JPRS ID: 9154 USSR REPORT HUMAN RESOURCES

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060040-9
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8999
25 ~viarch 1980 :
~
_ Near E st/ ort Africa Re ort
a N h
~
- ~ (FOUO ~0/80~
~B~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFOI~MATION SERVICE
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NOTE '
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- sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
' Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
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mation was summarized or extracted. -
Unfamiliar nzmes rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
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_ Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as ~
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; The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- -
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For further information on report content -
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JPR~ L/89 99
_ 25 March ].980
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT ~
_ (FOUO 10/80) -
- CONTENTS PAGE
,
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
President Bourguiba: 'Qadhdhafi Is Crdzy'
- (Liliane Gallifet; PARIS-MATCH, 15 Feb 80) 1
- AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan: No Empire Can Handle It
(CAMBIO 16, 3 Feb 80) 5
IRAN
Revolutionary Atmosphere in Tehran Said Simmerir,.g Down
_ (J2 cques Buob; L~EXPRESS, 19 Jan 80) 12 -
,
MAURITANIA
_ Next Few Years Viewed as Critical for Regime -
(Editorial; MARCHES TROPICAUX ~T MEDITERRANEENS,
11 Jan 80) 15
- Pro-Algerian Polisario Elements Gaining in Influence
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 16 Jan 80)......... 20
Need To ~testore Economy, Social, Political Problems Noted
- (Faiz Ouldna; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 4 Feb 80) 22 -
TUNTSIA
- Ahmed Ben Salah Elected Secretary General of MUP
(AFRIQtT~:-ASIE, 4-17 Feb 80) 25
Unanimous Election, by Adel Wahid
Biographic Informatior, `
- a - [IZI - NE & A - 121 FOUO] _
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page -
- Treatment of Impris~ned Trade-Unioni~ts Decried
- (Omar Nasser; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 4-17 Feb 80)............ 29
Prime Minister DiscusGes Gafsah Incidents, Domestic `
and Arab Issues
(Hedi Nouira Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, -
' 8-14 Feb 80) 32
-b-
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INTER-ARAB A~+~FAIRS
- PRFSIllENT BOURGUIBA: 'QADHDHAFI IS CRAZY!
Paxis PARIS-r�1ATCH in French 15 Feb 80 pp 28,33 -
[Article by Liliane Gallifet]
[Text~ Governed by a 76 year old man worn out by his struggle with
_ illness, Tunisia has just experienced another ordeal which shook the
entire country--the attempted uprising at u~,fsa, a town of 35,000 in-
- habitants in the south. This peacet'ul peo~~le, with no experience of wax~
has only one bulwark against Qadhdhafi's fcilly--F'ra,nce's friendship and
- its military aid. _
- itnkempt~ in tattered clothin,~, handcuffed~ some 30 pi~isoners faced me
_ in the oF:fices of hit;h security in the Ministry of the Interior. On an
avera~e} they were 25 yeaxs old ana they ~a,ce the death penalty. Their
= crime: the attack on Gafsa the night oi 26-27 January 1980 ahich was to
be foll.owed by the overthrow of the Tunisi~~.n Government wit:~ the help of
- a "forei~n power."
_ Noureddine Dridi comes from Tunis. The cuff of his grey, threadba.re
pants and his old sandals are covered with dust. He hobbles because he
was hit by a bullet during the attack. Sitting in a corner of a room
_ in the ministry~ the prisoner told his story. "I went to Libya in 1977
to work. One day in Tripoli~ I was in a cafe at noon, when an unmarked
cas stopped. All the young people in this cafe~ whatever their
nationality, were assembled and sent to a mil~.tary camp in Tripoli. They
took away our papers, then sent us to another camp 25 miles from Tripoli. -
There, for 3 months, we underwent commando training with li~ht, medium-
- caliber weapon~. Our instructors were Cuban, Soviet and Libyan."
l,'ith few variations, the scenaxio is the same for the 42 members of the
comma.ndo group taken prisoner at Gafsa. All went to Libya looking for
- work--like 10~,000 o.f their compatriots--holding papers more or less in
order; this somewhat illegal status put~ them at the mercy of the ~
authorities. Enlistnent in a training camp was sometimes camouflaged in
an offer of work and a,lways accompanied by promises of mone5?. Durin~
their 2 or 3 years o� training, some were sent ta J~ebanont some 40~, _
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according to ?~Toureddine i?ridi, between 18 and 20 years old, took part
with the Palestinians in the fighting a;ainst the Israelis. Some wPre ~
wounded~ others killed. Some months a.go~ they hinted to those m~os~; home- -
- sick that the,y mi~ht rett~rn to Tunisia by doin~; some smu~gling. The =
= prisonPr was m~.ich more discreet about what happened next. He who had
G~oken uninterruptedly for 20 minutes with perfect ease~ add.ing the names
of all h~s I~ibyan instructors and many cther precise details, forgot a11.
IJhen I asked him where he crossed the border, the interpreter told me:
"He does not know his ~eography." What exactly did he do when he
arrived in ~iafsa? "What you read in the newspapers. Obv~iously, the
Tunisian authori~ies do not wish to stress the capture of the town
abandoned by the army, which was holding maneuvers in ~'~e south, -
For several days, curiosity seekers were caxefully kept away from the town.
ldas this to conceal the presence of a 16 member intervention team from the
= national gendarmery? Nothing allowed us to confirm this rumor. When we _
arrived in G~,fsa, '350 Icilometers south of Tunis, no one appeaxed to have
anything to hi~.e. On the military airfield protected by several anti-
~ aircraft ba.tteries, guns pointed towaxd the sky, a Transall with a blue-
- white-red emblem on its sides occlipied a place of honor; "the other two
_ are in operation," we were told~ aa:3 so were the planes made available
to the Tunisian army by the king of TMlorocco. The town in dayli~ht had _
rFSUme~i nonchalant activity. One could scaxcely believe that several
days earlier this mining t;:~wn had been the scene of bloody ba.ttles. The _
- only reminders were the bullet holes in the walls of several buildings, ar~d -
a frame of a bus which the assailants ha,d used to sE~t up a barracad.e.
I had the privilege of examining minutely the incredible assenal, part -
of which had been discovered in a house, at police barracks near Tunis:
Franco-German G-3 rifles, Belgian Brownings, Belgian Fal rifles, very
sophisticated Rbj-7 Soviet bazookas, Sterling automatic pistols equipped -
with silencers, M-12 Beretta pistols, Yugoslav mor'~axs~ cases of
- a.mmunition, grenades an~ shells. On each weapon the manufacturing
_ numbers had been carefully scratche~. off but, something extraordinary,
bills from the British firm Presley to the Libyan Jamahiriya and printed
ma.tter in English were discovered, and on the cases could still be ~
_ discerned the half-erased address: Tripoli.
- In Gafsa, in the gardens of the governor's palace where the bougain-
- vill~a was in bloom~ some susnects covered with dust, with beards of
several days~~rowth~ were led in. The axmored cars and the ~anks took ~
up positions at all the strategic intersections. In neaxby alleys, the
= merchants sponta,neously talked of the hours of anguish they experienced
' that night~ holed up in their homes. Soldiers and policemen, most of
whom received their baptism of fire-- because, except for the 19']8 riots,
Tunisia has not experienced any axmed cla,~hes sir.ce its accession to
_ independence in 1956--continued to patrol and caxry out seasches on the
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. outskirts of the -~own. The rumor spread t~at three who flzd to the ne~,r-
by mountain were bei.ng sought.
N~verthele,s~ there were only two roadblocks on the 1?,5 kilometers be-
- tween Gaf:>a and Ne Fta where President Bour~;uiba. and his wi!'e arrived for
~ a stay in the country 3 days be~ore the attack. At the foot of desert
hi11s, donkeys, motorbikes and s:nall delivery trucks were on: the road as
- usual. On the road covered with sand, we passed herds of camels and
_ ~oats fiie;htine~ over the rare clumps of yellow grass, while on our car
radio the Libyan radio station announced that the fighting was raging in
Gafsa and other provinces of Tunisia.
?~~~om the terrace of their suite at the Sahara Palace, President Bourguiba.
and his wife, '~Tassila, loofied at the white domes of Nefta whose shadows
extended in the setting sun over the Chott and Jerid Desert.
- "My rrife wanted me to return to Tunis~ but why do that? We are fine here
and there is sunshine," said the president. "When that happened~ I
slept soundly," he added, "I was sure that it would not lead to anything."
Since illness laid him low, President Bourguiba has met only very raxely
with the international press. A heart attack, then viral hepatitus and
a nervous depression resulting in terrible insomnia kept riim away from
affairs. "It has been 10 years now~" said Mrs Bourguiba~ raising both
hands in an eloquent gesture. "I am glad you can see how well he is
anc~ what good shape he is in." The president, despite his 76 years,
seems, in fact, recovered, He is~ after Titoo the veteran head of state.
_ Illness affected his body~ but not his lucidity. "It took me one half
century of direct contacts and speeches to unite the tribes and sub-
tribes of this country; a union is not achieved overnight. Qadhdhafi
is totally insane. Of course, he is playing the Soviet's game~ bnit he is
too weak to be useful to the Soviets."
The president's days, in Tunis or elsewhere, unfold accord.ing to the same
- rhythm. Awakened at 0630, he has his breakfast in bed, listens to the
news on the radio and has one of his fri~nds who acts a~ his private
secretary reaci the newspaper to him in detail. At 1000, he takes a
- long walk. At Nefta~ he tramps through the palm grove with a quick step
_ every mornin~, o~rer 4 to 6 kilometers. Midway~ he sits on a folding
chair and glances at the headlir.es in the French press and has the
articles which interest him read to him. On his return, he meets with
seve.r.al visitors, watches the news on televi~ion and lunches at a set
time, ThP afternoon is devoted to rea,ding and short walks aro~and the
hotel.
Mrs I3ourguib~, onty rarely accompanies her husband to the palm grove.
"I have a bad knee," she said,leaning on my arm, "so I do not like to
_ walk these days. I avoid photographers and journalists," she added with
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broad smile, "because I am to~ heavy to look ~;ood in photographs and I
- speal: ?'rench too poorly to express myselP as I would wish." The first
laciy of Tunisia exu~.es intelli~ence and ~;oodness. Like her husband, she
- is outspoken. Qadhdhafi? "He wants union by force. I was astonished
that he attacked us during the president's iifetime. I thought he would
wait until his death. ~Je must break diplomatic relations completely with
him. I do not think he will last much longer. Even his people are
a.~ainst him." The Gafsa attack? "The commando group was larger than the
50 who were captured. The others escaped with local help. What concerns
me most is the quantity of weapons that they accumulated. There was
~ enou~h to equip a real army; they must have spent a yeax gathering all
- that to~ether."
~everal da~s after the attack President Bour~uiba. received a phone call
~'rom Libya. '~assila picked up the receiver: "I am his secretary, what
~lo you want?" she asked her interlocutor, Qadhdhafi's right hand man.
"c;o.lonel Qadhdhafi wants to speak to President Bourguiba...." "The
president has nothing to ~ay to you, " replied the "secretary" who put an
end to the communication. "I feel we are isolated here~ 500 kilometers
from Tunis, and I do not like it," she toid me. "I am always afraid that
so~ething will happen. I sometimes tell the president: 'You axe
oblivious .
- She unceas in~ly praised :~rance. She was present at the meeting her
husba.nd had with the Tunisian ambassador to France, Hedi Mabrouk. "We
know~ happily," she said, "that~if. necessary, President Giscaxd d'Estaing
r~ould even send us armed soldiers in uniform." Mrs Bourguiba did not
conceal her feax that the Gafsa attack might be the first stage of a
series of similiar raids. The Tunisian authorities, moreover, have
information that their embassies in Rome, Paxis and The Hague ~e
threatened with the same fate as the r^rench Embassy which was burned
t~fonday in Tripoli.
^1e~.sures wi11 be taken immediately to increase the small Tunisian axmy;
sentries may be postecl every 500 meters o.f the hundreds of kilometers of
- border with Libya and even with Algeria since the Ga.fsa attackers transited
- this cotzntry. 1~1i11 that be enough? "I consider that the most powerful
weapon is the people's support~" rPpeated President Bourguiba unceasin~;ly
- to his wi~'e. Is he worried about his country's future? "No. The
militants and the youn~ people whom I have trained for one half centuxy,"
he answered~ "wil~. face the future confidently."
COPYRIGHT: 1990 pax Cogedipresse S.A.
9~+~79
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- AFGHANISTAN
AFGHEINIS'PAN: NO EMPIRE CAN HANDLE IT
Madrid C~'~MBIO 16 in Spanish 3 Feb 80 pp 42-46
[Text] The Guerrillas Do Not Surr.ender
Ethnic, ideological and religious differences ~ceep the guerrillas from
' uniting their forces against the 5oviet Invaders. Isolated from the West,
d ispersed and poorly armed, the guerrillas have only one common goal:
= throw the Soviets out in any way possible.
After apparently sleeping for centuries, the Pakistani city of Peshawar has
a~ain become a participant in history. Located 30 km from Afghanistan, it
i~ on the road to the Khyber Pass, the historic threshold between central
ntiia and the Indian subcontinent. This strategic position allowed Peshawar
_ to ~;ive an involuntary welcome to Alexander the Great, to the founders of
tlie ~ionfiol dynasties which dominated India and to the British generals who
lost tl~ree wars to the fierce tribe~men. All the houses are small fortresses
' surrounded by exterior walls, towers and battlements. And there are few
p laces where more human beings have died in wars and episodes of violence
ttian in the Khyber Pass.
Now Peshawar has reencountered international fame, according to the testimony
of the hoard of journalists from throughout the world who roam its chaotic
_ streets. This is the headquarters of the Afghan rebels who are now fighting
- against Soviet invasion. Also to be found here is the Pakistani Land and
A ir Forces command, which is concentrated to deploy against its new neighbor,
the red army. The tribal chiefs come to the city to demand that the Paki-
stani president declare a holy war against the Soviet Union. In the immediate
area are the major Afghan refugee camps. There is a total of a half million
people dispersed along the lengthy border area. And in the midst of this
chaotic procession of historic events, the strangest and most intense traf-
f icking of drugs and arms continues, unaffected. From Peshawar reports Juan
Carlos Alganaraz, CAMBIO-16 special correspondent.
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r-
. 11 Kesistance Without Unity
Peshawar is the precise point where the rulers of Pakistan meet with the
tribesmen who dominate the mountains of the border with Afghanistan and
_ control the Khyber Pass. In the tribal zone the Pakistani presence is
nearly symbolic. This fact is basic for the future of the Afghan resist-
ance, since the possibilities of developing the resistance depend on supplies
and communications controlled by the Pathustan tribe in the central area and
ttie Baluchi tribe in the south. -
This ambivilance of power can be seen in the barracks of the Afghan resist-
ance, guarded by the mujahedin (holy guerrillas) themselves with their :
"kalashnikov" mach:.neguns on their shoulders. After interviewing a half -
dozen of the major groups, the conclusion of the CAMBIO 16 correspondent is
that the Afghan resistance lacks political as well as operational unity. In _
- the battlefield the only thing which unites them is the rejection of the
Soviet regime installed in April of 1978, which opened the road to civil `
- war, and now they also have the presence of the Soviet invader, a traditional
enemy since the times of the czars. -
.
"Actually, we are still recove.ring from the tremendous 'shock' of the in- -
vasion," Hassan Gailan, guerrilla military commander of the Patkia zone,
explained to CAMBIO 16 correspondent. Patkia is one of the most effective
centers of resistance against the Soviets.
Error in Calculation
Mangal Hussian, spokesman for the Islamic Party (Hizbi Islami), said: "When
the Soviets executed Amin and replaced him with Karmal, the mujahedin had
- complete control of the rural areas and had disrupted communications. We
calculate that within 3 to 6 months, Kabul (the capital of Afghanistan) would
have fallen into our hands. But the Russians were also aware of this and they
then launched their invasion."
A question without an answer is what would have happened after a mujahedin
- victory, because there is no unified poliCical command capable of supporting
a new government. Nor is there one now. The two principal groups now are
the National Front, led by Sayed Gaelami, and the Islamic Party, of Gulbuddin _
Hekmaytyar. In these two is concentrated the major portion of the political
loyalties and they have the principal guerrilla groups.
Hekmaytyar said: "They want us to appear to be a group of fanatics, but
there is nothing farther from the truth."
The Diagnosis of Hekmaytyar
"We went into bar.tle in 1968 because the king and his successor, Prince Daud,
opened the way for communism, which finally arrived in April of 1979 in the
various guises of Taraki, Amin and, now, Bab.rak Karmal. Our program clearly
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explai.ns that we want a society based on Muslim principles and we want to
follow the inspired teachings of the Koran. Traditional customs should also
- be respected, because they are iiidispensable to the identity of our people." _
It should be stated that in Afghanistan therF are about 15 ethnic groups,
each with its own customs and a series of codes ar.d norms centered on loyalty -
to distinct, and often antagonistic, tribes and clans.
"[f th~ communist governments Eell in the face of our fighting it was becausc =
tl~ey did not understand that the changes had to be made within our traditions.
_ Uur people love their independence a great cieal; they have fought for it for
centuries and they are deeply religious. But we do not want to create a reac- ,
tionary society, without social justice and buried.in the middle ages," con-
cluded Hekmaytyar.
The Radio Is a Weapon
The mountains lack vegetation to hide the presence of the guerrillas who
use, in order to escape detection from the air, the numerous caves and who
know how to camouflage themselves under the immense rocks or in the smallest
nooks. ~
"Our principal bases are the villages, the thousands of tiny villages which
give us all types of support and refuge. They are, in addition, our fami- _
1ies, our tribes, because we mujahedin always fight near the place where God
" sent us."
'I'lie huerrilla chiefs of: the Islamic Party proudly exhibited a short-wave
radio f:rom wtiich was emerging the sounds of the rebel radio station. "This ~
is a formidable support for our brothers in the resistance and for the _
refu~ees in the camps," they explained. Although 90 to 100 percent of the '
population is illiterate, radios and appara,,us for p'laying music are seen
everywhere. It doesn't matter how much it costs: this is a luxury which
- ttie Afghans will not do without.
In the National Front headquarters too the groups meet to listen to the
clandestine radio. As in the case of the Islamic Party, with almost identi- -
cal words the figures are repeated, regarding their own forces. "We control
the majority of the population and the guerrillas. The rest are minority
- groups."
_ Spokesman Mohamed Hakkim added: "Basically we have a different vision of _
the future. For this reason there is no unity, but only contacts with other
groups. 'The essential difference is that we believe in democracy as the
system to be implanted after the defeat of the Soviet invasion. We do not
want another dictaCorship in the name of Islam. We are Muslims and we ~
- respect our religion. But we want a secular state, modern and not managed
by the clergy. The mullahs (priests) are a~~ital part of our lives. Iiut -
their place is in the mosques and not in politics." -
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The clash between the National Front and the Islamic Party has blocked all -
_ possibility of a common resistanc~ action. In a headquarters of the Islamic -
Party, in addition to large photographs attesting to the successes of the
guerrillas or honoring the martyrs are effigies of the Ayatollah Talegani,
the great moderate religious leader of Iran who died a few months ago. -
A I,abyrinth of Rebels
The gap between the ideology which the Muslims support--without the fanaticism
oF a i~homeini--and the almost social democratic program of the National Fron~_
iti 'very,sm~ll. But what does constitute an unbridgeable barrier is the com-
plex personal`, tribal rivalries between the two groups. The remainder of the
groups, of le~ser importance, line up with the Khomeini (New Afghanistan),
fifie pro-China (Jamial Islami) and the most fanatic fun3amentalists (Jarakat
- 'I:nquelab::.I~iami) led by professor of theology Mohamed Nebi, tendencies. To
:~itl~s~ g~t.dup~s''are added others in Baluchistan, in the central provinces and
, ~ irr the Htir'~h. ` This torrent of parties and groups has received what nearly
,amqt~nts'~td~ ari ultimatum from the Muslim nations, follo~aing the meeting of the
Conference of Muslim Nations in Pakistan, to try to unify themselves and the _
Muslims will try to aid the resistance.
"We have won a number of sophisticated r~eapons from the Afghan Army, bur not
enough to fight against the Soviets," explains Commander Gailan, who belongs -
to the National Front. The Soviets have completed the first phase of their
operation--controi the main roads and cities--and now await the coming of
spring in order to move on the rebel strongholds in the mountains. _
~ Mule Rather '['han an Airplane -
_ "~o you expect aid from abroad?" _
The commander replies: "I~ is essential to us. This is not just our prob- _
lem, but that of all the Muslim people, of th~ whole Third World. We cannot
ask anymore of Pakistan. Just taking care of the refugees is sufficient.
_ �
But without weapons we cannot throw the Soviets out of our counCry. ,
"Will the Soviets be able to reestablish the Afghan Army?" -
- "The army dissolved because the successive co~mnunist governments killed the _
_ commanders. They will n~t be able to rebuild it, because the soldiers are
our brothers, our families and just as they deserted before, bringing us
their weapons, they will desert again. Since the invasian we have received
chiefs, officers and soldiers into our ranks and now they are mujahedin.
Even some former procommunist l.eaders have learned from the Russian invasion
that our independence is now at stake and they are fighting with u.s.
"We have something very precious: the support of the people. In these moun- _
tains, being able to deploy an old friend with a mu]~ is worth more than ten
tanks or a helicopter. So now what we have to do is prepare osrselves for a
very long, very bloody war in which our people will be victorious just as
they have always been over the centuries against all invaders." _
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In Peshawar reports are also received on the organization and the action
_ oC the re5istance in Kabul and the ma~or cities. During the days this
~ correspondent 5~~en~ in the A1"~;han capital and .Jalalabad the people's repudia-
tion oC the invasion was categorical and reached extremely imprudent praper-
tions.
I_n a bank, from the employees of an important local company, in the bazaar
and in the university, CANIBIO 16 saw evidence of a stubborn desire to resist. -
in the university, the only place in the city where the very few members of
t11e local bourgeoisie are appreciated, the students explained that the Amin
government had caused more than 100 of their colleagues to "disappear" some
20 of them from the same enginearing course. "During the first week of the
invasion other colleagiies also 'disappeared' the majority of them leftists -
- and we believe they are in jail."
But the left seems to have lost popularity since the invasion. Support is ~
_ almost always oriented toward the National Front or the Islamic Party. A _
youag medical student confessed to reporters: "I was thinking of completing
- my course and going to live abroad. But now I am going to stay and fight,
even if they kill me here. The victory is ours because we have God and the
Russians do not." �
- ''Che Russians Will Co'
Ingenuo~:s words? Perhaps, but stated in Kabul some 15 days after ttie in-
vasion tt~cy ring witii i.mpressive dignity and a mystical, Patriotic content
- whicl~ is the basis of t}ie resistance. -
I)espite the triumphant reports, the resistance in the cities is minimal
and in Kabul is limited�to the circulation of leaflets exhorting national
unity against the Soviets. , -
"But we organize more easily than anyone might imagine, because the police
have very little control." This information was given to CAMBIO 16 by an
AEghan who met this correspondent in Kabul. "It is basic, despite the risks,
that it be known that we are going to resist. And that they have to support
- us. We are beginning, but we in the cities and the mujahedin in the moun-
tains can hit and hit the Russians until they leave." -
It still remains to translate this national reaction into a common political
organization, which now seems diffi~ult after showing the degree of conflict
- between the islands or groups within the resistance. A poor peopl.e, back- -
ward, isolated and for now able to count only on the very insuhstantial
support oE the moral indignation of the West, the Muslim countries and the -
Third World, carries on its shoulders the resistance against a formidable
sunerpower. Will they continue alone? So far the world has shown that .
after the scandals caused by episodes such as the one in Afghanistan, time -
buries the great declarations and also the hopes of the victims. -
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Blood Came to Peshawar
Dragging a bulJet-wounded leg, Abdur accompanied us between the jumbled
rows of tents where the rest of his family is surviving. The refugee camp
stretches out for more than 2 km along the railroad which links Peshawar
with the cal~ital oC Pakistan, Islamabad.
The tents are insufficient to meet the needs for receiving the new wave of -
refugees caused by the Soviet invasion. Many families have improvised '
- pattietic huts of straw which provide little protection against the rain,
snow and the cold. _
Abdur, a 26-;ear-old man who learned English as a taxi driver in order to
converse with the tourists, said: "We arrived here 2 months ago. The Amin
government had launched an offensive in October. Our village, Ramak, was r
destroyed by artillery. Some 14 members of our family left and we joined a _
caravan to cross the mountains. We walked for 20 days in order to get here.
The worst was one morning when some soldiers shotme in the leg. They brought
- me as they were able, traveling at night, always in the snow. I survived,
but two children, an old man and a sick w~~man died on the road. Many have ;
rlied on the road. We also lost the few animals we had." ;
Abdur's family listens to his story in silence. In the tent there are some
- blankets, a little food and an improvised oven. They have arrived without j
anytlting in a land where t,1e people have very little to offer them. Above !
the ethnic and tribal differences here misery unites everyone. '
- '1'he camp holds the recent refugees. It is here that the tra~edy is greatest, _
where the needs are most pressing. Rahim Shamsiair, director of the Paki- i
stani Office of Assistance, told CAMBIO 16: "There are already more than a
half million refugees. We have asked for help from all countries and inter-
national organizations, bu:. so far very little aid has arrived. Only the
Pakistanis are making the effort to meet tha needs of this mass of people. _
Since the invasion, more and more refugees have arrived and, if it continues _
at this rate there will be more than a million by April." ~
In these camps, many located in quagmires, the men gather near the roads
with nothing to do or any where to go. Mawlawi, the chief of a family which
took nearly a month to get here, said: "tde were able to get here thanks to !
the tribes, our brothers of the borders, who guided us and gave us food.
Many of the sick and wounded remained with them because they could not cor.- _
tinue."
From the beginning of the war 20 months ago, the flow of refugees has fluc-
tuated in relation to the intensity of the bombing against the civilian
_ population. Now the government, over Radio Kabul broadcasts, is urging the -
people to return, but there are few who decide to return in the face of live
testimony offered by those who have arrived since the Soviet invasion. A1- ,
though the Russians are not trying to get to the guerrilla strongholds in the -
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high mountains, any movement against the rebels brings the artillery,
helicopters and airplanes into action against the smallest concentrations
cf people or villages, which are always guerrilla sanctuaries.
The mujahedin fight against the Russians, but they go to the mountains.
"We want to fight, but we have no weapons," explains one of the chiefs of
the camp located on the road between Peshawar and Barza. He adds: "It is
~ilso necessary to remember that those who are arriving now come from the `
combat zones on the border. Those who escape the war in the central area,
' iil I3emian and Badakshan, will take more than a month to get here. Those
wt~o can."
More political or patriotic speeches, the refugees demand food, shelter
and medical treatment. Although Pakistan is making a praiseworthy eitort, _
, it is easy to see that the aid is insufficient for the mass of refugees who
continue to arrive by the thousands. -
, COPYRIGHT: 1980 Informacion y Publicaciones, S.A.
CSO: 8048/7449
k
1 ~ c
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IRAN
REVOLUTIONARY ATMOSPHERE IN TEHRAN SAID SINII~TERING DOWN
_ Paris L'EXPRESS in French 19 Jan 80 p 94 ~ "
[Article by Jacques Buob, L'EXPRESS special correspondent in Tehran: "A
~ Dismal Period"]
- [Text] In spite of the impending presidential election, the revolution is
simmering down. And the taste for luxury and lust reappears on the scene.
~ Ttaelve months have elapsed since the shah's departure. On this 16th da~~ '
- of January 1980 Tehran is covered with snow, which blurs the ugliness of _
the city. The revolution is getting bored. In front of the United States
Embassy, which was stormed on 4 November last year, the banners which have
been soiled by the weather and weighted down by the rain and snow, are a =
dismal sight. The traffic has been restored on Talegani Avenue. Almost
forgotten are the 50 American hostages about whom we now know9 almost
certainly, that they have been dispersed throughout the city and even in
the countryside. The anniversary of the shah's flight went by in an _
atmosphere of almost complete indifference, far from mass demonstrations =
which had marked Tehran's daily life regularly until the last few weeks.
Meanwhile, at the Hotel Intercontinental, more than a hundred 3ournalists _
and technicians of all the American news media are packing their bags. .
They are being expelled by ttie Revolutionary Council for dissemination of
malevolent information. Having used the medi~ after the embassy incident -
to give weight to its anti-imperialist/American campaign, the regime is
- getting rid of them, now that it does not need them any more. Because,
if it was good to show the world a unanimous Iran shouting its hatred of
- America, it is less profitable to let pictures get out of Tabriz showing
fratricidal battles between supporters and opponents of the imam. It is -
not good to show summary executions of anti-Khomeynists. Nor is it good
to allow the media to say that insurgency is being hatched in Azerbaijan,
especially in Tabriz, where the movements which changed Iran's destiny ~
have always originated.
Nevertheless, the hour of an historical event approaches. On 25 January
(with a second round scheduled on 8 February), the Iranians will elect
- ~ the first president in their history by universal suffrage. The imam has ~
decided to play the game of free elections.
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- To the great chagrin of Ayatollah Khalkhali, the grand inquisitor of the _
Islamic tribunals, no mullah has been authorized to present himself as a _
candidate. Khomeyni himself will not give his patronage to anyone. Almost
120 Iranians have seized the chance to be nominated, among them a karate -
instructor, a master of hypnotism and an unemployed worker who stated that -
- since he was prepared to accept any offers, even though that meant going
- job hunting, he might as well try for the highest position. Of course,
the authorities considered this massive rush of candidates to be a perfectly
anti-revolutionary manifestation stemming from an imperialist-Zionist plot.
More than 100 have been eliminated under the pretext of callaboration with
the former regime or, simply, mental weakness. One of them (the karate
- instructor) has been arrested. He is accused of being a former collaborator
of SAVAK. ~
Half a dozen candidates are still in the running. One of the favorites, ~
- Jalaloddin Farsi, an obscure party worker from the powerful Party of the ~
Islamic Republic, dropped out 10 day~ before the election, the victim of
a low blow. It was discovered that his father was Afghan, which did not
permit him to seek the highest office: the candidate must be "of Iranian
stock." After the elimination of Farsi, two names remain at the head of i
the list: Admiral Seyed Ahmad Madani and Abolhassan Bani Sadr. In addition, -
there is the incumbent foreign minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, who had been -
considered soundly defeated until now. ~
The first candidate named above, who is the navy�s chief-of-staff and former
governor general of Khuzistan, carries the hopes of the nostalgic moderates
- of the National Front and the rich bazzar merchants who see in this military
man wearing civilian clothes a guarantor of a strong centralized power, a
liberal economy, and an end to uncertainty. He should be able to gather
the secular votes. -
The Anti-Sin Brigade.
13ani Sadr, in turn, forged a good reputation during his brief tenure in the _
Foreign Ministry. He counts on the support of a substantial part of the ;
clergy and the intellectual left. But there are no indications that these ;
two men will be reaching election day unscathed. Here the campaigns of '
disparagement are running full steam ahead; already Madani's American mili- ~
- tary training is held against him and Bani Sadr is being reproached for '
his 15 years of comfortable exile in Paris.
Even so, the new political game in this country does not excite Tehran,
under its blanket of snow. None of the candidates show in their programs _
_ the dynamic strength necessary to rekindle a revolution which is losing
steam again. '
On 14 January four officers of the imperial army were executed for having
fired at the crowd on Jaled Square during the riots in September 1978,
bringing to 732 the total number of persons officially executed since the
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~ ~zyatollat~'s return on 1 February 1979. The hostages are nearing the end
of their third month of detention. The Iranian government is signing �
economic treaties with North Korea. In Tehran, the big American cars are ~
reappearing after havir.g been prudently kept in the garage by their owners
to avoid provocations. The middle-class ladies are rediscovering their
- love of Western finery and, with the winter cold, their plush fur coats.
The prostitutes are timidly returning and slowly pacing the halls of the
big hotels. A ridiculous "anti-sin brigade" has ~ust been established
within the police in order to curb dancing, Western music, films and
immoral magazines. The taste for luxury and lust reappears on the scene
as a means of escape from Iran's boredom and its sad revolution. -
COPYRIGHT: 1980 S. A. Groupe Express
9261
CSO: 4900
. -
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_ ME'?URITAN IA
NEXT FEW YEARS VIEWED AS CRITICAL FOR REGIME -
P4ris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jan 80 pp 59, 60
[Editorial: "The koad to Recovery: Lieutenant-Colonel Haidalla Invested
With Full Power in Mauritania"]
[Text] All essential power will henceforth be concentrated in Lt-Col
Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla's hands following the change which occurred
on 4 January in the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.
While retaining his duties as prime minister and defense minister, he -
is replacing Lt-Col Mohamed Mahmoud Louly in the chairmanship of the
Military Committee of National Welfare, the country's supreme court.
Lieutenant-Colonel Louly had simultaneously been head of state, but his
purely honorary duties had gradually led him to dissociate himself from
public affairs.
Thus ended the bicephalism instituted on 6 April 1979 when the head of
state, then Lt-Col Mustapha Ould Mohamed Ould Saleck, who would later
resign, found himself confirming a prime minister in the person of Lt-Col
Ahmed Ould Bouceif, whose death in an airplane accident would result in
Lieutenant-Colonel Haidall~a's succeeding him.
Several days earlier on 20 March, Lieutenant-Colonel Saleck, challenged
by his peers, had in fact changed the constitutional charter promulgated
the date after President Moktar Ould Daddah's overthrow to his advantage,
conferring full powers on the chairman of the Military Committee "when
exceptional circumstances" necessitate. When creating the consultative
_ Nati~~nal Council with a view to involving the Mauritanian people in
political decisions, he took advantage of this change to eliminate from -
the government the three principal heads of the "progressive" trend who
were considered supporters of the Front Polisario. The council was unable
to meet as planned on 30 March owing to the refusal to sit of 26 black
Afri.can representatives who called the number of seats reserved for them -
- on the council "iniquitous." The Moorish community was represented by
80 representatives. At the same time a Front of Armed Struggle for Se1f -
Determination of Black African Populations (the Walfougui Front) emerged;
unrest developed in academic circles, and an atmosphere of crisis spread
to Nouakchott.
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Thus, with the support of officers considered to be "pro-West," Lieutenant-
Colonel Bouceif decided to give himself the post of prime minister. The
head of state was retained in the chairmanship of the Military Committcc
but saw his powers considerably limited after Lieutenant-Colonel Bouceif's ~
death and Lieutenant-Colonel Saleck's resignation. Lieutenant-Colonel
_ Haidalla became prime minister, and Lieutenant-Colonel Louly, chairman
of the Military Committee and head of state. ~
Between a head of state without real power and a prime minister who is
;~~�the true master of the country, the division of powers could not fail to
...,G~~,ate a political malaise which would aggravate the opposition between the
~two different~trends represented in,�the Military Gommittee. In order to -
~'�~dYscard a structure that seemed increasingly ill-adapted to the country's
situation and, to the grav~,xy of~ it.s problems, the Military Committee,
` wh~ch met on 4,'January with a11 members present, concluded that it was
~~"necessary to return to a system conferring all power on a single official.
According to reliab le sources, a vote produced a large majority for the
1~'~appointment of Lieutenant-Colonel Haidalla. Later on, a new constitutional
~charter w ill specify,t�he division of powers between the state and the
' Military Committee~
,
~~he designation;of..Lieutenant-Colonel Haidalla to the highest post in fact
const3tutes,sim le'normalization. In reality he held power even before
acceding'~~o''the~post of prime minister on 31 May 1979, since he had pre-
_ viously been chief of staff from 10 July 1978, the date of President -
~Moktar Ould Daddah's overthrow in which he had played a major role, until.
~K'tiApril 1979 and was minister of national defense after that. _
"Born in Houadhibou to a semi-nomadic, semi-sedentary family, and a for-
~'mer student of Saint-Cyr Military School, he made his mark in the army
through his courage, his competence and his incontestable intQgrity.
Almost shy, devoid of personal political ambition, ready to restore power
to civilians if they were more worthy than he to exercise it, imbued with
- a high sense of duty which forbade him to leave his country's service,
Lieutenant-Colonel Haidalla, a sincere nationalist, has retained the -
- simplicity of a meharist officer and an abhorrence of all financial com- -
promise. Under his authority a certain number of civilian and military
officials who did not display the same strictness were eliminated.
~ As an editorial of the daily newspaper CHAAB emphasized, the Military '
- Committee wanted "to rid itself of all fence-sitters and other opportu-
nists who served only their own selfish interests and who ended up being
an obstacle on the road to radicalization of the ideas and principles
of the moveLlent of 10 July 1978." By taking power on that day, "the
Armed Forces undertook the re-establishment of peace and began the coun-
try's economic, financial and social recovery."
The first objective was realized on S August with the signing of the
"definitive peace accord" between the Front Polisario, which thereby
16
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claims to have no territorial claims on Mauritania and the Islamic Repub-
_ lic of Mauritania, which for its part declares that it has no territorial
_ claims on the former Spanish Sahara. Since withdrawing from the war, the
government of Colonel Haidalla has endeavored to maintain a position of
titrlct neutrality between Morocco an3 Algerifl.
The evacuation by Morocco of its last garrison at Bir Moghrein normalized
relations between the two countries, and it is unlikely that Mauritania's
. foreign policy has been affected by the change which occurred in
_ Nouakchott, except pErhaps for more pronounced "rapprochement" with
Algeria, say some observers, calling attention to the fact that the new
incumbents of two k~y posts, the minister of f~reign affairs and the
minister of the interior, are known for rheir sympathy for Algeria, while
- the supporters of Morocco have been eliminated from the new government.
Before attacking economic and financial problems Lieutenant-Colonel
Haidalla was able to defuse the tension between the Moorish and black
African communities. Bilingualism has been retained for the next six
years, leaving hope for the promotion of national languages and thus
giving satisfaction (at least during a long trial period) to the justi-
fied demands of black students, who now seem themselves largely eliminated
from the competition for admittance to the civil service by their ignor-
ance of the Arabic Ianguage. The reopening of the schools carried out
last October without incident bears witness to the calming of tempers in
this area.
Without dissociating itself from the evolution of the situation in the
- Sahara and from the solution which will one day be found for it, the
Military Committee, by increasing Lieutenant-Colonel Haidalla's powers,
wished to give him the means to pursue energetically the ecnnomic and
financial recovery which began six months ago and which has been indicated
by distinct improvement over the situation prevailing a year ago.
Military outlays, which had risen to 5 billion ouguiya* during the last
year of war, should be reduced ~radually as the government reduces the
army's effective forces to their prior level by gradual demobilization of
approximately 10,000 men. Reform of public finances has been undertaken,
and struggle against waste and corruption, begun since Lieutenant-
Colonel Haidalla's coming to power. Fiscal laws have been strengthened.
Austerity measures which have made it possible to reduce public expendi-
_ tures by approximately 10 percent in 1979 have been reintroduced in the
1980 budget. The Zouerate iron mines have been put back into operation,
and iron production is on the road to recovery. Production for the first
six months of 1979 was 35 percent higher than far the first six months
_ of 1978, and the corresponding receipts from exports were 54 percent
higher.
Mauritania has chosen to pursue the realization of infrastructure works,
the beneficial effects of which will not be felt for several years. Thus
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work on the deep water port of Nouakchott is continuing, and the realiza- ~
tion of the second section (Boutilmiy-Nema) of the 1,100-kilometex' road _
which will later link up with the trans-West Africa (Dakar-N'Djamena)
road has just been ~egun. Exploration in connection with the possibili- _
ties of exploitation of hydrocarbons in the east of the country and off-
- sho~e off Nouakchott and of uranium in the north-east between Bir-
Maghrein and Ain Tsen T~lli is being continued with the participation of =
French companies. The financing of the Guelbs project, valued at $S00
million, will henceforth be underwritten simultaneously by the World
Bank and by 50 investment or assistance funds, including the Central
Economic Co-operation Fund. This project will provide, in addition to .
the opening of two mines in E1 Rheih and Oun Arwagen, for the construc-
tion of mineral crushing and enrichment units, should enable Mauritania
to maintain and even develop exploitation of iron ore after the exhaus-
tion of the Zouerate deposits, predicted for 1992, to ensure the govern-
ment of receipts in currency and to create several thousand jobs while
retaining qualified Mauritanian personnel presently employed by SNIM
[National Industrial and Mining Company] in Zouerate.
- At the same time, the government is engaged in developing the country's ;
two principal potential resources: agriculture, in these last years I-
a victim of persistent drought and of the preceding regime's neglect,
and fishing. The prior system of thoughtless granting of fishing li-
censes deprived Mauritania of the greai::~~t part of the resources due it ;
from fishirig. ~
- Large agricultural projects and projects for creating agro-food industries
are contingent on the realization of the Diama and Manantali dams. But i
as ot this writing, work on irrigation (Gargal) or the planning of large
projects (including that of the M'Pourie plain with Chinese assistance)
is either in progress or under study.
A French mission came to Nouakchott last October to explore the possibili-
ties of fishing along the Mauritanian coast, continuing co-operation of
_ long standing between France and Mauritania in matters of evaluating
and managing the qualities and quantities of fish in Mauritanian waters.
The Mauritanian government intends hereafter to protect its fishing
resources and to develop small-scale fishing for the benefit of its i
citizens, to give priority to foreign equipment which will maintain '
- local plants in such a way as to make the existing industries profitable, ;
to create new ones if possible and to increase budgetary resources. The
renewal or signing of new fishing contracts will henceforth make allow-
ances for these new objectives.
Thus it is not Mauritania's long-term future which inspires concern but
- rather the next few years to come during which the new regime must sur-
mount the after-effects of the war, put the administration in order,
revive public spirit and restore the confidence of friendly countries
- whose financial assistance has enabled it to weather the last few diffi-
cult years. In their co-operation is sustained, particularly that of the
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Gulf States and of the Near-East states, which in the name of Islamic
- solidarity have never spared their support, then Mauritania will be able
to regain its equilibrium at the budgetary level within four or five
ye~irs. Tl~e minister oE fLnance expressed thLs exrectation while prese~it- _
[ng the 1980 budget. The presence of Lieutenant-Colonel tlaidr;.llu at ll~~~
- head of the government should ~ustify him.
FOOTNOTE -
* 1 ouguiya = Fr 0.10
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1980
9380
CSO: 4400
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MAURITANIA
, PRO-ALGERIAN POLISARIO ELEMENTS GAINING IN INFLUENCE
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUr. in French 16 Jan 80 p 31
[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani]
[Text] "Eighteen months of peace have killed off more Mauritanian arml~ officers ~
than 3 and a half years of war," someone said, with a touch of irony, in .
Nouakchott after the recent purges which took place in the Military Committee ~
for National Salvation (CMSN) and in the government. It is true that, of i
the 18 regrouped off icers on the day after the coup d'etat of 10 July 1978, ~
only 6 in the Military Cammittee for National Recovery (CMRN) remained in ~
active service. Moreover, of the 16 ministers who made up the government
after Ould Daddah, only 3 remain in power. Hence, one can say that the f irst
9 months of the military regime have been "cal~" and it is since April of 1979 i
that the machine seems to have taken off at high speed. ~
~
In the course of the past 9 months, Mauritania has had 3 presidents and 2
prime ministers, all assumed to be "strong men." The latest, Khouna Ould
Haidalla, once again took over the duties of president and leader of the
government, while also hanging on to the Defense Ministry. On Friday, 4
- January, he eliminated the acknowledged president of the Republic, Lt Col _
Mahmoud Ould Louly, and above all, his most dangerous rival, Lt Col Ahmed
Salem Ould Sidi. The latter was the vice president of the CMSN and for a ~
few days had held power pro-tem, immediately after the accidental death of ~
Lt Col Ahmed Ould Bousseif, on 27 May 1979. ~
i
_ Other officers, such as Maj Thiam el-Hadj, former minister of the interior, i
and Lt Col Sheik Ould Boyde, former chief of the constabulary, were accused
of lukewarmness and opportunism, and thus were superseded. These decisions ;
to shelve the old guard made room for a military and governmental team that -
was deemed more "homogeneous" and "well-knit." '
- However, the homogeneity was achieved at the cost of the "neutrality" which ~
Mauritania had relentlessly sought. Since the position was almost untenable,
we now witness new and accelerated moves toward Algeria and the POLISARIO,
- made over the last few days, together with a massive elimination of the
"pro-Moroccans" or "pro-Westerns," whether military or civilians.
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And What Next?
- The most notable of departures from the government was that of Ahmed Ould
Abdal?ah, until recently :ninister for foreign affairs, whose main stYength
_ was his relationship to his namesake, Lt Col Ahmed Ou1d Abdallah, chief of
staff. It was the latter who, on 31 May 1979, established Khouna Ould ~
Haidalla as prime ~ninister, by virtue of his direct authority over the
chiefs of the eight military regions. Is the departure of the minister for _
foreign affairs to be regarded as the prelude to the eclipse of the chief
- of staff?
While we wait for an answer, it is Algeria and the POLISARIO who have been
marking up points. The new ministers for the interior (Moulaye Ould
Boukhreiss) and foreign affa~rs (Mokhtar Ould Zamel) are among their
strongest supporters. The French, including the French military presently _
in Mauritania, for the time being are attempting to maintain a detached
_ attitude...while f eeling shifting sands slip away under their feet.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Af rique GRUPJIA 1980
7129 '
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MAURITANIA
,
i=
~ NEED TO RESTORE ECONOMY, SOCIAL, POLITICAL PROBZEMS NOTED ~
_ ..Paris ArRIQUE-ASIE in Frencri 4 Feb 80 p 26
~~,',~{Arb3cle;by Faiz Ouldna: "Nation's Salvation Changes Hands"]
.,i [Text] The new chief of state, who in the eyes of !
' Mauritanians is cons~dered a personality above all +
suspicion, will have to get tfie cuuntry back on the i
track. ~
~
Mauritanians began the year 1980 with a new chief of state, Lt Col Mohamed ,
Khouna Ould Haidallah. In the new leadership team, the successor to Lt Col
Ould Louly, Ould Haidallah, in addition to his job as chairman of the
CMSN (Military Committee for National Salvation), is also T~ead of govern- i
~ ment and defense minister. According to the constitution, the so-called -
"4 January" Constitution, the CMSN moreover must appoint a new president
in case the sitting president is definitel5� disabled. An acting presi-
dent therefore is no longer possible since the new chief of state fias
taken the necessary steps and has simply dropped the posts of first
and second vice chairman c` the CMSN. '
There is thus every reason to believe that the current numtier one man in
Mauritania is determined to consolidate his power and to guarantee the ~
country's leadership in a more rigorous fashion. This is so especially i
~ince the new constitution stipulates that the chairman of the CMSN, who ~
holds executive power, is also the supreme commander of the armed forces.
It is therefore up to him to make decisions on appointments to civilian ~
and military positions as well as diplomatic accreditations.
Out of fear that this might be a little bit too much concentration of power ~
in one person, public opinion has recentlq expressed some reservations
which, to be sure, were quickly stifled, by tfie supporters of a strong -
central government and serious and energetic restoration of contr~l over _
the country's destiny. These minor protests however seem to lie counter-
balanced by the very high esteem and respect inspired by the personality
of Ould Haidallah who, in the eyes of Mauritanians, is a citizen aTaove and _
beyond suspicion, determined to pursue a policy of real neutrality.
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It is in any case certain that, in view of the maneuvers by the Royal _
Palace in Rabat, Nouakchott would have to react very clearly and without
any complaisance. People are only too aware of what the wait-and-see _
' attitude of Mr Ould Salek--who at that time was chairman of the Military ~
Committee for National Recovery--cost the country.
Mauritania certainly is no longer at war. But the toughest job remains
yet to be done: getting the country back on the track. The important
~hing as ,i matter of fact now is to make up the delay caused by the war
efEort imposecl by Ould Daddah and surmount the real or artificial dif-
�iculties which sprang up over these past 5 years.
_ First of all there was the problem of Mauritanians of black origin which
a certain Western press exploited skillfully butwhich suddenly declined in -
- significance, especially af.ter the champion of this cause, Mr Senghor, had
personally reassured his Mauritanian counterpart. This initiative coin-
cided with Morocco's reinforcing its positions along the northern border -
of the RIM (Islamic Republic of Mauritania). In other words, the various
_ Moroccan maneuvers of destabilizing the country were essentially aimed at
this "ethnic conscience," as it is called by the specialists: a perfect
- colonial blemish which is still a painful sore. _
The danger is all the more real since it is known that the trouble is
brewing particularly among the young people and in the schools; this is
an environment where the Muslim Brotherhood is beginning to assert itself -
~ Eorcefully. The mllitants of the PKM [Party of Mauritanian Toilers]
(Kahidine), at Nouakchott, the ethnic problem helps to "alienate the
m~isses from the class struggle which is supposed to overthrow the conser-
va~ive secular [centuries-old] structures and plunge us into an intermin-
able language dispute. These controvers.ies by the way can only alter -
the concept of national identity, according to all evidence." In the _
clandestine journal SAYHAT EL-MAZLOUM (the Cry of the Oppressed), the
PKM constantly keeps calling for a radical conversion of the Mauritanian
social structure, often still governed by feudal laws.
The second major problem which Mr Quld Haidallah must urgently address
himself to is of an economic nature. For the fragile Mauritanian economy, -
the bell has been tolling since since 1968, as a result of the drought
which settled all over the Sahel. Although, especially 3ue to earnings _
from the fishing industry, total disaster was partly averted, the Saharan
conf lict aggravated the situation, gobbling up all of the profits earned
and a large portion of foreign aid.
Right now, there is practically only one economically viable region,
situated on the Chemama, the Mauritanian bank of the Senegal River. But
_ the speculations of Senegalese merchants are turning out well, in particu-
- lar causing the transfe~, across the tiorders, of entire herds, cereal
crops, or the earnings derived from their sale; that means that Mauritania
is losing considerable revenues.
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_ i.
Here again the task of the government in Nouakchott would appear to tie
- enormous since it presupposes a kind of "opening up" of the southern part
uf the country.
~ pc~tenCin.LLy Stxong Mauritanlfln state howevc~r cnn der.�Ivc r~�~:.(.mum prc~f I t�r?
�rom the confused economic and social situation prevailing in the south -
where the brotherhood of the Ti~aniya (.founded in Algeria in 1782 by
Sheikh Ahmen Tijani) occupies a preponderant place on lioth banks uf the
Senegal River. ~
The statement by a CMSN spokesman, who recently asserted that Mauritania
would provide new impetus within tfie regional~organizations (OMVS jSenegal
River Development Organization], CEAO jWest African Economic Community]),
to which it belongs, undoubtedly runs in tliat direction. ,
This assertion shows in any case that Nouakcfiott is today looking for new ~
and solid guarantees intended to protect the country aga3:nst tlie neo- _
colonial maneuvers of Rabat and its accolytes.
i
i
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AFRIQUE-ASIE ~
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~ TUNISIA -
AHMED BEN SALAH ELECTED SECRETARY GENERAL OF MUP -
Unanimous Election
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 4-17 Feb 80 pp 23-25
[Article by Adel Wahid: "Ahmed Ben Salah Unanimously Elected Secretary
General of MtJP"]
[Text] The National Preparatory Conference of the Popular
' Unity Movement [MUP] animated by Ahmed Ben Salah has just
given itself structures which will enable it to look for-
ward to the Constitutional Convention. ~
Ahmed Ben Salah was unanimously elected, at the end of the labors of the _
National Preparatory Conference, Secretary General of the Popular Unity =
- Movement (MUP). Also put in place were a politburo and a national council,
whose tasks and jurisdiction were defined by the appropriate procedures.
Al1 these decisions submitted to the vote and approved by all the delegates -
have only a provisional character, while awaiting in particular the holding
of a constitutional convention, wnich can only be held in Tunisia itself,
as the MUP leaders forcefully reaffirmed to us:` In a new Tunisia, free, .
democratic, at last rid of all forms of oppression and repression, committed
to the path of socialist construction and united with all peoples struggl-
- ing to win their liberty and independence. _
- It is syu~bolic that the National Preparatory Conference of the MUP should
be held 'ten years after the rightist judicial coup of September 1969. It
was then that Ahmed Ben Salah, the principal force and promoter of the -
socialist experiment of the sixties, was arraigned before a High Court of
Justice created to that end and which was under orders from the Palace
of Carthage. Ahmed Ben Salah was sent to prison, from which he escaped in
February 1973 to announce, some months later, from beyond Tunisia's borders, ~
the creation of th e MUP.
It is also symbolic that this conference took place less than three years _
~ after the wave of repression which struck hard at the movement in March
1977. It is this in fact which provides the best proof of the vitality,
- , _
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j
= the deep-rootedness, the strengthening of this socio-political current ,
_ whose origins go back to the workers' movement and to the battles led by ~
the two great figures of Tunisian syndicalism: M'hamed Ali al-Hammi and
Farhat Hached.
The event is of great importance, as much from the importance and diversity
- of the subjects submitted for de~~,.~te as �rom the new structures added to
the MUP, made necessary by the extension an.d enlargement of the bases of
. the movement, both in Tunisia and abroad. ~
An Iniquitous Fiscal Policy
In the course of. the work sessions, some of which lasted more than 10 hours =
under the chairmanship of the indefatigable Ahmed Ben Salah, the numei-ous ~
delegates, sent from various branches of the movement, discussed and sifted
three reports by committees designated several months before and whose con- ~
clusions w ill soon be mad.e public. But here and now, authorized MUP mem-
- bers we have met have painted a general picture of the national conference
and given us the tenor of the reports studied, pointing out, however, that :
it will be up to the MUP [constitutiona?.] convention to ratify or modify '
these decisions.
i
i-
Underlining from the beginning that the notion of national unity is /"used ;
like a repressive ideology in the service of the dominant class and the j
privileged,"/ and that, throughout the decade of the seventies, [the ~
forces of] reaction /"exploited this to discredit socialism along with I-
everyting else that has reference to the laboring masses and progressive !
forces, / the economic report denounces the campaign orchestrated against ~
- the public sector, accused by the authorities of being poorly administered
and inefficient. It also denounces the decline of investment in this sec-
tor, as also the "sale to the highest bidder" of the national economy, the
pivot of the present eco~:~mic policy, notably through the bias of the laws
_ of April 1972 and August 1974 and the exorbitant fiscal advantages con-
ferred on foreign capital. ~
The economic policy followed during the decade 1970-1980 further aggravated I
the inequalities between individuals and classes. Thus more and more
Tunisians fall under the poverty line, while the redistribution of national ~
- income becomes more and more unequal to the detriment of the working masses
(decline of aggregate wages in the national income and orientation of pro-
= fits toward consumption for the benefit of the leisure classes, concentra-
- tion of landed property in the hands of a minority of rich farmers...).
In other areas, the regime has opted for a system of iniquitous taxes which '
punish the wage-earners and the working masses and which accentuated ~he
- gaps between generations and regions (decline of investments in the most ,
deprived zones of the country...). The conclusion of this important report,
supported by statistics, is clear: the present economic policy is not neces-
sary; it can and should be changed. Besides, in the near future, +the MUP
" will propose an overall_ so~.ution.
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f~or~c~r_tc:r. Youth
Because the failure of the liberal-capitalist policy led during the last
10 years is, according to the political report, patent. And recourse to
permanent repression has been the only means of imposing this choice (vio-
- lation of the constitution, multiplication of political trials, mass
nrresls tn the ranks of the ~rogressive and democratic forc~s, use oC Lor- _
Cure...). 1'he ~rocess of Lascistiz~~tian re~ulted in the massacres of 'L6
January 1978, in the total break between government and the popular masses,
in the isolation of the Destour and in the present political impasse, none
of which can be shoved under a rug by the authorities who regularly pro-
- pagate rumors of an "opening-up" and "liberalization." Reaffirming the
MUP's fidelity to its fundamental principles spelled out in the "manifesto -
of the Popular Unity Movement" of March 1975, the political report decla-
res that /"the socialism for which we fitht is not opposed to the notion _
of democracy-- indeed cannot be distinguished from it,"/ and recalls that
the MUP chose the democratic path in its fight. Elsewhere, the document
- contains a long analysis of thQ relations of the MUP with other political
- currents, with the present situation of the country, and the place of the
MUP in Tunisian society and political lif e.
The national conference of the MUP paid particular attention to youth and
to the grave problems confronting it. One report was in fact dedicated
- to this fundamental question. In a country like Tunisia, where more than
half of the people are younger than age 20, it is imperative to conduct
a strong and courageous policy in the interests of youth, the guarantor
oC the Tunisia of tomorrow. Now youth today are bullied, discredited, and -
repressed. The rise in unemployment, the absense of any future, have
thrown large sectors of the youth into despair and indifference, and are
at the origin of the increase in juvenile delinquence. Lost, forsaken, _
youth has more than once risen up against the regime responsib le for this
situation. Throughout the animated debates, it was thrown into relief _
_ that the Popular Unity Movement must be seen as a national liberation
movement, open to all progressives of diverse views, united around a common
roject but linked by political discipline, and the many delegates speak-
ing in turn insisted on emphasizing it. /"To present the country an over-
all solution as. much on the political and economic planes as on the ideo-
J logical," "to develop the struggles and strengthen the bases of the move-
ment,"/ these are the kind of essential tasks to which the MUP is apply-
ing itself today.
The developments which can occur in the situation of the country are unfor-
seeable, and one must be prepared to confront no matter what circumstance,
with faith and determination.
, Biographic Information
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 4-17 Feb 80 p 24
[Article: "Always a Militant"]
' [TextJ Ahmed Ben Salah was born 13 January 1926 in the small village of
Mohnine. Starting at age 14, he committed himself to the struggle agains
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colonialism. In 1946, he went to pursue advanced studies in Paris and
there became secretary general of the Neo-Destour cell. He was responsi-
ble notably for maintaining liaison between his party and the bey Moncef,
exiled to Pau by the colonial authorities because of his support Co the
nationalists. i
Upon returning to Tunisia, Ahmed Ben Salah continued to militate actively '
in the ranks of the Neo-Destour and the syndicate Tunisian General Federa-
tion of Labor [UGTT]. Farhat Hached makes h im responsible for represent- -
ing UGTT before the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions ~
[ICFTU] in Brussels, wh ich he did until 1954, when he was elected by the ;
- Fifth Ccngress of the UGTT as secretary general of that organization.
(He succeeded Farhat Hached, assassinated on 5 December 1952 by a terrorist i
organizatioi~ in service to the colonial authorities). In September 1956, -
Ben Salah was abruptly relieved of his duties as secretary general of ~
the UGTT by the prime minister of the time, Habib Bourguiba. He was ~
criticized for having vigorously defended the UGTT program, which called
for, among other things, a profound structural reform in all areas to
bring Tunisia onto the socialist path. -
In 1957 he was named secretary of state for public health, then in 1960 I
he was given the ministry of planning. He published with other socialist ~
militants "Perspectives of Development for the Decade." which would guide ;
- the economic policy of the sixties and which were directly inspired by !
the UGTT program of 1956.
In October 1964 the Neo-Destour, now become the Destourian Socialist Party, I
- opted for socialism as a basis for planning and structural reform. Hav- ~
ing become minister of planning, the economy, then national education,
Ahmed Ben Sala gave of himself without measure to make this policy suc-
ceed in spite of the resistance of the leisure classes, who tried to ~
sabotage his work. ;
Finally, [the forces of] reaction and certain foreign powers which put
pressure on Bourguiba ~ot the upper hand and, in September 1969 Ben Salah !
was sacked, put under house arrest in November, arrested in March 1970,
then condemned in May of the same year to 10 years of hard labor. On 5 I-
February 1973 he escaped from the Tunis prison and got to Europe where, i-
since then, he has lived in exile. In May 1973 he announced, in a lengthy I_
declaration, the creation of the Popular Unity Movement. In August 1977
he was again condemned to 8 years in prison at the time of the proceedings
brought against MUP militants. _
On 25 June 1978, Ben Salah sustained, at the Sorbonne, a doctoral thesis ,
in sociology entitled, "Men, Structures, and Developanent: The Tunisian
Experiment, 1961-1969." In addition, he discoursed at length on the
Tunisian policy in the sixties in a book published, in Maspero, by Marc ;
Nerfin: "Talks with Ahmed Ben Salah."
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AFRIQUE-ASIE ~
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TUNISIA
TREATMENT OF IMPRISONED TRADE-UNIONISTS DECRIED
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 4-17 Feb 80 p 25
[Article by Omar Nasser: "Winter of the Detainees"J
[Text] In prison and out of prison, the Destourian power
uses constant violence to try to keep the people doTan.
Someday we must collect all the testimony of victims of the political
~ trials--some hundred in all--b rought against opponents by the Bourguiba-
Nouira-Sayah government, in order to write the black book of the Tunisian
prison regime. It is in truth a machine for torturing and destroying:
the true face of a Destourian power which tramples under foot the dignity
of an entire people. How can one really not be profoundly disturbed lis-
tening to an old trade unionist, arrested the day after the massacre of
26 January 1978--which brought many more deaths than admitted by the sbi-
- res [translation unknown] of Sayah--confide to a European doctor that the
French colonists were more humane with their prisoners, Tunisian national-
= ists, than is today's regime of "independent Tunisia"? _
- After the butchery :f "Black Thursday", 26 January, the trade unionists
and political opponents, as well as 7,000 young people rounded up by the
police and whose main crime was to be unemployed, languish in prisons in
the most abominable conditions. -
In their humid and icy cells, most are nourished--when their families -
cannot furnish them with a daily "basket"--by a notorious soup, full of
parasites and bereft of the least protein. They do no~ get the chance to
be part of the small number of known prisoners which the authorities show- -
- case to try to fool an indignant international opinion. And even those _
who could pass for being "privileged," cannot get their needs attended
_ and get out of the total isolation in which they are confined. This is
_ th e case of the trade unionist Abdelaziz Ghorbal, whose right arm is
nearly paralyzed. All the detained have also been tortured. Torture
which one Destourian official described as simple beating with a stick,
_ comparab~le to that which is endured by recalcitrant students in the schoois.
"Refined" tortures, in reality, learned by the jailers in the course of
� their trips to the United States or the FRG. _
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As well as sexual abuses about which the victims often will not speak for
shame, or electrical tortures, or the "helicopter" system (which has been -
compared to bastinado), or the procedure of the "drop of water," which are
as often described by the detainec? and whose objective is not to force a
confession but to destroy systemat.ically their victims and to spread out
of the prisons a cunning fear wh~::h grips the whole country. To the point
that certain families no longer dare admit--especially after Black
Thursday--the death of one of their own, from fear that...One never knows...
Alarmed by this state of affairs, the Council of the Order of Tunisian
physicians recently succeeded in having adopted a law which requires that
each prison doc:tor immediately inform judicatory authorities in case he
witnesses e~idence of cruelty. A courageous initiative in itself, but
one which is doomed to have no effect. Because it is in the secrecy of
police stations that torture is per�ormed, and it is there that victims ~
of "preventive arres t''. can remain locked up for more than a year: The
responsib}lity of the prison doctors in the situation of the detainees
- however remains real. Some are hardened to the point of sadism, and
others simply refuse to take initiatives in making investigations of the ;
state of health of the detainees. ~
What exactly happened to Said Guagui, tortured in prison, as he recounted ~
in detail before his death, 9 January 1979, as a victim of generalized .
cancer? What happened to Sallouz, native of Menzel Bourguiba, militant ~
belonging to the "Ech-Chaab clandestine" group, dead in suspicious cir-
cumstances three months after his release from prison? And these are
only a few cases which broke through the wall of silence and fear.
This somber picture, comes from testimony collected by Dr Antoine Lazarus
~ and Ms Le Loc'H Marianne, who recently visited Tunisia and are thus able
to paint it. The first, leader of a multiprofessional group on prisons
and professor of preventive and social medicine at tl~e CHU [expansion
unknown] of the Saint-Antoine Hospital in Paris, came to Tunisia last 10 '
January in connection ~~~ith a medical mission inquiry on the conditions i
of prisoners of conscience. The second, a leader of the health federa- !
tion in the CGT [General Confederation of Labor], went during the same ~
period on a mission to Tunisian trade unionists and their families. Both
gave accounts of their observations in the course of a press conference
called by the "Tunisian Collective of 26 January," in the context of two
weeks of solidarity with the Tunisian workers and the UGTT, their legi- -
timate union.
Strikes and Petitions
This means, and in spite of the climate of cunning ~error which reigns in
Tunisia, that the police state is not succeeding in silencing the strug-
gles. No less than 212 strikes are on record, accor:Iing to the Tunisian -
administration itself, in the course of the first nine months of the past '
- year. Demonserations of support for the legitimate UGTT continue in the -
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country, ~~here more than 20 petitions were widely signed, notably on the
~ occasior. of 5 December, the date commemorating the assassination in 1953
hy the colonial Red Hand of Farhat Hached, a prestigious figure of
'Punisian syndic~il.ism. This pressure from workers and milttant untoni5tti
_ I?:i~ nc~t relaxc~d s Ince Black '1'hursday 26 January. It tiae succ~~cded sc~
l:ar in keeping the puppet UGTT of Tijani Abid in total isolation. And
ttzat is not a small victory.
= COPYRIGHT: 1980 AFRIQUE-ASIE
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TUNISIA
:i....
~~:.;~?RIME MINISTER DISCUSSES GAFSAH INCIDENTS, DOMESTIC AND ARAB ISSUES _
.',Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic:8-14 Feb 80 pp 29-32 ~
~ ' i
[Interview with~Tunisian Prime Minister Hedi Nouira, Conducted by Nabil -
~ Maghribi]
i-
.,,[1~ext] Tunisian Prime Minister Hedi Nouira stressed to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI ,
"'~thaC the Gafsah incidents created a national concensus throughout the
~ country for reacting to any attempt to damage Tunisian stability and growth. ;
� He renewed his charge that the "Libyan regime" had arranged these incidents, !
and dealt with Tunisia's stands on various local, Arab and international ;
issues.
The future? It is in the hands of the Tunisians alone. They are not afraid ~
for Tun~sia, the cuuntry of legal organizations and agencies. As long as
the people are devoted to these organizations, there is nothing to fear for '
the future. With these words, Tunisian Prime Minister Hedi Nouira responded
to a question dealing with future eventualities, especially after the Gafsah
incidents. ~
In his lengthy meeting with AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, the prime ministe~ was
determined and unequivocal, saying, "The Gafsah incidents have created an
all-embracing national concensus based on e~osing and reacting to any i
attempt directed at Tunisia's stability and security." ;
I
.When asked about the dimensions and purposes of the Gafsah incidents, he _
answered calmly, "Some people don't want Tunisia to have security, peace and
growth, but are made uneasy by the stages of development on various levels '
which Tunisia has witnessed and is still witnessing. They are making
efforts to stir up trouble, but Tunisia is always on the lookout."
[Question] The finger of suspicion in the Gafsah incidents has been ;
- pointed at the Libyan regime. On another occasion you said that you made a
distinction between the good Libyan people and the regime. The question is:
on what material proof are you relying in directing this immediate ,
accusation? -
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[Answer] The proof was discovered by judicial investigations. The
prisoners con~essed that they had been trained in Libyan training camps,
and that most of them had taken part in the Ugandan and Lebanese wars.
Also, a number of them had participated in the May 1978 Orly Airport �
operation. The investigations are still in progress.
[Question] Some people say that the Gafsah incidents cannot be isolated
from other incidents which have happened in the region (such as the
criminal attack on the mosque at Mecca and the activity of some radical
religious parties in Algeria and Tunisia), and that these incidents are
directly or indirectly connected with the phenomenon of the spread of 7s aii~.
_ How do you explain this phenomenon? _
[Answer] Mosques are houses of God, built to commemorate His name and for
Moslems to meet to pray and receive inspiration and guidance. This is
_ common knowledge and cannot be denied. Citizens cannot be allowed to use
these mosques as places to bring up matters over which the Tunisians
disagree, for the mosques exist to bring to~ether alt Tunisians without
exception, whatever their opinions or view of society. We believe that
wrapping oneself up in the cloak of Islam to attain political ends will
create, in the houses of God, differences which we can do without. If some
citizens have a political view or stand on a given topic, they should bring
~ it up outside the houses of God.
However, I want to make it clear that in Tunisia no one of this inclination
has been imprisoned, although some have been summoned because of having done
certain material acts, in order to get an explanation of their motives from
- them. They have all sworn not to repeat their actions, and official reports .
were compiled about them without any of them being arrested, as I have
mentioned.
Radicalism Is Not in the Moslems' Interest
[Question] But what is your evaluation of the spread of Islarn in the region
_ in general? Some observers say that the Arab world is going overboard
because of this phenomenon and because of the interactions of the Iranian ~
events.
[Answer] I feel that some elements who have no other excuse want to wrap
themselves in the mantle of Islam in order to stir up some problems and
profit from the incidents now taking place in Iran, while conditions here
in Tunisia are completely different from those in Iran.
, As I have said, we feel that radicalism and the call to radicalism and its
_ resultant damages at home and abroad stirs up a counter-reaction, and this
is not in the interest of either the Arabs or the Moslems.
We have noticed that some newspapers which had supporteci the Iranian
revolution reversed themselves after a while and began to take a more
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negative attitude. Reactions such as these were caused by radicalism and
extremism, inasmuch as Islam is a philanthropic religion, a religion of
equilibrium and tolerance.
[Question] Do you believe that any foreign powers have acted or are acting
to stir up such matters? '
[AnswerJ Such powers are many, and whoever wants to can demolish a society,
using every means to do so. Such has been the case for a long time. As for
lran, the problem is not a religious one but is in fact a social one, for
Iranian society was petrified and divided into distinct classes, and there-
fore there was inertia and development was impossible. Since there was no _
_ breathing space to express political or social opinions, the opposition took
the religious path in order to proclaim its views. This explains the
significant response which the religious leaders received. ;
- [Question] The Gafsah incidents confirm once again that Tunisia has always -
successfully confronted radicalism. This phenomenon really deserves to be ~
mentioned. What is the magic formula which Tunisia relies on to eliminate
attempts to impinge on its stability and security?
[Answer] We don't have any magic formula in Tunisia. The Tunisian people '
= are above all a pacific people, and most of the time their attitudes avoid
excessiveness. This may be due to their history, for Tunisia has been for ~
- ages a crossroads for peoples and civilizations, and its geography has
dictated openness to the outside world. All these factors make the
Tunisians' attitudes moderate ones, based on analyzing the circumstances and
trying to find solutions which take into cons3deration the higher interests ;
- of the Tunisian nation and people.
The Disasterous January Incidents
[Question] The Gafsah incidents coincided with the anniversary of the 26
January 1978 incidents, which led to the arrest of Habib 'Ashur. Is there
something the prime minister would like to say in this context? -
[Answer] If it were in my power to obliterate this day from Tunisia's ~
- history, I would do so, for it should not remain as one of the memories ~
which we want to preserve. It was simultaneously a surprise and a calamity. ~
The friends and lovers of Tunisia were surprised by it, and it was a
catastrophe for Tunisians and their friends, a disaster caused by ~
~ reckle~sness, thoughtlessness and miscalculation. _
[Question] It is said abroad that the January 1978 incidents have not yet
ended on the judicial level, meaning that there are still political '
prisoners because of these incidents. Are there any political detainees in '
- Tunisia now? ~
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[Answer] Naturally, there are those who were justly tr.ied. There is no
judicial problem now, for the judicial system has looked into and settled
all the violations.
[QuestionJ Uther news says that Habib 'Ashur was released and placed uncier
- house arrest. It was then rumored that he asked to go on the pilgrimage
and the authorities did not permit him to do so. How true are these
reports?
[Answer] I had not heard that Habib 'Ashur asked to make the pilgrimage,
especially since he had gone on the pilgrimage before. -
The Future Is in the Hands of the Tunisians
[QuestionJ Some observers say that Tunisia is now in an excellent position
and is capable of facing all difficulties, because of the presence of
certain persons at the summit of power such as President Habib Bourguiba _
and yourself. But people don't live forever. Permit me to ask you: after
the recent incidents, haw does the future appear to you?
[AnswerJ The future is in the hands of the Tunisians, and it is clear. I
, don't suppose tha~ a question like this would be posed to Giscard D'Estaign
_ or Helmut Schmidt. It would never occur to any journalist or politically-
informed person to ask President Carter, for example, what America's future
would be afrer his departure. The future lies in the legal organizations
- and agencies. People pass on, but organizations remain.
As long as the organizations remain and the people remain devoted to them,
there is no fear for the future. This is from the standpoint of the
constitutional entity. As for practical daily policies in the social and
economic spheres, they depend on the circumstances, and they are modified
by each generation according ta its needs.
There Are No Economic Troubles
[Question] How do you view today's domestic economic situation? Last week
you raised wages, and some people say that the country is suffering from
some economic troubles.
[Answer] The world is passing through an international economic crisis -
which is now at its worst. Maybe you know how Tunisia hit upon the way to
deal with this crisis and how it worked to overcome it. However, those
who criticise our conduct don't know anything about economics, or else they -
are avoiding the truth. Do these peopl~ have any knowledge of the concept
of inflation, and how far it has gone abroad and in Tunisia? There can be
no discussion except with speakers in possession of the objective factors on -
which we all agree. -
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Al1 the world organizations have seen that in 1978 Tunisia had the world's
third lowest rate of inflation, after Switzerland and West Germany. This
verdict was reached by respected experts working in world organizations ,
like the World Bank or in some well-known private organizations. '
Domestically, the price inflation index has never even reached 8 percent,
and even today it is below this percentage.
Howevzr, local products are facing domestic pressure because of low ~
production and excessive consumer demand. We have no control over the
prices of imported goods. The prices of some food items have risen by 50,
60 and even 100 percent in recent years. However, their prices on the
domestic market have remained fixed, for the state is paying the difference _
througr the comrensation fund. We have done so throughout the Seventies. -
However, the situation.has been aggravated, and it is our view that it i
cannot continue this way. The consumer must bear part of the rising cost of ;
living, because it is one of our development principles that equality among ~
- generations�must be achieved. It is inexcusable to deprive one generation ~
_ of 3ob~,opportunities so that another generation may enjoy excessive
consumption. Therefore we decided on the recent price rise. ~
~
The effect of the rise in food item prices on the price index is estimated I.
at 3 percent, and as of December 1979 the inflation rate in the price index ~
- was 4.8 percent, i.e. a little less than 5 percent. The agreement reached
among the various social parties calls for a rise in wages whenever the
- price increase index reaches 5 percent or more and stays so for 6
consecutive months.
In order to protect buying power, we raised the minimum wag~ by 3 percent.
We preferred this solution to waiting for the price inflation to reach 7
percent, for example, and continue so for 6 months. Therefore, we acted so '
- that the increase in the index would stay around 3 percent from the stand- -
- point of increased wages and actual price increases. If anyone has any i
proof to the contrary, let him present it. ~
- I would like to mention that our conduct in this respect was in consideration
of the present wor~.d crisis, which has led to a major rise in wheat, coffee i
and sugar prices. We took this urgent step on the understanding that we !
- would reevaluate the situation in 5 months time and decide on a wage increase
if the situation called for it. WP have met our promises, and have perhaps
granted more than we promised. All the social parties agree on that. But I
the saying "the enemies were satisfied but the judge wasn't" might apply to
some people.
- They Are Satisfied With the Electi,on Experiment _
[Question] My last question about the domestic Tunisian situation is:
Tunisia has once again embarked on a new experiment in paxliamentary
elections. Are S~ou completely satisfied with it?
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[Answer] The experiment was positi~r~ and we are continuing with it. The
municipolity elections this May wil]. be conducted in this manner. This
experiment represents a new step r_owards granting more democracy to
political life and expanding the fa.eld of choice and the citizens'
participation in managing public affairs, and the candidates were given a
grc~ater opportunity for useful dialog with the electorate.
As for the election results, they were legitimate with tha except~on of two
districts where some objections were ra~sed. The objection of one region
was accepted, and the other was rejected. Some people were afraid of this
undertaking, but in reality it had praiseworthy rPsults, and work on it will "
- continue"in the future.
AFgYianistan and Soviet Intervention ,
- [Question] Let us move on to your stand on international issues, in the `
' forefront of which, naturally, is the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
Could you tell us the Tunisian government's stand on this intervention, and
what solutions you are proposing for confronting similar situations should -
they arise in the future? -
[Answer] Tunisia's stand on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was made
clear by President Hsbib Bourguiba on the day he received the new year's
= congratulations of the diplomatic corps. The head o~' star~'~ analysis of
Tunisia's stand was ample and needs no further explai~ation.
]:n response to the second par*_ c` your question, I would like to make it
= clear that a small country like Tunisia cannot base its foreign policy on
_ anything but L-irm bases such a:: respect for international law, non-inter-
ference in the affairs of others, and above all not occupying weak,
neighboring countries.
As we see it, these foundations represent an essential principle to which
_ we have committed ourselves and according to which we have ac:ted ever since
Tunisia's independence. We believe that respect for ~nternal_ional law ~
represents a guarantee for all nations, and that it is our duty to call
world attention to such incidents.
[Question] In this context, some people are calling for taking a harder -
stand, such as calling for an Arab or Islamic summit cunference to face _
these matters. What is your opinion of this?
[Ar.swer] The Afghanistan issue is in princi.ple an international one, as z -
have made clear. On top of that, Afghanistan is an Islamic country.
' Calling for an Islamic summit conference is more all-inclusive than calling
for an Arab conference.
- [Question] And how cloes Tunisia feel about the holding of American
hostages in Iran?
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[Answer] Our view on this issue is no different than our view on the
situation in A�ghanistan. That is, we have based and wi.11 c~ntinue to base
otir foreign policy on firm ~oundations--respect for international law and
compliance with it.
We also call for respecting a11 int~rnat3onal agreements, especially those
which pertain to diplomatic representatives. Without them, international _
relations cannot be conducted with any peace of mind,
President Habib $ourgiiiba h'as,previously analyzed Tunisia's stand on this
- iss'ii'e:;;`: However proud we are of what the Iranian revolution is doing to
defend the dignity of a people whose rights have been long oppressed by
domestic and foreign forces of exploitation, and without meddling in Iran's
internal affairs, we nevertheless do not suppart the holding of diplomatic
emissaries as hostages, nor the negation of international agreements
recognized and complied with by the various countries of the world.
You know t_hat international usage ca11s for protecting diplomats, in such a
way thar_ should an emissary enjoying diplomatic immunity violate the ,
customary conditions, he is considered peYsona non grata and is expelled i-
- from the host country. ~
_ [Question] And how are your present relations with the Iranian government? ;
[Answer] We have representation in Iran, and Iran is similarly represented
= in Tunisia. '
- [Question] Tunisia is trying to establish irs international relations on
the basis of balance. Can you evaluate Tunisian-Soviet relations on the
one hand and Tunisian-American relations on the other hand in the present _
phase?
- [Answer] Our relations with the Soviet Union are good--President Habib
- Bourguiba confirmed this when responding to the new year's felicitations '
from the ambassadors, among them the Soviet ambassador. We have cultural,
economic and technical cooperation with the Soviet Union, but this does not I
prevent us from naving our say on questions of principle. ,
i
Tunisia and the Possibilities of American Intervention
[Question] President Carter stated recently that America might intervene
in the Middle East if a foreign intervention occurs, thereby alluding to -
the possibility of a Soviet intervention in the region. Does Tunisia
- approve of the dispatching of American forces to the region?
[Answer] There are American forces in the area now, since the American
fleet is here, and has been reinforced recently. There is also a Soviet
fleet. The forces of both superpowers are present in the region. ~
,
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[QuestionJ The Middle East, and in particular the Gulf, has witnessed an
' international polarization. Some observers feel that there are
possibilities that the cold war, or even the hot war, might start in this -
region. Do you believe that the situation in the Gulf and in the Middle
East in general is currently threatening world peace?
~Answer) We l~ave warned on more than one occasion that the situaLion in tl~e -
Middle East might have a bad effect on world security, ~or this region is
exposed to intervention, and these interventions might have a repercussion
on world security and peace.
[Question] You know that some Arab states were opposed to participating in
the Islamabad conference, while other states attached great importance to
_ its results. What is your opinion of this conference's us2fulness? ~
[Answer] Naturally, after an incident like what happened in Afghanistan, a
Moslem country, the Islamic countries' concern has been directed towards
this situation, and there is much discussion about it, because another
Islamic country might be exposed tomorrow to what happened today in
Afghanistan, if international dealings continue in the manner we are now =
- witnessing.
[Question] Moving on to the Arab scene, we are faced with differences and
divisions. The accusation that the Libyan regime arranged the Gafsah
incidents is basically a confirmation of the existence of these divisions,
along with the dangers they represent. Some people say that the Arab split ~
is the child of the Camp David peace phase. What is your proposal for
getting out of the current Arab dilemma? ~
[Answer] We do not allow ourselves to offer solutions which might not be
- consistent with the stands of fraternal Arab states, and we definitely don't
want to interfere in the internal affairs of any other nations. All we want -
to 3o is expound, elucidate and justify our stands. This has been the aim
of Tunisian policy in all issues, including Arab issues, naturally. _
- In 19:55, President Habib Bourguiba delivered his famous speech in Ariha, on
the West Bank, analyzing Tunisia's experience in the struggle against
- colonialism and appealing to the Palestinians to rely on interr~ational
legitimacy, to which all nations agree, whether they belong to the western ~
or eastern camps.
In this way, the Arab nation would be able to resist those who created
Israel and who have stated many times that they are determined to perpetuate
it on Arab territory. The establishment of Israel in this manner, although -
- it represents the greatest injustice in history, has been adopted by .
- international society.
Therefore, we feel that we are committed to this international legitimacy,
and we demand the implementation of everything resulting from it. This -
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- legitimacy calls for giving part of the Arab territory to Israel and the -
rest to the Palestinians. Tunisia, speaking through President Habib
- Bourguiba, calls for establishing the Palestinians in the lands reserved
for them by the provisions of the international partition agreement.
At the time, this stand aroused private and public scorn, and we were :
accused of being weak and denying the Arab cause. But our stand was aimed
- at establishing the Palestinians according to an internationally recognized
legal foundation which would open windows permitting them, if not to regain
all their rights, to at least come close to it. ,
An English politician has said that there is no friendship among nations,
but only interescs. The important thing is to have the correct vision for
discerning these interests, and to follow the best ways of attaining thcm. -
This means that the question is how to deal with matters and correctly ~
analyze situations, so as to determine the method of action and follow a
certain political course. This is our way of dealing with our domestic
problem or with world issues.
~
The Summit Will Not Resolve All the Differences i_
[Question] Does Tunisia support the call for holding an Arab summit ;
conference to resolve Arab differences or to study the post-Camp David -
stage? ~ _
[Answer] Holding Arab summits should not become a commonplace occurance. ~
That is, the purpose of summit meetings is to resolve what is agreed upon by
_ diplomats and foreign ministers, who prepare the dossiers, collect a11 the -
data, and discuss the issues. If they arrive at a solution pleasing to all
parties, the summit can meet to sanction what has been arrived at.
As for holding a summit without sufficient preparation and without the
participants' seeming to agree, that is not a practical solution which will i
enable progress to be made in the issue. A summit cannot eliminate all the ~
differences, if they are many and varied, even if it meets for weeks.
_ i
We Are All For a Policy of Stages, But. i
[Question] With respect to the Camp David peace, how do you view the stage ~
now reached by Egyptian-Israeli relations, the so-called normalization of ~
relations and the exchange of diplomatic representation? _
[Answer] We took a stand on this matter earlier, when we said that the Camp '
David agreement, no matter how it is interpreted, has above al1 created a
_ state of separate peace, which violates Arab commitments. As for the issue
of Palestinian autonomy, the nature of this autonomy is not yet known, and
every party has its own interpretation. Perhaps this is an opportunity for
us to see an aspect of international law which we had not known before.
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Some people question how Tunisia, which approves of a policy of stages, can
- oppose an agreement which is also based on a policy of stages. Yes, we are
one oC those who call for a policy of stages, but only after elucidatin~ the
goal, defining it precisely, and working in stages to approach it. The
~oal is for the Palestinians to establish a state on the land of their =
fa~hers and grandfathers. This is our position on the Camp David agreement.
We have said that there is a misunderstanding which is giving advance
warning of something the upshot of which wi11 not be laudable. Perhaps _
- Egypt will get some satisfaction out of its position, but with respect to
the Palestinian issue, which is the mother issue for the sake of which the
Arabs waged war four times, it will not achieve any results worth mentioning.
[Question] And your position on the Lebanese crisis? Does Tunisia see any
- way out of it?
[Answer] The solution we agreed on at;the last summit was, in our opinion,
- a positive one, in that it prevents th~e occurance of violent disagreements
among the parties. We left the resolution of the remaining differences to
daily life and the mutual understanding of the parties concerned. This, as
far as I know, is what is in force now. I have also learned that the Arab -
League representative had a positive ro1e. Although what we arrived at
during the tenth summit was an inadequate solution, in any case it was a ~
compromise solution which will help reduce the tension which had existed
between the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese government. -
Will the League Ultimately Remain in Tunisia? -
[Question] In the past, Tunisia has had differences and crises with the Arab
League, and Tunisia has always objected to the Egyptian hegemony over the
league's organizations. The overall picture of the Arab League has now
changed, and in a very short time the secretary general has undertaken
significant diplomatic activity, whether on the Arab or the international
_ level. But don't you believe that the presence of the Arab League in
- Tunisia, as a neutral country, has aided the accomplishment of the Arab
League's task? Do you think that it would be preferable for the Arab league
to ultimately remain in Tunisia?
[Answer] It is hard for a Tunisian official to answer this question. -
Tunisia took in the league only at tha request of many fraternal Arab states.
We thanked them for this valuable trust, which is a great responsibility,
and we took in the league.
I believe that the experiment has proven that every member of the league, no
matter what his political school, economic inclination or social outlook,
feels that whenever he discusses and debates in the league he is free to
_ take his stand, without rancor, because he is convinced that no one wants to
influence him.
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: I believe that the officials o~ the Arab states had these cons:tderations ~
- in mind when they chose Tunisia for the league's headquar~ers, ~or dialog in
Tunisia is open, and any problem and any issue can be dealt with in complete
f.reedom out in the open. Tuni.sia has no intention of imposing its hegemony
or its own way of looking at things. Therefore, the league is in a place ~
safe from pressure of whatever kind, be it intellectual, political or
material.
[Question] Do you therefore propose that the Arab League ultimately remain
in Tunisia?
[AnswerJ The Arab states must look into this mattex.
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