by the Popular Democratic Alliance (ADP),
communists according to some, "radishes"--red on the outside and white -
on the inside--in the words of Luis Cardoza y Aragon, the leader, in
exile in Mexico, of the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), the authentic -
communist party in Guatemala. Even so, under General Lucas the repres-
sion has exceeded all bounds and has generated a climate of increasing
vialence that, in the opinion of many, is driving the country to the
brink of a civi]. war. ~ recent report by Amnesty International states
that 2,000 deaths resulted from political violence between May 1978 and
September 1979. It is an item of reference now that every day an average
of nine bodies not attributable to common crime appear in the country. -
Many of them bear clear signs of torture.
Bloody Balance
_ Often, the victims are soldiers or policemen shot down by the Rebel Armed
Forces (FAR), the People in Arms Revolutionary Organization (ORPA),
Labor Party Youth (JPT) or the Guerrilla Army of tne Poor (EGP), the armed
_ groups fighting the governmer.t in the country and in the city with raids
and terrorist acts. Most, however, are peasants' and workers' leaders or
political officials murdered by the Death Squadron or the Antico~nunist -
Secret Army, groups which, according to the Amnesty International report,
- "often include uniformed members of the armed forces and security agencies."
All these deeds are spreading fear and insecurity through the streets of
_ Guatemala, and more and more people are speaking openly of civil war.
"Look how we live," this journal was told by Mario Sandoval Alarcon, for-
- mer vice president of the country, a lawyer trained in Madrid, an admirer
- of Franco and creator of the MLN, indicating the machineguns set up in
the small garden in front of his house near the La Aurora Airport in -
Guatemala City. "We can't go out into the.street unless we're in this
(He patted an armored automobile that had cost 3 million pesetas). We
always have our heart in our mouth, afraid that they're going to violate
our wives and take everythinq away from us." ~ -
Indian Majority
Six and one-half million Guatemalans are distributed over an area of -
131,800 square kilometers. One-fourth of the population lives in the
country's capital, most of it in "champas" (shacks). Some 65 percent -
of the inhabitants are illiterate. It has the lowest literacy rate in ~
Central,America. Two percent of the families awn 62 percent of the
country's land.
Moreover, Guatemala is a mosaic of races and languages. There are 22
different Indian grou~s speaking a k~alf-dozen languages and numerous
dialects. Officiaily, there are two million Indians, according to the
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most recent census; but there are considerably more, for the law provides
that for anyone to be considered an Indian, he must consider himself one.
In his book "The Homeland of the American-Born European," sociologist
Severo Martinez Pelaez estimates that Indians make up one-half of the
country's population. ~
Be that as it may, it is the Indians who thus far have not shared in the
progress which has benefited the "ladinos" (mestizos) and the "Europeans," -
who only 35 years ago modified the law that required Indians to work for
the neighboring landowner, as occurred during the Spanish colonial -
period.
They are by far the cheapest manual labor in the country. Whereas the
minimum wage in industry is 2.50 quetzales, the wage for laborers is set
at 1.50. The laws made by the "Europeans" and ladinos for all Guatemalans
are applied rigorously only to Indians.
For example, the law requiring military service is applied in practice
only to Indians, and in Guatemala it is hard to find a mestizo face under
a soldier's helmet unless i~ is accompanied by an officer's insignia. ~
~ Levies of recruits are at times true manhunts.
Two days a week there is a market in the community of Joyabaj, in the
E1 Quiche region. On those days many Indians come ta town to sel:l their
meager products and to obtain the most basic materials. Well, it is on -
- those market days that the Army ob~ains the soldiers that it needs.
- Hunting Recruits
The soldiers arrive in vehicles and block the exits from the marketplace,
and, among the cries of the women and the running of the men, the armed
body goes about catching the future recruits, the young men who appear to -
~ be about 18 years old, and loading them into trucks which then carry them
to the country's capital or to other provinces. It is always far from
their home. "Military service for these young Indians," says a professor
at the University of San Carlos, "is disastrous for their families during
the 2 years that they serve. Many o� those caught in this way are
married and have children. The 60 quetzales they are paid each month
scarcely cover their expenses in the city. Furthermore, many of the
rlimonadas' (shantytowns) in Guatemala City originated in these levies.
~ The Indians who have performed their military service here no longer want ~
to return to their villa~?s, so they build a tin shack wherever they -
- chose, and there it is. This is one of the reasons for the inordinate
growth of the city and, therefore, of most of its problems." A1;~~, whereas
the law requiring military service is applied to the Indians in iural
areas, the "Europeans" or ladinos in cities merely engage in military
~ training 52 Sundays a year at the base nearest to tHeir.home. an~d'then:.!.en~er
the reserves.
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= The Guatemalan Constitution is a progressive document. It explicitly
recoqnizes all the freedoms: thought, expression, union activity, right
to strike but in reality it is a one-sided law serving the whim of
_ the upper and upper-middle classes, with the consent of the Army and the =
police, whose officers and commanders they provide.
In practice, political freedom is limited by the law requiring that, to
be legalized, a party have over 60,000 members, 60 percent of whom know
how to read and write. In a country with 6.5 million inhabitants and
a 65 percent illiteracy rate, there is little room, then, for many parties.
_ On paper, there is comple~te freedom of the press. There is no prior ~
censorship of news, and the law troubles no one for expressing opinions in
the communications media. However, it is practically impossible to find -
direct criticism of the government in the newspapers, on the radio and -
television in Guatemala. Some of the 2,000 who died violently between
May 1978 and September 1979 were journalists. Just last week Adolfo
Zarazua y Calderon, producer of the radio bulletin "The Patriot,"
sought asylum with his wife in the Venezualan Embassy after a group of
strangers attempted to kidnap him at the door of the radio station.,
Freedom of union activity has the same limits. The actions of the
� parapolice groups are especially effective in the case of union activists.
_ Since Romeo Lucas took office, 20 top leaders have been shot down and
as many others have had to go into exile. .
~ Adolfo Suarez,"Cammunist"
At times, according to union sources, even the Army participates in the
repression. "Several months ago, they kidnapped nine peasants from
_ E1 Quiche, from the area made up of Nabaj, Gotzal and Chachu].," a
member of the National Federation of Workers told CAMBIO 16. "They put
green un~forms on them, gave them some old weapons, and the Army
machinegunned them in the square of a town, saying that they were
guerrillas who were trying to occupy the place."
T~ Ramiro Faillace, a surgeon and spokesman for the Revolutionary Party
(PR) in the Congress, one of the three parties that compose the governing
coalition, "the present violence is nothi.ng more than an international
- campaign by socialist or communist governments which in their crazy race -
to take over the world are interested in the Central American countries
~ecause of their strategi~ position. That's why Guatemala is the objec-
tive of evil Guatemalans and foreign groups who want to install a
communist government in our country." Faillace, who says "President
Juarez" when referring to the president of Spain, and calls him a
"communist," and believes that the Russian Revolution took place "nearly
_ 150 years ago," is certain that it is Cuba that is pulling the strings
_ of subversion in Guatemala and that has direct contact with the guerrilla
groups operating in the western part of the country.
'
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Against C~3rter
The same opinion is held by Lionel Sisniega, spokesman for the Catholic
National Party (MLN), the strongest party in the country now in the
_ opposition. To Sisniega, however, although the Soviet Union and its
satellites are responsible for the anti-Guatemalan conspiracy, the United
States is primarily responsible for the present situation in his country
"because they're giving ground before communism here in Central America and
in Iran and Afghanistan, and everywhere. Why do they want to impose a
model on us that they don't use ? Let them nationalize their banks. Let
them divide up their land, for there are i.mmense ranches there, properties
bigger than the republic of E1 Salvador. Let them take their Indians
from the reservations where they're oppressing them and give them that
land."
The National Liberation Movement has some 300,000 members--most of them
poor, lower-class people--40,000 cadres and 4,000 branches throughout the
country; and 6 years ago it demonstrated that it can bring together
40,000 peasants with their machetes in the country's capital. All obser-
vers consider it the best structured and most powerful party in the
country in every regard. -
Its leaders know this and are prepared to demonstrate it with force if
necessary: "If the government is unable to protect private property, the
security and lives of its citizens, we can do it and we are going,to do it.
~ We passzonately defend what is ours," s.aid Mario Sandoval Alarcon. "I
acknowledge it; but for some time we have been prepared to confront whomever
we have to."
"Che" Guevara's ~Dream
According to estimates by leftists, the fighting arm.of the MLN could
be as large as 15,000 men, more or less the same number they give for the
combined strength of the 4 guerrilla groups now operating in Guatemala.
Of course, the latter could have grown markedly in recent months with the
slow, but now very steady, addition of Indians to the guerrilla movement.
"Che" Guevara's dream, insurrection by the American Indians, is now a
fact in Guatemala. The process has crystallized through union activity,
~ another sphere scarcely familiar to Indians.
_ "At present, the percenta,e of Indian comrades is about 20 percent," this -
journal was told at the headquarters of the National Federation of Workers _
_ (CNT) in the heart of Guatemala City. "Since the Committee for Peasant
- Unity was founded 2 years ago, these comrades have been joining in
increasing numbers because we've succeeded in penetrating the areas where
very different languages are spoken, and the language problem was a
very large obstacle. Today there are good Indian union cadre~s." -
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- Given the particular harshness with which Romeo Lucas is suppressing
union activity among the peasants--20 organizations destroyed i;.i less than
a year, according to the CNT--it is not surprising that un?.on members who
have been "burned" or are excessively well known are taking up arms and
- joining the guerrilla groups.
Thus, the scene can change overnight, with an increasingly active guerrilla
movement that nearly sent Minister of Government Donaldo Alvarez (See box)
along the same road as Carrero Blanco on 11 February and that is capable ~
of enlisting the Indians; and with no other political sector than a right
clinging to its privileges and incapable of engaging in a dialogue, and ~
with a powerful, aggressive, armed nationalist-Catholic movement prepared -
for anything, peace is hard to attain. The Guatexnalan`volcano has now
begun to smoke. .
. COPYRIGHT 1980. Informacion y Revistas, S. A. _
9 085
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NICARAGUA
FINANCE MINISTER VIEWS U.S. AID, EUROPEAN TOUR
~ PA192257 Havana PRELA in Spanish 2345 GMT 16 Mar 80 PA
[Report by Angel V. Ruocco]
[Text] Bon:~, 17 Mar (PL)--Nicaragua needs much money, and much support
for its national reconstruction process but it will not accept any aid
� to which conditions have been attached, Nicaraguan Finance Minister
Joaquin Cuadra sa3d. In an interview granted to PRENSA LATINA, Cuadra
- said afCer many years of struggle, waged to reaffirm its nationality,
sovereignty and right to self-determination, Nicaragua will not agree
to any, directly or indirectly, canditioned aid which will limit ita.
right to choose i~[s political, social and economic system. .
~ In referring to the U.S. Congress' reluctance to grant Nicaragua a$75
million loan, the minister said it is up to the Nicaraguans to say if
. they will accept this aid or not.
"Personally, I would say that the only acceptable condition, although I
have my doubts, would be that they grant the loan with the condition that
. never again would a marine be sent to Nicaragua..." he said ironically.
Besides the negative attitude toward Nicaragua, which extreme right and =
reactionary congressional sectors may ha~ve in the United States, it is
- cause for concern that Congress has frozen the loan because it needs the
money to purchase weapons and cannot assign funds to aid poor countriea,
the mirii~ter said.
~ The fact that the United Statea does not have sufficient funds to aimul-
taneously finance its excessive armaments program and aid for develop-
- ment, gives food for thought to underdeveloped countries, he added.
"Ttiis is cause for concern for Nicaraguans, because we well know what the
empire is and what it stands for, that it has always been ready to send
its marines and that it imposed Somoza on us," he said.
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Our Sandiniet vanguard expelled Somoza and the last "marine" from
Nicaragu~a. This past will not return whatever they try. He said, this
is impossible.
Regarding the Nicaraguan delegation's European tour of which he was a
member and which was led by Junta of the Government of National Recon-
struction member Sergio Ramirez, Cuadra said it was very successful in
Belgium, the Netherlands and the FRG.
"The results were optimum since we obtained positive financial and tecl~-
nological support from the governments, instituCions and peoples of theae
countries which expressed their solidarity and that is very important for
us," he explained.
We have received, he said in concluaion, expressiona of understanding and
even identification with our liberation proceas which are really encourag-
ing and.I believe that this is because West Europe must also strive,
although not to the extent that we must, to end dependence.
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NICARAGUA
;
NUNEZ COI~sENTS ON I~IDN, LITERACY CAl~AIGN
PA191916 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1700 GMT 18 Mar 80 PA -
[Text] Managua, 18 Mar---Revolutionary Commander Carlos Nunez said that -
the Nicaraguan revolutionary process is reflected in the ideas of the
recently created Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (1~IDN] and the statements
by its leaders. Nunez said there can be no doubt about the historical '
_ continuity of the Nicaraguan revolution.
He said that when everyone condemned Sandino, called him a bandit and
despised his teachings, the Sandinist National Liberation Front [FSIN],
without considering the risks, had the courage and valor to defend the
struggle of the 1920's and 1930's and organized Che masses under the
Sandinist flag.
Today, certain sectors try to disCort Sandino's struggle, he said.
_ Nunez also said that there is a conflict today between those who believe
that the literacy campaign should have political purposes and those who
feel it should not.
The literacy crusade, he said, must teach the masses who exploited and
robbed them. -
If the literacy campaign does not help to teach thousands of ignorant
persons so that they can in the future become part of the essential
elements for the country's development, then what was the purpose of the
_ revolution, he said. _
There are those, he said, who want the workers, peasants and fighters to
- ignore what they have achieved and the changes attained with the people's
efforts. -
They, he added, do not want the people to know the role played by the
various organizations. They want the people to remain ignorant so Chat
it cannot identify its enemi.es. ~
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When the I~IDN says that the army must be apolitical, and become profes-
sional, it is trying to tame it. However, it was precisely an army like -
this which the Nicaraguans defeated.
It is an obvious fact that the people are part of the people's army. It
would be ridiculous to tell those who fought, sacrificed and died for this
revolution, under FSLN leadership, that they are not Sandinists. T.his is
absurd, he said.
= In commenting on the participation of the various sectors who fought
against Somozism, he recalled thaC between 1978 and 1979 there were two
fundamental alternatives: -
1. Those who tried to maintain a political-economic regime with Somoza's
resignation and based on direct U.S. action.
2. The FSLN positions which proposed the need to destroy the dictator-
ship's criminal machinery.
During Chis time mediation emerged as a way of sabotaging the people's
_ struggle, he said.
We know who supported mediation and who refused it because it implied a -
pact with the dictatorship. This would have been the equivalent of
liquidating ourselves historically, he concluded.
- CSO: 3010
35 =
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. PI:RU
GOVERNMENT SEEKS MEASURES TO CHECK TYPHOID FEVER OUTBREAKS
PA140227 Havana PRELA in Spanish 0043 GMT 14 Mar 80 PA
[Text] Lima, 13 Mar (PL)--The district councils of I~ima will meet tomorrow -
with health inspectors to draf t an emergency plan to check typhoid fever
outbreaks in the capital, it was revealed today.
- The dangerous sickness has reached unprecedented levels in Lima, Callao _
and the rest of the country, according to official reports.
Tfie Directorate of Epidemiology of the Peruvian Health Ministry on 7 March
official.ly declared 1980 as "typhoid epidemic year" in the country, based
- un predicCions of. a high incidence of this ailment among the population.
Larly tliis month, the president of the Peruvian Society of Epidemiology,
_ Galindo Torres Zuniga, revealed that typhoid outbreaks had increased in the
Peruv[an capital by 100 percent, mainly affecting persons between the.ages ~
- of S and 35. '
_ The main producing and transmitting sources of this disease, which may become
endemic in the coming years, are found in the unsanitary conditions in which -
hundreds of thousands of persons live in the so-called young towns, communi-
ties surrounding Lima, according to authorized medical sources.
According to statistical figures, the health centers of Lima treated 2,058
cases of typhoid fever out of the 7,854 cases registered throughout the
country, in addition to 5,466 cases of salmonellosis, similar to typhoid
fever in 1979.
= CSO: 5400
36 _
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