JPRS ID: 74877 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200040013-1
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1 , .

7 JRNUARY i988 N0. 2864 i OF 2
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JPRS 7~4877
7 ~ January 1980
~ / tl~ Af rica Re ort
~ear East Nor p ,
N~o. 2~064
Fg~~ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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~
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so~~~-io,
REPORT DOCUfll1ENTATIQN I 1� REPORT NO. 2, 3. ReciDient's Accassion No.
PAGE JPRS 74877
T~tle end Subt~tle
S. Report Data
NEAit EAST/hORTH AFRICA REYORT, No. 2064 7 Januar 198C
6.
7. Author(s) 8. Pariorm~nQ Organitation Rept. No.
~
9. PcAorming Orqanlzafion Name end Addross 10. Project/1'ask/Work Unit No.
Joint Yublications Research Service ~
1000 North Glebe Road ii. co~~..�cc~ o, Grant(C) No.
Arlington, yirginia 22201
(G)
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Addrass 13. Type of Report R Period Covcred
As above
14. .J
' IS. Supplementary Notes
16. Abs+ract (Limir: 700 words)
This sF:rial report contains information on socioeconomic, government, political,
and t~chnical developments in the countries of the Near East and North Afric~i.
17. Documrnt Analyzis a. Uescripmrs ~ ~ -
Pol.it~ical Science X Inter-Arab Affairs X Libya X Sultanat~
Soci.ology _ North Afr.ican X Mauritania of Oman
Econ~oiics Affair.s Morocco X Syria
Culture (Social Afglianistan People's Demo- Tunisia
Sciences) X A.lgeria cratic Republic United Arab
Etl~iiolo~;y _ I3ahr.ain of Yemen Emirates
Gengr.aphy F.gyPt Persian Gulf iJestern Sahara
7'echolo~;ical X Iran Area Yemen Arab
Mi].it:ary Sciences X Iraq Qatar Republic (
X Israel _ Saudi Arabia
X Jor.dan Spanish North
Kuwait Africa
X Lebanon Sudan
b. ~Jentiti~is/Open�Ended Terms
c. COS/1TI ficict/Group 5U, SC�, SK, 1.5
IB. ~Avni~abilrt 6tatement ~ ~ ~ ~
Y ` 19 Security Class (7his Report) ~ 21. tJO. ot Peges
lJnl.i.ro~Cer] ~lvailabilit}~ iJNCL1+SSTi'I)'I) i 118
So].d h}~ id'1'1S - . _ _ -r- . _ I
20. :ec~rity Clns~ (Thi; p~P,e) I:'L. Pnte
Springl~ield, Virginia 2216.1 ~ UI~Ci,~SS7.l~I1:1)
(See AHSI-239.10) See In:lr~r.tions a.~ !:everse ~ ~OPTWNAL fCr�M ; /1 (4�J7,
~Ybnr,r~lY ~:11;'-]Sl .
pepa~l�nerd oi Con~~�~c~~.r
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JPRS 74877
7 January 1980
NEAR EASTINORTH AFRICA REPORT
No. 2064
CONTENTS PAGE
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
~ PNC Chairman Hopes for Dialog With United States
(Khalid al-Fahum Interview; AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT AL-USBU'IYAH,
16 Dec 79) 1
Briefs
Joint Ventures With Arabs 4
ALGERIA
Oil Official Ait Laoussine Discusses Oil Pricing Problem
(AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 4 Nov 79) 5
IRAN
Moslem People's Republic Party Arouses Hostility
(Various sources, 11 Dec 79) 11
Statement by Qom Seminary
Khalkhali Favors Banning, by Sadeq Khalkhali
Reaction of Various Groups
Background Impressions of New Leaders Discussed
(Bobo Scheutz; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 29 Nov 79)............ 17
Means To Counter U.S. Sanctions Aired
(KEYHAN, 11 Dec 79) 22
.
Strategy of Possible U.S.-Iran Clash Discussed
(Jesus Pavlo Tenorio; NEVES DE EXCELSIOR, 6 Dec 79).... 24
Plan To End Unemployment Announced
(KEHYAI7, 18 Dec 79) 28
- a - [III - NE & A - 121]
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
IRAQ ~
Iraqi Position on Iranian Situation Analyzed
(AL-HAWADITH, 23 Nov 79) 30
New Oil Projects Inaugurated in Basrah, Wasit
(Yahya Kamim al-Najjar; AL-THAWRAH, 18 Oct 79).......... 34
Briefs -
Industrial Investments 39
IDCAS to Baghdad 39
Petrocr.emical Complex Completion 39
Naval Improvements Sought 40
ISRAEL -
Poll Indicates Begin's Popularity at Unprecedented Low
(HA'ARETZ, 24 Dec 79) 41
Arab Regime~ Should Learn From Iran How To Fight America
(~ditorial; AL-SHA'B, 6 Nov 79) 42
Arabs Must Take Care That Oil Weapon Is Not Turned Against ~
Them
(Editorial; AL-QUDS, 14 Nov 79) 44
Arabs Must Take Hard Stand Against Reaction
(Editorial; AL-SHA'B, 15 Nov 79) 46
Defense Agency Plan for Settlements Viewed
(Zeev Shiff; HA'ARETZ, 19 Oct 79) 47
Major Development Activity Underway in Galilee
(Judah Ariel; HA'ARETZ, 19 Oct 79) 51
West Bank Students Seen Shortchanged in University Admission
Exams
(Editcrial; AL-HISAD, Oct 79) 55
_ Solution to Teachers' Salary Problems Proposed
(Yitzhak Shneerson; HAZOFEH, 22 Oct 79) 57
JORDAN
_ Recent Bedouin Demonstrations Discussed
(AL-HURRIY~H, 12 Nov 79) 60
-b-
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
LEBANON
Raymond Iddih Gives Views of Lebanese Situation
(AL-DUSTUR, 12-18 Nov 79) 65
- Phalangist Party Reportedly Training Moslem Brothers
tAL-HURRIYAH, 12 Nov 79) 67
Fathi Yakan, Shaykh Majdhub Released by Syria, Interviewed
(AL-ANWAR, 13, 21 Nov 79) 68
Interview With Fathi Yakan `
Interview Trlith Shaykh Majdhub
Kurdish Party Official Released by Syrians
(AL-NAHAR, 25 Nov 79) 73
Members of Smuggling, Counterfeiting Ring Apprehended
(AL-NAHAR, 28, 29 Nov 79) 74
Results of Investigation
Further Details _
Ihdin Massacre Suspect Sprung From Juniyah Prison
(AL-NAHAR, 26, 28 Nov 79)., 76
Armed Attack on Prison
`A1-Maradah' Statement
Briefs
Phalangist Airport 78
LIBYA
Analysis of the Libyan Revolution, Qadhdhafi's 'Green Book~' _
(Charles Zorbigbe; LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Nov 79)....... 79
MAURITANIA
Country Said To Be Threatened With Famine
(Moulaye Hachem; CHAAB, 6 Nov 79) 83
Minister Assigns Priority to Water, Roads, Housing
(CHAAB, 28-29 Nov 79) 87
Briefs
French Loan Agreements Signed 88
French Cooperation Agreement 8$
National Educational System $9
-c-
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CONTENTS (Continued) Page
SULTANATE OF OMAN
Commercial and Economic Actions in 1979 Reviewed
('UMAN, 18 Nov 79) 90
Oil and Piineral Development and Prospecting Reported
('UMAN, 18 Nov 79) 92
- Improvements Made in Water and Electricity Services
('UMAN, 18 Nov 79) 95
Brief s
Police Force 9g
SYRIA
Evaluation of Efforts To Stimulate Exports Urged
(Salah 'Alwash Interview; AL-THAWRAH, 11 Nov 79)........ 99
New Economic Vistas Projected
(Husayn Ibrahim Interview; AL-BA'TH, 12 Nov 79)......... 107
-d-
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
PNC CHAIRMAN HOPES FOR DIALOG WITH UNITED STATES -
. LD181507 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT AL-USBU'IYAH in Arabic 16 Dec 79
PP l, 2 LD
[Interview with Palestine National Council Chairmar. Khalid al-Fahum by _
AI,-SHARQ AI,-AWSAT correspondent in ~~amascus--date not given] '
[Text] Palestine National Council [PNC] Chairman 1.'halid al-Fahum has ex-
_ pressed the hope of initiating an objective and constructive dtalog between
- the PLO and tl~e U.S. administration without prior conditions. He said that
- the continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab terri.tories is a
_ matter of life and death for the Palestinian people and that the Palestin-
ians now have no choice but, through understanding with their Arab brothers,
to use all the weapons, including the oil and economic weapon, to secure
Israeli withdrawal.
In an exclusive statement to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, al-Fahum said: It is no
secret that the PLO is seeking to obtain the support and backing of all
the world countries for its just and legitimate dem~.nds, which are reFre-
sented in the UN General Assembly resolutions confirming our people's right
to return to their homeland and to establish their independent stgte on
their national soil.
He added: Most unfortunately that official U.S. attitude toward the Middle
East crisis was nevar even-handed. The U.S. political, economic and mili~
tary support as ~�~ell as the total U.S. bias in favor of the Israeli side
has been clear since 1948. -
He said: We are making efforts and seeking to esi~~blish a constructive
_ dialog with the U.S, adn,inistratiun, but that administration h~s so far
set canditions that we cannot accept. The first of these conditions for
initiating a dialog is that the PLO accept Resolution 242. The PLO has
already stressed that it is impossible to accept this condition because it
would mean the end of the PLO as the legitimate and sole representative of
the Palestinian people. The resolution in question refers ~o the Paleatinian
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~
people and the PLO only from a humanitarian aspect, which means that it
- does not recognize any political rights fcr our people in their own coun-
~ try and on their own soil.
The second condi.tion that the United States lays down for initiating a
dialog with the PLO is that it recognize Isr~el when Isra~l, through the
Knesset and the government, declares that it will not recognize tne PLO
or the Palestinian people's rights as provided for by the UN resol~itions
evcn if t'~e PLO does recognize Isr:.el.
Therefore, al-Fahum said: "ive hope to establish an objective and construc-
' tive dialog with the U.S. administration without prior conditions, particu-
larly since it is clearer than ever that the U.S. administration committed _
a major mistake by adopting the self-rule agreement and signing such an
agreement with al-Sadat in the absence of the Palestinian peop~e and the
PLO, their legitimate representative."
He added: "Europe has more and more begun to realize the danger stemming
from the continued conflict in the riiddle East and the fact that this danger
cannot end without a just solution to the crucial element in the conflict,
namely the Palestinian problem. ~onsid~rable sectors af the U.S. p~iblic
opinion have also begun to be aware of tl~?is fact."
~'~l-~~an,~m expressed the hope that European and world opinion, which is in-
crr~asingly understanding the Palestinian people's rights, would influence
th~ U.S, administra~ion to adopt a better-balanced and more objective
attitude to the Pliddle East. ;
Asked if he could foresee a better future with the United States sooner
or later, al-Fahum said: "The road to the United States is still blocked.
But the continued Palestinian struggle, the bolstering of Arab solidarity,
the isolaticn of al-Sadat, the thwarting of the Camp David agreements and
ttie greater understanding of the justice of our cause in Europe and among
various circles in the United States itself as well as U.S, concern for
its own interests could all be facturs which contribute to initiating an
earnest and ohjective dialog between the PLO and the U,S, administration."
He added: "I do not think that the dialog will begin soon, because it will
take the United States some time to realize, in the light of its own inter-
ests, that there is a need for dialog with the PLO and for recognizing our -
people's right to establish a state of their own, and to stop offering un-
limited and iinconditional aid to Israel so that it curbs its expansionist
ambitions which the Camp David agreements escalated further. We hear and
feel daily the Israeli leaders' insistence on building settlements on our
land and persecuting our people. The arrest of the most senior elected
mayor. and the attempts to expel him from the country are but part of the
clear picture of Israeli ambitions in our occupied territories."
He added: "U:Zfortunately, the U.~. administration and al-Sadat signed the
~ Camp David agreements and, as a result, the enemy thought that the West Aank
and Gaza had been sold to him in return for his withdrawal from Sinai."
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[LD181509] Replying to a question on the possibility of using the oil
weapon again if necessary, al-Fahum said: "Our people's struggle, which
is supported by the Arab nation and the socialist and friendly states,
will continue and will redouble. We will certainly seek with our Arab
brothers to utilize all the weapons available to ua in order to speed the
achievement of what we aspire to and what are known as the national and
unalienable rights of the Palestinian people. Therefore it is natural
that, through understanding with our Arab brothers, we should seek to ~.:se
all the weapons available to us to achieve this. I am referring here to
an impox~tant weapon in the battle, namely the oil and economic weapon."
He added: "We hope that the world and the United States will realize that
we only want peace based on justice, that we refuse to surrender as pro-
vided for in the Gamp David agreements and that, in resorting to all weapons,
we do not intend to inflict damage or harm on anybody. We belie.ve that the
continued Israeli occupation of our Palestinian territories is a matter of
life and death for us. Whoever sees Israeli expansionism, Zionist arrogance
and the insistence on liquidating the Palestinian problem can only justify
our stand on the need to resort to all weapons, first among them the oil
and economic weapon."
CSO: 4802
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
BRIEFS -
JOINT VENTURES WITH ARABS--The Undersecretary of the Iraqi Ministry of In-
dustry and Minerals for Planning Affairs and Development Mr. Subhi Yassin,
who also chairs the Arab Company for Industrial Investments recently signed
- an agreement with an unnamed French company for feasibility and economic via-
bility of 11 industrial projects to be carried out as joint ventures between
Iraq and other Arab countries. The agre~ment was in the form of two contracts.
The first covers 8 projects while the latter three are covered by the second
cont:ract. Iraq holds 16 per cent of ~he Arab Company for Industrial Invest-
ments sY:ares. The company is capitalised at ID 150 million. Saudi Arabia
holds 15 per cent of the capital; Libya holds 8 per cent and Kuwait 8 per
cent. Syria and Jordan each holds 1 per cent. Contracts are underway for
wider Arab participation in the company and other countries are expected to
join soon. The Arab Company for Industrial Investment is an agency of the
Council for Arab Economic Unity and its specialises in joint Ar~b ventures.
[Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 31 Nov 79 p 13]
CSO: 4820
4
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ALGERIA
OIL OFFICIAL AIT LAOUSSINE DISCUSSES OzL PRICING PROBLEM
Paris AL-NAHQR AL-`ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 4 Nov 79 pp 52, 53
[Article: "Algeria Proposes Three Solutions to the Energy Crisis; Ait
- Laoussine: Oil Prices Should Be Raised Gradually in Proportion to the Price
of Alternative Energy"]
[Text] Iran and Libya have raised their prices, despite OPEC's agreement on
a unified price. Is this the answer to inflation and the fluctuations in
the currencies of the industrialized nations? The reply to this question has
recently been provided by Nordine Ait Laoussine, former vice president of
Algeria's oil. and gas company, SONATRACH, who is presently an oil consultant
in Algeria.
"Saudi Arabia can do nothing to prevent an oil price increase." So stated
Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, the Saudi oil minister, on a recent occasion.
"The world is heading for a war in the Gulf region between the Soviet Union
and the United States," said Mani` Sa'id al-'Utaybah, the UAE oil minister,
who also added in a warning to the OAPFC member states: "As current head
of OAPEC, I believe that member states cannot raise their prices beyond the
ceiling without a unanimous decision."
Neither Saudi Arabia nor the chairman of OAPEC is in a position of strength
_ after Iran and Libya decided to raise the price of their oil beyond the
ceiling OPEC has been observing for b months now to establish a unified posi-
~ tion and a streamlined policy among its members. -
As has been the custom before an impending meeting to determine prices,
prices have begun to rise indiscriminately and wildly, and competitive bid-
ding has reemerge: Libya demands a 50-percent increase in prices; Iran be-
gins to sell at spot market prices, i.e., $40 per barrel: Iraq finds itself
at a crossroads: Whether to i.ncrease its prices or to continue the policy
of rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and opt for freezing the present level of
prices by reducing production.
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According to OPEC circles, this latrer course [to decrea~e production and
freeze pr?.ces] is unacceptable because it would depress oil markets at a
time when the fate of production in Iran is unknown. The freezing of prices
would in turn cause an erosion in oil revenues. This year the purchase value--
that is, the real cost-- of a barrel of oil decreased by 5 percent. Freezing
the prices would bring the decrease in real value to 10 percent. At any
rate, it would be difficult to maintain the freeze for long, because the
increased demand for cheap oil will inevitably jack prices up. -
j~~ho Can Provide the Answer?
The expected solution at the forthcoming OPEC meeting in Caracas, Venezuela,
~ is for prices to be increased to $30 per barrel. It is rumored, however,
that the OPEC ministers will be called to an emergency meeting to deal with -
, the disintegration of OPEC as a result oi the indiscriminate price hikes.
The long-term solution, however, was provided by Nordine Ait Laoussine, the
former vice president of Algeria's 30NATRACH who is presently an oil consul- -
tant in Algeria, at the third annual seminar of OPEC experts, which met in
Vienna from 3 to S October under the theme "OPEC and the Future of Energy
;~farkets." The following is a summary of Ait Laoussine's paper:
The must important task facing the world today is the need to be exposed
to a:.-,r ideas and views relating to thP changes in the oil markets, so as to
avoid recurring oil supply crises. Two years ago, I came to the conclusion
that prices should be raised ov~r the long run to keep up with the cost of
producing alternate sources of energy. This involved a dilemma, for while
it is important to accept the fact that prices will have to increase, it is
more important to know to what extent, with what speed, and in which direction
these increases should occur.
I noted on an earlier occasion that prices can develop in one of two forms:
- we can have them follow the market forces--i.e. supply and demand--but then
we will have no choice but to face a crisis; or, conversely, we can draw
up a plan to increase prices through an agreement between producers and con-
sumers to decrease oil supplies in the market. I believe it is not too late
ta do tliat. -
~ t am in favor of the second option. I previously proposed a series of plans
For. a gradual increase in prices linked not only to inflation rates and _
currency fluctuations but also to a new factor--namely, the production cost
of alternate sources of energy, effective the second half of 1980. This is
why I proposed an annual rate of increase amounting to 5 percent. I argued
that if we were to continue freezing prices at the level of $12.70 per barrel _
(the so-called minimum price set before June 1978), this kind of shortsighted-
ness would speed up the increase in demand and would eventually push prices up,
with all the well-known implications and consequences.
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_ This is exactly what happened. Looking back, we see that those who wanted to
depend on the market as a means of determining demand and price carried the
day at the OPEC meeting in Geneva in June 1978 and froze prices on the basis
of the $12.70 per barrel price level, despite htgh inflation rates and the de-
~ preciation of the dollar. -
The upshot was that the profits earned by OPEC after the 1973-74 price hikes
evaporated and the price of oil per barrel dwindled to only $7, based on the
1974 value of the dollar; this is lower than the price demanded by the (World
Energy Agency)--lower even than the price unsuccessfully demanded by the a-
gency to encourage the development of additional sources of energy outside
- OPEC. Even the prices which have been based on the minimum price level to
raise sales and prices have not been affected.
Popular Talk
- The probYem is that no one has talked about that issue at all. Naturally,
talk about lowering prices is less popular than talk about increasing them.
. With regard to the consumer nations, the situation was comfortable. With
production of oil from the North Sea, Mexico, and Alaska, there was adequate _
supply at low prices--so much so, in fact, that oil tankers wasted a lot of
time sitting in ports waiting for buyers. The balance of supply and demand
tipped in favor of the consumer and determined the price of oil.
This situation gave rise to the predominance of the theory of allowing the -
- law of supply and demand to determine prices, but the theory in question con-
tributed little to the development of new sources of energy capable of ineeting ~
the needs of those nations in the long run. Why?
It has become customary to speak of market saturation but not of a crisis.
Indeed, everyone dismissed the likelihood of a crisis before 1990. But when
_ demand began to rise in the secon~d half of 1978 as a result of the Iranian
crisis and the decrease in the industrial states' oil reserves, and it became
impossible as a result of the Iranian crisis to make up for the drop in the
level of reserves, an oil crisis set in and prices began to spiral upward.
And so within a year`s time, the world was moving toward a severe crunch--
a situation which could be endless.
Any disruption in the oil flow jacks prices up. Added to this, some OPEC
nations began to show a preference for selling their oil on the spot market
to get a higher return. In less than 6 months, prices shot up by some 60
percent, until the minimum price reached $20. Official prices rose from
- $13 in 1978 to $20.50 in mid-1979. The increase was reminiscent of, and equal
to, the 1973 and 1974 increase.
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The Simple Law and the Game
The situation I have just recounted was the result of a simple law called the
law of supply and demand, or what is also called market forces. Do we want
this situation to continue? Do we want in the future to repeat this circular
process of an apparent surplus leading to a demand crisis, which in turn
leads ~to rising prices, and so forth and so on? If the answer is yes, then
the real price (that is, the purchase value af a barrel of oil) will continue
to go up and down indiscriminately and uncontrollably.
I b~~lieve that "the market" is no more than an expression of the balance of
power between the producers and the consumers at any point in time. If it
were up to the consumers, they would want to have large quantities of oil
at low prices. If that is not enough, they will manipulate each other by
means of the price system, exactly as if they were playing tug of war. In
that game, were one of the players to slacken his efforts or lose his atten- .
tion, he would lose ground.
This is the basic dilemma. A crunch is coming, and we can even begin to de-
rect it. Official sources have been saying that the crunch is coming next
~ear. This is not difficult to pr2dict.
As I have said, prices rose by 60 percent in a very short period of time.
The rise affected first the demand and then the reduced level of production
in the industrial [as published] nations. Thi,s will lead to further compli-
cations which will develop later. It is well known that the complications
created by the oil price increase in 1973 and 1974 and their effect on the
Western and world economies did not begin to appear until 1975.
Outside OPEC
?ahat will happen is that the increase in demand will be slow, contrary to -
expectations. Following the 1975 decrease, demand returned to its previous _
level and then began to rise annually at the rate of 4 percent. This year
the increase will be 2 percent. Some observers expect demand to decrease next
year by 65 million barrels a day. That is to say that world production,
outside OPEC, of oil and liquefied gas would amount to 35 million barrels
per day this year and 36 million next year. OPEC would produce 29.5 million
barrels per day instead of 31.5 million.
Actually, despite the decrease in Iranian oil production, OPEC output in-
_ creased by ~ percent this year. The oil produced by OPEC was not fully con-
sumed, because part of it was used to build up reserves in the industrialized
nations. Those nations have published statistics showing that their stockpiles
allow them to enter 1980 with rsserves far higher than last year's. The new
reserves are placed at 4.5 billion barrels. If this level of reserves
should decrease early, as usual, because of the industrialists' failure to
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reduce their levels of consumption, then resupplying the reserves will be
more dlfficult, because it is hard to tell what will huppen in Iran and be-
- cause OPEC can reduce its production to 27 million barrels per day in the
first half of 1980.
What do we have to do to avoid a state of instability in the world oil mar-
kets? On the 12th or 18th of next month [December], the result of what the
- consumer and producing states have learned from past experience will appear.
If we allow the market forces to operate and be the determining factor, then
we know what the result will be: a decrease in demand will not come quickly -
because there are different prices; that is to say, consumers would be able
to obtain oil. World prices will be affected until production decreases
and forces a change in prices, this time in a different direction. The
situation will go on and on.
We have not reached paradise yet. The progress we have made to link oil
prices to the cost of producing alternate sources of energy is still far
short of its goal. Freezing of prices will lead to a decrease in real prices,
which will widen the gap between the price of oil and the cost of alternate
energy, whos~ price will increase like any other commodity because of in-
flation.
Therefore I propose that we not seek a high increase in prices as a way of.
compensating for the decrease in surplus revenue, and that we should instead -
maintain the real prices of oil by raising them gradually, in addition to
controlling production as a supportive factor.
There is a great desire among the producers to reduce production because they
}~ave earned high revenues after the increase in prices, but this desi~e will
gradually abate once the prices are frozen and their revenues are eroded
by inflation. Therefore I emphasize that a severe crunch in the oil market
would become possible if OPEC maintained its present level of production in
the present inflationary conditions, and that prices will affect the producing
countries' desire to cut production. But if the producing countries were
to maintain the level of real prices, there would be little likelihood that
a crunch would occur. Everyone knows that if prices are frozen while the
present level of production is maintained, revenues will dwindle quickly in
the second quarter of 1980.
There are many who believe that the world is heading for an oil crisis.
Most economists agree that the rise in oil prices is not responsible for the
present crisis, but that the responsibility lies in the speed with which prices
have risen.
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I believe that the most important thing we can do to secure the world's long-
term energy needs to have the consumer nations publicly accept the need for _
oil prices to increase and to draw up a phased program to increase prices
gradually in proportion to the cost of producing alternate sources of energy
for years to come. I therefore propose the following: _
1) Put an end to sharp fluctuations in oil prices and production levels,
and determine levels of production by agreement between producers and con-
sumers on the basis of need.
2) Draw up a real reference detailing the cost of alternate sources of
energy, in order to use it as a basis for setting down pricing levels for
oil. The oil-rich countries should also link their production to their
expenses.
3) Increase prices annually by 5 percent of the real price, which I think
would be suitable for both producers and consumers.
Finally, the oil countries should not merely react to inflation, currency
fluctuations, and a deterioration in the conditions of marketing oil. They
shoul.d take the initiative.
9254
CSO: 4402
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- IRAN
?
MOSLEM PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC PARTY AROUSES HOSTILITY
Statement by Qom Seminary
Tehran BANIDAD in Persian 11 Dec 79 p 2
[Text] Greetings to you, the brave, hero and struggling people of Az~rbaijan.
Regards to you, the decisive and awake brothers and sisters who with firm
determination, following your positive vote to the Constitution of the Islamic
Republic, yon hit a heavy blow to the mouth of the criminal America and threw
the anti-revolutionary trash who wanted to stain your reputation, out of the
Islamic Republic Radio and Television center. You prevented bloodshed and
thousands from suffering martyrdom. Everyday, America arranges new con-
spiracies in every part of the country. This time it has thought of making
disturbances in Azerbaijan, unaware of the fact that our dear nation is far
more awake and aware tha~ being misled from its Islamic revolutionary di-
rection with such conspiracies and scenes. The Qom Seminary greatly appre-
ciates the awareness and assistance of you heroes under the leadership of the
- struggling clergy and wishes more success for the Islamic revolutionary goals
and its protection. The seminary condemns the imperialist conspiracies in
Qom and Tabriz and confirms the following points:
1. The brave people of Azerbaijan are expected to ti.ghten their lines and
maintain their unity of words, so that the anti-revolutionaries would not
ever think of making conspiracies and plots in that dear territory.
2. The great Ayatollah Shari'atmadar3 has requested to properly interpret
the issues and to banish those who change the realities, censor the news and
put it at his disposal.
3. The Ayatollah has also requested to banish those who under the name of
Moslem People's Republic Party relate themselves to him as well aa to announce
the party as an anti-Islamic revolutionary party, so that the stain would be
cleaned from the clergy and beloved Islam.
Signed by 'Ali Meshgini, Naser Makarem Shirazi, Mohammad Mehdi Rabani,
Mohammad Fazel, Hosseyn Rasti Kashani, Ahmad Janati, Seyyed Abbas Khatam
Yazdi, Ahmad Azari Qomi, Mohammad Yazdi, Ali Ahmadi, Seyyed Hasan Taheri,
Ja'far Hosseyni Karimi, Mohammad Ali ~:~ar'i, Mehdi Hosseyni Rohani and Mo-
hammad Mo'men, The Qom Seminary
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Khalkhali Favors Banning
Tehran BArIDAD in Persian 11 Dec 79 p 2
[Statement by Sadeq Khalkhali]
[Text] In connection with the daily events, Ayatollah Khalkhali issued the
foZlowing statement:
In issue 4~15836 of ETTELA'AT issued on Sunday 2 Ordibehesht 1358 [22 April
1979] I wrote an article against the Moslem People's Republic Party indica-
ting that the religious authorities and sources do not have any differences
but that there are some of the supporters of the banned Rastakhiz Party [the -
Resurgence Party of the People of Iran] and the shouters of "Javid Shah" [long
live the shah] or the identified SAVAK agents who want to oppose the prin-
ciple of the Islamic Republic by inclining towards Iran's Moslem People's
Republic Party.
It is worthy of being mentioned that they want to achieve their "Satanic"
goals even at the cost of ruining the reputation and destroying the clergy.
Therefore, it should be reminded that the Ayatollahs should take the initia-
tive as they did in the referendum and announced that they would vote for
nothing but an Islamic Republic. They should announce that the goal is the
same. That is, it is the Islamic Republic that everyone wants, so that those
who seek excuses would find their treacherous plans futile and the differ-
ences would be solved and the nation would move forward with total unity to
establish a new Islamic society in the Middle East. This was the most
sensitive part of my article which inflamed the adventurers. We all saw
that as soon as the article and various documents were published, sourceless
news, possibly fabricated, were spread in Tabriz and everyone was shouting
that Khalkhali should be executed. What were they saying and what was
Khalkhali saying? Eight months ago Khalkhali was saying the samz thing that
today all religious authorities throughout Iran from the dear Azerbaijan and
Tabriz to Rasht, Kerman, Jahrom, Mashad, Qom religious center, the high rank-
- ing teachers and the great religious authorities of Esfahan and Shiraz and
the grand Ayatollahs and the top religious authorities in all areas ask for
the banning of the adventurous party, the so-called Moslem People's Repub-
lic Party.
Why have the Sepahlanis, Saberis, and Rahmatollah Marghe'i Moqaddam, then
- the provincial governor of Eastern Azerbaijan, fled the great nation of Iran?
The supporters of the Moslem People's Republic Party wanted to make demon-
strations in the Azerbaijan mosque and close the bazaar in Tehran. Did not
we see that the group had been set up by the members of SAVAK, Rastakhiz, _
the mace beaerers and shouters of Javid Shah [long live the shah]? Why
were some of our contemporaries in fear at that time and went aside and
wrote articles against me? They should now come and see what schism that
the Moslem Paople's Republic Party is causing and what unholy ties it has
with the Forqan group and what an inseparable tie it has with the People's
Fedayin. Now their faces have been identified and the brave and heroic
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of Iran under the great leadership of t`~he honorable religious source and
powerful Emam has identified all those who have sold themselves and they
will all be given a stiff answer as soon as poysible.
"Wish the touchstone of experience were used sc~ that the deceitful would
lose their reputation." _
Thank God that those who wanted to hide their ugly face under deceitful masks
by using the names of the great religious sources such as the grand Ayatollah
Shari'atmadari in order to do a great service to International Imperialism
- and Zionism engaged in a futile task, now they can no longer continue their
deceitful pian. We should appreciate all the Islamic religious sources, the
grand Ayatollahs and the great nation of Iran in condemning Iran's Moslem
People's Republic Party.
We should call their name with respect so that those who have sold them-
selves could not act as supporters of Islam. I have a statement in this
respect which will be published in the future.
Reaction of Various Groups
Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 11 Dec 7~ p 11
[Text] Yesterday the religious authorities and clergy of Kermanshah sent a
telegram to the gran Ayatollah Shari'atmadari in Qom expressireg their anxiety
of *_:~e news regarding plots against Islam, the Moslems and the Islamic coun-
try and asked him to make a prompt and serious decision for preventing such _
conspiracies.
- A par*_ of the telegram indicates: Now the people expect you to issue an order
disbanding Ch~Moslem People`s Republic Party in which, unfortunately, the
opposers of Islam and the agents of foreign reactionaries have penetrated
and to evacuate government buildings which should be taken over by the
_ Islamic government. Because of the existing conspiracies which are about to
take place by foreigners it is necessary that the government exclusively
handles the deposals and appointments in the province of Azerbaijan. Of
course, the government will use your guidances and advice.
The struggling clergy of Abadan, Dezful and Shushtar also sent telegrams to
the office of the grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari. A part of the telegram
sent from Abadan indicates: Most of the agents involved in the tragic event
of Tabriz are from the Moslem People's Republic Party who unfortunatel}~~ af-
filiate themselves to you. By taking this matter into consideration, 'che
clergy of Abadan request that you issue an order for disbanding the pa:cty
_ in order to maintain unity and fulfill the great Islamic revolution and
neutralize the satanic plans of the deviated and corrupt persons and also
banish the deviated elements from your presence.
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Be referring to the recent events in Tabriz and emphasizing the point that
the elements causing the event were from the Mosl.em People's Republic Party,
- the clergy of Shushtar and Dezful have asked for. disbanding the party.
The following telegram was sent from the clergy community of the provi:~ce of
Ilam to the grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari:
The honorable grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari: Greetings. All of the inhabit-
ants of the province of Ilam and Poshtkuh express their condolences for the
death of the guard and condemn the treacherous plot of attackibg your residence.
They all demand that you issue an order as t6 the evacuation of Tabriz Radio
and Television, this Islamic propaganda base by the occupiers. And if this
has been done by the Moslem People's Party, to issue an order for disbanding
th~ party.
The Religion and Knowledge Society and the Islamic Society of students in
Miyaneh have each sent a telegram to the grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari of-
fering their condolences on the occasion of the martyrdom of 'Ali Reza'i, the
guard, and expressed their hatred from the occupation of Tabriz radio and
television station and asked for the disbanding of the Moslem People's Repub-
lic Party.
Tens of thousands of people in Azar Shahr and suburbs marched in support of
Ayatollah Shari'atmadari condeming the attack on the Ayatollah's house and
t:he msrtyrdom of one of the guards. The stores in the bazaar and streets
were closed for 2 days for the samp reason. The people issued a resolution
asking for the punishment of those who had attacked to Ayatollah's house.
TY~e clergy of Kangavar have also sent a telegram to the grand Ayatollah
Shari'atmadari stating: The events of Azerbaijan, that is the glorious ter-
ritory, have caused uneasiness for the people of this territory. It is ex-
pected that the disturbances which have surely been planned by conspirators
be ended by your actions and orders. Now that it is heard that individuals
affiliated with imperialism have penetrated Moslem People's Republic Party,
we would be glad if you renounce the party or issue orders for disbanding it.
Clergy of Arsanjan Send a Telegram
� Saqatol Islam Seyyed Ali Saqatol Islam sent a telegram from the clergy and
the struggling people of Arsanjan to Ayatollah Shari'atmadari. A part of
the telegram indicates: We request your honorable position, Ayatollah, that
you issue orders that the honorable people of that territory pay fu11 atten-
tion to the following two points:
l. The people cooperate with the Islamic government employees, so that they
could do their job in that vast territory.
2. The deposals and appointments of employees and directors of government
offices should be handled by the government of the Islamic Republic.
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- We also request that you issue orders for completely disbanding the Moslem
People's Republic Party. It is obvious that your influential words through-
out the country and abroad and the special obedience which the honorable peo- -
ple of that territory have towards you, hoth of the above mentioned issues
will be carried out."
The Clergy of Mazandaran ~
The clergy of Mazandara~ have also sent a telegram to the grand Ayatollah
Shari'atmadari. A part of the telegram states: We request that you take
prompt action as you may find advisable vis-a-vis the Moslem People's Repub-
lic Party; either to disband the partq or liquidate the anti-revolutionaries
who have penetrated the party. Also, throw out the persons who have pene-
trated the religious city of Tabriz, the cicy of heroes, and have attacked
the radio and television station so that any anti-religious conspiracy could
be stopped and tragic events would not take place.
The Religious Authorities of Mashhad Send a Telegram
The Grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari:
The tragic events which recently took place in Qom and the death of the dear
guard beside your house have caused a great sorrow. Undoubtedly the plot had
been arranged by Imperialist and Zionists agents. Fortunately, it shortly
resulted in defeat with disgrace. It proved for several times that anti-
revolutionaries will have no fate but defeat in th~s country. By condemn-
ing this anti-Islamic action we seriously ask that you issue orders for the
disbanding of the Moslem People's Party as unfortunately various anti-revolu- _
tionary agents have deeply penetrated the party, so that their violent and
anti-Islamic actions would not hurt your reputation. Signed by Seyyed Kazem
Mar'ashi, Abol Hasan Shirazi, Ali Falsafi, Mehdi Noghani, Ali Tehrani, Abbas
Va'ez Essi, Seyyed Abdolkarim Hashemi-Hezhad.
The Message of the Clergy of Gilan ,
In a message the clergy of Gilan Province have asked the grand Ayatollah
Shari'atmadari not to allow the enemies of Islam and the revolution to cause
disturbances in the beloved Province of Azerbaijan.
The Emam Jom'e of Kermanshah Sends a Telegram
In a telegram Hojatoleslam Haj Aqa 'Ataollah Ashrafi Esfahani, the Emam Jom'e
of Kermanshah (the chief mollah for Friday prayers and ceremonies) has asked
the granclAyatollah Shari'atmadari to disband the Moslem People's Party. A
part of the telegram indicates: While condemning the attack on your house
and the plot in Tabriz, I expect that you disband the party and exonerate
your holy presence.
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'1'he ::lergy of Lorestan
The clergy of Lorestan Province have also sent a telegram to the grand
Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Kazem Shari'atmadari. A part of the telegram indicates:
"At this *_ime that the hands of conspirators intend to carry out their in-
auspicious plans and fulfill the treacherous plans of imperialism and dam-
age Iran's Islamic revolution, the clergy and the people of Lorestan have
been deeply saddened by the unfavorable news received from Tabriz about the
Moslem People's Republic Party who affiliate themselves to you as undoubted-
ly they are related to the conspirators. We therefore request that you is-
sue orders for disbanding the party as soon as possible."
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CSO: 4906
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IRAN
BACKGROUND IMPRESSIONS OF NEW LEADERS DISCUSSED
Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 29 Nov 79 p 6
[Article by Bobo Scheutz]
[Text] Tehran--Almost every day, late in the after-
noon and sometimes in the evening, they gather in the
' round Senate building in Tehran. Thirteen men, more
or less well-known in Iran and the rest of the world.
They make up the Revolutionary Council, the institu-
tion that rules Iran today and these 13 men are the
most influential people in the country after Ayatollah
Khomeyni.
The Revolutionary Council was secret when Khomeyni
set it up while he was in Paris waiting out the shah.
He was afraid of assassination attempts and for that
reason he wanted to keep the core of the revolution
a secret.
On Wednesday Abol Hassan Bani Sadr was removed from his post as foreign
minister of Iran.
Until now Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, foreign minister and finance minister,
belonged to the Revolutionary Council. But recently he has acted very
independently, irritating the rest of the council. However he has re-
tained his post as finance minister.
Bani Sadr is definitely an intellectual, well-known in Iran as an eco-
nomist. He ~as educated at the Sorbonne in Paris, where he spent most
of his 16 years of pxile. He had been known as an advocate of a hard
Islamic line but ironically enough during the current crisis he has
stood out as the hope of Western diplomacy.
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Sadeq Ghotbzadeh
Nis successor is the colorful chief of radio and TV, Sadeq Ghotbzadeh.
Ele is also a member of the Revolutionary Council. Like Bani Sadr
(:hotbzadeh received most of his education in France but he speaks fluent
- l.nglish too as a result of a period of stu3y in the Uniter3 States. He
is always well-dressed and very self-assured. Ghotbzadeh has never hesi-
tated ta use the power he has and he is very unpopular in certain groups,
especially employees of Iranian radio and TV.
Mohammed Beheshti
The most influential man on the Revolutionary Council is probably its
secretary, Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti. It is likely that he is the
most powerful man in Iran after Khomeyni. He is the leader of the
dominant Islamic Republican Party which played a vital role during the
death throes of the shah' s regime.
He also holds a number of other important posts. Among other things he
heads the "holy war for reconstruction," an enormous project over the
entire country aimed at getting the economy back on its feet.
Beheshti's background is somewhat confusing. Under the shah he acted _
as adviser to the Ministry of Agriculture, among other things, and thus
cannot flaunt the martyr's halo ussumed by several of the revolution's
central figures. Many of them were forced into exile or spent hard
years iti tne shah's prisons.
For 4 years Beheshti was head of the Islamic Center in Hamburg and he
speaks excellent German and Arabic. His Englisl: is also good but in his _
contacts with the media he prefers to talk through an interpreter.
He is a cautious man who chooses his words carefully and when he speaks
in his deep, authoritative voice he makes a very calm and dignified im-
pression.
His name will undoubtedly be mentioned often in the future.
Mehdi Bazargan
To the surprise of many former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan is still on
the Revolu tionary Council following his resignation from power when the
American Embassy was occupied. He is regarded as the liberal represen-
tative of the middle and upper classes on the council. These groups are
on the outskirts of Khomeyni's Islamic Republic and therefore Bazargan's
position is not very strong. But he has a long history of opposition to
the shah and that gives him points in Iran today.
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_ Originally he was an engineer and a businessman (Bazargan means business-
man in Persian). On several occasions he has been on a collision course
with the religious leadership, as in a recent speech when he defended "
Iran's importation of Western technology. He pointed out that reli-
gious leaders liked to appear on TV and reminded them that TV is a West-
ern import.
Ali Akbar Moinfar
Perhaps one of the least influential members of the council is Oil
Minister Ali Akbar Moinfar. He is a decided technocrat, a close friend
of Bazargan and to date he has made no political statements at all in
hia meetings with the foreign press corps. At a recent press conference
he answered only questions dealing with oil and oil exports, replying to
every political question that it was not his task to solve political
problems.
Abbas Shaibani
Abbas Shaibani is a doctor of inedicine and a former president of Tehran
University. He too is one of Bazargan's close friends and was often
imprisoned during the shah's reign. His profile on the council is not
particularly sharp but he was part of the group of experts who prepared
the draft of the constitution.
Ezzatollah Sahabi
Ezzatollah Sahabi is an engineer and serves as budget and planning min-
ister in the government that doesn't really exist. He is part of the
delegation negotiating with the Kurds with unclear results. Sahabi was
jailed by the shah and subjected to brutal torture.
Hassan Habibi
The last of the seven nonreligious members of the Revolutionary Council
is Hassan Habibi, the official spokesman for the council. He belongs to
the generation of Iranian intellectuals who were educated in France
where he joined Islamic opposition to the shah's regime. Habibi also
serves as minister of culture.and higher education and he wrote the
first draft of the constitution for the Islamic republic.
Hashemi Ali Akbar Rafsanjani
Of the six religious reprPSentatives on the council Hodjatolleslam (a
religious title below the rank of ayatollah) Hashem Ali Akbar Rafsanjani
holds the position of minister of internal affairs, a vital post. Not
~ much is known about him but he spent a lot of time in the shah's jails
and was not released until just before the revoLution. It is generally
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believed that. at one time he received Palestinian training in guerilla
warfare in Lebanon.
riohammed Javad Bahonar
Ayatollah Mohammed Javad Bahonar has written many books on Is1am, some _
of which are now used as school textbooks. He is the Revolutionary
Council's representative in the Ministry of Education.
Musavi Ardebili
Ayatoltah Musavi Ardebili is as devout a Moslem as he is an anti-Marxist
and he has devoted much time and effort attempting to shield the youth
of Iran from the Niarxist concept of the world. He was one of the
- founders of the IsLamic Republican Party along with Ayatollah Beheshti
and Ayatollah Bahonar.
Mahdavi Kani
Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani is the powerful leader of all the revolutionary
committees that sprang up all over Iran af ter the revolution. The com-
mittees range all the way from police stations, courts and social wel-
far.e offices to a kind of neighborhood authority and they have a central
. pa:;iticn in everyday life in Iran. In Tehran there are now 14 of these
conul~ittees after the great number that flourished soon after the revolu-
tion were weeded out.
Kani is one of the religious leaders who actively combated the shah and
~ he is regarded as being very close to the average man on the street. He
reczived his religious education in Qom.
Sayed Ali Khamenei
The latest star in the Islamic revolutionary sky is Ayatollah Sayed Ali
Khamenei who is the council's representative in the Defense Ministry. -
He was recently named by Khomeyni as the new leader of the Revolutionary
Guards following the departlire of Ayatollah Lahouti for unknown reasons.
The Revolutionary Guards have reluctantly accepted their new leader.
Khamenei was formerly entirely unknown to most Iranians.
Normally the Revolutionary Council consists of 15 members but two seats
~ are being kept open for the time being and many names have been men-
tioned as conceivable candidates. These seats will probably not be
filled until after tensions on the council have been resolved. No one
knows for sure when this will happen and where the split will occur. ~
- But much indicates that it will be on the side of the table where Abol
Hassan Bani Sadr sits.
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- Today the council is no longer quite as secret but its members have
never been presented publicly. In spite of that it was possible to
obtain information from various sources resulting in the 13 names listed
here. Another name of ten mentioned in connection with the Revolutionary
Council is that of the religious leader of Tehran, Ayatollah '~meh
Montazeri but I was unable to get reliable confirmation of whether or
no t he is actuaJ.ly a member.
The council member most often mentioned during the current crisis is
Foreign Affairs and Finance Minister Abol Hassan Bani Sadr. His inde-
pendent behavior recently has left a number of question marks concerning
his position on the council and his future actions will be followed with
great interest in Tehran.
6578 _
CSO: 3109
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IRAN
MEANS TO COUNTER U.S. SANCTIONS AIRED
Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 11 Dec 79 p 11
[TextJ In an open letter, the teachers of Abadan School of Petroleum who
are members of the "Committee i'o Fight U.S. Economic Sanctions" present the
results of their talks and views on U.S, economic embargo:
1. The Government of the Islamic Republic should handle the monopoly of
foreign trade. Considering the great importance of improving the agricultural
condition, the government should do its best in establishing and developing
agri_cultural and road construction industries. The government should only
buy the primary industrial products from abroad and avoid buying any pre-
fabricated foreign commodities as much as possible.
2. To establish an organized staff in Tehran and the captials of provinces
called "Self-Sufficient Staff." Based on this project self-sufficient com- ~
mittee will be organized in educational centers, offices, government and
non-government organizations, factories, etc. Each committee will provide
_ a report and submit to the central staff their practical capabilities, type
of work and their specialty~. As an information and coordination center, the
self-sufficient staff will find out about the needs of the organizations on
services and equipment and will direct them to the proper sections, thus
meeting their demands.
3. We suggest that from now on all the universities and higher educational
institutes prepare a plan, so that if Iranian students residing in the United
States return to the country, they could continue their education in the
universities of the country. We, in our turn, are ready for any cooperation
_ within our capabilities. Establishing night classes will be a great help in
this respect.
4. We suggest:
a. To make a general evaluation and study of the existing vocational schools _
and workshop in Khuzestan and to provide a report (statistical) in this re-
spect. The workshops can be used for training technicians.
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b. To make an overall revision in the training and educational program of
Abadan School of Petroleum to make the school meet with the fundamental
changes that are made throughout the country.
For this purpose, engineering departments in the field of discovery should
be establiahed and excavation and information charts (well logging) depart-
ments should be strengthened.
_ 5. We suggest that the Central Department of the Ministry of Oil which has
so far been in Tehran be transferred to Khuzestan. We also suggest that an
extensive cooperation in research be established between Abadan School of
Petroleum and the oil industries. The Research Center of the Ministry of Oil
in Tehran should be combined with the School of Petroleum in Abadan to estab- -
lish an extensive research and training center in the south.
6. Abadan School of Petroleum announces its multi-directional cooperation
and technical assistance in the required fields especially in training tech-
nicians for getting information on Mud Logging and the use of related equip--
ment which is very much needed by the Excavation Department of the Ministry
of Oil.
With the experiences of the school, it can help in selecting, choosing and
the rental of the equipment and the companies in charge of operating them,
so that the cheapest and best equipment could be selected from various coun-
tries in the world (other than the United States) and the least number of
experts would be invited to Iran. In the meantime, it will directly and
closely supervise their operations and role in organizing an Iranian cadre.
7. We suggest that a seminar be held at Abadan's School of Petroleum in
order to study the self-sufficiency of oil industries with the participation
of experts in oil affairs in the country.
8. We ask the Oil Ministry to send us the copies of the projects of oil in-
dustry that have so far been sent to foreign companies and universities for
implementation or completion, so that we would study the possibility of
accnmplishing them at this trsining centec.
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- IRAN
STRATEGY OF POSSIBLE U.S.-IRAN CLASH DISCUSSED
Mexico City JUEVES DE EXCELSIOR in Spanish 6 Dec 79 pp 10-11
[Article by Jesus Pavlo Tenorio: "What War Between the U.S. and Iran Would
~ Be Like"]
- [Text] When the president of Mexico, Jose Lopez Portillo, was asked his opi-
nion on the critical situation that has arisen between the U.S. and Iran,
the chief executive replied that it was for problems of this kind, the essen-
tial motive for which is oil, that he attempted to offer a peaceful solu-
tion when he proposed his World Energy Plan to the United Nations.
And, as in the case of our president, statesmen the world over have been
particularly concerned over ho~r close to conflict Teheran and Washington
have come when, after the occupation of the United States Embassy in the
Iranian capital, President James Carter ordered dangerous military maneuvers
in order to assure the Ayatollah Khomeini that the United States would not
apathetic if the hostages held captive in its diplomatic premises were not
released.
It was not long before the international public received an accurate picture
of the hostile situation from the almost irrational positions assumed by the
aged leader who, at 83 and because he lacks a knowledge of international
laca, is acting in Iran as if he were the master of everything.
ti~ithout, of course, claiming thaL the United States is to~ally dissociated _
from these reactions on the part of the Ayatollah, this nevertheless does
not mean that the Muslim leader can violate all vestiges of law and civiliz- _
ed coexistence with impunity. This has obviously established a favorable
view toward any initiative by the United States, including, of course, the
invasion of Iran and the consequent overthrow of the Ayatollah.
What the War Would Be Like
If all prospects for saving the hostages were exhausted, and the U.S. forces
were in three locations at the same time, the military action would occur,
but not so easily as to warrant expectations of a swift victory.
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Although the United States would not deploy a considerable number of forces _
with the aircraft carriers "Midway" and Kitty Hawk" in the Arabian Sea, the
naval landing force stationed in the Mediterranean would have a military
balance with the Iranian army and fleet.
T(ios~ aircraft carriers comprise over 200 aircraft of various types. Ttieir
landing forces, certainly fewer in number than the Iranian, would be in
serious straits before the Air Force cleared the way from the coast of the
Persian Gulf to the Iranian capital, which is located a few kilometers from
the Caspian Sea, on the border with the Soviet Union.
It would be an excessively bloody war because, according to the Internation-
al Institute for Strategic Studies, in London, the Iranian armed forces con-
sist of 45,000 men, distributed among the Army, Air Force and Navy. It
also has 30,000 reservists, who would be immediately mobilized; and 75,000
national guardsmen who, in turn, would also be potential human resources.
The Iranian forces, which were armed by the United States itse~.f during the
Shah's time, are still regarded as the best equipped in the entire Middle
East.
For example, they have 2,800 tanks, as well as an extremely powerful artil-
lery, equipped with the most powerful missiles. The Navy has one submarine,
three destroyers and four frigates, all provided with missile systems; and
four corvettes, seven rapid gunboats, two coast guard vessels, two mine
sweepers and three rapid cutters which France is about to deliver to it.
As for its Air Force, it consists of 500 combat planes and about 100 heli-
copters, all of United States manufacture, except for 16 Super Frelons of
French origin. _
Added to this would be religious fanaticism, if not patriotic zeal; beeause,
as we have observed recently, the fanatical Khomeini has placed more stress
on his "holy war than on the national interests of Iran." Therefore, the
war would be excessively bloody.
The Waging of the War
On 22 November of this year, in a telephone interview with the British agen-
cy Reuters, Ahmed Madani, commander of the Iranian Navy, disclosed that a
first step in defending his country would be to close off the Strait of Hvr-
muz, a narrow deepwater channel at the entrance to the Persian Gulf, used
by tankers which carry over half of the oil used by the industrialized na-
tions.
This step would, of course, evoke a combined reaction from all those coun-
tries, which might we11 protest against the United States intervention be-
cause it would affect highly important interests of theirs, such as their
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energy supplies; or, on the other hand, they might join the United States
_ invasion, perhaps certain that, with a political change in that nation, the"
endless supply of black gold would be guaranteed. Of course, that poli-
tical change would have to be pro-Western, even more so than the Reza Pah-
levi regime was at another time,
When this step had been agreed upon by all tho~e countries, the first con-
flict would occur between the Iranian vessels and the two United States
aircraft carriersr baeked by a convoy of torpedo boats provided with mis-
siles and implemented with logistics.
Obviously, before embarking on a conflict, the Iranian Navy would attempt
to blockade the Strait of Hormuz; but the Yankee Navy has the necessary
equipment for clearing the way. Hence, this futile attempt to stop them
there would only last a few hours; that is, if the United States decided
to land inside the Persian Gulf. Because, if it did not do so, it could
seize land in the part of Iran bordering Pakistan, which lies in front of
the Strait of Hormuz. It would be a little farther from Teheran, but the
Air Force would go into action in an attempt at barrage bombing, and the
release of contingents of paratroopers.
The Impossible Rescue
The Cranian antiaircraft defense would have already gone into action. Its
S00 airplanes and 100 helicopters would be taking off to curb this offen-
sive. And the first really important battle would be the one in the air.
Whoever prevailed there would have the situation under control.
At this point, the United States hostages would already have been executed;
while the fanatical Khomeini would have sought refuge, as he did by fleeing
_ to Paris, while his people had to fight against the tyranny of Reza Pahlevi.
Rescue would be impossible, but it is logical that, if this situation were
to occur, the United States would have considered that impossibility, eva-
luating it from the standpoint of clearing up the unfortunate circumstances -
in which it was left in the Middle East by the fall of the Shah.
The Iranian military equipment would last for about a month in an overt war.
But, since all of its ordnance is of American make, it would lack spare
parts; and its S00 aircraft would gradually be destroyed, as would tanks
and its supply of missiles.
Meanwhile, the United States would have behind it all of its might as the
number one nation in the military realm.
What Would the Soviet Union Do?
Under th~se circumstances, there would be only one unknown quantity: What
position would the Soviet Union assume with respect to this action being
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carried out in its backyard; because it should not be forgotten that Iran _
has a border with the USSR, which it shares along the entire width of the
Caspian Sea. '
On Friday, 23 November, in the city of Bonn, in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the eternal Soviet foreign minister, Andrey Gromyko, upon being asked
about the role that his country was considering in the Iranian crisis, would
only reply that the Soviet Union steadfastly backs the principles of inter-
national law and the preservation of diplomatic immunity.
In other words, that the USSR by no means supports the occupation of an em-
bassy and the resultant capture of diplomatic personnel. But this is no
guarantee of the kind of action that it would take in the event of war.
However, it must not be forgotten that tha presence on its borders of a
country which has become converted into an Islamic theocracy is more dan-
gerous than anyone could imagine; particularly when Hua Guofeng, the top-
ranking Chinese leader, has just stated that the real threat is the wave
of Muslims that could set fire to the world.
As we can observe, a U.S.-Iranian conflict is more than a landing of Marines, _
like the last one conducted by Johnson in Santo nomingo, in 1965....
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_I
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IRAN
~ PLAN TO END UNEMPLOYMENT ANNOUNCED
Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 18 Dec 79 p 12
[Text] The Revolutionary Council passed a bill to
end unemployment in the country. The topics were
exc lusively put at the disposal of KEYHAN.
Bas ed on this bill, jobs will be created for all of
the highschool and voc~tional school graduates and
- the unemployed in order that Iran would reach self-
suf ficiency from the agricultural and industrial
point of view.
Hojatoleslam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, member of the Revolutionary Coun-
cil and in charge of the Ministry of Interior described the details of the
fill in an exclusive interview with KEYHAN.
The head of the Ministry of Interior presented the bill to the Revolutionary
Council and had it approved said: According to one of the principles of the
Constitution approved by the Islamic Republic, the government is bound to
provide jobs for all the unemployed in the country by taking the existing
capabilities into consideration. Based on this, the Ministry of Interior
received a proposal from Khorasan's governor general's office and it was
taken into consideration. Hashemi Rafsanjani added: Based on the bill, some
task units will be established in various parts of the country. These units
called Coop erative Production Units will absorb all the unemployed who are
skilled by giving them adequate training.
Hashemi Raf sanjani added: The units will utilize the unemployed in the
development and revival of agriculture and animal husbandry to terminate
reliance on foreign countries.
He added: Simultaneously with the approval of the bill, the Ministry of
Interior pr esented the necessary guidelines to the offices of the governors
general throughout the country for the precise implementatioii of the bill.
Very shortly the off ices of the governors general will provide precise
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reports on the unemployed to include the graduates of vocational schools,
higt~ schools etc...to be submitted to the Central Staff of the Ministry of
Tnterior.
The Minister oE Interior added: The cooperative companies will have admini-
strative, technical and management cadres. Each of these companies will be
officially registered on the part of the Ministry of Interior in the first
phase with 50 or more members. They will receive adequate training regard-
ing the regulations of the cooperative company system.
_ Hashemi Rafsanjani said: The total amount of oil income in one day which is
allocated to the provinces will be s~ent on th e implementation of this pro-
ject and to help set up the above mentioned units.
In describing the details of the bill, Hashemi Rafsanjani indicated that the
members of the cooperative production companies will be the share holders and
without any unfair job exploitation, they will contir.ue with their work and _
activity. Sufficient authorizations have been given to all governors general
offices in this respect.
The head of the Ministry of In~erior added: The cooperative companies will
be a central unit which will provide the ma~or needs of the country. Further-
more, in addition to financial aid, land and other capabilities will be put
at their disposal. It is quite natural that the activities of these com- -
p~i?1@S may be expanded and that the graduates of vocational schools, high
sc:iools and all of the unemployed will be covered by this project without
aciy limits .
Ir? the end Hashemi Rafsanjani said: Thus, the initiative of our youth will
be used and small units and industries will make us self-sufficient from
importing industrial parts from abroad in the future and unfair exploitation
will no longer be an issue.
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1 ttnc2
~
IRAQI POSITION ON IRANIAN SITUATION ANALYZED
London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 23 Nov 79 p 27
[Article: "Baghdad Speaks of 'Iranian Bloc in the Arab Ranks' and Khomeyni
Speaks of Personal Vengence Against Saddam!"]
[Text] When it was announced in Damascus that a visit to Iran would be
made by Sy rian President Hafiz al-Assad, the first Arab head of state to
receive an invitation to visit Iran since the Khomeyni revolution, an
important Iraqi official told a Lebanese politician who visited him re-
cently that the Arab position vis-a-vis Iran is extremely delicate, and
that it is not allowable for the Iranian card to be used in the sensitive
areas among the Arab states, "because that would erode Arab solidarity
and give Iran more power to involve itself in Arab conflicts." Similar
comments were made by other Iraqis while Syrian Deputy Prime Minister
'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam was making his commendable efforts with Tabatabai
during the sudden crisis that flared up in the wake of Ayatollah Ruhani's
statements concerning the Iranian claim to Bahrian.
The Iraquis have become extremely sensitive about any exuberant Arab
position supporting Iran. For at a time when Iraqi-Iranian relations are
deteriorating day by day, and propaganda and other campaigns have reached
their peak--the recent effects of which have included the closing of the
Iraqi Cons ulate in Khorramshahr--the Iraquis no longer view positions of
support fo r Iran as a positive shift toward the revolution of Khomeyni
which can be profitabl,y used against the United States and Israel. Rather,
the Iraqis have begun ~o view these positions as a"trap" for Iraq and its
role in the Gulf!
While Libyan-Iranian relations have taken a new path since 'Abd-al-Salam
Jalud's vi sit to Tehran--which ended recently in the establishment of
diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level, after the Iranians had
previously opposed such a move until the issue of the disappearance of
Imam Musa al-Sadr eould be cleared up--Iraqi officials have begun to speak
of what they term an "Iranian bloc within the Arab ranks," although they
have no evidence which proves the existence of such a bloc. Their
suspicions in this regard grew to the point that they regarded Algeria's
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celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Algerian revolution as evidence
of such a bloc merely because the celebrations brought some Iranian
officials (Bazargan and Yazdi) together with Bendjedid, Qadhdhafi, al-Assad,
and Yasir 'Arafat!
Wl~c:n Iraqi I~oreL~;n Minlster Ur Sa'dun llammadi met re~~e~ntly wlth his
colleague, Libyan Foreign Minister Dr 'Ali 'Abd-al-Salam al-Turayki, hc~
told al-Turayki that the exuberance which Lib~*a is displaying toward Iran
is very hasty, because it will be difficult to back off if it later proves
, erroneous and detrimental to the national welfare. He said that in Iraq's
view, thinking must become clear on the other considerations in this matter
so that it will become possible to form collective Arab relationships with
Iran which guarantee the interests of everyone.
However, Iraq's image of Iran is different from either Libya's or Syria's
image of Iran. ror while this image is a sensitive point between Damascus
and Baghdad, it is s~mething else to Libya. It is very important to Colonel
Qadhdhafi to obtain a certification of innocence in the disappearance of
Musa al-Sadr, and he can obtain such certification only from Iran. The
Arabs who are rushing to support Iran and Khomeyni have different views
on Iraq's hostile position vis-a-vis Iran. Some of them say the Iraqis
are makino a mistake by being alarmed at the good relations between some
oC ~Iie Arab states and Iran, because these good relations will te;d to
hel.l> hold the crisis between Baghdad and Tehran within reasonable ~imits.
It i~ lraq which is the loser in its war against Khomeyni because of the
Iranian leader's capacity for influence within Iraq, where he lived for a
long time and where there is a Shi'ite majority which the Iranians could -
stir up in a~aay that would threaten the fate of all Iraq.
There are radicals who say that, by its hostility to the Iranian revolution,
Iraq is serving American policy, whether it means to or not. In their view,
the United States is more capable of profiting from Iraq's stand on Iran,
even though there are those in Baghdad who believe that Iraq is in a
position to profit from the American stand on Iran. In fact, some of these
radicals say that there are secret Iraqi-American negotiations to supply
Iraq with advanced American weapons in the wake of the freeze in Iraqi- _
Soviet relations and Iraq's being compelled to diversify its sources of
armament. Those ~oho hold to this belief base it on the Iraqi assertion
that Baghdad plans to double its naval force in the Gulf following the
recent naval maneuvers. However, the Iraqis feel that the Iranian maneuve rs
were not innocuous, and that they were originally intended to achieve the
occiipation of Bahrain before the Iranian position was met by a strong stand
. on the part of Iraq, Saudia Arabia, and the rest of. the Gulf states.
For their part, the Iraqis chide these Arabs for their silence on the
demands of the Arabs of Khuzistan (Arabistan) at a time when these demands
had become realizable. They say, for example, that during the reign of _
the Shah, the Libyans issued a publication called ARABISTAN in which they
called for the liberation of this Arab region from Iranian rule and chided
Iraq for its silence on and disregard for this problem at that time. They
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~
even accused Iraq of co llusion with Tehran. But no t that Iraq has moved
to support Arabistan, the Libyans remain silent about the issue, as if
Arabistan no longer ne e ded to be liberated!
Despite the short perio d of harmony between Baghdad and Tehran, from the
signing of the Algeria pact between the Shah and Saddam Husayn in March
1975 until the victory of Khomeyni's revolution some 4 years afterward,
the two sides have had many inroads and have made many attempts to inter-
fere in each other's in ternal affairs. The Iranians supported and kindled
the Kurdish uprising in northern Iraq, and the Iraq is supported and kindled
the uprising of the Baluchis and sup~~lied them with weapons. The Iranian
organization SAVAK had agents in Iraq, Iraqi intelligence had agents in
Iran, and both countri es con3ucted secret operations within each other's
territory. The two bes t known operations which SAVAK conducted in Iraq
were the assassination of General Bakhtiyar, who took refuge in Baghdad
after he was expelled f rom Lebanon, and the poisoning of the son of Khomeyni
himself in al-Najaf. The Iraqis did not fail to respond to these actions
in Iran.
The Khomeyniites act o n the basis that Khomeyni has a personal vengeance -
against Saddam Husayn because Husayn expelled him f rom Traq in returr~ for
the Shah's expulsion of Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani f rom Iran, in accordance
with a deal concluded between the two leaders in Algeria, and they consider
this to be payment of an account which was overdue. The Khomeyniites also
say that during the pe ak of the Iran:ian people's revolution against the
Shah last year, the fo rmer Empress Farah Diba was permitted to visit the
holy shrines on the oc casion of 'Id al-Ghadir in order to defuse the revenge
of the people. In fact, they say, the empress was received personally by
Saddam Husayn, who def iantly allowed himself to be photographed with her
and complied ~~ith her request that Khomeyni be expelled from al-Naj af .
Ttie Ir~qi Ba'athists, however--who behave toward Khomeyni as if he will
eat them unless they e at him first--say that they received Khomeyni in
their country from the i.ime they came to power in 1967 and never once
disturbed him, but helped him and made things easy for him. It was he
alone, say the Ba'athi s ts, who profited from their hostility to the Shah
during the 7 years prio r to the Algeria agreement, and even after the
Algeria agreement they did not disturb him or ask him to leave the country
until after he rejecte d their urgent request that he limit his political
activity and respect t he principles of political asylum so that the Shah
would have no excuse to renounce his obligations. As a consequence, they
feel that it was Khomeyni who, without any justification, assailed them
with hostility, and some even accus2 him of showing ingratitude to Iraq -
and th�e Iraqis !
When Khomeyni returned victoriously to Tehran, a member of the National
Command of the Ba'ath Party asked Saddam Husayn about Iraq's position on
the Khomeyni revolution. Husayn said to him in effect: If this revolu~.ion
is an internal Iranian affair, then we have no connectioil with the matter,
and indeed we suppr~rt it and give it our blPSSings. If it is a general _
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religious revival, we are politicians and do not preoccupy ourselves with
religious matters. Politicians belong in politics, and clergymen belong _
in religion~ But if they want to use religion as a cloak for Persian
_ ambitions in the Arab nation, then we will resist them unequivocally and
with determination.
Commenting on this, a Gulf official says that this carefully defined
position is the position of one who knows but does not admit something.
For the Iraqi regime knows, but does not admit, that the Khomeyni movement
is slated to become an internal Iraqi affair, if it has not already done
so.
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IRAQ
NEW OIL PROJECTS INAUGURATED IN BASRAH, WASIT -
Baghdad AL-THAWRA~i in Arabic 18 Oct 79 p 6
[Article by Yahya Kazim al-Najjar: "Our National Oil Cadres Present Another
' Example of Direct Implementation"]
[Text] The numerous projects directly implemented here and there in our
country are a clear demonstration of the high competence and expertise
achieved by our national cadres.
Yesterday, for the commemoration of the sixth anniversary of the national-
ization of the last foreign control in the nationalized Basrah Oil Company,
- we accompanied a member of the Revolutionary Council, the minister of oil,
� on a field trip to the governorates of Basrah and Wasit for the inaugura-
tion ot a number of oil projects were directly implemented by our national
cadres for the first time. We observed at close range the degree of ex-
pertise achieved by our cadres, as well as the advanced ability to handie
modern technology.
Three Products in One Pipeline
This is a pipeline project to transport petroleum products between al-
Nasiriyah and al-Kut, which was realiz~d by the Public Institution for Oil
Projec~s for the first time at the cost of 6 million dinars. It is 187
kilometers long and transports three types of white petroleum products in
the same pipeline, i.e., gasoline, white petroleum and gas oil. It makes -
them available to meet the requirements of the Wasit and Dhi Qar governor-
ates, and possibly other nearby governorates, so they do not have to resort -
to trucking supplies from Baghdad and Basrah, as was done in the past. The
capacity of the projects, which was completed in 1 1/2 years according to
Mr Talib Dakhil, the director of the project, is 800,000 tons of white
petroleum groducts a year. The project inc"ludes nine gigantic storage
tanks; a loading unit, equipped with a control cabin, for loading tank ~
_ trucks; a pumping unit; a fire unit; administrative and maintenance -
buildings; as well as other installations related to the project both in
al-Kut and al-Nasiriyah.
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In tl~is project, in which the most sophisticated equipment was used, the
director of ti~e project added, the storage process is automatic. The
5~inu~ is Lrue c~f thc~ s~~tety equi.pment, particularly khe fire-extinguishin~
~~yulpment, wlilrl~ Iv lifghly mc~dern and is bein~; usc~cl Ic~r tl~e first time
in Lli[ti cauntry. 'I'lie fire-extinguishLn~; equ:tpmc~nC u~ecl .in thi.ti pru,~~~ct
operates in tliree ways, including automatic fire extinguishers for the
storage tanks and automatic foam fire extinguishers. -
Both types of equipment are self-activated at the first indication of danger.
The tliird method involves the use of manual foam fire extinguishers. One
hundred technical specialists were trained at the project and subsequently -
sent to the Biji refinery's storage stations in the north.
Celebration in al-Rumaylah
In the governorate of Basrah, the minister of oil inaugurated additional oil -
- projects in the midst of the enthusiastic cheers and songs by the workers
~ and staff of those projects. They wished a long life to the party, the
revolution and President Saddam Husayn and praised him for nis di.rect -
supervisian and sustained support which brought this project into existence.
[3ig festivities took place in al-Rumaylah to celebrate this occasion. It
was ~;t~ended by Comrade Muhammad Hamzah, secretary of the southern organi-
zati~~n oF the Ba'th Arab Socialist Party and the undersecretary of tile
Min~~;~ry of Oil, Comrade Radi Hasan, secretary of the command of the party`s
Basrali branch; the chairman of the Public Institution for Oil Projects;
and numerous people from the Ministry of Oil and national cadres who
participated in the implementation of these projects. -
On tnis occasion, Comrade Tayih 'Abd al-Karim, member of the Revolutionary
Council and minister of oil, gave a speech in which he pointed out that the
revoluti.on exists, renews itself and flourishes with the helg of its
children's hard work, their enthusiasm and their willingness to sacrifice,
to give and to build. The command of the revolution and the party, he said,
has entrusted the oil sector with great tasks, especially after nationali-
zation succeeded in reconstructing the oil sector and building a self-
sufficient national oil industry, as well as incorporating that sector
into the national economy and creating deep interaction between itand other
economic sectors thereby creating a balanced and strong economy. The
numerous oil projects which spread across the country after the outburst
oF the 17 July revolution--such as new oil fields, refineries, gas plants,
pipelines, ports, tankers, and so forth--stand as testimony to the apprecia-
tion you deserve and the esteem in which we hold you. And, here you are
today, presenting your revolution with another series of projects.
Your revolution, the member of the Revolutionary Council and minister of
- oil added, does not build only for Iraq. Its scope actually extends to
tlie whole l~rab fatherland. All its strength and capabilities acutally have
- been consecrated to the realization of the aspirations of the great Arab
- natior. for unity, freedom and socialism. This actually shows the magnitude
_ of your responsibility.
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Since you I~ave already performed the greatest achievements in the field of
tiie petroleum industry, the minister told our cadres, T am fully confident
that you can ~~cc~c~mplis}? more and even greater achievements, beczusc you
havc armed yourselves with the shining principles of yc~ur party. 'fhe
minister concluded t~is address by thanking the Public Institution for
Oil Products, tlie 'dational Oil Company, the Public Institution for
Southern Oil, the Public Institution for Oil Refinery and Gas Industry,
_ as well as the Public Institution for the Distribution of Petroleum Pro-
- ducts for their efforts and cooperation which brought these projects into
being. The minister also thanked the Public Company for Building contracts
for its valuable efforts and great awareness of the importance of realizing
the oil projects. He also thanked the friendly foreign companies and in-
stitutions which cooperated with us in implementing these projects,
prominently the Soviet company, "Te.chnoexport."
New Projects and Their Importance
The minister of oil subsequently cut the inaugural ribbon symbolizing the
launching of the operation of the water-pumping project north and south
of al-Rumaylah. I{e then inaugurated the project instituted by the Public
Institution For the Distribution of Petroleum Products to build several
installations in al-Shu'aybah, the project for the development of the
al-Muftiyah depot in Basrah, the project to build pillars for the al-
hluftiyah pier, and the project to lay two fuel and crude oil pipelines
to the al-Harithah power plant.
ReFering to the importance of these projects, Mr 'Isam 'Abd al-Rahim,
chairman of the Public Institution for Oil Products, said that they are
characterized by their diversity, their respective operating systems,
and the purposes for which they were conceived. First among them is the
water-pumping project in the areas north and south of al-Rumaylah, which
- involves three stages. The first stage was inaugurated today. The pre-
paration for this stage actually started gradually last April, and the -
work to complete the next two stages will continue gradually. Tt is
expec~ed that they may be completed toward the end of next year.
The implementation of this project, he added, was made possible with the
cooperation of a Soviet institution. The Public Company for Building
Contracts actually took care of the civil engineering work, which repre-
sents the bulk of the work actually completed.
The importance of this stage, the chairman of the institution said, concerns
the pumping of water in the field north of al-Rumaylah. This involves the
construction of a canal from the shores of Basrah; a refinery and a pumping
_ station with a capacity of 95 million cubic meters a year; a:nain pipeline
48-inches in diameter connected with the five pumping stations located in
various areas north of al-Rumaylah; in addition to the flow lines [al-
Jarayan] and the pipelines connecting the pumping stations and the insula-
tion stations, the high tension towers and lines, the secondary power stations,
the central control and long range control station, the wire and wireless
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communications network, and all the basic requirements of the project.
The cosr of the first stage reportedly amounts to about 40 million dinars
wt?ic~h wil] In~~rc