JPRS ID: 9040 JAPAN REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040033-9
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• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8865
15 January 1980
Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. 661
_ FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFOI~IVIATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
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JPRS L/8865
15 January 1980
SUB-SAI~ARAN AFRI CA REPORT
Fouo rro. 661
CONTENTS PAGE
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Joint Equatorial Guinea-Gabon Communique on Regional Issues
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 Nov 79)........ 1
Brief s
Cubans in Congo 2
ANGOLA
.
Brief s
Relations With Brazil on Course 3
BENIN
Impact of Forthcoming Beninese Elections is Discussed
(Various sources, 12, 14 Nov 79) 4 _
First General Election Scheduled
Feverish Political Strife, by Mariam Sysle
CAMEROON
� Limited Concession Poli~y Bearing Fruit
� (Jos-Blaise Alima; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 31 Oct 79)............ 8
CAPE VERDE
Drought Shatrers Hopes for Annual Food Production
(i9ARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 Nov 79)........ 10
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBI�IC
President Defends ~Iis Polwcy During Mass Meeting
_ (MARCHES TROPICAU~ ET MEDITERRANEENS, 16 Nov 79)........ 11
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page -
Continued Political Unreat, French Relations Described
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS, 23 Ivov 79)........ 12
Briefs
Fuel~ Shortage Continues 14
EEC Grants Emergency Aid 14
CHAD
Gunt's Establishment Marks Turning Point iu Nation's History
(Mariam Sysle; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 2e: Nov-9 Dec 79)........... 15
Briefs
Original FROLINAT Withdraws From FACP 18
Security in N'Jamena 18 ,
CONGO
Government's Policy Toward Private S~ctor Noted ~
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 16 Nov 79)........ 19 ;
Briefs
First French-Lingala Dictionary 21
GHANA
Briefs
1978 Statistics With Japan 22
Bank Gains Up 2~
_ Economic Cooperation With GDR 22
Details~on GIHOC Closings . 23
GUINEA
Spectrum of Cooperation With France Reviewed
(Jean Latremoliere; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, ~
9 Nov 79) ..........................................o.... 24 ~
Increased Expectations for Cooperation With FRG -
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 Nov 79)........ 29
IVORY COAST ;
Domestic Bottle Gas Shortage Reported ~
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 9 Nov 79)........'. 30
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
KENYA
- Briefs
New Sunday Weekly Published 32
MALI
Briefs
Cotton Harvest 33
National Seminar on Justice 33
NI.GER
- BCEAO Bulletin's Report of Economic Situation Given -
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEANS, 23 Nov 79)........ 34 -
Briefs
No New Canadian Projects 36
R~IODEST.~1
, Difficult Negotiations Presage Difficult Elections
(Jos-Blaise Alima; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 28 Nov 79)............ 37
~
Zanu President Mugabe Grants Interview to 'THE GUARDIAN'
' (Robert Mugabe Interview; THE GUARDIAN, 21 Dec 79)...... 40
SENEGAL
Agricultural Problems Noted
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS, 16 Nov 79)........ 42
Briefs
Peanut Production Decline 43
Economic, Social Council Session 43
Indictment of RND Leader 44
SOUTH AFRICA
'AFRIQUE-ASIE' Investigates Antiwar Movement
(Jane Bergerol; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 12-25 Nov 79) 45
TANZANIA
Briefs
Port Modernization Program 48
Zanzibar Development Plan Problem~ 48
Guide to Private Sector 48
UGAN~A
Brief s
Paraguay May Take Amin 49
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
JOINT EQUATORIAL GUINEA-GABON COMMUNIQUE ON REGIONAL ISSUES
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3279
~Text/ In terms that are ambiguoue but still favorable to Morocco, the
only nation mentioned explicitly, a joint Gabon-Eq~~atorial Guinea com-
munique released in Libreville at the close of thF; visit of President -
Obiang Ngueme (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAIVEENS of 16 Nov 79 p
3218) states the position of these two nations on the Wester:~ Sahara.
The two presidents "expressed their happineas about the total readinesa
oL the kingdom of Morocco to seek peace and understanding in the region
by propusing to the president of the OAU the holding of a summit conference
so that the chiefs of state or government of all the countries bordering
on the Sahara could meet i.n order to study means to implement in order
to ensure a harmonious economic and social development for all the states
of the region, for the well-being to which their peoples aspire."
The joint communique continues, stating that the new president of _
Equatorial Guinea has expressed his gratitude to Gabon for i.ts "unceasing"
and "unconditi.onal'' moral and materiel aupport.
The two chiefs of state also signed the general cooperation agreement
between the Republic of Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Gabon, and
the accord creating the joint commission on cooperation between the two
countries.
Also signed in the presence of the two chiefs of state were the by-laws~ -
governing this commisaion and the trade agreement designed to promote and
intensify trade between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.
In the same spirit, they decided to hold the first meeting of the joint
commission at Malabo next year, at a_date to be mutuaily agreed upon by
diplomatic channels.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
7679
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
CUBANS ~N CON~~--Is a war betk~een Gabon and the Congo in the offing?
Various frontier incidents have pitted the two countries against each other
during the past 2 weeks. According to the French intelligence services, ,
three Cuban battalions (900 troops) are now based in Brazzaville. The
Congolese aim appears to be to probe the ability of Gabon to defend itself, ~
particularly with respect to the presidential guard of Omar Bongo which is
staffed by French and Moroccan officers. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES
in French 24 Dec 79 p 11]
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- ANGOLA
BRIEI'S
RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL ON COURSE--Commenting on the prospects for ringola's
- foreign policy, Radio Bandeirantes said from Sao Paolo t~at "the policy
will not be changed and will follow the orientations defined by the late
president of the republic, Agostinho Neto. This statement is very im-
porta~t Lor Brazil, which has increased its cooperation with Angola. It
:s especially significant as it is based on statements made in Bra2i1
it~.elf, during th. visit of the president of the Central Bank of Angola
tc Brazil. The Brazilian supermarket chain, Pao de Acucar, is now the
backbone of the Angolan food supply system. Food supply is one of the
most serious problems which the Luanda government has to face and is a
problem that i;. must solve. Furthermore, a group of Brazilian experts
has been hired to reorganize and manage the Angolan hotel system. The
conti.n~:ati~n of the orientations defined by President Neto implies that
Angola will maintain a flexible foreign policy and relations with the
greatest possible number of countries. Although pro-Soviet, President
Neto did learn from America and had tried to attract foreign investors.
Brazil has benefited from this flexibility, by establishing itself in
the young Portuguese-speaking nation. The Brazilian presence in Angola
does exist, and it will continue to grow." /Text/ 1Paris MARCHES
- TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3289/ 7679
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13I:NIN
IMPACT OF FORTHCOMING BENINESE ELECTIONS IS DISCUSSED
First General Election Scheduled
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 14 Nov 79 p 31
[Text] On Tuesday 20 November the Benines~, will elect their 336 people's
commissars to the National itevolutionary Assembly. Mathieu Kerekou, the
"great combat comrade," and his friends fr.om the Military Revolutionary
Government (GMR) may have wished to show their fondness for symbols on
' the occasion of these first general elections since the 27 October 1972
coup which gave power to a junta of young officers. A red ballnt wi11
signify approval of the single national [candidates'] list, which includes,
side by side, "farmer and craftsman candidates," "worker candidates" and
"local middle-class candidates." A white ballot will signify re~ection.
Beyond its generaliy foreseeable returns, the 20 November election marks
the beginning of the second phase (or second wind) of the Benin revolution.
The People's Revolution Party o:E b~nir_ or PRPB, a single, "vanguard,"
Leninist-type party created in ~'.975, 'ias extended its influence into every
sector of public life, through ~rassroots organizations of self-defense,
such as the Co~nittees for the Deipnse of the Revolution, or CDR, or the
Revolutionary Action Grou~s, or GAR. Its top leadership,.the Political
Bureau, Benin`s real executive entity, is made up of six men: three
civilian prefects, who speak for the intellectuals and cadres who inspired
and supported the nation's "radicalization," and three military leaders:
Barthelemy Ohauens, minister of industry and dean of the government, often
represented as being liberal; Martin Dohou Azonhiho, minister of security
and national orientation, who is considered to be the regime's ideologist
as well as head of the orthodox Marxists, and Mathieu Kerekou, president
of Benin for the past 7 years.
Still, "pockets" of disconter~t remain, owing to the militarization of every-
day life and to a few ancient ills such as corruption and smuggling, which
the authorities have aot been able to cure. Last June's student protest
is significant in that respect.
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Economically speaking, on the other hand, some undzniable successes have
been achieved, even though the overambitious First National Three-Year
Plan (1978-1981) had to be cut back to more modest objectives after its
first phase was completed. The foreign debt has remained within reasonable
bounds and international organizations have granted loans without too much
reluctance. In conclusion, the recent discovery by two Norwegian companies
of the small offshore petroleum deposits at Seme (projected daily output:
15,000 barrels; local daily consumption: 3,000 barrels) wil],by 1981,
enable Benin to join the very exclusive set of petroleum producers.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
Feverish Political Strife
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 12 Nov 79 pp 50-51
[Article by Mariam Sysle] I
~
[Text] An atmosphere of inten~ive political strife
surrounds the creation of a major component of the
institutional system: the National Revolutionary ,
Assembly.
- Inching forward in a gradual but irreversiblF inarch, the People's Republic
of Benin is proceeding towards completion of its stated objectives. Thus,
since 10 October, the entire nation has been waiting for the time when the
National Revolutionary Assembly (ANR) will be established. This is a major
event that has been expected ever since 26 August 1977, when the Fundamental
Law,* first constitution ever freely created by the Beninese themselves,
was adopted. It incorporates both the total gains made by the revolutionary
movement of national liberation launched on 26 October ].972, and a prepara-
tory phase to the people's democratic revolution.
As a single legislative body and the supreme instrument of national power,
the National Assembly will be made up of 336 people's co~issars. They
will be elected for 3 years and will be answerable to the electorate for ,
their actions, and thus revocable at any moment in the event they should
betray the people's trust.
The duties of the National Revolutionary Assembly will include voting on
laws, adopting the national plan and the budget, and voting taxes. One of
the ANR's most important aspects, however, as a nationwide instrument of
participation and mass control (the assembly will be empowered to challenge
the supreme authorities) will be to speak for a broad union of all patriotic
and revolutionary classes and social strata, a union that is absolutely
needed, in today's phase, in striving to successfully liquidate the econcmic
grip of imperialism, to defeat the forces of the feudal system, and radically
change farming structures. ~
* see AFRIQUE-ASIE issue No 149 of 28 November 1977
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Under those circumstances it was out of the question, for instance, to take
one's inspiration from electoral systems prevalent in bourgeois democracies.
On the contrary, there was a need to consider both the ob~ectives set by
the People's Revolution Party of Benin (PRPB) and written into the Funda-
mental Law, and the present-day national realities. But those realities
presuppose that a necessary balance be struck between a concrete affirmation
of the PRPB's leadership role as a guarantee of the continuity and increased
depth of the revolutionary process, on one hand, and of the unity and the
. equally effective participation of all patriotic and revolutionary classes
~ and sectors in public affairs, on the other hand.
This is the reason why the People's Republic of Benin is introducing changes
in this area, too. And the reason why the electoral system worked out to
establish the ANR may seem somplex at first glance, is that the legislators
are being guided by many concerns.
1 An Equitable Representation
~
According to a tradition now solidly rooted in Benin since October 1972, the
first concern is to guarantee the full and total participation of the popula-
tion in choosing the candidates. At the same time, however, that involved
setting up a multilevel system of controls in order to prevent reactionaries,
dema.gogues or hoaxers from slipping into the list of candidates. The third
concern has to do with guaranteeing an equitable representation of all
classes and strata of Beninese society, and to make it impossible for some
of those [sectors of the population], for instance, the agricultural workers,
unaccustomed to public speaking contests, to be wronged to the detriment [as
publishedJ to the other, more skilled groups. Similarly, it was r~ecessary
to make it possible for the PRPB and the grassroots organizations to be
represented within the ANR. Thus those concerns p rovided ~reliminary ouide-
lines for the distribution of people's commissars within the Al~~it. In a~cordsnce
with the ordinance of 29 April 1978, therefore, the National Revolutionary ~
Assembly will include 84 agricultural workers and craftsmen, 33 industrial
workers, 8 representatives of the local mi~'dle class, 25 teachers, 42 agency _
- representatives from vario~us branches of t.he government and public utilities,
20 top national cadres, 6 representatives o~ re].igious organizatior~s and 33 .
members of the people's arrne~i forces (ranging from privates to officers).
Finally, the PRPB 3nd su~h grassroots organizations as cooperatives, women`s
and youth organizing committees, National Fe~eration of Workers Unions of
Benin and committees for the Defense of the Revolution, will each have 21
and 64 deputies at t1-.~ ANR, respectively.
. As to the electoral process proper, it comprises three phases. From 10 to
17 October, registers were open, nationwide, for the benefit of all citizens
desiring to present their candidacy to the posts of people's commissars,
although a certain number of conditions and criteria had of course been set
for those positions. For instance, ~n short, candidacy is restricted to
those who actively support the current revolutionary movement and who have _
_ not been involved in embezzlements or other dishonest acts. Automatically,
excluded were hired hands ar propaganda spokesmen for former regimes of ,
~ national renunciation, as well as all those involved in plots against the
People's Republic of Benin.
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In the same spirit, all actions reminiscent of past practices--whether they
involve attempts to corrupt the electorate or manifestations of regionalism
or tribalism, have been strictly outlawed for the entire duration of the
campaign.
That campaign began in effect on 19 October, wi.th the democratic referenda
that were to continue until the 31st of that month ar~d during ~ahich a selec-
tion of candidates was ~upposed to occur. That szlection is being effected
according to socio-professional categories, at the leve?s of the village,
district, province or nation, the barrakcs or the factory, if the election
, involves a farming candidate, a militant member of a grassroots organization,
a military person, or a worker.
The Stakes
The general principle involved i~n all cases is a.s follows: the candidates
are selected at the grassroots and the slate thus created is f inally sub-
mitted to the PRPB central committee, which will be in charge of the last ;
control and selection. ~
In the form of a single national list of candidates for people's commissars, I
that last selection will ultimately be submitted tc~ the Beninese electorate
on 20 November for approval or rejection. ~
In fact, the voting process has been taking place in an atomosphere of
intensive political ~trife and extreme vigilance. lndeed, it involved
preventing the reactionary forces from taking advantage of this i:ime, when
institutions are being democratized, to infiltrate the ranks and thus dis-
tort the meaning of the process now going on.
The stakes are conGiderable. This is why we are now witnessing a wide
mobilization of the people in Benin, as ernphasis is being placed on the
- indispensable rally of all progressive forces, because also invalved is the
preparation of further phases in the establishment of new institutions and
[the preparation of] the Second National Congress of the PRPB, which is
= expected to take place this year and to give the party a solid foundation.
COPYRIGHT: 1971 Afrique-Asie
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CAMEROON
LIMITED CONCESSION POLICY BEARING FRUIT
Paris JUENE AFRIQUE in French 31 Oct 79 p 26
[Article by 3os-Blaise Alima] -
[Text] The fever which gripped the French stockmarket at the beginning of
October did not keep 8 million Cameroonians from going at,out their daily
- business. The fever did not even overly disturb the sleep of the country's
leaders, apparently more concerned over preparations for the upcoming con-
gress of the Cameroonian National Union. ~aice during the same week, tY?e
' announcement of the discovery of oil depos3.ts caused a rise in the price
of oil stocks on the Paris stockmarket.
~
At the beginning of August, the French company Elf-Aquitaine announced the
discovery of two small oil deposits in the Ekoundou concession and in the
Rio del Rey concession to the north. Following close behind, the French
oil company announced on 28 August the discovery of signs of oil during the _
drilling of "Victoria Est," on permit H17, in Cameroonian waters. There is
mure: We have learned that the American company Mobil, at the end of Sep-
tember, also discovered a large deposit in the offshore area called Sanaga-
Sud. That was enough to set off a tempest on the Paris stock exchange.
And yet this last report is not entirely correct, as it was modified a few
days later.
Traces of hydrocarbons have indeed been discovered off Kribi by Mobil.
However, this is a natural gas deposit. It is true, though, that its pre-
sumed size is enough to send shivers up the spines of those in the know.
Some European experts are saying, in fact, that this deposit is one-fourth _
that of Frigg which was placed in service in 1977 and is located in the
North Sea. The Frigg deposit, which is coowned by Great Britain and Norway,
has recoverable reserves estimated at 258 billion cubic meters of gas.
Therefore, we understand the fever which has gripped specialized sectors
and at the same time the discretion of Cameroonian leaders in the face of
this "manna" of modern times, which �or some is synonymous with a poisoned
gift.
The zeal with which foreign companies are issuing communiques is not by
chance. Prospecting .for oil in.Cameroon began in 1951, under colonization. _
' It was not until 1977 that the first deposit was discovered, namely that of ~
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Kole. This situation was all the more surprising as Cameroon is located
in an "oil basin" which almost all its neighbors have been tapping for a
long time. That explains the decision made at the time by Che government
to place a time limit on the exploitation permits issued to foreign com-
panies. It is certain that this measure had a big impact since it encour-
aged competition and brought about the present explosion. tlowever,
although the blossoms are already bringing the promise of fruit, above
a?1 it is a question of keeping ourselves from being carried away by the
oil phenomenon.
After a rather cautious beginning, the production of black gold has con-
tinued to increase in a substantial manner. In 1978, oil production was
barely 800,000 tons, representing 4.5 billion CFA [African Financial Com-
munity] francs in revenues; i.e., 2.7 percent of the total budgetary re-
sources. The annual production of the four deposits exploited by the Elf-
Pecten-Shell group, off Victoria, is said to now total about 2 million
tons; and it is estimated that a high of 5 million tons will be reached
between now and 1983. That is to say, the refinery being built in Victoria
will be fully operational when its capacity is 1.5 million tons, with a ~
possible expansion to 2 million tons. This also means the future is bright i
since according to estimates of the reporter of the laws committee of the ,
- National Assembly, "production of 1 million tons per year would produce ~
20 billion CFA francs." '
This information was given in December 1978 during a debate on the new -
hydrocarbons system. In its own way, Cameroon intended to have control of ~
its resources. Also the new text reduced considerably tHe~privileges of
~ foreign companies by imposing a tax of 57.5 percent on revenues, particu-
larly.
Therefore, although Cameroon can today be pleased over being safe from an
energy crisis, oil, on the other hand, is apt to produce problems of another
kind. It was in the former English-speaking sector that the first deposits
were discovered. Some Cameroonian nationals in this region considered the ~
latter to be the poor relation of the country; and some members of the oppo-
sition abroad have gone so far as to disseminate pamphlets demanding a re-
turn to the federation. Unquestionably, the action was marked by a strong
smell of oil. In a related,connection, neighboring Nigeria has not hesi- _
- tated to again bring into question the border agreements between the two
countries, as the deposits had been discovered not far from the border.
Although the oil deposit discovered by Elf was off Victoria, not far from -
Nigeria, the natural gas deposit was discovered off Kribi, in the former
French-speaking Cameroon. That is one reason for the government, ever con-
cerned about the country's unity, to be reassured to the extent that it has
now been shown that oil is not the monopoly of a single region.
COPYRIGHT: J2une Afrique Grup~ia, Paris, 19?~
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CAPE VERDE
DROUGHT SHATTERS HOPES FOR ANNUAL FOOD PRODUCTION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3268
!Text% Cape Verde, which has suffered from an endemic drought for over
- 10 vears, will harvest almost nothing this year. The lack and irregulari-
ty of the rains have ruined all hopes and ~another hard year now lies
ahead.
According to FAO experts who have just filed their report, Cape Verde's
grai.n production this year will not exceed 1,000 tons; its annual con-
sumption is 48,000 tons.
In any event, say these experts, even under the best of conditions, :,ape
Verde, which has no rivers, will not be able to produce in the mid-term
peri~d more than a third of its grain needs, So they suggested that
_ act.i.on be taken to change the food habits of the Cape Verde population
and to introduce new types of grains, auch as millet and sorghum, to
develop animal production and improve the diet of the local population.
T;Zey further recommended that the aid already promised be given immediate-
ly.
Facing this situation, Mr Edouard Saouma, director general of the FAO, _
on 10 November approved the sending by the UN/FAO's PAM (World Food Pro-
gram) of emergency food aid valued at $908,000 to provide help to the
farmers. �
The PAM will send 2,500 tons of corn and 190 tons of edible oile.` The
aid to Cape Verde also includes a gift in cash of $67,250 to cover the
transport, storage, and handling expenses for the food sent.
Corn and edible oils will be distributed to 14,000 families of farmers--
about 70,000 persons in all--for a period of 3 months.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
7679
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~ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
. PRESIDENT DEFENDS HIS POLICY DURING MASS MEETING
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3216
- [Text] On 10 November in Bangui, President Dacko held a mass meeting during
which he dencunced "the opportunism" of the opposition and exhorted Central
Africans to strive to improve the economy of their country.
The day was declared a holiday so that the people of Bangui (200,000 in-
habitants) could go to Boganda stadium, where the meeting took place. But
beacuse of bad weather only 6,00o spectators were on hand to applaud the
president when he arrived at the podium, surrounded by members of the
government.
Speaking in the Sango language, Mr David Dacko began by denouncing the
opposition movements, whose leaders, he said, "carried out a noisy propa-
ganda campaign abroad to overthrow Bokassa, whom they had only recently
- been supporting. I, on the other hand, was quiet during mp exile, but I
succeeded in overthrowing the tyrant without bloodshed."
Calling for multipartisanship, he also denounced the opposition "wh~ch is
= trying to misuse its power, since its various movements are composed es-
_ sentially of people belonging to a single ethnic group, who do not consider
themselves, first of all, as Central Africans." Nevertheless, he promised,
"I am going to consider multipartisanship."
Then turning to the economic and social situation, the 1~~-esident underscored
the necessity of improving agricultural production and, in general, of working
together. Mr Dacko, on that subject, denounced strikes, which were frequent
that week in various administrations in Bangui. "The role of the labor
union is not to disorganize the economy of the country," he criticized.
The Central African chief of state then addressed himself to the youth ot
the country, a large number of whom are nnemployed. "These young people
should be oriented toward construc$f~e-work, esPecially agriculture, within
the framework of a paramilitary structure," he said. In 1962, President
Dacko had already inaugrated a"civic service," within the structure o� the
National Youth Pioneers.
, ~ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1979
8956 11
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC -
_ CONTINUED POLITICAL UNREST, FRENCH RELATIONS DESCRIBED �
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3277
[Text] In accordance with the terms of a constitutional act, supplementary to
the act of 21 September 1979 (provisional organization of authority in the
CAR [Central African Republic]), President Dacko an 30 October decided that
"the vice president of the Republic shall assume the duties of the President
of the Republic when the presidency is vacant."
It is known that Mr Maidou was named vice president of the CAR when the empire i
fell, and that he enjoys an especially marked esteem on the part of the French ~
authorities who are cooperating with the Central African Republic.
However, the possibility of the arrival of Henri Maidou, the last prime minis- `
ter under the dethroned emperor, who had earned the nickname "Mr Denial" by ~
virtue of his attitude after the Bangui massacres, would scarcely be to the
taste of the Central African populace. '
The AFP recently noted that the inhabitants of Bangui were disturbed by the re-
lease on 15 November of M. Massengue, the foxmer chief of police of Bokassa.
Also, everyone in Bangui meslical circles knows that the physician who in 1976 ~
agreed to kill the newborn son of one of the emperor's opponents who was him- '
self executed the day before, is circulating freely in the city. ;
In the face of such impunity the population is beginning again to criticize
the presence at the head of the state of former dignitaries of the Empire, be-
ginning with the president and vice president themselves, David Dacko and
Henri Maidou. In reply, Mr Dacko recalls on every possible occasion that he ,
- was merely a hostage in Bokassa's hands, and that it wa~ by pretending obed-
ience that he was able to prepare for and succeed in overthrowing the tyrant.
- And to calm public opinion, he continually promises to extradite Bokassa soon.
But that is not enough in the eyes of a population that believes ths Investiga-
tive Commission formed to drive out Bokassa's a~~complices has, up to now, chaP-
- lenged no one but "underlings." `
Forms classified as "confidential" that the Commission had distributed to the
population, which were really appeals for informing, were often returned to
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it anonymously, with the names of Dacko and Maidou at the top of the list. ~
_ The AFP repre~entative saw about 20 like that, before they rrere sent.
The climate becomesall the heavier because among those who were known for
their devotion to Bokassa, some are again raising their heads. Thus, recent-
ly, several dozen members of the former imperial guard, disarmed and chased
out of the arm~ after the coup d'etat, have come to threaten the Treasury em-
- ployees, demanding in vain that they be paid, like other civil servants.
In this atmosphere, relatioiis between the Central African authorities and
the French authorities seem to be singularly equivocal. The F~ench daily LE
MONDE stated that a helicopter and French soldiers took part in the search
that resulted in the arrest, in the northern part of the country, of -
Ange Patasse. President Dacko, on the other hand, on 27 October signed two
decrees (No 79-073 and 79-078) concerned with appointment "in exceptional
cases" to the Central African Order of Merit. The two decrees have to do on
the one hand with an executive secretary in the French Interior Ministry, on
the other hand with many French members of the military; including six super-
ior officers who are appointed to the rank of commander.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
.
8946
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
i
BRIEFS
FUEL ~HORTAGE CONTINUES--The shortage of hydrocarbons that Central Africa is
experiencing is a major worry for President Dacko, who, at the time of the big
meeting in the ~oganda Stadium in Bangui (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET A~DITERRANEENS,
16 November 1979, p 3216), yielded the floor to the head of Centra-Hydro, tlie
national distributing company, The larter condemned the employees and gas
station attendants who he said are refusing to deliver to their customers in
order to favor their friends and resell the stocks secretly to "Arab traf-`
fickers," ~vho can thus flood the province with fuel on the black market. We
note that since 19 October the Centra-Hydro Company, which was partially de- ~
nationalized in the erapire's last days, has a new general manager, Tinor Ibra- ~
him. (Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET 1~DITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 '
p 3277J 8946 ~
EEC GRANTS EI~RGENCY AID--The European Commission on 13 November decided to
grant emergency aid to the Central African Republic, in the amo~snt of 300,000
units of account (1 unit of account = 5.89 French francs). This aid, granted
in accordance with Art 59 of the Lome Convention, is intended for the purchase
of essential supplies (medicines, sugar, insecticides, etc.). It is a response
to the appeal for international assistance launched by President Dacko, and fol- ~
lows a mission carried out on the spot in late October by representatives of
the Commission. This emergency aid is granted without prejudice to later ad-
ditional intervention. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 23 Nov 79 p 3277] 8946
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CHAD
GUNT'S ESTABLISHIKEN`T MARKS TURNING POINT IN NATION'S HISTORY
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 26 Nov-9 Dec 79 p 28
[Article by Mariam Sysle: '~Twenty-two Men in a Boat"]
[Text] Has Chad emerged from chaos and has the risk of the country's
breakup been averted once and for all? One thing justifies hope: the
establishment, on 10 November, of the Transitional National Union Govern-
ment (GUNT), following 6 days of negctiations between the leaders of th~e
_ 11 political and military groups meeting in Douguia (a small town some
60 kilometers north of Ndjamena). The setting up of GUNT marks a turning
point in the country's tormented history.
On 11 October, the representatives of the 11 groups met and, following
laborious negotiations, the meeting ended in failure. On 21 August in
Lagos, they had signed the agreements that were ratified in Douguia. GUNT,
headed by Goukouni Oueddei (People's Armed Forces), who is in turn seconded
_ by Lt Col Abdelka.der Vadel Kamougue (Chadian Armed Forces), is made up of
12 "northern" ministers and 10 "southern" ministers. Gathering together
_ all the country's political and military factions, this government reflects
the extreme ethnic and religious diversity of Chad. Bantus, Gorans, Arabs,
animists, Christians and Muslims rub elbows on the new team.
There are also authentic leaders of the FROLINAT such as Dr Aba Siddick
(who is minister of higher education, research and scholarships), the
former "rebel toubou," Hissein Habre (who becomes minister of nati~nal de-
fense, veterans affairs and the disabled), and former ministers of General
Malloum. Key posts have also been.entrusted to men who are, rightly or
wrongly, cansidered to be pro-Libyans, in particular, Acyl Ahmat (minister
of foreign affairs and cooperation), and Mahamat Abba Said, named minister
of interior and security. In other words, the Douguia conference succeeded
in overcoming personal rivalries and political divergencie~ and in bring-
ing together on the same team all groups and the main figures which in one
way or another have influenced the course of Chad's history over the past
15 years.
A veritable wager has been won and for certain observers, this can only
be cause for optimism. Actually, the establishment of GUNT appeared to be
f ~
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the only solution which, given the current circumstances, could prevent the
country from once more being engulfed in civil war and avert the increasing
threat of a breakup. As Ndjamena Radio emphasiaed at the time of the Dou-
guia conference: "Without peace between the different Chadian factions,
national life can only be blocked and disorganiLed and the country will
become the inevitable prey of foreign greed and meddling."
It would therefore appear that a decisi~n wa~ made to heed the lessons of
the past. For the first time, there is a government which, in principle
at least, does not neglect any region and grants their.rightful place to
the northern region, always forgotten, and the Muslim populations. We
know that to a great extent, the Chadian drama was caused by the policy of ,
divisiveness begun by the French coloniaer and continued by Tombalbaye and
- his successor, General Malloum, both relying on the same narrow group inter-
ests to perpetuate, along with their own power, France's control over the
country. This policy of division, which stirred up foreign greed and
facilitated outside meddling, so ravaged the country th3t the FROLINAT it-
self suffered from it, as seen in recent years.
I
Has the establishment of GUNT thereby put an end�to the Chadian mess? Ac-
tually, while a great step toward peace and normalization has ~ust been
taken, the dgreement ~ust concluded remains fragile. There is justifiable ~
concern that :he extreme heterogeneity of the team in power might carry in ~
itself the seecls of division and collapse. Nor will there be any lack of
subjects of disagreement (fram the problem of demilitariaation of the capi-
tal to the means to be used to get a country bled white by the war back on
its feet). It would be naive to think that personal ambitions and rivalries
have disappeared as if by magic.
Ferryboats ~
One can predict that certain members of GUNT, Hissein Habre, for example,
whose thirst for power is well knotm, will do everything possible to look
after number one, Pven if they have to compromise the fragile balance '
finally established. Nor can there be any doubt that certain foreign powers
(including France) will exploit these rivalries in order to safeguard their
own interests. Moreover, GUNT has to solve an extr3ordinarily difficult
problem: restoring confidence and normal life in one of the poorest coun-
tries in the world, now completely bankrupt in all spheres. When one '
realiaes that it is the French soldiers (a contingent of 1,500 men remains) ~
who provide the only remaining air links, who keep the Chari River ferry-
boats, on which gasoline arrives from Cameroon, running and who even take
care of the sick (the only hospital still operating is the Tako military '
hospital, headquarters of French Col Le Tonquedec), one can see that
GUNT's room to maneuver is extremely small and that crucial problems still
have to be solved.
The main task of the new government is to enforce the Lagos accords in
their entirety. In other words, it will have to organize the departure of
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the French troops and prepare for free and democratic general elections to
be held in 18 months. Following such elections, a new team should take
over. But there will be no lack of obstacles and in tnat period of time,
many new questions may emerge. Under such conditions, it is not surgrising
that while the people were relieved to learn of the establishment of GUNT,
they did not greet it with joy.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
11,464
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CHAD
BRIEFS �
ORIGINAL FROLINAT WITHDRAWS FROM FACP--Dr Abba Siddick's original FROL~NAT '
has withdrawn from the Provisional Front for Joint Action (FACP), which was
created on its initiative last May in Tripo 1 i and regroups five FROLINAT
groups. In a communic}ue issued on 16 Novemb er in N'Jamena, the original FRO-
LINAT speaks out against creating, within the FACP, "small tribalist groups
intended to orient the movement toward objectives that are not its own." In ;
jarticular it accused the president of the FACP, Mahamat Abba Said, the new
Interior Minister, of having come to an agreement, "undex cover of tribalism," .
with the president of the Revolutionary Demo cratic Council (CDR), Ahmat Acyl, i-
the present Foreign Affairs Minister, to div ide between themselves "certain i
important ministerial posts." The group leaders' Douguia meeting was extended, ~
chiefly because of the refusal of the other FACP leaders to award to j
Dr Abba Siddick, who had been promoted to minister of Higher Education, the ~
Foreign Affairs portfolio he was demanding. With Dr Siddick's retirement from
the FACP and the government, there is nothing left of the movement but the pro-
foundly pro-Libyan tendencies embodied in Ahmat Acyl, Mahamat Abba Said, ,
Abdoulaye Adoum Dana and Hadjaro Senoussi. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3278] 8946 '
SECURITY IN N'JAMENA--A Politico-Military Technical Commission to study secur-
ity problems in the city of N'Jamena has bsen created by the Chadian chief of
state, Goukouni Weddeye, according to a communique of 14 November from the
presidency of the Republic of Chad. The Commission, made up of ten members,
will present a"detailed report" to the nat ional union transition government,
which will "decide accordingly." Various demands have indeed been evident in
the Chadian capital for some time; armed men are legion there. Merchants, es-
pecially French merchants, have been the victims of arbitrary arrests, after
which, taken before improvised popular court s, they had to turn over sums of
money to various politico-military organizat ions or be shot. French diplomats,
confirming this news, even stated that they had sometimes found themselves in
delicate situations as a result of this ins ecurity in the Chadian capital,
where all administration has disappeared and where payment of pensions to for-
mer fighters, for example, is no longer carried out. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3278] 8946
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CONGO
_ 1i
_ GOVERNMENT'S POLICY TOWARD PRIVATE SECTOR NOTED ,
. Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3219
[Text] During the visit to Paris of President Sassou Nguesso (MTM, 2
November 1979, p 2933), at a meeting in the offices of the CNPF [National
Council of French EmployersJ, in Paris, on 30 October, chaired by Mr J.
Dromer, the chairman of the ACP [Central Advertising Agency] Committee,
Mr Lopes, the Finance minister, confirmed that the president of the People's
Republic of Congo had asked his aides to "put their cards on the talile" and
' indicate the sectors in which foreign private interests could freely inter-
vene, in particular in the hotel business and tourism, and those in which
it would be desirable to have a mixed economy company. Mr Lopes cited as
a good example the case of Impreco Company [Textile Company of the People's
Republic of the CongoJ, in which the Congolese government owns 33 percent
of the capital: at the end of a certain amount of time, the government
will be able to increase its participation, or to own the entire ogeration.
The finance minister also pointed out that the indemnification of nationalized
companies, or expropriated ones, was accepted in principle but that a calendar
had to be drawn up for the dates of the payments, taking into account the
financial means of the government.
He let it be understood that personal income taxes were going to be reviewed
so as not to penalize expatiated executives, whose expertise is useful to
the Congolese economy, by imposing rates which are too high.
The minister of the plan, Mr Pierre Moussa, then broadly outlined, at the
same meeting, the Congolese investment code and he described the thrust of
the interim annual plans which cover respectively the years 1980 and 1981,
before the 5-year plan 1982-1986 is worked out. Priority is to be given
the agricultural and forest sectors and the industries both upstream and
downstream which are linked with them. The beginning of forest production
in the northern section of the country will follow the pro~ect for the re-
~ construction of the railroad.
The minister, citing the privileged position of the Congo with respect to
transportation abroad--RCA [Central African Republic], Gabon, Cameroon,
" even Zaire--emohasized the size of the problem of road and river transporta- ~
tion. 19
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A major project for a paper mill, using eucalyptus and pine, is being
planned for Pointe-Noire, with a Finnish group. Production amounting to
240,000 t~ns per year is anticipated, at a satisfactory return because of
- the rapid growth of the trees. The investment would be on the order of
100 billion CFA francs and the finance minister emphasized that the private
foreign sector might participate in supplying capital for a mixed economy
� plant, conceived on a take it or leave it basis.
"During these frank discussions, the French private sector was struck by
the favorable climate that the Congolese authorities are trying to create,
as well as by their desire to confront problems realistically, without
hiding either their options or their difficulties," we read in a recent
informational note from the International Committee for Black Africa.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
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CONGO
BRIEFS
FIRST FRENCH-LINGALA DICTIONARY--The first "complete" Lingala-French
dictionary will be published shortly in Leipzig, according to an announce-
ment of the official East German information agency ADN. Lingala is one of _
the main languages used in the People's Republic of Cc~ngo. The dictionary
was ordered by the Brazzaville government. Its author is Mr Adolphe Bzonkanga,
who worked for several years at the University of Leipzig with Professor
Brauner, a specialist in~ African languages. The work contains 10,000 terms.
- [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79
p 3219] 8956
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GHANA
BRIEFS
1978 STATISTICS WITH JAPAN--Japanese sales to Ghana in 1978 totaled $40.91
million, a drop of 29.7 percent compared to 1977; purchases by Japan from
its partner totaled $105.43 million, a drop of 29.9 percent. Ghana's de-
ficit in the exchanges between the two countries thus remained at approxi-
mately the same level. The drop in Japanese sales was attributed mainly to
this African country's lack of foreign exchange, and the drop in Ghanaian
sales to the low price of cocoa. These are the percentages registered in the _
~ lower Japanese sales: food products (ma3nly canned mackerel), 8.4 percent; .
11ghr industrial products (mostly textiles), 40 percent; metal products
(sheet ~etal and sheet steel), 60 percent; machinery (mainly for transport
p~~rposes), 25.6 percent. The drop in Ghanaian sales bore mainly on the
following articles: food products (fava beans and cocoa butter), 40.5
percent; raw materials (manganese ore and wood),40.5 percent; industrial
products (diamonds and aluminum ingots), 65.4 percent. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3399]
BANK GATNS UP--The Conunercial Bank of Gt~ana ha~.registered net gains of 15.1
million cedis for the period 1978-1979 which ended on 30 June. This is an
increase of 25 percent over the preceding period, when gains were of 12.1
million cedis. Of the 15.1 million earnings, 1.5 million reverted as di-
- vidends to the government, the sole stockholder. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3399]
ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH GDR--In October in East Berlin, Ghana's
minister for economic planning, Dr Amon Nikoi, signed a series of con- -
tracts with German Democratic Republic officials, which will tend to
stimulate trade between the two countries. These contracts, whose amounts
have not been released, call for the supplying by the GDR of farm equip-
ment, machine tools, and scientific equipment, and for the construction of
roads in exchange for purchases of cocoa and other Ghanaian agricultural
products. %Tex~ _'Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French _
23 Nov 79 p 32741 7679 ~
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DCTAILS UN G1HUC CLUSINGS--Ic~ early Ucrober Che GIHUC (Gtiuna IndueCrfal
Holding Corporation) was forced to ahut down over half of its industriea
and [o lay ~ff their personnel for lack of sufficient supplies of raw
materials. It was even considering closing all the other enterprises if
tae situation continued to worsen. The first nine enterprises closed
(of a total of 16) were those involved with ship construction, metal
industries, vegetable oils, footwear, glass, bricks and tiles, marble
w~rk, distilling, and electronics. The GIIiOC agreed to pay 2 years of
- salaries to the oersonnel laid off--7 million cedis--but did not think it
would be able te do the same for personnel of the other enterprises if it '
should also be forced to close them. One of GIHOC's officials explained
" that its problems came from the fact that it had obtained from the govern- _
- ment import licenses amounting to only 96 million cedis, while it needed
more than twice that amount, at least 200 million cedis. /Text% /Paris
MARCHES TRO PICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3274/ 7679
_ ;
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GUINEA
SPECTRUM OF COOPERATION WITH FRANCE REVIEW'ED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS 9 Nov 79 pp 3001-3003
[Article by Jean Latremoliere: "The Economic Follow-up of French-Guinean
~ Reconciliation"]
[Excerpts] Nearly a year after President Giscard d'Estaing's trip to
Conakry, spectacularly confirming the reconciliation, how have relations
between France and Guinea developed?
' To ask this question is also to evoke the criticisms raised against the
principle of the trip and the meagerness of the results which it appears
to have produced. These criticisms testify first o~ all to the difficulties
encountered by the government in the pursuit of its African policy in a
system where attacks from the right are rarely balanced by approval from
the left. Shou13 we think that respect for human rights stands in the way
of this shift or deplore the break in a Gaulian tradition assigning to
Guinea the role of an explosive situation? In the pre-conflict situation
of the continent, such a point of view.appears out of date in any case,
strengthening of economies remaining the only way of ensuring, as a preven-
- tive, the stability and consequently the neutrality of states, whether it
is a question of those with which cooperative links have long been established
_ or of others. This is.shown by the U.S. interventions in Guinea as well as,
mutatis mutandis, by the support given until recently by the USSR to the
former Central African Empire. .
The presidential trip was directly in line with this policy, and the combi-
nation of circumstances made it especially timely. Certainly not that Mr
Ahmed Sekou Toure had indicated any intention of parting company with his
Eastern all.ies. There are at present in Guinea 300 Soviet military advisers
and about a.thousand Soviet experts in the various sectors of production,
- without prejudice to 500 Cuban technical assistants, balanced by an equivalent
number of Chinese collaborators. The bauxite deposit at Dobele, near Kindia,
continues to be mined by the Russians, under~conditions truly so disadvantageous
for Guinea that we may ask whether the operation contributes to strengthening
the government's confidence in the USSR. On the contrary, however, indications
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were not lacking, before and after Mr Gisc~rd d'Estaing's visit, marking ,
a certain desire for disengagement by Conakry, with regard to the socialist '
- countries, in order for it to diversify the range of its partners an3 to '
set its "nonalinement" on more solid foundations.
Indications of a Reconciliation With the West
Among the elements likely to come into play in the sense of a reconciliation
with the liberal world, there are some ~f a posit3ve nature. Others, on '
the contrary, are the result of an indisputable economic and financial
stagnation.
In recent reports, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund noted '
the favorable prospects opened by the forthcoming entry into production oF ~
the bauxite deposits at Tougue, Dabola, Pita and Aye-Koye, which should bring ~
to 14 million tons the exports of this mineral, as well as by the increase ~
in aluminum production at Fria, possibly reaching 2 million tons; by the
beginning of iron extraction in the Nimba Mountains; and above all, by the
new awareness of their responsibilities developed by political leaders and
staffs~
For its part, Guinea's adherence to the Lome Convention facilitates this
reconciliation, with commitments of over $75 million, not including the
special long-term, low-interest loan~, having the effect of developing
Guinea's contacts with European enterprises in the field of agricultural '
development, fishing, industry, technical education and highway infrastructure. '
But the large public debt of $990 million, to which must 3e added $150
million in short-term borrowin$s from private banks and a Russian loan of
$40 million for the purchase of military equipment, as well as the general
decline in the turnover and profits of the 177 semi-public companies and
enterprises--certain factories working at 5 or 10 percent of their capacity--
also explains the serious need of financial support felt by the Guinean
Government at this phase of its development. This context is at the bottom ~
' of the numerous economic missions sent durir.o thp ~a3Jt ? years to Canada,
the United States and Europe, of~the arrival in Guinea of missions from the
Ivory Coast, of the reestablishment of relations with the FRG, lastly, of
the easing of the state's trade monopoly, particularly in the import-export
field, until now reserved for a national company, which will henceforth be
opened to private initiative, sub~ect to payment of a deposit. It is not
unrelated to the political.liberations that have taken place since May 1978
and considered encouraging, although insufficient, by Amnesty International.
It came into play during certain internal political vicissitudes, ending, as
a result of a trip to the Ivory Coast, in Mr Ismael Tour's exclusive from,
and then reintegration in, the government. Lastly, it is found again in
the reasons for the official trip which the Guin~an chief of state is to
make to France in the spring of 1980.
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Official Cooperation
To make a fai'r ~udgment of the significance and r~mount of the credits which
the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made available to Guinea by way
of cooperation, we must first know that this administrative cooperation, in
the form of grants, was not new, having been inaugurated in fact as early
as 1977. From a relatively low amount, in line with the credits available
to the Quai d'Orsay under this heading, it has nevertheless increased in
value from 6 to 9 million French francs and will reach 12 million in 1980.
The modesty of its interventions can be explained by the need for getting
to know again, before undertaking large-scale operations, a territory which,
since 1958, has become largely strange to us, whether methods, institutions
or men are iii~iolved.
It is less to the direct impact of these actions than to the possibilities
they open, without mention of the liberalism which prevailed in Paris in
1977 and 1918, for guaranteeing export loans and financing operations not
normally dependent on medium-term credits, such as the extension of the
Independence Ha11, that the development noted in trade exchanges since 1978
is dua; during the fiscal year 1978, French sales to Guinea, with a va].ue
of 480 million French francs, represented 40 percent of Guinean imports,
~ French purchases, consisting mostly of bauxite, representing 16.5 percent
of Guinean exports.
Intervention of the Central Treasury and Guaranteed Private Credits
It would be unjust to attribute to the Guinean authorities, in this patient
work of developing bilateral cooperation, only motives of self-interest.
_ This awa�reness of a co~on language and culture certainly encourages them.
It is striking to note that the position of the French language, since the
departure of our instructors, has been maintained by the local teachers
alone, under conditions that are far from disastrous. A simplified French,
for common and technical use, has been disseminated among the school
population much better sometimes than in other African countries where our
cultural cooperation traditionally makes substantial credits available.
There again, our possible interventions should be considered at length, in
the sense of instruction at the highest Ievel, care being taken not to go
against teaching methods or to seek to reform manuals corresponding to a type
of education which it is not in our province to evaluate.
It is clear, however, that if President Sekou Toure and the Guineans as a -
whole have decided to take aim at the o1d reasons for discord, it is in the
hope of benefiting at one and the same t3me from French financial support and
rrench technology in order to promote vast projects, notably those which -
would provide them with the decisive element, energy, which is lacking in
order to pass through into a new stage of industrial development. At the
forefront of these projects, naturallyy 3s the Konkoure hydroelectric develop-
ment project whose French ancestry is willing recalled at Conakry.
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We cannot, naturally, reply to these requests by an immediate acceptance
concerning an investment evaluated at a billion dollars, whose financing
by France alone is out of the question and which ~ustifies, in any case,
a serious reactualization, the technical progress achieved since 1958
making it possible to expect a doubling of power (750 MW in place of 350),
but the cost per kilowatt, however, approaching the limits of prof itability.
Hence the need for having available, during this phzse of the study, a
banking tool with much greater versatility and flexibility than those
provided by administrative cooperation, possibly also serving as a driving ,
force in the further search of international capital.
Lessons of the First Years of Cooperation
It would thus be contrary to the truth to talk of a chilling of French-
Guinean economic relations, after the certainly sincere popular enthusiasm
aroused by the President of the French Republic`s trip to Conakry.
It would be unrealistic, on the other hand, to be silent about the sectoral ~
gaps in this cooperation, as well as about the technical reasons which
sometimes make it difficult and tend to slow its financial yield. ,
I
The most surprising of the gaps concerns agriculture. Everything seems to
happen in Guinea as if the government intended to protect it jealously
from any foreign intervention or involvement, while the technical assistants,
almost all of whom have come from Eastern countries, are unanimously in
agreement about the exceptional difficulties they find in working in a system
- where a traditional aector, still predominant, lives in a nearly closed
economy, secretly hostile, for monetary reasons, to any commercialization,
having almost no financial or technical support available, alongside a
modern sector made up of several hundred agropastoral farms, whose rigid
collectivist structures do not plead in favor of their profitability. The
results of this policy are measured by the volume of foodstuffs imported--
balanced, it is true, by the clandestine export of a good number of local ~
products--and by the continuance of free food aid from the United States,
the EEC and France, ~ustified in part by some transitory droughts, but not
to be considered, in a country with such rich potentialities as Guinea, as
a normal resource.
In this field, where French technology seems to be, a priori, one of the best
placed, particularly for rich tropical crops and cotton, the cooperation
which has just been instituted has not brought any improvement. ~Our research
institutes and our semi-public companies have, moreover, scarcely done any
research on this. The only interesting element in this field would be an
Ivorian initiative, in particular that of Mr Diawara, in the direction of
the establishment of large, Sodepalm-type companies devoted, with Japanese
aid, to rice or, with United States aid, to soybeans.
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Having noted this surprising gap on the part of a government that has
achieved, in'the mining sector, a task full of promise for the future,
thanks to a r�elatively liberal investment code and a strict wage policy,
we should note; on the other hand, that one of the difficulties foreseen
for our cooperation in Guinea results from local, still large-scale
financial requests relating to sometimes risky projects, whether in the
field of urban construction, iron and steel metallurgy or oil prospecting.
Without challenging the principle of this mass strategy, we would be ~
satisfied to see it coexist with a ground-level development generating a more
immediately discernible improvement in living conditions.
But the principal difficulties encountered by French cooperation in Guinea
are financial. We saw previously the broadness of view with which were
calculated, at the time of the resumption of economic relations, the guarantees
granted to private credit. At the time of Mr Giscard d'Estaing's trip, -
arrears or nonpayments were being maintained within reasonable limits. Since
then, they have undergone considerable slippage, all the more disturbing
since, as they relate to short- and medium-term guarantees, they involve
the first repayments for operations decided on since this resumption. -
To what is this situation due? Currency receipts are to a certain degree
� fixed in character, consisting 97 percent of sales of bauxite and aluminum
abroad, shares of profits due to the Guinean state by virtue of the capital
which it holds in the large mining companies, and the export taxes levied
on mineral products. Currency expenditures, on the other hand, have
increased enormously during the last few yea~s. Beyond the level of service
on the public debt (nearly $80 million), the increase in the oil bill, not
only as a result of the rise in crude but also because of the growth in
the number of cars on the road since the reopening of the frontiiers, also
plays an important part. This bill is probably about $50 million per year
today. Lastly, the weak purchasing power of the syli encourages smuggling,
worsening its rate of exchange and the reactions of foreign creditors.
- We should hope that President Sekou Toure's next visit to France will make
it possible, in the mutual interest of France and Guinea, to lessen the
gravity of this situation.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
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GUINEA
INCREASED EXPECTATIONS FOR COOPERATION WITH FRG
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3269 :
/Text/ Mr Louis Beavogui, the prime minister of Guinea, from 12 to 17 i
November made an official visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, accom-
panied by several ministers of hi.s government. This visit served to
stimulate relations between the two nations, after a period of diplomatic
coolness, lasting from 1971 to 1975. i
During his meeting with Mr Beavogui, the Chancellor of the Federal ;
Republic, Mr Helmut Schmidt, remarked that 30 million marka (about 70
million francs) have been allocated for financial and technical coopera- ~
tion between the two nations in 1979.
The head of the Guinean government met in Cologne with representatives of ~j
the BDI /Federation of Industrialists/ of the FRG, and spoke with them of
the possibilities of strengthening bilateral industrial cooperation. I;
!i
Conakry is now trying to obtain increased participation by West German i;
firms in developing Guinea's raw materials, such as iron ore and bauxite. ~
On the subject of bauxite, 32 percent of the FRG's bauxite needs are
supplied by imports from Gu:.nea. For this reason, bilateral trade is
highly deficitary on the side of the Federal Republic, whose imports fr an I!
Guinea in 1978 amounted to 70 million marks (about 164 million French
francs), while its exports came to only 18.1 million marks (about 42 i'
million French francs).
~
West German industrial sources pointed out that the present political '
climate in Guinea is favorable to a renewal of economic relations with !
the FRG . '
i
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IVORY COAST
DOMESTIC BOTTLE GAS SHORTAGE REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Nov 79 p 3019
~ [Text] A shortage of domestic bottle gas was noted in Abidjan between 1 and
19 October. Although the situation quickly returned to normal, or at least
became comparable to that which prevailed earlier, the daily paper -
FRATERNITE-MATIN made a survey on butane distribution, which showed that
a new shortage could still occur.
' In ivory Coast, only SIR [Ivorian Refining Company] processes crude oil.
- Butane represents only a minor portion of the population's need for petro-
leum products. Ivorian gas consumption amounts to 13,000 tons, a 20 percent
a year increase, while SIR processes some 2 million tons of crude annually.
The first problem stems from the fact that Ivory Coast supplies certain
neighboring countries with petroleum products. Demand from the Ivorian,
Malian and Voltan markets totals 2.2 million tons, while SIR's production
capability is only 1.8 million tons a year. Thus some work has just been _
started to expand the refinery for the purpose of doubling production.
around 1981. For the time being, however, Ivory Coast must look abroad for
the petroleum products which it cannot produce at home.
With a theoretical capability for butane production of 45 tons a day, SIR
should be in a position to supply the Ivorian market, whose consumption
amounts to more than 30 tons a day. In fact, by reason of its low stora~ge
capability (1200 tons), SIR can't always meet domestic demands and must
therefore periodi:cally call upon foreign production.
Thus PETROCI [Tvorian Petroleum Company] a national company created in 1976
and responsible for the domestic hydrocarbons market, found it necessary to
import 500 tons of butane from Nigeria ta satisfy the demand. The delivery
took more time than expected.
As a second factor, the gas bottle traff ic has also caused tensions in the
market. Indeed the price of the 3eposit of gas bottles set by the Ivorian
commerce minister was 2,000 CFAFy while deposit cost in countries bordering
the Ivory Coast was 3,000 to 3,500 CFAF, which resulted in a traffic of
empty bottles towards neigh'ooring countries, creating a shortage on the
domestic market.
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In view of the fact that the distributing companies (AGIP, Texaco, Shell
and Mobil) pay 8,000 CFAF for every empty bottle, each unreturned bottle
represents 6,000 CFAF in gains prevented for the distributor, or, today,
5,000 CFAF, since the Ivorian Government has decided to set the deposit
price at 3,000 F.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1979
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!
,
. ,
~
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KENYA
BRIEFS
NEW SUNDAY WEEKLY PLBLISHED--The STANDARD of Nairobi, controlled by the
Lonrho group, began publishing a Sunday edition called the SUNDAY STANDARD
on 11'November. The two other Sunday newspapers in Kenya are the SU'_JDA~~
NATION, the Sunday edition of the DAILY NATION, of which the majority of
the shares are controlled by the Aga Khan, and the Nairobi TIMES, headed
by Mr Hilary Ngweno, who also publishes the WEEKLY REVIEW. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French p 3221] 8956
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MALI
BRIEFS
COTTON HARVEST--The CrIDT (Malian Textile Development Society) has 3ust fore-
cast the results of the cotton harvest in Mali, which is now in its closing
stages. Total will be about 144,000 tons, a clear increase over the total
for preceding campaigns, which were: in 1976-1977, 119,000 tons; in 1977-
1978, 113,600 tons; in 1978-1979, 127,690 tons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITER,RANEENS in French 7 Dec 79 p 3394]
NATIONAL SEMINAR ON JUSTICE--President Moussa Traore, speaking on 13
November at Bamako, closed the first national seminar on justice, which
was devoted to cooperation with other public institutions of the nation.
On this occasion he said he was "favorable to a healthy and on-going
cooperation" with the magistrates in the "implementation of a healthy
system for the dispensing of justice." He assured the magistrates that
the ~overnment is ready to take action to improve their conditions.
General Traore did add, however: "Our justice system must~be improved,
for we would not want to be forced tc take certain steps which would be
both painful and humiliating for our system of justice." %Text/,~Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 pp 3268-3269/
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NIGER
BCEAO BULLETIN'S REPORT OF ECONOMIC SITUATION GIVEN
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITEWtEWEENS in French 23 Nov 79 pp 3272-3273
[Text] A recent bulletin of economic and monetary statistics of the Central
Bank of the West African States (BCEAO) was devoted to Niger.
Among the principal marketed agricultural productions of the 1978-1979 sea-
son, shelled peanuts were xecorded at 8,513 tons (6,072 tons below the pre-
ceding season), representing a value of 6,000,000 CFA francs. The cotton-grain
. harvest was 4,371 tons (3,000,000 CFA francs). At the end of July 1979 de-
liveries of peanuts to local oil works totaled 7,372 tons, a net decline from
July 1978 (14, 331 tons) .
Uranium ore production for 1978 was 2,109 tons, for an export value of
52,400,000,000 CFA francs (1,441 tons and 28,400,000,000 CFA francs in sales
in 1977). Cassiterite production remains marginal (90 tons, for 144,000,000
CFA francs).
For the first five months of 1979, traffic out of Benin by the Benin-Niger
Joint Org3.nization went up to 61,458 tons, 41,153 of which was in hydrocarbons.
_ At the end of May 1979, the index of inerchandise turnover of the principal com-
mercial enterprises was established at 319.1, compared with 309.7 one year
previously (base, 100, specified for the year 1970).
At the end of July 1979 the general index of prices for African consumption
showed 273.9, compared with 260.1 on 30 June 1978 (base, 1U0, for the year
1970) .
On 1 May 1979 the minimal guaranteed interprofessional wage rate increased
from 75.67 to 99.11 CFA francs.
The general budget for the~fiscal year 1 October 1978-30 September 1979, made
up in revenue and expenditures at 81,200,000,000 CFA francs 24,800,000,000
over the preceding) and established without foreign contributions, devotes
21,900,000,000 to equipment expenditures 8,900,000,000).
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At the end of December 1978 the debt incurred outside of Niger represented an
exchange value of 29,800,000,000 CFA francs 2,000,000,000 over the end of _
1977) and the available margin not yet utilized from aid obtained was calcu-
lated at an offset of 4(i.:?~O,ii00,000 CFA francs 6,100,000,000 over the
end of 1977).
_ As of :1 '-iay 1979 banknotes and currency in circulation totaled 23,600,000,000
CFA francs (compared with 18,700,000,000 one year previously). Also as of the
end of May 1979, demand and fixed-term deposits in commercial banks rose to
34,400,000,000 CFA francs (26,500,000,000 at the end of June 1978).
In comparison, registered utilizations from credits open to the economy were
47,600,000,000 CFA francs (figures at the end of April 1979), an increased vol- _
ume by 9,500,000,000 in one year. In this recourse to credit, publicly-owned
and semi-publicly-owned firms intervened for 12,100,000,000 CFA francs, the
_ private sector showing 35,500,000,000.
As of 31 May 1979 the local net position of the Nigerian Treasury showed a
positive balance of 11,800,000,000 FRA francs, compared with a surplus of
10,400,000,000 one year previously.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et f;ie., Paris, 1979
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NIGER
BRIEFS
NO NEW CANADIAN PROJECTS--The Canadian ambassador to Niger, Gilles Lalande,
stated on 6 November in Niamey that the Canadian government will not be able -
to start any new development projects in Niger for at least two years. The
Canadian ambassador, who was received on 6 November by President Seyni
Kountche, said he had informed th~ Nigerian chief of state of his country's ~
difficult economic sutuation, which is causing the new conservative government
- to review the development aid programs. This situation, the ambassador em-
phasized, will necessarily have repercussions on aid to developing countries.
"All projects in progress will be continued," Mr Lalande said, "but unless a
miracle occurs Canada will refrain from starting any new projects."
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3272]
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RHODESIA -
DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS PRESAGE DIFFICULT ELECTIONS
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Nov 79 pp 20-21
[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima]
[Text] Everything went very fast on the morning of 14 November in London, at
the majestic and austere Lancaster House. When Robert Mugabe spoke in the
name of the Patriotic Front, the few participants at the conference--not open
- to the public--understood that something was about to happen. ZAPU's leader
e went right to the point. He asked Lord Carrington to modify the 13th point
in the settlement plan proposed by the British Government. Initially it
called for control of Rhodesia's army by the British governor during an interim
period. No allusion was made to the troops of the Pa~~:riotic Front, when they
were supposed to enforce the cease-fire.
Ttie question was to know if liberation fighters were going to wait for elections
titationed in their camps in neighboring countries or if they could come back
to Zimbabwe at the announcement of the cease-fire. Lord Carrington did not
- avoid the question. He reassured Robert Mugabe saying that the army of the
Patriotic Front would be treated in the same manner as the pre~ent Rhodesian
army. This concession was important for the front which backed off from its
demand to have the interim period extend over 6 months. Consequently, the
British government's proposal was retained (2 months of transitory period),
over the compromise of Kenneth Kaunda, who preferred a 4 months' period.
However, it was the trip to London by Zambia's president which got the con-
ference out of an impasse. In 10 weeks the position of the British Govern-
ment, concerned with tactfully handling Abel Muzorewa's regime to avoid an
irreparable breakup, was confronted with the intransigence of the Patriotic
Front, whose two factions do not always speak the same language. Kenneth
Kaunda's presentation of the "last chance plan" jeopardized the ZANU-ZAPU
_ coalition, bringing it to the point of breakup. This late alliance between ~
Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe seems more and more like a"combination of
circumstance." The Patriotic Front was forme September 1976, at the
time of the Geneva conference organized under cr auspices of the British and
the Americans. The aim was to oppose interior political men--notably Abel
Muzorewa, former partner of Nkomo, who had chose--the solution of entente
with Ian Smith.
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The failure of the Geneva conference only worked to give more credibility
to the Patriotic Front. It was recognized by the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) as sole representative of the Zimbabwe people. But the personal-
it1~~~; und t(es of its two leaders arc~ so different that unity seems to reSt
on l�liread. Robert Mugabe is presented A9 u Mlrxist militant, a:~ :~hown
througt~ his ties with Samora Machel and Agostinho N~to. Next to him Joshua
Nkomo could easily pass for a moderate. It is a fact that Nkomo is rather
difficult to define. He is highly regarded in Moscow and is welcomed in sev-
eral Western countries. It is not by chance that those who wished to see
_ the end of the Patriotic Front came to him. Tiny Lowlands, for example,
the boss of the almighty national company, Lonrho, used Kenneth Kaunda in
1977 to atter~pt a rapprochement between Nkomo and the nationalist leaders
of the interior.
This is probably the reason why proposals by Zambia's president have always
, been received with suspicion by Robert Mugabe. In London, Kenneth Kaunda
was confronted with the radical intransigence of the Patriotic Front's i
coleader. He first opposed the idea of a cease-fire be~ore the elections.
On the other hand, he demanded that forces from the Patriotic Front serve
as the embryo of the country's future army. Last but not least, the 6
months' transition period demanded by the Front was necessary for strategic
reasons. j
The return to Zimbabwe of elements from the liberation army will be followed
by the return of numerous exiles who would increase the ranks of supporters
of the interior. However, several months ef electoral campaign would be
necessary for men who had been cut out of the country for many years. That
is why it was difficult to bargain on the length of the transition period.
Thus, the acceptance of the British proposal shows to what point pressures
were inflicted on leaders of the Patriotic Front. 1~ is evident that the
fear of a breakup worries all parties concerned. Kenneth Kaunda used this
argument with an extreme ability. In case of a breakup chances for peace
would be considerably reduced. The front line countries would have to
choose between two factions. The weight of the war is felt more and more
and consequently, pushes "protectors" to advise their "proteges" to compromise.
But at this point a Muzorewa-Nkomo alliance would push Mugabe back in his last
hideout and Mozambique hosting his troops would then engage the war more
_ deeply with all foreseeable consequences. It would be a repeat of the Angolan
crisis, with the only difference that external opposition would benefit from
the total support of Eastern countries USSR ahead, more than ever determined
to implant themselves in the region.
- Is '::he laborious compromise of Lundon an insurance for the future of the
Patriotic Front? For the moment, the main unknown factor is the result from
the various electoral consultations to be organized at the end of the London
conference. Abel Muzorewa intends to maintain the advantage gained on the
field. Will it be possible? One of the dangers menacing the Patriotic Front
is the radicalization of his position to the point of provoking a schism in
itself. ~or Muzorewa it would be an unqualifial~le present, comparable to the
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- one given by the Union of Cameroon People (UCP) to President Ahid~~ in 1958.
The dissolution of the Cameroonese nationalist movement allowed Ahmadou
Ahidjo to recover a number of UPC leaders, whose opposition to his regime lasted
but a few years. Their adherance to the president's party ended with the
extinction of the external opposition, to which, little by little funds were
cut off by supporting countriQs. The situation has not reached this point yet,
even if the militant commitment of the beginning has been replaced by dis-
appointment, caused by the war. It is not beyond the realm of possibility
that political groups forming the Ratriotic Front will campaign together and
win the elections. ZANU and ZAPU would then have a majority in the assembly.
It would be another crucial outcome. Everything will depend on the party that
holds the majority. If friends of Robert Mugabe win, a tendency to the left
will be observed just as in Mozambique. Up to this point nothing is decided
and all hypotheses are possible. If no faction can obtain~ absolute majority,
it is probable that bargains will occur between leaders of minority formations
composed of dissidents from various origir~s and leaders of important formations.
This is the case with the democratic party of James Chikerewa who is an ex-
friend of Abel Muzorewa; and with reverend Ndabaningi Sithole's ZANU faction.
These two men would be tempted by a coalition with Joshua Nkomo. But in the
best of cases it is not certain that his coalition will collect more than
33 percent of the votes. The ZAPU leader will have to choose between Muzorewa
and Mugabe in any case.
- In the race for power in Salisbury, Nkomo is uncontestably the pivotal figure,
toward whom all attention is turned. Zambia, where Nkomo's men are, is pushing
hardest of the frontline countries toward the conclusion of an agreement
- which could put a stop to a war that is very costly. Robert Mugabe who has
not said his last word, relies on Tiozambique and Tanzania. The favors of
Angola go equally to ZANU, but the country is not really located in the com-
bat zone, since it does not have common borders with Zimbabwe. On the other
hand, the distant but influential Nigeria would rather support Joshua Nkomo,
who gathers the maximum number of crucial trump cards, for the time being.
Hovering very adeptly between East and West, courted by Americans, British
and Soviets, will he know how to exploit the situation judiciously?
It is probable that at the time of the next deal of cards, the legacy of
Angola will haunt leaders of Zimbabwe. Will leaders of African countries,
today supporting one of the Patriotic Front's factions, accept the defeat
of their "proteges," especially if it ends with total elimination of their
power? For nationalists who fought for 15 years against the illegal regime
of Ian Smith, the hour of truth has definitely come.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
8924
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- RHODESIA
ZANU PRESIDENT MUGABE GRANTS INTERVIEW TO 'THE GUARDIAN'
LD211207 London THE GUARDIAN in English 21 Dec 79 p 6 LD
[Interview with ZANU President Robert Mugabe by Patrick Keatley in London 1
on 2~ December 1979] ~
Text' Steel is the word for the ZANU I
~ , y president, Mr Robert Mugabe, joint ~
leadcr of the Patriotic Front delegation to the Lancaster House conference.
He is a man of steel, but a man without bitterness. Ask him about those 10
barren, wasted years in detention in Mr Smith's ~ails and he disagrees with '
both ad~ectives.
"We learned discipline," he said in an interview with THE GUARDIAN yester- ~
day. "We divided up the day into a time-table, for our studies. It was ~
a chance for many of our young men to complete an education that had been
halted by the aystem."
A reserved, modest man, Mr Mugabe prefers not to talk about his own self- ~
imposed agenda. He already had his B.A. from Fort Hare University in South
Africa, and two other degrees. In prison he registered as an external student
of London University and proceeded to take a law degree, then a master's, '
and was mapping out a PhD in 1974 when political levers at last wrenched i
open the gates and put him on the plane to the north and freedom.
Would he categorise the London conference on Rhodesia as a success? "Sixty
percent succesa" is the laconic ~udgment. He feels that the basis for ne- '
gotiation was tilted from the start in favour of the Sal,isbury delegation, ~
nominally led by Bishop Muzorewa, but under the thumb of the outwardly ~
silent military leader, General Walls. ~
"I still regard it as a piece of collusion," he says. "We are not content ~
to leave it as it is. We expect the governor to face up to realities in
the immediate weeks ahead."
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The collusion, in Mr Mugabe's view, began with the drawing up of i:he maps.
The front leaders, and their military commanders, were astonished to be told
that 15 places on t~e periphery of the country had been designated as
~ "assembly points" where the guerrillas would be concentrated after they
emerged from the bush. Why 15? No one could say.
The working talks, with maps and charts, which they expected to have with
serving officers from the Ministry of Defense were expressly forbidden
d~sring the first 12 weeks of the conference. As for the Salisbury delega-
tion, General Walls made no move to mee the froflt commanders.
Mr Mu~3be points out that the maps with 15 assembly camps marked for the
front were already prepared before the British military team had returned .
from their confidential reconnaissance trip to Rhodesia.
"So there was collusion," he says. "This was f~eneral Walls.-'. plan, presented
to the British, who accepted it. When we demanded a 16th place, in the
heartland, they had to send an official to clear it with General Walls last
weekend in Salisbury. So what we worry about now is further collusion that
may exist with South Afirca.
"We are dealing with people who commited Udi once," he said, "they could be
tempted again, especially on the most delicate day of all, at the end of the
election campaign. For we shall win--make no mistake about that--the front
will sweep the board. And then wi11 be the moment of temptation, w3th South
Africa able, and perhaps willing, to provide the backup. We must know where ~
the British governor will stand, on that vital day."
COPYRIGHT: The Guardian, 1979 ~
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~ SENEGAL
AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS NOTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3202
[Text] Mr Cheikh Cissoko, the Senegalese secretary of state for Water and
Forest Resources, recently announced that the lack of rain this year, which -
was very noticeable in the Sudan-Sahel region, has seriously changed the
composition of the pastureland wh?re leguminous plants have replaced the
gramineous ones, on which cattle normally feed. The new situation, Mr
Cissoko stated to representatives of the countries and organizations which
furnish aid, is going to provoke a major transhumance and an outbreak of
brush fires. Therefore he was asking for emergency aid to protect the
900,000 head of cattle.
This year there will be no millet harvest in the norhtern~~part of Senegal,
which is the poorest region in the country, the Senegalese secretary of
state continued. He concluded by saying that the problem of storing agri-
cultural products is a priority in Senegal, where infrastructures with a
capacity of 100,000 tons, at a cost of 3 billion CFA francs, are to be
completed in the intermediate future.
In addition, 3 million trees have been planted in Senegal during a re-
. forestation campaign, which was unprecedented in its scope, and which had
the participation of the population. The campaign, which lasted more than
6 months, was begun last April by President Senghor in Lagbar, in the north-
_ central part of the country, in the Sahel zone. The campaign was closed by
Mr Abdou Diouf, the prime minister, who stated that financing of more than
7 billion CFA francs was planned to carry out major reforestation projects
with the help of Canada, France, the United States and the UNDP [United
Nations Development Project].
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
J 8958
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sLNLCAL
BRIEFS
PEANUT PRODUCTION DECLINE--Thc ~.cline in Senegal of production of peanuts,
the country's main export prodiicc, will be lower this year by 350,000 to
400,000 tons, Djibril Sene, Sc .egalese Rural Development Minister, indicated
on 15 November. The decline, affecting not only peanuts but also other agri-
cultural products, is basically due to the drought that hit Senegal, and the
government's decision to grant credits in seeds only to those peasants who
have paid their debts. Thus, according to the minister, peanut production will
be approximately 650,000 tons, millet and sorghum 500,000 tons (against
800,000 tons last year), cotton 27,000 tons (against 35,000 tons) and rice
125,000 (against 140,000 tons). On the other hand Mr Sene announced that the
Senegalese cooperative movement is soon to be reorganized, to reduce the number ;
of cooperatives and improve their organization and management. Likewise, I
ONCAD (National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development), which
is responsible for marketing the peanuts and training the peasants, is to be ~
restructured. [Text]~ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French '
23 Nov 79 p 3267] 8946
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL COUNCIL SESSION--The second session of the Senegal Economic '
and Social Council was opened on 16 November by its chairman, Magatte Lo, in
the presence of Daouda Sow, minister of Information and Telecommunications,
who is responsible for relations with the Assemblies. Two texts were submit-
ted to the 51 Council members and nine associate members. The first concerns
a draft law on direct taxes reform (fiscal reform updating the first book of
- the General Code on taxes). The second text deals with the bill exempting from ;
- the value-added tax imports and local purchases of raw materials for manufac- ~
ture of books and newspapers in Senegal; the bill also is intended to abolish ,
_ the tax on film showings and to modify certain provisions of the General Tax
= Code. On the other hand, the Economic and Social Council will have two studies
to examine, which should be completed during the session, which is to end on
15 December or after. They concern an investigation of maritime transportation
problems, and another on protection of soil and forests. The latter study is
intended to strengthen the prevention of deforestation and desertification.
Finally, the planned hearings concern seven diverse questions, notably: a con-
sultatiti~e committee on industrial and energy research; an interministerial coun-
cil on the "export program;" the life of the Senegal Railroad Company; and
the operation of the Social Security Fund. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET I~DITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 3267] 8946
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INDICTMENT OF RND LEADER--A month after his indictment (16 October) by the
Dakar court, Shaykh Anta Diop is still waiting for Senegalese authorities
to set the date of his trial. Shaykh Anta Diop, 56, researcher at the
Basic Institute of Black Africa, director of the radiocarbon laboratory and
a world renown Egyptologist, is being prosecuted as secretary general of
the Democratic National Rally (RND), a party founded in 1976 but not recog-
nized in Senegal. In addition to being indicted, Shaykh Anta Diop has been
forbidden to leave the Senegalese territory, which halts his international
activities. Diop is vice president of the UNESCO international scientific
committee for the drafting of the general history of Africa, president of
the Association of Researchers from the Black World and a member of the
bureau of the International Union of Prehistoric and Protohistoric Sciences
and of the academic council of the UN African Technical Institute for Ad-
vanced Training. In 1966, along with Dr Dubois from the United States, he
shared the Festival of Black Arts (Dakar) priae as the author having had
the most influence on black thought in the 20th century. However, despite
all these titles, Shaykh Anta Diop has not been forgiven for trying to
revive a banned political party. [Text) [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French
28 Nov 79 p 29] 11,464
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SOUTH AFRICA
'AFRIQUE-ASIE' INVESTIGATES ANTIWAR MOVEMENT
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 12-25 Nov 7g.pp 46-48
~ [Article by Jane Bergerol: "Deserters by the Thousands"]
[Text] Young whites are starting to realize that the rea-
lity of war has nothing to do with the propaganda. .
, At the end of October, more than 300 South African soldiers were AWOL from
their barracks. They were protesting, in an arganiz~ed group, against the
delay with which they were granted leave (specifically) and with which they
were paid their remaining salary after they had spent 5 months fighting in
the combat zone in northern Namibia. This mutiny was the first to make
headlines in the South African press and at the very moment that the military
authorities have to face up to a growing opposition of civilians to the pro-
longation of compulsory military service, and at the same time that in the
white universities a war resistance movement is developing comparable to
that which American students launched against the Vietnam War.
For having participated in this movement, some white students were azrested, -
and several student publications were banned. The national union of white
South African students published a pamghlet on "South African Law and the
Conscientious Objector" which publicly reopenEd the debate, at the risk of
incurring penalties of up to 6 years in prison for inciting refusal of military
duty or even, simply, for having posed the question if whether it was always
- necessary to agree to performing said duty.
In London, in September, I met some young white South Africans who had fled
their country to avoid being arrested and imprisoned. Some of them had
deserted, others had left to avoid conscription.
In the British capital they have formed the Cape Committee For South African
War Resistance. This committee has relations with a similar group formed
in Holland and with the Front For Aid to South African Military Refugees,
formed in the United States, where about 100 resisters arr3ved--most of them
secretly--and who all risk, if they are caught, being extradited to South
~ Africa. ,
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Black = Red
These resisters are, of course, only a small minority. A spokesman for the
Aid Funds was able to state recently that "90 percent at least of white
South Africans would be only too proud and too happy to be able to kill blacks
to defend the motherland." Another told me in London, "As for the vast ma-
jority, the whites have no reaction to the sitation. They say, 'Yes, that's
- military service, you don't like it, but you do it.' Nevertheless, right now
this great listless mass is beginning to stir, and sometimes it refuses."
According to South African official statistics, the number of resisters is
now from 3,000 to 5,000 a year. In fact, there are certainly many more because
only the students are easily counted. '
At the present time the resisters in London told me, "Al1 white males must
first do 2 years of military service. Then for 8 years, they have to do a !
month every year. But today with the South African army always active, they ;
do serve, in fact, periods of 3 months every year, and some even stay for
6 months out of 12 under the colors."
i
And the nonwhites? For some time there has been talk of requiring the '
Indians and the coloreds do military service, which will doubtless be compul-
sory in 19$0 or in 1981. In the meantime, according to official statistics, '
the number of "volunteers" has increased in nonwhite units. Many are unem-
ployed, forced to enlist if they want to eat. One could say it is a matter of
"economic enlistment." As long as compulsory service will not be imposed on
the blacks and the coloreds, the resisters are, evidently, all whites. One
of them told me that, to guard against this opposition to enlistment, the
government was giving a real military training in so-called "vacation" camps
to the children and was carrying out on them genuine brainwashing: they submit
them to an incredible "antiblack and anticommunist" propaganda campaign,
which produces in some an authentic paranoia.
Comic books also play a role in this "training." There is one, MARC THE
CONQUEROR, in which the hero is a white athlete whose task is to eliminate
"terrorists." On one page, two small white children are playing in a garden
and a black African in work clothes is intruding in the background. Then
Marc the Conqueror arrives and kills the black, who, surely, was a"terrorist." ,
This simplistic idea, black laborer equals terrorist, is ceaselessly incul-
cated in the children throughout all of their schooling.
Once in the army, the young whites are subjected to an even more brutal brain-
washing. A deserter told me, "Everyday they grind into us that these blacks
are reds ready to violate our mothers. They also te11 us that the guerrillas '
do not know how to fight, and that the terrorists are only a.pack of bandits
without any discipline. But, when one is in combat, one sees that the
guerrillas are much more effective than we had been told, and they often win."
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"It is all this that the young white South African ~s starting to understand
today: namely that the propaganda does not correspond to anything that he
has to brave when he finds himself confronting the realities of war."
"They have tricked us," the resisters are saying in substance. "In 1976,
they made us serve periods of 3 months, because of the war with Angola. They
told us that after our troops withdrew from Angola, it would be finished.
Now, under the pretext that the army is always active, it all continues and
the periods of service are sometimes even 6 months. This angers many, not
, for political reasons but for personal reasons. Others are of the opinion
that if the duration of military service is prolonged, it is because the liber-
ation movements are becoming stronger. Then they no longer support the govern-
ment and they are less and less hostile to these movements because they are
disappointed: defend the present system?, they say; why are we fighting?
That's the big question right there that many are coming to ask themselves."
Shaved Head
It is in that way that the opposition against the Vietnam War started in
America. Even in the army itself troops are complaining about the food; one
unit completely shaved their heads because they were required to have their
hair cut short every 2 weeks; another unit refused training. Against these
forms of opposition, repression is getting more and more brutal; seven soldiers
were killed in their barracks last year. When the whites revolt, they are
treated as harshly as the enemy.
- Thousands of whites are resisting conscription. "The military police are
very active, but, it seems, less and less effective because more and more
people are hiding out in the countryside to avoid being drafted. They con-
stantly change their address, they take undeclared jobs, because they know
that the Ministry of the Army looks through the tax records to find them."
Once again, those who refuse military service for political reasons are a
minority within a minority. "Nevertheless," the representatives of the xesis-
ters' cummittee tell us, "the population is disagreeing more and more with
the government. It is still not very political. But experience proves it:
~ when people refuse to fight and are excessively abused by the artny, things
end finish up by becoming political and people come to ask them~elves in the
name of what they are required to make war."
For the Resistance Committee, this opposition movement is essential. "Essen-
tial because this forces the white South Africans to become aware of a
reality that the vast majority prefers to ignore."
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
47
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- TANZANIA
i
BRIEFS
PORT MODERNIZATION PROGRAM--The Tanzania Harbor Authority (THA) management has
just made public an ambitious program for modernizing the Tanzanian ports,
to be extended over four years for a cost of 1,300,000,000 shillings. The
program involves the ports of Dar es Salaa.m, Kilwa, Lindi and Mafia. It in-
cludes realization at Dar es Salaam of a wharf for hydrocarbons, a repair
shipyard, merchandise warehouses and enlarging the port's main access channel.
New piers would also be constructed at Lindi, Kilwa and Mafia. The World
~ Bank, the Great Britain and the Norwegian banks would aid in realizing this
THA program. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MfEDITERRANEENS in French
23 Nov 79] 8946
ZANZIBAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN PROBLEMS--Since the triennial Zanzibar development
plan was put into operation 18 months ago, only 31 percent of the desired ob-
jectives have been attained, basically because of the shortage of financial re-
sources, the secretary general of the permanent commission for the Zanzibar
plan, Professor Khamisi stated in mid-November. At a one-week meeting in
Zanzibar, he stated that approximately 1,000,000,000 shillings were necessary.
The Zanzibar government was to turn over 545,000,000, while foreign sources of
financing were to furnish 593,000,000 shillings, in the form of loans and sub-
sidies. But, Mr Khamisi emphasized, when the plan went into effect the govern-
- ment not only did not increase its share of the financing, but in addition the
loans and subsidies were not easily granted by the other sources of financing.
Mr Khamisi, on the other hand, thanked the Tanzanian government ~or having
granted the Zanzibar government a loan, under advantageous conditions, for
150,000,000 shillings, to complete certain projects. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Nov 79 p 32811 8946
GUIDE TO PRIVATE SECTOR--On 6 November President Nyerere announced that the
Tanzanian government was studying the creati~n of an official body which
would "guide" the private sector, particularly industry, in Tanzania. The
head of state declared specifically: "We are seriously thinking of creating
such an organization. I think we realize the need for it. It will not
only guide the private sector, it will also tell us where, when and how the
government's participation w~ll be used in a private enterprise." This
organization will define the economic sectors in which the private sector
will be authorized to function, as weil as the role it will be called upon
to play within the framework of the Tanzanian development strategy: [TextJ
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Nov 79 p 3222] 8956
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UGANDA
~
BRIEFS
PARAGUAY MAY TAKE AMIN--Idi Amin for oil: That is the deal being nego-
tiated between Libya and Paraguay. General Stroessner, who has been the
dictator of this South American republic for 25 years, offers hospitality
without much concern for anything. He is ready to receive the ex-presi-
dent of Uganda--who will have the company of the deposed dictator of
Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza; many former Nazis; OAS activists; and
assorted swindlers--if al-Qadhdhafi assures his supplies of black gold.
[Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 31 Oct 79 p 37] 8143
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