JPRS ID: 8803 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R0002000300'14-1

7 :~97~ i ~ i i OF i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAI. USE: ONLY
- J~PRS L18803
- 7~ December 1979
Near E / '
ast North Afr~ca Re ort
p
CFOUO 48/79) ~
<
~
~ FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVIC~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency =
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language -
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other c~aracteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in. brackets ~
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the �
lasti line of a brief, indicate how the original information was ~
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- _
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parenth~ses. Words or na.mes preceded by a ques-
t~on mark and enc~osed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within item~ are as `
given by source. _
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
_ c ies, views or at.t itudes of the U. S. Governme:it .
For further information on report content
call (703) 351-2833 lNear East); 351-2501
(Iran, Afghanistan); 351-3165 (North
Africa).
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/8803
7 December 1979
NEAR EAST/N(iRTH AFRICA REPORT ~
(FOUO 48/79) -
.
CONT~NTS PAGE
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Speculation Continues Unchecked in Gulf
(THE MIDDLE EAST, Nov 79) 1
- Arms Reportedly Smuggled From Lebanon to Gulf States via
Syria -
~ (AL-WAT.AN AL-'ARABI, 11-17 Oct 79)...........o......... 3
Analysis of Syria's Lebanese Policy
. (AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 11-17 Oct 79) 4
ALGERIA
Inside View of Ben Bella Before His Release
(Ahmed Ben Bella Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI,
25-31 Oct 79) 10
Gas Replacing Oil as Major Foreign-Exchange Earner
- (THE MIDDLE EAST, Nov 79) 23
Briefs -
Aircraft Negotiations Rumored 25 =
_ IRAN _
Iranian Workers Besiege Japanese Office, Demand Payment
(SHUKA~T SH'INCHO, 1 Nov 79) 26
IRAQ
Preparations for Elections Un~erway
- (AL-WATAN AL-'AR~BI, 25-31 Oct 79) 31
- a - [III - NE & A - 121 FOUO] -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I
CONTENTS (Continued) page
SAUDI ARABIA
Briefs
USSR Relations Request 36 '
TUNISIA
Habib Bourguiba's Role in Outcome o.f Destourian Party
Congress Discussed
(Souhayr Belhassen; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 26 Sep 79)....... 37
Fall of Abdallah Farhat From Power Discussed
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 26 Sep 79)....... 40 ;
Tension Reported To Be Underlying Surface Calm
(THE MIDDLE EAST, Nov 79) 42 '
prime Minister Discusses PSD Con~;ress, Labor Problems,
Plan
(THE ?KIDDLE E~ST, Nov 79) 48
WESTERN SAHARA
Saharan War Becoming Increasingly Large Scale Vendetta
. (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 24 Oct 79) 50
i
~
i
- b -
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOIt Ub'F'LCIAL US~ UNLY
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
SPECUTATION CONTINUES UNCHECKED IN GULF
London THE MIDDLE EAST in English Nov 79 p 106
[Text]
- Buein~smen in the Gulf In offering shares in public over-subscribed "only~ times;
generelly seem to have forgotten corporations such ea the Saudi of course, the offer was made _
what heppened in Kuwait in Arabien Public Transport J~tbeforeRamedan".
1977 when the Government had Company (SAPTCO) or the One of the moet dramatic e:-
to come to the rescue of UAE's Emirtel telephone com- amplea was provided in
speculators left financielly pany, the govemments are o~'er- September of this year in the
exposed by the collapse of the ing their subjectb a limited UAE when there was a virtual
Kuwait St.~ck Exchange boom economic vote in shaping future atampede for sharea in ths Gulf
in that year. prosperity. In Saudi Arabia the Medical Projects Company. Not
In ell the conservative oil- Govemment is also determined fgr behind was the demand for
producing states of the that the next (29~-84) Five Year $h~ ~ two new insurance
penin~ula and the Gulf there ia a Plan will not be marked by the companies set up in Bahrain
policy to encourage limited dirigisme which some critics ~der the state's exerr,pr,-
public ownership of national in- meintsined was at the heart of company laws. In the case of
, dustrial, banking end com- previoua plans. Gulf Medical, a~o holding in
mercial organisatione. The only In S~udi Arabia there is elso a the company's capitsl of -
difficulty is that public demand commitment to a more formal ~~h7~'mn ~4rhnnl H~c~ ~,Itered,l
for sher~es is considerably in capital market. The Govern- end nfter the ~ix ~i:~~� I~id IxricKf
- excess of supply. The result is ment commissi~ned Chase it w�es r+nrnmn~.rd thet Ihe is,vu~
that, in the largely uncontrolled Manhettan to make a study of had hcen ove?~ubsc;rihed 2,ODU
aecondary markets in shares the institutional and regulatory timee� The reault wea thet in-
which Hourish in the local suqs, requi'rements of auch a merket. vestors who had bid for the
speculators are having a field The growing number of local maximum of 10,000 sharea of
dgY� share offers being made after the ~he six milliun on sale received
, The Kuwaiti Government can Saudiisation of the foreign- an allocetion of f~ur shares
exercise some control over deal- owned commerciel banke, each.
ings in shares on the Kuwait coupled with the thriving secon- Some inveslor~ found thet the
stock exchange, but the dary market in sharea, is ~nterest on the m~mey they had
govemments of Saudi Arabia, making govemment ec�ion to ~~'owed I,o make their bids ex-
- the UAE and Bahrain, for ex- ~~blish an official stock ex- ceeded the valde of the ehares
ample, have no control wer the they ultimetely received. Thie
change more and more urgent.
unofficial ahare markets abaurd situat.ion was put right
operating in the suqs. The'risk ~e p�pu~~~' of public when the company raised it9
isaues of ahares in corporations
of s serious crash ~ollowing the is undeniable. Every offer i~ capital, permitting the
- endipg of a speculatory boom heavily over-subscribed. People e�~ation to be raiaed to 12
carmo,t h~ discounted. in the know have been heard to ahares per investor. `
scoff at issues +�~hich have bE.~en The Gulf Medical case is by
no means unique. Shares in any
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
company will be swallowed up merchant famities are concemed
indiscriminetely the moment that their privileged poeition is
they come on the market; no being eroded by a new breed of
regard is given to the proepects entrepreneur who lacka the
of a company, its management innate caution of the older
and the marketability of its pro- familiea and who, by reckleae
ducts. The Shazjah Cement and apeculation, risks demaging the
Induatrial Development whole commercial fabric of the
Company offer was Gulfsocieties.
oversubscribed 272 timea, a Although the Kuwait stock
much niore modest outcome exchange hes now opened its `
than Gulf Medical, but still far doois to non-Kuwaitis, provided
more than the likely profi- that they are Gulf Arabs, many
tsbility of the company coulc~ Kuwaitis worry that the cosy old
~"~~t' boys' club atmosphere of their
Perceptive ministers and stock exchange will be ruined by
officiele in the conservative oil- the feared inHux of speculators
producing atates are worried with dubious reputstions.
- about the implications of this 'I'he boom in commercial
extraordinary demand for paper in the conservative oil-
shares. The danger of such un- producing stetes is also reveal-
hridl~d ~pcculntinn i~+ ob~�irn~s. ing an extraordinary excec5 of li-
Rut h~~~~~md ihet, the be~t 1Hid quidity in the Gulf. Many
plans ~f K~n�c~mmenLc to tnvure people have made considerable
that the small im~estur has a . fortunes, but there is, as yet, no
chance to acyuire a ahare in the obvious means of investing
_ eyuity of a nalion's industriel surplus funds in the area.
and commercial future seem to In general, inv~tment in the
be failing in the face of the United States or Westem
wiliness, determinetion, and in Europe is not popular; people
some cases the rapacity, of the fear currency crises and in some
lArger merchants. A small in- cases forced nationalisation. At -
v~~5tc~r acyuiring, for example, the prices being paid for sheres,
= c~ne share in Gulf Medical is there is little hope of any
immediately offered four or five company being able to pay a
times the price he paid by e ( dividend which would be
local millionaire, that is assu- regarded as a reasonable return.
ming that the smell man was ~ Unle~s this besic problem can
not acting as a nominee ~ be overcome, govemment action
purchaser for the millionaire. to regulate the market in shares r
It is not only the perceptive amounts to little more then
few in government who are dis- tinkering with e dengerous -
- turbed by the vvay in which the machine that risks getting out of -
local capital markets are control. O
developing. The old-established
- COPYRIGHT: 1979 I.C. Magazin.es Ltd.
CSO: 4820
2
FOR Ob'FICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
ARMS REPORTEDLY SMUGGLED FR~I LEBANON TO GULF STATES VIA SYRIh
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 11-17 Oct 79 n 29
[Arricle: "36,000 Weapons to the Gulf?"]
_ [Text] At one of the meetings of the national front in Damascus, Khalid
- Bakdash, secretary general of the Syrian communist party, asked President
Hafiz al-Asad to guarantee the Syrian forces' withdrawal from Lebanon.
The Syrian president said to him, "When we met to make a decision to go
into Lebanon, you and Naji Jamil were urging the front to adopt a
decision to go in, and that daq I was reluctant because of all the
political considerations. Today, it was decided that it is necessary _
for us to remain in Lebanon to protect its unit~? and Arabism within the
framework of Syria's nationalist role, and I see you urging withdrawal.
wtsy.
. Khalid Bakdash replied, "I understand the situation. I am satisfied with
your answer, Mr President." ~
This is what the source told AL WATAN AL='ARABI's special correspondent -
to Damascus. He is trustworthy and very well-informed.
Perhaps the most significant thing that a Syrian official told a Beirut
leader who visited Damascus recently was: "There are operations being
carried out by political forces in Lebanon, with in~c~rnational connections,
to smuggle arms into certain Gulf states by way of Syria, under the guise
o f goods destined for export. We have uncovered some of these operations,
but military reports reveal that more than 36,000 weapons have been
smuggled into the Gulf area thanks to th~se networks."
AL WATAN AL-'ARABI reports the Syrian source's story in good faith and
with strict reserve.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL WATAN AL- ARABI
7005
~ CS 0: 4802
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
~ ANALYSIS OF SYRIA'S LEBANESTs POLICY
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 11-17 Oct 79 pp 28-29
[Article: "Damascus, the Lebanese Exit May Be Entry Into Relaxation i:n
Syria"]
[Text] AL WATAN AL-'ARABI sent a special correspondent to Damascus to
investigate the truth of rumors circulating in Beirut about the withdrawal
- or re-�grouping of Sysian forces in'Lebanon. The following is his
impressions about the situation in Syria and about Syrian-Lebanese
relations, based on his cQntacts and conversations with Syrian politicians:
Official Syrian sources have referred, directly and indirectly during recent
weeks, to a basic change in the strategy of Syrian political action within
Lebanon, in light of changes which have occurred unexpectedly in:the
conditions of the area and in the Syrian internal situation itself, and
in light of facts which experience has reve8led, during the last 3 years,
' regard~ing the balance of Lebanese political forcea. '
I
What is happening today in Syria is the other side of what heppened in ~
Lebanon. The plot is the same in the view of observers, although its ~
instruments and some of its methods differ, and despite the fact that the
elements of its success in Syria are much weaker than what they were iu ,
Lebanon, because of the difference of the area of action and the ;
dissimilarity of levels of harmony with the winda of change. However,
that does not prevent it from being the literal translation of a single ~
text rendered in two different ways. It [the plot] is based on the use
of terroi and violence to incite sectarian;gtri~e, aimed at tearing apart ~
the people's cohesiveness and solidarity and shattering the state and ;
_ its institutions. ~
;
While observers are trying to draw up a list comparing events of the two i
countries and are examining facets of the similarity between the Aleppo `
slaughter in the artillery officers school or the parking lot incident
in Latakia, with the autobus slaughter of 12 April 1975 in 'Ayn al-Rumanah, ~
a southern suburb of Beirut, and while various political circles are i
detecting a chain of violence in certain Syrian cities and are connecting ~
4 ~ ~
i
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY '
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
that with what happened in Lebanon during 1975-76, it appears that the
plotters are finding more difficulty in carrying through their plans in
Syria and on its Cerritory because of several reasons, the most important
of which is the victory of the national spirit in Syria over sectarian,
regional and ethnic feelings during 30 years of carrying out the struggle.
For this reason the plan aimed at shaking the people's unity has found
itself in a confrontation with the regime, iti which President al-Asad has
relied solely on his::personal standing, after it became evident that the
party was lacking, because he is exerting greater efforts to broaden his
popular base and to establish a diaiogue with other principal forces in
th 2 country. _
No matter what reprecussions the crisis may have in the near or long term,
there is an important lesson which the crisis has dictated to the government
- and party in Syria. It is the need to change methods of dealing with
incidents within Syria and in the rest of the Arab region, especially in
Lebanon whose shifting sands and moving shadows alter many expectations and
conflicts with them as the harvest estimate differs from the actual yield.
I~ has become clear now, as AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has reported on previous
occasions, that Syrian leadership is determined to make extensive changes
on the governmental, party and national front levels. -
Probably the changes will extend to dealing with accepted things which
were a:tiomatic until recently, in order to keep the country froan giving
way to the plotters' goal, and so long as the change does not affect the
basic structure of the ~,overnment.
Therefore it is not unlikely that the Lebanese doorway will be one of the
portals through which the Syrian internal change wil~ pass. To put it
more clearly, it is not unlikely that the main body of Syrian forces will -
be withdrawn from Lebanon, or that their re-grouping, along with reducing
their size, in specific strategic areas will be one of the principal
manifestations of the change in Syria.
That does not mean that Syria wants to lessen the 1eve1 of its concern
t~!ith Lebanon, but it does want to fEee itself of. the burden of the details
of life and the daily problems--and how many there are--in Lebanon, the
total immersion and the distraction by them from Syrian internal issues
and problems which have now become more imgoEtant and increasingly urgent.
A senior Syrian official told me: "President al-Asad has been preoccupied
by the e~vents in ~ebanon and the Syrian presence there for the past 4
years. However now he wants to allocate a greater part of his time to
Syrla's internal affairs."
The dominant feeling in official and party circles here is that al-Asad,
personally, still has a good opportunity to remedy the causes which have
5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i
led to the pre~ent situation in the country, and also that he has the
capability to once again put the wheels of goverr:~ient on track. Aowever,
that requires considerable effort and daily, personal followFup in order
to carry out the.public decisions and instruccions issued from the national
front. He knows that whenever his other problems preoccupy him, led by
Che Lebanese distractions, there are powerful forces capable of making
those decieions merely ink on paper and honey sweet words of no more
effect~than a wish.
Therefore the trend was toward withdrawal from the daily entaglement
in Lebanese details, details which have begun to revolve in a vicious
- circle, no longer of any benefit, a waste of precious time for the ruling
establishment in Syria, aimless and ~utile. _
Results of the Wyrian Effort in Lebanon
� Syria's gain from its initiative in Lebanon since the autumn of 1976 is -
scarcely worth mentcioning in proportion to the efforts ~;;iich it has made
toward affecting the direction, even though there is a certain amount of
- firm cooperation between Lebanese political and national forces and the _
political and national forces in Syria, not to mention the direct official
relations between the two governments and the revival of traditional
cooperation between the two countries and their institutions.
It has been evident throughout the stages through which Syrian political
strategy in Lebanon has passed, from the constitution during the regime of
~resident Sulayman Franjiyyah, to backing "the Lebanese front" in its
progress through the crisis of 1976, and then assisting the Lebanese
Government in getting past the danger of a constitutional breakdown (the
election of the president, the formation of al-Huss' first government, t:he
election of the president of the Chamber of Deputies and the continuati~n
of parliamentary life, and the establishment of the army's first elements)
and finally backing the nationa~. movement and supporting the Palest~nian
resistance in the south and elsewhere, throughout all of these stages, it
has been evident that Syria has only been able to find temporary allies.
The need was and still is for solid popular and political bases, which
will not be convulsed and vanish in regard to national allegiance, and
which will be a true supportiag force for Syria in any possible military
confrontation with the enemy or ~n the cold war to which the two countries
have together been exposed during the international conspiracy, no longer
concealed from anyone.
If Syria works internally to continue the establishment of the national
front, then it will still work in the Lebanese sector to create a broad
national front. Its activity is also being aimed on the Palestinian level
toward creating a cohesive national front which would reject th'e petty gang
or the individualism concept for the benefit of any Arab-or international
faction, and which would stress unity of the struggle in order to att~in
final and honorable solutions to the Arab -Israeli conflict. ~
6
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- Syria has succeeded to a large degree in its internal activity :.nd in its
Palestinian policy. However, its Lebanese efforts are still being thwarted
by a group of basic problems resulting from the disparity of goals and
methods and the mutual ly hosCile atmoaphere in a Lehanese arena filled
with variables.
- A quick look at the political map reveaels how it has changed from 1576 to
1979, and hew both the national movement and the Palestinian resistance
have become Syria's friend and ally in Lebanon, after the "Lebanese front"
had been the friend and the parties of the "nationalist front" the aily in
1076. This makes us aware to some extent of why the Syrian leadership
was compelled in this Lebanese arena to alter its plans in the fie13 and
in circumstances which it does nbt consider to be natural, or rather which
the facts of incidents, their developments, and their surprises farces
upon them. ~
Those informed about the intricacies of the Syrian situation confirm ttiat
Syria was and still is working to bolster Lebanese legal authority in the ~
int~rests of creating a broad national front. However, the waves of
incompatibility which have created petty states in Lebanon since 1975, and
it did not take them long to occupy tre power of government, are still in
the ascendency and dangerously increasing, forcing the Lebanese Government ~
into a position of passive, powerle~s sp~ctator, instead of pursuing its
basic job ;n keeping w ith the fact of Lebanese life which is that positive
rule should be powerful.
Thus, the Lebanese authority cloaked in legality appears to be semi-isolated,
as fully as the Syrian presence, which has taken on the legal presence in
Lebanon, through joint Arab desire, appears to be a presence incapable of
_ performing *hE roles it aspires to, achieving Lebanon's unity, security and
stabilit; in co~peration with the legal authority itself.
Syria has discovered, faced with the government's isolation and its forced
banishment [from affairs] resulting from organic weakness, that it must
have direct dealings with the various forces in the Lebanese arena. Thus
it has shown two faces: the face of cooperation with the legal government,
and the face of cooperation with the illegal petty states, frequently taking
_ into ac.count the legalities of the situation more than the legalities of
principle.
Damascus' Relations with Lebanese Political Powers
If we were to take a quick look at relations existing at the present time
between Damascus and the various political farces in Lebanon, they could
be ~'elineated as follows:
*'rThe Lebanese f~ont": tense relations amoun�ting to a degree of hostility `
and complete mutual repugnance in the summer of 1978. They then tended
toward wariness and mutual doubt. During th~ last year, attempts were
_ 7
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240030014-1
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
made ta mediate between Da~nascus and the Lebanese front, but this collided ~
. w ith basic obstacles, the most important of which are the Franjiyyah
family's position, the question of dealing with Israel and the Egyptian -
regime, and the front's position regarding the armed Palestinian presence.
Thus relations between Syria and the Lebanese front have ultimately become
a kind of wary truce with both sides convinced that a military solution
w ould not be beneficial.
* The "national front": It is an old all.y of Syria, but Damascus' alliance
w ith this fr~nt has created many difficulties becanse~of the turncoat
relations between this front and the parties of the national movement for
o ne thing, with traditional Islamic forces for another, and with the
Lebanese front for a third (the direct military clash between the Syrian
Nationalists [SNP] and the Kata'ib [Phalangists~).
This is in addition to the fact that the "national front" lacks the heavy
popular bases and the firmly established political preparation which ensures
firm alleoiance over the course of time, in addition to confusion of
authority and struggle for influence which exists within the front itself.
* The "national movement": The nature of relations b etween Syria and the
_ parties of the national movement differ and fluctuate between ordinary _
comp~iance and lukewarm friendship. While we see the Progressive Socialist
- Party having good relations and employing constant frank dialogue with the
Damascus authorities, under th~ direction of Walid Junblat, we note that
these relations have not reached the point of an open political alliance,
which is being prepared for the broad national and nationalist front, in
view of the antipathy existing between this party and certain important
powers within the ranks of the right and the left.
As for the organization of communist action and the communist party, both
their relations with the Damascus authorities appear generally tepid and
many times tense, because of:the control which Syria imposes over the
communists. It is a question of Syria tying it to a large extent to its
internal security.
As for the independent Nasirists (al-Murabitun), their increasing influence
in Beirut has led to a slackening off in relations with Damascus, which
rejects the principle of joining together in military authority especially
' in widp areas of the capital, and so wariness is currently dominant
between the two parties.
The Syrian national socialist party is just about the only party whose
relations between Damascus and itself are on the basis of mutual trust,
especially since the Syrian leadership played a prominent role in forming
- it. However, basic doctrinal differences between Syrian nationalists
and the Ba'athists are causing some reluctance in issuing a sure judgment
on the fature of these relations.
8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200034414-1
I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
There remains the various organizations, groups and minor parties which
_ have no power and are more of a burden on Damascus' auth~rities than a help.
Therefore, it is clear that Syria has not achieved any of the goals to
- which it aspires through creating a popular national current which would _
- be a eafaty valve for Syria itaelf, even though it has been able to limit -
the conspiracy's viciousneas to a conaiderabl~ extent and to weaken its
- nature during the past three years. The Syrians acknowledge this fact
and confirm~d it to a progressive party delegation that visited them 10
days ago. Fore~gn Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam told members of the �
delegation, "Syria will reconsider i~s existing relations with political
forces in Lebanon, in light of the considerable experie~nce gained during
the past years." ~
This is precisely what Colonel Muhammad Ghanim, chief of Syrian intelligence =
in Lebanon, told Lebanese Prime Minister Dr Salim A1-Huss when the latter
was reviewing with him the existing relations beCween Syria and Lebanesa
political forces shortly before al-Auss' recent visit to Damascu5.
In the face of all this, observers are asking themselves about the nature
of the change that Syria has decided to introduce into its policy in
Lebanon. Most of them answer that it will give the government a completely
free hand to impose its authority, after the Lebanese army has gained such
a posture as to be fit for greater duties.
_ however, the problem is not that s~:mple. It mi~ht be that the coming Arab
summit conference, in agreement with Syria, will have a way to extract
~ Lebanese legitimacy from tne predicament from which the legal Syrian
_ presence has been trying to extricate itself, before considering the
problem of the south. This might be Syria's way to withdraw through the
~ame door that it used in 1976 to reach the Lebanese shifting s~nds.
F
_ COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL WATAN al-ARABI
7005
CSO: 4802
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200034414-1
' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ALGERIA
INSIDE VIEW OF BEN BELLA BEFORE HIS RELEASE
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 25-31 Oct 79 pp 6-10
[Interview with Ahmed Ben Bella by Nabil Maghribi: "The First Interview
With Ahmed Ben Bella"]
[Text] This is the first interview with Mr .Ahmed Ben Bella to l~e "leaked"
out of Algeria. It took place a few days bef~re his full release in the
_ city of M'sila, which is 400 kilometers south of the Algerian capital.
Although Mr Ben Bella declines to receive ~ournalists or non-Algerian
citizens, AS.-WATAN AL-'ARABI succeeded in conveying a group of questions
to him to which he responded very~ clearly. He focused on his experiences
in prison and on the ideas he had on the present and the future. -
There is a story worth telling behind the succes~ of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
in conveyi,ng these questions to Mr Ben Bella.
The Picture From Abroad
When the eve of the first day of next November comes around, Ahmed Ben
Bella, the first pre3ident of the People's Republic of Algeria, will re- -
gain his full freeuom, pursuing his life and his rights like any Algerian
citizen. He can travel and move freely throughout Algeria without restric-
tions. He can travel abroad and can return to the homeland whenever he
wishes. He can express his views and his positions publicly and ~~ithout -
censorship.
I learned from a well-informed source that the Political ~3ureau of the
- Liberation Front Party, which is chaired by Chadli Bend~edid, the secre- -
t3ry general of the party and president of the republic--the Polit~cal
isureau is known today in the jargon of Algerian politics as the political -
'~adership--did take a unanimous decision to release Brother Ahmed Ben
R~lla. This decision was made during the bureau's regular weekly meeting
�tr.at was held Saturday, the 22nd of last September.
~?:e. Political Bureau had issued a previous decision last July the 3rd for
tk~~~ conditional release of Brother Ahmed Ben Bella and for the termination
c.= *_he house arrest restrictions under which he had been prisoner in a
10 `
FOR OFFlCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I
private home which he changed more than once. Ben Bella had been under
house arrest since he was overthrown by the 1965 coup on 19 June. Thgt
coup was led by the late President Houari Boumediene who was at that time ~
vice president and minister of defense.
Thia decision became effective on the 4th of July. That day coincided with
the 17th annivereary of the independence of Algeria which was the outcome
of the revolution of the million and a half martyrs that broke out in Novem-
ber of 1954. Algeria [has harnessed] all its energies ~nd is prpparing it- _
_ self to celebrate its 25th anniversary next month.
Former President Ahmed Ben Bella chose the home of his wife's family in the
city of M'sila which i~ ~ocated 400 miles south of the Algerian capita.l.
He will reside there temporarily until the decision of a full pardon is
announced. Informed sources think it likely that there was agreement be- -
tween the political leadership and Brother Ben Bella on this decision and
on its timing.
_ Ever since Ben Bella moved from [the condition] of being und~r house arrest
to a life of limited freedom in the city and suburbs of M'sila, he has been
receiving hundreds of Algerian citizens openly and without any restrictions _
except thase that are necessary for security. He walks around town; he
prays in the mosques of M'sila on F,:idays; and he lunches or dines in pub-
lic restaurants with his wife, the 3ournalist Mrs Zahrah Salimi, and a
number of his close friends.
Brother Ben Bella continued to decline receiving non-Algerians, even if
they were his Arab friends. He did so out of respect for the agreement
that was made between him and the Algerian authorities. He was postponing
such meetings to the day when a decision about his full release would be
issued.
' r
The former president's family consists ~f his wi�e Zahrah Salimi who was ~
a journalist for the leftist weekly magazine that was published in French
after tndependence and was called REVOLUTION AFRICAINE. Ben Bella married
her 5 years after he was placed under house arrest where he stayed for al-
most 14 years. ~
In addition to his wife Ben Bella's small family includes today two A1-
gerian daughters whom the couple adopted 1 year after their marriage.
Zahrah chose them from an orphanage for the children of those who were
killed in the revolution in Oran. The elder is 10 years old; and the
younger is almost 8.
The only request that Ahmed Ben Bella had made of his wife [in this re-
gard] and had insisted upon was that one of the girls be white and the
other black.
"Why, Mr Ahmed?" asked one of the Algerian citizens who was visiting him in
his home in M'sila.
11
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Ben Bella replied in an eloquent Arabic that surprised his audlence who
knew how littie Arabic he could speak before his arrest in 1965.
"This is a symbol of Ar3b-African brotherhood. ?.t is the brotherhood in
~ whose interaction and strength I aee the cornerstone of the new historic
confrontation with colonialism, Zioniam, backwardness and fY~agmentation
[that will occur] at the end of the 20th ce~tury."
- Boumediene Decided...But
One of Ben Bella's close f.riends says that those who had raiaed the ques-
tion of Ben Bella and had suggested to the Palitical Bureau that he be
released were President Chadli Bend~edid; Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui, the
party's business attache; and Col Belhouchet, former member of the Revolu-
tionary Council. Today, in addition to being a member of the Political
' Bureau, Col Belhouchet is the inspector general of the army. He was also
the one who was initially responsible for Ben Bella's arrest and custody.
[He was charged with this responsibility] in the context of the military
and security responsibilities he had ait that time for the first district. _
It is known with certainty in informed Algerian circles that the late
- President Houari Boumediene had decided more than once on Ben Bella's re- _
lease, but that there were always unexpected circumstances that prevented
him from actually m~king the decision. _
E�~ery time the council met it was Col Abdallah Belhouchet, member of the
Revolutionary Council, who would bring up the sub~ect of Ben Be11a. He
would get support from the late president and from a large majority of
the council members.
These circles affirm that the last time the decision was about to be an-
nounced was in 1977, but the so-called "the smuggled weapons airplane to
Algeria" operation was discovered, and announcement of the decision was
postponed one more time.
One of the senior statesmen who was close to the late President Houari
Boumediene on his death bed in Mustafa Pasha Hospital says that in his
few moments of consciousness, Boumediene's eyes fell on Col B~lhouchet,
an3 he murmured, "Ben Bella." He was, however, heard clearly by everyone
around him.
The Alger3an statesman goes on in his conversation with his friends, "The
late Boumediene was not impatient with those who took up with him the
question of Ben Bella, as some thought he was. Boumediene did not hide
his differences with Ben Bella, but he always said that the difference
w~s objective and that it should stay objective and not become personal.
Among those who continued to raise the question of Ben Bella most often
were Tito, 'Ard-al-Nasir, Castro, Nyerere, Sekou Toure and some Arab
friends, politicians and writers, with whom Boumediene had been meeting
almost regularly.
12
FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I
"Boumediene used to take advantage of these opportunities to bring up the
matter [for discussion] at every Revclutionary Council by saying, "Presi-
den~ so and so or brother so and so spoke to me about ~:~.e question of Ben ~
Bella."
The Risk
Very well! '
I was able to obtain this information about the case of Brother Ahmed Ben
Bell_a after entpring AlgE:ria recently in ~nusual circumstances that gave
me opportunities to c~ntact numerou~ Algerian figures who are impo-rtant in
, the country's contemporarp life. One feels the strong pulse of this coun-
try's life in different positions. It throbs for the purpose of continuing -
the course of putting the Nati.onal Charter into practice, overstepping with
awareness an3 with control the pains and the tremors that resulted from the
absence of Boumediene, the strong man of the people and of the army.
The information is useful in drawing a sketch from the outside of Ben Bella,
but is this information enough? Does it satisfy the sense of a~ournalist
- who is looking for the truth? No! One cannot apgroach the truth without
supplementing Ben Bella's outside picture with his picture from the inside.
One cannot put his hands on Ben Bella's picture without a direct interview
with him.
And here lies the insurmountable obstacle whose attainment was imposaible.
- Many of [r~ur] fellow correspondents--Arabs and foreigners--have tried
several ways to get an intervieza with ~tt:~ Bella, and they are still try-
ing. I can provide from my information the names of more than 60 persons
who attempted it, but [these correspondents] have not yet succeeded; they
have not given up, however. Today, there are still 14 colleagues in A1-
geria who are planning or awaiting the appropriate moment.
idhy do I not ~oin in these attempts since circumstances have made it pos-
sible for me this time to be in the heart of Algeria?
I proceeded to knock carefully, cautiously and indirectly on doors, but I
they all remained closed. Everyone, including the person who accompanied
me on the visit [to Algeria] advised me to stop trying, or at least to
postpone my attempt until a suitable time in the future when Ben Bella
would regain his full freedom.
The obstacles [that I encountered] were not only those that were made by
officials, but they were also those made by Ben Bella who firmly declined
receiving journalists. In fact he denied receiving non-Algerians, even if
they were his friends.
- The journalistic challenge provoked me, and my sense of provocation welled
within me. To be in Algiers, only 400 kilometers from Ben Bella who was -
free and to be in these suitable circumstances and not to see him or talk
to him [was unthinkable].
13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLX 4
I dectded to show my a~ceptance of the fact, to cease my attempts and to ~
pursue in secret, the different trouble-shooting methods of the profession
in order to reach ~en Bella. I no longer had any course but that of taking -
a risk, regardless of its cost.
Briefly, the risk was a success. I do not �aant to reveal its aecreta today
because most certain_ly this is not the time to do so, even though the story
deserves to be told in its details.
I am express~ng my sincere apologies here to everyone for taking this riek.
But my excuse is that I belong to the family of the press whose ob~ective
is to search for the truth even if that truth inconvenienced or embarrassed
others.
At any rate, all that I can do today is reveal one secret that was essen-
tial t~ La:e 3ournalistic risk [that I took]: I succeeded in making a group
of Algerian brothers convey the questions of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI to Ben Bella.
They traveled quickly to M'sila where they met with Brother Ben Bella and
asked him questions in an .Algerian wording. Ben Bella replied spontaneously
and candidly. As soon a~ I received the answers, I left Algeria i~nediately
on the first airplane.
The Picture From the Inside: the Interview
[Question] By God, Mr Ahmed, how?
[Answer] Prison was not altogether a loss and an affliction. It can also
be a blessing and a profitable experience for a human being if he so wishes. _
This blessing and this profitable experience may not be available to a human
being if he continues to go around the whirlpool of life talindfolded either
by rigid convictions; erroneous ideas; or emotions that are excessively
preoccupied with the self, with power, with renown or with money. In prison
the blindfold is removed from one's eyes--from the mind's eye and from the
eye of the intellect. A person faces himself fully naked; his critical
faculty is awakened so he can criticize himself and the experience of others
to the utmost. In addition, a person acquires an extraordinary capability
for love, f~r forgiveness and for understanding human weaknesses in people.
- The fact is that I e~erienced in prison--I mean under house arrest--two
stages. There was an extremely cruel and bitter stage of resentment that
lasted for the first 3 years. And there was the stage of blessing and the
profitable experiences that I obtained by challenging the cruel circum-
stances, by challenging myself and by reeducating myself and acquiring the
capability of facing my errors and evaluating everything ob~ectively. I
armed myself with scientific knowledge and with the ability to show love
_ and tolerance in analyzing everything: the revolutiori; the experience of
government; the present and the future of Algeria; the Arab character and
Islam; the question of Palestine; the problems of the Third World; the
struggles on the international scene; the human product of the age of
7,4
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
yI
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ,
technology, of oil and of going to the moon; and the pitfalls of material
~nd moral poverty that are becoming wider and deeper everywhere for man.
_ The First Years Were Harsh in Ezzaf
[QuestionJ May God bless ynur parents, M~ Ahmed, and grant them sslvation.
How was that period of the first 3 years?
- [Answer] The period of the firs~ 3 years was physically and emotionally
the harshest period of my being under house arrest.
Physically speaking, my activities were restricted to the utmost extent
Supervision was tight and severe in Ezzaf. During that period I was not
allowed to contact my relatives outside, to examine newspapers or books,
to hear the radio or to watch television. Ali that I had was the Holy _
Koran, and it was in fact an excellent companion. It reassured me and it
soothed and f_ortified my heart, my nerves and my mind. -
Psychologically, you can imag3.ne, of course, the state :C was in of being
torn, bewildered and anxious because of the dreadful shock that I had to _
face suddenly and unexpectedly.
My psychological condition became even more critical when, orders were
issued to all the guards not to exchange any conversation with me on any
matter regardless of the circumstances. [They were told] not to answer
any question I put to them.
Thus I was not only imprisoned by walls, but also by the dreadful silence.
I tried to break through the walls of silence, but I failed completely.
The guards were carrying out their orders to the letter. I sensed that
there must be a plan behind all this to drive me to insanity.
i
~
I decided to resist this plan with all my power, and my oniy weapon was
the greatest weapon; I mean the Holy Koran.
I buried myself in its chapters. My Arabic language was at that time weak
and it did not help me. But I persevered without weariness, and little by
little, God Almighty opened the closed doors for me, and I entered into
the boundlessness of purity and divine wisdom. The universe was opened to ,
me and I absorbed knowledge insatiably. Suddenly the prison of silence
collapsed around me in spite of the fact that the guards continued to ob-
serve their orders of not talking to me. The Holy Koran gave me extraordi-
nary inner strength that I had never felt before; it gave me mental power,
emotional power and even physical power. The more intensively I read in
the Holy Book and repeated what I read, the more new things I discovered.
I discovered numerous secrets of the universe and of life. And then my
view of myself, of life and of people became more magnanimous and more pure; ~
it became free from all malice or desire for petty or major revenge. I am
well aware of the errors I made, and i forgive from my heart the offenses ~
' 15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
I
FOR OF~ICIAL USE ONLY
that others committed against me. I reconsider with deeper rational and
moral capabilities everything that transpired in my life, all my sins and
the sins of others ao I can achieve a genuine and a~sincere degree of what -
I believe is self-criticism and criticism of the experiment and of others
with af~ection and tolerance. God was benevolent with me, and r.e enabled
me Co study all parts of the Koran. Suddenly I became fluent in Arabic to
the degree that I now smi~e or laugh at myself ~hen I remember how awkward
m,y Arabic language used to be; how difficult it was for me to speale in
Arabic; and how many mistakes I made when I expressed myself in Arabic.
From the gate of the Holy Koran I went to study the tradition of the Pro-
phet, may God bless him and grant him salvation. Then I went to the books
of ~u-:;:~prudence with their different orientations. Then I went to the
most a~.~.hr,ritative Islamic references in philosophy and sociology such as
those oi Ibn Rushd, Ibn Khaldun, al-Hamadani and others. I did this after
the first 3 years went by and I was allowed to ask for any books I wanted.
Then the 3 years passed peaceably in spite of Cheir cruelty. I came out ~
of these 3 years having won my religion, myself, my tolerance and my love
for my fellow man even if he declared his hostility to me. The fact that
one discovers the human side of one's enemy is in reality [like] finding a
friend under the enemy's skin. It makes one rise above the petty matters
of the world and of one's own selfish ills; it purifies one from the short-
comings of malice, of revenge or of vengeance. -
The Guards Turned Into Companions
After God pulled me through the crisis of the first 3 years, the atmosphere
_ changed and became clear. The guards turned into companions and friends
who devoted themselves to my service and my comfort and talked with me dur-
ing the day and night. The walls of silence and isolation were shattered,
and I began seeing relatives and close friends and reading any Algerian
and non-Algerian newspaper I wanted. I listened to the radio; I watched
television; and I kept up with everything that was happening in the home-
land and in the world. I commi.tted myself to a daily regimen ro educate
myself in philosophy, politics and economics.
I Bear the Late Boumediene No Malice
[Question] By God, Mr Ahmed, how do you now view your experience with the
late Boumediene?
[Answer] May God have mercy on him. My God have mercy on our brother
Boumediene. We struggled together for Algeria with all the fighters and
the masses of the people. We were in agreement for some time, and then
we disagreed. And what has been has been.
- The truth is that both of us, he and I, were victims of very complicated
and very mysterious circumstances in whose midst we found ourselves after
16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FGR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' 1
the revolution achieved victory and the coun~ry achieved independence.
[There was the task of] building the state; [there was] a vacuum; a lack
of cadres; and there were conspiracies planned against us so that we
would be forced to go to French colonialism or to any other colonialism
to ask for assistance.
With our lack of experience, and at the same time, our insistence upon
total reliance upon ourselves, we had to embark upon ~he dangers of poli-
tics an3 to chart a course that iione of us had previously experienced.
I embarked upon the dangers of polit~c.s, and I ultimately became the victim
of politics. As a fighter, may God have mercy on him, Boumediene embarked _
upon his course of political dangers, and he too became a. victim of another
kind. But each one of us did what he believed at tli~t time was his duty.
In all hones~ty and truthfulness, I bear the late Boumediene no malice.
Quite the contrary, I understand him well after uncovering the human side
within him, and T made peace with him.
, I no longer see politics as col~l and absclute tactics even when it contra-
dicts values. Successful and effective politics is the politics of civi- -
lized men with vision; the character of modern man makes him refrain pri-
marily from revenge.
Against Settling Accounts
I am returning tc: freedom having been completely pusified from any desire
to settle any ac.counts with any one of them regardless of who he is or of
the position he had taken regarding my experience. I am returning to
freedom with a desire to devote every sincere effort as a citizen to our
dear Algeria and to its progress forward. About this let me say that it
is necessary th~~ we be armed with revolutionary humility. We must review
what happened with a comprehensive, realistic and tolerant view. We must ;
- have the courage to criticize ourselves and our experience publicly. I '
= humbly will be the first to present my errors and to criticize them.
[Question] May God have mercy on your parents, Mr Ahmedl What are these
errors?
[Answer] There have been numerous errora. The truth is that prison en-
abled me to carry out a process of comprehensive and important revisions -
- of my experience and my responsibilities in government through the experi-
ence of the revolution and that of the government of ind~pendence and its
struggles.
From these revisions I deduced that we, and I was at the forefront, concen-
trated on pursuing a policy that was purely theoretical in nature and di- -
vorced [from reality]. Sometimes it was completely isolated from reality -
and from its given situations. We used to solve the problems as we under-
stood them and not as they were in society. We were more concerned with
philosophies and slogans than we were with life as it was experienced. _
17
' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Hence, our policy was in fact more theoretical than practical. When theory
clashed with action, we absolved the theory and tried to impose it force-
fully fln reality. This practice may still be found extensively in many of
the experiences of the Third World.
_ During the prison years, i learned that politic~ i5 action; it is behavior;
it ic changing reality. Accordingly, it must begin with reality, from its
- living substance and not from theoretical thoughts and ideas. Politics
must be turned into a practical policy that does not yield blindly to
- theory regardless of the capabilities of that theory. Politics must have
substance that may b~ translated into specific actiuns with specific time-
tables to achieve specific goals. It must not be a superficial policy
whose chief concern is to consider those who disagree with it or those who
have different opinions or positions to be dissenting and retrogressing
from the revolution.
The truth is that the difference between an abstract theoretical policy
and a practical policy which is based on intellectual and social alterna-
tives is the difference betwe~n adolescence and maturity. In various de-
grees, we all fell into adolescence.
And There Is the Problem of Democracy
There is also the question of democracy. We, and I was at the forefront,
did not give democracy the measure that was necessary for its growth and
fruition. Democracy continued to be a question urgently waiting for an
answer while we ignored it or offered marginal answers.
The truth is that the regime or the government in our country--as govern-
ments are in progressive Arab countries and in the countries of the Third
World--continued to revolve around the progressive, national individual
leader who had [the people's] trust; it did not revolve around constitu-
tional institutions and popular organizations.
The center of government continued to revolve around the individual leader
when I was responsible for the government and during the administration of
Boumediene, may God have mercy on him. In fact, the role of the individual
leader was gaining strength at the expense of the role of the people and
their institutions. This is a serious flaw in democracy which the people,
the party and the state cannot do without. [It should be corrected] so _
~ that the institutions can become effective and immune to the diseases vf
bureaucracy, neglect, corruption and the conspiracies of enemies.
There is also the question of recalling ou~ ~~utional history in a manner
that would enable us to look at it a3 continuous periods without divisions
that we ourselves would make in accordance with our personal preferences.
We should judge every period not according to our notions of today and our
current circumstances, but rather according tc the notions and the circum-
stances of that age. Many of those we have swept aside in revolutionary
enthusiasm and impetuosity or because of our personal preference were pure
18 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
and innocent nationalists and fighters. Whether they are movements, or-
ganizations or individuals, we must reatore to them t~eir fu11 regard.
Yes, we must criticize ourselves and re-evaluate our history with ob3ec- _
tivity and honesty. Generations have a right to the continuity of history
which must not be tainted and manipulated.
There Is Also the Question of the Party
There are many other questions...[such asJ the question of the party.
The political organization of the revolution was the liberation front.
This was necessary and in consonance with the nature, the spirit and ~the
goals of the revolution. The front includes and should have included
every Algerian who re~ected French colonialism and dedicated his life,
~ his wealth and his childr~n to take part in fighting it. After indepen-
dence we replaced the sign of the front with that of the party, but the
party grew weak and continued to grow weaker until it became a mere sign
without vitality. Accordingly, we lost the role [it could have had] in
influencing [affairs] and leading [the nation]. Why [did that happen]? -
. We did not study this problem with the necessary eamestne~s. Some move- ,
ments are calling for pluralism. Is pluralism possible or necessary for
democracy? Where would its scope be? Would it be inside the party or
outside the party? Must we continue in the form of a party, or must we
change our organization so that it would comprise the organizational form
and the formulae of a front? For 14 years I asked myself these questions,
~nd today I ask myself these questions again. I do not claim to have
ready, absolute answers.
But I do have a few preliminary ideas for discussion. In general, this +
is a question that only the people themselves will settle. ,
_ The Socialist Exper:.ment Is Essential...But i
~
[Question] By God, Mr Ahmed, wh~t about...?
[Answer] The socialist experiment was and still is the essential and the
- inevitable solution for Algeria. But the errar that we fell into with re- ;
gard to socialism is that we continued to tie it to rigid notions that we
revered and worshiped as though they were idols. We did not tie socialism ~
. to life. We were imitators more than innovatora and creators. We saw so-
cialism in the circumstances of o~hers. But we did not see it carefully
_ and deal with it creatively in our own special circumstances which are
quite different from the circumstances, the herftage and the spiritual
values of others. i
i
I do not believe that socialism can succeed in our country if it does not ~
take into consideration the specific features of our reality. Chief among
these specific features is the fact that our country is Tslamic, and Islam
19
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ has its own progressive view on life and its own notion of socialism. Peo- ~
ple are equal like the teeth of a comb.
At any rate, prison gave me the opportunity to make significant revisions.
I did in fact write 1,400 pages zhat I hope to publish in a book in two
' v~Zumes. Before I publish the book, I will show it to a number vf friends
so that I may get their observations, their criticism and their correct~ons
of the specific details of the facts or events where my memory may have
failed me. It is a oook about my experience as one of tne fighters in the
revolution, in government and in prison. I deal in that book with every-
thing in the past and in the present, and I try to look over the horizons
of the future and to raise the questions that I have for discussion. I do
that to the best of my effort. It is God who grants success.
'Abd-al-Nasir, al-Sadat and Camp David
[QuestionJ My God have mercy on your parents, Mr Ahmed. What else can you
tell us about these memoirs?
[Answer] Of course. My writings dealt with Arab and international events
and figures. Among those figures, for example, is Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, may
God have mercy on him. He was a great, progressive, nationalistic leader.
He achieved much for Egypt and for the entire Arab homeland. No one denies _
that but a blind or an ungrateful person. But the great man did also have
shortcomings. Like all human beings, one of his shortcomings was the fact
- that he made the sociaZ and political natio~;ial movement revolve around an
individual leader.
This is what broke the continuity of Egy~t's Arab course and of its social-
ist development. In the absence of the. centralizing [influence of] an or-
ganized popular movement, of constitutional institutions and of popular or-
ganizations, this absence of conttnuity in Egypt's Arab course allowed the
occurrence of this ma3or dangerous twist whose effect goes beyond Egypt
to the entire Arab homeland. I was referring to the Camp David Accords and
to the separate peace with Israel under the leadership of al-Sadat with his
centralized, individual leadership also. A1-Sadat's leadership represents
another political and social nature that is different from that of the
late 'Abd-al-"LVasir. Camp David was a catastrophe. If all of us, Arabs
and Moslems, do not overcome it quickly, it will drag us into a bottomless
pit that will take us back scores of years.
After dealing with the Algerian question, my writings deal with the Arab
question. .
In my opinion the essence of the Arab question is the Palestinian question.
Failing to achieve victory in the Palestinian question or stabbing it in
the back will lead all Arabs into mazes of wretchedness and fragmentation,
regardless of their countries and their inclinations, and they will fall
again into the cfiasm of colonialism wfiicfi, tfirougFi its strong and new
20
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
institutions, covets their oil, their marketa and their strategic loca-
tions. Color~ialiam wante to eatablish Zionist hegemony. What is being
done so far to support the liberAtion org$nization, the only legitimate
representative of the Paleatinian `people, is very little and is not ade-
quate on the part of the Arabs in spite of the fact that their destinies
are fully tied with the destiny of Palestine. I am even noticing that
some well-intentioned Arabs as well as others with evil intentions are
going al~ng with colonialism in its plans to abort the Palestinian Revolu-
tion. Sometimes, the methods of these plans are obvious; at other times
they are clandestine. It were as though the Arabs had been charged with
the task of preventing the revolution from achieving victory that would
bring about freedom and progress for Arabs through the victory of the
Palestinian Revolution against Israel.
What I wrote also deals with the fact that our destiny in Algeria and ou.r
destin~; as Arabs are tied to the destiny of the Third World. I dealt with
the necessity of unifying the Third World's movement in all areas against
the new racist, imperialist attack. I give special significance in this
unification to the establishment of an Arab-African brotherhood with strong
ties.
The Core of the Arab Character Is Islam
I pay special attention to the Islamic dimension of our movement whose core
is Islam not only because Islam is the religion of the vast ma~ority of the
faithful nations [of the Arab worldJ, but rather because it is the spring-
head of thought and culture which nourishes the Arab character and makes
it non-racist and religiously tolerant. Without this dimension we lose
our national personality and our spiritual values that move us to struggle
for freedom and for progress, and to mobilize our people in a profound -
manner to oppose different forms of colonialism, exploitation, tyranny,
racism and fanaticism.
Lebanon? Cain and Abel! ,
[Question] By God, Mr Ahmed, what...? "
[Answer] What is happening in Lebanon is heartbreaking. It is a crime
for which a11 the Lebanese and all the Arabs are responsible. It brings ~
_ back to our age the story of Cain and Abel. The crisis of Lebanon is the
crisis of the Arabs' inability to oppose colonialism Zionism and backward-
ness, not to mention the horrid bloody fanaticism which is forbidden by
both ~slam and Christianity. Unless the Arabs cooperate with good persons
who are among the people of Lebanon and in the legal government of Lebanon
= to temporize the civil strife, its fires will extend to all of them. i
Final Touches i
Thus ends the dialogue with Brot'her Ahmed Ben Bella. It sketches his pic-
ture from tfie inside. W[tat remains are a few final touches.
21.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200034414-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Ahmed Ben Bella is over 60 years old. He is in good health, and his body
and his movements are closer to those of a 35-year old man. He does not
have a single grey hair, and he has not lost a single tooth. -
- Ben Bella exercises by walking for at least an hour a day. He reads and
writes for 3 hours and divides the rest of his day between family and
_ receiving his visitors.
At the first Friday prayer he attended at the M'sila mosque, the worshipers
cheered him. He raised his hands humbly to greet them and he replied, "Long
live Algeria! May God help our President Chadli and his brethren, and rnay
God have mercy on Boumediene."
When Mr Attailia, who succeeded Col Abdallah Belhouchet in the responsi-
bility of,guarding Ben Bella, went to Ben Bella, Ben Bella responded to "
him in a spirit of brotherhood and embraced him with fervor that surprised
those who were prasent. This is because they knew that Attailia was known
to be one of the strongest opponents of Ben Bella and the men in his govern- ~
ment.
The Algerian authorities have placed two large cars at the disposal of Ben
- Bella. One is for his private use, and the other is to serve his family.
The rooms of the house at M'sila became overcrowded with books in Arabic,
French and Spanish on Islam, philosophy, economics, politics and sociology.
Ben Bella carried these books from his jail to the house of freedom. -
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8592
- CSO: 4402
22
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY �
I
i
ALGERIA
GAS REPLACING OIL AS MAJOR FOREIGN-EXCHANGE ~ARNER
London THE MIDDLE EAST in English Nov 79 p 125
[Text] '
Gas will replace oil as Algeria's ,
major foreign-exchange earner
over the next few yeais. '
Although the country will Additional foreign exchange is
r e m a i n d e p e~ n d e n t o n also coming from the expart of
hydrocarban exports at least .~mn tons annually of con-
until the end of the century, the ' densate, a byproduct of gas pro-
gas-oil mix is changing duction, which fetches a 5�'0
dramatically in favour of ges. premium over Algerian crude ~
Oil product~on is tending to fall, oil. Coming on the eve of a pro-
but Algeria s new deal with EI bable peak in demand for debt- '
Peso means that gas revenues servicing, the additiunal earn-
have been trebled. ings are seen as a bles9ing hy the
The EI Paso deal came at en , '
opportune time. Six months cc>untry s economic strategists. i
ego, there was a risk of a ,
significant shortfall in export ~
eamings as a fall in oil pro- i-
duction began, but now the ,
abundant gas reserves are being
_ tapped at the same time as the ~
new oil prices have given a boost
to revenues.
The E1 Paso contract is certainly favorable to Algeria. The price of gas
has been more than trebl~ed from 37 cents to $1.15 per million BTU fob.
Deliveries of LNG under the E1 Paso I contract began last year and are now -
at the full capacity of lObn cubic metres a year.
The significant new element in the gas pricing arrangements is that they
are linked to OPEC base prices for crude oil. A Sonatrach official told i
The Middle East that the new pricing strategy is intended to avoid competi- i
tion between gas and oil as an energy source. In the words of Nordine Ait -
Laoussine, former Vice-President of Sonatrach, the Algerians believed that ~
it was "essentiial and inevitable" that gas prices should rise so that OPEC's
vast gas reserves could
- 23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
I_~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FO.~. OFFICIAL USE ONLY
be exploited profitably. These operatiun of existing plants
resources, Laoussine said, means that some ere operating
represented "the biggest readily at 30'
~ below their rated -
available source of new energy capacit~�; some experts put the
potential for the future", production shortfall e~�en higher.
, Algeria, with the world's Inevitabl} the relati~�ely pooc
third-largest gas reserves, after performance of the L.\G plants
! the Soviet Union and the US, in operation hes placeri a
has been in the vanguard of the question mark over projected
movement to link gas prices to plants, It seems unlikely ~ for ex-
crude oil prices. The indications ample, that the plants planned
are that Algeria's move will be for Skikda Est and Les Lsseres
followed by the other major oil will be built.
exporters, most of whom are Instead. investment resources
trying to extend price-fixing are likely to be put into the con-
arrangements to sales of gas. struction of a second pipeline to
Ges pricing is likely to be on Italy ~1a Tunisia. As some 80 0
the agenda of the next OPEC of Algeria's ges is eaported to
ministerial meeting, in Caracas Europe, such an im�estment
in December this year, with the would seem to be eminently
eapectation that a common sound. Gas expnrts are expected
' "marker" price for gas will be to peak at over 78bn cubic
agreed. metres a year by the mid-1980s, -
Sonatrach officials told The and gas is likely to be the -
Middle East that it wes pro- principal foreign�eachange
bable that new contracts eamer until: leest the year
negotiated with European 200p,
custome~s for natural ges would
, use broadly the same formula as -
the El Paso contract.
Algeria has shown commen-
~ dable consistency in its plans for
; the exploitation of its
hydrocarbon reserves, though
signs are now emerging of a shift
in emphasis away from LNG
plants towards piped natural
gas. The Algerian experience
- has been that I.NG plants are
expensive to construct, to
operate and to maintain, and
that they are dependent on
_ sophisticated (and imported)
technology and labour.
Poor management and
_ COPYRI~IT: 1979 I.E. Magazines Ltd.
CSO: 442~
~
~ 24
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ ALGERIA
BRIEFS
AIRCRAFP NEGOTIATIONS RUMORED--Are some Mus~tere sircraft slated to re-
place the Fouga-Magister aircraft of the Algerian sir force? A French
military mission is negotiatiag secretly in Algiers. [Text] [Paris
PARIS MATCH in French 30 Nov 79 p 43]
CSO: 4400
25 _
' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
IRAN
~
IRANIAN WORKERS BESIEGE JAPANESE OFFICE, DEMAND PAYI~NT
Tokyo SHUICAN SHINCHO in Japanese 1 Nov 79 pp 36-39
[Text] It was 0700 14 October 1979 (Sunday) Japan time. The weather was -
fine for the firat time in many days and a former company director was
planning to go golfing when he was unexpectedly detained by a telephone
call from an acquaintance assigned to Tehran, capital of Iran. -
The gist of the phone cail from Tehran, which took 45 minutes, was as
follows:
"Sorry to bother you. Appealing to you will not help us but I do not know
to whom I can appeal so please listen to what we Japanese in Iran have to
say. I have heard that in Japan it was decided to use national tax money
_ ~c resume construction (Note: cabinet decision on the 12th), which Mitsui ~
; & Co., Ltd. [Mitsui] failed to accomplish, of the Iranian petro-chemical
' plant (Note: the Irano-Japan Petroleum Corporation [IJPC], a 3oint com-
, pany with Iran). Ezaki, Ministry of International Trade and Industry [MITI]
Minister, is visiting Tehran. But do you think such a venture will succeed?
As a natter of fact, a terrible thing is happening now in Tehran. A large
neimbe,r of Iranian laborers have besieged the Tehran oftice of Fudo Construc-
tion Co., Ltd. [Fudo] which is doing subcontract�work for Mitsui on IJPC,
and are perse~uting four Japanese, incl~uding the resident manager. They
are demanding i~ediate payment of layoff compensations totaling 8 million -
rials (spproximately 24 million yen). If Fudo makes such compensations,
they will make the same demands of other Japanese companies one after
' another. If Fudo give~c way, there is no telling what they will demand
: nex4:, even if the IJPC ~plant construction is resumed. Since the February
' revolution, manpower costs have risen 30 percent. With such worries in -
my mind, I hurried to the Fudo office. There, I was taken by aurprise.
The company's four employees had already been held in captivity for nearly
15 hours, since yesterday morning, but Mitsui and the Japanese embassy had
feigned ignorance...what time is it here? It is 0130 of the 14th. I tried
_ my best to mediate and~prevented the worst from happening, after which I
went home, but the four Japanese are not likely to be released soon...."
_i 26 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
i .
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I
~
The tel.ephone call from Tehran did not end here.
"What is Mitsui doing? That is the problem. They are having a big party
to welcome Ezaki. Ambassador to Iran Wada is also present. Since all of
the newspaper reporters are also invited to the party, no shred of news
regarding the captivity will probably be reported in Japan.
"During the regime of former Shah Pahlavi, Mitsui arrogantly boasted that
'we are going to accomplish this task in place of the Japanese nation.'
They bribed the Iranian Government and bragged to the Japanese contractors
...Japanese entrepreneurs prayed at the feet of Mitsui. Heretofore, Mitsui
took most of the margin from these entrepreneurs. They keep their profits
and are now asking for tax money. No.Japanese here will look favorably
again at Mttsui. Even the Iranians are aware of Mitsui's actions during -
Pahlavi's regime. It's anyone's guess as to when IJPC will be nationalized."
Well, the story is that this "righteous indignation" had co.tinued for some
time.
� After 32 Hours of Captivity ~
- The four Japanese employees of Fudo were held captive from 0800 on the 13th
to 1600 on the 14th (Iran time) or a total of 32 hours. Ironically, this
- is about the same period that Minister Ezaki and party were in Tehran.
On the evening of the 13th, through the auspices of Mitsui, a gala Japanese
party called "Welcome to Minister Ezaki" was held at the Hilton hotel in
Tehran. In addition to Minister Ezaki, MITI Trade Policy Bureau Chief
Miyamoto, Deputy Director General Furuta of the Agency of National Resources
and Energy, and Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau Chief Chiba of
the Foreign Miniatry, who accompanied Ezaki, were present at the party. Am- _
bassador Wada and embasSy staff inembers were also present. Approximately ~
60 Japanese residipg ~.n Iran were also there and a large number of them were
Mitsui representatives in Tehran. According to a Japanese in Iran who at- ~
tended the party, the Islam religion absolutely forbids alcohol and there-
fore, to call the partq a"gala" might be~an exaggeration. They toasted
with ~uice and cola and the "food was so-so." But even so, this type of a
party was a"lavish one" and "the first in Tehran since the r.evolution."
Tehran resident manager Wataru Shibata of Fudo, who had been held in cap-
tivity for 32 hours, was one of those who had been invited to the party.
"It was the morning of the 13th: Forty-five Iranian laborers suddenly -
- appeared in our office. I was about to leave in a car but they pounded on
the hood and ordered, 'You Japanese return to the office.' They were
laborers who had come from Bandar Khomeyni, where the IJPC combinant is ~
located, and were wearing turbans and sandals. They were southerners and
many of them were of black Arabian color.
_ 27 '
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
a
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
"They did not use violence but they surrounded us and shoved their de-
mands in our faces. In chorus (Sprechchor), they shouted 'pay money' in
the Pereian language. They cut the telephone linea and made it impossible
to contact outeidera. I was acared." [Statement of Fudo resident manager
Shibata.] . �
It is said that they carrie$ a directive, "pay layoff compensations to -
these people," which was published by the "Abadan Labor Co~ittee" of
Bandar Khomeyni. ~The total payment was for 80 ~ersons and 2~+ million yen
in Japanese money. According to Fudo books,� the employment contract with
them had expired in December of last year and they had been "given termina-
tion pay." -
In spite of that, they had been held captive for 32 hours. During that
period, a' member who had been permitted to go outside to purchase food-
stuffs, made an SOS call to the Japanese embassy and Mitsui. However.... .
"The embassy personnel said, 'a minister is here from Japan and we are too
busy,' or 'for the present, your lives are not in danger, is that right?'
and refused to help. They did not even contact~the police. As for Mitsui,
they sponsored the party and 'congratulated themselves that the enterprise
had become a national one.' They did not try to contact us. It was dis-
heartening." (Statement of Fudo manager Shibata.) -
The Hidden Aim of Mitsui?
The Iranian laborers, who reappeared in Tehran a week later, carried a
"compulsory enforcement directive" from the Abadan District Court Office.
The directive ordered that "unless payment were made by the deadline, ar-
rests will follow."
The frightened Fudo procured the money in a hurry and proceeded to the dis-
trict court office.
"This is like receiving the termination pay twice. From the Japanese
standpoint, there is absolutely no need to pay this money. We also feel
highly indignant about paying this money. The social conditions of Iran,
_ however, are not that stable. The laborers want to take as much as they
can get. It so happened that our office was open when many enterprises
had closed their doors. We became their target. If Mitsui reopens IJPC,
= the Iranians will besiege them. In this unsettled situation, the only
ones we can rely upon are the Japanese embassy staff but during~the revo-
lution, they were the first ones to run away. We have the deepest hatred
for them." (Statement of manager Shibata.)
Demands of this type of layoff compensation (Note: there are some who say,
"requesta from laborers who have terminated their employment, as in the
case of Fudo, are exc~ptional") against 12 Japanese enterprises in Iran
total 500 million yen. Are such unreasonable demands being made because
_ 28 ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' I
the society is under a revolutionary, dictatorial regime? Visiting re-
searcher at the Iranian Philosophical Academy, Hajime Igarashi (presently _
back in Japan because of the revolution), says:
"Because Iran does not have labor-related laws, there are no regulations
covering strikes and layoff:s. In September of last yesr, there was an
anti-Pahlavi strike at IJPC. In the midst of the strike, Iranian laborers
came to the company and asked for their pay. The companies were forced to
come up with a plan to pag wages to those who did not work and bonuses to
those who did. It is common in Iran to ask for pay whether they are laid
' off or not reporting to work. One of the teachings in the Koran is 'those
who possess should bestow blessings' and the Iranians are utilizing this
'to take without hesitation from those who possess.' There are some revc-
lutionary commtttee members, however, who do not recognize such demands
so there are no standards in Iran after the revoluti~n. There is only
confusion."
Among the Japanese residing in Iran, some say "even if IJPC resuaes as a
national enterprise of Japan, there is no telling what the Iranians will
demand. The outlook is not only bad but extremely dark." Others claim,
neither the Japanese embassy nor Mitsui informed the Japanese Government
about the serious situation and made it appear that Iran was safe." Re-
portedly, such charges are rampant now.
According to the Japanese cabinet decision, another 180 billion yen will
be granted to IJPC, in which Japan and Iran have already invested Sfl0.5
billion yen. Of the Japanese outlaq, government subsidy amounted to
20 billion yen and loans from the E~cport-Import Bank of Japan and othera
totaled 80 billion yen....
"I think that Mitsui reallq knows best that IJPC's future is hopeless from
_ the standpoint of profitability or any other standpoint. Mitsui is saying
_ that IJPC will definitely be in the black in the years ahead but I think
that inwardly, Mitsui has other thoughts. They are saying that rather
than continue any unfavorable relation with Iran, they should complete
_ IJPC which is already 85 percent finished and have the Iranians take over ~
the corporation stocks at market value. If the Iranian side nationalizes
and seizes the plant, Mitsui can get away by pleading a case of force
ma~eure. Even if the combinant is completed and produces goods, there is -
no sales outlet for the products. Ira~n's domestic consumption is limited.
If the products are imported by Japan, domestic makers will face competi-
tion. What can we do?" (Statement of aforementioned Igarashi.) "The
labor situation was chaotic im~aediately after the revolution but it is
settled now. There is absolutely no chance that the plant will be na-
tionalized upon completion. Becauae of that, the Japanese Government par-
ticipated." So says Mitsui.
The Fate of Oil Dependent Diplomacy
Under these circumstances, the question is raised as to why the Japanese
Government decided upon an inveatment with so many risks? A certain high
29
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
official of the Finance Ministry, which ia said to have been reluctant to
the last among government agencies to make the outlay, states: `
"As long as the nation is investing, it must make the payments~ There is
the question of future profitability but we are not even certain that
Khomeyni (leader of Iran's revolution) intends to see the pro3ect to com-
pletion. The Iranian Government says that it will definitely not nation-
alize but the FinancE Ministry wanted an official understanding between -
the two governments. It is said that a memorandum from Premier Bazargan
has reached the Foreign Ministry but.... �
"What we feared most was being told by Iran that 'well, forget it, but in
return, we shall not provide oil.' Because of that, we came around to the
decision to complete the remaining 15 percent of construction. It is a
form of bribery. There might be arguments as to the sum of 20 billion yen
for bribery but should the enterprise succeed, Japt~n would be highly eval-
uated, even in Iran, for being the only country to remain and finiah the
project, after all the European countries and United States had evacuated. `
For a country without natural resources, Japan had no choice but to try."
- Oil is mentioned as the problem. Speaking of oil, OPEC chairnian and Min-
: ister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources of the United Arab Emirates, Otaiba,
= was given an unprecedented welcome by the government and people when he
: visited Japan recently.
~ The government arranged an Imperial audience, the first since Petroleum
Minister Yamani of Saudi Arabia, for a cabinet level official visiting Japan.
Furthermore, he was presented with the First Class Order of the Sacred Trea-
sure, a decoration which even Yamani could not get. Newspapexs and TV sta-
tions competed for interviews with Otaiba. Among them, Fuji TV acted as
though it were a medium for the government by asking "will you continue giv- _
ing us oil in the future?" Otaiba was bewildered by a woman interviewer'3
remark that "Japanese wives in Hokkaido are having a difficult time because
of kerosene shortage." Ultimately, he severely criticized Japan's wastage
in oil consumption. In an interview, he said, "support Arab's anti-Israel
movements" but what he really meant by that statement was for "Japan to cut
off re.iations with Israel." If those who bickered for oil with Otaiba are
willing, at his request, "to sever relations with Israel," that is another
story. It can be said that by shouting for oil alone, without considering
today's world situation which is buried under the oil problem, Japan might
fall into a terrible "pitfall" of world politics. It is hoped that Japan
will not have to deeply regret the situation someday of seeing no increase
in the vital oil supply after having been utilized at will by the oil pro-
- ducing countries, whether in Iran's IJPC pro3ect with poor "guarantees" or
in the "all-out Japaneg~ welcome" for Otaiba.
COP'YRIGHT: by Shinchoeha 1979
l ~
9134
CSO: 4105
30 ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY '
IRAQ
PREPARATIONS FOR ELECTIONS UNDERWAY
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABT in Arah3.c 25-31 Oct 79 pp 21 '
- [Correspondent's Report datelined Baghdad: "Saddam Hussay in Pledges Free
and Direct Popular Elections"]
_ [Text] Baghdad today is busy drawing the necessary procedures and regula-
tions for establishing its constitutional institutions and electing its
representative bodies. However, this preoccupation does not prevent the
- Iraqi Government from watching closely certain disturbing phenomena on the
Arab arena. What are these phenomena? And what worries Iraq?
Perhaps before the end of ~his year, Iraq will be ready to begin a new
stage of national activity, represented by the establishment of constitutional
institutions, the foremost, of which is an Iraqi national assembly or a
parliament. !
It is taken for granted that the election of the members of the national ,
assembly will be free and direct. The elections will be held in a manner
apt to build up democracy on a solid basis quite different from those weak
and shakey foundations on which the parliaments and the representative coun-
cils were bu~.lt during the modern history of Iraq. Almost all those legis-
lative bodies were a distortion of genuine democracy and the will of the
people.
This may be the first time, during the past 20 years, the Iraqis will have
a chance to go to the polls to elect their popular xepresentatives.
Hence, the Iraqi political leadership is determined, after a long interruption -
for various circumstances, which cannot be expl~ined in this report, to
see that the new experiment will be sound, correct, logical and rational,
- rather than follow the model of the superficial elections held in most of
the countries of the Third World where referendums and elections recur and
the rulers and their representatives win with implausible ma~orities (99.99
percent). Perhaps President Sadat's referendums and elections are the
best evidence of the corruption of such experiments and falsehood of the a~.le- -
gations that they reflect the will of the people and express the hopes, '
and aspirations of the-people and their choice of their genuine representa- .
tives. -
31
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I
I
~
The 17 July Revolution has been ruiing the country for a little over 10 ,
years. But those years have been eventful and fui�1 of experiences and cir-
cumstances that prevented the fulfillment of this prerequisite of a democra-
tic government.
;
Stability flelps Democracy
It is true that many of the prevailing circumstances and preoccupations are ~
still impeding the process of building up a constitutional government, but
the Iraqi political leadership seems to be determined, today, not to drag '
its fee+t in building up constitutional institutions. It considers such work
an integral part of national action and national struggle. ;
~
In this determination, the Iraqi political leadership is supported by the
solid stability of the current regime and its self-confidence and long ex-
perience. These conditions are adequate to bring this democratic experiment
to a successful and honorable conclusion.
One of the most important conditions which help in expediting the process ;
_ of creating and electing the representative establishment is the existence
of the political establishment represented in the Ba'th party.
Perhaps the Ba'th party in Iraq is different from all the other political '
organizations in the Arab world or the Third World since it represents
_ authority of the people. In other words, it is not a party created by the
ruling regime to flourish and expand in a manner which would make it a
parasitic and subservient tool of the regime. -
Consequently, the presence of a strong and effective political party gives
the democratic process a special meaning and builds its institutions on ;
committed and firm foundations which are not affiliated with any one indi- ~
vidual or a particular government. ~
In fact, a committee was formed last week in which the concerned ministries '
~ !
were represented. The committee was charged with taking the necessary mea-
sures for holding elections of a national assembly and a legislative coun-
cil for the autonomous region. ' ~
~
Laws for the Representative Councils ;
Earlier, the Ba'th garty National Command and the Revolutionary Command ~
Council held several meetings devoted to the discussions of the draft law
of the National Assembly and of the Legislative Council for the autonomous
region of Kurdistan.
~
32 ;
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
r:~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
According to official inforntation "the two councils will be established on
~ the basis of free and direct popular elections in compliance with the policy
adopted by the Party and the Revolution calling for completion of society's
new democratic structure and increasing the democratic practices of the
masses."
The above mentioned two political organizations have already approved _
the two bills, in principle. The bills will be forwarded to the Council
of Ministers for study and discussion. The self-rule bodies will also dis-
cuss the bill concerning the legislative council for the autonomous region.
The two bills will also be presented for an open and free discussion in the _
press, seminars and mee*_ings of the various national organizations. The
suggestions and opinions concerning the two bills will then be summarized -
and sent to the Revolutionary Com~nand Council which will review them in
_ light of the views expressed. The Council will include those suggestione
serving the public's interest into the bills and then issue them in their
final forms.
However, the attention pa3.d by the Iraqi polit3.ca1 leadership to the creation
of elected representative councils during this stage does not prevent it
from pursuing carefully other national interests, especially the developments
on the pan-Arab arena.
Attempt to Distort the Independence and Sovereignty of Iraq
Observers note that the Western media is concentrating on distorting the
independence of the Iraqi political leadership. It is also attempting to
discredit this leadership through the fabrication of various rumors and dis-
torted information repeatedly reported by the greatest number of information
channels and networks.
As an example, there is the allegation that there aYe Cuban forces in Iraq!
The Iraqi President Saddam Hussayin, himself, denied these allegations. In
a speech he made in Najaf (150 kilometers to the south of Baghdad) he said
"The masters of the White House know the truth, that there is not a single
foreign soldier in Iraq."
He went on to say "The Arabs are capable of defending their lands, honor,
dignity and principles without seeking aid from any foreigner, far or near,
even if he is a friend."
Stressing the independence of Iraq and the pride the Iraqis derive from
maintaining sovereignty over their land, he said: "The Iraqis are masters
of their land, There is no room in Iraq except for its sons and the sons
of the Arab nation. The Iraqis will maintain their loyalty, not only in
Iraq but also in all the other parts of the Arab world. Wherever they find
33
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200034414-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
injustice they will fight against it with the sword of Imam Ali, peace be
on him, our Master al-Hussayin, Khalid Ibin al-Walid and Salah al-Din al-
Ayyubi and the swords of all the Arab strugglers and all the Mosle~ leaders
- in the land of Arabism. We will carry out our mission and we shall win."
Indications Worrying the Iraqis
On another level, some political and partisan circles here are concerned
about certain overt and covert initiatives and moves which are currently
taking place on the Arab arena.
What disappoints the Iraqis most is the allegation of certain Arab states
that the Arabs "receive offers from others and reciprocate with rejection."
In other words, these states say that the Arabs have no solid plan or counter-
proposals to offer against the current proposals for a solution to the
Middle East problem. The Iraqis also are outraged by the whispers in certain
capitals about "the necessity of finding a formula other than the Baghdad
Summit formula, acceptable to the American camp."
The Iraqis are provoked, as well, by those high voices calling for recog-
nition of the Palestine Liberation Organization in return for its recogni- _
tion of Israel! Or those voices that call for changing or amending the
United Nations resolution 242 return for a Palestinian recognition of the
Zionist state and consequently the acceptance of the proposed compromises.
In cvuntering these calls, the Iraqi officials, in their analysis of what
is happening on the Arab-international arena, see that there is an insistence, _
especially from certain mediators, on convincing the Palestinians that the
- gun is no longer the way and that they should give precedence to a political
solution, since the political course is now the only way to salvation at
this stage.
The observers believe that political action is necessary and required but _
onti~e basis that it should be part of a comprehensive Arab plan and an in-
tegrated strategy, rather than being a unilateral political activity.
For an example, they ask: What is the value of an international recognition
of the PLO if its price will he acceptance of an Tsraeli entity which re-
fuses the creation of an independent Palestinian entity, at least on
Palestinian territory?
With regard to Iraqi-Iranian relations, there is no a.ndication here that
Baghdad is certain about the real intentions of the new Iranian regime to-
wards the Arabs, particularly, the Arabs of the Gulf. Consequently, Baghdad
has not taken seriously the reports about Arab mediations to dissipate the
clouds of tension over the relations between Iran and the Gulf states.
34 .
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE O1tTLY
In this respect, the Iraqis believe that any mediation or effort cannot ;
succeed as long as there is more than one Tranian spokesman mak~ng state-
ments, attacking and expressing dormant or awakened dreams and expansionist
aspirations with regard to the Arabism of the Gulf.
Hence, the ideal solution, from the Iraqi point of view, lies in Tehran ab-
staining from following this rough course against the Arabs and in presenting
to the Arabs practical evidences of its good intentions and its genuine de-
termination to establish neighborly relations with the Arabs, based on mu-
tual interests and historical ties. Tehran should dispel the notion that
there is a vacuum on the Arab side that can only be filled by the winds of _
the "Iranian revolution" and that the mission of Iran is to export the revo-
lution to its neighbors.
~ The Iraqis say that when the leaders of the new regime in Iran relinquish
these illusions, Arab-Iranian relations will easily overcome the present
crisis, and will be based on normal friendship between the two nations with-
out complexes and sensitivities.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 al-Watan al-~'Arabi
6800
CSO: 4802
35
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
i
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SAUDI ARABIA
BRIEFS
USSR RELATIONS REQUEST--During the forthcoming visit to Saudi Arabia
'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, presidium chairman of the PDRY Supreme People's
Council, is expected to convey a Soviet request expressing Moscow's
eagerness to establish equitable diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia.
There was diplomatic relations between the two countries about 40 years
ago. [Text] [JN260704 Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 22-28 Nov 79
p 18 JN]
CSO: 4802
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200034414-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY '
TUNISIA
HABIB BOURGUIBA'S ROLE IN OUTCOME OF DESTOURIAN PARTY CONGRESS IIISCUSSED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Sep 79 pp 16, 17
' [Article by Tunis Correspondent Souhayr Belhassen]
[Text] Three days after the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] congress, -
three presidential decrees fell lik~: the guillotine. They "decapitated"
_ three men who, in varying degrees, had played a role during the lOth Congress:
' Messrs Abdallah Farhat, Hedi Baccouche and Mahmoud Triki. Only the departure -
of the first, the minister of defense, was announced, which was a big surprise
to many.
For some time, however, the minister's growing influence had irritated
PrQsident Bourguiba. There had been sufficient circumstances for his dis-
content to take pr~cise shape. Wanting to determine his position before
the lOth Congress met, Bourguiba reviewed the films of previous congresses _
on 3 August. According to one of his associates, he was upset over the -
sick-man image which he had given of himself in Mon~stir in 1971 at the
time of the Eighth�Canqress. This was further qrounds for complaint against =
his adviser at the time, who was none other than Mr Abdallah Farhat, then
director of his staff. Had it not been for the prime minister, who said
that he had assigned the organization of the congress to the mi.nister of
defense, the latter would probably riave lost some of his privileges beginning
on that day.
After opening the congress in Tunis on 5 September, Bourguiba followed its
proceedings from the palaae of Carthage by means of a special televi.sion
installation. On the very first day, he summoned certain congressional
participants. According to one of them, the president did not like the
"level" of the debates. In his opinion, belaboring the confrontations and
denouncing complicities, at the time of the events of 26 January 1978, were
clumsy moves. Irritation turned to anger when th~ participants, one after
another, requested the election of the general secretary, Mr Hedi Nouira,
' by the congress. "But that is a duality of power!," a surprised minister
confided to one of his colleagues.
37
FOR OFFICI6i:. USE OidLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
. I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ;
Al~dallah Farhat, who was presiding over the congress, noted this without ~
mentioning the party's bylaws which stipulate that the general secretary
is appointed by the chief of state. It waa simply as a member of the
_ Central Committee that Mr Nouira was chosen by acc.lamation.
Bourguiba refused to go and close the congress on Sunday, 9 September.
It was the congressianal participants who came to him. In the presidential
address, there was a grumbling threat: "You have properly fulfilled your
duty, although some of you deleted names on the recomn?endation of thsir
governors." The president did not like seeing the former political bureau ~
rejected in favor of technocrats who had nothing to do with politics. And
he liked even less seeing the party flaunt its disagreements. The prime
minister then requested an interview. The answer came crashing down:
"On Wednesday, as usual," i.e., 12 September.
In the meantime, Bourguiba prepared his campaign alone. His close associates
felt him stimulated, but he remained calm and especially silent. Only his
son met with him on Sunday afternoon, 9 September, during his walk; but the
president still said nothing. On Monday, 10 September, he summoned the ~
party's director, Mr Mohamed Sayah, and granted the interview which he re- -
quested for Mr Hassan Belkhodja, minister of agriculture, who was among
Bourguiba's former comrades mistreated by the congress.
It was Mr Sayah whom Bourguiba first received: "Well, they scratched you?"
"As long as I have your confidence, Mr President, that is all that matters."
For 10 minutes, the PSD leader said what he thought about the course of the
congress, the use of the army instead and in place of the party's apparatus.
The discussion turned to the settlement of scores. Mr Sayah did not mince
his words concerning the man whom he considered "his" political enemy,
Mr Hedi Baccouche, the prime minister's adviser. In his eyes, it was Mr _
Baccouche who threw Mr Nouira into the political action by allowing him to
_ address an entire generation which was not his own. !
i
If there has been talk in the international press of discord within the PSD, '
Mr Sayah blames the director of TAP [Tunis-Africa Press Agency], Mr Mahmoud
' Triki, who beat Mr Mohamed Sayah's deputy in Sousse. Bourguiba merely
listened. Nor did he say anything more with Mr Hassan Belkhodja, who made
an effort to point out what risked harming the president's prestige and power.
These interviews were not publicized. The prime minister summoned Mr Sayah,
who recounted his interview in detail. "If the president is eager for the
departure of Baccouche, that will be taken care of," Mr Nouira reportedly
replied.
_ On Tuesday, 11 September, the chief of state did not grant any interviews;
he thought. On Wednesday, 12 September, receiving his prime minister in the -
- presence of Mr Bourguiba, Jr, he reaffirmed his confidence in him and asked
' him to immediately implement the decree announcing the replacement of Mr
- Abdallah Farhat by Mr Rachid Sfar. The chief of state reportedly first '
thought of Mr Driss Guiga, Tunisian ambassador to the FRG. But the prime
minister tipped the balance in favor of Mr Sfar. The president is fond of
38
FOR OFFICII~L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
- FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY
' this young minister (Industry, Mines and Energy) of Mr Nouira. He pursued
a career in the Ministry of Finance until he entered the government. The
. son of a comrade in arms whom Bourguiba particularly likes, Tahar Sfar, he
is a native of the region of Mahdia, like Mohamed Masmoudi and Tahar Belkhodja.
- The second decree put an end to Mr Hedi Baccouche's short political career.
A former opponent close to Mr Ben Salah, later rallying to the side of Mr
Nouira, he was appointed consul to Lyon (France) and was asked to r~~ign from
the Central Committee. TAP director Mahmoud Triki, the victim of the third
decree, was assigned to the Tunisian $mbassy in France, but will be retained
_ on the Central Committee.
On the evening of 12 September, television viewers noticed a Bourguiba in
top form, after receiving Mr Mohamed Mzali, minister of education, and Chedli
Klibi, Arab League general secretary, with profuse accolades and smiles, he
put out a cold hand to Abdallah Farhat and harangued his former minister.
Bourguiba has always felt that "the.army's place was in the barracks." Did
he discover meddling in the party's affairs or~did he simply punish his defense
minister for exceeding his privileges? Nevertheless, the reprimand has left
politicians spellbound and some people are wondering. As for the man on the
street, he is not surprised. It was even with a slight degree of admiration
that a waiter remarked: "The old lion still has deadly claws."
- COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
11915
~ CSO: 4400
- 39
y FOR OFFICIt~T, USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY
TUNISIA
FALL OF ABDALLAH FARHAT FROM POWER DISCUSSED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 26 Sep 79 p 15
[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani]
[Text] Tunisian politics of the last 20 years resemble the tragedy of
ancient long-distance runners. They ran over a long distance to the point
of exhaustion, but often fell before reaching the finish line. In Tunis,
this marathon is still control3ed with an iron hand by the man who remains
president despite his 76 years: Habib Bourguiba.
The most recent victim of this political marathon is Abdallah Farhat, long
the powerful minister of defense, foll~wing Salah Ben Youssef, Ahmed Ben
Salah, Bahi Ladgham, Ahmed Mestiri, Mohamed Masmoudi, Tahar Belkhodja and
Habib Achour, all suspected of having aspired to power and advancement
outside the plans and interests of Bourguiba.
Mr Abdallah Farhat ran an "exemplary" race since 1956 and was among those
rare individuals who, behind Bourguiba, uninterruptedly led the country
and played a determining role in the president's choices. His main strength
derived from his unwavering devotion to the chief of state, which made him -
a simultaneously unobtrusive, powerful and feared figure. Some early
~ Destourzans still remember his rallying cry at the time of the Youssefist
crisis (1955): "Bourguiba, the Sahel is with you!"
In the past, Bourguiba rewarded his loyalty. He even imposed him on the
party's political bureau, to which he had not been elected, while he was
director of the presi3ential staff, a post which he occupied for many years.
- Except for a brief interlude in 1964 as head of the National Investment
Company, Farhat had always been a minister (PTT [Postal, Telephone and Tele-
graph Services], Agriculture, National Defense). Twenty-five years of power
have hardly changed his habits: Mr Farhat has not accumulated any villas or .
cars, nothing Married, with no children , this clever hunter with a sport-
ing appearance, looking younger than he is, naturally reserved, was born in
Ouardamine in the Sahel in August 1914.
40
FOR OFFICI~ USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
~ ~
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
A PTT employee during the colonial period, Abdallah Farhat came to politics
by way of the trade union struggle, specifically as one of the officials of
th~ federation of civil servants, one of the first branches of the Tunisian
General Federation of Labor (UGTT). Today at the age of 65, he is perhaps _
destined for an honorable departure as head of the vary same UGTT, whose
history of relations with the government is marked by many crises of con- '
fidence, the most recent on 26 January 1978.
On that black Thursday, Mr Abdallah Farhat was minister of defense and '
Col Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (an officer very clase to Abdallah Farhat),
director of the national criminal investigation bureau, the army and the
police violently put down the riot which was brewing. These tragic events
put an end to Mr Abdallah Farhat's unobtrusive isolation, especially since
some, like PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] leader Mohamed Sayah, another
"strong man," tried to ascribe the heavy responsibility for 26 January to
Farhat and to him alone. That is when the minister of defense, to preserve
his characteristic image, tried to disassociate himself from the clan of
"hard-liners" and to effect a reconciliation with Mr Hedi Nouira.
But Abdallah Farhat made the mistake of not being satisfied with being i
minister of defense, godfather of the heads of the national criminal
investigation bureau and the radio, treasurer and political bureau member.
He wanted even more. He organized the lOth PSD Congress, got himself ir
elected chairman of that congress and put his name at the top of the list
of candidates for the Central Committee, before those of National Assembly ~
chairman Sadok Mokkadem, Habib Bourguiba, Jr, and others. Abdallah Farhat
is today paying very dearly for those prestige campaigns. '
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
11915 '
CSO: 4400 ~
i
i_
i
41
FOR OFFICI~I, USE ONLY ~ '
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
. TUNISIA
TENSION REPORTED TO BE UNDERLYING SURFACE CALM
London THE MIDDLE EAST in English Nov 79 pp 46-48
_ [Text] Will Tunisia be any different after the long-awaited lOth Congress
of the ruling Parti Socialiste Destourien? Our Correspondent Susan Morgan
went there to find out last month and came to the conclusion that little
has changed. Despite the apparent triumph of Premier Hedi Nouira, there -
is still a mixture of surface calm and underlying tension prevailing in
Tunis ia.
The most significant aspect of Tunisia's tenth party congress was the
demonstration by President Bourguiba--ailing for the past decade--that he
still runs the show. The pre-election congress of Tunisia's single Parti
Socialiste Destourien (PSD), held in September, was supposed to be the
most important political event since the bloody rioting of January 1978
and was intended to prepare the country for the poat-Bourguiba era. It
was notably supposed to con.firm and strengthen the hand of Premier Hedi
Nouira (also Secretary General of the party) as the designated successor
to Bourguiba.
In the event, Nouira's apparent triumph was overshadawed by the swift and
unexpected manoeuvres of the head of state himself in the afterwath of the
conference. On 12 September the President dismissed Abdallah Farhat, the
powerful Minister of Defense and the main responsible for organizing the
congress. Shortly afterwards Hedi Baccouche, the Premier's political
counsellor, and finally Mahmoud Triki, director of the national news agency
TAP, were quietly removed. All three were close supporters of the Prime
Minister.
The dismissals were prompted by the President's finely-honed political
instincts of survival; a man who is too powerful represents a threat. In
addition to his ministerial post, Farhat headed the radio, was treasurer ~
- of the party and was a member of its decision-making body, the 20-man -
~ political bureau. This concern turned to alarm when Bourguiba saw Farhat
packing the congress with his own military men although the reports in the -
foreign press of abortive military coups were wild misrepresentations.
;
42
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOF.OFFICIAL USE ONLY
However, Bourguiba' a sudden flexing of semi-dormant political muscles
leaves unanswered the question: haw long will he be able to shaw he is
in control? The maj or question mark is over his health. Those at the
congress were astonished at how well and fit he iooked--but suspected -
he might well relapse in the next few months to take a back seat once
more.
Although Nouira--the star of the congress--was cut daan to size by the
removal of these key allies, this does not seem to have seriously compro-
mised his position as dauphin. Nor is there naw any obvious competitor
for this post, after the showdown of January 1978 which broke the back
of the main challenge to the Government, the Union Generale des Travailleurs
Tunisiens (UGTT) and led to the imprisonment of Habib Achour, darli~zg of
the doctrinaire opposition.
Nevertheless, though the odds are on Nouira taking pawer after Bourguiba
(largely because he was appointed by him) Tunisians point out that he can
never have the stature of the "supreme-combatant. He will, they say,
merely be the man agpointed Premier, and this will herald, rather than
end, political infighting.
Nouira described the congress to The Middle East as "a vital moment in
the history of the party"; he claimed in his 50-page, exhaustive speech
that the congress had discussed for the first time every aspect of
Tunisian life: politics, social affairs and economics. He pronounced
himself satisfied and claimed that the congress had "undoubtedly" helped
in directing the politically delicate transition to the future.
Muhammad Sayah, hardline head of the party's political bureau, also exuded
confidence with not a hint of his r.scent personal setback when he ~ust
scraped onto the list of the 80 e~ected to the central committee. He
insisted that the party had the active support of the people.
Nevertheless, his own setback, and that of a number of his allies who
failed to get elected at all, pointed to discontent in the party's ranks.
It suggested that Sayah's hardline approach was being challenged, while
the election of a number of unknown technocrats indicated that the rank
and file wanted to inject new blood and dynamism into a moribund party,
withering from lack of opposition.
If the rank and file felt unhappy, the tolerated opposition Social Democrat
Movement was still more unhappy. Ahmed Mestiri, the party~s head, professed
himself "very disappointed" by the congress--and added that this view was
not confined to his grouping. Mestiri was particularly bitter about the
tone of the seven-and-a-half-hour discourse by the Premier, which he
said "shut the door where the President had opened it." He said that most
key issues were not discussed at the congress at all. The Social Demo-
crats have decided to boycott the November elections.
43
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Certainly, the President's brief and cogent opening speech (which explicitly
praised Nouira for accomplishing his "immense task") ended with a call
for national unity. Nouira, on the other hand, made bitter reference to
the po?itical opposition and closed the door firmly on any extension of
influence beyond the confines of the party.
Although the congress had been expected to discuss in principle broad
questions relevant to Tunisia's future--such as the kind of society
Tunisia wants and the role of the individual in it as well as Tunisia's
role on the international stage--participants complained that, far from
being asked their opinions they were dictated to. Again, although Nouira's
new, more liberal approach to party politics won the day over Sayah's
hard line the limitations are still stifling. The feeling is of a
country which has outgrown its political institutions but is not offered
an alternative. Nor, while the President is still alive, is anyone
prepared to alter the system. True, for the first time candidates for
this month's election for the National Assembly can select 112 names from
a list of twice that number--but the extent of change this brings is
insignificant.
Although the Social Democrats say that continuing political restriction
and repression make violent political interference more likely--and they
hint at the army and Libya--the mood in Tunisia, apart from excitement
and political jockeying at the top, is surprisingly calm. The cafes and
pavements are full of people who talk freely, and the bourgeoisie exude
well-being and confidence.
Police activity is so discreet as to pass unnoticed and there is now
nothing to recall the events of January 1978 which led, according to
opposition estimates, to several hundred being killed in the rioting that
accompanied the general strike. The ominous "civilian service" work camps -
for unemployed youths organized by the Interior Ministry in the af termath
of January 1978 have all but lapsed, mainly because they were too expen- _
sive.
This debacle was the culmination of the campaign by the UGTT (which claimed
the support of 600,000 workers) to challenge the Government and install a
more radical political system. Its organization was as large as the
Government's own PSD--and a g~od deal more dynamic. In the event, owing
to a serious political miscalculation by its head, the veteran union
leader Habib Achour, the challenge was ove~come and the Government won
a resounding victory.
Hundreds of union militants and officials were imprisoned, mostly for
short periods. Although the majority have now been released (after some
had allegedly been tortured) the shock to a peaceful country like Tunisia
has acted as a deterrent to further attempts of this kind. Moreover,
although Habib Achour himself has been released (but is still under house
_ arrest~ other key leaders are still detained.
44
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I
The UGTT itself is now under the tame leadership of Ti~ani Abid (who told
The Middle East that the organization had not really changed--but was
merely no longer politicized) and there are even some strikes, but not for
overtly political reasons. However, the political will of the movement
was broken during "Bloody Thuraday" in 1978 and shows no signa of reviving. _
Tunisians eay many workera etill consider Habib Achour to be the true
union leader. But without the framework of the mass movement in which to
operate, pro-Achour workers are now quiescent and isolated. �
The crushing of the political union represented a triumph for the Govern-
ment. But the danger is that the elite may be leading the country along
a poli*_ical ~ul-de-sac. Although Nouira insisted to The Middle East that
the PSD responds to people's needs and is the "tdeal forum for ideas to be
expressed," and he explicitly rejected the need for a multiparty system,
few Tunisians really believe that the official party has much genuine
= support. In the countryside it is effective because it represents the
only organization there is and because peasants have learnt that playing
the political game results in benefits in the form of housing and loans.
Apart from the PSD, the Social Democrats, a tolerated reformist group, are
losing credibility. They have been badly overtaken by events (parti-
cularly the general strike) and hold little appeal for Tunisia's youth--
which makes up half the population. The movement's leadership is composed
entirely of former ministers who have little to offer in the way af an '
alternative prograuime--as Nouira poin*_ed out.
Nevertheless, they do represent an effective pressure group and 1'Errai
- and Democratie, their two permitted publications, are avidly read as the
only source of objective news since al-Chaab, the UGTT paper, was closed.
Further to the lef t is the clandestine opposition, represented by the pro- i
Soviet Tunisian Communist Party and Ahmed Ben Salah's Movement of Popclar
Unitq, most of whose support is outside the country. Ben Salah himself, j
responsible for the heavy collectivization of the 1960s, was recently
in Algeria, presumably canvassing support. Students support a number of '
left-wing movements, including a r4aoist group, but, apart from a number
of strikes at the university, they present no threat of real disruption.
Other figures from Tunisia's past are now trying to make a comeback in the ~
more favorable political atmosphere. Taher Belkhodja, former Minister of
the Interior, whose sacking in December 1977 by Bourguiba precipitated
- the resignations of half a dozen ministers, presented himself as a candi-
date at the recent congressional elections; the other ministers have been
consistently trying to return to political favor.
' The latest new voice, which surfaced some two years ago, is that of the '
Islamic revivalists, riding on the crest of the Iranian Khomeini wave.
Social pressures, notably unemployment, and the lack of relevant political
alternatives have revived Islam as a political as well as a religious
45
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
force. Mosques are crasaded with young people listening to frequently !
inflammatary speeches by yonng mullahs such as Ghoolbani. When former
Minister of Defense Abdallah Farhat cloaed some large mosques for "repairs"
devotees merely went to smaller moaques instead.
Although the movement has a good deal of influence, Tunisians say there is
no real parallel with Iranian events. The recent emergence of Islam,
in particular, indicates th~ pressures to which the regime is subject.
These are more social than political.
- Unemployment is the major preoccupation of the Tunisian leadership. The
problem is exacerbated by an excellent education system which leaves school
leavers unwilling to accept manual work or tasks they think are beneath
them. Nouira said that fully one-thtrd of the budget is devoted to educa-
tion--and two-thirds to social objectives--remarkable for a developing coun-
try of its relatively slender resources.
So far the country's economic performance has been impressive at about 6
percent growth a year obtained by a 3udicious blend of state intervention
and laissez-faire liberalism. However, prospects are likely to be
jeopardized by the enlargement of the European Economic Co~aunity and sub-
sequent loss of ma.rkets. This is also likely to entail further unemploy-
ment--mitigated at present by heavy emigration (itself indicative of the
problems).
The most successful area has been industrialization, the least successful
agriculture, where three years of drought has badly affected production,
notably of cereals. The aim is to balance farm trade by 1981, but this
looks optimistic.
The Government is certainly aware of the problems. In its own terms it has
clocked up impressive economic successes. Nouira himself believes the key
is employment--"which gives citizens dignity and frees them from falling
prey to foreign ideologies." However sincere this paternalistic view, it
leaves a number of questions unanswered. The observer ~s left with the
- feeling that however worthy the men who rule Tunisia are, they fail to
reflect or represent the aspirations of the masses. That the leadership
is of advanced age in a young country makes the problem greater.
Tunisia's role on the international stage remains that of a mediator--whether
over the Sahara or in the Middle East. It may be encouraged to play a more
active role here, as the headquarters of the Arab League was recently
moved to Tunis.
The only cloud on the horizon is its erratic neighbor Libya--although little
has been heard of Libyan involvement since the general strike, when Colonel
Qaddafi was believed by Premier Nouira and others to have been involved,
probably through Muhammad Masmoudi, former Foreign Minister and architect -
- of the disastrous attempted merger between Libya and Tunisia at D~erba in
1974. Masmoudi is now under house arrest. His chances of making a politi-
cal comeback are considered slim. _
~ 46. -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
Finally, for all the peace and calm now reigning in Tunisia, it is diffi- ~
cult to avoid the feeling that the malaise which produced the mass
support for the rash of strikes throughout 1977, culminating in the
abortive general strike of 1978, has not been resolved but merely swept
under the carpet. Even though there ie now no champion to lead such a
movement, it cannot be written off.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 I. E. Magazines Ltd.
CSO: 4420
i
i
~
i
i
'47 ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200034414-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ TUNISIA
PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES PSD CONGRESS, LABOR PROBLEMS, PLAN
London THE MIDDLE EAST in English Nov 79 p 48
[Text] The Tunisian Prime Minister, Hedi Nouira, has describ ed the
. recent lOth Congress of the ruling Parti Socialiste Destourien (PSD) ~
as a landmark in the history of the party and hinted that it has paved
the way for the post-Bourguiba period. In an interview with The Middle
East, he also spoke of the lessons drawn from the 1978 labor problems, the
success of the Five Year Plan and the emphasis being put on building up
new industries.
. What are the results of the tenth party congress? After a very exhaustive
study of economic, social and political developments, the party once again
endorsed the conduct of Tunisian affairs.
And what is the most vital aspect of Tunisian life? For me, without any
doubt, it is employment, because it represents man's dignity. Without it
he can be a prey to anyone and to an alien ideology. Tunisia's wealth
lies in its people--and education plays a vital role. We spend one-third
of our budget on education alone and two-thirds on purely social matters.
Does the new leadership of the UGTT embody the aspirations of the Tunisian
workers? Well, it has not changed any of its objectives like defending
workers' rights and fighting to improve their living conditions. But
there is a difference of substance. Instead of adopting what can be
described as a"conflict approach" to solve the problems, it is taking a
"participatory approach"--supported, it seems to me, by most of Tunisia's
workers.
Do you feel that the PSD, after 45 years of existence as Tunisia's sole
political party, is capable of facing Tunisia's political realities?
Undeniably. We are the only political group and political force capable
of developing the structures that make up Tunisian society at present.
This is mainly due to the fact that we are constantly in touch with the
country. We are the ideal platform for debating ideas and initiating
pro3ects, and we have the strength to car.ry them c?ut.
48
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
In your speech at the tenth congress you stressed that the people had
drawn certain lessons from the events of January 1978. Are you convinced
- that the circumstances that led to those events are no longer there?
Experience has now shown that we were a little unattentive. I think that
the conditions which led to the events were totally abnormal--nor were
they really Tunisian. There was very strong interference and we found
ourselves faced with an explosion.
What interference do you mean? This was fed by international pressure
groups which are just as virulent as multinationals.
_ What role did Libya play in this? All I can say is that it was involved.
, But do you think exploitation by Qutside groups was made easier by inter- -
nal conditions at the time? No doubt about that. Besides, the political
direction of the UGTT was far from that of national policy. But the atti-
tude of many of the people was influenced by foreign ideology.
Would you say the Five-Year Plan for social and economic development, now
in its fourth year, has been a success? We never said it was a success.
We have to wait until the f ive years are up. But it has not gone too
badly, given Tunisia's means. We have succeeded in overcoming the inter-
national constraints placed upon us. Many other countries, far better
endawed than us, have failed where we succeeded.
Which sector has been the most successful? Certainly industrialization.
The past two years have allowed the consolidation of the industrialization
process and the creation of industries which can absorb employment. Our
aim is the creation of employment.
But we do have problems, such as in the agricultural sector. Because
of the restrictions imposed by~our water resources, we are trying to
speed up our irrigation programme. Agriculture accounts for 20 to 24
percent of our GNP.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 I.E. Magazines Ltd.
CSO: 4420
CSO: 4420
49
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WESTERN SAHARA
SAHARAN WAR BDCOMLNG INCREASINGLY LARGE SCAI~E VENDETTA
Pa.ris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 24 Oct 79 pp 4~6-51
[Article: ~~The Big Blood I,etting"]
[Text] Morocco controls the urban centers. The POI,ISARIO
can travel anywhere but cannot establish itself in one
place. The war is becoming increasingly a lasge scale
vendetta.
The guerrilla wax taking place in the Western Sa,hara is a cuxious one.
Bringing 30,000 soldiers of the Roya1 Armed Forces [FAR] into combat with
4~,000 POLISARIO rebels~ it is both a tra.ditional and an original war. Tra-
ditional in tha.t, ~,s in a11 confrontat~ons of this kind, the insurgents have
the benefit of surprise. Original, first of a11 in tha,t it obeys secular
traditions of the region: the use of tribal rivalries between~ for
example, the Reguibat on the Algerian side and the Ait-Oussa on the Moroccan
side and of the technique of raids against cities and convoys. Apart
from the fact tha.t the d~uble tank Land-Rover has taken the place of the
camel with two humps. Origlnal also in that the civilian population con-
cerned is as physically divided as it is possiU].e to be.
As it should~ the POLISARIO swims "like a fish in the water,'~ according to
the sacred formula. But it has moved its bow~. into foreign territory, into
Algeria. Tha,t is good, because it makes a relative renewal of its strength
possible. But it is less good in tha,t it deprives it of a ma3or asset in
any guerrilla warfare: to be present within the enemy citadel.
In this regaxd~ the land and the numerical weakness of the people (a total
of 56,000 individuals) work in favor of Morocco. Morocco has exploited
them thoroughly: the settlement pxocess accompanied by numerous social
and ma,teri~l ad.vantages a1~.ows it to control the Sa,hrawis and to offer
them better guarantees of security at the sa,me time. Unlike regulax axmies
which have ha,d to suppress guerrilla movements, the Moroccan army dQes not
move in a politically hostile environment. Neither does it fight on com-
pletely unknown terrain. Set up in special units or dispersed, 5,000
Sa.hrawis (the figure is higher than the numbers of the FOLISARIO) axe
fighting in the ranks of the FAR. They know the terrain as well as their
50
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200034414-1
~ I
~I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
adversaxies a.nd a,re experienced in the same battle techniques. They give
the soldiers and officers from the north the benefit of their knowledge. -
This is a very important card which Morocco has not yet played~ "When we
receive the order~" a Moroccan officer told us~ "we will be able to return
blow for blow~ using the same methods~ on Algerian cerritory."
Blow For Blow
All these "constraints~~ give the first modern guerrilla war in the desert
its particular color. The POLISARIO cannot set as its goal the progressive
- '~liberation~~ of the territory it claims. One does not liberate completely
empty stretches of stor.es and sand. If it were to cor~sider setting up a
fixed ba,se, it would be exposed to certain destruction. It can at most
occupy a point long enough to hold a press conference.
Thus, the POLISARIO can circulate in cc~mplete peace, but cannot settle any-
where. Obviously, the FAR cannot control a 200,000 sc~uare kilometer desert.*
~ Even if they could do it, the cost of it would be exorhitant in relation
_ to the possible results. The Moroccan military philosophJ is primarily
_ inspired by the anti-submarine combat of World War II. It is as useless
to look for a POI,ISARIO column in the desert as for a submaxine in the
ocean. To seal off the Algerian border would not serve any purpose as the
POLISARIO would then qu3.etly pass t:~rough the northern part of Ma11 and ~he
Mauritanian border. There is not a varisty of solutions~ but only one: to
draw a net around the choice targets of the adversazy the ha,rbor in one
_ case, the agglo~erations in the other and to do their best to protect
the convoys. The military protection of urba.n centers such as Seguia el
Hanra-E1 Aioun, Smaxa, Boujdour, Guelta, etGetera~ is remarkahly effective.
All of them ase surrounded by a"security belt" with an average 30 kilometer
radius which makes them safe from the medium ran~e weapons of the POLISARIO.
A belt, which is made up of posts separated by mine fields, studded with
electronic gadgets including radas which automatically regulate and command ~
_ the firing of cannons wi~h lethal precision. As a matter of fact, every ,
_ time the POLISARIO announces that it ha.s attacked a city, it means that it ,
has tried to attack posts in the security belt~ which it has never managed
_ to cross. It always gets caugYit in a net made of very tight mesh. This
_ was the case in Boujdour in Ju~ly 1978, arid in ~L Aioun in June 1979~ where,
contrary to its claims, the POLISARIO did not succeed as I have been
able to observe in dama~ing, and even less in destroying the harbor.
These failures axe a11 the more frustrating as the future of the guerrilla
warfare depends on its ability to hit the urban centers. Because the
~ objectives of guerrilla warfare axe more political than militaxy: to sow ;
insecurity in the civilian population to prove that the authorities are
incapable of protecting them a,nd to achieve a glorious feat which might ~
mobilize the sympathies of international put~ic opinion~ ~
270,000 square kilometers when Tiris el-Ghaxbia is included.
51
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
. It is undoubtedly in order to compensate for its failurea in that part of
the Sahara, which was ceded back to Morocco by Spain in 1975, tha.t the
POLISARIO ha.s cancentrated its attacks since the beginning of this year on
agglomerations located in "uncontested territory~" according to the official
Moroccan terminology: Tan Tan~ south of Agadir, and Assa in the east. Even
though the scope of these raids has been greatly exaggerated, it is unques-
tionahle tha.t the POLISARIO has scored diplomatic points~ But~ now tha.t
the first effect of surprise has been digested, the FAR ha.s begun to com-
plete its response to the raids in areas which had been poorly defended.
POLISARIO Victim of Exaggerations
The first attack on Tan Tan took place on 28 January 1979� At 1330 hours~
the first wave of a column of 60 to 100 jeeps reached the suburbs of the
city where, as a ma.tter of fact, the ma,~.n bar~racks are located. The fighting
continued until 1500 hours. The POLISARIO commaxido never succeeded in
penetrating the heart of the city. An electric power station was daana,ged. E-
Only the two huge concrete ca.mels, which mark the entrance to the city~
- still bare traces of the fighting on 28 January. ~
Since then, the POLISARIO has tried three times to penetrate Tan Tan, but
each time it was stopped more than 30 kilometers from the city. The raid
~ of 27 June was paxticulaxly important. A POLISARIO personality, Soued Ould
Seghier, lost his life to it. The target of the commando was the harbor,
which a French company is completing. The rebels undoubtedly intended a
� repeat performa,nce of Zouerate by kidna.pping foreign technicians. Contrary
to its statements, the PULISARIO d,amaged neither the harbor nor the airport~
as I was able to see a few days later. Numerous indications lea,d one to
think tha': ,~he leadership of the POLISARIO is itself the victim of the
exaggerations of its fighters... The costly and repeated attacks on Tan `
Tan which is~ moreover, reputed to be poorly defended prove the
obvious fact that the goal which is being pursued is to reach minds inside
as well as outside Morocco.
The deadly raid, at the beginning of June, on the sma11 locality of Assa
in the area of Goulimine was intended to produce the rallying, or
at least the collaboration ~f the tribes (Ait-Oussa~ of a paxticularly
underprivileged region.
The Moroccan army has neither the means nor the manpower to enclose the
cities and villages of the south and east with security belts compaxable
to those which it ha,s set up in the "contested" Sahara. If it were to do ~
this, it would fulfil ~he wishes of the POLISARIO and Algerian strategists
who would like to immobilize it in passive defense ta,sks. Furthermore~
this would imply an impossible settlement of the nomads and the grouping
together of the inhabitants of the scarcely populated villages. Finally,
- ihe layout of the land, which is more uneven, allows for a more mobile
defense . -
52
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The establishment of an airtight belt like the one around Smara, which is
locatad on flat land, ia leae ~uatified for Tan Tan where the surrounding
area consists of ridges~ which facilitate surveillance and the estahlishment
of limited crossing points.
In the Tan Tan region~ a buffer province between the north and the extreme
south, the army plays a more dynamic role with less ma.npower than elsewhere.
There is no need at a11 for the security belt here to be airtight and con-
tinuous. Numerous posts with only a few men, which are visible along the
road to the harbor or to the airport~ are primaxi.ly intended to prevent ,
individual infiltrations. The key element for the protection of the city
remains the "shock troop" (a reinforced 300 man platoon). I encountered
one on manoeuvres around Tan Tan. They bear an uncanny resemblance to the
idea or the image one might have of a POLISARIO commando. '
Largely Autonomous Units
The majority of them axe Saharan males. Their faces wrapped in bl.ack
scarves, they have the same equi.pment: Land-Rovers equipped with mortars,
heavy or light macY~ine guns, double barrelled guns and radios. Having been -
trained in the same comba.t techniques as the POLISARIO, the FAR commandos
axe capable of fighting for 6 hours rdithout resupplying, of covering 400
kilometers or of patrolling alone for 6 days.
In addition to ensuring the defense of Tan Tan, these very mobile commandos
go to the aid of convoys and posts under attack. They frequently intervene
in other sectors~ pushing out as fax as Smasa. "We have only two regrets~"
a captain told me. "The first is the intervention of our air force whi.ch
sometimes deprives us of our prey, and the second is not to be able to
operate in Algeria." The commando group he belongs to intervened 29 times
in 6 months and suffered only 2 deaths. It is true tha.t the morale in the
mobile units is incompaxably higher than in the permaner.t posts. This is ,
probably why soldiers stationed in the latter have received permission to ~
leave their shelters to go and meet the rebel units, while waiting to be
rel~eved by reinforcements.
Defend L~ncontested Provinces
~ M~re to the east, on the side of the Algerian border, the reorganiza.tion
of the defan~g structure involves a more spectacular element: the arming ,
of paxt of the civilian population. Even though it had been rejected for
a long time, the measure was taken following the atta,ck at the beginning
- of June, of which the small city of Assa was the victim. Mr Bensouda,
~ councilor to the king~ who came to enquire as to the needs of the people~
- was told: "We want to meet with the king." Hassan II received a delega-
tion from the city of Assa in the presencP of the members of the National
Security Council. The substance of wha,t the delegates said to him was: ~
"We gladly accept the economic sacrifices imposed on us by the state of '
war of. our country. But at least we want to have weapons to defend our ;
lives and our property." Hassan II agreed. Immediately, a distribution I
53 ~
FOR 4FFiCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
of light weapons to paxt of the population was organized accompanied by
rudimentary training. In a,d.dition, the armed men have been entrusted with
the mission of providing information about possible enemy movements in the
area. The measure will be generalized only if the aituation requires it.
This~ together with the proclama,tion of a atate of alert at the border~ is
a step toward a general confrontation with Algeria.
The new structure should, in the eyes of the officers of the FAR, protect
the "uncontested" provinces from large scale raids like the one of 28 January
' on Tan Tan or of June on Assa. "Of cnurse," one high ranking officer t~old
me~ "we are not excluding minor actions against sma11 groups of isolated
civilians." As we were driving peacefully towaxd Agadir, we were surprised
to discover that night travel between Goulimine and Tan Tan was prohibited.
To avoid the taking of hostages, which would be embaxrassing to Morocco,
foreigners no longer ha.ve the right to travel south of Goulimine. Thus,
paradoxically, it is the agglomeratioMS in the provinces which were "recovered"
in 1975~ which are best protected.
The deadly attacks, which took place last August, on Bir Enzaxan and
Lebcuirate prove tha.t the security of the south-eastern provinces~ within
the former borders~ ha,s not yet been ensured. The lessons to be drawn f`rom
these two operations axe not identical. In the first case one cannot spea.k
of a POLISARIO victory as the Moroccan army resisted while outnumbered seven
to one. The second case wa,s unquestionably a military victory for the
POLISARIO. But one question arises: how can a guerrilla movement of 4~000
combatants mobilize 3,000 of them For each of these two operations? One
will have to wait to find out if the FAR will succeed in finding a response
to massive attacks where they are numerically inferior.
_ Defensive Mission
One can easily ima,gine tha,t life in the Sahara would be impossihle without
the regular provision of supplies to the people and the isolated militaxy
posts. In the most out of the way places, even water must be transported. -
And nothing is more vulnerable than a line of trucks on a road. A few
isolated and camouflaged jeeps on a hill can direct deadly fire. And the
_ FOLISARIO does not fail to do this. Military convoys, which do not ha,ve to
use the roads and which can progress in a way ad.apted to the terrain, are
obviously less vulnerable than the civilian convoys. A convoy of 150 trucks,
following each other at intervals of 200 meters, along a ma,in road is spread
out over 30 kilometers: It constitutes an ideal taxget, in spite of the
military protection it ma.y enjoy.
However, the draconian measures which have just been taken limit the risks
_ considerably. Roads axe used only as a last recourse. The ma,ritime link
between Agadir and II Aioun is given maximum use. Helicopters and the more
expensive C-130 transport planes axe used as ba.ck-up means. A Puma ensures
the civilian link between F1 Aioun and Boujdour. The transportation of
useless merchandise, such as television sets, hi-fi systems and fabrics,
from II Aioun toward the northern part of the country seems to have been
54
FOR OFFICIAL USE OI3LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
' prohibited. Finally, the size of the convoys, in terms of the number of
trucks, has been increased with a reduction of their frequency.
Together with attacks on citiea and convoys~ the harassing of posts consti-
tutes the third type of action by the POLISARIO. The isolated and irregular
firing of shells, at a distance of some 10 kilometers~ causes more noise
than damage. They hit only by a miracle~ Their psycholigical effect ha,s
_ been reduced. They no longer even interrupt the soldiers' card games. r
_ Thus, the primary objective of the Roya1 Armed Forces is to defend the civi-
lian population~ the reliability of normal life and the regional exploita-
tion operations. Their mission is essentially, but not solely~ defensive.
POLISARIO Strategy ~
The army conducts combing operations. Thus, Colonel Oujami.'s 6th Regiment,
ma,de up of elite soldiers and officers, continuously crisscross the Sahara.
Its missions could last as long as a month. It covers 1,000 to 2,000 kilo-
meters per week. The movement of 3,000 men with their hundreds of vehicles
(Land-Rovers, trucks, light axmored cars} is particulaxly impressive. A
certain permissiveness in their appearance which is not much tolerated
elsewhere hair worn long, the traditional black scarf over the fa,ce~
grumbling and the franI~ess of relationships~ indicates that these heroes
of inechanized Westerns are far removed from the civilized life of the
ba,rracks or of the staff headqua.rters. Yet~ the 6th Regiment has never~
not ever, met a single rebel during its combing operations. The POLISARIO
avoids and this is in the nature of guerrilla warfare any contact
with the operating uni~s. Could the combings be useless? They often make
it possible to find caches and to seize food and ammunition in them. They ~
_ familiarize the men with the terrain~ fQSter a fighting sp3,~it and~ finally,
hinder the movements of the POLISARIO. If these advantages are important, ~
they are not a determining factor in the eyes of some officers. The cost ~
in equipment would be exhorbitant compaxed to~the results~ There is little ;
proba.bility tha.t the more mobile hunting commando groups, which were recently i
set up, will ha.ve better results. When a11 is said and done, and contrary ;
to what is often said, the Moroccan army has the situation well under control, '
but at a relatively substantial price in loss of human lives. Until last ~
August, the estima,ted number of dead per month could be set at 40. Following
Bir Enzaxan and Lebouirate, the monthly average has certairLly gone beyond
the 100 mark. At least for the year 1979~ The FAR axe facing an enemy ,
which is becoming more seasoned as the yeaxs go by; the scattered and dis- ;
organized attacks of earlier times ha,ve been succeeded by raids conducted
according to the rules.
An important POLISARIO operation, such as an attempted attack on a city, !
might require a month of prepaxation. To organize the logistics of some
100 jeeps, with 300 to 400 men, who ha.ve to live in the desert while awaiting ~
~he right moment, is not an easy thing to do. One must pick out the rendez- ~
vous places, stock the caches with gasoline, a.mmunition, powdered milk~ dried '
meat and water. Raids ~~sually taka place at dawn and preferably under '
55 ~
FOR OI'FICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
overcast skies to prevent the intervention of the air force. The commando
is divided into three groups. The first, referred to as the attack group,
tries to b~eak down the Moroccan posts by surprise. The jeeps arrive in
scattered order and regroup only in front of the objective.
Well Armed Guerrillas
As a general rule, this first group knows that it will encounter a resis-
tance which will compell it to retreat. But it is an offensive retreat
which consists in luring the pursuers to a place where the second group,
. referred to as the fa11 back group, is waiting for them. After having
fought, this group in turn tries to lure them toward an ambush prepaxed by
a third group, referred to as the collection group. The three groups fa11
back while changing positions and exchanging their roles. They are served
by a knowledge of the terrain which allows them to keep the initiative,
even during the withdrawal. One of the concerns of the Moroccan officers
is to be able to cut off the retreat of the POLISARIO in places which the
FAR has chosen.
Spread out over some 20 kilometers or more, the jeeps of these three groups
are not easily destroyed. The Moroccan F5s can intervene only when the sky
is clear. As a matter of fact, the POLISARIO has at its d3sposal SAM 7
rockets, with a 2,000 meter range, which requires that Moroccan planes
intervene in groups of two. While the first pilot goes into a dive over
the enemy, the second flies at a high altitude to tei.l his comrade to
cleax out as soon as.he sees the chaxacteristic white trail of the SAM 7.
It is the general opinion that the officers of the POLISARIO have made a
great deal of progress in taking advantage of the terrain. Their mobility
forces the Moroccan troops to use light equipment which, with the exeeption
of the AML (light axmored caxs~, is inferior to tha,t of their adversaries.
- The POZISARIO has light Russian arms of the very latest make at its disposal,
- supplied by Libya. Its jeeps draw ?5 millimeter guns or carry Stalin organs,
rocket launchers with a 22 kilometer range~ very deadly 23 millimeter double
barrelled anti-aircraft s, 14~.5 machine guns~ anti-aircraft SAM 7s,
Kalashnikov rifles, RPG Rocket propelled grenade] 7 ba.zo.okas, capable of
da.ma.ging a blockhouse, etcetera. It would be hasd for the M~roccans to do
better, except for having greater range of fire. It is not a minor paxadox
of this confrontation that the regulax army and the guerrillas fight with
more or less equal arms and that, at least at the beginning of the raid,
the latter dispose of a numerical superiority~ Confrontations raxely last
- more than 4~ hours. Then the members of the commando group scatter in order
to regroup at their rendezvous locations. The POLISARIO makes life difficult
for the FAR. But, baxring exceptions such as at Lebouirate, it is difficult
for the POLISARIO to be victorious in these raids against the defenses of
the Sahrawi cities. At each confrontation, the Moroccan troops put one-third
to one-half of the ma,npower and equipment of the enemy commando out of
commission.
56
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
War Reconversion
Certain Moroccan officers believe that the POLTSARIO is being carried along
in a developmental logic of its operational units which has been experienced
by other guerrilla movements before it. The more it ac~pts the character-
istics of a regulax army, the more important its logistic needs will become
and the more vulnerable it will become. The ba,ttles of Bir Enzasan and
Lebouirate ha,ve~ for the moment, proven the opposite. It is well known
that armies prefer traditional wars... The Moroccan army is no exception.
At the beginning of the conflict it was psychologically poorly prepared to _
fight a guerrilla war. Life in isolated posts, under a blazing sun, without
water in abundance~ is trying for the strongest nerves.
Army Adapta.tion to Desert
To spend 3 to 4 yeaxs in a row in a"hole" (with no leaves) while awaiting
an unpredictable enemy atta.ck, with no other information than wha,t is broad-
cast by the Algerian radio or the rumors sometimes peddled by soldiers on
leave, does not lift the morale of the troops. Especially when certain
officers, who were ill prepared for life in the field and for the direct
command of troops, lived in ostc:t'~.cacious comfort. Things have changed a
great dea1. First of a11, there was the appointment of Colonel Major Ab~ouk
to the position of chief of staff of the southern front. A fellow graduate
of Colonel Major Dlimi, this Berber Y�arri or from the Middle Ai~.l.as, who was
- trained at the War School in Paxis, is evidently more at ease in the field
than in his office. Ta11, balding and with constantly smiling eyes, this
50 year old man hides a great determina,tion under his ~~,ppearance of a 3ovial
peasant or a good family man. He exercises a quiet authority and a na.tural
influence over his subordina,tes. While director of the Military Academy
in Meknes~ he developed the general training program for student officers.
He had distinguished himself by his max~ner, both firm and liberal~ of
exercising his comman~. He has not changed. Obeyed without servility~ he
apparently holds open house for his officers in fl. Aioun. Colonel Ma,jor
Al~ouk likes to talk and joke, but he reveals little about himself or about
the war he is waging.
He has introduced an information policy for the troops with regard to the
war, which does not hide (all?) the losses on the Moroccan ~ide but which
has served to lift their morale. Being aggressive, he cultivates the
fighting spirit of his officers and his troops. Colonel Major Ab~ouk in-
augurated his command by evacua,ting points where there was no civilian
population, such as Guelta, Hagounia and Amgala. Which caused the POLISARIO
to say that they ha.d liberated them... Nevertheless, the FAR continue to
occupy strategic points even when they are depopulated. On the other hand,
the sorties seem to ha,ve become more numerous.
More or less at the same time as Abrouk's appointment, the officers who
exhibited little taste for the wax and life in the desert were "repatriated"
to the north. Their replacements seem to exhibit a greater rea,diness to
57
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
fight, Well fed~ impeccably dressed, meticulously maintaining their
basracks and their equipment~ the FAR show signs of a developed army. The
field officers up to the rank of colonel live and fight with their -
soldiers. They show concern for the ~rell being of their troops and willinly
admit to being sparing of human lives. Soldiers like the officers
receive double pay in the Sahara. But 6 months in the desert~ without
leave~ is rather unbeaxable. Maybe leaves will become more frequent. Life
at the posts is certainly not pleasant; alerts, more often false than rea1~ ,
during the day as well as at night, are hard on the nerves. The fact tha.t
the soldiers grumble does not mean that they revolt. Proof of this lies -
in the courage and the readiness to fight with which, as a rule~ they conf`ront
- the POI,ISARIO. Their patriotic motivation is surprising for a regulas army.
It is no lesG true, however, tnat the Moroccan army is suffering from the
faults of its model, the F`rench army. The morale of the troops would un- _
doubtedly be better if the bureaucratic slotmess, the bureaucratic absurdities
were to be ended.
War widows often have to wait a yeax before receiving their pensions. The
newly promoted have to wait as long to get their salaries ac~justed. And
at the sa,me time, the money does exist and the recalled soldiers axe always
paid; but, payment is made in Rabat... One Casablanca family found out
' 3 weeks late and by accident about the death of one of its members at the
front: Officers and soldiers in the field do not put up well with having
to fill out repair forms for the slightest hreakdown of a vehicle...
The morale of the officers is high. But the ma.jority of them are somewhat
mortified at having to carry out what they call "gendarmerie operations,"
while they dream of doing ba,~tle with Algeria. "Our problem," one colonel
told us, "is no longer to defend ourselves, but to revenge ourselves."
This state of mind does not fail to affect the handling of the war. Also,
many officers believe that it is not very profitable, in terms of inen and
equipment, to pursue isolated POLISARIO jeeps. As fax as they are concerned,
only war against Algeria will bring an end to the war against the POLISARIO. -
Spectre of Wax ~
While regular axmies have a tendency to underes~ima,te the importance of their
equipment, many high ranking Moroccan officers believe, as a colonel told
us, "that to refer to the inad.equacy of the FAR in terms of equipment~ is
a pretext not to wage wax. Since 1976 we have been saying that the conf'~ict -
must be transferred onto enemy territor,y. If it were not fur the king's
policy of peace, I would long ago have moved on Algeria." For a11 of them,
it is absolutely inconceivable that Morocco would give up an inch of terri- ~ -
tory. Convinced that Algeria is using the Sahrawi cause as a pretext to
bring �'Morocco to its knees," many of them believe tha,t, peaceful solution _
or not, "it will in any case be necessaxy to teach Algeria a lesson."
58
FOR GFF'ICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1
I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
"We ha.ve been bl.ed hrhite," one colonel said to me. We have every interest
in wa,ging war with Algeria to show it tha.t if it does not accept the fact _
of our two countries staying afloat, then we will sink together~"
F`rom this point of view, a draw no officer hopes for this any longer
would be a victory for Morocco. While awaiting for the big settling of
scores, the Moroccan officers believe tha,t limited reprisal actions on
- Algerian territory would not necessarily result in a generalized response
from the enemy. One thing is certain: tightly compressed, like a spring~
Ha.ssan II's army will inflict pain when it is released.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Af`rique~ GRUPJIA 1979 ~
~3 Ertn
CSO: 4~00 _
~
. ~
~
i
59
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200030014-1