JPRS ID: 8792 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4
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APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000200020058-4 i979 i. i i OF i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 - ~ FOR OFFIC'IAI. USE ONLY = JPRS L/8792 30 November 1979 - ~ ~ SUb-Sahc~ran Africa Re ort p F~OUO No. 657 - ~ - ~ . ~ FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 NOTE - JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspap~rs, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material encl.osed in brackets a~e supplied by ~PRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] _ or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. ' Unfami?iar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are = enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. - Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item ori~inate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publicati~n in no way represent the poli- cies, views or at.titudes of the U. S. Government . For further information on report content call (703) 351-2833 lNear East); 351-2501 (Iran, Afghanistan); 351-3165 (North - Africa) . COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERLALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY JPRS L/8792 30 November 1979 SUB-SA~~ARAN A~RICA REPORT FOUO No. 657 . - CONTENTS PAGE _ INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS - Soviet Presence in Africa Reported (Jean Cau; PARIS-MATCH, Z2 Oct 79) 1 Briefs ' Guineans in Gabon 7 - - ANGOLA Briefs Reactivatiun of Agricultural Sector 8 - CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC ~ _ Central African Affairs Now Matter of French Internal Politics ' (Jean-Louis Buchet; JEL~NE AFRIQUE, 17 Oct 79)........ 9 Former Prime Minister Patasse Returns Home - (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 Oct 79)..... 12 Briefs Arrests, Housz Arrests 13 CONGO - New Offshore Oit Deposits Discovered - (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 Oct 79)..... 14 Briefs - Educational Cycles 15 ONPT Embezzlements 15 - a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO] ` FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 cv~ VL'1'1~.11iL u~r. viri.~ - CONTENTS (Continued) Page EQUATORIAL GUINEA Authorities Faced by Need To Restore Cconomy (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 Oct 79)...~ 16 s Briefs New President Sworn In 18 French Minister's Visit 18 _ Delegation Seeking Soviet Debt Repayment 19 Aid fc�r Refugees Requested 19 - GABON ~ Briefs ! - French Agricultt:ral Loan 20: ~ ~ _ uUINEA BISSAU ~.~~j Briefs ~ - _ Inaugur~tion o` AutomobilQ Plant 21 . IVORY COAST - Briefs Goverament Staffers Quit ZZ Naval Academy 22 KENYA - President Nfa.intains Effective Political Apparatus - (MARCHES TROPiCAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 O~t 79).... 23 ' Briefs ~ Bricish riission Studyi_ng Agriculture 25 Danish Technical Assistance 25 UK Aid Agreement 25 LIBERIA Briefs Projects With France, Austria 26 MADAGASCAR - Briefs - MiG-21's in Air Force 27 - b - . - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI.Y _ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CONTENTS (Continued) Page MAURITIUS Mid-August Riots Seen as Setback for PMSD, Owners (Herve-Masson; AFRIQliE-ASIE, 15 Oct 79) 28 NA1~B IA Briefs Additional Reinforcements 32 NIGER Results of President's Trip to West Africa (i~1ARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 Oct 79).... 33 'Society of Development' Has Good Chances of Success - (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 Oct 79).... 35 Briefs New Uranium Company 37 French Aid to Stockraising 37 RHODESIA Conduct of All-Party Talks in London Examir.ed - (Basil Davidson; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 1-14 Oct 79)......... 38 SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE . Causes of Public, Political Unrest Analyzed (MARCH~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Oct 79)..... 41 SENEGAL , Senghor Denounces Situation of Public Enterprises (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 Oct 79).... 45 Government To Pursue Economic Recovery Program (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 Oct 79).... 47 Briefs ~ Senghor, Premier on Political Parties 48 Schedule of Cabinet M~etings 48 Solar Pump 49 Maritime Transport Company 49 - c - ~ FOR OFFICIAL IISE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ CONTENTS (Continued) Page SIERRA LEONE Briefs FIDA Loan 50 TANZANIA ' ~ - Party To Control Municipalities (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 Oct 79).... 51 Jumbe Presents Constitution for Zanzibar, Pemba ~ (MARCHES TROPI~AUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 Oct 79)... 52 � Briefs j Zanzibar Constitution Adopted 55 ~ Minister's Visit t~ Paris 55 i Aid to Petroleum Exploration 56 ; M,3dibira Rice Project 56 SIDA-Financed Water Supply Studies 56 UGANDA Economic Situation Continues To Deteriorate (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, I~ Oct 79).... 58 ' Briefs Repatriation From Libya 60' - Exiled Students 6J UPPER VOLTA - Briefs President Warns About Labor Strikes 61 N~~w Dam at Webdila 61 ~ ' - d - - FOR OFFICIAL iISE ONLY ~ - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS ~ SOVIET PRcSENCE IN AFRICA REP!1RTED Paris PAR(S-MATCH in French 12 Oct 79 pp 60-63 /Article by Jean Cau: "Moscow's Hour Has Come in Africa"% %Text/ David Dacko is already starting to be criticized, ~ Ange Patasse has perhaps made a mistake by retreati~ig to . - Libya. In Central Africa where the race to succeed Bokassa is still open, people are talking more and mo!-e of Abel Goumba, a doctor formerly exiled by Dacko. Ar+d _ Goumba, he is Russia's man. Now in Brazzaviile, now in � Cotonou, he is waiting for his time. The Soviets are already in Bangui with 150 "diplomats." Aided by the _ East Germans and the Cubans, they are sFreading their red scarf that will complete~ly engulf Africa. These ~ _ p3ges show Bangui rejoicing af'ter the fall of Bokassa. _ But Jean Cau will tell you the story of the relentless development of the Soviet strategy. A"chef d'oeuvre." In his Caravelle, pinned down under the Normandy sky, the Emperor, a black fish in a steel bowl, went round in circles and did not understand. In his - guarded residence in ivory Coast, militarily surrounded, the former einperor is bored to death and does not understand, ~Jot only did France throw him ~ off his throne but has also refused him the right to stay and the right of asylum. He takes stock. Never did he touch a single hair of any of the thousands of French cooperants /French military draftees serving overseas in - civilian capacity/ living in Central Africa. Never did he nationalize, expropriate, or control so as to make life unbearable,�any of the French - companies and enterprises that prospered in his empire, Never did he attack "neocolonialism" and listen to the sirens of Moscow or Navana. He drinks? But Churchill and Stalin were not abstem:ous. He an emperor? But - Brezhnev is a marshal who awards himself major prizes for literature, and G reat Britain is a kingdom. He filled his pockets to bursting and taought - himself gold-knobbed walking sticks, watches, cF~ateaus? But in Africa a = - poor emperor is inconceivable, and wF~at would they have preferred? That he gave his money to subversive terrorist organizations inste~d of amassing it - in his coffers? He is accused of having killed children and adolescerts, = 1 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY o APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 I~OIt ~i~Fi(:TAI, US1: (1NI.Y But who threw them into the streets to start a war againsi: i~~!n, and who has not massacred, abominably, in Africa, Asia, the Near East, rec.en?:ly in Algeria, and formerly in Europe? And why did his "pare,nt," the president of the French Republic, come so often to hunt in his empire? And why has "Amnesty International" not produced such overwhelming rF;ports on what is ~ happening in other African states~ of one allegiance or another? From Addis Ababa to C~nakry, going through Kinshasa, what a tremendous trail of bload: - And forgotLen Biafra And France, which supported him so much, has ~ thrown him out, he and his !_egion of Honor, won on a military level. It is - totally impossible to unde;stand, thinks Bokassa, the former emperor of Ce~itral Africa, Witn a truly agonizing ignorance of ceremonies and myths, people have e~~en gone so far as to accuse him of eating human flesh, as thaugh he were accustomed to getting up in the nigf~t, opening E~is refrigerator and saying, while rubbing his hands: "Good; I am hungry and I will have some missionary steak tartare:" As though cannibalism, when it is ~ractised, is not an ~ infinitely serious act stamped with a mystery that overwhelms the initiate, ' Yes, to be sure, as though one said of a CE~ristian *hat he swallowed his ; bowl of eucharis~ every morning mixed with cornfla~es, 0, barbaric ignorance of Africa, ~f its sacred things and its terrors; There must perF~aps be-- there is no mistake about it-^a snag in this whole story and perhaps some = backstage scenes behind this stage where fie so br~rliantly played his role . of Ubu before getting tomatoes ti~rown at him today. ~ Supermuscular Cooperants What backstage scenes? Who is pt~owling around there? What play was really being acted (and still is) w[~ile Jean-Baptiste de La Salle (sic; thence B.d.l., thence Bedel) Bokassa was pl~ying the fool in front of the footlights? Who are the 3ctors? Wf~at will bp the ending? The former emperor does not un.derstand. Let us help him to see m~re clearly. Here on a table is an unfolded map of Africa. In the center, the former empire. In it~ ~he capital, Bangui. But, - - with the aid of a magnifying glass, what can we see, along the rivt~r~ in this capital? What is this enormous building~ which looks like a fortress, with the concrete barely dry? Is it an austere palace or the headquarters _ of a cempany with innumerable branc!~es? No, it is c~uite simply the new Soviet embassy, so fill~d with "diplomats~' tE?at one could truly ~elieve that Moscow considers Bangui a metropolis of the greatest magnitude and Central Africa a state of the greatest importance w(~ere 150 "diplomats" are not too - many to understand its business and policy. ~ However, let us remove the magnifying glass~ let us consider the map again, and let us draw back the immense, red scarf across the middle of it. It starts from Ethiopia where tf~e Soviet general Borissov~~s CP is installed, He is the highest leader of military operations on the wF~ole continent, from Addis Ababa, capital of a state that is now f~eld under the grasp of - 2 . FOR OFFICIE.L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - 1?_,000 Soviets, Cubans~ and East Germans. The planes, 60 ~'Mig 21's~' and F- 2U "Mig 17's", as well as the tanks (T34 and T54) and the ground-air missiles "SA-7", serve as a spearhead for these supermuscled "cooperants" who have under their orders an army and a militia of i40~000 men. The aeronaval base at Aden, on the other side of the stra~ts, serves as a "lung": 6,000 Soviets, Cu(~ans, and East Germans are not teing idle there. From this Ethiopia (and its carefully watched Somalian flank), the scarf unfolds in the direction of Tanzania, where the port of Dar es Salaam, on . the coast of the Indian Ocean, sees unloaded with the regularity of a chain pump thousands of tons of weapons and Soviet equipment spewed up out ' of the bellies of cargo ships from Odessa. Then the scarf goes down further south and spreads into Zambia and Mozambique. In the first of these states ' 6,000 Cubans (with "T54" tanks and much mobile artillery), to whom are added close to 200 East German specialists, keep up an incessant coming and 1' going between Zambia and Tanzania, where they control the airports. As for ; Mozambique, it is watched over by 2,00 East German and Cuban "expe rts." An Iron Belt Around Zaire Leaving the Red Sea, the scarf unfolds further and reaches the Atlantic, , without a single hitch, at Angola, Things are crowded in this country, There are 25,000 Cu6ans spread out in two divisions (one in charge of partitioning, "pacification" and surveillance of the 14 aerodromes and i communication routes; the other, a sF~ock^troop operation with armored tanks ~ trucks, and missiles, to whicF~ are added three transportation regiments), These troops, very well trained and over-disciplined in the Soviet-Prussian style, have--as a minimum estimate to this date-~a huge supply of equipment, including 200 T54 and T34 tanks; 120 ligE~t amphibian PTi6 tanks; 1~200 armored reconnaissance vefiicles; 400 antiair missiles mounted on armored vehicles (ZSU57 and ZSU23.~j; 200 tr~~ck~ with multibarreled rocket launchers called "Stalin's organs"; 250 ampf~ibian armored personnel carriers (Btr 50, and so on~; not forgetting "Mig 21" bomber figf~ters and "Mig 17~' fighters _ by the dozen, thousands of transport trucks~ pyramids of logistical basic _ equipment, and repair, installation, and liaison services, and so on, , (In Angola alone; As a comparison~ France has 700 tiny paratroops in Bangui.) Czechoslovakians and East Germans are in charge of maintenance, radar, radios and tF~e strict duties of police and education, Close to 400 KGB agents, 700 Soviet officers, and 10 generals cap the lot, In Teixera ~ de Souza, on the Zambian border, the CP of the East harbors generals Krupchenko, Paramonov, Koncharko~ and East German General Tenen; in Lubango generals OdaneSSian, Kodan~ and Zabutrov command the CP of the south; in the north, in Uige, General ChatchPnko is thf: boss of the military base; finally, in the capital its~lf~ in Luanda~ Gener Chakf~anovich~ flanked by generals Petrov and Trosnekov, is the head of the Angolan military mission. 1~1hat is fascinating is tE~at the scarf then climbs up to the north~ toward Congo, where in the enclave of Cabinda, 4,OQ0 overarmed Cubans are under the orders of Soviet General Postolov, TE~us~ this iron belt n~t only isolates Rhodesia and South Africa, but would fit perfectly around ' Mobutu's Zaire, the swallowing of whicf~ would be a mere formality, if the 3 ' FOR OFFICIAL U:iE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY buckle were buckled in the Central African Republic, the former empire ' of Bokassa, All that would then remain would be to go up slightly to the north, to Cameroon and Gabon, ir~ order to perfect the chef d'oeuvre even further. This is the situation in the southern belly and the center of - Africa, In the north, a second red scarf runs from Libya to Mauritania through the Sahara. (f Algeria were to give a helFing hand~ Morocco would be crushed in the vice. Between these two belts, already in place, what - wi11 Niger, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Cameroon, and Gabon become? Very ripe fruits to be picked by an iron hand, ~ - I said earlier, "cf~ef d'oeuvre." In truth~ the relentless unfolding of the strategy and tactics of Soviet penetration into Africa leaves one dumbfounded. It has been, probably for a long time, set down in black and white. It runs like clockwork. It is perfect, If it was not that nothing (or almest nothing) is opposing this systematic setting up of military protectorates, ~ and that by winning witFi no difficulty the Soviets are triumpE~ing without any show of glory, we would applaud, Their genius and their strength. Our stupidity and our powerlessness. A1tF~ougF~, as far as France is concerned, , it is doing, after a fashion, what it can; its Foreign Legion soldiers leapt i on Kolwezi; its paratroops patrol t[~e streets of 6angui, Perhaps because it ; knows that it is in a front row seat to watch the rout, since its petroleum (but not its petroleum alone) is carried by tankers along the african coasts where the USSR now has put a guard on thousands of kilometers, and since it takes from the continent of Africa, accc~rding to the statistics, 100 percent of its uranium, 100 percent of its cobalt, 75 percent of its - oilseeds, 72 percent of its manganese, 55 percent of its chromium, 65 percent of ~ts coffae, a third of its iron, and so on and so on. The noose is _ knotted. 7otal dependency. ~ Black Puppets for the Kremlin It is staggering. I am staggered, A French paratrooper inspects the papers _ of an inhabitant of Bangui and immediately, because of this televised pict~;re, an undertone of muttering rises in the world. "Horribile visu! - It is colonialism: Go back, little paratrooper." Tens of thousands of ~ soldiers from the East or from Cuba, armadas of tanks, clouds of "Migs," rows of generals and high-ranking officers, swarms of KGB members, swoop down on Africa, "align" it, control everything~ fill their hands with its raw materials, set up in power Agostinho Netos (.he died recently in Moscow), whose "independence" can be wrapped in a piece of confetti~--and that is not - colonialism, What is it? Tourism? And the West bristles, the f;-ae world remains quiet. It must be said that it F~as no voice any longer, it got so hoarse recently applauding tF~e liberation of Angola, finally freed from the _ Portuguese yoke, and j~~st yeste;day, protesting ah~ut the arrival of South _ Af rican rugby players in France, ~t is understandable why it is voiceless. Fifteen rugby players in France~ and Moscow warns us that it found it ~ntolerable. A fearsome Soviet-German~Cuban expeditionary corps swarming into Africa and setting up or maintaining in power black puppets whose st~-ings are all in the hands of the Kremlin~ tE~at is more than tolerable. _ That is an angelic demonstration of friends[~ip, Who dares to say the ~ 4 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 ~ - FOR OFFICIAL USG ONLY contrary is nothing but a colonialist, The historians of the future~ if - history is written with a free pen~ will not get over it. They will seek _ desperately for explanations, I can point to one for them: the most cynical - _ reason, when it is the strongest, is always the best. The West, with - numb fingers, r~as bleating about its princinles and its democratic morality; the USSR, with its weapon in its fist and its ideology-alibi loudly issuing forth from loudspeakers, exercised its wish ~or power and set up its system. In the name of its principles, the West left Africa; in the name of the revolutionary myth held in great reverence wf~erever it is not an excuse for exercising power, the USSR occupied Africa, Q,E,D, It is frigf~teningly clear, In the name of tf~e people's righ*. to navigation, Communist Vietnam - threw tens of thousands of people into tF~e sea, In the name of human rights, the capitalist West was called upon to fish them out, In the year 1979. ~ During this same year, in Africa, Emperor Bokassa 1 fell. (In the meanwhile ~j -~it is like bingo since ( do not know what numbers will fail out of the j bag shaken by the Russians-~Mobutu, for example (let us choose that number), - may fall. Weil programmPd riots, repressions denounced by Amnesty Inter~ national, corruptions, hidden in the closet for the time being but which "they" will disclose, very loudly, at the right moment, and goodbye Mobutu.) - But let us stay for the moment in Central Africa. Where Mr Dacko, who, ever since he appeared has proved how lightweight he is, will count for ~ less and less. !t is true that it is not his fault if he has been pulled ~ out of the shadows where, basically, all he wanted to do was sleep (his - capacity fo?� sleep is famous) and io quietly raise chickens on his farm. His ideas are so woolly and so drowsy that it will be hard to give them shape. And s o ~ancertain: In 1965, he took it into his head to espouse the - Ghinese ~ause. And the Sons of the Sky landed in Central Africa, Given the _ privileged relations that France maintained at that time with Moscow, this made De Gaulle raise an eyehrow; W!-~ich was remembered when Bokassa came to power. He, withaut further cerernony, kicked the Chinese out. (There was, moreover, a f amous gag here. The Chinese mission was supposed to contain 100 Chinese, but when Bokassa had handed them their notice, 300 more Chinese miraculously came out of the bush and jogged off posthaste to the airport,) - Patasse, Author of tmperial Protocol Good. Dacko is in power. He is a strawman~ this good fellow. But will - the French army protect his seat? My infallible crystal ball tells me ~ that "students and teachers" will rise up against this government, which they will call a pupFet and a toy of neocolonialism, They will call for the founding of a"true democracy.41 (What this word can mean in a tribal, animistic countr~~ where the ballot boxes must be .ng in the trees so that the Pygmies can vote, God alone knows.) Mr Patasse, it is not out of the question, may have some prest~ge since his exile. I would not~ however, advise betting on him: he made the mistake of exiling himself in Libya, r which ':iad made the mistake of welcoming a bitter Bokassa. Thus, for the time being (this will o~viously pass very soon) Libya is not in favor in Bangui; then, Mr Patasse was for 12 years a minister of Bokassa~ who _ 5 FOF. OFFICIAL TJSE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240020058-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY called him tenderly ~'my dear son Patasse~~; finally, the only ideological literature he has produced was the manual of imperial protocol: one of the comic masterpieces of the 20th century. That is why~ believe me, put your savings on Abel Goumba, e doctor, exiled by Dacko in 62, salvaged by the OMS /World Health Organization%, a refugee first in Cotonou and then in - Brazzaville, and a Russian man from head to toe. Bet on Goumba even if he is = wisely quiet, waiting for his time, his watch pPrfectly synchronized with _ - Moscow's. Before this time c~mes, I said that, firstly, the "students" will demonstrate in Bangui, Then, in the interior of the country, guerrilla groups, financed by Libya and fed with weapons by traffic through the ` porous frontiers, will begin to warm up, If Mr Dacko calls on French soldiers, there will be an outcry and, in audition, these soldiers wilt get _ "bogged down." If he does not do it~ he ~~ill rule over a restless Bangui. In both cases, the situation will ~~e intolerable, What will happen at this point? Well, Mr Goumba will appear to be the only one capable:, in his wisdom, nis moderation, and his caut'ious language, of achieving a"democratic consen~us," a"national mission" and ~f bringing an e~d to the confusion, , The internal and external pressure foi` him to ta[ce power will be strong, ~ then very strong, then incredibly str~~ng, then irresistable, The "Goumba i solution," ever~ our own newspaper will write~ is the only "reasonable~' one, ! The man, moreover, will b~~ striking in his moderation and will give "assurances" to the West 3nd to France, Finally, one fine day~ the matte~ will be in the bag, Goumb~ will be in power, and Central Africa will be _ nicely "Angolized." And '=rance will understand nothing of what is happening - to it, and the famous steel buckle of which I spoke earlier will tae buckled, And the expression of the West in the face of this picture? It will be - that of a good chess player, ridiculed by his partner, scratching his head at the end of the garne, wondering what he should admire most about tne one who has just given him a licking--science, luck, impassiveness--up to the moment when the victor takes off his glasses and his wig: it's Karpov: Everything is explained! Excuse me; "No harm done!" the Grand Master will r. say, and he.will even deign to explain: "Wher t saw you play Dacko, hesitate over Patasse, lose your knight paratrooper, and let me play Goumba, I knew you were sunk. I will say, moreover, that you were sunk already when you lost Bokassa "Yes, I played badly, it is true," "In truth, - no," the Grand Master will reply. "Let us say~ rather, that you don't understand chess. May i give you some advice? Unless you prefer jogging, carry on playing dominoes, my dear friend, That game suits us perfectly," COPYRIGHT: 1979 par Cogedipresse S.A. 11550 - CSO: 4~s00 6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 . . _ _ _ ~ - . . . . = FOR OFFICIAL USE ~NLY INTf.R-~FRICAN 11FI'ATRS . BRIEFS ~ GUINEANS IN GABON--In pursuance of a presidential decree dated 30 July 1979, nationals of Guinea residing in Gabon will have to get a special card whether - or not they are political refugees. The card will be valid for a period of 3 years. It will be given to persons over 18 years of age and will be exigible - as of January 1980. Until now, Guinean refugees in Gabon were theoretically - . supposed to have a card, but it had only be issued to 800 men native of Annobon, who had fled deportation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS ` - in French 5 Oct 79 p 2711] 6857 ~ CSO: 4400 . I 7 L. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY - ~ ANGOLA BRIEFS REACTIVATION OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR--The Angolan minister of agriculture en- ~ - trusted the Italian firm of Tecneco with preparing a program for reactivatin~ - - agricultural infrastructures in the Mocamedes region which covPrs over 30,000 square kilometers. This agreement was confirmed during a rec~nt meeting in Rome between Manuel Pedro Pacavira, Angolan minister of agriculture, Briatico, president of Tecneco, and Sarchi, director of ENI~s [National Hydrocarbons _ Agency] overseas sector. ENI is the Italian national petroleum and petro- chemistry company. Tecneco which specializes in anti-pollution systems and env~ironmental protection is a company of the ENI group . Tecneco ~wiTl have 2 years in which to draft the program which will go from soil studies to _ production and the final sale of the agricultural products. The program will alsa serve as a model for the future restructuration of agricultural activities - - in other regions of Angola. During the Rome meeting, Briatico officially handed Tecneco's offer for the relaunching of agro-industrial activities in the Cavaco region which covers 70,000 square kilometers of the Angolan territory. ENI has actively collaborated with Angola since that country acquired its independence. _ The Italian group offered its technical cooperation in both the petroleum sector " ~ and the field of agricultural development. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET TiEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Oct 79 p 2720] 6857 i CSO: 4400 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 , ~ ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i I ~ ! ' CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC i I ; ~ - I - CENTRAL AFRICAN AFFAIRS NOW MATTER OF FRENCH INTERNAL POLITICS ~ Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Oct 79 pp 22-23 ~ ~ [Artic:le by Jean-Louis Buchet: "Curious Things"] [Text] "The Western Cuba sacrif icing individual rights for the sake of raw materials President Valery Giscard d'Estaing did ' not believe his ears on Tuesday, 2 October 1979, before the cameras of the West German Lelevision network. Did he have to go to Bonn to hear ' the true questions on France's African policy? ' The nerve of the eight young Germans who questioned him live obviously irritated the French president. Theix questions had nothing to do with - French-Gern~an relations, so why did he sub~ect himself to this game? Waiting, undoubtedly, to manage one of these French-style press confer- ences, polished and refined, in which he shines with his purring voice. "Cuba?" No relationship. French troops intervened in the Central African Republic as they had in Zaire and Chad only bacause of a"dra- matic situation." As for believing that France "seeks economic advan- tages" in Africa, that comment was "abusive and stupid." By way of evidence President Giscard d'Estaing said: "Chad and the Central African Republic are among the 24 most underprivileged countries in the _ world. In these countries there are no resources whatever and the people live exclusively on French aid." Was Giscard d'Estaing unaware of the existence of Cenr_ral African uranium among other things? President Giscard d`Estaing's answers in Bonn while astonishing were not ~urprising in the context of the statements heard these days in Paris. They are part of those pearls shoveled up with a:ac~e since the Central African affair has become a matter of French domestic politics--as is - evidenced, notably, by the savory debate devoted to the Central African = Republic in the French National Assembly on 3 October 1979. That debate got underway with a speech by Socialiet Party deputy Alain _ Vivien asking for the resignation of Robert Galley [French minister of cooperation]. Prime Minister Raymond Barre found himself obliged to 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY reassert the government's "solidarity" with the minister of cooperation who enjoyed, incidentally, "the Psteem and confidence of the French president, the prime minister, and of all his colleagues"--to such a point that the head of the government did not deem it approprilte to recagnize Robert Galley as a speaker even though the latter was present in the Assembly. Was Raymond Barre afraid of a pseudo-declaration by the man of the "pseudo-events"? At any rate, for some 15 days now Robert Galley has been less talkative on the subject of the Central African Republic than in the past. He spoke to the National Assembly's committee of foreign affairs on 4 October 1979 but he has avoided any further public comment. Tn the meantime Jean Francois-Poncet, Olivier Stirn, and Pierre-Bernard Raymond, minister of foreign affairs and secretaries of state at the ~linistry of Foreign ~ _ A.ffairs, respectively, have taken Galley's place with enthusiasm. In the course of the parliamentary debate on 3 October 1979 it was the - minister of foreign affairs who was entrusted with answering the lengthy speech of Mr Montdargent (French Communist Party). The deputy denounced ~ the entirety o~ French policy in the Central African Republic before ~ requesting that French paratroopers in Bangui be withdrawn so that "Africa ~ i may remain for the Africans." ' Minister Francois-Poncet answered: "If F~ance maintained links with Jean-Bedel Bokassa since 1966 it was in the name of the principle of nonintervention and because the Central African people were not to be made , to pay for the errors of their leaders." This was curious. For years and years, it was thought, Bokassa, assisted and financed by France, exploited _ his country. Not so, Francois-Poncet explained. , France's attitude, the French foreign minister continued, changed after the massacres of Bangui and the Kigali summit meeting. But France could not act alone: The Africans may not have understood and may specifically have been hurt in their dignity." If someone still thinks that Africa was humiliated at the time of the installation in power of [President~ David Dacko, he is mistaken. Following the publication of the report of the fact-f inding mission (the product of African effort, haired as it should be), it was different, Minister Franc~is-Poncet added. Fran~e discontinued its assistance at that point. "After 17 August 1979 the Bokassa regime was in a fix be- cause of this and f elt itself doomed." Especially, do not think that the tyrant was doomed f rom the moment that France found him to be an embar- rassment. Jean Francois-Poncet preferred to continue to tell the story as ' if it were a fairy tale. Let's hear the sequence for it is worth our while. "When David Dacko asked to be transported to Bangui our answer was positive. Were we to - re;ect the appeal of the last democratically elected head of state of the - Central African Republic?" Accordingly, it is not only David Dacko who ' makes up tall stories. 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE O~II,Y = Ministar Francois-Poncet still found the IriP..3:1S to pin--not without reason--the French opposi';ion by reproaching its support of Ange Patasse, ~ - "Bokassa's Prime Minister at the time of the sugar case." It is true that the left found itself greatly disarmed in this matter and that its behavior was no better than that of the majority. Once the initial moment of stupor ~�~as gone the left limited itself to requesting the withdrawal of French troops sent to Bangui and to criticizing the government's policy. But at no time did the opposition clearly denounce the principle of intervention. And~ on becoming indignant--rightly so--at the government's attitude vis-a-vis Ange Patasse, retained in Paris on 25 September 1979, the opposition made of the leader of the Movement for the I~iberation of ~ the Central African People its (evil) battle horse in Bangui. David Dacko being the favorite of the French president, Ange Patasse that � ' of the Socialists, and Sylvestre Bangui that of the Jacques Chirac faction, one would have expected to see Abel Goumba supported by the communists. The Central African capital was to reecho more than ever the discussions in Paris. Yet, it appears that the French Communist Party is ignoring Abel Goumba. Perhaps it does not know him? At any rate, the CAR is not _ the business of Georges Marchais. Did Marchais not state that he was leaving the matter Co Giscard d'Estaing, preferring to deal with Angola? ~ _ In the last analysis who is concerned about the Central Africans? The Socialists no more than the others who den.ounce the seizure of the Berengo [presidential] archives by the French. And one should add that it is not _ _ necessarily "abusive and stupid" to think that the French prasident plans to cover up "the tracks of his long complicity with a puppet criminal." _ As if further evidence were necessary. COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979 2662 - CSO: 4400 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CENTFAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC _ FORMER PRIME MINISTER PATASSE RETURNS HC3ME - Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in ~'rench 12 Oct 79 p 2770 - [Text] Mr Ange Patasse, former Central African prime minister and presi- dent of the Central African People's Liberation Movement (MPLC) arrived at Bangui on 4 October via Tripoli. ! _ i Several hundred persons waited at the airport to see him welcomed by ~ ~ the minister of the interior, Mr Galen Doitfi. ~ Addressing "the foreign friends wfio are living in tfie Central African Republic," Mr Patasse promised to protect tfieir families and property. "The presence of French troops, an army of occupation, is a flagrant violation of our national sovereignty" he stated, befo.re adding that he advocated t~ieir replacement by a small military force from OAU Tnember j i countries. The MLPC leader also stated tfiat he had prepared an armed force to over- ; throw the Emperor Bokassa. Tfie operation, fie said, had been scheduled I for 29 September at 1600 local time and would have begun with taking Berengo palace, the imperial residence located 80 km from Bangui. ; ~ Patasse affirmed that his ~ourney througli Libya on his way to Bangui was due to tecfinical reasons and tfiat he had not contacted Libyan leaders ; during his stopover in Tripoli. : - A round table conference bringing together tfie various o~position viewpoints is scheduled for 15 Octobe~r. It will be field in an atmosphere og increasing tension. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979 8860 CSO: 4400 , 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FUIt JFFICIl1L USE ONLY CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC BRIEFS ARRESTS, HOUSE ARRESTS--At the end of September many persons of distinction belonging to the forme.r regime were arrested or put under house arrest. Among them the following we.re noted in particular: Elisabeth Domitien, former prime minister, director of MESAN (Move- ment for the Development of Black Africa) (single party}, counsellor at the imperial court: Pierre Zana, iormer minister of the interior, Zemoniaeo, mayor of Bangui and secretary general of UGTC (General Union of Central African Workers) as well as the minister of defense and a captain of the imperail guard. [Text] jParis MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French p 2711] 7493 _ CSO: 4400 ~ . 13 , FOR OFFICIE~L USE UNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 ~~c~?; i~ I c: I ni. u:;l~: c)Nt,Y CONGO NEW OFFSHORE OIL DEPOSITS DISCOVERED Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2772 [Text] Two drilling were carried out recently by ELF - Congo in the People's Republic of Congo, one for evaluation of the Sendji deposit - the other for exploring of the Yanga structure. The Sendji deposit is situated 38 km from the coast at the latitude of Pointe Indienne, at a water depth of 96 m, within the concession _ of Pointe Noire-Grande Fonds held by ELF-Congo (6~.~ percent) jointly with AGIP (35 percent). The test hole at Senji Marian 1 encountered _ a pool of oil at between 1100 m and 1350 m depth in a carbonate layer. Seismi.c studies have been carried as complementary action to define _ the extent and the form of the pna,:ential deposit more accurately. Last June a well, Sendji Marine was sunk for evaluation, by the drilling ship Navifor Norse, 2.5 km south of Sendji 1. That well confirmed the existence of an accumulation of hydrocarbons of medium size and a test carried out between 1220 m and 1270 m brought m3 of oil per day, with a 0.95 density. The Yanga structure, Iocated 8 km to the northwest of Sendji, was , explored during the past July-August. That test found an accumulation containing numerous oilbearing layers between 880 m and 1500 m depth Tests run at those levels, between 1112 m and 1296 m, brought 330 m~ oil per day. This accumulation of hydrocarbons, which also aPnears to be of inedium size, is going to be the object of seismic invE~..igations and drillings - actually already underway with the execution of the Yanga No 2 test. - These good r.esults will allow the preparation of that region for further development. Operations will start with the Yanga accumulation, which offers the most favorable production characteristics particularly because of the presence of dissolved gas in sufficient quantity. The start of production at Yanga can be expected for 1981. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreax et Cie., Paris, 1979 9291 14 CSO: 4400 FOR OFFICIii,'_. USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOk U1~F1CiAL US1~ ONLY CONGO BRIEFS EDUCATIONAL CYCLES--The Congolese minister of national education, Antoine Ndinga Oba, stated on 2 October that education in the Congo _ is divided into four cycles: The pre-school cycle cf 3 years (maternal care); the primary education cycle of 10 years (corresponding to the period of compulsory school attendance)i which includes the first stage of basic education for 6 years, which is taught in a grade school and the second stage of basic education (4 years of it), which i- is taught in a middle school for general or polytechnical subjects; the secondary cycle of 3 years (which is taught in specia'lized high scr?ools); the upper cycle during which subject,, are taught and - research organized in the department,s or institutes of the Marien Ngouabi University. The Congolese minister of,education also announced the use of local colloquial dialects (Lingala and Mounoukoutouba) the study of which will become compulsory beginning with the schaol year of 1981. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2772] 9291 ~ ONPT II~iBEZZLEMENTS--The sum of 22 million CFA francs has been embezzled - from the national offices of the Cc;ngo Post and Telecommunications Office (ONPT) by three officials of that Department, one of them a collector, according to the Congolese Information Agency (ACI). The guilty officials were publicly arraigned at Brazzaville, during a meeting organized for that purpose, on 27 September. The Congolese minister of information and of the post and teleconmaunications oftice, Capt Florent Tsiba, who presided over the meeting confirmed - that the embezzlement, which resulted in the "assassination" of the service, occurred at a moment when the latter was passing through difficult times loaded down with a debt of approximately 9 billion CFA francs and with payments on the order of 6 billion CFA francs coming due for the investment in the satellite ground station. [Text]_ [Paris MARCHES TROPICATJX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2772] 9291 ' CSO: 440~ 15 FOR OFFICII~L USE ONLY - ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICTAL USE ONLY EQUATORIAL GUTNEA . AUTHORITIES FACED BY NEED TO RESTORE ECONOMY Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET 1~I'IEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2771 [Text] In a recent review of the economic and political situation in - Equatorial Guinea following the coup d'etat which toppled Macias Nguema last 3 August, the French press agency, AFP noted that the country's leaders are still faced with a total paralysis of the country's economic and administrative apparatus. = They must now, observers note, reconstitute an administration and economy ~ totally destroyed, in a country whzch fias voluntarily cut 3tself off from the outside world. For this, the new leaders, who have affirmed their attachment to neutralislii and nonalinement many times, are hoping for an increase in foreign aid, notably from tfie Western camp where tfie former colonizer, Spain, a country still popular among Equatorial Guineans, is in the first rank. There is nothing to be found in Malabo, and even less so in the interior: _ the stores have long been desperately empty, tfie restaurants no longer serve meals, cars are rarely seen, and rst night light sometimes doesn't - come to the streets of the capital. The situation in rural areas is no less desolate, if the reporters of the Gabonese daily L'UNION, who recently wisited there, can be believed. According to the newspaper, the principle reason for the depopulation of - . the villages in Equatorial Guinea is the refusal of the farmers to deliver ! their cocoa and coffee fiarvests to the state storage facilities, modeled ' on the Cuban system. As a consequence of this refusal many villagers were deported to work camps. Moreover, the villages were regrouped and set up beside roads by Chinese leaders who planned them as people's communes. In these communes, according to L'UNION,�.the clearing of plantations, tfie - gathering of garden produce, coffee and cocoa was taken over by the state who confiscated the harvests. 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - "Many persons questioned in the villages affirmed they had not received one penny for their cocoa thus harvested in the last 5 years," the newspaper wrote. Cooperation with communist countries was diversely appreciated by the people - of Equatoriril G~inea.~~ The Soviets are blamed for pillaging maritime resources (they had a monopoly in fishing) while at the same time refusing to sell fish to tfie people. Tfie new government has requested the USSR to pay a reimbursement of the debt so incurred (M'i'Ni, 5 Oct 79, p 2711). - Moscow is also blamed for its military aid to the fallen dictator. China also supported Nguema to the end, with military aid as well, as ' Chinese advisers had participated in the counteroffensive launcfied at Rio - Muni on 3 August (from Nzeng-Ayong, the presidential village) against the authors of the coup d'etat. However, Chinese cooperation has resulted in works of real economic value: ~ - the telecommunications center at Malabo, and the electric power station I at Bata. This active complicity of the communist countries with the former regime - largely explains Equatorial Guinea's aboLt-face on the diplomatic front since 3 August. This country tfien turned towards its former colonizer and the west to rzceive the international aid indispensable to it. The produc- tion of cocoa, principle agricultural export product, has today fallen to 8,000 tons (.as compared to 50,000 tons 10 years ago). COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979 _ ; 8860 ' CSO: 4400 . - 17 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ODtLY � EQUATORIAL GUINEA BRIEFS _ - NEW PRESIDENT SWORN IN--On 11 October 1979 at Malabo, on the occasion of ~ the celebration of his country's independence, Lt Col Obiang-Nguema-Mbazogo was sworn in as "the new president of Equatorial Guinea. It should be noted that the oath of office was taken on a copy of the Bible. This action proves, once again, that the authorities in Equatorial Guinea have decided to protect the Christianity which President Macias Nguema had forbidden within the nation's territory. Mr Jose Luis Leal, Spanish minister of economics, was present at the.ceremony, as was a Gabonese delegation led by Mr veorges Rawiri, minister of state for transportation. On the occa- sion of the llth anniversary of their country's independence, the Supreme Military Council of Equatorial Guinea also decreed a general amnesty for all exiles who have sought refuge abroad since the country became inde- pendent. This measure does not affect Equatorial Guineans who remained _ loyal to Macias Nguema, and who were arrested following the coup d'etat which took place last 3 August. Remember that the grincipal countries which formerly welcomed Equatorial Guinean refugees were Gabon, Cameroon, Spain and Nigeria. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2834] 9174 ~ FRENCH MINISTER'S VISIT--French Minister of Cooperation Robert Galley, who was received at Malabo on 8 October by Lt Col Obiang-Nguema, delivered to him a message from President Giscard d'Estaing. During the official visit to Equatorial Guinea, Mr Galley stressed the desirability of strengthening " the bonds of cooperation and trade between France and Equatorial Guinea in the near future. It is probable that echoes from this visit of the minister of cooperation to Malabo wi11 be heard soon. A French mission of aid and cooperation would then be created in the Equatorial Guinean capital. Ac- cording to a joint communique evaluating Galley's visit, the two parties stressed the need for establishing cultural, tech-'cal and econc~mic coop- _ erative agreements and hoped for a harmonious development in their rela- tions. For its part, the Guinean party expressed the desire to cooperate with France in the areas of public works, agriculture and forests, industry and mining, culture and education, health, information, tourism and finally trade. Mr Florendo Maye Ela, first vice president and commissioner of Equatorial Guinean foreign affairs, has been invited to visit France at a time which will be set later on. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2834] 9174 1S FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 i FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY DI:LLCATTON S~EKINC SUVI~T D~BT REPAYMLN'f--A };overnmen~al dclegatlon " - from Lquatorial CuCnca arrived in Las Palma.. seeking Co be repaid the sum of $342,OQ0 whlcl~ was owed to them by the Soviet Ministry of . Fisheries: The origin of this debt dates back to November 1978, at - which time tha refrigerators on the Macias-Biyogo island (the former Fernando Po), could not preserve the fish which the Soviet were to deliver to Equatorial Guinea, in accordance with the f ishing _ treaty in force between the two countries. Therefore the fish were sold in the Canary Islands, and the amount turned voer to the authorities in Malabo. The latter maintained that they did not touch the $342,000, the amount derived from the sale of the f ish. The Soviets replied to the Equatorial Guinean delegation that they had spent the money for the purchase of material to repair the industrial refrigerators of the island, but the government of Malabo aff irms that it never authorized the purchase of the material. Finally, according to a source mentioned by AFP, the Equatorial Guineans - received the sum of $111,000 from the Soviets. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French p 2711] 7993 AID FOR 'REFUGEES REQUESTED--Tfie Government of Equatorial Guinea has asked i the United Nations High Couunissioner for Refugees to help in repatriating ~ some 80,000 Equatorial Guinean refugees from Gabon and about another 30,000 from Cameroon, an HCR press release from Geneva announced today. A~mission will be sent to that region to study ways and means for such an operation. jText] [Paris MARCFiES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2771] 8860 CSO: 4400 19 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 - = ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I ~ . GABON BRIEFS - FRENCH AGRICULTURAL LOAN--A loan of 900 million CFA francs earmarked for financing the Agro-Gabon Project in Lambarene was signed on 24 September in Par.is by the Gabonese minister of economy and finance, Jerome Okinda, and a ~ group of French banks headed by the Nati~nal Agricultural Credit Bank. Let us - , recall that the Agro-Gabon Project invoJ.ves the creation of an oil palm plan- - tation on the outskirts of Lambarene, along the Ogooue (see MARCHES TROPICAUX = ~ ET MEDITERRANEENS of 7 September 1979, p 2456). Furthermore, it was announced = that the Board of Directors of Agro-Gabon could possibly meet in Libreville - during the first two weeks of November 1979. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Oct 79 p 2711] 6857 ~ CSO: 4400 ~ - ~ ~ i ~ 20 ~ i ~ ~ j FOR OFFICIAL.USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - GUINEA BISSAU BRIEFS ' ~ INAUGURATION OF AUTOMOBILE PLANT--The manufacturing plant of FAF vehicles in ~ Guinea Bissau was inaugurated on 24 September by Cabral, president of the j Republic of Guinea Bissau. Lombard, chairman of Citroen's Board of Directors, ' was also present. Plans cal? for 500 vehicles annually (5-door version, pic- up and 4 x 4 patrol) whose production has already begun. [Text] [Paris j MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Oct 79 p 2702] 6857 i CSO: 4400 ; ~ _j ~ - ; ~ 21 . _ � F~R OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 ~ . _ . . _ . . . . . . ~ - . ~ . . ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ TVORY COAST BRIEFS GOVERNMENT STAFFERS QU?T-_Ivorization of the economy has had disquieting _ results for Abidjan officials. Five years after launching the "operation" (1973), nationals occupy 22 percent of the executive positions in private companies, 52.2 percent of the middle management positions and 72 percent _ of the personnel director slots. In ever-greater numbers, management-level people are leaving the government for better-paying jobs in the private , sector. And university students hope to take management positions a.n private industry upon graduation, somethin~ which the National Ivorization Commission officially deplores. LText/ /Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French ; ' 10 Oct 79 p 64/ 11935 ~ - NAVAL ACADEMY--Lamine Fadika, secretary of state for marine affairs, recently announced that. a naval academy will open in Abidjan in 1981. The announce-. _ - ment was made at the opening of a seminar on maritime security. The academy - - will have room for more than 500 students from West and Central Africa. _ ' /Text/ /Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 10 Oct 79 p 64/ - 11935 - - ~ =I CSO: 4400 I ~ ~ _ \ i 22 ~ - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - ~ . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY KENYA - ~ T::~ PRESIDENT MAINTAII~i EFFECTIVE POLITICAL APPARATUS - Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2774 [Text] After the announcement made by President Daniel Arap Moi on 1 October that general elections would take place on 8,November (M'i'M, 5 October p 2714) a first meeting of the national council of Kenya's - only party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), will be held on - 4 October and devoted to an examination of candidatures. It is known that other meetings are expected for the 16, 17 and 18 October, for the purpose of fixing the names of candidates for the ' various elective offices (presidents of local administrations, members of ministerial cabinet and of the National Assembly). At the start of the first meeting on 4 October we should learn about the elimination of a number of candidates for the assembly and particularly of the former vice president Oginga Odinga and of George Anyona, often a sharp critic of the government, who was arrested and jailed from 1977 to December 1978. - Those eliminations were certainly to be expected. Oginga Odinga, who is of Luo origin, the ethnic minority opposed to the Kikouyous, was _ deposed as vice president in ].966, imprisoned for 18 months and then freed, was never able to find grace before the men in power previous?y _ or now, in spite of his repentance. His leadership of the opposition party, The Kenya Popular Union (KPU), which was dissolved in 1969 with the establishment of the one-party system, has made him permanently suspect so that he could never receive ti~e backing of the KANU, which he sollicited. But all candidates for election mus*_ belong to that latter organization. The elections that will take place and which were promised by Daniel Arap Moi soon after his official installation in October 1978, for the end of this year, required a complete overhaul in advance of the abovementioned party. This became a matter of top priority since ~ the former president, Kenyatta, very old and more and more cantankerous, did not dare to ma.ke the least change of any kind whatsoever. 23 - FOR OFFICIE~:. USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 We must remember that the coming election for the assembly will be the - third one since independence was gained in 1963, the two previous pnes having taken place in 1969 and in 1974. There will be 158 seats ' available for a new term of 5 years, a dozen of which are reserved for deputies nominated by the president according to the terms of the constitution, which has remained unchanged. As for the remaining seats, from 700 to 800 candidates have already presented themselves, , wh:~ch allows the forecast of a number of important eliminations or withdrawals still ahead in the coming days. ~ Finally, in a general sense these elections ought not to provide major surprises. Daniel Arap Moi, having known to maintain an efficient ~ - political machine, basks in the apparent confidence of the population and of the outside world, particularly of the West. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979 ~ i ~ 9291 I CSO: 4400 ; 24 FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 ~ . . . . . . _ ; rOR UFFICIAL USE ONLY i ~ KENYA I - ~ BRIEFS BRITISH MISSION STUDYING AGRICULTURE--The British secretary for agricultu~e, Lord Ferrers, visited Kenya at the head of a delegation , during the end of September, to study some of the problems facing the i agriculture of that country and to find out how Great Britain could ' help resolve them. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS ~ in French 12 Oct 79 p 2274] 9291 ; DANISH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE--During the inauguration of a new center ~ for professional training, which was built by the Danes at Mombasa, the president of Kenya, M Daniel Arap Moi recalled that his country had until now received nearl.y $7.5 million from Denmark for the construction of such centers. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET ~ MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79] 9291 UK AID AGREEMENT--According to the terms of an agreement signed on ~ 10 October in Nairobi by the vice president and minister of finance for Kenya, Mr Mwai Kibaki, and the British secretary of state for overseas development, Mr Neil Marten, Great Britain has agreed to furnish 480 mil- ~ lion shillings to the African state. Of this sum, 400 million~shillings - : will be assigned to setting up highway infrastructures, especially in the districts located on the eastern side of Mount Kenya, and 80 million will be used to finance the purchase of British goods and services. [Text] , [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 Oct 79 p 2837] 9174 ~ i CSO: 4400 ; ; ~ 25 j ~ FOR OFFICIA:, USE ONLY ' - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY LIBERIA BRIEFS _ PROJECTS WITH FRANCE, AUSTRIA--On returning from fiis 3-week tour in Europe, Mr A. B. Tolbert announced tfiat a b~lateral Franco-Liberian mission, under- ~ ~rritten by the Frencfi Government and for the purpose of inventorying otfier ~ mineral resources wfiicfi could be exploited jointly by tfie two countries, arill soon be installed, the NEW LIBERIAN fias reported. Mr Tolbert also disclosed, the same source continued, tfiat the French and Liberian govern- - - ments are preparing an "aggressive agricultural campaign" to be conducted with funds obtained from ~'rencfi banks. Ae also stated tfiat through tfie invitation of 0?3vier Giscard d'Estain, president of the 'French Bank of Foreign Trade, he had contacted tfie management of the hotel cfiain Medidien. - Also during the course of his European trip, Mr Tolbert had reviewed in ~ Austrfa the possibility of tfie installation of a paper~making facility in Liberia during the coming year. jText] [Paris 1~fARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2768] 8860 ~ CSO: 4400 26 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY � APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 , FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ' MADAGASCAR BRIEFS - ~ MIG-21'S IN AIR FORCE--The Malagasy Air Force will be strengthened by 12 MIG-21's in 1980. For the present, besides the old Dakotas inherited from the French Army, 8 MIG-17's flown by North Koreans insure the surveillance - of Madagascar's air space. The approaching rainy season has the Malagasy general staff somewhat concerned, as MIG-17's cannot fly in overcast weather. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 10 Oct 79-p 64] 11935 cso: 4400 I I ; 27 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MAURITIUS MID-AUGUST RIOTS SEEN AS SETBACK FOR PMSD, OWNERS Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 15 Oct 79 pp 28-29 [Article by Herve-Masson: "The Riots in Mid-August"] [Text] "Neither victors nor vanquished"--it is in these terms that Sir Satcam Boolell, minister of agriculture and acting prime minister in the absence of Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, size3 up the denouement of the violent social crisis which shook the island of Mauritius during August 1979. These words concealed in fact the embarrassment of the minister who was well aware that the government had been obliged to give ground before - the determination of the strikers and the Mauritian people in general. - Furthermore, no one believes that everything is definitively back to normal. All observers think that when parliament recanvenes the government will have to face facts which, for the moment, it is striving to camouflage. The island of Mauritius had never experienced such a serious crisis, even severe than that of 1971. But this time the activists of the Mauritian - Militant Movement [MNIM] and labor union leaders, if they were not in jail, - were threatened with imprisonment following numerous actions pressed both against the leaders of the opposition and against the trade unionists. - Provocations What happened? Early in August 1979 two labor unions close to the government had initiated a strike in the sugar industry. Their goals had not been , clearly defined and, when the movement began to assume scope, the strike order was revoked. The government did not take a position. However, beginning on 13 August, the GWF [General Workers Federation], a trade union affiliated with the N1~1M, reactivated the movement. The labor unions demanded the following: l. Their official "recognition" by the owners; 2. A 40-hour week; 3. !~n 8 percent increase in wages (or compensation). The two unions of the GWF--the SILU [Sugar Industry Laborers Union] and the UASI [Union of Artisans Sugar Industry]--then joined a"yellow" organization, the OUA [Organization - of Artisans Unity], close to some ministers. After 2 days of total paralysis 28 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL LiSE OI~I,Y of the sugar industry, the OUA withdrew from the movement, leaving the activists of the GWF alone Eo face the government and the owners. This irresolution was followed by provocations by the owners and the minister of labor, Yousouf Mohamed. Stung in its own game, feeling the threat of large-scale dismissals at hand, the GWF then decided to join the movement in a big way and the strike became nearly general. The port, public trans- portation, public electricity and water supply services, and some municipal organizations halted work. Around 16 August 1979 the country was almost totally paralyzed. Piinister of Labor Yousouf Mohamed at that time put the blame on the GWF and, naturally, on the 1~4M. His speech on television was interrupted for lack of electric power. As for the prime minister, he chose conciliation and met with the trade union leaders as well as with Paul Berenger, principal negotiator of the GWF and secretary general of thP MMN1, on several occasions Berenger asked for the recall of parliament, the recognition of the SILU and the UASI, and discussion of the abrogation of the IRA [Industrial Relations Act], a wicked law banning all strikes. The prime minister was ready to ~ yield, a petition signed by 38 deputies (the I~IM has only 30) being trans- i mitted to him. At that point everything could have been arranged. ~ But management, which felt that it was in a strong bargaining position (it is well organized), had its watchdogs in the government intervene,namely, ~ - the minister of finance, Veerasamy Ringadoo; the ministers of agriculture and labor, Satcam Boolell and Yousouf Mohamed, respectively; rhe representa- , tives of the PMSD [Mauritian Social Democratic Party], the well organized riQht. His colleagues threatened and Prime Minister Ramgaolam, placed in a mi:~ority position, became afraid for his job. He admitted to Paul Berenger, whom he had summoned, that "I am in a weak position" and that "they will toss . me out." It seems, indeed, that a kind of pal~ace revolution may have occurred at that point and that, as Paul Berenger put it, Seewoosagur Ramgoolam was ~ prime minister only in name then. Repression On the side of the owners the dismissals were in full swing with 2,500 being fired in a few days. Some workers became frightened and tried to retrieve their jobs but many of them, exasperated by the provocations, went home. The movement was gathering momentum. Wishing to demonstrate its strength, the government had the port occupied by troops. The arrests of MNIIrl deputies and trade unionists escalated. The president of the GWF, Mr Ramsewak; trade _ unionist Ram Seegobin; deFuty Darga; Mr Baligadoo, the mayor of Port Louis; and others were arrested. Was the widespread repression of 1971 and 1972 beginning once more? And y~et, Berenger and the leaders of the GWF (to whom should be added MNIl~i deputies Bhayat and Bibi as well as Father Reynolds Michel), swollen by those - of the FTU [United Workere Federation] of Dev Veerasawmy (splinter oriented, former leader of the MMM in 1971), felt that this time the workers still had _ strength. During a large fraternal meeting held at the Place du Quai [square] 29 - FOk OFFTCIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ in Port Louis, they announced their decision to begin a hunger strike right away (it was Sunday 19 August 1979) to press their claims and to put an end to the dismissals. On the spot the workers of the port decided not to resume their work as long as this hunger strike lasted. That same evening Berenger, Veerasawmy, Ramsewak, Seegobin (they had been released earlier) and a few others ensconced themselves in the garden of the [sugar] company under a tent and began their hunger strike in public. Their gesture served as - tri~ger for the movement which was slated to achieve final victory. Beginning on the following Monday [20 August] the tent of the hunger strikers became a rallying point, almost a focus of pilgrimage. Crowds constantly gathered there. The government then decided to use force. It declared the garden to be a"prohibited zone" and had the armed police (the Riot Unit) occupy its approaches. Qn Wednesday 22 August, riots broke out. Demonstrators " attacked the Riot Unit with rocks,paving stones, and Molotov cocktails. The police counterattacked and hurled tear-gas grenades at those involved in the hunger strike. All day long, pursued by the police, the demonstrators - regrouped in the small neighboring stceets. Stores were attacked, some newspaper offices were sacked, and automobiles were overturned. The riots thundered in Port Louis. The few private buses which were still in circulation were stoned and sugar-cane fields were set afire. More than 2,500 arpents (of which about a dozen belong to the prime minister himself) were consumed - ' by fire. - Concessions There was disarray on the side of the government majority. The politburo of the PT [Labor Party] in office protested against the dismissals. President - J. B. David and General Secretary Jagatsingh went to see the prime minister in a delegation. On their side the lawyers of the GWF, Kader Bhayat and J.-C. Bibi, accompanied by Father Reynolds Michel, increased their contacts with the government. Right away dissension broke out within the government. The minister of labor, Yousouf Mohamed, and two PMSD ministers, members of the government coalition, slammed the door. The minister of argiculture, Satcam Boolell--the alleged "strongman" of the regime--relinquished his repressive position and tried then to find ground for conciliation. Regaining control of the situation Prime Minister Ramgoolam decided to make _i substantial concessions to the strikers. The government agreed to discuss ! on a priority basis the abrogation of the IRA as soon as parliament opened ~ (which could incidentally be moved forward). He agreed to make the 4U-hour week universal in public enterprises and would undoubtedly end up imposing it in the private sector. An ad hoc committee wa~ Qstablished to convince the owners to cancel their dismissals on account or the strike. The govern- ment pledged to compensate the dismissed workers immediately, and so on. ~ This committeee--it is appropriate to note--included three PT ministers, two representatives of the GWF/MNINI, namely, Berenger and Bhayat, but there were no PMSD representatives whatever. On Thursday evening [23 August] the hunger strike was ended. On Friday [24 August] work resumed. Victory was achieved, ` but for how lon~;? _ 30 ' FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The two big losers were the PMSD and the owners. As for the government, it continued to be divided and one can wonder whether it will hold out until the opening of parliament next month [November 1979]. COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie 2662 CSO: 4400 ~ I I , , _ ~ 31 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 i FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - i _ NAMIBTA BRIEFS ADDITIONAL REINFORCEMENTS--In a communique issued from Luanda, SWAPO stated that new South African military contingents have been sent to Namibia as reinforcements. This reinforcement of the South African battalion augurs - "a more intensive offensive action against SWAPO's nationalist bases." This organization also states that in addition to those bomber squadrons already , based in Ondangwa, new bomber squadrons have recently arrived at Groot- - fontein, Rundu and Katima Mulilo. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET ' MEDITERRANEEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2780] 9161 ; , - ~ CSO: 4400 ; ~ ; i ' 32 i FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICTAL IiS~ ONLY NIGER ,i I I', - ~I ~i RESULTS OF PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO WEST AFRICA ~ ~ Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Oct 79 p 2705 i - I [Text] The president of the republic of Niger, Col Seyni Kountche returned to Niamey on 28 September, after visiting Nigeria, Togo and the Ivory Coast. In Lagos the Niger chief of state brought into focus "the last modalities pertaining to the supplies of crude oil to Niger." This annual supply which amounts to 300,000 tons of crude is evaluated at about 10 billion CFA. Refining of this crude can be ~arried out directly by specialized transnational companies, or indirectly under cover of the Niger partner. The conclusion of these negotiations will guarantee energy supplies to Niger and will avoid the shortages in hydrocarbon stocks which are observed sometimes in some districts. In Lome extension operations for the purpose of increasing the capacity of the port are of particular interest to Niger if in the realization of this project stocking areas ~or merchandise destined to our country are included. Consequently 10,000 square meters will be developed and will comprise a 5,000 square meter warehouse. Investments will amount to approximately 500 million CFA. This ' extension is necessary in view of the increase in Niger's needs of imported goods and the economic perspective of this country. In 1978, 64,981 tons of products already passed in transit through the port of Lome. According to Colonel Kountche, this installation will be completed by the establishment of a corresponding road program which wi11 facilitate the shipment of products towards Upper Volta. The realization of these roadways will be reinforced without unduc. ~elay, by the - development of a regional railway network with wi:ich Upper Volta, Benin and Mali will be associated, in addition to Niger and Togo. ~ The next FED (European Development Fund) should make it possible for ~ Niger to obtain the necessary cred~ts. ' 33 FOR OFFICIr"~;., USE ONLY I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240020058-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ - In the Ivory Coast, Colonel Kountche again met his counterparts from - Togo and Upper Volta, Presidents Eyadema and Lamizana. The three chiefs of state from the alliance council called on the Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny in Yamoussoukro, where they held a _ meeting. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979 7993 CSO: 4400 i- i 34 ~ - FOR OrFICIr"~L L'SE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-00850R040240020058-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I - NIGER ~ 'SOCIETY OF DEVELOPMENT' HAS GOOD CHANCES OF SUCCESS Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Frencb 12 Oct 79 p 2765 _ [Text] With political power being transferred to civilians in Nigeria on 1 October, Niger now remains one o~ the last countries in western sub-Saharan Africa to be governed by the military. ' Niger is governed by the Supreme Mllitary Council (CMS, 11 members), presided over by Col Seyni Kountche, Six-military znen are in the govern- ment (composed of 19 ministers and secretaries). Of Niger's seven prefec- tures, six are administered by officers, tfie seventfi, Niamey, havi.ng been turned over to a civilian (see MTM of 14 September, p 2514)~ Unlike other countries of this region wTiose military leaders had promised - to return to a civilian regiine once the political and economic life of the country had been cleaned up, Niger's CMS had made no such promises. On 3 AuG~ust 19.74, barely 3 months after the coup d'etat of 15 April 1974, _ Colonel Kountcfie was talking about the idea af "a society in development," but without being more precise. For 5 years the accent was on concrete = actions aimed at "bringing oui� people the food and drink th~y deserve." I Not until the eve of the fifth anniversary of the takeover by the armed forces, 14 April 1979, did Colonel Kountche make it clear that Niger would never go back "to those p^~~'tical forms which disappeared from political necessity" nor would it eturn to a regime patterned on French democracy. At the same time he annc,~.nced a political restructuring of the country over a 5--year period, corresponding to the perio3 of esecuting a new 5-year _ development plan. Taking up again the theme of "a society of develop- ~t" Solonel Kountche has since many times insisted on the necessity of bringing rural groups into the development process by means of caoperatives and advisory councils at many levels. He empfiasized that tfie CMS would put Niger "on _ tfie road of development and not of politics" which would remain the _ province of the CMS and the government. Similar experiments, the A~'P noted, ha~;e a1:-eady been tried in Asia, but without success, their failure being due pri~narily to the resistance of the 35 FOR OFFICIAL USL ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY middle classes. Niger, a rural country where the urban middle class doesn't exist, and where the military regime presents a largely positive record to the country--financial strictness, absence of corruption and intrigue, priority to rural development moderate public debt, re~ection of ostentatious expenditure and prestige projects--the "society of development" has a good chance of success. _ Moreover, a national commission will soon study, propose and establish - new structures which could be unveiled simultaneously with the 5-year plan in January 1980. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreau et Cie., Paris, 1979 8860 CSO: 4400 i ~ I i 36 - ?OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 ~ . _ _ . . _ , _ _ . - i I I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ; I ~ NIGER BRIEFS NEW URANIUM COMPANY--A new uranium company in Niger, SMTT (~assa and N'Taghalgue Mining CompanX~ held its firs.t constitutive. as~semtaly in Niamey on 25 September. The objecLiye of this company with a - capital of 7 billion CFA, one half ownE~.d by ONAREM (National O~f ice _ of Mineral Resourcesl ~nc3 rhP ~thPr h?~ f t,~ rrx+~te !~r_o;;or~i _ Company for Nuclear Material~, a French.company, is tr~ exploit a deposit of uranium of which the reserves are estimated to he atiout _ 20,000 tons in the region of Arlit, wliere it will become the. third exploitation in tfiat territory. Production wliicTi. is~ anti.ci.pated to be on the basis of 1,5Q0 tons~ of uranium yearly, sf?DUld hegin towards the end of 1483. On tfiat date SMTT's potential manpower wi11 be in the neighborfiood of 1,200 employees. jText] [Paris. MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French p 2705] 7493 ~ FRENCH AID TO STO~;KRAISING--As part of a special aid program to the Sahe1 countries, tfie Central Fund for Economic Coogeration will contribnte to a pro~ect to modernize stockraising in the Soutfi Tamesna region of Niger where 25,000 nomads live aff stockraising in a 900,000-hectare zone , extremely wlnerable to drought. The experimental pro~ect plans concern ! the physical environment (clearing of fire breaks, improvement of natural pastures, construction of watering points, etc,), the animals (health protection), and the human factors (regronping of the stockmen, improvement of nutrition). An 8.8 million French franc loan (44Q million CFA francs}, granted 24 September, will be associated with an FAC jFrencfi Aid and Cooperation Fund] subsidy uf 2.2 million CFA francs (110 million CFA francs). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPCCAUX ET T'IEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 - p 2765] 8860 CSO: 4400 ~ ~ 37 i ~i FOR OFFICIIu. USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY RHODESIA ' CONDUCT OF ~LL-PARTY TALKS IN LONDON EXAMINED Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 1-14 Oct 79 pp 17-18 - [Article by Basil Davidson: "The Battle of London"] _ ~ [Text] The flexibility and the self-confidence of the Patriotic Front - during thP course of negotiations are the measure of its inevitable victory. When the London conference on Zimbabwe entered into its second working week no one among the people "in the know" doubted the fact that its possible failure would have numerous, unforeseeable and dangerous repercussions. But this strange conference, could it succeed? If yes, to whose advantage? During the first days, each of the participants--the Patriotic Front the British government, or the Muzorwea-Smith clique(s)--made it understood in private that the losers in reality would be those who would be perceived as responsible for the failure. Therefore, the prudence and verbiage of the opening sessions and the parallel discussions. The scenario set in motion, however, demonstrated already that the antiracist - cause could expect to make some important points during the course of this subtle and tortuous game. The first point: The unity underlying the poli~ies and the intentions of the conservative government of Mrs Thatcher and that of Salisbury was broken in Lusaka during the course of the Commonwealth conference at the beginning of August. Before this conference Margaret Thatcher and her colleagues took the same position as the extreme Right of their party: The Muzorewa-Smith clique should be recognized as a legitimate and independent government and ~ the sanctions should be lifted. But in Lusaka all that changed under pressure i from the Foreign Office--grealty alarmed--and aft the warning represented ; by the confiscation of a large portion of British petroleum holdings in - ' Nigeria. Mrs Thatcher beat a retreat. She accepted the proposal of the "front line" nations: To write a new, more democratic constitution for Zimbabwe. Not only to write it, but to get it accepted. i ~ The "front line" nations likewise tried to persuade the Patriotic Front to ~ accept--in spite of its reluctance--the Lusaka agreement. Thus, from the ~ 38 ~ - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 1' VL\ VL'L' 1~ItAL ~JJli Vl'IL,l ~ upeniiig of tlie conference of London it was evident that the solidarity wi~ich ~xiste~l between London and Salisbury was no longer what it had been--even Ll~u�~;ll it was only an unwilling alliance. The new constitutional proposals made by Great Britain certainly did not satisfy most af the demands of tlie I'atr~otic Front, buC they could be interpreted as bein~ designed to deprive the white minority of the pa:liamentary--administrative--power it presently enjoyed. Limit the Damages All that sowed panic in the bosom of the Salisbury group. It would be very difficult for Muzorewa to refuse publicly proposals which apparently would increase the power of blacks and the chances of black accession to power. But, on the other hand, his acceptance of the proposals would alienate him from Smith and the whites--something which would only encourage maneuvering among Muzorewa's rivals in Salisbury, notably Sithole. Thus, during the second week of the conference grumblings and a strong j current of discontent agitated the Salisbury forces. ~ The second point made by the Patriotic Front: To make its acceptance of ~ the constitution itself dependent upon acceptance of the provisions governing ~ the "transitory period" leading up to independence. Smith, it appeared, I was furious about this binding connection established between the two questions, and this is easy to understand. Salisbury wanted to separate the two problems. In that event, in effect, by accepting the new constitutional proposals the Muzorewa-Smith clique could hope in return to maintain power during the transitional period. In other words, to arrange things--once the independence was internationally recognized--so as to "work out" the - constitution more or less according to its desires. The Front and its allies could not accept this eventuality. And they pursued their advantage in this area by adopting a very diplomatic stand on various procedural questions. Flexibility and self-confidence are hallmarks of strength and symptomatic of victory in this type situation. The Patriotic Front played its hand to the fullest, and from the second week it was clear in any case that if there was a stalemate, it would be the Salisburg clique which would bear the responsibility for it, and the Front would walk away - from the matter with its head held high. Noen~heless it had not come to the end of its struggles, because the British government and its partners--or its pu~pets, according to the interpretation which is given to their respective influences--wanted at this stage "to limit the damage"; if they were divided it was only because each had a slightly different estimation of the "damages". The forces assembled on the side o:C the Salisbury clique will accept almost any "solution," but with one condition: That this "solution" be designed to prevent in Zimbabwe all processes of radicalization comparable to those which 39 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 _ . . _ . . . . w.. _ . . _ . - - - - . . _ FOR OFFICIAL USE'ONLY occurred in Mozambique and Angola. Actually, one can see that they are disposed to concede much on "form" whereas "content"--the essential socio-economic status quo--is not seriously challenged. They negotiate, - therefore, with the hope of causing the Patriotic Front itself to cut off the branch on which it stands. But this branch is the very trunk of the - tree. United, the ZANU and ZAPU forces not only dominate the military scene _ in most of the country, but they are also potentially capable of dominating the political scene. We say potentially because, as everyone knows, with the Front tactics and strategy are always the subject of difficult internal discussions. A Growing Realism Fighting a rear-guard action to preserve the status quo,_the British ~ Government has, thus, quite naturally established its hopes on an eventual _ division of the constituents of the Front at the decisive moment of agree- ment. Then, the British side believes they could be manipulated and forced to accept a compromise favorable to the Salisbury clique. Or maneuver them into bearing the blame for a setback. In that event, London would proclaim: "We tried everything, we even swallowed our pride and accepted constitutional proposals which do not please us at all...but the Front would not agree... etc." This would then permit them to go forward. Never mind the conse- quences: In this event London feels almost certain it could bring international opinion to follow its line of reasoning. Such were the calculations and wagers at the opening. But with the growing realism of the spokesmen for the ~ront, it became clear that the real divisions within the Salisbury camp would be a much greater factor than those anticipated from their interlocutors. Signs, tentative, began to : indicate that it was possible to move toward a compromise in which the forces j of progressive nationalism would win certain key positions which would serve - ~ as a springboard to subsequent gains. ! The winner in this affair will not be in effect the one who takes the entire c k b th e o ill a e, ecause no one will get it all. The winner will be e on wh w take the piece that bestows and sustains power (la feve no urriciere). CUPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie 9485 CSO: 4400 40 - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE CAUSES OF PUBLIC, POLITICAL UNREST ANALYZED Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Oct 79 pp 2688, 2689 [Excerpts] According to information originating mainly from Lisbon, Sao Tome was the scene of intense political unrest late in September. Miguel Trovoada, who was prime minister until last 9 April and who founded the island's CLSTP [Liberation Committee of Sao Tome and Principe] independent movement (which has, since then, become a . single party with the initials MLSTP, Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe) has been accused of attempting a coup during a meeting of the country's principal leaders. It seems that the authorities of a republic which, for some time, has been under political strife, are not too anxious to let the - outside world know about events taking place at home. Island men- tality, a certain pride and also justified fear would explain this - behavior. As it were, Sao Tome's political crisis dates back to the independ- ence acquired in 1975. At that time, a difficult balance was maintained among the various trends of the independent movement. Over the following years, MLSTP, which had maintained a socialist and nonalined position, saw the influence of its most radical members grow. For a long time, President Pinto da Costa, who is also secretary general of the single party, sppeared to be main- taining an equal balance among the various trends before recently _ - shifting closer to the radicals. The latter are chiefly repre- sented by Minister of the Interior Daniel Daio (who should ask to be forgiven for much of what he has done since he served in the Portuguese army) and the minister of information and culture who is none other than the president's sister-in-law, Mrs Alda do Espirito Santo, a poetess, orthodox Marxist theorist and a sort of, 41 ~ FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 vi~ vi ~ tvtaaa~ ~.~a, vara.+l - revolutionary Velleda who would like to impose Creole--which she speaks with difficulty--as the official language. Ccinfronted hy thiti cl~~n wh[ch, !t should he added, has bcc~n hc~lstered by thc _ presence of some 1,500 Angolan and Cuban soldiers since an alleged attempted coup in 1977 (known as the "77 Cobra Plot), a more pragmatic, and especially less alined with Moscow, socialism was being defended by Miguel Trovoada and _ by one of his long-term friends Leonel d'Alva, former minister of foreign affairs who later became minister of education. Trovoada is undoubtedly the country's most popular political personality. Among the governing class of the Filhos da terra, mulatto bourgeoisie ousted from its lands by Lisbon during the last century, he stands out by his modest origin: from an old family, but of poor parents, he learned a manual job before entering the seminary; he has perfect command of the Creole spoken by the rocas' (large agricultural enterprises) farmhands who are the essential segment of the population, while the language of the ruling class remains ! Portuguese; he is just as sensitive to plainly expressed hopes as to respacted i doctrinal abstractions. _ , However, his personal views are not enough to explain the radical clan's hos- tility toward him. The unforeseeable events of last August hastened his disgrace. A Spontaneous Protest Last 16 August the government organized a general census of the population. Consequently, to facilitate the task of the census takers, all citizens without exceptions were ordered to remain at home on that day. This order led to a spontaneous protest in rural areas. Did the population fear that this census would be the prelude to a new tax? The fact remains that barricades sprung up in ~illages and rocas. Mrs do Espirito Santo announced in the morning that the census had been stopped. Two ministers--Mrs Maria do _ = Rosario Barros (minister of health) and Daio--were nonetheless rebukeu. The latent dissatisfaction of the working segments of the population expressed it- self in various ways and, in some cases, barricades did not come down until. 18 August. The president was in Moscow at the time of those even*_s. The government blamed ~ them on the "counterrevolutionaries" when, according to travelers who witnes- sed taose events, they were obviously spontaneous. To satisfy the radicals' lo;ic and give credence to the "plot" theory, scapegoats had to be found for those troubles. It seems that Trovoada was it. Moreover, the plot theory is rather plausible in an [illegible word, probably f island] where the muted echo of outside events can engender an obsessive fear ~ and where tourism has disappeared since 1975. The republic remains distrust- ful of its closest neighbor, Gabon, from which it is separated by language and culture. Although in the past Libreville authorities supported Sao Tome's 42 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ independence, the latter believed the former had annexation designs. The _ arrival of an Angolan-Cuban contingent (joined by Guinea Bissau soldiers who are now said to have withdrawn) corresponds to the 1977 upsurge of invasion and "imp~rialist plot" fears. Short-i.ived Hopes Though Sao Tome's political class could pretend to the outside world (and to _ - itself) that a plot existed, the population's behavior last August expressed nothing more than its dissatisfaction and the leaders' moral isolation. On 18 August, a protest demonstration was canceled due only to the extent of the police and military apparatus in the capital. The unknown number of arrests is also evidence of the repression. Should it want to side with the _ population, the national army, reduced to S00 ill-equipped men, would have - little weight before a foreign contingent supporting the leaders. Thus, de- mands remain sterile, but they remain: They mainly rest on a sort of disenchar..tment: independence did not bring expected results. This trite remark is generally of little cansequence on the . African continent. However, it cannot fail to provoke a reaction in two is- lands populated by 80,000 largely literate people, where leaders and their promises can be judged daily b y a population tired of prudently repeating the same slogans. " Furthermore, nationalizations and nationals' take-over of public offices held by Portuguese have not been beneficial to most of the population. Local civil servants who are reviving old colonial methods, making them more heinous, are being blamed for their brutality. One thing is sure, last April's replacement of the rocas' directors by members of the president's family was badly received in Sao Tome. Impunity is a poor adviser and the purely military strength - available to the principal leaders does not bring them closer to a popular class which accepts less and less the lag between their militant speeches and their real behavior. The country cut itself from the outside as much as it could: for example, there are no more air liaisons with Libreville. Only Angola and the Congo, because of revolutionary affinity, are appreciated neighbors. The Sao Tome government recently refused an agreement to a western ambassador residing in Libreville. Even though the economic policy favors cocoa exportations (6,000 tons in 1976) and the excellent firmness of the escudo, thanks in ~rticular to a sound bal- ance of payments, the population's living conditions have deteriorated and in 1977, according to official statistics, 15 percent of the deaths were due to _ malnutrition. These few remarks are enough to give an account of popular movements and the political match which was recently wageel in Sao Tome. 43 I ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The f.uture of the republic and its inhabitants will depend to a great extent on the development of the situation in Angola which, for deep-seated reasons, - is the mentor of Sao Tome. Tt is hoped that we will not long remzin on our present path, for it could = ~~nty resul.t in Uoth increasing international tension in the Gu1f of Guinea and maintaining local discontent. There may be one hope. President Pinto da Costa is scheduled to go to Portugal on an official visit this coming October from the 24th to the 26th. A rap- prochement between the republic and the former colonizing power would be a prelude to an opening on the outside world, opening needed by Sao Tome which could remember that ideological communion is not the rule of international cooperation and that at the time of the slave-trade, a village in the Gabon - estuary was named Ntchantome, in honor of the neighboring island. _ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1979 ~ ( ~ 6857 ' CSO: 4400 I - i . 44 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USi: ONLY SENEGAL SENGHOR DENOUNCES SITUATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Oct 79 p 2701 [Text] The inefficiency of many public Senegalese enterprises of - which some show a deficit and some are even in bankruptcy, were the . subject of a meeting of the heads of these enterprises, presided by Leopold Senghor, president of the republic, which was held in Dakar on 28 September. ~ The public establishments, national companies (~23) and mixed economy firms (75) represent 40 ~iercent of the Senegalese gross domestic production and employ about 30,004 workers who receive aiiout 20 million CFA in salaries annually. Two-thirds of the above fiave been in existence less that 10 years. At the present time many of them such as SOSAP (fishing), BUD-SENEGAL (industrial truck-gardening~ are bankrupt, and in addition a scandal due to embezzlements amounting to one billion CFA shook ONCAD (National Office of Cooperation and Assistance for Development) Cooperatives Central Organization. - Senghor attributed a good part of this situation to inefficiency and . declared specifically "that management is a field which we have not been able to master as yet." Among the evils he denounced before the heads of the enterprises, the following were cited: accounting gaps, insufficiency of personnel training, lack of control in management and exploitation, absenteeism, nepotism, intervention by politicians and prominent persons in - recruitment, misuse of available means, lack of agreem~ent between the ~ objectives of the enterprises and their realization and poor ; financing metfiods. On thier par.t the enterprises denounced the flight of the higher level cadres to the private sector, at higher salaries, the insufficiency ~ of ineans, the procedural delays in allocating credits or payments of ; invoices by the state, transfer of personnel and directors, the extreme strictness of the supervisory agencies and tlie indifference of the personnel during this supervision. i 45 ' FOR OFFICIr~;~ USE ONLY I - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 I~UK UFl~1.ClAL USli ONLY - In conclusion Senghor requested the heads of tTiese enterprises to bc: exacting and persevering in order that the otijective. of the Senegalese recovery plan may be attained in 1983. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979 7993 CSO: 4400 ~ ~ ~ _ I- . I 46 - FOR OFFICIAL USE C~NLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 � rOlt OrF7'CtAL [I5E ONLY SENEGAL GOVERNMENT TO PURSUE ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAM Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Oct 79 p 2701 [Text] The main objective facing the Senegalese Government is to pursue the econamic recovery program was declared by Leopold Sedar Senghor on 16 September upon his return from vacation. Therefore, the government will proceed with the adjustment of salaries and prices. A meeting on this subject between government, employers and workers will take place, but the most important factor is simply to main- " tain the purchasing powQr of the workers. In other respects, President Senghor alluded to some measures taken, such as the development of a plan for economic recovery which was approved by the Internar_ional Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In addition some of the fundamental obj ectives of the development plan _ ;aere mentioned: increase in public savings, housing information, adjustment of prices and salaries, maintaining the purchasing power of the worker and increasing industrial and agricultural production. On the last poi;~t launcliing of the impending construction of the Diama dam on 13 Decembe-r, as well as the future exploitation of ~ some of the riches in the sub-soil (iron and oil) actuates optimism. It is for this reason tliat the Senegalese chief of state has further reaffirmed the need to rely more and more on the spirit of organization and procedure. He also laid stress on the prob lem o~' the management of some of the - st~te companied and indicated that a meeting is planned in this connection in the framework of an interministerial council with the _ heads of enterprises. It is imperative that ri~~rous and dynamic management be sustained, said the chief of state. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979 ~ _ 7993 CSO: 4400 47 = FOR OFFICIE+L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY S LNECAI. BRIEFS SENGHOR, PREMIER ON POLITICAL PARTIES--At the meeting nf the Cabinet _ on 25 September, President Senghor alluded to the domestic situation of the country and "forcefully reaffirmed his determination to en~orce ( - the constitution and the laws" especially in regard to tr,e establish- ment and operation of political parties. On his part the prime ~minister announced that legal instructions have just been instituted I in connection with some infractions to the legislation regarding the establishment of political parties." [Text] [Paris MARCHES ' TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Oct 79 p 2701) 7993 SCHEDULE OF CABINET MEETINGS--On 18 September Abou Diouf, prime - minister of S~ne~al, announced that in the future ~he Cabas~tanduncil , will meet twice weekly instead of once weekly as in tihQ P successively a Cabinet Council convening ~11 the members of tlie government around the prime minister will meet every Monday, and _ the Cabinet, presided by the president of the republic, in addition to the prime minister, the ministers-and eventually tfie secretaries of state, will convene every Tuesday. [Text] jParis MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Oct 79 p 2701] 7993 ,f - 48 FOR OFFICIf~L' USE UNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 , - _ . . . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY SOLAR PUMP--A photovoltaic solar pump was inaugurated 29 September by Senegal's Prime Minister Abdou Diouf, The village of Aere-Lao (700 km _ northeast of Dakar) will thus have 50,000 liters of water per day at its disposal. An ecumenical mutual help association, SOS Sahel Inteinational, and tfie readers of two Nantais newspapers, raised tfie 12 million CFA - francs necessary for its achievement. Tfie Senegalese prime minister noted on this occasion that the Sengalese solar ener.gy program, begun 3 years - - ago and based on the groundwork laid by researches conducted at the University of Dakar for the past 20 years, had at first consisted of _ bestowing thermodynamic solar pumps on four villages and photovoltatc pumps on two others. In a second phase, tfie Senegalese Government is interested in developing a medium power capacity: a thermal solar pumping systern 30 km from Bakel, in the north, for irrigating 130 hectares, two _ electric power stations of 25 kW and 1Q0 kW, a 2 kW motor pump and a 5 kW photovoltaic solar station for farm irrigation and market gardening. SOS- Sahel International has a pro~ect, 50 solar pumps for the eighties" which interests Senegal, Mali and Upper Volta. jText] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX _ ET MEDITERANEENS in Frencfi 12 Oct 79 pp 2760-2761] 8860 ' MARITTME TRANSPORT COMPANY--A national maritime transport company~ Senegalese Maritime Navigation Company (COSENAM) will soon be created. Eigfity-four _ percent of the shares will be lield by tfie state, 16 percent by foreign investment. The creation of COSENAM will enable Senegal to staunch the financial fiemorrhage stemming from increasing transportation charges and _ to improve its balance of trade. Increased eaports ~aill substantially diminish the cost of Senegalese imports. The Senegalese Maritime Naviga- - tion Company (SENAM) which cfiartered foreign ships only. A million CFA francs, such is the capital initially put up ~or the company. Shareholders ~ include SONACOS, the Independent Port of Dakar, the Senegalese Longshore- - man's Union (COSEC~, Fund for tfie Equalization and Stabilization of Prices, the Taiba Phosphates Company, BNDS [Senegal National Development Bank], the Senegalese Governmen.t itself, as well as private investors both nationals and foreign. COSENAM funding is a sixth of the defunct SENAl~t's financial ' cover, but its promoters feel this is quite sufficient for the company's operation and will even enable it to buy two ships. COS~NAM h~:~s not inherited any difficulties, in the sense that there is no legal tie ue~we~.~i it and SENAM. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2760] 8860 ' ~ CSO: 4400 49 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY = SIF,RRA I,EONE BRIEFS FIDA LOAN--The International Fund for Agricultural Development (FIDA) has approved a 50-year loan to Sierra Leone of $12.6 million at an annnal interest rate of 1 percent. This loan is earmarked to finance agricultural = development pro~ects affecting 3,000 families of tfie Magbosi zone where life expectancy is 44 years and infant-mortality is 240 out of 1,000~ jText] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2766] 8860 CSO: 4400 ~ i - ~ _ 50 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY I � APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 ~ ~ FOft OFFICIAL U5E ONLY ~ TANZANIA -I _ i -I I ~ I _ i -I ~ PARTY TO CONTROL MUNICIPALITIES Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2776 [Text] According to tre prime minister at the presidential office of Zanzibar, M A Mzee, the regional leaders of the only Tanzanian party, the CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi.) will be in charge of local administrations in Zanzibar and Pemba, starting at the end of the year. The regional leader of the city of Z.anzibar will thus become its mayor while the party functionaries for the districts of Wete, Chake Chake and Mkoani on Pemba, wi11 direct the municipal administration in those three localities. � We must recall that, early in 1979, the Revolutionary Council of - Zanzibar published a decree in which it created three municipal councils on Pemba and another one for the city of Zanzibar, which has a autonomous administration. - The essential purpose of this measure was to improve the municipal _ se~�vices and the social services in particular, so as to meet the challenge of the strong increa~e in urban population. ~ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979 9291 - _i CSO: 4400 ~ ~ ~ i - ~ - I _ ~ ~ - 51 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE UNLY ; . APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 i~oii c~F~~r.crnr, ~rsi: o~1i,Y - TANZANIA JUMBE PRESENTS CONSTITUTION FOR ZANZIBAR, PEMBA Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 69 PP 2275-2276 J [Text] The chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Zanzibar (and ~ Tanzanian vice president) M Aboud Jumbe, presented a projected constitution for the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba providing for , democratization of political life and the organization of elections, ~ on 5 October. The elections wi11 be the first (except for presidential elections of a single candidate) since the 1964 revolution, which chased out the Sultan and the Arab "Arab oligarchy." ~ _ , The constitutional project, which was submitted for inspection to the Revolutionary Council for 17 weeks, provides for the election of - the president of Zanzibar by the representatives. He then designates the member~ of the Revolutionary C~uncil. Since 1964 the council members have nominated the president who, in turn, has chosen the members without the electorate being consulted in any form. _ The electian of a Council of Representatives, provided for in 10 articles of this fundamental law, could take place starting next year, at the same time as the presidential and legislative elections on the mainland--the latter a repeat of those in 1975. � The Council of Representatives,should in some way be a parliament and the Revolutionary Council would then play the role of a cabinet of ministers, said M Jumbe. The constitution will also guarantee, for � the first time, an independent judicial system for Zanzibar. Until now the coopted Revolutionary Council promulgated all the laws applicable for the archipelago by edicr. The text submitted for study by the members of the Revolutionary ~ Council specifies that the president cannot serve for more than three - consecutive terms of 4 years each. 52 FOR OFFICIii,'.. USE UNLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 i'OR ~FF7CIAL IfSE ~Nl,Y ' M Jumbe has emphasized that the cons.titutional project would not he put off because the union of Zanzibar and the former Tanganyika into a single republic was at stake. Kenyan newspapers, in a discussion of that subject, expected a breakup of t~-ie United Republic of Tanzania (MTM, S Oct OBER p 2714). Disspelling dissatisfaction To account for the reasons that led M Jumbe to present the constitutional project and to specify the form of a deomocratic government, the AFP notes that since the union of former Tanganyika and the "Spice Islands" Zanziba.r always retained great autonomy. _ That applies particularly to its finances, which are supported hy the , ' exp~rt of cloves of which Zanzibar is the world's top producer. The - resources of the island have thus served to finance during the term - of President Karume (who was- assassinated in 1972) a low cost housing program on the outskirts of the old Arali city of Zanzibar. T1:~ effects of the world crisis, of the ri~e in gasoline prices and the economic effect on Tanzania of its victorious campaign against - the regime of Idi Amin, have caused a drop in tlie standard of livzng _ of Zanzibar, just as on the continent. Still tfie island populati.on receives the benefit of certain advantages when compared to their - _ fellow citizens. These days it is possible to find in the shops of Zanzibar cakes of soap and washing powder, which are not availab.le in " Dar es Salam. ; However that may be the people of Zanzibar find that tliey have heen - neglected, the more so since M Aboud Jumbe is more absorbed by his function as vice president of the union government than by hi.s functions as chief executive of Zanzibar. President Nyerere appears to have tried to reinforce the integration of the archipelago by _ entrusting to his vice president more and more missions, in Tanzania as well as abroad. In Zanzibar the complaint is that M Jumb.e, because of his insistence on making all decisions of even the smallest nature personally, is ~ neglecting local matters. Some malcontnets declare that even when he ' is in the archipelago he spends most his time on Pemba. The state of health of vice president Jumbe is also a source of some uncertainty. After undergoing an operation in the. United State~ last year, he is planning another trip to that country for medical reasons and that may be one of the. reasans for his paying so little attention - to local affairs. - 53 FOR OFFICIt~L USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 roi: ~~Fr~c:rnr, usi, oNi,~~ - Finally, the people of Zanzibar complain that the loss of their children during the war against Idi Amin was a very heavy one, _ because it was the batallion from the island that was to be the first to traverse the Kagera at the end of last year, for the penetration ~~F U};~~nd~. 'l'I?er~~ i5 littlc~ doubt that the R~volutlonary Council w[.11 adopt Llie project of ~tie Constitution presented to it. It remains to be seen, concludes the AFP, whether that reform will suffice to dispel _ the growing discontent and the particularism of Zanzibar. Since the return of the victorious Tanzanian soldiers an increased military presence has in fact been noticed on the island, but it _ seems that this precaution has not succeeded in quieting the uneasiness. COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979 9291 - CSO: 4400 i _ 54 � FOR OFFICI~~L USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TANZANIA ~ - ; I . BRIEFS = ~ ZANZIBAR CONSTITUTION ADOPTED--On 13 October, the Revolutionary Council of Zanzibar adopted the draft of the constitution which was submitted by its president, Mr Aboud Jumbe (MTM 12 October 1979 p 2775). According to the terms of the adopted text (adopted without consulting the people, although dissatisfaction is rumbling in Zanzibar and Pemba), the president of the RPVOlutionary Council, who will have the title of "president of Zanzibar," will be elected by universal suffrage every 5 years. He must have com- _ pleted his 31st year, and must carry more than 50 percent of the popular - vote in an election where there will be no competition, and a single candi- date will be presented by a committee of the only Tanzanian party, the CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi, "party of the revolution"). The Council of Represen- ~ tatives, which will act as the parliainent, will have 125 members. The term of one legislature will be 5 years. This council will include 35 members _ from the Revolutionary Council, the members of parliament representing the islands in the parliament at Dodoma, twc members of the local revolutionary committee per district, two members of the revolutionary committee from ~ each region, a11 regional commissioners from Zanzibar and Pemba, represen- - tatives from the sole political party and from Tanzanian popular organiza- tions. Ten representatives will be named by the president of Zanzibar's Revolutionary Council. The deputies must have completed their 21st year. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 October 1979 p 2838] 9174 MINISTER`S VISIT TO PARIS--On 12 October, Mr Benjamin Mpaka, Tanzanian minister of foreign affairs, met in Paris with Mr Jean Francois-Poncet, French minister of foreign affairs. T};is meeting has made it possible to give a new impetus to Franco-Tanzanian relations, which were somewhat I strained a short time ago. Remember that recent French aid to the Dar es ; Salaam airport (MTM 28 September 1979 p 2653) cemF~ted the Franco- Tanzanian reconciliation. This reconciliation was used to best advanCage by Mr Francois-Poncet during the luncheon served to his guest at the Quai. d'Orsay. The minister expressed "the willingness of France to expand her relations with Tanzania." This willingness, he said, "is in keeping with a policy of broad opportunity for all of the African countries, especially the English-speaking countries. While desiring to maintain close rela- tions witli French-speaking Africa, she finds that most of the problems i 55 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY occuring today are on a continental scale and that Africans are keenly aware of the importance of whatever will bring them together and unite them. "After having recalled the initiative of a dialogue between Europe, Africa and the Arab countries taken by President Giscard d'Estaing in Febru~ry, Mr Jean rrancois-Poncet enunciated the essential principles which are - guiding French policy toward Africa, namely the freedom of choice f.or every country within its recognized frontiers, and the assistance that the African states have a right to expect from the international community. In reply, Mr Ben~amin Mpaka expressed his country's willingness to establish active cooperation with France as it has with other important members of the EEC. After having stated his conviction that relations between his _ country and France are on the threshold of a promising future, Mr Mpaka paid homage to the French language, one of the languages of our continent and an important tool for cooperation and comprehension among the members of the Organization for African Unity." [ExcerptJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 October p 2838] 9174 AID TO PETROLEUM EXPLORATION--The World Bank has agreed to loolc into the ~ financing of new oil explora~~ions in the Songo Songo region, in the Kilwa province of southeastern Tanzania, announced the Tanzanian minister of i Hydroelectric Power and Mining, Mr Al Dash Noor Ka~sum. The minister made this announcement at a press conference organized on the 10 October upon , - his return from a 3-week visit to the United States, Great Britain, Austria and Canada. The World Bank participated in the financing of re- search into the possibilities of a gas development program in Songo, - simultaneously with an Indian consulting company, the Oil and Natural Gas Commission. Mr Kassum specified that the agreement concerning financing, ~y the World Bank, of petroleum research at Songo Songo was concluded dur- ing his negotiations in London, which were also attended by representatives of the governments of India and of the Commonwealth. The ~evelopment of gas in Songo Songo is estimated at 30 million cubic meters. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 October p 2838] 9174 MADIBIR~, RICE PROJECT--A preliminary study of the rice-growing project at Madibira, near Mbeya in southern Tanzania, was recently delivered to the Tanzanian minister of agriculture by a British organization, the Overseas - Development Administration (ODA). The feasibility study on the project should be finished by next December. It is expected to produce 50,000 _ tons of rice per year in Madibira, due to an investment on the order of 700 million shillings. The rice crop would be irrigated, and corn would - be recommended as a complementary crop by the authors of the project. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 October ~ p 2838] 9174 SIDA-FINANCED WATER SUPPLY S't'UDIES--Studies financed by the Swedish Interna- _ tional Development Agency (SIDA), which will take 3 months, began in September at Dodoma, the future capital of Tanzania. They concern the ~ water supply, and should establish wfietfier the city will receive its water from the Mtera dam in the Iringa region, or from some other source closer 56 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 ' ~ . . . _ ~ _ . . . . _ ; FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY to Dodoma. At the present time, the city's requirements are estimated at 10,000 m3 per day, and its water comes from the water level of Makutupora. In 1985, the city will need 45,500 m3, and 126,000 m3 in 1955, if the gov- ernment's plans to transfer its civil service workers from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma m3terialize. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 19 October 1979 p 2838] 9174 CSO: 4400 ~ i ~ 57 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ UGANDA ' ECONOMIC SITUATION CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2775 [Text] Former President Amin did serious harm to his country'~: economy by allowing himself to be dictated by whim, which is to say by his so-called premonitory dreams. Nevertheless, the economy survived. However, according to AFP the war of liberation waged by Tanzania and exiled Ugandans from October 1978 to April of this year has dealt the final blows. In the present situation, the team of e~erts whom the Commonwealth secretariat has asked to establish a plan for reconstruction does not have _ some basic necessities, notably statistics. At the end of 1978 the balance of payments deficit was close to $100 million and had doubled since the military dictator's arrival to power. In April the government inherited a foreign debt of $133 million. The interest continues to accrue and the rates have often been raised. The looting during the liberation accelerate~ the destructive effect of Idi Amin's actions. The confidence aroused when Yusuf Lule became president vanished after his departure. He had actually begun to obtain some convincing results, especially with merchants who had been willing to submit to price controls on their merchandise. The close connection between politics and economics bodes ill for the future and no one seems to have confidence in the Binaisa government. This same lack of confidence is found at the international level (see MTM of 14 September, p 2522). Countries and orbanizations which might be able to provide necessary assistance, aside from emergency efforts, are waiting ~ for this government to become more firmly installed and to prove that it has better control of the situation. - The authorities have invited those Asiatics expelled by Amin in 1972 to return. They have been offered 50 percent of their former possessions in the form of joint enterprises. They are cautiously waiting for others to _ take the first steps be~ore they are convinced. Recent examples whicn have been given to them. (MTM 27 July, p 2115) do not seem to be sufficient. _ ~ 58 ~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 _ ~ . However, Uganda has some solid advantages. Commonwealth observers feel that the country would soon be able to pay for a significant part of imports for normal use and reconstruction, if the economy were functioning normally. In the meantime, the large sugar cane plantations on the shores of Lake Victoria have been abandoned and will need to be entirely rebuilt. The coffee rlantations are kept up just enough to supply Kenya with contraband. Factory equipment continues to rust because of missing pieces and the amount of automobiles in use diminishes for lack of upkeep. A response to the challenge to renew the economy is in large m~asure in the hands of the government. Were there enough confidence in it, only a little = effort would be required to set in motions the activities parallel to those of the Magendo (Swahili for black market). This could be clone in a positive sense with a view to development. If this does not happen reconstruction will experience the same fate as the "action program" which Idi :Amin launched 3 years ago in 1977 and which was forgoteen within 6 months. ~ i COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1979 ~ ' 9161 CSO: 4400 59 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 i . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i UGANDA , ' BRIEFS REPATRIATION FROM LIBYA~--Libya, where former President Idi Amin Dada took refuge, is still holding many Ugandans whom the Kampala authorities would like to have repatriated. These are Ugandans who occupied various posts at the time of the averthrow of Idi Amin Dada. Kampala has also asked that - Libya return the Uganda Airline's Boeing 707 which has been in Libyan hands since the fall of the Ugandan capital. These demands were made by the minister of culture and community development, Daniel Nabudere. He also criticized i Colonel Qadhdhafi for the assistance he gave to the Amin regime. Nabudere said that Uganda was "ready to forgive but not to forget." Concerning ; Uganda's relationship with the Arab world, he stressed the idea that his country sees a distinction between countries which had supported the dictator and those which had not. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUY ET MEDITERRANEES in French 12 Oct 79 p 2775] 1961 ~ _ EXILED STUDENTS--On 8 October President Binaisa sent out a call to all exiled Ugandan students to return to their country. The statement was made ; during a ceremony which made him chancellor of Makere University. The j university has some 4,000 students. According to its administration, 950 million shillings (about $130 million) would be needed to reorganize after the disturbances experienced under ldi Amin Dada's regime. [Text] [Paris MARCHES - TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2775] 9161 ~ CSO: 4400 i i I ~ f ~ 60 i i I � FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200024458-4 r . _ . . . . . . . _ _ _ . . . FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i _ UPPER VOLTA BRIEF S PRESIDENT WARNS ABOUT LABOR STRIKES--"Constantly resorting to strikes is not good for a country as underdeveloped as Upper Volta," stated the Upper Voltan _ president, General P.boubacar Sangoule Lamizana, on 26 September, responding to press questions about the strike warnings given by several groups of affiliated labor unions demanding higher wages.. "We cannot put the entire ' national budget at the workers' disposal," added President Lamizana. "The unions and the government should together examine the workers' situation.... _ People who live in developing countries cannot press union demands to the - same extent as those who !.ive in the developed world," concluded the Upper - Voltan chief of state. /Text/ /Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS ! in French 5 Ocr. 79 p 2704/ 11935 NEW DAM AT WEBDILA--"During each rainy season, approximately 8 billion cubic meters of water fall on Upper Voltan soil. Of all this water, existing dams catch only 220 million cubic meters, or barely 3 percent of what we need n ~ to meet our requirements, stated Paley Issa Welte, Upper Voltan minister of ' rural development, during the inauguration ceremonies for the Webdila Dam , - on 15 September. The minister also stated that, "The amount of retained surface water from rivers and streams currently satisfies less than twenty percent of what we need to furnish each Upper Voltan with the minimal amc~unt of water needed for living, and to reach agricultural self-sufficiency through irrigation." Minister Welte thus expressed his satisfaction ~aith t:he construction of this dam, which is 18 kilometers long, covers 148 square kilometers and holds 2.80 million cubi~ meters of water. It was finan~eu - by the Upper Voltan Federation of Churches and Evangelical Missions, for a total cost of 200 million CFA francs. LText/ /Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Oct 79 p 2704/ 11935 - ' END CSO: 4400 ' 61 I FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020058-4