JPRS ID: 9122 WORLDWIDE REPORT TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000200060008-5

I
~ ~ . ~ i 0 F 1
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L%8967
7 March 1980
.
~lVest E ~u ro e R e o rt
_ ~ ~
cFOUO ~ , ~~o~ .
~
_ ~BIS ~OREI~N BROADCAST INFORIO/!lATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
I
NOTE
JPRS publications r.ontain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained. -
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was su~r~marized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a q~aes-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses w%re not clear in the
original but have been supplied as ap~ropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
Z'E?e contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government.
1
' Nor furthe-r information on report content
call (7031 351-2$11 or 351-2501 (Greece, -
Cyprus, Turkey).
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING 04dNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMiNATION
aF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE Oi~L,Y.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL tiSE ONLY
JPRS L/8967
- 7 March 1980
WEST EUROPE REPORT ,
(FOUO 11/80 )
CONTENTS PAGE
COUNTRY SECTION
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
SPD's Bahr Interviewed on Soviet Intentions
(Egon.Bahr Interview; QUICK, 21 Feb 80) 1
Correspondent Views Goals, Proble~s o~ Ostpolitik
(Frane Barbieri; LA STAMPA, 5 Jan 80) 6
FRANCE
Marchais' Support of Soviet Afghanistan Invasion Splits PCF
(Irene Allier; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 14-20 Jan 80) 11
Brief s
Nuclear Weapon~ and Politics 16
PRC-France Intelligence Sharing 16
Rene Journiac Successor 16
Marchais Campaign 16
' SDECE AssignmenCs 17
Arms for India} Pakistan 17
Oil Talks Foreseen 17 ,
ITALY
_ Post-Tito Scenarios of Military Readiness
(Luigi Barzini; CORRIERE DELIA SERA, 28 Jan 80) 18
Figures on Publi~ Deficit Reported ~
(Claudio Torneo; IL MiDNDO, 7 Dec 79) 21
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
, .
F0~ OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
CONTENTS (Continued) Page
CISL Leader Reiterates Union Line
(Walter Tobagi;'CORRIERE DELIA SERA, 28 Jan 80) 25
PCI's Macaluso on Allocations for the South
(Emanuele Macaluso Interview; IL MONDO, 7 Dec 19) 27
- b - -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
. . . . . . r. ~ . ~ . . . A . . . . . .
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COUNTRY SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
SPD'S BAIiR INTERVIEWED,ON SOVIET INTENTIONS -
DW211337 Munich QUICK in German 21 Feb 80 pp 13-15 DW '
[Undated interview with SPD Federal Manager Egon Bahr by Aans Wagner in Bonn]
[Text] QUICK: For roughly 8 weeks now Soviet troops have been occupying
nonalined Afghanistan. Has thia caused you to change your asaeasment of
the Soviet Un3on? Were you, too, as disappointed as was President Carter?
- Bahr: The Soviet Union has committed an act there which cannot be tolerated.
But I am not so terribly aur.prised that the Soviet Union indeed fills out
a vacuum when there is a vacuum that ean be filled at no riak.
QUICK: What do you mean by that?
Bahr: To cite an example, what I mean is this: Angola firet called on
the Americans for help and did not get it. Then Angola asked us for help,
snd did not get it. Finally Neto called on the Swedes--to no avail. On1y
then did hP approach ~he Soviet Union, and he found support there. The
inffuence which the Soviet Union has ga3.ned lately in Angola and elsewhere
ia not at all the result of Soviet g~nius but of Weetern mistakea.
QUICK: Does this also hold true for Afghanistan?
Bahr: Afghanistan has been part of the area of interest and influence of
the Soviet Union for many decades. There is not the slightest doubt in my
mind that the United States had observed how the Sov~.ets enormously enhanced
their presence there since April 1978 and, particularly so, in the fall of ~
1979.
QUICK: Do you believe that following the Afghaniatan shock the United
Statea will counteract diacernible Soviet intentione in the future earli~r
and with more determination?
Bahr: What I Iiope, above all, is tinat the c,ld miatakes will not be con-
tinued, believing that everything can be done with arms, bel~eving that one
can put one's stakes on th~ wrong people and having to prop up old, en-
cru~ted,feudal regimea. The example of Iran ahows that it ia no* enough ~o
support a man and to equip hia country wiCh arms. -
_ ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
QUICK: Does this also apply to Pakistan?
Bahr: I hope that the West will not have the same experience there, but
everything I hear from and about tl-~at country makes me concerned.
QUICK: Would you term the Soviet Union a peace-loving country? _
Bahr: This designation by Konrad Adenauer is valid even today. Th~e Soviet
Union wants to avoid World War III. And we, too, have begun to conclude
agreements which work and which have made Europe an oasis in which peace
and etability prevail.
QUICK: But has peace not become lesa safe for us, too, as a result of
Afghanietan?
Bahr: With growing tensions negative effects will result for Europe, yet
I stand by what I said: Peace in Europe has become safer. This is the
reault of 10 years of social-liberal foreign policy. Yet the European policy
of detente cannot prevent new conflicts from emerging in other parts of the
world. -
QUICK: What do you think of an Olympic boycott?
- Bahr: If it is intended to cause the Soviet Union to leave Afghanistan,
then it will not work. If it is intended to be psychological and moral
punishment before the world public, ita success will depend on how many
countries will go to Moscow. At this atage of the game it will be very
many. Besides, we hope for a development in which the Olympic games would
be possible in Moscow without any trouble. This means that we must fully
�~kilize the time left until 20 May. By that date the national Olympic com-
mittees will decide finally whether they will go or not. Much can change
before then. Therefore I am against any commitment prior to that date. _
QUICK: Do you fear that the Soviet Union in the near future might use Berlin
again as an inatrument for bringing pressure to bear on the West as has
happened before?
Bahr: There are no indications of that to date, nor do I believe that this
will happen.
QUICK: The impression prevails as though the Europeans were currently
making an all-out effort to avoid being dragged into the conflict of the
two auperpowers. Do you also see this tendency?
' Bahr: I believe that for a long time the cohesion of the alliance has not
been so strongly emphasized as it has been in the past aeveral days. On
the other hand, it is, of coiirse, the European's own intereat to prevent
the conflict from extending to Europe. And I t~elieve that this is also the
American inLereat.
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
QUICK: The Federal Republic, which is considered the most important ally
of the United States, is currently being strikingly spared by the Soviet
Union. Are the Russians working toward a special relationship with West
Germany?
l
Bahr: No, I do not think so. The Soviet Union is interested in the etatus
quo. It does not intend to shake the alliance aqetems of NATO and the
Warsaw Pact, either. I believe that the Sovie*_a up to a certain degree
also regard the Americans as the watchdog ineuring that the Europeans, and
naturally the Germans, do not become too independent or do anything eilly.
QUICK: You believe that the etatua quo is also in the German interest?
Bahr: For 2~ yeara, between '1949 and 1969, we tried to change the aituation -
in Europe. In that period the Soviet Union just grew stronger, and the
GDR developed into a separate state. By means of detente policy we sought
to make the situation at least more bearable to the people. I would not
want to endanger this. ~
QUICK: But in the period of detente policy, too, the Soviet Union merely
grew stronger. Do you really believe that the Ruasians are serious about
what the West understands to be detente--has Moscow not outsmarted us?
Bahr: I believe for several reasons that the Soviet Union ia serioua about
detente. Notwithstanding all justified outrage over the action in Afghanis-
tan we muat not fail to realize that since becoming equal in nuclear poten-
tials the Soviet Union has always acted with great care and purposefully
below the threshold of a dangeroue risk.
;DW211354) QUICK: But detente also means mitigating potentials. Do the
Ruasiana really strive for that with regard to themselves or only with re- '
gard to the West?
Bahr: We believe that detente calls for balance on as low a level as possi-
ble. Moscow knows that this also applies to the Soviet Union. I am con-
vinced of that snd therefore I am interested in SALT III being achieved in
the near future. -
QUICK: Moscow said that if NATO rlecided to close the arms gap there will -
be no further negotiations.
Bahr: The Soviet Union said it first like that. But today it formulates
it differently. It says that the basis that existed prior to the decision
does not exist anymore. So one must look for a new one. Negotiatione
have not been rejected in this way.
QUICK: Next to "detente policy" you created the formula "changes through
rapprochement," which became one of the moat used terms of the ao-called
new oetpolitik. What has become of it?
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
I FOR OFFICIAL USE O~Y
Bahr: I formulated it 18 years ago as an interim phase leading to agreed-
on reunification. Matters developed differently. Since 1964, the first
20-year friendship treaty between the Soviet Union and the GDR, a direct
policy aimed at reunification in measurable phases is no more realistic,
so that conaequently this term dieappeared into the pagee of the archives.
-
QUICK: The term reunification also seems to have disappeared. One doea
not like to l:ear it in your party any more--what is your personal approach
to it?
Bahr: I do not like the term "re." It must bear the weight of the past 30
years. T3ut for me the problem that Germans, if they want to, live under
the roof of one state, is the problem of probleme as long as I live. With
one exception: Peace is more important. And therefore I am used to being
considered a half insane person.
QUICK: Why are you being considered insane?
Bahr: Because some people say that this is unrealistic and that we have
other problems, ranging from protection of the environment to the diffarence
between the North and the South in the world. Maybe my opinion will really
turn out to be unreal in 20 years. But I feel sa atrongly tied to my con-
viction and the task of the constitution that I can take it in stride.
,
QUICK: Why is this--let us aimply call it unification policy--your subject?
i
Bahr: Because I was born a German, because I grew up as a German and be-
cause I knew Germany when it was united. There is a rational consideration
also: I believe that a great people in the center of Europe has the right
ro self-determination, and that it would be good for unbreakable peace if
what is called the German problem were solved some day.
QUICK: Do you consider your prevailiag political work ae helpful for that
aim?
Bahr: Yes, because we will be able to talk about unification some day only
if all neighbors are convinced that no danger will emanate ~ny more from
the Germans. Detente policy is a prerequisite for that.
QUICK: Do you consider your prevailing policy as preparatory unification
policy?
Bahr: That would be saying too ~uch. We ha`~e managed to carry out a small
part of the many preparations and prerequisites. But we must continue to
pursue peace policy in Europe so that our neighbors some day will find the
idea of German unity tolerable. At the moment I see no neighbor, neither
in the East nor the Weat, who would not get the creepa with regard to such
- an idea. Th~ German problem unfortunately will not be on the international
agenda for a long time. Other problema are more urgent and explosive.
4
F~JR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
QU ICK: The leftiats ranging from Peter Brandt to Martin Walser and adviser
Guntram von Schenk of the SPD Bundestag faction seem to be discovering the
nation now, although so far it belonged to the political field of the right-
is ts. Is that some sort of a change in tendency?
Bahr: I see it differently. The rightists are or were about to abandon
the nation and sacrifice it to European integration. Actually there have
always been SPD members who have warned against underrating that problem
so that it would not get into the wrong hands. Today there really are
- some young people among us who have discovered the national problem as some-
- th ing for satisfying the Cas printed~ I consider it a pleasant development
because a peo~le in the center of Europe simply cannot live without hiatory.
QUICK: What does the German nation mean to you?
Bahr: The unit in which these peo~le want to live.
QUICK: Is that a value for you?
Bahr: Yes, oh yes:
QUICK: Finally--what is your prognosis with regard to the outcome of the
Bundestag elections?
Bahr: Franz Josef Strauss will not achieve as good a result as Helmut Kohl. -
So the social-liberal coalition will be continued. I am convinced of that.
QUICK: And you do not reckon with the-Greens? [Environment Protection
_ Party)
Bahr: In line with the increase of international tensions the voter will
realize that these auxiliary troops desired by Strauss as a substitute for
his fourth party cannot give an answer to these vital problems. Therefore,
the Greens will not gain as many votes as they would have probably achieved
prior to Afghanistan.
QUICK: If no clear majority is achieved after the Bundestag elections,
wou ld you consider a grand coalition feasible?
Bahr: There will be no draw and therefore also no grand coalition. I can ~
imagine having a grand coalition only in times of emergency, and then :tt
wou ld rather be an all-party government. In a normal eituation we ought to
have a strong opposition.
CSO : 3103
- 5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' ' ~
COUNTRY SECTION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
OORRE5PONDENT VIEWS GOAIS, PROBLEMS OF OSTPOLITIK
Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 5 Jan 80 p 3
[Article by special correspondent F~ane Barbieris "A 'Nex Look'
Ostpolitik"]
[Text~ Is trie alternative to "Finlandization" applicable
in Elirope? Schmidt xants to make Western policy vis-a-vis
_ lbscox more flexible~ as Germany sees ita international
influence groxing. Bonn believes that if the Europeans
help the USSR solve i~s doaestic problema they xill in
return obtain access to a nex market and to nex sources
of rax aaterials. The chancellor is encountering
reticence on the paxt of Bonn's allies, hoxever.
Bonn--Bonn ia expanding rapidly--both horizontally and vertically--along
the banks of the Rhine. The skyscrapers and futuristic structures of the
nex Chancellery and ministries~ and the iaposing nerr buildings of the
political parties and nexspapers~ have not yet succeeded in depriving "the
largest village in Ger~aany" of its bucfllic atmosphere. As if it xere still
perplexed and uncertain about i~s oxn future~ Bonn has not yet ~ecided to
don the trappinas of an authentic capital of Germany~ never wishing to
- forget Berlin. At the ~ame tiae, hoxever~ it aspires to be the political
center of E~rope.
Fearful o~ irritating allies and adversaries a'like, the various goverrwents
in Bonn have almoat a.lKays had. to conceal their oxn aabitions. A German _
"leadership" Kould excrssively disturb the arrangement of the continent
_ that Kas fashioned at Potsdam. The lack of a Western "leadership" (since
the degree to which the Americans have lost control is such that they do .
not knox hox to use the strength of their oKn muscles) has had the Affect~
however~ of assigning to Germany a role that quite gimply goes beyond even
- t~he a~o~t secret anbitions of its governnent.
Schmidt appears today to he the only head of governtaent who does not face
~ serious domestic financial difficulties. The "quotations" on the chancel-
lor have accordingl.y behaved on the international scene in concart xith
6
FOR OFFICTAL U:i~ ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
the quotations on the mark. With the self-confidence of someone who alone
among the xorld's lea.dera has devised a formula to control inflation
xithout making his felloW citizens pay the price of the crisis~ Schmidt
aspires to the role of arbiter even in the global politics of the super-
poxers. Indeed, he is at one and the sa~e time a partisan uf the decision
concerning the E~.iromiseiles and the most severe critic of the stupiditiea -
- attributable to Washingtcn's leadership.
Schmidt is responsible for the triumph of an accura~e--though seemingly
paradoxical--syllogism: the fact that the E~Zromissiles facilitate ratifi-
cation and continuation of the SALT negotiati~ns. Moscox has accused him
of stren~thening the American military presence in E~rope; Wa.shingtdn has -
reproached him for ta.king Soviet interests in Europe too mucti into consid-
eration.
It xould in fact appear that the Germar; chancellor has situated the role of
his government somewhere in between these tWO critiques. One of his
a.ssociates told me: "We feel that xe are today the trustees and ~uar~ntors
of detente. The xeakness of the American lead.ership may well have its
counterpart in ~:3.kness on the part of the Soviet leadership. A break
betxeen Washington and Moscow xould give rise to events capable of jeopar-
dizing the precarious equilitrrium of the Korld. Europe xould be the first _
to suffer the consequences~ and pay the price, of such an eventuality."
Although the aforementioned official assured us that this does not consti-
tute a nex orientation but rather an attempt to safeguard a"correct and
consistent policy line" at a moment Khen the great "learierships" are
vacillating, xe b~lieve xe are able to discern, in Bonn's designs, the `
, outlines of a new Gstpolitik. We are rather far fron a return to Brandt,
xho is nox out of the picture xith a somexhat faded chaxisaia.
This time it is Schaddt xho is refloating his version of the famous Ostpoli- ~
tik. He proceeds from a premise that in many respects ia antithetical to
the preuise upheld by the White House, to xit: the West Will not be able
to rescue itself from its oxn crisis by aggravating the crisis of th~ USSR.
The thesi~ attributed to Brzezinski to the effect that it is necessaxy to
ensnare Moscox in the xeaknesses of its ~conomy and in the dysfunction of
its system is regarded here by authoritative Social ,Democratic spokesmen
as "stupid."
, We shall attempt ~o trace the outlines of Scr.aidt's nex Ostpolitik in the ~
light of the interpreta.tions ga,thereci in Bomi~ as folloxss The agproach
being employed by the USSR on the Western Etiiropean scene--in a frenzied
search for a xay out of its complex domestic problems--cannot be conti~.ined
by erectin~ a nex obetacle betxeen the txo Etiaropea (an alternative all the
more unacceptable to Germany in that the obstacle would dispel the mirage
of rsunificg,tion).
~ ~ccount should 'be taken of the Soviet aifficulties xithout rejoicing over
them, ina.sauch as Mosco~ apparently intends to seek a solution through
, 7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200064408-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
. ~
cooperation xith Eurupe. Only if MoscoW fails to find that solution could
~ the Soviet crisis g~nerate serious pressure on the continent. In the grip
_ of its oxn crisis~ the USSR doeE not desire a deepening of the European
crisis, and E~zrope ahould likexise not desire a similar fate for the U5SR.
- On this basis--Bonn gays--E~rope ca.n assist the U5SR a.nd at the same tine
_ assist itself by open�ing its doors to nex markets and nex sources of rax
materials.
- E1~rope should guarantee itself against the possibility of dis~quilibriwa in `
its relations Kith so mighty a partner by involving the United 5tates in
the operation and by reta.ining the American military presence on the conti-
nent. One high-ranking official of the government said to me: "The Soviet
syatem is founderin~ and in danger of collapse. Unless it copes xith the
q~estion of reforms, there wil; be an explosion of exasperation tt~at will
ultimately spill over into E~rope. The West has every reason -to support
the rsformisi~ point of viex~ xhi.ch is tha.t of Brezhnev."
I attempted to determine xhether these supposed factors underlie the differ-
ences between the behavior of the American Government and that of the
European governments with r.espect to an entir.e series of questions.
"But xhat differences axe you ta.lking about'?" a high-ranking official of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked me with an air of surgrise. I
` attempted to list thea~. E~'ope~ for example, has not implemented the
- technological blockade against th~ USSR that Washington desired (and ha.s _
in fact attempted to fill, xith its oxn trade, the void thus left by the
United Sta.tes); xith respect to playing the China. caxd," Bonn has disso-
the at~:i-
ciated itself from the American 'policy line; in the Middle East,
tude of the E~ropeans is much more mulr.ifaceted than that of the Amer.icans; _
_ and as regaxds the Cuban situation a.nd the presence of the Castroites in
Africa~ Washington's viexs do not coincide xith those of the Europeans.
"All things considered," I ventured to say, "Bonn appears to be much more
responsive and open vis-a-vis Moscok and its arguments than Wa.shington is."
The official sought above all to define the "para.meters" within which
German policy operates: membership in NATa and the EEC~ on the one ha.nd,
- and the "irreplaceable" American military presence, as a"guarantee of
atomic security."
He assured me that Bonn's Ostpolitik does not trans~end this framework. In
fact, he contended that there xere no substantive differences on any of the
points I had enumerated. He conced.ed only that Germany "is not interested
in playing the txo poxers--China and Russia--off against each other," but
asserted that not even on this point could one speak ~n terms of a split
betxeen America. and ~rope. In any case, because of their groximity Europe
assigns a relatively greater iaportance to relations with the countries of
the Soviet bloc.
8
FUR O~FICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPROVED F~R RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Secret Ags:�aements?
A similax defensive tone is observable in tne statements of alraost all the
lea,ding ~igureQ of thd government and ~he oartie$ of the coalition~ xho ~
- axe irritated by the ~uspicions currently voiced in London p,nd Pa.ris to the
effect tha$ a pr~ferential relation~hip exists betxeen Moscox and Bonn.
The story of Brezhnev's alle~ed secret proposal to Schmidt has also been
�revived--a proposal in xhich 8rezhnev supposedly offered the reunification
, of Ger~eany in retu~rn for German neutrality. "It's just a question of
' taking regular soundings," these officials explain. "In every delica,te
situa.tion~ even our closest alli~s want to ascertain the preciae distance -
betHeen Bonn and Moscox."
Based on interpretations obta.ined in authoritative quarters, Schmidt's nex
Ostpolitik xould appeax to be not a distinct a.nd separate policy line but
an attempt to give overall Western policy a more flexible and axticulated
orientation in respect to relatior.s rrith Moscox.
In Bonn's opinion, the most recent aggra.vations on the world scene are
attributable to the fact that the insecure Amer~.can lea.dership has found `
- its counterpast in an equa.lly insecure Soviet leadership, with each side
suspicious and uncertain as to the intentions of the other. More tha.n ever
before, E~rope (and in this context--at this moment--xhen one says Europe
one is thinking primarily of Bonn) feels it has a voca,tion for the role of
a~ediator and that it alone is capa,ble of halting the collapse of detente.
This is the concept of Chancellor Schmidt~ xho wouid appear to be fully
qualifiec~ to aspire to a position of "leadership" (a position nox vacant)
' in the West. Fully qua,lifizd, that is~ except for one thing: the fact
that he is German. This is precisely the reason why the chancellor elicits
,uspicions and reservations even aanong Bonn's allies--suspicions and reser-
vations xhich axe further aggravated by tY~e ambitions and proposals of the
paxty to xhich he belongs. The SPD [Social Democratic Fa,rty of Germany]
links the fate of the German nation to the fate of Europe as a whole. At
~ the same time, ho~ever~ xe have the xords of an authorita.tive spokesman of
the` pas.~ty: "The history of the German na.tion xill coincide xith the
history of socialism~ and vice versa."
Compromise
In the viex of the Social Democrats, the reunification of Germany coincides
with the evolution of socialis~a. According to this theory, in a more
relaxed internationa,l atmosphere even the Ea.stern regimes will adopt the
course of democratic reforr+s. The countries best able to embaxk on this
course ase the more developed and democratically oriented countries such as
Czechoslovakia, Hungaxy, Poland and the GDR itself, which have profited
from the relaxation of controls by Moscox--a Moscow no longer fearful for
its oxn security.
9
, FOR OFFZCZAL L'SE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000200064408-5
FOR OI'FICIAL USE ONLY
A similar hypothesis xas the ba.sis for the controversial '�tour" that Wehner, -
the SPD's presti~ious parlia~aentary floor leader, made of these countries,
and also for his even more controversi.al statements. "The USSR," he said,
"has no expansionist tendencies. Its cnly concern is its own security....
With the aim of concentrating its forces on the Chinese border, it xould
be prepared to sacrifice the Warsax Pact if the West wauld renounce
NATu..
Anticipating that the Western socialist parties will undergo a reformist
evolution (af radical orientation), the SPD (or at least one of its main
currents of thought) foresees a convergence, in the future~ of the tko
reformed socialisms of Europe. For Germany~ this xould also mean natianal
reunifica.tion. In this context, Wehner has also rehabilitated Ulbricht's
- concept of "Germa.n socialism," xhich was outlaxed in the East with the
advent of Honecker. In the evolutionary process of the txo socialisms--a
process capa.ble of removing the barriers that divide Europe--the German
social democrats are assigning a prominent role to the Eurocommunists.
This is the explanation for the close relations (somewhat diminished of
late) between the SPD and the PCI [Italian Communist Party~.
A high-ranking representative of the Social Democratic Party told me: "We
would look with favor upon paxticipation by the communists in the Italian
Government. Their participa.tion xould not imperil the West, where the
communists xill never be a~?redominant force; on the contrary, it xould
set ir~ motion an importa.nt reformist process." I have found that the
liberal Augstein, editor of DER SPIEGEL, holds the same viexs. The aim is
to proceed from the domestic "historical conpromise" to a pan-European
historical compromise--a utopistic expectation that far transcends the nex
Ostpolitik of Schmidt.
n pragmatist pa.r excellence kho xould rather deal xith the ~aark than xith
Marx~ the chancellor probably keeps himself at a considerable distance from
the ideologica.l illusions of his fellow party members. This does not save
him~ hoxever~ from the criticism and attacks of the opposition. As it
steels itself for the coming elections, the opposition is wondering: "Is
it not possible that the chancellor's nex Ostpc:litik embodies the main
features of Finlandization?"
OOPYRIGHT: 1980 Fditr. LA STAMPA S.p.A.
10992
cso : 3104
io
FOR GFI'] ~;IAL US~ O~ILY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
_ MARCHAIS' SUPPORT OF SOVIET AFGHANISTAN INVASION SPLITS PCF
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 14-20 Jan 80 pp 20-21
[Article by Irene Allier: "Marchais: An Order From Moscow"]
[TextJ So apparently nothing has happened in Afghanistan. The name of the
country where 80,000 Soviet soldiers are at present being deployed is not
even mentioned in the final communique published Thursday evening at the
close of Georges Marchais' visit with Leonid Brezhnev--even though on Friday
_ the PCF's [French Communist Party] secretary general on French television
went at length into the arguments put forward by Moscow to justify its inter-
vention,without the least trace of criticism. In the off.icial text the two
parties merely dwelt, but exclusively with reference to imperialism, on the
necessity of "respecting the principles of sovereignty..., independence and
noninterference in the affairs of other countries." At that cost, the spec- -
taculat reconciliation between Georges Marchais and the Soviet leaders went
off very well. For them, hasn't the invasion of Afghanistan meant only an
"incident on the way," as Michel Debre said 12 years ago?
On 22 August 1968: The PCF secretary general returned to Paris dumbfounded,
called together the political bureau on an emergency basis and had it publicly
condemn the entry into Prague by Warsaw Pact troops which had taken place the
day before. On 4 January 1980: The PCF secretary general calmly returned
from a"presidential" trip to Cuba. A week ago Soviet troops penetrated into
Afghanistan and the political bureau finally met. But this time it was "to
understand" a fait accompli. It would be impossible to rally a majority to
"censure" the military intervention as Waldeck Rochet was able to do in 1968.
All the same nothing indicates that Georges Marchais tried to rally one. It
was~ a feat of another kind that the political bureau managed to achieve: Re-
conciling the irreconcilable, it succeeded in championing the PCF's indefect-
ible attachment to the principle of noninterference and at the same time the
right of any country to seek aid from an allied country so as "to stand up to
foreign intervention." Georges Marchais had no intention of compromising his
trip to Moscow. For he was leaving for Moscow as head of a party delegation.
That apparently had the highest priority. And first he was to make a detour
to Rome. "He wanted the blessing of the pope and that of Satan (of Berlinguer
and Brezhnev)," a bitter militant explained. "He did not get that of the pope."
But in his eyes the other was far more important.
11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI.Y
Georges Marchais in the USSIt, that was an event. It had been over 5 years
. since he had gone there, to~~be exact not since July 1974. It had been ages
since he had the benefit of thoae holidays on the shorea of the Black Sea
wh~ch the Soviet leaders generously give the leaders of fraternal parties;
he even refused to attend in person the CPSU's [Communist Party of the Soviet
a
Union] congresses. Finally, in Paris he sometimes deliberately avoided ~
meeting Soviet leaders on official viaits. The fact is that despite his
prudence, his reticence and the weight of his pro-Soviet lobby, Marchais for
a long time believed in the virtues of Eurocommunism. In 1976 at the East
Berlin conference which brought together all of the European communist par-
ties (from east and west), he--along with Berlinguer--was the pioneer of
insubordination with respect to the USSR. Thanks to him "proletarian inter-
nationalisn,"which for so long meant unconditional salidarity to the "father-
land of socialism, had been cast aside for the benefit of an "international
solidarity" without any real substance nor any heavy obligat.ions. Finally,
in 1978 KOMMUNIST, the CPSU Central Committee's review, profited by the pub-
lishing of and publicity given by the PCF to a critical work: "1'URSS et
- nous," to denounce the anti-Sovietism of certain French communists. In short,
until it rediscovered on the occasion of its 23rd Congress the "over-all
positive balance sheet" of Soviet-style social~sm, it could have been thought
that the PCF found in Eurocommunism the way and reasons for a loosening of
its original ties with Moscow. .
China's Shadow
But Eurocommunism had as its natural complement the union of the communist
- parties of France and Europe with the noncommunist parties. To the extenC
that the PCF has given up this alliance policy, for it Eurocommunism is no
longer on the agenda, whatever Marchais may say about it. At the same time,
its bonds with the USSR are being tightened. In fact, the PCF is the only
French political group which cannot dispense with fitting its activities in-
to an international whole serving as a guarantee of its revolutionary will.
The PCF is an integral part o.f the international communist movement. Now,
ever since the latter has had two poles, the USSR and China (in Asia, Sino-
Soviet rivalry has to all intents and purposes replaced Soviet-American
rivalry), the PCF has made its choice.
"Seeing two countries that claim kinship with socialism fighting against
each other in every sphere, that makes us bleed all over," an ill-resigned
old militant sighed. Bleeding or not, the CPF leadership opted deliberately
for the Soviet camp.
"We could have said 'no' on Kabul," a party cadre admitted. "But we had al-
ready said 'no' on Cambodia when Vietnam backed by the USSR invaded it. And
yet we had published a book to the glory of Pol Pot:"
� So, behind Cambodia, behind Afghanistan, appears China's shadow in profile.
But it is not the only one. The PCF's political concerns are not exclusive-
ly planetary. The trip to Moscow also responded to other motives, motives
12
FOR ~)EE'i~:.CAL US~ O~JLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL L'SE ONLY
of an internal order and even out-and-out electoral ones. First of all
political, the surprising thesis spread toda~ by those who had ac~epted
only with a sinking heart the strategy of union of the Left, that the PCF's
electoral erosion is allegedly attri~utable to its drawing away from the
USSR, to the dissolution of its revolutionary identity. But above all there
is the electoral campaign of the future communist candidate in the 1981
presidential elections, Georges Marchais. For several months he has been
undertaking a series of international trips which, he hopes, will give the
world the image of him as a distinguished statesman. He has visited
Yugoslavia, Algeria, Poland, Cuba, Nicaragua, he has met Yasser Arafat, the
Polisario Front; other long rounds of visits are planned in Africa, Benin,
Angola. There would still be the United States and the USSR. The PCF is
endeavoring to have Marchais invited by an American university. A Soviet
trip therefore had to be arranged at the same time.
A Serious Split
It had been planned for a long time, before Afghanistan became a current
event. It was to have taken place in November 1979, an ideal time according
to the PCF's thinking people, not too close to the time of the 1981 elections
(in such a way as not to allow the adversary to exploit dangerously what
Jean Elleinstein already calls a voyage "to Canossa"), nor too far off as to
recapture in time the segment or militant opinion eager to see on television
and on L'HUMANITE's front page the accolades, the simultaneous embraces and
smiles of a Brezhnev reconciled with Marchais. Especially since it could be
hoped that once the reconciliation took place the USSR would know how to re-
frain from showing its preference for the "bourgeoisie's candidate" as it
did in 1974 by sending its ambassador to Giscard right in the middle of the
electoral campaign. This point was no doubt an integral part of the long
negotiations that ended in the drafting of the joint text Brezhnev and his
guest made public Thursday evening.
It took no less than two French delegations to the USSR since October, an
article by Gaston Plissonnier, guardian of the pro-Soviet flame, attacking
the French socialists... in PRAVDA a visit to Paris by Vadim Zagladin,
the member of the Soviet Central~Committee in charge of relations with the
PCF, to attain an agreement. The USSR recognized the right of communist
parties to take new paths towards socialism. Afghanistan arose to disturb
fleetingly the timing of the ceremonies; in the communist leadership's view
it could not in any case attenuate the: presidential necessity of the secre-
tary general's trip. Nor the date set for it so laboriously... Of course
this conjunction of events ran the risk of isolating the PCF a little more
from its European "brothers." Spain's Communist Party has condemned the
Soviet operatior,, the Italiar. Communist Party has condemned it, Yugoslavia
has condemned it, without even mentioning the Iranian revolution which has
also condemned it. It can't be helped: Nothing could stand in the way of
the Brezhnev-Marchais reconciliation. As for what comes next, that remains
to be seen. The political bureau, furthermore, left a door half-open when
it declared its desire that tt.~e Afghan people ensure their "march towards
progress peacefully and with frlll sovereignty."
13
FOR OX r ~.L 1:1L USE OM.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
However, it may be feared according to some of the party's Cassandras that
a significant aggravation of ireternational tension might incite the PCF ~
leadership to sacri~ice everything to the Soviet camp and in particular tiie
famous "divergences" on human freedoms and riuhts it had assumed for a f~w
_ years. The fact is that Jean Kanapa is dead. The PCF's "minister of foreign
affairs," he managed to hold the two ends of the chain together and make a
synthesia of what was owed the USSR in the name of "interr.ational solidarity"
and what was owed the PCF's necessary independence and the dPmands of demo-
cracy.
We cannot agree to the Soviet Army ruling as a master in Kabul, waging
a war against "Moslem rebels" kilometers from the Soviet Union's territory.
We cannot agree to the USSR behaving like a great power defending its in-
terests just like American imperialism... The Soviet troops must leave
Afghanistan..." There were 45 communists who signed that text. Forty-five
who protested openly. That isn't very many; but those who silently disap-
prove are infinitely more numerous. Among the usual signatures one notes
the new names of leaders still hesitant a short time ago: Adler, the his-
torian, for example, one of the authors of "~1'URSS et nous," the communist
mayor of Sevres, Roger Fajnzylber. A warning shot at the leadership. But
the latter feigns to be unaware that the party today is no longer closing its
ranks behind it. However, even the editorial staff of L'HUMANITE is divided
into virtuaily even parts between those who approve and those who do not ap-
prove the Afghan operation. An even more clear-cut rift in the CGT [General
Confederation of Labor] where a serious split occurred over a text that was
nevertheless more specific than that of the political buresu: A straight out
reminder of the principle of nonint~rvention accepted by everyone, including
by Seguy and Krazucki. If 16 members of the executive committee, among them
two communists, refused to take a vote on it, it was not because they found
it too difficult, but on the contrary because it did not explicitly condemn
Soviet intervention.
The Afghan affairs is obviously not of the kind to be helpful to this remo-
bilizing of the party which the leadership for 2 years now has been vainly
seeking. The success of the "lOQ's petition," which in less than a week
has become that of the "1,000," proves it. It demands union at the base,
union of the forces of the Left in the struggle against "general staff stra-
tegies." A number of communists signed it, this time its impact went beyond
the small circle of "critical" intellectuals. The bulk of the party, of
course, is not revolting against the 1978 rupture and its consequences; but
it is obviously not approving.
"The time has passed when a communist militant obeyed implicitly," a vigilant
observer of the internal evolution noted. Henceforth the communists follow
along only if they agree to discuss party policy with them." Since they do
not discuss it, the militants are quietly drawing away on tiptoe: An ex-
ample? In the central committee's framework of life committee headed by
Mireille Bertrand there is no longer anyone except the standing members.
The specialists who just a short time ago were participating in the Grenoble
14
. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE OPILY
cUlloquy on urbanism? They have 3isappeared. A number of ce11s (40 percent
in the Paris area, according to a study for internal use revealed by LE
CANARD ENCHAINE, have not met for 3 months. To explain themselves, some
militants are addressing the bo~irgeois press "because of the nonfunctioning
of their cells." "Mine has not convoked me for 8 montha," one of them said.
In short, a small number of the party is protesting, the bulk of it is play-
ing dead. An irrefutable test: Dues come in slowly or not at all. Five
- or six stamps a year are paid on the average, to the point that this failure
to get money is affecting the budget of the party which is specifically
seeking to build up the war chest of its candidate for *he presidency of the
Republic.
Inhibited, paralyzed, inert, the militants suspect fighting among the lead-
ers at the top of their party all of whose ups and downs they do not manage
to follow. They only perceive signs of it in the labored compromises drawn
up by the political bureau and in the cryptic exegeses of them which spokes-
man Pierre Juquin supplies: "We have no need to approve or disapprove (the
Afghan issue), but rather to understand it." Some see the triumphant label
of Roland Leroy and the success of the protracted patience of Gaston
Plissonnier, symbol of the party's continuing existence through its changes,
in Marchais' haste to rediscover the fraternal embraces of the past. And
they are waiting for the clock to turn back...
No Debate in L'HUMANITE
But it is of course on a party in very poor form that the Afghan operation
fell. "You forget that the Fiszbin-Gajer affair is continuing to effect
ravages, perhaps even worse ones," some Parisian communists are saying. In
fact it is no doubt easier for a communist at the base to agree from afar to
the USSR defending its great power interests as it chooses to seeing himself
shamelessly deceived by his own leadership. On 7 January Henri Fiszbin at-
tempted to take advantage of the open forum in L'HUMANITE on the occasion of
the impending national council meeting devoted to the intellectuals to ex-
poae in discreet terms but publicly the conflict setting him against his
hierarchy. Were they finally going to open the debate in L'HUMANITE? No
- indeed. As an exceptional action, the committee in charge of organizing
the discussion immediately intervened to close it "administratively." Who
would dare answer back to statements in speeches by Georges Marchais pre-
sented as so much evidence: Captain of a ship tossed about by the ground
swell on which one meets as many individuals nostalgic over the taking of
the Winter Palace as those desirous of a reformism without drama, Marchais
appears to be abandoned to ill winds that run the risk of blowing him far
from his point of balance. The spectacle of Moscow's resumed meetings
allows predicting that it will be for a long time.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 "le Nouvel Observateur"
8094
CSO: 3100
15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
.i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COUNTRY SE~CTION FRANCE
BRIEFS
NUCLEAR WF.APONS AND POLITICS--It is rare that a defense meeting becomes the
subject of widespread publicity. Said meeting, headed by the President,
brings together top-level defense officials. The 7 February meeting re-
ceived big play in the press even though all the "options " announced (arma-
ment of the sixth nuclear submarine, cruise missiles and mobile missiles)
were already known. The final decision will only be made in April after
debate in Parliament. The reason? It appears that the President, warned
that defense will be one of Chirac's main themes on the 12th, hopes to
deny him the use of this "exclusive" bit of information during this time
of international tension. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French
11 Feb 80 p 15]
, PRC-FRANCE INTELLIGENCE SHARING--Alexandre de Marenches, chief of the SDECE,
may meet witt~ top officials of the PRC intelligence services during his
unofficial stay in Beijing. PRC intelligence services are currently pro-
viding more and more information to their Western counterparts about Soviet
activities, particularly with respect to Africa. [Text] [Paris VALEURS
ACTUELLES in French 11 Feb 80 p 15]
RENE JOURNIAC SUCCESSOR--Guy Georgy, 61, one of the French diplomats most
familiar with Africa (he has devoted practically his whole career to it
except for a 3-year tour in the French Emhassy in Bolivia), will probably
succeed [the lateJ Rene Journiac. [Text] [Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION
in French 11 Feb 80 p 6]
MARCHAIS CAMPAIGN--[PCF Secretary General] Georges Marchais will head up
an extensive P~ campaign against the neutron bomb [in France]. [Text]
[Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 11 FPb 80 p 3]
16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL iJSE ONLY
+ SDECE ASSIGNMENPS--SDECE chief de Marenches has sent two colonels on de-
tached duty, one to Saudi Arabia and one to Tunisia. De Marenches appuinted
a subversion expert, Colonel G., to work with King Khaled, whose throne was
shaken by the Mecca hostage affair; and the successor to Colonel de Marolles
in the SDECE "Action" service, Colonel B., was appointed to go help the
Tunisian Government defend itself against Libya's machinations. [Text]
[Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 18 Feb 80 p 16]
~
ARMS FOR INDIA, PAKISTAN--:'ronce is supplying arms to both India and
Pakistan, the Indian subcontinent rivals. Thanks to a loan from Japan,
Pakistan hopes to purchase 300 AMX-10 light armored vehicles and 500 ANI}C-30
medium tankso On the occasion of the [French] chief of state's trip, India
let it be known that it would like to obta.in some Matra, Exocet and Milan
missiles; some Dauphin helicopters and some AMX-30 tanks. [Text] [Paris
VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 18 Feb 80 p 16]
OIL TALKS FORESEEN--[President] Giscard will talk oil with [Jordan's King]
Husayn when he visits Jordan next month. Large oil deposits have recently
been discovered in the northeastern part of the kingdom and a French company _
may participate in their exploitation. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES
in French 18 Feb 80 p 16]
CSO: 3100
~
17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
a
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~ COUNTRY SECTION ITALX
r~�~T-TITO SCENARIOS OF MILITARY READINESS
Milan CORRIERE DEL1,A SERA in Italian 28 Jan 80 pp 1, 2
[Article by Luigi Barzini: "If We Had To Think of Defending"] .
[Text] For days and days after the report of Tito's illness, Bastiani Fortress
ha.s been in a state of alert and, even now, everything has not become normal.
In Dina Buzzati's opinion, Bastiani Fortress was this newspaper's major
editorial table when we were unknown youngsters and were waiting from hour
to hour for some extraordinary event to occur which would have changed our
- lives. For our army officers Bastiani Fertress is now that brief stretch
of our eastern border where the bulk of our defense is concentrated and
where, scanning the horizon, we have been awaiting (fortunately in vain)
the arrival of the Tartars for 30 years.
As is well-known, the Alpine arc defends the Po lowlands from the coast to a
point north of Gorizia. There the mountains drop off and leave a rather
~road, less inaccessible passage free, called by tYie NATO military "Lubiana
Gap" or "Lubiana Corridor." It is the easiest entrance of an~ invader into
' the Po Valley, the natural route for numerous barbaric tribes in the early
Middle Ages. Therefore, it is the sector of the NATO defense entrusted
exclusively to our armies both because we know it perfectly well (part of
the territory was Italy; World War I was partially fought in those areas;
we have accurate topographical maps of those places) and because it is
presumed that our army (like all others, moreover) would give the beat
results defending its own land.
On paper we are ready for everything. We have available for immediate
deployment in that sector: three mechanized divisions, one tank division,
a few Alpine brigades, one airborne brigade, one missile bri~ade and various
anti~ircraft and logistical forces. Ready for what? In former general-
staff studies we calmly prepare.d to confront the armed forces of a single
country, tha~ bordering ours. However, we must now face up to a whole range
of uncertain hypotheses on our eastern border. If Tito (may God let him
live a long time) should die, it is probable that Yugoslavia (constr.ained by
the armed forces, the Internal Security Service and the ;~arty) would
18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
preserve its unity and continue its policy of a nonalined country; or else,
it may be divided among two or more factions, one part of which, or maybe
all, could become alined with the Warsaw Pact. In that case, we would have
to face Soviet tank divisions lined up on the outskirts of Trieste. In
case of invasion, we would find ourselves lacking even that advance notice
of a few days which would enable us to arrange our defense more effectively.
The various hypotheses do not all carry the same weight. Among other
things, the experts take it for granted that, after Tito's death, Russian
political and military pressure could be stepped up without necessarily
resulting in an invasion. It is hoped that, after the occupation of
Afghanistan, repercus5ions throughout the Western and Islamic world would -
make the Soviet General Staff more cautious.
The task assigned to Italy in the worst (and perhaps less probable) case,
that is, a direct Soviet attack on our border, is extremely delicate but
limited. We would have to stave off an invasion for whatever time is
necessary to permit reinforcements to arrive from the interior and almost
certainly from abroad. When will these reinforcements arrive? No one
knows. Among the foreigners on the spot there is only a modest U.S.
symbolic unit and various services. The provisions of the Atlantic Pact
are vague; eact+ natioi~ must decide how and when it will come to the aid of
an ally being attacked. Moreover, the need to prevent Italy's fall at any
cost is so obvious that we can count on the relatively rapid arrival of NATO
contingents and supplies. For what interests the others is not to save the
"cradle of civilization" or the "mother of the arts" but the peninsula
itself, the quay projecting into the Mediterranean, which controls the
maritime communication routes between Gibraltar and the Dardanelles. To
the east of Italy are Egypt, the Suez, Israel, Greece, Turkey and valuable
sources of raw materials and fuels.
Are our armed forces up to their task? Undoubtedly, our armament, although
insufficient, is extremely modern and adequate. Antitank and antiaircraft
weapons are particularly lacking. However, it is difficult to evaluate the
morale of inen and their training (as is known, the most perfect tank is
worth only as much as the men inside). As always, it is impossible to
predict how our units would perform in combat. Italians perform their best
(~n war and in peace) in desperate situations and under the eyes of foreigners,
for they reveal unsuspected virtues and resources and turn out to be
astonishing heroes (this is wh~t we commonly call "the big star"). However,
we cannot expect the heroism of a few to be the salvation of the entire
country. The armed forces have been neglected for decades. The ministers
of def ense, who have come one after another (with one or two exceptions),
can be categorized from mediocre to extremely bad. We spend proportionately
much lower sums than all our allies (about half those of the Germans and
English). Moreover, every year inflation decreases the true amount of the
allocations to a worrisome degree, to the extent that, with the same funds,
we must equip increasingiy smaller units from year to year. The 12-month
term of military service is inadequate to train men in the use of increasingly
19 -
FGR OFFICIAL iJSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
complicated, delicate and costly machiaery (one tank costs more than SGO
million lire). Lastly, limited available equipn.ent does not permit adequate
training. One tank may fire 15 shots in a year., insufficient to train a
gunner. The remuneration of officers and noncommissioned officers is not
sufficient to maintain the standard of living conditions necessary to attract
capable men and take them out of civilian life. There are also serious
difficulties in recruiting the personnel necessary to maintain the enuipment. :
As is well-known, wages in Italy are never proportionate to the usefulness
of the services for the common welfare, on~y rarely reward performance which
is essential and vital for the nation, but reward almost exclusively the
ability to alarm the government with strikes (as seen recently in the case
of flight controllers). In return, the recruits of the last few years have
been different from those of a few years ago: they are young, relatively
more serious, willing, capable and well-behaved. In the end, it is difficult
to predict the influence of parties closer to the ideals proclai.med by the
Warsaw Pact on the morale of a large part of the youth at the moment of
hostilities. '
We have spoken only of conventional weapons for a war which would use the
most modern weaponry except for nuclear weapons. The reason is that a ~
decision to use the latter as a first resort is so fr.aught with mortal
danger in the present state of affairs (it would open the way to reprisals
and counterreprisals in increasing degrees, probably unti~ there is total
destruction of the belligerent powers and a large part of the industrialized
world), that it is doubtful that it will ever be launched unless as a last
desperate gesture, the gesture of Samson, by a power about to be annihilated
and, perhaps, not even then. Their real value is the a~ocalyptic threat
they represent, and which exists, filling the warehouses and storage bins
with missile warheads.
COPYRIGHT: 198.0 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
8568
CSO: 3104
20
FOR OFFICrAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
rvn Vrr tl.lAL UJr; UNLY
~
i
COTJNTRY SECTION ITALY
FIGURES ON PUBLIC DEFICIT REPORTED
Milan IL MONDO in Italian 7 Dec 79 pp 8-9
[Article by Claudio Torneo: "Miracle in Rome'~~
[Text~ When they made their first calculations during the last few days
the treasury ministry and state accountancy experts did not believe their
eyes. And to avoid errors they decided to recheck, item by item, the
receipts and the expenditures of the stare and other agencies whose
accounts are included in the expanded public sector budget (state, state
agencies, local agencies, railroads, postal service, and ENEL [National
Electric Agency]). .
The report supplement, which will delay until mid-December the submission
of the quarterly treasury report in the parliament (the date prescribed by
law is 30 November) has confirmed the initial impression: in 1979, for the
first time in many years, the public deficit wi11 be below expectations.
~he 36 trillion which several months ago was still considered rock bottom,
will not be reached. The expenditure estimate for the expanded public
sector (i.e., the money that the state borrows to meet the deficit) will
hardly exceed 33 trillion and according to the most optimistic it could
even stop at 31 trillion. It is a distinct improvement over 1978: the
deficit is lower not only in real terms, that is, in comparison with national
income, but also in absolute amount (the deficit last year was 33.8 million).
The surprise is even greater because with the sole exception of the Prometeia
Bologna Forecasting Center and the CEPEC,the Studies Center of the PSI [Italian
Socialist Party], the government, the Bank of Italy, and the majority of
the experts were convinced that 1979 had been a particularly difficult
year for public finance. The Pandolfi document preparatory for the plan had
even hypothesized that the spontaneous deficit would 3ump to 43.1 billion
in 1979. And in order to squeeze the requirement to 36 trillion, the money
bill had anticipated a drastic set of ineasures which, between cuts and the
recovery of tax evasion, were to lead to savings to 6.5 billion.
Not all of the provisions of the money bill have been actually put into
- effect (for example, the disability pension reform has not been passed by
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOP. OFFICIAL USE ONLY
the parliament, and of the 3.35 billion in deposits of local agencies in
banks, only 1.5 billion have come back into the treasury coffers). Never-
theless, the meas~sres to hold down the deficit have succeeded beyond any
rosy expectation. How has it bee~i possible? The initial answers that can
be gotten from the experts are still cautions and guarded. Some guess that
the initial deficit predictions may have been overes~imated, but most prefer
to emphasize a series of accidental and in many cases nonrecurring events
that may have unexpectedly improved the public balance-sheet.
Whatever the explanation, the fact is that with both receipts and expendi-
tures many things have changed.
Receipts. This is the item where the surprises are chiefly concentrated.
Tax revenue has increased much more than expected. Between direct and indirect
taxes, at the end of the yaar receipts will amount to at least 50.5 trillion,
perhaps 51 trillion. This is an increase of 3 trillion over initial
estimates. It remains to be determined where the boom in receipts has been
especially due to inflation that has swollen the tax base and driven the
rates ever higher. But even the fight against tax evasion has not been
entirely devoid of results: probably about 1 trillion have been recovered,
mainly due to the greater revenue from the IVA [value-added tax] and the
ILOR. Just as conspicuous has been the jump in receipts from the INPS
[National Social Security Institute]. Many businesses which at first evaded
part of the social security contributions, have begun to submit more truthful
reports since the legislators have required that the tax code be included on
the payment forms. ~he fight against tax evasion will bring the INPS at
least ~..2 to 1.3 billion more in receipts, but there are those who maintain
it will ba even more.
E.A-penditures.
The expenditure picture is more difficult to interpret. The relative restraint
that ,:he analysis of the most recent figures has brought to light is due
mainly to the stagnation of public investments and to the failure to pass
the law that increases allocations for state participations (more than 3
trillion are involved). But something must not have functioned in the same
way in the initial estimates of expenditures. Af ter the increases granted
by the government to government employees, who in the course of a few months
have obtained first the 1976-78 contract settlement and then a bonus of some
250,000 lire each, the final balance for current expenditures should
actually have been increased by at least 1 trillion. However, this was not
so; evidently the greater outlay was compensated for by compressiona of other
items.
But what effect will the favorable public expenditures picture have on the
deficit for next year? Will the deficit for 1980, expected to be 40 trillion,
be positively influenced by it? These questions have remained unanswered,
at least for now. Among the economists and the politicians, no one is
inclined to co~it himself until all the statistical details have been
. 22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R004200060048-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
released. "In theory," a government expert told IL MONDO, "it is possible
that the deficit may go from 40 to 43 trillion because the expenditures
that have not been made this year will devolve upon the 1980 balance;
h~wever, it is also poasible that the 40 trillion will drop to 38 or 39
~ trillion." Everything depends upon the basis on which the predictions for
these years were made: "If the initial eatimatE was correct, there is no
~ reason to deceive ourselves; if, on the other hand, it was tao high, now
- we can be a little less pessimistic."
In any case, in the light of tY?e most rece,-~t developments on the deficit,
and thc~ many controversies that there have been about it during the last
few weeks, the government and the PRI [Italian Republican Party] appear dest
destined to retrench. In a document sent to Council President Francesco
Cossiga, the republicans have accused the government of straying from the
straight road indicated by the Pandolfi plan and of causing inflation to
escalate with their lively financial pol3.cy. The government has responded
in kind, maintaining that the deficit is under control and that in any case
_ it is increasing at a much slower pace than the Pandolfi plan predictions.
"I do not want to stir up controversy again," Mario Baldassarri, Cossiga's
economic adviser, told IL MONDO, "but it appears to me that the latest
figures show that there is, at least under conditions in Italy, an automatic
and direct relation between public deficit and inflation rate." If this
relation exists, how is it, Baldassarri wonders, "that in 1979 we had a
higher inflation in the face of a public deficit that in absolute figures is
below that of 197d?"
Public Deficit According T~ Prediction and Reality
Y/~~y
ifi 1
~ T~nd~~m T~nd~n~
~13.100 ~ 06i~ 43.100 3 ~Ghi~vo
' � 38.OOp ' ' 34.730
� . ~
^
Key: Key:
� 1. Pandolfi Document 31 Aug 1978 1. Pandolfi Plan 15 Jan 79
~ 2. Tendency 43,100 2. Tendency 43,100
! 3. Objective 36,000 3. Objective 34,730
4. In billions of lire
23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~ R~LAZI NFiD
G T~~RE . TESOqO;
1 ~ ~ y I ~
rl)~'''~~~~~i~, ~~~c;~: ~ :~~PI�
~ s;.+',. i, ~ ~ i
,r ` ~ ,
~~m~ ~ �
di ~lu~no '
6.000 ~ di ottob~~ .~c;. ,
i,~.
.
� 31/33. ~
000
.
~ ~ U
;g 1 ~~y ~
Key:
1. Comparison of Treasury Cash 1979 ~
2. June estimate 36,000
3. October projection 31/33,000
COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1979
7428
CSO: 3104
24
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_1
COUNTRY SECTION ITALY
CISL LEADER REITEkATES UNION LINE
Mi1an CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 28 Jan 80 p 2
[Article by Walter Tobagi: "A Union Bothersome to All Parties"]
[Text] At a time of second thoughts about Italian unionism, CISL [Italian
Confederation of Labor Unions] has decided once more to follow the path of
attack. Here is the gist of the organizational assembly which the Second
Italian Confederation (3 million members) finished up in Rome Saturday.
It was an assembly which served to deliberate on objectives and procedures
for union action and to strengthen the leadership of Pierre Carniti, CISL's
first secretary, who does not have the DC's [Christian Democratic Party]
card in his pocket.
CISL's "anomaly" i.s explainable, first of all, by the following fact: in
the history of all postwar Italian unions, this is the first time that a man
not enrolled in any party has become a secretary. A person who, as Carniti
d+d the other day, can vindicate the union's autonomy in almost brutal terms:
"A union is autonomous when it is uncomfortable for all parties which count."
Translated in terms of policy, this means that CISL declares itself favorable
to a government of solidarity including the communists; at the same time,
it maintains that, with regard to that possible government, the union
should maintain the same ind~pendence and aggressiveness against any "social
peace" which it has shown in past arrangements without the PCI.
Therefore, CSIL's strong point is still the "specific nature" of union action
seen as an essential element in the correct operation of the system:
dialectics are an instrument of progress. The union exists inasmuch as it
is autonomous and succeeds in expressing the demands of the labor world.
From this logic comes the principle of incompatibility, giving the impression
that trade-unionists cannot handle certain political assignments. CISL
members consider this principle more sound than the Gospel.
In fact, 30 years after its birth, CISL gives the impression of having
f inally come up with a clear enough image based on the binomial "autonomy
plus bargaining." We are quite far from the confederation first headed by
25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Giulio Pastore and then by Bruno Storti which, in the 1950's, found ita first
raison-de'etre i:? a connection with the Catholic and DC world. And ~.t seems
that everyone has forgotten the clashes of the 1970's between the left
headed by the industrial workers (first of all, Macario's and Carniti's
metalworkera) and the moderate wing closer to the DC. After Marcario's
resignation, elected Christian Democratic senator last year, Carniti choae
Bruno Marini, leader of the pro-DC wing, as assistant secretary.
Thus, the organizational assembly of Rome marks the c.r.*~solidation of the -
leadership group of the "new CISL." And it makes evident the interweaving
of values which this union is trying to express. The values of the best
Catholic tradition, for which we speak of the "centrality of man." The
values of industrialism and the bargaining system, which CISL's training
schools have be:~n teaching for more than 20 years with constant reference
to the mature experience of more developed countri~s, beginning with the
United States.
With this perspective in mind, it is onl~~ too obvious that CISL ha~s every
reason to recall its roots, firmly cast in the Western tradition. And
Carniti deplores the glamorous influence which "true socialisms" exert on
- still sizable groups of workers, who do not succeed in grasping the nature
of the Soviet system, "oppressive internally and violent externally."
For the CISL leaders, being Western does not mean accepting the norms of
moderatism. On the contrary. Recourse to the experiences of advanced
industrial societies implies a firm and effective use of the bargaining
system. A type of bargaining which answers the needs of the workers,
certainly not foreign political logic. And along tizis line, not by accident,
we have the union proposals which emerged at the Rome meeting. Automatic
~ay increases are defended in an uncompromising manner, because they are
the safeguard of the less privileged. But, at the same time, a willingness
is expressed to increase productivity and permit a new accumulation of
capital, essential to create new ,jobs in the South.
A substantial realism peeps out behind the ritual formulas. This is also
expressed in the bargaining of an increasing, almost schizophrenic, separation
between the union leaders, who draw up the major political strategies, and
the vast majority of the workers. It is important that the initial report
of Mario Colombo, one of the confederate secretaries, attacked these problems
shamelessly. Acknowledging one's infirmity is the first step toward a cure.
CISL's model drastically rejects any "union centralism." And it demands
room for total autonomy and the bargaining right for wor~Cers. There is no
doubt that it is a profoundly democratic model. But it is also a model
which does not go along with the aspirations of those who would like to
restore the Italian economy by reducing the autonomous and reciprocating
power of the unions.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 T:ditoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
8568
CSO: 3104 26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
COUNTRY SECTION, ITALY
PCI'S MACAL"JSO ON ALLOCATIONS FOR THE SOUTH
Milan IL MONDO in Italian 7 Dec 79 p 18
[Interview with Emanuele Macaluso of the PCI, by Bruna Bellonzi: "This Fund
Should Be Thrown Out"~
[TextJ The attacka are raining from all sides. In recent days it has been
the southern entrepreneurs, who, at a meeting of Confidustria's committee
for the Mezzogiorno [General Confederation of Italian Industry], criticized
the operation of the Fund and proposed radical changes in it.
Today the PCI takes to the field and asks in this interview with the man
in charge of the southern section of the central committee, Emanuele Macaluso,
about dissolving it. On the Fund for Southern Italy, in short, the con-
troversy does not stop. On the contrary, the additional 4 trillion provided
by the money bill for 1980 (IL MONDO No 45) has aroused still more criticism.
Question: Have you reached the conclusion that the Fund has been closed down
and that special support measures in the South have had their day?
Answer: Support, no, but the system and the tools of this support, to be
sure. Law 183 for the South, passed in 1976, was an attempt to tie the
South's takeoff to national and regional planning sustained by the additional
support funds. But the experience of these last 3 years has shown two things
clearly: first, that there has been and there still is within the government
forces themselves bitter resistance to planning, and second, that the Fund
is not a tool capable of planning support measures such as those provided
for by law 183.
Question: For example?
Answer; For example, the pro3ect for Naples, the pro~ect for Palermo, the
pro~ect for the inland areas. How far along are they? ~
Question: Then what do you propose?
27
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Answer: First of all, the exact opposite of what seems to be the intention
of the government and the present minister for the South. It seems to me
that the line that Di Giesi and his government colleagues are using is the
line of the past: since planning is bankrupt, since it does not work, we
distribute taxes here and there, like rain, so to apeak, even to complete minor
projects. It smacks too much of an electoral climate.
Question: Electoral?
Answer: Precisely. The administrative elections are only 6 months off. And
here all ready for 1980 is refinancing which, if removed from a planning
framework, can serve to revitalize old and new customers.
Question: But the money bill is still not passed.
Answer: And as far as we are concerned, it will not be.
Question: How is that?
Answer: We communists will request the suppression of such expenditures.
~ Question: No more additional funds?
Answer: Additional funds, yes, but to be sent directly to the regions
through regular channels.
Question: However the regions have not shown themselves to be better planners
than the Fund.
Answer: I would say, rather, that the Fund has not demonstrated that it is �
mure capable than the regions. Its passive surpluses surpass those of the
regions. Of the 18 trillion allocated, 14 trillion of which are to be
reserved for special projects and for the industrial infrastructure, the
commitments actually made have been 2.06 trillion in 1976, 3.85 trillion
in 1977, 3.549 trillion in 1978, and 1,846 trillion for 1979 (up to 31 -
October). Then the distributions made have been, respectively, 1,981
trillion for 1976, 2,406 trillion in 1977, 2,672 trillion in 1978, and
2,099 trillion through this past October. But it is a question of
~ expenditures made also on the basis of appropriations provided by laws prior
to law 183. Only 554 billion has as yet been distributed from the law 183
monies! In other words, every year the Fund accumulates about 1 billion in
passive surpluses. For an agency created for the purpose of planning and
financing special support measures, that seems to me to be a horrible result!
For Che future it is necessary to consider something different.
Question: The PCI has a proposal of its own?
Answer: Yes. Here is the general idea: 1) Special financing is included
in the national planning; 2) this financing is managed by those who concern
themselves with the planning. That is, the president of the council, the
28 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
economic ministers, and the planning agencies should be responsible for it;
this excludes the.presence of a minister for the South; 4) the recipients of
the support should be the regional programs.
Question: But you yourself have acknowledged that there is a regional
obstacle.
Answer: The functioning of the regions is a political problem and it is
necessary for the southern populace to shoulder the responsibility for it.
We are talking about the administrators who do not administer and those who
administer poorly are right in front of their eyes, and they know them by
name. So we call upon them to meet their responsibility. The administrations
must be made to perform.
Question: But the planning of large support measures, even interregional ones,
is a task that lies beyond the real, actual capabilities of the regions.
Answer: I think so. But dis3olving the Fund (which even so should manage
the�completion of the wc~rk in pragress) does not mean giving up a tool
capable of helping the regions.
Question: What do you have in mind?
Answer: Many suggestions can be made. One could be to establish an agency
with a superior planning capability. It could be created by the regions
themselves in coordination with the central government.
Question: You mean a new Fund?
Answer: No, a planning agency and a not spending agency.
Question: And how about the 3,500 personnel on the staff of the Fund?
Answer: A small portion could be assigned to the so-called agency. Another
portion could go to the technical machinery that the regions should have.
A third portion, finally, could be absorbed by the state machinery.
Question: There is one of the Fund's activities that is left out of this
plan--the distribution of incentives to the enterprises.
Answer: Even here things must be put back in order. In the tools and in the
system.
Question; Please e~lain.
Answer: There is a iayriad of holding companies operating in the South and
for the South: national ones (INSUD, FTME, FINAM), regional ones, and
special credit sections of authorized banks~ Too many. Nationally, two
are sufficient--one for industry and the other for agriculture.
29
FOR~:OFFICIAL USE ONI~3~
,;r; ; K
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Question: Theae are the tools. How about the system?
Answer: The system has been changed. First of all, it is sufficient, with
the incentives with no strings attached. Too many payments haye been made to
too many persons.
Question: Then it is sufficient with the subsidies with no strings attached.
But how about for the others?
Answer: It is necessary to establish objective criteria, reduce the
discretional aspect, make the entrepreneur responsible.
COPYRIGHT: IL Mi0ND0 1979
7428
CSO: 3104 E1VD
30
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200060008-5