JPRS ID: 9053 WORLDWIDE REPORT NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040046-5
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 46
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8877
23 January 1980
Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
FOUO N~o. 663
r ~B~S FOREIGN BROADCAST iNFORMATION SERVICE
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NGTE
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Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
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Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
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JPRS L/8877
23 January 1980
SUB-SAIIARAN AFRICA REPORT
No. 663
CONTENTS PAGE
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
- Development of UMOA Examined by Jean-Louis Buchet
(Sophie Bessis; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 12 Dec 79) 1
Economic, Financial Status of UMOA Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 Nov 79)........ 4
_ Construction of OMVS Dams Scheduled
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 14 Dec 79)........ 9
Liptako-Gourma Budget Approved
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Dec 79)......... 11 -
Great ;.akes Meeting Held '
(1'�1ARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDI~'ERRANEENS, 14 Dec 79)........ 13
Briefs _
" Alleged Escape of Officials 14
Forthcoming Lusophone Summit 14
East German Trucks 14
ANGOLA
Briefs
J.~ilitary Exercises With Cuba 15
CAMEROON
- French Loan To Extend Rubber Plantation
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 Nov 79)........ 16
Briefs
Bertona AirYort Construction
17
= Shipline on Mediterranean 17
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
CONGO
Information on Congolese Children Sent to Cuban Schools
(J~:UNE AFRIQUE, 5 Dec 79) 18
Economic Realities
Other Africans in Cuba
Cubans Prepare Their Successors
Briefs
- Pro-Opango Officers Dismissed 25
Petroleum Exploration Contract 25
- GUINEA-BISSAU
Briefs -
D'Estaing Visit 26
IVORY COAST
UN Industrial Development Aid
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 Nov 79)........ 27
Cooperation With Selgium Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 Nov 79)........ 30
French Aid to Refinery Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAITX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 Nov 79)........ 32
Computerization of~Cocoa-Coffee Marketing Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 Nov 79)........ 33
Cocoa Storage ProblQm Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET ~IEDITERRANEENS, 7 Dec 79)......... 35
Possibility of Sugar Exports Seen
(AfARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Dec 79)......... 37
New Highways Opened; Further Studies Made
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Dec 79)......... 39
SENEGAL
Pr.ess Said To Be Stifled by Economic Factors ,
(Mam Less Dia; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 5 Dec 79).... 41
-b-
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
UGANDA
Briefs
Elections in 1981 43
New Clandestine Movement 43
ZAIRE
Report on Economic Situation in Zaire
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 16 Nov 79)....... [~4
Belgian Finoutremer's Activities in Zaire
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEBITERRANEENS, 16 Nov 79)....... qg
Kinshasa-Ndjili Airport Reported Dangerous
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDIiERRANEENS, 16 Nov 79)....... 50
Briefs ~
FRG Coeperation 51
ZAMBIA
Kaunda Hopes for End to Rhodesian Conflict
(Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 12 Dec 79)............ 52
-c- .
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
DEVELOPMENT OF UMOA EXAMINED BY JEAN-LOUIS BUCHET
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Dec 79 pp 24-25
[Article by Sophie Bessis: "Strong Currency or Development"] -
[Text] A Ghanaian can do nothing with his cedis outside his country. A. -
citizen of the Ivory Coast or a Senegatese, conversel.y, could make pur-
chases without any preliminary steps in most Fr.ench speaking countries in
Africa. Even better, like the Voltan or the Nigerian, in principle, he
could exchange his CFA francs in any bank throughout the world, even if
he is forced to convert them first in French francs to be able to buy
dollars, yens, marks, or Swiss francs. Many Latin Americans or Asians do
nor enjoy this facility. Before going abroad, they must purchase for.eign
~urrency and lose in the exchange. To them the black market is a daily
reality. In or.der to fight any depreciation of their national currencies
they buy dollars. Even though the value of. the American currency may be
dropping, this is their only means for losing as little as possible.
In Africa this role is played by the. CFA franc. Wher.eas the official
rate of exchange of a sily is 10 CFA francs, the Ghanaian must pay 50
silys on the black mar.ket per CFA franc. Obviously, ir~ the black con-
tinent the CFA franc enjoys the reputation of hard currency. It is inter-
nationally acknowledged and its value is reduced only at the ratQ of the
depreciation of the French franc with which it is tied in a state
of ~ixed parity (1 CFA franc - 0.02 French francs).
What makes this fr.anc of the "French African coasts" which, after 1960, -
became the fr3nc of. the "African financial community," is, fir.st of all,
the guaranree of the French tr.easury for the two systems rallying the
African countr.ies within the franc zone: UMOA (West Afri.can Monetary
Union; Benin, Ivory CoasC, Upper Volta, Niger, Togo, and Senegal), and
OMEAC (Monerary 'Organization of the Central African~States; Cameroon,
Central Africa, Congo, Chad, and Gabon). As the main element of the
cooperation agreements which link these groups to France this guarantee
must meet certain conditions such as, f.or example, that of depositing
most of the currencies of the two emission institutions--the BCEAO
(Central Bank of West African States) and BEAC (Banks of the Central
States}, in an operational accaunt with the French tr~easury. Furthermore,
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representatives of the French treasury are members of the administrative
councils of both banks. This has led to claims that Paris had given
itself the right to supervise the monetary policies of African states,
and even go beyond that. It is clear that the CFA franc means, first of
~11., Fr~nc~.
Actually, Eor quite some t.ime charges of neocolonialism have been fre-
quently made r.oward the franc zone. The member-countries were blamed for
not being truly independent. Thus, among the French-speaking countries,
Guinea has never been a member. Mali withdrew in 1962 and established
the Mali franc. In 1968, however, without joining UMOA, the Bamako
authorities rejoined the franc zone. As to Mauritania, it withdrew in
1973 and established its national currency, the ouguiya.
How to explain that today the opposite is taking place? More or less
timidly, in 1979, Guinea, Mali and Mauritania attempted to make approaches
toward UMOA. Evenrually, Mali's return to the union is not unlikely.
Mauritania could regain a situation similar to that of today's Mali
(reintegration within the franc zone without UMOA membership). As to -
Sekou Toure's Guinea, which is resuming its ties with France, the Ivory
Coast, and Senegal, it would eventually join, taking its time. The
attraction of UAiOA goes beyond the French-speaking framework: English-
speaking Liberia, whose currency is tied, on a parity basis, to the
American dollar, is interested on ehe basis of practical. experience!
The origins of such requests may be traced, first of all, to a relatively
strong political current which favors West A�rican economic in[egration.
Actually, this explains the fact that the movement is limited only to
UMOA. Mali and Mauritania, for example, are members of CEAO (West
African Economic Community), together with the Ivory Coast, Togo,
Senegal, and Niger. A common currency .nakes a number of things easier
should one wish to develop trade and create mul~tinational institutions.
It also off~rs the advantage of stability, which is becoming even more
precious in the present period of economic crisis. There is also, and
above all, UMOA's mutation, in which France is acting more discreet.ly
than in the past.
Since 1973 the French vote has become less powerful within the administra-
tive council of the BCEAO (one member out of seven, as compared with one
out of three previously). It becomes decisive only in making a majority,
i.e., in the rare cases of "strategic" aperations. Furth~rmore, today
the bank is free to handle 35 percent of its assets in foreign currency,
reducing to 65 percent (as compared with 100 percent previously) the
sh~re which must be kept in its accuunt with the French treasury. Today
it is the conference of the member chiefs of. star_e which acts as the
supreme authority of the UMOA. It decides on a11 matters which the
council of ministers, which must pass unanimous decisions, cannot.
Finally, in accordance with the factual and successful Africanizing of
the personnel, the seat of the 8CEA0 was moved from Paris to Dakar,. It
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was opened on 29 May 1979 by the chiefs of state who met in the
Senegalese capital for their annual meeting.
'I'liu~:, UM(lA i s ;,t i l l T'ranc�~~ hc ~unr~~nr~~ ~C t~h~ CFA f rr~nr ,~nd i t s ~;C ipu-
l,il inii:;), hul (1 is nc~t c~nt ir~~ly f~rr~nce. Thc t r.~ns.~ct inn of dr.al:; w[th
nciKhborinK countries also reflecr the honoring of a certain French
policy for its ability to have adapted and maintained (and broadened) the
French presence while keeping a lower profile. This applies to all other
than critical situations. This allows France to go beyond its traditional
area of inf.luence.
Does this mean that, as the crowning of thi~ policy within the framework
of monetary relations most Western countries will progressively join the
UMOA? Some caution becomes necessary here. If the UMOA may today be
described as a relative success it is becaus~ it has few members. It
operates like an association offering mutual benefits: influence (French)
versus stability (of the CFA franc). Would this apply to 8 or 10 members?
Nothing could be less certain. The union would become more difficult to
manage, as it requires a convergence of budget policies and a certain
financial strictness. To achieve this, eventual candidates would have to
impose upon themselves a new kind o� discipline.
Withi.n the iJMOA, with six members, the question has already been raised
on the effects of the divergent economic evolution of the richest coun-
rries and the others. Would a broader association not lead to the rtsk
af increased differences and to lose the advantages of today's UMOA?
This would be serious, for the only thing left in such a case would be -
the interest of France.
Some young cadres of the BCEAO would like to strengthen the union of the
six in order to be ready to break its last links with France. ThiS had
been asserted as technically possible. Stability would be lost but
autonomy would make it possible to implement more ambitious and more
"developing" monetary policies compared with the present. Is it worth it?
Both political and f~scal atithorities would rather maintain the current
status. Is this obsolete caution or justified realism? The argument
cannot be resolved with~ut, at least, giving it a try.
`
~ COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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. INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL STATUS OF UMOA~REPOkTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 pp 3317-18
/Article: "Economic and Financial Status of the UMOA /West African
Monetary Union/"/ -
- /Text% At the last meeting of the ministers of economic affairs and of
finance of the member nations of the f ree zone (Paris, 27 September 1979)~ r
the Central Bank of West Af rican States submitted to those attending the
said meeting a document of the economic and financial status of the UMOA,
a body that encompasses Benin, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Senegal, and Togo.
Agriculture
The issuing institution considers that, since the beginning of 1979 the flow
of export products f rom the UMOA has taken place under more favorable
condi.tions than in 1978.
The Union's cocoa production for the 1978-1979 season was estimated at
327,000 tons, against 324,000 tons for the preceding season, most of it
being supplied by Ivory Coast (317,000 tons, +~1,000 tons).
The coffee harvest, severely affected by the drought of 1977, sfiould be
approximately 280,000 tons, against 201,000 tons in 1977-1978, the improve-
ment being mostly attributable to ~vory Coast.
In the six member-states, the marketing of cottonseed should reach 242,000
tons (+21 percent over the 1977-78 seasoh); this harvest should supply
approximately 94,000 tons (+~8,000 tons) of cotton fiber for ginning. With
115,000 tons of cottonseed~ Ivory Coast ranks first among the Union's
producers; Senegal, with 37,000 tons, showed a reduction of close to
5 pe rcent.
The improvement in climactic conditions, especially in Senegal, allowed for
the reestablishment of the marketing of peanut oil, The total for the -
197$-1979 season should amount to 93fl,000 tons in the shell, against 475,000
tons for the preceding season, with Senegal contributing g12,000 tons ~
against 436,300 tons.
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The abundant rainfall in 197$-1919 encouraged the development of food crops
in all the countries of the monetary union, allflwing for the establishment
of plans for forming emergency stocks by organizations in charge of ma~ket-
ing, particula rly in ivory Coast.
The lumber industry slowed down in 1978 because of ineasures to preserve the
forestry resources. The expected production for 1979 is placed at 4.4
million cubic mete rs of undressed timber, against 4.5 million in 1978 and
5.2 million in 1977.
In the area of stock farming, major efforts have been undertaken to
replenish the livestock following lasses brought about by the drought during
the period 1974 to 1977; the actions taken were mainly concerned with
diversifying the species and developing intensive stock farming.
Mines
In 1978, phosphate production showed a slight decline; exports of calcium
phosphate totaled 4.4 million tons, of which 2.8 million *..ons came from
Togo.
In Niger, the production of uranium (2,lOg tons) benefited from the fact
that the Mining Company of Akouta began operating.
Industry
In contrast to the situation thai prevailed in 197~, industrial activity in
1979 should profit from the good level of agricultural production, which
supports the local market.
Nevertheless, the textile sector suffered from difficulties in selling, both
- because of fraudulent imports of articles at low prices and because of the
adoption of protectionist measures in the industrialized nations.
The oil mills are runring well in Senegal and Benin. On the other hand,
the oi.l mills of Niger rem?.in insufficiently supplied,
Prices
Since March 1979~ there has been an upward thrust in the prices of food
products, except in Senegal. Wage increases occurred during the first
6 months in ivory Coast, Upper Volta, and Niger.
Finance and Money
With regard to public finance, the rate of increase in the ove ~all budgets
slowed down.: +8.6 percent for 1979 against +11.1 percent for 1978, in the
Union as a whole. The accrued budgets of the six states, balanced in
receipts and expenditures, total 856.3 billion CFA francs for fiscal 1979.
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The current receipts represent 65.7 percent of the total resources (+)2.4
percent over 1978) and receipts devoted to equipment (293.5 billion CFA)
are up by 1.8 percent. For the six states, operating expenses were
12.6 percent heavier than in fiscal 1978.
- The year 1979 marks a pause in the increase of the UMOA's foreign national
debt, both because of the high volume of prior commitments and because of
the increasingly heavy cost of the interest on the debt.
The overall econom~c situation has, on the level of currency aggregates,
resulted in a drying up of net foreign assets, an acceleration in the growth
rate of credits in the economy and a deceleration in the issuing of money.
The total amount of currency had increased by 16.7 percent as of 31 May
1979 against 20.5 percent as of 31 May 1978. This deceleration is a result
solely of the drying up of foreign currency. This slowing down is also
only to be found in ivory Coast: in Benin and Senegal, on the contrary, a
sharp acceleration in the rate of increase was shown, and a weak increase
in Togo, Upper Volta, and Niger.
As of 31 May 1979, the increase in the fiduciary currency was established
at 18 percent, against 14 percent for the period ending 31 May 1978. This
increase was true for all states in the union except Benin, where a
decrease of 6 percent was recorded.
The growth rate of bank deposits was slower than that of the fiduciary
_ currency: +16.2 percent (against pe rcent over the preceding period).
Deposits by individuals and companies contributed 112.1 billidn CFA francs
toward expending the total amount of mon~y, while deposits by public bodies
decreased by 10.1 billion CFA f rancs.
Between 31 May 1978 and 31 May 1979, the domestic credit increased by
261.7 billion, or 31.1 percent. This increase is a result of an additional
demand for loans from individuals and companies and from a diminishing of
the net credit position of the governments with regard to monetary
institutions. This position has in fact amounted to 78.7 billion CFA
compared to 84.8 billion a year earlier; the decrease shows the tightening
of public treasuries. In Benin, on the other hand, the improvement of the
government's credit position seems to come from drawings on foreign loans.
The liability on economic loans increased 6y 255.~ billion CFA, or 27~8
percent, during the period under review compared to 24.7 percent a year
earlier. The strength of these additional requests for loans varied from
state to state. Strong in Senegal, Benin and Niger, it was noticeably
weaker in tfie other states, As tonnages of marketed goods have increased,
so have seasonal ioans increased sharply in S2negal and ~vory Coast. In -
the category of inedium-term credits, a sharp increase was shown in Benin,
Senegal, and Niger. The banking sector is sharing more and more in the
financing of investments.
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Foreign Relations
In the area of foreign relations, the year 1978 finally closed for the
Union as a whole with a deficit in foreign transactions of approximately -
22.5 billion CFA compared to an overall surplus of 21.1 billion in 1977.
The very considerable deterioration in the balance of current operations,
the negative balance of which went from 173.2 billion CFA one year to
319.9 billion the next, is at the origin of this trend reversal. In this
category, the cumulative balance of foreign exchanges in the six states now
has a deficit of 37.4 billion CFA, whereas an overall surplus of 60 billion
- had been cleared in 1977� The Union's export receipts amounted to 849�2
billion CFA in 1978 (+14.1 billion), but the cost of importing equipment
materials and food products rose sharply. Only Ivory Coast showed a
surplus in its trade balance for 1978 (142.8 billion CFA).
The financing of major equipment projects was largely realized with foreign
res~urces and led to an increase of 103.1 billion CFA in net capital
rece~pts.
This increased and widespread recourse to foreign capital, which was often
negotiated under market conditions, nevertheless made for an appreciable
increase in obligations linked to payment on the debt, which, in some
states of the Union faced with bad tr~ade performances, such as Senegal and
Togo, fostered a situation that is incompatible with the foreign balance and
the budgetary resources. This has resulted in 1979 in an appeal for the
financial~facilities of the Inte rnational Monetary Fund and the setting up
of short and medium-term pra~rams aimed at achieving bases for stable,
- accelerated economic growth.
According to the cyclical development of the past months, one should expect
to see irr 1979 an improvement in the trade balances of most of the states
in the Union. Indeed, the latest estimates foresee at the end of the year
that these balances will show an overall surplus of 17.2 billion CFA instead
of the overall deficit of 37.4 billion in 1978. The movement should be
expanded even further in 19$0 when the overall surplus of the trade -
balances should rise to 33.8 billion in spite of the growing burden of the
oil bill.
Taking into account the de~fic;it for services (.295.9 billion CFA in 1978,
350 billion estimated for 1979, and 384.1 billion for 1980~ and the slowdown
in contributions of private foreign capital, the result should be a sharp
reduction in the negative balances of current operations.
The strict surveillance on any recourse to foreign capital will aid in
_ stabilizing the net imports of nonmonetary capital~ which went from 297.4
billion CFA in 1975 to an estimated 311 billion in 1974 and 328~3 billion
in 1980.
Finally, the development of the balance of payments resulting from all
transactions will be seen in the Union as an increase in the total deficit,
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which will be 28.8 billion CFA in 1979 and 35.2 billion in 1980, compared `
to 22.5 billion in 1978.
The net'foreign assets of th~~ UMOA hava been reduced from the equivalent
of 190 !~illion CFA at the end of Hay 1978 to 141.4 billion at the end of
- 1979. The percentage of asse+cs in French f rahcs of tt~e total amount of
avaitable foreign funds has weakened considerably: 66 percent against
75 percent a year ago.
In concluding i~s study, the Central Bank of the West African States ~
considers that at the end of 1979 the level of foreign assets of the Union
- will truly be less than that at the znd of 1978.
For 1980, an effort to replenish the UMOA's fcreign assets risks being
impeded by the worsening current situation. The slowdown in the growth of
developed nations and the persistent inflation aggravated by successive
oil price increases could lead to a worsening of the trade balance deficit
in spite of the probable reduction in food product imports and the improvement
likely to be shown in the area of receipts from raw material exports.
~ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIF~S
CONSTRUCTION OF OMVS DAM SCFiEDULED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERftANEENS in French 14 Dec 79 p 3458
[Report: "Diama: Foundation Stone Laid"]
[Text] The building of th;: Diama and Manantali dams, the two most impor-
tant joint projects in the struggle against drought for Mali, Ma~ritania,
and Senegal, will be started in 1980, the AFP was told by Amadou Aw, high
commissioner of the OMVS (Organization for the Development of the Senegal
= River), on 4 December. According to Aw, the final technical problems
related to the building of these dams were settled at a meeting in Dakar
between the OMVS and the financing sources.
Thrsc~ problems were related above all to the Diama dam which is ro be
built on Senegalese territory, not far from the mouth of the river. The
project was reduced in size, as ~hose atter.uinb the meeting kept f.or the
future dam only its function of blocking the extension of the saiine
water and irrigation. The building cf a 90 kilometer dike and of a
reservoir with a capacity for 30C to 580 million cubic meters was. post-
poned. The project will cost $132 million and the laying of the founda-
tion stone was to take place on 12 December in the presence o� the chiefs
of state of the three member countries.
The only problem related to the Manantali dam, located in Mali, was to
= determine the height (starting from the river bed). The moneylenders
agreed with the OMVS on 208 meters. The Manantali dam will allow the
irrigation uf 250,000 hectares of land and the possibility to make the
river navigabl.e. The plan calis for the construction of a reservoir con-
taining 11 billion cubic meters of water. Excluding the hydroelectric
power plants which will be built later and will generate 800 mitlion
ki.lowat~ hours, it will cost $470 million (r.aking inflation into con-
sideration).
Aw pointed out, furthermore, that the procedure for the acquisition of
the necessary funds for the building of the dams (about $600 million) had
- not been entirely established yet. For the time being, available funds�
total $500 million and the sum of $100 million remains to be found. -
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Several couTitries and agencies are participating in the Einancing of the
project: Saudi Arabia ($100 million), the FRG ($92 million), Kuwait
($75 million), France ($56 million), the group of the African Development .
B~~nk ($52 millionl, Ab~u-Dhabi ($50 million), Italy ($24 million), the
Tslamic. Qevelopmenr Bank ($20 miltion), Europe~n Developmenr Funds ($19
million), Canada ($8.5 million), and Iran ($4 mill.ion).
" The Diama project will be started in the first half of 1980, whereas the
start of the Manantali project will be started at the end of that year.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris,1979
- 5157
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iNTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
LIPTAKO-GOURMA BUDGET APPROVED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3397
[Report: "Liptako-Gourma; 1n80 Budget: 103,7 Million CFA and Development
runds of 600 Million CFA"]
[Text] The 14th regular session of the Council of Ministers of the Inte-
- grated Development Authority of the Liptako-Gourma area (Upper Volta,
Mali, and Niger), held from 8 to 12 November in Niamey, approved the 1980
authority 'budg~t totaling 103.7 million CFA, or a participation of 34.6
million per state.
The 14th session also adopted a modification to the statutes of the
organization. Henceforth the conference of chiefs of state wilt be the
~ supreme authority. It alone will define the general policy o� the organi-
zation. This decision deprives the Council of Ministers of its rights in
the matter. Henceforth it will be in charge of implementing the decisions
reached by the chiefs of state. The con�erence of chiefs of state shall -
meet once every two years.
On the other hand, the session ratified the decision of the last organiza- .
tion summit meeting on the establishment of a development fund. The fund
will become operational as of the 1980 fiscal year. It will amount to
600 million CFA (a contribution of 200 million per state).
Finally, a report on the activities of the director general described the -
progress made in the implementation of the projects or in their study.
Speci�ically, it is a question of the Niamey-Tera-Dori road based on the
~ mining project (currently at the stage of taking aerial photographs), of.
interest to Upper Volta and Niger; the plan for the establishment of tele-
communications between Upper Volta, Mali, and Niger. This project Fs
f.inanced by the African Development Bank.
~
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The next ministerial session will be held in Niger, in April 1980, while
the Conference of Chiefs of State will be held in 1981 in Mali.
COPYRTGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
5157
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
GREAT LAKES MEETING HELD
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERiZANEENS iY~ French 14 Dec 79 p 3471
[Report: "Great Lakes--Third Community Summit Meeting"]
[Text] Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, the president of Burundi, succeeded Zairian
President Mobutu Sese Seko as president of the Great Lakes Economic
Community which includes Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi, at the third summit
meeting which was held in the Shaba capital on 8 and 9 December. -
In addition to the adoption of the budget which totals 1 million 579,961
units of account for the ordinary budget, and 707,660 units of account
f.or the extraordinary budget, three new agreements were concluded by the
three partners: automobile insurance, sports exchanges, and finally,
agronomy, research.
A number of recommendations were also adopted on seating in Goma (in the
Kivu) of the Development Bank oE the Great Lakes States, the opening of
border posts among the three countries from 0600 to 2400 hours, produc-
tion of inethane gas from Kivu Lake, security, health (establishment of. a
mixed committee for epidemiological control), the social area (social
security, general convention), trade and, finally, information and the
press.
Some of the decisions adopted in the course of the summit include the
nomination of the Rwanda minister of foreign affairs as president of the
Council of Ministers of the member states of the community for 1979-1980,
and the acceptance of Burundi as the host of the next summit meeting at a
date not as yet deterrtsined.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie,Paris,1979
5157
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
. ALLEGED ESCAPE OF OFFICIAI~S--Castro Lopo, chief of the Mozambican political
police, traveled to Johannesburg in November and December 1979 to inquire
about the disappearance of two light planes belonging to the COMAG state
company. The aircraft, which had left Maputo illegally on 9 September,
reportedly took to South Africa four high Mozambican officials accused of
"splittism" and "fraud." According to certain sources, the flight of these
officials was organized by...the South African secret services. [Text)
[Paris JEUNE A~'RIQUE in French No 990-991 26 Dec 79 and 2 Jan 80 p 60J
FORTHCOMING LUSOPHONE SUNIl~IIT--The conference of the chiefs of state of
Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe
will take place in Maputo next Februsry. It will continue the discussion
of various problems initiated at the beginning of this year in Luanda con-
_ cerning the consoli~dation of their relations. The Maputo aummit will be
preceded by a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of these countriea.
[Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Dec 79-6 Jan 80 p 24]
~ ERST GERMAN TRUCKS--Starting with 1976 the automotive industry of the GDR
has supplied f.ive African countries with some 10,000 trucks of inedium
capacity (S tons), the East Berlin foreign trade services reported.
Angola (7,000 units) and Mozambique (1,500) were the recipients of the
biggest s~lipments. Er.hiopia, Cameroon and Tanzania are among the other
GDR customer.s which have been joined by Zambia, it was reported. The
trucks are or the M-50 model. They were assembled in Ludwigsfelde (IFA)
and Zittau (Robur). The GDR imported African craft and agricultural
goods. [Text] [paris.I~IARCHES TROP.ICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
30 Nov 79 p 3316] 5157
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ANGOLA
BRIEFS
MILITARY EXERCISES WITH CUBA--Luanda--"Iko" Carreira, Angolan minieter of
defense, presided on 7 December at the closing ceremony for the joint Cuban-
Angolan military exercises. The ceremony was attended by high Angolan and
Cuban military officials. These maneuvers took place on the occasion of
the joint celebration, on 10 December, of the 23rd anniversary of the found-
ing of the MPLA, the second anniversary of the establishment of the MPLA-
Labor Party and the landing (in December 1956) of the "Granma" in Cuba.
~ao Angolan artillery groups equipped with BM-21 and 130 mm cannons, a
paratrooper company and tanks participated in the exercises. The Cubans
fielded combat and transport planes, as well as helicopters and an infantry
brigade. In his speech, "Iko" Carreira stressed~the degree of cooperation
achieved by the Cuban and Angolan armed forces. "We were.able to obaerve
for ourselves the efficiency and technical perfection, with 300 combat ~
vehiclES of different types and the 2,000 officera and soldiers." These
military maneuvers, planned under the name "Combat friendship-23rd anni-
versary," were held about 30 kms from Luanda. [Text) [Paris A.FRIQUE-ASIE
in French 24 Dec 79-6 Jan 80 p 11]
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CAMEROON
FRENCH LOAN TO EXTEND RUBBER PLANTATION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3338
[Article: "HEVECAM: a 4 Billion Franc CFA Loan From the Central Fund"]
[Text] A financing agreement for 4 billion francs CFA [African Financial
Community] (Fr 80 million) intended for the development of Hevea-Cameroon
was signed in Yaounde on 23 November by the Cameroonian Economy minister,
Mr Youssoufa Daouda, and the general director of the Central Fund for Eco-
nomic Cooperation (CCCE), Mr Roland Billecart.
This loan is intended to finance in part the second phase of the plan to
expand the H$VECAM plantations. It involves building a latex treatment
unit with a capacity~of 20 metric tons a day and start~.-~g up support opera- -
tions, especially a village plantations pilot operation, the creation of an
agricultural perimeter, and experimentation with the action of vegetable
matter, cultivation methods, and the application of new techniques.
By the end of this second phase, the area of industrial plantation will have
grown in 4 years from 5,800 to 13,500 hectares, and the construction of non-
industrial buildings (infirmaries, dispensaries, schools) will continue.
The cost of completing the program is estimated at nearly 20 billion francs
CFA. In addition to contributions ~from the United Republic of Cameroon and
the CCCE, loans are expected ~rom the World Bank and the Commonweal'th Develop-
ment Corporation.
This new agreement brings to 28.815 billion francs CFA the total amount of
loans made with the CCCE since the beginning of 1979.
The various forms of aid extended to Cameroon by the CCCE involve the rural ~
development sectors, support structures and.industry, especially with finan-
cing the expansion of Alucam in Edea and the Victoria oil refinery.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreaux et Cie., Paris, 1979
8782
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CAMEROON
~ BRIEFS
BERTONA AIRPORT CONSTRUCTION--The office of the president of the Cameroon
United Republic has called for bids to construct an airport at Bertona.
The job includes upgrading the present runway, erecting buildings, and
supplying and installing navigation aids, Specifications may be obtained
from the office of the President of the Republic, general secretary,
Central Governing Board of Markets in Yaounde for 100,000 francs CFA
[African Financial CommunityJ. Deadline is 25 January 1980. [Text]
- [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3338] 8782
SHIPLINE ON MEDITERRANEAN--Cameroon Shipping Lines (CAMSHIP, the Cameroonian
national navy) recently started a new service in the Mediterranean. Hence ~
the National Loaders Council of Cameroon (CNCC) will no longer make quarterly
allowances for any imports that can be delivered by the national fleet from
from the ports of Leghorn, Italy; Marseilles, France; and Valencia, Spain.
liowever, prompt allowances will be made by the agents named jointly by CAM-
- SHIP and the CNCC: Tepeschi and Capanna, Leghorn; Roneu and Co., Valencia;
and Worms Maritime Service, Marseilles. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3338J 8782
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CONGO
INFORMATION ON CONGOLESE CHILDREN SENT TO CUBAN SCHOOLS -
Economic Realities
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Dec 79 pp 27-31
[Text] The fact that Congolese children were sent to
Cuba deeply shocked European and American public opinion.
Oddly enough, at the end of October, at the very time
when President Denis Sassou Nguesso was visiting France,
the whole campaign by the press was actually based on
erroneous information: that 600 Congolese children were
supposedly "deport~d," without their parents' consent.
Sophie Bessis, on behalf of JEUNE AFRIQUE, investigated ~
the matter in the Congo. Francois Soudan, back from
Cuba, reveals that the Congolese are not the only
Africans being educated in Cuba. Mohammed Maiga remem- -
bers that prior to the Cuban experiment other African
. children have experienced voluntary "deportation."
Wi�thout making any waves.
"It will:do my son a lot of good, he is stbborn, the Cubans will straighten
him out"; "My son to Cuba? Never, I want him to remain a child of this
country"; "Cuban education has a very good reputation, why not take ad-
vantage of it?" These are some of the comments taken from many different
and contradictory ones that we got on the spot.
- Of course th~re is talk, in Brazzaville and P.ointe Noire, about the 601
young Congolese sent to Cuba., but much Zess than in the Western editorial
offices. The majority of the citizens are much more concerned with
~ "VDA," an abbreviation for "difficult life today." In any case, one thing
seems certain: the authorities had no trouble in finding 600 families
in the country, who were ready to send their children to get a secondary
education in Havana. Even if all were not guided by enthusiasm, the
prospect of having one less mouth to feed, the attraction.that an education
in a foreign country has for people, the certainty.that these young.people
will easily get work when they return home and that they will be favored
by those in power, have inspired many vocations. Hence, many families
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accepted the offer, and some even tried to "intervene," in other words
to pull strings, when their children did no~ have all the necessary require-
_ ments, in order to send.them to the home of Marxism in the tropics. Out
of dozens of people questioned, only one told us that there had been pres-
sure applied, and he c.~as not Congolese.
How did the process develop? Everything starts with a Cuban proposal, no
doubt with ulterior motives: Havana offers, as it has done for other
"friendly" African nations, to take care.of the secondary education, in
Cuba, of 600 Congolese children. Braz2aville's answer is immediately
positive: the people in charge, hard pressed financially and economically,
are only too happy to get this aid which corresponds to the financing of
a whole college, considering the importance of the numbers involved.
As for the ideological aspect of this education, it does not bother them
at all, quite to the contrary. "After all," declares one of the people
in charge, "we completely share the same ideas with Cuba, and we see only
advantages if our children acquire them;" another one brags about "the
sound moral and political education" awaiting them. One understands them:
if all goes well, they are the future support of the regime, which is not
meant to displease the rulers....
But, beyond the immediate political preoccupation, many Congolese believe
that the Cuban education is especially well suited to the realities of
their country: "the school in the fields," is learning agriculture start-
ing in high school; it is an intellectual education that is not cut off
- from practice, hence, it is an excellent thing. Of course~, 10 years are
- a long time, but the rulers maintain that they will do their best to find
the necessary funds to finance a visit home, every 3 years, during vaca-
tion.
Thus it is only a matter of f inding the 600 chosen ones. It is decided ~
that only those can be candidates who have an elementary school diploma
and who have not started secondaxy school. The best among them will be
chosen, respecting the regional equilibrium, and in principle without
favoring any segment of the population. A real "invitation to tender" is
launched, and a committee, formed by including leaders in education,
people in charge of the youth, as well as a Cuban representative, is
responsible for malcing the selections from among the thousands of applica-
tions received. One doubts, however, that reality corresponds completely
to this ideal outline. Many parents refused to be separated from their ~
children and did not seem to have worried about it. Others, on the
contrary, moved heaven and earth ta have them go.
In Brazzaville we questioned several parents. One of them, an employee in
a ministry, father of nine.ch3ldren, succeeded in having his 13-year-old �
gone go to Cuba, who, he thought,. had been lost to.the world.of education.
For this boy it was the only chance to finish his schooling;.the dunce in
question evidently did not have his elementary school diploma, but daddy
managed....
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~ Another one, a municipal employee, has a.15-year-old son who does not want
to go to school anymore and who smokes hemp: he is off to Cuba now, to his
father's joy. The �ather hopes thaZ his son will be curbed by the Cubans!
Onthe other hand, the chauffeur of a minister had hoped that his son
would go too, but the attempts of his boss to pull strings failed. How- ~
ever, one should not think that Cuba is,the place used for deporting prob-
lem children. Many party members have seat their offspring because of
political conviction, to set an example, or...to facilitate their access
to responsible positions later on. One of ~them expressed his pleasure
at the idea that Cuba will educate "Red officials," who are capable of
running the true revolution. But, a little over a month after his son's
departure, he has still no news from him and regrets his decision a little
bit: now he believes that a"true revolutionary" should be educated in
his own country. In fact, zhe parents have not yet had any news from
their children since their departure for Cuba, and they are beginning
to find the waiting long....
But who was a part of the draft? Many were the children of political
leaders and of high-ranking officials. There is almost total agreement
in Bakongo: it is always the same people who take advantage of systems.
An illegitimate son of President Sassou Nguesso is supposed to be part
of a group, as well as the children of the ministers of health and of
- labor. But others have also been chosen. The head of state himself is
supposed to have reviewed ~he final list in order to avoid too much
favoritism. Yet, malicious gossip has it that the proportion of "north-
eners" is considerable.... We were not able to verify this. In any
event, there are no children cruelly wrenched from their mothers, or
families in dispair because their offspring were sacrificed to the
"higher interests of the revolution."
Actually, complications and poor organization caused the anxiety and gave
rise to certain rumors. The children were supposed to leave at the begin-
ning of September; they were duly vaccinated, their good outfits ready (the
parents received 35,000 CFA [African Financial Co~unity] francs per child
_ in order to buy the necessary items), they regrouped at the Liberation
High School in Brazzaville, waiting for Air Africa to fly them to Havana.
This is when some unexpected things come up: for several days Havana
Airport is closed because hurricane Frederic is passing through the region;
hence, departure is delayed and the children are confined for a longzr
period of time than anticipated, from whence stems the dissatisfaction of
certain families. Another complication: no allowance was made for the fact
that the planes of Air Africa were booked solid by people coming bac,k
from vacation. To honor its agreements, the airline hired thQ services
of a Dutch airline; this explains why the first reports about this affair
came from the Netherlands. The students fi~ally left Brazzaville with
six Congolese teachers who will teach.them French and the history of
their country.
Does this mean that everyone in the Congo agrees to this mini-exodus?
Far from it. Many are scandalized by the "irresponsiblity" of the
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authorities: "~he young people w~,ll be cut off from their country; they
will be brainwashed," states a young engineer from Pointe Noire. "I will
never send my children at such a young age; kids should not be separated
from their families," confides a young official, though a member of the
Party. Many Congolese are aware of the "political side" of thj.s affair,
and they do not hesitate to criticize their rulers in no uncertain terms.
For the basic problem is this: the Cubans know that, in the long run,
their presence in Africa is not popular. Who will be better replace-
ments than ~he children educated by them and of their own free will?
Thus, they will assure the long-lasting effect of their influence through
Congolese intermediaries, especially since they are ready to renew their
proposal for a new contingent of students next year. Unless the situation
changes, ten years is a long time....
Other Africans in Cuba
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Dec 79 pp 28-29
[Text] Jose Marti Airport, Havana. Sunday 19 August, 1979. Two Boeing
737 from Taag, the Angolan airline, gently land on the runway, wet from
the night's rain. Looking apprehensive, dazzled by the sun, dozens of
- children wearing red scarves come down the gangway in an orderly fashion.
All are Angolan. None is over 15 years of age.
_ The Cuban ~ournalist accompanying us smiles at our surprise; for him it is
occurence: "Not a week passes by without the arrival, or the departure
once their education is completed, of a plane-load of African kids." A
month later, 14 September, 600 Congolese kids, of the same age, step off
two DC 10 planes belonging to Air Africa, rented for this occasion by the
authorities in Braz2aville. In the meantime, hundreds of children from
Mozambiqu~, Ethiopia, and Guinea-Bissau arrive to and leave the Jose
Marti Airport.
Tod^y there are 10,000 young Africans, 10 to 25 years of age, from high
school to university level, who study in Cuba according to the agreements
of cultural cooperation. The Congo.of Massemba-Debat was the first one in
black Africa to sign these agreements in 1964. But the Portuguese decoloni-
zation and the Cuban intervention in Africa, in creating "specific and in-
ternationalist ties" between certain states and Fidel Castro's island, have
increased considerably this special form or cooperation: 3,500 Angolans,
2,000 Ethiopians, 1,500 Mozambicans, 800 Guineans (plus 700 Congolese and
about 100 from Benin and Tanzania) follow a"Cuban educational program"
today.
In a way, one can understand the motives that drove the leaders of these
young socialist states,.the former Portuguese colonies, to send the elite
of their youth--for it is the most gifted who go,.chosen on the spot by
Cuban educators--to be educated 10,000 km away from home. The kind of ed-
ucation in effect in Cuba, which mixes an especially strong scientific
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education and a practical study of modern meth~ds in tropical agriculture,
is geared to the economic needs of.these countries. And, no doubt, also
to the political needs of their leaders.
Besides, ev,ery group has ita own national training, which insures that a
number of cou~ses are taught in the mother tongue (namely hiatory and
geography).
If for Angola, Mozambique, or Guinea-Bissau, independent for less than 5
years and with practically no managerial staff or the means to train any
themselves, and who want to get their economies going as quickly as pos-
sible, this "exportation" of children is, all in all, a logical process,
the same cannot be said for all countries. The Congo and even more
Ethiopia have been independent for a much longer time.
How do these thousands of African children live in the middle of the
Caribbean? Much like the young Cubans, though, it is true, wiChout a ~
family. Besides, some do not tolerate the emotional isolation during such
a long exile--as is the case of some of the older students in Europe--and -
they are then repatriated. I was able to visit one of these "schools in
the country" on the Island of Youth (ex-Island of the Pines), nat far from
Nueva Gerona, where 600 Congolese students were recently settled. Four
prefabricated buildings lost in the middle of sugar cane fields, three
sports grounds, thirty dormitories with 20 beds in each. Eight-hour days:
four for courses and four for "productive work" on the plantations run by
the school. About 10 Angolan kids of the "Practice Lumumba Brigade" who
enumerated, for 3 hours, the distressing recollections of the civil was
that ravaged their country and which they remember a little, were not,
it is true, in a mood for ~okes.
But they would certa3nly have laughed heartily at the statement made in
New York, last 6 November, by another Angolan, Jonas Savimbi, leader of
the UNITA, w~o stated that "the African children in Cuba are used as labor
in the fields where they toil night and day under inhumr~n conditions."
Cubans Prepare Their Successors
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Dec 79 p 30
[Text] Ethiopians, Mozambicans, Angolans, Namibians, and recently some -
Congolese.... The exodus of African students to Cuban secondary schools
seems to be accelerating to a point where the West is getting worried:
a r_ampaign by the press in France asks for explanations from the Dutch
parliament to the government of the Netherlands; alarmist rumors from the
American State Department, accoYding to whom.the children receive military
training in Cuba. Nothing is omitted that could inform the public about
this new kind of "cooperation."
However, on taking a closer look, only the destination of these thousands
of students is really new. The Congolese and the Cubans are hardly
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innovatars. During the whole colonial period,�and especially since 1945,
the home countries--France, Great Britain in the lead, and Portugal to ~
lesser degree--took tens of thousands of.the citizens of their etnpire into
their own schools. Far from stopping the,flow, independence unly confirmed
it: Paris and London continue to take in a great number of African stu-
_ dents. As for the French, British, or American schools or military acad~
emies, they are wide open to the future off icers of the Third World.
Besides, everyone is aware that this western education of the African elite
constitutes the best means for the fonner home countries to perpetuate
their influence. Hence, Western anxiety over this matter seems to be at
least hypocritical if not exaggerated. However, this time there is some-
thing original in the sending of young Africans to Cuba: it is actually
the first time that outside of Africa children of this age are taken in
charge in such a systematic fashion, that their education is planned up _
to the smallest detail, and that.their ideological education is so pre-
cisely prepared. Whatever the quality of a Cuban education may be, the
students there will hardly have the opportunity to learn about different
opinions: in Havana one does not trifle with orthodaxy, and pluralism
is rather frowned upon. Besides, it is the objective: theoretically, the
_ school must serve to form good militants as well as to turn out future
managers. Reality is, in fact, much less monolithic....
I3ut whS~ Cuba? For several years now, Fidel Castro's country has been a
real godsend for the Soviet leaders: the Cuban soldiers "do better" than
their counterparts from the shores of the Volga. Same observation in the
f ield of education: the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow, reserved
for Af rican students, turned out to be a failure: the students who went
there did not become perfect communists, Moscow style, far from it, and ~
the USSR ended up thinking that because they did not come when they were
young enough, they were already beyond redemption. At the same time, ~
the Soviets are not much loved in Africa: accordin~ to almost total con-
sensus, their people in service are often racist and know little about
the problems of the continent. Cuban socialism, though strictly orthodox,
- has the advantage of being mixed with black blood, of having a tropical
climate, and the samba; for this reason it is less forbidding for Africa.
The result: Cuba is the country to which about 10,000 future officials
from different African nations will go, and where they will stay for about
10 years. In Havana it is hoped that within the required time they will
become useful replacements for Cuban advisors who cannot stay indefinitely
in friendly countries. After a11, the Eastern countries, following a tech-
nique that was duly tried by the West, have understood that they must rely _
on the future generations. Will East-West rivalry take place at the
children's level from now on? East-West south of the Sahara? Recent argu-
ments seem sto point in.that direction. The points wi11 be counted a few
years from now,.when they return--with what qualifications--to their coun-
try. In fact, past experience.shows.that many similar efforts have failed.
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One can be happy about or deplore.the present situation, but it is useless
to dramatiz~ it too soon. Is not.thjs new type of migrations actually
the responsiblity of the new African elite it$elf, which has,shown that it
is incapable of forging its own values in.the face of ideological and
cultural imperialisms of a~l kinds. _
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
9465
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CONGO
BRIEFS
PRO-OPANGO OFFICERS DISMISSED--The Congolese Government supposedly dis-
pleased the Soviets by dismissing and assigning to forced residence several
o�ficers who were favored by ex-President Yhombi Opango, and who had been
trained in the USSR. Hence "without security" in Moscow's opinion. [Text]
[Paris ,TUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Dec 79 p 45] 9465
PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CONTRACT--A contract of partnership between the
national Congolese society Hydro Con$o and Coastal State Occidental. The
American company will play the role of operator in the search for oil.
One of the conditions stipulated by Brazzaville at the signing of the
contract would be that Coastal State Occidental participate in starting
to operate the refinery in Pointe Noire, which could not function since
its construction. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Dec 79 p 46]
9465
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GUINEA-BISSAU
BRIEFS
D'ESTAING VISIT--President Giscard d'Estaing is planning to visit a number
of African countries during the first quarter of 1980. Biasau will welcome
the French chief of state, who had been invited last year by President Luiz
Cabral. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 24 Dec 79-6 Jan 80 p 24] -
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IVORY COAST
UN INDUS`fRIAL DEVELOPMENT AID
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 79 p 3333
[Report: "UNIDO Aid to Ivory Coast Industrial Development"]
[Text~ On the occasion of United Nations Day, celebrated last 24 October,
Latortue, chief technical adviser and co-director of the UNIDO Project
for Aid to Ivory Coast Industrial Development, spoke on the United Nations
In;:ustrial Development Organization (UNIDO), created in November 1966,
and its main targets and activities: industrial development planning; -
promotion of industrial investments essentially in small and medium-sized
nationat industries; industrial decentralization and creation of indus-
trial sectors; development and promotion of suitable technologies; indus- -
� trial standardization and quality control; industrial management training;
and industrial information and documentation.
Lator.tue emphasized most of all the UNIDO activities in the Ivory Coast
where it has been in operation for about 10 years and has contributed to
the government's efforts in the field of industrial development. This
cooperation follows six major directions:
1. Promotion of Ivory Coast Enterprises. This consists essentially of
helping in the creation o� small and medium-si2ed industrial enterprises
_ belonging to Ivory Coast citizens. The help provided by the UNIDO con-
sists of the study of the viability of projects, looking for financing,
management training, and technical follow-up of estab2ished projects
until they reach normal development.
2. Industrial Decentralization. This activity is within the framework
of the governmental effort to set up a number of development centers in
~ the country and avoid rural exodus. A program is under stud}~ for the
creation of industrial areas in the various economic regions in the
country. The building of the first centers will be undertaken next year
within the framework of the regional action program bf OPEI (Office for -
the Promotion of Ivory Coast EnCerprises).
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The UNIDO also carries out for the government industrial surveys in some
parts of the country (North and Center) in order to determine these areas'
poten[ial for industrial developm~nt.
3. Industrial Standardization. In its current relatively advanced
industrial development stage, it is indispensable for the Ivory Coast to
concentrate on problems of industrial standardization and quality control
of manufactured goods. The UNIDO is cooperating with the Ivory Coast
Standardization Bureau (BIN) for the development of. Ivory Coast standards
and of a system for contr.olling their application.
4. Promotion of Industrial Exports. Within the General Office for
Industrial Activity (DGAI), the UNIDO is closely cooperating in the
development of structures which could facilitate, on the one hand, inter-
industrial trade in the Ivory Coast and, on the other, encourage the
~ export of Ivory Coast industrial goods to the CEAO [West African Economic
Community] and the CEDEAO [West African States Economic Community].
5. Promotion of Industrial Investments. The UNIDO is als~ participating
in the government's effort, within the framework of the Industrial
Development Bureau (BDI) in the promotion of investments, faciliratin~
_ rhe participation of the Ivory Coast in fairs and meetings expecially
organized to promote the meeting between potential investors and promoters
of industrial projects. Occasionally the UNIDO puts at the disposal of
the government high level specialists and consultants to help in the
objective assessment of industrial projects submitted by foreign
investors. �
6. Industrial Training. The caoperation of the UNIDO in this area is _
limited essentially to the training of. cadres f.or the various industrial
institutions in the field5 of technical studies, drafti.ng and assessment
of industrial projects, and advancement of Ivory Coast heads of enter-
prises in managing the production of industrial goods. In the future,
based on the needs formulated by the government, such cooperation, '
naturally, could assume other aspects, meeting the requirements of the
government's policy of the training of domestic cadres for enterprises
located in the Ivory Coast.
' Finally, the UNIDO is a dynamic institution serving the industrialization
~ of the Third World. Latortue recalled that since the 1975 declaration
and Lima Action Plan, it has undertaken the implementation of ineasures as
the result of which, by the year 2000, industrial output in Third World
countries will be raised from 7 to 20 percent of the world's industrial
~ output. This is a Herculean task which requires substantial material and
~
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financial means but which also shows very great faith in the capability
of the people to change and adapt themselves to the new requirements
governirig international cooperation among equal partners.
COPYRTCHT: Rene Mareux et Cie,Paris,1979
5157
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IVORY COAST
COOPERATION WITH BELGIUM REPORTED -
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Nov 74 p 3332
[Report: "Belgium Sovereigns Pay Official Visit; Cooperation and Trade
Between Belgium and the Ivory Coast"]
[Text] King Baudouin and Queen Fabiola of Belgium were official guests
of the Ivory Coast from 21 to 24 November. In both Abidjan and
Yamoussoukro they received a particularly warm welcome.
In a speech delivered on 21 November at the dinner he gave in honor of
the royal couple, Presiden Houphouet-Boigny emphasized the richness and
diversity of bilateral relations between Belgium and the Ivory Coast; ~ ~
promising "numerous and rich" future prospects.
In turn, King Baudouin toolc up the idea close to the heart of President
Giscard d'Estai.ng of a European-African community within which Europe
would contribute its technology for the development of the abundant raw
materials of the black continent.
c,conomic Relations
On the occasion of the visit paid by the royal couple, let us recall that
cooperation between Belgium and the Ivory Coast is governed by a general
cooperation convention, signed on 7 June 1968, subsequently enlarged by
specific agreements. Within this framework three mixed commissions met
in 1974, 1975, and 1978. On the other hand, th~~ number of Belgium
citizens living in the Ivory Coast is estimated at 1,20a; about 100 of
whom ar.e cooperative workers, whereas some 500 Ivory Coast,citizens,
mostly students, live in Belgium.
In the area of traCe, in 1978 Belgium sold the Ivory Coast goods worth
17.45 billion CFA (the se~,enth biggest supplie~r) and bought from it
- products worth 7.4 billion CFA (12th biggest customer), including pine-
apples (810 million CFA), cocoa beans and derivates (1 billion 975
million), coffee (838 million), timber (1 billion 708 million), as well
as cotton and cotton staples (128 million) and clothing (465 million).
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. , ~ , r,.~ ~
~ , : , ~ . . ~ _ .
w.�.;...~. . , :,:...c_.r. ...o,-',.~.:r, < ~ _ , , . , ~ , , ~ , - x ,6 . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . _ . _ . . , ~.r.i~ . . . E .
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Belgium investments in the Ivory Coast are in food production, chemicals,
construction, and agriculture: Solibra, Chimie Afrique, Entreprises -
~ Francois.et fils Afrique (currently assigned the construction of the new
internat,ional trade center in Abidjan), Codetaf, and Sofalca, not to
- forget the participation of big Belgian bank groups such as Societe
generale de banque de Belgique and Banque Bruxelles-Lambert, within the
Societe generale de banques en Cote d'Ivoire (SGBCI) and within the
Banque i-nternationale pour le commerce et 1'industrie de la Cote d'Ivoire
(Bicici). Belgian study offices are also working in the Ivory Coast,
Tractionel and Sybetra in particular.
Belgian cooperation with the Ivory Coast also involves the merchant
marine (personnel training, Academy of Marine Sciences. ship repairs
(a preliminary study for the building of a repair dock in Abidjan was
financed by Belgium) and, naturally, teaching, particularly on the
university level and through television, and health care.
Let us azlso point out that Belgium is helping to develop.the department
of zootechnology of the Ecole Nationale superieure agronomique in Abidjan.
This represents additional Belgian assistance to the development of cattle
breeding_ in the north.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie,Paris,1979
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IVORY COAST
FRENCH AID TO REFINERY REPORTED .
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Frenr_h 30 Nov 79 p 3333
[Report: Petroleum: 1.4 Billion French Francs for the Expansion of the
Abidjan Refinery"]
[Text] Two loans will be granted to the Societe ivorienne de raffinage
to finance the expansion of the Abidjan petroleum refinery.
The first will be a cash loan totaling 500 million French francs, some
of which to be repaid within 10 and some within 13 years. The breakdown
is the following: A loan of 400 million francs related to export
activities with an interest rate of 1.25 percent higher than the average
bank interest rate and the interest rate charged on the French money mar-
ket, covering a six-month period; and a loan of 100 million francs wi.th
an interest rate higher than that same average by 1.5 percent for the 10
year repayment share and 1.75 percent for the 13 year repayment sha.re.
The second loan is an export credit for about 900 million francs,
guaranteed by the compagnie francaise d'assurance pour le ccmmerce
exterieur (Coface).
Both operations will be managed by the Societe generale and the Bank of
America.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux . et Cie,Paris,1979
5157
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IVORY COAST
COMPUTERIiZATION OF COCOA-COFFEE MARKETING REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 30 Nov 79 p 3332
[Report: "Coffee and Cocoa Trade Controlled Through Computerization"]
[Text] Computerization is being developed to assist in the marketing of
coffee and cocoa in tne Ivory Coast. The Ivory Coast government has, in
fact, set up the Coginfor company in charge of developing a network of
terminals in shelling enterprises, port plants, and main collection
centers, linked with a major computer center installed in the building of
the Caisse de stabilisation. This will enable the officials to follow
the development of the campaign on a daily basis.
In order to make it possible for this network to do its work, customers
will mandatorily submit to planters purchase information as the goods are
shipped out. Such purchase bulletins, in four copies, will be kept by
the Coginfor agencies for accepted customers in the shelling enterprises.
The original of the bulletin will be given to the planters. The second
copy will be sent with the goods to the shelling enterprise and the
plants; an entry stub will go with it which will be submitted to the
terminal. The third copy will be collected weekly by the subprefecture
_ of the purchasers and put at the disposal of the computer. Finally, the
_ fourth eopy will be kept by the purchaser.
Since the computErized system will be based on the classification of the
purchase bulletins, any customer who has purchased a product from a
planter without immediately giving him the purchase bulletin may be sub-
ject to penalties which may even include loss of purchase rights.
Futhermore, to facilitate the repayment of transportation costs to ~
- exporters and shellers, the compuCerized system will submit periodically
to the Caisse de stabilisation information on billing data.
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' Expor.ters and shellers have also been asked to see to it that alI the
necessary documents are submitted to the terminal immediately after
receiving the product.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux. et Cie, Paris, 1979
5157
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1VORY COAST
COCOA STQ~tAGE PROBLEM REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3395
[Report: "Cocoa: A Serious Storage Problem Facing the New Crop"]
[Text] The first cocoa beans of the 1979-1980 crop began to reach Abidjan ~
the last days of November, after over six weeks of delay caused by the
rains.
The stock which was to increase at the pace of 25,000 tons per week until
the beginning of next year totaled 20,000 tons severat days ago. The
Ivory Coast, which withdrew from the market at the beginning of October,
will, therefore, quickly find itself, in the opinion of a number of ex-
perts, facing difficult storage problems, since its storage capacity is
f.or abou[ 100,000 tons. Some experts have pointed out that the Fund for -
- rhe Stabilization and Price Support of Agricultural Goods will not only
have to pay the price for renting about 100,000 square meters of storage
space (it takes about one square meter of storage space per ton of cocoa),
but that it also risks the fre~~ing of substantial funds in this opera-
tion. According to the experts, in addition to the leasing of storage
space, insurance, the purchase of a substantial amount of insecticides,
depreciation of the quality of the cocoa by virtue of its storage, and
toss of weight, as well as the consequent freezing of funds could,
according to the AFP, cost the Eund about SO billion francs CFA.
For a whilP the Stabilization Fund could supply about 15,000 to 20,000
tons of cocoa to the local plants whose annual capacity totals 80,000
tons. However, cocoa dealers in the Ivory Coast capital have pointed out
that this would require the resolution of. the conflict which pits these
plants, in which foreign capital controls the majority, against the Fund.
For the time being, two o� the four plants, accounting for one-half of _
the cocoa processing capacity of the country, have preferred to stop
their output, arguing that the conditions imposed by the Stabilization
Fund were clearly inadequate "and no long made it possible to face
foreign competition," as stated by the director of. one of them.
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A renegotiation of the status of this processing industry is in progress.
However, there is no indication that a solution will be immediately f.ound
and accepted by the Stabilization Fund. The same circles have let it be
known that the government may be forced to requisition the plants should
the involved parties be unable to reach an agreement, even though empha-
sizing that the government would take such a decision only after having
exhausted "all other means for reaching a quick solution."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie,Paris,l979
r 5157
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IVORY COAST
POSSIBILITY OF SUGAR EXPORTS SEEN
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3395
[Report: "Sugar: Possible Exports in the 1979-1980 Campaign"]
[Text] The Ivory Coast will be able to meet its sugar needs as of the
~ beginning of. 1980 and would be able to export 30,000 to 40,000 tons in
the course of the 1979-1980 campaign.
Thanks to six refineries, two of which a.re nearing completion in the
northern part of the country, in the Zuenoula and Katiota, Ivory Caast
sugar production should reach about 320,000 tons in three years, whereas
domestic consumption needs are currently in the vicinity of 80,000 tons.
,
Some ten years ago the Ivory Coast had undertaken sugar production and -
was planning to produce about 600,000 tons of~sugar at the beginning of
the 1980's. However, in recent years the program was considerably hin-
dered by the low sugar prices on the world market and the high production
costs per ton. Production costs in the Ivory Coast are currently $800,
or twice the world price.
For this reason the international experts are rather skeptical as to the
possibility to export Ivory Coast sugar. "The government would have to
pay about $400 per ton of exported sugar, unless the price of sugar rises
rapidly on the world market," specified a technician asked by the AFP.
According to the specialists, the Ivory Coast has extremely high produc-
ti.on costs, as the sugarcane fields are all located in the northern part
of the countr.y, away from export centers. On the other hand, the building
of a sugar production system has not been completed and a sugar terminal
is still not to be found in Abidjan. Even though planned, its precise
location has not yet been decided and, according to the experts, it would
take at least two years to build it.
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Let us recall, as we pointed out in our 30 November iss:.e (page 3358),
that the International Sugar Council invited the Ivory Coast to join the
international sugar agreement and offered it an annual export contingent
- of 70,000 tons.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie,Paris,1979
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IVORY COAST
NEW HIGHWAYS OPENED; FURTHER STUDIES MADE
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3395
[Report: "Opening of. the Northern Highway"]
[Text] On 28 November Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouet-Boigny opened
, the first section of the northern highway, which was started in December
1974.
The highway has �our lanes, two in each direction, with 2.25 meter wide
shoutders each. The central divide averages seven meters in width. -
The first section of the highway starts at kilometer 12 of the Dabou
route and stops at Sikensi. It is 60 kilometers long and has a nine kilo-
meter long connection with Sikensi.
The predicted 1980 average daily circulation will be 4,800 vehicles or
1,400 passengers and 800,000 tons of freight.
The cost of the northern highway will be 22.5 billion CFA, 75 per~nt of
which financed by a consortium of Swiss banks (Union des Banques cuisses,
_ Banque populaire suisse, and Credit suisse); the remaining 25 percent
will be financed by the Ivory Coast.
The highway studies were conducted by Setec (Societe d'etudes techniques).
The construction was carried out by Gesco, the Group of Swiss Construction
Enterprises, consisting of the following companies: Schmalz, in Bern;
Conrad Zs~chokke, in Geneva; and Bless GA in Zurich. The building of the
highway involved about 100 Gesco engineers and the work of some 1,700
Africans.
The project requires 160,000 tons o� crushed rock per month. Two granite
deposits were discovered in the immediate vicinity of the highway and
were developed: Therefore, there are two quarries producing granite
materials: the first is at KilomQter 21, near the Attinguie Village,
with a 200 ton daily output which, therefore, can produce 60,OOO:tons of
of crushed rock per month.
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The second quarry, not far from Sahuye Village, is at kilometer 70. It
has a capacity for 360 tons per hour and is able to deliver some 100,000
~ tons per month.
The northern highway includes two other segments. The first, between
Sikensi and N'Douci is 35 kilometers long, to which will be added a 12
kitometer long connection to N'Douci, scheduled for completion at the
beginning of 1981. The second is between N'Douci and the bridges on the
N'zi (19 kilometers), to be completed at the end of 1981.
Furthermore, Gesco is studying a plan for a junction with Yamoussoukro
and financing possibilities for these 130 additional kilometers.
Started in September 1976, the east-west highway was commissioned on
26 November. This urban highway, 70 meters wide, consists of three lanes
in each direction and should relieve traffic north of Abidjan.
The east-west highway represents an investment of 24 billion CFA. It is
7.7 kilometers long and was completed in three years by a group of
enterprises (Dredging and Public Works, the Jean Lefebvr.e EnCerprise, and
the Colas Company).
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie,Paris,1979
5157
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SENEGAL
PRESS SAID TO BE STIFLED BY ECONOMIC FACTORS
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Dec 79 p 11
' [Article by Mam Less Dia: "The Senegalese Press Is Stifled"]
[Text] The main corollary to the introduction of democracy in Senegal was
the appearance of a rash of new names in the press which had remained,
until then, as though it were a domain reserved for the state and a few
Frenchmen acting in a private capacity.
In 1977, barely 3 years after the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] was
created, and 1 year diter the retum of the PAI [African Independence
Party] as a legal party, about eight papers reappeared. Five of them
[LE DEMOCRATE, L'UNITE AFRICAINE, SIGGI, ANDE SOPI, and MONSAREW] raised
high the banner of political struggle, each one being the propaganda tool
of a party. ~
In 1978, three other papers, including a"satirical" newspaper published
by the youth ~a the PS [Socialist Party] in power, were added to this col-
lection, which was already quite appreciable for a country where the il- .
literacy rate exceeds 70 percent.
In 1979 five publications practically disappeared. Of the remaining 7,
2 are controlled by the party in power, and 3 others by political grougs'
of which only 1 is 1ega1, leaving only three newspapers: AFRIQUE NOWELLE,
AFRIQUE TRIBUNE, and LE POLITICIEN. All three are also in danger of beit~g
stifled, indeed of di~appearing, because they are not backed by any
financial power.
Tiie independent Senegalese publishers do not have the advantage of any
protection, either regarding printing or regarding distribution. They are
forced to submit to the law of the "go-between" who controls distribution
and whose only interest, by definition, is to make a profit. Between 1977
adn 1979 the price of printing has risen by 20 percent. The expense for
distribu'tion, fixed at 40 percent of the returns fram sales by a sub-
sidiary of the French firm Hachette, is.all.the more unbearable since the
publisher is not in a position to control the actual sales.
I
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During a conversation with the prime minister, I pointed out the signifi-
cance of these questions. I believe Mr Abdou Diouf had considered the
possibility of.th2 state's being a di�tributor for the press, and even
helping in the stabilization of the price of paper, with the intention of
helping the press through a system of ad~ustments. So far nothing has
been done. Instead of stabilization, the printers raise prices that can-
not be ~ustified in any way. And, in the long run, the "death" of all
independent papers will crown the beginning of democracy which had raised
so much hope.
One asks why, at the beginning of the year, did the government take so
much trouble to get a vote on its precious law on "limiting the freedom
of the press," since it had at its disposal an equally efficient method:
economic asphyxiation.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA' 1979
9465 ~
CSO: 4400
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- ~ UGANDA
BRIEFS
ELECTIONS IN 1981--The former minister of Regional Cooperation, Mr Ateker
Ejalu, announced in mid-Novembex' that the next elections will be held on
3 June 1981. The elections will be preceded by a regional census, which
is planned for the beginning of next year. A commission is also to be
set up to fix election district boundaries and prepare the voter registra-
tion rolls. The 1981 Ugandan elections will be the first in Uganda in
l0~years. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
23 Nov 79 p 3281) 8782
NEW CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT--Tracts circulating in Kampala attest to the form-
ation bf a new clandestine oppositi.on movement, the Clandestine Democratic -
hiovement of Uganda, favoring former President Yusuf Lule. This movement
calls for Mr Lule's return to power. He was pushed out last June by Mr
Godfrey Binaisa. The movement's tracts also call for the reestablishment
of the 1962 constitution, which was abrogated by former President Milton
Obote in 1967. The movement is led by General Dayana. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3281] 8782
CSO: 440U
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_ .
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ZAIR.E
REPORT ON ECONOMIC SITUATION IN ZAIRE
Paris MARCHES TROPICA~JX ET MEDITE~A~BANFENS in French 16 Nov 79
pp 3105, 3107
~ext7 Since 1976, when substantial meesures were ta,ken to
stimulate the economy, Zaire has had a di~ficult time. The
linking of the currency with SDR ~pecial DraWing Right],
the return to ~ormer owners of z airianized enterprises with
60 percent of nationalized ca,pital, the moratorium and adjust-
, ment of the service of the foreign public debt, have not pre-
vented 1977 from being a very hard year and in No~ember 1977,
the chieY of state had to.promulgate an emergency plan~ giving
priority to the reorgenizetion of tranaportation, agricultural
developoent, the development of the mining industry in the
minimum time end an overhaul of the state apperatus. The
trade balance again became ositive in 1976 and had a surplus
o~ 284.9 MZ ~illion zaire~ in 1977.
The agricultural branch is unable to meet the domestic demand
for foodstuffs. The mining branch su~fered from the loW prices
for copper; it needs maay inQestments. The industrial aector
showed progress in some ~ields (~ood, sugar)~ but a decline in
textiles, cement and chemical industries. The large scale re- '
duction of imports haa not alWaya a1loWed a setisfactory sup-
ply level Por industry.
Net foreign credits at the end of December 1977 showed a nege,-
tive bal~nce of 201.7 MZ. Since 1974, the country has not
been able to guarantee the service of its ~oreign debt, which
an administrative office has been managing since 1976. At the
end of 1976, total liabilities amounted to 2.7 MZ, including
1,283 MZ o~ credits to the state and 1~422 MZ of credits to
enterprises. ~ _
The 1977 budget included an allowance of 249 MZ for debt serv-
ice: It had an estimated dePicit of 293 MZ. The de~icit in
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public finances reached, even at the end of 1978, 223.2 MZ
financed by loans.
The gross national product dropped slightly from 1056.6 MZ in
1976 to 1037.1 million in 1977.
~ From June 1977 to June 1978, total currency in circulation
increased flrom 881.9 r'1Z to 1, 262 MZ or an increase of 43.1
percent. This increase is made up mainly of net credits to
the state (+351.9 MZ) and credit to the economy (+48.9 MZ),
while net f oreign credits declined by 21.7 MZ.
In 1978, the economy continued to be disturbed by the contin- ~
uance o~ imbalances, both domestic ae well as f oreign, in
spite of some indices which indicate a certain stabilization
of activity.
According to the Bank of Zaire~ the imbalance of domestic
- prices is not the result alone o~ the reduction o~ supply from
local and foreign sources, but also of the expansioa ot de-
mand, supported by the ill-advised creation of monetary li-
quidities indirectly by treasury monetary financing.
The impact of the foreign deficit has only partially af~ected
the process o~ creation of monetary liquidities, !or the pay-
ments in foreign exchange by the government had as their
counterpe,rt in local currency a treasury debit at the central
bank.
Although the first three quarters of 1978 r~sulted in e trade '
surplus of about 100 MZ, the country's foreign transactions
showed a deficit o~ 22 r1Z. An economic recovery plan was
drawn up. on the level of the chief of state, and the signs o~
a pickup in 1979 are already noticeable.
A law of 14 July 1978 authorizes the conclusion of develop-
ment agreements between the executive council and commercial
and industrial enterprises. The latter are creating an eco-
nomic recovery fund, supported by the collection of a percent-
age less than 10 per~ent o~ the value of each unit produced
- and/or ~old, over and above the sale price. This levy is tax
free. It is deposited each month in an account opened at the
Bank o~ Zaire, to finanae the completion o~ projects delayed
by agreement. Each enterprise manages its fund, which is
state property and is overseen by officials. It is a matter
of guaranteeing to the producer the sale of his products,
encouraging the cultivation o~ new exportable products, organ-
izing livestock raising and providing a technical cadre. The
45
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~a~ ,.a~~>T~ , . . . ; t.. , : : . , . . . , . , . . _ . , _
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enterprises will have to build or maintain roads, schools and
clinics in the framexork o~ their projects for the benefit o!
the people involved.
The Banking System
The banking system includes: The People's Ba.nk, the
Kinsha,sha Bank, the Commercial Ba,nk o~ Ze,ire, the Zairian
Bank Association~ the Bank of Zaire, the A~rican International
Bank in Zaire, Barclay's Bank and City Bank. Zaire also has
a very important develo ment Pinance company, SOFIDE ~inance
Company for Developmen~.
In September 1978 all the savings banks had 112.2 MZ in
foreign credits and 25? million in reserves, 115 million in
credits to the state and 555 million in credits in the private
sector. Demand deposits amounted to 733.3 million and time
deposits to 198 million.
The Commercial Bank of Zaire with a capital o~ 4 MZ, had 207.9
MZ in demand deposits and 61.9 MZ in time deposits at the end
of 1977. Its investments on hand were made up of 22.5 A'1Z in
government a.nd semipublic securities (6 months and 1 year '
treasury bonds), 82.7 MZ in commercial paper and 1.8 I~IZ in
securities. Its protit for the 1977 Piscal year was 2.5 1'iZ.
The People's Bank has a capital o~ 4.5 MZ completely sub-
- scribed by the state.
- Credits Granted in 1977 by the People's Bank
(million zaires)
31/3/77 30/9/77
Short term 68.33 96.29
Long term 24.90 22.74
Agriculture 19.57 32.78
~ Industry 30.15 43.90
Trade and services 42.63 40.47
8ea1 estate loans 0.50 0.68
Personal loans 0.36 1.17
Construction 0.62 0.68
Stockpiling 1.01 2.86
$aw material purchase loans 14.84 22.02
Documentary credits 50.56 44.20
Enterprise treasnry of~ices 1.74 2.03
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SOFIDE, whose capital was increased in 197T to 4 M~, has
doubled the volume ofl its opera,tions, which rose from 10.1 MZ
in 1976 to 22.01 MZ in 1977. For the first 3 quarters o~ 1978
the amount of tra,nsactiona wae 13.91 MZ. The value of trans-
e,ctions increesed~e,long with their amount~ from 31.21 percent
in 1976 to 47.41 percent in 1977 and 54 percent in 1978.
The share ot the agricultural sector continues to increase
since it was 3.20 percent in 1975, 22.3 percent in 1976, 33.46
percent in 1977 and rea,ched almost 50 percent for the first
3 quarters of 1978.
Manufacturing industry rose from 35.60 percent in 1976 to
57.64 percent in 1977., In 1977 construction recorded 4.54
perceat, transportation 1.5T percent, extractive industry 0.68
percent and other services 2.11 percent.
Ass~.stance in 1977 bene~ited especially enterprises with a
foreign majority (71.67 percent) and the interior o~ the
country enjoyed 61 percent of the projects and 66 percent of
their value.
IYi 1977, SOFIDE had a~und of its own ~rhich rose to 10 MZ and
a special fund o~ 13 MZ for ~inancing small and medium agri-
cultural enterprises. It also was aided by ~oreign credits
(IDA ~nternational Development Associatio~ and CCCE ~entral
Fund f or Economic Cooperatio~). The debt collections are
satisfactory. Unpaid debts were hardly '1 percent of outsta,nd- '
ing business on 31 December 1977. The pro4it for the fiscal
yee,r 19?? amounted to 606,57? zaires.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie,Paris,1979
8490
CSO: 4400
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� ZAIRE
BELGIAN FINOUTREMER'S ACTIVITIES IN ZAIRE
. Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3220
[Article: "Zairian Activities by the Belgian Group FINOUTREMER"]
[Text] The administrative council of the European and Overseas Financial
Company (FINOUTREMER), a Belgian company, has filed its report for the 1978-
79 fiscal year. It is to be presented at a general meeting on 19 November
1979 and indicates the following activities by its Zairia~ subsidiaries in
the context of the present economic situation in Zaire.
. "The activities and fir.ancial results of our Zairian branches and subsidi-
aries are subject to the general condition of the economy of the Republic
of Zaire. The country is particularly sensitive to a continuing international
depression that recently caused several monetary adaptations. The authorities
are striving, with the aid of international organizations, to remedy the si-
tuation. Their efforts are directed to both balancing the budget and reor-
ganizing the administration. The necessary measures have now been put into
action, which gives Zaire.a new chance to strengthen its economy. ~
"As for our agroindustrial companies, the difficulties inherent in the general
situation have often been warsened by unfavorable climatic conditions, espe-
cially in Lower Zaire, where there has been an unusual drought.
"Our companies have generally s~riven to maintain and increase, if possible,
their productive capacity. The measures that have b een taken should enable
' them to fulfill their social and economic function as the recovery plan is
put into e~fect. Most of them have adapted their financial structure to
reflect a GO-40 percent balance of interest with the government or private
parties in Zaire. In the direction set on several occasions by the adminis-
trative council and communicated to our stockholders, our company has attempted
systematically to reduce administrative services and has proceeded to make ~
various changes in its portfolio."
FINOUTREMER has increased some of its activities in an attempt to concentrate
its interests. It has thus acquired capital stock in certain subsidiaries,
such as the Society for Managing and Financing Agricultural, Industrial and
Commercial Enterprises (AGRICOM-AGRIGES), the Society for the Study and Manage-
ment of Cement Works (EGECIM), Intertropical Comfima, and Frozen Foods and.
Products (F~ROFRIGO~. It has also had the opportunity to acquire 10 percent
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of the capital of La Pastorale ~inance Company, of which PROFRIGO already
held 9 percent, as their interests in Zaire are interrelated. It also
boiight stock in Olfica, a company whose acti~vities are in some ways similar
to those of tlie SCA [expansion unknown]. The SCA has undertaken a financial
reorganization involving capital reduction followed by two concomitant in-
creases. On this occasion, FINOUTREMER underwrote for cash 47,052 shares
of preferred stock and received 60,000 on credit.
In addition, the Union for the Creation of the Gbadolite Soya Project
resulted in the constitiition of the Gbadolite Agricultural Society (AGRIG-
BADO). In exchange for its share in the Union, FINOUTREMER has received
568 shares in the new company, in which it holds a total of 815 shares after
an additional subscription.
In accordance with the agreements concluded, the company has ceded a second -
part of its holdings in General Western, a French law firm. It has also
sold its interest in AGRIDUS, a company that is being liquidated.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
8782
CSO: 4400
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ZAIRr -
KINSHASA-NDJILI AIRPORT REPORTED DANGEROUS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3344
[Article: "The Kinshasa-Ndjili Airport Is Said To Be Dangerous"]
[Text] The FRENCH PRESS AGENCY correspondent in Kinshasa echoed the cry of
alarm that has been sent up for the past several weeks b~~ airlines serving
Zaire. They report the increasingly unsafe conditions at the Kinshasa-Ndjili
airport.
Several reports made by the companies involved and officials of the Airways
Board report that a constant risk of collision exists due to ex~remely pre-
carious security conditions that are well below the norms accepted by the
IATA [International Air Travelers Association]. The authors of the report
emphasize the bad general condition of the installations, the total lack of
- weathet� forecasting, the inadequacy of navigation aids, the undependability
- ot rauio navigation (mixed frequencies), and the defective quality of the _
control tower, all of which constitute a real danger to the people using them.
People in Kinshasa aeronautical circles note that the airlines are especially
- worried because fire control is practically nonexistent and there is no ambu-
lance service to city hospitals. Insufficient equipment and personnel add
to these unsafe conditions.
Finally, the anarchic management of the airport has led some companies,
notably Ai,r Zaire, Sabena, UTA [Air Transportation Union], and Alitalia, -
to advocate that the airport be privat~ly operated so that it will be
autonomous, as i*. is in European capitals.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Mc~Yeux et Cie., Paris, 1979
8782
CSO: 4400
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Z111 RI;
BR?EFS
FRG COOPERATION--The German-Zairian joint commission met in Kinshasa on
5-8 November. Zairian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Mr Bolela Wa
Boende and a West German delegation led by FRG Ambassador to Zaire Mr Werner
Schattman were in attendance. A communique published at the close of the
meeting on 9 November indicates that the FRG has decided to make DM 70.25
. million available to Zaire in 1979 in the form of financial and technical
cooperation between the.two countries. DM 28.3 million not yet used are -
to be added to this sum. DM 50 million are for financial cooperation and
DM 20.25 million are for technical cooperation. These credits are mainly
intended to finance the investment programs of ONATRA [Nationai Transport
Office] and the SNCZ [Zairian National Railways] and the construction of
a road between Kisangani and Bukavu. According to the communique, both
countries plan to~"strengthen trade" and cultural cooperation. The com-
munique also states that "Zaire's mineral wealth, which the FRG urgently
needs, ranks Zaire as a complementary country." [Text] [Paris I~IARCIiES
'I'ROPICAUX F.T ~tEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3220] 8782
CSO: 4400
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ZAMB~A
KAUNDA HOPES FOR END TO RHODESIAN CONFLICT
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Dec 79 pp 34-35
[Article by Francois Soudan: "A Raped Country"J
[Text] At 55, Kenneth Kaunda has not changed: a pinch of Biblical humanism,
a little of the Boy Scout spirit, a zest for utopian socialism and a dose
of obliviousness. This is how his friends see the man who on Sunday,
28 October, celebrated the anniversary of 15 years in power, 15 years during
which he has been the embodiment of Zambia. Along with Tanzanian Julius
Nyerere, the sole survivor of the generation of the great leaders of Et~glish-
- speaking Africa, "KK," as he is called by those close to him, is not a man
to arouse passion. He would more readily be taken for a modest pastor, who
leads his country as one does a parish,, rather than an omnipotent guide.
Consequently, the few festivities in Lusaka marking the 15th anniversary
of independence were an example of discretion.
The discretion was undoubtedly wise, inasmuch as a week previously, from
_ 20 to 22 October, two Rhodesian commando raids destroyed a fortifted camp
of the ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) of Joshua Nkomo, 40 kilo-
meters inside Zambia. Furthermore, it is scarcely the time in Zambia -
now less than ever for sumptuous expenditures. Perhaps Kaunda's politi-
ca~ fuaziness and dilettantism, joined with a sharp sense of maneuvering
and pragmatism, explain his presidential longevity. But they also explain,
partially at least, the country's obscurity, its situation as the "Lebanon
of Southern Africa." ~
~or a dozen years, observers have regularly predicted Kaunda's fall and
emphasized the collapse of the Zambian economy. To date, KK has always
found pleasure in contradicting these predicttons, but at the end of this _
year, it seemed that he was in a more delicate position than ever before.
What are the reasons? They have to do with two things: security and the
~ economy. Zambia is a raped country and it is also occupied, to a certain
extent. The rape is perpetrated nearly every week by the Rhodesian troops.
Like the Israelis in Lebanon, Salisbury's men penetrate Zambia whenever
- and however they wish. Their target is the camps and leaders of the ZAPU,
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~~nc tlie tw~~ ?.Lmb~~bwe n.ztionalist movements which Kaunda "she].ters"
~ r;ither symbolically on his soil. The Rhodesian bombers calmly fl.y over
the Zambian air space on their way to strafe the guerrilla camps 2,000 kilo-
meter.s from their base along the Angolan border. General Walls' helicopter-
borne commandos can go to downtown Lusaka to dynamite the general head-
quarters of Joshua Nkomo (April 1979). Teams of assassins murder ZAPU
military leaders such as Alfred "Nikita" Mangena (killed in June 1978)
or Lameck "Lookout" Mafela (seriously wounded in January 1979). This
"work" is considerably facilitated by the likely presence of Rhodesian
agents in high spheres of the Zambian Government. In November, Rhodesian
commandos destroyed several important bridges, practically cutting off
any Zamtiian opening to "independent" Africa. -
Raped, Zambia is also an occupied country, somewhat like Lebanon. With its
15,000 men trained by Soviet and East German advisers, the ZAPU has an ~
excessive tendency to act like a state within a state and an entire portion -
of southwestern Zambia is in fact controlled by the Namibian SWAPO guerrilla
soldiers who have set up some of their rear bases there.
Within such a context, it is not at all surprising that the most dangerous
dissent for Kaunda is that emanating from his own army. Made up of only
7,000 men and poorly equipped, it sees itself as humiliated, both by the
insolent arrogance of the Rhodesians and by the f act that it is not the
ar.my but the ZAPU which in fact provides the altogether relative security
oC the country. The Zambian soldiers are demanding weapons whether
Soviet or Western, they do not care which a cautious Kaunda refuses to
give them. In May, this climate of tension led to the removal of Commander
in Chief Peter Zuae and the resignation, as a sign of protest, of Kaunda's
own son Panji. The two men were the leaders of the malcontents. But it
would appear that this minipurge had scarcely any effects. The grumbling
continues and it is said in Lusaka that the current commander in chief,
Gen Benjamin Mibenge, a loyalist, has little authority over his men. The
general mobilization ordered on 20 November to meet the "Rhodesian aggres- ~
sion" is not likely to calm them.
_ In addition, the omnipotence of the ZAPU has had an effect on 7.ambia's -
secand c~irrent hot point: its economy. Most of the exports of Zambian
copper ~90 percent of the country's foreign exchange) take the tortuous
railroad route in the south, through Rhodesia to the South African ports
of Durban or Port Elizabeth. However, the line crosses certain areas of
territory in Rhodesia that are controlled by the ZAPU, which, as soon as the
Lusaka government shows~any sign of impatience, threatens to sabotage it. _
It is by this vital artery that the thousands of tons of corn and fertilizer
regularly imported from South Africa come to relieve the constant hunger
raging in western Zambia. A striking illustration of the state of near ,
Bantustan in which the country finds itself is that these South African
commodities have become a prime weapon in the hands of the government in
Salisbury. Consequently, on 5 November, Abel Muzorewa decided to block
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200,000 tons of corn headed for Lusaka because Kaunda did not "prevent the
Nkomo guerril.las from infiltrating into Zimbabwe." However, as we know,
Kaunda can do little about it. Two months of such treatment would put
Zambia in a situation of widespread famine. -
'1'he opposition, which has no official status all members of Parliament
belong to the single party: the UNIP (United National Independence Party)
is mainly a conservative and bourgeois force, something quite rare in
Africa. But given the uncertain to say the least performances of a
nationalized sector paralyzed by corruption and red tape, the anomaly is
understandable. The leaders of this opposition, former Prime Minister
Simon Kapwepwe and former Minister of Finance Arthur Wina, are demanding,
in the name of pragmatism, a return to the private sector of hundreds of
enterprises gathered together in INDECO [Industrial Devlepment Corporation], -
a broader opening to South Africa, control of the ZAPU camps and recognition
of the Muzorewa regime in Zimbabwe.
Above all, Kaunda fears that the discontent of the bourgeoisie will be
_ combined with that of the army. Naturally, KK does still have a few cards
left to play, particularly his personal prestige with the farmers and the
copper miners. But what he mainly needs is an end to the interminable
Rhodesian conflict. For him as for Zambia, peace in Zimbabwe would mean
the end of many nightmares.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
11,464 -
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