JPRS ID: 9061 WORLDWIDE REPORT NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040054-6
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 61
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 54
• Content Type: REPORTS

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~8 1~80 ~ ~ 1 ur 3.
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JPRS L%8885
28 Januar~; 1980 _
, Ja an Re ort
p p _
CFOUO 3/80) _
FBIS FOREI~N BROADCA~~ INFORMATION SERVICE ~
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NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are transl~ated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
- other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted. ~
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically o~ transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- -
tian mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the _
_ original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. '
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication ir~ no way represent the poli- ~
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
' For further information on report content
call (703) 351-30b7 (Japan, Korea,
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JPRS L/88$5
28 ~anuary 1.980
JA~AN REPO~T
c~ovo 3rso) _
CONTENTS PAGE
~~.iTIC~., ,AND SDCIOIAGiCAi~
' JAPAN TIl~:S' Den,ounces Soviet I.nvasioa i~ Afghanistan
{~di~oria~; T~i~ JAPAN Tii~S, 5 3aa 8A) 1 _
JC~'s Mi3?amoto Speaks vn i~ternat~ona~ Si~~at#.oa
~dPS, 2 Jan 80) 4
.~CP's Miy.a,~t~o Spsa.~CS c~a iateraai Sitnatioa
~dPS, 3 Jan 8U) 8
- 'ASAHi' ~Views Couatry's Di~lomatic Difficulties in i980's
(Editori.a~; ASAHi EVENING NE~TS, ifl Jan $fl) 11
P~olit~cs in the Dezade of Eighti.es Aaalyzed
~('~ario~ss so~srce~, 3, 4 Ja.n 80) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 .
Polities 19$0, ~'.diroriai
- ~utur~ of (~ne-~arty Rule, Ed~torial
- '.~APAN '~iP~1ES' Projet:ts Japanese Politizs in ~.9${i
- {Miazoru Shimizu; Tf~E dAPAN TIMES, 1 Jan 8U) 19
F~r~eign 3+It.nister ~3kita ~nt~rvies+~d oa i98t~ Issues
~{4k~.ta iate~iew; TOKYl3 SHiP~~i~I, 3 daa $fl) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Ol~ira's Adsai.aistrative Refo~-m ~ep~ored
(SHi~Kl~N SHINCHO, 15 Nov 79)..... 28
Keidanreu Rou~s LDP
{Raisuke Hunda; !'HE ~AIL~ YOMiiJRI, 21 Dec 79)........... 31
- a - {II~ - ASIA - 111 FOUO~
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CONTENTS (Cont~nued) Page
'JPS' Carries 'AKAHATA' Ed~.torial on Success of JCP-CPSU Talks
(JPS, 27 Dec 79) 32
- JCP Adopts Resolution on New Year Activities
(JPS, 14 Jan 80) 36
Midesst Envoys Issue Proposals After Tokyo Talks
(Jl,il, 22 Dec 79) 39
'JAPAN TIMES' on SDF's Foreign Broadc~sts Monitoring
Eapability -
(THE JAPAN TIMES, 6 3an 80)> 42
Briefs ~
Siberian Development Aid 44
ECONOMIC
Research Body Fredicts 1380 Growth Rate of 3.5 Percent
(MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 8 Jan 80)......~ 45
'MAINICHI' Editorial on White Paper on Economic Aid
(Editorial; MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 30 Dec 79) 50
_ MITI Calls for More Aid to Oil-Producing Natians
(ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 22 Dec 79) 52
Government To Make Public Super-LSI Patents
_ (NIHON KEIZAI SHIl~IBUN, 1 Jan 80) 54
5CIENCE AND TECHN~LOGY
Japan's Kyoto University To Complete N-Fusion Device in January
(THE JAPAN TIMES, 4 Jaa 80) 56
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POLITICAL AND SOC.T.OLOGICAL _
'JAPAN TIl~S' DENOUNCES SOVIET INVASION IN AFGHANISTAN
OW061215 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIl~S in Englieh 5 Jan 80 p 12 OW
~Editorial: "Soviet Power Play Imperils Peace"]
[Text] The only word,_ that can possibly explain the soviet Union's brutal
invasion of Afghanistan, which mocAQd detente and outraged the Moslem world,
is "desperation."
It became obvious to the Soviet Unioa that hard-~ine Marx3sti President
Hafizollah Amin, who antagonized the predominately Moslem Afghenistan peo-
ple, was losing the war against the inaurgenta. Soviet troop~ deposed him
and bullets ended his life. Then the Soviet U~iion brought out of his exile
in Czechoslovakia Babrak Karmal, who is ready to be the Moscow line and who
promisea to abolish the abuaes of the "sangui~ary Amin band."
But Karmal is not expected to rally the 50,000-man Afghan army, which ie
ineffective as a fighting force and distrusted by the Soviet Union because
of countl~sa defections to the rebel cause. The Soviet Union has taken over -
the war with tanka, helicopters and an estimated SO,OOC troops with the in-
tention of crushing the guerrilla forces in the Moslem fundamentalists.
To retain its nearly two-yeax political control over Afghanistan, the Soviet
Union resorted to force. The Kremlin was understandably nervoua about the
Moslem revolution, which conquered Iran and inapired the Afghan rebels,
infecting its own vast Moslem population. -
.
But the strategic importance of Afghanistan is more important to the Soviet
t+nion than even its worry over the Moslem revoltuion leaping acrose its bor-
der. Military contrvl of Afghanistan would place the Soviet Union in atrik-
ing distance of the Persian Gulf and its vital gateway, the Strait of
, Hormuz.
It is speculated that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is motivated by
the Soviet Union's concern about the future need of Middle East oil and ig
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part of its strategy to i-hreaten and dominate the Arab nations. A U.S. Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency report claimed that the Soviet Un~on, now the
w~rld's largeat oil producer, will become an importer of 3.5-4.5 million
b3rrels of oi1 a day in the mid-1980s.
Moet certainly the So~iet Union weighed in advance the conaequences of its ~
military intervention, which left detente a shambles and angered the Moslem
w~rld, arid decided for ita own interests to defy interational opinion.
President Jimmy C~rte~!s;reaction was awift and angry. He accused Soviet
President.Leonid;Brezhnev of lying to him by claiming rhat the Soviet army _
- w~s iniviteJdin by Am~n who ;aas assassinated. Mr Carter condemned the
Snviet Union for its "blatant violatio~ of internationally accepted rules
of bghavior," and he withdrew the U.S. ambassador from Moscow. The U.S.
furthe.~,intends to have the Sovi~t Union condemned by the United Nations and
is plauning economic sanctions with its European allies--possibly a cutoff
of credits and even a halt of U.S. wheat sales.
And Mr Carter strongly implied that detente was in a very deep freeze. Also,
_ the chances of the U.S. Senate ratifying the SALT II treaty, whi~h the Soviet =
Union wanted, are fading fast. The damage to U.S.-Soviet relati4ns is in-
calculable now but must be viewed with se~ious concern.
But it is obvious that the Soviet Union will survive condemnations and
e~?en severe economic and diplomatic presaures. This had to be taken into -
' cansideration before the Soviet Army came acrose the border into Afghani- -
atan.
The Soviet aggresaion is likely to have some other side-effects which most
certainly wiZl work against its interests. In reaponse to the Soviet in-
vasion, there was a verystrong spirit of unity found among the Nc~rth Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO~ allies when they met last week to diacuss mea- "
sures to be taken against the Soviet Union. -
The Soviet Union by clarifying its aggressive intentions in Afghanistan has -
_ probably wrecked its carefu~l diplomatic efforts to divide NATO and keep its
fc~rces underarmed. Western Europe, after all, cannot have forgotten the
early aggreasions of the Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy which ~ed to World
War II. -
Also, the United States, which had been considering the strengthening of its
_ forces in the Gulf and MIddle East area, now will be propelled into massing
, greater forces near the oil fields which could become the focus of a U.S.-
Soviet power struggle. The U.S. has already sounded out countries in the
Middle East and Africa about the use of military facilities.
, Furthermore, the Soviet Union by its act of aggression will strengthen the
arguments;of President Carter and others that U.S. military power must be
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s
etrengthened in the face of a naw far more obvious Soviet menace. And words
coming out of Waehington now are not in the aoft and moderate tonea of the
post-Vietaam war period. Mr Carter's national security adviaer Zbigniew
Brzezinski eaid the U.S. would use "armed force" if Soviet forces pour
through the Rhyber Paes into Pakistan, which Moacow accuaea of traiaing and
~supplying the Afghan rebe~s. The U.S. aleo is proposing to supply weapone
to Pakistan which ie being cautious about this offer becauae it co~sidered
the U.S. an unreliable a?ly in the past. `
Mr Carter was correct in saying the Soviet invaeion of Afghani~tan ia "a
grave threat to ~~eace." By its aggreasian, the Soviet Union has brought
closer the danger of a global conflict to the despair of thos~ wtio work �or
peace.
~
CSO: 4120
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
JCP'S MIYAI~OTO SPEAKS ON INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
- O~i020955 Tokyo JPS ~n English 0855 GMT 2 Jan 80 OW
- [Text] Tokyo, 2 Jan JPS--In an interview with the editor in chief of AKAHATA,
~ Toshio. Sakaki, pres~dium chairman of the Japanese Communist Party Kenji
Miyamo'to'spoke about the world and Japanes~ situations in the 1980s. Ex-
cerpts of the part c~n the international situation below (the pa.rt on the
internation situation ia to be carried tomorrow):
To Make An Era of 1980's a Naw Greatly Rapid Advance of the JCP
Mlyamoto said that the intensification of international teneions continues
in Asia and Europe due to maneuvers of the imperialist forces centering on the
U.S. At the same time, the characterietics of the world situation ia that
the forces of sociai, progrese, peace and national liberation are making
headway as a whole.
- In internationa].situa~i,ons too, as was shown by the election results (the
general elPCt.ic+ns), the mal:-administration of the Liberal~Democratic Party
h.~s invoked the people's firmly rooted criticism, and the situation is now
maturing. That criticism of the mal-administration will inevitably rise.
In this circumstance, there are maneuvers aimed at maintaining the con-
servative political power by utilizing the right leaning opposition parties.
But as a consequence, the force of defending the genuine interests of the -
Japaneae people, Japanese genuine sovereignty and peace, and the Japanese
Communiat Party in particular, are to play a greater role all the more in
the 1980's, and it is sure that the condition and the activities for the
gr.eat causs of establishment o� a progressiv~ united front and the coalition
gover~ent baaed on this united front�will be inevitably matured and ba
deve3:oped. We must develop our activities for this purpose.
Qn SLCCeasive Downfall of Dictatorial Regimes
The characteristics of the international situation, which are easy to under-
stand, are that the reactionary regimes and dictatorial regimes supported by
the U.S. have successiv~ly fallen down in recent years.
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Precaut3an.sr not to repeat the failure werE comparatively strong in II.S.
atrategy after the defeat in Indochina, but the II.S. recentlq has taken
strang attiti~dea. We can say thie is its "impatience." The background
of this ie that the U.S. etrategic poeition in Asia beCames stronger due ta
China's support for the Japan-U.S. anilitary alliance= and that the conditi~on
is there, that a kind of allied relationship between Japan, the U.S. and
China has been established. �
On the Situation in Indochina
It was by studying in detail the then historical conditians tfiat we decided
- to support the new people's administration in Cambodia. The Pol Pot regime,
which was backed by China, made repeated aggressioas in the Western border o#
_ Vietnam. The Vietnamese side proposed a ceasefire and talks oace and ag~lin,
but the Pol Pot aide continued aggressions and pillages along the long
border, even severing the diplomatic relations with Vietnam, and the pro-
posal on taSks was disregarded. We studied these thorough~.~ via ARAHATA
reporters there and other meaas. Then we were firmly couvinced that the
Vietnameae counterroffensive was made~ from the proper position of .se1f- .
defense, and that the rapid overthrow of the Pol Pot regime was the result
of uprising of the Cambodian National IInited Front for Salvation, as well
as the counter-offensive by Vietnam. We came out With our clear ~udgment
that the so-called Vietnam's aggression agaia.st Cambod~a was out of the
ques ~i~on . -
On the Three Non-Nuc;lear Princ iples
In Europe, a~lan to deploq new models of nuclear weapons to NATO countries -
has become a big issue. A mass monement against the deployment has risen
in ~'rance, Belgium aad others. The JCP ezpresses solidarity ~ith this strug-
gle i~ Europe. in this respect, ~e must emphasize much that it is very
important to internationalize the th~ee aon~nuciear ~rincipies ("Japan
does aot manufact~re, posses$, or bring in nuclear weapans'7.
New Definitions in the JCP-CPSU Joint Communiqne
A ree~ect to equalitq between parties, independence and the right to decide
on its own lines is advocated in the JCP-CPSU joint cc~nunique v~ry clearly,
and unpsecedently in detail and concretely. Wfiat this means is that each
party has it own righ; to decide on its way independently--the way covering
all stages of development from socialist revolution to construction of so-
cialism and cormmunism.
, Certainly a respect to independence had been publicly admitted in general
terms. But the ~oint communique this time provided a detailed, new defini-
tion, and defined in a strong tone that no one is in pasition of inter-
fering in the affairs of other garties.
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In accordance with the spirit expressed in the JCP-CPSU joint cn~unique, I ~
think, mutual understanding between the CPSU and other communist parties in
- socialist cauntries on one hand and co~unist parties in advanced capitalist
countries on the other will be promoted furthe~ '_n the 1980's.
On the Collapee of China's Foothold of Intervention in the JCP
The phenomenon that was worth drawing attention rose in China as an after
ad~uetment of the "Great Cultural Revolution." China has recently criti-
cized itaelf, saying it took an erroneous policy for the struggle (against
' revisionism) by departing from the principle of democratic centralism, but
it gives no appropriate explanation on what revisionism is.
Since the dieruptc~re of the talks between me and Mao Zedong in 1966, China
begar. condemning the JCP for its "revisionism." It has carried on activities
for overthrowing the leadership of the JCP by utilizing antiparty elements.
Therefore, attacks on other countriea' parties by labelling "revisioni:sm"
became groundless.
In addition, every time when Chfn~attacked other partiea by defining them
as revieionism, it took up iirst the attitude toward the U.S. But China it-
self now completely sides Grith U.S. imperialism, and is reduced to aupport
the increase of military strength of imperialist blocks, including the
Japan-U.S. military alliance. Viewing from this, the intervention in -
other parties' affairs at the time of the China's "Great Cultural Revolu-
t3on," the in~ervention aimed at imposing China's policy upon the JCP in
particular constitutes the trampling on the "publicly~approved criterion," -
and interventions becsme groundless theore~ically to them.
Speaking in concluaion, it is not vecy easy for China to return to reason-
able policy line right now as a whole.
Becauee without re-inquiry into the basic policy line of supporting imper-
ialistic block and the Japan-U.S. military alliance, there will be no works
to make a genuine correction of ita errors. In this sense, I do not thinlc -
~ that worke to correct goes smoothly. [sentence as received]...I hope that
China will return to the right direction az an early date, breaking out of
~ontradictiona in a series of domestic and inte~rnational policies.
JCP-CPSU Talka and Interests of the Japanese Feople
- t~e had the (JCP-CPSU) talks in a frank and friendly atmosphere. This was
- so in the proper meaning o� the words. Very frank, and at the same time
~oth aides liatened to the other very carefully, without uaing any word of
denunciation.
:[n diacussion, we said that Japan and the Soviet Union have not yet deter-
inined their border which should have been demarcaCed by the two past belli-
gerents after the war, and that the demarcation of the border should be
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an important part of a peace treaty, and hence a peace treaty must cover the
problem of border and territory. Following these discussione, both sides
confirmed wha~ are their agreed points on a peace treaty: theq also con-
firmed that they would continue to exchange opinione, and negotiate, on the
content of the treaty. I believe that a great progresa has been made because
the two parties have produced a forum to have friendlq, open and frank
_ discussions about basic problems of a peace treaty. -
CSO: 4120 ~
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- POLITICAL AND SOCIOLO~ICAI~
JCP'S MIYAMOTO SPEAKS ON INTERPIAL SITUATION
OW031101 Tokyo JPS in English 0854 3 Jan 80 OW
. [Text] Tokyo, 3 Jan JPS--[Continued fram yesterday] Following is an excerpt
.from a speech by Ken~i Miyamoto, presidium chairman of the Japanese Com-
muniat Party, in an interview with director of the AKAAATA editorial board,
r_arried in the new year issue of the gaper. (Today's JPS dispatch ~sinly
covers points on internal situations. World and international situations
were mostly covered by yesterday's dispatch~.~ _
On the Pexspectives of Establishing a Democratic Coalition Goverment in
the 1980's
r4iyamoto said, that there are still posaibility of forming a progressive
united front and establishing a democratic c~~alition government, as the
Liber.$1 Democratic Party gover~ent is to inevitably deepen contradictions
with the interests of the people. Not onl~y there fs such possiblity, but
also we can further strengthen the possibility with a big advance of the
Japanese Communist Party.
On the LDP and Reactionary Forces' Strategy in the 1980's
Miyamoto said, they also have their own plans for the 1980's. It is a
policy line, aimed at resolvin~ the contradi~tions brought about by their
~conomic policy serving the interests of big business, by sacrificing the -
peogle. The government draf t budget for 1980 has revealed that they
plan to impose much more burden on the shoulder of the people by ~aising
public utility chargea and by cutting public welfare, than the burden
that could be imposed by the introduction of the general excise tax. They
xre pursuing such an anti-people policy.
The second characteristic is that they are speaking about self-restriction
~ in order to caver up their political stand in service for the final cir-
c:le, the collusion between the financial circles and the political party,
and corruption which is inevitable to such reactionary politics. But, in
fact, they are still accumulating collusions and corruptions.
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And the next iaeue is the Japan-U.S. milltary aZliance. As i$ ahawn by the.
nl~nned part~cipation b3~ the Japane$e self defen$e �oxces in the RIMPAC
(Rim of the Paci,fic .Toint Military Scerc#se), this is being more and more
_ internationalized. At the same time, there ia anothex approach shown by
giving Chi~na a ewa of 50 billion yen in sid, in return for China's aupport
to the Japan-U.S. military alliance. -
And, they are planning to resort to a aingle member constitusncy system,
- which means Japdnes.e style fascism, with the sim to fundamentally auppreas
an advance of the JCP and the pragreasive forcea. To achievs th~s goal, they _
are now elaborating a draft of a single conatituency syste.m whiGb can per~
suade the right-leaning opposition parties.
Finally, rhey are maneuvering to entice and get hald af the right-le,t?ning
opgaaition parties to carry out their reactionary poZi~y. In this is~sue,
the zight-leani.ng opuosition parties have already supported the J~pan-U.S.
milita~ry al.liance and the Japanese self defense force$, and thaX also gave
votes for the legislation of the impexial era name and a series of other
raactionary bills. On the economic pc~licy, too, thsy are obviausly follow-
ing ~h~ policy of supplementing the conservative farcea. Thie ~as clearly
rev~~.aled by the Japanese Communis.: Party, when the Komei and Democratic
Sociali~t parties were going to apgrove the general exclse taae a~stem,
while they were good at saying the oppositiaito the iAtroduction of thax
syskem.
On ~he Recent Change of the J~pan Sccialist Farty
= Miyamoto said that th~ most serious result of the Japan Socialist chairman
Ichio A~ukata's visit to the United State$ was the turn of the JSP to tlie
stand that the Sapan-U.S, security treaty shauld bQ abroga~ed an~g if the
two aides agree ta da so. This is not a paxtial, chaage in ita po],icy but
a 18~0-degree change, a compl~te surrender to the palicg line ctf the Romei
Farty.
The Japan-U.S. military alliance is one root caus~ of the intensified sit-
uation in Asia. Against the background of China's befor~h$nd announcemsnt
of its xe-invasion of Vietnaat, there is ths .~apan-II.S. military alliance.
The change af the Socialist Party toward approufng the lapanese self defense
farcas and appraving the Japan-U.S. military allia~ce means a suicida~
action of this party~
The mainstay of the Liberal Democratic Farty a~rate$y in thQ 1980's for
its reinforcement is this co~on golicy on ba~h internal and external
= polieies, existing, among the LDP and the ri$ht-leaning opgoaitian parties,
that is, the maintenanee Qf th~ system of monopol}r capitalism, and the
maintenance of the ~apan-U.S. alliance and the apgroval of the Japanese
self defense forccs. In adclition, their unanim~cg rest~ with splitting
the pragressive forces, in other words, exclusian of the Japanese Communist
Party and oppasition to a progreasive uaited front. Qa thes~ issues, there
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has already been a grand accord between the LDP and the DSP and Komei Party.
Tt?e concept of the Ohira faction of the Liberal Democratic Party for ~oin- -
" ing the New Liberal Club in their coalition to mske a breakthrough from
the crisis, and the concept harbored by the Komei and Bemocratic Socialist
P1rty for a coalition government, including the forces of the Liberal Demo-
cr.atic Party, are basically on the same line. Now, the Socialist Party is
guing to be committed to this line.
The logical conclusion of this is that the ~ocialist Party, in the end,
wi.ll be thrown into the concept of the Romei and Democratic Socialiat par-
ties for the political power, which leads to a coalition government with the -
Liberal Democratic Party. It is obvious that will openly trample on the
- cause of progress.
But, the Socialist Party which has officially made a pledge as a political -
party to the Communist Party that it will make every effort to form a
progressive united front, bears responsibility to the people. This respons-
ibi.lity cannot be dispersed even if the Socialist Party arbitrarily tramples
- on the responsibility. ,
On the United Actions and Unity of Workers Movem~nt -
In. this situation, the Japanese Communist Party should struggle for construc-
_ ting a party of 500 thousand mEmbers with a 4 million AKAHATA readers, and
at the same time carry high the banner of a progressive united front and
strengthen united actions.
In trade unions, class organization of the working class, there is a~rong '
inclination in Japan at present, that a trade union has become a subordinate
organ of the Socialist Party or the Democratic Socialist Party, while pro-
moting the "Socialist-Komei axis course" and imposing it on the workers,
which will inevitably result in helping establishing a goverriment reinforce- '
ing the conservative forces. But, now, there is rising struggle for and
a voice that such an arbitrarily way of doing things must be ended and
that genuine trade union movement be promoted and genuine national center
be sought for. This is also a very important task in the 1980's for the
formation of a progressive unity front.
CSO: 4120
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
~ 'ASAHI' VIEWS COUNTRY'S DIPLOMATIC DIFFICULTIES IN 1980'S
OW111131 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 10 Jan 80 p 5 OW
- [ASAHI SHUMBUN 5 January Editorial: "Japan"s Diplomacy"~
[Text] Japan's diplomacy is on the threshold of an era that may well be
the most difficult since the end of World War II. ~apan's predicament
as a result of the dispute between the U.S. and Iran was symbolic of the
difficulties lying ahead in the 1980's.
_ Unable to satiafy both sides, Japan is in a dilemma. Its friendship with
~ the U.S. and its need.to secure petroleum have become an antinomy.
- Countries have asked Japan, "Are you hostile or friendly." Or have told
it, "A friend of our enemy is our foe." This is akin Co being shown the
"fumie" (a copper tablet with a crucifix zo be trodden on to prove that
one is not a Christian). Japan is facing a tough situation under which
it cannot spurn the close questioning as unreasonable or ~assume a 3efiant
- attitude. This is a tragedy of Japan's omnidirectional diplomacy under
which it cannot help but be friendly with both sides.
Renounce Excuae-giving Diplomacy
Japan is not.a country that hoists ideology at the forefront and flutters
- natural resources or military might as a means of intimidation. Since it
is not such a country, it cannot be helped if ite dtplomacy is less clear
- and crisp than those of the other countries. Japan's diplamacy is apt
- to become one that copes with the prevailing situation, to put it mildly, -
and one that is slow in starting and applause-seeking, to put it less
mildly. We say so because clashes with various countries and confusion
are certain to follow if Japan aims only at making a good show of itself
. in a poor manner.
We wonder, however, if Japan can tide over various situations by repeating
the excuse-giving diplomacy which it has been following. So long as Japan
Wiii not change basically from ~eing a resources-poor country and a non-
military state, we believe that the government and the people should keep
at least the following points we11 in their mind:
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1. The people should become aware of the fact th~t the international
environment surrounding Japan has developed into one of unprecedented
severity. To strengthen the national economy, they should be prepared
_ for a review of the vested rights they won dur.ing the period of high
economic growt~~. As long as the people fail to have a sense of crisis
_ and take the present political and economic systems as well as their
mode ~f living for granted, Japan's diplomacy cannot help but remain
hseitazt forever.
2. Japan's peace diplomacy is giving the world the impression that Japan
is not doing anything--that it is adhering steadfastly to the safety-first
principle. The proposal made at the end of the international symposiinn
on the role to be played by Japan in the world, sponsored by the ASAHI
SHIMBUN in November last year, points out the need to bring about social
_ and economic development on the basis of what to support instead of what 4
to oppose.
We must consider at all times not only how to gain profits from inter-
national society but also how to contribute to international society.
In this context, Japan's reputation in the world suffered when it took
a cold attitude toward the acceptance of Indochinese refugees. That was
a bitter lesson.
Diplomacy Only Is a Key to National Security
3. From the viewpoint that diplomacy is a key to national security, govern- -
ment should be orienr.ed toward the outside more than ever before.
Specifi~cally, efforts should be made by the ruling and opposition parties
to reach a consensus of opinions of basic foreign policy and the exchange
of information and the adjustment of views among the ministries and agencies
should be stepped up under the dir~ection of the prime minister. Attention
should be paid so that Japan will not arouse misunderstanding, opposition
and contempt among other countries th at Japan is a country which has no -
principles or that it is a country that does not move unless it is given a
good thrashing as a result of troubles it has caused them. -
4. We want the prime minister to be more responsible than at present with
respect to diplomatic problems. We also hope that the foreign minister
_ will be ready at all times to go abroad at the opportune time to explain
the special position Japan is placed in. The foreign minister should
not be kept within Japan because of domestic affairs.
We believe that diplomatic negotiations that should be expedited the most
are talks for the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. Relations _
between Japan and the Soviet Union have cooled down inverse proportion to
rapprochement between Japan and China. We hope that the governments of _
, the two countries will do their utmost during the first half of this year
in mending such ties.
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Moscow is dissatisfied that the sentiment of the Japanese people toward -
the USSR sharply differs from that toward China. On the basis of the
historical and geographical relations between Japan and China as well
as the flex'~ble and compromising policies Peking has taken toward Japan _
these past few years, we believe that it is natural that there is a
difference between the~ sentiment of the Japanese ~oward China and that
~ toward the Soviet Union which is not m~king concession over the northern
territory and fishing in the northern water~. -
[OW111133] Further, an overwhelming ma,jority of the Japanese people are
strongly opposed to the Soviet Union's way of pushing by force, as seen
in its military intervention in Afghanistdn. In a public opinion survey
conducted recently by the ASAHI SHIMBUN, only three percent of the
respondents answered that they believed it was proper for Japan to be
most friendly with the Soviet Union, against the 45 percent who mentioned
the U.S. and the 34 percent who cited China. This is a manifestation
cf how the Japanese people feel toward the Soviet Union.
Pave the Way for Mature International Relations -
We feel tne need to widen the channel for dialogue with the Soviet Union,
more so because of ideological differences. We are hoping for the early
resumption of regular consultations between the Japanese and Soviet foreign
ministers, which have been postponed, and for the realization at an early
date of the first vlsit to Japan to top Soviet leaders. Japan has no
intention whatsoever of creating with other countries a network to surround
~ the USSR. We want the Kremlin to seriously reflect ~n why the Soviet Uttion
is disliked by the Japanese, instead of showing concern over its being
contained.
Sino-Japanese relations are showing far more desirable developments than ~
Russo-Japanese ties as indicated by Chinese Prime Minister Hua Guofeng's _
scheduled visit to Japan in May. The task of the two nations is to
advance toward mature relations so that both can argue without reserve
in a friendly atmosphere.
- A peaceful and stable Korean Pen:insula has always been one of Japan's
deepest concerns. The reunification of North and South Korea rests on
nothing but the judgment and efforts of Chose concerned. Hawever, we are
of the view that Japan should contribute more positively than ever before
toward the creation of an environment leading to the easing of tension
on the Korean Peninsula.
Seemingly stable but precarious are the relatic?ns between Japan and the
U.S. Each time a summit is held, the leaders of the two countries pledge
to remain staunch friends. H~owever, i11-feeling toward Japan, like that
on the eve of the Japanese at'~.~ck on Pear1 ~iarbor, heightened, mainly in -
the U.S. Congress, a number of times during the past few years.. This
ill-feeling stemmed from the tendency on the part of trade between the ~
two countries to be in Japan's favor, irritation as a result of bungling -
in American domestic policies, a drop in Washington's say in the world
and insufficient understanding of Japan.
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Above all else, Japan must make the U.S. understand well the real situation
that under the prosperity i~ is showing on the surface, Japan is suffering
seriously from a shortage of natural resouz�ces. At the same time, we
believe that there is need on the part of Japan to pay attention to
cooperating with the U.S. wherever and whenever possible and, by maintaining
- ltaison with West European countriee, to advising and at times restraining
Washington to prevent the U.S. from becoming isolated or from making a
dash all by itself.
Let's Recome More Versed With North-South Problems
We believe that the so-called North-South problems, such as those concerning
natural resources, energy and nationalism, will play the leading role in the
world's stage in the '80s, although ideological differences between the
r~ast and West will remain as basic major questions. Three-fourths of the
member countries of the United Nations belong to the south. All the
advanced nations have come to think that stability and prosperity cannot
be had by ignoring the north-south problems.
Sadako Ogata, a former Japanese minister to the U.N., said that viewing .
the world through the U.N., she was impressed of the wide gulf between ,
the poor and rich. She added that it was necessary for the Japanese to
develop the view that advancing into international society was to step into ~
poor countries.
We must expect developing nations to resort to acts that are unthinkable
in the light rf accepted rules of international politics and incidents
shaking the existing order, centered on the advanced countries, to occur
frequently in the future. The late Shojiro Kawashima, who was a vice-
president of the Liberal-Democratic Party, said that the political world ~
is dark one step ahead. In international society, the situation is such
that it is truly diff icult to make a forecast of what will happen tomorrow.
It is urgent for Japan, which looks to the south for almost all its
petroleum requirements, to concentrate its diplomacy on the north-south ~
probl~ms.
I-
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Evening News 1980 ~
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~
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOI.OGICAL -
POLITICS IN TfiE DECADE OF EIGHTI~S ANALYZED
Politics 1980
Tokyo MAIlJICHI DAILY NEWS in English 3 Jan 80 p 2 -
_ [EditorialJ ' As we stand on the threshold of the 1980s, we.place
high nopes once again on the future course of
Japanese politics and behavior of politicians. despite
all the bitter exper�ences we have sufiered in the past.
It is our sin~cere ~vish that politicians will stay clean.
- free from corivption and keep the ever-expanding -
bureaucratic system under control.
ln retrospect the decade ot the 1970s can be
summed up as one of discouragement and frustration.
Politics. especially in the latter part of the 70s, had
little resilience to cope with immediate pTOblems. The
- lack of long- and medi~im-range prospects and
foresightedness on the part of political parties, to say
nothing of the successive governments, was. fatal. IE is
small wonder the people have become distrustful ef
the nation's politics.
~ To make matters worse, the political world t~as
remained at a loss throughout the latter part of the
- 1970s in the face oi series of shocking political
scandals invoiving the rank and file of the tiiberal-
Democratic Party. The LDP has certainly revealed
structural evils accumulated~ in the wax of governtng
the nation over the years, but the political worid has
failed to remedy the "Japanese disease," or the
"LDP disease" for that matter. And here we are now
greeting the beginning of the otherwt~ hopeiW and
promising decade of'80s.
The Liberal-Democratic Party fougAt bard in two
_ ge~eral elections and t~vo Wouse of Councflnrs tlec-
tions during the past tive years~ but tailed to cecover
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lost ground. The parliamentary strength ot the LDP
_ and opposition p~:rties still remains virtually equal~
with little prospect of a tilt in t;~e scale in the im-
mediat$ future. ~ .
The Economis~ of r ondon right!y commented on.
the last general c,lection; calling it an election to
decide who should govern the LDP rather than to
decide who would govern the country. Although the
LDP suftered a miserable setback in the ei~ction,
Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira succeeded in
retaining his post as head of the LDP, hence the post
as hsad of the country. ~
For the past 2a years, the LDP has enjoyed many
advantages as a government party. Even in the final ~
phase of the intraparty squabble in the aftermath o[ '
the general election, there was tacit understanding
among the LDP members not to split the party, in-
dicating how prof~table It is to be the gov~rnment +t
party.
_ 'Phe structure of "corruption" is presented in the
form of "collaboration among the political, .
bureaucratic and financial circles," plus some voters
bumming from politicians. The Liberal-Democratic
Party, infested ~vith intricate power machines, has
been noted for its lack of ability to formulate policies' .
and its poor image as a mass party. For survival~ it
has to import talented figures from the bureaucracy '
wl~ich, accordingly, has increased its voice within the
party. The LDP has emerged in its present form
through the assistance of the powerful bureaucratic ~
system and cDose relations with various prpssure
groups.
- Shady relations have resulted in political
corruption and scandals. Successive LbP prime
ministers have worked hard, not in the best interests
- of the nation, but for petty partisan interests to hold '
the reins of government as long as possible ar~d tackle '
policy p~oblems heavily dependent o~ the
bureaucracy.
Here is an interesting result from an inion
survey �~hich asked respondents to what degr~r they
trust the listed items. About ~4 percent replied that
they trust "weather forecasts," 81 percent trust -
"newspapers," 77 percent "doctors" and 21 percent
"fortune telling." But, only 3 perccat trust
"politicians." In other words, politici~n~ ranked
lowest on a list of "trustworthlness."
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So the immediate task of politics and politicians~
al~ke is to restore the trust of the people, even to a
small degree, in the years ahead. All political parties,
regardless of their ideologies and interests, must join
tiands in dealing with many problems designed to
restore the authority o[ politics, such as revision of
the existing election law and the introduction of a bill .
aimed at publicizir~g the personal assets of -
_ politicians. ~ � .
The surest way to restore lost ground is for all
politicians to stay clean. , . _
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News 1980
- Future of One-Party Rule
Tokyo 'FHE DAIL1' YOMIURI in Engltsh 4 Jan 80 p 2
[Editorial] -
[ Text ] The one-party domi.iance of the nation's polltics by
~ the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) is coming ta an
end, but will this lead to an eventuaI aplitting of
- the party? This question will probably be the focas
of attention in the 1980s as~ the LDP failed to win~ a
majority in the past two general elections. Also, the
- internal feuding which continued for more than a
month has caused an irreparable crack in the party
wzity. . �
The LDP has been maintaining ~its position aa the
goverament party by changing its. leader whenever
it was faced with a crisis but there came a break in
thia practice when the party suffered a setbsck in
the last October's general election and a bitter con-
frontation between the mainstream factions and anti-
mainstream factions followed. "
Prime Minister Ohira is deter~ined to ensure sti
LDP victory in the coming House of Councilors elec-
tion next summer and then seek reelection sa LDP
president in the party election acheduled for Decem- ~
ber as seen from the way the Ohira. cabinet has com-
piled the Sscal 1980 budget.
But the Ohira strategy is diametrically opposed to -
the viewe of Takeo Fukuda and Takeo Miki, Ohire'a
main challengers, and Yasuhirn Na.kasone and Toshio
" Somoto, both aspirants for the top party poat. Tha
aata.gonism within the LDP may erupt if a non-
aonfidence motion is submitted in the Diet _
In addition to these factors, moves ~nmong the cen-
trist opgosition parties aIso deserve attentian. 1~l-
though Komeito and the Democratic-Socialiat 1''arty _
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(DSP) have denied that they are planning to form
a coalition government with the LDP, they, however,
expect the ruling pai~ty to eventually split.
1V~any Uncertaintiea Involved 6
' There are mE.ny uncertainties about whether the
LDP, which has been in power for 24 years, will real-
' ly dis:ntegrate. The political situation at ~cresent is ;
such L.hat a coalition between any opposition parties
other tiaan the Communist Party (JCP) will co~e
as no auri~rise to us.
� If sn oppoaition coalition government is formed, it
will,not be a stable government. In the electiona held
after the war, the,conservative party usually garnered
?0 percent of the votes cast and the reformists 30
percent until ~he emergence of centrist parties. The
ratio then changed to 50 percent for the LDP, 20
percenf for the centrists and 30 percent for the re-
fornaists.
The change from 7-3 to 5-2-3 reveals the voters' su-
perior sense of balance which entrusted the LDP with '
the power to rule but assigned the task of checking
the LDP's arbitrariness to the reformists with the ~
centrista as a cushion.
It is evident from this ratio that even if the LDP
split up and the splinter joins hands with the cen-
trists, they will not be able to form a inajority power.
Weakening Power Of LDP . ~
Even if the LDP wins in the upper house election,
the party will not be able to rule the nation as u ata-
ble power, given the present antagonism between the
- mainstream f:~ctions and antimainstream factions. The '
political situation will be thrown into confusion if the
LDP did eplit up. �
If in this aae of economic crisis and turmoil, politi- ~
cians continued to curry favor with their supporters
or yield to pi�essure groups and ignore the intereat of
the peopje, the future of Japan will be in jeopardy.
The age of a coalition government, however, should ~
be welcomed if political leadera give top priority to
the interes~ of people. . !
- The votera should cast aside their coa~ition allergy j
as more than 70 percent of West European coun-
tries have coalition governments.
- In addition, to revamp the nation's politica~ the
voters ahould continue to mak~ assiduous efforts to
atamp out the "money-power" election practicea. With-
out such efforts the nation's politics won't improve
whether or not the voters favor the advent of r~ coali-
tion government in the 1980s. ;
COPYRIGHT: The Daily Yomiuri 1980
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
'JAPAN TIMLS' PROJECTS JAPANESE FOLITICS IN 1980
OW031159 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 1 Jan 80 p 8 OW
[Article by Minoru Shimizu: "Japanese Politics in 1980--Confusion and
Uncertainty Expected To Increase"J
[Text] The "confusion" and "~.mcertainty" which was created by the almost
equal strength between the ruling .~nd opposition parties after the general
election last October will most likely be inc~eased in Japan's politics
in 1980. The first year of the 1980's.
Many political observers predict that sometime during the 1980's. Most
likel.y :Ln the firet half, the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) may fail to
secure a ma~ority in the House of Representatives and consequently a coali-
tion goverm~ent between the LDP and middle-of-the-road parties may emerge.
Such a prediction has encouraged the opposition ~arties, and their offeneive
against the Ohira cabinet and the LDP is expected to become further intenAi-
f ied thi.s year .
The already unstable Ohira cabinet will be rocked whenever occasion ariaes,
and its instability wi11 be revealed.
The biggest political event this year will be the election of the Hbuse
of Councillors scheduled for June or July. The outcome of thia election
is expected to have a decisive effect on the future of the Ohira cabinet. ~
The upper house election will present tHe vital question of whether Japan's
politics will continue seeing the continuation of a single-handed rule by
conservative forces or put an end to the conservative rule and opea the
way for the emergence of a policy union or a coalition goverrnnent between
the LDP on the one hand and centrists and even socialists on the other.
At present, the LDP has 257 seats in the 511-seat lower house, which is
only one seat more than a ma~ority in the lower house. Consequently,
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majorities are held by oppoaition paxty members on 10 of the 16 standing
committees of the ~ower ~iouse, including the budget committee.
The ruling LDP will most likely experience great difficulties in the deli-
berations of bi11s at the ordinary sess3on of the Diet schedule3 to be re-
opened in late January.
If the strength of the ruling and opposition parties is reveresed as a re-
t~ult of the upper house election this summer. the ruling party's operations
in parliamentary affairs would come to a complet~ standstill.
The LDP now holds 124 seats in the 252-seat upper house, 3ust maintaining
a ma~ority because of the existence of five vacancies. Should the LDP
~ fail to maintain a ma~ority as a r~esult of the upper house election this
swmm~er, Prime Minister Ohira, who 3s president of the ruling party, will
be asked to take the responsibility for the setback and will certainly be
forced to step down.
Whoever within the ruling party succeeds Mr Ohira, the aforementioned
difficulties in the Diet will rem~n.:It wi11 therefore become absolutely
necessary for the LDP to seek the cooperation of centrists in the form of
~ poli~ical c~alition or in other �orms of alliance. This means a virtual
end to the single-handed rule by the 7~DP. In this sense, this summer's
upper house�electiQn will receive greater attention than ever.
The upper house election is held every three years to reelect half of the
252 members. The term of office is six years. This time, 58 Liberal-
Democrats will be uu fc?r reelection. Sixty-six others will remain as in-
- cumbents.
If the LDP is to win a ma~ority in the upper house, at least 61 candidates
will liave to be returned. In the light of its election results in the past,
this target will not be so difficult for the LDP to achieve. In every upper
house election in the past, the LDP was able to elect more tham 60 candidates.
Prime Minister Ohira and many of the party leaders expect that similar re-
sults can be achieved in this summer's election if vigorous election cam-
paigns are started in its early stages.
In their interviews held at the end of last year, the Liberal-Democratic
hopefuls for president in the 1980's expressed the view that there would
be no reverse of strength between the ruling and opposition parties as a
result of the upper house election this s~mer.
These hopefuls included Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone, former secretary general of
the LDP, former foreign minister Riichi Miyazawa, Shintaro Abe, chairman of
the LDP political affairs research council, Finance Minister Noboru Take-
shita and Ganri Yamashita, former director general of the Defense Agency.
Even former Socialist Party Secretary General Masahi Ishibashi made a
similar prediction.
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t..
To be sure, there are xelatively many LDP upper house members who will not
run for reelection this summer. As a result, there is the view that numer-
ically there will probably be no rcverse of strength between the ruling and
opposition parties in the upper house.
Severe Setback
In should be remembered, however, that the LDP suffered a severer setback
than originally expected in the general election last October. As a result,
the once reviving popular support for the LDP has completely vanished.
Moreover, the rift has deepened as a result of the antagonism between the -
_ mainstread and antimainstream factions wittiin the LDP. The popular supporfi
for the Ohira cabinet has dipped below 30 percent.
On the other hand, never has the mood of cooperation in the election been -
so high as at presznt among the oppqsition parties.
All these facts oppose the view that the LDP will fare well in the upper
house elec*_ion this summer. Some observers predict that there may be a re-
verae of strength between the ruling and opposition parties as a result of
the upper house election. _
It is most unlikely that, in the light of the drawn-out intraparty struggle _
last fall and tlie lack of leadership Prime Minister Ohira revealed after the
struggle, the Ohira cabinet will ~e able to retrieve itself from the present
instability. The Ohira cabinet will most likely treat on the verge of
reaigning at any time.
To use the term of Sumo, this cabinet is in "Shinitai," a falling poeition
with no chances of recovery. In Japan's political history, in fact, there
has never been a cabinet that appears so unstable as the Ohira cabinet.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Masayoshi Ito, a close aide to the prime minister, -
says, "The fut~xre of this cabinet depends on whether it can do anything
that will be appreciated by the people in the next six mon~:hs. All we
can do for the immediate present is try to solve step by ~tep such problems
as the eliminatior~ of corruption within government agencies and administra-
_ tive and fiscal reforrns. We hope to restore public confidence by doing what
we have pledged to do. We have to see what will com~ out of the election
- in six months time...." ~
However, another influential aide to the prime minister, Miyazawa, has
expressed the view that as things now stand, the Ohira cabinet will aat be
able to achieve anything that will help it regain strong popular suppflrt.
There are various theories regarding how long the Ohira cabinet will be
_ able to ].ive apart from the length of the Ohira cabinet's life. It can
hardly be said that, as Miyazawa points out, much can be expected of the
Ohira cabinet as far as its political ability is concerned. _
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As Ohira's term of office as party president lasts until the end of Novem-
ber, it ia theoretically possible for him to remain in office as prime
minister till that time. Some leaders of the anti-mainatream faction of the
LDP predict~~ that the Ohira cabinet will be short-lived and may not be -
able to stay on until the upper house electian this suIImmer.
In the light of the ir~stability of this cabinet, this prediction seems con-
vincing, but it is true that, for the immediate present, there are hardly
- any chances for toppling this cabinet. It is most likely, therefore, that,
barring the unexpected in parliamentary operations or in other affairs, the
- upper house election will be held at the hands of the Ohira cabinet.
Opti~'stic View � _
Prime Minister Ohira and his circles seem to take the viaathat if the LDP
can successfully tide over the upper house election, it will help Ohira win
reelectian for another two-year term as party president in the presidential
election to be held late this year. As a result, the Ohira cabinet will
be able to survive for a total of four years. But this view seems to be too
optimistic. It is more likely that Ohira will have to conltinue the "tight- -
rope-walking" operations in handling political affairs without kaowing when =
he may be requested to step down.
In these circumstances, Ohira's advantage, if anything, is th~t he was
able to clear the way for a coalition government af�ter he had obtained sup- -
port from the New Liberal Club during the intraparty struggle last fall. -
With this approach, Prime Minister Ohira let it be publicly known that,
whenever necessary, he was prepared to form a coglition government with
certain opposition parties.
Even if the anti-Ohira forces within the party threaten Ohira with such
radical means as "bolting the party," he would be able to counter the
threat with plans to introduce opposition forces to his cabinet, thereby
nullifying the threat hurled at him by the antimainstream faction.
In the light of the setback the LDP receiv~d in the general election last
fall and the subsequent intraparty struggle, the opposition parties take
the view that the singlehanded rule by the LDP is collapsing and that an -
"age of coalition" has emerged as a concrete political schedule for this
year. Moves for mapping coalition plans are expected to become activated
among the opposition parties this year. To formulate concrete coalition
- plans is no easy task, however.
It would have been reasonable if the LDP had yielded power to ~the opposition
parties after the drawn-out intraparty etrife to let them for a"progressive"
government.
However, the Japan Socialist Party (JDP), the No 1 opposition group, was
devoid of political power strong enough to attract the communists on the
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~
left and Komeito, the Democratic Sacialist Party (DSP), the New Liberal Club
and the Social Democratic Federation (Shaminren) on the right, so as to suc-
- ceed the Liberal-Democrats. .
After the beginning of December, the JSP approached Komeito on the matter
- of political cooperation and, with this move as a start, the JSP has begun
to envision a coalition on the JSP-Komeito-KSP line, i.e., a right-inclined
coalft+fun of the opposition parties, excluding the communists.
- FIowever, Komeito and the DSP seem to be much more inclined toward a con-
servative centriat coalition with certain forces of the LDP. -
Although Komeito is now taking tY~e posture of accepting the JSP's invita-
tion, this party appears to be more inclined to~rdrd a coalition with con-
servative forces and the DSP. Therefore, the possibility is slim that the
JSP-Komeito-DSP coalition plan may be realized. Komeito and the DSP will
most likely use their energy in the direction of including a split of the
LDP. -
Professor Rei Shiratori of Dokkyo University predicts that during the period
between this year and the middle or the 1980's, Japan's political structure -
will be divided into three ma~or groups: conservative, centrist and pro-
gressive forces. -
- But none of Lhe three groups will be able to hold a ma3ority in the Diet.
As a result, the present single-party rule by the LDP will be replaced by
coalit~,on governments working under the principle of consensus politics.
When such a political structure takes root in Japan, there is no guarantee
that the LDP and the JSP will be able to maintain their present forms.
As shown by the rasults of the last general election, the LDP and the JSP
will have to see their popularity continue to fall for some time.
The drawn-out struggle within the I,DP after the last general election and -
the intensified conflict between the right and left wingers of the JSP,
as well as its uncertain political stance--all these indicate that it will
be no longer possible for the two parties to maintain their presenC forms. _
The question is when and in what form the two parties will split. This ques-
tion will be constantly asked throughout the 1980's.
~
Iu the so-called "1955 structure," the LDP and tHe~JSP ruled Japan's politics.
(It was in 1955 that the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party were merged
to i~rm the present I~DP and the right-wring and the left-wing socialists
were united to form the present JSP).
It may be said that the two major parties had a three-legged race, opposing
on the surface but shaking hands backstage. This structure ha.s eventually .
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reeulted in the longterm, aingle-party rule by the LDP, while providing a
_ hotbed for many political scandals like the Lockheed bribery case and the
- alleged moaey-power and corruptive nature of the LDP.
Unlike the time when the LDP held an abaolute ma3ority in the Diet, Japan's
politics is bound to see some uncertainty in the 1980's.
However, when the values become diversified and popular interests in politics
vary, the trends toward multi-party politics and coalition government plans
seem to be a natural course of events.
COPYRIGHT: The Japan Times 1979 .
CSO: 4120
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,
P01.1'I'fCA1, ANI) Sp(:lOT.QCICAL
~r
FOREIGN MINISTER OKITA INTERVIEWED ON 1980 ISSUES
OW100237 Tokyo TOKYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 3 Jan 80 Morning Edition p 2 JW ~
[Foreign Minister Okita's new year interview with TOKYO SHIMBUN editorial
staff inember Nobutoshi Nagano and reporter Noriyuki S~:~ama--date and
place of interview not given]
- [Text] The Hostage Incident Is Inadmissible
[Question] In this turbulent.world Japan's 3iplomacy is expected to face
many difficulties in the 198Q's. What attitude should it maintain to cope
with them?
Okita: Protecting the people's livelihood and safety is the basic mission -
of diplomatic activity. Externally we will seak to settle disputes peace-
fully and help developing nations build their countries. In other words,
Japan's foreign policy is dedicated to peace and construction. For Japan, -
diplomacy bears a particularly important responsibility, because we have
few natural resources and are virtually unarmed.
[Question] But there is always a gap between ideals and realities. For
example, Japan is finding its position in the current U.S.-Iran crisis
very awkward.
Okita: The (Iranian) seizure of an embassy and taking of hostages, for
whatever reason, cannot. be condoned from the standpoints of international
law of humanitarians. The basic foundations of international relations
would disintegrate if such acts were allowed. We feel that Japanese-
- U.S. relations should not be harmed. Until the hostage issue is resolved,
we will continue to cooperate with international public opinion.
On the other hand, in our energy diplomacy, friendship with Middle East
nations, including Iran, is indispensable to Japan. Once the hostage
issue is resolved, we will endeavor to maintain our friendly ties with Iran.
[QuestionJ Why are Japanese-U.S. relations treated as the axis of the
nation's foreign policy?
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Okita: Japan depends on the United States for 70 percent of its food and
more than 25 percent of its industrial exports go to the United States.
This fact alone shows how close relations are in the trade areas. Add
this to relations in the national security and politiaal areas, and you
can see how broad and far-reaching are Japan-U.S. ties. Historically, _
as well, a det~rioration in Japan-U.S. relations has always led to a crisis -
for Japan. ,
~ Expectations of the Wisemen's Group
[Question] Do you mean that Japan must be submissive to the United States? -
Okita: No, I do not. In the 1980's Japan will increasingly face the need
- to think and act on its own. From a mere follower, Japan will become
an equal partner of the United States. But our relations will basicall~j~
remain cooperative. '
As a result of the developments in Europe, Japan and some developing nations ;
and their globally expanded economies, it has become difficult for the
United States to take the lead in everything in the international community.
U.S. economic power accounted f~r 33 percent of the world economy 25 years -
_ ago, but 3 years ago it had fallen to 23 percent.
_ [Question] It is feared the yen's downward trend may again touch off
economic friction between Japan and the United States. What is your opinion? ~
Okita: This year Japan's large car exports might become an issue. In view
of the upcoming presidential election, which is Iikely to raise many such
issues, I hope that the Japan-U.S. wiseman's group wi11 do something to ;
keep those issues from developing into heated disputes. In this regard,
I also hope that I will be able to visit the United States as soon as ,
possib le. ~
[Question] Japan's diplomacy in the 1980's will also attacr~ importance to I
obtaining energy resources, will it not?
Okita: Oil accounts for 75 percent of Japan's total source of energy, and
Japan seets 99.8 percent of its oil requirements through imports. What
is more, three-fourths of Japan's oi1 imports are from the Middle East. _
_ The problem is that this very area is now the most unstable throughout the '
- world. Japan should step up its diplomacy in the Middle East, contribute
as best as it can to the stability of the area and strive to secure oil
imports through effective measures to cope with various situations. I am '
- eager to realize my plan to visit the Middle East, although it will bP
affected by my future domestic schedule.
At the same time, Japan's diplomatic and domestic administrations will
need to cooperate with each other to reduce Japan's dependence on oil to less ;
;
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~ i;
than SO percent in the 1980's. To this end, Japan will strive to seek
vara~ed energy resources, such as coal, natural gas and uranium, and try
to import tliem from various sources. Prime Minister Ohira's visit to
Australia is aimed at securing this stable supply of resources.
[OW100241J [Question] I would like to ask about the Venice su*nmit (the
summit meeting of advanced nations). At the meeting, Japan is expected
to be plac~d in a more difficult position on the energy issue, is it not?
Okita: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
this year estimates the growth rate of its members at 0.3 percent. If
this zero point growth becomes a reality, the world will see alleviated
oil requirements. Taking a broad view, this will lead to a well-balanced -
supply and demand for world oil. However, an imbalance will exist among
_ individual nations because oil dealings will be conducted separately
between each oil-consuming and oil-producing nation unlike the past practice
in which oil supplied through international oil ma~ors. It is unlikely
that in the future oil prices will go down or people will again enjoy
large oil supplies. At the summit, the participants will discuss ways to
save oil and shift to the wide use tif other energy resources.
Japan Will Watch the Situation in the ROK
[Question] What is the prospect for improved relations with the Soviet Union
in the 1980's?
Okita: There are various lines of communication between Japan and the
Soviet Union. Our relations are progressing favorably, except for the ~
dispute o~~er the northern territories. Concerning government-to~-government
relations, procedurally it is Foreign Minister Gromyko's turn to visit
' Japan an:i, therefore, I have no plans for the time being to visit the Soviet
Union. As to Japan's cooperation in modernizing China, Japan has explained
to the Soviet Union that it will not cooperate in the field of military
affairs. It now appears that the Soviet Union understands Japan's position.
[Question] Is there any way for Japan to contribute to the peaceful solution
" of the situation in Indochina, which is considered Asia's powder keg?
Okita: For the time being Japan has no plans for action. Depending on
developments, such influential countries as Japan, China, the Soviet Union,
the United States and France might feel the need for concerted efforts to
prepare for the peaceful solution of the area's issue.
[Question] How are you going to tackle the Japan-ROK issue?
Okita: Japan will watch the situation in the ROK for some time and
encourage a move toward democratization. I hope that the regular Japan-ROK
ministerial meeting will be held as soon as possible at a mutually
convenient time.
COPYRIGHT: Chunichi Shimbun Tokyo Honsha 1980
CSO: 4105 2~
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POI.I T( CA1, AN~ S~CI O1.OGICAL
OHIRA'S ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM DEPLORED
, Tokyo SHUKAN SHINCHO in Japanese 15 Nov 79 p 26
[Sohyo: A True Motfve for Its A~proval of Reshuffling Public Servants Within
Government Agenciesj
[Text] "Wt~at are you talking about at this time?"--This must have been ti~c
impression of the majority of the people.
_ According to the pretentious articles by several newspapera, the General
Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo) at the ~oint committee with the
chairmen of unions, chief secretaries, and local council representatives
, held on the first day of this month decided to take a flexible stand toward
' the administrative reform--especially focusing on the change of their attitude
from negative to 'positive' toward reshuffling public workers within the
government agencies.
However, ~udging from the people's point of view, and when our voice urging
drastic action--by reducing the number of public employees by half--on the
overexpanded administrative system under this unprecedented financial crisis
in history is becomiug louder, how can people be convinced that a mere re- -
_ shuffle of public employees be called a progressive reform?
Besides that, although Sohyo's decision claims the reshuffle or transfer of
government officials within the agenecies is possible when the government
~ carries out administrative reform, its decision stipulates that reshuffling
. personnel within its government agency should be practiced according to the
rLles set by non-government organizations; individual preference should be
c~nsidered, and also the reform must be carried out according to the consensus
reached among the offices of the government and Sohyo, and to begin with,
S~hyo demanded the right to collective bargaining on personnel change.
In short, the government couldn't possibly carry out the administrative re-
form unless Sohyo approves of personnel transfer or reshuffling.
Tlierefore, the promoter of the reform, the Administrative Management Agency
itself shows, perhaps knowing what lies ahead, no enthusiasm for the positive
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decision of Sohyo, and says that "it presents merely a general principle, and
if Sohyo decision-makers were to actually discuss more in specifics with
the lower ranking union officials, there is no guarantee that everything will
go smoothly.
At tt~e Diet s~rs5ion on September 26th, in order to promote effective place-
ment among the government officials, the government decided to set up a
"Council for Personnel Transfer, Promotion and Liaison10 which is staffed by
the chief secretaries and bureau directors of the ministries and agencies;
however, the meeting has not yet been held even once.
All of these seem to reflect the government's attitude which bears in mind
the.strong resistance by the unions.
. :a
' With the general election coming ahead, there was a feverish campaign for
administrative reform. One of the issues concerned with reshuffling personnel -
within the government offices en~ed up in the sorry state, "is? the mercy of
Sohyo" and as for the other issue, which deals with a uniform reduction of
the public employees in each office, we cannot expect to see any favorable
results to come out.
A well-informed source says that "sccording to the fifth plan to reduce
public employees, 37,000 employees are supposed to be cut within 5 years
from 1980, however this figure does not exactly represent the actual reduction
to be carried out in the public offices. There is a trick that the yearly -
budget proposal for additional new slots is reviewed under a separate cate-
gory from the proposa? for personnel reduction. In fact, the ~overnment was
supposed to have cu-_ a tc~tal of 128,400 employees during the first to fourth~
year plan--from the year 1968 to this year--,under separate categury they
have been increasing by 120,500 employees, which neans in reality they have
- decreased by only 7,900 employees."
Moreover, the cut is carried out very slowly--the practice in government
offices is to fill the vacancies created by retirement, marriage, change of
job, etc with some control. It is far away from the image of the administra-
tive reform wished by the people. Considering the dying fiscal situation, they
should stop filling vacancies with new recruits for a while, and at least
wouldn't it make a sense if the government fills the newly created positions
by reshuffling personnel within the agencies and ministries? It is a common
practice among the private enterprises that if its management fails, they
would transfer their people to the subsidiary companies, or train some of
them as salesmen. Government employees are pampered in the hot house of
the government bureaucracy and they are totally out of it. I am thoroughly
disgusted with the government practice in which the private sectors' "common '
sense" does not pass current. Even the prime minister Ohira, in the beginning
showed a great enthusiasm and took pains to carr~ out administrative re~orm,
- cannot be expected to carry through with required stron~ leadership at this _
time when, in his own ground, he is liable to lose a battle.
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Tlien the reason why Sohyo at this time suddenly took "the flexible stand"
knowing that the reform will never work out anyway might have been ~ust a
facade to deceive the people. We can say nothing, but the whole story is
vcry deapicuMle to ti~e people.
COPYRIGHT: Shinchosha 1979
9i31
C50: 4105 -
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POLITICAL A~JD SOCIOLOGICAL
KEIDANREN RdUTS LDP
Tokyo THE DAILY YOMIURI in English 21 Dec 79 p 3
[Commentary by Raisuke Honda]
- The government and the Libcral-Dem- mura tepcrtedly "threatened" that there
[Text] ocrattc Party rLDP) have abli~doned plans would be r:o flnanclnl bac~ktr.~ irotn 61ie
to increase corpornte tuxes in fiscal 1980, business K�orld for the LDP lu the House
e~pitulatir. ; once more to the pressures of Councliors election next summer, un-
of big busiress. less the n:;~ty dropped the plunned tax
The qo�rcrnment proposal f~r a cor- boost.
porate tax hil:e ca~ne after the major set- LDP sou:ces snid the party secretary-
b~ck of the LDP ln the last general elec- general then "diluted" the tax ruise plans.
tion that w~as duc primarily to the peo- ~fly~ng a one per~�~nt hike aould do. but
pl~'s indig[~tlon over Prime Minlster Ohi- Hanumura would not accept uny tux boost
ra'a statements during the election cam- at 111.
palgn urgtn.~ a generui exclse tax. In the face of this pressure irom the
The premier came under Rre and with- bustness worid, such mtiitant LllF Diet-
- drew Lhe planned tax on consumers. This men as Ka~o Watanabe stronK~Y demand-
greatly dis~ppointed the F'Inance Min- Ed that t}:e ~;overnment go ulicad wlth
1s6ry whicl~ had lioped for this tax to help ~he planr,ed tax boost "!n order to iio6
ovcrcome the diiriculties in government mar further the image of the LDP:'
flnances. ~ But the voices of the few mllltants aere
In consultation with Finance Ministry -
of~icials. trie premier then decided to im- 9uirkly druw~ned out.
pose a hike in corporate taxes by two to The LDP is now budly shorL o1 money.
three percent, while again pledging to ~nce it spent so much for elcctioneering
mnke drastic slashes in government speud- in the Oc~..c~bcr 7 general election.
ing. The party fs said to need at least 'Y5
The Fins~nce Ministry had been hoping " blllion !n campal~n funds for the forth- '
th~t the pl~nned corporate tax hike would coming upper house election. Therefore. -
raise the government revenue by an esti- the LDP had little choice but tq a~ithdraw -
mated �~F430 btllion to Z860 billion for the thc planne~ tax, though reluctantly in
next 8scal year. order not to unger Hanamura. who ts
� The tax ir~crease plans, however, touch- "Kcidanren's flnance minister:' '
ed ~ oS stron;er-than-expected criticism Even Fsnunce 1Vlinistry o~iicials have
irom the top echelons of the business refrained from inststing upon. the need for
aorld. corpotate ta~: increases. Instead they now
Toshiwo Doko, chairman of the F~edera- say the gu~ernment eBorts !n slashing
tion of Ecc+nomic Organizations (Keidan- its expend:tures are making unexpectedly
ren),lashed out at the planned tax hike, good progress. to the extent o! ellminat-
saying the government couid not iustily a in~ the need for tax raise.
tax raise on the plea of flnancial difS- Following the government decision not
calties, "as long as it faila to cut back to ralse tlie corporate tax. in flscal 1980,
on its ovm expenses." the flnance minister met with the Kei-
Dako vehemently launched an antitax danren vice-president last Wedneaday to
hiDce eam~a:gn sending early this week solieit Keicianren's support for tax boost
~~ice-Chair.:~ah of Keidanren Nlhachiro � in flscal iS81.
lianamura to Prime Minister Ohira and , In the tsx blttle, Keidanren routed the
other LDP executives to protest against govemment and the LDP. This is inter-
anl' tux lncrease. eati'ng when we conslder the trinngular
In his tnik with LDP Secretary-C3eneral basia of conservative power-the LDP. top
Yoshio Sakurauchi last Monduy, Hana- bureaucrats and business leaders.
COPYRIGHT: The Daily Yomiuri 31
1980
~cn. i i ~n �
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ~
'JPS' CARRIES 'AKAHATA' EDITORIAL ON SUCCESS OF JCP-CPSU TALKS
- OW271401 Tokyo JPS in English 1130 GMT 27 Dec 79 OW
[Text] Tokyo Dec 27 JPS--AKAHATA on December 27 carries an editorial
entitled "On the Success of.the Japan-Soviet Communist Party Talks Arousing
Reverberations." The full text of the editorial follows:
The talks between the Japanese Communist Party and the Co~unist Party of
the Soviet Union, and the ~oint communique issued by both delegations are
causing wide reverberations. This is reflected in voices of welcome of
the people from all parts of'Japan and various circles communicated to this
paper, and.in newspaper reports-and comments, while the talks were still
continuing. There is a suitable reason why wide repercu~sions are now
arising.
- In the talks, wide-ranging and manysided views were exchanged, from the
issue of the relationship betWeen the JCP and the CPSU to international -
problems, including the recent situation in Asia, various issues of the
international communist movemen~, and the problems relating to the relations
_ between the people of Japan and the Soviet Union. We must speak about the -
substance and meaning of them, but for the present, we would like to raise
some of them.
(1). First, as presidium chairman Ken~i Miyamoto said at a press conference,
an end was put by the JCP-CPSII~talks at this time to the disrupted norn?al _
relationship between the two parties, which began with the Shiga issue, .
and to the unnatural relations which have lasted for 15 years since the
Shiga issue.
At the preliminary talks in February this year, the Soviet side said that
it did not ~ustify the publicax.~on of an article in PRAVDA supporting the
Shiga clique, nor was it right to have published it, in an agreement paper
issued by the preliminary talks in April, it was noted that the Japanese
side appreciated affirmatively this point and it was clearly written that
"the Soviet side also declared that any actions under the name of the
communist movement by former members of the Japanese Communist Party or
different groups are manifestation of antiparty activity and that the
Soviet side has no relation with activities of such groups whatever flags
~ they may carry and whatever pretext they may use."
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In the talks of both parties, including the summit talks, the important
agreement made in the preliminary talks was confirmed, and at the beginning
of the joint communique it is emphasized that the relationship between
both parties will develop on the basis of the adherence to the universally~
recognized norms of independence, equal rights, noninterference in internal
affairs and'solidarity in the solution of common tasks. ~
In accordance with given conditions in their countries, and led by scientific
socialism and communism, each communist party has the right to determine
independently its way to social progress and transformation in each country,
transition to socialism, the building of socialism and communism, and no
one can intervene in this. Vigorous development of solidarity between ,
coBnnunist parties of respective countries on the basis of agreed common
tasks is possible only [if] all forms of hegemonism are rejected in the
communist party relationship and the universally recognized standards are
observed.
Thus, in addition to the importance of respecting the independence and equal
rights of the two parties, in the name and reality, the contents of
authority of each party to decide independently are written more concretely
and in more detail than ever before in the agreement this time between the _
two parties. This is the first time in this kind of an international , -
_ document and holds an international significance.
Moreover, there is no doubt that this agreement holds a positive significance
in overcoming the split situation that is still left in the fields of the
antinuclear weapons movement and the Japan-Soviet friendship movement.
(2). Secondly, the joint communique says it is "important to develop a wide
movement of the masses of the people, and to mobilize international opinion"
for such actions as: opposition to the imperialist and reactionary forces'
policies for aggression and oppression, Urgency of developing the
struggles for a complete ban on nuclear weapons and an international agree-
ment banning the use of them, in the light of the danger of the armaments
race, especially the nuclear armaments race. Denunciation of the maneuvers
to make Japan a nuclear base, especially Okinawa, and the new plan to deploy _
nuclear missiles in NATO countries. -
The joint communique confirms that Indochina has become a new focal point
of the international confrontation between the imperialist aggressive
- forces, and the anti-imperialist peace forces, and political and economic _
aid to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia is the common task of the international
anti-imperialist peace forces. It is also taken up in the joint communique
- that the armed invasion oi the Western and the northern parts of Vietnam -
is an obvious action of hegemonism alien to socialism, and that this should
be denounced. This is drawing attention as it holds great significance
internationally.
_ The joint communique, moreover, takes up the deterioration of the crisis of
world capitalism, and the successive downfall of reactionary dictatorships
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~nd military regimes, and points out that the forces of peace, national
independence, and social progress are advancing, in the universal trend.
T'he joint communique confirms that in this situation the historic mission
_ of the socialist countrtes, the working class and working people of
rapltali~t countries, ~nd the national liberation movements, the three
main revolutionary forces, has become more and more important.
[OW271403] (3). Thirdly, the problems of both countries and the two
peoples were taken up seriously in the talks, opinions were frankly
- Expressed on the border issue, the so-called territorial question.
~�peaking about this question, the JCP's views and prospects for the
Chishima (Kurile) Islands, including the southern Chishima Islands, are
' well-known as indicated in the published JCP program. -
Some newspapers carry comments suspecting that the joint communique "carries
no words referring to the territorial question." It is a common practice
j.n international law that in a peace treaty, the demarcation of the border -
lines will be settled between the belligerent countries, and needless to
say, in the conclusion of a Japan-Soviet treaty for peace, the demarcation �
cf the border lines and the demarcation of the territorial limits will be
included. This was seriously discussed in the conferences, so that on the
question of the conclusion of a Japan-Soviet treaty for peace, the joint
c.ommunique says, we "reached agreement to continue exchanges af views"
- on it.
As Chairman Miyamoto said at the press conference, this provided evidence
that the Soviet side has "ears to listen" to the "word of socialism." [as
received]
As for the Habomai Island and Shikotan Island, these islands are part of
I:okkaido from the beginning, and are not included in the Chishima Island
archipelago, which was renounced by the Japanese Government in the
San Francisco "peace" treaty. The Japan-Soviet ~oint declaration in 1956
Frovides that the Soviet Union "in response to Japan's request, and in
consideration of Japan's interests, agrees to hand over Habomai Island
and Shikotan Island to Japan."
Therefore the Japanese Communist Party made new proposals calling for an
intermediate treaty, aimed at temporary Japan-Soviet friendship, and calling ;
for package negotiations for the issue af the return of Habomai Island and
Shikotan Island, by taking into account a deadlocked present situation of
the signing of a Japan-Soviet peace treaty. The new proposals on the ~ :
i.ntermediate treaty by the JCP were made from a positive wish and standpoint,
- aimed at developing the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, and
peoples of both countries on a more friendly and stable basis. In the talks ~
it was agreed the "exchanges of opinions" will be continued ~y the Japanese ~
and the Soviet communist parties on issues related to both countries. ~
It is a matter of caurse that big reaction to the JCP's new proposals is .
now rising in Japan as a reasonable and active mean [as received] to the
development of friendship between Japan and the Soviet Union and to the
advance of the so-called territorial issue.
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Together wi~h the proposal on the issues of fishery, kelp gathering and
visits to graves, which is arousing repercussions as a creation of stir
of "how the opposition parties should tackle diplomatic negotiations,"
and Soviet's favor of these proposals [passage as received], it can be
said that this shows the responsible attitude of the JCP aiming at meeting
the general interests of improvement of both countries' relations, and
~ world peace and security,
(4). The talks at this time were held in the midst of the JCP's endeavors
- to make a success of the 15th party congress to be held in February next
year, with a party strengtl-, of "500,000 members and 4 million organ paper
subscribers." After having won the biggest ever parliamentary strength
in the gene~'al election, held as the last one in the 1970's, defeating
various anticommunist attacks and maneuvers by antiparty groups.
The ~oint communique in conclusion says both parties are convinced that the
_ talks of both parties at this time will not only open the way to th~
development of friendly relations between the two parties and two peoples,
but also have great significance for the cause of peace and progress in the
world and f4r the international communist movement. The draft resolution
of the 15th congress of the Japanese Communist Party also stresses: "The ~
role of the struggle of the work-_ng class and people of Japan, the only
highly developed capitalist country in Asia, is very great in the inter-
national arena, too."
In order to make headway in the struggle for the progressive transformation
of national politics, as the domestic and international situation needs,
and to contribute to the struggle against intrigues by the forces of
aggression and reaction led by U.S. imperialism, we are resolved to achieve
our immediate tasks. This will add significance to the success of the talks
between the JCP and the CPSU, which have evoked great reactions.
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
I, .
1. . . . , i, f I ~ .
JCP ADOPTS RESOLUTION ON NDW YEAR ACTIVITIES
OW141021 Tokyo JPS in English 0915 GMT 14 Jan 80 OW
[Quotation marks as received]
[Text] Tokyo, Jan 14, JPS--The Presidiwn of the Central Committee of the
Japanese Communist Party on January 12 unanimously adopted a resolution
"On the new year party ~activiti~s for a successful 15th party congress, ;
and preparations for the House of Councillors election." The gist of the
resolution follows:
1. "Since the last year, more and more party organizations have come
foith, one after another, that have attained the goal of expansion of
the'party strength in a short period of time, aiming at "the 500,000 party
membership, and the 4,000,000 AKAHATA readership." But it is required :
that "all organizations and members give their best efforts in the
remaining period of time to accamplish needed tasks" for a successful
party congress, which will convene in a little over 40 days, and for a ~
victory in th~ House of Councillors election to be held in five months. i
2. "With the increased communist ~iet members group, the JCP activities
- in and out of the Diet, representing the voice of the people, are strongly
expected of from all quarters. [as received] including the defense of the
paople's living, and the investigation into and the eradication of
- irregularities and corruptions in politics.
"The people's sympathy with the JCP position is spreading, which is based ~
on the truth and reason, indicated in the Japanese and the Soviet
communist parties talks, and in the statement on the Afghan issue. ~
"The voice of the public, including supporters of the socialist party, is
rising against such right leaning line as...the anti-progressive trend
of the socialist party, and the swing to the right of the leadership of
the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo), in addition to the
~ role of the Komei and the Democratic Socialist parties.
3. "One activity for a successful preparation of the party congress is
that all party members carefully read the party congress draft discussion ~
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items on the agenda, and all party organizatior~s and groups deepen their
discussion on it, and through branch meetings to be held in the latter
- p,Yrt of January, district committee and prefectural meeting committee
m,eetings to'be held from the be innin throu h mid-Februar in `
g~ 8 8 y, prepara-
tions for th~ party congress, all views in the party be reflected positively
in the party congress. [as received]
"There are prefectural and district committees, in which the ma~ority of the
party membership have so far finished reading the items on the agenda, and
prefectural and district committees in which more than 90 percent of
branches are carrying on discussion of the agenda, but on the other hand,
there are some district committees, in which only abot~t 20 percent of thei~
party branches have proceeded to discuss the agenda items.
"Leading prefectural and district committees have strengthened their
leadership and assistance to the party members' reading of the agenda,
and the branch discussion, in such activities as the party organizations
holding many explanation meetings on the congress agenda; distributing
recorded tapes to assist the agenda reading of ~he new rc:cruits to the ~
party, and the old party members and publishing a party news or a ne�as
letter answering or explaining doubts and inquiries, which are often
e presented in the branch discussion. On party branches which have fallen
behind in reading and discussian, the party organizations must take into ~
account the real situation whether the pamphlet "The 1~th Party Congress
Agenda Items" is actually handed to all party members, and how respective
party members are reading discussion items on the agenda and the branch
discussion of the agenda are proceeding."
_ 4. "The ground-swell of the movement for the expansion of the party strength
is rapidly rising with the coming of a new year...but there are some party
organiza?:ions, in which the AKAHATA readersfi ig still remains under the
level at the time of the previous party congress and which have not extricated
themselves from the state, "The slackening which needs immediate attention."
"The expansion of the party membership, on the other hand, has nationally
advanced over the level of the previous congress....However, six
prefectural committees, including the Tochigi, have not broken through
the state, "the retardation, which the party membership is less than 0.2
percent in comparison with the prefectural population." Many big prefec-
tural committees including the Tokyo and Osaka, and party organizations
which keep Diet members, have not yet displayed their full capacity fitting
to their strength.... The most crucial factor for this situation is that
being satis~`ied with a small success in the general election, the tendency
_ to be self-satisfied with the present situation has not yet been overcome. _
"The experience and the achievements of the district committees, which
- have so far attained the goals set in the "expansion months, are matured
- in all places today. "It is important to drive home to all party members
that their task is very light, if it is taken on the average for an
individual member, and have them apply best efforts." -
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5. In regard to the Aouse of Councillors election, "we should keep in
mind that the election will be proclaimed in the first half of June."
"We should not fall into the error of stage-by-stage c2mpaigning, to
begin the election preparations after the conclusion of the party
congress.... It is important for us to start making particularly
election preparations at once. "The forthcoming Upper House election...
~ will be the opportunity for us to ~lect all national constituency candidates
by obtaining the highest votes in the postwar period, to maintain stable
seats of the incumbents in the local constituencies challenging new seats,
and to surely make a big advance in the national elections including the
next House of Representatives election, in the 1980's.
~
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~ POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
MIDEAST ENVOYS ISSUE PROPOSALS AFTER TOKYO TALKS _
OW221341 Tokyo JIJI in English 1251 GMT 22 Dec 79 OW
[Text] Tokyo, Dec. 19 (JIJI Press)--Following are "proposals of the 1979
conference of Japanese ambassadors stationed in the Middle East, as
announced in English on Dec. 13 by the Foreign Office through the Foreign
Press Center: (The meeting took place in Tokyo for 3 days from Dec. 11.)
(Begin text) In recent years, retations between Japan and the countries
� of the Middle East have become increasingly close in�various fields against .
the background of growing recognition in Japan of the importance of this
relationship. The interdependence of Japan ~nd thsse countries has
accordingly deepened rapidly. The situation surrounding the Middle East
is showing further signs of tension, and future developments should be
watched carefully in view of the global implications, both political and
economic. In fact, dr~ring the present meeting, a grave situation is being
confronted in connection with the taking of hostages and occupation of the
United States Embassy in Tehran. This demonstrates beyond doubt that
relations with the Middle Eastern countries form an integral part of Japan's
global diplomacy, including relations with the U.S. which constitutes the
pivot of our foreign policy.
_ In such a situation, the conference has discussed future Japanese policy
based on thE principles of independence and continuity toward the Middle
East. Views were frankly exchanged on ways and means to establish a truly
welcome Japanese gresence in the Middle East, by maintaining and promoting
friendly and cooperative bilateral relations with the countries in the
region, while fully giving consideration to their particular positions.
_ Accordingly, the conference makes the following proposals:
- 1. Japan should further promote exchange of visits by leading personalities,
~ as well as interchanges in the fields of culture and sports. This is in
order to deepen mutual understanding with the Middle Eastern countries,
as efforts in this direction have so far lagged behind Western Europe
and America. It is also necessary to further develop balanced understanding
on the part of the Japanese people of the history, culture and religions
of the Middle Eastern peoples. ,
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It is especially desired that an early visit to the Middle East by the
prime minister of Japan will materialize, as well as visits to Japan by
leader~ oC the M.Lddle ~~~Htern countrie~. it iy F~1so nec~eRR~ry for the
foreign minister and other cabinet members to take every opportunity to
make frequent visits to these countries. Moreover, in view of Japan's
lack of close historical relations with the Middle East, basic studies
on the area and academic exchange should be further promoted.
_ 2. Through more flexible application and further improvement of the
ex~sting system for economic and technical cooperation, Japan should make
constant efforts to expand cooperation with the developing Middle Eastern
countries, whether oil-producing or non-oil-producing, �or their socio- _
economic development and the stabilization of the livelihood of their peoples,
in order to contribute to their nation-building and human resources develop-
~ ment.
3. In order to secure suppliea of energy from the Middle East, Japan _
should make efforts to stabilize the oi1 markets through international
cooperation to cope with the changing world energy situation. At the
same time, Japan shou].d endeavor to restrain demand and to develop alterna-
tive sources of energy. By taking such wide-ranging measures as mentioned
above, including promotion of mutual understanding and cooperation with -
nation-buiJ_ding and hum~n resources development, while remaining sensitive
to specific local needs, Japan should reinforce bilateral relations with
the countries in the region.
4. In conformity with its basic position on the problem of peace in the
Middle East, Japan should extend as much cooperation as possible to attain
peace and stability in the region, and to maintain the territorial integrity
and security of all the Middle Eastern countries in accordance with Resolution
242 of the United Nations Security Council. Moreover, bearing in mind that
the question of Palestine is at the heart of the problem of peace in the
Middle East, and that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) represents
~he Palestinians, the dialogue already conducted with the PLO should be
further promoted.
- 5. In view of the fact that relations with the Middle Eastern countries
- involve energy and other extremely complex and divergent problems, it is
important for the government to ensure well-coordinated implementation of
external policies from a comprehensive viewpoint in both its political -
and economic aspects. Care should be taken so that misunderstandings and .
sources of friction do not arise both at home or abroad. Accordingly,
the government should establish a highly flexible administrative setup
fully capable of coping with this situation. _
6. It is essential for the government to improve and expand its diplomatic
efforts. To this end, the relevant budget, as well as the number of
personnel in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the field shoulZ be
increased to a level sufficient enough to execute Middle East policy.
Likew~.se the training of more experts on the Middle East, strengthened
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~ measures relating to staff welfare in hardship postings, and relating to
- Japanese residents in the area should be taken. The government should
' ~nl~o secure its own m~uns uf transport for pot~sible emergency attuation~
which might require the repatriation of Japanese residents.
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- POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
'JAPAN TIMES' ON SDF'S FOREIGN BROADCASTS MONITORING CAPABILITY
OW070542 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 6 Jan 80 p 9 OW
[Text] "Foreign intelligence is more important than weapons for a nati4n
such as Japan having armed forces only for defense. We must have the rab-
bit's sharp pars in collecting intelligence," said Yasuhiro Nakasone in 1970
when he was director general of the Defense Agency.
How aharp are "the rabbit's ears"?
' Zn September 1971 in Guangzhou, southern China, about 10 Japanese tourists
were held up for about a week waiting for an airplane to Bei~ing. Chinese
officials blamed the del.ay on bad wegther in Bei3ing, and the travelers did
not doubt the explanation at all. -
About the same time, however, the Japanese self-defense forces were paying
much attention as they monitored broadcasts from Mainland China, including
arders canceling flights and soldiers' leave. _
T.heee telecommunicationa were monitored by a detachment of the ground staff
affice's intelligence department. -
Ten months later, China announced that Chinese Communist Party Vice Chairman
Lin Biao died during a getaway attempt by plane after failing to carry out
a coup d'etat to September 12, 1971.
The mystery was solved. The "rabbit's ears" had got wind of the Lin Biao
case. _
= 7.'he listening unit, established in 1953, has a~staff of about 1,050 persons -
and nine monitoring facilities across the country, an official of the De-
fense Agency told the House of Repreaentatives cabinet committee in June
1.975.
Among the facilities, the Miho branch in Tottori Prefecture has the most
up-to-date array of antennae (75 meters in diameter), whose nickname is
"the elephant cage."
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. ~
Foreign electronic intelligence received by each facility is sent to the
unit's headquArters in Ichigaya in Tokyo. The headquarters analyzes the
data and deciphers coded meaeages.
"Soviet television broadcasts from Sakhalin can be watched at the headquart-
ers," an intelligence official said.
Even noting fluctuations in wireless teleco~unications traffic aad the di-
recti~ons of radio emissions can be valuable.
During large-ecale troop movements, the amount of radio traffic increases.
If transmissions stop abruptly, it may mean a surprise attack is imminent.
Monitoring radio broadcasts is an activity conducted by every nation, offi- -
cials of the agency say. In the United States, it ~s the ~ob of the Na-
tional Security Agency (NSA).
The NSA has about 2,000 ra~io monitoring facilities scattered all over the
world, according to an exposure by an NSA crpptanalyst who def.ected to the
Soviet Union.
During the Sino-Vietnamese war last February, Washington released much de-
tailed inf.ormation on the battles. Intelligence specialists here believe
. it was based on intelligence received by reconnaissan~ satellites and
"elephant cage" antennae at Clark Air Base in the Philippines.
The aritennae are said to have caught even short-range uncoded radio com- _
munications during the fighting.
The Japanese "rabbit's ears" can cover the Korean peninsula, the Soviet
Far East and continental China to fairly far inland, an intelligence offi-
cial said.
COPYRIGHT: The Japan Times 1979
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POI.T1'T(:Al. AND SOCIOIAGICAL ~
BRIEFS
~
SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT AID--Tokyo, 7 Jan (JIJI PRESS)--A leader of the
ruling Liberal-Democratic Party Monday hinted at the possibility of
slowing Japan's cooperation in t'he development of natural resources in ,
Siberia by way of protest against the 5oviet Union's incursion into
_ Afghanistan. Even a slight slowdown of 3oint Siberian development would
ccnsiderably affect the Soviet Union, he stated. The LDP will stronply '
protect the Russian action when Soviet ambassador in Tokyo Dmitriy
Polyanskiy pays a courtesy call on three top LDP executives and other
leaders Tuesday afiter.noon. [Text] [OW071351 Tokyo JIJI in English
1256 GMT 7 Jan 80 OW]
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ECONOMIC
RESEARCH BODY PREDICTS 1980 GROWTH RATF. OF 3.5 PERCENT
OW091118 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 8 Jan 80 p 5 OW
["An Economic Forecast for Fiscal 1980," by Mitsubishi Research Institute,
released in December]
[Text] 1. World demand-supply outlook for oil:
In 1980, total oil consumption of the free world is expected to decline
, from the levels reached in 1979. Reasons for anticipating this decline
are: (a) that successive price hikes by OPEC have triggered off consider- ~
able progress in the conservation efforts of the oil importing countries,
(b) that the world economy is heading for a recession and so demand for
oil ought to level off accordingly.
On the supply side, the outlook is relatively bright with only a modest _
decline expected for total free world production. No doubt the OPEC -
countries will attempt to reinforce their production cutback, however,
the effect of this will be partially offset by increase~i supply from non-
OPEC sources.
Such being the circumstances, demand-supply conditions are expected to
relax somewhat in the coming year however, conditions are bound to become
- strained over the long run. It has become the OPEC countries' basir_ ~
position to preserve their resources and therefore, large increases can
no longer be expected in the production levels of the larger OPEC members
such as Saudi Arabia. Some countries which feel that they have already
earned enough from their exports of crude oil, may even start cutting down
rapidly on their supplies. -
2. The world economy and the world trade outlook:
In the year 1980, growth rate for six ma~or OECD countrie3 (the United
States, Canada, United Kingdom, West Germany, France and Italy) is expected
to average at minus 0.5 percent. Given negative growth in economic activity,
import demand in these countries is sure to remain subdued. Consequently, -
the volume of world imports is expected to grow by only a mere 2.0 percent
= in 1980.
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3. Outlook for the Japanese Economy in Fiscal 1980: Balance of Payments
Sustained by a downslide in the yen's exchange rate, Japan's exports have
been growing at a steady pace throughout fiscal 1979. However, because of
*_he fact that they started from a relatively low starting point at the end
of fiscal 1978, volume increase for the year as a whole is expected to
average a modest 2.4 percent.
Tncreases in export prices will also be modest owing to the yen's deprecia-
tion. The year-on-year rate of export price increase is projected at 3.7
percent. As a result, the value of customs exports for the year is expected -
to grow by 6.2 percent and stand at $105.0 billion.
Meanwhile, crude oil imports are expected to reach $37.8 billion in fiscal
1979. Imports of other goods are pro~ected to see an 11.0 percent increase
in volume coupled with a 20.2 percent rise in prices. In consequence, the
value of total customs imports is expected to reach $11$.8 billion: an
increase of 40.5 percent over fiscal 1978.
As a result, Japan's IMF based trade balance is expected to post a deficit
_ of $2.3 billion in fiscal 1979. This will be the first time in 16 years
for Japan's trade balance to show a deficit position. Our current account
_ balance is also expected to mark a deficit of $13.8 billion.
For fiscal 1980, the volume of crude oil imports is pro~ected at 275 million =
~:LS, corresponding to a 1.5 percent 3ecline against fiscal '79 levels.
Assuming that higher prices will facilitate conservation, this valume of
imported oil supply ought to more or less equal the level of total domestic
- consumption. In normal circumstances, such a tight demand-supply balance
- would arouse fears of supply shortage.
Fiowever, as the current level of reserve stock is quite high, we may say
that basically, there are no serious problems of supply shortfall to be
anticipated in fiscal 1980. On the other hand, oil prices are expected
to come under continuing upward pressure throughout the year.
In the face of rising oil prices, there is little hope of a rapid return
to surplus in our balance of payments.
Exports are expected to retain their momentum in fiscal 1980 with a 6.4
, percent increase in volume and a 5.3 percent rise in prices. This will
result in a customs clearance value of $117.6 billion with an increase of
12.0 percent over fiscal 1979.
On the import side, while the level of oiZ imports is expected to reach
some $50 billion, imports of other raw materials and manufactured goods
are expected to remain sluggish. As a result, the value of imports
excluding oil is projected to grow by a mere 5.6 percent. Even so, the
value of total customs imports will still soar to a record $136.5 billion.
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Consequently, .lapan's balance of payments is expected to post a deficit
of $5.5 billion in its trade account. Notwithstanding a aizable improve-
ment in our balance in invisibles, the current account deficxt is expected
to reach $14.9 billion. Hence, the Japanese economy will be faced with a
return of the balance of payments constraint which had been virtually non-
eixstent throughout the 1970s.
It goes without saying that any forecast concerning the turn of events in
fiscal 1980 must depend heavily on the development in ~rude oil prices.
Our forecast for fiscal '80 assumes an annual average level of $29.4 per
barrel for our customs import price of crude oil.
Should prices stay relati~.~ely stable throughout the year and our cost of
crude oil imports remain at $26 per barrel instead of our $29 assumption,
our current account deficit would then shrink from the fiscal '79 level of
$13.8 billion to less than $10 billion.
[OW091122] View of FY '80
From the October-December quarter of 1978 up until the July-September
quarter of 1979, the Japanese ec~nomy enjoyed a period of expansion that
was led primarily by the domestic private sector.
Throughout the October-December quarter of 1978 to the January-March -
quarter of 1979, personal consumption expenditure and private investments
were the main elements of growth. In the following April-June quarter,
private investments began to falter, but housing investments took its place
to keep up the pace of private sector expansion.
However, the July-September quarter of 1979 saw a slowdown in consumer
- spending and a change to negative growth in housing investment so that the
external sector became the major contributing factor to growth. Thus in
the July-September quarter, we saw once more the resurgence of export-led
growth.
In fiscal 1980, all the components of the domestic private sector are ~
expected to suffer a slowdown in their growth rates. -
_ To begin with, personal consumption expenditure can only be expected to
~row by 3.3 percent in real terms. 4]hile only a modest increase can be
hoped for in disposable personal income, consumer prices are pro~ected to
rise by 8.9 percent for the year, so that purchasing power of households
is bound to decline.
Private plant and equipment investment is expected to see very little ~
change from fiscal '79 levels. Rising interest rates, shrinking profit
margins and uncertainties concerning the future will work to restrain -
investment activity. Investments aimed at rationalization and those for
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mlintenance :ind repair, which had been sustaining the volume of capital
s~?endinq in the manufacturinR sector, are also expected to peter off
~radually.
Iri spite of the very limited expansion anticipated for world trade (.20
percent in terms of import volume), Japan's exports are pro~ected to grow
by a healthy 6.0 percQnt in fiscal 1980. On the other hand, imports are
er.pected to see a modest decline.
C~iuses of Decline
Causes for this decline would be: (a) that the slowdown in domesti~ busi-
ness activity wil�1 result in reduced demand for raw materials imports,
(b) that the hitherto steady increase in manufactured goods impo~ts is
expected to lose much of its momentum in the coming year. As a result,
surplus of the nation on the current account is expected to grow by a hefty
27 percent in real terms.
Thus, Japan's GNP is expected to grow by 7.7 percent and 3.5 percent in
nominal and real terms, respectively. The real term growth rate of 3.5 per-
cent is the lowest figure since fiscal 1975 when the rate of expansion was
a meager 3.2 percent.
_ Iri spite of slu~gish final demand, no drastic change is anticipated in
iriventory investment behavior. Every since the first oil crisis, companies
h~~ve clearly become more cautious and skilled in their handling of stocks.
Coupled with this fact, monetary policy turned restrictive at a time when
ttiere was sti11 no sign of excessive inventory accumulation and the inven-
tary-shipment rate was close to optimum for most industries.
For these reasons, it is hoped that unlike the situation following the
fi.rst oil crisis, the fiscal 1980 economy will require only a minor ad,just-
mFnt in stock levels.
~
Ihie mainly to OPEC price increases, the price of imported goods is expected ~
to continue its upsurge well into the first half of fiscal 1980. rhe
expected rise in electric power charges ought to add further momentum to ,
ir?flationary pressures. These factors will combine to sustain rapid infla-
tion at the wholesale level throughout the first half of f iscal 1980.
However, parallel to a deceleration in the rise in import prices, the over- '
a].1 rate of wholesale inflation should also begin to level off in the
ldtter half of the year. The year-on-year rate of wholesale price increase
is projected at 7.6 percent.
Consumer Prices
Consumer prices which have so far remained relatively stable will begin to
increase rapidly as the effects of wholesale price rises begin to seep
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= through to the consumer level. Moreover, a round of public utility charge
increases is scheduled in the coming sprin~ and this will also work to
hoogC thE~ rate of consumer inflation.
'I'he annual averaqe increase in consumer prices is expected to stand at
8.9 percent, so that as opposed to �iscal 1979 when the rate of wholesale
price increases outpaced that of consumer inflation, consumer prices will
once again become the predominant concern in the area of domestic inf lation.
Thus, in fiscal 1980, the Japanese economy will be confronted with the
dual problem of high inflationary pressure and a deteriorating balance of
payments position. Compared to circumstances that prevailed following the
first oil crisis, the current situation is relatively better placed in that~
the inflation rate is lower and that the econony has not been running at
such a rapid pace as was the case prior to the quadrupling of oil prices
in 1973.
Judging from these factors, we may assume that the possibility for a severe
recession of the ~egative growth type is relatively low for the coming year,
however, the situation is most certainly a diff icult one. With a negative
growth rate for the world economy, Japan could not expect to rely on exports
to lead the way out of recession.
Moreover, depending on what form the new OPEC pricing strate~y will take,
we may have to be prepared for a prolonged period of painful adjustment.
The foremost policy for Japan to take in the face of such circumstances,
- would be to fight and to succeed in holding down the rate of domestic infla-
tion.
COPYRIGHT: riainichi Daily News 1980
CSO: 4120
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FCONOMIC
''.MAINICHI' EDITORIAL ON WHITE PAPER ON ECONOMIC AID
OW311243 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEF1S in English 30 Dec 7~ no page given OW ~
[Editorial: "White Paper on Economic Aid"]
[Text] The "white paper on Japan's economic aid for 1979," issued by the ,
Ministry of Interuational Trade and Industry, retrospects on the progreas
made in the:so-called "aorth-south dialogue" in the past 20 yeare.
The issue, arising from conflicting views and interests bet~reen the have
and have-not countries, has preaented itself as one of the most knotty
global problems since the 1960s.
'
Deepite many and earnest attempts to resolve the problem, it atill remaina '
a difficult one to solve and may be even more so in the furure. '
Disarray shown=`among the OPEC (Orgaaization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) '
nations, and their subsequeat failure to set unified oil price standards at
their Caracas, Venezuela, general meeting, once again remind us of the dif- ;
ficulty of dealing with the problem, a difficulty mainly posed by develop- ~
iag countries. The disarray among the developing ccuztries complicated mat-
ters by preaenting a"south-south" problem--a problem of conflicting inter-
eats among the cou~triea in the south.
The "south-south" discord was also evident in the general meeting of the
United Nationa Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held in Manila ,
last May. The disagreements, coupled with declining eathueiasm on the part ~
of the induatrialized countries about nffering sid, brought the conference
~ to what seemed to be diacouraging end.
IYiITI's white paper outlines the present state of the north-south issue. How-
ever, in describing Japan's role as a mediator, it appears to go too far.
_ While hailing the Man31a meeting as a ma~or mileatoae in the hiatory of the ;
"continuous north-south dialogu~," it stresses "Japan's ma~or contribution ~
to ward solving the iseue" in a manner which can be considered as exaggerated. ~
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- Also, i~ preaents an itnpneasion of self-praise by Japan, even going to the
extent of noting "Japan's act3ve leadership" in guiding the advanced coun-
tries to some agreem~nta on the north-south probletn at the Tokyo aummit.
- Admitt~dly, industrialized countries' offers of economic cooperation to
developing natione would be one of the most effective means of solving the -
thorny issue. But as far as we could see in the white paper, it appEare ~s
Japan's understanding of the seriousnesa of the problem is ineuffi~ient.
A ma~or feature of the white a er ie that it
p p proposes linking econc,mic co-
operation with Japan's "economic security" with regard to energy and minerals
and other raw materials. Another ma~or feature is that it recommends that -
extension of aid be planned from an overall viewpoint, by coordinating
domestic, industrial, trade and natural resonrce factors and energy poli-
cies instead of viewing the aid as an entity in itself.
~ The paper takes up five immediate problems facing Japan with respect to co-
operation with developing countries which include increasing Japan's offi-
cial development aid and making adjustments in domest3c industries. As for
the latter, it has already been pointed out that Japan's economic cooperation
will not be as ef�ective as hoped unless Japan opens its markets more widely
to developing countries. '
~ One thing that makes the paper seem somewha.t unsatisfactory is that it fails
to go into details about a series of major cooperation pro3ects which sur-
faced recently.
They include the controversial government investment in a Japan-Iranian
~oint petrochemical project undertaken in Iran by the Mitsui Industrial
_ group and massive yen loans for Chinese economic development.
_ Winning a national consensus is a prerequisite to making econ~mic coopera-
tion fruitful, and it is even more so when the country is gasping under
the pressure of slow economic grwoth and deteriorated national finances. _
The refusal to refer in detail to such import~nt pro~ects as mentioned
above is certain to make the paper's major proposals--directing economic
cooperation at establishi.ng eocnomic security and offering such cooperatfon
fram an overall viewpoint--less aignificant.
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News 1979
CSO: 4120
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ECONOMIC
MITI CALLS FOR MORE AID TO OIL-PRODUCING NATIONS
OW241017 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 22 D=c 79 p 1 OW
[Text] The Ministry of International Trade and Industry Friday called for
the expansion of economic aid to oil-producing countrfes ta secure stable -
energy supplies.
- In its "White Paper on economic aid for 1979," the MTTI proposed linking
aconomic assistance to developing countries with promoting Japan's
"economic security" with regard to energy, mineral resources and raw
materials.
^or this purpose, it stressed the need of giving more yen loans to petroleum-
~~roducing countries and encouraging private ~oint-venture projects with them.
:[t also said that assistance should be given to developing countries vn the
development of geothermal energy, solar heat and other alternative energy
:~ources . -
The white paper pointed out that the oil-price increase after the Iranian
revolution is posing a much more serious economic threat to the non-oil-
producing developing nations than the 1973 energy crisis. I.t, therefore,
~ urged advanced countri.es to step up their cooperation in the developing
world's efforts to use energy more efficiently and to develop energy sources.
- In the 1980's, it stressed, emphasis in economic aid should be placed on the
expansion of employment in the developing countries to expedite their economic
' independence. At the same time, it called on the Third World to make -
increased efforts of its own, including social reforms and pro~ects to curb
population growth.
According to the MITI report, Japan's overseas economic assistance for 1978 -
totaled $10,700 million, almost double the $5,500 million for the previous
year, and its ratio against the nation's gross national product (GNP) rose
, from 0.8 percent to 1.09 percent.
Japan's amount for 1978 was the second biggest, after that of the United
States, among the 17 member countries of the Development Assistance
Cvmmittee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(~ECD).
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However, the amount of officxal development aid (ODA), thP most important -
portion of aid for the recipients, came to anly $2,200 million. Its ratio
~ against the GNP was 0.23 percent (0.21 percent for 1977), which was much
smaller than the international goal of 0.7 percent, and placed Japan -
13th (14th in 1977) among the 17 DAC members. -
The MITI white paper declined to refer in detail to the controversial
government investment in a Japanese-Iranian joint petrochemical pro~ect
undertaken in Iran by the Mitsui industrial group and the massive yen loans
intended for Chinese economic development.
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Evening News, 1979
CSO: 4120
.
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ECONOMIC
GOVERNMENT TO MAKE PUBLIC SUPER-LSI PATENTS
OW050925 Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 1 Jan 80 Morning Edition
p 1 OW
- [Excerpt] Japan's super large-scale integrated circuit (LSI) technolo~y,
the world's foremost, will soon be made fully public. Tt?e government has
- decided to disclose in January the hitherto undisclosed super-LSI patents,
- owned either 3ointly by the government and private firms or excluaively by
the government, and to permit even foreign enterprises to use them if they
pay accordingly. The government made the decision to comply with the U.S.
demand to open the technological door, since Japan-U.S. trade frictions are
possible over semiconductors. It is anticipated the United States will -
zegard super--LSI and other technologie~, developed by Japan through coopera-
~:ion between the government and private sector, as "NTB" [nontariff barriersJ,
and trade problems in the 1980s are expected to take a new direction in-
voling the development of technologies. On these grounds, the government
plans to disclose the results of large-scale research and development pro-
jects and open Japan's technological market as much as possible.
The 1980s are called the "decade of super-LSI." To prepare for this decade,
t:he government in 1976 introduced a system under which the government and
private sector jointly develop super-LSI, and so far it h~s outlaid some 30
billion yen in subsidies. Charged with this development project is the
super-LSI technological research union, which is comprised of the Nippon
Electric Company, Hitachi Ltd, Toshiba Corporation, Fu~itsu Ltd. and
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation.
7'he super-LSI patents are classified into three categories: Privately
uwned patents developed by researchers from the five union members; patents
~ointly developed by researchers from private firnts and the Government
Industrial Technology Research Institute; and state-owned patents developed ~
exclusively by researchers of the Governments' Industrial Technology Re-
search Institute. Of the three, Japan began disclosing privately owned
patents about a year ago and the five union members have been exchanging
- their patented technologies with IBM, Texas Instruments and ~ther U.S.
c.omputer and semiconductor makers.
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s.
Japan, however, has not been disclosing the two other categories of
patents, in order to protect state-owned property and individuals' rights
and interests. Patent applications relating to super-LSI filed so far
number some 600 cases, most of which are privately owned patents. Patent
applications"filed for ~oint government and private ownerahip and exclusive
gover~ent ownership number some 30 cases.
The increasing U.S. criticism of exports of Japan-made semiconductors in
the recent period led the Japanese Government to make publicly available
all super~-LSI technology. While Japan's current-accounts balance has begun
showing a large deficit, it is feared exports of automotiiles and semicon-
ductors will generate a ma~or trade dispute between Japan and the United
States.
Japanese semiconductors make up only 4 or 5 percent of the U.S. market.
But speaking of the 16-kilo-liit LSI alone, which is considered frontier
technology in se~niconductors, the share last year was approximately 4C1
percent, and th~~ figure is expected to grow further and surpass the 50-
percent level this year. This frontier teclinology involves what Japan
has achieved in its research and development of super-LSI, and this :Ls why
- Texas Instruments and other U.S. firrss have been demanding that Japan make
its super-LSI technology completely public.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1980
CSO: 4105
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SCI~ICE AND TECHNOLOGY -
- JAPAN'S KYOTO IIDTIVERSITY TO COI~LETE N-FUSION DEVICE IN JANUARY
4W060211 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIl~IES in English 4 Jan 80 p 2 OW
_ [Text] Kyoto (KYODO)--An experimental facility to contain high temperature
plasma, or ionized gas, is scheduled to be completed this month at Kyoto
University's heliotron nuclear fusion research center.
The center is planning to carry out experiments on the containment and con-
trol of high temperature plasma beginning in May.
2'he facility has been under conatruction since 1976 at an ;~atimated cost of
9.1 billion yen. The facility, na~aed Heliotron E, is degigned to increaee
the temperature and denaity of plasma to a level directly below tha~ needed
f.or nuclear fusion.
The facility has been developed with Ryoto University's owa technology.
Heliotron E is a doughnut-shaped vacuum tube with a spiral coil wound around ~
it. A generator with an output capacity of 330,000 kw built next to it
runs electric current through the coil. A powerful magnetic field is devel-
oped ineide the coil in order to control the plasma "envelope."
The ionized gas ia further heated by radiating it with neutral particles.
Relatively high-density, high-temperature plasma is conf3ned within the
magnetic field for 0.02 to 0.1 second, according to researchers at the
center.
l~uclear fusion, the eame reaction which keeps the sun ablaze, is conaidered
a new energy source for the 21st century.
To contral thermonuclear fusion on the earth, it is ~ecessary to confine
plasmas of about 100 million C at a very h3gh density for about 1 to 2 seconds.
COPYRIGHT: The Japan Times 1980 "
CSO: 4120
END
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