JPRS ID: 8837 JAPAN REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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, . ~ JPRS L%8837
2 ~ January 1980
- ~ Ja an Re ort
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(~OUO 1 /~0~
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JPRS L/8837
2 January 1980
JAPAN REPORT
(FOUO 1/80)
CONTEN7S PAGE
POLI.'I'ICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
JCP Dietman on U.S.-Japan Defense, Middle East
(JPS, 1 Dec 79~ .......o.o..o..a 1
'AKAFL4TA' Editorial on LDP, Single Member Constituency _
(JPS, 3 Dec 79) .....o ..........................oo... 2
?
MCLITARY
Stance on SDF E:cercises With Foreign Forces Adopted
(ASAHI SHIl~iBIIN, 2 Dec 79) 3
Experts Debate on National Security, Civilian Controi
Over JSDA
( Bi1NGEI sxilN~TtT, oct 79 ) � � . � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 5
Pessimistic Future of Civilian Control, by -
Michio Morishima
Optimistic View on `Civilian Control' , by
Yoshihiko Seki
Demilitarization Will Not Guarantee 'Peace', by
. Yoshihiko Seki �
Intellectuals, Readers Corr~ment on 'War and Peace' Debate
(BUNGEI SHUNJU, SeP 79) 17
Debate Introduced
Shinkichi Eto -
Shinji Komada _
Yuichi Yoshikawa -
Makoto Nakajima
Masamori Sase
- Masanori Kikuchi
- a - [III - ASIA - 11.1 FOUO]
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= CONTENTS (Continued) ~~e
Tadac Takubo
Fuji Kamiya
~yoko Hayashi
" Tokichi Aarada
Other Readers Opinions
F.~cperts Discuss Future of Japa,n Self Defense Forces
(SHUKAN ASAHT, 13, 20 Jul 79) 42
Expert Says Japa,n Facing Slow but Deliberate 'Militarizationt
(Susumu Takahashi; SEKAI, Oct 79) 5g
_ Critic Analyzes Experts~ Arguments on National Defense
Issues
(Tsuneari Fukudd; CHUO KORON, Oct 79) 77 "
ECONOMIC ~
'AKAHATA~ Editorial on Proposed Budget Cuts in Welfare
(JPS, 3 Dec 79~ 108
Industry Sources Disclose UAE To Triple Oil Shipments
(MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 6 Dec 79) lp9
Private F'irm To Reprocess Spent TJ-Fuel by 1990
(THE JAPAN TIMES, 5 Dec 79) 110
- Briefs
Banks Report Business Slump 111
- b -
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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
JCP DIETMAN ON U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE, MIDDLE EAST
OWO11001 Tokyo ,?PS in English 08i8 GMT 1 Dec 79 OW
(Excerpts] Tokyo Dec 1 JPS--On behalf of the Japanese Communist Party and
the Progressive Unity, Mitsuhiro Kaneko, deputy chief of the Secretariat
took the floor in the Lower House plenary session, posing questions on poli-~
tical discipline of the Ohira cabinet, problems of state finance crisis,
energy, corruption and scandals, security, and foreign policy. -
On the energy problem, Mitsuhiko Kanelco called for a control on wild-profit
seekings and speculations by oil majors, major companies and trading ~irms,
and a curb on rising oil prices. Calling for a fundamental policy change to
overcome the present energy crisis, he demanded that the government (1) end
the U.S.-followed diplomatic policy toward the Mideast and establish economic
relations with Mideast countries on the principles of equality and mutual
benefits, and (2) launch on the rehabilitation o� domesCic coal industry.
Kanel:o touched on the relations between U.S. military bases located in
~ Japan and planned military operaticns by the U.S. in the Middle East,
questioning the government's views, he asked:
The L1.S. 7th Fleet, making Yokosuka a home port, is now being sent to
Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. This sailing is being carried out at the
time when U.S. President Carter is suggesting a military intervention in -
Iran. This is the matter of extremely seriousness, and sheds light again
the dangerous features of the Japan-U.S. security treaty. How daes the
Japanese Guvernment view the sailing of the U.S. 7th Fleet? If the govern-
ment approves its sailing, it means that Japan is sharing military threats
against ttte Middle East with the U.S.
Should Japan hope to promote friendly relations with Middle East countries,
and for a new resolution of energy based on the principle of mutual benefit.
The Prime Minister must declare in Japan and abroad that the government
will not allow to use U.S. military bases in Japan for military interven-
tions in the Middle East countries, and must strongly lodge a protest with
the U.S. administration.
CSO: 4120 1
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POLITZCAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
.
'AKAHATA' EDITORIAL ON LDP, SINGLE MEMBER CONSTITUENCY
OW03?359 Tokyo JPS in English ~850 GMT 3 Dec 79 OW
[JPS headline: "New Moves To Introduce Single Member Constituency System::
AKAHATA Editorial"] -
[Text] Tok.yo Dec 3 JPS--Since the beginning of the second Ohira cabinet,
the Liberal Democratic Party has been rapidly stepping up its maneuvers
_ for the introduction of the single member giving a warning to these moves.
The editorial says: "The single member constituency system which will lead
the LDP occupy to attain absolute majority seats in the Diet, has been cor_- .
sistently maneuvered by them for introduction, to check their historically
_ inevitable retreat, and to establish their one-party domination. In the
last general election, the LDP suffered a big defeat, and the JCP gained
41 seats, the highest mark in the party history. Needless to say that this
has become a new motive for the government and the LDP to maneuver for the
introduction of the single member constituency system.
"Using a focal trick of recent political scandals, and repeating deceptive ~
propaganda that 'an inexpensive election is needed' (for preventing the
political corrugtion), the LDP government is doing their best to take in
_ the opposition parties for the introduction of the small constituency system.
Furthermore, the Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party, anti-communist
opposition parties, are rapidly exposing their essence as new government
parties, analogous to the decline of the LDP, and revealing their programs
for the alliance with the LDP forces, and even the Socialist Party, influ-
enced by Komeito, has taken a step for the right leaning line. It should
~ not be overlooked that this has given a realizable condition to the LDP for
their maneuvers for the introduction of the single member cotistituency
system.
"We are giving a strong warning that a dangerous sword is being pointed
at the root of democracy now, and appeal to all geople aspiring for demo- -
cracy to rise in action to prevent the danger, rising above the differences
of the political parties they support."
CSO: 4120 2
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MIL ITARY
STANCE ON SDF EXERCISES WITH FdREIGN FORCES ADOPTED -
OW050415 Tokyo A~AHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 2 Dec 79 Morning Edition p 1 OW
[Excerpts] The Maritime Self--Defense Force [MSDF] is scheduled to partici-
pate in bperation Rimpac next March jointly with the Canadia, Australian
_ and New Zealand navies, as well as the U,S.3d Fleet. A gover~ent source
disclosed on 1 December that Japan's decision to participate in this
exercise was made personally by Prime Minister Ohira.
According to the same source, the United States suggested the exercise
plan this past March. Subsequently~ the defense agency and the Foreign
Ministry discussed the matter, and in late April, just before Prime
Minister Ohira's U.S. visit, the then defenss agency director, Yamashita,
asked for Prime Minister. Ohira~s decision on the mat~ter. The prime minister
then decided to allow the MSDF to participate in the exercise. Later, in
October, the defense agency formally decided in favor of the plan after
consulting the Foreign Ministry and the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. In.
making tfiis decision, the defense agency once again obtained the prime
minister~s prior approval.
In the past, ~oint exercises with U.S. forces were subject to th~ defense
agency director general's approvalt Therefore, it was unusual that the
prime minister's prior approval was sought for exercise Rimpac. This
indicates that despite the contention that Rimpac is merely an "extension
of Japan-U.S. joint exercises," Rimpac is som~thing different from {~ast
exercises.
Rimpac will mark the first exercise in whic'h Japan will j~oin with other
countries besides the Un~ted States. This exercise includes some phases
which ca~not be explained wi~hin the framework of the Japan-U.S. security
treaty. That is why the government formulated a uniform view to justify
Japan's participation in that exercise.
Cabinet Legislation Bureau Chief Tsunota~s remarks during the Upper House -
Budget Committee interpellation session on 28 November were made in line
with this uniform view. He said: "Exercises with any foreign country
are possible as long as they are 'educational training necessary to
perform the assigned activitiesf as prescribed in Section 21, Article 5
of the Defense Agency Establishment Act."
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However, opposition parties began to criticize this uniform view on the
grounds that it indicated an attempt to drastically expand the scope of
countries with which Japan would carry out ~oint exercises, and there
should be a"brake." A~ a result, the defense agency was compelled to
_ adopt a basic stanca on future ~oint exercises..
Thus the defense agency interprets~the government's uniform view as having
the following legal constraints:
1. Japan cannot exercise collective self-defense rights nor participate
in exercises which assume support for other nations.
2. Japan cannot participate in ~ffensive exercises in view of its commit-
ment to the defense-only principle.
Thus the deferise agency has reaffirmed its stand that "it is legally
impermissible for Japan to participate in exercises like Operation Team
Spirit which assumes a.n incursion from the DPRK."
As a matter of policy judgment, the defense agency puts the following
restrictions on even those exercises which are legally possible:
1. Joint exercises will be carried out with free countries only.
2. No joint exercise will De conducted with parties in conflict or
divided countries.
Thus the defense agency will push.its stand that joint exercises with _
- the ROK are impossible. -
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shimbun Tokyo Honsha 1979
_ CSO: 4105
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MILITARY
EXPERTS DEBATE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER JSDA
~ Pessimistic Future of Civilian Control
Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Oct 79 pp 105-108
[Article by Professor Michio Morishima of London University: "Heated
Debate: War and Peace--Question of New 'New Armament Plan
' [Excerpts] Let us move onto the topic of civilian control. I.ike Mr Seki,
I, too, believe that if we are to have a military force, civilian control
should be established. A modern military force exists not for the purpose
of satisfying the combative nature of citizens, but as a means for attaining
political ob~ectives--among them, independence. Therefore, the military
should be subordinated to politics. On this point there is no disagreement
between us. My special warning to Mr Seki has to do with the incomplete
nature of the basis for civilian control in Japan. Establishing (nominal)
civilian control without regard to foundation building, and thinking that
_ all is well because there is a framework of civilian control may lead to the
breakdown o� that control, takeover by the strengthened military and reversion
to the military control era of the past. A worse situation sti11 would be
if the civilians themselves become fascist and directly use the military
for evil purposes. (One must not forget that the Nazi corps were a civilian-
controlled military force.) Therefore, l cautioned that the foremost need is
the construction of a social foundation. _
To my argument, Mr Seki rebutted that, "although I, too, [word "too" under-
lined in text by Morishima] agree that the calibre of (Japanese) politicians
is poor, nevertheless, this is a comparative question."1 "The Self-Defense
Force of today is different fr~m its counterpart of the militaristic era."
"It is true that Japan's democracy has some half-fledged features, but this,
- too, is a comparative question and I think that considerable credit can be
given to Japanese democracy."2 Mr Seki's line of reasoning is not always
- clear, but judging from above passages, he appears to believe that though
the calibre of Japanese politicians is low, they are at least capable of
controlling the military. The Self-Defense Force differs from the old
military corps, and democracy is well established in Japan. Therefore, it
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is possible for Japan to have a"considerable degree" of civilian control--
though not 100 percent. And as a finishing stroke, he adds, "I do not think
that the Japanese people would be foolish enough to make the same mistake
twice--on the question of civilian control. Mr Morishima appears to under-
_ rate the Japanese people's sagacity. I do not know about the Japanese
intellectuals, but I think the people at large are not such fools."3
I do not believe that ~Ir Seki's thinking is convincing. He hypothesizes -
that there is a perfect society and rates the actual situation by its
distance from this perfect state. He seems to think that as Japanese are no
fools, if we eliminate the faults and encourag~ the good points, Japanese
society is going to approach the state of perfection by and by. I do not
agree. Each society has merits and weaknesses, but frequently there are
situations in which merits are at the same time weakne~ses, and vice versa.
I stressed this point in "England and Japan" an.d its "Sequel." My essay -
regarding amateurism and professionalism in relation to civilian control
was based on the same concept. The choice between amateurism, which has
c~ertain merits and disadvantages, and professi~nalism, which possesses a
different set of advantages and weaknesses, rests with the citizens` value
sense.
If my thinking is correct, Englishmen wou~d try to develop the meritorious
aspects they themselves value highly. (I mean by this that there are
~ weaknesses corresponding to the strong points.) Germans w~_l.t try to
develop strong points that Germany possesses. As a result, in spite of
"card" reshuffling resulting fr~m numerous wars, England and Germany still
persist in their respective "card" gathering. Consequently, their fates
are always at odds with one another. In the same vein, :lapan has its own
unique value sense and because of it, Japan has achieved success, but at ~
the same time is faced with difficulties. Of course, people's value
orientation is not fixed and char~ges with the passage of ~ime. But it i.s
too optimistic to suppose that it is capable of great change. Fortunately
(unfortunately for Mr Seki), the current Self-Defense Force is a weak body
and thus at present, the problem is not evident, but if it develops to a
scale approximating the old military corps, thea it will become independent
and will eventually develop into a uniquely Japanese military force. To
the degree that the postwar Japanese businesses--their operation and
Iabor management--resemble prewar Japanese businesses rather than English
businesses, the new Japanese military force is more akin to Japan's old
military corps than to the English military.
- With this new Japanese military force encounter~ a situation akin to that
faced by England during 1935-1938 (a situation where the German strength on
the Continent was greatly aggrandized as a result of the Br.itish cabinet's
appeasement policy), would it disregard the situation as the British military
force had done? When we consider their professional conscience, their sense
_ of responsibility as Japanese, it would not be surpr.ising at all if they
decided to break the law, disregard protocol and assume power. Moreover, -
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many peoplz would either give tacit permission to their revolt or they
might even aupport their action. Especially if an influential thinker like
Mr Seki declares thac the politicians have been poi~oned by appeasement
- doctrine, they would be encouraged to translate their belief into action.
What has thus far been described would have taken place (and did take -
place) in the old Japanese military corps. Mr Seki would probably claim
thatthe present Self-Defense Force is not the old military corps, and thus -
such a situation can never be. But the incident he cited as proo.f of the
distinction between the two military groups (the fact that when Yukio Mishima
burst i~to the Self-Defense Force compound and tried to stir them into action,
he failed to incite the Self-Defense corps) was of a trivial nature. There
was no imminent threat. A peculiarly uniformed man with a Japanese sword
crashes into the compound and urges them to act according to his unique
_ concept of aesthetics. The professionals simply laughed it off. If they
had been st~rred even slightly by Mishima's plea, they, too, would have been
mad.
Even in the old military force Mishima's theatrical demonstration would not -
have had any impact except during the mass civilian hysteria era toward the
_ end of the war.
In the 2.26 [February 26th] incident, the soldiers were incited by a small
band of young officers. But these officers--especially the leader, Captain
- Shozo Ando=-were men of exceptional character devoted to the welfare of their
men. Moreover, many soldiers who participated in the incident were acting
under orders. To compare the soldiers inveigled by Ando and other officers
with the Self-Defense men who reacted with contempt toward Mishima's agitation
speech and to conclude that the Self-Defense Force is unlike the old military _
force is like comparing a child who scores only 10 points in a differential
calculus test with one's own child who scores 100 percent in an ordinary
. srithmetic test and concluding that the latter has a superior brain.
~n any case, in a national emergency, if the Diet members chosen by popular
vote (and ultimately the prime minister) are incompetent and indecisive, the
military will not act, either. This in.a nutshell is the formula for civilian
controlled military. I think that among the readers there are those who hold
that in such an extraordinary situation, the military should be resolute
and act independently in orde~ to protect the country. As long as many
people believe this, we must conclude that there is a latent tendency toward
military control in Japan. In order for soldiers and civilians alike to
_ believe that even under such an extraordinary situation, the milita~y should
not act on its own, the Japanese value orientation must be altered. Civilian
control must necessarily be preceded by the building of a foundation for
civilian control. Without fulfilling this necessary condition, it would be
a counterf eit civilian control which will collapse at a crucial t3me.
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FOOTNOTES ! '
1. I have never once said that the quality of Japanese politicians was low
in my previous essays. I have merely pointed out that the relationship
between politicians and bureaucrats in Japan is different from that in
England.
2. Mr Seki states that, "Mr Morishima stresses the fact that Japan is an
anti-amateur state. Does this mean that he holds that democracy is
unsuitable in Japan?" I am not of the opinion ~hatdemocracy in any form
will not thrive in a country which professes anti-amateurism. In
reality, Japan is a democratic state, at least in form, and parliamentarism
has been we11 established here since before the war. But the relation-
ship between amateurs (general public and its re~resentatives) and pro-
fessionals (bureaucrats, soldiers and so on) in a state where amateur.ism -
prevails is different from a state espousing professionalism.
In a democracy where the professionals were dominant, legally chosen
parliamentary representatives were not able to rebut at all--not even
_ in parliamentary debate--once they had been "silenced" regarding military
affairs by the military. In this manner, t~e mode of life in a democracy
in which the professionals are dominant differs frem a life in a democracy
where amateurs are dominant. When we state that democracy is well
established in Japan, we need to consider what type of democracy is ~
weli established in Japan.
3. I have never undervalued the sagacity of the Japanese people. Mr Seki
st3tes that "common people of Japan are not fools; thus they are not so
foolish as to repeat the same mistake twice, even on the question of -
civilian control." If this logic is true, as long as Japanese are not
fools, a former mistake will never be repeated. Such a claim is the
worst type of persuasive argument. I have heard this kind of absurd
and dangerous logic from those who professed to be "imperialist economists"
and/or "Japanese (nationalist) economists" during the war. I think that
- Mr Seki is about to repeat their mistake. Of course, Mr Seki appears
to regard the Japanese intellectuals as fools. Thus for the intellectuals
to commit this kind of error twice would not be inconsistent at all to
Mr Seki.
4. In a country where the citizens have a certain type of value orientation,
if the national assembly becc.mes putrefied, a coup d'etat will result as
_ a matter of course. The fact that Japanese demo~racy is not quite so
brittle is attested to by the Lockheed incident and the like but
even in Japan, once the people realize that the parliament or the
cabinet is powerless against an external enemy, they will probably
~ readily assent to the abolition of civilian control.
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Optimistic View on 'Civilian Control'
+ _
Tokyo BUNGEI: SHUNJU in Japanese Oct 79 pp 139-141
[Article by Yoshihiko Seki, lecturer at the Waseda University and chief
editor of JAPAN ECHO: "Heated Debate: War and Peace--Question of New
'New Armament Plan -
[Excerpts] As many peoplP have pointed out, the question of civilian control
is indeed a difficult problem. Mr Morishima warns me that the basis of
civilian control has not been sufficiently established in Japan, and thak
without laying down the foundation for it, there is a danger of reversion
= to the old military control era, or else the civilians themselves may become
f ascist and use the military for evil ends. It is not clear as to what Mr -
Morishima means by laying the foundation for civilian control. But when
I think of the basis for civilian control, I think of diffusion of parliamentary
democracy and democratic socialism in the sense of enlargement of social
justice.
- I think that relative to the shert history of democracy in Japan, the above-
noted foundation laying has beP:~ quite successfully accomplished in Japan.
This is demonstrated by the fact that altho~agh the Communists and the
- Liberal Democrats were pol.es apart in the 1950's, today both sides have come
closer to the middle of the road, at least in domestic policies. This can
_ aiso be assumed from the well-established support toward the democratic
principles of the new constitution among the popuiace. In these regards I
give quite a high score to the Japanese. Of course, this is not to say that
there are no shortcomings.
Mr Morishima further states that, "Mr Seki hypothesizes that there is a
perfect (100 percent) society, and that Japanese society is gradually moving
toward thi~ perfect state." This is a~complete misinterpretation. I have
always denounced the theory that there is a perfect society in this world.
If such a state does exist, then social progress would come to a halt. What
I want to say is that it is possible to express as an abstract ideal a
direction toward which we should go. Without such direction no social
reform would be possible.
In relation to this, Mr Yuichi Yoshikawa, chairman of Peace for Vietnam
Committee, has stated in the September issue of BUNGEI SHUNJU that "the
necessary thing is a nation building effort that the populace of a given
- country can accept as worth defending. If the country is worth defending,
its people will automatically rise to resist an unjust invasion." On
reading this passage one receives the impression that Japan is not a country
worth defending. In so far as there can not be a country which is 100
percent worth defending, all discussion is relative. What country is Mr
- Yoshikawa referring to as a state worth defending? Is it the United States,
the USSR, a country like Switzerland, or a country like Vietnam, which produced
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the "boat people?" Although many JapanesE may be dissatisfied to a greater -
or lesser degree, I believe that they consider Japan--whose self-image is
middle class--a country worth defending. I wonder if Mr Yoshikawa thinks
that Vietnam is more worthy of defense than Japan.
- Going back to the question of civilian control, Mr Morishima appears to be
regarding the present day Self-Defense Force as analogous to the old military
force. For example, he states that "once the Self-Defense Force grows to
the scale approximating the old military, it will start to go its own way."
I do not know what scale is the scale close to the old military, but Mr
Morishima is overlooking the changes in social order that occurred in postwar
_ Japan. Granted that national character does not easily chan~e, more
- important than national character is the social system. A comparison of
post-World War I Germany and post-World War II West Germany would lead many
to conclude that the national character of Germany has not changed very
much, but I doubt that many people would anticipate another Nazi Party
takeover in today's West Germany. Mr Morishima writes in the current essay =
- that once the Japanese Se1f-Defense Force is aggrandized in size, would it
stand by inactive when Japan f3ces a type of situation that Great Britain
- confronted during 1935-1938 (as a result of the English cabinet adopting a
policy of appeasement, German strength was vastly expanded in Europe)? The
British military force did not act. Can the Japanese military follow the
example of the English counterpart? Supposing that an event such as England ~
_ confronted during 1935-1938 could occur in the vicinity of Japan, I cannot ' -
predict what direction such a situation would take. But even if Asian
communism is greatly expanded or even if, on the other hand, a man like Hitler
appears on the scene, the present Self-Defense Force, which has not thus
far intervened [in political affairs] as the old military had done, is not
likely to interfere in the future.
Mr Morishima, moreover, states that as long as many readers believe that in ~
the event of national emergency, if the Diet members and politicians pro-
crastinate, the military should make an independent decision, there is grave
- risk of Japan becoming a military-centrolled state. This, too, is an
arbitrary judgment. If and when the situation becomes as Mr Morishima fears,
the popular cry for change of prime ministership will become loud enough
that there will be a transfer of government--as England dismissed Chamberlain
and in his place elected Churchill. The danger of forceable military take-
over, judging f rom the current situation, is quite slim. This was well
_ demonstrated last fall when Kuri~u's cnmment led to his dismissal. Many
citizens supported the governmen;;�s action as an inevitable step.
In relation to this affair, Mr Morishima states that within the framework of
Japanese value orientation which gives pr.eference to professionals, even
thoug~ Japan is a dernocratic state, "the lawfully chosen representatives of
- the people were not able to rebut--at the National Assembly debate--once
they had been 'silenced' regarding military matters." Consequently, he
stresses the danger of democracy reliant on professionals. ~
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On this question, too, Mr Morishima completely disregards the difference
between the prewar and postwar Japanese political systems. Needless to -
mention, in prewar Japan, the military held an independent supreme command
autharity unfettered by control of the Diet. Because it was such a perverse
assembly system, independent military action was permitted. In the same
section, Mr Morishima states that parliamentarism was already established
in prewar times. But the practice of party politics based on ordinary
election by male votes was in effect for only a few years, and it was a
crippled system with the Privy Council, the House of Peers and the military
having conditional claims.
I might be belaboring a minor point, but in the previous essay Mr Morishima
stated that, "where the scale of military preparedness is small, 3n order
for the military to be effective, the people must follow its dictates, and
though there may be a nominal civilian control, it must necessarily be a -
showcase ent3ty." T rebutted this statement with examples. In the current
dissertation, he revised his argument and states that, "I merely meant that
all things being equal, in the case of smaller-scale military preparedness,
- civilian control tends to be merely a figurehead." If this is so, I would
like him to cite concrete examples.
As for the difference between amateurism and professionalism, Mr Morishima
has cited numerous examples on previous occasions, and repeats them in his
current essay. I do not contradict his theory that in England sagacity of
non-professionals is given a relatively high value, whereas in Japan there
is a tendency to give undue weight to the know-how that tre professionals
possess.
In so far as politics is concerned, the important key for democracy is the
blending of professional know-how and sagacity of the general populace and
tl~eir representatives. This has been enumerated by many theorists, foremost
- among them John Stuart Mill. In the Japanese postwar values, there is a
portion that changed from the prewar days and there is a segment that remained
unchanged. With regard to the question of civilian control, at present
there is no evidence to suggest that the factors negative to it are gaining
in strength. There is no evidence that directly verifies this claim, but
there is indirect proof in the "Survey of National Character" conducted by -
the Statistical Research Agency every 5 years. That is to say, those who
believe that "in the event that a superior statesman emerges, it would be
better for Japan to give him the helm of the government than for the populace
to debate the issues" decreased from 43 percent in 1958 to 23 percent in
1973. Those who oppose this precept increased in number from 38 percent to
51 percent. (Statistical Research Agency, "Survey of National Character---
Sixth National Survey," 1978, 85 pages.)
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Demilitar~,zation Will Not Guarantee 'Peace'
Tokyo BUNGET SHUNJU in Japanese Oct 79 pp 143-146
[Article by Yoshihiko Seki, lecturer at the Waseda University and chief
editor of JAPAN ECHO: "Heated Debate: War and Peace--Question of New 'New
Armament Plan"']
[Excerpts] The last question is how to ensure Japan's safety. I have nothing -
more to add to my constru~tive theory [which I have already enumerated], so
. I will limit myself to rebutting Mr Morishima's criticisms. First of all, Mr
Morishima wrote in the previous essay that "it is dangerous to develop -
heavy industries and centralized information industries." I rebutted, "Then
do you suggest that we abandon heavy industxies and centralized information
industries?" Thereupon, Mr Morishima now insista that, "I have neyer in any
portion of my previous essays suggested that Japan should forsake heavy
industries or centralized information industries." Yet, he has written
that "Switzerland has an excellent international monetary organ, and no
heavy indust.ry of any significance. It is necessary for the Japanese
industry to switch its emphasis to commodities that would not be of much
use to the enemy in the event of occupation" (previous essay, page 106). If
this is not Mr Morishima's true feeling, I have no rebuttal on this point,
but then I will be forced to give a"zero rating" to such an ambiguous
sratement contrary to his true convictions.
The second question is whether or not the United States would come to the
aid of Japan should an emergency situation arise. I wrote that as long as
Japan makes an effort toward self-defense in compliance with its national
strength and maintains friendly relations with the United States, the United
States will not forsake Japan. Mr Morishima was critical of this exposition,
and stated that in so far as past historical data do not verify this as a
valid international hypothesis, it is nothing more than "agitation."
Fortunately, an international relations specialist, Mr Fuzo Kamitani, has
addressed this issue more persuasively than I myself could have in the last
month's issue of BUNGEI SHUNJU.
The gist of his article was that the United States would no doubt continue
to have life and death interest in East Asia/PaciEic region. Japan's security
- and maintenance of Japan-U.S. amity are indispensable to U.S. Asian policy.
Therefore, it will not sit by while Japan is attacked or invaded.
As for historical proof, we have only to cite U.S. support of Korea during
the Korean conflict and its intervention in Vietnam. In the case of Vietnam,
the U.S. intervention was not successful because of the incompetence and
corruption of the Saigon regime. I believe that at present at least, we can
be assured that in the event of foreign invasion against Japan, if the latter
demonstrates a will to fight and act accordingly, the United States will not
remain a mere spectator.
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With regard to this point, Mr Morishima rebuts that, "if the United States
intervenes in a fight between Russia and Japan, the conflict will lead to a
- Third World War. Such a crucial decision will be approached with extreme
caution and after scrupulous consideration [by the United States]." In
the event of a nuclear war about 20 million Americans will die. At worst,
the earth will become desolate. Therefore, the majority of Americans will
decide to leave the Japanese to their fate and the president, too, will follow
the voice of the penple. As Mr Morishima asserts, there is little doubt that
a real war between United States and the Soviet Union could at worst end
- in desolation of ehe planet earth. Therefore, no doubt statesmen will
decide on such an isaue with extreme caution and after scrupulous conaideration.
- But the same consideration will be made by the Soviet leaders who also risk
the lives of about 20 million of their people. The American nuclear strategy
is to lead the Soviet leaders into thinking that a la:~e-scale invasion of
Japan could result in a real nuclear war between the Unii~d States and the
Soviet Union. My thinking is that accordingly the United States is obliged
to commit itself to ensuring Japan's security to the utmost.
Of course, this avenue is not without pitfalls, and therefore I seek the
progress of simultaneous nuclear arms limitation negotiations betw~en the
United States and Russia; Japan should support the progress of the said
- negotiations as much as possible. But at present, my conclusion is that
there is na better way to preserve Japan's security than to place ourselves
underneath the U.S. nuclear shield.
In relation to this topic, a certain university professor of my acquaintance
had his students read the Marishima-Seki debate published in the July issue
of BUNGEI SHUNJU, and he asked them to comment. I was informed that there
were several students who supported the Morishima view on the ground that
we cannot put our trust in the United States. But contrary to Morishima's
conclusion, they concluded that Japan, too, ought to have~.nuclear armaments.
I oppose both of these extreme views--non-armament/surrender and nuclear
armament/resistance. I think we need to be mindful of the fact that for
- "an influential high-powered thinker" like Mr Morishima, to stress mistrust
of the United States may add fuel to the stand diametrically opposed to the
original inten* of the said view.
Thirdly, I am well aware that Mr Morishima does not subscribe to communism,
but I am puzzled by the fact that while he preaches insincerity of the United
States, he seems quite trusting of Soviet "good will," although he does not
view "Russia as the savior." For example, he states that Japan should
perfect such Soviet-directed software as Siberian development and cultural
exchange while taking the demilitarized~neutral position. As long as Russia
is convinced that it would be advantageous to respect Japanese independence
rather than occupy Japan, exceptional situatic:is as~;de, it will not commit
aggression against Japan. In exceptional situations, Morishima advises us to
- surrender. In his previous dissertation, he intimates that even if Japan
does come under Soviet control, in the case of unconditional surrender, Japan
will have political autonomy.
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I, too, think that as long as Russia believes in the advantage of keeping '
Japan neutral, it w~11 respect Japanese neutrality. This would be a -
situation analogous to the People's Republic of China leaving Hong Kong to
- go its own way." But ~.f there was no Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Pact, and
~ if the Soviets know in advance that the Japanese response would be
unconditional surrender and that ;Iapan can be occ~:pied with practically no
_ sacrifice on their part, and, moreover, if they think that it would be more
' advantageous to gec hold of Japanese heavy chemical industries and centralized
information, industries and apply them to the Siberian development or use _
- th.em as strategic bases for an offensive against the United States or China ~
- than to leave Japan neutral (and it would be quite reasonable for the Soviet
leaders to think this way), they would subjugate Japan and Japan's political
autonomy would be recognized and granted only within the scope convenient
to the Soviet Union. In this case an allegonical argument that China is ~
leaving Hong Kong alone does not hold water because the circumstances would
be different. If we must introduce a metap~orical example, it would be
more appropriate to cite the Morishima argument that as a strategic base for
attacking Great Britain, Hitler decided that attacking the Benelux nations
would be more advantageous than respecting their neutrality, and thus invaded
these countries instead of going through Switzerland (if this hypothesis is
correct).
Though Mr Morishima may reply that the two--Hitler and the Soviet leaders-- -
are different, and assuredly there are a number of points on which Hitler
and the recent Soviet leaders do differ, both fo1_low a logical formula in
analyzing events. This has been explained in detail bv Mr Morishima with
respect to Hitler. I would like to put an even great emphasis on the fact
that the social structures of Nazi Germany and the cc~nmunist countries are
similar, and also on the difference b~tween these social systems and the
social framework of the United States and other Western democratic states.
In discussing national defense theory, Mr Morishima almost never touches ~n
the social structure question. I do not deny that the people's values do
_ ~ have some influence on a country's foreign policy. But I believe that its
social structure has an even greater significance. After World War II the
United States, in spite of bitter fighting during the war, repatriated the
Japanese prisoners of war immediately. Meanwhile, the USSR interned them
for a long time in Siberia and refused to repatriate them. I hold that
these differing responses are attributable not to their differing national
characters, but to their respective social structures.
In other words, the characteristics of a liberal dzmocratic state are plurality
of political parties and recognition of plurality of opinions as a fact of
life, and the supporting value orientation which in turn sustains the said
system is the respect for individual spiritual life~ After the conclusion
of a war even the enemy nationals are recognized as a group of individuals
whose spiritual lives are to be respected. The belief that they should be
repatriated as soon as possible and assistance of food extended to the
_ starving originates therefrom. It also supports the conviction that a promise
- of a mutual security pact is binding as far as it is practicable.
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In contrast, the characteristic of Nazi or communistic absolutism is a
single party, single opinion system. Existence of opinions and parties -
other than the ruling party and its official dogma 3s denied. And the
thinking which supports this system and at the same time emanates from it
is that the leader or the controlling party has the absolute truth and the
individuala have value only as means for realizing the controlling party's
ideology. It gave riae to the retention of prisoners of war and their
subjection to years of labor under deplorable conditions. This system
even represses its people's civil liberties. The fact that Japan surrendered -
to the United States and thereby gained happiness is due to the fact that
- the United States had the social structure described above. If there be a
state under Soviet control that has political autonomy, I would like it named.
Next, I would like to touch on the hardware/software question. In the current
essay Mr Morishima states that, "Japan should adopt a national defense plan
chiefly reliant on software." At a casual reading, it would appear that he
accepts hardware (soldiers and weapons) as secondary items in the national
defense plan. But was it not Mr Morishima's opinion that the Self-Defense
_ Force should eventually be reorganized into a corps of engineers? If he
approves of the Self-Defense Force as a secondary element in tihe defense plan,
then the difference between his opinion and mine is one of degree. But
here, I will advance this discussion under the assumption that Mr Morishima's
- opinion denotes software development exclusively.
I contend that in addition to diplomacy, economic cooperation and cultural
exchange--what Mr Morishima refers to as cultivating Japan's allies through
- software--we need to effect balanced development in hardware or national
defense through military strength. Mr Morishima claims that this kind of
balanced plan would fail, and due to limited funds available, both would be
diluted and the software plan ;~ould become practically useless.
But many Western developed states do follow the balanced software/hard~rare
policy. These include such armed neutral states as Switzerland and Sweden.
If Mr Morishima insists that though these countries may succeed Japan would
fail, I can cite in rebuttal recent achievements in Japanese international
cooperative efforts. Of course, I admit that the Japanese :International
cooperative e~forts are not far-reaching enough, but would Mr Morishima claim
that since international cooperation had heretofore been conducted in con- _
junction w3th an effort to increase Japan's national self-defense capability,
it has been diluted and therefore is practically useless? Unless he can
explain why it would be ineffectual to develop both of them side by side
by giving reascns, his argument is not convincing. It seems to me that Mr
Morishima's crit3cism of ine quoted below is quite applicable to his own stand:
"His argument is nothing more than an arbitrary conclusion. At best it
demonstrates anxiety; at worst, it is inflammatory (seditious)."
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Lastly, let us toucr. on Mr Morishima's counterargument regarding the "Red or
Dead'� issue--a debate between Bertrand Russell and other unilateral
abro;,ation advocates and its opposition, Gaekel [transliteration]. I think
that Mr Morishima~s argument that if worst comes to worst, we shotild surrender
with white and red flags in hand is similar to the un.ilateral abrogation
adherents' argument that voluntary surrender of nuclear arms is preferable
to n~uclear death, and that the worst that can happen would be to come under
Soviet domination. Mr Morishima insists, however, that his plan is better -
dead than red," and that it is the fourth proposal to the Three Proposals
advocated by Getschell. He reasons that the possibility of Soviet attack is
very slim. But as I stated before, Mr Morishima's proposal, though it may
not regard Russia as God, is predicated on Soviet good will. Therefore,
for those who mistrust the Soviet Union due to its unique social structure,
this would be tantamQUnt to selecting "Red." I think that Gaekel's and my
proposal is the plan which would bring neither death nor red, though it is
not completely free of risk. As I have already enumerated my reasons for
subscribing to this view elsewhere, I will not repeat them here.
With regard to comments from various gentlemen regarding the Morishima/Seki
debate (published in the September issue of BUNGEI SHUNJU), I have nothing
more to say beyond what I have already touched on. But I accept Mr Shinkichi
Eto's criticism that "Mr Seki's suggestion for getting shelter and other
nuclear attack preparations ready is premature, and therefore he [Eto]
opposes it." I therefore revise that pa~sage to read, "shelter and other .
questions should be considered as issues for.the future." As Mr Eto states,
the priority issue is the qualitative revision of the Self-Defense Force so
as to make it strong enough to provide true defense of the country.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Bungei Shunju, Ltd.
11460
- CSO: 4105 -
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MILITARY
?
_ ~
INTELL~CTt1ALS, READERS COMI~Il~IENT ON 'WAR AND PEACE' DEBATE
Debate Introduced
Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 94-114
[Articles b,y 10 intellectuals and 5 readers: "SurrEnder or Resist?"] -
[Text] Is Mr Seki's assert~on that "As there is no danger -
_ of attack, the self defense capability and the Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty are unnecessary," too hapeful an outlook?
Or is it, as Mr Morishima states, that "Rather than in-
- viting the miserable aftermath of war, it is wiser to make
an, orderly surrender and obtain the right of political self-
determination.t� This dialogue in the July issue of this
magazine evoked a great reactioii. To which side will 10
authorities in various fields align their Proposals?
Shinkichi Eto
Tokyo BUNGE_I SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 94-95
[Article by Shinkichi Eto, professor, Tokyo University: "An Intel:iectual
Stimulus"]
[Text] In dialogue and in writing a debate which provides an intellectual -
stimulus is enjoyable. The debate between Mr Seki and Mr Morishima has
_ indeed been so. There has been no attempt to establish dominion'in the `
realm of empty polemics or to domineeringly protagonize the sole validity of
one's own position. They differ from those who do not attempt to get out oi
the octopus jars set in place 30 years ago, singing the same song. With
supple minds, tackling the reality of history, they are able to formulate `
theories. We.have been greatly entertained.
The two sides agree that we cannot attain a complete capability for maintaining
the peace through military power alone, and for this reason support maintaining
peace through means other than military, that is, in the word to which we have
- become familiar, they place emphasis on non-military peace maintenance meas-
ures. Mr Morishima states, "At present it is not 'hardware' like tanks and
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_ missles which protec*_s the nation, but the 'softwear' such as foreign re-
lations, ec~nomics and cultural interchange." Mr Seki says, "A country's peace
may not be defended by military power alone, however by the same token it
cannot be protected without military power...I too am in complete accord
with Mr Morishima's proposed so~twear tactics."
The points on which the two sides diff~r are firstly on the efficacy of
military power, secondly on the difficulty of civilian control, thirdly on how
to respond to a highly unlikely enemy attack, fourthly on their appraisal of
, the international environment and fifthly on what course Japan should pursue.
Regarding the first point Mr Morishima propos~s the matter of why Switzerland
was able to maintain its neutrality in tJorld War II, and states that this was
- beca~se Switzerland was neutral and Hitler wished to use Switzerland as an
avenue in negotiations with enemy nations. Mr Seki opposes Mr Morishima's _
conclusion and asserting the eff icacy of military power states, "I think
that my suggestion that this was due to the military losses that Hitler en-
visaged from Swiss resistance is not mistaken."
I have on hand a book put together by the Justice rfinistry Police Department
and issued by order of the Swiss cabinet to each family entitled "Civil
Defense." One paragraph states, "It is no coincidence that we escaped attack
during World Wars I and II. This good fortune is due to our unbending will
to defend ourselves and the efficacious preparations of our army." At the -
least, it cannot be denied that the Swiss Government holds its military capa-
bility in high estimation. As Ikuhiko Hata states in the 5 September 1979
issue of GENRONJIN in stating that he would like to research the Swiss pre-
cedent thoroughly--while acknowledging the existence of Ryoichi Taoka's
research--that leaving this aspect unconsidered no quick decision (on Japan's
position) can be made.
On the second point Mr Morishima concludes that civilian control of the Self
Defense Forces is difficult, and makes this assertion on the conjecture that
the army may again get out of hand. This does not differ from Mr Seki'~ con-
eention that we must guard against such an exigency with the Self Defense
Forces. On the third point--the unlikely event of an invasion of Japan--
~ Mr Morishima, while admitting the unlikelihood, speaks out for preserving
the integrity of the country and submitting under an orderly system, obtaining
then in return the right of political self-determination. Mr Seki fears that
- there is a danger that if tlie Soviet Union knew it could occupy Japan without
- sacrifice it would do.so immediately if the necessity arose, and that there
is a danger that other countries opposing Japan might. take over one part of -
of the country. For myself, I would like to say that above everything we
should pursue every available means in an unmitigated effort to anticipate and
_ avoid a condition which invites invasion. Let us reflect on the fact that
`rasuku Nakazawa believed that we should not go to war because we could not
match the United States. Both men have convincing arguments, but here I must ~
set forth my own ideas. For me, "every available means" actually encompasses
a moderate capacity for self-defense and a strong spirit on the part of the
people to resist. The firm determination in the words, "though~outmatched -
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in a sudden invasion we will respond," is an important deterrent. If in t}ic
Blitzkreig oE 1940 Hitler had known that Switzerland would capitulate in an -
orderly way, bypassing anticipated opposition in the Netherlands and Belgiu,m,
the German army would have gone through Switzerland and invaded France from
the Swiss border which had no Maginot Line. �
On th~ fourth point, the appraisal of the international environment,
Mr Morishim,a states clearly that "I believe there is no possibility of the
Soviet Union invading Japan." I also think this is so, but that it is the
anti-Soviet American deterrent which is speaking here, and I would like us to _
consider the situation with America completely witl~drawn from Asia. What
would the Soviet Union do with Japan? It.is hard to gauge.
Finally, with regard to what course Japan should pursue, I am opposed to
Mr Morishima's theory that zero weapons is good and support the same
Mr Morishima's realistic policy that we should not rush to cut back the Self
Defense Forces. And I oppose the contention that Mr Seki's proposal to pro-
vide shelters is premature. Japan's self defense costs rank seventh in tlie
world at the enormous figure of $900 million, but money alone cannot purchase
a de~ense capability. What is necessary is that the Self Defense Forces become
a truly strong and upright "bone" of the people, under no circumstance ven- -
turing outside the country, an essential element in upholding the independence
of the nation. For that reason quality rather than numbers, and the present
membership should be diminishcd.
Shinji Komada
Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 95-97
[Article by Shinji Komada (writer): "Shutting the Door With Moderation"]
[Text] Reading the words of Yukio Morishima and Yoshihiko Seki in the debate
on "War" I~ad a frightening thought. This is because I recollected a war ~
experience of my ocan.
The most frightening recollection among my wartime experineces is, rather
- than something that occurred upon being cast out into actual warfare, an ex- -
perience prior to that. It was at the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942.
I was a teacher in an old-time high school in a rural area, still in my
twenties. At a meeting of the teachers the principal announced, "There has
been an announcement that the 3-year graduation is to be shortened by half a
year." The teachers were silent. After a while a science teacher declared,
_ "I can just barely manage to teach the course in 3 years. Even now there is
too little ~ime. If it is shortened by 6 months, what is there that can be
taught?" Lightly striking the desk with his hand, his voice wavering, this
teacher wept. The teachers meeting felt as emp~.y as a gathering of those
facing their deathbeds.
That is all there was to it. In the secrecy of the teachers meeting he could
bring himself to say only that little. Leaving the teachers meeting he could
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say nothing. In the debate Mr Morishima says, "In Japan as a rule a'national
concensus of the people' takes shape impulsively and with surprising speed.
Furthermore, once this 'concensus' is reached, the national character is such
that it is exti�emPly difficult to voice a differing opinion." It is not dif-
ficult. It is my frightening experinece that weeping in a private room is all
that can be done.
That I found a reading of the comments of toth men fr:.ghtening goes along also
with my wish that a stop be called to too much heralding of war, war. This
is because I think that there exists to a large extent in the Japanese char-
acter something which, while all the outcry of thus and so is going on, could
suddenly catch hold and grow and become serious. This is because there ate
those who are aiming for this and clamor for it in a l~ud voice.
Both men, typical scholars, relate such things as what Hitler did at the be-
ginning of the war, how Chamberlain acted, thus and so about Switzerland and
Belgium, and what Kennedy wrote about it afterwards, what Churchill wrote -
afterwards, and use them as proof to support their assertions. And in the
midst of this they exclaim that "It is necessary to extract a lesson from
history but if one says that if this had been done at the time, and thus spec-
ulates with an admixture of empty ideas and draws out one's personal moral,
then we learn nothing from history." (Morishima) But in effect Mr Seki's
assertion seems to be that we should have "a minimum defense capability."
Mr Seki says that this "minimum defense capability" is a"force with which
Japan by itself can continue at war until the arrival of the American relief
army--for example about 2 weeks." Mr Morishima's assertion is that in modern
Japan "the Self Defense Forc2s should not be made any larger than it already
is and moreover should not be immediately lessened or abolished. Ultimately
it should b.e changed over to a spacial corps of army engineers with a combat
- capability of zero and "in the unlikely event that the Soviet Union should
attack again there is nothing for the Self Defense Forces to do but resolutely =
_ with order and discipline surrender. Rather than inviting a full-out war and
- earning an honorable death, and then having the enraged Soviet army sweep down -
and usher in the post-war misery, make an orderly surrender maintained with
_ dignity, and then obtain in return the right of political self-determination.
This is, I believe, much the wiser:course."
This part of Mr Morishima's assertion is a very attractive way of
engaging -
defeat and if this were a lecture he might get a round cf applause here, but
from my experience of actual war, war does not happen liice some war game and
- this "resolutely making an ordered and disciplined capitulation" is a dream
and nothing more than a dream. And is not "receiving in exchange the right
of political self-determination" a naive view as well.
However, between the two, I prefer Mr Morishima's opinions. We should shut
the door. We should also be careful of fire. When thieves are everywhere -
we should take doorclosing much more seriously. And even then if a thief
sould berak in, it would be better to not surrender in the attractive manner
- Mr Morishima suggests, but in great distress, seeking only to save our lives.
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lloor-shutting naturally varies with the prevalence of thieves. If the
door is locked too ostentatiously, there is the danger that the thieves will
rather set their eyes on it. ~
Yuichi Yoshikawa ~
Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 97-99
[Article by Yuichi Yoshikawa (Former Director of Vietnam Peace Movement):
"'Software--A Country which Deserves Protection:]
[Text] I have been asked, upon reading the dialogue of the two men, to add
something. I am opposed to the existence of the present Self Defense Forces
and my position is one of having previously called for its demilitarization.
_ So broadly speaking this means that I am in support of Mr Morishima's argu-
ments and opposed to Mr Seki's position.
I in particular support for Mr Morishima's argument that the great expenditures
engendered in armaments could be expected to do more for Japan's defense if
channelled into cultural interchange and the i~provement of international
relations. There is virtually no part of Mr Seki's arguments which departs
from a reiteration of the door-closing policy which has been resolutely
repeated up to the present..
However looking over the arguments of both men, what leaves me unsatisfied
with both is the point that they leave the inner core of the meaning of -
"nation" in a time of national defense virtually untouched.
A defense debate divorced from the questions of who should protect us from
what and what is a defense-obligated country becomes meaningless. As
Mr Morishima also states, during World War II the final line on wh~t the
Japanese Government attempted to defend was "the entire nation"--that is
the status of the emperor, and not the lives of the peaple. From what does
the present Self Defense Force intend to protect us and what are they pro-
- tecting?
Inferring from Mr Seki's arguments, the Japanese "nation" which should be
defended appears to be a country which supports non-intervention in heavy
industry and intensive know-how type industries and "the current level of
living standard." As long as the "national interest" and peace of the Japanese
- nation are promoted in this way, in the midst of competitive economic war
for resources and markets, we must also engage in ever more oppressive policies
against the Third World. However this in not the place to debate directly
Japan's future course and I limit myself to a discussion of what it is the
Self Defense Force is trying to defend. -
It must first be recognized that the object of Self Defense Force protection
is not the people. According to Sadao Fujii's indication Admiral Tatsuo
Chikudo, head of the Maritime Self-Defense School, concludes that the object
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_ ul cl~~fi,nv~� upoii wlilrl~ tli~~ tic~lt I)cfen:;r I~vrccr tiltould placc~ Chc mntn ~~mpl~ct:~I:;
is "the national soil," this being not the protection of each individual's
life and property as is generally held, but the public defense capability of
the police, the fire departments medical facilities and in th~ event of an
- emergency of the organization which would likely unite them as a force for
protecting the people." That is, the first ob~ect of defense is not the life
and safety of the people.
How are the people of the country viewed? The Self Defense Force excludes the
people. That within the country there are bath sopporters and opponents of
the Self Defense Force is natural if Japan is a democratic country, but they -
do not wish to recognize this. The Self Defense Force regards critics as
enemies and opposes them severely. This is not only the approach of the
ranking officials of the Defense Agency in response to the issues raised by
- the opposition parties. For example in the attitude towards the Nozaki
family of the Hokkaido Eniwa Affair (Eniwa Affair 1955-67) the Self Defense
Force approach to private citizens and citizen groups became clear for the
first time.
At present, as Mr Seki himself says, "civilian control is without doubt not
proceeding well" and he places the blame on "the strong opposition to the Self
Defense Force" on the part of the socialist and communist parties. It is also
clear that the idea of emergency legislat~on is also directed towards the
power of opposition.
As Mr Morishima also says, as a force in avoiding war, "software" is now
becoming increasingly important over "hardware." Within this so-called "soft-
ware," together with the policy of peaceful relations supported by the people,
is included the fact that the people themselves find it worthy to defend the
country, and in an unlikely invasion, even in the event of the surrender of
the government, in various forms the populace holds a determination to re-
sist in numerous ways. _
r4r Moriyama, extracting the example revolving on the emperor system, argues
that this is a"weaponless deterrent power." In the event the emperor were
captured, irregardless of any judgment of whether in Japan any large-scale
rebellion would occur, "even if a large portion of the occupying army remained
for a long period, we may expect that the occupation affairs would not proceed
in an orderly manner favorably," for the invading country and we may reckon
that the strength of the all-out posture of popular resistance is an important
and essential element.
Take a case of a military base; a base surrounded by hostile nearby residents
can not completely fulfill its functions and would gradually have to be aban-
doned, an actual example being the first struggles in Okinawa in a number of
localities over the bases. In this case it is not necessary to delimit, as
_ Mr Morishima says, the use of weapons. (However this is of course not use of
arms by a Self Defense Force protection organization hostile to the people.)
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However, tt~at this is possible, as'was touched on earlier, is due to a, moral
sense of resistance felt by the people. That is, the precursor is that one
must be committed to defend the country oneself.
The present day actions of the Self Defense Force, the actions the government ~
is permitting to occur, lie rather in the opposite direction. Internationally
the government for example violates a United Nations proclamation and aids
. countries like South Africa and Nambia which ignore human rigl~ts, and continues
to adopt policies which earn the opposition of the Third World. Within the
country it authoritatively suppresses differing ideologies and movements on
defense and intently pursues peace preservation law and increasing military
strength. If this continues it is hardly plausible that the people would
regard such a country and army as something they should defend themselves.
An army alienated from the people can serve no function whatsoever.
What is necessary is not an education which cultivates an abstract "love of
country." In actuality the people of the country have a commitment te protect
the country, to work to make the country. If it is a country that values pro-
tecting itself, the people, in the event of an unjust invasion, will of them-
- selves arise in resistance.
' rfakoto Nakaj ima
Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 99-100
[Article by Makoto Nakajima (critic): "Urge Continuation oi' the Debate"] -
[Text) Examining both arguments, Yukio Morishima's "New 'Armaments Plan
- Proposal"' and Yoshihiko Seki's "The Peace Cannot be Preserved Without Wea-
pons," I felt that the former has let us hear an argument for rPinforcing
rearmament but the latter has a fairly unique and keen perception. I would
like to present only three outstanding points from Mr Morishima's arguments,
first that in the event America an3 the Soviet Union came to grips as apart
from Vietnam, Korea and Taiwan, Japan with a population of 100 million and a -
major power with the second largest GNP in the world would withou*_ doubt be-
come enveloped in a third world war. Next, the choice as a course of action
in the unlikely event of a Soviet attack as an ordered surrender retaining
national integrity and in exchange obtaining the right of political self-
determination. And finally that the best form of self defense for us is to
~ avoid war before it happens, and th~t for that reason we should incorporate
not a group of people who can act in the event of war, but people who can act
- ~ before the outbreak of war. The second point is one that has not been made
well by the existing reformist groups, and is much more convincing than es-
tablishment of disarmament only on the basis that there is no likelihood of
a Soviet invasior.. It seems to me that the unproductive argument that with
no rearmament and taking a neutral position there will be no invasion, or
because of it there will be an invasion, is here being repeated.
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On the first point, in a recent Gallup Poll, in the event that the Soviet Union ~
invaded Japan, 42 percent of American citizens answered that the American
army should be sent to Japan. Compared to 92 percent of leaders in the field
of foreign policy who said the U.S. should respond to western Europe by sendinP
U.S. forces, 81 percent of those leaders believed that if a Soviet invasion
of Japan was to take place, U.S. troops should be dispatched, and we may call -
U.S. citizens and policy makers' apFraisals fairly close to reality. Further,
the YOMIURI SHIMBUN published on 9 July "top secret information" on a decision
on a plan for Self Defense Force troops and reinforcements in the event of an
invasion of Kokkaido for a resistance of one month's duration. In this plan,
mainly with the Reservists of the Self Defense Forces and former Self Defense
- Forces members, 77,000 personnel are expected to be called up for service.
And the same paper stated that this ties into a military conscription system.
The normalization of China and the U.S. foreign relations, the restoration of
Japan-China relations, the conclusion of the Japan-China Peace Treaty, and in
the disputes between China and Vietnam, we see the gradual formation of multi-
lateral relationship of the EC, U.S., Japan, Korea, China vs. the Soviet
Union and adding to this the energy crisis we can see that all the ingredients
leading to "a third world war" are in the process of becoming aligned. -
- The condi.tions for~a world war come together at a focus point around 1985.
The problem is how to one by one demolish the dangerous ingredients. The best
thing for our country is not curtailing local conflicts but eliminating the
conditions for a major war. However as Mr Morishima says, the prevention
beforehand of war must be accomplished with the economic and industrial appeal
oF the country continuing to grow as it is. v
I believe the most essential things is Mr Morishima's third stated point.
On this p'oint Mr Seki as well is in general accord.
However, what sort of people are these "who play an influential role before
the war." These are the people who can accurately assess the damage to the
economy of the populace brought about by war, and those who at the same time ~
can foresee the possible situation of the "post-war" world. Those who can
measure these things will spare themselves in every effort and in every
conciliation to prevent war.
Next year is 1980, the 55th year of the Showa reign. I would like to strongly
emphasize that there is a need to consider the time of 40 years ago, the year '
of 1940, the 15th year of the Showa era. In the first half of this period we
have the establishment of support systems, the reorganization of wartime
economic systems for heavy and chemical industries in time of war, the pro-
duction of staple food by farmers, mobilizing men and sending them overseas. -
In the latter half we have the loss of the war, an occupation, and the reform
of ideologies and political systems after the war. A mere 10 years com-
prising all this and yet out of Japan's history in no other century was such
a rich lesson given to us as it was presented today. I believe that research
- into the history of the 1940s, from every angle, has become necessary to us.
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For the last 10 years I have criticized simple views of history which see
this period as a simple aggressive period, a dark age, or a transition period
between facism and democracy.
- Especially in the beginning of the 1940s it was a time ~ahen "those who play
an influenttal role upon outbreak of war" were held~necessary, and in fact
those sort of people existed ma3nly among the ranks of the bureaucraric tech-
nocrats. It may be said that the eve of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War
in 1938 is important. However, even more so then it was precisely the period
from 1936-1937 to the end of the forties that there were some persons, although
not enough, who demonstrated for the prevention of world war. I do not here
have ;pace to prove this in detail but place my hopes in the overall tendency
in the people to oppose and feel aversion to war. Specifically in those faced
with the onerous task of choosing a national policy of war or peace, in an
attitude which views the outcome of a lost war only in a negative way in
the defense problem today, and moreover in the question of non-armament and
of staying neutral or emergency legislation, we must not fall into controversy
over either of the unproductive extremeties of action, for this can lead to
fomenting a~Z inadvertent descent into war and an irresponsible nationalism
which does not take into account the aftermath of war. -
The 1979 debate between Messrs Morishima and Seki is comparable to the dialogue -
in 1978 between Jun Eto and Akigo Honda and the two debates have some connec-
tion. Mr Eto's fresh discussion of the meaning of the occupation and -
Mr Morishima's discussion of future "surrencler" are problems which should be
considered in the same light. As one outside the ring, I hope for a recess
in the debate.
Masamori Sase -
Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 101-103
[Article by Masamori Sase (Professor, Defense Academy): "Disappointment
with Mr Morishima's Arguments"]
[Text] Mr Morishima's arguments disappointed me on a number of points. I
had expected some original arguments from Mr Morishima, but all he has pre-
_ sented is a number of dogmas. This is the first reason for my disappointment.
Below I will present two major examples of this dogmatism and offer a number
of proofs.
1) Mr Morishima claims that in Japan war cannot be supressed but only avoided
and advocates efforts in the direction of neutrality. The process whereby he
demonstrates tliis is through a weighty consideration of the Swiss example
in World War II. He asserts strongly that the reason this country was able
- to maintain peace was because "Hitler" was considering using Switzerland as
an avenue for negotiations with the ener.ry nations. However as Mr Seki
pointed out there are a number of documents which show that this assertion
has no authority whatsoever. Conversely, the German army which Moriyama _
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designates as Hitler, while formulating a plan for the invasion of Switzerland,
gave up the execution of the plan in the face of the Swiss posture of opposi-
tion. Moreover at the time the Swiss people themselves were hardly considering
at al.t tliat ttiey had--as t4r Morishima calls it-- "a capacity f~r inter-
_ mediation." Indeed if we compare this to a strict definition of neutrality,
they were compelled to make "concessions" to Germany which tortured their
conscience. However Switzerland did not only "support" and cooperate with
Germany. In Switzerland as well a large number of Nazis appeared, but even
so the overall posture of the Swiss people was opposed to Hitler. To exag-
gerate this disparity slightly the tenor of feeling in the Swiss was not -
neutral at all, it.was pro-Western European. These sorts of things are shown
clearly in for example W. Links' "The Swiss at War 1933-1945" (1974). At
least Mr Morishima should engage in an investigation of that order.
In the event the Soviet Uninn attacked, Mr Morishima writes that the Self
Defense Force should make a disciplined and orderly surrender and Japan "in
exchange would obtain the right of political self-determination" and con-
cludes that "under Soviet control, if only we persevere, a form of socialist
economy suitable to Japan is possible," exactly as though tlie values of
surrender to the Soviet Union and political self-determination can be inter-
changed, and as though any other form of socialism other than Soviet-style
communism or peoples democracy--such as social democracy or people's social-
ism--would be permitted. Nothing more need be said beyond that these two
propositions are unfounded. But it seems Mr Morishima.intended to submit the
semblance of a basis for his arguments. That is, "As I have friends in
- Hungary and Poland, when I met them, I listened to them exhaustively regarding _
freedom of thought and other matters, and from their comments I believe
that the degree of freedom which they are permitted is tl~e same degree as
that permitted in Japan in 1940. Or again, "Since I believe in people, the
Russians together with the Americans, (bearing both red~ and white flags)
I say greet the Russian troops." But this is not a substitute for the basis
of an argument. To bring forth a"talk" with friends without substance or
rule to confirm this serious proposal is an affront to the intelle.ct, and if
an espousal of one's personal bPliefs is suf~i~i~r.t Lo CStablish the basis
of an argumeht, academics has no important function. What astounded me even
more is the matter of the ease with which he sets forth and uses such words
as "Soviet control" and "polirical self-determination." For one country to
"control" another is to subjugate that country's "right of political self-
determination" and that a country has "self-determination" shows that it is
not under "control." The two things from the first are conceptually opposed
to each other. Does Mr Morishima not realize this? Is this not so when in `
good and in bad "the Japan of around 1940" was acting on the basis of political
self-determination and he is mixing this up with the "freedom" of present day
Hungary and Poland? For the former there was political self-determination,
but the freedom within the country was meagre. For the latter there is a
lack of both. There are a number of so-called socialist countries which op-
pose Soviet intentions and pursue political self-determination. In the cases -
- of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, this was frustrated in the face of Soviet
military power. What about the examples of China, Yugoslavia and Romania?
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If Mr Morishima says that he wishes to bring forth again the "white flag, red
flag" argument I would like to have him investigate towards just whom the
armies of these countries are deployed in opposition.
- The next thing which disappointed me in Mr Morishima's arguments is their
terrible preconclusions and ring of inevitability. I present the main examples.
1) Mr Morishima holds that Japan, differing from England, is a country which
espouses anit-amateurism and in which the ~pecialists have an extended range,
and warns that if no exception is made with regard to defense, "if there is -
no reform in Japan's high school education, with the situation remaining
that the soldiers are the well-educated, and if the army is strengthened,
but with nevertheless the civilians controlling the army, Japan will likely
again become a nation under the control of the military." If we proceed
with this type of argument, to the extent we do not abolish amateurs, it is
_ nonsense for Japan to consider civilian control of the army. But in no way
is it such a simple matter. Regarding the advantages for England of civilian
control, it is an over-simplification to conclude that there is "the army
and then there are amateurs." Certainly the English army is under govern-
ment control but the fact that in the government and parliament there are
military men and authorities on a general par in ability should be mentioned.
To the extent of my knowledge a number of treatises verify this situation.
The word "amateur" which might be so construed, does not mean the establish-
ment of the transcendency of the carefree non-specialist. On the other side,
in order that the civilian control system of our government does not end in
failure, changeover to amateurs is not the sole anitdote. Rather, A) Without
ignoring military problems politicians must deepen their knowledge of mili-
tary matters, B) Provide a thorough education for those in uniform to obtain
- compliance with civilian control and C) Map out a harmonious merging of
government and the military. I am bearing a part of the burden of B) myself,
and from my experience I can never side with the sort of preconclusion Mr ~
Morishima espouses.
2) Mr Morishima's statement that, "In the present stage of nucl~ar weapons
development, if a war occurs it is the end," is again a terrible preconclusion.
If people, including pacifists, would investigate the afterma~h of World War II,
they would not consider that "if there is a war it is the end." The reason
is that the world has experienced after the war an unrecountable number of
- wars and disputes. From the eyes of those who have experienced this the
extreme position that, "In either event in the worst possible case, unfortu-
nately for Japan there is only an honorable death for 100 million people, or
a surrender of 100 million," is untenable. That in addition to preconclusive
theories this sort of extremism exerts an influence is the outstanding fea-
ture of Mr Morishima's arguments. However, logically speaking, there are
~ several gradations in actual war, from an all out nuclear attack "where -
- nothing can be done" to non-nuclear and small-scale engagements, and a great
_ breadth of choice of from 100 million surrendered to 100 million dead is a
spectacle. Why does Mr Morishima ignore this? -
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A mountain of faults which should be pointed out remain. Of these I will
broach one more point. That is that on many occasions Mr Morishima uses the
word "winning capability." It may be said that throughout his argument he
has sut,mitted the checkmate theory to criticism. But essentially this
checkmate theory bears no relation to thought on "winning capability."
Not only this, but in view a position of the sort that holds, "the generals
of the Self Defense Force are add3cted to 'winning capability'," I cannot
but wonder at his intentions, whether this is based on ignorance or is due
to some other reason. It is impossible that anyane could not be disappointed
with argur~ents based on dog~na, preconclusions, ext~emism and then ignorance
or in*_enti~nal distortion.
Masanori Kikuchi
Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 103-105
[Article by Masanori Kikuchi (Assistant Professor of Soviet History, Tokyo
University): "What Sort of 'Japan' Should We Create?"]
- [Text] In discussion on the defense of Japan, divided into arguments for an
absolutely unarmed neutrality and an absolute rearmament, we have passed
through 34 years of mutual denouncement and reply. At the present stage when ~
such unsettling pronouncements are being.published one after another the
attitude of Mr Morishima and Mr Seki on frankly expressing ideas on Japan's
defense, i.e., if America $nd the Soviet Union sh~uld happen to go to war, the
= discussion of a Soviet invasion of Japan, etc., must be regarded as significant.
The proneness towards racing the engine in discussions of national defense
and the difference in the outlook on the future lies in the point that the
difference outlooks on the future of the two exerts a great influence on
their current assertions. And the outlook on the future international situ-
ation, formed by appraisals of the situation and the historical awareness
which measures it, is by its nature prone to being greatly influenced. What
I felt firstly from the arguments of both parties is in the actual "if only"
examples from history, almost all are limited to major warsites in Europe and
- to the experiences of World War II, and it is excessive to draw upon this
historical process as data in considering why Japan was plunged into the war.
I found this strange. It must be concluded that, the relevant parts of both
parties' positions notwithstanding, to interpolate a large number of "if onlys"�
from European history is surely unproductive in any debate. Suppositions of
the sort that "if only" an unwavering attitude had been taken against Hitler,
and analysis based on the assumption that then it wouldn't have happened thusly,
_ no matter how many meanings may be extrapolated, is only this and nothing
more. History is history just because things didn't happen that way. And if
both parties pile up "if only" style arguments we must go back to the source -
of World War I and the military cooperation of Germany and Russia during
World War I.
If ttie stage of the debate were shifted to Japan and Asia, the problem could
probably be better engaged. The loss of the war on 15 August 1945 was the
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destruction of the path of Japan~s former military nationalism. And if we
pursue that course of events we understand how difficult Mr Morishima's
stated civilian control is. This experience has sunk into the very flesh of
- the Japanese people. And the hostory of authorative power controlling news,
thought, religion, gatherings, trampling all rights of the people underfoot
is clear. For this reason especially, democracy--not the wasted remains of
it--is necessary. It is also important that because of the defeat in the
Pacific War, the Japanese people know that those who had advocated it and been
inspired by war, when defeat came, changed their nature like cameleons, negated
war, abandoned the people in a tragic situation and took flight in self-
preservation. For those who advocate rearmament the most important thing
is to promise that in the event of war they will stand themselves zn the front
line, and so earn the trust of the people. It must be seriously brought
to mind that the reason that discussion of rearaament can not obtain strong
public support lies in the conduct of betrayal entered upon by its precursors.
I used the word "front line" but this i:s in a moral sense. The shape of war
has changed greatly. Mr Morishima speaks for the appeal of occupation and the _
capitulation of the country, surrendering and holding up the white flag if
tHe Soviet Union attacks and avoiding the horrors of war and says that we
should create a unique socialism under the Soviet embrace. Mr Seki refutes
this.
Both sides state that they do not reckon the Soviet Union as an enemy, but in
reading their arguments invariably the form of the Soviet Union appears. I
dislike a playful "if only" sort of history but to mE that the present day
Soviet Union should entertain a proposal such as the occupation of Japan is
unthinkable. Knowing the serious internal contradictions and the stultifi-
- cation in foreign policy in the Sovi~t Union we must arrive at this conclusion.
While calmly observing the trends of the Soviet Union, it is important that
Japan should not break its flexible yet rigid fundamental posture and it
should also exercise caution against irresponsibly broadcasting a Soviet
threat and avoid the error of forming a single policy with respect to the
Soviet Union.
The era to debate the pros and cons about whether Japan should "submit" or
_ "intimidate" when it comes to diplomacy is now something of a past. Funda-
mentally Japan should take an acrobat-style pursuit towards foreign relations.
And it is the Japanese people who support the acrobat from below. Indeed a
disbelief in political authority is the most dangerous thing. It is not
necessary to reiterate th~t on this point the authority of the present Liberal
democratic Party is driving the people towards a spirit of political in-
difference. The opposition party cannot evade this responsibility.
In Iran or Nicaragua there is a fitting reason why authority should tumble.
This is that the leaders think only of personal gain and leave the people in
the midst of great poverty. To say that this is permeated with communism is
a mistake. Mr Seki's allergy to communism exceeds my imagination, but let us
take leave of an unhistorical sense which places Hitler, Stalin and Mao Zedong _
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in the same line and then, adding "if onlys" makes erroneous declarations.
Rather it would be better to make the issue the difference between a Germany
wliich has not ceased its pursuit of war criminals and a Japan who makes a former
war criminal, who appeared invariably in graft scandals, the prime minister.
Unfortunatcly socialist countries have a number of serious faults, but we
cannot utilize these faults in order to praise Japan. Love of the country is
born for the first time when the Japanese people become truly one with the -
government. In making the base of discussion what kind of Japan we should
create, the controversy over national defense will bear fruit for the first
time. A national defense discussed apart from love of country is dangerous.
And the road towards making Japan a country that the Japanese people can
truly love lies foremost in conCroversy.
Tadae Takubo
Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 105-107
[Article b5t Tadae Takubo (Critic on Foreign Affairs): 1�A Happy Era"]
[Text] I think that Mr Morishima's argunents take in problems of too wide a
periphery. If our eyes are dazzled by the problems raised one by one, no
matter how many sheets of paper there are it will not be enough. But to
squeeze these problems dry to the utmost, let us go ahead with, "In the un-
likely event that the Soviet Union should attack there is nothing for the
Self Defense Forces to do but resolutely with order and discipline surrender.
Rather than inviting an all-out war and earning an honorable death, and then
having the enraged Soviet army sweep down and usher in the post-war misery,
make an orderly surrender maintained with dignity, and then obtain in return
the right of political self-determination. This is, I believe, much the wiser
course." I am obligated to quote partial quotations, but in adding, "In either
event if the worst possible case should occur, unfortunately for Japan there
is only an~honorable death for 100 million or surrender for 100 million. If
we say that an honorable death is meaningless, then we are left with surrender,
but if surrender it is, then, zero armaments are sufficient," the essence of
Mr Morishima's arguments becomes manifest.
Arguments for the unarmed neutrality of Japan are statements which do not heed
the precedents in the world. The basis of this argument is the general view
that Japan has a so-called peace constitution and that the international en-
- vironoment is encompassed by the three great powers of the U.S., China and
the Soviet Union. However if from the outer surtace of this basis we enter
a step within, we ~~ill consider that, since we cannot wage war, there is no _
other means but to surrender and for that reason armaments are unnecessary
and Japan must take a neutral stand_. Thus we attain the real motive.
This section on the real motive is imposing, and Mr Morishima for the first
time revealed the details, and it all seems to have been systemat~zed. Con-
sidered only in this wav a defense policy becomes unnecessary for Japan. In
this sense it is an~epoch-making:argument. I wonder what eort�of impressron ~
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~ the late Admiral Nurumi Inoue, in his grave, has on Morishima's argument?
Although perhaps not enraged, I think that he is smiling grimly.
What I~ust cannot understand is that although this argument is formulated
~ on an attack against Japan by the Soviet Union, people throughout Jap.an _
should also foster more countries which feel Japan's existence is beneficial
to them. .
I ask that Japan become the mediator for the east. I believe that an eastern
country can understand the other eastern country better than [a Western
country can] and that a country which can become a mediator for the world is
necessary. Without relying on weapons or armaments, stacking up results in
economics, culture and foreign relations, etc., I ask that we be a mediator
of peace.
The present time is called the nuclear age. In armaments and energy, a basic
~ idea proliferated by "nuclear" is being formulated into every subject. I
think this is rather frightening. No matter how much peaceful use of nuclear
energy is called for, there is no change in the fact that nuclear material
is dangerous. It is needless to say that ever since the discover~ of an
atomic nucleus, the existence of mankind has been 'threatened. In this sort
of age, can we avoid war by arming ourselves? In the June issue of GENDAI
in an article entitled "Our Strongest Defense", by former chairman of the
Joint Chief of Staffs Kurisu stated that "since it is impossible for Japan,
unlike the Soviet Union, to put up its full war capability, if in some area
- we can excell in exerting its influence and use it as a deterrent power, an
opponent with greater overall power would not easily turn against us." It
is a discussion with no end. It may be an immediate deterrent but can never
be absolute. The top seat will soon be taken over by another country. The
point is unclear on what sort of international climate will be the basis of
the attack. He completely ignores U.S.-Soviet relations, Sino-Soviet rela-
tions, U.S.-China relations, the Korean Peninsula and the international cli-
mate which envelopes Japan, and he says "in the event of Soviet attack", sur-
render does not make any sense. I imagine that he bases an attack against
Japan on present U.S.-China-Soviet and U.S.-Japan relations but he has not
touched at all on the act;ons of the U.S., tied in with the U.S.-Japan Sec-
urity Treaty. Professor Moriyama says that un~der current Japan-U.S; rela-
tions, even if Japan is invaded by the Soviets, the U.S. will not come to
her aid, but this is absurd. I consider that depending on conditions and
circumstances'the U.S. may even invade Japan.
It is common knowledge that the two countries of Japan and the U.S., under
a nuclear umbrella and tied by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, consider the
Soviet Union as an enemy. I do not know under what circumstances it would
occur, but if Japan hoists up the red and white flag, for America this con-
duct would be a clear betrayal. To put it clearly, if after being under U.S. -
protection long since the end of the war Japan were to open up the castle
and invite the Soviet Union, don't you think it's possible for the U.S. to
attack Japan? The change from "love" over to "hate" is frightening. If
the,single nation of East Germany proceeded to surrender to the NATO army,
the Soviet Union would not likely sit by.
;
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In the 19 July issue of SANKEI SHIMBUN in the column "Sound Debates" Tokyo
University professor Yoshitaro Katsuta pointed out that, "For America, if
a major power with the economic expertise like Japan falls helplessly into
the hands of the Soviet Union, a'preveiitive occupation' is a possibility,"
hut it certainly would not seem to end with that. For America Japan's stra- ~
tegic value is extremely great. If professor Morishima placed himself in
- the White House and thought about a Japanese-Soviet war with the interests
of the U.S. at the center that should become clear. It is impossible that
the U.S, in a sportsmanlike manner should laugh and then just cut Japan
- off asunder.
In the event of a war with the Soviet Union do we raise our hands in surren-
der from the first, or do we fight for a while and then pursue the choice of
100 million honorable deaths or 100 million surrendered, then making "a .
i surrender replete with integrity?" I feel that this section is~very vague. _
Professor Morishima can state that, "under Soviet occupation, building a form
of socialist economy suitable to Japan.is possible if.we persevere," but
I question whether this statement was made after deep thought on what it
would be like under Soviet occupation. Unfortunately as it is not possible ,
that we conduct an experinent and ask the Soviet Union to please occupy -
Japan for 5 years, everyone has no course but to speak out as he pleases on
whatever they fancy. But I cannot be as optimistic as Mr Morishima. Is
there any guarantee that political self-determination will be recognizPd?
I do not mean to say that it is going to be unbearable to exist under Soviet
occupation, therefore we chose 100 million deaths. This, as Mr Seki says,
is an extreme situation and it is something for the cabinet and prime minister
to ~'ecide. To think of it, we are fortunate to be in a society where free
speech is permitted, where food and clothing are sufficient, and where we
- can debate 100 million deaths or complete surrender and so on. This pheno-
menon speaks for how peaceful a nation like Japan is.
However, at present, ar~ong~,T~panese, I�don't see any~serious attitude taken
toward the militarily and economically fragile sta'te of their own country,
and there is no concern over how to cope with the situation either. I think
the danger exists within the minds of people, and long before we are invaded
_ by another country, I am afraid to say that it is likely that 100 million
will lose the mental.strength and become scared. And they will. fall to a
_ spiritual death.
Fuji Kamiya -
Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 107-109
[Article by Fuji Kamiya, (professor, Keio University): "An Era of Relativism"] ~
[Text] Since I am allowed certain space, I would like to limit myself to
presenting some doubts I have with respect to professor Morishima's thesis.
(1) Today is the age of collective security. It is often stated that in
- today's world, apart from che great powers of the U.S. and the Soviet Union,
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there is no country which by itself can preserve the security of its own
nation. But even the U.S. and the Soviet Union single-handedly cannot guar-
antee the security of their nations without the cooperation of their allies.
If this is so for the U.S. and the Soviet Union Japan cannot consider national
defense without the cooperation of its ally America. It must be said it
should be very natural for us to always think of national defense on the
premise of U.S. cooperation. The far-fetched scenario of Japan fighting the
Soviet Union by itself--which has become a standard scenario nowadays--is
not an appropriate position for discussing the prqblem of Japan's defense.
(2) But at the time of emergency, will America come to our aid? This, to-
gether with the credibility of the nuclear umbrella, is the question hurled
out by those who have repeatedly opposed the U.S.-Japan security system. This
is a problem which cannot be tested. If we suppose that America will come to
our aid in actuality, this is after an attack or invasion has been inflicted
on the country, and so the damage is already done. The object of our defense
policy is to see to it that an opportunity for testing the reliability of Amer-
ica does not come.
If testing or objective verification is impossible, then ultimately we can
only return to the subjective problem of whether to believe or not believe
in America. However this is not a problem which can be settled by preference
or by feeling, and we must sufficiently examine the persuasiveness of the
argument which lies behind any such subjective judgment.
In order to place trust in the U.S. defense cooperation with Japan, I believe
- that we need to examine, at the least, the following two matters. A) First
there is the problem of whether America will in the future as well be a
Pacific power, and my answer to this is "yes." There is no doubt that in-
creasingly in the future as both a Pacific and Atlantic power it will con-
tinue to hold a vital interest in the regions of eastern Asia and the western
Atlantic. An America without its influence in these two areas is unthinkable -
as it is a great world power, and I can't imagine that in the foreseeable
- future the country would submit to losing its posttion as a great power.
B)~ Next, what is the basic axis of the America-Asia relationship? I am not -
leaving aside Japan-U.S. relations. For America, the present stable alliance
with Japan and the preservation of friendly U.S.-Japan relations--in addition
to harmony in Asian policy and its effective enforcement--is essential. With
the reconciliation and normalization of China-U.S. relations, it has been
mentioned that now the cent~r of Asian policy may be shifted fro~n Japan-U.S.
relations to U.S.-China relarions, but for a long time to come, that is nothing
more than an illusion and beyond comprehension. In politics, economics,
militarily and technologically, China is still in every way an unrealized
country.
Essentially, for a matter of life and death in Asia, Japan is the decisively
important nation, and accordingly America could not, after all, sit by and see
Japan submit through attack or invasion to a third power.
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(3) Since the history of mankind was established from ancient times by war
and peace, when we studied history, we used to memorize the chronology of wars
to study that subject. Even now, I imagine, those students who are preparing
for.their entrance exam may be doing the same to prepare for the history
exam. fiuwc.ver ~~resent day wars do not easily become oUjects af inemorization.
For future students who are studying to take the exam, it will not be.an easy
task to remember all about the Vietnam War. This is because in ~11 probability
there is no teacher or instructor who can conclusively teach when it began.
The difference between peace and war has become so vague. On the other hand,
at the time of the recent Tokyo Summit meeting, excessive use of police pro-
~ tection became the controversial issue. It is easy to criticize this, but if
something happened it would be i.rrevocable. Considering the Red Army and so
forth, even a nation like Japan which is considered to be one of the most
peaceful and free, did not have confidence in the safety of a small number
of vips without calling out the.entire police force.
As I mentioned above, nowadays there is no absolute guarantee of peace. The
same cannot be said for every country and place, but generally speaking there
can only be a relative guarantee of the peace. However while we submit to
this relativism we have no course but to pursue an even slightly better peace.
How would it be to stand on the out-dated thought, "For a nuclear nation, a
non-nuclear army is no threat," or decide, like John Foster Dulles, on "all -
or nothing." It is hard to get used~to such dichotomy in the modern time which
we call the "age of relativisn."
4) I cannot concur with Mr P~orishima on surrendering to the Soviet Union in
response to a Soviet attack, "obtaining in return the right of political
self-determination" and even under a Soviet occupation, "if we only persevere"
we can "establish a splendi.d society." I would prefer to abstain from the
"freedom" of 1940 Japan or the "freedom" of Poland. Japan is able to maintain
its prosperity because it trades with the advanced democratic nations extensive-
ly. The past history should have proved to us that ~apan, in surrendering to
an invader and confined to the framework of the COMECON system, could not -
possibly establish "a fine society."
Kyoko Hayashi
Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 109-111
[Article by Kyoko Hayashi, (writer): "The Japanese People Wish a Permanent
Peace"]
[Text] I read over again today Japan's constitution. The result was that I
was moved by the introduction to the peace constitution,--which was enacted on
3 May 1947 after the much of suffering experienced at the end of war, and which,
in an excellent fashion, left nothing unsaid--presents the spirit of the
Japanese people of the time. And I realized again how a.Tapanese nation should
be molded and i find the idea of proposing additional words to the constitu-
tion unnecessary.
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What came to mind after reading the dialogue on war and peace between
Mr Morishima "The New 'Armaments Plan Theory" and Pir Seki "Without Weapons
Peace Cannot be Preserved," is the simple question of protecting the country
or our lives from a hypothetical enemy. Is it a matter of one of two choices,
to fight or to surrender? And at the same time I question simply whether de-
fense of our nation is untenable without the premise of militarization. Is
the maintenance of peace withflut military force, a national defense based on
peace, a desk theory of amateur? It is of course not necessary to split hairs
on the arguments of both parties, and I know that both men's continued de-
bates are fo r the sake of peace, nonetheless the following doubts come to my
mind.
Mr Morishima gives as title to his opening paragraphs, "Tribute to the late
Admiral Narumi Inoue," and records that the Admiral states strongly that com-
petition with the U.S. and Gr~at Britain in building a naval force is by no
means for the sake of protecting japan. The same could be said for today as
well. What is possible for Japan is not deterring war but only avoiding it.
I, from my meagre but wholly sufficient experience ~f war, believe also that
in any event we should avoid war. To survive war and to go on living is nothing
- but the destruction of body and soul. Suppose we obtain peace after war; we
should recognize the fact that some of our people sacrifice their lives.
A peace obtained in exchange for lives is unconceivable. However I can not
go along with Mr Morishima's idea of avoiding war by orderly surrender to a -
hypottietical enemy nation. In avoiding war I think that there is only on~
_ way which is for the people to adhere to Article 9 of Chapter II of the
Constitution of Japan. This did not evolve from a complasiant concept that,
as in Mr Seki's words, "is based on the opportunistic outlook that it is in-
conceivable to believe any country would invade Japan that has a peace con-
stitution." For those of us who have experienced World War II, the old
wounds of the past are not slight enough for us to discuss peace with an
opportunistic outlook. It is hard to say that Japan faces a risk of en-
countering invasion from one side only. It's possible for Japan to become
an invader. Could this opportunistic outlook be derived from the debates
on peace which acknowledges both possibilities Japan faces?
Mr Morishima proceeds with what we have to learn from the "political position
of Switzerland which is neutral country," and states that, "the important thing
is to be always active in the arena of international politics and accumulate _
good records of being a.mediator during-peace time." Mr Seki as well states
that, "the most important thing is to exert out utmost efforts to avoid war.
I am in full support of the software diplomacy asserted by Mr Morishima,
which is through foreign relations, economic cooperation, and cultural inter- -
� change, etc. We should create foreigners knowledgeable in Japanese affairs and
should have good relations with more countries that feel the presence of
Japan is beneficial to them."
I believe truly that the only thing that can serve as a deterrent to war is
- people. I think there is nothing but individual's efforts and human wisdom
and driving the word "peace" firmly into our heads is the only answer. As a
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means of preserving peace, war and militarization should~not be considered;
human wisdom is the answer. Especially in order to avoid a war i.n the nuclear
age, it can be achieved by using human wisdom. If this is not achieved by
the unified effort o~ the entire G~orld, the day of self-destruction of man-
kind is most likely to come. The oil energy problem, the Vietnam problem,
whatever the problem is we have come ta an age when one country's policy could
not possibly solve all of the problems we face in the world.
As a place to solve problems peacefully in the world as one, I feel secure in
the existence of the United Nations. If it is said that it exerts little in-
fluence, those of u~ who ask for peace have a responsibility and duty to pre-
_ severe in raising the level of its influence. I believe it is the United
Nations that can serve as a deterrent force.in avoiding war. _
We Japanese pledged ourselves to "forever renounce war as a sovereign right
of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international
disputes." Before mocking it as empty rhetoric, we should make greater efforts.
A mere 32 years has elapsed since then.
Tokichi Harada
Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese Sep 79 pp 111-112
[Article by Tokichi Harada (Commentator): "The Blind Spot in 'The Great
Debate ]
[TextJ The opposing ideas on 'defense' which divide the country into two,
"the anti- and pro-armaments theories, appear in the July issue of the maga-
zine BUNGEI SHUNJU as a debate in four parts. These are Morishima Yukio's
"New 'New Armaments Program" and Seki Yoshihiko's "Without Armaments.the
Peace Cannot Be Defended."
A debate is fair, superlatively intellectual, and full of vigor. The editor's
postscript states, "These debates might have become a'starting point"--which
we are surely to touch in future debates--when national defense of Japan was
to be discussed. I have absolutely no objection to this. And I must confess
also that I felt a slight boredom and a secret disappointment.
The instigator ot the debate Mr Morishima states that returning to Japan from
London on the airplane he read Mr Seki's artic~e "We Should Be Able to Deal
- With Emergencies Such as a Surprise Attack" in the SANKEI SHIMBUN and was
amazed. He states that, "I even felt frightened to go home," and "for the
10 hours to Tokyo, with my wife as a listener, argued obstinately against
Mr Seki."
It is needless to say that it was Mr Seki's article in the newspaper and the
"completely changed" image of Japan that so excited him. Considering this
from a different angle; the fact that he could not even imagine and expect such
a transformation means that he had held all these years deep in his heart
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the golden age of unarmed neutrality theory in the sixties. With the feeling
of the sixties he takes on the present, becomes indignant, then this emotion
triggers him to debate on "War and Peace." It is natural that his debate
_ givrs tl~c~ strong impressian of. being only "a declt~ration from tt~e sixtieg." -
= Mr Seki's defense theory was formulated independent of any relationship with ~
Mr Morishima's questions and expectation~. It may be said that his rebuttal
- to Mr Morishima's "Without Armaments the Peace Cannot Be Preserves" impresses
us with his maturity and confidence which he acquired during the past 10-odd
years of continued struggle with rationalization of his idea and theory of
unarmed neutrality. In the face af a challenge he says what should be said,
plunges in to make the points that should be made, until he feels that to ar- ~
gue any further would be futile. If the above is so, there is nothing strange
that we have in this debate a splendid condensation of a substance with the
defense debate of the sixties and we should frankly admit tha~ we have here
an "orginal document" of the genre.
But having done so, let us address ourselves directly to the lack of rigor in
these emotional ideas. Reading over the dialogue, what unfortunately came to
mind was the recollection of a"time capsule." It seemed that the unfruitful ~
defetise debate of the sixties had been packed as is into a time capsule,
buried deep under the ground, and that it was unearthed to set loose a repe-
tition of the same old thing. I could only think that although the bac?~grounds
and the rhetoric may be modern, the substance was identical with the iss;~e we
had already discu~sed in the sixties and in the early years.of the seventies.
The strong feeling of, "What else to talk about now?" was with me, and that
. is why I felt a slight boredom and a hidden disappointment. In a word, we .
are "tired of listening" and "disgusted" with the f ruitless debate on arm-
ament-disarmament which may continue for who knows how long.
If, in this debate, there were some new development beyond the sixties, it
must be Mr Morishima's arguments which we might call "the promoting of sur-
render." Mr Morishima arrives at the conclusion that, "Under the worst
possible circumstance there is either death or surrender, and if death is
meaningless there is only surrender, and if surrender is the choice, there
is no need to arm ourselves." And also, "Rather than invite the horror of the
aftermath of war...an orderly sur~:ender with dignity, and obtaining in re-
turn the right of political self-determination." (He devoted 30 pages to
prove his thesis.) We might as well call it "the theory of unarmed surrender." _
When a question was posed, "Will a foreign country truly not instigate an
attack if we are unarmed?" we may say that Mr Morishima has rearmed himself
logically with the "unarmed neutrality theory" which has dropped in favor so
completely recently, so much so that we may call his stand "a change in
. approach." He offers tt~e solution to the question of "an unlikely attack"
as "an ordered surrender with dignity" and "the right of political self-
determination" and tries to make his point that "accordingly we should carry
through with disarmament."
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Again, unfortunately, we must state that in rhe background here as well we
have an image of the Soviet Union tinted by the rosy-hued miasma of the sixties.
In the sixties, was he unaware of the ccntroversy over a country which ap-
proved "a surrender with dignity" and a country which considered "zero arm-
aments?"
I wish to add that this "promoting of surrender" argument, and Mr Seki
touches upon this also, is exactly the same sort of thing we went through in
the fifties with Lord Russel's peace theory. This as well is no new develop-
ment and is nothing less than a pretense.
It is well to learn from the lessons of history of the last world war, but in
order for a"time capsule" argument to bloom and thrive in 1979 like the lo-
tus blossoms of ancient times which came to life again, to obtain a realistic
and correct assessment of the present day Soviet Union and current insight,
into the substance of wars in progress in Africa, the Middle East and South- ,
east Asia is absolutely essential. These are the real pictures and it is the
modern day reality that transcends the period of the sixties.
Other Readers Opinions
Tokyo BUNGEI SHUNJU in Japanese 79 pp 113-114
(Text] Ttie Defense Controversy is Still in Time
Reading Yukio Morismina's treatise, his points made in opposition to Mr Seki's
views aside, I felt a great sympathy with his ideas, and read them with great
interest.
However I've alawys been puzzled about the current trend which seeks to evade
- all mention of armaments. So, his argumenz that, "Differing opinians on the
national defense controversy must be presented at an early stage" made a
strong impression on me. And he states that having the military in obeyance -
to civilians is the same as forcing the military group to play ~ role of grand
champion of a stronger sumo wrestler. .
When I ponder how many politicians there are in Japan who have figured out
how much military power Japan needs in case it becomes a stage for war, I
can only feel a sense of revulsion.~ And furthermore if we consider rearmament
from the positiun of how much time is necessary to put that military capabil-
ity into effect and how much ammunition will be necessary, the whole debate
is an empty one.
Politicians, bureaucrats, and you people, who continue forever to debate
10 year-old issues: We are standing at the threshold of the age when people
should be, as Mr Morishima says, debating the question of rearmament and
establishing national security for Japan. (Company employee, 57 years old)
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A Rejection of Quantitative Concepts '
It may be imp~rtinent, hut I thought "the great debate" did not attain its
- goal. That is, the two parties had totally different views on life and
society to the extent that there is nothing common between their basic thinking
and, it is only natural that the debate does not go anywhere.
Personally I believe that the arguments of Mr Seki appear natural, and that
Mr Morishima seems to have taken things for granted that what he believes
is always correct.
He adheres to the historical path Switzerland has taken, calls for making fine
records as a mediator, placing emphasis ~n the light industry, etc., and his
thinking is so naive that I cannot believe he is considered to be a tap in-
tellectual. For example, even if the fact that Switzerland was not enveloped _
in the horrors of ~the last world war is due as he says to its neutrality, there
is no significance to this, other than that "that was the Switzerland of that
time." In the event Japan becomes the object in a worldwide war, neither
neutrality nor a mediation role is going to be the contributing factor for
being able to escape wars. -
Furthermore Mr Morishima states that in a nuclear age, a country without
nuclear weapons is powerless and that in the event of war it would be the end,
but I do not think so.
A nuclear attack on a small country like Japan and leaving it to a devasted
state removes all the merit from an invasion. Yet the ordinary weapons I
have in mind are by no means bamboo spears.
At the base of Mr Morishima's various thoughts, there seems to be quantitative
concepts, but can,human beings live in such a practical way? When the incident
of a uniformed policeman murdering a female co-ed occurred, I saw a man
laughing and saying, "If she'd let him have his way, she cauld have survived."
but for human beings, is there not something more important which surpasses -
this sort of thought? So even if more police officers were to be killed
than hostages the police department will be able to continue its operation.
And women sometimes choose to die rather than be sexually vioiated and sur- _
vive .
Anyway, even if Mr Morishima.'s ideas are correct overall, we should expect
to encounter some people who were not enlightened, and thoroughly understand
this human society just as Mr Morishima does not. When those people were
killed off one by one or were sent to mental institution~ and to concentration
camps, would he be able to eulogize the degree of freedom of the 1940s?
(Student, 25 years old) ~
The Idea of a Free Citizens Army
Mr Morishima adovcates "absolute non-resistance" and writes that teaching
= the young people to "waive both the white and red flags and peacefully welcome _
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the Soviet forces," is "a duty for those who experienced war." I am one of
_ those who experienced war, but have a different notion of "duty for those who
lived through war." It is the idea of having a democratic citizens army.
In the recent past the~~e was a saying, "25 years life time." This was a time
_ when the war was in its last stages, we were continuing to send out a special
offensive force, and even junior high school students were sent to war as
members of the "young mens corps." During the period of over 30 years, since
the war ended in its inconceivable fashion, I realized that the feeling of
sorrow held by the people of my age toward the death of those young people
during the war changed. More elderly people are feeling sad about those young
people who had to die in the war. It is downright unreasonable that young
people should die in wars before old people do.
Now having reacheu middle age, I would like to propose a democratic citizen's
- army to those of my age, and to those older in order to protect our nation
and to give a chance for young people "not" to die before older ones.
Let us be prepared for the time should our country's independence be threatened,
.to stand and defend the most dangerous front lines before young people do.
Particiaption is based on free will, with those whq consider Japan a country
worthy of sacrificing their.,lives, as well as those who do not think this way
but believe their participation in a citizen's army is a must for the future
of their descendar,.ts and countrymen, and also those who can not resign them-
~elves to foreign control, all taking up arms as a united force.
For weapons, rifies will be sufficient. As it is a non-professional group,
no ranks will be established and direction will be left to the specialist.
The criticism that "it is worthless", will naturally be made,but isn't .this
rather in accord with the present constitution? If and when we the elderly
_ people with some common sense and determined to pull us together to protect
our nation, there may be less chance of being looked down upon by other
- cvuntries. (Doctor, 58 years old)
The Amateur's Blow, the Professional's Parry
"The Great Debate--War and Peace" was very, very interesting. The former
debate between Mr rior~shima and Mr Tsuru was, in terms of the Takarozuka _
Theatre, like a recital contest between an amateur still in training and a
_ specialist, and was not a very good pairing. But this time the casting was
good and b~th had enough sense to be stars. When I had finished reading, my
impression was "the amateur's blow, the professional's parry." Mr Morishima
danced brilliantly, seemingly to benefit Mr Seki's appearance. Yes indeed, -
it was truly enjoyable reading and was interesting to read the arguments of
_ an amateur qu~.etly overturned one by one by the oppositian.
As something to read, or as a thought, Mr Morishima's arguments were very
interesting and there were parts I could concur witYi, but the paragraph which
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began with, "if we only persevere" ended up as an amateur's argument. Does
not the defense ~roblem begin with the fact that we are not certain whether
we are strong enough or not, no matter what age we are in, it's impossible
to be confident of being strong? Mr Morishima writes, "because I believe in
people." I also believe in people. But I do not believe in the Japanese.
I like them individually. But I have no belief in the group.
Groups of Japanese are not gatherings of individuals, and are flocks of
people gathered together i,n one effort without any individuality for a certain
effect. I am uncertain that with zero-armaments, and after a surrender, each
person could live with dignity suff iciently to build a f resh social system.
' There is no doubt that most people will change positions quickly and adopt
- the posture of the invaders, and then there will be many of those who can
distinguish themselves within its system. (White collar worker female,
20 years old)
The Tragic History of Unarmed Neutrality
Professor Morishima points out that, "because Japan made a dignified and
admirable surrender to the U.S. Army." LJe were able to achieve, after the
war, a miraculous reconstruction. Just as the professor points out, it is
true that the people of Japan through the loss of the war gained f reedom, and
became affluent. Professor Moris::~*^^ ignores the serious matter that it is
the "U.S. which hoped for the non-armament of Japan" allowed r.he creation of
today's Self DPfense Force (derogatively speaking a puppet army). Historical
instances of "the conqueror creating the same sort of army" are not limited
to the U.S. Luxembourg was a very similar sort Qf unarmed neutral country
but Nazi Germany invaded Luxembourg, recruited the youth in the army and -
sent them to their death on the Russian front. When the Soviet Union liberated
- East Europe they set up the Warsaw Pact Arnry, and in 1968 used it to attack
Czechoslovakia.
From these historical examples, we see that even if small- and medium-sized
countries hope for dis-armament, the great powers ignore this and use them
as the vanguard in the invasion of other countries. So, shouldn~t we small
and medium sized.countries arm ourselves on our own will and resist the in-
_ vading great power even if the enemy is too much for us? .
And another point, while Professor Morishima cites ~witzerland alone as a
neutral nation, why does he not make mention of the tragic history of Luxem-
bourg or the bitter historical experience of Liechtenstein which became
unarmed and neutral in 1868. If he is to advocate unarmed neutrality, he
can not ignore the history of the two countries. (Newspaper reporter, 37
years old)
COPYRIGHT: 1979 BUNGEI SHUNJU, Ltd _
9501
CSO: 4105
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MILITARY
EXPERTS DISCUSS FUTURE OF JAPAN SELF DEF~NSE FORCES
Tokyo SHUKAN ASAHI in Japanese 13, 20 Jul 79
[Special Series: CAN JAPAN SURVIVE: "Defense" Part I and Part II. Inter-
view articles by Keitaro Hasegawa]
[13 Jul 79 pp 141-145] .
[Text] [Text] The Soviet carrier '~Iinsk' has passed the Tsushima
Strait, and it appears that debate on matters of defense will
intensify further. It also seems that the nation's percep-
tion of the Self Defense Forces is gradually changing. How-
ever, surprisingly much is not known about the actual nature
of the Self Defense Forces. How are the Self Defense Forces
different from the old armed forces? What kind of impact
did the affair of the dismissal of Hiroomi Kurisu as
chairman of the Joint Staff Council have? We have tried
to look into the truth of the matter.
TNe Self Defense Forces are composed of army, navy, and air forces. Among
the Self Defense Forces, which are "technocrat bodies," the Ground Self
_ Defense Force is lowest in terms of technical-group elements; the relative
weight of importance placed on the "personnel" [soldiers] is large. For that
reason, among the forces, it comes closest to the old armed forces' concen-
tration on "human bullets." If we look at the Ground Self Defense Force and
clarify the difference between it and the old army, there exist great dif-
ferences.
The military intervenes in politics. For example, in the case of a coup
d'etat, the army is always at the heart of it. Neither the air force no�r the
~navy is instrumental in br~nging about a coup d'etat. Even if they shoLld be
instrumental, the coup d'etat wi11 definitely fail as long as the arcry does
not act and if the army is ~pposed to it.
Thus, examining the Ground Self Defense Force is the best way to investigate
the operations of the Self Defense Forces as a whole.
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Ttie place is Akasaka, Tokyo. There is no air-conditioning in tlie Ground Staff
UffLce in the Defense Agency building. In a brief respite from rain, the
strong early summer sun makes the hot and humid air all the more unbearable.
Here in this office I interviewed the head of the public relations corps of
the Ground Self Defense Force, Colonel Shigematsu. He is one of the 3rd group
of Defense College graduates. He was born in 1936.
Interviewer: It is necessary for soldiers of a defeated nation, professional
soldiers--especially professional soldiers who cannot expect to be praised
by society in general--to have selfconsciousness as soldiers because they
dared choose the soldier's way of life. This is true in any country. In
your case, in what respect do you feel pride as an officer of the Self Defense
Forces?
Shigematsu: I believe that to belong to a group of those professionals who
are concerned with the nation's defense and the job of protecting the country
is sufficient reason for dedicating one's whole life as a man.
Interviewer: Soldiers of a defeated country cannot help but always feel
_ responsibility for the defeat. Especially in a country such as Japan, where
the Self Defense Forces are not officially recogr.lized as a military organi-
zation, I think that in choosing the profession of soldier it is necessary
for a person to make up his mind that it will not be easy. Where does that
kind of determination come from?
Shigematsu: From education, I should say. In general, when Self Defense `
Forces' member joins up, he does not come in burning with the determination
to protect the country. It is no different from choosing another profession,
like civil servant, private businessman, whatever. Motivation is not strong.
After joining and going through initial training, and then the training that
comes once a person is assigned to one of the forces, for the first time the
- new member understands how important a job it is to be charged with the de-
fense of the country. Such understanding is accompanied by the confidence
tliat the new member has not made a mistake in choosing membership in the
Self Defense Forces as his occupation. ~
Raising Sense of Duty During Training
- Interviewer: You are saying that a person joins the Self Defense Forces in
the same way he would choose any other profession? Although he is choosing
- a profession where one uses weapons and kills people, he does not need any
more determination than that?
Shigematsu: That is correct. In elementary and junior high`school, the new
Self Defense Forces' member has not been taught at all about national defense,
about the work of defending the country. Therefore, he has no knowledge
about the profession called "defense" until he enlists and receives training.
The new member chooses the Self Defense Forces just as he would choose
another occupation. He does not have any special sense of duty.
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Interviewer: In other countries people are taught in elementary school about
' national defense, about military matters. They understand that joining the
armed forces is different from entering another profession. Only in Japan
is that not the case. However, how does the member,who joins without any
special motivation, without any self-determination, immediately understand
the importance of national defense?
- Shigematsu: In the f irst place, there is the generally a.great understanding
[toward national defense] among Japanese as a whole, and the high level of
their intellectual capacity. SecQnd, looking at the situation in the world
today, the latent consciousness present in any country that that country has
the particular right to protect itself is awakened in the Forces' training.
Interviewer: The instinct of self-defnese is found in all living things.
In humans as well. It is natural for the Japanese people to protect Japan.
Is it really awakened by the Defense Forces' training? -
Shigematsu: I think so. That and group thinking, perhaps. Once a person
is part of an organization, he wants to contribute and do his best. I can
= say that this, too, is one aspect of it. To add one more, one wants to use
weapons, to wear a uniform, and to particiapte in well disciplined and �
group oriented activities. Is this not also a young person's instinct?
In the pre-war armed forces, there was Imperial Rescript for the soldiers.
The first line, which says, "Japan's armed forces are under the perpetual
command of the Emperor," was surely the basis of those orders. The im-
perially-led forces were done away with because of our defeat in the war.
The Self Defense Forces, which were set up differently,.beca~ae a group that
"in order to protect Japan's peace and independence and to preserve the
country's security has the principal duty to defend~the country against direct
or indirect attack and when necessary to maintain public order." (Self De-
_ fense Forces Law,~Section 3, paragraph 1)
As opposed to "the Emperor commands the army and navy" (Section 11 of the
constitution of Imperial Japan), "the prime minister, representing the
Cabinet, has supreme command of the Self Defense Forces" (Self Defense
Forces Law, Section 7). Thus, the Self Defense Forces are undar the civilian
_ command of the prime minister.
Herein lies the decisive difference between the pre-war army and navy and the
post-war Self Defense Forces. This is also the decisive difference between
pre-war imperial rule and post-war democracy. -
When we take note of these differences, we are made to realize that the Self
Deferise~ Forces are no longer simply the successors of the former imperial
forces. �
In talking about training in national defense or, simply, sense of duty -
concerning defense, which Colonel Shigematsu spoke of here, the Self Defense
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Forces have no textbooks to teach their members awareness of national de-
fense. Education of a sense of duty in "defending our nation" is, as a rule,
carried out during the officers' training course, but actually explanation
and lecturea giver~ to the soldiers durin~ the,period of basic training are
- niayins a ma~or role in educating SDF members about the sense of duty.
As opposed to the old army which required memorization of the "Imperial
Rescript" for the soldiers, the SDF's officer training stresses "spontaneous"
training--even though moral education lacks its consistency--in that the of-
ficer's initiative can be freely demonstrated, learning of sense of duty
for national defense within the Self Defense Forces is extremely flexible.
The Qualities of the Japanese People Which Make for High Morale
Interviewer: Because of the old army's use of the draft, people were forced
to enlist. There were many young men who did not necessarily want to enter _
the armed forces. I think that for those soldiers, the word "to be taken"
expressed the feeling. Compared to the old army, how is the morale of the
Self Defense Forces?
Shigematsu: I was born in 1936. When the war ended I was a third grader
in elementary school. I don't know much about the old army. However, I
think that the morale of the present Self Defense Forces is extremely high.
If I think back to what I saw when I studied for a year in the American Com-
- mand and Staff School, the Self Defense Forces are superior, with respect to
bo~h unit performance and willingness to do whatever their duties call for.
Interviewer: In both the American and British armies, which are, likewise,
run under a voluntary enlistment system, the decline in soldier quality is -
a great problem. In a volunteer army, society's dropouts, failures, those
who cannot find employment elsewhere, volunteer for the army as a way of
making a living. In the case of the Self Defense Forces, it was said that
young people join in the same way as they would select any other occupation.
They do not have deep convictions when they join. But somehow they become
more highly-motivated soldiers than those in the American army. Is there a
special reason for this?
Shigematsu: The morale of the Self Defense Forces is high because of the
- good quality of the soldiers. The educational background and quality of the
Japanese peoplc are in general superior to Americans also. The high morale
among SDF members is also due to great efforts made by the members over a
period of close to 30 years. Of course, a peacetime army, no matter what
the country it is, devotes most of its time only in training and educating
SDF members. The Self Defense Forces are no exception. For the very reason
that there is strong motivation among soldiers and officers, even if they are
"outcasts", the result of continuing efforts [o build the morale of the Self -
Defense Forces is gradually becoming visible.
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Iii tratning the minds of SDFs members, a great proportion of time is spent
fc~r thc~ mor.~l educ.ntian tc~ create memberg af society al~;o. It is tr.~inin};
of inembers in how to conduct themselves in society.
The degree to which this training has been successful is indicative in the
crime rate registered among SDF members. The more than 200,000 SDF members
comprise a group of average Japanese. To what extent do these members commit
crimes and how does it compare to society at large? �
In order to see the positive results of moral education--the "nurturing their
sense of duty" of the Ground Self Defense Force--we took a look at the
crime rate.
In a survey made by the Ground Self Defense F'orce police unit, criminal of-
fenses in 1977 were about 27 out of 10,000 people. This is about one quar-
ter of the crimes comitted by the general public, which is 112. As for -
murders, there was one case in 1976; none in 1977. The results are not bad.
Interviewer: Is there no index to measure the degree of the Self Defense
Farces' morale? For example, the officers?
Shigematsu: In the ranger course, now, almost all second lieutenants vol-
unteered. As you know, compared t~ ordinary infantry soldiers, rangers
undergo rigorous training. It is commonly known that in today's Self Defense
Forces, almost without exception ranger training i.s taken voluntarily by all.
Interviewer: Even in America, commissioned officers who volunteer for ranger
training are in the minority. To say that in Japan almost all are volunteers
is extraordinary, I think.
Stressing SDF Members' Initiative and Independent Action ~
Interviewer: In the armed forces of foreign countries, there are strict dif-
ferences in rank between officers and enlisted men. For example, methods of
salary payment are different. Commissioned officers receive a month's pay
in advance on the first day of every month, but enlisted men receive a week's
pay at the end of the week.
The problem is the discrimination which is obvious in this system. It is
all right to.pay commissione3 officers a month's salary in advance, but they
pay the enlisted men at the end of the week because it is never known when
they are going to desert. In other words, commissioned officers are regarded
as individuals who can be trusted, but enlisted men are thought of as mere -
providers of labor, in other words, as "human bullets." Therefore, when en-
listed men are given orders by officers, the officers watch to see whether
_ or not the enlisted men carry out the orders. If they don't watch over
them, the officers cannot be sure that the orders are carried out.
Shigematsu: ~ did not know that in foreign armed forces officer and enlisted
men's pay was given on different days. In the Self Defense Forces everyone
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has the same pay day. Rather, the officers take the lead and set an example.
The enlisted men learn from that. The enlisted men understand how the of-
ficers ttiink, and they try, through their own initiative, to do what the
officers would do. In no branch of the Self Defense Forces do officers
supervise the actions of each individual member.
Inteviewer: In the old army, internal corps regulations were fixed: the '
commander was the father, the squad leader was the mother, and the soldier
was the child. Such a corps-family arrangement was emphasized and within that
training was carried out. How is it in today's Self Defense Forces?
Shigematsu; We stress the initiative and independence of the members. In
times of trouble, we work things out as a whole group, with the commander and .
officers taking the lead. Enlisted men do not criticize or refuse orders, but
they contribute their opinions to the officers. Thus, when it comes to
carrying out orders, the men behave as if the order were their own idea. How
the officers achieve this kind of cooperation is an important key in increas-
ing member initiative and at the same time strengthening the group cohesive- ~
ness of the Self Defense Forces.
Interviewer: How was it in your division?
Shigematsu: I have been commander. Often, in breaks from training, I would
call my men together and talk to them. Things talked about at those times--
for example, the topic of just how important is the job of defending the
country--helped the troops in better understanding matters of defense. I
think that this type of discussion during training is much more effective than
doing it via lectures in the barracks. That is probably because the whole
corps has the shared experience of participating together in training. It
is because real feelings emerge there. After speaking to the men about'the
importance of defense, their motivation changes.
Interviewer: In the old armed forces, training was accompanied by physical
punishment, beating and kicking. The Self Defense Forces training utilizes
methods which demand member self-realization and independent behavior. This is
a reflection of the fact that Japanese politics have changed from a pre-war
imperial system to a post-war parliamentary democracy. Also, it derives from
the technical need to make a modern army, that is, an army that uses modern
weapons. What modern weapons demand of soldiers is close teamwork with
high level technology.
Shigematsu: That is correct. To make full use of the mighty equipment, the
fire-power of which cannot be compared with the bayonet-charging old army, _
close team-play among Self Defense Forces' divisions and troops cannot be
lacking. Each member of the Self Defense Forces fully understands his own
role and carries out his own responsibilities 100 percent. That is the goal
of training. I think that in order to achieve that we must make the men
understand the significance of defense--and that it is important to carry
out training from that perspective.
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The Uniformed Group Shuns Political Debate
One difference between the Self Defense Forces and the old army is the qual- -
ity of weapons. The main wepaons of the infantry of the old army were 38-cali-
ber rifles and bayonets: The non-automatic 38-caliber rifle took one minute
to fire five rounds. The 64-caliber small rifles with which the present
Self Defense Forces are now equipped, are automatic and can go over 300 _
rourids a minute.
Moreover, the old army relied on horses and men's feet for infantry movement.
The Self Defense Forces, hewever, are mechanized and at all levels have high
mobility and speed.
It is needless to say tr~at high-level technology is necessary for the soldier
to opereate modern weapons with large capacity for mobility and fire-power.
This makes it all the more necessary for the officers to have high levels of
technical skills. The officers not only teach the soldiers how to use the
weapons, but they must be able to maintain the supplies which support the
fire power, together with coordinating and organizing the various types of
weapons according to the purpose.
- Moreover, a high degree of tactical ability is also necessary to fully under-
, stand the sophisticated weapons, and the function and ability of the divisions
which operate those weapons, and to demonstrate in the most effective way the ~
fighting strength as it would operate in actual conditions.
The of~icers of the Self Defense Forces are all technocrats and specialists
in high-level technology and war technique. The men of the Forces are skill-
ful at and have mastered the operation of the weaponry. The Self Defense For-
ces as a whole is a body of technocrats. Skilled people can be trained in a
relatively short time. However,~that is not the case with officers. After
completing 4 years of War College and one year of officer candidate school,
at last they become corps commanders. After that they spend several years
working in a division, and they train in specialty school and for 2 more years
in officer school. It talces 10 years to reach commander class.
In the c d navy, the training entailed "10 years for lieuten~nt, 20 years
for commander." In the Self Defense Forces, where high technology which
- cannot be compared to pre-war time is demanded, commander training similarly
requires a long time. It is natural that the Self Defense Forces also put _
great stress on officer training. Officers are the core of defense.
The Kurisu affair of July 1978. Hiroomi Kurisu, who was chairman of the
Joint Staff Council, said that the Japanese armed forces might act on their
own in case of a surprise attack. The affair, in which he was expelled
from the top post of the uniformed forces, sent unexpected shockwaves among
the Self Defense Forces' ur.iformed personnel. -
By interviewing Colonel Shigematsu, chief of the Ground Self Defense Force
public relations corps, we were able to learn how extensive and how strong
were the shock waves of the Kurisu affair.
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In the first place, self-control of the uniformed personnel was greatly
strengthened. They spoke in unison.
~
There are no individual opinions concerning the way the Self Defense Forces
should operate. We express our opinion through a spokesman. Please go to
him."
It is courteous, but the tone is quite firm. In it we can see an expression _
of the self-~nitiated intention to adhere to internal rules, as a body of
professional war technicians. _
In the second place, it is a fact that the idea of not wanting to get involved
in politics has become more deeply rooted. It is completely different from
the young officers of the oZd army who would have a drink and start grieving
over the nation and discussin~ politics. "Serve in the army silently."
(General order of April 1923). ~SDF members consider the military their
career and their psychology is such that they don'r like to have anything .
to do with politics, and consequently, they do their best to avoid politics =
while they drive themselves to become true soldiers.
"Following correct procedure, we report political opinions to superiors--
for example, those conr_erning defense policy. Such opinions are passed up the
chain of command, from regiment commander to chief of staff and on to the
ministry. We do not think it groper to alter defense policy on the strength
of broadcasting opinions outside of the Forces and resorting to public opinion."
Therein lies the nature of the ranking defense officials which tries to bring
itself int~ line with military bureaucracy--whose first concern is chain of -
command and order.
In the third place is trust. "Shigematsu was in my class. He is an honest
type and, above all, he is not a person who hides his convictions. I trust
him. Please listen to all he says. He is not mistaken in whatever he says."
That was said by an officer outside the Ground Self Defense Force, who is _
also a member of the 3rd group to graduate from the War College. 1'herein
lies the feeling of mutual trust that transcends the separate spheres of
Ground, Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces. Joined together as classmates
who eat rice from the same pot for 4 years of War College, the relationship
gets this strong. It makes one aware of an aspect of the unifnrmed forces
that is not otherwise known.
The Kurisu affair convinced SDF members further not to get involved with
politics. Stepping away from the arena of political debate, the Forces say
they are trying to devote themselves to their duties. The trend to discuss
defense policy within the uniformed Forces has disappeared. By mutually
respecting formal channels of communication and by discouraging individual
contact within offices, the Forces are trying all the more to strengthen their -
group unity as an organization. The difference between the Self Defense
Forces and the old armed forces lies in this kind of spontaneity and self-
initiation, change that is undertaken by the SDF members.
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In the old army the young officers were more politically aggressive tocaard the -
government however, the Self Defense Forces mind their ~wn business and leave ~
discussions of defense policy to the politicians. It seems that Folitical
intervention by the uniformed forces is, for the foreseeable future, impossible.
The nature of the Self. Defense Forces is fundamentally different from that of
tlic old armed Corces. ~Lt has gone from an imperial army to a democratically-
controlled rnilitary group. In what way ar~ the Self Defense Forces, which
l~ave gone from an infantry-centered "human bullet" attack force to a modern
army that stresses fire power, useful for Japan's defense? How will they deal
with internal probler.~s? They must look into many problems, such as a problem
of matching Japanese defense policy to everchanging international situations.
- I would like to discuss these matters in the next issue.
[20 Jul 79 pp 125-129]
[TextJ. A book such as "The Russians Have Landed!" is number
_ five on the best-seller list. T~tlk that Japan could fall
victim to a surprise attack tomorrow, that "the Self Defense
Forces are a scarecrow and have only 3 days' worth of am-
munition," is often heard and stirs up national insecurity.
Facing the "crisis 80's," is Japan really~safe? We sought
frank opinion from Michita Sakata, chairman of the LDP
Nationa? Security Research Council.
- Even now, when Japan's defense is the responsibility of the Self Defense -
Forces which are a body of military specialists, decisions regarding defense
policy must be made by the government, which is a civilian organization.
Japan is a parliamentary democracy. Under what conditions does the ruling LDP
_ make its decisions, and what kinds of defense policies are they contemplating
based on those decisions?
In the inner LDP the National ~ecurity Research Council is in charge of
defense problems. We asked the frank opinion of. its chairman, Mr Michita
Sakata, who was formerly the Director General of the Self Defense Agency.
I~nterviewer: For Japan in the decade of the 80's, issues of security and defense
are extremely important. The ~.DP, under the present constitu~ion, has made
the Self Defense Forces civilian-r_ontrolled. Can the Forces preser_ve Japan's
security in the 80's?
_ Sakata: Honestly speaking, there is insecurity. The way the Self Defense
Forces are presently organized ur.der the constitution,'there is no threat to
other countries and there is no cnance that our own public welfare will be '
endangered. However, a group that is opposed to the sort of defense strength
that is neither too little nor too much--looked at domestically or internation-
ally--is putting down roots. Perhaps such opposition reflects thinking left
over from the pre-war time. They say: change the Self Defense Forces into
a body the same as the pre-war military; to do that revise the constitution,
and moreover, get nuclear weapons. Such talk is courageous, but it does not
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take i.nto consideration the present international situation and, moreov~~r, it
ignores the constitution which is firmly rooted in Japan. There is a grou~~
of people in the LDP that is pushing forward their single-minded militaristic
views.
T'he danger that these people may take the lead within the LDP has not been
eliminated. As long as this danger exists, I do not think I can quit the '
_ Security Research Council. (laughter)
Interviewer: Within the ruling party there is a persistent group that blindly
wants io increase defense power. If these people get hold of civilian control,
it will mean that Japan learned nothing from its defeat in World War II. The
uniformed group of the Self Defense Forces have the idea that they are com-
pletely different from this group. Does the u~tra-rightist group o.f the LDP
think it has caught up with the "trend" of the inner Self Defense Forces and
their taking such a stance?
Sakata: Actually, it i~ not clear. When I was Director General of the Self
Defense Forces (from December 1974 to December 1976), even among the Self
Defense Forces officers, I felt there were clear differences of opinion be-
tween those who served in the pre-war army and navy and those officers are
of the post-war generation. The post-war generation underwent the new-type
6-3-3-4 education (6 y~ars of elementary school, 3 years of junior high, 3
years of high school, 4 years of college), and they are accustomed ta the new
constitution. After leaving the post of Director General of the JDA, I haven't
had direct contact with the uniformed officers, so, for example, I do not
' really know t~ow these officers interpreted last year's Kurisu affair.
Interviewer: I wrote 3bout it in the previous article, but, the officers
who graduated from the TJar College, at least think that Kurisu's pronounce-
ment was out of line. I believe that the Self Defense Forces--which were
established under the new constitution--have been accepted well and the idea
~f having defence forces has taken root among the officers of the post-war
generation.
Sakata: That makes me glad. Truly glad. I thought that the new constitution
has taken root among the post-~aar generation, but I was very worried about
what kind of effect the Kurisu affair had on the uniformed personnel. When
' I was Director General of the JDA, my irstructions to Self Defense Forces -
y members were: "It is th~ duty of the Self Defense Forces to defend the con-
stitution," and so it was natural to issue such instructions, but much was
made of it at that time. . -
Interviewer: I think the Self Defense Forces Law is well-formulated. You
- cannot say that there aren't any points which are difficult to put into
actual practice, but there aren't any basic, important points that are missing. -
To say that we cannot defend Japan if we do noti revise the constitution is
probably a bit too strong--and I think it is only nostalgia for the pre-war
armed forces. _
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Sakata: I feel the same way. The present Self Defense Forces are not the old
army and navy. A constitutional reform not desired by the Japanese people
is out of the question. The defense forces must not be something which threat-
ens either foreign countries or our own people. The Japanese people will not
permit the military to be domineering, to ignore the proper political pro-
cedures. They will defend the constitution to the end. This must be the
basis of Japan's defense pnlicy.
I did not know anything about "defense" until I became Director General of tf~e
Japan Defense Agency, because I never studied about it. What I determined to
do at that time was to start tackling the defense issue with a clean slate
- and analyze defense problems like average Japanese people would do, in short,
_ deal with it from an amateur point of view. Even with respect to the Self
Defense Forces Law, I thought the amount of s,tL+dy I did on that subject -
was just enough for the immediate needs. It is not necessary to create a
special situation on purpose and to be pressured to write laws applicable to
y it. My idea on this is no different, even now. ~
Interviewer: Do you say:that emergency legislafion is unnecessary?
Sakata: To investigate whether or not there are defects in the law is not to
ref~rm it immediately. We must exercise considerable caution. I think there
is nu need to do things in a rush.
'rhe Soviet Unicn--Not Prepared to or Capable of Attacking J~pan
_ Interviewer: When we analyze "national defense", we must consider international
_ conditions that affect Japan. Do you think that the present situation in Asia
and the international situation which involves Japan is becoming strained?
Or, do you think it is loosening up? -
Sakata: I think the strain is decreasing. The situation in Asia after the
end of the Vietnam War is clearly headed in the direction of detente. Of
course tliere are many trouble spots. There are several disputes: Cambodia,
the China-Soviet border, the 38th parallel. However, if you look at it as a
whole, there is no mistake that those are sporadic disputes and that, as a
~ whole, things are moving in the direction of detente. -
Interviewer: Looking at the worldwide situation, SALT II has been formulated.
Speaking of the power relationship between America and the Soviet Union, even
if you say that the Soviet Union is gaining military strength which will
exceed that of the United States, it cannot be thought that the strain will
intensify all at once. What is your opinion on this?
Sakata: There is no limit to the fine points. If we talk only about military
aspects the~e are any number of problems. Because technology is rapidly ad-
vancing, it s nip and tuck as far as weapons are concerned. It will always be
so.
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Politicians must not be trapped in those finr: points. They must look at the
whole pictu~e. If they don't, they will erY in their judgment. They must
look at the whole picture--not only in military matters, but in politics,
diplomacy, as well as in economics, culture, and society. If they do this,
it is certain that the world will move toward detente. There is no danger
c~C a world war any time soon.
Interviewers Is the defense system, which was established under the TJ.S.-
Japan Security Treaty with its axis, sufficient to maintain peace?
- Sakata: YeS. Even with detente, we cannot'r~isband the-Self Defense Fbrce~.
Rather, small to medium scale fighting strength has become important. The
United States and the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities are balanced so that
they cannot use nuclear weapons. Because they run the risk of all-out war by
using large scale conventional strength, even if the U.S. and Soviet Union
greatly exceed the military power of inedium-small countries, they cannot fully
use their own military strength.
Therefore, even medium-to-samll countries that only have limited military
strength can play a role equal to that of the U.S. and the Soviet`U-riion. In
other words, having less military power does not mean one has no say in things.
. Even if the military strength of the Self Defense Forces is not great compared
to that of surrounding countries, it does not mean that Japan is not secure.
Interviewer: A Soviet military build-up--especially an increase of troop
strength in the Far East--has been talked about. It is said that the deploy-
ment of the Minsk and the construction of bases in Kunashiri and Etorofu is
evidence of that. However, it is only the airborne sixth division of Kha-
barc~vsk that is filling the Soviet 44 divisions with a full complement of man-
powex, and which is being deployed from central Asia to the forth military
district in the west. Even those that are 80 percent full constitutE only
three divisions in the Khabarovsk area. The remaining 40 divisions are only =
training troops, which have only 50 percent of troop^capacity: They are all
gazing at the Soviet-China border. The troop strength aimed at Japan is no
more than a single navy regiment in Vladivostock. Fven if troop strength is -
increased to some degree, and even if the Minsk carrier comes, it is considered
that the Sowiets are not prepared to attack Japan.
Sakata: The Soviet Union has amassed all its nerves in its opposition to
- China. Because they are a large continental nation, they have acquired a
habit of guarding themselves and consequently they are watchrul of their
- borders. They are not prepared to invade us by crossing the ocean. As long
as China and the Soviet Union continue to rival each other, I think it is all
right to vi~w the situation as unchanging.
Interviewer: In a geopolitical sense, Japan's defense system is premised on
the fact that the country is an island. A country that attempts to invade
Japan would have to carry out both a sea and land invasion.
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Sakata: 'Pherc ar~ no countries near Japan that have the capability to de~~loy
land and sea strategy on a big scale. Most likely this situation will not
change in the foreseeable future.
Manulacturing Capability that will Permit Emergency Production of Weapons and
Ammunition
Interviewer: Japan is a big power. If, by chance, a neighboring country
should attack Japan, it is not possible for it to be a surprise attack without
any warning at all. In the first place, it is not only that diplomatic rela-
" tions caith that country would deteriorate; the international situation would
likely get strained. In other words, one can say that there are hardly any
cases of unexpected invasions. We can assume that in order for an invasion of
Japan to take place, quite a bit of time must elapse. -
- Sakata: It is almost impossible to assemble the military strength and to
deceive reconnaissance satellites. Moreover, all countries would modify
their policies toward Japan, and it would take a lot of time to invade Japan.
Interviewer: The Japanese people have the experience of the attack on Pearl
Harbor. What if that kind of thing were done to Japan? It's strarge for
~eople who have actually done such a thing to worry, but...
Sakata: Certainly an assailant is the one who wouldn't like it if what he
does to others is done to him. That is precisely why we need to be resolved
to defend the constitution. Article 9 of the constitution may be called a
"reflection" on Pearl Harbor. However, in actuality, reconnaissance satellites
_ and so forth have develo~ed and we are in a situation where the movements of
troops all over the world are monitored minute by minute. It is a world
_ where we know immediately if ~var ships are gathered in Hitokappu Bay. There
cannot be a second Pearl Harbor.
- Interviewer: For example, a submarine blockade without a direct invasion of
Japan is conceivable. Because we only have four anti-submarine ships, our
ability to fight at sea is ver~y limited. However, Japan's shipping strength
is number one in the world. We should be able to mass-produce anti-submarine
ships if iae have rPady-made blueprints and if we mobilize all the country's
factories. We should also be able to have crews trained quickly.
_ In my opinion, in a total of 2 years--one for building the naval vessels and
one for training the crew--quite a strong defense can be prepared.
- Even in the case of land weapons, if we run the manufacturing capacity of
Japan fully, we can be ready quickly. At present levels we can produce 48
type 74 tanks a year. Howeuer, in the opinion of those in manufacturing, if
we go into mass production, it will be one-half year at the most in order to
reach a yearly production level of 1,000 tanks.
Even with regard to ammunition, it would take at most a year to construct and
equip factories to mass-produce it. If the equipment is set up, the time
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period necessary to get ~upplies is about 3 months, so even after the situation
becomes strained, we will have sufficient time to prepare.
Sakata: Before the war Japan's industrial power was weak. If we hadn't
5tocked wcapons and ammunition durinb peacetime, we couldn't have made war.
liecause our present manufacturing capacity is great, it is not necessary to
_ stock up ready-made weapons and ammunition during peacetime. Rather, it -
can be said, it is sufficient if we develop new kinds of weapons.
Even if the worst happens, because Japan is an island nation, great forces of -
tanks cannot readily invade us. Even in our anti-submarine forces, Japan
l~as the capability to develop, in a short time, great strength. That capa-
bility alone is sufficient.
Interviewer: Even with an anti-submarine strategy, the side that controls
the air wins. That is what happened in World War II. As long as the U.S.-Japan
Security Pact is honored, it czn be supposed that control of the air of Japan
and the surrounding sea will not be taken by force by the United States.
Sakata: Of course Japan has no defense against nuclear attack. Moreover,
to have power of defense against nuclear attack is related to having nuclear
capability. We must crush all nuclear bases which can attack Japan. To
proceed with that type of preparation is only to raise tension around Japan. -
The very act of adopting that kind of defense policy would ensnare Japan in
danger. I think that Japan should not acquire nuclear capability.
Interviewer: Japan at present is a very strong country with respect to manu-
facturing strength. If Japan launches a full-scale military expansion one can
say she is a country in which great forces can be instantly ready and equipped
with all new weapons--including nuclear. If we think of the great latent
strength Japan has, America, to say nothing of the countries near Japan, will
have to beware of Japan's defense policy.
Sakata: It may be said that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty has the function
of applying a brake to Japan's military expansion. The power of the United
States has certainly declined, but, nevertheless, America does not wish Japan
to increase its military strength to the degree that such an increase will
bring great change to the international order in Asia. I think that America
does not desire Japan's military expansion because it will upset conditions _
in Asia.
Interviewer: Because the defense budget is decided in the Diet, the Diet
takes part in the civilian control of the military. Each party must have a
defense policy.
Sakata: It's not only the Diet. The people must also have an interest in
defense. Looking at the percentage of support of the Self Defense Forces,
_ last year it rose to 86 percent. A national consensus for the Self Defense
Forces and defense in general is growing. Even among supporters of the So-
cialist Party, which advocates de-militarized neutrality, quite a number of
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~1Q0~)1.4 recogni�r.~ and support the existence oE the Self Defense Forces. I'sve~n
among supporters of the communist party it is the same. It is certain that
peoples' interest in defense has increased, and the idea of de-militarized
neutrality is fast losing strength. For that reason the responsibility of
politicians has grown heavy.
The Self Defense For~es''"Old Boys", and Their''Single-minded, Old FasfiionQ~'
Military Thinking
- Interviewer: Many important lessons were learned from Japan's defeat in
World War II. For example, although Japan is an island nation, she put to-
gether an armed forces as if she were a large continental nation. Under
imperial control, we tried to make the Japanese people, who live in an is-
land nation, play the same role as that of continental people. This Makes im-
possible demands of the people. Thus, when the army was disbanded at defeat,
the people immediately returned to their island way of life. It is like
bending a stalk of bamboo: if the added pressure is taken away, it goes right
back to its original shape.
Sakata: Former Army General Tsukamoto, whom I respect, has studied Japanese
history and concluded that if Japan pursues a policy of invading the continent
without having a primary defense policy, we will definitely end in defeat. I
think so too. When I was in command (October 1976), I decided on "the big
line of defense plans"--the basis of that concept being that Japan is an is-
land nation. We have put together regiments to use for a continental invasion,
supplying them with heavy tanks, but they have no immediate use for defending
Japan and will get us nowhere. I am annoyed more by these Old Boys who are
slaves to the old ways of thinking than those uniformed members of the Self
Defense Forces.
In general the Self Defense Forces are a"school." The only thing both of-
ficers and soldiers are doing now is training. Look at the school system.
Compulsory education extends through junior high. High school and up is all _
voluntary. Isn't it all right to consider the Self Defense Forces as that
type of school s~~^~em? There is no need to impose teaching on those who do -
not ~aish to "aarn. It would be a different story if situations were to be-
come such that people thought Japan will be in serious trouble unless every-
one did not receive defense training. The volunteer system we have now will
suffice in the meantime. There is no need to proclaim a draft system. I
wish the Old Boys would understand this a little.
Interviewer: The Diet members who have been in the Self Defense Forces are
not very many but they must play important roles as military specialists.
Sakata: Military specialists in the Security Research Council have a single-
minded, and narrow point of view. When we speak about contemporary national
defense we cannot get by solely on a military term. As I said earlier, we
must keep our eyes on a broad spectrum--political, diplomatic and economic.
We try to analyze situations by caluclating only how many tanks and planes
we have. They should be politicians in business suits--not uniforms. I
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tried to convince them that "peace" cannot be maintained. by military strategy
alone. Well, I doubt if I can ever correct the way those old boys think...
The Difficulty of Controlling Natianalism
Interviewer: The point about civilian control--it is not a matter of looking
at it as an imminent issue, but it is a matter of viewing it in the long-
term perspective. In that sense I think Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida was
great. His forecast for these 30 years was right on target. What will be ~
the perspective from here on?
Sakata: It's on record. I said it when we began. I cannot be optimistic.
Although Japan's GNP is number two in the free world, we are eighth in defense -
spending. To control those who criticize this and to maintain an appropriate
defense force which is not too strong and not too weak is never easy. The
Japanese people have nationalistic sentiments, so when the situation becomes
such that Japan seems to be unfairly held back, the subject that we sho,uld
strengthen our defense power will be taken up by storm. To skillfully control
that feeling is quite difficult.
Interviewer: Even among the uniformed members, not everyone understands these
- things. There are those w~o are hotblooded and who burn for the Old Boy ap-
proach.
Sakata: That is true. Although a politician's ability is important, but I
think his attitude is more so. I am afraid this is too personal but at the
time when Miki was in power, a campaign to oust him was initiated, and Fukuda
invited me to sign the call for his resignation.
I told Fukuda that I was the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA)
and I was not deputy prime minister. The Director General of the JDA takes or-
ders from the prime minister--as is stipulated in the Self Defense Forces
Law. Because the Self Defense Forces in turn takes orders from their Director
Gneral, what would happen if he went against the prime minister? There would
be no civilian control. Suppose I were to go against the prime minister, and
then if the Self Defense Forces' members were to take positions against me,
I could not possibly control my men. Mr Fukuda was surprised and he never
came back to solicit my signature. I have never talked about this to anyone,
but, I dared to mention this story because after all, it is necessary for
politicians to always realize the weighty role of the JDA Director General.
Nothing is better than "not" having military forces, however, the way the
world is today, I do not think we can do without military power. And, for
that reason, I believe the role of Director General of the JDA who holds the
_ future of the entire Self Defense Forces is important.
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shimbunsha 1979
9391
CSO: 4105
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MILITARY
- IXPERT SAYS JAPAN FACING SLOW BUT DELIBERATE 'MILITARIZATION'
Tokyo SEKAI in Japanese Oct 79 pp 47-64
[Article by Susumu Takahashi, Asst Professor, History of International
Politics, University of Tokyo]
[Excerpt] Value System Leading to Reactionism
Introduction
The 1970's are almost at an end, What kind of "era" will the period of
the 1970's be. Many signs materialized in the 1970's indicating that con-
temporary history had a turnabout, In that, a forecast of the future was
uncertain and, on account of that, the terminology, "era of uncertainty," -
"chartless era," and "era of confusion was frequently used. And now that ~
the 1970's are almost at an end, the words that represent the trends of
"rightist movement," "conservatism," and "reactionary," have begun to
appear. The "present" situation is felt to be abnormal and a feeling of
crisis has deepened. It seems to this author that the feeling of a loss
of historical direction fram this uncertainty in the future's forecast is
a phenomenon often seen at a"turning point" and also, regression to the
conservatism and reactionism af the past is a phenomenon often seen at a
"turning point."
_ In this short treatise, I would like to try to analyze these.two phenomena
~ seen at a turning point. Why does .the feeling of a loss of historical direc-
tion exist and, in that, what kind of reactionism has come forward? Before
that, I will clarify this author's concern with the problem since it can be
supposed that the analysis and explanation concerning this problem will differ
depending on viewpoint. That is, why has it become difficult to discuss ~
and think about "peace" as the Japanese have come to have "peace and wealth."
Looking at the present world, the question of "war and peace" certainly exists
~ and at the same time, the problems of poverty and oppression, seen in the .
third world, are seen as worsening each year. Then, the importance of the
sub~ect of analyzing and clarifying the circtunstances of a].oss of peace is
not lost at all. It is thought that what ha~ to be considered at the same
time is what kind of ideology makes it difficult to consider peace and allows ~
peace to continue. Therefore, I have decided to analyze from the viewpoint of
- a peace theory one value system created in the situation of "peace in abundance"
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a nd try to consider first its present position and circumstances. Next, I
w~iild like to point out and explain one aspect of the reactionism that has
comc Lorward ai: present in that situation.
1. "Present"---Two Opposing Value Systems
~ 'I'F~c~ Archetypa7 Pcacr Thc~ory
At the time of Japan's departure after the war, the fundamental viewpoint
on which the peace theory was established was considering international
peace via the system constituted b}~men. Since I have previ.ously published
a manuscript concerning these points ("Sengo Nihon no heiwa-ron," ["Post-
war Japan's peace theory"] in SEKAI, June 1978) I will avoid a detailed
explanation, but at this time I would like to emphasize repeatedly the
following three points. The first point is that the levels of man, the
system and international peace are set as individual levels and considera-
tion is giyen to the principles in each level; peace has been established
in the sense of anti-war inclination in men, pacifism in the system and a
- no-war situation in international society as values. Secondly, concerning
the connection between these three, it was thought v.ntil the anti-Japan-U.S.
- s ecurity treaty revision movement in 1960 that peace was from men and peace
was from the system, but it can be said that the connection from man to
system was exceedingly weak. In other words, it can be thought that the
theoretical connection between the anti-war sentiment at the level of tihe in-
_ dividual and pacifism in the system had not pxogressed very deeply. And -
thirdly, a systematization of these three levels was completed in the 1960's
through the anti-security treaty movement and the anti-Vietnam war movement.
First of all, the connection between the level of man and the level of the
system, the weakest link, was reinforced by means of introducing democratic
thinking as a"movement," and at the same time, the people's defiance for
the right to live peacefully and for demilitarization appeared as man toward
the system, and the chain was complet.ed. The most unifying assertion in this _
point is the thought expressed by Sadao Maruyama that, from the viewpoint of
the poeple's sovereignty, ultimate authority to judge whethere there will be
war or not lies in the people. (Sadao Maruyama, "Kempo kyujo o meguru jakkan
no kosatsu" ["Short study of article 9 in the constitution") in SEKAI, June
1965). At the same time, the connection between the level of man and the
level of world peace, that is, the anti-war inclination, was reinforced.
Until now, each individual thought of being anti-war from the viewpoint of
war's victims. But in the anti-Vietnam war movement, anti-war sentiment
began to be considered from the position of war's assailants. This signifies
that a generalization of anti-war feeling had progressed from opposition to
war as something which directly destroys the life of each and every individual
Japanese to opposition to war in general with the ability to conceive of the
inhumanity of war over and above the individual's situation.
At this time, as previous examples of the process of generalization, it should
not be forgotten that, thr~ugh the experience of the bombing of Hiroshima and
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N:~gasaki and tl~e experience of the fear of lethal ~fallout, there existed a
~eneralization. of opposition to nuclear weapons which destroy not only the
individual's peace but also humanity's peace. And the connection between
the l~vel of the system and the level of world peace has been reinforced in
the ~roping for ways to develop pacifism as a principle of the system in
actual international politics. The concept of positive neutralism toward
tt~e promotion of tl~e security treaty revision was presented as a pc~licy and
_ all aspects of the nuclear deterrent theory, popular in the 1960's, were
criticized.
The fundamental viewpoint and value system of the aforementioned peace theory
of post-war Japan is a passive peace in the sense of anti-war sentiment at
the,level of man, pacifism in the level of the system and a situation of no
J war in the level of the international system. And the connection between the
level of man and the level of the system was reinforced by means of the
peace through democracy=democracy theory as a movement; the viewpoint con-
sidering international eace via the s stem from men is what made the value ~ _
of peace coherent.
Value System Under High Level Growth
Then, regarding the problem of "war and peace," the archetypal peace theory
was able to establish this viewpoint; but this peace theory begins to lose
its persuasive power in the situation of "being in peace and having a ~
wealth" existing since the 50's. That is to say, the point of issue on
'4aar and peace" is that it has ceased to be a critical problem to the vast
majority of Japanese, and the point of issue has begun to be manipulated
by the conservative party goverrnnent so as to make the point of issue less '
salient. Well, just what kind of value system has prevented the considera-
tion of and ability to imagine a loss of peace, still existing throughout
the world, transcending the peace achieved in our own familiar world. At
post-war Japan's point of departure, there were demands for '4naterial
abundance, rebuilding the national economy and obtaining economic inde-
'pendence." With this national consensus as the basis, it can be thought
that an undeniable value system had been campleted under high level growth.
Then, I think it is necessary for research into the developmental history -
leading to completion of this value system to be worked out separately. But
I think the next two points can be pointed out as chara.cterisitc of develop-
mental stages. First, the domain of the economy was presented by the conserv-
ative party administration as a trade-off for the domain of "war and peace,"
presented in the aforementioned peace theory. The logic of promoting the
- security treaty revision and the logic of the Japan-U.S. economic security
theory provide typical examples. The second is connected to the first. The
viewpoint of this value system is that two middle levels which do not have
any correspondence to the viewpoint of the peace theory have been allowed to
surface as main strategic points. (fundamental axis) One is the level of
society located in a middle level between man and system; it appears as the ~
main domain so much so that it can be said that it has given salience to
the point of production in economic society. It goes without saying that the '
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nucleus is enterPrise. The other is the level of international economy'lc~cated
in the middle of the levels of world 3nd system. .
These next points must be heeded , especially from the perspective of inter-
national economy. Concerning diplomatic normalization with China, which
was placed in a directly opposite pole to Japan in Japan's modern contemporary
history, it was asserted as one of the main arguments at the time the request
for normalization was made that economic ties with China are necessary for
Japan's economic independence; and concerning Korea, having an aligned polarity
to Japan, government loans were offered at the same time as the Japan-Korea
treaty; and finally, concerning Southeast Asia, which is outside this polar
field, an "informal empire" was established via Japan's reparations.
In this connection, the question of relations between Japan and Asia has posed
large problems for modern contemporary history. China was p'laced at an oppo-
site pole as a major power, of which Japan was conscious (a nation concealing ~
the possibility of competition with Japan.) On the other hand, Korea was
placed in the position of aligned polarity as a lesser power, of which Japan
was conscious (a nation included under Japan's formal empire). Southeast
Asia was placed outside this field of polarity as a target area for expansion,
of which Japan was not conscious.
Domestic Aspects
In 1950, the Japanese per capita income was 135 dollars; but it was 1909 dol-
lars 20 years later in 1970. That showed an approximate I4 fold growth in
20 years. In that, one value system was established. That is, with the
levels of society and international economy as the fundamental axis levels,
value was given to man-society-system-international economy-international
politi.cs, and one value system was completed. First of all, I think it may
be supposed that the appearance of the level of society as the first funda-
mental axis was coupled with a positive appraisal of enterprise (large enter-
prise) which was to be the bearer of high leve]. growth. The appearance of
the level of society---it incTudes various groups such as the family (needless
to say), religious groups and cultural groups---signifies that enterprise
as but one of the groups comprising society was allowed to surface as the
nucleus. The value enterpise embodies under high level growth is advancement.
It is felt that capital input of a set period of time results in a+ptoutput
- in the following period of time in accordance with the effort of enterprese,
the nucleus, and this is a normal situation and will continue. Let's say a
tangible expression of advancement as a value is the economic activity of
expanded equipment and plant investments which support high level growth.
Additionally, advancement, the value of this level of society, gives value
to the level of man and the level of the system. When value was given to
_ the level of m3n, it is thought that the following three premises existed.
First of all, each individual experienced starvation immediately after the
_ defeat and had a basic desire to excape from it; abundance came on top of a
continuation of this excape from starvation. Secondly, the relationship of
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society and man, that is, the relationship of enterprise and workers, did not
only exist as a mere offer of labor based on wage agreements, but also was a
relationship within a quasi-cooperative system called an "all-supportive
enterprise;" this is a social relationship in wi~ich the individual is buried
_ within the group. Thirdly, more than just satisf~�ing the workers' abundance,
enterprise has furnished its workers with a life et;virnoment of company houses,
health and recreation facilities and such that the individuals himself could
not provide, and generally speaking, has guaranteed the individual's advance-
_ ment. From these premises, assimilation has come into being as a value on "
the individual level. The behavior norm is that the social group to which
one belongs guarantees advancement in all areas of life for its members (both
materially and spiritually) and the members have a strong sense of belonging
to that group and faithfully carry out the roles expected by the group.
_ On the other hand, the value, advancement, in the level of society also in- _
fluences the level of the system. Conservative party control has been con-
tinuous except for one period right after the defeat. In that time, the logic
whereby the conservativ~e party j ustif ied its control has consistently been
the logic that stability in the system is a necessary indispensability for
.~dvancement (growth of Japan's economy).
In particular, the significance of the Ikeda administration's economic policy, _
_ the income-doubling program, lies in the fact that "it ratified the reality -
achieved throughout the post-war period and merely confirmed that that trend
would continue." But it can be said that the political significance is that
it has officially declared that the governemnt links advancement and stability -
- and these two are inseparable. What is notice~ble here is that while it i~
natural for the financial world, the largest pressure group advocating con-
servative party control to have made strong demands for stability (for example,
the financial world's activities seen in the political process are unified
behind the LDP), the opposing reformist parties and the labor movement who
stand behind them have shown the robberism activities of the pressure groups
in this advancement, which has been acknowledged and advanced as reality.
Thus, domestically, the situation of advancement under the rapid growth of
enterprise appeared natural (value was given to it) and it is thought that
together with the surfacing of the level of society with enterprise as its
nucleus, assimilation at the level of man and stability at the level of the
system became values. The value system of assimilation=advancement=stability
is indicated by various expressions, cuch as "GNP for the sake of GNP."
Foreign Aspects
The amazing character of Japan's post-war economic growth was not limited to
domestic aspects. Presently, Japan exists as an indisputable economic power
and Japan's international economic expansion seen in this process ~aas amazing.
After th e defeat, Japan's economy had as its objective economic independence, -
and was exerting itself to strengthen its international competitive power,
and was struggling to catch up with the advanced capitalist nations. However,
it can be said that such a conscious effort to catch up was unable to allow
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an acknowledgement of the international economic expansion that existed as a
fact. Concerning this, in the relationship with Southeast Asia where expan-
sion existed as an invasion not as competition, it was bluntly pointed out
that an awareness of the existence of this invasion and Southeast Asia was
not seen until the anti-Japanese riots at tfie time of Prime Minister Tanaka's
round of vists to Southeast Asia in 1974. Then it was argued that this kind
expansion was acknowledgAd and affirmatively asserted.
I think the essential points can be pulled together in these three. The first
is the indication of the indispensability of commerce and the emphasis on the
necessity of domestic support for commerce. All people have recognized ideo-
logically that "the road for Japan's e:~istence as an island nation with a
population of 90 million can lead to nothing but trade with foreign countries.
However, we have not been con,scious of how difficult that is or how great an
effort is necessary. Espetially, we forget that it is different than domestic
transactions and has to be accompanied witfi a great degree of political effort.
- As a result, we entrust that part of Japan opened to the outside to free opera-
tion." In this, commerce has been given the position of "national prosperity" -
in Japan, and warning has been given to the narrow-minded views of the nation's
elite and the public in general who do not sufficiently understand what "nation-
al prosperity" is.
The second is the high estimation of the capability and rationality of having
commerce as the nucleus. "The conr_ection with the outside world made commer-
- cial relations its axis. Unknown factors surely remain. In that case, the
adaptability of inerchants and the spirit brought by freedom are decisively
important."
Thirdly, the government's domain of activity was limited to maintaining an
environment for commercial activity (as the nucleus). "The policy government
should take can be divided broadly into two categories. The first is the gov-
ernment strives to turn the people toward the outside and promotes a departure
into the outside world, is responsive to the part opened to the outside,
regulates and supports it; in such a case, the government should not do its
own planning nor provide too much guidance. The second is government carries
out the long-range policies only it can do. Enterprise freely performs the
activities which generate profit. Therefore, it is necessary for government _
to carve out a future for the people without thinking of present profit."
As pointed out in Mr. Takasaka's dissertation, it is thought that, in high
level growth, the viewpoint which considers international relations to be
based on international economic relations has been established as a level.
And in the level of this viewpoint, a consciousness has been created that
Japan's economy can expand endlessly if efforts are made. The value of
foreign expansion, corresponding to advancement in the level of society,
has been established. There was recognition of Greater Britain in one of
the premises of Sealy's books. Japan's international political outlook,
specializing in the level of international economy, made "Greater Japan" a
premise. _
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i
rvn vrri~,ic~i, u.~L, viv,,L
- Then, in international relations, when international economy became the funda-
mental axis, the significance of being tfie fundamental axis is that it influ-
enced the other two levels of international politics and the s~stem. First
of all, maintenance of tht status uo is advocated at the level of interna- _
tional politics. Namely, the maintenance of the IMF-GATT system with the cold
war structure, the framework making international econamic expansion a possi-
biliity, was made the supreme position. The question of special procurements
for Vietnam during the Vietnam war is one typical example.
Kan Kawada has concluded: "In the past, Japan's economy was given a powerful
foothold for redevelopment after World War II by the Korean War. Now again,
.iapan's economy has found a clue for a return to prosperity in the Vietnam
war, and has not ~nly obtained the primary means, which could not be ignored,
for checking the full breadth of unfavorable conditions in the international
balance of. payments, but also has tried to take upon itself an important new
role in Asia through this war. The formation of that new role for Japan's
- economy has advanced in close correspondence with America's Asian strategy,
clearly expressed in the Vietnam war---that threw a huge problem on Japan's
_ future." (Kan Kawada, "Ajia e no chosen" [Challenge to Asia] ihiiversity of
Tokyo Press,1969) It can be said that the international economic expansion
of Japan's economy was allowed to advance in cooperation with maintaining
America's cold war structure. Japan-Korean relations are undeniably an un-
disguised manifestation of international economic expansion and maintenance
of that framework.
Then, this maintenance of the status uo has been reinforced by the theory
on maintaining the Japan-U.S. security treaty, based on the "strategy theory"
- of the so-called "actualists" that began to be emphasized in the mid 60's.
Then, when the proof is read, the viewpoint becomes "national security,"
- and although the governed, the general public, enter into consideration to
a certain extent, a point of view on war and man has been dreadfully lacking.
Then, this international economic expansion has affected the level of the
system. The most representative bearer of this international ec~nomic ex-
pansion is the "multinational enterprise." It goes without saying that these
multinational enterprises have aimed at stability in the system in the host
countries, and there is a union between the enterprise and the h~st country's
political ~lite as a pathological phenomenon. And the multinational enter-
prise is strot~gly politcally-colored by nature. But it can be said that it
is necessary to take heed of the role government has performed in this inter
_ national economic expansion. Government executes the maintenance of the
fundamental system of international economy, such as currecny, commerce and
the like, but it can be thought that in Japan, more than that, private enter- -
prise's foreign profit is "national prosperity," and the government has pro-
tected and promoted it. In relations with the advanced nations, there was
resistance to the demand for "trade liberalization" that began in the mid 60's.
And in relations with the underd?veloped nations, a base for expansion was
_ built by the government, seen in the reparations to Vietnam and government
loans to Korea. It is thought that in this, an integration of profit between
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~;overnment and enterprise materialzzed; and the continuation of conservative
party government was deemed natural for enterprise, and the value of stability
- in the level o� the systPm was further reinforced. _
- As mentianed above, it can be thought that even in foreign relations, the
maintenance of Che status uo in the level of international politics and
- stability in the level of system were created as values with international
economic expansion in the level of international economy as the fundamental -
axis. A positive assessment of this kind of value system was "economic
power," a negative assessment was "ecotiomic animal." '
_ Nt~w VaLue System
The value system created under high level growth and supporting that growth
---the value system of level of man=assimilation, level of society=advancement,
level of system=stability, level of international economy=international econo-
mic expansion, level of international politics=maintenance of the status quo---
has one specific feature. That is, the values in each of these levels have
orignated and materalized from the logic of "formation." Consequently, car-
rectly speaking, the substance taken as values existed as the situation up
until now. It is thought that they were put into the position of "values"
after the pathological phenomena of this "situation" appeared and were acknow-
ledged. L
Then, it can be said that through the medium of these pathological phenomena,
a new value system has started to evolve in a form connected to the previously
mentioned archetypal peace theory's viewpoint and at present, it is opposed to
: the value system under high level growth. -
rirst of all, it tis thought that the pathological phenomenon at the level -
of man is "individualization." In that, a fei_ling of helplessless as a member
of society has existed at the foundation. It has been analyzed that the con-
sciousness of the "my home type" people, who are a majority among the Japanese
at present, is as follows. "The spatial extent of the daily life of these
people is often limited to the home alone or to home and work; consequently,
= the extent of their interest is also narrow." "Then the paucity of feelin~s
of solidarity and the iion-interest in society, which come from the narrowness
of human relations, can be indicated as the basic posture of these people
toward society." (NHK Broadcasing Public Opinion Poll Research Center Com-
pilation, "Gendai Nihonjin no ishiki kozo," ["Structure of consicousness in
the modern Japanese") NHK Books, 1979.) ~
In addition, one more pathological phenomenon has occurred at the level of -
man. It is the so-called "abandonned people;" it is tre discarding of
_ those who have been stripped of the ability to assimilate within enterprise
- because of th~ir misfortune or social restrictions. The segregation and
discrimin3tion from competitive society of patients with diseases caused by
environmental pollution, children orphaned in traffic accidents, the elderly
and others is steadily advancing. A re-establishment of humanity has been
attempted many times in this loss of humanity at the level of man, but I think
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- L vn vrr tvttit, U~~, U1VLY
that value is expressed in the word, "citizen." That is, first of all, the
re-establishment of the individual as the nucleus, and the strategic release,
at the point of residence, of the people who have been buried in enterprise.
_ Next, there is positive participation in society by the individual. And what
must be heeded is that there exists in the value of "citizen" a solidariLy
- witii thc~ ".~b~nd~nned ~~eaple" who ].tve as human bE~in~s.
The following concerns the level of society. In the first half of the 1970's
there was criticism of enterprise because of land speculation and the like.
And the questioning of the social responsibility of enterprise is fresh in
our memory. But in reality, it is thought that new values occurred at this
level also. I think they can be put together in the terms, republic and de-
' centralization of authority. Here, the thinking has been pointed out that
the domain of the individual's self-determination must be expanded within the
organization. And the principle tying individual with individual must be
formed in a horizontal associatian. Republic and decentralization of authority
were strongly demanded, centered in a local self-governing body, making the
main place of activity the point of residence. But the realization of this
value of the new way the relationship of individual with individual should
be is overdue with respect to production, or enterprise. In such a phenomenon,
I think it can be seen how abnormally the social group, ente.rprise, sticks
out under high level growth.
And then, concerning the level of ~the system, as was seen in the Lockheed in-
ci.dent in the 70's, a"grass roots racketeerism" took root behind stability,
under what Michitoshi Takahata called "pressure (group) democracy." It came
to be widely held that there is a need for new democratic principles. It
goes without saying, that would be nothing other than "participatory demo- -
cracy."
Since many discussions have taken place concerning "participatory democracy,"
I don't think an explanation is needed, but what is noteworthy is that recently,
Professor McPhearson has presented "defensive democracy," "developmental de-
mocracy," and "equilibrial democracy" as models of liberal democracy, and has
made the analysis that rhis "participatory democracy perhaps cannot take
- place nor endure unless there is an extensive value consciousness in the power
of the governing principles of the code of conduct in liberal democracy, the
core of developmental demecracy---each man and woman has an equal right to
exercise and develop completely his or her own potential ability." (C.B.
MacPhearson, Can Liberal Democrac~ Remain," Iwanami Shinsho, 1978.) Some-
what analagously, it can be thought that the so-called "post-war democracy,"
premised on the creation of "modern man," after a time held that "Japanese- -
style democracy" whould be an adherent of "equilibrial democracy," and at
~ present, that has been taken over by "participatory democracy" which holds
the "citizen" to be the image of the ideal person, and has begun to develop
again.
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Clobal Viewpoint and Values , -
Thus, domestically, the value system that citizen=republic and decentralization
- of authority=participatory democracy was formed, but, at the same time, in in-
- ternational relations as well,, a different viewpoint was formed and value
system was established. It i: thought that it was generated from the problem
situation of 1?ow to grasp coherently these two situations---tt~e situation ~
where a buildup of military strength has advanced unabated, despite the fact =
that a dismantling of the cold war structure in East Asia took place in the
70's (the situation in the Korean peninsula is an exception to this), and the
situation where the economic control of the underdeveloped nations by the
advanced nations was so swollen that the people in those lands resisted, as
indic_ated in the anti-Japanese riots which occurred in various countries in
Southeast Asia in 1974.
The existing value system toward such a problem situation presented as a solu-
tion a"balance of power" between th~ four (five) poles of the United States,
Japan, China, and the Soviet Union (and Europe), and transactions based on
a profit redistribution in accordance with the regulations of the the diverse
interests among the advanced nations' economies (advanced nations summit),
and the advanced nations' initiative in the economies of the underdeveloped
nations. However, this solution, based on a separation of international
- politics and international economy, ignores completely the world-wide militari-
zation that has suddenly increased in the 70's, amd moreover ignores the mag-
nification of the north-south differences in the 70's. From the perspective
of those who desire reform, the viewpoint shown ;iere spells out the mechanism
for oppression by the military=economic control of the advanced nations and
tries to resolve it. -
What demands attention here is that the center of this viewpoint.is always
man. The "logic of nationalism" is negated and the "logic of humanism" which -
- gives substance to "dealing with the question of man's needs and happiness;
not from the point of view of each country separately, but from the world
point of view. (R.A. Falk, "Road to comprehensive nuclear arms reduction---
three intertwined ropes," and "New plan for nuclear arms reduction," Iwanami
- Shoten, 1977). The value brought out by this viewpoint was precisely the
liberation of man at the global level. On account of that, that value can-
_ not be thought of as separuting international politics and international
_ economy, but if one dares to speak of separating them, first of all, there
would be economic independence for the nations to which the oppressed masses
belong, and the nuclear extinction or comprehensive complete arms reduction
which should completely negate the nuclear arms expansion that exists in the
culmination of the mechanism of global violence that has supported this op-
pression.
In this way, the new viewpoint and value system, opposing the ideology created
under high level growth, came into existence. I think that "today," when it
is said that Japan is at a"turning point," it means that the value system
under high level growth is facing a reality that will not permit its continua-
tion and a new opposing value system has begun to appear and_has emphasized
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run vrrl~tr~L uoc uivLi
the need Eor reEorm. Actually, the value system under high level growth can
be analyzed because this new opposing value system has appeared.
2. "Reactionism"---Silent Militarization
- Conservative Ideology
At present, recognition of "reactionism," "rightism," and "conservatism" has
spread, and the voice of fear toward the present situation has stareed to be
heard. For example, Ryutaro Komiya, in his report, "Ureubeki Nihon shakai no
usenka" /"Japanese society's lamentable turn to the right"/ in a special eym-
posium in GENDAI KEIZAI (Spring issue, 1979), described Japan's present over-
all situation as a"turn to the right" as distinguished from "having become
reactionary," from his judgment that "fortunately it can be interpreted funda-
mentally as 'having become conservative and he analyzed the phenomenon of
this "turn to the right" and its causes and expressed concern for the direction
it will take. When the present situation is anaylzed with eittier the term
- "turn to the right," or "conservative" or "reactionary," what most analyses
indicate is that, first of all, a consciousness demanding a continuation with
- the past (for example, tfie recent past, meaning "only yesterday," the era of -
high level growth) has been emphasized, and secondly, that degeneration is
seen boht in the doctrine of reform of the future (for example, the doctrine
of socialism) and in the nucleus of present politics.
Since I think that either an overall or individual analysis of such a grave -
situation will be made in the future as well, I think I will simply point out
in this chapter specific features of the ideological situation seen in relation-
ship with the preceding chapter. And then, I would like to examine critically
the situation of military preparedness in present day Japan, which can be
analyzed only as "having become reactionary" from the angle of view of the
peace theory, and the security debate dealing with it.
At present, as mentioned in the previous chapter, it is thought that the value
system under high level growth is in a situation of having been challenged
both by "reality" and by the new value system. And then, it can be said that
the value system under high level growth has been ideologically reinforced in
- this o~.~position.
The value of domestic advancement has always been evaluated in terms of Japan,
a country which succeeded in modernizing, but now it is being evaluated in
terms of being a model country for the world. "It is evident that Japan
can accomplish the unique role of being an inspiration, exa~r~ple and pattern
for the developing countries, aspecially nations th,at, like Japan, do not have
a Western European background. However, at the same time, Japan greatly de-
serves to be a model even for the most advanced Western European nations...
Among those nations politically democratic, intellectually free and socially
egalitarian, today's Japan has clearly become one of the most competent and
prosperous nations of the world. Our commonly held notion was that the
world learns from Western Europe, but today there are many points even the
most proud advanced nations of Western Europe ought to learn from Japan."
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(Is. Reischauer, "L'olden cpportunity given to Japan," ASAHI JOURNAL, 25 Mar
1979) Such an assertion is but one example. The negative aspects tl~at Japan's
- advancement has brought have been completely forgotten. '
This advancement has been evaluated as follows, when it arrived in Southeast
Asia passing through the level of international economy (international economic
expansion). "After the decisions were made that allowed Japan to recover
and become a powerful industrial nation, the businessman became Japan's only ~
image. Japan's goals can be summarized in one word. Profit...Unfortunately,
the reality of this one race, seeking economic goals without rest and lowerin~
all other affairs to a secondary place, and its image seem to have become one.
This conformity was not born because contact between the many races of Asia and
Japan was made solely through leaders of the industrial world. It has also
come because the Japanese ep ople in general are hopelessly linked together
- with the totalitarian s stem, and because of that, their attitude toward
the outside world reflects the singlemindedness of their own material
advancement. In this way, even though the Japanese people also are nega-
tively influenced by their own huge enterprises, in a different sense, they
are tacit a~eomplices, closing their eyes to the exploitation of the third
world." (Renato Constantino, "Daisan sekai kara mita Nihon---Nihon no
minshu ni uttaeru," ["3apan as seen by the third world---appeal to the
Japanese people"] SEKAI, February 1979;. (Underlining by this author).
Thus, even talcing just the one value, advancement, the assessment here has
been made that Japan should be the world's model, but in the estimation of
the victim of that advancement, the Japanese close their eyes to the "third
world exploitation."
As pointed out in the above examples, it can be thought that the value system
- under high level growth has been historically generalized by the opinion,
"it is something Japanese," and the present ideological situation has let
a reform of the present be denied by its discontinuation with the past.
That is a conservatism within conservative control; it has molded the soil
for reactionism. It is fresh in our memory that the logic of the group who
requested the quick approval of the Era Name bill was the emphasis that it
is "something Japanese."
A Regional Military Power
Well then, speaking of reactionism, last year's emergency legislation dis-
cussions could be taken up, but I think I would like to point out from a dif-
- ferent angle the problem points concerning Japan's militarization, currently
making steady pYOgress. Before that, I will mention one basic fact. On the
front page of the 26 July issue, IL MONDO dealt with the visit to Korea for
- the first time after the war by Yamashita, present director-general of the
Defense Agency, and had this headline, "Japan, regional military power." -
According to the 1979 issue of the Stockholm International Peace Research -
Institute yearbook, "World armaments and arms reductions," Japan's military
expenditures in FY 1979 was 6.226 billion dollars (current value). (It is
_ the largest military power in East Asia, except for China.) and amounted to
a level about 1.5 times the approximate 4.415 billion dollars (current value)
- for military expenditures by the five ASEAN nations.
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A voice of warning has ar~sen from the Southeast Asian nations regarding the
fact that it is such a military power. For example, an Indonesian Security
authority has stated: "When one looks at the increasingly expanding and
c~n?ar~In~; economic presence of Japan, itn't it natural to think that Jap.in
wou.ld liave recourse to military power in order to protect its interests in
an emergency situation. Japan's insistence that it wi11 not and cannot be-
come a military power is understandable, but, in reality, I think that would
collapse in the face of the demands of reality." (ASAHI SHINBUN, 24 March
, 1978) What I wQUld like to take up here as a question is that at present
many people think that the war potential of the Self-Defense Forces is fine
as it is, but is that an affimration of the present situation with an under- ~
standing that, although less than one percent of GNP, it is second in East
Asia in terms of absolute amount.
International Military Order
It is necessary to analyze the function this kind of Japanese military pre-
paredness is fulfilling in international politics from various angles. But
here I think I would like to attempt to consider it from the analytical frame-
work of the "international military order." This concept of "international
military order" has been posed in order to grasp global militarization, and
the unending increase in miliLary expenditures is a direct indication of this -
global militarization. The total amount of world military expenditures is
l~.~Armaments System
Militarizatio ~Gonflict/Peace
B _`G
Imperialism Expansion -
North-South Problems
(This diagram has been simplified)
approximately 334 billion dollars (current values) and matches the aggregate
GNP of the world's 38 poorest countries. It has reached a scale where it ~
uses in just two days more than the total budget of the United Nations and
its special agencies. In addition, the sudden increase in military expendi-
tures by the third world in recent years demands attention. The arms sales
by the advanced nations are behind this, as many people have pointed out.
Then, this analytical framework points out that such an increase in military
expenditures has formed one system. -
This system can be divided into five levels, and each of these levels is
closely linked, and an interlocked military arms order has been achieved
throughout the world. "The military-industrial complex" of the military '
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, has been placed at the
top; it has continued a persistent military buildup. The second level
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is the arms competition between both superpowers, the United States and the
Soviet Union. And the third level is the level of arms shipment network,
in which "armaments~ going beyond the confines of one country, flow from the
superpowers and other advanced nations to foreign countries." The fourth
level is the arms competition within the third worl.d. The fifth level is
a system of oppression, seen in most of the third world, represented in the
military=technocrat control structure and modernized in the developing nations. -
From this analysis, it is pointed out that a vertical relationship between
three of these five levels, the control of the military-industrial complex,
control by international transfer of arms and the brutal oppression within the
developing' countries, is the main rea:~on for the "detente-sytle military
expansion." !1ll the weight of this military order system falls on the
people of the third world, placed at the bottom of this hierarchy. (Yoshikazu
Sakamoto, "Gunshuku no seijigaku" ["Politics of arms reduction"], SEKAI,
- june 1978)
The relationship between the "international military order" and the so-called
North-South problem can be considered as follows. To lay a finger on this
point, the world-wide continuation and magnification of the structure of in-
equality, that is, economic exploitation of the underdeveloped countries by
the advanced nations, wl:ich is called the North-South problem, is deeply con-
nected to the world-wide arms system. A Swedish peace researcher has arranged
this relationship in the a~~ove diagram. Fromerly, the North-South problem -
- was considered BC axis as its basis, and it was thought to be tension between
imperialism and the growth of independence among the people of the third world.
However, the problem was not only that, but here is the problem of the AB axis,
this is, militarization whereby a world-wide arms system has promoted imperial-
istic control. And there is the problem of the AC axis, that is, conflict and
peace, which is how the arms system relates to the independence of the third
world (for example, what kind of situation would exist ~f one or several of
the third world countries escaped from their present subordination?) (Jan
Oberg, "The New International Economic and Military Orders as Problems to
Peace Research," BULLETIN OF PEACE PROPOSALS, Vol 8, No 2, 1977)
Theory on Security of the Economic Powers
Next, I think I would like to examine Japan's frequently advocated "security -
concept" from the viewpoint of this "international military order." It is
a"comprehensive security concept" which makes its supreme position the con-
tinuation of Japan's foreign economic expansion, which has suppressed the -
autonomous growth of the third world, and furthermore approves a rise in the
ratio of the defense budet to GNP from the present 0.0 percent to 1 percent,
(Mainichi Shimbun, 1 August 1979) and tries to give justification to the
increased amount of defense expenditures.
- A report entitled, "Development of a comprehensive strategy based on the inter-
national environment as well as economic and social changes in our country,"
which the Nomura Research Institute of Technology and Economics was commis-
sioned to draw up by tfie Research and Development Organization and which is
regarded as the model for this "comprehensive security concept," explained
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some interesting facts. It is thought that this zeport was written witti a
conscio~isness of the problem of ho~ to re-establish as the basis the value
system under high level growth, which was unable to continue under the struc-
tural changes in the international environment, and how to reconcile it with
the new environment. The conservative nature of this has been disclosed in
a paragraph concerning the "consciousness of the problem." Four points were
listed as making it necessary to have a clear-cut basic concept. Excluding
the point that the goal of "catching up with the level of Western Europe"
has been accomplished, the three points of the change in international en-
vironmental factors, an increase in international interest in Japan's basic
concept and the necessity of realizing national prosperity and international
responsibility within a deepening of international mutual dependence have
_ not presented essential factors but rather conditional terms.
Looking at the details, it is clear that the values of advancement and inter-
national foreign expansion, which this writer submitted as the fundamental
axis of the value system under high level growth, has been inherited intact.
First of all, as for the inheritance of the value, advancement, it can be
shown that it has help up the "existence of a more desirable way of life" as
one of the nation's objectives, which should be the nucleus of the basic con-
cept; and it has been asserted that the "stage which makes the minimum level
of subsistence the goal of the nation, that is, ensuring food for tomorrow
for a large majority of the consituent population, has already been achieved -
in our country's case, and, even though it cannot be said that it will not
l~appen, it is extremely difficult to think of coming to such a situation in
the future where this goal must be held up. Many informed people, when talk-
ing about a change in the "quality of life," have made the continuation of
abundance the "nation's" goal, without ever questioning what its substance is.
Moreover, complementing this, the "superior national character whereby order
has been maintained and society has been managed efficiently" has been cited
as one of the "national (traditional) causes" making it possible for Japan's
economy to continue into the future and for Japan "to surpass other advanced
nations and the developing nations in economic power and to develop strate- ~
g~cally economic power as the fundamental axis." "The greatness of Japanese
loyalty to enterprise is almost without parallel in the world and was a major
cause for supporting high level growth. Hereafter, loyalty will certainly
weaken little by little, but it cannot be thought that it will die completely.
And because even in an era of the manpower surplus anticipated from now on,
it is not anticipated that the life-long employment system and the system
of promotion by seniority will change, it is thought that the tendency for
the Japanese peculiarity of enterprise-being-one-family will continue" So
it has been observed that the value, assimilation, at the level of the indi- -
vidual will continue.
Then, the value, forei~n economic expansion, has also been inherited. As a
part of the operation of each theory in the basic concept, a"regional :~p-
proach" was formed. In that case, the "Asian Pacific domain" was mentioned
as the "domain which could be entrusted with Japan's growth at a relatively
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low cost and risk, as looked at from the financial, political and military
points of view." And mention has been made of the economic view that "ASi:AN
l~as made economic cooperation inside the area the economic development str:~te-
~y after the oil crisis, and is trying to actualize this by making economir
relations with Japan closer. Adding the nations of Oceanio to ASEAN, there
is a move to set up a Japan-Oceanio-ASEAN cooperative system. America's parti-
cipation will be an important condition in order to develop this cooperative
rela~ionship f~xrther. Along with giving economic substance and importance
to this regional cooperative relationship, America's participation would
add political and psychological security."
~
In this connection, a"Japan-ASEAN exchange conference" was held in Thailand
in August of last year, and the so-called "Fukuda doctrine," brought out when
Prime Minister Fukuda visited the ASF~SN nations in August 1977, was the sub-
ject of discussion. I think it ought to be kept in mind that, at its conclu-
sion, "Japan said the Fukuda doctrine is the opening curtain on ASEAN becoming
more friendly and equal partners with Japan; but the Southeast Asians did not
believe Japan's assertion." (ASIA QUARTERLY, 1979, Vol 11, No 1)
Secret Military Buildup
Thus, the value throughout this report is none other than the value system
under high level growth, but what cannot be ignored is that this report, in
_ an item called "security," dealt with the defense efforts which made military
power the main measure," that is, "security in the narrow sense," and as-
serted the following two points. The first demands rightful recognition of
the Self-Defense Forces and the arms buildup under the assertion of "forming
a national consensus toward the defense question." Whi1e reporting that a
qualitative repletion of basic defense capability is important, it was as-
serted that "in that case, defense expenditures will be decided in the end
by how much the people will tolerate; there is no theoretical basis why it
must be limited to less than 1 percent of GNP. It is also necessary to
strengthen a minimum crisis control capability to be able to cope with
emergency situations to a certain limited degree. For example, coping with
major earthquakes and the disposition of displaced persons from the Ko:Pan
peninsula." ~
The second demanded "non-partisan mutual agreement" on a military cooperative
relationship with America, the military superpower, and "an effort to de-
crease the conspicuous asymmetry regarding the capability and responsibility
for defense in Japan-U.S. relations" without "expanding interpreation of the
concept of self-defense." And as a price for the effort to decrease this
asymmetry, it has listed the "economic and political activity which would
indirectly contribute to a furtherance of the security of the Asian Pacific
region."
In August of last year, the "Japan-China peace and friendship treaty" was
_ concluded, but it has been said that, except for Cambodia, all the Southeast
Asian countries expressed caution regarding the treaty. This reaction has
- been expressed: "The Japan-China peace and friendship treaty has pointed
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out that permanent antagonism is impossible, if it is for national prosperity
...we welcome the conclusion of the Japan-China peace treaty, but at the same
time, in reference to this treaty, we must fortify ourselves so as not to be
victimized by the superpowers." (SOIR KARUYA) (Osamu Watanabe, "Samazama no
Tonan Ajia shokoku no hanno," ["Reaction of Various Southeast Asian Nations"]
Asahi Asia Review, No. 36, 1978, No. 4)
_ In the era of high level growth, the value at the international political
level is maintenance of the status quo; the Japanese military buildup has
_ grown within that framework. And then, this report has tried to promote a
Japanese military buildup within a limited framework, while carrying out
- the maintenance of the status quo in the present changed situation.
Summing up the exam.ination of this "comprehensive security concept," I think
_ it can be said that there will be attempts made to increase the present
military buildup situation within this framework, 'based on a continuation of
_ the value system under high level growth. In other words, following the
previously noted diagram, it can be thought that attempts will be made to
continue it by more closely committing the imperialism=spontaneous growth
relationship (North-South problem) to the international military order, albeit
in a limited way.
Discussion on Security of Military Powers
The arms buildup of the world's top ten military powers has been reinforced
by a movement to make it an independent variable. The recently materialized
request for an arms buildup by the Self-Defense Forces made the arms buildup
an independent variable in the assertions expressed in the "Defense White
Paper," published in 1979 and aclcnowledged at the 24 July cabinet meeting.
Regarding this white paper, various leading publications have pointed out
specific features as follows.
First, in part I, "International Military Conditions," the Soviet military
buildup was stressed. In particular, data was presented in one report on
the "military situation surrounding our country," indicating a buildup of
the Soviet Far East Army, and, more than that, the buildup of the Soviet
_ Far East Army is "an important concern for our country's defense." It was
mentioned that "it a ears the Soviet Union has been en a ed in buidling
bases since last year, along witl-i deploying ground forces on a moderate scale,
equipped with tanks and guns to the islands of Kunashiri and Shikotan, terri-
tory belonging to our country. (Underlining by tliis author)
Second, the "principles of the defense program" were determined at the National
Defense Council and cabinet meeting in October 1976, and the "basic defense
capability" concept, setting as the goal the ability to deal effectively with
limited and small-scale aggression, was established. In this white paper,
while there is no major change in the basic conditions assumed in the princi-
ples, "expressions with hidden connotations" were used regarding revision of
the principles. It has been expressed that "it is necessary to allow suffi-
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cient time to shift to a new defense capability setup, and it is necessary
to perceive as quickly as possible tfie implications of a change in ~nternational
politics and military conditions and to ref.lect on policy." It was reported
that the Defense Agency does not deny that th~is came forward with the aim of
beginning the groundwork for revising the principles. (ASAHI SHIMBUM, evening
edition, 24 July)
'I'hen, it is a commonly known fact that there has been dissatisfaction among
"those in uniform" regardin~ this "basic defesne capability" concept from the
_ time it was originally established. At a defen~e meeting, Commander Nagano
_ requested that another look be given to the defense principles, saying: "at
present, objective circumstances have gradually changed from the time these
were decided. We are in a si~~ation where a change in the principles must be
faced in the near future." He stressed "increasing the level of our defense
capability." (MAINICHI SHIMBUN, 29 March)
Well then, how should the view of a Soviet threat and the request for arms
buildup, stated in this "defense white paper," be considered? It can in no
way be thought that there is a high degree of friendship in present Japan-
Soviet relations, compared to Japan-China and Japan-U.S. relations. It cannot
be thought that the Soviet threat asserted by the Self-Defense Forces exists -
as asserted. This is pointed out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' warning
that "the Soviet military capability is played up too much." (MAINICHI SHIMBUN,
27 July)
If so, this kind of opinion on the Soviet threat can be thought to be a false
image for military buildup. Professor D. Zenkhaus, a West German peace re-
searcher, concerning the relationship of threat-deterrent-military expansion,
raised the question of the validity of the "actiorrreaction shame," which is
threat from another country~necessity of deterrents~jpromotion of military
expansion, and asserted that the connection of the structural profit collabor-
ation system directing the military expansion represented by the military-ind-
- ustrail complex~deterrent theory, which is the ideology justifying the request
for that military expansion~the image of a threat created by ourselves can
explain today's military expansion. And the analysis must be that a linkage
between the insistence on military expansion by the Self-Defense Forces and
the emphasis on the Soviet threat is at work.
Next, it must be considered that the present Soviet threat theory has begun
to have repurcussions on public opinion. The aforementioned Professor D. ?enk-
haus pointed out that the process of a linkage between military expansion profit
system~deterrents~threat allows the image of threat to permeate the country's
populace, reflecting this fabricated threat. He also pointed out that there
exysts a vicious circle process of military expansion profit system~deterrents~
threatypermeation of the image of a threat from another country at the level
of the general public~affirmation of military expansion by the general public.
This process is called an "autism model." I think this penetration of the
Seviet threat theory into the general public is indicated by the fact that
novels about hypothetical s~tuations, such as "Sorengun joriku su" ["The Soviet
Army Lands"] have become best sellers in Japan.
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Above all, it is necess~xy to pay attent~.on to hqw easily tl~e stereotyped
ir~i~z~e of tt?e I~SSR,un.fr.iendl.y nation is accepted in Japa.n. iioth Hiroshi Az~nna
and Toshinao Yoneyama irYyestigated the racial attitudes of the Japanese in
"Henken no kazo---Nihonjin no jinshukz~n," ["Structure of prejudice---Japanese
racial prejudice"](NHK Books, 1967) and pointed out a very interesting fact.
That is, among the English, French, Germans, Americans, Italiaas and Russians,
the Russians are lowest in degree of acceptance and highest in degree of re-
jection. Considering this, the judgment can be made that tne "autistic"
phenomenon of constantly promoting military expansion by susing the Soviet
threat theory as the springboard has regrettably been allowed to evolve.
Previously, I critically examined the comprehensive security concept and tl~e -
defense white paper, and neither allows a reversal of Japan's military buildup.
The comprehensive security concept clearly tried to strengthen the present
international economic order by a renewed commitment to the international
military order, and the defense white paper does nothing less than plainly
try to strengthen the international military order by Japan's military buildup.
_ Now a dangerous situation exists, in which the choice in the defense question
has begun to be manipulated as either the comprehensive security concept
or the defense white paper.
Conclusion _
Finally, this writer would like to try to explain the meaning of analyzing
_ Japan's militarization from the viewpoint of reactionism. In the first half
of this small treatise, I indicated that the basic viewpoint of the post-war
Japan peace theory is colisidering international eace via the system from men,
and its value system is anti-war inclination-pacifism-international peace.
In summary, it can be said that we have ranounced military sovereignty as a
"nation." Looked at from this position, the present state of the secruity
debate, which has tried to promote anything but a reversal of the arms buildup,
is but a way of saying "reactionism."
Then, if- one considers resistance to the reactionism that has come forward at
present, the peace theory has as its theme the theoretical consideration of -
the connection of each level in the aforementioned new value system. In parti-
cular, if the domain of militarization is mentioned, one large critical prob-
lem is how to clarify the theoretical doctrine of pacifism established by the -
principles of the ~peace theory in the new value system, citizen-republic and
decentralization of authority-participatory democracy-global human liberation.
On 6 August, the following two facts were pointed out regarding this crisis.
"Prayer services for peace" were held in Hiroshima on 6 August, the 34th anni-
versary, and on that same day, Defense Agency Director-General Yamashita made
an official visit to Yokota Base for the first time since the war and consulted
with the Japanese and American army commanders who were there.
COPYRIGHT: Iwanami Shoten 1979
9400
CSO: 4105
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- MILITARY
CRITIC ANALYZES EXPERTS' ARGUMENTS ON NATIONAL DEFENSE ISSUES
Tokyo CHUO KOROAT in Japanese Oct 79 pp 66-97
[Article by Tsuneari Fukuda, Critic]
[Excerpt] In order to place the arguments on national defense issues in
the proper perspective, what are the basic issues that we must consider?
The self-deception underlying the arguments between Morishima and Seki
and arguments held heretofore will be exposed.
~
Prologue. Only an Exile Can Propound tihe Non-resistance Doctrine.
Michio Morishima, professor at London University, has written an article
Citled "New 'New Military Preparedness Plan Theory in the July issue of
BUNGEI SHUNJU. Following the example of Adm Narumi Inouye, who in January
1941, approximately a year before the start of U.S.-Japan war, wrote an
article, "New Military Frepazedness Plan Theory," in which he cautioned
against a naval shipbuilding race with the U.K. and United States,
Morishima wrote his present-day "New Military Pre.paredness Plan Theory"
and simply added another word, "new," at the beginning. The sub-title
reads, "dedicated to the deceased Adm Narumi Inouye." Admiral Inouye
had no doubts that military ~:rmament was necessary for Japan's defense and
supported the existence of the army and navy at the time. Otherwise, how -
could be have dedicated himself to the navy and risen to the rank of
Admiral? Therefore, his "New Military Preparedness Plan Theory" concerned
the conduct of military strategy and tactics and was not an argement that
military armaments are unnecessary, a theory advocated by Morishima. The
latter should be fully cognizant of this view. That he titled his article,
- "New 'New Military Preparedness Plan Theory, is a"complete deception
of the title," as pointed out by Hayao Shimizu in the September issue
. of SEIRON magazine and furthermore, it not simply a smug pun or joke but
a clever fraud, but I will not question it at this time.
What Morishima wants to say, in essence, is that should the enemy attack,
the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the people should abide by a non- -
resistance p olicy and surrender unconditionally. He has listed each of
the reasons f or believing that that is the best step to take, but as
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menti~~ned by Shimizu in SEIRON, his argument~ are sophistical and mutually
contradictory. Not only that, they are merely abstract, paper plans
and he is being inconsistent and drawing conclusions that suit him best by
arguing that certain steps, which might be only 1-out-of-10 or 1-out-of-100
possibilities, are the only ones that can be taken or on the other hand,
placing expectations on possibilities with odds of 100-to-l. In ex:reme
instances, he is trling to deceive the readers by nonchalantly telling .
lies as though they were truths. An example of this vicious practice is
the section in which he describes the civilian control of the U.K. In a
broad sense, his argument can be interpreted as the "fal;.acy of begging
the question" (Petitio principii).
His action, which I find most unpardonable, is his attempt to use vulgar,
pretentious play or should I say, his acting as a show producer to become
- popular with the vulgar masses. His ar~uments can be s~amned up as
non-resistant, defeatist doctrine, but he does not truly beiieve in it. He
has taken into consideration "safety valves" which will prevent his extreme
views from "exploding" and anticipated that his views will be popular.
Probably, he first enjoyed the taste in his dispute with Tsuru [Shigeto~
and the respectable university professor, who had been treated as an alien,
was built up, in his exiled place of London, as an agitator, by Japanese
journalism. He must've been carried away by the joy of his first pleasure
- and started his second round of arguments. Essentially, his argument
deserves to be treated with silent contempt, but a full-grown adult can be _
blinded by a bi~wgun, shot playfully by a child. Thinking that his argument
cannot be ignured, I am refuting it. i do not wish to start a controversy,
however, with Morishima. My aim is to use this opportunity to put t:~e
defense controversy in the right perspective, and believe that Morishima's
non-resistance doctrine is a good target.
- Probably what I said might be an exaggeration but I feel as though, s omewhere
in my heart, I was waiting for the appearance of such a target. Since the
target is an easy one, there is no reason to let it go unscathed.
Although belatedly, the target finally appeared as it was destined. I
am not the only one who thought so. Tadae Takubo wrote the following
remarks in the September issue of BUNGEI SHUNJU:
"Japan's non-annament, neutral doctrine has no parallel in the world. The
bases for this doctrine are Japan's Peace Constitution, the international
evr:ironment of being encircled by the three great powers of the United -
States, PRC and USSR, and public opinion. Probing one step deeper into
these ostensible bases, the underlying truth will be discovered, I believe,
which is: since we cannot wage war, we must accept surrender and to do that,
armament is unnecessary and we must take a neutral stand. Professor
Morishima boldly and minutely made public for the first time, this under-
lying truth. Clear-cut thinking will lead to the conclusion that defense
strategy is unnecessary for Japan. Considered in this light, it is an
epoch-making treatise."
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In the same BU1vuEI SHUNJU issue, Tokichi Harada also writes as follows:
"This (conten~ partially omitted) is a change in attitude or strengthens
the logic for the argument (non-annament, neutra~ doctrine) which
had been on the wane."
I'urthermore, Hayao Shimizu expresses similar views in SEIRON, as the
foregoing two persons, and suppoLts Morishima:
- "When I read Morishima's article in BUNGEI SHUNJTJ, I was imprassed by the
fact that there are people in this world who make such brazen jokes and
believed that the Japan Socialist Party [JSP], which advocates disarmament
- and neutrality, would receive quite a~low. (Omission). In oCher words,
the situation that the JSP wanted to keep hidden, i.e., the condition of _
~ unconditional surrender to the USSR was exposed by the professor, who
says the condition is acceptable. I~ is only natural that I considered
the professor's article a literary parody with the intention of criticizing
the JS~. (Actually, I have some doubts as to the professor's intent. That
is because in the er.d, instead of boosting the morale of non-armament
- neutralists, the professor's article might result in heightening the
militaristic, defense consciousness of the Japanese people who realized
the destination to which non-armament neutrality might Iead.)"
Regarding this point only, I believe that Takubo alone 'r.as accurately
g;.asped the political motives of Morishima's contenti~r~. Although it
might be a literary parody, I cannot believe that Mox~ishima's non- -
resistance argument will, as Shimizu says, "result iri heightening the
militaristic, defense consciousness of the Japanese people." The reason
is that in the past year or two, the Japanese people, or rather, the
Japanese newspapers, began to show a cautious attitude toward the USSR,
_ but this is only an outward change and is not related, in actuality, to
defense consciousness or national consciousness. You can take my word that
- this cautious attitude wi3.1 becane diluted, depending on Soviet actions.
The necessity of national defense is, without question, a realistic problem.
Therefore, the e~tent and methods are naturally swayed by happenings.
- But what the problem should be depends on national consciousness and views,
that is to say, it is tied to the relations between nation and individuals
or the source of human existence. In that sense, it cannot be said that
Morishima's advocacy depri ~ed the non-armament, neutral doctrine of its -
substance nor was Seki's opposing argument, with which I am in full agree-
~ ment, strong enough to bury the non-?:esistance theory. N~t only in logi::
but ir~ actuality, the non-resistance doctrine was deep-rooted in post-
war Japan and even if Morishima loses in the controversy, the doctrine
will remain alive. As far as I can surmise, the ones who were puzzled were _
not the JSP members wh o preach the non-armament neutrality but the
- conservative party members, who claim the Self-Defense Forces [SDF] is
constitutional, and leaders of the bureaucracy. They are the ones who are
grateful for Morishima's words, saying only an exile could've said them,
- and feel inwardl~ relieved. I am not making irresponsible statements.
Tt you read this entire article, you should understand that what I have
~
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~ to say is jusCifiable. Then,I would've accomplished my aim of placing
the defense argument on the right track.
Part 1. What Does "Civilian Control" Signify?
In practically all cases, the conflicts of opinions seen in debates and
controversies are not conflicts of opinions themselves but differences in
the meanings the participants attach to words even while mutually using
the same words. In controversies conducted on the erroneous assumption
that similar words possess similar meanings, mutual understanding and
agreement, in a broad sense, cannot be reached through dialectics, and
result needlessly in chaos and confusion. Particularly, in post-Meiji era
Japan, the new Chinese words which were made up for purposes of foreign
language translation, and the foreign words which were misused without
benefit of translation in post-WW II, have contributed to this trend and
our thoughts have reached the stage of utter confusion. The newly translated
Chinese words have a brief history and have lost the breath and depth of
the original words. They have lost their association with other similar
coords though these words might be likened to the roots or branches of a
tree intertwining with another tree. Not only in debates and controversies
but even in our daily lives, about 80 percent of the Chinese words that we
use are new Chinese words. Words such as overbearing or courageous, modest
_ or vulgar, etc have been used from ages ago, but such clear Chinese
words which have practically become a part of our national language are
_ not used much recently. Instead, abstract *.aords such as nation, sovereignty,
human rights, democracy, peace, freedam, international environment,
industrial make~up, rEStraining power, national defense, etc are used
Frequently in newspapers, and controversies over political and social
problems rely almost wholly on this type of new Chinese words. Ir? pre-war
China, not crisp, new paper bills, but wrinkled, worn-out bills were
desired. The old bitls had passed through many hands and can be trusted -
as genuine bills, but there is a strong suspicion that new bills m~ght be
counterfeits. New Chinese words should be treated with the same caution.
The most suspicious word is civilian control, and Morishima is utilizing
to the maximum, the weakness of this counterfeit word.
Among the new Chinese words, civilian control was used for the first t:.;ne
aFter WW II, ancl if Japan had academies like those of the U.K. and France,
the word might not have been included in the Japanese dictionaries. As
far as I know, even in the U.K. and the L'nited States, the word "civilian
control" has a. vague, subtle meaning and is troublesome in usage. In any _
country, the military is necessary for national defense, but once its role
and size exceed an appropriate limit--and as Morishima says, such a
possibility is not limited to Japan, and though there are differences in
degree, the possibility exists in any country--it becomes necessary to
protect the administrative and legislative bodies from one's own
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- military, which was created to protect the country from foreign enemies.
~herefore, the word "civilian control" denotes only an intent, and during
the past one or two centuries, the method and system of control have
varied with different countries, depending on time and practices. In
the United States, following WW II, there was the Korean war, followed by the
Vietnam war and from tlie late 1950's to early 1960`s, various controversies
arose. nccording to one interpretation, the word "civilian supremacy"
was ordinarily used but "civilian control" was substituted when the Vietnam
war became mired and something had to be done. As is known, McNamarra
advocated and carried out the intervention of the executive branch in
military affairs. The truth of that interpretation cannot be verified
- but we cannot overlook one facC and that is, there is the danger of the
military pressuring the civilian, but on the other hand, there exists the
- equal danger of the civilian exercising power over the military. By right,
both parties should be equal to the two wheels of a car, but civilian supre-
macy is sought because the military is the sole possessor and custodian of
military weapons. No matter how manifest civilian supremacy is made, there
is no absolute method or system to completely prevent the military from
running berserk. The important f~ctor is maintaining relations of mutual
_ trust. Military recklessness cannot be blamed on the military alone, and it
~ is wrong to think that civilian supremacy is the "charm" to prevent it.
The civilians who are in a superior position must be experts who can deal on
e ve n grounds with the military.
Morishima claims that civilian control is possible in the U.k. because of
the doctrine which gives supremacy to amateurs. Masamori Sase questions
this point in the September issue of BUNGEI SHUNJU. Morishima's claim
cannot be dismissed as sophistry. It is simply an out-and-out lie.
There are few countries like rhe U.K. which respects experts. Japan is
the country of amateur supremacy. By appearing for a number of years on _
TV programs, such as "You at 3 o'clock" and "Economics in the Living Room,"
1 one can became a Diet member or a metropolitan governor, but in the U.K.,
J such ~ peculiar phenomenon does not happen. The academic world and academism
are well established. Even if one becames famous by writing in newspapers
or popular magazines, should the subject of the article be outside of his
specialized field, the achievement is not credited as a professor's
- accomplishment and does no~ contribute to his promotion. With Morishima,
even if he wrote, on the basis of his slight personal war experiences,
arguments opposing armament and war and became popular by ha.ving them
published in the GUARDIAN, the event will not be a credit to him. In
fact, his position and trust as an economist within London University
might be hurt. If he were teaching in a Japanese university, he might
gain direct or indirect benefits. If his income from journalism becomes
greater than his uni~ersity income, he will be that much busier and he _
might gain direct or indirect benefits. If his income fram journalism -
becomes greai:er than his university income, he will be that much busier '
and 'ne might have to neglect some tasks as a scholar and professor, but
no one will blame him. In the U.K., even amang jaurnalists, there are
experts who can talk on even terms with scholars of international politics.
_ The same is true of politicians. Pitt, who defea#'ed Napoleon of France,
can be said to be the first prime minister of the U.K. and he is the second
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son of the well-known Count Chatham. His political genius can be traced
genealogically to generations of politicians. In the British socially
stratified society, the family line serves the role of an institution to
train experts. During the Victorian period, when modern art flourished
most, the three prime ministers who served three teYtns respectively,
namely, Count Derby, Gladstone and Marquis Salsbury, were all political
experts bred by the family lineage. In recent years, Baldwin and Chamberlain
of post-WW I and Churchill of WW II years are no exceptions. The situation
is the same in the other Anglo-Saxon country, the United States.
Morishima might interpret the foregoing circumstances as evidence of the
amateur supremacy doctrine that he has conceived but he is misusing the
term, "amateur." He is contributing to the misunderstanding by making
such claims as, "In the U'.K., not only the military but other experts are
under the thumb of amateurs. Therefore, it is not strange to have civilian
_ control." If we are to interpret Morishima's word "amateur" in a good
light, we can say that it refers to one with the expertise to understand what
the other experts are saying and with the comprehension to put the opinions aE
experts in the proper perspective. In a broad sense, that can be interpreted
as political supremacy, at its best. The problem lies, however, in his
phrase, "under the thumb of amateurs." Such careless remarks can be
misunderstood as the expressions of a frustrated and exiled professor.
As Morishima knows, not only in the U.K. but in the advanced couritries of ~
Europe, the se~up is quite similar. Although the military is said to
be "under the thumb" of the amateurish civilian, the civilian representative
is the president or the prime minister, under whom the national defense
minister and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] hold equal
positions. The JCS chairman has the right and responsibility to attend
Cabinet and National Defense Council meetings and at times, to present
his views directJ.y to the president or prime minister. In the United
_ States, the set-up is somewhat different and civilian control is not held,
as in the U.K., by the prime minister alone, but is divided between the
president and Congress. The mil.itary is swayed by politics more than in
the U.K. For example, even if the president strongly advocates the with-
drawal of U.S. troops from the ROK, the military can take its case to
Congress to try to suppress the president's action through political
� manipulations. Or, there might be cases where the president approves but
the Congress opposes, although the military might not have lobbied, and
a stalemate results. In such cases, thare is the danger that the military
might take the situation in its own hands. Thus, depending on the methods
used, civilian control does not necessarily have the same meaning or bring
about the same results.
What is the situation in the country with which we are concerned, i.e.,
Japan? Unlike the Defense Ministries of oCher countries, the Japanese
_ Defense Agency is an extension of the Prime Minister's Office. The
National Defense Council, which the premier chairs, is made up of the
f oreign minister, finance minister, Defense Agency director and Economic
Planning Agency director, all of whom are "part-time" members. The
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Joint Staff Council [JSC] chairn?an, who is an expert and the highest
responsible official in SDF, has no right to attend, except when so ordered
by the prime minister. To serve as the civilian watch-dog, there is an
Internal Bureau within the Defense Agency, and neither the JSC chairman
nor any of the SDF officers can be a member. The Internal Bureau is
staffed by officials on TDY from the National Police Agency and Finance
Ministry, and uniformed officers of SDF are excluded. As Morishima
hopes, the government and ruling political party believe that the Japanese
people consider civilian control unsuitable for the nati~n. They have
_ strongly upheld the doctrine of a.mateur supremacy, which excludes officers,
a set-up which has no parallel in the world. An article in a recent iss~e
oL' a certain magazine stated that even Morishima, who is an "economisC of
the Establishment," has begun to advocate non-resistance. The fact is that
because he is a member of the Establishment, he can safely advocate main-
taining the status quo of SDF and denying civilian control. -
What I am concerned about, however, is not the opinions of an exile, -
Morishima. It is the nonchalant attitude of the government's ruling party
which shows no concern for his irrational arguments. In fact, because he
a~vocated the continuance of the present treatment of SDF as persons outside
of government service, as was the case before civilian control, he brought
to tight the stalemated situation. On this score, I even want to pay my
respects to his "courage." I feel this was because the government has
obscured the fact that the present-day SDF is still at a standstill, as
before the enactment of civilian control, but led the people to believe
that principles of civilian control were being followed. The Japanese
people are not the only ones. Even among experts who discuss defense
issues, any talk about troop strength, equipment and military costs but with
respect to the most fundamental problem of a higher level, i.e., the
national and social role of the military, few are willing to try to correct
the distorted situation. To repeat, that situation remains in a frozen,
isolated and confined state. If the situation which existed prior to
_ civilian control continues, as heretofore, the local SDF commander must
act on his own judgment, in case of emergencies. To prevent this from
happening, Hiroomi Kurisu, JSC chairman, made the sound and modest request
last year of strengthening the civilian control set-up. He was misunder-
stood, however, and forced to resign. The resgonsibility lies with the
civilian government and the Diet, which pretended that the present-day SDF
had been under civilian control fram before.
When Masamichi Inoki was head of the Defense Academy, I was once asked to
attend the graduation ceremony a civilian representative and to address
the graduates and sfiudent body. Of course, I did not touch on the stalemated
situation and spoke as though the SDF was under civilian control as in
Europe and the United States. I told them that betore they considered
themselves as military men with a profession, I would like them to think
of themselves as a citizen, as a civilian and as a human being. This is
_ not an easy act to perform even under the civiliar. control of Europe and
the United States. It is nearly impossible in a society where they are
exclucled from the civilian ranks and considered as persons with specialized
prof~ssion and locked in a cage reserved for collective groups of experts.
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Morishima prophesies that if the stalemate is broken and normal civilian
control is exercised, the military will run amok, but I think the reverse
is true. If one is treated as an outsider and confined for too long a
period, not only the military but anyone will have the urge to give vent
to his pent-up anger and run berserk. Spealcing like a"scholar of the
f:stal~tishment," Morishima claims that arms reduction of the early Showa
era led to militarism, and learning from the experience, he opposes arms
reduction or complete disarmament. As is the case with the majority of
the people who oppose his views, Morishima is concerned with the number
of troops and quantity of equipment and completely disregards the quality
aspect.
Although he is likewise one of the "scholars of the Establishment," Inoki
realizes that the present-day SDF is in a situation which existed prior
- to civilian control. He is advocating that the SDF be "placed under the
people--in other words, the Diet." Although Japan is a democratic country
where sovereignty lies with the people, as far as civilian control is
= concerned, it is risky to permit only the popularly-elected Diet members
to represent the people. If that is the case, the only alternative is to
follow the example of the United States and divide the control between the
chief of the executive branch and the Congress. Probably, thar is what
Inoki wants. It is truly strange, but our Diet has abandoned the right
to deliberate on defense outlays. If the SDF is to be placed under civilian
control as in Europe and th~~ United States, the military must consider
arguments affecting increas~~s, decreases, improvements, etc of equipment,
armament and troops, and pr~~sent a budget draft, like other ministries and -
agencies. The draft should be mulled over and revised by the Finance MinisCry
and the original and revise~ drafts should be passed to the Diet for
consideration and deliberation. Even if the top agency of the civilian
control is not the D iet but the prime minister or president, the Diet
should still assume that responsibility. Because the Diet forsook that
right, the SDF was treated more and more like outsiders and placed in a
state of confusion. As far as the budget is concerned, the Defense Agency
is under the jurisdiction of the Finance Minis try.
The foregoing discussion has made clear that Morishima believes civilian
control is difficult to administer in Japan and that the fault does not
lie with the military, which is to be controlled, but with the controlling ~
side, the civilians, for lacking the necessary qualifications and
capabilities. There is no need to scare the populace at this time by
� mentioning the rash actions of the military during wartime. I do not believe _
that the civilian side lacks the qualifications and capabilities. To be
exact, the civilian side is not lacking them but does not want them. The
Diet does not lack the ability or confidence to place the military under
its control, but on the pretext of the people',~ sovereignty, the Diet
_ regards the SDF as an explosiv e or dangerous ot~ject and does not want to
touch the problem. Of course, like the people, the Diet members do not
really think that the SDF is a dangerous item like nitroglycerine. On
this point, the Diet differs greatly from Morishima. Within the Diet
building, the "floor is covered with oil and a stick of match can cause a
dangerous explosion." Plainly speaking, the "oil" is the constitution and
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the SDF laws. If they are ignited, matters can become serious. Trying to
adopt an illegitimate child of a kept mistress can result in a running
quairrel between husband and wife and disrupt the harmony of al~nusehold.
Similarly, what the Diet fears most is any risk which will create unrest.
_ If the government or ruling party can be likened to the husband w'.-~o
fathered an illegitimate child, it can be expected to fervently try to
gain time by feigning ignorance or taking the attitude of "see-not,
hear-not and speak-not" to his wife, the opposition party.
Part 2. "Orderly and Fully Dignified Surrender" and "Right of Political
Self-Determination."
In Morishima's article, the above-mentioned are practically the only words
which touch on morality and the way a person should life. Although s anewhat
long, the following excerpt from his article is quoted in full because
it reveals most frankly, his flippant attitude:
: "The ASAHI SHIMBUN, dated 23 August 1945, carried an article which stated,
'The enemy troops are approaching, but be brave and calm in dealing with
them.' As a matter of fact: a) I believe that the Japanese people
made a dignified, admirable surrender which the later generations can recall
with pride. Because the people made such a surrender, Japan was able to
make the miraculous recovery tYcat it did.... Likewise, should the Soviets
attack, the SDF has no choice but to surxender with courage and orderliness.
A horrible aftermath is expected, with frenzied Soviet troops pouring in,
should the SDF fight to tiie end and prefer death to surrender. Rather -
than that, the Japanese should make an 'orderly and fully dignified
surrender'; and b) insteaa, obtain 'the right of political self-determination.'
I think that this is the wiser course to take. As long as diseensions do
not break out all over Japan nor a segment of the Japanese people torture
and abuse the remaining Japanese, I believe that it is possible to build
a sound society, even if Japan falls into the Soviet orbit--perhaps, it
might not be perfect, but a semblar.ce, of the socialistic society espoused
by Seki."
Of tlie abovementioned points "a" and " b," with respect to "b," logical
counter-arguments have been made respectively by: first, Seki himself;
Shimizu in SEIRON; Sase in the September issue of BUNGEI SHUNJU; Tadashi
Matsubara in GETSUYO HYORON (13 August issue); and Ikuko Taniura in the
"Readers' Comments" section [September issue of STN(~I SHUNJU], after she
read the Morishima-Seki controversies in the magazine. From their respective
professional standpoints, Seki, Shimizu and Sase are laughing at the
optimism, or rather, the ignorance of Morishi.ma who holds such dream-lilce
espectations of the USSR. Furthermore, Shimizu is clai.ming that the SDF
is a"white elephant" if its mission is to surrender unconditionally, and
is rai:~ing the question, "Why should the Japanese people have to pay high
taxes to maintain a useless military force?" I am in agreement. Morishima
_ would like, however, to keep the SDF as it is, without civilian control,
and let it surrender unconditionally. He thinks it is "wiser Co obtain the
right of political self-determination" by handing over the SDF as a gift
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or ransom money to the Soviet military. For this purpose, he is claiming
- that the SDF "should not be suddenly decreased or abolished."
Ilnlike the abovementioned three persons, Matsubara and Taniura are
objecting to Morishima on the grounds of morality and humanity. With
regard to Morishima's arbitrary assumption that "as long as dissensions
do not break out all over Japan nor a segment of the Japanese people
torture, abuse and oppress the remaining Japanese, "Matsubara states "human
beings are not like that" and explains in detail the indecencies of human
nature. In the HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN, Morishima has written an articie con-
taining the same views as in item "b" of the excerpt quoted above. In
the article, he states, "Even under Soviet domination, as long as we are
firm, it is possible to build up a socialistic economy that is suited
to Japan. The article was reprinted as his supplementary article in
BUNGEI SHUNJU. On this point, Taniura reflects on her surroundings
and daily living and says, "The phrase 'as long as we are firni' made the
article appear to be that of a layman. We are not firm. Or, we cannot
say that we are firm under whatever circumstance. I have doubts that,
after surrendering without military preparedness, we can create a social
system under which individuals can continue living with self-respect. -
I feel certain that an increasing number of people will come to the forefront
by immediately conforming to the set-up of the ruling side."
I find it very difficult to believe that this article was written by a
21-year-old girl. I cannot imagine that such a"finn" girl exists in
present-day Japan. I am not saying that because I hold women in low esteem
but because I think that women who have such self-awareness would find it
awkward tn express themselves in this way, espec~ally if they are only
21 years old. Probably, she is using an alias. Taniura concludes with
a positive assumption that, "an increasing number of people will probably
come to the forefront by immediately conforming to the set-up of Che ruling
side." For persons of our age, her assumption appears to be far more
realistic than Morishima's afterthought, which is only an experimental past-
time, that Hitler could have been contained in this manner or that it was
impossible to restrain him~ About 10 years before Taniura was born,
repatriation ships loaded with Japanese POW's who had been captured by
the Soviets entered Ma.izuru port, but she probably doesri't know what
happened aboard those ships. Within the USSR or Soviet-occupied terrirory,
there appeared Japanese who "came to the forefro:~t by conforming to the
set-up of the ruling side." At the time, they were called "activists"
~ (positive elements, active elements), and as the repatriation ships ~
neared .7apan, the situation was reversed and those who iiad been abused
by them began to take revenge. This scenario was repeated on every -
returning ship. We must not �orget, however, that within the Japanese
homeland, "ar_ increasing number of people had already come to the forefront
by conforming to the spt-up (occupation forces) of the ruling side." Such
being the case, as Taniura sCates, she and other youngsters who are
offsprings of those very people cannot be expected to be fixm at any time -
under any circumstance.
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I want to presentT at this time, another factual story about the experience,
of my friend in Ta-lien at the time WW II ended. Morishima claims that it
cannot be helped if the Soviet troops "went to the extreme in plundering
and assaulting" because "the Soviet troops were watching for an opportunity
to invade, and with the declaration of war, they poured in as if the em-
banlcment had broken through." This is not true. If was a fact th.1t in
North Manchuria, the Japanese and Soviet troops waged hard-fought Uatttes,
but they were not "resisting to the end" or "preferring death to surrender."
In the end, they did surrender. Learning about the surrender, the master
of the railroad freight station in Ta-iien began to think. It was useless
to offer token resistance. Rather, he should follow the example
o� the story by Eiji Yoshikawa, which he lw ed to read, about surrendering
Ako castle [scene of Chushingura or 47 Loyal Retainers]. He re-read the
story for an entire night. He then made a detailed inventory of the items
in the freight station warehouse, had the list translated into Russian and
calmly awaited the enemy troops to make an "orderly surrender." The general -
populace followed suit. The Soviets entered the war on August 9th and
_ 10 days later, invaded Ta-lien. Of course, they were not troops which
fought the Japanese military. They were troops which had been dispat~.~hed
suddenly from Northern Mongolia to occupy Ta-lien before it fell to `
Chiang Kai-shek's army. They were not frightened by the Japanese troops
_ "fighting to the end" and were not "frenzied troops pouring in." The
results were contrary to the expectations of "Tai-lien Kuranosuke" [pun
on name of the head of the 47 loyal retainers in the Chushingura drama] and
the Ta-lien residents faced a pitiful end of the war. They were plundered
and assaulted daily.
What is most difficult to comprehend, however, is point "a" of the above-
quoted Morishima's statement. During the war, I was not a good citizen.
I did not oppose the war and I was war weary. I could not rely on the
government or troops and felt that the uppermost task was to assure the
minimum livelihood of my family and close friends. For that reason, I
cannot indulge in the self-praise that, as Morishima says, "[We made] a
- dignified, admirable surrender which the later generations can recall with
pride." Bt~C I was not the only one, and I regret to say that as far as I
know, there was not a single Japanese at the time who is worthy of the _
praise of having made an "orderly and fully dignified surrender." ~ven
if there were several or several tens of such admirable Japanese persons,
they were not of sufficient number to be referred to as the "Japanese
people." The people met the American troops with envious eyes and dr:~oling
, mouths at the sight of chocolates, Lucky Strikes and food rations that
they carried, and wore servile smiles on their faces. My self-respect
will not allow me to claim that our appearances at the time conformed to
the request of ASAHI SHIMBUN that "the enemy troops are approaching but
be brave and calm in dealing with them."
P'urthermore, Morishima states in his article in the sectian irunediately
preceding the excexpted part that "once the Potsdam Declaration was
accepted, Japan (military nation) recovered and coped with the situation
in =s model, splendid manner." But can we say that? Since I wrote the
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"current constitutional theory," 14 years have pasGed. In that article,
I mentioned that judging by the treaty provisions, I can say that the un-
c~~nditional surrender of the Potsdam Declaration was clearly directed at the
Japanc~se military and not at the Japanese Government or people. Moreover,
Ll~e decl:trati~~n d~es not imply that we must unconditionally accept evtry-
tt~ing, e.~., the constitutional revisions demanded during the Occupation
in violation of international laws, reform of the educational system and
meddling in our language use, culture and customs, or destruction of the
various traditions, which might appear trivial, but which support the
Japanese feelings and upon which our pride and confidence are built. I
do not wish, at this time, to put the blame on the Occupation Forces.
In fact, the reverse is true and I wish to criticize the attitude of us
Jap aneae people or the civilian leaders at the time. Of course, the
authorities concerned must have had various excuses. The Potsdam
Declaration, which was clearly intended to be a surrender with conditions,
- was accepted as unconditional surrender. This flippant attitude of the
Japanese people in permitting non-resistance resulted 30 years later in
breeding casual-thinking persons who view the post-war confusion as "a
dignified, admirable surrender which the later generations can recall with
pride," who believe that because the Japanese people were able to do so,
they succeeded in building up today's prosperity, and thus affirm, without
questioning, that Japan is as it should be today. This attitude is
what bothers me the most.
At any rate, I wish to call the reader's attention to the five points below.
First, for us ordinary people, "fully dignified surrender: is an incomparably
more difficult task than fully dignified conquest or occupation. Only those
who have fought with full dignity can carry out a"fully dignified surrender."
Second, how can the Japanese people, who could not make a"fully-dignified
surrender" to the Santa Claus-like, generous American forces do the same
with the poor, backward Soviet troops? Setting aside the question of dignity,
among the Japanese at the time, there were some who dlthough servile did -
"deal in an ideal manner" with the American Occupation Forces. Although
treated as 12-year-olds by General MacArthur, when the general was dismissed
by President Truman for ignoring civilian control during the Koreaa war, many
of the Japanese people knelt on the ground in respect and regretted his
departure. The reason for that can be simply explained as the poverty suf- _
fered during and after the war. Accordir~g to Morishima, British and French
teaders said, "In order to fire up the people, first Hitler must be allowed
to beat them up thoroughly." Following this reasoning, in order to make
a"fully dignified surrender" to the Soviets, as well as to the Americans,
Japan must first return to the poor living conditions of 30 years ago. The
post-war "miraculous recovery," which he praises on the one hand, must be
completely reverse:'. on the other hand, if we are to follow his advice. For
Japan to do this, the USSR or the United S~ates "must be allowed to beat Chem
up thoroughly." It is true that in a democracy, the government's leadership
is weak. It is difficult to restrict individuals and enterprises which
are apt to pursue their own interests and to confine them to one direction.
- It is not true, however, that to facilitate control, Churchill planned from
the beginning to sacrifice the harmless people of his country and of Europe
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as bair_ to Hitler and to force Roosevelt to participate in the war by
usin~ their sufferings as excuses. To uphold the honor of the hawk faction, -
I proclaim war against such atrocious, or rather, unpardonably inhuman
schemes of- Morishima.
Tt~ird, wl~ether t}icy bc American or Soviet troops, they are Loreigners
who cannot understand our language. If the "Japanese are fiYtn" enough to
make a"fully dignified surrender" to them, it should be much easier to
deal with the Japanese SDF than with Soviet Occupation Forces, even if
the SDF should get out of hand in the future. The Japane~e people should
find it simple to make a"fully dignified surrender" to the military
authority of the SDF and if "deviation" is pennissible, to obtain to some
extent, "che right of political self-detennination." Fourth, after earnestly
' explaining the non-resistance doctrine and the bases for it, Morishima
states, "In spite of the foregoing 'defense plan', I want to make clear that
I do not personally believe that the Soviets will ever attack Japan." If
that is the case, Morishima wrote 60 or 70 pages merely Co earn fees to make
up for the high-yen and low-pound exchange. That makes me angry, but leaving
personal feelings asiae, let me continue my questioning. Whether the Soviets
attack or not, the aforementioned "fully dignified surrender" is difficult
for ordinary people to carry out. In spite of that, Morishima thinks that
the Japanese easily accomplished the difficult task in 1945 and thereby,
made the "miraculous recovery." Because of such feats, Morishima anticipates
th~t today's Japanese will be able to carry out the same difficult task
again, even in the "unlikely event" of a Soviet attack on Japan, which he
- himself "believes will not happer." If he believes the Japanese people
a~e so competent why does he flatly assert that civilian control, which
is much easier to implement, is not possible in Japan?
Fifth, Morishima states, "Bec3use I have faith in human beings, I believe in
the Americans and the Soviers and have no fear of a nuclear attack."
If such is the case, the o*.~ly ones who cannot be trusted arethe Japanese,
who cannot implement civilian control. Morishima claims that he has faith
in human beings, but who is going to believe such a big lie? For him,
human beings are only "economic animals," Thus, he can say that the SDF
should be frozen in the pre-civilian control status, content itself with
the stigma of a"transistor salesman" or "workaholic living in a rabbit
hutch" while Japan dashes ahead as a great econarric power. The word,
"great economic power," was made up by the Japanese or is a translation -
of "econommc giant" and is a new Chinese character. The original word
"giant" does not necessarily mean a"big person" or "possesser of super
powers" and is sometimes associated with words, such as, "boor," "barbarian,"
"ghost," etc. Therefore, it is probably preferable to translate "economic
giant" as "economic ogre" or "money greed." At any rate, economic pawer
is not the only qualification for a major power. In the fall of year
before last, when I interviewed fonner Prime Minister Heath of the U.K.,
_ he said economy and defense should be considered as a"set" and the
ensuing remarks that he made can be considered as very frank for a foreign ~
J statesman. He does not mince words. The question is "whether the Japanese
_ nation is planning to remain the western defense set-up of the United
States, Western Europe and Japan." If Japan wants to remain, it "must
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devise methods to eliminate the "economic friction" with the United States
_ and the European Community. If Japan does not want to remain, it "must
not depend on joint defense set-up and defend its own country by itself."
On lie:~rin~; this, I was about to question him again but I refrained and replied _
thrit the Jripanese people are lacking in awareness of and determination
l'ur "jc,~int defense set-~ip," and are dominated by the desire that "they wt~nt
to stay forever in the 'air pocket' created by the pressures of all nnd
sundry powers." Heath burst out laughing as though in agreement. What I
wanted to say was, "you claim that it must not depend on joint defense set-up
and defend its own country by itself," but a more appropriate way of putting
that is "only if you think things out and become determined that one
must defend one's country even if only by oneself, are you ready to share
the realization that one must rely on a joint defense set-up." David Binder
of the NEW YORK TIMES made similar remarks. He stated, "The majority of
_ the American people think that the Japanese Government and the people,
as a whole, should bear more responsibility toward their fate. One segment
of that responsibility is defense. What I want to say is that no matter how
sensitive they are to risks of militarism or to the tragedies and misfortunes
wrought by a military set-up and military adventures in the past, and no
matter how much they fear their,reoccurrence, I do ne~ think they can fully
mature as hyman beings or as a nation if they only keep saying that they refuse
to defend Japan, that they hate to come in contact with anything bearing the
name of arms and that they want to be completely neutral to all countries."
,~I~edless to say, Morishima is opposed to the views of both of the above-
named persons and myself. Morishima talks about defense and economics but
he discusses them separately and does not think of them as a set. Furthermore,
he ignores the framework of U.S.-Soviet world strategies and holds the
delusion that Japan alone can obtain the special privilege of extra-
territoriality. Probably, he fears the military recklessness which ignored
the economy before and during the war and is taking an opposite stand to
encourage an economy which ignores defense. He is advocating that the
industrial set-up be changed and that Japan get away from "heavy industries
and knowledge-type enterprises." Since both Seki and Shimizu have adequately
refuted this anachronism, I shall not swell on it, but Morishima is saying
that Japanese indusCries "should change to the type that will not greatly -
benefit the enemy, should they occupy Japan." To do this, Japan must
revert not only to the Taisho and Meiji eras but to the Edo period, while
r,he population must be decreased to one-third and the other two-thirds must
be put aboard Japanese refugee ships for overseas exile. There is no
need, however, to lis ten to such rash argum e nts. I want to point out
to the readers that the military recklessness whicn ignored the economy
bef,7re and during the war, and the run-away economic og~e which ignores
defense after the war are two sides of a coin. A favorable intepretation
is that this represents the brains and energy of the Japanese while an
unfavorable interpretation is that it represents abnormalities in Japanese
_ adjustments to modernization and westernization. The latter is a specially
_ serious problem and I shall comment on it again.
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Intermission. In the Foyer
In the f oregoing paragraphs, I have tried to make a concentrated attack
on the two key points of Morishima's argumenta, ~he non-resistance
_ doctrine and defeatism. I do not expect, with only the above attack,
that the exiled Morishima will hoist a white flag and the Rising Sun flag
and make a"fully dignified surrender." Like a cornered rat biting the
cat, resistance must be expected even if the two key points are taken. -
Actually, Morishima has prepared various "hiding places." I shall itemize
and expose a number of them. (1) Hitler did not attack Switzerland because
_ of its armament :~.nd civilian troop organization, geographical conditions
and neutrality, and among them, Seki considers the civilian troop set-up as
the most important reason. Saying that is wrong, Morishima opposes and
stubbornly claims that Hitler refrained because he wanted to utilize
neutral Switzerland for peace negotiatinns. With impudence, he is advocating
at length a similar view, which appears more like the sudden inspiration
of a high school student, that Japan become a neutral country to serve as the
e peace-maker between the United State and the USSR. But an incidental idea
is worth only that and it was torn to pieces by the readers' comments in
the September issue of BUNGEI SHUNJU. Newspaper reporter Teruji Oishi
writes that "Professor Morishima dwells at length on the armed, neutral
country Switzerland, but why does he not mention the tragic history of
Luxembourg (became an unarmed, neutral country in 1868) nor the bitter
history of Liechtenstein (became an anned, neutral country in 1868)?"
This is not the Morishima-style rhetoric with bad intentions but rather -
a"poor inductive method" which tries to draw conclusions from only one
or two examples. For example, I have a secretary who is an American, and
despite my warning that her father not possess a gun, the father does not
listen and buys a pistol to guard his store. One day, a burglar entered
the store, and because he drew his pistol, he was shot instead and wounded.
Using rhis silly anecdote Morishima tries to jus~ify unarmed neutrality.
Wit1i this one example, one cannot establish the logic that if one poss~~sses
a pistol, one will be shot and wounded. On the contrary, there are ~robably
countless numbers of cases where the pistol protected the family and
tortune. ~ -
r am in comp lete agreement with Morishima's views, however, that Hitler did
not invade Switzerland, not because of its armed civilian defense set-up but
because he wanted to keep Switzerland as a medium for peace talks. It is
true that to serve as the medium for peace negotiations, the country must
be a neutral one. But "the reverse is not nscessarily true," and just
because a country is neutral, it does not mean that it has negotiating
capability, regardless of whether it is armed or not. To have the capability
- and qualifications, the country's neutrality must be recognized historically
and geopolitically by the entire world. Therefore, even if Japan is swayed
by Morishima's agitation to change its industrial set-up to one that "will
not greatly benefit the enemy, shou~d they occupy" and become an insignificant
pr~wer, it is too late to proclaim neui;:ality on the grnunds of non-armament.
The world w~ll laugh and n~t pay any attention because it would be the same
as a child being neutrnl by nature. How can such a country serve as the
mediator between the United States and the USSR? The SAI,T agreement, which
is under n~g otiations between the United States and the USSR, is not an
easy problem which can be mediated b~ calling in neutral Swltzerland. SALT
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_ is dipl~wn;i~ic nc~;~~tiatiun which mibht be cc~nsidered as tl~c prclim:aary skirniish
of WW III, but war has not started and we are at peace. Yet, no country
has the power to mediate or conciliate. Whether it be Morishima's or -
- someone else's plan, there is no way that Japan can materialize the impossible.
(2) As quoted above, Morishima says, "I do not personally believe that the
Soviets will ever attack Japan." As the basis for his belief, he quotes _
the words of Jiro Kamishima, but to cite only one authority is insufficient
documentation. Why does he not use his own head and think carefully: He _
: used Kamishima to suhstantiate his belief because the latter states that
after WW II, wars arid armed conflicts were waged in the world for only
the following reasons: (a) the co~erned countries were founded under
strained circumstances (Israel, Cyprus, etc); (b) the concerned countries -
had contiguous land boundaries (PRC-USSR, Vietnam, India-Fakistan, etc);
and (c) the concerned countries were invaded by allied countries
(Czechoslovakia, Hungary, etc). These source materials themselves are too
scanty. Historically, as compared with the several thousands oF years
which have elapsed, the past 30-odd years are an insignificant segment.
Probably, both of them think the nuclear restraint has changed the complexion
of wars conducted in the preceding several thousands of years. Perhaps that
is why the Korean conflict was omitted from the abovementioned second
example. I do not believe at all that nuclear power has a restraining
effect. To those who do believe, I want to ask, "then, in that case,
military preparedness is after all a guarantee of peace, even though to a
timited extent?"
Kamishima and Morishima have forgotten an important development. The USSR
- has sent in pro-Soviet elements to foreign countries, created a state of
confusion and under the name of revolution, had others fight wars for them.
= They have invaded other countries or made them satellite countries. This
is another f~rm of war. Yugoslavia is continuously under this threat and
barely managing to hold its own. The same applies to various African
cour.tries. In the case of Africa, Cuban troops were thrown in although
Cuba and Africa are not adjoining land areas and the abovementione~ examples -
(a) and (b) do not apply. Presently, Vietnam is falling into the Soviet power
sphere and Iran is facing the same risk. In both cases, foreign wars are
_ nor being waged. Furthermore, I want to point out a case of ignoratio elenchi
which Kamishima and Morishima are overlooking. They have ignored several
thousand years of history and concentrated solely on the 30-odd years after
WW II. Abovementioned examples (a), (b) and (c), all point ta "wars whicli
had been waged" under such and such or so and eo circumstances and listing
past events a posteriori. To use the same cases and :~ay that "war wi11
occur? under such and such and so and so circumstances in the future (or
"for only the following reasons") is taking a slanted position that is
fallacious. Likewise, the reverse position does not hold tru~ that "under
- such and such a situation war is sure to occur." To what extent we should
take into consideration the events of the past 30-odd yeara is a matter
- of probability and at the most, it is only 30 percent at this time. Within
the next S to 10 years, the probability might drop to 10 percent. It is
far more realistic to think that a U.S.-USSR war can be waged across the
oceans and on the basis of a 30 percent probability, to plan diplomacy and
defense measures.
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' (3) Morishima praises, as a model of non-resistance policy, the attitude
of Kaishu Katsu in surrendering F.do castle in the closing days of
Tokugawa shogunate. Morishima says, "When defending one's country, courage
is nec:ded to compromise on points that call for compromise and to surrender
~ whcn tlie l.imc cal.ls Lur a surrendcr," ~iid continucs, "13y surrendering Bdci
_ castle, Kaishu Katsu saved the Tokugawa family." This is clearly a case ~
of ignoratio elenchi, because one's country in this case is Japan in
entirety and not just the Tikugawa family. Even if Katsu had resigned
himself to the demise of the Tokugawa family, he had the choice of surrender-
_ ing to the forces of Sattcho [Ka.goshima and Yamaguchi] for the good of
Japan's future or for the same reason, to fight to the end. In any case,
Morishima's arguments are not logical. I do want to point o~.it hzre that
not only Katsu himself but the Tikugawa family which was saved by Katsu
- lost everything by making a"fully dignified surrender." Although Edo city
was not burnt down, "the right to political self-determination" was not
obtained. Edo citizens were losers and became outcasts while Edo ~ulture
was barely kept alive and continued to decline until ite complete termination
by the ~reat Kanto Earthquake. Morishima further states, ''If war had been
_ te nninated by holding an Imperial conference when the U.S. troops landed on
Okinawa, how many Japanese ~and Americans) lives would've been saved,
how much of cities and fo~tunes would've escaped burning and how much -
of traditional cultures would've been kept intact." The peoQle and city
of Eda es~aped burning because of +-h~,: speedy termination of war, but :aasn't
the traditional culture of Edo d~astroyed? At any rate, ~he foregoing
excerpted section and his earlier remark are flagrantly contradic~.ory:
"The Japanese pe~ple made a dignified, admirable surr.ender which the later ~
generations can recall with pride...because the people made such a surrender,
Japan was able to make the miraculc�is recove?~y." Of the two alternatives,
which does Morishima prefer? In any event, unless a rain of i.ncendiary bombs
blanketed the cities throughout the country, it would have been impossible
to attain the "miraculous recovery" of today. Is Morishima imply:.ng that
the then Koiso-Yonai Cabinet foresaw that to bring fear to the Jap,inese
_ populace and militarists, they had to "pextnit the United States to beat
them up thoroughly," that they had been unable +to do anything while secretly
awaiting the atomic bouibings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and that we
should be grateful for that?
(4) Morishima is not qualified to discuss culture. Yet, he talks about
"traditional culture," "cultural exchange" and "brain export," so the
discussion gets needlessly confused. He says, "At~present, it is not
hardware such as tanks or missiles but software such as diplomacy, economic
cooperatiorc an~ cultural exchange that defends the country." He labels
- Inoki and Seki as defense advocators, but isn't Morishima also one, whether
the defense measures be hard or soft? Culture cannot defend a country,
however, and culture is not a defense measure. He seems to think lightly
of the word software but that is because he thinks software is a substitute ~
for hardware. If he thinks in that vein, the software might eventually
wind up as hardware. ~
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As I mentioned earZier, the pre-war military recklessness was the result of
abnormalities in adjustments to foreign culture and civilization during
the westernization and modernization processes. In the same sense, the
post-war overconfidence in peace and democrafy and the bcginnings of economic
recklessness, created by economic fattening and equality with W~st European
advanced countries, represent abnormalities in adjustments. The symptoms are -
getting worse. The best evidence is Morishima himself. His term, "fully
dignified surrender," is a confusion of morality and politico-economic,^,
- and is a good example of adjustment abnormality shown by the post-war
Japanese software to the hardware called defense, which is the product of
modern, Western thinking. To prevent such illusions, cultural exchange
is important no matter what it represents. The most urgent task for
Morishima is to give his brains, which can be considered as software, some
hard training so that he can answer the question, "Is the passenger aircraft
which carries an international gocidwill mission an 'angel' and the bomber
which attacks 2n enemy base a'devil'?"
(5) I want to make one last comment during this "intermission," and that is -
on Morishima's "rear base" which both Seki and Shimizu could not destroy.
I realized this after reading their counter-arguments to Morishima. Thar
is the U.S.-.Tapan Security Treaty. Regarding it, Morishima states:
"Because Japan cannot defend itself alone, Japan is not safe unless the United
- States comes to the rescue. If you should question them as to whether they
will come to our aid without failure, their only answer is probably, 'I
' hope so.' Even if there is a security treaty, the situation is the same."
The foregoing lines contradict, in logic, what Morishima himself has written
- earlier. He has said t.hat because he has faith in human beingsa he believes
in Americans as well as Soviets. If that is so, he should not be so
confident, without Soviet assurance, tnat the Soviets will grant "the right
of political self-determinat:.on" as long as Japan surrenders unconditionally
and hola such doubts about the security treaty with the allied country
of the United States. The USSR is bitter about the strategy of Soviet
containment through restorat:.on of U.S.-PRC diploma.~ic relations. Morishima
says that "in this situation, si~ouldn't Tapan try to take an opposite stand
by widening the distance, a bit, from the United States, and strengthen the
tendency toward neutrality and thereby, strive to lower the tension between
the United States and the USSR?" On the oth~er hand, he has said, as quoted
above, he feels safe. that "in spite of the abovementioned 'defense plan,'
I do not personally believ~~ that the Soviets will ever attack Japan."
In effect, Morishima's true intentions are to keep a little distance from
the United Stai:es but to retain thQir strong support to minimize the pos-
sibility of Soviet attack. This view is one of reliance on the United
States, which is similar to that of Yoshio Nakano of 20 years ago, who
supported the posirion that U.S. forces, stationed in accordance with the
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, were playing a watchdog role ta prevent the
SDF from taking reckless actions. Why didn't Seki and Shimizu point this
1~ out? This is merely my guess, but I think that they were blinded by the
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fiery proposition of unconditional s~rrender to the Soviets and overlooked ~
the deep-rooted, cunning ~ature of Morishima, which is to conform to the
Establishmer=. Both Seki and Shimizu believe in America's commitment to
Japan. Rather, they are trying to convince themselves that they must so
believe, but in their hearts, they have great doubts. Each has made the
following comments:
"In order to have r.he Americans come to our aid immediately in emergency
cases, Japan must minimize U.S.-Japan economi~ frictions and promote mutual
understanding by having close cultural exchange between the two co~~tries,
~ and at the same time, Japan must possess selF-defense power that is
commensurate with its own economic pwer. Although they are ~llies, the
, American people are not so good-natured as to see the bl~od of their own
youths flow to savy a country that does not possess the will or power to
fight for itself. I believe that the United States is not so merciless as
to sacrifice a friendly country that is fully prepared." (Seki's statement.)
"The important point in this situation is the determina.ion of Japan to
cooperate with the United States to defend taie Free World. Japan's will
to defend itself aad to ass~e responsibilities befitting its national
str~ngth to defend Asia will also benefit the United State:: and strengthen
the determination of the United States to protect Japan from nuclear attaclc.
"Rather than worrying about whether or not the United States will come to
our aid, we should be more concerned about creating national conditions
that will make it imperative for the United States to defend Japan."
(Shimizu's statement.)
With regard to the foregoing statements, I have doubts on two points.
I question whether the present-day Japan is making sincere efforts "to have
Americans come to our aid immediately," especially as to whethex Japan
"posses~es the will to Fight for itseif" or "had the detex~nination to
cooperate with the United States to defend the Free World." "Will" and
"determination" are not visible, and it is easy to verbalize but difficult -
to implement. The important m nsiderations are the apparent measures and
the concrete policies. What are the national conditions that will ;nake
it imperative for the United States to defend Japan? What worries me is
the passive attitude of Japan, as for example in trade, where Japan does not _
_ act on its own until the Americans comp~ain. Furthermore, there is a taboo :
against bringing up the problem. Unless the go~~errnnent and the people discard
this self-deception, the arguements on defense issues will not get on the right
- track.
Part 3. No Assurance Whatsoever That the United StateS Will Help.
- Morishima says, "Because I haee faith in human beings, I believe in "believe"
too carelessly. To be really frank, he is telling a lie. As I mentioned
earlier, if you are going to have faith in human beings, you must naturally -
believe in Japanese, rather, you must place greater faith in Japanet,e. ~
As far as Japanese are,concerned, he says only that he does not believe
Japanese have the capability of civilian control. If he says that he does
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not recognize Japanese as human beings, his view is logical, but on the
other hand, he is saying that "we must not forget that Nixon and Carter
betrayed the confidence of South Vietnam, the ROK and Taiwan," and "I believe,
that at least for the next 10 years, American yQUths will never take up arms
ta rescue Japan." When he says he "believes," he means "partially believe"
ani "not believe" means "partially not believe." There is a difference between
"partially" and "absolutely." I am not trying to find fault but I do want
to caution that trying to raise an issue by using rash, vague or dece~tive
words wilt not only bring negative results but invite confusion needlessly.
~ At the same time, I want to question Seki and Shimizu. Seki's words, _
"self-defense power commensurate with its own economic power," are also
ambiguous and though not downright deceptive, there is sophistry even if
well-intentionpd. The same is true of Tnoki w'ho advocates 1 percent of GNP
for military expenditures. As compared with the "declining, Grand Old
Country" [U.K.1, which is still u~ing the same buildings and bridges of
400 years ago, Japan has no natural resources or stockpiles and is tearing
up and repaving the same streets the year round. The GN"P of such a country
should not be exaggerated. As compared with other countries, too mach
money is spent on food, clothing and shelter and the people might become
"uxrkaholics livir~g in a rabbit hutch." The true value of the national income
must be rea~ly discounted in its consideration. It is difficult to refute
the argument of Shinkichi Eito that a"halt" should be placed because presently,
- "Japan's national defense outlay totals 4 1/2 billion dollars and seventh in
the world." It is true that as Eito says, "Defense power cannot be built
by money alone." As Eito continues, "What is important for the SDF.is to ~ -
bec rnne strorig" and as the "backbone" of the people, it should not "appear ~
on the outside" but it st?ould become an essential element in supporting
the independeLice of the country by being tightly interwoven with the
people." But the SDF that I am thinking of, one that has a justified
role natior.ally and socially, that is legally recognized and under official
civilian control, cannot be kept from "appearing on the outside." Though .
"defense power cannot be built by money alone" and "quality rather than
quantity" counts in personnel, it is too hasty a conclusion and premature
in logic to say that "the present number should be reduced." The reduction
of troops is a matter of quantity and not of quality. The "strength" of
- the SDF is without question a problem of quality, but strength in that =
sense reverts to the problem of quantit,y. An SDF that is "tightly inter-
- woven with the people" is truly a matter of quality, and the SDF's existence, -
aims anr3 role must be urgently considered. That we must consider these -
problems at this ti.me is unusual, but to try to evade the real issues with
abstract t alk reveals abnormal atti.tudes which require even more urgent
- consideration. It is difficult to refute the argument of Shinkichi Eito -
that a"halt" should be placed because presently, "Japan's n~tional _
defense outlay totals 9 1/2 billion dollars and is seventh in the world."
It is true that as Eito says, "Defense power cannot be built by money alone."
As Eito continues, "What is important for the SDF is to bec4me strong" and
as the "backbane" of the people, it should not "appear on the outside" but
- it should become an essential element in supporting the independence of the
country by being tightly interwoven with the people." To do this, quality
rather than quantity counts in personnel and the present number should be
reduced. ~
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- To be truthful, when I read ~this, I became disappointed with Eito. There
ure two contradictions. It is true that the "b~ckbone" cannot be seen from
the outside and as a rhetoric or figure of speech, there is nothing con-
tradictory with the words, "tightly interwoven with the people." But the SDF
that I am thinking of, one that has a justified role nationally and socially,
that is legally recognized and under official civilian control, cannot be
_ kept from "appearing on the outside." Though "defense power cann~t be built
by money alone" and "quality rather than quantity" counts in personnel, it
is too hasty a conclusion and premature in logic Co say that "the present
number should be reduced." The reduction of troops is a matter of quantity
and not of quality. The "strength" of the SDF is without question a problem
of quality, but strength in that sense reverts to the problem of quan~ity.
An SDF that is tightly interwoven with the people" is truly a matter of
quality, and the SDF's existence, aims and role must be urgently c~~nsidered. ~
That we must consider these problems at this time is unusual, but to try
to evade the real issues with abstract talk reveals abnoYtnal attitudes
which require even more urgent consideration.
Likewise, Shimizu's statement, "detennination of Japan to cooperate with the
United States to defend the Free World," is made on the assumption that
there will be the "determination." Also, his statement, "to assume
responsibilities befitting its national strength" is an assumption that
"if Japan assumes." If predicated on assumptions that conflict with present
realities, views such a's, "that will also benefit the United States and
strengthen the detennination of the United States to prot~ct Japan from nuclear
attack," are optimistic but meaningless. I have no disagreement with
- Shimi~t~'s view that "rather than worry about whether or not the United States
will come to our aid, we should be more concerned about creating national
_ conditions that will make it imperative for the United States to defend
Japan." I believe that it would be more accurate to say, "Rather thar~ worry~ng
about whether or not the United States will come to our aid, we should be
more concerned as to whether Japan can create national conditions that will
_ make it imperative for the United States to def.end Japan." Not only that,
but what worries me more is the fact that we have too many discussions over ~
. defense issues that emphasize the necessity but disregard the obstacles that
we must face. If that is the case, we cannot complain if Morishima says, ~
"Even the realistic defense arguments are as ephemeral as the fanciful -
peacP talks, and under a thin veneer, there is nothing more than an ideology."
When I toured the Unite3 States in 1973, U.S.-Japan relations were at the
worst. The Ni~ton a~tministration was scarred all over by the Watergate incident
and betting everything on the conclusion of the Vietnam war. Although this
i.s hinds~ght, the American Congress relied on President Nixon's capability -
for the latter and after utilizing him fully, plznned to eliminate him by
capitalizing onti~e former crime. For Japan's future, was Watergate or the _
Vietnam withdrawal the more crucial problem? T believe that for Japan the
= latter was the more important problem and the~ ~ormer was hardly of concern.
But the majority of Japanese newspapers continued to criticize U.S. inte~r-
vention i.n V;.etnam and denounced the Hanoi and Haiphong bombings which were ~
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made to enable withdrawal and welcome the end of the war. On the other hand,
the Watergate incident was treated like a domestic matter and reported in ~
detail daily although it was an American internal problem which had no direct
bearing on Japan's fate. The presses were not the only ones. Even among
the go~�ernment's LDP members, there were public statements ~uch as calling
Ngo Dinh Diem~s government a"crazy government" (Yasuhiro Nakasone) and
"they cannot be called a government or a political administration" (Kiichi
Miyazawa). Miyazawa appeared as though he were siding with the "Peace of
Vietnam Committee" by making such remarks as, "Americans frequently make
such mistakes." According to Miyazawa, the mistake that America frequently
makes is to bind themselves by adhering too closely to the concept of politicat
legitimacy and committing the error of protecting undemocratic governments.
Those words might have prophesied the fate awaiting Japan someday. I say
that not because I think a military coup d'etat is likely to occur, but
the present Japanese Government not only cannot handle the problem of
civilian control but cannot cope with the confusion stem~ing from the democratic
processes. The legiti.macy of the goverriment's power for overall control is
in question.
- The same Miyazawa later became the foreign minister in the Miki Cabinet.
The majority of the readers have probably forgotten what he said when he
went to Washington, D.C. but since I had visited the United States in 1973
and had come inklir+g of the White House stmosphere, I received a great shock.
t~lhat he said was carried in Japanese newspapers in big headlines. I do not
remember the exact words, but when he went to the White House. he said, "The _
United States is obligated Go defend Japan--I want it confirmed." iie
newspapers treated it with big headlines on the front page because people
were beginning to have some fear that the United States, after the Vietnam
war, might abandon Asia and eventually Japan. If so, why did the people
continue to oppose the Vietnam war, criticize the goverrnnent's attitude of
adherence to American diplomacy and continue to oppose the U.S.-Japan Security
Treaty? What shocked me was that, until then, neither the Japanese Government
or nor even a Cabinet member had told the people or the SDF, "you have a
duty to defend Japan and we ask for your confirmation." The government has
still not said so.
I met several tens of Americans and became aware that practically all of them
did not have a sense of "obligation to defend Japan." After returning
to Japan, I wrote on the situation in articles titled, "Appeal to Japanese
and Americans" which were published serially in BUNGEI SHIJNJU. The following
year, the articles were compiled into one, with supplementary writings,
but it was almost totally ignored. I do not feel bitter about it.
What I want to say is that it was ignored because the Japanese feelings =
toward U.S.-Japan solidarity are undermined by tacit reliance on what might
be termed as Japan's fate. As I have mentioned earlier, even Morishima, s~ho
is claiming that United States, will not come to our aid, is relying on a -
sense of securit,y brought about by the United States. The "realistic
def~nse theory,1� which calls for positive actions to seek U.S. aid, has no -
teeth because of the same feeling of security.
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When I sent t~ the United State~ 6 years ago, U.S.-Japar~ relations, particular-
ly in the strategic, military sphere of the security treaty, was at the lowest
_ ebb. Since then, President Carter's age began and though the cold relations
were once thawed, strained events began to occur one after another such
as military troops' withdrawal from the ROK, termination of diplomatic
rel~*ions with Taiwan and U.S.-Japan trade war. In spite of these events,
the Japanese Government especially the Foreign Ministry, and the great
majority of international relations observers believe that the U.S.-Japan
security guarantees have taken a turn for the better. That is probably the
- reason why Japan has expressed a will to become a country worthy of aid
but is in a stalemate. I would like yuu to recall once more the words of
Heath and Binder which have been quoted previously. Perhaps it wo~cld be
rash to have the two persons represent NATO and United States, but both
have strong doubts about the will of free society or democratic camp in
Japan. If the action is limited to an expression of dete~tnination, it is
the same as the Japanese Government's conventional measure of "considering
with positive attitude" which Heath criticized half jestingly.
As an example that the pendulum of U.S.-Japan relations has swung back
recently from the worst period of 6 years ago, some cite results of a
Gallup poll conducted of 266 important diplomatic personnel. To the question
of whether to dispatch American troops if Western Europe is attacked by the
USSR, 92 percent replied in the affirmative, and in a similar situation
involvirg Japan, 81 percent replied in the affirmative, and in a similar
situation involving Japan, 81 percent replied positively. Thi.s is an
increase of 20 to 30 percent within the past several years. To accept
the results as they are shows simple faith in the dubious factor of probability
and to confuse an idealistic argument of "should do" with the realistic
argument of "will probably do" revaals only an optimistic outlook. What
is most difficult to understand is the nonchalance of the pe ople in not
� realizing that the most dubious question was not asked, i.e., what if
Western Europe and Japan face dangerous crises simultaneously or if
Western Europe c~lls for help and after so many divisions of American
troops have been sent, Japan then faces a dangerous situation? In that
case, how many of the 81 percent would continue to say that Japan should
be helped? There is no question that the number would decrease to less
than 50 pereent. Dependxng on the seriousness of the danger in Western
Europe, the percentage would probably ebb to a low of between 10 and 0
percent. To-complicate matters, the U.S. presidential electio;~s will be
held next year and Senator Edward Kennedy, who has announced t:iat he will
run, has 60 percent popularity whiZe incumbent President Carter is not even ~
close. Should Kennedy run, it is almost certain that a President Kennedy
will emerge. In a conversation with Kennedy, I asked why Japan is needed
by the United States and he re~lie~, "as a market." Frankly, I was
dumbfounded, because that is what the Japan Communist Party said 30 years
ago. With respect to the defense treaty with Taiwan, he says clearly that
it binds the United States only to the extent that "when Taiwan faces an
emergency, the United States is obliged to deliberate in Con~ress as to
whether it should assist." When it comes to Japan which is getting a free
- ride for its security, it is exti�emely doubtful that the United States
will give due consideration.
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Another point which I cannot understand is that Seki and Shimizu talk about
the necessity of "minimum military preparedness" and say it is impo~tant
for the SDF to resist for 2 weeks. In the United States, where civilian
control is divided between the president and Congress, to force a decision
within 2 weeks on whether or not to fight the USSR is sure to result in
a negative reply. Whether it be Western Europe or Japan that it wants to
help, the decision to assist will rest on the judgment as to whether that
country is worth assisting or not. ~t the same time and more important
is the estimate of the battle situation, i.e., whether effective assistance
can be rendered. To bring about this situation, Japan must be able to
resist for 2 or 3 months. Many people talk about the strategic importance
of Japan to the United States, but that is not simply a fixed estimate of
geopolitical position in peacetime, but is a fluid, changeable estimate
depending ci the battle situation after war starts. This is also a trap into
which the probability factor falls an easy prey. The intelligence information
that the U.S. Defense Department, for the past 10 and several years, has been
prepared to pull back the Asian defense line to the Philippines -Guam-Mariana
Islands cannot be dismissed as groundless.
Part 4. Japan Cannot Be Defended With Ma.ximum Military Preparedness Under
- Present Circumstances.
To resist for 2 or 3 months, or even 2 weeks, is not an easy task under
present circumstances. Eito claims that even today, the troop strength
is too high. I do not think so. Recently, Seigyo Takasaka wrote that during
the Ikeda-Robertson talks in 1953, "Tkeda-Miyazawa took an extreme Finance
Ministry standpoint in negotiations with the United States." In short,
priority was placed on economics and although the United States demanded
that the GSDF strength be placed at 350,000 at that time, the Japanese side
decreased the number to 180,000 in the negotiations. Takasaka is not
necessarily critical of this stance. The United States agreed and did not
again request increased troop strength, not to save Japan but made strategic
plans on the premise that Japan would be lightly armed. Takasaka continues
that the world~s strategic situation has chan~ed today and we must discard
ti~e "self-righteous idea that we can decide Japan's security measures according
to our plans and efforts" and change its "light armament dogma." I agree
with him. But to be frank, even with heavy armament, the basic problem would
not be solved.
~he reason is simple. Even with huge outlays of 9 1/2 billion dollars, or
thrice that, 30 billion dollars, to increase and strengthen troop strength
and armament and assemble a force with high cnorale, the outcome of the
early stages of the war depends on fate and fortune. It is not conceivable
that there would be no losses in 3 months or even 2 weeks. The "defense- `
oriented" SDF cannot count on a Pearl Habor attack or sinking of the
Prince-of-Wales. To ask the SDF, which emphasizes defense and self-guard,
to hold back the enemy is like Morishima's asking the SDF to come under
civilian contrcl in order to prevent its running amok. In both instances,
the SDF is being asked to "fight a major bout." In fact, that is asking the _
SDF to fight like a sumo grand champion but "only a truly pa~oerful force can
- wage a calm battle where it is forced to retreat to the last defense line
~and after a moment's pause, can turn the tide by switching to the offensive."
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There� is a limit, however, to counter-atta.ck. As long as it is "defense-
oriented," it is forbidden to pursue beyond its territorial waters and sky.
In ligt~t of this, Morishima can be interpreted as nointing out that
civilian control is impossible for a lightly armed military and is suggesting
a changeover to heavily armed forces. Both Seki and Shimizu misread
Morishi.ma's true intentions and opened fire because they mistook the long-
awaited ally for an enemy.
Even if Japan pretends to become a"grand champion" with outlays of 30
billion dollars for heavy armament and ~arge forces, once war starts
the position of the military "grand champion" can follow the downward path
daily. Before the end of the tournament, the military "grand champion"
might drop to a much lower rank and in the ensuing tournaments, have
difficulty in staging a comeback. In the case of a real sumo tournament,
on the final day. The fighting strength of today`s SDF is at the peak in
peacetime or just prior to the outbreak of war and as time passe, it only
weakens. Although "money alone cannot build up defensive power," money can
purchase weapons and armament. If naval ships and bombers are lost one after
another, money can buy the necessary goods to maintain "minimum defensive
_ power," and get even superior quality replacements. But where are the military _
crews to be obtained? The only "manpower source" ic the reserve Self-Defense
personnel. If decrease by aging is calculated, the strength of the forces
is aut anaticallv restricted. Unlike the past, new weapons are improved
constantly and to utilize them, new sldlls and training are needed. Hurriedly
conscripted civilian amateurs are helpless. In the first place, the Japanese
civilian government is not authorized to conscript recruits from the populace.
In fact, it is restricted from doing so. It has the duty to tax the people
and provide education to the children but it does not have the obligation
to defend the country. Miyazawa's bluster in Washington, D.C., that "The
United States has the duty to defend Japan" might be apt words.
"There is no need to think so deeply. It's a matter for the Japanese
peopie to handle. In case of emergencies, we will not adhere to troublesome
:.aws involving rights and duties ard willingly take up arms. Not only
the Japanese but Bismarck said tha.t, 'there is no law when facing necessity."'
There are those who preach such optimistic doctrine. But for an adult with
" brains, there are two pitfalls. First, pre-WW II days are over where the
minimum armament was rifles and grenades with the "chrysanthem~nn emblem."
The majority of today's armaments are precise, mechanized ordnances which
amateurs cannot handle. It takes 3 years to train an officer who can
command a company equipped with such armaments. It is no longer sufficient
to wave a sword and order the troops to attack. The second pitfall is the
tendency to think that laws exist only to be broken. Morishima considers
_ the SDF a"white e].ephant" but thinks that it is dangerous to decrease its
size suddenly or to abolish it. He thinks of the SDF as "wanted in peacetime
when it is not really needed" and when the enemy attacks and is urgently
n~eded, it is a"useless item." As mentioned earlier, however, there are
two sides to a coin and this view harbors risks. To think of laws as
decorationo and that "there is no law when facing necessity: is to deny -
civilian control itself and provides an excuse for the military to run
berserk.
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At any rate, the first g~tfall is that hurriedly mustered soldiers, whether
as volunteers or through emergency, wartime conscription, are useless and
cannot foztn a"powerful military force." If my memory serves me correctly,
the United States alternately used the draft and volunteer systems in
WW II, the Korean war and the Vietnam war. The volunteer system is used
today but military training is still carried on in colleges. Needless to
say, only volunteers are accepted, but volunteers exceed the recruiting
- quota. American youths seem to have the will and fervor to defend their
country. Among them, quite a number also seem willing to defend West
Europe. Why is Japan lacking in that spirit? The reason is the Peace
Constitution, which is a"house made of cards," and Japan fears that by
touching it or even blowing upon it, the house will fall. Not only politicians
and bureaucrats of the government and opp sition parties but college
professors, salarymen, men of letters and journalists, as well, or anyone
with rhe facade of a pseudo-intellectual, do not want to discuss this
subject, even in private, for fear of ostracism by their col.leagues. It
is easier to criticize political briberies. Americans are aware of this
spiritual rigidity. Why have the American abandoned the concept of
_ "mutuality" in the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and become "lenders"
while permitting Japan to get a free ride as "borrowers." I questioned
Kennedy persistently on this point and his only answer was, as mentioned
earlier, "Japan is necessary as a market." In other words, "defense can
be bought with money." As though in agreement, a segment of the Japanese
people have thoughts such as the defense outlay should be 1 percent of the "
GNP or the "white elephant" SDF can be regarded as a fonn of taxation, or
Japan's share of UN support should be increased from 2 percent to 3 or even
5 percent. They do not want to tear down the constitution which is a
"house of cards." Buying a free ride in a mutual security arra ngement is
like getting admitted to college illegally, without studying, or for
college ~vomen to get promoted to the next grade by offering their bodies.
It is bribery and it is prostitution. If Americans are considered as
mercenaries, that is trading in human lives.
The problem lies not with Kennedy alone. There are a number of American
intellectuals and politicians who give their tacit recognition. I remember
the comment made, about 10 years ago, by a high official o= the U.S.
government. The Peace Constitution, which renounces armaments and is the
only kind in the world, is troublesome for the Americans but they are
willing to maintain the status quo and permit the Japanese to get a free
ride in security matters because: 1} since America gave it to Japan,
it is difficult for Americans to complain even if Japan misuses it; 2)
if Americans demand constitutional revisions or rearmament, it will
become impossible for the LDP Cabinet to stay in power; and 3) if Japan
should again become a great military power, the United States might feel
threatened by its nationalism and militarism, and more so, the neighboring
Southeast Asian countries would have a deep sense of insecurity. The
aforementioned are the three main reasons. These are only.privaCe views,
however, and both governments have never once seriously considered the
problem. The subject is considered taboo for agenda of official conferences
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of civilian scholars and intellectuals or it is considered ~nrefined to
- take up the subject in debates.
Whenever the premiership changes, the new prime minister visits the United
States and holds what is called the summit conference. Claimin~ that
tliis lils laid the basis For stronger partnership ties between the two
cou~ttries, both leaders wear big smiles and shake hands. This act is
nothing more than a formality. A former civilian employee of the U.S.
Defense Department, Lawrence E. Ka,hn, published a magazine called
KAIGAI HYORON [O~VERSEAS COMMENTARIES] in which he strived to inform -
Japanese readers of foreigz developments. He once majored in Far Eastern
history at the university and his wife i~ a Japanese. Probably for these
reasons, in a interview with me on Fuji TV, he aptly described the deception
in post-war U.S.-Japan relations.
"The United States and Japan entered the same arena but they have never
contested each other in earnest. Since Perry; there is a long history of
relations between the two countries but only once have rhey squared off
seriously and that occasion was the Pacific War." He added that he considers
it truly strange that practically a11 the Japanese firmly believe that the
United States will not abandon Japan. No American has ever been so frank
on a public platform. In any event, both Japan and the United States
have xespectively utilized, when convenient, the Japanese constitution
as a cover to hide under. For Japan, the constitution could be used as an
excuse for the security free ride and provided a comfortable position
from which to become an "economic great power." While the Soviet military
power was inferior, the United States could afford to leave Japan in a
comfortable position and could even profit by letting Japan sleep. The
situation is not the same. In contrast to the increasing military power of
the USSR in the Far East, the United States is yearly withdrawing from
Asia. Because of the abovementioned three reasons, how2ver, the United
States is not revealing its true intentions. In a selfish light, the
United States would find it easier to withdraw if it is giving Japan a
~ free ride. It would be easier to abandon Japan. Isn't President Carter
trying to withdraw from the ROK, which is not getting a free ride?
In spite af the foregoing developments, many of those who advocate. U.S.-
Japan joint naval maneuvers planned in waters off Hawaii. Before the
temporary freeze of the U.S. withdrawal from the ROK, joint maneuvers
were held by U.S.-ROK land and naval forces. It was a gesture to calm
the fears of Koreans over President Carter~s military withdrawal plan.
It was a gesture to restrain the North Koreans from descending southward.
It was also a gesture of the Far Eastern U.S. military forces to check
the topmost civilian leader, President Carter. There are probabl}r various '
other reasons for holding the joint U.S.-Japan naval maneuvers but the -
strongest motive is probably a restraining gesture against the Soviets.~
Whatever the reason, one cannot interpret it, without reservation, as
evidence of U.S, com,mitment to Japan. I am not concerned, however, with.
that aspect of the joint maneuvers. According to our constitution, our
SDF is for "defense only" and cannot be sent overseas as an aggressive
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force. How can the Maritime Self-Defense Forces [MSDF] set out for distant -
Hawaiian waters ir~ American territory and hold joint maneuvers with the
U.S. Navy which is not even thinking of "def2nse only" strategy? The
opposition parties and newspapers, which had shown sadistic fervor during tt~e
constitutional trial of SDF, are pretending not to notice the joint maneuvers.
This can be interpreted as increasing defense awareness against So~riet
pressure. But we cannot be happy over this because the maneuvers are clearly
a repudiation of civilian control. If the National Defense Council had
approved the plans., the government must be tried for the crime of breaking
constitutional laws. Some might say that MSDF should concentrate on such
tasks as clearing the waters of mines, but that is a poor excuse of a
shyster lawyer, like Ashida's [former Prime Minister) interpretation of
Article 9, Section 2 of the Peace Constitution.
That trade wars can be solved en the simple economic level is the common
belief and trend of the times, but econocnics and national defense must be
considered together as a"set." The classic concept of an independent
country has been completely demolished in a world polarized by the U.S.-USSR
confrontation. In a large sense, Japan does not have the "right" of
political self-determination" although it is under �"_ne nuclear um:brella of
generous America. The security free ride further weakens Japan's position.
Even if a mutual security guarantee, with equal responsibilities,is worked
out, the burden is presently too great for Japan. As long as a potentiaY
enemy country exists, we cannot eliminate restraints and restrictions
from the outside. This is true not only today but in the future and
applies also to individuals. What we can da is to build up an independent
and autonomous position so that we can voluntarily yield the "right of
political self-determination" at the appropriate time and to develop the
ability to judge and determine our counterpart. We must be able to stand
on common grounds and mutually solve problems of conflicting interests and
confer on means and methods of cooperation. Presently, the defense problem
is being shelvec~, without questioning, and trade wars and problems over
natural resources and energy are being viewed as mere economic matters,
with temporary, stopgap measures used to solve them. In so doing, Japan
is follaaing the steps, in reverse, of the Greater East Asia War and will
be surrounded again by the ABCD net and chased into a corner. When that _
happens, Japan will be shoved aside from her camfortable position and forced
to take a nasty fall.
In that sense, I cannot fully understand how people who view the U.S.-Japan
relations and defense problem as I do, and I'm not even considering Morishima,
can approve of ineasures to bypass the constitution. Do they truly believe
in protecting the constitution and view the SDF as constitutional? Or,
are they people who do not believe in the constitution but like the Americans,
take a solicitous attitude, because they fear that if they cause the
downfall of the LDP, a new revolutionary opposition government might emerge
and not only create a small rift between the United States and Japan but
destroy the security treaty? Are they planning to propose a constitutional
revision after the constitution has become meaningless with the passing ~
of time and getting a free ride is on ly verbiage and not a fact? If that
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is the case, Bismarck's statement that "there is no law before necessity"
might not be appropos but it would be a case of "changing the law as the
necessity arises." Morishima is saying that now is the time to reduce ar
_ abolish the SDF a-~d making remarks to the effect thal-. we must gain time.
Shimizu's counter-argument is that why do the Japanese people have to pay
s?ich iiigli taxes to support a white elephant?" Can't the same statement
be made with respect to biding for time to revise the constitution? It is
a fact that the support of the present constitution would not cost a cent
and there is no concern about waste of tax money. But I fear that the
longer the deception continues, the Japanese people will lose faith in law
and politics, become corrupted with conspiracy and hypocrisy and degrade -
themselves to the level of Morishima's non-resisters. This is also true
, of those who believe that the SDF is constitutional and who want to safeguard
the constitution. The illogical and unrealistic preamble and Article 9 of
- the constitution plant seeds of distrust among the people like laws and
politics which say, "Before necessity, laws may be interpreted freely
without any restriction." At any rate, a nation's populace, like an
individual, who does not have the conscience to admit deception as deception ~
and who alternately become self-assertive without any qualms and submissive
without pride, will be despised, forsaken and eventually thrashed by all
the other countries.
Epilogue. I Do Not Trust Human Beings and Furthermore--
I do not trust human beings, and therefore, I do not trust Americans nor
Soviets. df course, I do not trust Japanese. I can trust another person,
_ only as an individ ual. But I am unaccustomed to thinking of abstract
beings, such as h umans, interms of trust or distrust. I might trust a
certain American or a certain Soviet but not collectively, the United States
of America or the USSR. So says Morishima and inquires as to whether his -
thinking is normal or abnormal. He should ask that question of London
University's profess~r "D" whom he trusts. In this connection, it might
be said that my thoughts are what I learned at some time, in the past,
_ from the literature and history of the U.K.-Europe and the United States.
As an individual, the one I distrust most is myself.. Next, is ~y wife,
then children and then friends and as the relations become more distant, my
trust increases. Simultaneously, my concern decreases as to whether I
can trust or cannot trust and instead of regarding my counterpart as a person,
I have to think of him only as a functional element ~ithin the framework
of my work or interests. I would be exhausted if I considered the ticket
collector at wickets of railroad stations as individuals and tried to deal
with them socially as human beings. I think that they will be eventually
replaced by machines as modernization advances. Like U.S.-Japan relations,
, I ta.:kle the problem squarely only if some unpleasant incident occurs.
The reason that I distrust myself the most is because I want to trust
myself the most and I want to be a complete person. In my speech and
actions, I act as though I have the fullest confidence in myself. "As
though" implies that I am pretending to be a complete person. Mori Ogai's
- work, [ka,-no-yo-ni] is often the subject af literary talks but most of
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those who di~cuss it are mistaken in t~eir approach to the subject. As r
a literary figure who was most familiar, at the time, with West European
thinkir,g, Ogai was aware of and concerned with the conflict betwealthe
W~est European thoughts that individuals are ephemeral aYrl the Japanese
habit of viewing things spontaneously. Qf course, he was sincere and
not being indifferent and skeptical.
If individuals are ephemeral, the nation and populace are also ephemeral,
and fictitious. Recently, frivolous discussions have been rampant on
differences between Eastern and Western cultures. Discussions lead to
boasts a~out the nature of the Japanese people and the Japanese nation and
~he Japanese virtue of having a"sense of sl:ame" is forgotten. Explanations
as to what type of person one is should be left to others. If we have the
- time to comment on the special characteristics of the Japanese people or
Japanese nation, we ~ best advised to consider how the world looks at a
country or an individual. Generally speaking, Westerners look upon
themselves and others as unmanageable and to reasonably restrain the desires
of multifarious individuals and to cope with the conf usion resulting fr rn?
individual conflicts, a framework called a nation is needed to govern
and to regulate the c onflicts between the desires of the governing and governed
parties, laws are necesary. In general, the Japanese people hate to see their
children sent to ~aars and be killed so they oppose wars, resist military forces
and deny conscription systems. This is a"rrother's feeling." A"father"
probably feels the same but a"father" presents logical arginnents. In
order to build up the fiction of a nation, he thinks that it is unavoidable
if his child is recruited for war and also looks upon the system as a fiction.
But he has feelings, also, at.d might try to manipulate so that his child
only would not be drafted. I think that is also possible. As a"father," -
an individual wears two masks, one of the "people" and une of the "parent" _
and plays the two roles. It is the person's character which enables one
to become a unified whole while playing the two different roles. It is our
self-awareness that "we are not firm" which dema.nds nation and ~!efense,
fictions of another dimension, which made us firm. Character, law and nation
are all fiction and their destruction must be prevented by arches and but-
tresses, and means must be devised to maintain them.
At the moment, defense is not a support for the buttress but it is also
Fictitious and is a fiction which preserves the fiction of nation. Aichough
Morishima says he believes the Soviets will not attack Japan, most of his -
article was written on the assumption of a Soviet invasion. He has
- arbitrarily decided that "in discussic.~n of defense issues, the focal point
cannot be determined unless an imaginary enemy is designated," but
- historically speaking, defense is not a matter of choosing another country
as a potential enemy. Depending on changes in the international situation,
it is possible that all the countries can become potential enemies. Shimizu
says that, depending on the Soviet movements, "the United States will
immediately protect and occupy Japan" as a prelim~nary action. Not just
the United States, but I cannot trust any country to that extent. There is
far greater possibility that the following will happen. With the famous -
statement, "Is shall return," U.S. forces will temporarily withdraw and at
some appropriate time, drop two or three hydrogen bombs on the Japanese
islands to prevent the Soviets from using Japan as an arsenal. Like a lone
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voice in ~li~ wilderness, Morishima might continue shouting that the
Japanese industrial set-up must be changed, but it is alrea.dy too late.
IF that happens, that reason alone would be sufficient for the United
States ~o look upon Japan as an unnecessary partner. In the feudal
period, there was a saying that "once a man leaves his home, he
can expect to find seven enemies." It teaches one to regard all strangers
as poi:ential enemies, Thus, tt~ere were fictitious thoughts in Confucianism,
too.
When Morishima says, "Civilian control is an extremt~y difficult task for
Japanese to carry ouC," the Japanese he is referring to are the Japanese
of the period when adjustments could not be made to the westernization
and modernization of the post-Meiji era. He himself is an example. He
uses the words "hardware" and "software" with the commonly accepted -
meanings. But as I wrote in last year's September issue of this magazine, -
the relation between these two words is a relative one like the relation
between purpose and means. For example, the weapons and ammunition used
in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars were literally hardwar~~. The
troops ar,d the organization set-up used, however, were software. But for a
farmer who is drafted and becomes on of the soldiers in a squad which
belongs to a regiment, a brigade and a division, the milit ary set-up is a -
hardware. As compared with the modern military forces, the Western
bureaucracy, educationat system and ps;rliamentary democracy are software,
but unless one is aware that they are fictitious, they can change to
_ hardware, which is even more difficult to manipulate than the controls
of bombers or nuclear weapons. That applies not only to defense and
military forces. In our surroundings, there are many other things which are
i more difficult to adjust to, but like Morishima, the majority of the people
are unaware of the situation and "have lost the software." Yet, Morishima
keeps talking of software.
International relations, and the treaties which regulate them, are perhaps
the m ost fragile fiction. The constitution is a hardware wi~ch can
compared to a defective car. In spite of that, we are being forced to
implement it. Finally, I wish to question those who believe that the
- SDF is constitutional. By forcing its application upon the populace,
what will happen to the software called the Japanese people? Fiction is
a structure. The Japanese constitution is a poorly built structure and
that is why I call it "a house of cards." That is only a mirage or
deZusion. Fiction is not a mirage but a strongly built structure. Efforts
to adjust to and maintain fiction will build up character. To put it
another way, the character of each individual end the effort to prevent its
- destructian builds up and strengthens fiction. Demanding conformity to
a mirage will cause the heart, which is a software, to lose conscience (good
conscience, self-awareness) and charac~er. When that happens, it can no
longer be called character and is a destructian of character and deterioration
of moral spirit. Even if no other country attacks Japan, irreaponsible -
defense talks will gradually wear away the fiction called the Japanese
country and the character of each individual in the populace. Opposition
to Morishima's non-resistance doctrine, no matter how strongly made, will
in effect assist it and contribute to the brainwashing of the Japanese people.
COPYRIGHT: Chuo Koronsha 1979
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ECONOMIC
'AKAHATA' EDITORIAL ON PROPOSED BUDGET CUTS IN WELFARE .
OW031415 Tokyo JPS in English 0858 GMT 3 D ec 79 OW
[Text] TokyQ Dec 3 JPS--The Cabinet on November 30 approved the "appraisal
_ of financial conditions for fiscal 1980," (the framework for budget)
reported by the finance minister. This is an exceptional event that the
Finance Ministry makes an unofficial announcement of the draft budget.
AKAHATA carried an editorial on December 3 entitled "Budget Compilational
with Deep Cuts in Welfare." The editorial said: "The bearing tif the com-
pilation of the budget for next fiscal year, being advanced by the govern-
ment and the Finance Ministry in the name of the 'first year for the finan- -
cial reconstruction,' is chiefly aimed at coercing sacrifices on the
peaple, in an attempt to preserve the measures for the service to big
business, and the military spending, and to make drastic cuts in the
costs involving the people's living.
' "One indication which plainly demonstrates the Government-Finance Ministry
position for the compilation of the budget at the sacrifice of the people,
is a bare-faced attack on welfare and social securities, including the paid -
medical costs for the aged (free of charges at present) the paid medical
care for the patients (the same), and the abolishment of children's allow-
ances provided in the children's welfare law.
"What must be. placed importance than any others on the ''reconstruction of
national finance' is that the priority should be given to the following
positions: the defense of the people's living, particularly further advance _
of caelfare and social securities.
"Now that the Government-Finance Ministry's bearing for a full swing retreat -
in welfare has become known, a stronger rise in the national struggle is
needed for defending the people's living and the reconstruction of the
national finance for the service to the people."
CSO: 4120
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.
ECONOMIC
INDUSTRY SOURCES DISCLOSE UAE TO TRIPLE OIL SHIPMENTS
OW071249 Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 6 Dec79 p 5 OW
[Text] The United Arab Emirates will triple its oil supplies to Japan
- from the present 20,000 barrels to 60,000 barrels a day beginning next -
month, oil industry sources in Tokyo have disclosed. ~
The sources said that a notification to this effect came from the UAE in
reply to a Japanese request made to Manj' Sa'jd al-Utaybah, UAE minister
of petroleum and mineral resources, when he came to Japan last October.
_ They said 40,000 barrels is less than 1 percent of total Japanese daily
- oil imports. At a time when oi1-producing countries are expected to come
up with policies for squeezing their production, however, the increase in
supplies from the UAE will still be a considerable relief for Japan, they
said.
Currently, 30,000 barrels per day of UAE oil is shared by Maruzen Oil Co
and Daikyo Oil Co. The increased supply of 40,000 barrels will be shared
10,000 barrels each by the two companies. The remaining 20,000 barrels �
are expected to be in?ported by Nippon Mining Co.
The UAE reportedly has surplus oil production of 100,000 barrels a day -
available for export as a result of its recent 5 percent reduction in its
oil sales to the major Western oil companies.
Negotiations for prices for the increased supplies of oil to Japan are
expected to be conducted later this month after the general meeting of
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Caracas, Venezuela.
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News, 1979
CSO: 4120
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1:C ON OriI C '
PRIVATE FIRM TO REPROCESS SPENT N-FUEL BY 1990
- OW060018 Tokyo THE JAPAN TIMES in English 5 Dec 79 p 5 OW -
[Text] Japan will have its first privately-run company to reprocess
spent fuel from nuclear power plants by the end of 1990, electric power
industry sources said Tuesday. For that purpose, a founding members meet-
ing will be held in Tokyo on December 13 and the company will be inaugu-
rated around next February to build a reprocessing plant, the sources said.
The power industry will provide about 70 percent of the new company's
$10 billion paid-in capital, with the rest being shared by the steel in-
dustry, nuclear power equipment makers, chemical companies, trading firms
and banks.
The sources said the plant ~aill most likely be built somewhere in Kyushu, _
- with Tokunoshima of Kagoshima Prefecture being named as a possible location.
According to the plan, the reprocessing plant with a capacity to reprocess
five tons of spent nuclear fuel per day wi11 be completed at a total cost
of $486.7 billion and put into operation at the end of 1990.
Japanese power companies have thus far had their spent nuclear fuel repro- -
cessed by British and French nuclear fuel reprocessing companies because _
reprocessing by a private company had been prohibited in Japan until recently.
Part of their spent nuclear fuels has been reprocessed by the Governmental
Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation at Tokai, Ibaraki
, Prefecture. But the law regulating nuclear fuel reprocessing was amended _
last June to allow a private company to reprocess spent nuclear fuel and
help establish Japan's nuclear fuel cycle.
Kiyoshi Goto, vice president of Kyushu Electric Power Co, has been picked
tentatively as the new company's president, the sources said.
- COPYRIGHT: THE JAPAN TIMES 1979
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ECONOMIC
BRIEFS
BANKS REPORT BUSINESS SLUMP--The 13 biggest commercial banks in Japan
suffered mazked business deterioration in the semiannual bookkeeping period
ended last September chiefly due to the slump of the national bond market.
Their financial reports showed that the combined gross income of the so-
called "city" banks totaled 3,860,063 million yen in the April-September
_ period, up 17.4 percent from the previous six-month term. But their com- .
bined current account profits decrea~ed 36.7 percent to 172.216 million
yen and net profits also fell 15 percent to 111,026 million yen. All the
13 banks saw drops in net profits after tax while 12 of them suffered de-
creases in current profits as well. They blamed the sharp profit decline
on the protracted market price decline of government bond issues and the
inevitable evaluation losses resulting from the holding of such bonds.
They said such bond portfolio evaluation losses totaled 204,486 million
yen, up 110 percent fror.?the preceding half-year period. The reduction in
the gap between lending and deposit interest rates due to the two hikes of
the Bank of Japan's official discount rate in the period also contributed
to the business aggravation, they added. The 36.7 percent decline in -
current account profits was the biggest in 11 years and the 15 percent fall
in net profits was the sharpest in five years. The banks include Dai-Ichi
Kangyo, Fuji, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi, Sanwa, Tokai, Taiyo Kobe, Mitsui,
Kyowa, Daiwa, and Hokkaido Takushokubanks. [Text] [OW031341 Tokyo
MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 2 Dec 79 p 5 OW]
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