JPRS ID: 9081 LATIN AMERICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-R~P82-00850R0002000500'18-5
P0L _ _ _ AND M I L ' . ~ ~ ~
11 FEBRURRY 1g88 CFOUO 1~80) 1 OF 1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/8J 16
11 February 1980
China Re ort -
p _
, POLiTICAI, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
- CFOUO 1 /80)
F~BIS FOF~EIGiV BROADC~?ST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5
NOTE
lPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources -
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
- other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt) in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- _
mation was summarized or extracted. -
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
_ tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as _
given by source.
The contents of this oublication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Governnent.
~
I'or ftir.tl~~r inform~~tion an report content
call ~703~ 351-?77~ (political, socio-
logical, military); 351-2780 (economic,
science and technol.ogy). .
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING (%W~IERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REOUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICII,L USE O~~TLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/8916
11 February 1980
~H I NA REPO RT
;
POLITICAL~ $OCIOLOGICAL AND I~ILITARY AFFAIRS
' (FOUO i/so)
CONTENTS PAGE
- MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY -
~ Role of Submaxine in Chinese Nava1 Strategy I}iscussed
(Ch'en Kuan; HSIEN TAI CHITN SHIH, 1 Jan 80) 1
Chinese Ground Forces: Soviet Review and Coirmient
(A. Marov, V. Timofeyev; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE .
OBOZRENIYE, Sep 79) 8
- a - [III - CC - 80 FOUO]
FQR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5
FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY
MI~ITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY ~
ROLE OF SUBMARINE IN CHINESE NAVAL STRATEGY DISCUSSED
Hong Kong HSIEN TAI CHUN SHIH [CONMILIT] in Chinese,l,Jan 80 pp 17-22
[Article by Ch'en huan [7115 0385)]
' [Text~ By paying a high price and at r_onsiderable sacrifice, the Chinese
are building their country into one of the world's top military powers.
China's military expansion is considered a necessary step in realizing the
country's objectives.
_ China's national objectives must be supported by a strong military f.orce, -
to do the following:
--guarantee territorial integrity and security;
--assure that China wi11 be a developmental model for the nations of Asia
and for other developing countries and will be accepted as the leader of
the Third World.
- To mention security of Chinese territory does not nec~essarily imply that the _
United States and Soviet Union harbor imperialist ambitions; it simply means -
tt~at the Chinese believe this threat exists. The deployment and defensive
nature of China's armed forces, China's untiring development of nuclear
_ weapons, and the Chinese Government's public statements still make it clear -
th~t China is still concerned for irs territorial security. '
In order to achieve these objectives, Beijing has bpgun to seek a"nuclear
safeguard," and the most practical method is to d~velop its own reta~iatory
force to avoid being destroyed in a preemptive nuclear attack by its enemies,
= and in addition to deal its enemies a heavy political blow and put them in
a hopeless position. Such a strike could be delivered by a s~all, apparcently
inferior unit, and accordingly it can well be imagLned that Bei~ing believes _
that even if China's nuclear retaliatory force is very small, it still can `
deter the "paper tigers."
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5
F~R OFFICIAL USE ONLY
But this does not mean that if China has a deterrent force which can just -
harel~� protect it, it has no intention of developing a strong strategic
offensive capability. The retaliatory capability is necessary to guarantee
its superpower status and to protect its territory, but in the "limited
- dispute" and the national liberation struggle, only the deterrent effect of
Chinese strategic offensive systPms can eliminate the nuclear threat from
the other superpowers. Accordingly such a strategic offensive capability
is necessary for the Chinese to influence the underdeveloped nation~ and
use them to op~n a new front.
Serving National Objectives
The Chinese stress that because in the last 150 years the invasions and
humiliations suffered by China have almost all come from the sea, building
a strong navy is a sacred historical task of tne Chinese people. Curren~ly
Soviet warships arrogantly sail along the Chinese coast, and the stationing
_ of a Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean has increased the threat to China.
Japan has the potential to become a naval power again. In the per~od encom-
~ passing the Korean F1ar, the Taiwan Straits crisis and the Vietnam W;~r, the
United States Navy roamed China's coasts unchecked and with impunity. All
of this has unceasingly warned China that the caast requires a strong
~ modern navy to protect it. China's current naval strategv i~ atill built
around coastal defense, as it has been since the la*e fifties w~hen the
Soviet Navy departed. However, as the Chinese Na~. has continually increased
in size, improved technically and acquiced greatE experience, its options
have expanded. Beijing will discover that a different strategy is more
suited to its aims.
Most deserving of attention is the fact that in C~~ina's naval expansion it
has no need to f.ollow in the footsteps of other naval powers. Beijing has
already expressed the view that taking others' outmoded paths of technologi-
cal development is "crawlism." Accordingly, China must break with tradition
and do everything possible to absorb other countries' advanced experience.
- Submarines and Naval Strategy ~
China's submarine force has already expanded from its initial eight obsoles-
cent Soviet boats to a current 70-plus, with the added submarines being
primarily ones develored by China using indigenous resources and methods.
The submarine force is still defensive and is still a system of weapons to
~ be used by a weaker nation in dealing with muc:h stronger naval powers.
Beijing's stress on submarine production does not mean that China is content -
with its interior naval position. The successful deployment oE a nuclear-
powered submarine has already shattered the traditional concept of submarine
use, because a nuclear-powered submarine is not only an effective offensive
weapon, but is also the main force of the superpowers' navies. Chinese
deployment of nuclear-powered submarines may well mark a milestone in
Chinese naval strategy's transition from defense to offense.
Conceptually, the historical foundation of the theory of developing a nuclear-
powered attack ~ubmarine (SSN) combined the following elements: defen~_~ in
2 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5
FGR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
depth; interdiction of sea lanes; protection of ocean commerce; countering
the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) threat of potential
enemies; and establishing prestige. Let us discuss these elements one by -
one with reference to Beijing's naval strategy and political ob~ectives.
Defense in depth. China's zone of sL~marine activity is almost entirely
- within 90 miles of its coastline. But this ocean area has a maximum depth
of about 150 meters, and generally is much shallower. The shallow water
increases the danger of high-speed underwater navigation, because of the
possibility of hitting bottom. On the other hand it imposes limitations
on the great capabilities of modern nuclear-powered submarines. In addition, -
- in doing battle near the coast the continuous sailing capabilities and rangE~
of nuclear submarines are unnecessary. Accordingly, the cost effectiveness
of such a plan becomes a grave problem.
The capabilities of such Chinese-produced diesel-powered submarines as the
Romeo class are great. The Romeo has a submerged cruising range (submerged
or with snorkel) of easily 3,000 miles, and cs~n stay at sea for 30 days.
On r_onventional patrol (at much less than its maximutq capability) it can
reach a sea area 1,040 miles from base and "roam" for 520 nautical miles
in its patrol zone, If it takes 6 days to reach its patrol area (12 days
~ round trip), then each patrol can last 18 days. Range ares centered on the
_ Shanghai and Yu-lin-kang bases encompass the entire Yellow Sea and South
China Sea as well as most of the Japan Sea and PhilippinP Sea, and extend _
into the Indian and Pacific Oceans. If China chooses an island in the
South China Sea as a submarine base. these patro2 zones wi11 be further
expanded. But the expanded submaYine patrol area that would result would
be of offensive significance.
The use of r.uclear-powered attack submarines for defense in depth may have
been temporarily shelved by Beijing until it needs to expand its submarine
_ combat area outside the area accessib~e to conventionally-pow~,red submarines.
Interdiction of sea lanes. Interdiction of sea lanes is an offensive tactic, _
and other than the sea lanes within China's defensive area, sea lanes are
probahly not currently an object of concern to the Chinese Navy. All sea
lanes within its defensive radius could be controlled by Romeo class sub-
marines. If China's nuclear-powered attack submarines appeared in
relatively large numbers in the ~icinity of the United States Seventh Fleet,
they would be viewed l~y the Americans as a threat, and America would have
to maintain or reinforce its current strength in the Western Pacific. Such
, a strengthening of American power in the Western Pacific is not desired by
Beijin~;.
Guaranteeing ocean commerce. China's merchant marine is expanding steadily,
- and the area which it plies is increasing, while the facilities them~elves
are being modernized in accordance with Beijing's desire tc extend Chinese
influence and prestige throughout the world. This type of expansion requires
a certain guarantee of the security and free access to international sea
lanes, and the current Chinese Navy is not strong enough to provide such
guarantees. Guaranteeing the security of international sea lanes requires ~
' strong long-range surface ships, an air for~e which at leas'.- will not hand
3
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5
rux vrr lvtEw u~r. U1VLI
over air superiorzty to the enemy, and a long-range submarine force. It
~ appears that China still has not given serious consideration to this objec-
tive and developed the necessary ;.~urface and air forces. Moreover, China
- could not si.mply build nuclear-powered attack submarines for this purpose
~~ithout having surfa~e and air forces. Currently China seems content with
the equilibrium bet~.7een the naval superpowers ancl the maintenance of inter-
- national sea lanes for the use of all.
Countering the SSBN's of . potential enemy. ror China, creating and main-
- taining a nuclear-powered attack submarine force, staffing it with high- -
_ qunlity personnel and enabling it to counter the threat of Soviet and
United States nuclear-powered balli~tic missile submarines is currently -
not very feasible. _ Beijing'~s only countermeasure against this type of
threat (real or imagined) is deterrence. Beijing knaws that even the
United States and the USSR cannot deploy nuclear-powered attack sub forces
sufficient to overcome each other's nuclear missi_le submari.ne forces, so
that it is extremely realistic for China not to make the attempt.
Establishing prestige. Judgic;g by the laclc of strategic or tactical m~tiva-
tions for a Chinese nlan to develo~ a nuclear-powered attack submarine,
we can only believe that i.ts ~urpose is to establish prestlge. 'i'l~us we
may consider that the "prestige" er~bodied in a nuclear-powered attack sub
resu].ts mainly from its nuclear propulsion system~ Since this prestige
would also accrue a:iy nuclear-powered submarine, in ~he case of a nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarine the prestige would be even greater. _
Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarir?es -
_ One of Beijing's problems is that the level of economic resources and -
national economic output that must be allocated to military items entails
a sacri{ice of agricultural production, light industrial goods and consumer
goods. The fastest and cheapest route to impl;:mentation of China's national
goals with a stress on the military is to use a nu~lear-powered ballistic
missile submarine force. Because it both has strategic deterrent value and
can function as an c,ffensive weapon system, such a force could give the
greates[ return on investment and capital, would provide powerful support
in case of nuclear blackmail, and would raise China's international prestige
and standing above the actual strategic value of this type of system.
Starting out from China's naval bases and carrying a 2,000 nautical mile
missile system, a submarine would have a rather wide range of targets at
which it could strike. Of. particularly great significance are the following
' Eactors: a boat in the Ir.dian Ocean could include the European USSR among
its targets; and a boat setting out from the Chinese mainland could very
. easily reach an operating arua from which it could include Hawaii and the
- U.S. mainland within its 2,~00 NM range. In view of China's economic and
military (particularly naval) aid to Tanzania, Sri Lanka and Pakisran,
Chinese SSBN's could possihly use these friendly nations' port facilities
_ in the In3ian Ocean, so that Lhe Chinese Navy's tar~et areas could be
greatly expanded.
4
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5
I
_ ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The Nuclear Submarine and Deterrence
Westerners generally consider that a deterrent force can only have its
intended deterrent effect when it is understood by potential enemies and -
- when its effectiveness is constantly proven. But from the viewpoint of
_ Chinese fear and suspicion of foreigners, if you can prevent potential enemies
from getting any information it does not necessarily decrease your credibility
but may cause an enemy to overestimate China's strength. In that case it is
incorrect to c~nsider that the fact that China makes little public mention
of nuclear-powered submarine production and SLBM's means that Beijing is _
not concerned about and is not developing these systems. Similarly, it would
be a very costly error to bel~.eve that before the capability of these systems
_ is demonstrated they cannot be used as a deterrent.
The Chinese may think that deploying an SSBN, even with its combat capa-
bilities unproven and with its missiles and their potential unknown to
outsiders, can still produce a"fear" mentality in the USSR and the United
States, and thus will effectively put an end t~ the period in which these
two superpowers can threaten China with impunity. The high survivability
of the SSBN has already incontrovertibly established its credibility as a
- strategic deterrent. The idea o` "defense" may be used by Beijing to avoid
" at*_racting undesirable attention, and thys may be consistent with Beijing's
declaration that China "will not be the first to use" nuclear weapons a.r,~
that its purpose in developing them is pure~y defensive. The most classic
of these statements came in September 1969, when China, having completed
two nuclear weapons tests, once again assured the woXld that it was develop-
ing nuclear weapons only for defensive purposes and in order to break the
two superpowers' nuclear monopoly. Chinese officials stated that China -
would never uncier any conditions be the first to use nuclear weapons.
But why not rely on land-based ballistic missiles or conventionally-powered
submarines? Because if a country is to nave an effective nuclear deterrent
its total system must be able to deter both a lim~ted nuclear attack and
a large-scale nuclear attack. This additional condition requires that it ~
acquirE all types of weapons and delivery systems. Similarly, in oruer to
guarantee that the basic nuclear retaliatory capability will not be
eliminated by a defensive system or engineering breakthrough, it must have
ditferent types of deterrent systems. The nuclear-powered missile submarines
are mobile over an extensive launching area, so that it is even harder for
weapans systems to defend against it, and a higher price must be paid; this
is an advantage which land-based missiles, whose warheads can be launched
onl.y at a limited target area, do not possess. A1Chough land-based missiles
can be a portion of the oversll deterrent force, they cannot stand alone, -
nor is it possible to rely solely on numbers to replace the effect of an
SSBN force. _
_ A deterrent force based or. conventionally-powered missile submarines (SSB's)
is not a desirable option for ~ha Chinese, because nuclear-powered suomarines
have already been deployed. Lf Bei~ing adopts this approach it will lose
- 5 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240050018-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
international prestige. Moreover, conventionally-powered submarines will
be subject to serious limitations on their range and continuous cruising
capability. It is also impossible to use conventionally-powered missile
- submarines as a temporary deterrent force, because this will greatly weaken
the ultimate international effect af deployment of nuclear-powered submarines,
and will also increase the Chinese economic burden. It is believed that
~ China's only Golf class conventionally-powered missile submarine is a research
_ and development boat, and that China will not be likely to continue producing
this cl~ss of s ubmarine.
_ The Han Class Submarine
When a country first uses nuclear power in a new-design, streamlined submarine,
the danger of f ailure is very great. Accordingly, it should not install its
first set of SLBM systems developed by domestic methods and with domestic
_ resources on this submarine, thus further decreasing its probability of
success. If the Han class nuclear-powered attack submarine'spower plant
proves unsatisfactory, they could produce another hull ~ntil an acceptable,
high power, long-cruising-time system is successfully tested. Accordingly
the Han class nuclear-powered attack submarine is an experimental submarine
- for testing the nuclear propulsion system rather than the prototypF of a
nuclear-powered attack sub force. China's goal is to deploy an SSBN force, -
and in the interim to create one or several nuclear-powered attack subs in
order to take some of the logical steps on the way, and does not constitute _
' a change of strategy.
China i~as thus far not made any major alterations in the defensive naval
strategy which it inherited from r_he Soviet Union. Accordingly its naval
force will naturally be a"guerrilla" force--an extension of the PLA. Sub-
marines, gunboats and missile subs have given this force a naval combat
capability, but it can only conduct combat acrording to Mao Zedong's hit-and- -
run theory. Thus we may believe that the decision to modernize China's navy
from a guerrilla--type force to a strategic nuclear deterrent was a decision
taken in the mid-sixties during the Sino-Soviet split and after China had
achieved several successes in the development of ballistic missile submarines.
This decision was in accordance with China's national goals and economic
capabilities. But progress in this direction was shattered by political
turmoil (the Cultural Revolution, the Lin Biao incident, the "gang of four's"
anti-parcy action and attempts to disrupt the military), unfareseen economic
difficulties and ultimately by Mao's death. However, the Chinese have felt -
_ deeply for a long time that it was reasonable and logical to favor nuclear-
powered missile submarines; but when will the outside world finally see this
Chinese SSBN with its own eyes? This is not yet known.
[Inset, p 22] China's Romeo Class Middle-Size Conventionally-Powered Parol
Submarine Displacement: 1,100 tons at surface, 1,600 tons submerged.
Dimensions: 75 meters long, 7.3 meters wide, draft 4.4 meters.
Power plant: 'I~ao 2,000-HP diesel engines; two 2,000-HP electric engines
twin screws.
6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240050018-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Capabilities: Surface speed 17 knots. Sub~~ierged speed 14 knots. Capable
of traveling 11,294 nautical miles at 10 knnt surface speed.
Armament. Six 533-mm forward torpedo tubes; forward storage for 18 turpedoes
- or 36 submarine mines.
Crew: ~65.
CF~ina received four Romeo-class submarines from the Soviet Union in the early
sixties and began to produce them on its own in 1962. Currently 50 Romeo
- class subs are on naval service, with npw ones being produced at the rate of
six per~ year. It is reported that 3 new enlarged Romeo variant has gone
into service; it is longer than the Romeo by 2 meters, has a surface displace-
ment of 1,400 tons and a submerged displacement of 1,800 tons, and has eight
- 533-mm torpedo tubes.
China gave North Korea two Fomeo class submarines in 1973, two in 19 74 and
three in 1975. Subsequently, North Korea has produced two of its own.
CQPYRIGHT: Conmiliti Press, Hong Kong, 1980
8480
CSO: 4005
~
7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MILITARY A1~TD PUBLIC SECURITY
CHINESE GROUND FURCES t SOVIET REVIEW AND COA4~'~h'T
~ Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 9, Sep ?9 signed to
press 1+ Sep 79 pp 21-26 ~
[Article by Col A. Marov and Lt Col V. Timofeyevi "The Ground Forces of
China" ~
~ [Text~ As the foreign press reports, the military and political leadership
of China is, as before~ continuing a policy of militaxizing the countxy in
order to realize its far reaching great power aspixations. Today, the
policy of the Beijing leaders is quite close to the positions of the most
extreme reactionaxies in all the world--from the militarists and enemies
of relaxing tensions in the Western countries to the racists of Southern
Rhodesia and the fasci~t rulers of Chile.
In striving to carry out the great khan ideas and achieve world domination,
the Maoists extol war in every way possible. Beijing regards a new world _
war as one of the major ways to achieve China's hegemony over all the world.
In this regard~ the main consideration is placed on a conflict between the
Soviet Union and the United States, the results of which the Beijing lead-
ers wo uld like to use to realize their military and political goa.ls.
Beijing is actively coming out a~a.inst the peaceful p~oposals of the Soviet
Union and ~the other countries of the socialist commonwealth~ it is continu-
ing to discredit the Conference on European Security and Cooperation~ it is
advertising its hostility to the USSR, and it is ~emanding the strengthening
- of the military p~ega.rations of the United States and NAZU with clearly
~ovocative purposes.
The aggressive intentions of the Beijing leadership are confirmed by the -
war unleashed by China in February of this year against socialist Vietnam.
_ This was one of Beijing's dangerous p~ovocations and adventures against
sovereign states. This aggression also testifies to the unremitting attempts
of the Maoists to plunge the world into the abyss of a destructive war.
When speaking to the voters of Moscow's $aumanskiy election district~ comrade ,
L. I. Brez~nev, general secretary of the CPSU ~entral Committee and chairman
_ 8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200054418-5
FOR OFFICIAL JSE ONLY
of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, saidt "By their unprecedently
blatant and lawless attack on a neighboring small country--socialist Viet-
nam--the present Beijing rulers ha.ve once and for all revealed to the whole
world the per~idious and aggressive essence of the ~eat power hegemotiistic
policy being conducted by them. Now, everyone sees that this policy at the
present time regresents the most seTious threat to peace in all the wc,rld.." -
Thinking that military might is the main factor for transforming China into
a strong power~ the Beijing leaders~ as the foreign pr~ss r~ports~ are pur-
suing ever more stubbornly and persistently a policy of building up the
country's military and economic potential, equipping the armed forces with
modern combat equipment~ imp~oving the organizational structure of large _
units and units, and raising-li~e combat and operatianal txaining level of the
i troops and staffs. In doing this, a lot of attention is bein~ devoted to `
the ground forces.
Organization. The ground forces, in the estimation of foreign military
specialists and in ticular in tha.t of the author of the book "Kitayskaya
voyennaya. systema" ~e Chinese Military System]--the dmerican H. Nelson,
- are the basis of the Chinese armed forces and number more than 3 miliion
people (more than 80 percent of th.~ oyerall number of armed forces). The
Chinese command assigns them the main role in the destruction of an opposing
enemy. The tasks of inflicting decisive blows on his troop groupings~
seizing territory~ and holding on to occupied defense lines and areas in
c~ordination with the other branches of the armed forces~ have been placed `
on them.
The book po~.nts out that there is no ground force headquarters in China. _
Its functions are performed by the general staff whose chief is also the
commander of this branch of the armed forces. The large units, units and
subunits of the ground forces are located in the 11 category 1(large) -
military districts into which China's territory is divided from a military
administrative respect. Xinjiar~g, Lanzhou� Beijing, Shenyang~ Chengdu, Wuhan,
Nanjing, Jinan~ Fuzhou, Kunming~ and Guangzhou. Tha headquarters of the =
~ Xinjiang district is located in the city of Urumqi, and those of the others
in the cities of the same name. The large military districts are subdivided
into provincial ones (two-three in each).
The ground forces consist of field and local forces. The former axe sub-
ordinate to the command element of the category 1 military districts, and _
the latter to the headquarters of the provincial districts. -
The field forces are composed of infantry~ airborne and armored troops;
artillery; and special troops--chemical, engineer~ signal, and railroad. -
- Thsy are meant to carry out comba.t missions in any area of the country and
beyond its borders.
The main and most numerous branch is the infantry. The p~imary task of
destroying an enemy, seizing,and holding positions has been placed on it.
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850ROOQ2QOQ5Q018-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Accor3ing to foreign ~ess information~ orga,nizationally it has 121 infantry _
divisions as well as other units and subunits.
The airborne forces (three divisions) ase the most maneuverable and mobile.
They are capa.ble of conducting comba.t operations both in the enomy's rear
and with troops operating at the front.
In the opinion of the Chinese command, armored troops are the shock forces
of the ground forces and the decisive means for achieving su~cess in an -
attack. As the foreign press reports, they have been brought together into
12 tank divisions which form the reserve of the High Command.
_ Artillery is considered to be the grimary firing force for sup~sessing and
- destroying enemy ta.nks, artillery~ personnel, and other objectives. It is -
composed of 20 artillery divisions as well as a large number of axtillery
units and subunits orga.niza.tionally includsd in the combined arms large units
and units. As the English reference book the Military Balance reports, they
are armed with about 18~000 guns, more tha.n 20,000 mortars, and a large
number of multiple firing rocket systems and antitank systems. _
The chemical troops consist basically of a sma.ll number of sepa r ate xegi-
ments and the chemical defense batta.lions and companies included respectively
_ in the composition of army corps and infantry divisions.
Engineer troops are grouped together in engineer construction divisions and -
separate regiments (construction~ pontor.-bridge, and others) which are
subordinate to the commanders of the militaxy districts and the main direct-
orate of the rear (all told up to 30 regiments~. In addition, each infantry _
division has one combat engineer battalion.
Signal troops consist of separate regiments and battalions located in the
composition of army corps and divisions. d1s H. Nelson notes in his book~
they are insufficiently equipped with modern technical equipment and primar-
ily use wire communications.
The composi.tion of the railroad troops nt~rnters 15 division which axe engag- _
ed in the construction and repair of railroads. Sometimes~ the duty of
mainta.ining sepaxate railroad lines is imposed on them.
A.s Nelson points out, the majority of field force divisions are grouped
together into 38 army corps of the fi~]lowing types~ reinforced~ heavy, _
- light, and mountain infantry. They differ from each other in their purpose,
orga,nization, arms, transport equipment, and number of personnel.
In the estimation of foreign military specialists, the reinforced army
corps is the highest ta.ctical large unit which possesses comparatively
high mobility. It is capable of transporting at one time no less than one-
thisd of the personnel in the infantry units using its own transport equip-
ment. It has been noted ~hat the fire power of this :Large unit is ra,ther _
1_ 0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
great. The corps is designed for o~Prations on level terrain or in areas
with a well developed road system. Normally, its large units and units �
- are located'at a considerable distance from the state border on the main
operational avenues, and are primarily intended for conducting mobile combat
operations.
A ccording to inforniation in the book "Kitayskay voyennaya sistema"~ the
corps numbers about 50~000 men. Its armament includest 279 medium and
- 30 light tanks; 12 152-mm and 48 122-mm howitzers; 48 122-mm guns; 48
76-mm howitzers; 36 76-mm guns; 36 120-mm~ 253 82-mm and 168 60-mm mortars;
12 85-mm and 324 57-mm antitar~k guns; ~F each 75-mm and 57-mm-recoilless -
_ weapons; 72 37-mm antiaircraft guns; about 200 armored personnel caxriers,
. and 2,385 trucks. -
A heavy army corps is equipped with lighter weapons and a lesser am~unt of
comba.t equipment as compared to a reinforced corps. It is intended for the
conducting of com'~at operations iri areas with difficult terrain relief.
The light and mountain infant.ry army corps axe intended for operations
under special conditions (forest massifs, swampy flood lands, individua.l
islands, mounta.ins, and mounta.in platea.us~ .
Irifantry divisions are subd~vlded into the same ty~es as the army corps and
differ from each other in the numerical and qualitative composition of
- weapons and combat equipment. They consist of three infantry and one
artillery regiment, a ta.nk destroyer battalion, an antiaircraft artillery
battalion, and other combat support and service subunits. Besides the above
listed units and subunits, a reinforced. infantry division has a tank regi-
~ ment (93 tanks).
Local forces are a component paxt of the Chinese ground forces and~ in the
opinion of the author of the book "Kitayskaya, voyennaya sistema"~ are
intended for the conducting of comba.t operations iaith the field forces
primarily within the limits of those provincial districts to whose command
they axe subordinate. They axe also enlisted in the defense and protection
of important objects and structures, the battle against enemy sabota,ge and
reconnaissance groups, the supgression of antigovernment demons-~.sations, etc.
At the present time, they number as THE MILITARY BALANGE reports-- 70
divisions and ~30 separate regiments. It notes that local forces are equipp-
ed with more obsolescent weapons and have extremel~ less transport equipment
than large units and units in the field forces.
Grouping. Accor.ding to data from the London Institute for Strategic
Studies, the major forces of the Chinese ground troops axe concentrated in
-the border areas with the USSR and MPR [IK~r~1~,an People's Republic]. A
- total of 75 field force divisions (more than half of the overall total~ and !
33 local force divisions axe located here; In north and northeast China
(Shenyang and Beijing military districts) 55 field f'orce divisions and
25 local force ones, north and northwest China (Lanzhou and Xinjiang military _
- districts) 20 and 8 respectively.
11
FOR OF~'ICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
In east and southeast China (Jinan, Nanjing, Fuzhou~ and Guangzhou military
districts) there axe 28 field force divisions and 18 local force; in central '
China (Wuhan Military District) 12 field force divisions and 11 local
force divisions as well as the three airborne di~~isions; and in west and
southwest China (Chengdu and Kumming~-- 18 and 8 repectively.
An especially important role is allotted to the Wuhan Military District
whose ground force grouping is regarded by the Chinese militaxy leadership
as the strategic reserve, The presence in centxal China of a developed -
road and wa,ter network permits the Chinese command to move, when necessary,
the ].arge units and units of this grouping to any axea of the country.
Recruitmeiit and service ase orga,nized in accordance with the law, "Active -
Militaxy Service" adopted in 1978. The period of service for servicemen in
the ground forces has been set at three years and for voluntaxy admission--
15-20 years.
Levies axe made once each yeax from Oc~ober to February. The draftees
undergo a careful medical examination and a check for loyalty. As a rule~
_ a recruit is sent to a temnorarily formed training unit where he studies
regvlations for two months. and also undergoes drill and firing training.
During this period, the young fighter* is subjected to intense ideological
indoctrination in Maoism, nationalism, chauvinism~ anti-Sovietism and blind
obedience to the chief's orders,
In the estimation of foreign military specialists, the recruit acquixes
during basic training firm skills in handling his individual weapon~ learns
the fundamentals of conducting combat operations as part of a subunit, and
strengthens his physical hasdiness. After this, he is sent to a unit i:o ~
perform further service.
- According to informa.tion in H. Nelson's book, the training of junior command-
ers for the ground forces takes place in special training divisions attach- ~
_ ed to the headquarters of the military districts. The most intelligent
servicemen who are most dedicated to the ideas of Mao Zedong undergo train- _
= ing here. The middle command element is filled by graduates of military
schools or by assigning junior commander_s, who have undergone the apgropriate
training~ to -the positions of platoon commande~s.
Demobiliza.ticn of servicemen~ who have completed the p~escribed service
periods~ norma.lly takes place in April. First~ personnel who do not have
any prospects for service advancement~ are discharged. Personnel, who have
a good technical training in rare military specialties and who are needed
for the forces, are enlisted with their agreement for voluntary service. -
*In 1965~ the system of military ranks in the armed forces was
changed and at the present time the ranks "commander" and "fighter" exist.
12
FOR OFFICIA,L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
~ �
Combat tra.ining in the ground forces is orga,nized so as to further raise
- the comba.t ca~a.bility and combat readiness of large units and units. Major
attention is devoted to making training as close as possible to the actual
conditions of conducting combat operations and to carrying out the specific
_ tasks facing large units (units) as determined by the~r combat designation.
The basic stages in the combat training o~ ground force personnel ares basic -
(individual~ and as part of a subunit (unit~ and laxge unit.
According to the latest reports in the foreign p~ess, the Chinese command at
the present time allots 60 percent of training time to combat training,
30 percent--to ideological indoctrinatior.~ and 10 percent to construction
and econom~c needs. A tota.l of 40 percent ~~f the training time allot~ed
for all combat training is spent on the figh+,ing man's special training and
on tactical exercises.
In forcing trae milita.riza.tion of the country, China's military leadership is
placing prima�ry stress on the troops' field training during whi~h the conduct
of offensive (breakthrough~ envelopment~ turning movement, encirclement,
pursuit}~ defensive~ meeting and night combat is p~actic~ed. 4~ lot of
attention is also being devoted to questions on combating the tanks~ avia-
tion and air assault forces of the enemy; on p~otecting against weapons of
mass destruction; on overcoming na-�ural obstacles; on forcing water barriers; ~
etc. Mao Zedong's "milita.ry ideas" about "actively luring an enemy into
the depths of the territory","concentrating superior forces and wagj.ng a
battle for destruction" etc.~are studied in combination with combat training
assignments. -
.~s the foreign r~ilitaxy press points out, the Chinese comr~and organizes ,
courses and assemblies to retrain the higher command element in order to
~ train commanci cadres for the forces and headquaxters in operations as paxt
of large troop units. During them~ Mao Zedong's "rriilitary ideas" and
strategic and tactical questions are studied, and the direction of large
unit combat operations and the work of headquarters in or.ganizing coordination
between branches when solving specific combat missions are worked on.
_ The Chinese military and political leadership attacr. no small importance in
their plans for further raising the stxiking power c~f the ground forces to
their equipping with modern weapons and comba.t equipment. During the last
ten yeass, according to the I,ondon Institute for Strategic Studies, the
number of tank divisions has increased f.rom 5 to 12 and tanks--up to 10~000.
t~t the p~esent time, the forces have about 40,000 field artillery guns and
mortaxs. Attention is being paid to increasing the maneuverability and fire
_ power of large units and units and their equipping with more modern air
- defense systems and systems for combating tanks.
A large role in the implementation of these plans is assigned to the West. -
Chinese leaders are tryin~ to use the military industrial circles of the -
United Sta,tes and other NATO countries as suppliers of modern types of
weapons and combat equipment. As the foreign p~ess has reported~ China is .
- 13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
displaying great interest in the purchase ofthe English "Harrier" fighter
bomber, helicopters, antiaircraft missile systems, ATGM's~ tanks, antitank
weapons, small arms, and other combat equipment. Attempts are being made -
to conc"lude long term p~rograms for cooperation in the military field with
_ in~iividi.Lal NATO countries.
The analysis of the Chinese ground forces, whictl has been made by foreign
- militaxy specialists, testi.fies that now they axe already one of the larg- -
- est in the world. The country's military and political leadership is
_ taking steps to further increase their comba.t capabilities so that they
~ttst as al1 armed forces in general~ will be capable of carrying out its
hegenonistic great power aspirations. -
PHOZU CAPTIQN
1. p 23. Organization of a reinforced army corps. Diagram from H. Helson's
book "Kitayskaya voyennaya sistema."
2. p 24. Organiza.tion of an infantry division (number of persorLnel
_ 12~900 men, 16 76-m~n howitzers, 1~ 76-mm guns, 12 120-mm mortars~
81 82-mm mortars, ~ 60-mm mortars, 108 57-mm antitank guns,
18 each 75-mm and 57-mm recoiless guns, 1.8 37-mm antiaircraft
guns, ~4 flamethrowers, more than 400 trucks). Diagra~ from
ff, Nelson's book "Kita.yskaya voyennaya sistema,."
3� P 25 Tactical classes in a ground force small unit. Photograph from
the magazine NA'IO's FIFTEEN NATIONS.
- COPYRIGHTs "Zaxubezhnoye voyennoye obozz.reniye", 1979
8802
CSO s 1801 EP1D -
14
FOR OFFICIAL USF. ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200050018-5