JPRS ID: 74661 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020053-9
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 81
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• Sequence Number: 53
• Content Type: REPORTS

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' 466i
~8 NOVEM6ER i9~9 N0. 2049 i OF i
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I JPRS 74661
- 28 November 1979
- ~Hear / '
Easf ~lorth Africa Re ort
p
No. 2049 ~
FBI$ FOREIG~I BRAADCAST INFORNlATION SERVICE
_ , ,
, . .
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NOTE
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Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
- enclosed :~n parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
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_ original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. ~
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sozrz-io~
REPORT DOCUMENTATION 1. REPORT NO. 2. 3. Reciplent's accession No.
PAGE JPRS 74661
1. lltie s~c1 Sublifla � B. Rapon Det~
N~AR IsAS'T /NOR7'il AFRICA RI:PORT , No . 2 0 4 9 2 8 November 19 7 9
6.
7. Author(s) B. Pen ~rminQ Organiiation Rept. No. ~
9. Perfo~minQ O~Rr~~=atlon Name snd Address 10. Pro~ect/Task/Work Unit No. '
Jojnt PublicaCions Research Service
1000 Nor'th G1Cbe Road co~~~a~tcc~ o~ Gront(G) No.
Arlington, Virginia 22201
(G)
l2. SOOnsoring Organization Nome and Address 13. Type oi Report d Period Covcred J
~S aUove 14.
15. Supplomentary Notes
16. Abstract (Limi4 200 words)
This serial report contains information on socioeconomic, ~overnment, polirical,
and technical developments in the countries of the Near East and North Africa.
17. Uocum~nt A~alysis Descriptors
Palitical Science Inter-Arab Affairs Libya Sultanate
Sociology North African Mauritania of Uman
Ecunomi_cs Affairs x Morocco Syria
Culture (Social Afghanistan People's Demo- Tunisia
Sci~nces) x Algeria cratic Republic x United Arab
Ethnology Bahrain of Yemen Emirates
Geogr~iPhy Egypt Persian Gulf x Western Sah~ira
Teci~ological x Iran Area Yemen Ar.ab
Mi].itary Sciences Iraq Qatar Republic `
x Israel Saudi Arabia
x Jordan Spanish North
Kuwait Africa
x Lebanon Sudan
b. Identil~e+s/OpemEndcd Tc,rm~
a COSATI FiciA/Group SD~ 5C~ SICs 15
1R. Availabflity Statcment 19. Secur(ty Ciass (This Report) 21. No. of Pa{(es
Unlimited AvailabiJ.ity UNCLASSIrII:ll ~ _
- SO~.C~ b}7 i~~l JS 20. SeCUrlty Clsss (This Page) 22. Pric~
SprinF,fi.~ld, Vir~;inia 22161 UNCLASSIFIED
(See ANSI-T.3'3.18) Se� Insiruetlons on Rsverse OPTIONAI_ FORM 272 (d-17~
(FOrmerly NTIS-35)
Depsrtment ol Commercu
~ ~ E~ ;'j~
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JPRS 74661
28 November 1979
NEAR EAST/NOP,TH AFRI~A REPORT
No. 2049
CON7ENTS PAGE
ALGERIA
Briefs
Moroccan Kidnapings, Murderers 1
~ IRAN
Could Iran Become a Second Lebanon?
(Editorial; NAME-YE RUZ, 'L7 Sep 79) ?
Swedish Paper Cites PLO's Tehran Aide on Re~~cticn of Mediatior~.
(tlke Ringberg; DAGENS NYHETER, 10 Nov 79) 4 -
Former Corrupt Elements Attempt To Whitewash Their Past
(Editorial; NAME-YE RIJZ, 1 Oct 79) 6
Revolutionary Council Member Cites Political, Social plans
(KEYHAN, 27 Oct 79) ........................o.....,~...o. 8
Militant Islamic Group Scotches Anti-Government Rumors
(KEYHAN, 29 Oct 79) ...................................o. 12
Possible Prosecution of Hassan Nazih Discussed
(NAME-YE RUZ, 28 Sep 79) 14
Details of Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i's Assa~sinatiori in
Tabriz Given
(BAMDAD, 3 Nov 79) 16
Tudeh Party Issues Statement Regarding Kordestan
(NAME-YE RUZ, 28 Sep 79) 2()
Government Describes Plan To Settle Kurdish Crisis
(BANIDAD, 28 Oct 79) o 21
- a - [III - NE & A - 121~
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~ Page
CON'CENTS (Continued)
Central Bank General Director Declares Government Hard
Currency Policy 24
(BAMDAD, 4 Nov 79) ~ ..........................~o........
Inflation, Unemployment Threaten Iran's Future 30
(Editorial; NAME-YE RUZ, 28 Sep 79)
Steel Mill Production Capacity Increased by 2 Million Tons
a Year 31
(KEYHAN, 29 Oct 79) o
Briefs 33
Joint Publications Committee Formed 33
Stabilization in the Universities 33
- Cooperation With Military Urged 34
Execution of Homosexuals 34
Bomb Explosion 34
Conflicting Reports 34
Oil Output Drop Possible 3~
Democratic Party Demonstrations Banned 35
Hassan Nazih 35
Electric Power Plants 35
Iranian Students Criticize Regime
ISRAEL
Begin's Claim To Be Student of Jabotinski Refuted
37
(Editorial; AL-QUD~, 9 Oct 79) .....o
Editorial Deplores 'Heroic' Statements about Sale of :~and
39
(Editorial; AL-QUDS, 1 Oct 79)
Co~mnentary on Appointment of Hurvitz as E1 A1 Head 41
(Ze'ev Schul; THE JERUSALEM POST, 14 Nov 79)
JORDAN
American Dollar Mentality Seen No Threat to Jordan 43
(Editorial; AL-QUDS, 7 Oct 79)
LEBANON
Lebanese Army Commander Views Scope of Current Tasks
(VicCor Khuri Interview; AN-NAHAR AL'-ARABI W~' 45
AL-DUWALI, 29 Oct-4 Nov 79) ..............e..����������
Briefs 49
Sham'un Dialog With PLO
- b -
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, CO:VTENTS (Continued) Page
MOROCCO
~
Editorial Criticizes Undemocratic Government Policy
(Editorial; LIBERATION, 19-?.:i ~ct 79) 50
Foreign Minister Discusses Sahara Problem, Egyptian Aid
Offer, Purchase of U.S. Weapons
(M'Hamed Boucetta Interview; AL-MUSTAQBAL, 13 Oct 79). 53
USFP Opposition Leader Discusses Sahara Problem, Socio-
economic Problems
(Abdelwahad Interview; LIBERATION, 19-25 Oct 79) 58
Iiriefs
198U Finance Bill 63
UNITED ARAB EMIRATFS
I'igures on Industrial Firms, Workers Released
(AL-NAHAR, 28 Sep 79) 64
UAE Oil Revenues Reach 18 Billion Dirhams
(AL-NAHAR, 28 Sep 79) 65
Briefs
Foreign Investments 6~
- Education Budget 67
~dESTERN SAHARA
Algiers Cites SDAR Statement on Fighting in Sahara
(Algiers Domestic Service, 15 Nov 79) 68
~ 'L'HU!~IAIJITE' Interview's Polisario's Abdelaziz on Sahara
Issue
(Mohamed Abdelaziz Interview; L'HUMANITE, 3 Nc~v 79).. 69
Algiers Cites SDAR Statement on Military Victories
(Algiers Domestic Service, 9 Nov 79) 71
'L'UNITA' Carries Communique on Visit to W. Sahara by PCI,
PCE, PCF Delegation
(L'UNITA, 5 Nov 79) 73
- c -
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- ALGERTA
BRIEFS
MOROCCAN KIDNAPINGS, MURDERERS---The masses inside Morocco live in an atmosphere
� of fear because of the kidnapings and assassinations, and also because of
the unjust trials and verdicts passed by ~he royal courts against the
revolutionar~ an3 progressive elements in the country. The secret police
watch all ciL�izens--the tradQ unionists or those who are suspected of
being sympatnetic to the Saharan revolution. They are sent for trials by
order of the Royal Palace; they are sent for trials to appear Uefore the
courts which are to a certain extent similar to the military tribunals which
the regime set up following the Sukhayrat uprising and the attempt to
assassinate the king. As for the kidnapings and assassinations, they have
become the main task of the monarchical regime. This regime planned and
carried out the assassination of 'Umar bin Jallun in December 1975~ and
'Abd al-Taif (Zarwal) and Husayn [name indistinct] as well as hundreds
of progressive citizens during ~anuary and February in Casablanca, Rabat,
Tangier, Fes and Tetouan.; most of them were university and secondary
school students. jExcerpt] [LD142334 Oran Domestic ~'ervice in Arabic
2300 GMT 13 Nov 79 LD]
CSO: 4402
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TRAN
COULD IRAN BECOME A SECOND LEBANON?
Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 27 Sep 79 p 1
[Editorial: "Ethnic Minorities"~
[Text~ During an interview in the publicat~.on "Foreign Pol.icy" with George
Ball, a former official in the American State Department, and chairman of
the Counnission to Study Conditions in Iran at the Time of the Revolution,
the third and last phase of which is studied in today's issue, this American
expert has said that there is danger of fragmentation in Iran, espec~al~y
if this country develops conditicns similar to those in Z,ebanon l:oday.
In such conditions, there would be danger oF fragmentatior_ in 7:ran because
of ethnic minorities.
The issue of ethnic groups raised by Gecrge Bal'1 is not pecv.l~ar t~ Irano
It exists in many Asian, European, and even African countriese Mo~e
politically advanced countries, such as England, have solved this problem
- by decentralizing and delegating some civiJ. and financial ma.~t~rs to the
local level. Underdeveloped countries refrain from doi.ng this, fearing
that if this authority is delegated to ethnic minorities they w3.12 thexz
become independent due to the weakness or ineffectuality of the central
regime.
Historically, Iran has always contained ethni~c and religious minorities.
What has unified these nationalities and tribes making u~ the Ixanian
nation is a common history, geogr~phy, and economy, not ttieir oneness of
_ language and religion.
Insofar as the leaders of the religious regime have had a sl:.are in our
history and poiitics, until now, with no constitution, they have tried to
solve this, our most praminent issue, through the use of force, or they
have postponed so?.ving it. With reason and the utilization of the experi-
ence of otheYS, they could find a solution. Instead of a parliam~ent with
one house they could establish one with two houses, a legislative assembly
and a house of representatives from the provinces or states, and they could
delegate civil and limited financial authority to the different provinces.
2
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This is a modern solution that would settle the issue forever, and if it
is not solved there will be war in Ku~rdistan, Baluchistan, Khuzistan, and
perhaps Azerbaijan. This issue ~an be postponed only if the central
government remains authoritarian and undemocratic.
9310
CSO: 4906
3
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IRAN
~
~
SWEDISH PAPER CITES PLO'S TEHRAN AIDE ON REJECTION OF MEDIATION
LD131447 Stockholm ?JAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Nov 79 p 9 LD
[Dispatch by correspondent Ake Ringberg: "PLO Shuns Mediation"]
[Text) Beirut, 9 November--"The AmEricans have let us suffer for 30 years
so let them now taste some of their own medicine. The PLO is on Ican's
side so we cannot undertake the role of inediator." That remark was made
Friday by the PLO's representative in Tehran before boarding an aircraft
back to Iran following talks in Beirut with PLO leader Yassir 'Arafat.
With that remark the chances of an active conCritiution by the PLO to help the
prisoners in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran seem to have lessened consi.derab].y.
At the same time the Iranian ambassador in Bahrain said that the talks under
way between the PLO and the Iranian leaders will be about the hostages, "but
there can be no question of any mediation."
It seems that it is precisely the world "mediation" which the PLO is striv-
ing wholeheartedly to repudiate in its official remarks in order to refute
reports that the PLO is best placed to act as intermediary for averting a
massacre in Tehran.
The United States is regarded as the Palestinians' foremost enemy since
Israel uses U.S. bombs and U.S. aircraft to terrorize helpless Palestinian
ref ugees .
"We do not expect much from the United States," Hani al-Hasan, the PLO's
representative in Tehran, said. "We helped American citizens get aut of
Lebanon during the civil war in the summer 1976, but what has the United
States done for us since then"?
The remark was directed at the wholehearted U.S. support for the state of
Israel and also at Israel's attack against south Lebanon March of last year
with the express purpose of "crushing the PLO." But since that action the
PLO has won new positions in the world.
4
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Notwithstanding these opinions, which reflect years of bitterness against
a superpower, it seems apparent that the PLO really wants to play a part
_ in the drama but also that it must proceed with great cAUtion.
Through its new general secretary 'Isam al-Qadi (whose predecessor Zuhayr
Muhsin was murdered last summer in Cannes) the Syria-backed as-Sa'iqah organ-
ization has criticized any decision which could benefit U.S. imperialism in
return for recognition by the United States. There has reen sim~lar cri-
ticism from the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation oY Palestine
led by Nayif Mawatimah. -
CSO: 3109
5
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~i~
FORMER CORRUPT ELEMENTS ATTEMPT TO WHITEWASH THEIR PAST
Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persiar. 1 Oct 79 p 1
[Editorial: "Those Who Put the Country Where It Is Today"~
~Text~ One of the basic reasons for the Iranian national revoluti.on last
January was corruption, which was daminant in the previous regime. Some
because of their associates, some under the influence of �riends, another
because of his neighborhood and another because of his speciaT access to
an important official in the government or the military occupied themselves
with plundering the country~s wealth. In the mi.ds~ of a11 this there weze
ma.ny in foreign service, meaning representatives of the nation, who went to
foreign countries when they were not really representatives of our country
but were instead manifestations of the corruption that got them their jobs.
Most of these "diplomats" have kept quiet and continued living exactly as
before in some corner with their share of the plunder from the treasury in
a country where they once held a h~.gh title, now recognized only b,y waiters
in cabarets and sellers of poker chips in casinos. Functionally, these
people had been removed from the staff of the Foreign Ministry even before
the revolution. '
Some of them, however, who, like the Bourbons, have not acquired anything
and have not f~rgotten, have been busy changing clothes and are graduall.y ~
trying to claim, when their very appointment to their posts is the wost
obvious manifestation of the worst corruption, that they were opposed to
, that cc?rruption and that system.
Several days ago, one of these diplomats, who suddenly rose from the rank
of secretary to the rank of ambassador of a European country because of
personal services he rendered, and.who greased ~he palms of his foYmer boss
and of a colleague :.n the Washington embassy throu~n various manipulations,
according to the current fashion wrote an article for the HERALD TRIBUNE
which, were it no so shameful, woulc~ be laughable.
6
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This gentleman, whose appointment from secretary to the prime minister to
tlie office of ambassador raised a lot of hac?cles in the Foreign Ministry,
and whose appointment was taken as an insult and a sign of deteriorating
relations by the country to which he was sent, tried throughout the ghost-
written article to clear himself, and, by attacking circumstances in which
he was a principal actor, to smooth a path for his future, little knowing _
that for such persons as himself there is no place, either in the present
or in any future regime.
It is better tha.t the persons who have angered the nation with their deeds
and helped lead it to its current state should get out of the country
before the nation takes revenge against them. In order to have their bad
names forgotten, they should at least be ashamed of themselves and ask for
a share in the Iranian nationa.L movement.
9310
CSO: 4906
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IRAN
REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEM}3ER CITES POLITICt~L, SOCIAL PLANS
Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 27 Oct 79 p 10
/Article: "The Revolutionary Council's Economic and Political Plan for
Running the Country"/
/Excerpt] After the people had paraded and gathered at the
University of Tehran and the surrounding area, Ayatollah llr Beheshti, vice
chairman of the Council of Experts and member of the Revolutionary Council,
made a sCatement. In his statement, he, as a member of the Revolutionary
Council, described the country's economic and political poZicy.
Referring to Moslem revolutionaries' past efforts to break free from the
fetters of imperialism, exploitation and tyranny, Dr Beheshti said "Our
young generation has risen up with the glorious martyrdom of martyrs, the
forivard thrust and movement of universities, educational centers arid men
of the street and the market, and the creative participation of women, and
has realized the dreams of decades with valor and heroism through this su~-
cessful uprising. We have now put the weighty and terrible stagas behind
us, to the point where I think the stages of the past fe~v years at least
remain in your minds. What troubles, what tortures, what vexations and
what strikes our people put behind themselves during the uprising standing
in the face of difficulties until it threw the basic enemy out of Iran in
February: In the past few days, America, our unyielding enemy, has taken
him into its arms; I really do not know if he has become i11 or is pretend-
ing to be ill. God willing, it will be an illness before which he can no
longer resist; of course were it to happen that we could bring him alive
to Iran, it would be better."
The Revolutionary Council's Economic Plan
"People have asked us, 'What is your economic thesis? What is the economic
plan of the Revolutionary Council and the leadership of the revolution for
combatting deprivation and poverty?' j~e would prefer that a summary of
this plan emerged in the form of principles and the constitution and that
we then discussed it with you. Now, however, that we are before the Iran-
ian nation on this historic day and this beloved opportunity, we will give
a brief explanation:
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"1. The Islamic government has the duty of providing capital and tools to
every person who wants to perform productive work and to place those at
his disposal. Our farmers in the Islamic Republic must work on land which
belongs to them. Our laborers in the Islamic Republic must work with tools
and capital which belong to them.
"Therefore the economic plan of the Islamic Republic is this: the govern-
ment of the Islamic Republic is to provide tools, capital and work from
the public treasury, from oil revenues, from other revenues and from taxes
on individuals for every Moslem, for every Iranian even if he is not a
Moslem, for everyone who is a citizen of this republic, so that no one will
bz obliged to sell his labor for the trivial wages which others give him.
Now I ask whether we will be able to s$ve the workers of this c~untry from
becoming the hirelings of brutal, vexing wages by this solution. I am ask-
ing everyone who is well-read in the field of economics to work on this and
to give us an answer.
- The Revolutionary Council's Political Thesis
"People ask us, what is your political thesis for administering the country?
We have to a large extenC reflected our political plan for administering
the country in the principles of the constitution.
"There we have stated the following: Ours is an Islamic society. It is a
society which wants to be administered through Islam. It wants to stay on
the Islamic road. The true Islam, the Islam which pious and clear-thinking
jurists specialized in understanding Islam who are informed about the is-
sues of the day--these people will explain this Islam to these people. To
this end we have stated that our Islamic society will be administered in
this manner. The supreme leader is at the peak of the country~s adminis-
trative power, a pious, committed, combative, aware jurist, a jurist who
does not want to dominate, who is not worldly, who is not a tyrant, who is
not a dictator, a jurist who loves the people, a jurist who, like the lead-
er of this revolution, says 'I have done nothing-�it fs these people who
are doing it'--a jurist with these characteristics will arise at the head
of the power administering the country, but will not appear at the head in
such a way that he will be a chief. It is a mistake for anyone to imagine
that we say tbat the religious jurists are at the head, that is, thaC they
must throw in people's faces the claim 'we are your chiefs' through twist-
- and pomp, political wheeling and self-aggrandizement. As the emam has com-
manded, if a religious jurist is seized with this sicknees he will have no
further guardianship over the people. What kind of jurist, then? An aware,
just, god-fearing, people-loving meek, modest jurist, a jurist who is humble
before the people. You know that one of the designations or appelations of
the CoTmmander of the Faithful (on whom be peace) is Abu Tawab. What does
Abu Tawab mean? It means that Ali aits on the ground, is humble and lives
with the people, that a modest, meek, popular, people-loving jurist comes
and is placed in the leadership of the nation. Is this jurist imposing
himself upon the people?
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The Role of the Councils
"Does it m~an that you tell the people, 'Co~ne and accept this rela_gious
jurist as leader~!
"In ~he constituLion, provision has been made for Che fact that the people
must accept this religious jurist. A religious jurist whom [he ~baoiute
majority of the nation accepts as leader is the one who becomes the leadQr.
All right, if a well-known j~irist who can b~ accepted by the n~ajar~Lty of
the people is not to be found, then what? A council of juri.sts, some of
the best, choicest, purest and best-informed of jurists will cocistitute ~
council, and the well-informed, elected representatives of yuu, the people,
will appoint this council and nominate and present it. Such a leader or
such a council will become the leadership and will occupy the position oC
leader. Then you., the people, will choose a president from among tY~~e
people who meet the conditions. Xou will note that the government which
comes to power will be under the supervision of you, the people, in three -
ways:
"1. Through the leadership of the well-informed, just, elected religious
jurist.
"2. Through the elected president.
"3. Through the elected representatives.
"These people can control the prime minister, ministers and others. Who
will control the government employee in a given vill.age or a g:[ven corner
of a remote town? Who must control the government employee, the head of
a given department, the commander of a given garrison which is i.n a remc~te
corner 1,000 kilometers away from the representatives, the prP~ident and
the leader'? This is the duty of the councils. Our friends ttiie students
have asked, 'What is your opinion on the councils?' Our opinion is that
the councils which have arisen from the people must be the administraLoxs
and the supervisors of their actions, while you, the people, do the elect-
ing.
"Unfortunately, in these elections to town councils, the number of votes
for persons elected is generally so ;.ow that we cannot say that they are
the representatives of the majority of the people.
"The councils, which are composed of the representatives of the majority
of the people, must be the overseers of proper day-to-day operations
throughout the country. What about the factories? What about the offices'
Do these also need coucils or not? In our opinion they do. We have re-
peatedly said that where these investigations are made one must place a
new investigator in the place of the old one, one must place a senior in-
vestigator in the place of the old one, one must place a senior investi-
gator over this second one and then place a general investigative office
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over them. Come let us create a system of oversight and guidance every-
where out of the body of the masses, so that we will have Less need of
these investigations from above. The factory councils, the department
councils and the company or~anizations, in our opinion, are amon~; the
necessary elements of a popular, Islamic revolution. Therefore, from our
standpoint, the mode of political administration of the country, the
country's domestic policy, is oi~e where the people, the very masses of the
people, must take part in administering the country in which they are
influential as soon as possible." _
11887
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IRAN
MILITANT ISLAMIC GROUP SCOTCHES ANTI-GOVERNMENT RUMORS
Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 29 Oct 79 p 12
/Article: "In Presenting a Way To Confront Rumors, Organization of the
Combatants of the Islamic Revolution Presents an Announcement on Counter-
revolutionary Rumormongering"/
/Text/ The Organization of the Combatants of the Islamic Revolution has
published a statement regarding the spreading of rumors througho~.~t society
and has requested compatriots to disgrace "rumormongers." _
In its statement, the Organization ~f the Combatants of the Islam~c Revo-
lution pointed out "The Islamic Revolution of Iran, because of its quest,
which results from the profound culture of Islam, has more enemi.es tt~an
any other revolution. To this end, West and Easl-, tugether wt~h inter-
national Zionism, are assailing this revolution from every ditection, hop-�
ing to nip it in the bud."
In the statement, subjects which have been the target of the propaganda
attack of rumormongers of the revolution wer~ mentioned: these were liated
as the person of Emam Khomeyni and revoluCionary organs and per~onaliries.
Regarding the spreading of rumors on Emam Khbnnzyni, it was not asserted
/sic/: "Since the emam enjoys the strongest base and mass protection, the
conniving counterrevolution; out of fear of the people's v:tolent anger, in
its meetings and speeches, is always indirectly making utterances about
the en:am's estrangement �rom the people under the mask o� following the
emam's path and enthusiasm for the people and the emam, stating that a
number of people have blockaded him and are not allowing words and news
to reach him. All people, groups and organizations must freely contact
, the emam and speak to him.
- "By raising the emam's remoteness from the realities of society, rhey are
trying to create an atmosphere of lack of confidence and despair regarding
the emam so that they can later easily eradicate the revolution.
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"Regarding revolutic,nary or~;ans and personalities, the en~my is finding
weak spots in the Revolutionary Council, the Army of the Guards, the com-
mittees and influential persons, making them seem much, much more aerious
than they are, and spreading rumors that such-an-such a minister kissed
the Shah's hand, such-and-such a member of the Revolutionary Council is
living in a very aristocratic fashion, the government is the satellite of
America, and so on and so forth.
"Thus news devoid of reality spreads about in the society.
"The rumormongers consist of foreign and domestic elements. The foreign
- elemen*s (imperialists and Zionists) are examining the issues of Iran,
finding weak points, communicating with Iran through channel:: and influ-
encing everything.
"The domestic elements (opponents of the revolution and opportunists) who
see their interests disappearing, intend to destroy the revotution with
the cooperation of domestic and foreign elements. _
"In order to confront the rumors we first must not be the pr~.soners of the
atmosphere of rumor but, by investigation must give a categorical answer
to the rumormongers and by recognizing the sources of the ru~:~ors and de-
manding evidence from them, disgrace them utterly."
In its statement, the Organization of the Combatants of the Cslamic Revo-
lution also pointed out, We are not claiming that weak points do not ex-
ist, but criticism is one"thing and destruction is something else, and the
enemies want to destroy thia revolution."
In the statement, people who have a role in the revolutionary staff were
requested "I~nediately to bring their lives in line with that of the emam
so that they can impart continuity to the progression toward perfection
in their lives and give no pretexts to the counterrevolution.
"We must also be aware that everyone has a weak ~pot in some way or anoth-
er and only within an Islamic process will we be able to overcome our
weaknesses."
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IRAN
POSSIBLE PROSECUTION OF HASSAN NAZIH DISCUSSED
Paris IVAME-YE RUZ in Persian 28 Sep 79 p 1
[Article: "Ma.ximum Penalty for Nazih Could Be Death Sentence"~
[Text~ Tehran--(UPI)--Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan discharged Hassan
Nazih, chairman of the National Petroleum Department of Iran, who had
instigated disturbances around himself, on Friday. In his place he
introduced a minister of petroleu~ who will supervise all operations
related to the oil, gas, and petrochemical industries. Hassan Nazih
has been under attack by the mollahs running Iran for not purging the
40,000 workers in the Petroleum Department. Without referring to the
stepdown of Hassan Nazih, Mehdi Bazargan announced that the new m~.nister
of petroleum, 'Ali Akbar Moinfar will also continue to fu1fi11 his
responsibilitives in the Cabinet as chairman of the Board of Directors
and personnel ma.nager of the depa.rtments of petroleum, gas, and pexrochem-
icals, which have been combined.
Hassan Nazih was appointed in March on the blsis of his qualifications. -
Until that time, oil industry workers had been on an extended strike in
opposition to the Shah which had stopped oil production. Hassan Nazih,
a French-educated lawyer, was called in for investigation on the authority
of the revolutionary public prosecuCor to answer existing charges against
the workers of the department.
In one of Ayatollah Khameyni's directives to Bazargan he ordered that
assurances be obtained that Nazih would be present for an interrogation
on Saturday. At the same time the Ayatollah gave notice that if there
should be enough evidence against him, Nazih would be prosecuted. The
nature of the "innumerable charges" said to be in the hands of Che public
prosecutor against Nazih has not been clear.
The Islamic groups in the Petroleum Department have demanded that Nazih
be tried as an enemy of Islam. The maximum penalty for this crime is death.
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Moini:~r's appointment has cleared the way for a"purging" of w~~rker's
leaders in the Petroleum Department, to which Nazih was opposed. Nazih
maintained that this purge wou'ld create difficulties in the production _
of oil. It is still not known how many people will become "purgees."
'The attacks against N,assan Nazih concerning the adminis~ration of the
Petroleum Degarthabeldin Eshraqi,yhislrepresentative in matters related
Hojatoleslam Sha
to petroleum.
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IRAN
DETAILS OF AYATOLLAH QAZI TABATABA'I'S ASSASSINATION IN TABRIZ GIVEN
Tehran fiANIDAD in Persian 3 Nov 79 pp 1, 3
/Article: "Details of Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i's Assassination in Tahriz"/
/Text/ His Eminence Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mohammad Ali Qazi Tabataba'i,
the emarn's representative in Tabriz, was martyred at about 1900 hours
Thursday evening by gunshots from an assassin's pistol.
KEYI~.AN's correspondent in Tabriz, who was the only reporter immediately to
betake himself to the bedside of the dying ayatollah at the hospital, gave
the following report concerning the incident, fram his compani.ons' account:
His Eminence Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i, who was leading extensive programs
of demonstrations by the people of Tabriz on Wednesday and 'Phursday, wenk
home to rest around noon after participating in the Eyd-e Qorban prayer.
ceremonies and the popular parade. Because of the extensive religious and.
national programs, the effects of fatigue in him were apparent, but his com-
panions' counsels did no*_ cause him to refrain from participating in the
evening prayer, and he set o}it for the Sha'ban Mosque.
The ayatollah, on completing the evening prayer, set out for his home by _
car in the company of four bodyguards, a driver and his companions. As the
car transporting him reached the Maqsudieh Avenue curve, after crossing
Artesh Avenue, it slowly turned toward an alley in order to pass a Peugeot
which was going over the culvert into the alley. Suddenly a young man of
25 or 26 who was wearing a green raincoat and a hat came out from behind a
bench in the alleyway and appeared before the car bearing the ayatollah and
the companions. The assailant, holding his firearm in both hands, took aim
at the ayatollah, who was sitting in the back seat, and fired three shots
in succession; the first hit the ayatollah in the head, the second hit him
in the shoulder and the third went wild. The assailant, taking advantage
of the darkness, immediately mounted a motorcycle and vanished in the al-
ley across from Haj Reza Square. The Ayatollah's bodyguards, who had been
taken unawares, flung themselves confusedly out of the car and a shot was
fired into the air. At that moment the ayatollah uttered the following
sentence "It seems my head has been hit." The driver immediately took the
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ayatollah to the ~ed Lion and Sun HosplL-al and .he doctors ~ot to work and
oparated on him. The bullet which had hit him in the shoulder was removed
but the doctors' efforts to remove the bullet from the skull were futile
and the ayatollah passed away a moment later.
A Threatening Phone Call
According to one combatant, a telephone call fYOm an unknown womai~ to the
head of the Sha'ban Committee in Tabriz a few days before lifted the cur-
tain from this conspiracy. This woman said "In 3 days' time you (that is,
the committee head) and Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba�i will be killed." The
committee head informed the ayat~llah of this; re response, he said "God
will take care of it." One of the Ayatollah's companions had visited him
a few days before and said "From the rumors in the city one may conclude -
that some danger is threatening you. Please permit us to equip your car
with bulletproof glass." When the ayatollah was informed of the high cost
of this he said "Pay this money to the Fund foz~ the Downtrodden."
One of the ayatollah's bodyguards told KEYHAN's correspondent, "Yesterday
an announcement signed by the Forqan Group was distributed in Tabriz's
Bagh-e Shamal while the Eyd-e Qorban prayer was being held. The contents
of this declaration have not yet been determined and one copy of it was to
have been given to the ayatollah. One person visited the ayatollah on
that day and said that a copy of the Forqan Group's announcement had been
discovered, but the ayatollah said "This isn't the place for it here, bring
it to the house." Eyewitnesses state, Two days ago three suspicious per-
sons took part in the ayatollah's evening prayer in the Sha'ban Mosque and
performed the afternoon.prayer. The ayatollah's bodyguards became suspici-
ous of them but did not take the matter seriously." It was said rhat the
weapon used to kill the ayatollah was a handgun which left no cartridges
at the site.
On this matter, one of the ayatollah's bodyguards said "On the day of
Eyd-e Qorban, as he was setting out to take part in the prayers Ayatollah
Qazi Tabataba'i told his followers on the steps 'See how quickly they are
assassinating me.
The important point concerning the implementation of this conspiracy was
the dexterity of the assailant, who aimed accurately at the syatollah in
t:he midst of the five people sitting in the car, in the dark of evening.
Although he had bi~ responsibilities in terms of security and the affairs
of the ostan, especially Tabriz, Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i was the only
person who did not like weapons; whenever an armed person appeared, he
disarmed him.
A Synopsis of Ayatollah Qazi Tabatab~'i's Life
Ayatollah Tabataba'i was a combatant spiritual leader who fought with the -
satan courageously and without fear, in an open manner during the years
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the Pahlavi regime was in power, and he did not let up on the strut;gle Lor _
a moment. At the apex of the Islamic resurgence, in Che S June 1963 evenr_s,
when the re~ime sununoned the Azarbayjan clerical corrdnunity to the Ctiamber
of Commerce of Tabriz for discussions and a so-called search for a solutian
to the political crisis, Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i was the only person ~aho
stooci up, fearlessly and without the least anxiety over a reaction from tl~e
- regime, and cried out in the face of the regime's agents "Wha~ do }~ou want
from our souls? We just want respect for the law from you."
This severe attack by the ayatollah jotted the military commander at ~he
time harshly, and an intense verbal quarrel erupted between them. The re-
gime banished the brave free man of Tabriz, tied him up and put him on an
airplane, but 2 years later, when he returned home victoriously, his f~llo~~i
townspaople feted the son of Azarbayjan in a manner that ti~as befitting onl.y
to him. The regime was terrified by this great reception by ~he people,
and the seed of the stru~gle with the devil was sowed right t}~ere. At the
peak of the regime's power, Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i sent tremors th~-o~~,h
the spirits of the regime's agents with his devastating declaral-ions, w}ien-
ever he ascended the pulpit, and his words intensified the people's
stru~~; le.
When the revolution attained victory, he with firmness and exper.tise pr.e-
vented the needless tumult and bloodshed which was very LikQly te occur>
For this reason, he grappled with narrowminded people who coul.d not carry
out their designs in his presence, and he summoned everyone to uoiry,
solid4rity and service of the Islamic republic. His horne wa~ ~:tie r.efuge of
ttie sufferin~, and he repelled every kind of a�;gression by a11 pow~~:�s
a~ainst the people with a rare courage. He carried ou~ Lhe responsibility
~ he had received from Emam Khomeyni to be the leuder of the :Cslamic. r.evo7.ution
of Iran in Azarbayjan for the prosperity and benefit of rhe people ~xnc~. was
weary of every kind of spite or animosity.
The newspaper KEYHAN offers condolences for this great loss to a11 L-he
- fighting people of Azarbayjan, in particuXar the heroic people of Tabriz,
the fighting conununity of spiritualists, and the families of this brave
martyr.
Funeral Ceremonies
Starting at 1000 hours yesterday morning, ceremonies were heid for the
funeral of His Eminence Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Ali Qazi Tabataba'i be-
ginning in Namaz Square and heading toward the Maqbareh Mosque in the
Tabriz Marketplace.
Participating in these ceremonies, were Eng Gharavi, the governcr general
of East Azarbayjan, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, the guardian of the Radi.o and Tele-
vision Organization of the Isla~mic Republic of Iran, Reja'i, the acting
minister of education, the great Ayat~ollahs/, scholars and sp~.ritual men,
and a large number of people. After the holding of the prayer in the
Maqbareh Mosque, he was buried.
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His Eminence Ayatoll.ah Qazi Tabataba'i began his religious science studies
in Tabriz and Qom and acquired grace over a period of many years in tre
holy town of Najaf, in the presence of the great combatant and learned
scholar Kashef ol-Qatta'. Then he returned to Iran and engaged in the guid~
ance of Moslems. Starting in 1962, with the beginning of the Islamic re-
surgence of Iran, he embarked on the srruggle with other religious scholars
and was imprisoned and banished f or periods of time. In the years after
1962-63, l-~e continued his struggle, starting in the Qezel Qal'eh Prisan and
then in banishment in the towns of Baft, Kerman u~:d Zanjan.
Later, as a consequence of his unremitting struggle against the satanic re-
gime, he was forcibly confined to bed in a Tehran hospital for 3 months
and on emerging was banished again to Iraq. He was in exile for 1 year
then returned to Iran to continue his struggles against the satanic regime.
Three Days of Public Mourning
Following the martyrdom of His Eminence Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i, Eng
Gharavi, the governor general of East Azarbayjan, gave a declaration pre-
senting his condolences to the people of Azarbayjah and proclaiming 3 days
of public mourning.
The funeral ceremonies for the martyred Eminence Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba'i
were held yesterday morning starting at 1000 hours in the Namaz Square of
Tabriz.
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1 ~iAN
TUDEH PARTY ISSUES STATEMENT REGARDING KORDESTAN
Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 28 Sep 79 p 1
[Text~ Tehran (Various press sources)-The Central Co~ittee of the Iranian
Tudeh party, in a detailed staCement published in connection wirh the affairs
of Ko.rdestan, put forward sume suggestions to the government and the people
of Ko.rdestan for coping with the crisis situation in Knrdestan.
A portion of this statement said that the existence of plots and anti-Islamic
activities cannot be and should not be used as an excuse for not attending
' to the fundamental reality, meaning the conditions of the suffering Kurds,
and their desire for and need of human rights and justice, or for reject~.ng
their demands and needs in the na.me of a war against counterrevolutionaries.
Most regrettably, we must say that a knot that could have been easily untied
with the fingernails has been pulled apart with the teeth, and for cuin~.mal
results we have seen some unwholesome processes se~ into motion: Barricades
against brothers, brother spilling the blood of brother, and the poisoning
of the country~s political environment, an envi.ronment which, in the w~rds
of Emam Khomeyni, has the greatest need for tranquillity and mutual under-
standing. The Tudeh of the people of Kordestan say: "We are Iranians and
we are opposed with all our being to the secession of one foot of Iraniar~
soil or the reduction of this land by so much as a clod. We are only demand-
ing our true and national rights. We are waiting for the great revolution
of Iran, to which we have given ma.ny partisans, to meet our legitimaCe and
just demands. We demand an end to poverty, privat~on and backwardness.
It is clear that despite the importunity of some political administrators
of the military occupation, there exists in the minds and hearts of everyone
a spirit of huma.nity and reasonableness concerning the issues of Kordestan.
Accordingly we propose to the government that it immediately end all militaxy
activities, recall the army, put an end to trials and publication of opinions
in the revolutionary courts, and annaunce its readiness for peaceful polit-
ical negotiations concerning solutions for Ko.rdestan. In sum, we propose
two things: An immediate and prompt end to military activities, and govern-
ment readiness to discuss and search in a peaceful way for a political
solution to the problems of Kordestan."
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IRAN
GOVERNMENT DESCRIBES PLAN TO SETTLE KURAISH CRISIS
Tehran BAI~AD in Persian 28 Oct 19 pp 1, 3
/Article: "Plan ~To Eliminate Kurdish Cr3.sis Is Approved by Emam"/
/Text/ Yesterday afternoon a four-man committee consisting of Hashem
Sabbaghian, minister of the interior, Daryush Foruhar, minister without ~
portfolio, Dr Chamran, minister of national defense, and Yadollah Sahabi,
minister without portfolio and guardian of the Plan and Budget Organiza-~
tion, whom the government had t~vsigned to investigate the Kordestan crisis,
was received by Emam Khomeyni in Qom in.the company of Gen Shaker, joint
chief of staff of the military, and the commanders of the National Gendarm-
erie and the Army of Guards . .
According to the report by BAIyIDAD's correspondent in Qom, following Chis
session and the visit which lasted 2 hours, Hashem Sabbaghian~ the minist-
er of the interior, stated, with reg~ard to the results of the committee's .
discussions wiCfi the emam:
' "The conversation revolved around the axis of problems and issues of
Kordestan and the plans which must be brought to the implementattion stage
in that ostan, which were accurately conveyed to the emam by Che four-man
committee of ministers and the commanders of the army and the Army of
Guards, were ratified by him, and will soon be carried out in the region."
In answer to BAI~IDAD's question on how the matter of Kirdestan's problems
will be resolved with the entry of Daryush Foruhar into tbe ministerial
council charged with inves tigating the issue of Kordestan, Hasham Sabbaghian
said,
"Our staff has been supplemented and the government committee has approved
having Mr Foruhar also joining the tripartite ministerial group.
Regarding the issue of the committee's travel to Kordestan, Sabbaghian
said "The issues of this co~nittee are political, military and develop- ,
mental." Regarding a rumor on the reorganization of the cabinet, Sabbaghian
said, "I have no information on this subject. These matters are the style
;
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of correspondents." In responae to a question whether the commLttee would
be going to Kordeatan following the discussiona with the emam, Sabbaghi~n .
8aid "Naturally the co~nittee will go to Kordestan."
- It has been learned that Daryush Foruhar's recommendations and view~ on
eliminatins the Kordestan crisis, which were publiahed in yesterday'e is-
aue of BAIvIDAD, including the departure of the Army of Guards frc Kordestan,
the transfer of their duties to the gendarmerie and police, and inv~stiga-
tion of the conditions of the revolutionary courts in this ostan, we~e ap-
proved at yesterday's meeting.
Condition of the Region
At the conclusion of ineetings with the emam on the current situati.on of
Kordestan, Abu Sharif, operations commander of the Army of Guards, told
� PARS News Agency's reporter "In general the region is quiet now except for
the towns of Bukan, Mahabad and Baneh, where scattered shooting is t~king
place."
Government Announcement
~ With Daryush Foruhar's inclusion in the tripartite committee, the ministers
charged with investigating the Kordestan crisis and the ~ove.rnment's meas-
ures for eliminating the dispute in Kordestan and creating muCual undex--
standing in this region have assumed broader dimensions.
Last week, following one meeting, the government presented Hashem Sabbaghian,
the minister of the interior, Dr Chamran, the ministex of na~iox?al deL�ense,
and Sahabi, the minister without portfolio and guardian of the Plan and
Budget Organization, as plenipotentiary government representatives to in-~
vestigate the Kordestan crisis and delegated its powers to them.
When this committee was presented, Daryush Foruhar went to Qom, had ax~
audience with the emam, and conveyed a report on the resules o� his sec~nd
trip and his discussions in Kordestan to the emam. Following his visit to
the emam, the country's National Security council examined Foruhar's recom-
mendations concernino Kordestan at an important meeting, the upshot of
which was the announcement which was published in the following for.m by the
government yesterday afternoon:
"In view of the concern which the lofty leader o� the revolutiun and the
government cabinet have always had for the deprived ostans of the country,
including the border areas of Kordestan, hoping to resolve the issues and
prob~ems of these regions as easily and quickly as possible, the council
of ministers has approved delegation of its powers conderning the develop-
mental, cultural, military, welfare, and budget affairs bearino on Kurdish-
inhabited ostans to a four-man committee composed o� Eng Hashem Sabbaghian,
minister of the interior, Daryush Foruhar, minister without poxtfolxo,
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Mostafa Chamran, minister of defense, and Eng Ezzatollah Sahabi, miniater
without portfolio and guardian of the Plan and Budget Organization. For
their part and that of the other ministers, this committee and its pleni-
potentiary represnecessars ordersaines lvingPtheeadministrativedmatterss
and proclaim th Y
and varioua problems of the region." _
?~i
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IRAN
CENTRAL BANK GENERAL DIRECTOR DECLARES GOVERNMENT HARD ~iTRRENCY POLICY
Tehran BAI~IDAD in Persian 4 Nov 79 pp 1, 9
/Article: "Central Bank General Director Declares Government Hard Currency
Policy"/
/Text/ Dr Mohammad Ali Mowlavi, director general of the Central Bank of
Iran, explained the Central Bank of Iran's views on severing the link be-
tween the rial and the dollar and the country's economic, fiscal, hard cur-
rency, monetary and credit policies in an exclusive inCerview with BAI~AD.
At the start of his interview, Dr Mowlavi, referring to the link between
the rial and the dollar, stated "From the start of my work in the Central
Bank, I, together with my colleagues, have been intending to consummate
the severance of the link between the rial and the dollar, which has been
a national Iranian demand. However, it goes wiChout saying that in order
that this great�action may be carried out, studies must be made and all.
- aspects of it must be examined.
"Since a basic portion of our payments, as well as our deposits, is in dol-
lars, we must be careful lest by taking a hasty decision we be harmed in
cutting off the link between the dollar and the rial. For this reason I
have carried out preliminary studies; bhis matter will be acted upon in
the very near future without any kinu ol dau?a~c or loss and the link be-
tween the dollar and the rial will be severed."
Dr Mowlavi then referred to the issue of the country's hard currency policy
and added, "One of the current problems of the Central Bank is handling th~
country's hard currency policy. In the past, since foreign curxency was
free, the Central Bank did not interfere in hard currency transfer matters
except in special situations. This nonintervention caused the previous
regime to adopt unreasonable hard currency policies and lead the country
~ toward bankruptcy. However, following the triumph of the revolution, by
orders of the leader of the revolution, confirmed by Eng Bazargan, the
prime minister, to the effect that the nation's hard currency and the
national capital must not be plundered without cause or reason, we have
taken the categorical decision to create a specific foreign currency
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' policy although the Central Bank has not been ready and prepared Co carry
out a new foreign currency policy. Of course a limited group of people
who cannot export the /is/ enormous volume of hard currency as a consequence
of this policy are dissatiefied but the abeolute majoriCy of the Iranian
people, who beliave in the revolution, have endoreed our dacisiona."
Differing Views
Mowlavi pointed out, "In general, there are two differing viewa regarding
hard currency. Some people expect all the income derived from oil revenues
to be spent on capital investment in the country and even wonder what neec'
there is for the country to allow people to travel, believing that the
transfGr of foreign currency must be avoided by all means. Others believe
that the hard currency obtained from oil exports must be spent on the es-
sential expenditures of all the people in the country and that often in
the past the government made commitments which we cannot ignore, among tliem
to our students, who are this country~s capital, and whom we can~ot put
into difficult straits or render homeless by not offering hard currency
for their foreign expenses. Here the government's policy is to adopt a
moderate policy between the two views, both carrying out its commitments
and invigorating the country's economy through capital investment on the
one hand and preventing the smuggling of hard currency, which has increased,
in any way possible, on the other. It i,s to be taken for granted, though, _
that the government must pay the necessary expenses of certain classes of
people, including students and sick people, and certain necessary expenses.
On the other hand one must note the important point that we cannot store
up foreign currency and not spend it, since the main portion of the country�s
income comes from the sale of foreign currency. If we do not sell hard
currency for rials, we will not be able to meet our rial costs. In any
case the government has adopted a moderate policy in this matter, on the
one hand spending the country�s hard currency reserves on necessary ex-
penses and on the other erecting a barrier before smuggling and embezzle-
ment." "
New Regulations `
Mowlavi then said, "At the present time we are in the process of preparing
new regulations. These will involve imports in the first stage. In this
regard our policy will be to carry this process out in the short term,
with fluctuations in the foreign currency rate, and the government's policy
depends on being able to stabilize the foreign currency rate related to im-
ports and not allow inflation to spread throughout the country through im-
ports. Regarding sCudents, although contrary and contradictory educational
certificates reach us and forged educational certificates are even sent
~ from certain countries, there is nonetheless no thought for immediate
change as regards real students and no change will be made in their foreign
currency allotments. In this regard we are also engaged in drawing up
special regulations and will determine their expenses through the Ministry
of Higher Education and the Ministry o~ Foreigu Affairs so that students'
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expenses in all countries will be determined. After the concluaion of the
coming academic year, we will accordingly set out new regulations so that
forei~n currency will really be sent to studenta. Very many times peopLe
exploit this situation, and we have obtained some certificates for certain
individuals who are 45 or SO and are still engaged in studyinge In any
event until the end of the coming academic year no changes will be made in
students' hard currency aituation and all rumors which have been or are
- being spread about in any way are to be strictly disavowed."
Retired Persons
Regarding the sending of hard currency for retired persons, Moha~mnad Ali
_ Mowlavi said, "Some people believe that there is no reason �or us to sel.l
hard c:urrency at the official rate to a group of retired persons; if any-
one wa;~ts to live abroad he should provide his means of livelihood himself
or at least get hard currency from the government at the unofficial price.
All in all, we are in the process of drawing up new regulations for retired
persons and other groups which must use foreign currency, and these regu~a-
tiona will soon be implemented following ratification by the Economic
Council and the Money and Credit Councile"
Regarding foreign currency paid to sick persons, Mowlavi said "Tt~e view is
that sick persons should travel abroad only if no possible means of
treatment for them exist inside the country. The Central Bank has had no
means for determining this; as a result of talks which have been held, the
Medical System has agreed to take the responsibility for this, an.d from naw
_ on persons who are sick must refer to the Medical System to receiv~ a cFr-
tificate and receive the necessary certificate for obtaining foreign cur-
rency." ~
i ~
Concerning foreign currency for travelers, Mowlavi said "Until the ratif~.-
cation of the new regulations, no kind of change wi11 in fact be made in
disbursing foreign currency to travelers."
Mowlavi was asked when the new regulations would be announced and he said
"Maybe in 15 days' timee"
Mowlavi then pointed out, A group of people have complained Chat the
Central Bank is changing hard currency regulations every day. This group,
and other protestors, musC realize that we are obligated to delrote atten-
tion to the income derived from oil, which fluctuates, and in the short
range make hard currency policy comply with hard currency revenue policy
and look into the future lest we become burdened with foreign currency re-
serve deficits and not be able to import the goods the nation requires int o
the country."
Hard Currency Acquired from Exports
In response to a question on how much hard currency is rec~eived from ex-
ports, he said "At the present time Iran has no major exports. Our export s
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are restricted Co some traditional goods such as ruga, tragacanth, cumin
and dried fruita and nuts, r~nd a1L the forei~;n currency obtaLned from rhem
does not exceed about $400 or $500 million. We cannot rely on the hard
currency obtained from non-oil exports, but we do believe that urgent
thought must be given to non-oil exports so that we wi11 not only be de-
pendent on oil; this will require a careful export program and other ele- _
ments although the aid provLded by r,he Central Bank will be unstinting."
Mowlavi said, "Unfortunately, the valume o� fraudulen~ invoices related to
certain impvrters exporters has risen, and close attention is not given
to the quality of gacds in some cases either. As has been reported, people
present invoices on the purchase of soma goods ~~rh2re the per-unit cost price
is higher than the international per-unit price; thus these people are try-
ing to keep sorne of the foreign currency for which they have opened credit
outside the country. Conversely, in some cases concerning some exported
goods, the real price of the exported goods has not been determined and
the foreign currency which the Central Eank receives for revenues from ex-
ports is less than the real price of the goods, and here too there is em-
bezzlement. People are trying to keep the hard currency acquired from the
sale of goods outside the country. To be sure, a one-time forgery by an
importer or exporter is equivalent in volume to the foreign currency sold
to 2,000 students and 2,000 travelers. Of course the Central Banlc has be-
come aware of this matter on some occasions, and we have even taken some
individuals to the competent courts and prosecuted them, but the Central
Bank unf ortunately has no control over imports and exports and these prob-
= lems are not in the Central Bank's area of competence."
The head of the Central Bank then referred to the ].ist of persons sending
hard currency out in the days prior to the triumph of the revolution, and
add~d "t�le have prepared a 33-volume list of persons exporting hard currency,
sending one copy of.Chis to the Office of the Prime Minister and one copy
to the Ministry of Justice," persons who want to receive certificates r.iust
refer to these two authori~ies."
Foreign Currency Reserves
In another portion of his interview, regarding t'he country~s foreign ex-
_ change reserves, we said "The country's foreign exchange reserves increased
from 22 September 1979, when they were $10,936,000,000, to $12 billion on
19 October 1979. Of this, the sum of $11 billion is obtained from oil ex-
ports."
Mowlavi added, "The important thing is that our foreign currency is now in
highly-regarded internati.onal banks and that we are drawing $1 billion a
year in interest from the foreign currency. However, my personal view is
that we must not keep our oil revenues in the form of deposits in the
world's banks--we must turn them into capital investments, since a loss of
money is always harmful to the country and ~ae can obtain a greater benefit
from the interest we receive with capital investment."
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In answer to a question on why oil money is computed in dollars, Mowlavi
eaid "This will have no effect on the country's foreign exchange income,
aince the dollars we receive for oil money taday we can exchange for other
money which we ourselves want on the same day. It makes no difference to
oil producing countries if they recefve their money in dollara or some
other highly regarded currency."
The president of the Central Bank of Iran then referred to the status ot
the nationalized banks and added, "I wanted to say that so far there has
perhap s been no more unfortunate Central Bank president than me, since the
CenCral Bank has never had such problems. On the one hand economic prob-
lems and on the other hand the problems of the nationalized banks, foreign
currency regulations, credit and money have taken all my t~.me, night and
day. We have to provide liquidity for the nationalized banks. We musr
pay off their foreign hard currency debts. ~de musr alleviate their intern-
al prob lems and draw up their employment regulations. We are busy arrang-
ing regulations and rules day and night and we hope that we will finally
be able to alleviate these problems in a short period. It is clear that
the nationalized banks must be active, for the economic development of Che
country, and managers who are appointed by the government musC furnish the
necess ary facilities for providing credit to merchants. The specialized
banks, which consist of the Industrial Development Bank, the Agricultural
Developmene Bank, the Agricultural Cooperative Bank, the Bank Sepah, the
Export Bank, the National Bank and the Welfare Bank, which are continuing
their activities independently in accordance with xules and regulations,
have not been merged into any bank, conversely, we also have dectded that
the other banks, in order to be able to compete in a practical sense,
should meanwhile be broken down into two groups, and we will soon determine
their f unctions~so that they may continue their activity."
Mowlavi then said "What is important is to create regional economic de-
- velopment banks; that is, we should create one economic development bank
- in each ostan to avoid coneentration of activities in the capital and con-
centrate the activities related to that ostan in that banl:, which will
have t he independence to give industria~l, commercial and agricultural cred-
its so that people need not refer to the capital for detailed activiti.es."
The Volume of Currency
The president of the Central Bank then referred to the volume of currency
in cir culation, stating "The volume of currency in circulation in February
1979 was 912 billion rials and this has now been reduced to 358 billion
rials. One of the Central Bank's problems is to keep the volume of cur-
rency out of circulation by whatever means possible, and the bank will
~ gradually try to keep the volume of currency in circulation within the de-
sired limits of economic requirements so that it is not greater Chan com-
mercia 1 transactionse Of course, if the volume of goods is oreater than
the volume of currency in the market, this will be counter-inflationary
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and result in a drop in prices. In any event, the effort is to have the
volume of currency in circulation within the economic orbit conform to the
volume of commercial transactions and respond t o the volume of economic
yielda."
Mowlavi, concluding the firat portion of his interview, streased that any
decision made by the Central Bank of Iran regarding its functions will be
presented to the nation with total frankness, that any kind of publication,
rumor or statement which is uttered or published by bodies without author-
ity regarding the functions of this bank, inc2uding hard currency, hard
currency reserves, money, credit, the printing and circulation of currency,
deposits or savings, must not be heeded by the Iranian people, and that
those who mislead people's thinking on these matters are wittingly o~ un-
wittingly giving aid to the counterrevolution. .
Takin~ part in Mohammad Ali Mowlavi~s interview with BAMDAD newspaper were
Dr Qasimi, manager of Economic investioation and studies, Dr Abu Hoseyn,
chief of the foreign bureau, Khoshtinat, head of the currency circulation
department, Khalil Azar, deputy credit director, and Liqva'i, director gen-
eral of public relations of the Central Sank of Iran.
11837
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,
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IRAN
INFLATION, UNEMPLOYMENT THREATEN IRAN~S FUTURE
Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 28 Sep 79 p 1
[Editorial: "On the Road to Collapse"~
~Text~ The economic situation in Iran has become so deplorable since the
installation of the "Islamic" regime that M~ehdi Bazargan himself admits
that only 50 percent of the industries are in operation and those at half
capacity. He adds that unemployment has reached 20 percent. Of course
Bazargan intentionally forgot to say that this 20 percent unemployment
figure is in relation to employment 4 months ago and according to a study
by the Internationa.l Bank this figure has now reached 31 perceni~ (2-3
million people) and inflation is above 100 percent. The temporary prime
minister has not wanted to say that if the situation continues this way
throughout the winter Iran will break the world record for inflation and
that actual unemployment, now the highest in the world, will transform
a wave of discontent into a revolutionary wave.
One of our country's leaders in a recent interview compared Ayatollah
Khomeyni to someone who hijacks an airplane, but due to a lack of under-
standing of navigation is unable to guide the airplane and can do noChing
but crash. Khomeyni, who is not even the most knowledgeable of our
theologians, has no knowledge c~f political science, and at 79 he is too
old to learn. The noble Irani.an revolution took him out of the pulpit
and placed him in the seat of power, and now, seated there, he still con-
tinues to seYmonize as he did in the mosque. His sernwnizing has an
audience of millions but in runaing the country, whether the regime be
dictatoria 1 or democratic, sermonizing cannot implement any plan.
In zhe final months of the Shah's regime we ourselves said that the Shah
had set the country back several decades politically. We must now add that
this retrogression, thanks to the regime of the Shah-mullah, has also begun
economically and socially.
At a time when the world is preparing itself for thousands of years in the
future, it would be regrettable if we were to fa11 behind thousands of years.
It is a na.tional duty of noble Iran to put a stop to the current decline of
our dear country.
9310
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IRAN
STEEL r1ILL PRODUCTION CAPACITY INCREASED BY 2 MILLION TONS A YEAR
Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 29 Oct 79 p 10
/Article: "Steel Mill Production Capacity Increased by 2 Million Tons a
Year"/
/Text/ With the promulgation of the steel mill expansion plan, which is
being carried out at a cost of $600 million, this industrial facility's
productive capacity will be increased to 1.9 or 2 million tons in 18
months' time.
In announcing the mat~er, Jalaloddin Ashtiani, managing director of the
steel mill, stated "Following the revolution, steel output was very low,
as a consequence of strikes and unemployment as well as a lack of coal and
the slagging-up of the furnaces; fortunately, all these problems have been
eliminated and it is the only industrial facility at the present time whose
production has been above capacity since the revolution." .
Regarding the project to expand the steel mill, the steel mill managing
director stated, "Seventy-five percent of Che op~rations on the second
stage have not been completed; this will be completed in another 18 months,
and full production will start on the second stage of the project 1 year
after the date of the expansion of capacity at the level under discussion."
Ashtiani added, "The cost of this stage has been estimaCed at 430 million
rubles, or $600 million, which is one-third the cost of similar direct re-
duction plants. Five hundred Russian specialists are working to this end."
In another portion of his statem~nt, Ashtiani said "At the present time,
30 billion rials are being placed annually at the disposal of the steel
mill by the Plan and Budget Organization, and steel sales are 24 billion
rials annually; however, since the steel mill is procuring all raw mater-
ials directly and expansion and exploitation operations are talcing place
simultaneously, steel is being produced at a cost higrer than prices on
the European and Japanese markets. However, with proper management and a
decrease in surplus workers, one can avoid factory losses and make output
competitive with foreign output."
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The munct~;in~; director of the steel mill also said, "If we can rr~iae pro-
duction to 2 million tons per year in tlie second stage, s~ee1 sales will
rise to 30 billion rials; under these conditions, the current costs of
this industrial facility will be no more than 50 billion rials."
Concerning steel and coal reserves, he said "Our annual consun~ption ie
1 miilion tons, while the reserves of the Chanarat Bafq coal mi.nes being
exploited have been estimated at 200 million tons and those o~ the Chador-
amlu mines 100 ki lometers from Bafq, Zarand and Gol Gowhar at 400 million
tons.
Describing welfare measures for workers, rhe managing director of the steel
mill stated "We wi 11 need 40,000 people in the first and second sta~es but
there are ~0,000 p eople employed in jobs in the steel mills at the present
time; the workers surplus to the steel mills' requirements will be used in
steel a~1d branch industries." In connection with the housin, problei~i,
Ashtiani said, "P-feasures are actually underway in the area of workezs'
housing and we ~oi 11 allo cate 1.2 billion rials to workers' housing each
year, which is pr ovided by 600 million rials from Plan and Budget Organi-
zaL-ion credits and 600 million rials from steel mill credits. Each year
these credits will be pl aced at the disposal of workers who have no l~ous-
ing so they may build homes in the villages surrounding the fmctory and
the mines, and not be remote from their job environment. Regarding white
collar workers, we will give loans of up to 60 times wages and a minimum
of 200,000 and a maximum of 400,000 tomans."
In conclusion, Ashtiani said: "We intend to establish a purification con~-
mittee so that we can take steps in this field. Of courae a number of em-
ployees who cooperated with Savak in the past have been expelled. Accord-
ing to a bill which has been approved, we will transfer a number of workers
to other organizatiflns and redeem others and will retire the official group
on a basis of employment history plus 5 years' compassionate bonus."
In conclusion, the managing director of the steel mill added "Contrary eo
some peoples' statements, the steel mill was not imposed on us but was one
of the desires of the Iranian people, and we must defend and expand it."
113~7
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IRAN
BRIEFS
JOINT PUBLICATIONS COMMITTEE FORMED--Tehran (PARS)-~The director of
Domestic Publications of the Ministry of National Guidance said that
- the formation of a Joint Publications Co~nittee with representaCives
from the offices of the Imam, the Publications Office, the Revolutionary
Committee and the Ministry of National Guidance would guarantee indepen-
dence of the press. One of the important issues he raised was the
difficulty encountered by publishers in confrontations wi.th the many
centers of authority and in making of decisions in the last few months.
The proposal for forming a joint committee is intended to coordinate
these authorities and is thereby a protection against the dangers threaten-
ing the independenc-YEnRUZrin Persian 27pSeps79~pg1~ b9310e revolution.
(Text~ ~Paris NAME
STABILIZATION IN THE UNIVERSITIES--Tehran (Voice of the Is.lamic Republic)--
Dr Tavasoli, president of the University of L~sfahan, announced yesterday
Referring
that as of September 29 the University of Esfahan will be open.
to the stabilization of the University area and the prevention of probable
battles and confrontations he said that some time ago measures had been
taken and responsible officials alerted. He added that Hojatoleslam
Eshraqi, who had come to Esfahan, during a meeting he held with professors
and students, along with his assurances that the universities are being
purged of some of the extremist individuals and groups, cautioned them to
reconsider their m~des of behavior. ~Text~ ~Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian
27 Sep 79 p 1~ 9310
COOPERATION WITH MILITARY URGED--Tehran (Voice of the Islamic Republic)--
The Public Service Office, with the aim of ineeting manpower needs, called
for volunteers from those who served in the military prior to the Islamic
Revolution from 1974-1979 to voluntarily re-enlist in army regiments or
uniCs of the gendarn?es to assist their brothers in theomi~healslamic Republic
Volunteers for service in the army, air force or ~v'Y Volunteers for
should return to the mi.litary unit nearest their home.
service in the gendarmes or eoli`T~~jul[paris
NAME-YEeRUZnin Persiant or
magistrate nearest their hom
27 Sep 79 p 1~ 9310 � ~
33 ~
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I~.~I~:CU'1.'Ll)N Ol~ ll~rtOSl?XUALS--'Celirln (Various press s~~urces)--The lsla~n.i.c
Kevoliitiunary Courl- ut- Kurdistan convicted two tiomosexuals tor repeated _
tiomos~xual crimes and of corruption on earth, sentenced them both Lu deaLh
and made arrangements to carry out the sentence. Mear_while ttie Islamic
Revolutionary Court or '1'abriz also sentenced an iridividual to death L-or
the crime oL subversion. In the Islamic Court of Kermanshah, Ali Pasha
Iteydari, �-ormerly a sergeant in the army, received a commutation to life
imprisonment for the crimes of murder and suppression of revaluLionarie.s.
['1'ext~ ~Paris NAME-YE 1tU'L ii? Persian 27 Sep 79 p 1~ 9310
I;~NIl3 EXPLOSION--Tehran (Various press sources)--A bomb exploded ar a ga~lier.-
ing on the occasion oF the National Day of Saudi ~lrabia at the honie of: tliat
country's ambassador. kesponsibility was claimed by the OrganizaL-ion to
Avenge Martyrs. The explosion did not injure any of the officials or
foreign diplomats attending the gathering. ~Text~ ~Paris NArIL-YC RU'L in
Persian 27 Sep 79 p 1~ 9310
CUNFLICTING REPORTS--Paris (AFP)--It was announced yesterday that all oI
the Islamic Committees of Tehran excepting those established in police
- stations have been dissolved. An official oF the Central Co~nittee, in
an interview with the newspaper BAMDAD, announced this and specified ttia~
this measure was taken after efforts to purge these co~ittees had railed,
After limiting the number of committees, the recruittnent of iiew peop].e. ~ri.ll
be undertaken. (NAME-YL RUZ--Though the Central Conunittee issued a state-
ment to the effect that the news of committee dissolution was incorrect ~ncl
came out of the inarticulateness of the Central Commi.ttee`s rc~presenr_ative,
the same statement mentioned a basic intention of reducing the number oF.
committees from five to two or three and also of purging the membership ol
unsound individuals and reducing the number of committeemen, which ~aas in
Lact conFirmed by the earlier statement.) ~Text~ ~Paris NAME~YE RUZ in
Persian 28 Sep 79 p 1~ 9310
OIL OUTPUT DROP POSSIBLE--Tehran (FINANC7AL TIMES)-~The announcement o�
the trial of Hassan Nazih, chairman of the Iranian National Petroleum
Department, which took place thanks to Ayatollah Khomeyni, unoffici.al
president of the country of Iran, increased the possibility of_ a sudden
reduction of Iran~s oil output. ~Text~ ~Paris NAME-YE RU'L in Persian -
- 28 Sep 79 p 1~ 9310
llEMOGRATIC PARTY D~MONSTRATIONS BANNED--Tehran (Various press sources)--
This announcement of the night before last was issued by religious magis-
trate Sadiq Khalkhali to the inhabitants of the country's western cities:
The respected inhabitants of the cities of Mehabad, Saqez, Bukan, Baneh
and Sardash are hereby advised that all forms of demonstration and clainiing
of refuge by the Democratic Party are banned by the Islamic Republic of
Iran. Anyone who engages in this type of anti-Islami.c activity will Ue -
prosecuted. ~Text~ ~Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 28 Sep 79 p 1~ 9310
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!ir1:~.;~1N TiA%i}1--Tetiran (Various pr.e.s:; sources)--Saturday the Ctrst meeting
sin~-e tlie resturati~n of Prime rlinist~r I3azargan to the chairr?a.nship was
held by the government administration. During the meeting, 41Y11CI1 lasted
3 hours, the rroposed Ministry of Petr~~leum and the outcomes of the meeting
of ihe Revolutionary Coun.cil were propounded and studied. AJ.1 organizations
belonfiing to ttie Uepartment oi Petroleum will ~ome under the mantle of L-he
new PetroJ.eum ~tir~i.st.ry. The minister of civi.l service, i.n cunnection with
the tact ~liat the revol~ltionary public prosecuror has surnmoned Hassan Nazih
by way of the pr.ime minister, and according Lo ~ahose knowledge Nazih has
not presented himself wirhin the allotte.d i:z~:~e period, said, "According to
intormatzon he has given us, whicYt may not be reliab].e since Nazih had not
come to the prosecutor's office as of 5 pm, ir has been arran~~,~.d that he
wi11. be inter~ai.e~aed at another location." As of the end of the day Sunday
there had been ito news puUlished concerning the interrogation ~f Has~an
Nazih. [Text~ CYa~ris NP,~~-YE RU~: in Persian 28 Sep 79 p 1~ 9310
ELECTRIC POWGR PLANTS--~ng Taj, minister of powery announced the m;.nistry's
future p'_ans for meeting the country's electrici.ty consurnption. Regarding
the Ativaz potaeY plant, he said that 40 percent ~~f constructic~n activicies
on l-his power plant have been completed. This plant, which will be con-
structed with the cooperation ot the Soviet Union, will comprise four 315-
megawatt units, one of which is operating now; work on two others has been
started, and one is half tompleted. This plant will be in use in 2 years,
according to the plan set forth, and more than 1,250 megawatrs will thus
be added to the country's nationwide electricity grid. Russian and Iranian
experts are now engaged in completing this plant. Taj adde3, "Priox to Che
' rc~v~lution, an a;;reement f or t he construction of f our 200-megnwatt units in
t~s~ahan was signecl with the Soviet Union, and, in the course of discussions ~
held recently, the decision was reached for the Soviet Union to operate in
accordance with the substa~ice of this agreement and to begin transporting
the equipment and machinery for this power p1anC.'~ Another power plant be-
ing completed is the Naka comp lex, which is to be considered one of the
biggest fuel-operated powFr plants in the ~~orld. One 440-megawatt unit ?n
this complex is operating now and, if this trial operation is successful,
it will be hooked up to the nationwide grid and put to use in another month.
In conclusion, Taf complained abaut excessive electricity conaumption by
the people of Tehran and said "When we fly over Tehran we see that this
city is many times brighter than Moscow or B~udapest; although the electric-
ity output of these two cities is greater than that of Tehran, the_people's
extravagance makes Tehran several times brighter than Ch~y are." /Text/
/Tehran BArIDAD in Persian 30 Oct 79 p 10/ 11887
IRANIAN STUDENTS CRITICIZE REGIME--The occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Teh-
ran and Ayatollah Kh~meyni's ~emand for the extraditioii of the shah from the
United States is not in fact directed against the United States but a more
or less desperate attempt by Khomeyni to regain his failing pop~xlarity. Tris
is stressed by representatives of the Iranian Students' Union in Sweden.
They think that the occupation damages Iran's prestige abroad. (Sture -
Johansson) reports from Goeteborg: (Nadim Ma.nuchehr), a representative of ~
the Iranian Students' Union in West Sweden, thinks that the support en~oyed _
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by Khomeyni among khe people of Tehran is greatly declining as a result of
great unemployment, nonappearance of promised reforms and the persecution of
national minorities in Iran. [Begin (Manuchehr) recordir.g] Khomtyni's re-
gime has not fulfilled the (?promises) given when he came to power. He has
declared war against different minorities in Iran, for example, ~he Kurds,
and he has not ~~een able to manage this war either politically or militar-
ily. He wants in some way to make the people forget all this and to whip
up another wave of revolution among the people and regain the support oI
the people as well as regain his lost popularity. [end recording) [Text]
LD121952 Stockholm Domestic Service iu Swedish 1700 GMT 12 Nov 79 LD]
CSO: 3109
.
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ISRALL
BEGIN'S CLAIM TO BE 5TUDENT OF JABOTINSKI REFUPID
Jerusalem AL-~UDS in Arabic 9 Oct 79 p 1
[Editorial: 'The Student of Jabotinski"~
[Textl Last Sunday evening, on the program 'The Week in an Hour," Israeli tele-
vision broadcast a segment in xhich some Israeli leaders reviewed the historl-
cal attempts and various contacts to achieve peace from 1948 to the present.
Our attention xas attracted by Current Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin's
oft-repeated statement to the effect that he considerss himself a student of
Jabotinski, that the latter is his teacher whose footsteps he folloxs and ac-
cording to whose teachings he conducts his policy~ and that he has adopted mar~y
of his te~,chings .
Ne knoW that the Herut Party~ led by Begin~ is an extension of Jabatinski's
leadership, and at the same time is an extensian of the reform movemen~ founded
by Jabatinski, xhich historians of the Zionist movement consider the strongesto
most radica.l~ most obstinant Zionist movement adhering to the let~ter a~ the
Zionist doctrine.
From looking =.t selections from a book xritten in 1940 by Jabotinski~ called
"The JeHish War Front," one sees that in the above-mentioned book Jabotinski
dreamed that world Zionism had. succeeded in establishing a Jewish state in Pal-
estine having a Jexish ma3ority and a considerable Arab minority. The author's
imagination expanded, and with his movement's executive bureau he drew up his
conceptions of the rights xhich ought to be granted to the Arab minority.
We looked up these proposed rights and began comparing them with the stands
of the Herut Party ard its leader Begin. and xe drew the falloxing conclusinn:
either Begin is not a student of Jabotinski, or he is an unsuccessful one.
Jabotinski and his movemsnt's executive committee had broad horizons~ and
according to their concepts they xould give the Arab minority complete auton-
on~y including land, and the ri~ht to enact laws, impose ta~ces, full.y supervise
educa.tion~ and fill state positions accoxding to numerical percentage. Arabic
xould be considered a completely official language.
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We remind Begin of Article 5 of the resolutions of his professor Jabotinski,
pertaining to "land~" and we ask him, as long as he still considers himself
a successful student, to reread that paragraph and compare his present behav-
ior with the contents of tha~t paraB~raPh�
Our examination of Jabotinski's book is aimed at point ing out 'Lionist contra-
dictions ar~d affirming that Zionist aspirations are be coming more extravagant
and radical by the day.
We xant to stress that Jabotinski~ even xith his radica.lism and excessiveness~
xas thinking of building a bridge betxeen Arab and Jex Khile creating the p~-
tential f'or "peaceful coexistence" between the txo peoples. His current stu-
dent is working to destroy not ~ust one bridge but all bridges~ and to buzy
the theory of peaceful coexistence in the depths of the gr~,ve before it even
sees the light.
- An unsuccessful student--nut ~ust in relation to his professor Jabotinski, but
xith respect to all the peace movements in the Arab east.
We Kill return to discuss Jabotinski's book in dstail, since it is our right
and the right of coming generations to study those peopleS' method and nu~nner
of thinking.
8559
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ISRAEL
EDITORIAL DEPLORFS 'HEROIC' STATFMEI~I'S ABOIII' SAIE OF I11NI?
Jerusalem AL-~IIDS in Arabic 1 Oct ?9 p 1
[Editorials "Vehement Claim of Seriousness and Frantic Clamor"]
[Text~ Israel has permitted Tsraelis to b~y land in the occupied territories,
thereby permitting an act xhich Has not ori.ginally forbidden. Most people
might nOt knox that the Qeren Qayyemet established a brancll
under the name "Hamnuta," in accoidance with West Bank lax~ and made a West
Bank city its headquarters. ,1s an Arab compar~y it bought Arab land, most~y
xith dubious deeds and through person~ asauming the chara.cter of someone else.
~ The HaWSan village real estate issue is but one overt ma.nifestation of this
company's activities.
Sadly and unfortunate~y~ this Israeli step atirred up an outcry at home and
abroa.d. Within the country~ people started talking, daytime heros and night--
time bats ~ and held secret ~ serious meetings in the manner of James Bond.
Their meetings resulted in the issuance of heroic~ visionary statements to
c learly prove tha.t they didn't knox xhat Nas ha.ppening in their country. They
didn't have enough time for such lucrative activities, and they were preoccupied
more xith statements than xith any other profitable activity. These statements
will not save a single one of our country's stones from being lost~ nor Kill
they protect a single oak tree of our country's forests. These people disba.nd- _
ed after demonstra.ting their ignorance and arousing the 3aughter aand derision
of their enemies. The verse "0 nation at whose ignorance all the nations
laughed" is applicable to them.
Do those heros know how the land is leaking asray to non-Arabs? Do those
heros know that ' Adasa Pond in Bayt Hanina ~ and the lands of Kafr ' Aqab, and
the lands of al-Baq i� ah ~ and the property of the aatinah family i.n Jerusalem
xere sold xith forged deeds? Do those heros I~ox that some of those xho sign-
ed the deeds as sellers died scores of years ago? Do they kno~r that thQ Is-
raeli security authorities are not takir~g legal steps against the forgers,
liars and swindlers? If they knox all this~ and still issued those horoic
statements, then that is a calamity. If they don't knox, then the cala.mity
is greater. The sale of land cannot be dealt xith by obsolete methods, but
by other methods Which thos~ xho claim to preside over patriotic action ought
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to icnow. Qtherr+ise~ let them be silant, and be content xith what they are
familiar xith.
'1'he feverish outcry ha,s spread to the Arab xorld and it ha.s fallen into the
same trap. We �ind that this xorld has the excuse of being very ignorant
about us.
Recently, AL-QUDS reprinted the Kuxaiti paper AL-WATAN's editorial about the
purchase of land from xhomever xants to sell. It xas a serious editorial
callin~ to wind the tragedy of the "National Fund." We don't xant the land to
be sold~ neither to Israelis nor to Arab caPital. The obvious, fxank answer
is tfia~ even -if. Israe]. would not resort to appropriation, confiscati~n r~nd
dectarati.on ot closed military zones, tlieu we still would not ~oant to sell.
lde will adhere to this stand. _
The land is the nation and if xe lose the land xe lose the na.tion. Whoever
has no land has no nation.
8559
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IS1~AI:L
COMMENTARY ON APPOINTr'IGNT OF HURVITZ AS EL AL IiEAD
Jerusalem 'THE JERUSALEM POST in English 14 Nov 79 p 3
- [Article by Ze'ev Schul~
[~reXt] Is El A1 headed for brighter ekie~ or for a
crash landing aaks T~e Poet's ZE'EV
SCHZJL in this viewpoint story lollowing the
surpriae appointment of Avraham Shavit aa'
the airline's new board chairman yesterday.
The nomtnation of lndustrial Unprofltable ~chedulee will al~o be
wunderktnd Avraham "Buma" di~contlnued. Fuel�guzaling 70?
Shavit ae board chafrman of EI A1 Boein~s wtll be dlscsrdsd and tliQht
wtll probably be remembered in the crews, above all, wtll be made to toe
airllne aa the day llghtning etruck. the llne and tske psy cuts - oc look
3havit may not be much of an avia- tor gnener paeturee elrewhere.
tlon expert - hie specialiaation ia lt ie all the company management
kltchen atovee - but he hae a reputa� hae ever wanted to do to !te etaffere.
tfon as a man who geta thing done. The one remaining queetion is: will
And he uaually 11vee up to thie these meaeure~ save the compauiy,
reputation. and sre all o! them ree?Ily
El A1 wlll thue have the dietinctton nece~eary?
ot becoming the flr~t economic body The company's history containe
to expertence the untender merefes aome slgnlticant pointere that may
of the new P'inance Minister Yigael help answer these que~tions.
Hurvitz. Initially El A1 wea � nondescrlpt
8havit ie Hurvitz'e choice. Thls airline patronlaed by eranks and the
double�barlelled combinatlon bodes tew tasclnated by the thought of
no good for any conservative dlehard "Yiddi~hkelt" several thousand teet
who may st111 be holding on to hi~ up. Whnt eventually "made" the line
deek at El A1 - tor the sirline 1s was 1ts teohnologic,sl ~upremacy.
about to set sn example, one way or Thir wru achieved the day the
another. (then) commercisl msnager,
8o far reporte hsve it thst db� l~tordechai Ben Ari fought for the
mieeals rlght down the line are ~een purclwe ot a couple of turbo prop
as the panaces for El AI'~ ailment~. Brftannles. Thie at a time when Hoe-
Last�in�tirst�out. All this comes ac� ins iets were already !n the offing
companied by addtttonsl rumours of and world travellers and their
meueive ~ale~ of planee and equfp� u`ent~ wen stlll reeling under the
ment, to help trlm the compsny. impact of the Comet (BOAC)
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creahea. Wlth the Comete grounded ataff fa in kcepfng with EI Al'e am-
- and El Al the only non�Britlah bitious network o[ deetlna~lone.
company to operate these aircraft, With the cream eklmmed oft the
El Al'e Hrttanniae made avlatlon market, airlinee muet now contend
news overnight. wlth lower protit margine. Thla aleo
They won and held the Atiantic makee neceeeary new aircraft wtth
~ Blue Ribbon (faeteet crossing) - lower fuel conaumption and faeter
flew the longeat unretuelled dis� turn-around capability.
tances ae the lateet-design aircratt. Management made 1te bid for the
Withln months El Al, which had for European Airbue, but wea denled
1ts flret few yeara been almwt per- tund;ng by the Treaeury. The
eiatently 1n the red, wae equally manaaement ehould have drawn the
tlrmly in the black. The line was not right conclueionn then and there,
to climb out of that pleaeant dark 8nd not waited until now, two yeare
hue again until two yeara ago. too late.
The acquiaitlon of the Britannlae It El A1 is trlmme'd down now it
later enabted the company to bide ite m&y prove diftlcult to undo the
time in taking ite pick of the new
"pure ieta" that followed. The com- damage later. There are, after all,
pany'e aura of technolosical prospecte in aight. Cairo !a one ot
eupremacy pereisted, in epite ot its them. Thie might glve El Al, and tta
uncouth cabin etaff and ground Egyptian counterpart of couree, that
attendante, not to mention atrlkes or extra little edge ot a novelty re-
good, old-taehloned Levantine quired to climb back onto the black.
mn~innns. The crowde atayed with El Once the pilote are dfemiaeed and
Al, and ao did the profite. the crewe diepersed, it will take a
Securlty was another aeaet. Get� long time and tremendoue euma to
ting frlaked waa ae much s part ot get them back.
the El A1 quality ae the ~?ntnyan Hae anyone figured out� how much
prayer on board tranaatlantic it coete to produce an Ieraeli pilot -
flighte. and what hia ioee meane 1n terme of
pure inveatment. Ae reeervfete they
But all tnat evaporated. El Al'e are now part ot the back bone of our
ageing fleet - with the exception of detence. The loea of even ten o[
a few late�deeign Jumbos - looked them (and more than that have
ahabby. The food was indifferent - �already left the country in recent
the cabin crewa (by and large) ditto yeare) te greater than any lose EI Al
and the totlete were hopele~s. Is going to chalk up withln a year or
What El A1 neede to rejuvenate ti two. Thte te !n terme of hard curren�
cy - wlthout coneidering the huu~an
would be new-generation alrcratt. aepecte or bearing in mind that El Al
Something technologlcally ahead the Ie often the balt at the end of a long,
way the Britannias were. "Yid� gruelling afr force etint.
dishkeit" ian't going to win the But thie 1e one aepect that doesn't
paseengere back - eepecially now e e e ry t o f i t i n t o a n y o n e' e
- that the competition of Laker calculationa.
charter fllghta hae cut pricea on the A final unanewered queation; why
London and traneatlantic route to la overatafting blamed for El Al'e
the bone. troiiblee, when i1 ie a fact that ex-
One way ot increaeing occupancy penaee for ataff calculated on_ a
ratee without adding co~te would be paeaenger mile baets are lower than
by means ot newer atrcraft without they are with protlt�making com� _
any lncrease in etaff, although there paniea in the U S� Italy, Canada,
are thoee who argue that the I~resent Switserland and (3ermany - no
namea ment~oned?
CSU: 4820
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JORDIW
AMERICAN DOLUR MEI~fALITY SEEN NO THREAT TO JORDAAi
Jerusalem AL-QtIDS in Arabic 7 Oct 79 p 1
[Editorial: "American Arrogance"]
[Text] King Hwsayn has returned from the United States after staying there
about 2 xeeks~ during xhich time he delivered hia speech to the UN General
Assembly. The king returned xithout having ~wt Preeident Jimuy~r Carter, xhich
is rare xhenever a head of state visits the United States even on an unofficial
visit.
It is no secret that King Husayn xanted and desired this meetingv But Px~s-
ident C~ucter~ expr~ssing his displeasure xith Jozd,an's Arab pollcy~ refuesd
to meet him~ excusing himself by saying that he didn't ha.ve enough tine~ as
reported by NEWSi~FEK in its last issue.
This Aaerican arro$ance and abnormal behavior xil7. not harm K9.ng Husayn. aor
~ill it affect his standing Kith his psople aad the Araba. But ii~ offars nex
p~oof that the United 3tates xill not be a auitable ~ediator for the Pal.eetin-
ian isawe~ and that it hae assused pcsition on the bssi~ of one uapsct ~,nd
he,s cloaed its eyes to all other aspscts.
This conduct also offera nex proof t~at the Unit~d States contiaws to operat~
according ~~o the Dollar Ment,~lity, ~eaning that it believea that it can b~r
the ~+ill of peoples and tsks ovar the reinu of thsir policy b~r payixig dollars.
It ia n9 secret that Jordan rsceivea auppart, sid and loaris frot tha Unit~d
States, snd it is no secret that Jardsn c~?nno~t ~a~ail~r give up this aid. But
in no way does accepting aid nan aurrendering one's political Kill snd sound
nstional line. Jordari prefera adherence to th~ Arab right, and going alaag
with the Arab conmunity sa dictated by Arab int~reste~ to the millions o~
urgently needed dollars it raceives from ~Aarsrica..
Whether America likes it or not, Jordan hae a prin~i'Y~ funda~ental role in
the proble~ af our Arab xorl,d in general and ths Palestiniati c~se in pa.rtic-
ular. Those xho advised the A~ns~rican pi~sai~dsnt to behave as he did xere cloe-
er to utter fgnorance tt~n they xere to the xim~ political couree.
43 ~
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In the pe~st the United States has behaved similarly toxards some of our Mid-
~ dle ~aet atatee. We might mention Turkey as an exaaiple~ tlney suspended aid
to it because of its stand on the Cyprus issua, then came back to box before
the Turkish governioent, ~oaking excuaes for their haaty~ thoughtlesa stand.
This xill not harm Jonian or the Jordanian peePle. In fact~ its econaqy aight
f lourish because of Arab aid. What xill be affected will be the biased Amer-
ican role in the Palestinian cause.
8559
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;
~ LEBANON
t
i
;
LEBANESE ARMY COMMANDER VIEWS SCOPE OF CURRENT TASKS _
;
LD051521 Paris AN-NAHAR AL'-ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 29 Oct-4 Nov 79
pp 10, 11, 12, 13 LD
~ [Interview with Lebanese Army Commander Gen Victor Khuri by Nihad al-Mashnuq
' --place and date not given]
[Excerpt] Question: Should the army command decide to deploy the army in
, the south, what steps could be taken and what would be the obstacles?
Answer: The army's prior3ty task has been and still is to see that the
state's authority is established over all Lebanese territory, particularly
in the south where it is mostly lacking. However, the fact that the question
of the south is linked to a great extent with numerous local, Arab and inter-
national factors could impede the deployment of the army. At present, we
can strengthen our role by standing alongside the UN forces to insure the
implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions. This requires the
Palestinian resistance not to obstruct our task. It also requires inter-
national pressure on Israeli to make it respect Lebanon's sovereignty and
adhere to the armistice agreement concluded with it in 1948.
Despite this, we can enter the south, to change the bitter situation it is
experiencing, provided that political work continues to bolster our presence
there. We do not wish to cause the situation to explode there, but the re-
verse.
Question: What is the nature of the relationship between the Lebanese Army
and the Palesti.nian resistance? What is the position regarding the military
agreements between the aY-my and the resistance?
Answer: There are no agreements b~tween the arnry and the resistance, but
there are agreements between the state and the resistance. These agreements
became obsolete because they were stillborn. Had those who signed the Catro
agreement been able to implement its provisions in a~dvance, they would not
have signed it [sentence as published].
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The c�rrent relations between the army and the resistance are going through
the process of eliminating convulsions and strengthening mutual confidence.
This requtres ef.forts by the Palestinian resistance, so that its dealings
with the Lebaneae Army can be aimilar to its dealings with the other Arab
armies .
The Palestinian resistance took over the south on the disintegration of the
army. The resistance ought to return the south to the army, now that the
army has been rebuilt. Moreover, a military interpretation of the political
Cairo agreement necessitates the presence of two parties; and so far, I have
no presence in the south.
Question: Historically, strang relations exist between the Lebanese mili- ~
tary establishment and its Syrian counterpart. It is observed that th3.s
policy has not been adhered to for quite some time. What is the reality of
Lebanese-Syrian military relat3.ons, discounting the question of the "deter-
rent forces"?
Answer: The relationship between the military personnel is now strong. It
is also strong in the territory where the two armies are present. The exist-
ence of some gaps is not worth mentioning when considering the ultimate
target, namely, the common enemy. Israel occupies the Golan and is commit-
ting aggression against Lebanese territory. Any dispute would be a dispute
among brothers, despite the difficult circumstances in which we are working
and which could be casued by the presence of an army other than the national
army even though a fraternal one. Relations of mutual confidence and coopera-
tion were resorted when the rebuilding of the army started.
Question: How do you view ths Lebanese military position in the event of
war between Syria and Israel?
Answer: What threatens~ Syria naturally threatens Lebanon. Every time
there was a threat, Lebanon honored, and it continues to honor, ifis obliga-
tions within the framework of the joint Arab Defense Counci~. It has not
withheld, nor will it withold it~ capabilities from Syria. If a war breaks
out between Syria and Israel, the Lebanese military position should not be
viewed in isolation from the Arab military position as a whole but within
our capabilities to date. The joint Arab Defense Council is aware of these
capabilities becasue we send it periodical detailed reports on the phases
we have completed in rebuilding the arnry.
Question: Those who oppose the army express their opposition only to cer- ~
tain personnel, whereas nobody is saying anything about the arn?y's policy.
What is the context of this policy, and on what political basis is the pres-
ent buildup being carried out?
Answer: Within our present capabilities we pay attention to the situation
inside the borders and not outside. We refuse to side with one group against
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lnother. We nlso re~use to a11ow one group to overpower another. Our gouls
are modest. We are against anyone who carries arms !.n place of the army, be-
cause according to military regulaCions only the army has the right to carry
arms. Our cause is legitimacy and its defense. Our enemy is whoever
threa tens security from inside or outside our borders.
Question; What is the army co~nand's view of the question of relations with
Israel in the light of accusations that certain political parties have such
relations, and what are the arny's relations with Israel within the joint
armistice commissions?
Answer: It is wrong to call the armistice commission meetings relations with .
Israel. The armistice commission meets under UN supervision and in the
pres ence of UN officers. We try continuously to revive the work of this
commission because it implies Tsraeli recognition of the international bor-
ders provided for in the 1948 agreement. Lebanon adheres to this agreement
in o rder to preserve the security of its borders, despite the attempts by the
Israeli military to evade th.e agreement. Regarding the accusat3.on that
certa in political quarters have relations with Israel, that questien must
be put to them.
Ques tion: The parties that are calling for all security matters in Lebanon
to be entrusted to the army are the very same parties that clash witli the
army. What is the nature of relations between the army and these .forces
- and how do you view their future?
Answer: The question, of course, refers to "the Lebanese front." In fact,
the front believes that the deployment of the army has always been carried
out in areas under its influence and at its expense, while the army is not
deployed in the influence areas of other organizations. The relations be-
tween the army and these parties is the same as between the army and other
parties. Briefly, the idea is to make the army the only force capable of
doing away with excuses for any party, regardless of its characters, to car-
ry arms and to defend the citizens against whatever threatens taem or is be--
lieved to be threatening them.
The army does not want to be deployed in the rea of a particular group to
the advantage of another. The army's plan is to be deployed in the interest
of the Lebanese people as a whole. I believe that the political conflict,
which has turned into armed conflict, must be taken back to its right place
in the democratic institutions.
Ques tion: Some people say that, had the Lebanese Army fought Israel, it
would not have disintegrated, and no one would have dared to stand against
it. Bvidence for this can be seen in the Arab countries that fought Israel
as we11 as in the instances when attack on a Lebanese unit in the south
generated unanimous Lebanese support [for the army].
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Answer: Those who have said these things could be right. But the Jordanian
Army that tought against Tsrael used this as a legal excuse to strike at the
resistance. I do nut wish to do the same. However, I would llke to recall
the belttles that the Lebanese Army fought against Israel in September 1972
deapite the imbalance of sCrength. The army files contain names of scores
of martyrs who fe11 as a result of Is~raeli bombing or operations between
1969 and 1975. I was posted in the south for 11 years, during which I saw
100 clashes between the Lebanese ~Srmy and the Israeli fozces. In 1974 one
single bomb killed 5 officers with one blow in Tyre barracks, and in 1967 we
set up a Palestinian battalion in Tyre and were tensely waiting for the army
_ command's order to fight. But 'Abd a~-N,~~ir's 9 June surrender sent every-
one back to his wor k.
Question: It is being said that you are in constant contact with Sa'd Had-
dad in the border strip and that his salary and the salaries of his troops
are sent to him by the army command. It this true?
Answer: There is no contact with Haddad, not even indirectly. TY.e salaries
have been stopped, and Haddad has been referred to a disciplinary board. He
has been dismissed from the ar~y and is no longer a member of the military.
As for those who are with him, we will look into their cases in the light of
Lebanese law when we are able to contact them and free them from the pres-
sures being brought on. them. I believe that Sa'd Haddad completely lost
control when the kawkaba battalion was dispatch?~ [no further details] and
decision-making became entirely Israeli. Despite the fact that there is no
contact, I woul~. like to ask: Why is the Jordanian regime allowed to be in
contact with the inhabitants of the occupied Wes~ Bank and the Syrian regime
to be in contact with its own people in the occupied Golan, under the slogan
of seeking to liberate the land and the people from Israeli occupation, while
I~ebanon is asked to liberate its land and people by cutting off relation with
those living in the border strip?
Question: Is the Lebanese Army ready or getting ready to take over its
tasks in all Lebanese cities in the event of a security vacuum?
Elnswer: We hope that no security vacuum w~ll occur but rather an organized
deployment of the army. A security vacuum would require rapid political
action by all the parties. The Lebanese Army is now capable of taking addi-
tional security tasks in a number of Lebanese cities, particularly in Beirut,
but it is still in need of close and strong support from the Arab deterrent
forces" so that, gradually and in coordination with these forces, it can car-
ry out such tasks once a political decision on this is made.
I would like to point out there that the rebuilding of the Lebanese Army
should not be interprpted as ending the Arab deterrant forces' task.
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LEBANON
~ BRIEFS
SHAM'UN DIALOG WITH PLO--[Unnamed radio correspondent's 2 November interview
in Beirut with former Lebanese President Camille Sham'un--recorded] [Ex-
cerpt] [Question] Your excellency, in a statement today Abu Iyad [Fatah
Central Committee member] called for a dialog with the Lebanese front. Do
you think that this statement was in response to your repeated calls for a
dialog, and do you agree to meet with him? [Answer] I have not seen the
statement made by Abu Iyad. However, since I have called for a dialog, I ani
ready in principle to enter into one. I have no objection, providing the
~ dialog is based on one principle: That Lebanon has absolute sovereignty
over all its territory and that the question of settling Palestinians in
Lebanon and their acquiring of Lebanese citizenship should not be discussed
in any way. [NC022006 Voice of Lebanor ;Clandestine) in Arabic to Lebanon
1715 GMT 2 Nov 79 NC]
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MOROCCO
L'bITORIAL CRITICIZES UNDENIOCRATIC GOVERNMENT POLICY
C.iSablanca LIa~RATION in French i9-25 Oct 79' '
[ I.ditorial]
[7'ext] The ~_...:onstitutional actions of the Moroccan administrative apparatus
~ no longer need be demonstrated. After the rigging of the results of the
communal elections in 1976 and the legislative elections in 1S'7, after
the flagrant violation of the clauses of the constitution on the right to
strike and the dismissal of 1500 teachers and health officials, this is an
administration which no longer wears kid gloves to prove that texts, laws,
and itbality no longer have intangible value.
The affair of the Municipal Council of Ifni is already testimony to the
manifest lack of constitutionality in the action of the administration.
From that time the question has been: who is responsible for what in this
country? Are we really within the framework of a normal operation of the
constitutional system or is this the more or less whitewashed exception?
Since 3 years after the communal elections, the administration still finds
tl~e means to intervene to mould the political configuration of the Municipal
Council of the city of Ifni, the moves were not so complete on 12 November.
To designate a president in the place of the legitimate president opens the
enigma to two possibilities:
1. Whether this was only one action among so many others to thwart the
opposition in our country particularly since the president of the Municipal
Council of the city of Ifni is an active militant of the USFP [Socialist
Union of People's Forces] and the CDT [Democratic Labor Federation]. He
served a 4-month prison sentence as a result of the strike of teachers last
April. It is as much as saying that nothing but declarations remain of the
Opposition Statute in ~he Moroccan constitutional system. Furtr?ermore
Morocco is in a fair way to gain itself ir~:ernational renown in the art and
style of concocting texts and speeches on democracy and of ignoring them in
the interests of everytliing except democracy. But this two-faced policy is
far from insuring our country the international support necessary to it
in such crucial circumstances as those in which it finds itself. Just as
it only erodes a so precious internal front for national mobilization around
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I
the defense of our national integrity. If one therefor.e passes over in
silenc.e these two aspects of the immediate political viability of the
democratic functioning of Moroccan political life, the other key question
still remains: what mode of. power do the Moroccan government leaders
intend to exercise?
2. If. the affair ot the Municipal Council of Ifni does not forcibly raise
tl~is question, it still raises another just as important question--namely,
~tie reality of the centers of political decision in our ~ountry. In this
aEfair are we facing an initiative which is strictly attributable to local
zeal, an intervention of occult forces in unavowed but very significant
designs, or simply a declared, deliberate, and considered choice of the
government? There are as many question marks as there are indications of
the serious process which our country has been adopting in recent times c.ith
regard to the relationship of those who govern with the governed.
Actually in its smallest machinery, the state reflects this dilution of
responsibilities. And perhaps the explanation of the paradox of the govern-
mental action may be found here: the total absence in serving the masses
but omnipresence to oppress or even domesticate them. One cannot even speak
any more of a tentative aborting of democratic experience, since the truth
is that it is complete reality.
So? Is it necessary to search for the mor~ plausible of the two possibilities
or can one anticipate a reply from the circles concerned anyw~iy? Both
certainly place the constitutionality of the administrative action and its
power at the center of the national preoccupations. For a�ter all it is a
question of knowing if the individual as well as the collect=~~e possess
even a modicum of legal protection against the "supra-constit~iticzal
administration. It goes without saying that it is not a statement o~ the
texts which is demanded here. For a long time now the texts have had only
a formal significance. After a11, does the government not permit itself
to interpret them unilaterally, independently of the imperative legal
procedure for such action? The aff air of the dismissal of the teachers
and the health office~s is in a fair way of becoming a milestone in distortion
of. the law.
Concretely, the government is calle~ upon to break the silence it has
adopted on the subject of Ifni. But not for the pleasure of the Chamber of
Representatives. It is with regard to the credibility of the Moroccan _
constitutional system that the attitude of the government is the determining
factor. Through its position the government will prove what exists and
what no longer exists of the "democratic ex,~erience" as intrinsic value.
Let us point out, however, that for us the time or illusions is long since -
past. On the contrary, the timP for frankness is still with us. Frankness
in action and frankness in intentions are still the two fundamental terms of
all frank and above all durable and beneficial relations for the future of ~
Morocco.
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In any case, this affair shows, if there is any need to, that democracy is
still to be built in our country. And that those who believe that they are
able to change the papular will no lenger have illusions. The struggle
will be continued at Ifni as everywhere else for an ideal which goes beyond
- the framework of political principles because of its historic significance
in our country: democracy.
6108
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MOROCCO
FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES SAHARA PROBLEM, EGYPTIAN AID OFFER, PURCHASE
OF U.S. WEAPONS
Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 13 Oct 79 pp 24-25
[Interview With M'Hamed Boucetta, Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs, by
Basim al-Mu'allim; "No Egypt~an Army in Mor~cco; We Will Purchase Weapons
From United States and From Others; Morocco Abides by Its Position Toward
Camp Davi~. Accords and Egyptian Regime; Plan Aimed at Providing African
Countries With Outlet on Atlantic Ocean"]
[Text] New York--Since the OAU [Organization of African Unity] summit that
was held in Monrovia last August and the resolution of the Committee of
Africa's Sages to conduct a referendum in the Western Sahara, the conflict
over the Sahara has been assuming two forms: A military form reflected in
Morocco's annexation of (Wadi al-Dhahab) province and in the quick attacics
staged by the POLISARIO forces and a diplomatic form reflected in the
mediation initiatives made by Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba and PLO
Chairman Yasir 'Arafat, and recently by King Khalid of Saudi Arabia.
~ M'Hamed Boucetta, the Moroccan minister of foreign affairs, has come to
the United Nations to declare to its General Assembly his country's posi-
tion vis-a-vis the Sahara conflict and to reveal the contents of the mes-
sage which the Moroccan monarch had sent to the President of Liberia wtio
is the current OAU chairman.
On th~is important message, on the Arab mediation initiatives and on Egyp-
tian President Anwar al-Sadat's declaration that he is prepared to send
Egyptian troops and war material to Morocco, AI.-MUSTAQBAL has conducted
the following interview with the Moroccan minister of foreign affairs:
[QuestionJ How do you assess the Arab initiatives to settle the dispute
between you and Algeria over the Sahara, especially the latest endeavor
made by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and King Khalid's visit to the Libyan
Jamahiriyah for this purpose?
- [Answer] The fact is that this so-called Sahara issue was presented to
the Arab group in the fir~t summit held in Rabat in October 1974 and at-
tended by all the Arab heads of state at the time. They asked questions,
requested explanations and familiarized themselves with the dossier of
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the issue and ended up with a united view toward the issue, including A1-
geria. Everybody knows that this area, i.e. the Western Sahara area, is
a part of Morocco that was under Spanish colonialism. There was absolute
Arab support ~t the time for supplying Morocco with all the material and
moral aid to liberate this part of its soil. A change then took place
in Algeria's position, thus turning this part of the Arab world into a
point of tFnsion and conflict.
[Question] What is the position of the Moroccan opposition toward this
issue?
[Answer] We can be sure that all the Moroccans are unanimous that this
issue is a national issue and that this spot must be restorPd to Morocco.
There is opposition insofar as the other economic or cultural issues are
concerned but there is absolute consensus over the Sahara issue. I would
like to add that an initial mediation was made by the Arab countries in
1975 and was followed by other mediations whenever tension occurred in the
area for fear that the conflict might turn into a comprehensive and destruc-
tive war. One of the latest mediations was made by President Habib Bour-
guiba who asked King Hassan II and the Algerian President to hold a meet~ing
between them so that they may study whatever may bring the two cour.tries
closer to one another. Morocco's response to the convocation of the meet-
ing was positive and i~nediate. But regrettably, the other side di:~ t~ot
agree, saying that the matter d~es not concern it but rather concerns the
so-called POLISARIO. I have learned while in New York that after his
visit to the Libyan Jamahiriyah, His Majesty King Khalid may be in cont~lG~
with Habib Bourguiba on the issue of the mediation. I Yiave nothing so for ~
to indicate that there is agreement on a meeting to�take place for this
issue. But there are signs that demonstrate a sincere desire for His
Majesty King Khalid and President Bourguiba to bring the views of Morocco
and Algeria closer to each other, or at least to try to get King Hassan
and President Chadli Bendjedid to meet with one another. This is all I
have on this issue at present.
[Question] Do you welcome these efforts?
[Answer] Yes, and this was our attitude toward President Bourguiba~s re-
quest. There is no change in our position that welcomes any mediation that
may contribute toward settling this issue.
[Question] When President Chadli Bendjedid assumed power, it was said
that one of his concerns was to settle the Sahara issue. Have contacts
taken place between the two governments on this issue?
[Answer] No contact has been made. We have heard what you ~ust ~entioned
about the presence of the desire to settle this issue which in fact is an
issue between Morocco and Algeria. You know that large parts of Morocco
were annexed to the Algerian administration when the French ruled the area.
The French believe3 that Morocco was on its way to independence some day
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whereas they considered Algeria a part of the French soil. This i.s why
they stripped away parts of Morocco and annexed them to Algeria, as I have
already said. These are the areas of (Tanduf, Bishar) and others. Some
exr.;lanation can be found for the pressure currently exerted over the West-
eri: Sahara issue in Algeria's fear that Morocco may renew its demand for
these areas whereas Morocco has always tried ta surpass this issue of
borders.
[Question] What are Morocco's conditions for settling the Sahara issue?
[Answer] Morocco has no conditions whatsoever. The Sahara issue is the
issue of completing the unity of the Moroccan soil and of regaining what
was usurped by the European colonist. A very important initiative has
found its way to the light in the past few weeks and I will announce it
officially in the name of Morocco in the speech that I will deliver to the
UN General Assembly. King Hassan sent last month a message to the Presi-
dent of Liberia, who is also the current OAU chairman, asking him to con-
sider the Sahara as a number of areas, some of which fall under the Moroc-
can control and some under the control of other countries adjacent to the
Sahara, and stating that this area should be an area of cooperation and
peace for the area's peoples. This initiative seeks to realize numerous
goals, some of which are linked to the OAU charter's provision that seeks
~ to turn the area into a means of cooperation among the members who belong
to it. The initiative also seeks to realize one of the goals desired by
both the Arab group and the African group, namely cooperation between the
Arab and African countri.es. This is in addition to the endeavor to estab-
lish an Arab-African-European dialogu2. All this can produce positive re-
sults f~r the Western Sahara that borders numerous Arab and African coun-
tries. This initiative also seeks to realize another important goal,
namely to enable some countries that have no sea outlet, such as Mali,
Chad and the Niger, to get such an outlet through the said cooperation.
[Question] Is this goal different from the trans-Sahara railroad?
[Answer] No. The railroad project seeks to link the noxth with the south.
The cooperation I am talking about seeks to link the north with the south
and the east with the west.
[QuestionJ As long as the discussion is on the Arab countries' relations
with the African countries, then why don't we talk about Morocco's rela-
tions with an Arab African country, namely Egypt? President al-Sadat has
expressed his country's readiness to advance military aid to Morocco. He
also said recently that 700 Egyptian troops were martyred in the battle-
- field with the Moroccans. Do you have any comment to make on this state-
ment?
[Answer] Several statements have been carried by the wire services and
the press. What I know is that the Moroccans are extremely sensitive to
whoever supplies them with aid to defend their territories. This initia-
tive by President al-Sadat has been received by the Moroccans with under-
standing and acceptance. However, as far as I know, President al-Sadat
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declared that he will supply Morocco with war materials and not troops.
There is no Egyptian army in the area. However, this does not mean that
in its relationship with Egypt, Morocco has changed or will change its
position toward the commitments that it has undertaken, be they the reso-
lutions a~.dopted by the 1974 Rabat summit or those adopted by the Baghdad
summit. Morocc~ is still com~nitted to these resolutions and will con-
tinue to be committed to them as long as the i~sue continues to be as it
is at present.
[Question] Does this mean that you have accepted weapons and war material
from Egypt?
[Answer] A statement has been made, as I have said, and the natural reac-
tion of any people defending the unity of their soil must be one of under-
standing.
[QuestionJ Does Morocco deny that it has received weapons from Egypt?
[Answer] I cannot deny or confirm. There is a statement and there is a
Moroccan reaction to this statement.
[Question~ Will you purchase weapons from the United States and what is
the position of United States vis-a-vis the request that Morocco has sub-
mitted to purchase weapons from it?
[Answer] Yes, we intend to purchase weapons, as long as we need them, from
the United States and from others. A few months ago, there was procrasti-
nation in the U.S. position on this issue but when the Americans understood
the situation and understood that we are defending our sovereignty and our
land, this procrastination disappeared. Our relations with the American:;
are good at present.
[Question] So, has the United States agreed to sell you weapons and what
types of weapons?
[Answer] There is presently no reservation by the United States on sell-
ing us weapons. I am no military expert to tell you what types of weapons
they are.
[Question] Has the United States exerted any pressures on Morocco to
change its position toward the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli
peace?
[AnswerJ No, there is no pressure. After the Camp David accords, we ex-
plained to the United States the position that we adopted, that we have
abided by and that we will continue to follow. This happened on the occa-
- sion of the visit that His Ma~esty King Hassan II paid to the United States
last November.
[Question] Is there a plan for a visit by His Majesty King Hassan to the
United States this year?
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[Answcr] Not now.
[Question] How do you assess the Moroccan-French relations generally and
the French Government's policy on the Sahara issue?
[AnswerJ France tias always expressed its vi.ew that it wants to remain
neutral toward the Sahara issue. France being more aware of the truth than
others, we ask it to make its testimony that this area is an indivisible
part of Morocco. France, as well as Spaia, knows this but wants to remain
neutral. We leave it to this position of hers. Insofar as other issues
are concerned, our relations with France are good relations.
[Question] Do you think that the ongoing mediations concerning the Sahara
will be positive and that a settlement will be found?
[Answer] I believe that this issue, i.e. the so-called Sahara issue, is
a fabricated issue intended to create tension in the climate of the area.
Morocco is serious in its efforts to turn this area into an area of coop-
eration and solidarity. I hope that the latest initiatives will be posi- _
tive in turning this area into an area of security and cooperation.
[Question] Do you hope [sic] this latest Moroccan initiative will have an
impact on building the Greater Maghreb unity?
[Answer] I very much hope so because we have all grown up with the hope
of unity of the Arab Maghreb. We will work with all our strength to
achieve this goal.
[Question] Do you have an opinion on how to overcome the Lebanese situa-
tion of which you are aware?
[Answer] Lebanon's issue is one of the major issues preoccupying Morocco
and an issue that grieves all the Moroccans. I say this because the
Lebanon that we used to see as the gem of the Arab world has reached this
degree of destruction and evil. We are doing all we can so that the Leba-
nese issue may return to three principl2s:
Respect for Lebanon's unity, respect for its sovereignty and respect for
its independence.
Morocco's reaction to Lebanon`s request for the convocation of an Arab sum-
mit to deal with the situation in the south--a request conveyed by Presi-
dent Sarkis' emissary--has been that it accepts and welcomes the convoca-
tion of this summit as soon as possibl~. We wi11 exert efforts to make
this summit come through. I hope that Lebanon will return as it used to
be, the gem of the Arab world, as I have already said.
8494
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MOROCCO
r
USFP OPPOSITION LEADER DISCUSSES SAHARA PROBLEM, SOCIOECONOMIC PROBLEMS
Casablanca LIBERATION in French 19-25 Oct 79
[Interview with USFP [Socialist Union of People's Forces] leader Abdelwahad--
~ date and place unknown]
[Text] It is, as has become suitable to call it, a social
and political beginning. It is also the beginning of
parliament. We met the president of the opposition USFP
~ [Socialist Union of People's Forces] to examine with him
various questions facing our country.
Question No 1 is that of safeguarding our territorial
integrity in the face of the escalation of aggressions
carried out against our country. The undeclared war
carried on against the Moroccan people by opponents of
our territorial unity requires a mobilization of all
energy, but also a desire, and the political courage
on the part of the government and its majority to
take a certain number of political, economic, and social
steps capable of really consolidating the domestic
front.
What is the role which parliament could play in all this?
Abdelwahad replied to this question.
[Question] The opening of the parliamentary session coincides with what
they call a social and political beginning, of which it is a part. Whae
are the main problems facing the Chamber of Representatives?
[AnswerJ Actually the Chambei� of Representatives has no spec~ific prob lems.
If it were really the mirror of the nation, these problems would be its
own also. But the problems which the country is debating are man}� and varied
and have found no solution up to now.
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In the first place there is the problem of our territorial integrity, which
Y~as been the subject of two extraordinary sessions, but without the chamber
having the opportunity to engage in a debate in depth on the question with
the government.
In the second place we have been witnessing an increasingly worrisome
deterioration of the economic and social situation which has been aoparent
all throughout what they call the 3-year plan. And then there is especially
the problem of education, which is mortgaging the future of many generations.
Finally there is the problem of individual, collective, trade union and
political liberties which is urgent, particularly since the wave of
dismissals and arrests of teachers, health officers and workers in the private
sector unleashed since last April.
[Question] Let us begin with question No l, which is that of our territorial
integrity. What will be the role of parliament in working out a national
defense policy capable of safeguarding our national gains?
[Answer] Up till now the contribution of parliament has consisted of voting
credits destined for national defense, supplying moral and material support
to our f ighting forces and to all the initiatives in the direction of the
completion and consolidation of our territorial unity, and missions of
explanation and information designed to thwart the mystification propaganda
of the opponents of our territorial integrity on the level of interparliamentary
organizations, international agencies like the UN, and nongovernmental
international organizations.
The USFP opposition has taken several initia.tives in this context. It was
the First to raise an oral question on the Sahara. It asked for a meeting
of the committee of the interior and those of foreign affairs and defense
following the attack against Tan-Tan, as well as holding an extraordin.ary
session devoted to the Sahara affair.
The USFP opposition moreover effectively contributed to the explanation of
the meaning and extent of national unanimity concerning the defense of our
territorial integrity, which actually involves the destiny of our people,
within several international organizations, governmental and nongovernmental,
with friendly political and trade union organizations, and occasionally
even to declared opponents to our national cause.
But all these activities in no way justify the fact that the Chamber of
Representatives does not assume its constitutional responsibilities by
controlling the action of the government and by outlinirig the strategy to
follow.
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[Question] Do the parliamentary delegations which go abroad and which a~e
composed ot members of the majority and the opposition adopt common positior.,;
concerning the different questions raised with the people with whom you speak?
[Answer] The fa~t of being part of a parliamentary delegation does not at
all mean for the opposition that it aline itself with the position of the
government maj ority. Each time we have aff irmed the unanimity of the Moroccan
people concerning our national cause and have expressed our agreement with
the other national political groups on this basic question.
Nevertheless that does not prevent us from explaining, each time that it is
necessary to do so, our specific positions deriving from the line and decisions
of our party and concerning the different social, economic, cultural, r.;litical
and foreign policy spheres.
For example, at the time of our recent visit to Belgium and Luxemburg at
the invitation of the Belg ian Parliament, we developed the theses of the
USFP throughout our contacts with local and European officials concerning ~
the economic and political relations which the Third World shoulc~ have with
the industrialized countries, and in particular those of Morocco with the
EEC. Relations which should be based on the abolit~~n of links of dependence
and on mutual respect and the safeguarding of the reciprocal interests of
the peoples. _
Thus we have publicly explained our own view of the conditions of our emigrant _
workers who contribute to the development of those countries but who are
relegated to the status of a subproleteriat sub~~ect to shameful exploitation
and who are victims of a scarcely concealed discrimination in all fields.
- Our relations with these countries should have the goal not only of
improving the living conditions of the emigrant workers, but of working
over the long term to eliminate the very causes of the emigration, which
constitutes one of the re~ults of the colonial period and a consequence of
underdevelopment which is its~lf only the result of unequal relationships
between developed countries and their former colonies. On this point we
have affirmed that our economic and trade relations with the :i~dustrialized -
countries should take account not only of an improvement in the terms of
exchange, which in any case will maintain the links of dependence of our
economy with the countries of the center, but of the vital necessity for our
country to insure, by undertaking structural reforms, a development oriented
mainly toward the satisfaction of the basic needs of our people and capable
oE making our country a valid participant on the international s~ene... . In
the same spirit we have brought up the situation of our students in Europe
and the cultural relations of our country with those of the EEC.
[Questior~] The attitude of the Chamber of Representatives toward the socio-
economic crisis and the deterioration of the conditions of life ot the paor
and middle classes resulting from the rise in prices and the freeze on
wages...
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~P,n:;wer~ Actually the economic and social crisis which covers the country
;in~l wli[~~li ~�ont [nueti Co fi,et worse, is ~ sc~cr.rt to no onc . Thc ~;over.nmental
m;ij~~rLt_y L~self, after long deny~inb ti~e existence of this crisis, yfeldecl
t~~ c.i~e evidence aFter the royal speech of 4 June 1978. It then tried to
miiiimize the seriousness of this crisis by attributing its main caiises to
the international business situation. Until the moment when the former
finance minister recognized the structural character of the crisis on the
occasion of the discu~sion of the recent law on finance.
But what has the Chamber of Representatives done to face up to this situation?
It confronted it by enthusiastically approving the 3-year plan, a plan of
stagnation, of disinvestment, and of continued pauperization of the masses
disinherited by the worsening of unemployment. We said all this ~t the time.
- The majority also appri:ved the so-called austerity policy, which again
favored the well-to-do classes at the expense of the poor and middJ.e classes.
In addition, it approved in committee, between sessions, a law rectifying
the finances which increased indirect taxes *.he main victims of which are
the strata with the lowest incomes. It is true that there was a solidarity
tax affecting the rich classes, but it is about time there was such a tax,
and in short it is symbolic when one takes into consideration the enormous
grivileges which these classes enjoy.
Furthermore, despite the repe~ted promises of the prime minister and the
finance minister not to raise the prices of basic commodites, the government
has just decided to raise the prices of certain products of primary necesGity,
such as milk, sugar, and oil. Without taking account of the daily increases
which occur for other products. In approving the law on finances, the majori.ty
even delegated part of its legzslative power to enable it to proceed as it
likes in raising pri~:es.
All this shows that the majority ratifies the government decisions which, far
from xesolving the crisis or mitigating its effects, only increases it and
aggravates its consequences.
As a consequence, the Chamber of Representatives, with a majority within
it which systematically supports the class policy of the government, cannot
face up to the crisis, the sole beneficiary of which is the class which it
represents.
- [Question] Public and trade union fre~doms have been gravely infringed by
the collective dismissals, arrests, and arb~trary sentences, etc..., especially
after the wage demand action conducted by the CDT [expansion unknown] since
last April. There are even elected representatives of the people who have
been imprisoned. Can parliament intervene to stop this situation?
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[Answer] In effect we have been witnessing since early last spring a marked
violation of the political and trade union liberties guaranteed by l-he
constitution. And the most flagrant measures taken by the government
fc~llowin~; the exercise by the workers of ditferent sectors of thelr constilutional
rl~hl to 5trike, were the collec~ive dismissals r~f teachers, health oCficers,
an~ workers of the private sector, as well as the arrests and sentencing
of trade union and political off.icials.
The USFP opposition first condemned all rhese illegal measures. Then it
demanded a meeting of the committees concerned, those of interior and education,
in order to make the majority and the government face their responsibilities.
Until now our demand has had no result because the procedure requires a ~
majority resolved to convoke the committees. And you know that we do not
have a numerical majority. So we think that in the face of the inertia
of ttie bureau of committees and the indif~erence of the deputies of the
majority either the governmental majority has no interest in the fate reserved
to more than 1000 citizens or it purely and simply approves the arbitrary
measures which have been inflicted upon them.
I'ur~hermore the USFP opposition continues to demand the cancellation of
these measures, especially during the extraordinary session held after the
recovery of Rio De Oro.
[Question] How can the Chamber of Representatives contribute to the consulidation
of the domestic front particularly in the face of the growing threats which
weigh on our country?
[Answer] Since the recovery of the province of Rio De Oro the aggressions
~ perpetrated against our country have multiplied while expanding increasingly
in scope. We are therefore confronted with an undeclared war. Such a
~ situation actually requires the mobilization of all energies, and more
particularly those of the privileged classes, which should contribute
financially to the national effort to the same extent as the poor classes
which, until the present time have been the only ones to agree to all sorts
of sacrifices since the unleashing of the process of liberation of our Sahara
provinces.
The enthusiastic mobilization of the people's masses can be achieved only
in a climate of confidence, of liberty, and social justice. The political,
social, and economic measures necessary to bringing about such a climate
are among the constitutional perrogatives of the Chamber of Representatives
~ and the government. The obstacles to the commencement of this process are
juridical or constitutional. It is above all a question of will and political
courage.
6108
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MOROCCO
BRIEFS
1980 FINANCE BILL--Rabat, Nov 13 (MAP)~-"Despite the international economic
. conjuncture marked by the serious recession of 1974-1975, our country could
record encouraging results in the recovery of our basic balances, thanks
to the financial and economic policy adopted by the current three-year
plan," stated the Moroccan finance minister, Abdelkamel Raghaye~ here
Monday. Presenting to the Moroccan House of Representative the 1980 finance
bill, the minister made a roundup on the international economic con~uncture,
outlining that the developing countries had been more or less affected by
the slowliness related to the economic activity and the strong inflation
which affected the industrial ized countries during the last years. After
he recalled the choices of the plan, and the results reached, the minister
asserted that the 1980 finance bill is (?based) on the four following _
poirit-.s: endow the national defense with necessary financial mPans far
ensuring the preser~ ation of Morocco's territorial integrity; pu~ at the
disposal of social sectors sufficient credits, despite the policy of
financial austerity drawn by the Moroccdn Government; support the growth
effort in the respect of fund amental balances without aggravating the
fiscal pressure and f inally, the intensificat~on of the effort of national
solidarity by the recovery of the "zakat" and its assignment to the
development of poor regions. [Text] [LD131424 Rabat MAP in English
1244 GMT 13 Nov 79 LD]
CSO: 4420
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U1~IITED ARA.B EMIRATES
I'IGURLS ON INDUSTRIAL FIRMS, WORKERS RELEASED
t~e irut t~L-Nt1HAR in Arabic 28 Sep 79 p 7
[Article: "The Emirates: 20,000 Workers in Conversion Industries"]
['Pe:ct] TY~e r~umber of workers in the UAE's conversion industries sector has
rt~~.e~hed 20,000, and investments in this sector now total 2,278,900,000
~l~~rhans. The conversion industries include foods, beverages, tobacco,
lumber, furr.iit,ure, paper, printing, publishing, chemicals, petroleum prod-
uct;s, mineral ores, machines and mining. ~
`i'r~ese st~,tistics include all 597 establishments which ~~mploy 10 or more
wo.rkers. Some 82 percen~; of all establishments in the conversion iridus--
tr�ies sector are located in Abu Dhabi, I?ubai and Sharjah.
The results of the industrial surve,y conducted by the Ministry of' Planning
in cooperation with the UN Industrial Development Organization revealed
that the manufactured metal products, machines and eguipment industr,y
occupies first place in the framework of the conversion industries with
respect ~;o both value added and number of workers. Firms in this category
account for ~+75 million dirhams, or about 45 percent of total value added,
and employ 28.4 percent of al1 conversion industr,y workers. Second place
is occupied b;~r the mineral ores products industry (excluding petroleum
products), an~ coming in third are the lumber industries.
'1'he information in the industrial survey indicates that the 597 esi;ablish-
ments counted, which all have 10 or more employees and of which 501 firms
responded, represent 18.8 percent of all establishments in the state's con-
version industry sector. Firms with fewer than 10 workers represent the
remaining 81.2 percent of the establishments in this sector.
The survey results also indicate that the heaviest concentration of indus-
trial production pr~duction in the state is in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah,
wtiere 82 .8 percent of cor.version industry firms are located.
The emirate of Dubai is first with 199 industria.l establishments employing
10 or more workers, followed by Abu Dhabi with ]2 5, Sharjah with 91, 'Ajman
with 43, Ra's al-Khayma.h with 30, Umm al-Q,a.ywayn with 8 and ~jayrah with 5.
8591
C SO : 4302 64
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UNIT~D ARAB L~MIREITL ~
UAE OIL REVENUES REACH 18 BILLION DIRHAMS
Bei.rut AL-NAIiAR in Arabic 28 Sep 79 p 7
[Article: "Trade ~alance Surplus in E~nirates Rises to 18 Billion This Year;
Abu Dhabi Takes Control and Tips the Surplus Scale"]
[Text] The UAE's trade surplus at the end of the curx�ent year is expected.
~ i:o climb to 18.046 billion dirhams, as compared with last year's surplus of
1'7.n97 billion. This fact was confirmed by a Ministry of Planning report
on foreign trade and the trade balance for the state from 1975 to 1979�
This surplus was achieved despite a large increase in imports, which
amounted to 20.023 billion dirhams last year. This surplus provides impor-
tant indicators of the strength of the state's economies, as well as the
occurrence of building and industrial development and a renewal of funds
set aside for inves'cments. This is reflected in the steady growth in the
volume of imports, inasmuch as intermediate goods and investment goods
gained a largz share of the imports.
Ministr,y statistics confirm that a substantial drop occurred in the impor-
tation of consumer goods during the last 3 years, countered by an increase
in the rates of importation of machines, implements and eguipment pertain-
itig to industry, building activities and development plans. The statistics
and information provide favorable indicators for the state's future progress.
The increase in imports, which am~unted to 9.12 billion dirhams up to 1978,
yieldeci returns in the area of industrial development and investments. In
other words, it was not a parasitic increase or a burden on the state's
er.onomies. In this connection, the ministry's report states: "While con-
sumer goods represented 27.1 percent of total imports in 1975, we find that
they represented only 24.8 percent of total imports in 1977. Intermediate
goods, on the other hand, represented 24.1 percent of total imports in 1975
but grew to 27.6 percent in 1977. Similarly, investment goods represented
16.4 percent of the total in 1975 and ~+7.6 percent in 1977. In other words,
Lhe percentage of imports for investments rose 31.2 percent in only 2 years.
This is an encouraging figure and suggests some things with regard to indus-
trial development and the quality of consumption. If we couple these results, _
which led us to a decrease in the percentage of consumer imports from year to
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year, with the increase in the percentage of the population and new arz�ival:~
constitui;ing a consumer force, this means that the rate at which impori:ed
consumer goods decreased was reasonable during the last few years--especi.ally
sinc:e ttie world experienced a substantial incre~,se in the prices oi' these
~oods. Tr~e record increase ir~ prices from 1975 to 1978 was 132.4 percent, a
rise wtiicPi applied not just to consumer goods but to all goods imported from
abroad.
n11 ~;i{~OT'j;S
Ttie UAE's oil exports for 1978 had a value of 23.~?~29 billion [sic] dirhams--
representing the exports of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah--while oil exports
for 1~7j wez�e valued at 26.642 billion dirhams. In other words, oil expor~;~
~howed an increase of 6.787 billion dirhams, or 25.5 percent. Abu Dhabi
repreUents the bulk of the UAE's exports, since under normal circumstances
it accounts for not l~ss than 83 percent of the total value of the state's
n.xports. An exception to this was the year 1978, in which Abu DhaUi sougYit
Lo decrease its productiori and contributed only 79.I percent of total oil
exports. Dubai accounts for 18.8 percent of the state's oil exports, while
the emira~:e of Sharjah contributes 1.5 percent.
'1'he amount realized from the reexportation of a number of goods arrivirig a~L
UAE ports was 1.776 billion dirhams in 1978, as opposed to only 594 million
dirhams in 1975. Thus, the value of reexports is up by 299 perceni;--a lar~;e
i.ncr.ease which goes a long way to illustrate how far trade ac~;ivit,y has
advanced wi~hin the state, as well as coni'irming the fa.ct i;hat some cit.ies
in the UAE have acquired a commercial character tha~ is attracting ~the
attention of neighboring states.
Prom a look at the trade balance of the UAE it is evident that Abu Dhabi,
whose oil exports represent 83 percent of the state's total oil exports,
bears the deficit which some emirates contribute to the overall trade bal-
ance. P~oreover, it is Abu Dhabi which singlehandedly righted the trade
balance and b,y stages made the trade surplus exceed the defici+ for ~;he iJAE.
Thu~, by means of the foregoing statistics concerning the trade balance ~~f
trie state as a whole, we arrive at the fact that ~Lhe deficit in the trad~:
Lalance attributable to some emirates means nothing in relation ~;o the over-
a,ll trade balance of the state. As was stated before, the UAE's trade _
halance showed a surplus of 17.897 billion dirhams last year. Nloreover, ~the
curplu;, is expected to increase by the end of this year to 18.G46 Uillion
dirhams. This is attributable, of course, to the balancing operation
brought under control by Abu Dhabi, as well as the steady increase in the
UAE's oil exports.
859~-
c so : 4802
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t~riz2~L.r~ nxn~ t~~t1 ~tn~ri~,,;
BRIEFS
FOREIGN INVESTMENTS--The UAE has allocated 743 million dirhams (approxi-
mately ~190 million) in this year's budget for foreign investments in a
total of 26 Arab, regional and international institutions. This year the
UAE will participate with approximately 66 million dirhams (~17 million)
in the Arab Development Ba.nk in Africa, as compared with last year`s 26
mi?lion dirhams (about ~17 million). It will also increase its partici-
pation in the Islamic Bank to 107 million dirhams (about ~27 million), as
compared with the 100 million dirhams (about ~25 million) invested last
,year. The state's total participation in international finance institu-
tions, namely, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
the International Nbnetary Fur.d, the Agency for Development and the Inter-
Ylational Finance Corporation, amounted to 61 million dirhams (about ~16
million) this year. [Text] [Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 28 Sep 7g p 7] 8591
EDUCATION BUDGET--The graduated budget of the UAE's Ministry of Educatiori
and Instruction for -this year is 1,212,130,000 dirhams, in contrast to last
year's budget of 982,630,000 dirha.ms. In this regard, the state recentl,y
celebrated the 14th International Day for the Elimination of Illiterac,y.
For this occasion it prepared a report on the educational situation in the
- state. This report said that the UAE has made great and rapid progress in
regular education programs, having been able in 7 years to establish kinder-
gartens, elementary schools, preparatory schools, secondary schools, voca-
~,ional schools and teachers institutes in all parts of the state. Then in
1.977-78 i~he University of the Elnirates opened its doors, thereby completing
~Lhe stages of education. The report also revealed that the UAE's population
had. reached 862,000 as of the beginning of 1978. Of these, 635,000 persons
had pas~ed the age of 10, that is, the age of literacy. Some 191,000 of the
latter ~~rere illiterate, consisting of 129,000 ma.les and 62,000 females.
Tl:ere were 98 Centers for the Elimination of Illiteracy in existence last
year, with 523 classes and a total of 72,258 male and female students. [TextJ
[Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 28 Sep 79 p 7] 8591
- cso : 4802
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WESTERN SAHARA
ALGIERS CITES SDAR STATEMENT ON FIGHTING IN SAHARA
LD152138 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 15 Nov 79 LD
[Text] The Saharan cause has been gaining ground with the passage of time
on botn the political and military levels. The Royalist Moroccan invasion
forces have suffered heavy defeats at the hands of the Saharan fighters.
Furthermore, world solidarity with the firm right of the Saharan people to
independence and self-determination continues to gain momentum. Only the
Rabat regime and the i.mperialist forces refuse to recognize this right.
Following the recent military gains made by the Saharan fighters and the
defeats they have inflicted on the invading Royalist Moroccan forces both
in the Western Sahara and inside Moroccan territory, the Saharan Defense
Ministry has issued a statement about new attacks made by the Saharan fight-
ers against the invading Royalist forces, with in the framework of the Houari
Boumediene offensive.
The statement said that these attacks took place on 4, 5 and 7 Noveanber
against the positions and garrisons of the invading force in Bo~ador, Ha-
gunia and Semara. The Saharan fighters used heavy weapons in these attacks _
which resulted in many losses among the invading forces including 15 Royalist
Moroccan soldiers killed and a similar number wounded, in addition to the
destruction of installations and large quantities of military hardware.
The Saharan Defense Ministry ~tatement added that the Saharan revolutionary
fighters planted mines in various roads leading to ~he fortified positions
of the Royalist forces. Some of the mines went off, destroying military
vehicles of the invading forces. This happened on 31 October on the road
between E1 Aaiun and Semara when four transport vehicles were destroyed,
two of them loaded with troops.
CSO: 4402
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WESTEItN SAHAIiA
'L'HiTMANITE' INTERVIEW'S POLISARIO'6 ABDELAZIZ ON SAHARA ISSUE
LD081143 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 3 Nov 79 p 7 LD
(L'HUMANITE interview with POLISARIO Front Secretary General~Mohamed Abdel-
aziz: "The French Government Should Reconsider Its Position date and
place not specified]
[Text] [Question] What conclusions do you draw from the visit which the
delegation from the three European co~?unist parties has just made to the
West Sahara?
[Answer] We welcome this important initiative. It is part of the great
campaign of solidarity which is constantly developing among the democratic
forces. It shows us that the position of those parties and of the French,
Ttalian and Spanish peoples is completely different than the position adopted
by some of the governments in those countries. Therefore, we value this
initiative and hope it might be consolidated by other democratic forces in
those countries and throughout the world.
[Question] The French Government claims to be neutral. Do you see any change -
in the French ~osition?
_ (Answer] So far our people have not noticed any change on thz Freanh Govern-
ment's part. We legitimately hope that that government will learn from the
over 4 yeara of that war in which it has blindly supported the aggressor
countries--a position which not only challenges the OAU position and hence
Africa's position, but runs counter to the peace process started by the
POLISARIO Front and consolidated by the signing of the 5 August 1979 agree-
ment with Mauritania, and runs counter to the legitimate aspirations of the
peoples of the region to peace and progreas. That attiCude is bound to b~
regarded as aggressive toward Afria, the international organizations and the
region's peoples, including the Saharan people.
There have recently been attempts to mediate between Algeria and Morocco ~
in addition to the Carter Administration 's dangerous decision. Those
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various maneuvers are aimed at strengthen.ing Morocco's intransigence i.n its
war of aggression against the Saharan people and at countering the inter-
national organizations' decisions in favor of a just and lasting settlement.
We have said and will repeat that any solution to the problem of Saharan
decolonization and any mediat~on must take account of the main factor,
na;nely the Saharan people and.their sole legitimate representative, the
POLISARIO Front. We regard the attempts you mention as maneuvers if they
are not sound attempts and are aimed at bilateralizing the conflict by making
it an Algerian-Moroccan problem whereas it is purely and simply a decoloniza-
tion problem between the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic's peol~le and the
foreign forces of aggression.
[Question] Dur.ing the French delegation's visit to the West Sahara many
Saharan citizens showed their concern over President Carter's decision to
step up his military aid to Morocco. Many said that if that decision were
implemented they would feel they were at war not only with Morocco but with
the United States itself. What is your view on this subject and do you en-
visage direct contacts with the U.S. Administration?
[Answer] It is only natural that we should expreas our disapproval and con-
cern in face of those decisions. Our people are not only facing the Moroc-
can forces of aggression. There is a new threat in this decision by the
United States which has hitherto declared itself to be neutral. Faced with
this situation, we justifiably feel not only at war with Morocco but with
a].l forces which support Morocco militarily and diplomatically.
For our part we see no reason not to establish contacts with any party in-
volved in the war for the purpose of mutual explanations. We no longer need
to prove our good will; our meeting with the Moroccan king's representatives
at Bamako bear witness to it.
CSO: 4400
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i
WESTERN SAHARA
ALGIERS CITES SDAR STATII~NT ON MILITARY VICTORIES
LD092256 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 9 Nov 79 LD
[Excerpts] Over 100 Royalist Moroccan soldiers killed, hundreds injured,
scores taken prisoner and large losses of equipment and ammuniti.on--these
are the results of the successful military operations carried out by the
Saharan Peoplees ansionist Moroccan
invasionnforcespinttheWareaksouthioft
the Royalist, xp
Uad Draa and other occupied Saharan towns.
A statement issued by the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic [SDAR] Defense
Ministry said that the ALPS on 20, 23, 25 and 27 October attacked Smara,
Zar and Tan-tan. During the first week of November, the Saharan Army at-
tached ~he i~vasion fvictoriouseattacksLehugeelossesTofZlife andtmaterial
Draa. During these
were inflicted on the Royalist Moroccan invasion forces.
The statement added that the Saharan fighters' attack against Lenqueb re-
sulted in the destruction of the garrison post and that over 40 Royalist men
and officers werneYill~eafighters alsosseizedea�mortar,M10 automaticirifles,
were taken priso
16 submachineguns and a radio.
After stating that the positions of tHe~.enemy forces in Bir Enzaran, Bo~ador
and Hagunia were exposed on 4 and 5 November to concentrated fire from the
Saharan fighters, the statement points out that an ALPS unit carried out a
bold attack against the of thea hosphate.conveyertbelt nearrEl~-AaiunaiCheted
against sta tion 2 and 3 P
capital of the occupied Sahara.
The statement sack ti~~atdestroyingathe twosstations~toge herfwith six pylons,
utes of the att ,
causing severe damage to the phosphate conveyer belt.
During this bold aet~lledhandta similaranumberein~ur dyalAsla gernumberfof
ficers and men wer
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enemy vehicles were also destroyed together with their occupants. These
included land rovers and [word indistinct], a large quantity of military
hardware was al~o destroyed and a number of cars seized. Nine Moroccan
soldiers were captured, including a captain.
Because of the successful military operations and triumphant attacks of
the ALPS units, the Rabat reg3me's forces have waged a feverish offensive
against the unarmed Saharan masses in the occupied towns.
The statement said that since 6 November, the Royalist occupation forces
have been conducting terror campaigns and making arrests among the Saharan
citizens in E1-tlaium. A large number of them are imprisoned in the jails of
Hassan II.
CSO: 4402
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WESTERN SAHARA
'L'UNITA' CARRIES COMMUNIQUE ON VISIT TO W. SAHARA BY PCI, PCE, PCF DELEGATION
LD081045 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 5 Nov 79 p 5 LD
[Unattributed report: Three-Party Delegation Communique: PCF, PCE and
PCI Solidarity With POLISARIO ~ront"]
[Text] T~tedetheaWestern Saharaeearlyllastaweekdhasareleased~theSfollowing
which vi
co~nunique at the end of its visit:
As agreed in Madrid, a joint delegation of the French, Italian and Spanish
communist parties, composed of PCF Politburo member Maxime Gremetz, PCI
Directorate member Gian Carlo Pa3etta and PCE Executive Committee member
Jaime Ballesteros, has visited the Western Sahara at the invitation of the
POLISARIO Front.
The delegation had in-depth conversations with Secretary General of the _
POLISARIO Front Mohamed Abdelaziz on the situation and the prospects for the
struggle.
Acccompanied by the interior minister of the Saharan Democra tic Arab Republic
[SDAR] and several other POLISARIO Front political leaders, the delegation
travelled several hundred kilometers across the country. I t had talks on
the politico-military situation with the SDAR defense minister, visited sev-
eral refugee camps, a school, a hospital, a military college and a school
for female cadres.
Thus the delegation acquainted itself with the situation of the Saharan
people, its living conditiona and its administrative organization under the
direction of its unquestionable representative, the POLISARIO F`ront.
Everywhere it noted great popular activity and participation, a real manage-
ment of their own affairs by the people and their determination in the strug-
gle for their national independence and freedom, wh3ch is e~ressed in ma~or
military and diplomatic successes.
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An examination of the military equipment captured by the POLISARIO Front
fighters from the aggressors enabled the delegation to verify the aid given
to Morocco by several governments, including in particular the United States,
Frfinc c nnd Spain .
Gverywhere it went the delegation received a warm welcome for the solidarity
it conveyed. It returns convinced that the only solution is an end to the
Moroccan aggression and the initiation of negotiations with the POLISARIO
Front, which will enable the Saharan people to live freely and independently
in their own territory.
The representatives of the three parties assert the desire to further de-
velop their political and material solidarity with the struggle of the Saharan
people and the POLISARIO Front. They pledge to do their utmost to insure
that it develops in each of their countries and that the governments of
their respective countries contribute to a positive solution to this conflict
in this area of the world.
This solidarity, the cotnmunique continues, will also be expressed in demon-
strations of solidarity, which will be held in Paris, Madrid and Rome, which
will be attended by PCF Secretary General Georges Marchais, PCE Secretary
General Santiago Carrillo and PCI Secretary General Enrico Berlinguer.
CSO: 4404
END
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