JPRS ID: 8978 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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NOR OFi~IC1A1. USF: ON1,1'
JPRS L/8978
17 March 1980
W~st Euro e Re ort
p p
(FOLO 12/80)
~
FB f$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/8978
17 March 1980
~ WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 12/80) �
CONTENTS PAGE
COLRv~RY SECTION
AUSTRIA
Kreisky Discusses Afghan Crisis, Other Issues
(Bruno Kreisky Interview; STERN, 28 Feb 80) 1
FRnNCE
Mar,chais Trip to Moscow Explained
(Branko Lazitch, Jacques Roure; L'EXPRESS, 12 Jan 80)... 4
New Gendarmery Unit's Mission: Protect Nation's Weapons
(Pierre de Maximy; ARMEES D'ArJJOURD'HUI, Jan-Feb 80}.... 8
- Directorate f~~r Civil Aeronautics Programs Review~d
(AIR & COSMOS, 9 Feb 80) 12
Briets
Relations With Yugoslavia 17
ITALY
Cossiga's Foreign ~'olicy Criticized
(Carlo Rossella; PANORAMA, 28 Jan 80) 18
Labor riinister Proposes Pact With PCI, L~nions, Confindustria
(Vincenzo Scotti Interview; IL MONGO, 8 Feb 80)......... 22
Polemics on Military 'Counseling' to PCI on Its Defense 'Platform'
(Gianfranco Ballardin; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 'L~ Feb 80).. 28
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
PCI Asks Voters' Opin'_ona for Administrative Elections
(Armando Cossutta Interview; CORRIERL DCLLA SI:RA,
24 Feb 80) 30
NCO's in Friuli Comment on Coming Military Elections
(Sergio F'ardera; CORRIERE DEI.LA SERA, 24 Feb 80).....,.. 36
Red Brigades Spreading Fear at Alfa Romeo
(GiancarJ.o Pertegato; CORRIERE DELLA SERE~, 24 Feb 80)... 39
Resumption of Violence in South Tyrol
(Teo Da~~vecuras; IL MONDO, 7 Feb 80) 43
'rension in Relations Between Catholic Groups, DC -
(Walter Tobagi; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 20 Feb 80)......... 46
Detrimental Effects of EEC's AgricLltural Prices
(Cesare Selieri; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 20 Feb 80)........ 49
SPAIN
Weekly Predicts Imminent Expulsion of More Soviet Spies From Spain
(CArfBIO 16, 2 Piar 80) S1
SWLDEN
Industry Banking on Pro-Nuclear Vote in March Referendum
(Ewa Thor;~; VECKANS AFFARER, 17 Jan 80) 58
-b-
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COUNTRY 5ECTION AUSTRIA
KREISKY DISCUSSES AFGHAN CRISIS, OTH~R ISSUES
~
DW291325 Hambuxg STERN in German 28 Feb 80 pp 78-82 DW
[Interview with Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky in the latter's office in
Vienna by Editors George Karp, Victor Schuller and Gerhard Krug, date of
- interview not given]
[Excerpts] STEF,N: The Austrian winter sportsmen are bringing many medals
back from Lake Placid. Hearty congratulations! May Austria's Olympic ~
~ participants also go to Moscow?
Kreisky: To begin with--fortunately we still have time to ponder the whole
- matter calmly. But I can say this much even now: The Austrian Federal
Government does not have any possibility of prohibiting sportsmen from
participating in a sports event. And I advocate the view that if one has
a quarrel with the Soviet Union over Afghanistan, then this should be waged
in the field of politics which, after all, is broad enough. -
STERN: You said recently that the Austrian sportsmen should not only use
their feet but also thFir heads.
Kreisky: Yes, each athlete should decide for themselves whether they want
to go to a country or not. This applies to Argentina, to South Africa, but
to the USSR as well.
5TERN: Hence, a boycott of the Olympic Games is a unsuitable instrument
of pressure3
Kreisky: The Olympic organizers should have thought of all that beforehand.
' After all, they were perfectly aware to whom they assigned the games. The
current event of Afghanistan can be equated at least with what happened in
Czechoslovakia in 1968 or in Hungary in 1956. After all, this did take
place, this did happen, and it is naive to assume that something like that
- could never happen again. So they adopted the decision knowing wt~ere ~hese
Olympic Games would be held. Now all of us have to sail in the wake of an -
- American election campaign and honestly speaking I do not feel like doing
, it notwithstanding all sympathy with the United States.
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STERN: What would be the main argument for you to go to Moscow after all?
Krei.sky: One could ask these particularly for people who are hard to meet-- -
such as Sakharov, for example, -
STERN: Would a 100 meter sprinter get an answer?
hreisky: It is much more important that questions will be asked. They
must know that we are interested in this. I always ask for neople who have
been imprisoned. In the GDTt I have aske~ about Bahro, and ~ust n~w I i~ave _
asked on the Philippines about a gentleman whose name was given to me by =
Amnesty [International]. He was released later on. I have also protested
against the execution of Bhutto in Pakistan.
STERN: Is detente in Europe being threatened by the Soviet invasion in -
Afghanistan?
Kreisky: Enormously. Afghanistan is an enormous burden for Eur.ope. That -
conflict can very much backfire on detente, ic can even make it impossible.
Ilut it must not be. There has also been detente policy ~t the c~mes of the
Vietnam war. If une has no illusions, disappointment will be small~r. I
have ex~�rienced all kinds of things in the past 25 years, together with
all the others. We have experienced the Berlin crisis, the Hungarian crisis,
the Czechoslovakian crisis, the Cuban crisis. We are now experiencing the
terrible conflict in Cambodia. No, I never had illusions. And I know that
one cannct deny it that the Soviets pursue a certain--let us call it--~ower
policy. One cannot deny it either with ra_gard to the Americans. .And now I
must say something that will possibly result in extreme enmity....
5TI;RN: ...Which you are not afraid of.
Kreisky: One cannot say on the one hand that the Soviet troops must leave
Af~;hanistan while not saying on the other har.d that the Israeli troops
must leave the West Bank. The Israelis motivate their stay with security
needs, the Russians motivate it with the same security needs. I belong
to the people who believe that one cannot pursue a double-dealing policy.
T}~e same applies naturall.y to human rights. I have always said that human
rif;hts are indivisible. That is really a principle of mine.
STGRN: You think nothing of an Olympic boycott and little of military mea-
sures. What do you think of a measure Carter has already taken, namely the
r.e~uction of wheat supplies?
Kreisky: Nothing at all. I discussed it once already with Kennedy. At that
Lime the ~oviet Union wanted to buy wheat from the Americans for gold--that
was good at that time. I have warned against a boycott because Khrushchev
- would have said at that time: The United States does not even want to sell
us wheat, it wants us to starve.
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ST'ERN: An~i that is valid also today? _
Kreisky: Yes, that is valid also today--despite all the sympathy fur the
men i.n Washington. Please bear the following in mind also: All supplies
to the allies of the Soviet Union would have to be stopped then also. Then
there would be no wheat for Poland. Do you want that? I do not know whethe-r
the GDR is buying wheat in the West.
,
STERN: Is not there something like a Marshall P13n a la Kreisky for the
Third World?
Kreisky: If you want to name it that. I believe that presPntly one could
interest only a few "light minded countries" for quick and efficient de-
velopment aid. ~
STLKN: So sm~,ll, neutral European countries linked to rich oil countries
will help poor developin~ countries. Is that so?
~~eisky: Yes.
STLRN: What countries? ~
_ K.rcisky: I cannot tell you that.
STER~`J: And how is that sup~ossd to work?
Kreisky: It does not make sense to build only factories in developing
countries. One must build railways. This is the way in which Europe dis-
covered Am~rica. Irrigation systems must be built and there must be tele-
communication. I want to implement a pilot project in this connection be-
cause T have not much time left.
ST'I:RN: How that? You will certainly run for candidate again in the next
_ chancellor's elections in 1983?
i~reisky: No gentlemen, I am 69. That is enough for me.
C~PYRIGHT: 1980 Grunertjahr AG ~ Ce
CSO: 3103
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
MARCHAIS TRIP TO MOSCOW EXPLAINED
Paris L'EX~RE:;S in French 12 Jan 80 pp 86-8i
fArticle by Branko Lazitch and Jacques Roure]
- [Text] "What is so surprising about a visit by the general secretary of ~
the French Communist Party to Moscow?" In writing his editorial of 9 Janu-
ary, Rc~land Leroy, editor of L'IiUt~IA?vITE, must have relished the "perverse
_ effect" of his question. Actually, for a comcrtunist leader, the Kremlin
- meeting is usually a step as natural, ordinary and commonplace as a pil-
grimage to Rome is for a cardinal.
But as it happens, the case of Georges Marchais is not commonplace. And
Leroy, an old communist fox sanctioned by the 23rd Congress in May 1979
for having been introduced by some as its le~der's challenger, is well
awarP of this: if there is n~thing abnormal about this visit, the most
amazing thing is that no Brezhnev-Marchais meeting has taken place since
December 1974. The two men did not speak to each other in June 1976 at the -
time of the c:onference of European PC [Communist parties] in Beriin or in
,7une 1977 at the time of Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Paris.
~
was there a better way than by this apparently naive question to point out
on the fronc page of L'HUMANITE--for those who read between the lines, the
only way of understandinq the real meaning--the two real questions being
asked a;~out Marchais: why this 5-year quarrel? And why today's meeting?
The reconciliation is even more dramatic since the Soviets have provided
him with exceptional pomp: an airport reception by the elite duo of the
Kremlin orthodoxy, Mikhail Souslov and Boris Ponomarev; reappearance of
_ Brezhnev, absent from public life for several weeks; long opening sequence
or. Moscow television. Tne reconciliation also comes at a time when Moscow,
involved in the Afgha~ bid for power, needs international support, which it
conspicuously lacks, even within communist ranks. And thus at a time when
every PC which prides itself on independence, as the PCF has done for
10 years, has an interest in drawing away or keeping its distance.
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'1'he "Marchais mystery" does not date back just to yester.day. What pledge
~3ic3 this obscure militant make in order to begin his irrestible ascendancy
- to the PCF leadership in 1956 after just getting out of the party's ad-
vanced school. in Moscow? What bug bit him to make him quarrel with the
Kremlin beginning in 1975, a quarrel which his highest-ranking opponents
escaped, such as the Italian Enrico Berlinguer and the Span~iard Santiago -
Carrillo, with whom relations were never broken, despite their criticism
and their differences?
But if a thick fog covers this quarter-century of Georges Marchais' public
lif~~, just as it covers the previous 15 years of his private life, the
c:larity of the process of public reconciliation which has recently occurred ~
is biinding, And in perfect accord with communist traditions: whoever
wants to be received by the Kremlin is not received when he wants to be. '
My mistake requires penance before pardon is granted.
Marchais' PCF has devoted itself to his redemption with notable zeal in
recent months.
'I'ime of Pledges
'Phe main quarrel was eliminated beginning in September t977. By torpedoing
, the joint program with the PS [Socialist Party], the PC deprived the Ur.ion
of the Left of any chance of coming to power. Moscow had never approved
of ttiat prospect, believing that a liberal "middle-class" government char-
acterized by Gaullist anti-Americanism was preferable in Paris to a leftist
majority dominated by the socialists and committed to "a French path to
socialism," The attitude adopted by the socialists followed by the defeat
of march 1978 offered a second advantage: concerned with not giving the
impression of "shifting to the right," Francois Mitterrand's friends would
' avoid taking any clearly anti-Soviet position until the Afghan crisis.
Rc~qinning in 1978, the time had come for the PCF to make pledges. First
there was the alinement with Moscow concerning Cambodia. The French commu-
nists fully supported the pro-Soviet, Vietnamese expansionism against the
I~ro-C}iinese Khmer Rouge.
, in May 1979, there was the new view formulated by Marchais concerning the
"totally positive assessment" of the Soviet reaime, which had nevertheless
bec>n mal~gned from Prague to the Goulag. Ponomarev was given an ovation by the
delegates of the 23rd Congress. Ther~ began to be talk of a visit by -
Mar.chais to Mosrow,
ori 9 October, the No 2 man in the PCF, Charles Fiterman, would prepare the -
~ yroundwork for the Kremlin visit. Where there still differences? Did the
5oviets demand a f.urther pledge? The top-level meeting, rumored for Novem-
t~~r, still did not take place. But an emissary from the Kremlin, Vadim
Za.c~ladine, did land in Paris. Shortly afte rwards, the PC launched its cam-
paiqn against the installation of American missiles in Europe.
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'I'his time, reconciliation was possible. Was the date of the visit scheduled -
before the Kabul power play on 27 December? It matters little. The PCF
could not, without jeopardizing months of effort, condemn the attack on
~fqhanistan, as the Spanish and Italian PC did. "It was in anticipation of
t1~c Moscow visit that the leadership adopted the position to support the
Sc~vi~t Union in the Afghan affair," two communist officials ~rivately
acknowledged. And they added: "It was also to preserve the appearance of
a certain degree of independence that Marchais insisted on first making a
detour through Rome."
T}ie Italians were the first to be surprised. A meeting was expected, bLt
not schedu].ed. No one thought that between his return from Cuba on F'riday,
4 January, and his departure for Moscow on Monday, 7 January, that Marchais
would have the time to make this side trip. The meeting, which received
broad coverage on the front page of L'HUMANITE, was aimost confidential in
L'UNITA, its Italian counterpart. The meeting took place at Frattocchie,
Togliatti's former villa 20 kilometers from Rome. In January 1979, at the
time of the previous meeting, a motorcoach had taken journalists there.
This time, the ;ress service of the PCI acted as though it was unaware when
and where it wa~ being held. The very flat joint communique-~-23 lines, but
not one about Afghanistan--spoke of a"candid dialog," which means in com-
munist language that there was a disagreement. It was eclipsed in Rome by
a strong statement of the PCI condemning the Soviet inter~�ention, published
even while Marchais and Berlinguer met. The Italian communists, it is
true, have lony distrusted this unpredictable comrade, as excessive in his -
overly sensitive nationalism as in his alinements with Moscow. _
~ Riding tr,e crest of a fine series of visits to all variations of communism
(Belgrade, Warsaw, Havana, Rome), Marchais could then--finallyl--add Moscow
to his list. What is so surprising, indeed?
For the Rremlin, the advisability of this trip to Moscow, at this time, is
obvious. Except for certain financial and personal pr~.;sures, which the
Soviets could exert on French communists, what were Marchais' reasons for
anxiously wanting a reconciliation at such a bad time?
" Actually, there has been unrest in the ranks. The historian Alexandre
Adler, the mayor of Sevres, a member of the Fed?ral Bureau of Vendee added
their name to a petition, along with the usual opponents. Certain party
officials stressed "the total theoretical and strategic incompetence of
Marchais and his lieutenants."
"We Must Choose Our Camp"
The grumbling is even louder at the CGT [General Confederation of Labor]:
half of the 16 members of the Confederal Bureau, including comnunist
Jean-Louis Moynot and Christiane Gilles, came out against a text which
- "whitewashed " the Soviet troops. An appeal had to be made to the execu-
tive committe (94 members), which is better controlled and in which the `
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eiyht Ieaders confirmed their disapproval by abstaining. But a large major-
~ ity approved. L'HUMANITE reported only this vote.
These jolts apparently do not disturb Marchais. Z'here are probably three
exF~lanations for his calmness.
- The first is international. Although denouncing the "alarmism" of Western
governments, French communists seem convinced that confrontations between
"socialist" and "capitalist" countries will increasE+. "We must therefore
choose our camp," PC leaders repeat in private. Several years ago, when
thc Soviet Union seemed to be on the defensive or even in retreat, hesita-
tion was possible. Today . . . .
Tk~e second explanation is national. This return to unconditional solidar-
ity with Moscow is not necessarily considered disastrous from an election
standpoint. Among Marchais' associates, it is readily noted that the PC
sc:ored best when it was "in the ghetto" and suffered its most serious set-
backs when it was playinq the game of the leftist Union.
Finally, the third explanation deri~~es from the party's internal situation.
The tactical zigzags, political compromises, ideological shifts and dis-
putes have shaken it. What better way of welding it toyether than by re-
newing the issues which have been responsible for its continuity and
stLength: antisocialisrn, the class struggle and solidarity with the USSR.
"This position is not a bad move," opponent Jean Rony explains. "The party
is even redis covering a certain cohesion."
Roland Leroy explained to the federal secretaries on 28 December: "To make
workers doubt the PC, to make communists doubt their leadership and party
- line, that is the main objective of the ideological war being waged by big
capital. To develop the revolutionary movement, workers need certainties."
c
By going to Moscow, Marchais has gone to reestablish the most compromising
of those certainties.
C:OPYRIGHT: 1980, S.A. Groupe Express
11915
c.so : 3100
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CUUNTRY SL�'CTION FRANCE
NEW GENDARMERY UNIT'S MISSION: PROTECT NATION'S WEAPONS -
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Jan-Feb 80 pp 32-33
_ ~Article by Lt Col Pierre de Maximy*: "The Weapons Gendarmery"~
~Text~ The Weapons Gendarmery is the latest ot the National Gendarmery's
specialized units. It was created in 1973. .
~ong before the creation of this unit, the Ministerial Delegation for
weaponryl had decided that a reorganization of the means at its disposal
for the surveillance and protection of its establishments was necessary.
- ~I'hus, leqislative and regulatory steps to guard against unwarranted intru-
sion in places where weapons were installed were taken,and culminated fit-
tingly with the entrustment of the missions of surveillance and protection
oF weapons establishments to the Natioi:al Gendarmery.
_ Actually, the National Gendarmery had already been carrying out this
task with Departmental Gendarmery units spread out over the national terri-
tory, whose qeneral surveillance functions had included the weapons estab-
lishments.
[3ut the situation called for greater specialization of Gendarmery forces
in regard to weapons installations, and the Ministerial Delegation for
Weaponry wanted to have available, in addition to civilian personnel
for the usual guard functions, a seasoned military unit able to carry out
- investigations as well as armed interventions on the spot.
It was to meet this need that, by decree of le March 1973, the Weapons
Gendarmery was created.
f
* A yradua~e of Saint-Cyr (1953-1955), an infantryman,.Lt Col Pierre de
Maximy became a gendarme in 1959. He served successively in the Mobile
Gendarmery, the Air Gendarm~ry, the Departmental Gendarmery, the Navy
General Staff, and the Overseas Gendarmery. He now commands the Weapons
Gendarmery. He holds a law degree.
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What are its functions, what are its means, and what is its organization? _
'I'he replies to these questions will provide an understanding of this
~ Cendarmery unit.
Une Gendarmery, But 'Phree Police Forces
~s a specialized unit of the National Gendarmery, "the Weapons Gendarmery
is ckiarged with police functions in places and establishments pertaining
to tt~ Ministerial Delegation for Weaponry and participates in their pro-
tecti.on. "2
Conc~rrently, as an integral part of the National Gendarmery, the Weapons
c;endarmery "assures execution of laws, decrees and administrative decis-
ions." ,
'L't~ese two aspects o� the same mission, differentiated here for the sake
oL- clarity, are, in practice, ind issociable. If one of them were lacking, _
the Weapons Gendarmery would lose its reason for being.
`I'hus, besides the investigation of crimes of all kinds, besides exercising
the general functions of administrative police and military police, the
Weapons Gendarmery has the specific mission of policing establishments of
the General Delegation for Wea~.~onry.
- `1'!iis mission requires that it: supervise, in conjunction with the civilian
guards oF the establishments, the control of entrances and exits of ~persons _
and vehicles; provide escorts for funds and equipment; carry out security
and criminal investigations within the establishments; systematically and
co~~tinuously investigate reports and information in conjunetion with other
services operating outside the establishments and especially with the De- -
partmen tal Gendarmery; take part in the protection and defense of the
establishments against attempts from within and without; perfor~n any mis-
sion contributing to the security of the ~~ital points constituted by the
c~s;tal.~lishments, functioning therein as criminal investigative, administra-
tiv~ ancl military police, using all means at their disposal.
~icx]est Means, IIut a Significant Deterrent
ot~ly recently created and developing rather slowly, the Weapons Gendarmery
has only a small staff.3
- Its ~ersonnel is recruited within the National Gendarmery from volunteers
havinq at least 3 years of service in one of the Gendarmery's other organi-
zations.
~ Tlii~ personnel is selected, trained and placed under military discipline.
~t~t~eir status, their functions as criminal investigative police officers or
~ ayer~ts, and their military and legal training render them more capable of
action and Eunctionally more versative than civilian personnel.
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'1'he lateral tie-ins that the Weapons Gendarmery can establish place the
National Gendarmery's entire investigative capability at the ~ractical _
disposal of the General beleqation for Weaponry.
It may be added that the presence of a Weapons Gendatmery unit in an estab-
lishment has a deterrent efEect that cannot be ignored, which extends
beyond the boundaries of the establishment: Approaching these boundaries
means not only facing the front end of a military defense capability but
a~.~o exposing oneself to the control checks and criminal investigative -
Eunctions the Gendarmery is required to per~orm at all sites. ~
Its equipment is comparable to that of other Gendarmery units of similar
type. The design, maintenance and renewal of nor~special equipment--weapons,,
office equipment, vehicles and so forth--are the responsibility of the _
- General Delegation for Weaponry. Special equipment--technical equipment
Lor criminal investigative activities, traffic police, signalization, and
so For th--is the responsibility o� the Gendarmery.
A Dual Relationship
'I'r.~ understand the Weapons Gendarmery's corparate organization, its dual
relationship must be considered.
It is an integral component of the National Gendarmery, assigned function-
_ ally to the general delegate for weaponry.
Consequently, the commander of the Wea~ons Gendarmery reports directly to
- the director of gendarmery and military law, and, for the carrying out of
specific missions, to the general delegate for weaponry, to whom he is a
technical ~adviser.
Itowever, its personnel, regardless of where they are stationed, are under
the direc t authority of their hierarchic superiors in the Weapons Gendar-
mery, and :staff-level inspection of the unit is an assigned function af the
general who heads the Inspectorate General of the National Gendarmery.
'1'he internal organization of the Weapons Gendarmery reflects this situa-
tion.
It is diagramed in the accompanying chart.
't'he heads of establishments designate the objectives to be achieved, and
may in some cases specify the means to be used, but in no case may their
instructions require services that are not properly functions of the
Gendarmery.
Thus, the use of Weapons Gendarmery units by the heads of establishments
must conform to the National Gendarmery's �unctional code.
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.
- - Key:
~1> 1. Weapons Gendarmery Command
COMMIINOIMINi D! l� `
O~NWIIMf~II D1
~.uT~. (3) l'A~MtMtNI 2. General Directorate for Weaponry
~t~N~{IMtMt ~ 4 ~ ~ e~ COMM~YOfMlNf 3. Techn ical direc `.ora tes
11/O~ON~I 0~ lA
C'~ Of 11 M
5 4. Establishment/Brigade
M ~N..pa . i IMqW
- i J 5. Company from ist Military
~ aww~r~Mr~
� (9)i 1 District
~_cor~.~cMU.
6. Company from Military District
~8~ a~~~M 7. General Directorate for Military
6 Law
COMMGN~1 r
Dl U~ 11 M. 1 LlOIOMS
i 1 8. Gendarmery District Command for ~
(9) i�"�'"!�~"'- the Military District
~ carn.wwes 9, Legions, groups, companies ~in
descending order~
~
The General Delegation for Weaponry, charged by the Defense Ministry with
responsibility for implementation of weapons programs, is also responsible
for preserving within the nation a modern and efficient weapons industry--
the measure of the nation's independence.
The Delegation's directorates oversee nun~erous establishments distributed
throughout the national territory and employing nearly 300,000 persons.
Tl~ese complex, costly and sensitive installations required special protec-
tion. The Weapons Gendarmery takes part in providing this protection. -
This is its reason for being and its pride. ~
FOOTNOTES
l. Its current designation is General Delegation for Weaponry.
2. .~xcept sites and installations whose "security is placed under the res-
ponsibility of the Navy or the Air Force," which have available to them
for this purpose the Maritime and Air:Gendarmeries respectively.
3. Its staff numbered 105 in 1973, and 112 in 1979.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 - Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"
9399
CSO: 3100
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` COUNTRY SFCTION FRANCE
DIRECTORATE FOR CIVIL AERCivAUTICS PROGFi~iMS REVIEWED ~
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 9 Feb 80 pp 9-10
~Text~ The Directorate for Civi1 Aeronautics Pragrams ~DPAC~ was created '
on 30 March 1976 when the Generat Secretar~.at tor Civil Aviation ~SGAC~
became a general directorate. ~
It was formed by merging a Subdirectorate for Aeronautical Construction
Programs, which had been a part of the former SGAC's Directorate for Air
Transport, with the major aeronautics program directorates (Conc~rde,
Airbus, CFM 56), which had reported directly to the secretary general.
The aim was to achieve better Eunctional coheren~e within the Ministry of
Transport, which is responsible for all. civil aeronautics construction
matters, whether they concern commercial aviation, private av:.ation, heli-
copters or light aircraft, or whether they concern airframes, engines,
equipment or research.
Article 6 of .Decree 76284 of 30 March 1976, which created the DGAC ~General
Directora~e for Civil Aviation~, stipulates the functions of the DPAC: "The
DPAC pregares detailed civil aeronau~ics research, design and construction
programs, implements them and manages the bud~~ts relative there to."
The new organization has made it possible to strengthen the liaison between
those res~onsible for major programs and t:hose responsible for the rest of
the sector, to render advance-planning activities more coherent, and to
more clea~ly regroup all combinatorial activities, especially the budget
and programing. "
Prolong:~�.:.ion of Successful Activities
In accordance with the government's policy on aeronautical construction,
which, based on the existence in place of a modern military aeronautical
industry,-seeks to develop acquired technologies toward other ends, to
assure highly skilled employment, and to improve our foreign trade, the
DPAC has as a priority objective the long range prolongat~on of activities
that have..already achieved success or are on the verge of doing so.
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avi. vt�L~tVtt1L UJL' V1YL1
Products that have achieved a breakthrough must continually evolve in
accordance with technoloqical advances and the needs of the ;narket. Pro-
visio?~ must therefore be ~nade for their constant adaptation, to promote the
branching out that is indispensable for maximum profitability over the
longest period of time. This der~iands tenacity and follow-through, and the
DPAC is determined to provide maximum possible support to those industrial-
ists who, through their own dynamism and ability, have succeeded in captur-
ing a place an the international scene.
In particular, the Airbus and the CFM 56, the two major civil aviation
programs, have opened noteworthy long range employment and export prospects.
Everything must be done, ~herefore, to support these product lines.
The new organizational structure facilitated the decision-making that went
into the launching o�- the A 310 version of the Airbus in 1978, and the
establishment of a policy supporting the equipment manufacturers who were
_ able to earn a choice spot in the future of this plane~
New derivatives of the Airbus are already being designed with government .
aid.
The CFM 56, for its part, has entirely fulfilled the hopes placed in it in
the early 1970's, with the decision by many companies to replace the en-
gines in their DC 8's with the CFM 56, and the recent one by the American
Air Force to equip their KC 135 supply plane with it.
To extend these successes, progressive improvements to the basic motor are
already being planned with a view to maintaining its long-term competitive-
ness, and a scaled-down derivative of it is already being planned to equip
or re-equip planes having seating capacities of 120-130 passengers.
~lhile these two programs, because of their vast potential for spin-offs of
all kinds, are being given the highest priority, support of sectors that
long ago succe~ded is in no way be'ing neglected.
This is the case of private planes, the most recent of which, the Falcon
50, has received significant government support, and of the civilian-heli-
copter sector, which, because of the preeminent position occupied by our
industry, is being diligently safeguarded.
The overall results of this policy, the seeds of which were germinated some
10 years ago and which has since then been nurtured by progressive adoption
of the necessary accompanying measures to bring it to fruition, are measur-
able in tern~s of its ope?:ative impact on our balance of payments.
T:,us, civil aeronautical construction, which wa~ in the red in 1.975, .
accounted in 1979, through deliveries made in thEs course of that year, for
a net surplus oE more than 2 billion francs in our foreign trade balance--
a surplus that will grow to more than 8 billion (1979) francs in 1983.
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Openzess to Innovation
To secure the long-term future, the DPAC makes it a standing rule to pursue
diligently and without a prioris the prospects opened by new technologies,
as well as new projects which may in some cases be based on profound
innovations.
To this end, it has facilitated developmental exploration projects (aero-
nautics, composite-materials structur~s, and so forth) bridging the crucial
gap between research and development properly speaking.
It is providing full support to the exploratory studies being carried out
by the SNIAS ~National Aerospace IndustriaL Company~ on future planes based
on the concepts disclosed by Airbus Industrie and approved by the prime
minister at the last Bourget Air Show (narrow-bodied plan�~s seating 130-160
passengers, a larger-scale version of the Airbus, and a l.;r~g-haul Airbus).
Its aid is not always crowned with success. Thus, it supported the effort
deployed around the helicostat ~a type of helicopter stabilized by a
streamlined balloon~ in an attempt to resolve the troublesome problem of
unloading timber in zones of difficult access. Although this effort has
been discontinued, the studies carried out served to clarify the nature of
the difficulties that have to be resolved.
This illustrates the importance of a policy of soundings that can be car-
ried out at low cost levels and that enable the timely phasing out of a
program as soon as the requisite studies show that it probably cannot be
undertaken with a reasonable chance of success.
The support currently being provided to the study of a rotary-plug motor,
which could bring about a minor revolution in the field of light aviation,
is based on an exploratory enterprise of this kind, with no assurance as
yet as to its future outcome. _
It is from this same standpoint that the DPAC is participatin in the
technical vigil being maintained by the SNIAS and the SNFCMA ~National
Aviation Engine LPsign and Construction Company~ over the future of super-
sonic transport, so as not to be caught unawares should an opportunity
arise in time, within the framework of an enlarged international coopera-
tion, for a second-generation plane.
The DPAC: A Small Organization Dedicated to Promoting and Synthesizing
To carry out its missions, the DPAC has progressively and intentionally
organized itself as a light centralized administrative structure, avoiding _
~ duplication of functions, taking into account the existence of structures
in other ministerial.departments that are already working on aeronautical
matters.
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~
a va~ vi i tvit~J.i UJ1`, UIVLl
1 0 ur
ORWNIGAAM~E AtNEI ~E LA D.P.A.C. i. pIIBE
AdJotnts w Dlrec ur ch~rgls du :
progr [ONCORDE : M. UIGORCE*
Aq~olnt : 5. GA055 ~
proqrMnt AIRBUS : J.P. PERMIS
~ r~ Dr'a9rrme CiM 56 : J. lE GALL~ ~ ~ 9~
r
I Otrislon Gs Propneees Otrtslon des Aff~tres
Ecawolques et Fin~nctins
P.l. IWSUBIAN J, CNA9AGN0
7 a 10~ ~ ~I1~
' Aviation transpar Avtatlon Glnfr~le H611coptPres Affalns lcona~lques Budget ~t P1M
I MOElf IIWYNY7{ .
J.P. TOAOEC J. CAMELIN D. GUT D. 011YfD J.P. JACOYEL
* Mr. Lagorce is also responsible to the director
general of civil aviation ~or environmental problems
and for export and foreign operations matters. In
the latter function, he is assisted by S. Gross.
J. le Gall is also responsible to the director of
the DGAC for various assignments (bi-CFM 56 planes,
large subsonic engines, F~tc.)
Key:
l. Current DPAC Organization Chart
2. Director
3. Deputy directors for: ~programs as shown~
4. Deputy
5. Programs Division '
6. Transport Aviation
7. General Aviation
8. Helicopters - New Applications
9. Economic and Financial Atfairs
10. Economic Affairs
11. Budget and Plan ~
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In particulac, the Technical Directorate for Aeronautical Consttuction
provides it with invaluable assistance on the technical and industrial
aspects of every progr:~.:n or project, as much on the part of the technical
and industrial directurs assigned to the two major programs (Concorde, Air-
bus) as on that of the engineers in the technical services (STPt~ ~expansion
unknown~ ,~nd STPE ~Technical Service for Propellants and Explosives~), each
from the viewpoint of his own specialty.
The DPAC employs, at the moment, in addition to its administrative person-
nel, a staff of 15 engineers and one administrative officer, the engineer
staff being:
--five weapons engineers;
--seven civil aviation engineers;
--three civil aviation operations and design studiES engineers.
It is planned to increase th~~ DPAC staff by a few additions to the PrQgrams
Divisian.
The DPAC's budget covers practically nothing beyond capital expenditures
totaling around 1.2. b~llion ftar~cs, consisting of over 75 percent of the
credits of this~:~iype allocated to the DGAC and 12.5 percent of those
allocated to the Ministry of Transport (1979).
COPYRIGHT: Air & Cosmo~, Paris, 1980
9399
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
BRI EFS
RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA--Yugoslav authorities have told [Foreign Affairs
Minister] Jean Francois-Poncet that continued good relations between Paris
and Belgrade depend upon the Frenctc'ceeping a closer watch over Yugoslav
immigrants. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 29 Feb 80 p 72)
CSO: 3100
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, COUNTRY ~ECTIOt1 ITALY ~
i
COSSIGA'S FOREIGPd POLICY CRITICIZEll -
rlilan PAP~ORAMA in Italian 28 Jan 80 pp 40-41
[Article by Carlo Rossella: "Hat in Hand"] -
[TextJ At the Diinistry of Foreign Affairs, Gianni Baget Bozzo's remark .
made desks tremble. "Italy is the Bulgaria of NATO" wrote the Catholic `
political analyst in La Repubblica. That is to say: a faithful ally,
now incapable of separating its own opinions from those of the dominating
superpower.
In a long essay on "Thirty Years of Christian Democratic Foreign Policy,"
which will be publishPd in the next issue of MONDOPERAIO, the ideological
magazine of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), Bino Olivi wrote: "No
country of the Atlantic Alliance has shown itself more ready to accept the `
hegemonic ally's theses In short, Italian credibility, because of
this, has been greatly damaged."
Along with Baget Bozzo and Bino Olivi's criticisms are many others aimed
at the foteign policy of the tripartite government of Francesco Cossiga,
his ex-minister of foreign affairs and Fanfani supporter Franco Maria
Malfatti, who because of a heart ailment was replaced on 14 January by
- the Dorotei leader Attilio Ruffini. The list is long but significant.
Following the discussion on the deployment in Italy of the Pershing II
and cruise missiles, Cossiga promised Christian Democratic Party [DC]
Senator Li~igi Granelli he would go to the Soviet Union to analyze the
issue of bilateral weapons reductions w;th Leonid Brezhnev. However,
Cossiga was very careful not to initiate any substantive talks. Because
of Cossiga's direct intervention in the matter, Italy has declared a
military sales embargo on Iran. (Tehran's Ministry of Defense has been
requesting spare parts for 250 Aousta helicopters for months): this risks
the loss of 3 billion dollars investecl in Persia, thus threatening further
reduction5 in deliveries of Iranian crude oil.
The situation with other Arah states has also worsened. Italy is risking
a crisis with Iraq: the Baghdad government has been refused a delivery of
materials needed for the production of the atomic bomb, a pro~ect the
Iraqis have been working on for a number of years. Furthermore, in recent
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weeks, following the Red Army intervention in Afghanistan, the Italian
government has done all it could ta cancel out years of excellent economic
relations with the Soviet Union. (Italy in fact, since 1979 has been one
of Moscow's principal trading partners). The visit by an important Soviet
government economic de].egation was canceled (and the French, who immedi.~tely
welcomed the delegation, have gained by making profitable de~ls with them).
While Helmut Schmidt, the German chancellor, in the middle of the Afghan
crisis, was confirming Brezhnev's visit in March and hammering away at the
necessity for detente and Ostpolitik, Italy agreeably sided with the
Americans, closed its ports to Soviet vessels, and even reached the point
of sharing in the insane plan for boycotting the Olympics in Moscow. Even
at the Council of Ministers of the EEC, Italy meekly supported Jimmy Carter's
_ new anti-detente doctrine, forgetting all the theories of a European
autonomous role, even ignoring the astute nuances of the French and the
German Social Democrats, who are not at all disposed to confuse politics
with economics and not at all inclined to unload on Europe's shoulders all
the politico-military tensions between the two superpowers. Even the
"agenda" of "r'rancesco Cossiga's upcoming trip to Washington allows room
for doubts, uncertainties and preoccupations regarding Italy's national
autonomy. Then, there is the point reserved for "future relations" and the
"future majorities in government"; this involves, as is obvious, a question
which Valery Giscard d'Estaing or Helmut Schmidt would unquestionatily not
submit for approval from the White ~touse. "Reinforcing the bonds of friend-
stiip with the United States," as former P4inister of Foreign Affairs Arnaldo
Forlani told the Chamber, has become, for some months, the political objec-
- tive of the Christian Democratic Party of its allies in the government, and _
of President of the Council [of Ministers] Francesco Cossiga, a politician -
the American ambassador Richard Gardner, in his year-end report defined as
"a great friend."
That autonomous role in the Mediterranean and in Africa built up so labor-
iously by the foreign policy of Amintore Fanfani and Aldo Moro has been
lost. (For 9 years the minister of foreign affairs has not visited Algeria,
a country which is to provide us with 8 billion cubic meters of fuel by
- constructing a new gas pipeline.) The privileged relations with socialist
- countries have chilled, and Italy is destined to play an inadequate inter-
national role vis-a-via its economic, political and cultural reality. The
present Christian Democratic leaders focus more on d~mestic than on foreign
policy, trying to avoid causinb ~vaves with moderates and conservatives by
embarking on open-minded international initiatives, and as Luciano Vasconi,
specialis~ in foreign policy and deputy director of MOIdDOPERAIO said, "thPy
are characterized by a quick-change international behavior, conditioned ry
home politics, and lacking a general, European view."
Ldith murkier and more cauti~us statements, former Undersecretary for
Foreign Affairs, orthodox Christian Democrat Angelo Sanza admics t~:o the
influence of the Italian internal situation on the government's interna-
tional policy. Said Sanza: "National policy, searching for a different
relationship with the communists, brings about a certain international
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caut'_on and leads to choices which are more pro-West than one might origin-
ally desire. The Social Democracies can allow themselv~s to be more
critical than can Italy. We are preoccupied with the fact that a policy
critical of and autonomous from the United States, could favor, in the eyes
of the Americans, the communists." Following the 1919 poiitical elections
and despite repeated criticisms by Berlinguer of the USSR, the Americans
have requested from the Italian government greater international solidarity,
and, in practice, the setting aside of a too independent foreign policy of
Giulio Andreatti's majority national unity government.
With press~~res from Washington, coupled with the cautious mood of the
Cossiga government, it will be very difficult for Italy to exploit to its
advantage and to the advantage of an autonomous European policy the presi-
_ dent's seat on the EEC Council of Min:~sters. During the upcoming bilateral
= meeting at the White Iiouse, Ji~any Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski, national
security advisor to the president, will ask our country to be a"watchdog"
= for American interests in Brussels. As Brzezinski has alreacly allowed to
be understood in his interview with the [aALL STREET JOURIVAL, the American
government is relying on the unity of the allied f ront to meet and with-
stand the USSR's challenge. From this point of viecv, Italy in the position
_ of presidency of the EEC Council of Ministers, will be able to mediate only
in favor cf Washington. The new role of "faithful U.S. ally" is the com-
fortable position many major bureaucrats at the Farnesina Palace had been
awaiting for a long time. In a ministry by tradition f eudally inbred with
the most conservative DC section (even though Secretary General Francesco
Malfatti, baron of Nontetretto, is a dear friend of Bettino Craxi), the
reappearance of bipolarism a la 1950 favors even more the notable strength =
of the traditionalists and obliterates those renewal exigencies which have
remained alive despite the ruthless witch hunt of the last 7 months. As
is written in the CGIL-Farnesina [Italian General Confederation of Labor-
Farnesina SectionJ leaflets, beside a governmental decline of foreign
policy, the minister of foreign affairs "has experienced a regressive
phenomenon of bureaucratization." According to the CGIL and to many young
diplonats, the state of stupor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is due
to several internal factors, many quite disquieting, in addition to the
Cossiga government. First among others is the discrimination of the so-
called leftist functionaries, affected by the "promotion jump" system and
the yearly efficiency reports. In 1979 more than 50 CGIL associated
functionaries were punished by the former head of the personnel department,
_ presently the ambassador to Bonn, Luigi Vittorio Ferraris. The internal
repression, together with the absurd norms of Article 148, which forbids
diplomats the right to free expression of their opinions, favor the crea-
tion of an out and out separate body, fre~e from any political control and
resistant to any innovative projects. (The Foreign Commission of both the
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have never questioned prospective
ambassadors to hear their evaluations and programs, as takes place, for
example, in the United States). Only in this manner can the ministry's
reform, which never came about, be e~lained, for the ministry has remained
exactly the same since the end of the war, and is the only one among modern
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cour.tries not to be divided by geographical areas of competence, not
producing real specialists but rather classic jacks-of-all-trades Italian
style. For example, in the period of 10 years, an Italian diplomat may be
tasked to be the commercial attache in New Zealand, the consul in Stuttgart,
the counsellor in charge of internal affairs in Warsaw, and, once back home,
the functionary who reads reports on Arabic countries dealing with petroleum
products. The same coufusion between political cooperation of the minis-
try's activities (the responsibility of the council president and the minis-
ter of foreign affairs) and its administrative coordination (the responsi-
bility of the bureaucratic structure) leads to confusion over tasks and
roles and to a dangerous discharging of responsibilities between diplomats
and politicians which certainly do not contribute to a clear foreign policy.
A symbolic figure which characterizes the situation of the ministry is that
of the secretary general, who is powerful with weak ministers (as Malfatti
was with his namesake, the other Malfatti), and weak with strong ministers
(during Fanfani's and Moro's tenures, Roberto Gaja was of littie conse-
quence). In the opinion of the CGIL, the position of secretary general
should be substituted by a college body coc~posed of undersecretaries, heads
of general departments and of other operational units. But the hopes of
- the CGIL and the Farnesina progressives have scant probability of success. -
Unless, as ir by miracle, Minister Ruff ini might initiate the ministry's
reorganization and the revitalization of the moribund Italian foreign -
policy. "At the Ministry of Defense, Ruffini clashed with the generals,"
say his Dorotei friends at Piazza Del Gesu; "at the Farnesina he certainly =
_ wouldn't be drowned out by all the hats." Hit number one: on 17 January,
Ruffini only half finished the debate ~n the Europarliament and left
Strasburg, despite the pleas of ministry functionaries.
COPYRIGcIT: 1980 Arnoldo Mondadori Editore S.p.A.
9209
CSO: 3104 _
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
LABOR MINISTFR PROPOSES PACT WITH PCI, UNIONS, CONFINDUSTRIA
Milan IL MONDO in Italian 8 Feb 80 pp 14-16
[Interview with Vincenzo Scotti, Christian Democrat and labor minister, by -
Maurizio De Luca: "Three-Way Pact Proposed"; date and place of interview not
given]
[Text) The agreement with the PCI is not ended-
The unions and Confindustria must be brought in
in order to avoid repeating the errors of 1978.
_ What is the first step?
The anpointment is for the end of February, not long after the DC [Christian
Democratic PartyJ congress. Then all the parties will begin discussion what
is to be done to find new political solutions to replace the uncertain major-
ity that has thus far supported the government led by Francesco Cossiga.
But will the parties discuss things cor.~~retely? And, at least as concerns
the steps to be taken in economic matters, how will this debate fit in with
the negotiations that are still going on between the government and the unions?
And what chance of success does such an enlarged debate have? I L MONDO talked
- about these things with the ministor of Labor, Christian Democrat Vincenzo
Scotti, who supports within his party a policy of open debate with the PCI.
[Question] It is increasingly~difficult for an outsider to understand wha~C
is happening to the economy on the labor sceaZe.
[AnswerJ .I know, I know. Actually, there is a risk of looking at things
~ in the wrong way. Thcre is a lot of talk about distributing and redistribu~
- ting incomes without any concern for how much they may increase and what
must be done to insure even modest progress.
[Question] Be more specific.
[AnswerJ We have to change our starting point. We must not seek small, ,
unstable agreements that give advantages to corporate posi~ions or solutions
to small problems. Rather we are confronted with the problem of the relation-
ship between the costs of production, competitiveness, inflation, employment,
and development. And we confront the problem with the concern that there be
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no reduction in real wages, and also with the purpose of eliminating the
acceleration of inflation and of improving competitiveness.
[QuestionJ An ambitiot~s program.
[Answer] Yes, but indispensable. I would call it a pact for development.
I mean it is necessary to make a pact that has the objective of increased
investment, consolidation of the lagging productive structure of the country,
and increased employment. To this end we must work toward a drastic reduc-
tion in inflation and greater competitiveness.
(Question] And how do you go about defining such a pact? With whom? And
when?
[Answer] Let's take those questions in order. Even I realize that such a
pact cannot be a short-term one. Indeed. It also requires serious agree-
ment on the sacrifices to be made to reach the proposed objective: development.
I think the pact should be basically a firm understanding among political
and social groups and should have adequate force and duration.
[QuestionJ Just a minute. Let's take a look at the political aspects of it.
PJho makes a pact of this type? The Cossiga government?
[Answer] This is a very delicate subject. I don't think the Cossiga govern-
_ ment can achieve a development pact as I understand it. If an agreement is
reached, it will imply, I would say automatically, the formation of a dif- ~
ferent majority, a fuller one. Now, the government of which I am presently ~
- a member might possibly help achieve this pact. Besides, it has already
brought up certain themes and avoided a confrontation between the government,
unions, and political groups, a confrontation that would have been limited
_ mereiy to problems of redistributing incomes. It has forced everybody to ~
raise their sights and to move, I think, toward a solution that will inevi-
tably supersede the present formula. ~
[Question] In other words you think the agreement contributes to national
unity.
[Aiiswer.] Certainly, in that there would have to be a different government ~
- to achieve the pact for development.
[Question] But how do you think the pact can be achieved? How does it work? -
[~nswer] I'l1 try to be specific. I am convinced that the parties are
fooling themselves if they think they can reach a political agreement on
national unity if they haven't confronted the unions and Confindustria directly
on development problems. This was one of the mistakes of 1978, when people
thought that the mere fact th at the PCI was in the majority coalition the
Problem of relations with the union movement, i.e. the definition of a pact,
had been shoved aside. It was a mistake. Of course, reaching a majority
coalition agreement with the PCI is an important fact, a fact of no small
importance indeed, but it is not enough. I think it is necessary, then,
first to indicate the terms of a development pact and then~to set about
managing and implementing it coherently. A new relationship with the PCI
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must begin with a critical analysis of the 1978 experience and the goal of
unity, otherwise we will fall back into a situation that will inevitably
lead to the same negative developments we have now. And there's another
mistake I think we ought to avoid.
[Question] What's that?
_ [Answer] Tying national unity to a temporary economic emergency, which works
more on effects than on causes. The emergency is not in the effects, which
can be alleviated by any number of ineans, but in the structural causes of
the country's development. For example, in phases of rapid growth Italy
has always underestimated the problem of the material basis for development
by giving first priority to the corporate protecti~n of employment and in��
comes. The result has been to penalize investment and employment by increasing
the area of marginality. This has jeopardized the future.
[Question] Before considering the substance of the pact, tell us how the
negotiations should be handled.
[Answer] Of course I'm hypothesizing. I think an early three-cornered
meeting should take place between the political groups, the unions, and
Confindustria. And the timing shouldn't be bad. The three union leaders
have already said they are ready to make an agreement of this sort. And
Pierre Carniti has publicly said he is aware of the problem of reinvestment
and productivity. I think the unions would have to reconsider realistically
each of their sacred cows, like wage indexing.
[Question] And then what should the parties do?
[Answer) I think they should seek~common interests and reach a proposal
for forming a government. I would then expect the Council president and
the ministers to define and mange it. It is certain that an agreement
between the political parties should be checked out first with the unions
and management. Not to do so would be to make a basic mistake all over
again. Some people even in my own party think that only the political
parties can decide, but this is not possible. They respect the primacy
of politics, but they are ignoring, in the last analysis, the concrete
facts of the country's civil and economic life.
[Question] But what should the parties, unions, and employers talk about,
exactly? Tn other words, what should be in the development pact, as you
ca~ll it?
[Answer] Let me say this first. We all know the argument about a two-tradk
policy, i.e. whether it is more or less possible to have benefits and sacri-
- fices at the same tine. We all know that international change (increases
in raw materials and energy sources)have imposed a real adjustment on our
_ domestic policy that cannot be made at the expense of investment, as has
been the case. The pact should now be made on ending sacrifices. These
are the conditions for meeting stable growth objectives. To this end, for
example, I have always opposed in the government taking any unilateral measures
concerning wage indexing; it was a passing notion anyway because no parlia-
mentary majority could have been gotten together to approve it, not because
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the problems of indexing are not problems but because the political signals
of such an operation would have contrasted with the possibility of achieving
a true development pact.
[Question] O.K., but what is the development pact? What does it consist of?
[Answer] I'm getting there. First of all, let's agree on the nature of the
Italian crisis. It is said to be structural. Let us agree on ways of elimi-
nating these structural causes. The pact's objective cannot be, for example,
to reduce inflation alone and by itself, although this is of course one of
the fundamental reasons for which the pact should work. The objective ought
to be an increase in investment, general income, and employment. It is a new
quality of development. Do I make myself clear?
[Question] Yes, of course. But what does the pact contain?
jAnswer] Let us consider the nature of the crisis itself. Now, there is a
wrong way of perceiving and interpreting it: it is to limit it to its contin-
gent aspects. Let me explain. There is generally a large difference between
what most people see and the publicly acknowledged seriousness of the crisis.
This can be explained by the fact that the crisis is not having an immediate
impact on the level of consumption and well-being of the majority of the popu-
lation. Mechanisms that protect workers and their incomes are functioning,
even in a crisi.s. But at whose expense? That's the point.
[Question] What do you mean?
[Answer] This happens at the expense of investment, as I have said, of jobs--
especially future ones, and at the cost of increasing inflation, Here we
should mention a few dates: net investment in 1973-79 dropped 4 points with
respect to national income, and yet the measurement is based on a rather low
fi.gure: 11.6. At the same time, the ri~gidity introduced into the organization
of labor created a situation...
[Question] What rigidity are you talking about? -
[Answer] Rigidity in terms of internal and external mobility, in the use of
extra workers, in the crushing of professionalism and the like. Now, these
symptoms of rigidi.ty made the situation more dramatic. There was a deep
split between an area including agriculture, many service activities, small
industry, and what in one way or another keeps competition sufficiently
flexible, between that and large industry, which does not compete, has no
margins for self-financing investment, and cannot invest with money being
lent at such high rates. In practice, they have lower productivity than ~
,their competitors abroad, as in the case of the automobile, where they are
losing domestic sales and are not covering losses abroad by keeping prices
1ow abroad. ConseQuently there is pressure for devaluation and an alteration
in the rate of exchange.
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_ [Question] 1'herefore there is less investment, more inflation, and large
industry loses the race...
[Answer] Those, I think, are the conditions of the crisis in Italy, although
I have stated them a little simplistically. The pact for development must
remove them. .
[Question] But it is still not clear how it will do so.
[Answer] I~11 explain. I think the way leads through a reduction in the
rate of inflation, an increase in competitiveness based on a higher level
of productivity with a rise in economic growth rate,and an increase in the
rate of investment. Now, there is a series of inechanisms (wage and tax
dynamics, and the like) that are counterproductive: they increase inflationary
forces and the costs of production, but net wages increase modestly, with a
flattening that is detrimental to every recognized professional value. -
[Question] That is analysis. What are the remedies?
[AnswerJ I'm coming to that. First, I would like to bring up another fact,
which I think is illuminating: as an effect of existing mechanisms, an incr.ease
in the monthly cost of~labor in Italy of, say, 5 percent means that labor would
get a net increase of 1.1 percent. This is an almost incredible disproportion.
In that sit~uation, everybody defends their own protective mechanisms with the
consequence that the perverse effects are not eliminated. Only the amount
intended for investment goes down. The government feels the effects less:
the deficit in public financing is not becoming flagrant because the govern-
ment, paradoxically, gains from inflation by seeing its tax income increase
disproportionately and make it easier to meet current expenses; but the workers,
despite continual demands, are not improving their real incomes.
[Question] Yes, but what steps should be taken?
[Answer] The pact for development should have the objective of correcting
all these perverse effects. ~.~;;~y, i;, wuld avoid a dispute over the prin-
ciples of the mechanisms�by modifying theix effects, and, without touching -
what now goes into the workers' paychecks, it could reduce the strong infla- `
tionary push by diminishing the costs of production and making increased
. competition possible. The positive effects would be not only to reduce
inflation but also to increase incomes and investment. It is obvious that
an effective agreement is needed to increase productivity and workmanship,
But there are ways of going about it. In fact, a series of studies we have
made show it is possible to meet the objectives I have indicated.
_ [QuestionJ But at whose expense?
jAnswer] I must say that the objection that the unions could raise at this
point would be guarantees on investment. In oth~r words, control problems
might arise. Now, I say that an ali.bi could be taken away from businessmen,
i.e, that perverse mechanisms have been undermining their investment resources.
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Well, no. At this point the challenge could become concrete: once the
conditions for reinvestment are created, it should not be lacking. And
it can be controlled.
[Question] But h'ow? '
[Answer) The means are there. By a particular tax treatment according to
use, which distinguishes between what has been reinvested and the rest, by
the creation of contractual savings intended possibly for a fund with union
participation (which exists, moreover, in other European countries and is
called p3rticipation in capital formation), and by agreements on the prices
set by big business. No, the means are there. Look, to achieve this we
must agree to modify the perverse effects of the mechanisms that now prevail,
and meet the problems of capital formation and productivity with something
more than words. The agreement can happen. It can be done.
[Question] And what if it isn't, after all?
[Answer] I think if the pact is not made, a condition would result where,
to avoid a complete collapse, authoritarian measures would have to be taken,
of the kind that were taken in 1976, but on a much larger scale. In other
words, forceful measures. There would be enforced sacrifices. There would
not be any more choice. .
COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO, 1980
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
POLEMICS ON MILITARY 'COUNSELING' TO PCI ON ITS DEFENSE 'PLATFORM'
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 20 Feb 80 p 7
[Article by Gianfranco Ballardin: "Dispute on Military 'Counseling' to PC"J
~Text~ Rane--Can a military person be the consultant to a political party
on defense issues7 At first glance, it would seem not. However, accord-
ing to the rules and regulations currently in effect, a function of this
kind is not only possible but lawful. The question arose following a press
_ conference held 1 week ago by the PCI ~Italian Co~�nunist Party~ to unveil
the party "platform" on defense issues.
A press release was distributed at the party headquarters containing the _
statement that the position adopted by the PCI parliamentary group had been -
worked out with the "assistance of democratic military personnel." This
vexed the Defense General StaEf. We were told by a high-ranking officer,
"Under current rules and regulations on discipline, a military person
- may join a political party but cannot be a militant. .In particular, a -
military person may not provide counsel to a political party on military
matters." Otherwise--our interlacutor added--where would it all end?
In a letter to CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Arnaldo Baracetti, head of the Chamber
of Deputies Defense Committee's communist group, specified more exactly
the limits of the "counseling" provided by the military to his party.
Baracetti's letter explains that under the basic law on military discipline
(passed in July 1978 by Parliament), the military citizen has the right to
join a political party and, outside the barracks and out of uniform, may
take part as a militant in the political and military activities of a
- political party.
"Within this right," Baracetti wrote, "the m~litary citizens, like all the
other citizens, have been invited ~o and have pasticipated in innumerable
assemblies held more or less throught Italy by cammunist parliamentary
groups and by the PCI to discuss and criticize our policy toward the armed~
Eorces as well as the more general issues of public health, taxation, fair
rental, and so forth. Therein ].ies the nafrure gf the "participation" in -
the determination of our policy by the military citizenry as well, a"par-
ticipation" the PCI holds to be its duty and its right to solicit,as should
all democratic parties."
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Baracetti states that on the other hand, the delegates elected within
"military organizations" are not permitted contact with political parties,
to avoid the risk of involving the armed forces in "party and ideological
contentions."
In sum, may or may not a mil.itary person be a consuLtant to a political
party? According to Baracetti: yes. According to Defense Ministry ex-
perts: no. ihe pertinent legislation is ambiguous, however. The govern-
ment's bill on the "basic principles o~ military discipline" had included
a provision forbiddir,g career mil.itary persons to join poiitical parties.
This provision was subsequer.tly struck in Parliament. And today, the first
paraqraph of Article 6 of the law passed in Ju].y 1978 establ3.shes that "the
armed forces must under all circumstances abstain from taking part in poli-
tical contentions."
The former 1965 regulation on military discipline did not forbid membership -
in a political party or trade union; but in the past, very few career mili-
tary persons have availed themselves o� this tight. When Parliament de-
bated the new law on military discipline, the communists fought tooth
and nail to allow the military to join a political party: The PCI today has
4,000 members throughout the regular armed forces.
While the current law on military discipline al.lows the career military to _
join a political party, it forbids their joining a trade union. Thus, a
military person may be a consultant to the PCI on defense issues, but he
may not, for example, join SUNIA,;the tenants' union.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
- PCI ASKS VOTERSF OPINIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ELECTIONS
Milan IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 24 Feb 80 pp 1, 17
[Interview with Armando Cossutta, PCI~s local politics expert,
, by Fau~to Ibba]
[Text] PCI does some pre-election polling: ~~What do you
think of the mayor you've got?" Showdown between
_ left-leaning regions and the DC. Interview with
Cossutta.
Rome '"You know that the Christian Democrats have not provi-
ded Campania with a stable regional government, and that their
crises have paralyzed the region fc~r 30 months now?~~ "Ev~ry-
_ body says that agricul.ture is in trouble in the Marches: do
you know that the region has 41 billion ~.ire lying idle in its
coffers?~~ "Did you know that the leftist coalition in Taranto
has built 14 daycare centers, and that until 1976 there wasn't
even one?~~ ~~Which officeholders would you like to see struck
frorri the slate at the next administrative el~ction in Sanza, and
why?" ~
These are questions cull~d at random from the qties~;ionnaires the
Communist Party will be handing out to voters in zdvance of the
coming regional, provincial, and local elections. Citizens will
be asked ~to speak out on the political attittides, platforms, and
decisions of PCI candidates. This is an unpr~ecedented undert ak-
ing, a mass survey of voter opinion scheduled to begin ~about
now. What features wi11 it have? What are its objectives? We
= asked Comrade Armando Cossutta, who heads the Local Autonomies
Department of the PCI's executive.
[Question] The most striki.ng innovation has to do with the way
~ the communist slates are being assembled. Citizens will be able
to suggest candidates' names to the Party. There has even been
talk of ",primary elections." Some people see this as an attempt
to import an idea from the American electoral system, which is
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i
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hardly noted �or its participatory record, if half the eligible
voters don't vote, even for the president.
~A.nsWer~ Yes, we have in f act spol;en ot a"kind of primary elec-
tion," not just for the sake of importing procedures that do
not meet our needs or fit ou~ traditions, but to underscore our
plan to introduce something really new in the selection of can-
didates. We feel a need to strengthen the confidence that
should pxist betwen citizens and their institutions, betwe$r~ the
voters and their Party. The approach we have chosen seemed to
be the likeliest to fit in with the times. It was indispensable
to test a more open method to keep the Party organizations from
shutting themselves up into routine, a pattern whose limitations
- we have all felt.
[Question] Isn~t there a risk that the very idea of participa-
tion will lose credibility if there.i�snot an effi~ie~t democra-
tic government, with points of reference and r�esponsibilities
clearly defin~d for the citizens?
[Answerj Ther~ are difficulties because in some cases democra-
tic participatlori has been confined solely to the neighborhood
councils, where they talk over such things as the budget and
nianufacturing schedu]:es. But the councils were to have been
the organizers of fax~ broader participation. They were to keep
the people informed, ~~n a regular basis. They have not always -
done so~ Citizens f.eel that they are involved in a participa- .
tory relationship if they are made truly capable of formin~
opiiiions and contributing to the decision-making. Although on
a very limited scale, the communists have been making an effor~
in this direction ever since 1975� With election day coming,�,� -
we want to crown this effort by asking, first of all, for opin-
_ions on what the administration has be~en doing, and secondly
for suggestions as to solutions for our most pressing problems.
We want to put our programs for the eighties in the regions
and in the communes together with the people~s help. And with
tlie people, we ~ant to pick the people best suited to put the
pro~rams into action.
[Question~ But isn't this pre-election survey to be used mainly
to evaluate the work of the leftist coalitions, and to assess
their records?
[ Aiiswer] Of course we want to make serious reckoning, not an
acritical one, of our activities. You might say, putting it
very simply, that there are three key points that distinguish
ou.r actions in government, what we ca11 the "new way of govern-
ing": l. honesty and administrative propriety, meaning an end
to corruption and to patronage machines; a change of direc-
tion that has given top priority to public and social services
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to improve citizens' living conditions: classrooms, pre-schools,
daycare centers, counsellors, help for the neediest, for small
children and the aged, providing new green spaces, et cetera;
and 3. a drive toward patterns of participation and hence a
- remarkable flowering of cultural undert akings designed for the
young people in particular.
[Question] Could you give me a coiiple of significant examples?
' ~Answer] There are lots of examples, and we have been shy of
talking about them. Just take the Commune of Naples: that will
do. It has built more classrooms than were built in all the
last $0 years. What about the Emilia Region? In one $-year
= period it has built twice as many nursery schools as all eight
- of the southern regions run by the Christian Democrats put toge-
ther.
[Question] In the past, it has been said that Red Emilia was
siphon~ng off government financing that could have been diver-
_ ted to the Mezzogiorno. There is clearly a trace of anti-sou-
thern bias in that policy. Could such an argument stand up
today?
' [Answer] It is a charge that has been proved baseless. The
point is a different one. While Emilia all six regions with
leftist governments in the field of social services do not
have one lira left oE their liuciget appropriations, meaning~ that
they have invested every farthing the s~ate made available to
them, the regions with DC administrations have spent around
'1000 billion lire, and I am talking only of social services.
[Question] Maybe in the Mezzogiorno for reasons we might call~
- say, "structural," it is harder to get the spending machinery
working?
~Answer] That's not it. Yes, there is scant spending capacity,
and inefficiency in the administrative machinery. But this
fact cannot explain some of the things that have happened.
There was in fact a political choice made there, which bowed to
the interests of the dominant forces. Social consumption was -
slowed, while private consumption was encouraged. The regions
did not transfer the sums to {;he communes, or s~neti.mes the
sums were transferred but not utilized. Concerned with improv-
ing the quality of 1if e for local populations, we decided at
the same time to do something toward modifying the prevailing
national attitudes. I want to emphasize this aspect. The
crisis in this country is not solely economic. The hospitals
don1t work; housing is not to be found; the schools do not
respond to the new requirements. We have galloping inflation,
and yet in 1979 Italy was second only to Japan in the rate of
increase in production ax~d income. We have never considered
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the effort we have put forth in the field of social services
inconsistent with the need for a rigorous economic policy, which
must of course be rooted in the growth of economic activity
achieved in other ways. In 1979 we experienced a SO percent
increase in privat e consumption, and only 'L-percent growth in "
public consumption meaning construction of hospitals, hous- '
ing, schools, transport, etc. We believe that this disparity
must be reduced. That is the national standard for our admi-
nistrative efforts. This is why we opposed the government de-
cree that would have cut appropriations for the communes by
80 percent, and succeeded in changing it. And we are fighting
now for a bill that would reform local governments. No program
of national planning is conceivable without the independent
support and input of the regions, on their participatioii in the
development of guidelines and intervention plans.
[Question~ And so we are starting to gather citizen views on
programs and candidates. But we still don't know when the
elections will take place.
~Answer] It is vital that the government set the date of the
elections as early as possible. They must be held, according
to law, on one of the four Sundays prior to the expiration of
the term, which means prior to 1$ June. So our survey is not
premature: quite the contrary. This is a crucial phase, a
t;ime when citizens can think clearly about the real issues,
about the record of achievement, and about what ought to be
done.
LQuestion~ Isn't there a risk, though, with this questionnaire,
oF salving our consciences with a little sociology? What does
it mean to ask as you do in the questionnaire of a southern
citizen who is to blame for the crisis, and then give him
a choice of six answers: the government's, the parties', the
Americans', the terrorists~, the bosses', th~ unions'? This
looks to me not so much like a call for clear thinking as an
invitation to oversimplify the issues.
~Answer] Our intention is to thrust.the Party into a real
dialogue with the citizens. We ~hall carry the questionnaire
from door to door as a guide for opening discussion and eli-
ci~;ing opinions. Yes, it is true that in framing the ques-
tions we may have erred on the side of oversimplification now '
and again. But this is the first experiment we have ever made
on a nationwide basis. Our ties with the masses and the
atrength of our Farty organization enable us at once to talk
personally with the greatest possible number of voters. Now
is the time when opinions are being formed.
[~iuestion~ In the last political elections we suffered a net
loss of votes. That f act may lead to pessimism.
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!Answer~ We must look forward with confidence to the coming
campaign battle. There are in fact very profound differences
in the situation by comparison with 3 June 1979. The main ones,
- I think, are two. First: we are in a bett er position than we
- were on ,3 June to display the tangible results of our work in
government. I don't mean that we have managed to do everything
that was necessary: we may not even have done everything that
was possible. And yet, despite the pervasive crisis and the
woeful record of misgovernment we inherited, there is no ques-
tion but that the Communists have been the architects of vital
innovations. Woe betide anyone who interrupts that effort:
What would happen if we were to return to the domination of the
old patronage system, the old corruption, the men who produced
the ruin of our cities?
In 1979 we could say that we had warded off the worst, that we
had halted inflati~n and prevented an economic collapse, that
we had defended democracy against the terrorist assault. And
there was a~ortion of the electorate that did not grasp the
import of this contribution, while others concentrated their
attention on our mistakes. Now we can also show our record of
responsible, committed administration, whose first concern has
been the people's interests. -
~Question~ What then do you see as the second difference be-
tween no~ and 3 June?
~Answer~ Our political watchword this time is instantly under-
standable, doable, and indicative of a political solution that
has been proved sound: "Consolidate the incumbent democratic
leftist coalition admitnistrations, and elect more of them.'~
There is an objective that speaks to a situation in which t he
DC, with its congress, rules out any government including t he
communists, even in local administrations where, as everybody
knows, there is no use at all in invoking military alliances
or foreign policy pretexts. Of course, in our view, the demo-
cratic leftist coalitions are based not only on the solid
ties between communists and socialists although we consider
those essential but are open to input and participation on
an equal footing from all who are willing to help forge a policy
of renewal and progress. It is highly significant that we can
already count on the existing collaboration with the Proleta-
rian Unity Party (PDUP) and the Social Democ ratic Party (PSDI)
in the three biggest cities in Italy Rome, Milan, and Naples -
and with the Republicans (PRI) in many more towns.
[QuestionJ Let's get back to the candidates. The voters will
be asked to suggest names for the PCI slates. There are some
who say this is asking for trouble. Small pressure groups, for
example, might move in for purposes having nothing to do with
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_ the elections, but rather in order to distort, rather than en~
rich the democratic dialectic. How seriously do you take this?
(Answer~ The first issue to clarify, if possible in public meet-
ings, has to do with the kind of people who are nominated as PCI ~
candidates. We require that their records be impeccable; that
they be competent people capable of governing, and that they
have meaningful ties with the people. Secondly, the final de-
cision, by law, lies with the assembly of.registered members of
the section and, in the larger cities~ with the citizens~ com-
mittee or the federation committee. If there is a demand for
it, the balloting is secret. There is every possible guarantee.
This survey will stimulate the Party to find out where it stands
with a vast number of vot~rs. We must shun the temptation to
make candidate selections in secret and out of force of habit.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editoriale del "Corriere della 5era," s.a.8.
6182
cso: 3io4
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COUNTRY 9ECTION ITALY
,
NCO'SIN FRIULI COMMENT ON COMING MILITARY ELECTIONS
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 2� Feb 80 p 5
[Article by Sergio Pardera]
[~ext] Udine Friuli, the "borderland" (it is only 90 kilo-
meters from the Austrian border, and the Yugoslav border is a
scant 4d kilometers away) is where most of our armed forces
are stationed. Right here more than ~0, 000 men are under arms..,
al.ong with the best of our armor and the mightiest of our ar-
tillery (including a missile brigade), plus our newest anti-
tank weafpons. In short, this is the hard core of our armed
forces. That is why, here in Friuli, the impending elections
for councils to represent the troops take on special meaning,
and all the excitement of a ma jor event reaching f ar beyond
the periraeters of the military bases to involve, apparently,
whol.e co:amunities, towns in which the number of soldiers in
the stre~ets is sometimes greater than the number of civilians.
That is why it is incwnbent upon us to take the pulse~ as it
were, of this region.
Our interlocutors some 30 in all are noncoms from the
army anc~ air force stationed in Udine and other Friuli towns. "
What is ~he cl,imate at the basES, a month before the base
council elections? How are commanding officers complying in
impTementation~ of the guideli.nes handed down b,y the defense
ministry and the general staffs? These were the issues dis-
cussed at this meeting, which lasted several hours. The vot-
ing materials have been deli:vered to commanc~s in the Friuli
region, all right, but there is very little talk about the
eTections i:n the barracks, and even less outside the posts.
- The official regulation has certainly not been hel.pful in es-
tablishing the climate for an election. "On my station," we
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were told b,y one warrant officer from Ariete, "there was a
meet in g of more than 300 men, who openly blamed the government
for failing to adhere to the instructions handed down to it
by parliameiit Others comrlain that "there ~ s almost no in-
formation" ("most of the men don't even know when and how the
elections will be held; if democratic men are not elected to
the base councils," said one sergeant in the mountain corps,
"we won't even have any intermediate councils"), and that
"there's a great deal of sker;,icism."
Nor has there been any lack of complaints about the behavior
of certain commanders. ~'Thei~e are people who ~aork underwater~
who take the men as:ide one at a time to advise them not to
vote for "hotheads," but for men they trust. Then there are
others" --~ere's a sergeant-major from Julia talking " who
engage in spreading know-nothing propaganda.�
Nor yet according to what we are told has there been any
lack of intimidation. "Be careful: they've already got you
in their sights," is what one commanding officer in a Zasarza
barracks allegedly said to one non-com who was planning to
stand for election. This, though, is not a very widespread
phenomenon, and should be neither dismissed nor blown out of
proportion. Nobo~y will be surprised to learn that elections
for councils are running into a lot of resi~t,ance. "The brass,"
says one NCO, "may have a better notion than we do of the fact
that these councils will constitute a real revolution in the
army, ana tliey are afraid of losing some of their old power. "
Are there limits to the regulation? Are obstacles put in the
way of electioneering?
"It is right to speak out about all this," says another army
NCO, "but the amportant thing is to elect our own democratic
bodies, a right th.at has always been denied us, in order to `
stamp out an already obsolete notion of military life."
~n other words, the communists were right we asked in -
fighting to improve the regulation, at the same time taking
care to avoid givin~ pretexts to those who didn't want to `
hold elections by blocking the whole thing?
The reply to that was unanimous: Yes. ("Afterwards we~ll
make our strength fe1t," said one young artillery sergeant,
"when we ask for the changes that are needed.").
The talk then shifted to preparations for the elections. How
do we stand in Friuli? The situation, I am told, varies from -
one conunand to the next . "In some, " says the sergeant major
from Julia, who seems well informed, "there have been quite
a 1ot of briefing meetings; the commands have had bulletin
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boards set up and set aside other areas for electioneering
posters. In others, though, there have been anly small meet-
ings (or none at all), and there are very few poster boards."
The ministry and the commands assure us that there will be
more provided. "When?" asked an air force NCO. �After the
elections are over, ~maybe?"
The discussion then shifted to the choice of candidates and to
platforms. There was talk of draft reform, of the military
~code of justice and of the new disciplinary regulations; of
~ milit ary health clinics (al~. matters primarily of interest to -
the troops); of the promotion and career sys~em, of vocational
training, of housing and of living conditions .on the ba ses
all matters the represent ative councils are to deal with.
What raost were afraid of was seeing the men stay away from the
polls oF cast blank ballots, particularly the rank and file
draft ees. "TherP are still too may youngsters asking us,"
says an artillery sergeant major, "what good it will do to
vote, and whether they have to vote.~~ ~~Shouldn't we worry
about this?" was the argwnent raised by one NCO at the Udine
meeting (a similar position was voiced at Padua at a raeeting
~ with a group of soldiers and N~Os at the Pierobon barracks, and
others from the Northeast Military Command), because "the i.m-
portant thing is to elect democratic servicemen, determined to
see to it that the 1aw in it s principles and the ro1'e o~ the -
elect ed representatives are respected?" Not to concern our-
selves with this would be wrong and dangerous. "If we do not -
turn out i;o vote en masse,'~ said an Ariete sergeant major, and
everybody agreed with him. "the representative councils wi11
be discre~ited from the start, And that means that we will
have played in~o �~he han~s of ~hose who didn ~ t want them tu ,
begin with." '
The other concern that surfaced in both meetings was that the
milit ary representation elections would take place amid total
indifference on the part of the local populations. They must
have -their consciousness raised. A veteran air force aergearrt
major t~ad a sp~cific suggest ion: call for discussion and de-
bate on local TV stations.
The communes must be involved, too it was said to deepen
the rapport between civilian society and the military.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
6182
CSO: 31oq
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COUNTRY SECTION JZ~~LY
RED BRIGADES SPREADING FEAR AT ALFA ROMEO
Mi1a~n CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 24 Feb 80 p 2
[Article by Giancarlo Pertegato] ~
[ Text ] ARESE (Milan We are at the Alf a Romeo plant on the
- day after the ambush at Dallera. When you ask people here for
answers, what you get are stories of incidents, or theories. ~
When you have finished, you find that all you have is more ~
questions. Different from the ones you started asking, these
help you understand the climate that prevails in this place,
but they do not explain the mystery of this pervasive Red Bri-
gade presence that hovers like a malignant spectre around the
Arese plant.
Who are the terrorists? They are people who came to work here
ori orders from the Red Brigades. They are people nobody would
ever noticee !~Ihy?_ They are terrorists that's all. All
the political and logistical backup work is handled by the
others.
Who are the others? They are free-lancers who act as messen- ~
~ers for the Brigade people and who shout the slogans against
the union.
You also hear a note you have heard before: yes, the terror-
ists are indeed inside, but they are here because they got '
jobs in the plant just so they could mount '~operation fear."
Ts there fear at Alfa Romeo? The reply is that for more than
= 7 months the terrorist telephone crews have been calling the
_ homes o� foremen, technical mana ers, union stewards, and Ber-
linguerists [orthodox communists~. Many more have been threa- ~
tened, though, but have not reported it. You hear another
~ note you have heard before one you hear invariably when
something bad happens: the others, the terrorists, come from '
outside. They are inside, but only because they have been
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sent here. It's an understandable explanation, but not a sa-
tisfactory answer.
What about the Red Brigades' resolution number eight, dealing
with Alf a Romeo? Of course it is fright ening because it shows
such a knowledge of the plant, because the lauguage is so clear
("It sounds like one of us"). But isn~t the hand of a leader
visible in that document? They reply that there are two rea-
sons that would indicate a"shadow-director" of the Red Bri-
gades: a knowled~e of details known only to a few top people,
and the unmistakable ability to draw a picture of a production
lirne like Alfa Romeo's, and then to explain it with a clarity
that only absolute mastery of the subject would allow.
It sounds like somebody who grew up at Alfa Romeo, don't.you
think so? It certainly looks that way. It might we11 be so.
Carlo Melada, socialist, is on the executive board of the Alfa
plant council. He says:
"We are doing our duty. We were a little bit worried about the
strike, after the bloodshed at Dallera. Why? When Bachelet
was killed in Rome, things didntt go right. We are striking ~
and calling meetings, but if nothing changes after we do it,
people start wondering why they should go out on strike. So
I said: 1et's call a meeting of the plant council before we
~ decide we are goinf to do. And so on Friday morning at 0800
we met, and we called the strike.'~
How did it go?
"I didn't ~elieve it would go so well. Worker participation
was excellent. "
Riccardo Contardo~ a FIOM (Metalworkers~ Union) man like Melada,
and a comraunist, is another member of the executive board of
the plant council.
"It went well here, but not so well at Portello. When some-
thing hapspens, people look at us: and here we are. But the
- others? For example, there were no top management people at
the Alfa meeting. And yet it was one of their own who was hit.
- We dic~n't withold our solidarity from them. It~s our duty,
but we didn~t get even so much as a phone call. Will the strike
be enough? Of course it won't be enough, when the terrorists,
from thei~r point of view, display such efficiency as they do
here, you begin to wonder: how in hell do they do it, i.n spite
of the punishment they have taken? They've got to have some-
body conniving with them, some support, some accomplice."
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Here Melada breaks in:
"Then there's the rest of it. We go on strike against terror-
ism, there's no sign of management, and what is said outsidc;?
'1'hat the victims are striking not t~,o escape paying their~
i;axes, God forbid I should say that but so they won~t be
subject to audit on past payment of taxes.�
And witll the Red Brigades in the plant, what happens?
"They try to create a riafia climate as you understand when
so~nebody tells you that the guy who was passing out leaflets
was wearing a ski mask, so there was no way to identify him."
~ Contardo: The others have to do tt~ir part, too. This is one
r~eason why we are calling a meeting this Tuesday, with people
there from the magistrate's court and from the police union..~~
Vittorio Ammir~ati, of the Alfa Romeo PCI section bureau, tries
an explanation.
"With their resolution eight, the terrorists took a qualita-
tive leap forward. They proposed a"Red Brigades" union. Why?
For `L years Alfa has been in the cross-hairs of the BR~s sights.
They would like to send a message from here to the outside, to
the whole cotintry. This their planned offensive against those
who stand in the way of their plans, and it is well under way.
After setting fir�e to the plant council ~ s car, they attack
and wotu-id somebody from top management. And in the files that
were seized in Parma from the Prima Linea people they found
fi.les on Alf a's union and political directors. The files showed
the leaders' habits, and even the addresses of the schools their
kids attended, and the times they went to and from school. And
then the telephone offensive, going on now for '7 or 8 months...
Threats, like the one the f amily of a member of the plant coun- -
c:i.1 got last Friday morning. You can imagine what it's like
whc;n you come home from work and find your wife frightened. to
death...~~
T~iere is one Alfa director who consented to talk to us. Now he
i~ out of the fray, having retired a short time ago. His con-
ditions far talking? That he not be identified.
Why is Alfa in the Red Brigades' cross-hairs?
"I can only try to understand. The company is pursuing a policy
:in the area of lab~r relations of decentralization of power,
one tending toward [worker] participation, toward consensus. -
Ii~ ~.s the very opposite of a policy of confrontation. Do we
want to eliminate or at least reduce alienating tasks? Fine:
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let's do it. Does work on the assembly line impoverish a man
and take away his sense of responsibility? Absolutely right:
in this is a real awareness that comes from the heart of the
p"lant, if it is a genuine desire of the workers, well then le't ~ s -
take notice. This is how the Alfa plan was born, a reorganiza- -
tion plan that comes to grips with the fact that thoae are new
times. With the production islands, the work is not merely a
repetition of one motion with one tool, repeated endlessly a11
da.y long, every day, the same forever. The job is enriched
with new tasks and responsi.bilities. There you have the danger
to terrorism: the area of alienation may shrink, and if it
does argue the theoreticians of the revolution then there
will be, or may be shrinkage in that area of malaise and dis-
content they can count on to stay neutral toward whatever they -
d0. u
Why do they threaten the un~.on lead~rs?
"They can guarantee political consensus around the Alfa opera-
tion.'~
And why are the technical management people being hit?
"Not because of their personal views. According to BR strategy,
as proclaimed in the document dealing with Alf a, people are
singled out for attack because of the technical position each
- of them holds. At every nerve center in production and i.n the
reform plan there is one man, and therefore one~responsibility.t~
This Red Brigade strategy seems to have been born inside~ with -
specific and complete knowledge of Alfa. How do you explain
this?
"It might very well be a shadow-director of the Red Brigades.
It might be. . . rr
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editoriale del "Corriere Della Sera" s.a.s.
6182
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
RESUMPTION OF VIOLENCE IN SOUTH TYROL
Milan IL MONDO i~i Italian 7 Feb 80 pp 14-15
(Article by Teo Dalavecuras: "Talk of Ethnic Fragmentation in Tyrol"]
[Text] The struggle for linguistic autonomy is taking
a violent turn as the 1981 census approaches.
Bolzano--"Communists are crap. Flush 'em down the drain" was the ditty an
old drunk was droning one evening not far from the Bolzano station. It was
an obnoxious spectacle that could happen anywhere. Here in Alto Adige,
however, the episode takes on a more "serious" aspect; it brings to mind
Alex Langer's speeches about the "Tyrolese model." Langer represents the
"Nuova Sinistra--Neue Linke" [New Left] on the provincial council, and he
explains that "the autonomy of Bolzano province is not territorial but above
all the autonomy of linguistic groups." Thus the German-speaking Tyrolese
is primarily a"German" and only secondarily a worker rather than an innkeeper
or a farmer. The same goes for the Ladin of Val Gardena, and the Italian
civil servant in Inps di Bolzano. in this way, Langer says, "a strong element
of ethnocentrism has bcen injected into Tyrolese autonomy, and it is in con-
stant danger of lapsing into racism."
Beginning next year, linguistic identity will become obligatory. With the
1981 census, every inhabitant of Alto Adige will have to state which of
~ the three official linguistic groups he belongs to. It is a declaration
that Langer sees as "fixing status." The New Left leader is starting a
battle against the census.
The "new options" of 1981, as they are called, raise the specte,r of the options
.imposed by Hitler and Mussolini in 1939, which forced the southern Tyrolese
to either declare themselves "German" and pack up and leave or declare them-
selves "Italian" and give up using their own language.
The options of 1939 were a barbarous measure, and Langer does not want to
put the census at the same level. However, he does fear the consequences
of this radical way of subdividing people according to ethnic groups. He
realizes that the first consequence will be the closing of the already narrow
field of political debate and social conflict.
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Silvius Magnago, head of the Bolzano governme~lt and chief of the Suedtiroler
Volkspartei [South Tyrol People's Party]--a kind of Strauss from Alto Adige,
thunders, "Langer is trying to undermine the basis of the autonomy statute
for the sole purpose of making propaganda fo~c his group." The elderly leader
speaks sarcastically of "young Dr Langer." "He was a leader of Lotta Continua
[Conti.ni~ous Stri~ggle]," Magnago added. "Now I think he's no longer a part of
it."
He will never admit it, but Magnago must nurture some.hidden gratitude for
"young Langer." After years of political routine, Silvius Magnago smells
a challenge and is as excited as a full-blooded politician can be. Langer
speaks from the standpoint of national conflict, but he calls himself
and indeed is an authentic supporter of Bolzano autonomy, But he is bringing
up the subject of social conflict and combating "linguistic corporativism,"
which is the apportionment of social needs in rigid proportion to the rela-
tive size of linguistic groups. In the case of public housing ("We call
it 'social dwellings,"' says Magnago, with a trace of affectation, "but it's
the same thing") or public administrative jobs, one-third goes to the
"Italians" and two-thirds to the "Germans" and Ladins, who are not very
numerous at all. As a result, Italian-speaking Tyrolese, who are concentrated
in Merano and Bolzano, where there has been less construction, cannot find
housing.
Silvius Magnago remembers Fascist persecution, hints at the necessity of
- repairing the wrongs that were done, and assures that the new census in
1981 will count not only linguistic groups but also actual needs ("And
maybe," he adds as a veiled threat, "it will be found that new housing
is needed in the valleys as much as in the cities, and maybe more").
"It's true," Magnago continues, "I want to be perfectly clear: autonomy is
costing the Italian-speaking population certain privileges. Do you want
to call them advantages? It's the same thing. Italian-speaking people
now have to know German to get a public job. Now, we have always had to
speak Italian. Bilingualism was implicit in the Paris agreements between
Italy and Austria, only now it is being achieved, and it isn't our fault
if Italian-speaking politicians haven't prepared the people for it. Of
course, in government jobs the two groups should be represented in propor-
tion to the population, but we in the provincial offices have had this -
proportionality in effect from the beginning. But for too long German-
speaking Tyrolese have not been able to get into government offices unless
they spoke Italian."
But there is a political'problem. The SVP jSouth Tyrol People's Party]
is leaning toward a politica.i "model" that has no place for anything other ~
than linguistic and national identity. Nfagnago knows this and confronts
the problem without mincing words: "But do you think that we could have
achieved autonomy or been able to defend it without the linguistic basis?
We are not trying to sweep social conflicts under the rug; we know that
the interests of a farmer and those of an innkeeper are very diverse.
But we are trying to find the lowest common demoninator. You've got
class struggle and 7-8 percent unemployment. We are against class struggle;
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our model is 'Partnerschaft' [partnership], Austrian participation, That
way, the Italian crisis has barely touched us here. Because of us there
is social peace and investment is increasing. Do you think people are
ready to throw all that over? Even the Italian-speaking population has
benefited."
There is nothing wrong with what he says. It is too bad that this model
eliminates any possibility of change, and society closes in upon itself.
But it is a price that the SVP and, probably, a large part of the Tyrolese
popt~lation is quite }iappy to pay. The "national" parties in the Bolzano
provincial capital know this and are thus being drawn in the wake of the
SVP, leaving the opposition to Alex Langer and the New Left (fourth party
in the November 1978 elections after the SVP, DC [Christian Democratic
Party], and the PCI).
Ilowever, as happens wherever ethnic identities are privileged, any politician
can find a way to unleash violence. For a year, German-language terrorism
has been matched by "Italian" terrorism. On the fiery night of last 5 Decem-
ber, the API [Italian Protection Association] dynamited eight "German" inns
and aerial cable cars. It was only a foretaste of the actions promised by
the API, only a"Christmas greeting," as their flyer said.
The poor drunk we met in the Bolzano station will never occupy a factory or
take part in a violent strike, but he might find the call of nationality
and the "Heimat" irresistible.
Is ethnic violence the price of "social peace"? This is indeed curiou~,
Dr Magnago. How come the communists, who pursue change and not social
peace, actually support the "Tyrolese model" and give no support to the
ohjectives of the New Left? "The communists," Silvius Magnago sneers,
"are too smart not to realize that the end of autonomy based on linguistic
groups would mean that war would begin here."
But hasn't the war already begun? "I am very worried about the attacks,
but I think that only when the autonomy statute takes complete effect will
all danger of violence be eliminated." This is a veiled way of saying that
"Italian" bombs do not frighten them and that, when there is talk of frag- -
mentation, the German-speaking Tyrolese intend to have the last word, at
least in their own home. And few Italians are ready to dispute the fact
that Alto Adige is their home. They only want to live there in peace, and
it remains to be seen whet}ier the conditions dictated by the SVP are peaceful.
It may be decided easily: the SVP offers sacial peace in exchange for immu-
nity from any Italian "pollution" (and it is well known that Italians always
bring with them opera and a little subversion).
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Rizzoli Editore
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COUNTRY SECTION IT~y
TENSION IN RELATIONS BETWEEN CATHOLIC GROUPS, DC
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 20 Feb 80 p 4
~Article by Walter Tobagi; "Difficult Relations With the Catholic Organizations"]
~Text~ Rome--Catholics and Christian Democrats, or, as ~.he observers see
a DC CChristian Democratic Party~ congress, the clergy and the laity, con-
secrated to the big Catholic organizations. A sensitive issue at a time
when, as now, the Vatican appears definitely to�have decided on a more
detached stance toward Italian politics. The Polish Pope has consistently
avoided meetings with the DC l.eaders, lest they be interpreted as endorse-
ments of one faction or another. But there has been no lack of signals,
unofficial though they are: an article in CIVILTA CATTOLICA, tt;~ Jesuit
magazine, which sounded a warning on the eve of the congress. Then an
editorialized report in L'OSSERVA~ORE VATICANO, the newspaper of the Holy
See, stressing "caution" toward an alliance with the PCI ~Italian Communist
Party~.
This view is confirmed by the representatives of the "Catholic world" who
are attending the congress out of professional duty. Father AngeLo Macchi,
a Jesuit of the San Fedele Institute who writes for AGGIORNAMENTI SOCIALI,
said to me, "L'OSSERVATORE has made it clear that a decision to share the
government with the PCI would be contrary to the opinion and the will of
the Christian democratic rank and file and of the electorate." Father
Macchi expressed no opinion on the divisions of opinion within the party:
, He liked Zaccagnini's report "on the problems and prospective roles," but
- thought the part dealing with the communists had been insufficient. His
criticism regards mainly method: Zaccagnini indicated a number of issues on
which the PCI "must" take a certain position, but "expressed no opinion
on the PCI's present position regardir.g those issues." And more generally
speaking, "He underestimated a fundamental factor: the PCI's historical,
geographical, political and ideological orientation."
Father Macchi remembers when his articles 20 years ago were interpreted as
a green light to cooPeration between Christian democrats and socialists. ~
But he says, "The socialists had convened a congress to uproot themselves
from their past ideological and p~litical terrain." And as to the current
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communists7 "The PCI could respond 'yes' to many, even to all, of the
questions being asked of it by the DC on specific issues. The basic ques-
tion, however, is what positions underlie these responses. The problem,
beyond substantive issues, is that the communists would have to uproo t
themselves from the communist world's system of values, political solidari-
ties and ideol.ogical motivation."
Basically, what is being sought is that the DC re-starch the system of
values that makes it the expression of Italian Catholicism. And further
reservations are being expressed in this regard. In the opinion of Angelo
Narducci, Christian DemocratiE Eura]eputy and managing editor of the Catho-
lic daily AWENIRE, who long ago assumed a c?etached and critical position,
"The Catholic world's values are there, but they are in the background,
too much in the background." How can they be brought out more effectively?
"Through a presence in civil society. It the DC radicates in society, it
will establish with the Catholic world an organic relationship that will
safeguard it from moderatism, integrationism and leftism. The Catholic
world is a world of values, not oE power." -
Cesare Cavalleri, managing editor of STUDI CATTOLICI, objects to the lack
of "cul tural offices" within the pC: "A party Canno~ Offer a social model
if it cannot shape society from within insteac7 of through the advisers of
the princeps on duty." In Zaccagnini's report, he challenges, among other
things, "the use of the adjective 'historic,' an adjective that is foreign
~o Catholic culture when used in the sense ot 'good."' He finds Forlani's
reference to the right to life gratifying. But he adds, "One cannot posit
one~elf s moralizer when the state, governed by a party that calls itself
Christian, approves abortion."
I'rom a more "social" and concrete political viewpoint, Domenico Rosati,
president of the ACLI ~Christian Associations o~ Italian Workers~, sees in
the congress a confirmation of the "mutual independence" between the D~ and
the Catholic workers associations: "Our relationship is with the entire DC,
not just one faction." And Ruggero Orfei, who manages the ACLI weekly,
stresses the importance of "rejection of socialist principles,' a recurrent
~.heme in the congress's debate. In this way, "the DC puts itself in a
position to judge which political decisions contain elements of socialism.
The berthing of the PCI in the government takes on more and more the aspect
of entering into a mined harbor. And this can in some ways please the
conununists themselves, who prefer to be in the opposition."
According to Orfei, the decision to revert to indirect election of the
secretary flows from the lack of "a man capable of interpreting the party
line." The entrusting of the choice to the party's national council is
indicative of a"power fragmented in little pieces: it is the Polish mon-
arch in the hands of his barons." And this is not at all to the liking of
' Father Macchi: "A disappointment, a return to excessive power of the fac-
tions."
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Will the DC that comes out o� this congress Eind its relations with the
Catholic world more difficult? The answers are cautious. All. the inter-
locutors stress the preeminence of Christian values which must override
strictly political considerations. An example is terrorism: "Violence,"
they say, "cannot be stemmed solely by issuing more weapons to the police,
if the moral conscience of the people is not renewed." And Cavalleri
criticizes the excessive tendency o� the Christian democratic leaders to
~ resort to "mediation"---a tendency that led even Moro to "seek mediation
be tween the state and the Red Brigades." In other words: "The political
aim cannot be to sit around a table, but rather to govern the country."
Whatever the outcome of the congress and the name of the future secretary,
the probabilities of their being earth-shaking are 'small. Arturo Parisi,
former vice president ot Catholic Action Youth under Bachelet and now
managing editor o� MULZNO, proposes that a distinction be made between
the "Catholic world" and "Sunday Catholics": "The Catholic world is made up
of lay militants in the Catholic organizations that are tied to the Church;
and this world remains solidly attached to the DC. The Sunday Catholics
manifest a greater pluralism, but this stems more from political opinions
than from religious motivations." In any case, the political and numerical
force of the party appears to be beyond question. As Orfei has well said:
"Despite the commotion in the stands, one breathes an air o� serenity--one
has the impression that, for the DC, the worst is past."
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
9399
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COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF EEC'S AGRICULTURAL PRICES
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 20 Feb 80 p 12
[Article by Cesare Selleri: "Italy Is Paying Too Much for the ~EC's
Agricultural Prices"]
~Text~ A great deal of space has been devoted by the press this year to
the problem of EEC Ggricultural prices although negotiations have not yet
entered a crucial phase; they have not even got past the first meeting of
~ the EEC ministers of agriculture. The committee's recommendations to the
Council have in fact been the object of severe criticisms by the EEC agri-
cultural associations ~nd the governments of many of the member countries.
The committee's principal aims were: a) to contain EEC expenditures (also
the sense expressed by Parliament); b) to discourage production in sectors
af structural surpluses (milk, cerpals, sugar); c) to contribute to the
containment of inflation. Based on these objectives, it has recommended a
mean price-increase of only 2.5 percent for the 1980-1981 season (with a
maximum of 4.27 percent for rice and a minimum of zero for butter.).
Since the mean rate of inElation within the EEC will be around 8 percent,
the agricultural associations have protested vigorously. The COPA ~Com-
mittee of EEC Professional Agricultural Organizations~ had requested adop-
tion of the "impartial method," which would haye meant a general 7.9
percent increase in agricultural prices. The representatives of the
various countries, though not insensitive toward th~ considerations on
which the committee's recommendations were based, have also requested "the
assurance of an equitable standard ot livin~ tor the agricultural popula- '
tions" in accordance with the provisions o~ the Rome Treaty: in plain
words, not to place the burden oE containing inflation entirely on the ,
backs of the farmers. This basic thAme, in which all the governments seem
to concur with various shadings, is the rootstock on to which the indivi- -
dual countries, complicating things enormously, are grafting their specific -
requests relative to this or that product or to this or that special
consideration.
As is often true in other sectors as well (energy, public expenditures, and
others), the specifias o� the Italian position are especially relevant, in
that our probl.ems are ~reater. In the first place, it must be noted that,
as compared with the EEC mean devaluation rate of 8 percent, our devaluation
rate is c.lose to 20 percent.
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Since the lira is held stable in the SME CEuropean Monetary System~ orbit
(the possibility of future devaluations of the de~leted lira is also now
ruled out), the prices for agri~ultural products at goint of origin (heavi-
ly influenced by decisions made in Btussels) increase at a"European" rate,
while production costs, tied to domestic devaluation, increase at an "Ital-
ian" rate. Whereas a 2.5 percent mean increase in agricultural prices may
be insufficient for the German farmer, it is absolutely unacceptable to the
Italian farmer. -
Secordly, Italy is the only country in the EEC orbit that is a heavy import-
er of structurally surplus agricultural products: dairy products, cereals,
sugar. It must therefore submit to a produc tion containment policy on pre-
cisely those products it most needs.
Lastly, Italy is o~ce again alone carrying the defense of Mediterranean
production against Lhe other countries, which are predominantly producers
of continPntal commodities. Thus, the task of Minister Marcora, who besides
defending Italian inte.rests is burdened this semester with presiding over
the Counci.l of CEE Ministers, will be extremely difficult.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
9399
CSO: 3104
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?
COiiNTRY SECTION SPAIN
WEEKLY PREDICTS IMMINENT EXPULSION OF MORE SOVIET SPIES FROM SPA~N
LD07I601 Madrid CAMBIO 16 Spaniah 2 Mar 80 pp 16-19 LD
[Unattributed report: "How They Hunted the Spies"]
[Excerpts] On the evening of 19 March 1979 Enrique Lopez Alcantara, 58,
had just left his invalid friend Antonio Diego Diaz at his home on the
Canillas Road, Madrid. Next he drove his car, a Citroen GS, to the garags
at Number 3, Calle Canillejas.
Some 90 minutes later Enrique lay dead on the floor of the dark, lonely
garage. Z'he only report the next day was a brief, hastily-written item in
the daily YA. ~
Furthermore, this brief news item omitted several key facta regarding his
death--the fact that Enrique Lopez Alcantara was a friend of Aeroflot's
Spanish representative, that he was a former soldier and that he had returned
from the Soviet Union 2 days previously. It was his first and only viait
to the Soviet Union,
Just 1 year later one of Lopez Alcantara's colleagues was expelled from
Spain by the Spanish intelligence services. He was Oleg Shuranov, Aeroflot's
Spanish representative, who l~ft Spain on 15 February accused of espionage
by the Spanish authorities. By coincidence Enrique Lopez Alcantara a1$o
worked for the Russian company, specifically as a sales manager. The
following day first secretary at the Soviet Embassy Anatoliy Krasilnikov
left in the same way. The expulsion.of Oleg Shuranov and A. Kr.asilnikov
has ma.de what is already an old issue in the still young Spanieh-Soviet
- relations--the expulsion of Russian diplomata and officials accused of
eapionage--extremely topi~al once again. Our country had already expelled
five spiea in the 3 years of diplomatic relations between the countries.
This is the story.
A ~ew months ago Prime Minister Suarez met in Jordan with the Spaniah
- ambassadors of the East Mediterranean area. One or the topica raised by
the prime minister was his concern at Soviet expionag~ activities in Madrid -
and its possible aims to foster�a "controlled" deetabilization so as to
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r
to prevent Spain's entry into NATO. Just over a month ago the prime minis-
ter told a Madrid journalist in a private conversation about these same -
feara, and at the same time announced the imaninent expuleion of more Soviet
officials accuaed of eapionage. The premier's announcement did not take
long to come into effect. Shuranov was arrested by Interior Minietry offi-
ciala early last week after purchasing plane for aome electronic aviation
equipment. The "vendor" was none other than a member of the Spanish
secret services, ;aho passed himself off to the Soviet citizen as a top -
Executive of a Spanish company. With the evidence in his hands, Shuranov
was taken to the state security office, in whose cells he spent the night.
_ The next day, rriday 15, Cwo police cars escorted a Renault 12, which
carried Shuranov, right to the steps of the aircraft, a Polish Airways
Tupolev,
Oleg Shuranov, 41, tall, with a fair complexion, almost bald and born in -
Leningrad, is married to Charita Shuranovna, has two children, aged 15 and
7, is an engineer and before his Spanish appointment held the same post as
Aeroflot representative in Canada. Pilots and ground staff at Barajas air-
port [Madrid] wer.e well acquainted with Shuranov's peculiar interest in
the trequency used in Spanish aircraft communicat~ons and with security
~ arrangements at Barajas. On one occasion he went as far as to express to
a Spanish pilot an unusual, preposterous desire--to be let into the U.S.
airfield at Tarrejon de Ardoz. According to Spanish security sources,
Shuranov was a member of GRU, the Soviet military espionage service.
S't~y Diplomat
No more than 24 hours had gone by since the expulaion of the Aeroflot chief
- and Enrique Lopez Alcantara's boas,~when one of his compatriots followed in -
, his footsteps. First sec.retary at the Soviet Embaesy in Madrid Anatoliy
Krasilnikov was caught =ed-handed in the Canary Islands talking with a
prominent member of the Canaries terrorist and separatist organization led
_ by Antonio Cubillo: The Movement for the Independence and Self-determination
of the Canaries Archipelago. The supposed militant was in fact a member of
' the S.panish intelligence services who had infiltrated the GUANCHE organiza-
tion,
'1'lie conversation between Krasilnikov and the Spanish agent, c~uring which the
Soviet diplomat gave specific insL-ructions concerning how to wage the guer-
rilla struggle, was recorded at long distance by powerful directional micro-
pi~ones. The tape was brandished as irrefutable evidence by the Spanish
at~thorities. The overwhelming pr^of of the evidence was enveloped by non-
commi.ttal and glib euphemism: According to the Spanish Government communique
the first secretary was expelled for "excessive~concern with specific aspecta
of Spanish domestic policy and security." On Saturday 16 February, using
one oF Aeroflot's weekly flights from Madrid to Moscow, Krasilniko~v left
Spain.
Anatoliy Krasilnikov, 42, with receding black hair and not very tall, is a
law graduate and career diplomat. A quiet, retiring man, on 22 ~une 1977
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he was poated to the Soviet Embassy in Madrid as charge d'affai~-ea. He
was promoted the same year to second aecretary and recently to first
secretary, in an undeniably brilliant rise. Accordinb to Interior Minis-
try sources, the intelligence sent back by Anatoliy was important.
The expulsion of the two Soviet officials was followed by the rumor of the
_ departure of Igor Ivanov, an embassy advi~er and a very well known�figure
in Madrid opposition political circles. Sources at the prime minister's
office have confirmed to this paper that Ivanov, a very pleaeant and
friendly person, has no proven contacta'with the Soviet espionage aervices.
ThQ Russians' reaction was not long in coming. Just 24 hours after the
expulsions Soviet Ambassador Dubinin in person visited the Foreign Ministry
ro deliver a verbal note noting the "coarse provocation" conatituted by
the expulsions and the attempt by certain sectors to wreck "the good rela-
tions between Spain and the USSR."
[LD071603] Other reports confirmed by this paper mention posaible Soviet
_ reprisals against Spanish officials living in Moacow and also against a ~
high-ranking official very close to Prime Mtnister Suarez. The latter is
Eugenio Bregolat, a member of the prime minister's office, headed by Alberto
Aza, and an expert in Soviet affairs--h~ spent several years at the Spanish
Embassy in the USSR--who has a close relationship with a Soviet citizen whom
he plans to marry.
An official spokesman for the Spanish Foreign Ministry described the Soviet
protest note as "inaccurate, improper and unacceptable." Thia same source
also told CAMBIO 16 that "there is no campaign in our country againet the
USSR either over the invaeion of Afghaniatan or over the Olympic games."
Soth Soviet officials were caught red-handed committing c~rimes,punishable
under Spanish law and, out of diplomatic courtesy, they were sent back to
their cou~ltry instead of to ~ail." [Quotation marks as published]
Strange Crime
Enrique Lopez Alcantara's death on 19 March 1979 rapidly alerted the Spanish
security services. Colleagues of~the dead man have confirmed to this paper
their surprise at the no less surprising case of Enrique. Though officially
he had been held up by villains who attacked him in order to rob him, none
of his belongings were missing and his~car remai~ed parked in the garage.
The wound which caused his death was also very strange. A simple cut behind
hia knee caused a rapid hemorrhage which killed him. The cut, which pre-
cisely and accurately severed his femoral artery was either.a remaxkable
_ chance occurrence or the work of a hardened professional.
Tfao police stations became involved in the inquiries into the events. One
of them, the Chamartin station, is quite a distance from Canillas Street
and much nearer Che offices of certain Spanish intelligence servicea. No
chargea have yet been preferred because of the abaence of clues, and the
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police have told this paper plainly and clearly that it does not believe
there were any motives other than robbery. When consulted by CAMBIO 16,
his widow confirmed this theory. Nevertheless, other im~estigators are
intrigued by the strange circumstances surr~unding the former Aeroflot
sales manager's death, which prompted the investigation leading to the
expulsion of the Soviet airline's representative Oleg Shuranov. _
Spies in Spain
Before the expulsion of Shuranov and Krasilnikov, four other Soviet spies
had left our country suddenly at the request of the Spanish authoritiea
since February 1977, when diplomatic relationa were established between
the countries. On 2 March 1977 embassy official Yuriy Pivovarov left Spain
at the Spanish Government's request. ~Pivovanov was accused of carrying out
industrial and military espionage. His dossier was prepared by the central
higher chief of staff. The second Soviet spy to be expelled was Gennadiy
Sveshnikov, who worked for the Spanish-Soviet joint stock company Intramar,
carried out his activity in U.S. bases in Spain for the GRU and, on his
arrest in Aranjuez, was found in poFSession of several documents pertaining
to state security.
But the most i.mportant loss took place on 22 April 1978, when top Soviet
Embassy official Yuriy Isayev left Spain on an Aeroflot flight. General
7sayev, 46, was one of the brains behind the KGB and came to Spain to re-
_ atructure the intelligence services. The fourth man to be expelled was
Yuriy Popov, 32, an engineer employed by the 3oint stock company Weimar.
Presumably Shuranov and Krasilnikov will not be the last to leave. Accord-
ing to information received by this paper from two separate and entirely
reliable sources, there could be developments in the next 2 weeks. Two
more Soviet spies will soon be leaving our country. According to one of
these sources, there are some�106 spies in SI�ain, identified among the 800
- or so Soviets living in Spain.
Gf these, 69 are Soviet Embassy officials, 26 with diplomatic status. The ,
remainder are distributed among joint stock companies, news agencies, for-
ei~n correspondents and the world tourism organization. CAI~'BIO 16 has
learned from entirely reliable sources the name of a further nine Soviets
working in espionage activities (see inset). [at end of item]. �
Acc~rding to a top Tnterior Ministry official 30 percent of diplomatic
_ staff in embassies and consulates'in Western countries are Soviet apies.
In Spain over 60 percent of Soviet diplomats are involved in espionage
work. This is due to Spain's strategic position, as in West Germany, where
the percentage is similar." [Quotation marks as publishedJ The ma3ority
of them belong to the KGB and, according to sou*ces, their chief is Embasay
Adviser Sergey Konstantinov, General Isayev's succeasor, who lives at 8,
Ca11e Caleguera.
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[LD071605] The same source has said that about 15 percent of the U.S.
Embassy are also CIA spies concerned with the strategic control of the
Mediterranean and Spain's entry into NATO. At present the CIA ie launch-
ing a ma~or campaign to facilitate our entry into the Atlantic alliance, �
taking advantage of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The favorite targets for Soviet espionage are the Basque country and the
Canary Islands, in its attempts to control or influence the separatist
a and terrorist movements ao as to create the notorioua "controlled tension"
which would obatruct Spain's NATO entry, the objective being obsesaively
pursued by ita U.S. counterparts.
Specifically in the Basque country, the Soviet secret services have no
joint stock companies behind which to camouflage their informants. Never-
theless, the Spanish authorities have detec~ed exceseive intereat from
the Soviets in working as technicians in Basque companies. One of the cases
cited to CAMBIO 16 by these sources is that of the Cegasa Company, based in �
Vitoria, which manufactures Tximist brand batteries.
The situation in the Canary Islands is more worrying. Following Masie's -
fall in Equatorial Guinea and the new regime's cloaure of the Soviet base
at Luba, the presence of Russian fishing vesaels in Canary Island ports
is massive and has almost doubled in a few montha.
According to the intelligence sourcea consulted by CAMBIO 16, theae fishing -
vessels "are not actually fishing vessels, unless you can fish something
using aerials and sophisticated electronic apparatus." ~In fact what they
are "fishing" for is the presence of U.S. submarines in the Atlantic, infur-
mation which they tranemit to orbiting Soviet satellitea. Last year the
Americans made this ohservation twice to the Spanish authoritiea, pointing -
out at the same time that supplies to Cuban troops on their way to Africa
were taking place in Canary Islands waters.
There are three companies under close surveillance by the Spaniah intelli-
gence services. They are import-export companies trading with the Soviet '
Union; one of them, Prodag, is owned by an old acquaintance of CAMBIO 16
readers, the millionaire owner of famoua stables and manager of Real Madrid
Soccer Club Ramon Mendoza. According to the services consulted by this
paper, Mendoza is.very friendly with the GRU colonel. Everybody already
knows about his close friendship with KGB superspy Victor Louis. When asked
_ by CAMBIO 16 whether he has any S~viet employees in his company, Mendoza
_ replied with the following equestrian aimile: "The personnel who work with
me are like my horses--born and bred in Spain." He failed to mention the
personnel employed by the Prodag mission in Mascow--a11 Soviets well known
to all followers of espionage.
_z
According to the alaove-mentioned sources, w'iemar, for its part, receives
the same surveillance. The curious thing about this enterpriae is that
one of its former board members is current Minister of the Interior AnConio
Ibane+ Freire. The expelled epy Yuriy Popov used to work for Weimar. -
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Nor, for its part, does Juan Garrigues' Ciex enterprise escape the above-
mentioned services' suspicions and surveillance. "We are not at,present
expecting the capture of any agent in these enterprises," a member of the
Spanish intelligence services told CAMBIO 16. "But we are keeping them
under cloae surveillance, because the aplendid and profitable business
which they are doing with the USSR is not being done free of charge." The
Russians never give anything without demanding something in return."
It is merely a matter of time, because there wi11 be further expulsiona,
which have helped cool Spanish-Soviet realtions appreciab~y and are causing
the king's envisaged visit to the Soviet Union to recede into the distance. -
Nor does Spanish co~interespionage lose sight of other countries' diplomatic -
missions. Thus there is the Cuban G-2, which has about 50 men scattered
_ throughout Spain, gathering intelligence for the Soviets, many.of them
disguised as "Gusanos" (anti-Castroist exiles). The Cuban G-2.is a literal
and exact copy of the Soviet KGB; like the Algerian secret.servicea, ~hey
are also kept under surveillance. The Algerians have many agents in the
Canary Is~.ands and Madrid, gathering intelligence on a topic of crucial
importance for them--the Sahara.
All these espionage services can be detected by Spanish intelligence. What
they find more difficult is discovering how many of *.he 7,000 children who
at the end of the civil war returned to Spain from ~the USSR, where their
parents had sent them during the war, are the children of Spanish citizena
and how many are spies. "
The intelligence services know that many of them died as a reault of the
coJ.d and that KGB sent its best agents, who spoke Spanish we11, to Spain
in their place.
[LD071607] These are also Spies [This section printed as boxed-off inset -
in magazine]
Following the expulsion of Anatoliy Krasilnikov and Oleg Shuranov, com-
pletely reliable sources have assured CAMBIO 16 that 106 Soviet spies,
who have been fuZly located and�verified, still remain in Spain.
This magazine has had access to a more modest list of agents. These are
the names of nine of them:
Sergey Konstantinov, secretary at the Soviet Embassy. Arrived in Spain
- 17 August 1977. He is the successor to GRU General Yuriy Isayev, expelled
in April 1978. ~
Boris Karpov, chief of the trade delegation at the USSR Embasay in Spain.
Arriv~d in Madrid 5 September 1977.
Vladimir Volosatov, first secretary at the embassy; following missions in
Lebanon, Algeria and France, he arrived in Spain in June 1977. ~
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Boris Remnev, first secretary. Arrived in Spain 8 July 1977 to replace
the spy Gennadiy Sveshnikov.
Evgeniy Aatakhov, first secretary. Arrived in Madrid in March 1919.
Yuriy Golovyatenko, "journalist," representative of the APN agency in Madrid.
Vladimir Akaenov, attache at the embassy. Arrived in Spain in June 1978
to replace Popov, the engineer expelled from Weimar S.A. , .
Vladimir Bogachev, deputy chief of the trade delegation at the USSR Embassy.
Arrived in Spain in September 1978.
Yuriy Nikulin, deputy chief of the trade delegation. Arrived in Spain in
September 1979.
COPYRIGHT: 1980. INFOR1~fACION Y REVISTAS, S.A. '
CSO: 3110
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COUNTRY SECTION SWEDEN
INDUSTRY BANKING ON PRO NUCLEAR VOTE IN MARCH REFERENDUM
Stockholm VECKANS AFFARER in Swedish 17 Jan 80 pp 3~-33
~rticle by Ewa Thorn: "No Panic s Companies Planning for Nuclear Power" -
~ex~ As late as 2 months before the referendum on nuclear power the com-
panies possess no planning and readiness for action in case of a no vote.
"It would create excessively negative psychological effects to plan for a
shutdown of certa,in activiti.es," is a common statement. What frightens
the companies more than a popular referendum is the risk of increased energy
prices and even more the risk of an energy shortage. Swedish industry is
built on cheap electrical energy and is hence considerably more sensitive to
price than that of the competing countries. The enterprises axe futhermore
convinced that the yes side will win.
What happens in the industrial enterprises in case of a potential no vote
for nucleax power in March? In what way are they pre~axing?
The answer seemes to be: Not at all: In practice one does not expect a
Sweden withput nuclear power to result in A Big Catastrophe Like the Plague
(Gosta Bohman's compaxison) in the everyday operation of the companies, a
picture that is frequently pa3nted in campaign times like these.
In such an event the companies rely on the politicians to soften the effects
for industry. And there are energy-saving technology and substitution possi-
bilities to resort to if there is a real need: Internationally seen, Swed-
ish industry is very electricity-intensive.
But in addition: Even the electricity-intensive companies those most
strongly affected by abolished nuclear power seem to have complete fa3th
in a victory for the yes votes. '
"We axe working with the hypothesis that for factual reasons it is unreason-
_ able to imagine that the no alternative xill win. B ut no matter how the
nuclear power referendum turns out it must nevertheless be expected that the
politicans' decision will be that industry must have its energy requirement
met at reasonable prices," says for example direct~r Gunnar Bjorklund of th~
steel division of the Sandvik group.
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Ind~x ~ ~
110 3 ~
EI
106
0
10D
186 ~ 19 5 197!
85 f ~
~
90 Q
1 69 5 1970 O
15 2~
Specifik ei- och oljeamandning 1960-78 D
inom industrin D
~0 (Kon:ekventutredningen,DS11979:ii)
S~ . ~O 4)
75 Index 1970=100 Olja
According to the Impact Committee (DS I lqj9:11) Swedish industry has become
- increasingly electricity-intensive. This means sensitivity to the elimina-
tion of nucleax power, but also that substitution possibilities exist.
Key: 1. Index
2. Specific electricity and oil consumption 1960-78 in industry
(Impact Committee, DS I 1979:11)
3. Electricity
4. Oil
5. Index 19'j0 = 100
"Furthermore, a no to nucleax power will not hit us overnight but after a
- period of about 5 yeaxs. This is why there is time to deal with the prob-
lem when and if it may come. And this is why we have not felt any
need for alternate planning in the face of a potential no in the nuclear
poWer referendum."
Director Rune Nylander of the KemaNobel group describes the nucleax power
referendum as irrelevant to the company's p'lanning today:
"What is decisive is not in itself whether nucleax power will be approved.
or rejec~te~d but where the politicians will place the energy price level in
- relation to other countries regarc~7.ess of whether there will be a yes or
a no in March. The threat of excessively high energy prices is present in
both cases, and so is the threat of an energy shortage although it will of .
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course get worse without nucleas power. It would furthermore have much too .
negative psychological effects to plan for a shutdown of some of our branch-
es of activity."
"We call for an ener~y policy which mea,ns electricity at a reasonable price~
not in itself a yes or no to nucleax power," says director Einar Klinga as
well~ vice managing director of the Holmen group, which also will not deal
with alternative planning until the decision about abolition of nuclear pow-
er is actually a fact. "At present we have no current strategic decisior~s
and the uncertainty before the nuclear power referendum therefore has not
directly affected our planni.ng, even if it has caused a certain measure of
idleness in the work."
The Fagersta group as well will not begin "planning for no" until a decision
to abolish nuclear poxer is a reality, according to the chairman of the com-
pany's unit for energy and material supply, director Per Hallstrom. And the
same goes for Stora Kopparberg, Sven Erik Malmeblad, head of development and
responsible for the energy use of the company, says. "I do not believe that
any company has had time to work out alternate plans for the future. It
would also be wrong to plan defensively."
Not even at the Smedjebacken Rolling Mill, where the entire existence of the
company is threatened if nuclear power is eliminated and -~he politicians do
not soften the effects sufficiently~ does one work in a,dvance with any sys-
tematic planning in order to potentially meet such a situation. The ongoing
investment program is also continuing as before. The company's~managing
director Leif G ustafsson says:
"We are in the midst o~ investments which we axe al.ready carrying out. And
there is not a single current project which we would stop immediately even
if there should be a no vote for nuclear power in the referendtun. B ecause
we will not get the decision about what the future will look like until the
moment we know what to expect from the politiciansc Are the common people
_ to carry the burden? Or will the politicians really allow the processing
industry to be eliminated?"
Companies in the branches which, according to the Impact Committee will be
most exposed in case of abolition of nucleax power the forest industry,
the iron ar,d steel industry and the chemical industry thus apparently do
not experience the threat of abolition as so acute or so immed.ia+.e in time
as to be forced to make sp~cial plans for guaxding aga3.nst a no vote in
Maxch.
An important explanation seems to be that it is not at all abolished nucleax
power which primarily worries them about the 1980's. It is the energy situ-
ation as a whole which is the source of trouble with or without nuclear
power due to the uncertain future of oil. It is al.so not primarily en-
ergy price increases which one fears as a result of a rejection of nuclear
power but in the first hand the risk of an energy shortage.
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Director Sven-Erik Malmeblad~ Stora Koppaxberg; "What energy will cost in
the future wi11 be just as little known in April as today. The most impor-
tant question if the no alternative should win is instead whether we will be
hit by a power shortage and rationing."
Director Per Hellstrom, Fagersta, agreeso "We will have an increase in the
cc,st of energy with or without nucleax power. It is the potential future
energy rationing which we experience as the most serious threat if Swedish
nucleas power is abolished."
Concern for the energy situa.tion in general has long since influenced the
companies in their planning.
At Sandvik one is for example working on active planning in order to reduce
sensitivity to potential future oil crises. Director Gunnar Bjorklund,
Sandvik:
"The big problem for the companies today is not whether there will be a yes
~ or a no in the nuclear power referendum. The acute problem is instead oil.
We know that the 1980's will mean oil price increases. And there is also a
risk of shortage situations. This is why we have gradually reduced our oil
dependence by about 30 percent since the early 19?0's and are planning
further reductions of 20-24 percent during the 1980's.
The company's energy consumption in 19?8 was about 56,000 cubic meters of
oil and about 0.4 TWh of electricity. The guiding light for the 1980's is
thus the same as for the 1970'ss It is the dependenc~ on oil that is being
reduced and not the dependence on electricity in order to meet for example
a potential no to nuclear power. -
Gunnax B jorklund: "Our electricity consumption is about the same now as at
the beginning of the 1970's and we also do not primarily make an effort to
save electricity. The price level of electricity in Sweden has been one of
the most important competitive advantages we have had. It is unreasonable
to imagine -~hat we will be forced to throw away that advantage. It is simp-
ly not a future with which we are calculating."
B ut abolished nucleax power would imply that not only oil but the electrici-
ty consumption as well must seriously come into focus. The internationally
seen low cost of electricity of Swedish industry has gradually guided in- '
dustrial production onto increasingly electricity-intensive paths, above a11
in the forest industry, the chemical industry and the iron and steel indus-
try.
More Energy Efficient Technology in Important Competing Countries
A comparison between the conswnption of labor and energy in the manufactur-
ing industry in i967 and the energy and labor supply needed if U.S. or West
Germa,n technology ha.d. been used clearly shows that Sweci~sh industry alread.y
at that time used considerably more electricity per dollar processing value
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Swedish Industry Requires Extreme Amount of Electrical Energy
A compaxison between actual Swedish labor and energy consumption in the -
manufacturing industry and hypothetical consumption with U.S. and West Ger-
man technology (index: Sweden's actual conswnption = 100).
With U.S. technology With West Germa.~
technology
Labor consumption (million
hours~$ processing value) 63 109
Fuel consumption (kWh~$
processing value) 118 96
Electricity consumption
(kWh~$ processing value) 57 47
Tota1 energy consumption
(kWh~$ processing value) 103 g~6 ~
Specific energy consumption in certain industries in the United States, Swed-
en and the FRG (kWh~~ processing value~.
Tota1 energy consumption Of which electricity consumpt3.on
Sweden USA FRG Sweden USA FRG
Pulp and paper -
industry 72.4 71.0 56.0 21.1 10.2 8.7
Iron, steel and
ferroregulation
plants 5S�o 38�3 5~.6 10.7 4.5 3�9
Non-ferrou~ met-
alxorking ~lant 27.4 29.9 17.8 14.9 10.8 5,4. i
Chemical industry 18.6 26.6 20.0 9.6 4,2 1~,9 -
Total for industry 15.0 13.4 11.6 3.7 2.0 1.6 .
Source: Bo Caxlsson, IYI
From an in~ernational point of view~ Swedish industry is unusua,].ly electri-
city-intensive, above all in our most electricity-intensive industries. The
compaxison in the two tables was made by Associate Prof Bo Carlsson, IUI
jndustrial Reseaxch Institut~ for the Energy Commission in 1977 (DS I
1977:17) and is for 1967. "The picture is probably unchanged today or may
perhaps have intensified judging from the calculations of the Impact Commit-
- tee of the specific electricity consumption in industry during the years
follawing."
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than these two international competitors, strictly speaking twice as much
seen as a total, according to the study made by Associate Prof B o Carlsson
of the Industrial Research Institute in 1977 for the Energy Commission.
The difference was greatest precisely in our most electricity-intensive
_ industries.
- These differences which hav~ probably been intensified since then since
Swedish industry has increased its specific electricity consumption during
the 1970's as well while the specific oil consumption has instead decreased
according to the Impact Committee (DS I 1 979:11) naturally indicate that
substitution possibilities do indeed exist, that the electricity intensity
of Swedish industry is not an absolute must.
"The picture is probably unchanged today and according to the material of
the Impact Committee it may perhaps have intensified," says Bo Carlsson of
the IUI ~ndustrial Research Institut~. "In the FRG the prices of. elec-
tricity and energy have always been high� and this has led to a distinct
orientation toward energy-efficient technology in the buildup of industry~
while favorable electricity prices in Sweden indeed had the opposite effect
here in the choice of products and production processes. This causes the
reflection that Swedish industry will have possibilities for substitution
in the long ruri but not instantly or so rapidly that it would be possible
to counter abolition of nuclear power painlessly. It is a matter of other
raw materials, other maxkets~ other machines. And the knowhow in industry
if furthermore strongly tied to the production technology used."
Quite a few researchers and experts who paxticipated in the Impact Committee
also decisively maintain that there are wide extra magins for saving elec- -
tricity through technological review of the production processes without
changing the production orientation, and the Impact Committee has been ac-
cused of a lack of interest on that point.
Une of the critics was depa~.^l~ment director Peter Steen, Defense Ministry
Research Institute, who was a member of the committee:
"There a.s too little knowledge on this point, primarily because there has
sirnply been too little interest in developing it. In the reference alter-
native (with nuclear power~ the committee calculated only with savings of -
_ 2'iWh and with only an additional 4 TWh in case of abolition of nucleax pow-
er by 1990. The potential for saving electricity i:s in reality consider-
ably greater~ approximately 20 TWh, of which not quite half in industry."
We can achieve such savings during the 1980's with a more conscious energy
policy, in the opinion of Peter Steen:
"One of the most important tasks of the energy policy must be, among other
things, to erase the differences betweeii what is profitable from a business-
econom9_c viewpoint and from a socioeconomic viewpoint. If the companies
themselves cannot manage to utilize the savings potential that may not be-
come an obstacle. The communities, for example~ should be able to finance
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experts who xill visit the electricity-intensive companies and review the
opportunities for technological savings."
Civil engineer Stefan Essle~ metallurgical researcher at KTH ~oyal Tech-
nical Advanced Schoo~ in Stockholm (who scrutinized Jernkontoret's trade
report for the Impact Committee) instead emphasizes that demands on the
companies themselves can also also be set higher: ~
"Internally, the companies have much too great demands for the profitability
of energy-saving investments and they require much too short depreciation
periods for investments in electricity and energy-saving technology. If the
Swedish steel mills do not change thd.r way of thinking it will cost them
dearly in the long run. They will probably be overtaken by their foreign
competitors."
_ Important known ways of saving axe~ among other things~ increased production
of industrial backpressure and regulation of the number of revolutions in
pumps. But e~cperts also point to many other possibilities, different from
one industry to another, and not least the need for real research on the
subject in order to discover additional opportunities. It is possible to
use savings in order to erase the impact of an elimination of nuclear power
on a limited electricity supply, the experts on the no side believe~ but the
companies do not ag~ree:
_ It isn't as easy to save on electricity and energy as may perhaps be thought
if one hasn't actually visited the fioor of the factories, is instea.d. the
opinion of Sven Erik Malmeblad, Stora Kopparberg:
"The profitability of such investments do indeed increase with the increased
costs of power. B ut they still mean that investment funds must be diverted.
from other things in which one might have preferred to invest the money."
But a great deal of saving is certainly going on in the enterprises, not
only of oil but of electricity as well~ even if the steel companies, for
- example~ rank low.
Director Per Hellstrom~ Fagersta (with an energy consumption of 0.3 TWh -
electricity and 55,000 cubic meters of oil~:
"Having switched from ore as raw material to scrap means that we switched
from heating with coke to a great dependence on eJ.ectrical energy just as
other scrap-based steel mills. The entire steel manufacture is now based on
- electricity, and investmer~t decisions axe ma.d.e for decades ahead and provide
no maxgin for rapid changes. 3tee1 furnaces and rolling mills are no over-
~ night projects. We have now started looking at savings opportunities in the
manufacturing processes and thereby hope to compensa�te for the increases in
energy cost~, but no more than that. There isn't n.uch one can do."
Director Leif Gustafsson at Smedjebacken Rolling Mill looks negatively at
the possibilities of ineeting aboli-tion of nuclea.r power with electricity
- savings:
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"Each additional ore in the kWt-~ price of electricity means new annual costs
for us in the a.mount of 2 million crowns. We have sma11 chances of compen-
sation through price increases since the world market sets the price. If we
can't get electrical energy at a reasonable price there are no technological
electricity-saving si~ortcuts to survival. It is the electric arc ~urnace
which swallows two-thirds of our annual electricity consumption oJ" 0.2 TWh
and that is not replaceable. The sole alternative would be to oornpletely
change the direction of production, shut down present production and go in
, fer an entirely cLtfferent business idea."
Saving H eat and Lighting Yields Only Marginal Results
- Stefan Essle, KTH, on the other hand belives that essential savings oppor-
tunities do exist: "In the electricity-demancling electric axc furnaces _
which melt steel through electrical discharge in the steel mills based on
scrap iron it is possible, for example, to cut down on electricity consump-
ti.on by one-third through the method developed in Japan, which is based on
= additional heat for example with coal powder. That alone w.ould mean sav-
ings iri the Swedish iron and steel industry totalling at least 0.5 TWh."
The chemical group KemaNobel uses about 1.2 TWh of electricity each yeax (of
which two-thirds are self-generated pcwer and the rest is bought). It is
the KemaNord division which is ~l'~e electricity-demanding one, above all the
silicone and ca.rbide production,which will definitely drep out of the pic-
+ure in case of large increases in the cost of electricity.
"The silicone production requires as much as 14,000 kWh per ton. Even sma11
increases in the price of electricity thus have great impact, but at the
' sa~rie time even sma11 savings in electrical power have great effect percent-
agewise," says director Rune Nylander. The company also aims most of its
e:Lectrici~ty-sa:Jing efforts towaxd the electricity-intensive fuzmace pro-
cesses. "It is there we achieve significant results. Saving heat and
~ lignting yields only marginal results."
The fo-rest industry is the largest consumer of electri:city in its branch of
Sxedish industry, but it is also concerning the need for electricity up to
19y0 in that branch that evaluations vaxy the most, from about 12 to about
22 TWh~ between peopie in the industry and outside experts who talk about
several TWh of "air" in the calculations of the industry itself. There is
agreement that pot~ntials for savings do exist but disagreement regarding
the possible extent. Stora Kopparberg, which uses about 130,000 cubic met-
ers of oil and about 1.3 TWh of electricity annually, accord.ing to director
Sven-Erik Malmeblad, is simultaneously an important power producer which is
considerably more than self-sufficient in electricity.
On th~ side of oil one is looking among other things at ossibilities for
~ replacing oil primarily with for~st energy (forest waste~ and second if
the infrastructure exists t�rith coal. One the side of electricity indus-
~rial backpressure already accounts for one-�third. of the company's electric-
a1 consumption. "We have almost reached the limit of what we can achieve in
~he w~,y of backpressure," Sven Erik Malmeblad says.
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Electrical Energy Added Laxgest Amount
Energy use in industry (TWh) and production volume.
1955 1965 1978 Increase 19 5-
8 ercent
Electricity 13 2 38 +200
Oil products 33 56 60 +82
Other fuels 32 43 ~9 +53
Total energy consumption 78 125 147 +88
Production volume 49 90 124 +153
Source: Impac~ Committee's B group, DS I 1979:11
Whatever H appens: Coal Will Increase
Supply of energy raw material according to Impact Committee (TWh~
Without Without � With~ut
nucleax nuc. power nuc. ~+~wer
power alternative 1 alterriative 2
1 8 1 1 p 1
Oil 310 225 2~ 216
Coke, coking coal 20 60 111 91 "
Wood waste products etc. 4-0 72 74 g3
Wind, solax power l~
HycLroelectric power 55 65 65 65
Iluclear power 20 5g 1 1
Total 4~5 484 509 490
of which total electri-
city consumption 81 125 105 95
Industrial electricity
consumption 39 57 53 50 -
During the period 1955-7$ industry ~nereased. its electricity conswnption
more tha.n any other form of energy and also more rapidly than the production
- development (index: 1968 = 100). The oil situa,tion is even more worrisome
- than abolition of nuclear power. The oil column will still be large in 1990
and coal w.ill increase in all of the Impact Committee's alterna,tives: the
reference a:lternative (electricity consumption 125 TWh in 1990) and the
abolition alternatives (105 and 95 TWh, respectively).
Just as for other pulp and paper manufacturers it is above a11 the produc-
tion units for mechanical pulp (at Kvarnsveden, semi-owned Utansjo and the
planned production at Sandarne) which is in the danger zone with increased
electricity prices and tighter supply. Because mechanical pulp requires a
_ six times greater supply of electricity than chemical. pulp.
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For Holmens Bruk each ore of increased energy price means a cost increase
af neaxly 20 million crowns~ according to vice managing director Einar -
Klinga.
"This is why energy-saving measures have always been important to us. We
have consistently concentrated on generating backpressure where it was
possible in connection with new investments. And regulation of the number
c~f revolutions is an equally obvious complement when making new investments
in large fans and pumps."
Holmens Bruk uses about 2 TWh of electricity annually and is one-third.
self-sufficient.
- Einar Klinga: "It is not possible to deal with the consequences of a no
_ to nuclea.r power only through energy savings. B ut we also do not have to
sleep bad.ly each night. There are, after all, substitution possibilities,
although they cost a great dea1. We can change foot and enter paths which
demand less electricity, even if it should mean difficult conversions and a
stagnation in development."
- COPYRIGHT: Ahlen & Ak~rlunds tryckerier Stockholm, 1980
11949
CSO: 3109 END
~
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