JPRS ID: 8919 LATIN AMERICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050021-1
• Release Decision: RIP
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 21
• Content Type: REPORTS

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I~OR OFH'ICIA1. 11~E ON1,1'
~ JPRS Ll8919
- 12 February 198~'~
La~in Arr~eri~c~ R~ ort
~
(FOUO 2/80)
FBeS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/8919
12 February 1980
LATIN AMERICA REPORT
(FOUO 2/80)
CONTENTS PAGE -
INTER-AMERICAN AFF'AIRS
Castro Sends Letter to Nicaragua on Joining Nonalined
(PRELA, 22 Jan 80) 1
Peace Group Charges Intervention in El S~lvador
, (PREI,A, 28 Jan 8U) 2
ARGEN!' INA
Future of' Pero.lism Within Political Process Viewed
(Eduardo J. Faredes; LA OPINION, 16 Dec 79) 3
Health Secretary :.:peaks on Medical Care, Nation~,l
Objectives
(Manuel Iran Campo Interview; LA OPINION, 26 Dec 79) 8
COSTA r~ICA
President Replies to Communist Deputies �
(PREI,A, 30 Jan 80) 11 ,
CUBA -
Brzezinski's Foreign Policy Views Assailed
- (Carlos Mora Herman; PRELA, 2 Feb 80) . 13
- Contradictory Remarks by Carter on Caribbean Reported
(Jose Gonzalez Tosca; PREI~A, 31 Jan 80) 15
Mari Bras: U.S. Admiral Behind Attacks in Puerto Rico
(PRELA, 2 Feb 80) ].6
_ Cuban Ambassador Denies Attacx on Embassy in Caracas
- (PREI,A, 29 Jan 80) 17
- a - [III - LA - 144 FOUO]
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CON`l'ENTS (CotiLi riuE,d) Page
Cooperation With CF~IA Members Aids Cuban Agriculture .
(Rafael Francia Mestre; EKONOMICHESKOYE l~
SOTRUDNICHESTVO STRAIV-CHLENOV SEV, No 5, 1979)���
EL SALVADQR
- LP-28 Leader Comments on Imminent Armed Struggle
(Jorge Urbe; PREI~1, 19 Jan 80) 23
- Mexican Paper Interviews Guerrilla Chiefs
(Carmen Lira; PRELA, 16 Jan 80) 26
GUATEMALA
Brie fs
DGP Said Occupying Towns ~9
- HONDURAS
Young Officers' Document Warns Government
(Gregorio Selser; F'RELA, 19 Jan 80) 3~
NICARAGUA
Robelo Sees Threat Posed by 'Anarcnistic' Forces
(Stella Calloni; PRELA, 19 Jan 80) 33
PERU
Briefs -
Deaths, Injuries in Peasant Ba.ttle 35 -
VENEZiTELA
Vene~uelan Armed Forces Deny Rumors of Discontent ~
(pREI,A, 24 Jan 80) 3
Newspapers Interview Ambassador to Cuba
(pRII,A, 9 Jan 80) 37
B-iefs
Territory Violatior. 39
- b -
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INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
CASTRO SENDS LETTER TO NICARAGUA ON JOINING NONALINED
PA260034 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1815 GMT 22 Jan 80 PA
~
[Text] Managua, 22 3an (PL)--Fidel Ca3tro, president of the Cuban
Councils of St~te and Government, has expressed his ~oy "over the fact
that Cuba was the site where Nicaragua joined with dignity" the non-
alined movpment.
~
The greeting of the Cuban leader and president of the nonalined coun-
tries is included in a letter dated 24 October, published yesterday in
- the National Reconstruction Government Junta's press bullerin.
Following is the text of the letter: _
I assigned myself the task of writing a few lines to thank each govern-
ment of the *~onalined countries for their participation in the sixth
summit. On reaching Nicaragua, I realize it would not make any sense
to do that. How can I thank you, our most affectionate brot~ers-in-
struggle? How c~,n you, guerrillas and r~volutionarias, be thanked
when you were by our side in the not-too-easy battle waged to make the
conference a success? No, those formalities have no place between us.
- Thus, if there is any ~ustification for this letter, it is to expreas
to you ~y ~oy over the fact that Cuba was the site where Nicaragua
joined with dignity the ranks of our movement, to tell you with what
emotion I listened to the magnificent speech delivered by Companero
- Daniel, when he announced that his country--with its wounds still open
and only 41 days after the victory--was present among the nonalined with
extraordinary force, and to congratulate you for the inestimable role
that Nicaragua, with its immense moral authority, played in the re~~~~ts
of the sixth summit. _
r
I am sure the new battles will continue to find us side by side, in the
same cause of revolution, freedom and anti-imperialism. -
Fraternally yours,
[Signed] Fidel Castro Ruz '
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INTER-AMERICAN AF'F~IRS
PEACE GROUP CHARGES INTERVENTION IN EL SALVADOR
PA281748 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1622 GMT 28 Jan 80 PA
[Text] San Jose, 28 ,Tan (PL)--The Third Costa Rican Peace and Solidarity
Congress, which has concluded here, has rharged the ~overnment and armed
forces of Guatemala with intervention in the internal affairs of E1
Salvador.
The final plenary session also warned of the serious threat of a massive ~
military intervention by U.S. forces in that Central American country.
Artist and cartoonist Hugo Diaz was appointed president of the Costa
Rican Peace and Solidarity Committee. The committee marked the impor-
t~nce of the Nicaraguan people's victory against the Somoza dictator-
ship, which had constituted a permanent threat to peace in Central
America.
Scoring the annexatiun claims of Guatemala over Belize, the third con-
gress accused that country's milftary dictatorship of trying now to
become the rearguard of Central American reaction. _
~
ThP congress was attended by political and labor delegations of Costa
- Rica as well as from other nations of the area.
The final ~lenary session expressed its concern over the U.S. decision
to install nuclear missiles in Europe with the aupport of the Nor~h
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It also noted China's announced
- support of NATO's position.
- The attendants censured the colonial regime imp~~sed on the Puerto Rican
people and charged that the installation of military bases on that
island constitutes a threat to peace.
The congress fully supported Panama's claims of sovereignty over the
Canal Zone and described the U.S. refusal to comply with the agreementa
_ already signed as a provocation.
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ARGENTINA
FUI'URE OF PERONISM WITHIN POLITICAL PROCESS VIE4IED
Buenos Aires LA OPINTON i,n Spanish 16 Dec 79 pp 12-13
[Column by Eduardo J. Paredes]
[TextJ Last Thursday's press conference by President Videla did not provide
any spectacular surprises, but it did confirm the president's thinking on
various basic issues in the political process.
. But the eagerness with which the private news media gnphasized his reply con- _
cerning the future of Peronism demonstrated what a really basic issue Peronism
is in Argentine politics. It is logical that it should be so, and there is
' even historical precedent for it. When General Justo became head of the
- government known as the Conco rdancia, everyone wondered what would happen
to the Yrigoyen movement, since the Radicals were then div~.ded into personal- '
� ists and antipersonalists, depending'on whether they followed the trend of
- thought re~resented by the great leader of the UCR [Radical Civic Union] or
the Alvear line, which in many parts of the country fostered what later be-
came the "union" group. And what happened? After Yrigoyen`s death, the
= personalist movement flailed about in internal polemics until the famous
and definitely juvenile convention in Avellaneda, when men like Moises
Levenson, Crisologo Larralde, Ricardo Balbin, and others vitalized what was
called the ints ansigent radical line in opposition to certain union groups
whose tendencies were conservative. Talking about personalism or antiperson-
alism in the Radical Civic Union today, so many years after those historical
episodes, is an absurdity. Out of a great movement of the middle and lower
middle ~lass and a large percentage of the proletariat--a movement that fol- -
lowed an important lead~r and dominated Argentina's political scene from
- 1916 to 1930--there arose in time an organized and democratic political -
par ty. In that party, today's Ricardo Balbin is not yesterday's Hipolito _
= Yrigoyen but the party chief who associates with a group of top leaders
from all over the country--Raul Alfonsin, Juan Carlos Pugliese, Antonio
Troccoli, Arturo Illia, Carlos H. Perette, Fernando de la Rua, Cesar Garcia
Puente, EduaYdo Angeloz, Rodolfo Leyenda, Miguel Angei Zabala Ortiz, and a
laxge number of provincial leaders--who can aspire to compete at any mr~ment
, in an internal struggle to be elected within the party or as candidates for -
_ public office.
<
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Any political analyst of the 1930's--if indeed there then existed that ac-
cursed journalistic breed to which I belong and which consists of those who
specialize in being permanently wrong to help others not be wrong--might
- have thought that the Radicals were doomed to disappear. With the leader
dead, his party politically defeated and divided in one aspect over the is-
sue of "c~ncordancia," and the local leaders being pulled this way and that
by socialists, conservatives, and the incipient rightwing nationalism that
was to culminate in the Peronism of the 1940's, there was not much room for �
speculation. But the UCR not only resisted the assaults of the time but also
became stronger internally and is now expected to be a permanent party in
Argentina's political panorama--a party with a greater or lesser deqree of
electoral impact.
What elements played a part in transforming into a vigorous party what had
appeared to be a chaotic dissolution?
1. Historical roots.
2. National ideology.
3. A class of leaders.
4. Proven honesty when its time came to be the government.
Those four eie~�ants are objectively palpable. Now tet us look at the situa-
tion of Peronism to see if historical comparison will allow us to play at a
- kind of futurology.
There are very clear similarities and differences. At the death of its
leader, Peronism presented the following pict~xre:
1. Historical rc~ots.
2. A national ideology infiltrated at each end by pro-Nazi or pro-Marxist ~
tendencies.
3. Few fit leaders.
4. A very heterodox mixture of honesty and corruption in acts of qovernment.
5. Multitudinous popular support.
" The historian Gabriel del Mazo says in his book "History of Radicalism"
. that Yrigoyen, almc~st on the point of death, whispered to Elpido Gonzalez:
"Marcelo must be supported." He was referring to Marcelo T. Alvear, the
former Radical president who governed between the two Yrigoyen periods.
Yrigoyen knew that Alvear represented continuity of neither his thought nor
his activity, but he also knew that Alvear was the leader with the greatest
personal prestige left in the UCR. It was not a matter of a personal heir.
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It was a matter of saving the party. "Supporting Marcelo" was a practical
- strategy for seeing that the UCR would not dissolve. And Alvear, an anti-
person3list and fierce critic of Hipolito in many respects, had to resign
himself to playing a personalist role. But he had m4re than enough intel- _
ligence to understand the leader's strategy. So he accepted the challenge
in a perfect demonstration of political fervor. He attended meetings that
he did not like, spoke with leaders inferio r to him, plotted although he
loathed plots and even fought in a revolt, and had to go into exile--and he
got off cheap, because others wound up in Ushuaia.
Peron did not have an Alvear--perhaps by his own fault, because he was a
leader scornfu]_ of other leaders, while Yrigoyen, although he did what he
wanted and was rather arbitrary, never denied political space to important
Radicals--and so Peron could not say, in the republic's most difficult hours,
who was to be supported. But 2 weeks before his death, he made a statement
of real importance to anyone who really wants to take it at its absolute
value: "Peron's only heir is ttie organized Peron movement." That statement
contains his legacy. Peron, as a military man--because let us not deceive
ourselves, he did not exactly graduate from the Sorbonne--could not speak
of a party. During his lifetime Peron did not believe in parties. He be-
lieved in Peron. But in his old age and from his c~y:pe.rience in Europe, he -
- , realized that the modern world is moving toward large organized political
movements. And in a nontotalitarian system, organization can be achieved
only through the party. It is therefore clear that Peronists who want to
continue with the movement are either very innocent or ill-intentioned. Be-
cause the movement cannot function without the leader, and if it hopes to
have another leader it is running the risk of becoming even more frozen
than it is and of living in continual doubt as to whether the new leader is
or is not interpreting complicated Peronist ideology--a kind of seciali~t,
corporatist, and liberal conservatism that no one can figure out, since no
political thinker has ever explained it except Peron himself in his buok
"The Crganized Community," which basically was written for everyone except
Peronists. If Peronism does not want to enter a new and permanent diaspora,
it must organize a political party, and the best advice it can be given i~
to copy the Radical model exactly in its organization, because they are
sort ot like first cousins, and so everything will remain in the family.
The problem lies in the fact that while Peronism's class of leac~ers is not
nonexistent, it is atypical. A leader is someone who leads, and if one =
thinks of Peronists such as Hipolito Jesus Paz, Italo Luder, Ricardo Guardo,
Angel Robledo, Raul Matera, or Jorge Daniel Paladino, who are, atrong others, _
_ men of great experience, irreproachable conduct, and a significant share of
~ what is known as the benefit of intelligence, one notes that in reality they
_ do not lead anyone. But a former town councilor who places about 20 public
employees can have the run of any slum quarter simply by painting his name
alongside the party symbol. -
In that connection, it was interesting to note the recent statements by the
- former Peronist national legislator Raul Busto Fierro--a man who has the
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_ virtue of being consid.ered a leftist by t?he Nazis and a rightist by the
. Marxists--ir_ which he practically advocated giving Peronism the status of an _
assembly (a way of disorganizing the disorganized in an ~rganized manner).
That is not bad if it serves to make Peronist leaders stop the pantomi.me of
a move~nent and join together in internal factions with women and men, be -
they wo rkers or doctors in philosophy--and thus do away also with that
ovarian-proletarian anachronism of female and trade-union branches--in order
to discuss the ideological problem seriously and organize a party which, in
accordance with the future statute, will be ready to face honest internal
elections and have, as all parties do, its different internal wings. C
Peranism's problem is not structurally difficult. It is complicated morally.
In Peronism, in its form as a movement, no one ever learned how to lose. I
And to be democratic, it is necessary to know how to lose, and that is the -
most difficult thing. Winning is easy and agreeable. Losing is what en-
ables one to gage greatness of spirit and a sense of responsibility, be-
cause the one who loses must give way to the one who w~ns but continue t~o '
- work without ostentatior. or sinecures. '
i
In the Peronist movement no one has ever lost. A great ideological con-
glomeration was produced in which everyone spoke well of Peron from diff er- ~
ing viewpoints, and so no one lost, at leasr_ his per diem. Obviously,
, serious things happened, and there were so~:e who lost their lives and some '
who were responsible for others losing their lives. Without the leader,
the movement means anarchy, violence, and disintegration.
As far as Peronism's historical roots are concerned, they cannot be denied, 1
even though at the same time they produce hate and love that are equally
unbridled. Peron and Peronism are realities in Argentina, and while criti- -
cism is appropriate concerning methods, it is also appropriate to honestly
acknowledge various sensible legislative moves which meant, in their prac-
tical application, a leap ahead in 10 years on issues that had been debated
for decades. The negative aspects--demagoguery, political intolerance,
the cult of personality, and disorder in production--are phenomena that cor-
responded to political circumstances. No American w~ould say that all Repub-
licans are deceitful just because Nixon fell into thP temptation of Water-
gate. No impartial Ar,entine could say that all Peronists are demagogu~s
just because Peron knew how to say they were going to build 500,000 houses
when there was only enough money for 10,000 and because, moreover, people
believed him. Now the Peronists are facing other circumstances, including
the crucia~ circumstance: Peron is no longer here to tell the~n what should
be done.
And the element of popular support is also tangible. That support probably
does not equal the 64 percent achieved by �eron in 1973, but if an election
were held today, about 40 percent would lean toward any kind of Peronism
that entered the fray, even if its candidate were Dracula. The perfect
Peronist talks to the anti-Peronist today and tells him that Peron was be-
trayed, that Isabel was a pooz unfortunate woman, that Lopez Rega was a
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scoundrel, that Campora was a traitor, and that the trade unionists ar~ un-
scrupulous". But don't say anything bad about Peron to him, because he will
take out af ter you with a cudgel .
And now we reach the point where the finger is placed in the wound. If
Peronism organizes itself as a party, will that be good or ~ad for Argen-
tine democracy? Is it desirable to root for a diaspora so that the mass of
Peronism's traditional voters will split up among ttza existing parties or
abstain? Is it desirable that Peronism in Argentina should be a sort of
Labo r Party which, instead of liberal democratic roots, has--for example--
nationalist roots and incipient Christian Democratic features?
If a histo rical comparison is made, we see that based on the Radical Civic
Union's experience at the death of Yrigoyen, Peronism should organize it-
self so as to be able to compete democratically for the nation's political
power and subscribe in good faith to a system of conduct guaranteeing that -
if it returns to power, it will not change the country's structures to es-
tablish a totaiitarian syst~n.
But no ma tter what kind of party statute is approved, if Peronist leaders
are not prepared mentally to set up a democratic party in the historical
shadow of personalism and t,~ live together within it, diaspora will be in-
evitable, and there will be no need for anyone to plan it.
The f inger of "fingerocracy" is headed fox the wound. And the echo of the
bass drum is fading away as the lif e of the one who caused it has faded
away, just as yesterday's "shirtless ones" are today's workers who, when
they get a wage increase, go for a stroll in Florida better dressed than -
more than ~ne repo rter.
COPYRIGHT: La Opinion, 1979
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ARGENTINA
HE~LTH SECRETARY SPEAKS ON MIDICAL CARE, NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 26 Dec 79 p 8
[Interview with Rear Adm D~ Manuel Iran Campo, secretary of state for _
public health by Daniel Gomez Lopez; date and place not given]
[Text] Obviously it is a complex undertaking to put together a consistent _
and continuing health policy, incorporating into it all the connected
se~tora: state, private and social services. Even more so, when--as
actually happened--the first thing to be done was to immediately reverse _
a deteriorated health situation. _
"Health policy basically endeavors to insure a good level of health care
for every member of *_he poFulation by setting ug the institutions which
provide health services in accordance with the cultural and aocial level _
of the country, "the sec.retary of state for public health stated in the -
course oL an exclusive interview with LA OPINION. These are the views of
Rear Adm Dr Manuel Iran Campo. _
~
LA OPINION; What are the national health objectives establish~d by your _
ministry?
Campo: The Secretariat of State has determined seven main areas where
specific objectives have been identified, along with the respective
associated policies. These are: primary health care and extension of -
_ coverage; arrangement of health services by region aad area; cleaning up
the environment; human resources; financial resources and application of ~
the principle of f inancial aid. One of these highly important objectives ~
and policies that I can mention is the organization of a level of primary
- health care which would allow the development of a group of simple programed
health operations. Another priority is to bring about the efficient '
functioning of a syetem of welfare servicea arranged by area and region
- so as to give the whole population access to health care, -
. 8 ~
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L:'~ OPINION: The eff ective installed capacity that now exists is
j.ntimately linked to the achievement of those goals. Is Arge~ntina up to
standard in that regard?
Campo: The Republic of Argentina has a sizeable and widely dietributed
inatalled capzr_ity. Altogether there are 56 beda and 19 physicians per
10,000 inhabitants, and according to the 1970 cenaus, 75 per cent of the
population is concentrated in towna of more than 2,000 people. Comparison
with other countries, even the most highly developed in terms of installed
_ capacity, ahows that a satisfactory level has been reached from that point -
= of view. But it should be emphasized that the solution of problems of
medical care to a great extent is not determined by an increase in those
possibilities. The essential problem in the nation is the achievement of
adequate distribution, maintenance and recovery, so as to achieve greater
efficiency in using them, so as to care for the needa of the population.
LA OPINION: What relationship is there between the social work subsector
_ and the state subsector? �
Campo: The social services medical aid grants should be understood in the
- framework of a national heaZth policy and of the plans and programs intended
to implement them. One of the principal factors in the present aituation _
has been the lack of coordination between the differen.t subsectors: public,
y social assistance and private. Without reducing the introduction of the
highly complex technologies which may truly be necessary, we will try not
to imperi~l the extension of coverage by alloting reaources for excesaive -
consumption which, in the vast majority of cases, has nothing to do with
the health of the general population. At present, a permanent inter-
sector committee is in operation between 6ocial Security and Health, under
the ministry of social welfare, which deals with these relations. The
social services subsector should participate in the on-going procesa, which
- emphasizes primary health care operations and extension of coverage through
area and regional services.
LA OPINION: In the area of preventive medicine, what have been the moat _
important steps taken during 1979?
Campo: We have put special emphasis on mass immunization pro~ects, -
obtaining highly encouraging reaulta. For example, we have reduced the
incidence of ineasles by 50 per cent through operations carried out. In
1979, 2 million anti-measles injections were given, at an expenditure of
3.6 billion pesos. Poliomyelitis was eradicated in the course of the year,
~ for which 550 million peaos was invested. Another success has been the
anti-rabies campaign, which allowed the incidence of animal rabies to be
reduced by 76 per cent.
LA OPINION: What is the picture in regard to Chagas disease?
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Campo: As is known, this disease has been progressively spreading !
throughout the country, except in Patagonia. The number of persons j
infected is around 2.5 million, and there are some 300,000 people ill i
with chronic heart problems and other progressive disease. Control of i
this problem is basically directed toward the elimination of the triatomas ,
in the houses by meana of insecticide, toward adaptation and improvement j
of housing and toward health education. Laboratories have been set up, '
and since 1977 a campaign against Chagas disease has been in operation, '
with its headquarters in the province of Cordoba, i
i
LA OPINION: What consideration does the aecretariat for public health ~
- give to this disease in the budget?
i
- Campo: The struggle against Chagas disease represents an investment of ,
_ 6 percent in the annual budget of the secretariat. For 1979, 27.05 billion
- pesos have been alloted, that is, 6.1 percent of the total alloted to the '
health sector, which amounta to the sum of 449.26 billion pesos. ~
COPYRIGHT: La Opinion, 1979 ~
8131
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CUBA -
BRZEZINSKI'S FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS ASSAILED
PA021807 Havana PRELA in Engliah 1650 GMT 2 Feb 80 PA
LAri:icle by Carlos Mora HermaJ -
[Text] In this epoch, regarded as one of the most dynamic in the
history of humanity, the concept of national security, according to
the interpretation of some U.S. leaders, means to head the changes,
since the United States of America has been called on to play a special
role in the world.
The former i~ part of the imperialist philosophy of PresidenC James
Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski.
- The U.S. magazine DEFENSE MONITOR sums up that policy in the following
- words: _
"The current explication of national security means a global estimation
_ of the policy of force. It is a dangerous line which clears the way to
direct intervention and to war. A line which differs greatly from our ,
true national interests and leads to the isolation of U.S. foreign
policy."
In the present stage, the United States is trying to recover the posi-
- tion which it had in the world, aspiring to its military or political
interventions in the domestic affairs of other states being confirmed.
In 1965, the United States succeeded in getting the Organization of
American States (OAS) to confirm its invasion of the Dominican Republic.
A U.S. State Department document set down the troops which should be -
sent to eact~ country. Brazil received two divisioni~, Mexico and
Argentina a division each, Feru, Colombia, Chile and Cuba (prerevolu-
tionary), a regiment per country.
There were similar plans regarding Vietnam..
- At the present time the duat is being shaken off some of those out-
, dated ideas and an attempt is being made to bring them up to date
adapting them to the new circumstances.
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_ According to U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown, the world of the
1980's will demand more of the United States and from its capacity to
react in the face of crisis.
In the United States hegemonic dreams an important role is played by ~
- what Brzezinski calls the "instability belt" which stretches from
southern Africa to the sumnnit of the Himalayas. -
The so-called "quick action force" created by 'Washington is an attempt _
' to drown all the United States adversaries who may arise from Tehran to
New Delhi and the Mekong Delta.
It is a question of the "contention doctrine" practiced by the United
States and which already has a chain of victims: Iran, with Mossadegq,
in 1953; the Guatemala of Arbenz in 1954; the Lebanon in 1958; the ~
Con~o in 1960; Cuba in 1961 (Bay of Pigs); Vietnam in 1964; the -
Dominican Republic in 1965; Kampuchea in 1972, and Chile ir. 1973.
Also, in recent years, the U.S. Government has meddled in the domestic
affairs of an infinity of countries: Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique,
Lebanon, Jamaica, Grenada, Iran, Afghanistan. ,
The turn in U.S. foreign policy, which involvee the return to the worst !
times of the "cold war" and the blackmail of military might, opens ;
- gloomy prospects for the decade which is just beginning. i
,
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_ CUBA
CONTRADICTORY REMARKS BY CARTER ON CARIBBEAN REPORTEI~
PA020040 Havana PRELA in Spanish 2110 GMT 31 Jan 80 PA
[Report by Jose Gonzalez Tosca]
- [ExcerptJ [No dateline as received] President Jimmy Carter has said
that he is not aware of any foreign threats in the Caribbean, and there-
fore, does not see the need to reinforce the area militarily. His words
_ are in open contradiction to the activities of the countries in the area.
The President's remarks, published today, were made yesterday to a -
group of newsmen visiting the White Houae when he was asked what
priority he would attach to the situation in the Caribbean.
Carter sai3, "I am not aware of any foreign military threat to the
- integrity of the countries in the area, and therefore, do not see the
need tc 13be1 it as a vital interest zone in which military action is
necessary."
Political observers, however, point out the obvious contradiction to
statements made previously by the Preaident and by other high U.S.
military and government officials.
CSO: 3010 ~
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~
CUBA
MARI BRAS: U.S. ADMIRAL BEHIND ATTACKS IN PUERTO RICO
- PA021803 Havana PRELA in English 1645 GMT 2 Feb 80 PA
[Text] San Juan, 2 Feb (PL)--Juan Mari Bras, secretary general of the
Puerto Rican Socialist Party, said that Admiral Arthur Knoizen, chief -
of the U.S. Navy in the Caribbean, is behind the terrorist plot aimed
against the progressive forcea in Puerto Rico. -
He added that there is sufficient proof of Knoizen's guilt and he
mentioned the fact that the explosives which were used in the dynamite
attack on the headquarters of the Puerto Rican Lawyers Guild, in San
Juan, came from the arsenals of the U.S. Navya -
He underlined that this is affirmed in a document of the United States
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) in which an agent accuses a U.S.
- Navy lieutenant, Alex de la Cerda, of being guilty of the dynamite
attack on the Lawyers Guild, as well as attempting to d,~namite a plane
and the offices of the Fishermen's Association of Vieques, an organiza-
tion which is opposed to the military maneuvers of ttie U.S. Navy in
that territory.
Together with La Cerda, the ex-president of the "Pro-Navy Vanguard"
organization, Roberto Lopez Gonzalez, and the Cuban-born counterrevolu-
tionary Rene Fernandez del Valle, are also accused.
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ruK Urr't~:itw uan ~~vLx
CUBA _
COOPERATI~N WITH CF~rfA MEMB~ERS AIDS CUBAN AGRICULTURE
Moscow EKONOMICHESKOYE SOTRUDNICHESTVO STRAN-CHLENOV SEV in Russian No 5,
1979 pp 58-60
Lt~rticle by Rafael Francia Mestre, minister of agriculture of the Repub-
lic of Cuba: "The Role of Cooperation in the Development of Agricul-
tural Production of the Republic of Cuba'J
/Tex~ Significant reform.s have been carried out in the national economy
of the Republic of Cuba, especially in agriculture, during the 20 yeaxs
following the victory of the revolution. At present on more than 80 per-
cent of the agricultural land production is organized on the basis of a
- higher form of socialist property and extensive work on collectivization
based on the principle of voluntary ~axticipation is carried out. These _
refc~rms are aimed et the formation of a new economic structure and at the
establishment of the necessar~ be,se for graduslly bringing the level of ~
development of the national economy oP the Republic of Cuba cloaer to and
equalizing it with the levels of other CII~IA members.
Ir. 1959 Vast efforts were made to develop agriculture and to introduce
advanced agricultural technology. Hundreds of thousands of hectaxes of
virgin land were developed and included in agricultural production, which
- doubled the cultivated areas. Among the ma~or agricultural crops speciel
place is assigned to sugar cane, which occupies an area of 1,511+,000 hec-
tares, as well as to rice, which occupies 180,000 hectares and whose cul-
~ tivation is fully mechanized. Citrus crops are growii on more than
100,000 hectares and tobacco, on 70,000 hectares.
- More than 7.3 million tons of raw sugar were obtained in 1978, which is
the second indicator in its magnitude in the country's history. In 1978,
as compared with 1977, the volume of raw sugar increased by more than 11
_ percent.
In 1.978, as compared with 1977, the procurement oP citrus crops increased
by 28 percent and of root crops and vegetables, by more than 20 percent,
totaling approximately 1.1 million tons, and of cocoa, by more than 15
_ percent.
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- There is no doubt that Cuba's entry into the Council for Economic Mutual
Assistance acquires ever greater importance for the process of transfor-
matio.n and developmen~ of the country's national economy.
The existing forms af cooperation among CE~IA membera enable them to re-
ceive long-term credits, to engage in mutual deliveries and in an ex-
change of technology and scientific and ter_hnical documentation of a sig-�
nificant value and to train technical personnel and skilled workers for
utilization at various cooperation pro~ects in the country.
Discussing this aspect, we cannot fail to note the valuable assistance
received by our ministry from CII~IA members. Man~y specialists from the
Soviet Union and Bulgaria gave us great help in the development of irri-
gation systems and livestock breeding sectors ancl continue to do so.
. The significant contribution of the USSR to the development and imple-
mentation of the long-term plan for the mechanization of Cuban agricul-
ture should also be noted.
Other CEMA members--the Hungaxian People's Republic, the German Democrat-
ic Republic, the Polish People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic--cooperated with our country in the area of veterinary science,
- plant protection, poultry breeding, mechanization of agricultural pro-
duction, genetics of cattle and artificial insemination and continue to
do so.
This cooperation enabled us to improve the skills of Cuban specialists,
to exchange experience in almos~ all agricultural sectors and to conduct
- ~oint investigations aimed at obtaining new varieties and improving the
techniques of inechanization of soil cultivation, as well as at refining
methods of selection in hog breeding, organizing agrochemical services in
the country and testing agricultural crops and various machines and equig-
ment under tropical conditions.
In the last few years the participation of the Republic of Cuba in CEMA
activities has increased considerably and at present there is a seaxch
for economically effective solutions for a large number of scientific,
technical and economic problems of agricultural production.
The extensive utilization of combines for the harvesting of sugar cane and
of equipment for irrigation and nitrogen fertili2ers, which we were able
_ to receive owing to the cooperation with the countries of the socialist
camp, is an example of the cooperation in the field of agriculture.
Instead of the 9,000 tractors available bePore the revolution todey there -
- are more than 50,000 large-capacity tractors in the country. A national
network of repair shops and service stations is developing.
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The achievements in the harvesting of sugar cane resulting from the use
of combines are of gree,t importance. Almost one-half of all the proc- -
esses in the ha.rvesting of this crop have been mechanized. It can be
stated that the KTP-1 cane harvesting combine and its improved variant
KTP-�2, whose design we developed in cooperation with the USSR, plsyed a
decisive role in the mechanize,tion of haxvesting and continues to do so.
The plant for the production of these combines in the country's eastern
province Holguin was built with the help of the USSR.
Cuban and Soviet specialists participated in the modernization of the
Soviet-made sugar cane loader, which made it possible to mechanize the
loading of manually felled sugar cane on transport facilities 98 percent.
Our country takes part in the development of the International Machine
System carried out by CEMA members for sev~ral years. From 1973 we have
gradually ~oined in this activity, taking into consideration its great
importance for Cuba. The countries that produce agricultural equipment
now can take into consideration the technical and agrotechnical require-
ments when developing agricultural machinery and equipment for our
country.
We consider Cuba's participation in the national and international tests
of agricultural and timber machines very important. In our opinion,
- within the framework of this work it would be advisable to establish in
Cuba an international testing station, which would meet the requirements
of the testing of machines of CIIKA members under tropical conditions.
The need far the establishment of such a station is also confirmed by the
considerations of its further possible use in Latin American and other
countries with climatic conditions similar to ours.
The application of CEMA standards when testing tractors and agricultural
and timber machines in Cuba represents a significant step forward in sci-
ence and technology and once again stresses the need to establish an in- _
ternational testing station in our country.
In 1977 Cuba signed an agreement on multilateral specialization and co-
' operation of the prod.uction of equipment for the repair and technical
servicing of agricultural machinery, which enables us to receive highly
specialized equipment not produced serially, a large part of which cannot
be received on the basis of regulax trade.
Cuba's pasticipation in the international competitions of plow operators
of CEMA countries enables us to improve plowing production operations, to
familiarize our machine operators with the latest equipment and to devel-
op and strengthen friendship among the agricultural workers of CEMA
countries.
The results obtained in the use of the new irrigation systems (especially
sprinkliiig systems) for almost all agricultural crops are also stgn~icant.
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- We must not fail to note the advantage that the paxticipation in the
implementation of the long-term specific cooperation programs approved
at the 32d meeting of the council's session gives Cuba. These programs
map out not only the development of our traditional sectors, but also
contribute to an accelerated development of some other sectors.
Among the most important measures for our national econo~y the country's
specialization within the CEMA framework in the production of citrus
crops and sugar can be mentioned. At present the interested CE~1A mem-
bers examine the drafts of long-term agreements with technical and econ-
omic substantiations. According to these agreements, the export of cit-
_ rus crops to CII+~A countries in subsequent yeaxs should increase approxi-
mately by a factor of 9.1 and the export of sugar, by more than 25
percent.
For an overall fulfillment of these two programs for cooperation among
CEMA members in our country provision has been made for an expansion of
plantations, establishment of new irrigation systems, construction of
sugar plants, expansion of ports, construction of refrigeratos and a,c-
quisition of modern machines and transport facilities.
A successful fulfillment of these long-term agreements on multilateral
cooperation will make it possible to more fully integrate the national
economy of Cuba with the national economies of other Cr`~IA countries and
will create the material basis for the further development of agricul-
ture and the food industry in Cuba. In turn, the increasi.ng needs of
CEMA members for citrus crops and sugar will be met to an ever greater
extent.
Provision has also been made for Cuba's active paxticipation in the work
of the international economic association the International Center for
- Poultry Breeding, which will make it possible to give an ob~ective eval-
uation of the possibilities of our genetic stocks and to obtain new gen-
- etic materials.
Our country's accession to the agreement on multilateral specialization
and a mutual use of the genetic stocks of cattle of black-and-white
breeds contributed to an intensified cooperation with CEMA members in
_ problems of selection, breeding and improvement of the dairy properties
of cattle.
Cuba's official accession to the agreement on multilateral specialization
and cooperation of the production of veterinary preparations is envisaged
this year. This will enable us to acquire certain drugs, which axe
scarce in our country and which we now receive from capitalist countries,
as well as to offer some Cuban-made biological preparations.
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We must note another important problem, which was discussed ~t the Per-
manent CEMA Commission on Agriculture and which is of special importence
for our country, that is, the eatablishment in Cuba of a station for the
international testing, selection and production of seeds of some agricul-
tural crops.
~ The station could operate as the head institution managing scientific ac-
tivity in the field of genetics, selection and testing of varieties in
the country and be the center for the introduction of materials of plant
origin, as well as for the testing and reproduction under our conditions
of species and varieties of agricultural crops of interest for all CEMA
members.
Most of the work done within the framework of the Permanent CEMA Commis-
sion on Agriculture is very useful for Cuba, which ever more actively
- ~oins in the processes of specialization, cooperation and integration
of agricultural production.
We are convinced that the solution of these and a number of other prob-
_ lems, which we did not mention here, will contribute to the further -
~ strengthening of reliable friendship and multilateral cooperation among
CEMA members.
COPYRIGHT: Sovet Ekonomicheskoy Vzaimopomoshchi
Sekretariat Moskva 1979
11,439
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- ~UATEMALA
BRIEFS
- EGP SAID OCCUPYING TOWNS--Mexico City, 13 Jan (PL)--The Mexican paper
EXCELSIOR has reported that the Guatemalan poor people's guerrilla army
[EGP] has occupied several towns and villages on the Pacific Coast of
Guatemala. The Mexican paper reports that a communique released to the -
media here claims that the Luis Turcio Lima ~uerrilla front of the EGP _
occupied the town of Chirin and other areas near Mazatenango in Suchitepe-
quez department. The communique states that Heledoro Pelaez, chief of the
military ~arrison and a member of the death squad, was executed when he
resisted. [Texc] [PA132244 Havana PRELA in Spanish 1910 GMT 13 Jan 80 PA] _
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PERU
- BRIEFS _
DEATHS, INJURIES IN PEASANT BATTLE--L3ma, 13 Jan (PL)--The newspaper -
LA PRENSA reported today that a confrontation among peasants from six -
communities who attempted to occupy property owned by a cooperative in
- Huancavelica left six dead and three injured. According to the report, -
- the violence occurred when Deputy Land Magistrate Augustin Lapouble Cherds,
- accompanied by a group of police, went to Los Limites, Huinan, Puca~ocha
and Achapata, owned by No 40 limited cooperative. According to the paper,
~ the communities had reportedly attempted to invade Jarahuasa lots 1 and 2,
25 lan from Huancavelica (440 lan southeast of Lima and the capital of
- Huancavelica). LA PRENSA added that when the nagistrate appeared for a -
~ firsthand inspection, the peasants of the six communities objected to his -
- presence and attacked the vehicle in which the team of 1~5 police were -
traveling, using sticks and stones. Members of the cooperative then inter-
vened in defense of the policemen. In the ensuing conf rontaeion, some
persons were killed, wounded or bruised, tihe latter including some`police-
men. The incident is reported only by LA PRENSA, which gives no precise
details regarding the exact causes of the deatris or the participation of
the variQUS sectors in the conf lict. [Text] [PA140109 Lima PRELA in
Spanish to PRELA Havana 1915 GMT 13 Jan 80 PA]
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