JPRS ID: 8872 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040041-0
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• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 41
• Content Type: REPORTS

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18 1980 ~ ~ 1 OF 1
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JPRS L/8872
18 January 1980
~i~ar East/North '
Afr~ca ~e ort
p
. CF0~10 3/80)
FBIS FOREIGN ~ROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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I
NOTE _
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are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
~ieadlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
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mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
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Otk~er unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an -
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given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
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JPRS L/8872
18 January 1980
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPO RT ~
(FOUO 3/80)
~ CONTENTS PAGE -
INTEYt-ARAB AFFAIRS
Briefs
Iraq-Mauritania Aid ` 1
ALGERIA
Government Emphasii,es Party Renewal, Agriculture
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 Nov 79)......... 2
- Housing Construction C~operation With Hungary
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 Nov 79)......... 8
Briefs
French Irrigation Equipment 10
_ Line of Credit From Lloyds 10
Airport Extension 10
EGYPT
Egyptian Polxtical j7riter Comments on Egypt, Arab World
~Lutfi al-Khuli Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
22 Nov 79) 11 ~
IRAN
Khomeyni's Rule Seen in Serious Trouble
(PARIS MATCH, 21, 28 Dec 79) 24 -
Vulnerable Position, by Jean Larteguy
Revolt of Shariat-Madari
Gains for Bakhtiar, Shahpur Bakh~iar Interview
Threats by Khalkli~li, Ayatollah Sadeg I~alkhali
Interview
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
Army Showing Some Signs of Revival
(Robert Fisk; THE STATESMAN, 12 Dec 79) 37
MAURITEiNIA
Minister Presents Broad Outline of 1980 Budget
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAIr'EENS, 9 Nov 79)....... 38
Briefs
Spanish Fish ing Agreement Signed 40
TUNISIA
- Good Oil Prospects in Gulf of Gabes
(JEUNE AFRIQiTE, 12 Dec 79).....~ 41
- b -
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
IRAQ-MAURITANIA AID -On 27 October at the close of Iraqi Vice Premier
Taha ~asin Ramadan's visit to Nouakchott, it was announced that Iraq would ~
grant Mauritania $20 million in the form of a long-term loan as well as gifts.
According to Radio Nouakchott 12 millions of Iraq's long-term loan will be
used to back up Mauritania's balance of payments. In addition, Iraq will
grant Mauritania $5 million for the construction of a television station in -
Nouakchott and $3 million to face the consequences of the drought. [Text] -
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MED~TERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 pp 3015-3016]
- 7993
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ALGERIA
GOVERNMENT EMPHASIZES PARTY RENEWAL, AGRICULTURE
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 pp 3253, 3254
jText] One may indeed be surprised wfien the president of a legislative
assembly, in solemnly opening a session, begins by congratulating his
colleagues on the work they have just done, an effort which they will con-
tinue within other organizations. That however was the case on 29 October
at Algiers when Mr Rabah Bitat, president of the National People's Assembly,
reviewed the activities of numerous deputies within the context of the
subcommittees of the FLN jNational Liberation Front] Central Committee.
The representatives of Lhe people Chus--under the auspices of the party
which they are members of--contributed to the drafting of the basic laws--
tasks which one might have expected to be accomplished rather within
the framework of their own assembly.
But that precisely is the originality of the current Algierian structure,
designed with a view to upgrading the parCy and enahling it fully to
. accomplish this exclusive leadership role which it received from the
National Charter (constitution].
Thus, as Mr Rabah Bitat put it, "The complementary nature of political and
legislative functions is beginning to be expressed concretely and actively
and that complementary natur~ springs from the very spirit of the Algierian
institutional system." -
But that does not mean--and the president of the assembly right away em-
phasized that point--that the deputies as such do not have to pursue a
legis3.ative effort as such. Thus they will examine the fundamental laws
pertaining to the control organization, an institution to which the gevern-
ment attaches outstanding importance. They will also adopt the national
plan.
Finally, the representatives of the people, in concert with the executive
_ branch, will proceed to the ''adaptation of legal standards to the guidelines
of the party and to the profound changes experienced liy the country in order
. better to make sure that the law wi11 be the fundamental instrument of the
state and of society." We note that this clever formulaCion once again
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- confirms that primacy of the FLN which the Algerian government agencies are
energetically resolve3 to turn into reality.
Important Role of National Organizations
The national organizations play an essential role toward this end and the
president of the assembly did not fail to recall that most of the deputies
are members of those national organizations,
One of those organizations has just had its national council meeting; that
was the UNFA (National Union of Algerian Women) whose meetings were opened -
on 9 October by its secretary-general, Mme Djeghroud, under the chairman-
ship of the party coordinator Mr Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui. The latter urged
that the organization`s political role be developed in depth. Without
particularly emphasizing "the realization of the aspirations of Algzrian
women," the need for which he briefly touched on, Mr Yahiaoui vigorously
urged self-criticism which is an indispensable "revolutionary step" suitable
for "bringing out all negative aspects and insufficiences that slowed down
the organization's march"; the slight overtone of blame was quite evident.
Mr Yahiaoui then mentioned the case of the people`s assemblies in the com-
munities and the governoraCes; lie did not conceal the fact that "in most
cases, these organizations did :iot play their real role." The choice of
men, he explained, was not always good and the party should make sure that
this wi.ll be handled in a more rigorous fashion in the future; nobody is
forced to join the party if he is noC convinced as to its ideology but
there is no shortage of sincere milita-~ts who can provide an infusion of
new blood.
Whi1e looking forward to "an in-depth explanation and training effort,"
intended to increase the political sensitivities of the members, the UNFA
Council was concerned with protection for children, education, the improve-
ment of living conditions, particularly through rigorous price controls _
and the harmonization of wages in keeping with the rising cost of living.
The n eed for integrating Algerian women into modern society was vigorously
underscored. The congress members talked about the future "family code" _
which, as we know, is still in the drafting stage, because conservative
circles are heavily challenging the liberal guidelines of the project. _
They express the wish that this code "be inspired by revolutionar.y principles -
and that it reflect Algerian authenticity"; it should in particular "preserve
the family cell and take into consideration its evolution in a society in
the midst of change"; it would be a good idea to make it an ob~ect of "vast
popular debate."
Need for Picking the Best People Among the Grass Roots
The election of the new people's assemblies in the communities and
- governorates, to be held this autumn, will constitute an excellent opportunity
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for the FLN to impose its position in practice. The deficiencies reported,
as we saw earlier, by Mr Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui, were some of the major
causes for the difficulties encountered in the agrarian revolution; while
these assemblies--which were enlarged,where necessary---should be the
essential instruments in constituting the socialist land sector, they
made it possible, due to negligence and more often even due to complacency,
for many landowners to hold on to their land which, under the provisions ~
of the law, should have been nationalized.
Likewise "There can be no question of allowing the profiteers or those wtio
displayed incompetence in the exercise of their responsibilities to try to
run for any kind of off ice" (EL MOUDJAHID, editorial, 1Q October 1479).
The local and regional assemblies thus must present their activity reports
and the candidates will be picked among their members in the light of *hose
reports.
Even before the elections, it will be necessary to elect new party "grass-
roots authorities," that is to say, the bureaus of its cells and its
"kasmas," In this connection, the FLN hopes that there will also be a
real replacement in terms of individual members.
These revitalization efforts, which have been underway for several weeks,
are being watched in the fieid with great attention by Mr Djilali Affane
Guezane, chairman of the party commission for elections and elec*ed
representatives,
I?uring one of these trips to the provinces, Mr Affa~e Guezane denounced the
"spirit of tri.balism and despotism which still prevails among certain mili-
tants" and which entails the risk of undermining the very foundations of
_ the party. Thus he stressed the need for broadening the party's base which
"is not the special preserve of a minority of citizens but which must open -
its doors to all those who meet the criteria of integrity, competence and
commitment stated in the constitution."
And Mr Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui f.urthermore on 26 Octoher, in addressing the
Central Committee members who were called upon to keep tabs on and supervise
these operations, stressed the decisive importance of personnel selection
in this situation; in the final analysis, it is the quality of future
regional development plans, in other words, the fight against regional
inequalities and hardships, which o;ill depend on these personnel selections.
Agriculture to Be Restored
Agriculture has been particularly challenged because of the agrarian revolu- -
tion; according to criticisms currently expressed in Algeria, with reper- -
cussions abroad, the financing and organization effort made in support of
agriculture was all the more insufficient since the failure of an agrarian
revolution--entirely too ambitious and poorly implemented--caused tremendous
waste.
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Algerian leaders or officials often take issue with these extreme statements
and president Chadli Bendjedid himself, in his recent interview in LE MCiJDE
(2 November), had some specific comm~ents to make on this point: ~~Contrary to
what certain people said, agriculture was not sacrificed. But we had to
make certain decisions. The agriculCural sector at least had the merit of
existing, something which was not true of industry." After having given
priority to industry as well as education and health, "When the moment came,
we launched the agrarian revoZution, a revolution to which industry can now
make its contribution."
This brief su~ary given by way of justificaCion undoubtedly looks rather
optimistic and this is especially so since it seems to infer that the agrarian
revolution stimulated rural production. Looking at the overall results, the
material balance sheet is rather negative: "Our agricultural output level,"
- Mr Selim Saadi, minister of agriculture and the agrarian revolution, said
on 12 October at Saida, "dropped compared to what it was right after inde-
pendence."
The press published some rather eloquent statistics along those same lines:
Algerian imports of food products accounted for, respectively, 731, 925, and
4,049 million dinars during the first three-year plan and during Che two
first four-year plans. In 1978, cereal imports were 3.7 times higher than
the annual average for the period of 1967-1969. Not only did the number of
consumers go up but national cereal production declined; it dropped from an
index of 100 in 1954-1967 to an index of 82.3 in 1974-1977 (according to the
18 October issue of EL MQUDJAHID},
On the other hand one might maintain that the output of certain sectors did
increase, such as truck gardenino whose output went up 23 percent and citrus
fruits which went up 40 percent (same source). One might also stress the
- success of several major undertakings, such as, in the south, the creation
of the Abadla irrigated area, which wrested 5,000 hectares from the desert.
We must also consider the social and moral progress made in the rural areas
where the living conditions of the peasant~swere improved in many ways. How-
ever, if we listen to the pessimists, this transformation was not enough to
slow down the flight from the land.
Consequently, even though Algeria is making a great effort to contradict the
critics, whose malevolence is often quite s;~stematic, people are engaging
in very deep thinking on the ways to restore a rural situation that con-
stitutes cause for concern.
Addressing the self-managemenC off icials of a property near Tlemcen, on
8 October, Mr. Selim Saadi urged them "to go beyond the stage of simple
complaincs, to exam.ine the problems within their proper context, to suggest
measures suitable for putting an end to the current lethargy~ This is not
only the task of *.he technical cadres in this sector; it is also the task.
of the fellahs who are running into daily difficulties. Once.all of the
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viewpoints have been gathered at the grass roots, it will be possible
quickly to draft a farm policy which w~ll fully play the role of spring-
board in Che economic area."
As a matter of fact, everybody readily agrees on the overall observations
and the general ideas. A big meeting of agriculture cadres, held at the
ministry of agriculture and agrarian revolution on i6 and 17 October,
produced conclusions which are not at all unexpected. It is necessary -
to fight against negligence, against laxity, against the avoidance of
responsibilities, against anything that harms group work, against the
discouragement of too many producers, against the obstacles put up by the
enemies of the revolution and th~>ir allies.
The off icials involved declare that they are determined to pursue the effort
aimed at the success of the agrar.ian revolution and they say that they are
"mobilized" with a view to reorganizing agriculture, assuring the social
and cultural advancement of the fel~afi, deconcentrating the technical support
structures, recasting the supply and sales cizcuits, and, more generally,
all procedures, eliminating waste and passivity, maintaining land and water
resources, and finally launching a rural fiousing policy particularly based
on self-help construction efforts. -
Some Specif ic Projects
But out in the f ield, and we must emphasize this, Mr Selim Saadi talked _
plain language. In the course of a visit to t~e governorate of Saida, oz~
12 October, he said: "The fellah of the socialist sector must tie his
future to his own outp~it; that future depends on raising the output level";
government aid must not consist of outside support b~it must try to f acilitate
and increase the parti.cipation of the fellahs. In his analysis, the minister ~
pointed out that the management of the production units has not been p~operly
mastered, that the quality of manpower has deteriorated, and that the supply
and sales structures are insuFficient. ~
Some elements of solution have already been listed. The state farms, under
~ the develogment institutes, will constitute the vanguard of production and
will serve as examples, rarming establistunents which are too big and too
numerous in the social.ist sector will be hroken up. Rural housing will be
~ renewed with the help of the construction of hamlets making it possible to
house the peasant in the area of E~is activity, with a central village,
midway inbetween, containing the social, administrative, and cultural
facilities; in other words, the socialist village will become a kind of
cluster.
The organizational setup of the cooperatives will be made more efficient
so that they will not confine themselves to supplying equipment and selling
products but so that they will provide institutes for local agriculture and
so that they will support the growers. -
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The offices and services dealing with the rural environment will he
reorganized in the light of the search f or efficien~y; in each governorate
there will be created certain structures consisting of all cf the agricul-
tural organizations, capable of ineeting all needs; officials are envisaging
the establishment of two regianal subdirectorates, one of them to he charged
" witn rural improvement and the other with agricultural supply. The organi-
zations intended to handle public $upply---with.milk, for example--will be
increased in nutuber and will be moved closer to tfie consumer.
I'inally, the third phase of the agrarian revolution, involving the prairie
and animal husbandry, will receive new impetus, particulary due to the
creaticn of a high commission for pasturage, endowed with extensive
- authority.
Imagir.ation, a practic.zl approach, and a determination to win thus seem
necessary to characterize this period of revival of socialist rural health-
management and of the agrarian revolution in line with the principles and
objectives which must under no circumstances he renounced.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cis, Paris, 19.79
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ALGERIA
HOUSING CONSTRUCTION COOPER.ATiOIV L~iITH HUNGARY
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2,~ Nov 79 p 3261
[Text] A Hungarian housing engineering conference was held b.etween 14 and
23 November in the exposition pavilion at Maritime Pines, Under the
patronage of Mr Abdelmadj~_d Aouchiche, Algerian minister ot urban develop-
ment, construction, and housing, and Dr Abraham Kalman, Hungarian minister
of construction and urban development, this event was designed, through an
exposition of public works equipment, to permit the showing of films and
lectures on plaaniug, urban development, as well as training and technology
in Hungary in the f ield of construction so as to present a precise idea of
the possibilities for cooperation between Algeria and Hungary in ttie
hous ing f ield .
In the address delivere~ after the opening o` this technical conference, Mr
Abdelmad~id Aouchiche, also speaking in his capacity as co-chairman of the
mixed intergovernmental committee on Algerian-Hungarian cooperation, stressed
the importance of this initiative in view of the considerable upswing which
the construction sector is expected to experience within the framework of
the next development plan. The im~,~ortanc~e of the talks between the Algerian =
and Hungarian delegations on 14 November was further underscored by the
proximity of the next meeting oF tne mixed committee, scheduled for early
in 1980.
On the occasion of the Hungarian housing engineering r_onference, Alger~e
' Presse Service, the national press agency, recalled that tailateral cooperation ~
in this field received its first impetus in 1970 with the signing of an
- agreement calling for the establishment of a heavy prefahrication plant of
~ the "Olygon" type with an output capacity of 500 housing units per year to
the benefit of the EPBTP (Muleipurpose Hausing and Public Works Enterprise)
of Anna~aa. This unit laecame operational in May 1978.
Furthermore, the protocol signed at Budapest on 23 September 1978, established
a schedule of ineetings b.etween the respective organizations of the two
countries for the purpose oi seeking suitable ways and means for consolidating
the boads of bilateral cooperation. In th~s context, a certain number of
projects was carried out, Thus, tr?e organization of cultural exchange to
the benefit of the hou~ing industry workers, on the Algerian side, provided
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an opportunity for sending 70 families of workers from the Annaba EPBTP to
~ Hungary, between 26 ~'lugusti and 16 September 1979,
Concerni.ng practical implementation, the Annaba EPBTP is still holding Calks
with ttie Exemport enterprise for the construction of 2,750 housing units
- (2.,000 at Annaba and 750 at Guelma) with Che perCinent facilities (schools,
shopping centers, transportation).
A contract was signed between the Vati and CadaC enterprises with a view to
assigiiing, to the Algerian fund, a multidisciplinary team of 12 experts for
- ~ perio~l of 2 years to study urban development and the improvement of the
Skikda region. The experts are now in the area.
rforeover, 27 Algerian trainees (20 technicians on scholarships, three for
postgraduate studies in urban deve~.opmenti and four high~r-level technicians
in the field of dimensions and prices) will go to Hungary at the end of
the month while SONATIBA (National Infrastructure and Building Construction
Company) is negotiating with the Femmunicas enterprise for construction of
an iron foundry.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1.979
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ALGERIA
HRIEFS
FRENCH IRRIGATION EQTIIPMENT--The roll-on-roll--off vessel "Antinea~" of
the UIM (Metallurgical Industries Union), delivered 283 tons of irrigation
equipment from Sete to Algiers, including 162 crates of aluminum pipes
_ weighing 132 tons, intended for isrigated sugar beet cultivation in
Algeria. This equipment was producecl at Paulhan (Herault) by the
Irrifrance Company which also ~igned irrigarion equipment contracts
with Tunisia, Morocco, and the Antilles. [Text] jParis MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET riEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3261) 5058
LINE OF CREDIT FROM LLOYDS--The Lloyds Bank of Great Britain last week
announced that it had just opened a new line of credit of 6.5 million
pounds made available to the BAD (Algerian Development Bank). This capital
could also he used for the collective financing of small Algerian purchases
in Great Britain involving goods and services wfiose value does not justify
the negotiation of individual loans. As the orders come in gradually, the
Algerian bank could draw on this credit in order to cover up to 85 percent
of the amount of the bills. This is the second transaction of this kind
- between the two banks. The firsC loan pri.marily served for the purchase _
of cranes, forklifts, and machinery intended for the food industry. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3262]
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AIRPORT EXTENSION--As part o.f a four-day inspection and working visit to
the governorates of Tlemcen, Sidi Bel-Abbes,and Mascara as we11 as the
district of Arzew, Mr Salah Goudjil, minister of transportation, on 12
November visited the international airports at Oran-Es Senia which is to
be the subject of studies with a view to a possible expansion o.E its
capacity. The annual traffic volume presently is something like 9~0,~00
passengers, whereas the capacity of the facilities in place does not ex-
ceed 600,~00 passengers. [Text] jParis MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 23 Nov 79 p 3262] 5058
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rcYP7~
EGYPTIAN POLITICAL WRITER COPiM~NTS ON EGYPT, ARAB WORLD
pas.ls AL_y~1~TAN AL- ~ ARABI in Arabic ?2 Nov 79 pp 35-37
- ~fnterview with Lutfi al-IChuli; date and place not given
~ex] This is the second and last segment of an interview witih Lutfi
al-Khuli, the politician, writer and thinker, about issues running the
gamut from the emergence of the communist movement to the issue of unity
and pan-Arabism. In this segment he responds to questions covering i;he
rela~tionships and problems of the Egyptian left from ~Abd-al-Nasir to
Anwar a1-Sad~t. The dialogue also covers the position of al-Sa.dat and
his unilateral peace wi~;h Israel and then Lutfi a1-Khuli's view, as an
Egyptian political thinker, of the present Arab reality following Camp _
David . At some spots ~ the course af the dialogue, he takes a break
and gives his uninhibited impressioris of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, Anwar
al-Sadat, Khalid Muhi-al-Din and Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal.
_ ~uestio~ You are a regular party-line Marxist. What was your impres- _
sion of the 23 July revolution at the moment it erupted?
~Answe]The moment, the revolution erupted was a profoundly happy moment -
because it got rid of the monarchial regirne that was allied with feudal-.
ism, capitalism and imperialism. It was the beginning of the move up~rard.
[~uestio~ St~me of its opponents from the right axid the left charged
tnat it was American ~n spired and was a coup, not a revolution?
~Answe> No, it was not American. I personally do not believe that,
However, given the struggles, the chao s, the novelty of the experiment,
the army element and our unprecedented ideas~ the revolution was inevi~;-
ably shaped in the form of a military coup and the use of the axmy, in
line with the literature pre~railing in socialist th~nking, certainly had
to lead to a sort of reaction and fascism.
The publications of the free o�ficers prior to the revolution had taken
up the position of the nationalist movement in its leftwing extensions;
they opposed allianaes and i.mperialism and supported agraxian reform.
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'l'ho~,e who latu~ched ~the rovolution ware young, jtuiior oFficera who hnd
enl,ci�ed i;he mili~FZry academy 3n the climate of the rebirl:Ii of i,he na~Lion-
alist movemerit in the 30!s.
Accord~ngl.y, we were pushed and pulled by two lines of thinking; one~ on
the one hand, was a feeling of welcome towards the nationalism of the
leadera of ~the movement and the possibility that it would be a real key
to a better society and, on the other hand, a feeling of apprehension over
its military hue.
The revoluti0n~s actions thrust us into this hesitancy and conflict: the
execution of the two workers, Khamis and al-Baqri in 1952, then the pro-
- mulgation of the fir st agrarian reform law an 1952 as well, the convening
of a constituent assembly to draft a consi:itution~ abrogation of parties,
establishment of s~ngle-party liberation body and removal of the monarch-
ial system.
~uestio~ As a regular Marxist as well, how did you evaluate Jamal
~Abd-al-Nasir and his role at the beginning of the revolution and then
upon his death?
,[Answe) ~Abd-al-Nasir was not an ord~nary person. In fact, his place -
was to play a positive, unique role in the course of history.. Suffice
- it to say that when he inclined toward a given trend in his country, the
Arab homeland or the third world, it was that trend which would dominate.
Accordingly, he used to represent an objective force through this unique
historic ro1e. jJhatever negative aspects there were in his dealing with
democracy, he was a fundamental guarantee of political and economic inde- _
pendence and social development with dimensions of socialism, pan~Arabism
and the Arab struggle.
So, ~the loss of this guarantee gave rise to some very worrisome factors,
pax~.icularly since ~Abd-al-Nasir did not leave behind an organized people.
The street was in disorder and there was no school conta~ning Nasir~s
cadre to fi11 the vacuum were he to leave the scene.
~uestio) What is your evaluation of Nasir now, in 1979, s.fter every-
thing that has happened since he left the scene:
~Ari swe> Were I to take a po sition against him, I w~ uld be guilty of
subjectivism and narrow horizons. I have transcended all this. He~
without argument, was one of the greatest leaders of the nationalist move-
~ mento fIe led the great beginnings in the history of Egypt: he initiated
~;he liquida~tion of colonialism and the blaws at imperialism and the nulti-
national corporations and he began the re alization of political and eco-
nariiic independence. ~
~ues~:io> I see you str~ss "the beginn~ng~' only? _
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~l~.~swer] He was the one who made the great be-~inning in giving the r~a-
tional liberation movement an advanced social content with socialist
horizoiis. He was the one who made the start in convarting ~gypL f'rom en
agricultural saciety to rin industrial-agricultural. society. lie was the
one who made the great si~art ixi ~'~rab unity.
However he was also responsible for some relapses in these initiatives,
such as the triumph of one-man ru1e, ~hQ approach of employir~g divine
decisions..anevertheless, one mus~t take into consideration the base nature
of' the colonialist hegemony . fand 11rab and domestic reaction, includin~ the
k~ureaunracy and its stand again st him.
~uestion] You met and talked with Nasir more ;.nan once and you were a -
confidant of those who were in very close touch with him. Who was Nasir
the ruler, Nasis the man and Nasir the citizen?
~Answe~ I used to feel that ~Abd-al-Nasir respected ideas and education
a.nd was open to di.fferent ideas and opinions through free discussion and
through reading.
'Abd-al-Nasir was not a sociable person and had few friends. I raised
tht~t with Ha.ykal and Haykal raised it with hirn and his reply was: "I am
now a president of a republic. If I go out who should I sit down with?
Should I suffer immersing myself in the homes of the high officials and
~the wealthy while, at the same time, I cannot go to the home of a worker
and a peasant?" -
However he was quite sensitive to the masses through his direct contact
with them in his public speeches and reading t}ie letters he received and
~n ~the reports which would be submitted to him. Right there was the weak
point for the entry of the cancer virus of the security machinery which
~through a variety of inethods would axouse his anger against a specific
person or persons.
~uestio~ Didn~t he puriish ~the security officials when he discovered
that he had been the victim of one of their reports?
~Answe~ He didn ~ t puriish the apparatus.
~uestio~ Exactly where would you put iJasir, in the right, center or
1ef't of the 23 July revolution?
~nswe~ Nasir naturally was in the leftwing of the 23 July rcvolution
and enjoyed the advantage that he was a man of the state.
~ues~io~ And Khalid Muhi-al-D~n?
CAriswe~ Khalid as we11. Idasir e,v~ g~~vQ~ the name Khalid to his oldest
son. fiowever, he used to say to Khal.id Muhi-al-Din: "You have been in
too much of a rush in raising issues."
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ldhat If `L~cariyah Muhi-al-Din Were President?
~uesi.io~ }Iad Zakariya Muhi-al-Din continued on as vice president of the
republic and had he not resigned to be replaced by Anwar al-Sa.dat, do you _
think that F,~ypt would have c~ncluded a unilateral peace with Israel as
has happer~ed in the al-Sadat era?
~l~nswe] rdo. 7akariya Muhi-al-llin was opposed to a peace with Israel.
~uest~o~ Ii~w cauld a ruler or president divert a country the size of
F~yF~; from its national and pan-Arab course? WY~y was the opposition to
President al-Sadat politically and popularly weak?
~Answe] There are objecti_ve and subjective reasons. The situation _
which Pdasir bequeathed to Egypt gave the legitimate ruler, paxticularly in
an Egypt with one-man rule and a bureaucracy constructed over 7,000 years,
a leading role in defining the nature of the course to be followed and
also in creating an alliance of specific social forces.
~uestio~ There is a feeling that the Egyptian opposition is still
coexis~ting with the regime. Why isn~t there a total political boycott of
_ the regime as long as it has defined its options and its alliances against
the Arabs and with Israel?
~An swe) The political and social circumstances of people who make a
living from their work, such as mes do not permit that. They have no
property or businesses, merely their own potential. The ones controlling
the major issues work in the public sector. If you are odds with the
es~ablistu;.ciit~ yc ~t =~n tt t.,rork. So a view in a vacuum is not realistic;
y ouu eii:her had to attack him or a~andon your work.
_ ~ues-tio~ But don~t you consider this position as being at the expense -
of your principles?
~Answe] It was not at the expense of principles.at all. If there were
no alternative to conflict, we would say no, engage in conflict, have our
s~laries cut off ancl make the sacrifice if that called for the duty of
sacriSice.
The main problem between us and Nasir was that we had a distinctive pro-
gratn, persgective and political and social position, both with regard to
the course of the Nasir experiment or with regard to the course of the -
a1-Sada~t experi.ment, though in di.ffering degrees.
The isNue was that we should continue tn ha.ve an independent ~bosition
with regard to expression and action. During the Nasir era, we succeeded
in having him accept our independence and coexist with us on this basis.
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Coiirequer~tly there wa~ not break and AL~-TAI.I~A}I was not shut dotim.
'Abd-al-N~.sir u~ed t,o deal with us as a paxty arid this went on with Fresi- -
dent al-Sadat uni;il the 19'75 ~cidents, the student clashes, and things .
reached their peAk in Januaxy 1977. There were clashes and altFadal, and
t,he regime rejected our independence and closed down I~L-TALI~AH. I was
removed from the ;ocialist Union, having been ir~ churge ot foreign rela-
~tions and was a rnember of ~the central committee. My colleagues, Fu~ad
P~ursi and Ismatil Sabri, were kicked out of the cabinet. In this con- _
nection, Marr.ists had not participated in the cabinet throughout 'Abd-al-
Nasir~s era and only frr p 5hort time in the al-Sadat era.
Al-Sa.dat Is Changing the Course of the Experimen~
~uestio~ You were subjected to prison in the Nasir era and not during
the a1-Sadat era. Why not? Can ynu put your experience with the two men
on a single plane?
~ll~iswer,~ You cannot say that. The fact is tha~t prison was a means of
s~triking a blow at freedom of opinion and expression. However, Nasir~s
methods were temporary and were in the context of continuing the experi-
raent while al-Sadat~s axe permament and within the context of changing
i,Yie course of the experiu~ent.
_ ~ues~Lio) As long as tha~ is the case, why isn~t there a complei;e
bre~k bctween the system and the oppositaon? Ib es the Qrouping Party
clratir a distinction between the system and its institutions and the
_ al-Sadat government and i~ts ac~tions and policies?
~Answer~ The sys~em means the constitution and its political, economic
and social bases, bases that say that Egypt is a part of the Arab home-
land, Yias a socialis~L program, is a state of democratic ins~:i~tutions and
L-hat all forces are guaranteed freedom of expression. We are abiding by
~i,he system. l�1e say that ~Lhe government establishment through its prac-
tices is the one that is violating the constitution, in other words, vio-
~.ating i,he system.
Questin> It appears a li~ttle ambiguous to me.
~Anuwe) ~Je are fightin~ to have the ~nstitui;ion a respected reality.
Giver this concept, we are siding with and cooperating with the system
ana derive our legitimacy from the sense of this constitution.
4~e oppose ~:he government for its violation of and departure from the -
:;onstitution, both in its domestic and foreign policy and paxticularly
wii;h regard i;o its handling of the fLrab-Israeli struggle and Egypt ~ s
pan-Arab obligations.
~uestio~ About the Grouping Party: is it a party, a grouping or a
front?
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L1~riswe~ When the issue of f'orurns be~tu? to emerge in 1976, thQ progressive
and riatiorialisl: forces with a pa.n-Arab, socialist and democrat;ic dimension
1'owicl l,l~emsel.ves facin~ several options. We could either fi~ht and quar-
rel ~unon~ oursel.ves over w11o would get the leftwing forum and pave the way
for l,ru~ ~;overnmeni; est~.bli; hment t;o pick its leftwing as it wi; hed, or the
lei'L co~_~ld be a~l expresNion and a unified political structure oould be
built .'.'or l.he lef~t, despite differences in ideological and social programs.
There ~~ere meetings and get-togethers among ~the Marxists, the Nasirists,
the e~ilr.~;h~tened r~ligious ~~ypes and the progressive socialists. They dis-
- cuNsed the situation and found that the disagreements among them were not
so greai: as to prevent them from identifying the crisis and the way to
solve it and to come with proposed solutions for i~. So was born the
name "the National Progressive Ur_ionist Grouping~' LNPU~. It reflects
the i,atitire and objec~;ive of tne elements that comprise it.
You ask me whether this party is a party~ a grouping or a front. In .fact,
this issue was put before the founding body which included 211~ persons.
The z�eality is that we now have the fabric of a party, a fabric which from _
the stau~dpoint of cohesiveness is closer to a pax~ty than a front. A party
narrows rather tlian widens disputes and strengthens unity of action. In
general, it was the movement, er.perience and the time which ultimately
dictated t,he actual choices, It is clear that the co urse of event is
movirig towaxd adoption of a party formula.
- ~ue stio~ To which faction of the NUPG party do you belong?
~Answe] I am in the Maxxist faction. I think that one must draw a dis-
t;inc~tion between a Marxist� and a communist. The phenomenon of independent
rlarxism is now a major one, The Marxists who belong to the P1UPG party _
must nat be~.ong to any other organization or party, overt or underground.
Tne IJUFG Party rlade No P~iistake in F~tering the Elections
~uestio] Didn~t the IdUPG Party make a mistake in deciding to enter the
general election~ in ~gypt z�ecently, particularly af~ter al-Sadat~s law
barring candidates f'rom challenging the tmilateral peace treaty with
Israel?
~Answe~ The f'act is that there were two trains of thought in the party.
One viel~~ held that wit~-~ this law ~Lhe elections had lost any political
- ; i~,mificaxice a.nd that our paxticipation in them would imply shedding some
legitirnacy on the peace agreement and 3~et not give us the opportunity to
challenge it ili debate and to define why we had opposed and would oppose
it.
The oi;her� vieti~~ held just tl�?e opposite. It held that as long as we were
a party, we had ~l:o get ~nvolved in these campaigns, whatever the restric-
tioris tr~at had been imposed, with the goal of knocking down these re-
s~rici,ions. The second view won out.
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In the election campaign and the statements oi nur candidates, we said
that we had issued statements setting forth our position on the Camp David
- agreement and then our candidates and speakers went arotmd reading these
statements and positions. Had we made axiy direct reference to the se
agz~eements, we would have been s~.lbject to prosecution.
So~ ~the campaign was political. 1~1e had to interact with the masses
through these elec+.,ions and it was a successful tactic~ whether or not
the elections were free with the results preordained.
~uestio] Someti.mes it appears to me that there is more media coverage
surrounding the TiUPG Party than is justified by its real size~
~nswer7 We don~t claim to be a majori~Ly par�ty. We are a minori~;y par�ty
but a minority that contains the most effective ideological and tech- -
cratic elements in various fields. In conformity with the law, our rec- -
ords and the records deposited with the parties committee show that the
paxty has 160,000 members.
You may say that this is a size on paper only. Yes, that is the paper
size of the memberuhip. However, it is the active membership that expres-
sec the effectiveness of the paxty, lde have mem~~rs who are making sacra.-
fices, some by moving ~;he ir employment and some who ar~ being subjected
-Lo pressures and intimidation.
In any case, we have w~~at could be described as ~:he essence of responsive,
competent Egyptiax'~ thou~ht in all spheres of activity, economic, union,
political and ideological. Here lies the essential strength of the par~ty
- which is bolstered by the unity among a11 its elements, tributaxies,
ranlc and f ile and leader ~hip.
~ There axe symbols in the party leadership embodying a new manifestation
in the ~gyptiar. political mentality. The paxty struggler ~words illeg-
ibl) of Nasirists, pan-Az�abist and Marxists, like Khalid Muhi-al-Din.
F~e is one of those who set off the July revolution. He was at odds with
the revolu~Lion over the issue of democracy but he did not stoop to mud-
slinging when he was in opposition to Jamal -~Abd-al-Nasis and this shows
his honesty and idealism.
~3uestio] How would you classify Khalid Muhi-al-Din politically: a
Idasir ist, a rlarxist, a socialist or what?
~Y1SWe~ Iie is in fact a religious man; he prays, goes on the pilgrim-
a~e and fasts. He follows a Marxist coarse in his thinki.ng, perspective
and personality but he rejects t~1e Maz~xist philosphical paths; in other
words, he rejects dialectical materialism which he views as incompatible
wit;h religion, but he accepts its social and economic laws and theory.
IIe is completely sincere in this.
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~uc:~tio~ In a f'ew words, how would you classify him?
~u~:;~i~~] I corisi~.lt~r him a rel:igiou:, P1t~rxi:,t, lieliE;ioti is rio Qt1StEll%lf:.
- 1~~ l~;ul~o~.~e Lf~et�e ur~~ reli~;ious Mnxxi~t;; zuicl cc~mmutiie~L:~. `Ptie l~'reiicti l',om-
mur~is l. Pai� ty dele Lecl fr�om i~ts slo~an ~t,Yic: phrase "No member shall be a
reli~;ious believer."
~uest,ioti F3u1, doesn~t that conflict with scientiSic Marxism:
~Ariswe:_? One of the main erros of Marxists is to believe or imagine that
their bati;le is with heaven; the battle, in fact, is wi1;h exploiters and
tyrants. The values of the struggle axist in Islam. There is nothing to
pre~ent there being a socialist society in conformity with scientific
laws, based on a strong democracy, with a single pan-Arab dimension but,
at the same time, flying the banner of Islam.
It is constantly reported that Marxism stated that rleigion is the opium
of i;he masses. Yes, Marx said that but he also said: "I am not a
Nirirxist." He opposed freezing theory and transforming it into dogma as
that abrogated the theory of dialectics, according to Marxist thinking.
They have confiried themselves to saying that t+Iarx said that religion is
the opium cf the masses but ~hey have left out the Pull text. lie also
saia ~.hat religion has the fighting values needed to chr~r~e the masses
with Lhe s~trength and power to defeat injustice, tyranny and exploitatiori.
Consequently, religion becomes the strength of the masses.
Our populace in Egypt is, in fact, a religious poQulace; in other words,
i~; believes in religiously defined values. In the Marxist concept, the
faith of -the masses is converted into physical power; without it, there
can ue no change or ax~y achievement of actual, tangible progress. Other-
wise, we would have Y~ad to import an irreligious populace.
~uestion When you were talking directly with ~Abd-al-Nasir in the
1961-1962 period, what issues were mainly on his mind and what was his
position toward them?
~Answ~~~~ D.iscussion, for exa~nple, revolved around: What is t}~.e politi- -
cal optior~ and what is the collective option? He was also very inter-
ested iri i,he pan-~lrab option and in social development. For instance,
in his view Marxism would lead to apostasy; he rejected it from the
ideological at~d denomicational standpoint but agreed with its social laws. -
~ue s ~ion Arid demo cracy ? _
~riswe~ lt was the topic of constant debate and we never reached agree-
rnent except in sort of a compromise solution. We agreed that the com-
munists should dissolve their organizai:ion and be accepted as members in
trie :~ociali~t Union.
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In any case, Nasir used to interact with us a.s a pnr-ty and this iri~terac-
tion in t;his concept continued with the axrival of al-~adat.
~uestio~ You a.re a friend of Muhammad Hasariayn Hqykal and you have
worked wi l,h hiiu. What is your view of hi~u as u poli~. ictui?
[Ar~swc~ 1Je mu;;t tirst make clear i,hut there is a political clisagreemer?i, _
between us but each of us respeci~s the othe~ . I do riot believe that }ie
lias ever used his administrative or political powers to suppress any view
or to dictate that things be written along a given line.
Iiaykal was ~Abd-al-RTasir~s mentor in his development when he used to
think that there was Soviet imperialism and no American imperialism until
they found that friendship with the Soviet Union was a strategic basis
for zhe irtternational relations oi E~.ypt and the third world, and that -
America was the leader of ititer~r~ational ~mperialism.
~uestio~ Does he take pride in his political capacity or his journal-
i stic capacity?
- ~Answe~ Haykal is a journalist~ not a man of political action. Haykal
is an individual and is uniffiliated thanks to his individual indepedence.
~~uestio> Does he have rio politica.l ambitions?
~Answe~ His political ambition is through being a jowrnalist and h~ di-~
rects i~t to serve a given line oi' thinking or regime.
- ~uestio] How would you personally evaluate his journalistic ability?
~Answe~ EIe is an extremely capable journalist, particularly as a report-
er, a wri~;er, an editor or an editor of a whole newspaper.
~uestio~ ;~owever there are those who accuse him of turning AL-AHRAM
in~;o a power center during his;time there:
~Ar~swer~ AL-AHRAM used to reflect all attitudes of the nationalist and
political forces. For ~;he right there was Butrus Ghali who was the editor
of i:he magazine, AIr-SIYASAH A~-DUW4lALIYAH. For the left there was
AL-TALI~AH that was edited by the Marxists. For the center there was -
Tawfiq al-Hakim, Najib Mahfuz, Bint al-Shati~ and al-Hus~yn Fawzi.
So AL-AHR.AM was not a power center but was a center of diffusion.
~ue; ~;io~ Is he a political analyst or thinker?
~Ilnswe~ Ha,ykal is a journalistic writer and follows the American jour-
nalistic school_in ~n~.].ysis. Read Kissinger~s memoirs and read Haykal~s
memoirs about the Ramadan wax and you will find a similarity in the
narration and drawing of lessQn~ ~from them.
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I a~id Al-~adat~s Political School
~ue;tio] And you, are you a politican or a journalistic writer?
~Answe] Journalism anci writing as far as I am concerned are an extension
of my political. work and are means to serve the ends of this wo rk whether
- strategically or tactically. I don~t mean journalism in itself or writin~;
i.i~ itself but with regard to technical or literary works; that kind of
wril,in~; in particular.
~uestio~ A few yeaxs ago you wrote a series of axticles on "the
al-Sada~t politica:l school." Do you now think that your analysis matches
its reality?
[~nswer~ Permit me to clairri with all due modesty that in that set of
articles I published in 1975, through my work in the Socialist Union and
i,hrou~n many hours and days of discussions that I had directly with Presi-
de~t- a1-Sadat and those around him, I predicted al-Sadat~s course in broad
lines, both domestically arid ex~ernally and both with re~ard to his rela- "
tions with ~the ~oviet Uniori arid America and his Arab relations, as well
as his proceeding to conclude a peace with Israel.
I claim tha~t the incident that made me monitor all of President al-Sadat~s
positions was his ven-turing to reopen the Suez Cana1.
."~,ae or most of. these article s came as a s.hock in the nationalist movement
l~ecause ttiey pic~tured me as defend~ng al-Sadat.
7'hc f'acl, is that I laid ouf. the al-S~.dat phenomenon which they had not
taken serio~zsly when the first beginnings appeared in a political labora-
tory or plant. T did not insert my own point of view; I merely monitored
wha~ was going on on the basis that it was a new political schocl that
wa: constantly taking the initiative while his opposition was alw~ys tak-
in~ reactive positions with no in itiative.
I concluded that he would reach a peace with Israel with America~s help
and suppor~t from Iran and would try to substitute for the Arab and pan-
Arab world with the so-called Islarcic world, that is, Iran, Turkey and
simi.lar couritries.
The importarit thang was to confirm the soundness �of rny predictions. He
called. me in personally and discussed that with me and~ following this
di~cusciori, I became fur~iher convinced t,hat my predictions were correet.
_ ~uestio] Alow where does President al-Sadat stand in your final analysis.
~Answe~ President al-~adat has attained his choice and must pursue this
. option because abandoning i~; would mean i;hat he would leave and he does
riot wari t to leave. Iie vie~rs himself as having undertaken an historic
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_ 1
action and feels ~that time will prove that he took the definitive course .
he will coiitinue to pursue this cours~. So he has no possibilities
for retreat because he has picked his option. ~
1lowever, normalization of relations, Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli
treaty ~re facing mounting oppositinn from the E~yptian people and its
political forces. -
~uestio) What do you think the Arabs must do as long as al-Sadat has
picked hi.s course and is no longer able to retreat from it?
~Answ~'r,J~ The Arabs must take in~to consideration that Egypt can only be
Arab from tYie standpoint of its reality, destiny and best ir~terests.
~ue:;tio) Do you expect President al-Sadat to turn to dissolution of the
:'a [TPG Party?
~Answe) The campaign against the party is continuing and will not be
broken off and ~n attempt to dissolve it and the use of approaches that
would lead to that are a11 in the ~axds.
~uestio~ W~hy do you insist on staying in Egypt whi.le many of al-Sa,dat's
opponents have left, paxticularly those from the leftwing?
~Answe~ For a per son who has his obligations, his political work and his
a~'filiation with a political group or a party is, in fact, an unjustified
flight.
I LJill Alot Leave Egypt Even Were I To Face Prison
uestio) As a consequence of this, won't you have to go along with
the system at the expense of your position s and principles?
~nswe> There is no going along with it in political action. With re-
gard to writing, I am Laxred from it so where will I be going along?
I will not leave Eg-,~pt even were I to face prison. Prison is in the cards
for me and my colleagues in the NUPG.
~uestie~ Every system has its own circumstances. In general the issue
of democracy is a pressing one and is the daily bread for the average
Arab. I~t is not longer acceptable to impose restrictions on him and his
righi,s must be resp ected under any system. jJithout that we cannot restore
s~Lrength and progress to the Arab liberation movement and cope with the
imperialist-Zionist incursion. These restrictions put the people and an
individual in the posi~tion of being only an onlooker.
~uestio) 41his has prioity for you- - socialism or unity? Can social
_ justice or socialism be achieved before unity of the homeland and unity
of the people are brought about?
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- ~nswe,r~ Achieving economic integration and pan-Arab unity. ~ue demo-
cz~acy ~rill be achieved when all Arab territory from the Gulf to the Atl~n-
tic becom~~s a theatre for the open expression, work and action for the
l~~ab ur~ion. 7ionism is certainly defeating the achievement pan-~rab ac-
tion and unity.
, ~~uestio] 4Jhat are your aspirai:ions as an Arab and as a politic~l.
-L, ::inkex�:
~ ~~r~c~we~ `I'he time is here for a sort of forthrightness and absorption of '
l,ne 1'i�tiit of past experience. 1~Je need a new and wise l~rab enlightenment
mo~~ei:icn ~ ii~ the era of the worrisome international relaxation, the era of _
the scientific and technological revolution, in the era of the new Pale-
stir~iari i�etiaissance, in the era of the new oil phenomenon which gives the
Arab,; tremendous underlying and fundamental capabilities but whose time
will enc: by 1;he end of the century and in the era of the new Islamic
renaissance.
`1't~e time is here ror an open, rational and comprehensive dialogue among -
the fund~znental ideological tributariesf the religious, the (modernist)
liberal, the pan-Arab and the Marxist, on the basis of the fruit o� ex-
- perience over the past quarter of a century and of i�eality and present
problems.
The ti?ne is here for us to leaz`n from one another azrl ~to overcome the
statement, that one current has a monopoly on truth to i:he exclusion of
others and claims to alone speak for people and history.
The ulti~na te obj ective is to fortify the Arab mentality and the Arab
psyche against ignorazlce and backwardness and against narrowmindness and
~rrong tY~inking. Consequently we wi11 leap into the contemporary era and
prooress.
The time is here for us guide the course of disputes amdn,~, disputes that
canriot be disregarded whether from the social or political aspect in
order to be worthy of being Arabs, masters of our fate and in touch with
the realities of the time.
~uestio) Do you believe that this dialogue among these currents of -
opviior~ i;, possible, given their differences and quaxrels:
~~n~we> The important 'thing is that we have the courage to engage in a
aialo~;ue and the courage to recogr'~ize that those who disagree with us have
somc relative trutl-~ on tneir side which we may have ignored and are con-
~;inu~n~ to igriore. _
I;r�aeli~ Yes...Zienis~.~ I1o
~ur:;;tion ~nd the is~ue of Israel?
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~nNwe> We ca~inot coexi~i, with or have any iriteres~La with Zionism; - -
otherwi~e we woi~ld deny our existence, l~Jith Israel, here is an issue tha~L
appcaz�u rnoi�e complex; `Lionist Isz�ael, no; witti t}ie Israelis, yes.
~ucsi:io] Is ~there a pracise di.f~'erence between Israeli~ r~and 7ioriist
I:;racl?
~I1SlJC] I raean with ~the non-Zionist, Iuraelis; otherwise we will fall in-
_ to arioLher racium. Zianisrn is a tent~cle of imperialism and colonialism "
in a riaturalized form. For example, one could not conceive of reconcilia- _
_ ~Lion with British colonialism while it continued ~to occupy Egypt so how
could one do so with naturalized colonialism.
, ~uestio] 6Jhat is thA ultimate s~lu~tion of the problem of Israel?
~Answe> The only practical solution is a democratic state in which the
Arabs and the Israelis coexist. The fact is that the Israelis today axe
in a dilemma: on ts~e one Y:and there are the domestic crises and the
deteriorating economic situation and, on the other, the irnportant Arab
tlireat.
~uestio] Iiow do you interpret the steadfastness of the re~iigi~us
ii. ~b~ r } �
~Anstire~ It is not onl~l in Egypt, it is going on throughout the world.
The religious tide is emerging in a new form, even ~n the socialist
countries.
~ue s~tio) tidhat is your interpretation of what is notir go ing on in Iran.
Is it a revolution, anarchy, a tr.ansition stage or what?
LAnswe]One must recognize that the movement to bring down the Shah was
r~o less than any other revolutionaxy action throughout history, both in
the bold undertaking and in the tactics. b!e must acknowledge the genius
of al-Yhumayni, the Iranian people and the religious leadership.
_ Thei�e i; still tYie problem ~f building the state. The revolut.icin is domi-
nated by multifaceted quaxrels and still has not crystallized as it is
in a state of interaction. Accordingly, one must not be hasty i,~. passing
j ua~emen~t .,on. it.
- I thinl: ~t,hat the Arab~ rnust continue to engage in a dialogue wii;h it be-
cau:;e of the i.mportance of the Iranian Pactor in its hostility to imper-
ialism arid Zionism. We must avoid creating an imaginary battle between
I'~rab nationalism and ~the situation in Iran at present lest we enc~urage -
a coni'lict between Arab nationalism and the so-called Iranian
na~t~onalism.
COPYRIGHT: AL-WATAN AL-ARABI 1979
' 8389
CSO: 4802
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IRAN
KHOMEYNI'S RULE SEEN IN SERIOUS TROUBLE
Vulnerable Position
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 21 Dec 79 p 56
[Article by Jean Larteguy: "Khomeyni Has Had It"]
jText] I have just spent 3 weeks in a 4Torld apparently seized hy religious
madness. Everywhere, the crowds acclaim God and deliver themselves up to
all kinds of deliriums in His name. In Iran, the constitution was approved
99.6 percent even in the provinces where, following the watchwords issued
by the political, ethnic, and religious chiefs or simply their laziness
and ignorance, nobody had gone to the urns, which made the vote count
easier. But Khomeyni wanted more. The mass support of an entire people
w'no did no longer function and who had shouted "Allah Akbar" for entirely
too long seized with fear in the face of the abyss which was opening up
before it and, in spite of the distribution of some foodstuffs, beginning
to feel stomach cramps.
He rather clumsily provoked his rival, Shariat-Madari who, in the name of
that same God, rejected that aberrant constitution. Grabbing the ball on
the rebound, Carter, the big Satan, girded himself to the applause of an
American electorate, suddenly recovered from its V:.etnamese complex. He
sent two giant aircraft carriers and their escorts to the Persian Gulf.
For the sake of appearances. A former officer in the U.S. Navy, he knew
very well that one could not risk them in those narrows where a few
missiles would be enough to bring his farmidable armada to grief. At any
rate, the appearance of Phantom aircra�t in the skies over Iran could lead
to the murder of the hostages. He also let it be known at the same time
that he intended to secure the "release of the hostages" through a
cautious method in order to avoid bloodshed.
He also reassured his reelection by a mixture of firmness and moderation
while waiting for the dust to settle in Iran where events followed each
other in fast order. There were two obstacles that still hindered a
"reasonable" solution to the hostage problem.
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First of all there was the Imam Khomeyni. But his excesses made him less
and less credilale. His partisans were abandoning him to follow the wise
- and moderate Shariat-Madari, supported not only by the Bazar and the 15
million Azarbayjanis and Kurds, but also by a large portion of the Shiite
~ clergy who realized that the time had come to save the furniture.
'ihe se~ond obstacle cor.sisted of the students: They no longer knew how to
aroust~ the "revolutionary" enthusiasm of- the masses. They also had to stay
in thn limelight somehow, to swagger before 300 journalists from all over -
the ~vorld who were seeking their incoherent declarations but who, dis-
heareened by ~hei_r lousy performance before the cameras, were only too
eager to kick their backsides. If they wanted to push their logic to its
end, ttie only thing left for them to do would be to try the hostages. And
perhaps even to execute some of them. Unless somebody could find a solu-
tion to what they secretly wanted: A means for exercising thexr clemency
without losing face,
It seems that this is the way we are going tio drif t. The hostages sup-
posedly would be tried by an international tribunal which does not mean
much while the crimes and exactions of the Shah's government would be
examined in the United States as soon as the hostages have been released.
Carter would then be reelected; Brezhnev's slow agony wouJ.d not he troubled
by the threat of war and the Russians could in peace accomplish his diffi-
cult succession.
The only thing the men behind the scenes would have to do would be to
settle accounts and to gather the fruits of this crazy revolution whose
dupe would once again have been the Iranian people.
Iran ceased to Pxist as an organized nation. No more administration, no
more army or police, no governmenc, nothing but crowds who, like bees
- swarmi~io insanely after having lost their hives, cluster around mosques
or the American Embassy--invoking Al1ah and Khomeyni.
To get ttie country going again, to save it from famir,e, anarch~, and
collapse, to be able to continue to use its energy resources which are
considerable, the Russians and Americans must restore a certain degree of
c,rder. The Russians want the gas in the north and the Americans and the
[~~ester.ners want the petroleum in the south, These two sources are in
danger of drying up if the revolurion goes on.
There will not be any joint occupatic*~ of the country by the Russians and
tt~e Amer.icans, the former in the north and the latter in the south, as in
194]_. But, in the long run, there will instead be a neutralization with
spherPS of influence which boils dor~m to tfie same thing. This will prevent
_ provoking Iranian nationalism--due to the presence of foreign forces--which
is still very 111llCYl concerned with form rather than substance.
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_ The pie will be divided up after it has .Eallen from the beaks of the
mullahs, those black crows, perched on their minarets,
We will then see the rebirth of an autonomous republic of Azarbayjan which
will discover affinities with the neighboring republic of Soviet Azarbayjan.
The Kurds will once again allow themselves to be put off by promises of
autonomy which will not be kept. They will thus be more useful than iF -
they were reunited.
Lven more important will be the implemenCation of a new strategy in the
Middle East. These spheres of influence will soon create defense problems.
It will be necessary to prevent one of the thieves from grabbing what the
other one has.
~ I returned From a visit to Sinai to the big Israeli base at Etam, near Al
Arish, which is to be returned to the Egyptians within 2 years but which,
according to the Camp David Accords, can no longer be used for military
purposes. In other words, it will no longer have any use. One will then
see just about nothing because everything will have been carefully
camouflaged and buried,
There are other bases of this kind at Etzion, at Sharm A1 Shsik, designed
according to the American model, wliich can shelter 100 aircraft,
As was explained to me by the Israeli colonel in charge at Etam, these
bases present an enormous advantage over aircraft carriers, An aircraft
carrier uses 60 percent of its aircraft for its own defense and 40 percent
for attack. At a ground base, 100 percent of the aircraft are operational.
From Sinai, the fighters and fighter-bombers can cover the entire strategic
zone of the ~ulf and southern part of Iran, Khuzistan, where the petroleum
is. There will no longer be any need for bases in Iran; threatened Saudi
Arabia would recover its shield.
_ It would suffice for the Israelis and the Egvptians to agree on permitting
- tne utilization of these bases by the Americans who would pay the proper
price. Israel and Egypt are caught up in a big economic crisis; inflation
in Israel this year will exceed 120 percent. Egypt needs American wheat,
technicians, and dollars to replace the petrodollars which the Saudis,
the emirs, and the sheikhs of the Gulf had given it.
The Americans would thus assume the defense of Israel which would have a
free hand in southern Lebanon, in dealing with the Palestinians and they
would also handle the defense of Egypt which could at last settle accounts
with Qadhadhafi.
The Egypt-Israel-U.S.A. bloc would become a center of attraction for the
moderatQ Arab countries and the Camp David Accords would be extended to all
those who had initially rejected them--provided the American awakening
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continues, forcing President Carter to pursue a more realistic policy, where
the defense of human rights would be replaced by the traditional defense of
spheres of influence.
Certain indications are highly revEaling. Arabia and the countries along
ttie Gulf suddenly have displayed a certai:n ~riendly understanding toward
the policy pursued by Sadat. They now cor.demn the principle but no longer
ttie man. That leaves us with the two pillars of the Rejection Front, apart
from Libya, whose policy is tied to the moods of Qadhdhafi alone. One of
tham, Syri.a, because of its internal situation, as well as its commitment
to the Lebanese quagmire, runs tfie risk of being persuaded to pursue a more
graduated policy. As for Iraq, it runs the risk of causing surprises. It
would be tempting for it to grab some oil deposits in the Arab province of
Iran, called Khuzistan which is also called Arabistan.
The Soviees temporarily seem to accept this form of settlement which suits
them. With their troubles in Afghanistan, they are not for the time being
too fond of the Iranian revolution, It is entirely too Islamic, entirely
too disordered, not enough Marxist, and without any deep foundations.
Everything still depends on the life of the 49 hostages, the frustration of
severa?. hundred students who believed for a moment that they were the center
of worldwide attention, the madness of an ol.d man belonging to another cen-
tury, the disorderly intrigues of the Palestinians who, as is their habit,
~ created confusion everywhere, but above all, the reason and interest of all
those who want to settle the affairs o� men between men, without a God com-
plicating everything, in other words, those who normally should be in
charge. Khomeyni would only have precipitated a new Yalta, another divi-
sion of that part.of the world. And after several weeks of exaltation,
their blood purged, the Iranians would return to their disenchanted
cynicism and their habitual skepticism.
And, depending upon the camp they belong to, they would explain to you that
this entire affair was a coup set up by the Russians or the Americans and
that Khomeyni was nothing but an old fool who did not realize that.
Revolt of Shariat-Madari
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 21 Dec 79 pp 52-55
[Unattributed article: "The Uprising Against Khomeyni"]
[Text] Ali Reza was one of the personal guards of the Ayatollah Shariat-
Madari. He was killed at the moment the latter's residence was attacked
by supporte:-s of Khomeyni. The mutiny started the moment the coffin and
the photo of the dead man was displaye3 in the streets of Tabriz,
The clashes which resulted in ten dead at Tabriz, the capital of
Azarbayjan, above all sprang from a quarrel between prelates. The radio
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station, taken by assault by the supporters of the Ayatollah Shariat-Madari
and then retaken by those of the Ayatollah Khomeyni, changed hands four
t:tmes. At the head of those who, at Tehran,had been listed as insurgents,
eherc was an 82-year old man wliom many Shiites consider to be their rc~al
- imam. Shariat-Madari as a matter of fact in 1962 resigned from that
supreme office and that, in ti~e end, saved the life of the man who at that
time was only the number tc~o man in the hierarchy,Khomeyni, today his ad-
versary. At the time, Khomeyni was in prison and was about to be sen-
tenced to death. He became untouchable after being appointed imam thanks
to Shariat-Madari. And he was exiled. The moral authority of Shariat-
Madar~_ therefore is great. Uur special correspondent Hatami interviewed
the F.yatollah Shariat-Madari. He told him, "Azarbayjan demands that it be
con~sulted in all matters affecting it directly. We furthermore demand the
_ repE~.al of Article 110 of the new constitution which gives all legislative,
exe~utive, and judicial powers to a single guide, We do not accept this
guj.de, whose name is Khomeyni, any longer."
Everywhere in Iran, discreet representatives of the chalienger, Shariat-
Madari, are rallying the discontented around themselves. Here, the
Ayatollah Olanabadi of Tabriz, in the name of Shariat-Madari, receives
the opponents of the Ayatollah Khomeyni at Qom.
The strength of the Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, who opposes Khomeyni,
springs from the discontent which is rising everywhere. "I am like the
l~ole at the bottom of the gutter," said Shariat Madari. "I attract the
water that flows." This water comes from the four corners of Iran.
First of all there are the moderates who want a change in regime. But
that water also comes from on high; their leader, Mr Moghaddam, who heads
the Radical Party, barely managed to avoid being arrested by Khomeyni's
~ police who had come to pick him up at his home; he got away, undressed,
through a door which he locked behind himself with a key. This escape, _
by the skin of his teeth, served to stir up his supporters even though his
life was not exactly in danger at that point. The merchants in the
bazaars and the clerical employees of offices in which no work has been
done for many months are similarly riled. Finally, there are the workers
whose wages cannot keep up with runaway inflation and the Islamic govern-
ment itself has admitted that 65 percent of the country's economic activi-
ties have ground to a t~alt. Tehran now resembles a vast slum where people
sell anything on the black market, including meat, auto tires, and whiskey
(at F 500 per bottle). The crowds cluster around the mosques where the
mullahs, illiterate and turbaned, hold forth. And if violent and devas-
tating civil war does not break out tomorrow, then the Iranian pie will be
divided among the chief users of the country's energy, that is, the
Soviets who need Iranian natural gas and the Americans and the Westerners
who want to assure their petroleum supply. The Shah's fall thus in the
end would have turned out to be a good thing tor everybody--except for the
Iranian people and all of its ayatollahs.
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riore than Khomeyni, the Ayatollah Shariat-Madari has hecome the~Mardjae-e-
Taghlid," the religious model to be imitated, the man whose name means
"Guardian of the Law." His home at Qom is only a few hundred meters away
f.rom that oF the Ayatollah Khomeyni. And this is where, surrounded by his
f,iithful Followers, lie signs checks and issues order.s while making pleasant
sm~l I ta1k. ftc sl.owly nibbJ~s away at the m1n he accuses of h~iving ~:arvcd
out for tiimselt the lion`s share of a tailor-made constitution. "Mr
Khomeyni (This is what he calls the ayatollah) has lost his sense of
reality," tie says. Madari is in favor of having the mullahs return to
the mosques and wants the esCablisfiment of a constitutional government;
he has become the leader of tlie petty-bourgeoisie, the liberals, and the
students who do not make religion the guiding principle of the revolution.
As for those who recaptured the television building at Tabriz his f irst
statement was this: "We must restore it to the legitimate agents of the
state." To use the trademark of bis rival, fiis main weapon simp~y is
civil war which he can unleash with one word: "If the executive branch
makes more mistakes, then Azarbayjan will explode," fie says, "and in that
case a considerable segment of the army will join us." Khomeyni, who is
aware of that, is hiding his time. For the moment, he criticizes the fact
that one of Madari's advisors is a young, red-bearded Englishman who has
converted to Islam. "An agent of the CIA," proclaims Khomeyni. "The
- Islamic Republic does not need tiim."
Gains for fiakhtiar
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 28 Dec 79 p 58, 77
jInterview With Shahpur Bakhtiar, the Shah's Last Prime Minister, by
Cenevieve Chauvel: "Khomeyni Is Paving the Way for my Arrival"J
jText] Shahpur Bakhtiar, the Shah`s last prime minister,
sentenced to death by KhDmeyni, received our correspondent
Genevieve Chauvel in the apartment where he has been living
in exile for a year, near Paris, with his son who is a _
medical student. No knickna~ks, no paintings. Ttiis
sparse decor features only a huge map of Iran which he
keeps looking at constantly.
Question: Carter said that he would not use force against Khomeyni. Do
you believe that he might nevertheless do so?
Shahpur Bakhtiar: No. In my opinion, America must not intervene mili-
tarily in Iran. The wisdom with which the United States has tackled this
pr.oblem, the calm and firmness on the part of Carter in the face of those
hysterical. individuaLswhom Khomeyni gathers around him every day to make
his shrill sounds has borne fruit. For the first time in more than 34
years, the Security Council has unanimously demanded the unconditional
release of hostages. It certainly makes sense for the USSR, China, Great
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Britain, France, America, and a good number of other countries to vote to-
gether in this way. Mr Khomeyni has already lost on the international
level. It would therefore take a miracle for him to understand the enor-
mous booboo he made.
Question: So?
Eakhtiar: I do not believe in miracles. Many people, even those who have
had some education, those who attended Western universities were dazzled
and found something miraculous in the ayatollah. Not I. But I do not think
that he was as ignorant as all that. Now people are heginning to understand
that there has been f ighting, that there have been massacres, that people
were in prison for many years, suffering inhuman treatment, all for nothing.
They had been wrong and it was an error in ~alculation. The new and ridi-
culous constitution made the whole world laugh. I think that Mr Khomeyni
wanted power, that he always had complexes and suppressed desires. But today
he has nothing to off er. The results of the referendum and the troubles in
Azarbayjan prove that people are taeginning to have enough of this comedy
- which is started up over and over again and only diverts the people from the
real problems. Things are going to get heated up increasingly until the in-
evitable explosion.
Question: And you are going to intervene at that moment?
Bakhtiar: Before that. I will not wait for the disappearance of Mr
Khomeyni.
Question: Soon?
Bakhtiar: Mr Khomeyni is paving the way for my arrival, In view of the
situation of chaos and the insurmountable difficulties in the economic
area, I helieve that the government can no longer maintain what is left of
cohesion and order in the co~ntry. Unless of course there is some sort of
upheaval or violent military action, Consequently, I hope that I will
very soon he in Iran and I know that the difficulties will start on that
day. I left Khomeyni a state that was coherent. He is going to leave it
in a condition of total chaos, with a ruined economy and with very advanced
disintegration of the country as a whole.
Question: Have you retained contacts in Iran? Are people waiting for you?
Bakhtiar: I do know whether anybody is waiting for me hut I do have my
supporters. So you can draw your own conclusions. I am not here just for
nothing, But I am not going to the theater or the movies every night. I -
try to organize the authentically national and progressive forces inside ~
- Iran. On the outside, I try to explain the waX I see things to international
public opinion. I have been fighting for social democracy and against
fascism, dictatorship, and corruption for 40 years. The future government
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must be center-left. For many reasons due to the current structure in Iran,
a right-wing administration or even a center administration would not be in
line with the country's profound needs where social inequalities are so
great.
Question: Do you not think that the Shafi might return?
Bakhtiar: That question no longer comes up.
Question: Do you have any foreign support?
Bakhtiar: When it comes to moral support, to consent, I find much sympathy -
and many supporters in France, Great Britain, and especially in Germany.
And I think that America is beginning to understand that I was right,
against Khomeyni who, in spite of his bitter anti-Americanism, remained on
very good terms with the United States, who supported him, until the hos-
tages were taken. Now I believe that Khomeyni has displayed the admirable
genius of having organized and aroused popular discontent around him. Not
in the country (where things are very progressive) but beyond our borders.
That is palpable above all in the Arab countries. Nobody can accept this
frenzied fanaticism any longer.
Question: Just how far can the Ayatollah Khomeyni go?
ggkhtiar: He cannot go far. He is stuck. He cannot do anything. He can
spill. biood, he can cause a little more disorder, he can ruin the economy
a little more, but the movement is irreversible.
Question: Still, people say that the ayatollah has produced a mystical, _
religious fervor which aroused the Iranians--is that not so?
Bakhtiar: Pascal said that man is a Uundle of contradictions. In each one
of us there is certainly a little more or less of the mystical. There are
moments when these feelings are galvanized, when they are stirred up by
economic, moral, or political factors. This Islamic push, which you re-
ferred to, does not necessarily have an anti-imperialist origin. But I
believe that America made big mistakes in supporting certain corrupt
regimes throughout the world, including Iran, Mr Khomeyni henefited from
that in order to preach an Islamic Republic in his own way Gzhich.has
nothing republican about it and whose Is1am is to be taken with a grain
- of sa].t. Egypt is the country with tfie largest number of Muslims in the
Middle East. And there is no Islamic push over there. Nor is there any
in Turkey. The troubles are of linguistic or ethnic origin. Khomeyni did
not introduce any trace of democracy in Iran, There was no revolution
here but rather an upheaval, a revolt, whicfi, because of its incompetence
and in spite of its undeniable prestige, could not be channeled in a good
direction.
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Question: Do you helieve that the Islamic revolution is the underlying
motivation for Khomeyni? Does he not also serve to galvanize the cxowds,
as Hitler did with his antisemitism?
Bakhtiar: Hitler at least in the beginning believed what fie sai.d. That
was absurd. But he really believ~d in the superiority of the Aryan race.
He was profoundly antisemitic. These are unacceptaFiie tfiings 6.ut he be-
lieved in them. By profession, Mr Khomeyni is a mullafi whicfi means that
- he must preach Islam. But his Islamism is a rather special thing. Now he
finds himself facing problems which he cannot solve. He knows nothing
about the economy. As for politics, he cannot even read a map. Now, that
anti-American push does not solve anything. What has to be done is to re-
build a country which is in a catastrophic situation. Mr Khomeyni is a
Muslim in his own fashion; I do not deny that but he does not consider him-
self zo be an Iranian. When I say that I am first of all an Iranian and
then a Muslim, Khomeyni finds that to be blasphemous. I find thati this is
the truth. I can always change my religion but I cannot change my
nationality. For me, being an Iranian is an absolutely undeniable fact.
For him, Mr Khomeyni exists wherever there is Islam, Now, nobody believes
him, People laugh in his face. Shiism involves only one-tenth of the
world's Muslim population. And out of that one-tenth, Mr Khomeyni repre-
_ sents only a portion. What does he really want? Iran or a caliphate as
during the time of the Omayyads and the Abbasids?
Question: Do you expect to get support from the opposition movements
which emerged through the uprisings in Kurdistan, Azarbayjan, and in your
own tribe, the Bakhtiari?
' Bakhtiar: These uprisings have been eacaggerated. They are only a symptom
of the breakup of a country which has enough of these troubles aiready.
No region, no minority in Iran demands secession. There are local prohlems
which are sometimes very serious and which, overall, the Shah's government
did not pay enough attention to. The ayatollah's opposition is in Qom
_ itself. Only the atmosphere of terror does not yet enahle it to express
itself,
Question: What is the role of the USSR in the current situation?
Bakhtiar: I have no contacts to know the answer to that question. Sut I
do know that the USSR would love to have two kinds of government in Iran:
Either a government in its pay with an iron curtain down on the Persian
Gulf, which is very unlikely considering the current state of international
forces. Or a government like that of the Shah's,with whom the Soviet Union
was on excellent terms. What the Soviet Union cannot tolerate would be a
progressive, perhaps even a pro-socialist government which would not be in
its pay.
_ Question: What is the position of the army?
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Bakhtiar: UnfortunaCely, the army accepted dictatorship for a long time.
Khomeyni cruelly killed and dismantled this army. He is afraid of it. And
sometimes, as in the case of Kurdistan, he needs it. Personally, I think
that our army must be restored on aational bases and it must be respected.
Question: That army was strong and it was well equipped by the Shah. Was
_ it the strongest in the East?
lSakhtiar: Regarding equipment, I agrea. As for the rest, it left much to
- be desired.
Question: Due to lack of training?
- Bakhtiar~ No. Promotions were no~t in line with. the merits of the soldiers
and officers. There was too much discrimination and, besides, this army
was a separate organism in the nation, It was not a national army. -
Question: How can one explain the fact that the Shah left without f ighting?
In his memoirs he regrets not having reacted immediately hy force.
Bakhtiar: For the period of 25 years following the downfall of Mossadeq,
the king had every chance of transforming his country. With the abuse of
power in the long run, a dictaL-or makes mistakes. And he made unpardonable
mistakes from whom Khomeyni today derives benefit. The king was mathe-
matically forced to leave and I was the one who su ggested this to him. If
he had not agreed, I would not have formed the cabinet. Because things at
that time were at such a fever pitch.thaC the explosion could have taken
place overnight. As for his memoirs, I am sorry that the king is writing
books. He began f ifteen years ago. A king who governs and who protects
hir.?self against attacks does not wriCe 6ooks and does not start hitter
debates. It would have been pre.ferable if he had kept quiet forever, in
his own interest.
Question: Do you feel threatened �ollowing the murder of the Shah's
nephew?
Bakhtiar: I always felt threatened, more than he. But I kept my cool,
before and after. I do not know w~?o killed him hut this was a heastly
thing to do. I was told that, in the Pahlavi family, he was not a rotten
apple.
Threats by Khalkhali
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 28 Dec 79 p 57
[Interview with Ayatollah Sadeg Khalkfiali by Georges Menager: We Wi11 Kill
Bakhtiar Regardless of Where He Is"]
jText] The Ayatollah Sadeg Khalkhali, 52, is the Fouquier-
Tinville of Iran. His circuit-riding revolutionary trihunal
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has already dispatched hundreds of opponents of Khomeyni to
the next world. He is at the same time the bloody repre-
� sentative of the imam, the hand of the Lord, and the sword
of Islam. He is called the "flying ~udge." Getting around
in an American helicopter, it is he who, everywhere in Iran,
punishes the "corrupt of the earth" in the name of Allah.
During the Kurdish revolt, it was he who sentenced the
rebels to death, witnessing the sentence before judging
other crimes, against Che Koran~" It was he, finally,
- who demanded the murder of the Shah's nephew in Paris
and it was he who proposed tY:at he preside over the trib.unal
charged with trying the ~nerican hostages at the emhassy
in Tehran. In the holy cit;~ of Qom, the home of this little,
pot-bellied man with a sfiort beard, smiling easily in the .
tumult of events, is a low-level, rather ordinary mansion
frequented by young bearded men, revolvers sticking out of
their helts, their eyes burning with defiance. Seated like
a tailor in the corner of the central room, fie received
our special correspondent Georges Menager.
George Menager: Are you still going to get Shahpur Bakhtiar?
Khalkhali: After the departure of the Shafi., it was Bakhtiar who gave the
order for the massacre of ~he people. He is thus responsible for the crimes
which the old regime co~nitted. This is why, as far as we are concerned,
he is sentenced to deatti. If we can, we wi11 bring him back to Iran; if
not, we will fight him and we will execute him wherever he may be. The
imam himself has also said that Bakhtiar should be executed.
George Menager: Do you also want to prosecute those you consider to be
traitors, all the way to the White House in Washington?
- I~alkhali: We are after them everywhere, even in the far corners of the
White House, They will never be safe from our grasp. They cannot escape
us, except if they die. Then, God will take charge of them.
George Menager: Specifically, who?
Khalkhali: We already gave their names: Ardeshir, Zahedi, Hushang,
Ansari, Nahavandi, Mohakrei, Razmi, Panizdan, Oveissi, Gholamreza, Pahlavi,
Farah, Ashra (Pahlavi), Mohamed Reza (the fugitive Shah), Shahpur Bakhtiar,
Shrisemani, Amuzegar, Shaban Djafari, Azari Shahram (Pahlavinin, son of
Ashra), Sabeti, etc,
Many people, like them, are sentenced to death as far as we are concerned.
If we can bring them back to Iran, so much the better; if not, the sentence
- is at any rate irreversible and they will be executed.
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Georges Menager: Even the wife of the Shah, the former Shabanu Farah?
Khalkhali: Yes, except if she kills tfie Shah, in which case she will par-
doned and will be able peacefully to return to Iran.
' Georges Menager: You claimed credit for the murder of the Shah's nephew
in Paris. But in your communique you were wrong on the first name; you
announcecl the assassination of his brother. Did they get the wrong man?
KhalkYi~li: The person who was killed in Paris was also sentenced to
death. The same goes for his brother who wi11 be executed in turn. But
we have not yet decided, as they said, to Exterminate the entire former
imperial family. This does not involve the children; they are innocent
of the crimes of their parents.
- Georges Menager: Is it true that you tried to assassinate the Shah in
Mexico when he was at Cuernavaca?
Khalkhali: Yes, we wanted to kil.l him but it did nut work. They then
beefed up his protection which.has become very expensive. This by the
way is why he moved. Not because he is sick. His cancer? If he has one,
it is he who caused it in our country for 57 years. The cancer is his
very existence.
Georges Menager: People say that you carry on your person the personal
weapon of Hoveida?
Khalkhali: This is the weapon I was given as a reward when I had nim
executed.
Georges Menager: In your vindictiveness to prosecute the traitors to
Iran, what do yau make of those grand principles of Islam which are repre-
sented by generosity and pardon?
Khalkhali: We have already pardoned a large number of people who had to
repent. Many were also released. But those who were at the head of the
old regime--the n~tion will not forgive them. The treason and crimes
thev committed are unpardonable and we will express the will of the nation.
Georges Menager: Do you still have Carlos in your ranks?
Khalkhali: I have not had any contact with Carlos recently. He phoned
me especially in the beginning (of the victory of the revolution, of
course) to tell me that he was ready to serve our cause without any com-
pensation. And we do not turn down anybody who wants to render a human
service. If you want to do so wL will not turn you down either.
George Menager: At the start of this interview you told me that j our-
nalists--in other words, myself included--are representatives of Zionism.
~y?
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Khalkhali: No. I did not mean to say that~ If I said something like that, _
it was just to make small talk. But Associated Press, United Press, and
- Reuter's and the vast majority of the information media are controlled by
the Zionists although individually the journalists are honest people; they
gather the news and they generally report the truth.
Georges Menager: Can you tell me how you fought during the time of the Shah?
What was your part in the revolutionary fight? And what role do you play
today?
Khalkhali: It would take a long time to tell you what I did. The imam put
me in charge of the Islamic tribunal and I took resp~~nsihility. I am taoth
the attorney-general and the head of the trihunals.
Georges Menager: Were you always the leader of the fiard-liners, the
feddayin of Islam?
Khalkhali: As regards the feddayin of Islam, I am not their of�icial -
Ieader. They accepted me and they listen to what I tell them~
Georges Menager: You were i.mprisoned under tfie old regime; did SAVAK
[Intelligence and Security OrganizationJ torture you?
Khalkhali: No, I was not tortured in prison. On the contrary, they
respected me, I was arrested, impris.oned, and exiled several ti.mes over
the past 15 years, I was never tortured, I was never even slapped.
Georges Menager: Is it true that you were on several occasions in a
psychiatric ward during the tiune of the Shah? -
Khalkhali: No, that is not true.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 par Cogedipresse S.A.
5058 =
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IRAN
ARMY SHOWING SOME SIGNS OF REVIV~I. _
Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 12 Dec 79 p 8- WA
~ [Article by Robert Fisk]
[ Text ] jRAN'S army, the broken back- it~ oT~ ~ cominani~ ' a'nd'" edntrol new army ls ' commanded
1 bone of monarchical power, structure. More important. ~t by l~iajor General Ha~:n Shak-
ts feeling its wa~~ cautiously back proved that the reco'.utionarv �r, an allegzdl,y gcn al m?n ra-
to life at a critical moment in guards, the Islathic praetorian oarded as a goon military cuorcli.
the history of the Iranian re. guard ��hich ow~s it~ alle~iance nstor, ~cho was trained at r'ort
volution. p?�imarily to the clergy and not Les~enworth. Eut the old Tur-
As P.yotollah ~Fhomeini con- tu the Governnient, could not kish and Kurdish b!ood in the �
tinues to invoke khe s^irit of cope with serta~ internal unrPSt. ~fticer corps has been sapped
m~rtyrdom and c~lls for tlix The guards were unable to over- a~~a~~.
trair.ing of 20 million armed come the Kurd~sh guerrillas. The only senior otficer of eth- -
youtUs amid oredictions uf an Zealuus, or�er-enthus~ast~c , and nic minority e.ctraction is Bri~u-
Ame^ica*~ invasion, ;~e new inexperienced, they suffered d'er Gen~ral Zal~~r Nsjad, who
Islamie Renublican Arm~� is tr~� "ca~~ily in Iiurdistan, and u~h~l' was promoted from co'.on?l to
ing to rebuild its ~tren;th to i:a the force, which numbers abaut command the 64th in:antry divi-
pre�revolut~on co?nplement of B,OUO acts as a coordinatino cPn- sion xt Urumive six months aga
- 280,Q00 men. - tral command, it at least has to He is ui T~u�k~sh descent,
After the appointment of the scknowledge the 7ece~sity of Some regula~� ol~cers are now
' Bazargan Go~~e: nment 1 a s t maintain�n: a rehu!ar armv helping to train the Revolut.ion-
spring, every officer from the The commander oE the army's ary Guar~~, who are a!so r~im- -
~ rank of General and above was first division m Teiieran, whicn oured to have a cadre from the
retired (more than 3D0 of the coit:;ins thc. pro-Khome[ni etF� palestin: Liberation Or~aii zat on
former Shahs commanders de- ments of the old imperial ~uard. as~~~tsn~ the~. ~'^r+^~n'~~ f~~e
parted in just two ~~ceks) and ~a~d that the Kurdistan c:~mpai~n ~uards act not just asuparami-
conscription was lo~vered frottt �had proved that "the armv st.l1 litan~ ~endarmerie but as ~
two years' service to a cr:pplin^ ha;: a role to pla.y in Iran". check on ~the army's power us
ane year. Bui malntaining an arm.y is �~ell.
Now it has been raised to 18 one tfiin~ : n~ainta~nin~ its ~qu~r7- Dr 1Iustafa Chamran, tlie ~4ini,e.
months and about 200,q00 men ment is quite another. Iq theor~, ter of Defence, has bemo;ined the
are reporting for duty, a fi~ure =h~ 3rmy can moi~ilize up to fact that his o(fic��t~s are n~t moro
much higher than that pra 1.600 t~nl;s, ~nclud~n~ 800 Br~- ~~revolutionary". They are certain-
pagated in the I'entaQ~n's mosc tish-manufacture~l Chieftains an~3 1~� r~,ea^~ird'as a mrd~rate. no~i-
' re~ent assessment of tne Iranian 60Q Am~rican 1~160s, tically disinterested group vf inen
arr*iy. :~iost of tlie American tanks who are more coneerned ~hout
Nowhere ha~~c the . armY's are in good ~tiorking order a9 the army'c national pre:tige thsn
problems since the re~~olut~on t~~e>~ are comoaratively easy to in advancinR th~ Islamic cau'se
been more apparerit than in ~�aintain anJ ren~ir, but the In the right environment. the
Kurdistan, ~~he;e a~i hoc un~ts Chie[tains. ~t�ith their sopMsticat� army in Iran could reemer~r ~s
were t;irown togethe~ , to 6~tht ed firing mechanism, ma~� alrea~:� a credib'.e force capable of put-
Kurdish rebels demanding autn� be down to half-strength through ting un consideruble re::istance to
- nom~� for their re~ion. So great lack of maintenance. Som: oP a 1!mited m~litar~ assault on the
has been tiie turnover of trno~~s. them ha~�e been cannibaliaed for co~+ntr~,
in the F:urdish battles that spare parts, But once th: arm~~'s po~ti�er is
~every Iranian arm~~ rlivision. The Iranians ~I;o ~LSe the Ame- i�e5uilt it ma~~ also Prosenc :i
especinlly the 'lP,th ~ti~hich is rican 1I47, ~ti~hich made a? an- r'olitical tiireat; and there are �
based on Sanandaj,, h~s been in� pearance in Kurclistan recently, tlinse in Iran who may~ preter to
vol~�ed in the fighting: but they are almo;;t us:~ess ~n ri:k the clar.;ers of out^icle ot� -
Yet fiurdistan geve the armp armoured warfare and could nat t~ck in ord;r to.safeguard their
a nev: _motlvat?on and,.I.evived be emplo~~ed aQa nst an inti�adtng revo~ution.-Fror?i The . Ti~nes.
forcc. . . . . . . Londmz
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1979
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MAURITANIA
NINISTER PRESENTS BROAD OUTLINE Or 1980 BUDGET
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 p 3015
(Text] Ahmed Ould Zein, Mauritanian minister of finance and commerce recently
declared that "at the present time the Mauritanian financial situation is
marked by a serious imbalance on the level of public finances as well as in
the balance of payments."
_ ,
In his press conference, pub~ished in extenso in several issues of CHAAB,
our national daily paper, Ou].d Zein added, in connection with the orientation
of Mauritania's budget for 1980: "O;z the level of ~receipts it is necessary _
to work towards an increase in receipts without modification of the total
rate of taxation, which is already high, but make every effort to recover
any outstanding amounts due."
= The minister continued: "In regard to expenditures an effort will also be
made to reduce them. Of course expenditures must be considered according to
their nature, but in connection with the expenditures for civil management,
the measures already in force will be continued. On the level of personnel
there will be no new recruitment, except for the personnel already in training
on the outside. All possible means for the reduction of manpower will be
used by making public servants who are not indispensable in public off ices,
available to the para-public sector and state companies whenever there are
openings on that level."
As regard expenditures for maintenance and equipment, the same strict measures
which prevailed in the second semester of 1979 will be continued. They will
- be reexamined systematically and these expenditures and all others, for which
there is no justification, will be ~.bolished."
"As regard expenditures for investments, in accordance with general economic
policy options, which require that only profitable investments be encouraged
henceforth, the amounts apportioned to these investment expenditures will
also be reexamined, taking into account the advisability of the investments
available at that time."
As for state companies, subsidies will be reexamined and even cut off if the -
enterprises cannot justify them. The state companies, of a commercial or
industrial character, will have to demonstrate their viability before they
can expect government subsidies.
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Ould Zein esrimates that "if we continue this program of thorough austerity _
we ttiink that wi~hin a period of perhaps about 4 or 5 years, the balance
un the bud~;et level will be assured."
I~or ~he 1979 fiacal year, Uuld 'Lein apeci('ied that "reducations in credits
Cor aclministrative management, represented approximately 1.4 billion UM, or
almost 10 percent of the total budgetary expenditures, and due to the require-
ments of tlie department management, some derogations were made in the education,
hea]_th, erc. sectors. These derogations amounted to about 250 millions up
to the present time. We therefore foresee that by the end of this year other
derogatic,ns, other credit openings will be necessary in an amount of 300
to 350 millions. Thus, due to these steps we will have a total gain of 800
millions."
COPYRICHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
7993
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MAURITANIA
BRIEFS
SPANISH FISHING AGREEMENT SIGNED--A bilateral cooperation agreement in
relation to fishing was signed in Madrid on 26 October, by the Mauritanian
minister of planning and fishing, Moulay Ould Boukhreiss and the Spanish
minister of transports and communications, Salvador Sanchez Teran. This
agreement, the text of which has not been circulated as yet, establishes
the new conditions under which the Spanish fleet will be able to exploit
the Mauritanian banks after Nouakchott's withdrawal from the Tiria E1
Cliarbia Province, annexed last August by Morocco. The Mauritanian delega-
tion invited the Spanish ship-owners to come to Nouakchott in December in
order to review the various stipulations regarding the cooperation proffered
by the new policy formulated by Mauritania in connection with fishing.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 p 3016]
7993
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TUNISIA
GOOD OIL PROSPECTS IN GULF OF GABES
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Dec 79 p 28
[Article: "Good Oil Prospects"]
[Text] While deposits in exploitation show signs of depletion, oil prospec-
ting in Tunisia is making good progress. On 18 October, Cities Service
Tunisia Petroleum Corporation was granted a prospecting zone in the Gulf of
Gabes.
This is the fifth permit given to a U.S. company, other foreign companies
(French and Italian among others) sharing a total of six permits. All to-
gether, the permits graneed cover a total of about 150,000 sq km, i.e.,
90 percent of the country's area. Prospecting is entirely at the risk and
expense of the companies.
At the beginning of 1979, oil indications were discovered in the Gulf of
Hammamet (approximately 100 km from Tunis). Other "encouraging" signs were
found near E1 Borma (site of the main deposit in exploitation in the south).
There, the most impor*.ant discovery, announced on 28 September, appears to -
be that of Sabria-north No 1 well, near the pipeline used for the transpor-
tation of the El Borma oil. This well, drilled by Amoco Tunisia Oil Company,
who bought a 99-year lease for it, has a daily output of 930 barrels of crude
oil.
Production and research should therefore supplement, and eventually replace,
the deposits now in exploitation. At E1 Borma, water-injection had to be -
used to increase the output, while Ashtart (an offshore deposit not far from
Sfax) has reached its full production rate. Tunisia's most important expor-
_ tation product, oil, has brought it approximately 410 million dollars in 1978,
corresponding to a production of 4.9 million tons; the 2.7 million tons pro-
duced during the first half of 1979 represent an 11.7 percent increase over
the same period during 1978.
Under these circumstances, one can understand why Tunisians are dreaming of
oil prospects which are "not bad at all."
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
END
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