JPRS ID: 8949 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050051-8
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• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 51
• Content Type: REPORTS

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IH

~6 1988 ~ 7r ? 1 OF 1
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JPRS L/8949
26 February 1980 �
Ne r / '
~ ~as~ North Afraca R~ art
p
CFOUO 7/80)
_ ~BIS FOREICN BROAQCAST INFORMATION SERVICE "
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~
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with thc: original ph�rasing and =
_ other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
[J are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
o~ [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, ~r following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- _
mation was summarized or extracted.
- Unfamiliar names randered phonetically or rransliterated are -
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and eiiclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. -
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within 2tems are as -
given by source. -
Tlze contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or at.titudes of the U.S. Government.
For further information on report content
call (703) 351-2833 lNear East); 351-2501
(Iran, Afghanistan); 351-3165 (North
Africa) .
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERI~tING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSE~IINATION
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- JPRS L/8949
26 February 1980
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPGRT
- (FOUO ~/so)
COP~TENTS PAGE r
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
French Sign Oil Contract With Gulf 5tates
~ (AL-WATA1~1 AL-'ARABI, 21-27 Dec 79) 1 -
- Bri ef s _
Arab Demand for Mirage Aircraft 3
ISI,AMIC AFFAIRS
Islam in Ma.ghreb Countries Discussed ~
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, Jan 80) J~
AFGHANISTAN ~
Moscow Incorporates Afghanistan Under Brezhnev Doctrine
(CAMBIO 16, 27 Jan 80) 10
IRAN `
Anti-American Show Goes on Amid Political Chaos
(Ricardo Herren; CAMBIO 16, 6 Jan 80) 19
Tabriz Disputes Rage as Imam Vacations
(Bernard Ullmann; L'EXPRESS, 12 Jan 80) 25
Briefs
Attempt To Kic;nap Prominent p.rmenian ~9
IRAQ ~
_ Attempts To Counter Israeli Move.7 in Af'rica
(AZ-WATAN AL-'AR.ABI, 28 ~ec 79-3 Jan 80) 30
' a- [z2I - NE & A- 127. FOUO]
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CO?~TENTS (Continued) Page .
- 'AI,-WATAN AI,-'ARABI~ Speculates on Ir.aqi Form of Democracy
~ (AL-WATAN AZ-'AftABI, 14-20 Dec 79) 3~~
Europe Sees New Qpportunities for Trade
(AI~-WATAN A.L~~ARABI, 21-27 Dec 79) 38
~ SAUDI ARABIA
Briefs ~
= Delivery of Weapons Package
~
- b -
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
FRENCH S,IGN OIL CONTRACT WITH GULF STATES
Paris AL-tJATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 21-27 Dec 79 p 47
[Article by oil affairs editor: "Oil Contract Between France and KuwaiC
To Be Followed by Another Contract with UAE"]
[Text] Despite the secrecy that has surrounded the results of Kuwaiti
Oil Minister 'Ali al-Khalifa a1-Sabah's visit to the French capital on
his way to the OPEC ministers meeting in Caracas, Venezuela on 17 Decem-
ber, it can be confi~ed that the main purpose of the visit was to com-
plete the initial discussions on the signing of a bilateral oil supply
agreement between the French and Kuwaiti governments. The agreement, _
which would be patterned after a similar agreement concluded between _
France and Saudi Arabia, would be for a period of from 3 to 5 years. '
_ I'rance reportedly wants to obtain stable oil supplies from Kuwait averag-
ing 100,000 barrels a day (or 12.5 million tons a year) based on the
proposed contract. This would enable France to f ill any gap resulting from ~
an interruption of Iranian oil supplies, if the need should arise.
Fra~:.ce is also awaiting the visit of Mr Mani' al-'Utayba (after the conclu-
sion of the Caracas conference) in order to negotiate the signing of a ~
_ contract to guarantee France 50,000 to 60,000 barrels of oil a day from the
UAE. This is part of the French move to insure an elem ent of stability in
. oil supplies, based on its strong relations of friendship with the Arab eil
states.
Another matter discussed in the Kuwaiti oil minister's negotiations with
French Minister of Industry Andre Giraud, who is in charge of oil affairs,
and French Foreign Minister Jean Francois-Poncet, was President Giscard
d'Estaing's plan to convene a conference for a 3ialog b etween Western
Europe and the Gulf oil states. This conference had failed to convene
b ef ore the end of this year, because of disagreement ovFr agenda items.
- ~ France proposes that the dialog be confined to the issue of cooperation
- on oil-related matters, while the Arab states feel that the agenda should
include matters of technical, economic, political and military cooperation.
1 ~
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It has been learned that the Kuwaiti oil minister has placed new stress
on the Arab viewpoint in his Paris discussions.
In any case, the conference for the proposed dialog will be one of the
main issues to be discussed by President Giscard d'Estaing during his
tour of the Gulf states at the beginning of the coming year, and by _
Prime Minister Raymond Barre during his forthcoming visit to Saudi
Arabia. The latter visit was supposed to have taken place before the
end of this month, but it has apparently been postponed for a while.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
_ 8591
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
- BRIEFS
ARAB ~EMAND FOR MIRAGE AIRCRAFT-�-French sources i:~dicate that the deal
to supply Iraq with 24 Mirage F-1 aircraft is an imple:nentation of an
agreement concluded in July. The agreement provides supplying Iraq with
36 Mira~e F-1 interceptor fighter aircraft. The same sources say that
Iraq is interested in obtaining aircraft of the Mirage 2000 type currently
under development. Kuwait, Libya, Morocco and Jordan have all contracted
to purchase a number of Mirage F-1 aircraft. Qatar has contracted to buy
6 jet trainer aircraf t of the al-Farhab [translation unknown] type. -
Morocco previously purchased 24 pla:~es of this type. Jordan has report-
~ edly contracted to purchase 36 Mirage aircraft. [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN
AL-'9RABI in Arabic 2�s Dec 79 - 3 Jan 80 p 17] 8591
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ISLAMIC AFFAIRS
ISLAM IN MAGHREB COUNTRIES DISCUSSED -
= Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Jan 80 pp 5-6
[Article: "The Rise of Islam in the Maghreb"j
[Text] In North AfricR it has long been possible to observe attempts at fun-
damental Islamic indoctrination, conducted or inspired by the Muslim Brothers
of Egypt. This dissemination of radical and intransigent Muslim thinking, �
_ moreover, has been conducted carefully in order not to upset Maghreb minds too
severely; b.ecause of Western influences they more or less lean toward a certain
liberalism.
In particular, for the benefit of the Maghr.eb people, emphasis has put on the
spiritual and cultural elements; but the possibility of direct action, so con-
siderably developed in the Egyptian Association, was scarcely mentioned. The
violences perpetrated by that organization's "secret branch,~~ such as the at-
tempt to assassinate Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir in 1954, in fact aroused instinctive
and sincere disapproval in the Maghreb. On the other hand, the Association of
Muslim Brothers of Egypt, which became clandestine, was able to exext consid-
= erable influence, especially on intellectual youth, by circulating little works
of theologic vulgarization, in Arabic or French, using in particular the famous
Koran Commentary of Sayyid Qutb, who was "martyred" by the Nas~erian repres-
sion.
The "Free Maghreb" and Fundamentalist Islamic Thoughc
- Shortly after independence, conditions a.re unequally favorable in the three
Maghreb states for the development of these fundamentalist seeds. -
Tunisia finds itself initially under the influence of the reformist initia-
tives of President Habib Bourguiba, who modernizes the.personal regulations by
_ reinterpreting Islamic sources and then devotes himself to renewing the con-
cept of the ritual fast day and introduces planned birth in principle and in
fact. But soon President Bourguiba, discovering with anxiety the symptoms of -
a certain familial and social disequilibrium, restores the teaching of the Mus- ~
lim ethic a~td sees to it that Islam remains a solid and definite base for the
nation.
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In Morocco the no less remarkable (though very different) personality of Allal
and rassi associates a prudently updated concept of Islam with a trilogy of
monai:�chic loyalism, patriotism and progress. There is a certain distrust of
the Eastern interpretations of Islam; but a debate between evolutionists and
traditionalists feeds upan local sources. During recent years appeals to nat-
ional sentiment and action on the Sahara question are helping to turn the uni-
~ versity young people away from fundamentalist temptations that were becoming
- fairly powerful.
- As for Algeria, it is approaching the problem head-on by clearly refe~ring
Islam and, the National Charter says, to a revolutionary Islam that has been
- substituted for a reformism that was not very effective. The affirmation of ~ -
this dynamic of Islam, combined with the cultural effort to Arabize, leaves
only a narrow platform for the fundamentalist demands; they were prematurely
demonstrated with the "Investors" movement, but the few disturbances
that occurred were quickly put down.
Few Fundamentalist Demonstrations Currently in Alg eria aald Morocco `
At the present time, although a certain agitation prevails in the high schools
and universities of Algeria, aroused both by the material difficulties that
_ are trying the students and by the delicate Arabization problem, the strikers
of the University say they have nothing to do with Islamic fundamentalism,
a.nd state tha.t they are doing nothing but asking that the principles laid dcwn ~
= by the FLN and approved b y the Algerian people be applied.
- The fundamental~st groups, therefore, would only invest discreetly, even clan-
destinely. Along ~Che same line, it should be pointed out, however, that there
. is a familial and social conservatism that remains powerful and in particular
holds back the adoption of a new personal regulations code, which is thought
to be too progressive. There is also no doubt that the same conservative cir-
cles that are blocking familial evolution and feminine emancipation would mil-
itate for fundamentalism if the opportunity and the potential presented them-
selves. But it is unlikely that the authorities would go along with it.
In Morocco the problem cannoL be posed in clear terms at present; religious
- sentiment corroborates the dynastic and national need to justify the war in
the Sahara; today the potential fundamentalist ~mpulses cannot fail to be
channeled in the same direction.
The Development of Islamic Thought in Tunisia ,
- So it is in Tunisia, and paradoxically because of the tranquillity that pre-
vails in the country and the absence of large prob lems dominating current e-
vents, that the fundamentalist trends may be more clearly perceived.
The Destourian Socialist Party (PSD), moreover, has chosen to deal with these
problems openly; it believes it is better to conceal nothing, and it is jus- ~
tifiedly confident that in this case public opinion everywhere is on its side.
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But the noise it is helping to make over this question might well give the
funclamentalist groups ancl activities in Tunisia an effect out of proportion
to their present r.eal importance, if not to the importance they expect to as-
= swne over the more or less long term.
The zealcts of the fundamentalist movement justify it in Tunisia, because -
they consider the excesses committed by the progressive socialist regime 111-
- stalled in the 1960s by Ahmed ben Sal.ah to be insupportable. However, they
intend to dissociate themselves just as much from the present government,
which condemns the collectivist experiment no less, and which is building an
entirely different socio-economic system, known as the "golden mean," based
on caFitalistic methods of develupment and distribution formulas with social-
istic tendencies. -
_ But the government of Hedi Nouira and the PSD in its entirety are denounced as
"lacking soul," moral vigor, inner conviction in the face of the present world
crisis, which tomorrow may impose difficult tasks and heavy sacrifices. So it
is necessary, according to the zealots, to fall back on the Muslim faith, -
which offers both the indispensable moral and doctrinal framework and the sim-
ple and sure rules that are necessary to '~uild and manage a society.
This way of presenting things contravenes neither law nor public order; the
idea may even be supported that it is moving in the direction of that rebirth
of the moral ethic that the president has tried to arouse.
Still the illustrating of such an Islamic rebirth must not include topical
commentaries likely to arouse popular p~.ssions. It is here that a danger ap-
pears, increasingly precise as dxamatic events are being produced in the East,
of which Islam appears to be the driving force. Not only do the religious
newspapers, such as AL-MUJTAivIAI ("The Society"), ~verflow onto political ter-
rain with a eulogy of the Iran revolution and blame for the attitude of the
United States, but preachers attached to the popular mosques, like th~ one at -
Sidi Mahrez in the Tunis medina, are commenting every Friday, in a happily
dramatic tone, on the evolution in the Near East. All of these positioiis,
which are aimed at bringing the institutions closer to those of the Islamic
state and loosening the bonds linking Tunisia with the Western countries,
seem more and more ill-timed to the authorities. -
The Parade of the Tunisian Government and the Destour
y Beginn~.ng in December, the Tunisian is suspending AL-MUJTAMAI, which had added
to the eulogy of the Iranian Tslamic revolution and condemnation of the atti-
tude of the United States, a reprimand for the Arab states for not having re-
ceived the Ayatollah Khomeyni's emissaries at the Tunis Summit.
= More~ver, positive measures are taken immediately. An orientation campaign is
launched by the PSD, according to directives given orally on 1 December by
President Bourguiba to the director of the party, Mohamed Sayah. "Reason,"
he says, "must prevail in all circumstances," ar: ~',ic nation must be "pro-
tected from destructive currents and hegemoni;,� trends that hide behind siogans
as :nistaken as they are fallacious." ,
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The PSll press reports that it is necessary "to protect Isla~n from its detrac-
tors...and from fanaticism" (L'ACTION, 4 December); even while rebuking "for-
eigners who caracature Islam," it advises "blocking the tendency of Muslims to -
- withdraw into themselves...," calling it "ill-considered reactions." Return- `
ing to the subject by.sayi.ng, "Islam, vigilance is imperative!", the editorial-
writer of the same newspaper (6 December) recommends "barring the way to sor�-
cerers' apprentices and demystifying the supporters cf obscurantism, who...u~i-
der the white veil of Islam are concealing black plans for subversion." A-
gainst "the Islam alibi," therefore (11 December) it advises stopping "those
who ride spiritual ~ alues, the better to satisfy p~litical ambitions..,Not con-
tent to tarnish Islam's image with repeated falsifications of th~e holy texts,
deliberate false interpretations and imprecations against all of man's tri-
umphs in the fi elds of scientific progress, social welfare and cultural blos-
soming, they seek to destroy the party, the regime and all the achievements so
laboriously accumulated by the nation in a half century."
Tunisian diplomacy gets in closer contact with the Eas.tarn_Arab leaders who
t~e the crucible of the extremists of Islam; Mohamed Fitouri, Foreign Affairs
minister, on 2 December takes to King Khalid of Saudi Arabia a message from
President Bourguiba thanking him for his "firm position" on the occasion of
the events in Mecca. On 7 December he leaves Tunis again, carrying a person-
al message from President Bourguiba, this time for Damas.
The ministers, members of the PSD Politburo, are busy informing and orienting
?-he various classes of the population. Messrs Slaheddine Baly (Justice) and
Mohamed Mzali (Education) do this with the young students of the Bab al Kliadra
_ high school and Sadiki College; Mzali, denouncing de^:agogic overstatements,
describes "the real strength of the faith...it is not to withdraw into itself,
but to shine forth, adapting the principles to the pragmatic virtues of action"
(6 December). Mohamed Sayah speaks to the officers of the Tunis PSD and the
general secretaries of the coordination committees (6 arid 10 December); he de-
nounces anarchists and obscurantists and emphasizes that to strengthen Islam's
position it is necessary to acquire technologies and exact sciences.
The ambassadors from the Tunisian Republic abroad participate actively in this
same action; dedicating on 9 December the premises of the Tunisian Workers'
Association in Toulon, Hedi Mabrouk warns against the opposing excesses of the
lovers of the past and the dehumanized modernists. , ~
Toward Perfecting Muslim Training in Tunisia
'I'he 1,300th anniversary of the great "Olivier Mosque", which claims to be the
world's earliest university, on.14 December,.according to the Tunis ZEITOUNA,
gives Hedi Nouira the occasion for evoking the methods that will enable every-
one to be offered "a transcendant image of the highest virtues of Islam" and
"the accusation of fanaticism, deep-rooted immobility and xenophobia" to be
avoided.
Hedi Nouira evok es Islam as "a religion that allies faith with action and, at
the same time as it exalts worship, exalts the prlctice of good and the under-
- standing of the laws of the universe and life, with the help of God-given
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intellectual faculties." He recalls the bond between the faith and the Sa-
vior, illustrated by the dual function of the small shrines and mosques which
have also always been used for teaching; he emphasizes the many appeals to
reason and reflection contained in the Koran; he quotes the passage from the
= book ir.dicating that God made Muslims "a gol.dPn mean community," and this re-
- call is especially striking when one remembers that Mr Nouira, in the economic
and human area, intends to establish in Tunisia "a median society."
The head of government mentions, in order to rehuke them ener.getically, "move-
ments or groups that claim the right of protectorship over religion and re-
fuse, in speaking to their century, to adopt the language appropriate to it; .
thus claiming to ~onstrict the M~aslims into rigid molds, they are opposed to
progress and the opening of minds, make light of the feelings of Muslims and
do noti hesitate to resort to violent and provocative behavior." On the con-
trary, he announces, "Islam is correct balance in conduct, elevation in deeds,
reconciliation between.mind and matter, finally incessant intellectual effort
to accede te the *ruth, which is found to be midway between two extremes,
blind fanaticism and total indifference."
' Finally, Mr Nouira concludes by recommending that the "immense resources" of
Islam be exploited, and "its great capacitiy for going forwaxd toward progress
and the advancement of man." An appeal all the more significant in that it is
uttered at the cradle of this Islamic university, which has now been revital-
, ized within the frameowrk of the University of Tunis, and thus is called upon
- to perfect the modern Muslim training of Tunisian citizens.
Shortly after ~5 December the budgetary debates in the National Assembly show
- that the Tunisian people's representatives are seriously concerned about
these training problems.
� Ferid Dhaou, discussing the prime minister's budget, on which the management of
worship depends, asks various questions: what are graduates of the theology
school, the heir to the ZEITOUNa, worth? Are they equal to their responsibil-
i*_ies? t,s the office of "mufti" (bslamic jurist) of t;~e republic effective?
Bechir Laribi suggests that the management of worship b~ strengthened. On t}ie
same subjsct, Ammar bei~ Aouicha and Belhassen Cherif request that the preach-
- ers and agents of worship be better recruited, better trained and better paid;
tfie second of these two members of Parliament, Mr Cherif, suggests that ori-
enta~ion conferences be organized to inform them, and hopes that measures will
be taken to prevent the mosques from "being used for goals other than those
for whicr Lhey were built."
Finally, Moharr,ed Jemal recommends revising ~he sermon programs, and effective
- support for the preachers, to adapt well to the spirit nf the times and ade- ~
quate possibilities for growth.
Hedi Nouira, ciosing the budgetary debate, mak.es an attent.~~n-getting speech
in which he recalls that Islam--a religion of moderation and tolerance that .
bans any restraint--is the country's official religion and is the priricipal
source of inspirat~on i:n drawing up the laws. He emphasizes the state's ef-
forts to reinforce religious and moral education, and forcefully denounces the
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danger of the fuiidamentalist trends that "are in danger of degenerating soon-
er or later into a kind of civil war.
~~Lt 1.S our duty~~~ Mr Nouira continues, ~~35 sincere Muslims, t0 50UI1C1 t~l@ alarm.
- We are saying that the situation is grave. Its gravity does not lie solely in -
the crusading spirit that continues to motivate some nostalgic people in the
West, but also in that ir~cesponsible behavior and thase extremist movements -
that wish to provoke discord, compromise security and make use of religion for
ends that are often foreign to it."
Before attacking more directly certain opponents, who make us of "a mixture of
ideas and equivocation" in an opportunistic collusion with a claimed religious
fundamentalism, the prime minister reaffixms that "in its capacity as manager
of. Islam as stipulated in the corrstitution, the state assumes the responsibil- -
: ity for protecting Islam and its institutions in Tunisia and prececting tlie gen-
' erations against subversive and extremi.st trends." And more~ver, "One has to
se~ that the conceived, programed policy that this regime has had the responsi-
_ bility for implementing for nearly half a century is the object of a consensus _
_ that is as good as a rule of life."
1'liis parliamentary debate confirm~ how deepLy the Muslim institutions are "in-
volved in the century," and may aid in a better understanding of why any Islam- _
' ic movement, even though it be merely intellectual, is an "affair of state."
it also illustrates the opening up of the Tunisian nation, which, unlike too _
,ua.ny Muslim countries, allows ample public debates on such subjects, and al-
lows foreign public opinion to be well informed.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1980 -
,
8946 -
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_ AFGHANISTAN
- MOSCOW INCOR.PORATES AFGHANISTAN UNDFR BREZHNEV DOCTRINE
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 27 Jan 80 pp 38-44
[Article by CAM13I0 16 special correspondent Juan Carlos Alganaraz]
[Text] The "Brezhnev Doctrine" concerning the limited ~
sovereignty of socialist states is bexng applied in Asia for the
_ first time. Amid the m~~unting wave of international criticism, ~
Soviet troops that were "invited to invade" assure Moscow control
of a new satellite country.
Afghanistan has ceased to exist as an indspendent nation. This is
testimony, not a political conclusion. With astounding rapidity and
inexorable precision, in 3 weeks the Soviet troops have conquered _
_ the cities, control the few main roads and are now hastening to
besiege the pockete of resistance tha~ have fallen back into the
most inaccessible mountain areas.
It is a true spectacle to watch the Soviet war machine on the march
_ ~ around Kabul, along the roada and crossing the moat strategic
mountain passes. CAMBIO 16 special correspondent Juan Carlos
Alganaraz reports from Kabul.
Although the Soviet military presence is now discreet in Kabul, the -
routes into the interior immediately put one in contact with the
forces of the USSR. Russian soldiers dig trenches and foxholes
all along the roads, especially at high elevations, where it is
- bitingly cold, with snow everywhere. In addition Co checkpoints,
you can see successive troop barracka protected by light armored -
vehicles, tanks and artillery.
The Soviets smile courteously at the timid greetings of newsmen, but
- any attempt to leave the road inevitably brings a harsh gesture, the
cry of "halt," a furious glance and an accusing index finger at -
cameras and a categorical "nyet."
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Red-Tinted Kabul
The spectacle is the same on any of the main roada. The heLicoptera
and small observation aircraft make incessant overflights at low
altitudes. From time to time the deep-blue aky is atreaked by the
parallel stars of two Migs on patrol. The airlift
of some 40 flights a day is lesa intense now at the airport but
continues uninterrupted.
_ The trucks, the enormous tank transports, the artill~ry and the
armored vehiclea also move incessantly along the roads.
Russian Trenches
Kabul Airport is a frenzy of red flags and stars. Enormous posters .
cover the front of the main building, proclaiming in the national
language, in English and in Russian: "Proletarians of the world,
unite" and "Long live proletarian international solidarity." -
- From the air you can see that the Soviets have carried out the two 4
exhortations at all costs. Giant mountain chains dominate the ,
landscape. The low, sprawling city of Kabul rises and falls amid
- some 10 hills, with ~.ts confused physiognomy that combines the
motley neighborhoods of old, mud structures and the few low,
- rectangular modern buildings that line the avenues. -
On the surrounding hills the Sovieta are working full speed to build
~ an icon ring to defend the city. You can see trenches, army tents,
artillery, some armored vehicles and, on the main elevations,
enormous trucks with radar and communications screens. Next to the ~
airport you can make out an enormous, perfectly squared-off barracks,
with its rows of tents and smoking field kitchens. The
entire parimeter of the camp is guarded by armored vehicles and a
number of gigantic T-72 tanks. ~
As the plane descends, one sees that both sirles of thP runway are _
lined with combat and transport helicopters, more armored vehicles
and a large group of AerofloC (the Soviet airline) planes. We pass
by an Aeroflot plane that is surrounded by ambulances and Soviet
medical personnel.
Once in the streets, the only patrols that cross uur path are Afghan
soldiers. "During the first few days," an Afghan told us, "the
- Soviets were constantly patrolling the streets with soldiers and small
armored vehicles. At night they fired shots into the air to keep -
: everyone at home."
.
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,
A Britiah newsman who arrived and wae expelled 2 days later explained
to me that Kabul Airport looked like an immenae arsena~. with an
enormous concentration of air materiel and armored vehicles. Although
the Soviets also utilized the Bagame and Shendan bases north and west
of the capital, ICabul Airport waa the main acene of the invasion.
After the initial confused reporta, 1oca1 diplomatic circles
indicated that in reality it was on the night of 26 December that
the Sovieta began the operation by occupying the three airporta with -
troops from the aforementioned basea.
There were not very many troops but enough to provide defense and
receive the first planes bringing specialized personnel to organize
the movement of aircraft.
Soviet Anthill
Beginning or.. 27 December, the Sovieta flew 350 flighte in 48 hours to
install their bridgehead: the "blue berets" of Air Transport
Division 105, an elite unit of 6,000 men specially trained as
assault troopa, The division has light tanks, a few T-62's,
artillery and a group of helicopters.
In the penthouse of the Intercontinental Hotel, which is located on
a hill that dominates the city, a terrified group of foreign
businessmen were singular witnessea to the military avalanche. "We
couldn't believe it," relates an Indian executive who works for a
local German firm. "There was a tremendous noise of airplanes and
a ring of lights in the sky deacending like a serpent." One
landing every 3 minutes in a difficult, mountain-girt airport.
The follo,wing night, other lights attracted the attention of the
small group of witnesses on the upper floors of the hotel. These
were the first endless military convoys that were arriving from the
- Russian border and beginning to surround the city.
Afterwards, toward evening the row of transports continued southward
in the direction of Khalalabad, while other groupa headed a~.ong
other roads to various points in the interior.
Amin's Executioners ~
A hotel employee was helping a Soviet driver who had amashed an
_ Afghan bus. They were able to communicate in Farsi (Peraian). "He
told me," the employee explained to CANIBIO 16, "that he was -
exhausted because they had been on the march for 7 days and were
_ practically unable to sleep." By the end of the year the Soviet
maneuver had clearly been accomplished. Directed from the Sovi~t -
border city of Termez, the Soviet general headquarters for the
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operation, the "blue berets" liquidated the resistance in Kabul,
whose only major pocketa were at the local radio etation (dangerously
close to the U.S. Embassy), the Interior Miniatry, the Houae of the
People and, in particular, the Palace of Darulamman, where
President Amin had taken refuge with his bodyguards and several tanks.
A Coup with Music
A atYange episode, which reveals how "voluntary" the local
government's request for Soviet military aid was, took place on
27 December. Radio Kabul was broadcasting music all day when suddenly
- itseemed to be airing a message from Barbak Karmal, the new prime
minister installed by the Russians, announcing Amin's fall. All
~~stimony indicatea that Karnial did not show up in Kabul until 2
days lat~r, when control of the city was already assured, and that
the message was broadcast from the USSR.
By the beginning of this month the 306th Division of Soviet Motorized
Infantry was in charge of defending Kabul, replacing the "blue
berets," who in turn headed for Badakshan, where the resistance or
the guerrilla fighting is the heaviest. The 12,000-man division
controls an immense zone centered in the capital.
- Two mcre divisions, the 16th Motorized Infantry Division and an
armored division, set out from Termez, via Kabul, towards the area
of Khalalabad and Patkia, near the Pakistani border. The vise was
complete when two additional divisions, the 357th and the 36th, -
crossed the Soviet border, descended on Herat and then headed for
Kandahar. These shock troops were followed by a stream of support
troops. Depending on the source, the Soviet troops total between
60,000 and 80,000 men.
The S?ege of Kandahar
The battle of Kabul was over in a matter of hours. According to
testimony and accounts, which are often contradictory, the Soviets
encountered the toughest pockets of resistance around Herat and then
or the outskirts ef Kandahar. This city was under siege for
several days and eventually suffered a serious supplies problem.
_ Tt was impossible for newamen to rea~ch the area after 10 January.
The province of Bamian, a rebel stronghold east of Kabul, t:~.~s also .
the scene of fighting but is now under firm Soviet control. There
_ were similar developments in the regions near Khalalabad and Gardez,
by the Pakistani border. .
~ The only road open to newsmen was towards Khalalabad, a city
strategically located next to the Khyber Pass, the historic -
gateway to Pakistan and India. The Soviets are solidly in control
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- of the route, and the military apparatt~a is gigantic when you get to
Gorge, a narrow ravine from whose elevations any military force could `
- pulverize the route. The slopea and main elevations are covered ~
with arniy tents, artillery and armored vehiclea. Controls are
tight, but people are allowed to pase.
- "Careful, Don't Let Them Miatake You for a Soviet!" _
If there is calm, though not tranquility, in Kabul, Khalalabad is
a city on edge. The Soviet presence here is overwhelming, and
there are increasing accounts of fierce fighting on the outskirts
during the initial days of the invasion. Ttie guerrillas apparently
_ blew up several bridges, but the Soviet military engineers spanned
the gaps in a few hours. -
"Careful, don't let them mistake you for a Soviet." This warning,
which was repeated over and over again in Kabul, becomes a tragic
memory h~re. In March 1979 the rebels controlled the city for a
= few hours and killed several Soviets. But the worat incident took
place in Herat, where 60 Soviet military peraonnel and a number of
_ their relatives were tortuxed and mutilated. -
The only.authorized direction is towards the border. The Soviets
have no problems in this area. But attempts to head elsewhere meet
time and�again with the checkpoints. This shows that the Pakistani
border, region, many of whose posts were abandoned by the army, is
still a combat zone. On Saturday the 12th persistent news reached -
Kabul about Soviet bombers on the outakirts of Birbok and Khust.
The Indomitable Afghans
Back in Kabul, you can stop to observe some of the mou~ntain
hamlets. All of the houses look like fortresses: outer walls, a
single window and, inside, a life that has noz changed for centuries.
_ Tied to age-old, immutablecultures, the inhabitants are famous for -
- their indomitable fighting spirit and their passion for independence.
In reality, they would atruggle against any authority other than
their tribe and have their own moral and legal codes, which are at
_ odds with the government's regardless of its orientation.
But if there is anything that unifies the population, it ia the
Muslim religion, which holds definitive sway in every aspect of
life. This is the wall against which the British were dashed in
three wars.
Now it i~ the Soviets' turn. Has the Kremlin met its Vietnam? The
_ comparison is exaggerated because the differences between the two
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conflicts are enormous. The Sovieta are fighting in a neighboring
country with troops that in many casea belong to the eame ethnic
groups ae thoae that populate Afghaniatan.
All of the indications are that so far the rebel resistance has been
crushed by the Soviet military drive. The guerrillas have been
confined to the most inaccessible regions of the mountains. Most
of their weapons are extremely old, with an extraordinarily wide
variety of models, and the modern arms that they do have are
insuffici~nt to cope with the might of their adversary. The fact
is, this medieval,.sheeph~rding people has to confront tanks,
heli~:opters and airplanes with rifles.
A Bleak Future
, The Soviets are now engaged in sealing off the borders to prevent
supplies from entering, rather than in liquidating pockets of
resistance in the mountains. No serious obstacle to their operations
has yet appeared. The USSR will clearly try in ~very way to _
convince Pakistan to stop supporting the guerrillas. In any case,
it is a concrete threat to Pakistan that the Russians might crosa a -
_ difficult to define border to pursue the rebels.
The future of the rebellion now hinges on the guerrillas' ability
to get supplies from abroad. Another prominent point, which further
highlights the differences with Vietnam, is the division of the rebel -
groups either on political grounds (Muslims, ultra-orthodox sects,
followers of Khomeyni, loyalists of the former king, pro-Westernexs) -
or because cultural tradition intertwines their loyalties basically
with the family, the tribe and the ethnic group.
_ "We now have a common enemy, and that will put an end to our
- rivalries," reiterate the rebel leaders at their headquarters in -
- Peshawar (Pakistan). But until that time comes, the guerrilla war -
against the Soviets does not have a unified leadership. This i.s a
fundamental shortcoming because the Muslim rebels are now facing an
enemy vastly superior to the various governments of the People's
~ Democratic Party (PDP),whichstaged the pro-communist coup of April 1978.
Soviet military domination of Afghanistan is topped off by ita _
pol.itical domination. There is not a single major institution
(the ministries, the post office, telephones, radio and television)
that does not have its "Soviet advisera," who, without much secrecy,
are the ones who give the final orders.
- "Advisers" Everywhere -
The Armed Forces and the police are not only under the direct command
of the Soviets; they also have their "advisers" in each unit. This
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correspo~dent even came acroea a ~oviet officer in the foreign
exchange office, which is located in the General Police Command, a
~arracks bristling with Soviet troops. The incident is significant
because ;there was no way to communicate with the local police until ~
- the Soviet officer, in shaky but understandable French, reaolved
- the problem with impeccable courteay.
The incident is also significant because it showeto what extent the
Soviets cannot conceal that they are the masters of the situation.
The succ~essive PDP gover~ents plunged the country into disintegration.
First, the Khalq (people) �action, led by Taraki and Amin, '
liquidated the "Parcham" (flag) group, headed by Barbak Karmal. Then
last September, Amin got rid of Taraki but was ultimately toppled
and executed by Karmal, wham the Soviet invasion installed in Kabul.
Being Without Wood Is Like Being Without Oil
All of the speculationsabout the Soviet action become clearer when
you see the realities of Afghanistan, a poverty-stricken nation with
a per capita income of $120 and a life expectancv of leas than 40
years. Ninety percent of the population live inrlittle villages
and hamlets and are ravaged by all kinds of diseases. In reality, -
all figures are estim~tes because a census has never been conducted.
The clash between the PDP reformist programs and traditional
society triggered a rebell~on that by the time the Soviets arrived
controlled more than half the country and was not too far from
Kabul.
A liigh-level German executive remarked to CAMBIO 16: "In recent
weeks supplies have not been caming in from the most remote areas.
For example, there was no wood, an essential fuel for the most
deprived inhabitants in this atrocious cold. I was unable to -
communicate by land with my branches in the various cities. So we
had to rent a light plane. The countryaide and the roads, -
especially in Novhe, are in the handsof the guerrillas. In the
= midst of this catastrophe, the sv~ccessive purges in the PDP tore
the party and the government apart. This turmoil hit the Armed
Forces hard. Arrests, changes of command and, finally, mass -
desertions had brought the army to the brink of paralyais."
The Soviets had reached the conclusion that the extremely tough line
against the rebels had r;o future. Not only did Amin weaken the
party by liquidating Karmal and Taraki, but he also launched an
offensive against the rebels, which resulted in hundreds of
casualties last October and turned out to be a military setback for
the government.
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All sorts of geopolitical and historical speculation~ are possible
to explain why the Sovieta launched the invasion, but the most
realitic explanation is that if they had not taken direct control
of the country, they would have been faced with the defeat o~ a
"people's democracy" and the prospect of an ultra-conservative -
- Muslim government nestled alongside their Muslim republics (50
million Soviet citizens).
The "Brezhnev Doctrine" in Effect
Afghanistan was already a satellite when the Soviet invasion took
- place. A11 of the outward symbols (the national flag had been
replaced by the red flag) and institutions of the country were -
similar to those of a people's democracy. The Soviet invasion
has confirmed that the "Brezhnev Doctrine" regarding the limited
sovereignty of socialist states, which the Sovie~ leader proclaimed
' after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, also applies to Asia.
As far as the Soviets are concerned, it is now a question of
reorganizing the entire state machinery and the economy, in addition
- to consolidating their military position. Karmal insists on
respect for religion and private property. Radio Kabul now
_ broadcasts readingF of the Koran, and official communiques begin
with the ritual fo�rcnula of "1~n the name of inerciful and compassionate
God." In other wo;rds, the drasti.^, program of reforms will be
softened to the utmost.
Now, however, comes the worst phase of the war for the Soviets: they
have to crush the rebels in the mountai,n strongholds. When the
snows mel~t, Soviet helicopters, airplanes and mountain forces will
begin an offensive that could result in a slaughter if they
encounter stiff resistance. As in all guerrilla wars, the backing
of local residents is essential to the Muslim rebels, and here the -
Soviets will have to learn from the lessons of Vietnam. To
begin with, they are making lavish use of MI-24 helicopters,
similar to the American Cobras, which are as lethal now in the Sahara in "
hands of the king of Morocco as they were in Vietnam.
By spring the Soviets have to set up a new Afghan Army that wi11
enable them to rely an a seriousiy structured local force. If they
do not come up with a political solution and if the orthodox Muslim -
resisters receive enough foreign support, the battle of Afghanistan,
a country in which by tradition no prisoners of war are taken, will
be long and exhauating.
This prospect is on the minds of the soldiers in the occupation force.
The following anecdote has become famoua these days. A German -
television correspondent met a Soviet officer in the post office who
spoke to him in perfect German.
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~
The officer was descended from the group of Germans that Cath~erine
the Great brought to Russia. They had a friendly talk that ended
when the newsman asked the officer whether he was planning to leave
soon. With a melancholy.gesture, the Soviet replied: "No, we have
enough for a long stay."
- COPYRIGHT 1980. Informacion y Reviaras, S.A.
8743
CSO: 4410 _
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IRAN
ANTI-AMERICAN SHOW GOES ON AMID POLITICAL CHAOS
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 6 Jan 80 pp 42-44
[Article by special correspondent Ricardo Fierren]
[Text] Any pretext will do to renew the populist,xenophobic
carnival against the Americana. The clamoring, however, conceals~a
situation of total political, social and economic chaos, with ita
backdrop of 700,000 men under arms who could turn Iran into another
Lebanon.
Shouting into a microphone, a mullah led the crowd in its rallying
cries while brandishing a revolver to mark the rhythm. "Death to
- Carter!" "Death to the Americans!" The same old threata have been
repeated throughout Tehran for the last 50 days, but especially
along Thalegani Avenue, the location of the American Embassy, -
occupied by the revolutionary students and the SO hostages that
they are holding prisoner. CANIDIO 16 special correspondent Ricardo
Herren reparts from Tehran.
But now the hatred of the thousands of demonstrators was stained -
with the blood of the .Ayatollah Moffatah, a top-level leader of
the Shiite sect with close ties to Khomeyni who was assassinated
- last Wednesday by two gunmen apparently belonging to an ultraright- -
wing sect. Neither timid nor lazy, the Ayatollah immediately
saddled the Americans and the Zionists with the crime.
Moffatah's assassination under very myaterious circumstances was -
just what was needed to give new life to the drooping populist
carni.val outside the American Embassy. After days of incessant -
agitation, the crowd became less dense, the traffic flowed normally,
and there were increasingly,few~r hawkers of cooked beet snacks
and dried fruit. "Death to Carter; get your hard-boiled egga," -
one of the merchants shouted.
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- Threat of Naval Blockade -
Now the crowds are coming back, eapeci~tly after it was learned that
the United States is thxeatening a naval blockade of Iran if the
50 hostages are brought to trial. With 21 warahipa and two sircraft
carriers in the area, Carter could attempt a blockade with the
backinb of a Wi resolution, which seems unlikely becauae of the more
than probable Soviet veto. In any case, however, the tension is ~ -
tremendous, because the radio and television are announcing the
start of a battle nearthe Hormuz Strait, the key to the Persian Gulf,
where the Iranian Navy would do battle with the Americans to _
maintain access to its ports.
This entire climate is essential to Khomeyni, who needs the constant
rallying of the masses against the foreign enemy to cover up the
catastrophic domestic political and military crisis. With 700,000
men und~r arms, if the unifying element of xenophobia ceases to
- exist, Iran could wind up like Lebanon. "If this campaign againat
the Americans were to end by trying or deporting the hostages, it
would be a real disaster for tYie Islamic revolution. These kinds .
of incidents have to continue," Ebrahim Yazdi, Ayatollah Khomeyni's
former foreign affairs minister and a current member of the
- revolution, explained to CAMBIO 16.
Yazdx supports the theory of the "ongoing revolution" as an
indisp2nsable element in making the people forget about the economic
crisis, for example. This crisis becomes evident as soon as you
enter the bazaar, the downtown area with the most chaotic traffic
in the world, the thousands of stalls selling clothing, Islamic
music cassettes (all other music ia expr~ssly prohibited by
Khomeyni) and the entire array of Ayatollah speeches and somewhat
fly-flecked food.
A good part of the three million persons who have lost~their jobs '
since the b~ginning of the Islamic revolution have found work in '
this makeshi.ft trade.
The jobless account for no less than one-third of the active ' -
Iranian population. The country has 35 million people; only one- !
fourth, some 9 million, are regarded as the active popt~tati;on.
" Thus, the country depends on what less than 20 percent of its
citizens now produce, and what they do produce is meager enough to
loom (behind the shows that the regime stages day after day) as one
of the most dangerous and threatening elements for the disjointed
Islamic revolution.
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Little and Plothing
The country's industrial potential is in a state of aemi-pa~�alyeis.
Many factories have been occupied by the workers, who have expelled
or detained their owners, the hated "tagutis" (literally, "devil"
in Farsi, but which is used as a nickname for the wealthy).. Shog com-
mittees have taken charge of management and production. `
Other businessmen have fled the country. Bankruptcies and
suspensions of payments number in the tens of thoueands, but reliable
statistics are lacking owing to the widespread chaos. Most foreign
and Iranian technicians have left the country.
Hamid Nazati was the owner of a textile factory in the outskirts of
Tehran. One day the workers committee demanded that he surrender
the factory. When he resisted, he was ~iven a thorough thrashing
and thrown out of his company. "They told me never to return,
� unless I wanted them to report me to the Guardians of the Revolution.
I'm leaving the country; I don't want to have anything to do with
it. They'll remember me when they run out of raw materials or when
_ the machinery breaks down on them," he told CAMBIO 16.
The revolutionary workers are probably already remembering th~ir
taguti.
The textile industry as a whole is producing about 40 percent of what
it was a year ago. The automobile inclustry is doing even worse:
30 gercent. The canning industry has been completely shut down,
and the effects are beginning to be felt in stores, where most
. of the canned food shelves are empty. The building materials
industry is also at a zero output level, but the effects are leas
visible. All of the major scheduled projects, such as a satellite -
city complex in Tehran budgeted at $20 billion or the Erbatan urban
developments next to the capital's airport (300,000 housing units)
are frozen.
The iron and steel industry, which was nationalized along with
petrochemicals, the banks and insurance companies, was scheduled
to produce between 15 and 20 million tons of ateel in 1980.
Current production amounts to a half million tons.
The petrochemicals industry, which is highly dependent on U.S.-made
industrial goods, has sharply cut its output owing to the abs~nce
- of direct imports from the United States.
The Islamic revolutionary regime has been importing only emergency
items in the area of foodstuffs and medicines, while halting the~flow
of other merchandise, in a country that depends heavily on ita
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forpign trade. Japan has seen its exports to iran drop 82 percent,
and Spain, 75 percent. The country least affected has been the FRG,
whose trade with Iran has faZlen off 67 percent.
Just in Case the Flies
The upshot can already be aeen in the streets. There are shortages
- of eggs, tix�es, detergents, construction materials and pharmaceuticals.
- There is also an active black market for these items, some of which
sell for almost six ti~ies their normal price. As a result of this
_ turmoil, the annual inflation rate is estimated at 50 percent,
in spite of the inflows of petrodollars. ~
Most of the populace lives at subsistence levels, and that explains -
why inflation is not worse. The price of housing has been -
- constantly on the decline. The price of household appliances has
not risen because there ia no demand; no one ia buying conaumer
durables. A number of primary wants, such as clothing or bread, .
- have not increased in price either, because of government inter-
vention and because the least hard hit sector has been farming
(it is producing only 20 percent less than last year). Oranges,
however, are now a"luxury item," climbing from 120 to 280 rials
a kilo.
In a Persian Market ~
Along the dark, narrow alleys of the Tehran bazaar, an enormous
_ marketplace in the sr~uthern part of the city, pictures of the
Ayatollah Khomeyni and black flags with Koranic sayings to
- commemorate the holy month of Muharram abound, as they do everywhere.
"Don't get the idea that everybody here is a Khomeyni supporter,"
_ cautions a bazaar vendor with a waggish smile. "Many people have
replaced theshah's picture with some ayatollah's."
Most people have more than enough personal reasons not to be too
fond of the Islamic revolutionary regime. At the outset, the
bazaar merchants enthusiastically supported the overthrow of the
shah because.he forced them into unfair competition with the big
multinationals. ~In this war between "the neighborhood store and the
supermarket," as a European diplomat described it, the bazaar
- people quickly took their place alongside the revolutionaries.
"But things have changed in the last few months," the bazaar merchant
explained. "The lack of security, the fear of a future that no one
can see clearly has caused a recession among us
- bazaar merchants, who account for 40 percent of the country's non-
oil trade."
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The notion that they could be invaded by the Americane at any time -
is going through the heads of many merchanta, who anxiously ask
newsmen "when is the invasion going Co happen."
One ~i ~he merchants commented in all seriousness that he wae
prepared to clear out all of his merchandiae "because the Americans
_ will be coming soon and they'll kill us all."
The Americans, of course, do not aeem ready to kill any Iranians,
with guns at least. In the short or medium term, however, they
could force them to tighten their belts. "Sixty percent of Iran's
overseas foreign exchange has been frozen; the domestic supply of
_ rials is totally insufficient," explains economist Rokhsam Manucheri.
Fast for Islam
_ Iran depends heavily on imports, especially in baeic sectors such
as foodstuffs. At least 60 percent of the food that the 35 million
Iranians cansume comes from other countries, although some sources
- say that the dependency reaches 90 percent (as in almoat everything,
there are no official figures). The BBC has put the country's
food imports ~t $8 billion a year.
In the absence of sufficient financial assets, Iran is at a
= bottleneck, tied hand and foot in the bid to purchase all that it
needs, pay off pending debts, get the country moving and shoulder
, the liability of a 30 percent jobless rate. "Iran depends on its -
oil revenues today to buy what it needs, and they are clearly
insufficient," says Manucheri. Oil revenues this year will be
around $27, bzllion. The country's foreign debt, however, totals
$7 billion, weighing heavily, above all, on the helter-skelter
attempt (no clear-cut program or visible planning) to transform the
country's economy.
_ In Debt up to Its Ears
The credit terms cf the past have vanished. "The Iranian economy
was already in debt up to its ears before the Islamic revolution,
with outlays that were much higher than revenue," says a Euronean
economist. "But there was confidence in the country's potential.
- That confidence has disappeared." Iran used to get credit with 12
percent security, but foreign banks now demand 100 percent. "In
light of such demands, we can say that most loans are no longer ~
- available to Iran," the expert adds.
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The 50 Hostages _
In the face of all this, "the only policy of the new managers of the
_ Markazi Bank (the nationalized central bank) seems to be t~ shake
- ~heir fists angrily at the U.S. banks that have frozen ~heir reserves -
- in Europe," economist Manucheri contends.
Placing the emphasia on political spectacle thus becomes an urgent -
need for the Islamic revolution, "not only to rally the masses,"
as Ebrahim Yazdi advocates," but also to demagogically prevent the
- populace from realizing the nation's serious basic problems.
In addition, however, empresario Khomeyni's big ahowe keep the
public's attention absorbed, which enables the government to not
govern or to govern as little as possible.
- Iran is, in fact, a country fragmented into countless political,
- religious, personal, tribal, regional and economic divisions and -
subdivisiona. If the government took ateps to organize the country,
. it would entail admitting that the period of utopia has ended and
that it is now high Cime to return to reality. It would also mean
curbing revolutionary excesses, placing every citizen in his spot
and organizing the machinery of production and t:~e other facets of
" national life.
To do this, the country would have to have a national program,
which does not exist (or at least no one has disclosed it) and -
which cannot even be guessed at from what is happening. And even
if such a program existed, taking action, governing in other worda,
would again bring out and heighten all of the latent atrife among -
the Iranian masses. Several persons have already been executed
by firing squads for "practicing sodomy."
For the time being, the shows are much more useful to the Ayatollah
Khomeyni and enable him to shunt aside all of the nation's problems,
even though the country is silently rotting away. Yazdi does
not fool himself: "We have to come up with excuses, just as you
newsmen invent sensationalist headlines to attract readers'
attention. We have to create incidents to keep the masses -
mobilized."
- COPYRIGHT: 1980, Informacion y Revistas, S.A. _
8743
CSO: 4410
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- IRAN
_ TABRIZ PISPUTES RAGE AS IMAM VACATIONS
- Paris L'EXPRESS in French 12 Jan 80 pp 73-74
[Article by Bernard Ullmann: "Iran: Falling Apart"]
[Text] Civil war is breaking out in Tabriz again... A
pitched battle in a village on the gulf: 40 dead... But
the Imam has decided to be tired from 12 to 27 January.
Khomeyni's periods of silence are as eloquent as his diatribes. He chose
the right moment to go into retreat: Civil war erupted once more ~n Wed-
nesday in Tabriz in flames, more violently than ever. Every day the peri-
pheral provinces are becoming increasingly engulfed in an anarchy which
suits many people in Washington, Moscow, Baghdad, and doubtless also very
near where the Imam is, in the holy city of Qom. In short, it is in fact
a struggle for power or for the succession.
The American hostages: A lot was said about them on Tuesday evening on ~
French television, in "Screen Reports." In the face of the Sovi.et divisions
in Kabul they no longer carry much weight in chancelleries or editorial ~
_ offices. In Washington, following the tragicomedy of the unfortunate Kurt ~
Waldheim's last ditch trip, people have stopped having any faith in a poli-
tical or diplomatic solution. But their fate provides fuel for a campaign
- on a new theme, carefully orchestrated by the White House for once: The
men who hold the American diplomats are not, if they ever were, "Islamic
students." Now it is a question of professional terrorists, definitely
_ Marxists, perhaps Palestinians, who are deliberately seeking to set minds
afire in the hope of pushing the United States to military intervention. _
Jody Powell, the White House spokesman, himself asked the newsmen question- -
ing him: "Who is Iran's leader today?" Which amounts to saying that for
- lack of authorized representatives, one day or other the United States will
have to take unilateral action. The fact is that the formida~~e American
"task force" which has been cruising south of the Gulf for a month and a
half is again to be strengthened. Now, on those famous "warm seas" so
many Soviets covet, it just so happens that Iran is contiguous to Pakistan.
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"A Final Ultimatum"
This week it was in Tabriz, only some 50 kilometers south of the Soviet
Union, that the most spectacular confrontations took place. Not neces- _
sarily the bloodiest: At Bandar Langeh, a small gulf port, some 40
J deaths were reported, some 150 wounded. A real pitched battle for 2 days
set Khomeiny supporters against local inhabitants, Sunni Arabs of the area,
armed perhaps by Baghdad and officered by pro-Iraq Palestinians.
In Kurdistan where the Iraqis are also active, a forthcoming "final ulti- _
matum," another one, was predicted following a deadly ambush which on -
Tuesday made it possible for autonomists to confiscate the weapons of 120 -
policemen.who were perhaps not very combative. The previous day the
governor general of the province, Hossein~Shahvessi, himself resigned to
rally to the insurgents, which says a great deal about the authority of
the "central government."
In Azerbaijan, the stakes are infinitely higher for the future of the
_ Iranian revolution. For despite their denials, it is in fact the two holy
men of Qom, Khomeiny and Ayatollah Shariat Madari,who are fighting over
which of the two is to be the supreme leader of the Shiites with exchanges
of rifle fire by the "guardians of the revolution" and the.native mili-
tants of the Moslem people's Republican Party.
Two years ago, long before Teheran, Tabriz was the scene of mass demonstra-
tions against the shah which were violently suppressed. Today, Khomeiny is
openly boohed there, In accordance with a well-established tradition, the _
combatants are fighting over ~he 'radio-television building, not much of -
which can be left. After the proclaiming of martial law, there were at
- least some 10 dead, about 100 wounded--among them our colleague, French
photographer Patrick Chauvel--several banks looted, cars set on fire. E.
scene that in Iran has been virtually "normal" for 2 years. But all that
took place on a day sacred to the Shiites, Arabaine, which marks the anni-
versary of the 40th day following the death of the prophet Hussein.
At Qom itself the worst was expected. Since the scuffles oi 4 January, -
Shariat Madari's partisans thought he was restricted to fiis residence and
--who knows?--threatened with death. Clearly his appeals for calm, forced
or sincere, hardly soothed tempers in his Azerbaijan fiefdom. The army, or
what remained of it, had to multiply its barrages to prevent an armed raid
from descending upon Qom. However, the only ones who showed up were ardent
supporters of Khomeiny, parading by tens of thousands by the modest resi- -
dence of the Imam who, seated on the terrace, greeted them by waving his
hand. On their way they.shouted "classic" slogans: "Long live Khomeiny:
Death to Carter:" Whereas in Teheran it was under the green flag of Islam
alone, without any portraits of Khomeiny, even without any hostile shouting
against America, that hundreds of thousands of people marched.
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A strange atmosphere nevertheless for a"presidential campaign." For on
26 January (barring unforeseen events) the Iranians go to the polls without
lcaving their guns at home for all that. Khomeiny announced that he would -
not exercise the right conferred upon him by the constitution of accepting
or rejecting candidacies in advance. He also forbade the mullahs who after -
_ his death must preserve the reality of power within a council of wise men, -
_ to stand for election. Which bars the way for Ayatollah Mohammed Behechti,
secretary of the Council of the Revolution, who posed perhaps excessively
as a possible successor.
_ There thus remain the two eternal rivals of Che days of Neauphle-le-Chateau,
- Bani Sadr and Sadegh Ghotbzadeh. An admiral whose fleet since the revolu-
tion no longer leaves port and especially not to observe the movements of
_ zhe American aircraft carriers, Ahmad Mahdani, they say, has the support of
the "moderate" bourgeoisie and also perhaps that of Shariat Madari. And
_ then an unknown has presented himself as a candidate: A certain Jallalehdin
- Farsi, author of an obscure work on the Islamic state who, it is said, ap-
parently enjoys the favor of some members of the entourage.of.the Imam.
The latter, having decided that he would be tired from 12 to 27 January,
will not have to intervene directly in those disputes among his underlings.
On the Islamic Republic's sidelines (which moreover has never prevented him
during previous retreats of the same sort from granting long interviews to
those mass media that persistently denounce his lieutenants), he obviously -
remains the arbiter. But the rules of the game are no longer observed by
anyone.
With its convulsions bringing back into question the country's very unity,
its clan struggles, its hostages whom they continue to claim as a right to
"try," unlike any other this revolution goes on in a strange isolation. As
though the swarming of Soviet tanks were taking place in another universe
and not in a neighboring country as ferociously Moslem as Iran. It is true
that the Afghans who speak Farsi, but who are chiefly Sunni Moslems, have
always been cordially despised by their big Iranian brothers and the victims
of frequent "punitive raids."
So no one was surprised to see the Teheran police roughly expel young
Afghans who for a few hours had occupied their country's embassy as a show
of protest against Russian intervention.
The demonstrators who sought to attack the USSR embassy met no better fate. ~
The guardians of the revolution fired into the air to disperse them, allow-
ing them just enough time to burn ritually a Soviet flag and a few portraits
of Lenin. Which enabled Ambassador Vladimir Vinogradov, in thanking the
authorities for their swift intervention, to pronounce these memorable words
without a laugh: "It would not have been appropriate to take us as hostages, -
us who are not armed." ~
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This shock di~lomat was not just anybody. From the Kremlin's standpoint, -
_ the i.m~~ortance of the Teheran embassy is measured by the facC that ttie one
nuw liulding tlie position was previously assigned to Tokyo and to Cairo and
went to Kabul at the end of December to endeavor unsuccessfully to bring
- Hafizullah Amin to reason before the "final solution."
- Moscow's Gift
~ In the early stages of the revolution, Khomeiny did not treat Moscow with
kid gloves any more than it did Washington. Today, the Iran that has been
torn apart cannot offer itself the luxury of defying the two superpowers at
one and the same time. And the Soviet Union is dangerously near by. It is
true that right after the intervention there was a statement by the minister
of foreign affairs deploring the "occupation of a neighboring country which
has the effect of weakening our struggle against American imperialism and is
_ considered a hostile action against the Iranian nation."
- But Ghotbzadeh i.s now virtually certain that the USSR, which since the Afghan
crisis no longer has any reason to treat Washington with kid gloves, will
exercise its veto in the Security Council on any "strong arm" resolution. -
Such a gift certainly deserves some indulgence toward the powerful neighbor
ta the north. The Afghan warriors of the provinces bordering on Iran must
therefore not expect any help from their Moslem "brothers" on the other side
of the frontier unless the latter themselves become dissidents. Against
Teheran.
At the beginning of this new year the situation seems more than ever at a -
dead end. _
The hostages are certainly not going to see their families again ~n the near
_ future. American military measures against Iran would doubtless cause
Washington to lose the advantage of the reprobation aroused in the Moslem
. world by the Soviet seizure of Afghanistan.
And, lacking a UN vote, the economic sanctions envisaged by Carter, even
- supported by his Western partners as a whole, will have hardly any short-term
impact. Given the general mess, who will notice them in Iran?
COPYRIGHT: 198o S.A. Groupe Fxpress
8094
CSO: 49U0
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IRAN
BRIEFS
= ATTEMPT TO KIDNAP PROMINENT AF.MENIAN--Felix Aqayan who some revolutionaries
tried to kidnap from his home in Paris is not only a personal friend of the
shah but also the recognized head of the Armenian minority in Iran, which
is Christian. This action is attributed to the plan being conducted by the
Shi'ite Moslems against the other religious communities. [Text] [Paris -
VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 7 Jan 80 p 10 - WAJ
CSO: 4900
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I~Q _
ATTEMPTS TO COUNTER ISRAELI MOVES IN AFRICA
Paris AL-WATAN .AI,-'ARABI in Ai-abic 28 Dec 79 - 3 Jan 80 p 26
[Article: "Baghdad Works Actively in Africa To Counter Israeli
Penetration"]
[Text] The Iraqi-African meetings i.n Baghdad are proceeding with start-
ling speed, causing some observers to ponder the implications of Iraq's
sudden burst of diplomatic activity on African affairs in the light of
the rapid results this activity has achieved. -
President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who came to Baghdad last week in -
response to a personal invitation from President Saddam Husayn, was the
fourth African leader to visit Baghdad in less than 3 months.
The Iraqi move in Africa falls within the scope of what can be called an
Iraqi strategic vision of strengthening the nonalined African states,
considering that they constitute a natural ally in the fight against colo- ~
nia.list inf luence. One of the main priorities in this f ight is, of course,
_ the erection of strong barriers against Israeli penetration into Africa.
This strategic vision, based on broadening cooperative relations between r
_ Iraq and the African states, revives a long-standing historical link.
The voracious colonialist wave which dominated Africa for many centuries
was able.to weaken this link, but failed, in the f inal analysis, to drawn it
in the well of oblivion. Since colonial'~sm is quickly disappearing from
Africa, the independent African states are naturally searching for someone
who understands their needs and sees the necessity of enriching their
, experience in building an independent existence, as well as someone who
would respond sincerely to their need for assistance free from aims of -
domination and exploitation.
- In any case, this development is a natural outgrowth of Iraq's increasingly
i.mportant role within the nonalined movement. The importance of this role
~ was made clear during the Sixth Conference of Nonalined Nations held in
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Havana last summer, when Iraq was unanimously chosen to be the host coun-
- try for the seventh conference which will meet in 1982.
The Iraqi move was naturally aimed especially at the progressive African
states. On a wide-ranging African tour, 'Izzat Ibrahim, a member of the
RCC and official of the Economic Office, carried special messages and
official invitations from President Saddam Husayn to the leaders of these
states.
Observers point out that the doubling of capital appropriations for the
Iraqi Fund for External Development has supported the Iraqi move in Africa,
= since the developing states of Africa are the nations which have benefited
most from Iraqi aid.
Observers and diplomats were especially interested in President Nyerere's
visit to Iraq in view of his steadily rising influence in.Africa. The
Tanzanian leader's influence has grown particularly since his forces
cooperated with Ugandan opposition forces in sweeping away the regime
of Idi Amin, thereby extending Tanzania's influence all the way to the
_ headwaters of the Nile in Uganda.
The developing bond of cooperation between Iraq and Tanzania springs from
bilateral economic cooperation agreements. This opens new horizons for
joint action by the two countries to serve the interests of their peoples,
and strengthen themselves in their fight against colonialism, Zionism and
racism.
African leaders who visited Baghdad prior to Tanzanian President Nyerere
included Samora Machel, president of the Republic of Mozambique; Didier
Ratsiraka, head of government of the Republic of Madagascar; and Kenneth
- Kaunda, president of the Republic of Zambia. There is no doubt that the
results produced by these visits will have a far-reaching eff ect on the
- future of Arab-African relations in general and the Arab-Zionist struggle ~
in particular,enabling both sides to draw from unity under conditions of
similarities of their struggle for independence and of their progressive
revolutionary experience. This could be gleaned from the personality
characteristics of those activists among the heads of the African states
_ who have responded to the historical need for a link between their coun-
. tries and Iraq.
Mozambique and the New Experiment
Mozambique's President Samora Plachel was the last African leader to visit
Iraq before the president of Tanzania. Machel's visit ended during the
second week of becember. The Mozambique president held extended dis- -
cussions with President Saddam Husayn and high Iraqi officials culminating
in the signing of three agreements for economic, commercial, and scientific
and technical cooperation. The discussions also produced very much closer
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points of view with respect to both Arab and African issues. In addition,
Michel 'Aflaq, the secretary general of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party,
met with the Mozambique president for the purpose of developing relations
between the Ba'th Party and the FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front]
(formerly the Popular Liberation Forces) in order to achieve their common
goals.
It should be pointed out that Mozambique is a newcomer to independence, ~
having won its freedom only 5 years ago--on 25 June 1975, to be exact--
after some 5 centuries of Portuguese colonial rule.
Madagascar and the Arab Struggle
Didier Ratsiraka, head of government of the Democratic Republic of
Madagascar, visited Iraq from 28 November to 1 December. This visit also
resulted in a strengthening of relations, in this case between the Arab _
Socialist Ba'th Party and the party of the Malagasy National Front for
the Defense of the Revolution. Another outcome of this visit was the
signing of an agreement for economic, technical, scientif ic and commer-
cial cooperation between the two countries. The Iraqi side expressed
readiness of the Arab Fund for External Development to participate in
development projects [of Madagascar].
In addition to near total conformity of the political views of the two
sides on the various issues that were discussed, the Malagasy side wel- _
comed the Iraqi decision to compensate the poor developing states, which
now have direct oil contracts with Iraq, for any increases in the offi-
cial prices of Iraqi oil from 1 June 1979 to the end of 1979. This will
be accomplished by offering these states long-term interest-free loans,
equal in amount to the oil price increases, in the hope of achieving a
radical and just solution to this problem.
- ~ It is recalled that Madagascar became independent from France on 26 June
1960. Independence was proclai.med in (Muhamasina) Square in the center
of the capital city of AntananarLvo where the coronation of kings and queens
had formerly taken place. The Malagasy people had remained subject to
colonialism for about a century. Some 700,000 Malagasy people had died -
either at the hands of the occupation forces or due to starvation.
On 18 May 1972 former President Tsiranana called on General Ramanantsoa
for help, and turned over all powers to him. This paved the way for the
end of neocolonialism in the country at the hands of Didier Ratsiraka, -
who assumed the task of reconsideration of the French-:Kalagasy economic
agreements. The last French forces left the country, and surrendered their
naval and air bases, and the national government took over the NASA Air
Station located 40 1~ from the city of Antananarivo.
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Ratsiraka also moved to sever the relations which former President
Tsiranana had established with South Africa and Zionism.
- On 30 December 1975, the people approved the military command's decision and
Ratsiraka was elected president by a 94.66 percent majority.
Zambia and the Rhodesian Issue _
Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda was the first African leader to visit ~
Baghdad at the invitation of President Saddam Husayn. Like Mozambique,
Zambia is in the fron t line of defense of the revolutionaries of Rhodesia.
_ Some have termed Zamb ia "the Lebanon of East Central Africa," and in fact
its situation resembles that of Lebanon to a considerable extent.
The 55-year-old Kaunda, who celebr.ated the 15th anniversary of his -
accession to power on 28 October, is one of the last 2 African giants
who formed the vanguard of Africa's revolutionaries. The only other
leader who shares this distinction is Tanzanian president Juliua Nyerere,
who was the last of the African visitors to Baghdad.
Kaunda's most serious difficulties lay in the fact that his land was re-
garded as open territory f or the raids of the racist Rhodesian army. This
was based on the army's pursuit of Rhodesian revolutionaries operating
from Zambia, which welcomed the revolutionaries by virtue of common
nationalist bonds.
It is perhaps paradoxical that in spite of Zambia's tense relations with
Rhodesia's racist regime, which came to an end following the successful
settlement with the Af rican nationalist leaders last ~aeek, the economy '
of Zambia is dominated by relations with Rhodesia and South Africa, since ~
90 percent of 'its copp er production passes through Rhodesia en route to
_ the South African ports of Durban and Port Elizabeth. By this same -
route, Zambia imports thousands of tons of corn and chemical fertilizer
from South Africa to meet the needs of agricultural production.
COPYRIGHT: 1980 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8591
CSO: 4802 -
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- IRAQ
'AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI' SPECULATES ON IRAQI FORM OF DEMOCRACY
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arab ic 14-20 Dec 79 pp 20-21
[Article: "Iraq: Open Popular Dialog on First Parliamentary Experiment
in 20 Years"]
[Text] In Iraq these days, an open popular debate
is underway on the draf t laws for an Iraqi National
Assembly and for a L~gislative Assembly for the ~
_ autonomous area. Based on this discussion, the two
laws w ill be put into f inal form in preparation for
the holding of the f irst elections in the country in
over 20 years. But what is the significance of
Iraq's new democratic experiment? What are its
limits? What is its substance? How serious is it?
This report to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI from Baghdad
attempts to answer these questions.
_ The violent events in the Gulf area have almost completely overshadowed -
an important internal event in Iraq which will have far-reaching signifi-
cance for political life in this Arab country.
Had the political leadership not been serious about its promise to estab-
- lish popular constitutional institutions, it would have used events abroad
as an excuse to postpone or bury the matter. However, it is abiding by
its promise that Iraq would have its elected representative assembly no
later that~ the end of this year or the early part of next year.
- In fact, the airing of the draft laws for an Iraqi National Assembly
(Parliament) and a Legislative Assembly for the autonomous area, at this
particular time when a storm is gathering over the Gulf, comes as confir- ' -
mation of the importance attached by the Iraqi political leadership to -
the matter of establishing constitutional and popular institutions.
This determination to open a debate on this subject under the present
circumstances is perhaps an indication of the stability and self-confidence
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of the Iraqi regime. It also suggests the regime's firm belief that
however boisterous the popular debate on the draft laws may turn out,
it will above all provide a healthy and timely demonstration of the
strong day-to-day relationship of the regime with the citizens and the -
masses.
A Bitter Experience [Jith Parliaments
Past Iraqi experience with representative assemblies, particularly dur-
ing the royal era, was not successful. Rather, it gave rise to extreme
bitterness, at times bordering on desperation and rebellion, among the
people. The reasons are too involved to go into here. However, it will
suffice to mention that British c4lonialist influence, political corrup-
tion, fruitless party infighting, and the lack of deep-rooted democratic
traditions, all contributed to abort the evolution of a healthy democra-
tic experience, even by the [modest] standards and concepts of that era.
More than 20 years have passed since the collapse of the last represen-
tative assembly. It is perhaps inappropriate to ask why there were no
representative assemblies from 1958 to 1968, since the regimes in power -
- during those years did not enjoy the stability needed to estab lish
_ representative government. _
Why Have There B een No Representative Assemblies Since 1968
It is appropria te, however to wonder why no representative assemblie~s
were established from 1968 until the present time. -
There is more than one answer to this important question. First, there
was the bitterness still rankling in people's hearts over the failure of
the conventional parliaments which existed before the 1958 revolution in
_ doing their basic job, namely, giving expression to the will of the
people.
Another reason was the preoccupation of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party
regime with the momentous issues which had always proved to b e a stumbling
block in the way of previous governments, and frequently led to their
downfall. Thus, the regime fought to reclaim the country's national
wealth (oil) f rom international monopolies.~ It also fought to end the
rebellion which aimed at draining the resources of the country, as well ~
as to resis t[ international] power blocs. .
In the past, all these factors forestalled the formation of genuine
representative assemblies. They also disrupted the very stability of
Iraq, and prevented the establishment of a strong national government
which was Arab in action, speech and vision. -
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1
Acc:orclin~;l.y, af ter the 1968 Revolutionary re~ime had taken care of these
- tasks and preoccupations, and had proven its stability, continuity and
_ competence, it automatically turned its attention to incorpora te the
ideals of the revolution into law, and to establish its constitutional
and popular institutions.
One might ask at this point; But wasn't the regime tardy in launching
its democratic experiment? The answer is negative. The nature of the
[1968] Revolutionary regime and the challenges it faced did not allow it
to pursue a policy of "trial and error." Any serious mistake would have
inflicted serious damage upon the regime, so that there was no room for
repeated experimentation.
~ In other words, it was not possible to establish a representative insti- _
= tution on a haphazard or rash basis, because collapse or fragility~~of such
an institution would have been damaging to a regime which came to power -
through the strength of its party organization, the sympathy of the masses,
; and the staunchness of its leaders.
Actually, it is only fair to point out that the issue which on many
occasions preempted all of Saddam Husayn's time and energy was the issue
of democracy. He was not satisfied with posing the matter to himself,
his party, his associates and his aides. Rather, on many occasions
he engaged in deep and lengthy discussions about it with guests and visi-
tors, including senior officials, men of culture, intellectuals, adminis-
trators and statesmen.
The Democratic Experiment in Iraq
How can democracy be applied in a country like Iraq? What are the pre- -
conditions for it? What circumstances are favorable to it? What would
guarantee its success? How will its institutions operate? What are the
necessary political and perscnal qualifications of the members of these =
institutions? And, finally, what is the proper role of the ruling or
leading party in this experiment? Or, put more exactly, what is the proper
role of a popular party, like the Ba'th Party, which has come to power
through its struggle, the strex~gth of its organization, its sacrifices,
and the affinity of its principles and its vision with those of the great
majority of the people?
A seemingly endless stream of questions was posed by Saddam Husayn to
himself and to others. He had a great variety of ideas and con~epts,
and so did the others. With time, these ideas and concepts crystallized
and took their f inal form in the two texts which Saddam Husayn submitted
to the people, after discussing them with his associates in the Revolu-
Cion Command Council and the senior apparatus of the party leadership. -
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_ Any ruler or young leader in the position of Saddam Husayn, whose long -
years of experience in government have not blotted out of his memory of -
- his original party, popular and revolutxonary experience, no dosbt places ~
his allegiance to the people and the masses ahead of allegiance to the
government and the administration.
From this one can realize how serious the democratic experiment being
undertaken by the revolution of Saddam Husayn really is. He.earnestly _
wants to make it succeed, so that there can be a true democr.atic process
which will satisfy himself as well as his people, his party, his small =
[Iraqi] homeland and his large [Arab] nation. -
Those who know Saddam Husayn assert that he does not believe in half-
solutions. In other words, h~ would never proclaim his democratic experi-
ment, unless he is firmly determined to conduct a true democratic experi-
ence according to revolutionary standards of democracy.
A Fundamental problem sti11 remains. The political leadership's percep-
_ tion of the importance of democracy, and its dedication to making the
democratic experiment genuine, signif icant and effective are not enough.
. For just~as the political leadership had the dufy to seek the road to _
democracy, individual citizens as well as the masses now b ear a heavy
responsib ility [with reg_~rd to the democratic process].
Democracy does not consist of inere formats, constitutions and institutions.
Rather, it involves practices, traditions, rituals and faith which gradu-
aily become rooted in the conscience, daily life and national outlook of
, the peop le.
Democracy is not an escape from rules, standards and values. Democracy ~
_ is not ab solute freedom, but rather responsibl~e freedom. It is the abil-
ity to use freedom as a tool to serve the public interest and the national -
welFare, not to sow hatred, stir up emotions, and reviv e sedition and
intrigue.
Ttiis is how democracy ought to be. The question is: How will the Iraqis
practice it?
COPYRI~HT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL'ARABI
8591
CSO : 4802
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II'cAQ
EUROPE SEES NEW OPPORTUNITI~S FOR TRADE
Paris AL-WATAN AL-~ARABI in Arabic 21-27 Dec 79 p 48
[Article: "Ten Iraqi Projects Attract General European and Arab
Attention"] -
[Text] The attention of world economic circles is turning to Iraq, as
the Iraqi projects scheduled for implementation as of the beginning of
1980 may provide the largest market for business opportunities in the
- Arab world.
The most important of the new 1980 projects, which are attracting the
attentiqn of European companies and organizations and Arab international -
contracting companies, are the following: -
= l. Projects to complete overland transportation systems. A supplemen-
tary appropriation of 153 million dinars has been allocated to these
projects, in order to begin constructing and paving 758 kilometers of -
roads. Likewise, a supplementary appropriation of 77 million dinars has
been allocated to drinking water systems. ~
2. Various production projects in al-Ta'mim (Kirkuk) Governorate valued
at 80 million dinars. These include construction of a cement plant at a -
cost of 64 million dinars, a plant to produce plastic cables, and a high--
voltage electricity generating station. They also include modernization
of a gas liquefaction plant. -
3. Projects in the education sector costing 33 million dinars. These
= in~lude construction of a technical school of higher education in Kirkuk,
- an agricultural college, and 87 elementary and secondary schools in ~ _
Kirkuk Governorate. They also include a complex for athletic events in =
Hawijah and six youth centers in Wasit.
4. The start of implementation of 124 projects in various governaratc~s `
involving expansion and improvement of se~ae~rs and pumping of drinking
water.
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5. Construction of a gas bottle filling plant in Hamam al-'Alil
(Nineveh Governorate) with a capacity of 3,000 bottles per hour, construc-
tion of a similar plant in Hilla with a capacity of 2,000 bottles per -
houry and expansion of the capacity of thQ gas liquefaction plant in -
Basrah from 560 ~0 1,000 bottles per hour. -
6. Start of construction of the international airport in Basra at a.
_ cost of approximately $40 million. Invitations to bid on the pro~ect are
_ expected to get underway early in the new year, and contracts are expected
- to be awarded early in the spring.
_ 7. Construction of a four-star hotel in Mosul, using prefabricated
, components.
8. Establishment of a tourist complex in Dukan�-al-Salmaniyah (near the
Iraqi-Iranian border).
9. Digging of the Tigris channel between Baghdad and Basra to regulate
_ the flow of waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. .
10. Construction of a turnkey food plant to process potato by-products -
_ in Abu Ghsrib (east of Baghdad). _
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI -
8591 =
CSO: 4802
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- SAUDI ARABIA
BRIEFS
_ DELIVERY OF WEAPONS PACKAGE--Measures have been taken to speed up delivery
- to Saudi Arabia of the naval weapons package that was agreed on with
- France. This package includes 18 vessels--both launches and missile boats
of the "Cherbourg " class--and 12 attack helicopters. The responsible
- French authorities are working to complete a study on installaCion of an
electronic belt along both the Saudi Red Sea and Persian Gulf coastlines
to waxn of movements at sea. [Text] [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI 11-17
. Jan 80 p 18] ~
, CSO: 4802 END
1~0 =
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