JPRS ID: 8946 JAPAN REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020048-5
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• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 48
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8784
27 Navember 1979 ~
Sub-Saharan Africa R~ ort~ -
p :
' FOUO N~. 656
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFOaMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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_ Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
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JPRS L/8784
27 November 1979
SUB-SAHARRN AFRICA REPORT _
FOUO No. 656 -
CONTENTS PAGE _
INTER-P_FRICAN AFFAIRS '
.
Briefs -
Malian Arms Transshipment Concern 1 -
ETHIOPIA
Eritrean Official Criticizes USSR, PRC, PCI Stances on
Horn Situation
(Isaias Afe Werki Interview; L'EUROPEO, 8 Nov 79) 2
GHANA
Speculation on Uncertain Future Civilian-Military Balance
(Marc Yared; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 7 Nov 79) 5
MOZAMBIQUE
Recent Events May Denote Angolanization of Situation ~
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 7 Nov 79) 8
RHODESIA
Destruction of ZANLA's Chimoio Base Described _
(Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 17 Oct 79) 10
'GUARDIAN': ZANLA'Commander Assesses Rhodesian Situation,
London Talks
- (Josiah Tongogara Interview; THE GUARDIAN, 3 Nov 79). 12 -
SENEGAL ~
Political, Economic Conditions Surveyed -
(Jacques Latremoliere; MARCH~;S TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS, S Oct 79) 17
~ - a - [III - N~ & A - 120 FOUO] ~
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rux urrll;lAL UJ~: UNLY ~
CONTi:NTS (Continued) Page
'1'AN7.AN I/1
UK Pa~~er Interviews Nyerere on Rhodesian Settlement Plan
(.lonathan Dimbleby; THE OBSERVER, 4 Nov 79) 2r~
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
MALIAN ARMS TRANSSHIPMENT CONCERN--President Moussa Traore's visit to
Guinea was less "informal" than was officially reported. The Malian chief -
. of state was cuncerned over the reticence snown by Sekou Toure about the
transit of armaments for Mali over Guinean territory. For almost 20 year.s,
all equipment for the Malian army--which comes essentially from ~the Soviet
Union--has been re3ching the port of Conakry, from where it is carried
overland to Bamako. However, President Sekou Toure has been increasingly
intolerant of this arms traffic in recent months. [Text] [Paris JEUNE
AFRIQUE in French No 983 7 Nov 79 p 20]
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~ ETHIOPIA
~RITRrAN OFFICIAL CRITICIZES USSR, PRC, PCI STANCES ON HORN SITUATION
LD090959 Milan L'EUROPEO in Italian 8 Nov 79 pp 64-71 LD
[Intervi.ew with Isaias Afe Werki, deputy secretary general of the Eritrean
People's Liber.ation Front (EPLF), by Pietro Petrucci: "Neither Moscow
Nor Beijing, Nor Even Berlinguer"--date and place not given]
['fext] [Question] The wind seems to have changed in your f avor, but one
problem remains. There are 3 million Eritreans and 30 million Ethiopians.
Will they not eventually overwhelm you?
i
[Answer] 'Phey are the ones with manpower problems. Despite everything
that they have mobilized they have been immobile ror the past 6 months.
Moreover, they are e:~periencing peasant revolts from one end of the coun-
try to the other. The peasants have had enough. To nurture this war they
have dragged people from the ~iillages with the promise of only 1 year's
war, pay and family subsidies. The economic crisis and the outcome of the
war have null_ified all those promises and it has become increasingly diffi-
cult to recruit peasants into the "militia," which has to wage the physical
conflict.
[QuestionJ What about the regular army?
[Answer] The army cannot be improvised. The militia serves as canno~i
fodder but also as a reservoir for the army. And the malaise is universal.
- ~ A member of the militia receives $20 a month and a soldier at least $100,
$120. The peasants who are unable to escape obligatory enrollment rebel
- against their superiors and against the army ~tself, which often forces _
them into enemy fire at gunpoint.
` [Question] Are these warning signs or just a current phenomenon?
~ [Answer] We never stop calculati*_:~ the number of our enemies, trying to
' discover who they are and where they come from. Well, for the past year
the Ethiopian "establishment" has simply diminished. Now they are sending .
"security squads" to the front from the urban centers. In other words,
i the "red terror" squads. -
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[Question] Then there is the superiority of weapons. The USSR has already
taken the entire Ethiopian coffee har;*est at "token" prices in payment for -
weapons. It does not seem that Ethiopia has any means for paying for new
~aeapons . . .
- (Answer~ f.( Moscc~w supported the Addis ~baba junta ~ust to sell it wea-
~~oris, there is no doubt that there would soon be a situation of insolvency -
and therefore a militr,ry and political change. Unfortunately, Moscow
ap~~ears to want to keep this regime alive at all costs to avoid jeopardiz-
ing its own policy in the region. Men~istu's junta is equally determined -
to continue this war, because it knows that it will prove to be its tomb,
just as it was for the emperor. It is a vicious circle. Moscow will con-
= tinue to provide weapons and Mengistu will continue to overexploit the _
peasants to pay for them as far as he can.
[Question] Just 2 years ago you described Soviet policy in trris regien -
as an "error." Are you still of the same opinion?
_ ~
[Answer] The error in Soviet foreign policy has been made and it remains.
Nor does it now concern only this region or this continent. We have
analyzed this error, striving to consider Mosco*.a's foreign policy from a `
broader viewpoint than the Eritrean viewpoint. There is now a fundamen- ~
tal ilaw in the way in which the USSR regards its conflict with U.S.
_ imperialism: It believes that it can, and must, be the obligatory guide
for all peoples struggling for their freedom. This gui3ing role is, in
fact, imposed as a cage within which parties, movements and countries are
imprisoned, no longer free to determine their own destiny. The next step !
from solidarity is conditioning, and we do not want to have anything to do
with that.
.
[Question] There are continuing forecasts of a spectacular r3ppro~hsment ~
on your part with the Chinese.
s
[Answer] All the reports concerning our contacts with China are lies. We
have never had--and do not have now--any formal or unofficial relations
with the CCP. Of course, we are always looking for new allies and we try ~
= to convince everyone--including the Chinese--of the worthiness of our -
- cause. But we have not succeeded. I
I
The fact is that we regard China's foreign policy as aberrant and we fail ;
to understand many aspects of its domestic policy. The world view spread ~
by Beijing is the most aberrant ever proposed by any Communist Party. ~
Even with respect to us, instead of trying to understand who is in the !
right and who is in the wrong, they concern themselves with discovering ~
whether we share their little formulas, whether we ar,e prepared to repeat ~
their slogans in exchange for some aid. We do not need friends like that.
We are satsified with what the Chinese taught us by carrying out their
own revolution. ~
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[Question] There are still the Eurocommunists. The PCI is your friend,
but on the Horn of Africa it is friends with everybody. Even Mengistu
and Siad Barre. Are you satisfied with the PCI?
[Answer] Many of our friends believe that there is a revolution "also"
in Ethiopia and that it must be supported. That is their free choice.
tf they are in good faith,we try to correct what we believe to be an
err.or. If, however, the "dual support" is the result of diplomatic
� calculations, nothing can be done about it. For some time the PCI has
held a stance on the Horn of Africa, which we consider confused, as you
yourself said. I am not sure how it justifies its support for diametric-
ally opposed forces. If its aim is to open the way to a dialog, it is a
good tactic. But is it correct for a revolutionary force to maintain a
tactical stance f.or an indeterminate period? Time will tell. We do not
intend to bring anyonE to trial--least of all those who help us in one
way or another.
� [Question] Who are your best friends?
_ [Answer] At last our cause has made an impression in Africa. Mozambique
has openly announced that it supports us. Others would like to do so
but their ties with Moscow prevent them from doing so. Algeria is chang-
ing from political to material backing. Then there are the old friends
who do not abandon us: The PLO, Syria, Iraq. It is strange, but we are,
in fact, turning to them to help our experts become acquainted with the
- most sophisticated Soviet weapons which we have wrested intact from the
Ethiopians' hands but which we do not yet know how to use to the fullest.
CUPYRIGHT: 1979 Rizzoli Editore
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Fl)i: ~.)l~ i~ 1 C t~1l. U:il~: UN1,1'
CHANA
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SPECULATION ON UNCERTAIN FUTURE CIVILIAN-MILITARY BALANCE
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 983 7 Nov 79 pp 26, 27
[Article by Marc Yared: "Who is Pulling the Strings?"J
fExcerpts] The Ghanaian national assembly refused, on 9 October, to approve
- two appointments proposed by Dr Hilla Limann, chief of state: Mr Riley-Poku -
as minister of defense and Prof George Benneth [sic], who had been asked
to retain his position as commissioner for oil. The deputies demanded that -
the two candidates proposed by the president be-first questioned by a -
committee of inquiry on illicit gains.
This apparently innocuous incident is truly revealing. 7L actually high-
� lights the principal problems which are assailing the Third Ghanaian Republic -
even from the moment of its birth.
However, the mini-contest opposing Dr Limann and certain parliamentary
circles on the issue of Riley-Poku and Benneth illustrates also the existence _
of a certain sense of malaise among the civilian leadership. Dr Limann
may have actually been propelled to the presidency of the republic on 24
September of this year....
i In Accra, the rumor is that the man who is "pulling the strings" is Imoru _
Egala, one of the leaders belonging to the PNP (Popular National Party) "old
guard," the big winner of last June's elections and heir to the CPP (Popular
Convention Party) founded by Dr Kwame Nkrumah, the hero flf Ghanaian independence.
~ Dr Limann, CPP militant during the fifties and present leader of the PNP,
recently acknowledged in an interview that his election to the presidency
was the result of "negotiations."
The chief of state will find iz difficult to put some distance between
himself and his "protectors," who are retaining their influence in the
legislative assembly and often obey the direct~.v~s issued by those professional
politicians in voluntary exile in London, such as Dr Ayehkumi, Krobo Edusei,
Kojo Botsio, Tawia Adamafio, etc. They reportedly would like to have an
international peace-keeping force intervene in Ghana to watch over internal
security while waiting for dl.scipline to be re-established within the army.
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Dr Limann will encounter difficulties in maintaining an even balance -
betwsen this conservative old guard and the PNP progressive wing, embodied
. in the government by Isaac Chinebuah and Ekow Daniels, respectively ministers
oF Eore~.gn aEfairs and interior. -
Last but not least, the controversy created by the designation of Riley-Poku
and Benneth for the ministry of defense and the oil sector could well poison
relations between civilians and military. Indeed, the two candidates are
very close to the leaders of the AFRC (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council)
who were presiding over Ghana`s destiny from June to September of this year. _
Violently anti-militaristic, animated by a spirit of revenge, the PNP "old
guard" wish to exclude Riley-Poku and Benneth. ~ `
On the contrary, Dr Limann does not wish to burn his bridges with the officers,
who willingly relinquished the reins of power in September after seven and
a half years of military rule. The chief of state is subtly trying to satisfy i-
the AFRC leaders while reducing their political role. This is why he has
appointed several former AFRC leaders--and especially Flight Lieutenant Jerry
Rawlings, the soul of the "purifying" June revolution--to the leadership of i
a council of state which he promised he would consult. This is also why I
he has adopted the anti-corruption slogans and the price controls dear to the ~
heart of the AFRC. All of this, of course, does not prevent him from
attempting to bring about a rapproachment with Nigeria, to advocate a
_ moderate economic policy and to reject any extension of the public sector
in order to ensure oil supplies for the country and not to discourage possible
foreign investments.
_ The happenings in Ghana since last June can be analyzed in two ways: it is
possible that Rawlings, a 32-year-old mulatto, sincere, honest, devoid of
ambition, thought it his duty to eff ect a four-month "house-cleaning,"
but will not seek power any longer. Unless, as he puts it, "the new regime
starts a policy of corruption...." The AFRC leaders would be content, tlien, `
to ensure their role as advisors to the chief of state, as "conscience of
the nation" and as censors of the excesses committed by the civilian leaders,
now that Ghana is again on track. ~
_ However, Ghana's military are not all genuine reformists. According to some I
observers, there exists, in the army, a tough core which unleashed a long �
revolutionary process, of which the 4 June coup d'etat--and this is the '
second interpretation--was merely a first phase. The situation in Ghana, ~
then, would present strange similarities with that in Ethiopia in 1974-1975.
In both countries, the threat of famine, strikes and student unrest were
catalysts of the crisis. Fligh~t Lieutenant Rawlings would then be but the ;
equivalent of Gen Aman Andomy a very popular man, who ended up being
liquidated because of his moderate opinions~. Specifically, because he was
advocating civilian participation in the government.... ,
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Within the Ghanaian AFRC, ~ust like within the Ethiopian Derg (Provisional
, Military Committee}, junior officers and corporals are the spear-head of
the revolution. The real strong man--Captain Boakye Djan in Accra, Lt Col
Mengistu Haile Mariam in Addis Ababa--is actually a second-rank player,
leaving to others--civilian or military--the task of making unpopular 3ecisions,
before taking center stage and revealing his goals: monopoly of power by
the tuugh and pure military, c].ass struggle, Marxist socialism and alliance
with the Soviet bloc....
Reform or revolution? Only the future will be able to tell which will be
Ghana's direction.
COPYRIGHT: 3eune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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MOZAMBIQUE
-
RECENT EVENTS MAY DENOTE ANGOLANIZATION OF SITUATION
. Paris JEUNE AFRIQJE in French No 983 7 Nov 79 p 39
[Text] "The revolution is not accomplished with candy." This is a favorite
saying ~f Mozambican president Samora Machpl. Neither is the counter- -
revolution. In Maputo, on 22 October, Minister of Foreign Affairs Joaquim
Chissano revealed for the first time the extent of the confrontation between
the national army and the MRM (Mozambique Resistance Movement) anti-marxist _
guerrillas. Chissano even acknowledged that a few weeks before, the rebels
had occupied the city of Macossa in the central province of Manica after six
days of fighting.
Is Mozambique on the road t~ Angolanization? One might well fear it is.
Since the beginning of 1979, the MRM sabotage activities and surprise attacks
have become increasingly frequent. Last April, the anti-marxist guerrillas
blew up the country's main fuel tank in the port of Beira. Like Jonas
Savimbi's UNITA operating in Angola, the MRM, led by Domingos Arrauca and
Matade Matsangaisse, enjoys the support of the white minority regimes in -
Southern Africa. UNITA's bases are in Namibia, while those of the MRM--
which numbers about a thousand men under arms--are in Rhodesia, and specifically
- in Gwelo, where the powerful radio station VOZ DA AFRICA LIVRE (Voice of Free -
Africa) is located, flooding Mozambique with its anti-marxist propaganda.
The objectives of the two movements are identical: to establish a government
of "national unity" and rid the country of the Cuban, Russian and East
German military advisors. Besides sabotage activities and spectacular raids, -
~ the men of the MRM--trained by Rhodesian instructors--have become _
~ specialized in selective killings of Cuban or Soviet officers. They even
operate in the suburbs of the capital, Maputo. Just like UNITA in the
. southern part of Angola, the MRr: enjoys a measure of popular support in the
northeastern part of the country, along the frontier with Malawi. However, -
' none of the various movements constituting it really participated in the
struggle against the Portuguese colonial army.
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_ l~aving reacted violently in the past against the guerrillas and their
~ s;~mpathizers (executions, imprisonment in work camps, etc.), Mozambican
autho~rities are seemingly displaying today a measure of liberalism. Samora -
Machel has gone as far as to announce the release of several hundred
- prisoners at the end of October. It is true that the only solution, as far
as he is concerned, is a peace settlement with Zimbabwe, which would cut off
the MRM from its bases in the rear. The same i~ true for the Angolan leaders,
for whom only Namibian independence would put a stop to UNITA incursions. '
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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FO(t i1Fi~].CI'~~L Util~. l)N1,Y
RHODESIA
, DESTRUCTION OF ZANLA'S CHT'.-i0I0 BASE DESCRIBED
- Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 17 Oct 79 pp 21-22 .
[Article by Francois Soudan: "Bitter Victory"]
_ [Text] The Rhodesian Army counted on destroying Chimoio
in 2 hours. ZANLA's guerrillas resisted 5 days. _
Chimoio no longer exists. Sixty-four square kilometers of burned earth,
fissured by bomb craters, have replaced the bunkers and casemates of the
, headquarters of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA),
the armed branch of Robert Mugabe's ZANU. Here, 20 km inside Mozambique
territory, in the entangled bush of Manica Province, there took place, from
27 September to 1 October, the most important confrontation between Zimbabwe
~ nationali:.ts and Rhodesian armed forces since the beginning of the struggle
~ for liberation 15 years ago.
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Before dawn on Thursday, 27 September, the Chimoio camp, built at the
beginning of 1977 by Soviet military engineers, was the principal training
center for the ZANLA guerrillas and the starting point for the armed colutnns
infiltrating the east-central part of Rhodesia, toward Umtali and Mashonaland. _
~ A camp made of half-buried concrete bunkers, linked by a network of trenches,
~ among hills whose crests were protected by light anti-aircraft batteries. _
Inside: 1,000 men, the spearhead of some 10,000 ZANLA guerrillas, led by
~ Gen Josiah Tongogara. Among them about 10 Soviet advisers.
; On 27 September at 0600, when the first Rhodesian fighter-bombers rumbled
~ on the horizon, there was a general alert. Chimoio was accustomed to this:
in 2 years, the camp had already undergone 15 bombardments. But this time,
something else was involved: "operation Tiger" had only begun.
~ At Salisbury, the commander in chief of the Rhodesian Armed Forces, Gen _
Peter Walls, had decided to wipe Chimoio off the map. Such a"blow," the -
Rhodesian authorities considered, would considerably weaken ZANU's striking _
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force and would reduce the margin for maneuver of its leader, Robert
_ M~igabe� during the tripartite negotiations in London. For that, it was
n~~cessar.y to act quickly. Peter Walls set himself a time limit: in a
few hr~urs, everything would be over.
_ An attack scenario was set up on the classic model of Rhodesian raids:
aerial bombardment, landing of troops transported by helicopter, then return
to base. But the means used were exceptional: some 10 Mirages and Canberras, `
- some 20 Bell helicopters and nearly 800 men. Walls had gone all out. He
- did not yet know that this surprise attack would become a frontal combat of
5 days' duration.
The waves of bombardment had, in fact, spared the majority of the guerrillaa,
- protected from the napalm by the thickness of the bunkers. The Selous scouts,
an elite unit of the Rhodesian army, sent as an advance guard, came up ,
against very sharp resistance and had to fall back. Moreover, the approach _
of the helicopters, which were to bring up the waves of ground support, was I
considerably impeded by ths 20mm Soviet anti-aircraft guns. ~ao days would ~
. be needed before the Rhodesian forces could take possession of the crests ~
and silence these batteries. Dug in in the trenches, the men of ZANLA would I
hold out for another 3 days.
On Sunday, 30 September, a small unit of Mozambique armor coming from Piavita ~
tried without success to dislodge the guerrillas. It is true that the old ;
_ Soviet T-34's dating from World War II, with which Maputo's army was
equipped, could not do much in the face of the French antitank missiles,
delivered to the Rhodesians by South Africa. In the morning of 1 October,
ZANLA withdrew, leaving nearly 500 dead on the ground. The Rhodesian Army
itself finished the destruction of Chimoio before regaining its base.
Officially, the Rhodesian general staff acknowledged...two killed and six ;
wounded, a figure that seems far below the reality. The few press correspondents
allowed to follow the operation--and whose dispatches had been censured at the -
request of the military authorities--as well as several South African newspapers,
themselves spoke of 80 dead and 150 wounded: the most serious losses !
suffered by the Rhodesian Army during a battle. A victory for Muzorewa,
therefore, but a Pyrric victory that strongly resembled a defeat. For the ,
guerrillas, for thefirst time, held out five days and five nights in the face ~
of an adversary whose equipment and armament were unquestionably superior to
theirs. For them, for their leader, Robert Mugabe, this resistance was a
victory, somewhat like the way the battle of Karameh, iti 1967 in Jordan, had ~
been a success for the Palestinians of A1 Fatah. At Chimoio, the acrid odor '
of napalm is still afloat, but ZANLA's soldiers have already begun to rebuild
the camp. ~
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RHODESIA
'GUARDIAN': ZANLA COMMEINDER ASSESSES RHODESIAN SITUATION, LONDON TALKS
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,
- LD031114 London THE GUARDIAN in English 3 Nov 79 p 17 LD
[Interview with Josiah Tongogara, commander. of the Zimbabwe African
National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and member of the Patriotic Front ~
Delegation at the Lancaster House talks on Zimbabwe Rhodesian lnde-
pendence, by Alves Gomes, Mozambique magazine TEMPO--date and place
_ not given]
[Text] [Question) Where were you born?
[Answer] I was born in Selukwe, in the southern part of Zimbabwe.
[Question] It's also the place where Ian Smith was born, and we have
heard a story at this conference of your meeting with Smith. What was
the meeting?
[Answer] I merely met Smith as one of the participants of the Lancaster
House talks. It so happened that I got nearer to him and he also got
nearer to me. So we looked face-to-face and then we couldn't avoid talk-
ing t4 each other. When he met me he greeted me. I greeted him too.
But immediately I switched to asking him about his old mother whom I
had known during the time when I was a kid. So he then replied to me that
she was very energetic, and she was now 86 years old, but still able to
walk ~n her own two feet, and I was very much impressed. The old lady,
during those days when I was a youth, a small boy in 1952 and 1953, used
to throw sweets at us kids. You know kids, when you give them sweets they
always say "Let's go back in and get some more." So tY~ose days I and the
other kids treated the old lady as a very kind lady, because she was
~ supplying us with sweets. ~ -
And we then dragged into the discussion of~politics, talking about the
conference, and one point Ian raised was that he was very much impressed
because he thought we wouldn't meet. I said no, he was wrong. We have
~ never been able to meet because he has been in Salisbury and I have been
somewhere, commanding the ax~my, so there was no possibility of us meeting, -
' I posed a question to him--What would have happened if I had gone to
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_ Salisbury two days before we came to London? Was he going to welcome me,
or was he going to shoot me as a terrorist? Also, if he had come to our
operational areas two days before we came to London, would we have been
abl.e to go back to Salisbury?
I think both of us couldn't answer. We looked at each other and said,
okay, let's forget about what would have happened if.... Let's concen-
trate on what is happening here at the conference. He started telling me
about Selukwe, which has now becume a prosperous zone.... .
[Question) What is the present military situation in Zimbabwe?
[AnswerJ Well, on our side we look at the situation as excellent. We
have made a lot of progress. We have been able to accomplish our 1979 '
programme, we have reached all the areas we have always wanted to reach;
most of the targets within our programme have been accomplished.
I-
[Question] However, the British are saying that you did not come here as
~
the winners of the war. What is your comment? ~
[Answer] When the Rhodesians declared war in 1965, Wilson said he was not ~
going to send troops, but if the situation inside Zimbabwe deteriorates ~
and there is a need to intervene, the British are going to intervene. What ~
is happening here at Lancaster House is that the British now want to inter-
vene. They think they want to send their administration. They want to '
take over, because there is something going on. It is the war that makes
them think so. We could have refused to come to talk to the British. We
have lost nothing. We are making progress ev~ry minute inside Zimbabwe.
And, I can assure you, if we had remained in the bush and said continue,
we forget about London, we would still be going to win.
[Question] Did many people from the Rhodesian army desert to join your
forces?
[Answer] I can't even give the figures. Nearly every day I think if ~
Peter Walls was to be honest, you'd know that half the forces he created
are no more with him. They come to us.
[LD031124] [Question] In London your leaders have been saying that you I
will run for the elections as one party. You have ZAPU and ZANU--how
wi11 you do it?
[Answer] We don't talk of Z~PU an~ ZANU at the moment. We are a patrio-
tic front which has got ZAPU and ZANU in it. We have formed this not
because we were going to go to Geneva, or Malta, Dar es Salaam, and London. i
We formed it in order to bring unity for the people of Zimbabwe.
[Question] And do you hope to wir: +the elections?
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_ [Answer] It's something that is natural. I don't have to hope.
~(li~e~;1 l~~n~ Y~~ur ~~r~~~~~~~11 is the [nte~;rnti.on oF thc ref;ime (or.c~y with
- yc~ur lorcc57
~ [Answer] What we are saying in our proposals is that dur.ing the transi-
tional period, we would like what we call "three men in a jeep." That is,
we have the PF forces, the regime's forces and the United Nations' forces
to police the situation during the interim period.
[Question] How do you think it will h.appen in reality? '
[Answer] The reality is that you cannot ignore the PF forces--the forces
that have brought about this conference, the forces which have done a lot
'i of decolonisation in Zimbabwe--and reject their participation. They have
~ to participate, they have to be there.
=i
[Question] So it means that you cannot accept the British plan as it is
_I now?
i
' [Answer] No, we don't accept it. They say they want to be everything,
run it--how do we kr.ow that the British will safeguard us? That is the
question of security.
[Question~ A~e you prepared for a cease-fire?
[Answer] Well, we came here to achieve peace. Peace means we should cease
to shoot each other. So we are ready for that as long as conditions are
created for a ceasefire.
[Question] So it means that your remark some weeks ago saying that if
this conference decides that you have to work with the regime forces
or even Peter Wall's, you will do so?
[Answer] What I said was that we are here at Lancaster House and we hope
that any agreement that is achieved here between the parties participating
must be respected. If we agree, as we have stated in our document, that
we feel that in the Rhodesian forces there are the mercenaries and some
undesirable elements, if those could be pulled out then there would
i remain a force which is considered to be a force for Zimbabwe, which is
going to be loyal to any administration which comes to power.
[Question] Are your guerrillas prepared for a cease-fire?
[Answer] They are prepared for a cease-fire under the terms laid down by
, their leadership, the PF.
[Question] Do you have conditions for your liberated areas? Areas you _
control?
,
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[Answc~r) Well, that would depend on the formula [f our ceasefire was
such tha~ w~ :~ay "we 11ave tt~ese areas where our peasants are, no one
should interfere," or "we have areas where the Smith forces are--forget
about Muzorewa--and then no shooting," we will have to be there to
' exPla.in. 7't~is is the reason why we have been saying to the i3ritish that
the procE+ss c~f ~a ~:easefire should not be less than two months, because
we think in that period we will be able to get to every area. You cannot
go to the radio and shout--they will not accept. You must go and explain
to them.
_ [LD031253] [Question] Your guerrillas: Do you have contact with the
- farmers? '
[Answer] Oh yes, we have contacts. In much of the area we have c:overed
there are farmers, and in those areas we have committees and some of the
- farmers have joined the committees. But mainly the blacks. You could not i
_ expect the whites to do so. Some of the white farmers have sympathised
with us and given us some hel~+.
[QuestionJ What kind of help?
[Answer] Without mentioning names of the farmers, if you go to their farm
and ask for food they give ycs food. You ask for directions and they give ,
you directions, and tell you "the se~.urity forces are there--go this way.
We have taken these white farmers as our allies because they want to see
that the people of Zimbabwe are free.
[Question] They will receive special treatment after independence?
[Answer] Not special treatment. They will have that special treatment _
which is given to every Zimbabwean.
~ [Question] What about the farmers who do not give you support?
i
[Answer] Some of these farmers who don'c~give us support, and some of ~
the soldiers who fight us, they think that they must fight to maintain ~
white supremacy. But once a government of the people's choice is Chere, I
I see the possibility of those peopl` changing their mind. Once they ,
accept the real ity, there is no reason to go round and say "you didn't !
support us." ~
[Question] You will allow the white farmers to produce and work on their ~
i
land? '
[Answer] We will allow every Zimbabwean to run what he's supposed to, I
irrespective of his colour. We are trying to destroy this idea of race
which we think is very dangerous. Every Zimbabwean is a Zimbabwean,
regardless of colour. i
~
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[Q~.~estion] If an agreement is not reached here, what will be the situc;tion?
[Answer] Disagreement at I.ancaster House means contimiation of war? We
wi11 not be to blame.
[Question] If the Commonwealth countries and the British arrange a soLu-
tion for this present situation you will have a transitional period and
elections. If you win the elections, what will happen to Muzorewa?
[Answer] Muzorewa is not our enemy and even his bunch of lieutenants are
not our enemy. Our enemy is the system. Once we uproot the system, there
is no enemy. Muzorewa will be treated like any Zimbabwean, who lost and
we will ask him to contribute in any capacity he can. But if he refuses
and tries to cause trouble, we will definitely treat him as a troublemaker.
[Question] The South Africans have threatened to intervene in the country.
If they will not do so, what will your relations be with the South
Africans?
[Answer] If South Africa invades Zimbabwe or causes trouble, we will treat
_ it as an enemy and we will fight the enemy. After all, South Africa has
- always been fighting us in Zimbabwe ever since we opened the north-east
through Mozambique. If they don't interfere, we will treat South Africa
- like any other country that has not intervened in our internal affairs.
[Question] You will have a policy of noninterference with South Africa?
- [Answer] If it doesn't intervene, it wvuld be wrong to treat South Africa
as our main enemy. We will put it in the place as it is put by other OAU
; countries. We will still talk to them because they will have done nothing
to us.
COPYRIGHT: Guardian Newspapers Limited, 3 November 1979
CSO: 4420
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. SE~EGAL
?'CiSTICAL, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS SITRVEYID
Parie MARCHES TROPICAIIX ET MEDITERRAN~iS in French 5 Oct 79 PP 2685-2687,
2688
[Article by Jacques Lat~emolieres "A I~ew Dimension for Senegal"~
[Text] Stopping in Paris on his way to Normaazdy, President Senghor recently
- gave voice to hia bitter disappoi.ntment over French industrialists' lack of
- interest in investing in Senegal. Coming from a man whoae life and career
have been devoted to Eurafrican cooperation, who has so often given proof
- of his attachment ta our country arxd thanks to whom France has, before and
a~ter 1~60, always found in Senegal an essential partner in its African
policy, his atatementa were disturbi.ng and surprising. Perhapa it was he
who in paxt provoked the friendly visit Mr Valery Giacard d'Esta.ing made in
summer to his home in Calvados, to the "wise man of Dakex," whose 74 yeare
ha,ve in no way alt~red hie youthful figure and keenness of mind~
~ Firet of all, ia it appropriate to ~udge this apparent or real etagnation of
French investments in Senegal in terma of overall foreign investments aad
their evolution in the neighboring African countries? l~ihile Senegal'a rate
of i.nduetrialization ia co~pa.r~ble to that of Ivory Coast, the resulting .
indluatrial power obviously ranks it fairly far tiehind the latter and in the
course of the ~ast few years there has beea four times as much forei~ in-
- vestment in Abid3an as in Dakar. Trae, this situation is not a nerr one az}d
is in part the result of physical circumstances that could not be modifieo
overnight,
On the other hand, in reaponse at the start of the year to Mr Mamadou Dia,
who ha~d accused the Ser~egaleae Socialist Party of having favored Frenah eco-
nomic influence on the country, Mr Senghor ~ointed out that Franae, ~rhich in
1962 provided 85 percen~~ of the forei~gn capital invested in Senegal (in it-
~ self 90 percent of the tota~), in 1978 acaounted for only 54 percent of this
capital, since reduced to 68 percent of the financial volume invested~ l+~ar
irom deploring the fact, the Senegaleae chief of eta.te quite rightly vieWed
this ata.te of affairs, which enabled him to refute Mr Dia~s criticism, as,a
sign of the progress made by local industry aad the internationalization of
- support for it. Therefore, the disappointment he has reaently voiaed doea
not refer to the percentage of Frenah oapital in forei~ investmenta, but to
their absolute value, which he feels fs declining.
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This view of the situation is worth going into in greater detail, In aal-
culating inveatments, too often African ata.tiatica bureaus only take new
tranefers into account. In a couritry where the French have been entrenched
for as long as they have been in Senegal9 the reinveatment of profita whioh
our enterprises annually engage in must be kept in mind in order to appreaiate
~ the true value of French contributions toward the creation of ~obe and the
gror~rth of national income. Furthermore~ these contributione affect not arnly -
industry but also the other sectors of the economy, -
= While the conversation of the two presidents in fact dealt with the problem, ~
Mr Giscaxd d'Eetaing probably did not fail to mention tc hia interlocutor
the davices elaborated in Fraace to encourage foreign investments, easy loans ~
and grovernment guarantees against political riaks, nor to remind him, unfor-
�~unately, of the reasons for the slowdor~m, linked with the eaono~ic aituation,
which apply not only to Senegal but to all capital movementa, the French
market being no exception, He regretted them, furthermore, questioning their
validity, during his last television interview.
But it is also interesting to analyze those faators whioh, from Senegal's !
standpoint, could explain the phenomenons feara of political inatability, !
a lack of real or presumed boldriess in the Senegalese eoonombr, or certain more ~
~ specific aspects of how it is oriented, its pricea regulated or eimply ite ~
administrative organization. i
Political Stability I
If we ha.ve brought the~iasue up here, it is certainly not because the riska
of destabili~ation are greater than elsewhere in 3enegal which, on the con-
trary, prea~~nta the image of a democracy better balanced and more moderate
than that of any other country in Afriaa. But this very balance, whose
bases ha.ve been gradually reinforced since independence, ouriouely arouses
a certain mistrust in potential investors, rrhich can be expressed in two rrayss
- "It is preaisely because it has lasted too long that it cannot help but be
upset soon," ors "Seng~or, O~K., but after him?" without going ao far as to
- paraphrase General de Gaulle who, during one of hie preee conferencea, added,
applying the same kind of reasoning to himselfs "For fear that things may
g~o badly later, some people would prefer to have tYsem gc~ badly rigtit array."
"I ask for time to think," General de Gaulle concluded. No state~man seem~
to have thou~t more about this problem than Leopold- Sedar Sen~,~'ior. 'I~?e _
solution he designed and realized guaxantees the present aad pretty much the
future as well, given the fact that the political future belongs to no one~
' The limited multiparty system, official doctrine in Senegal, in fact assures
the regime a liberal opposition, fairly aolidly arichored in pub3ic opinion,
thanks to the peraonality of ite leader,, Mr Abdoulaye Kane~ a profesaor bril- ,
liant enough to constitute a symmetrical ma,tch of value to the chief of state, ,
~ yet one who really does nat overshadow his authority, Aseuming poeitiona
_ more advanced than the government in the domain of forei~ affairs, be it on
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the i'I,~? ~Palestine Liberation Organization~, the P~~I.1 ti~~itl u Front or South
Africa, Mr Kane's Senegalese Democratic Party as a result benefits from a
ma~or leftist intellectual current on its fringes without for all that ~eo-
pardizing the essential principles of the state's politicel and economic
administration.
On the opposing side, a Mosle~-influenced conservative faction brings tog~ether
a large number of older, prominent i.ndividuals, which keeps the Socialist
Paxty now in power from being disagreeably branded as a rightist party and
fends off the lampoons of the young people. And finally, in the extreme left
- the break with the Marxist front resulting from the "legalization" of Mr
Mahjmout Diop's PAI (African Independence Party~ has not affected the move-
ment's theoretical options, but by staying out of Mr Mamadou Dia's COSII
[Coordination of the United Senegalese Opposition] and the Senegalese Asso-
ciation of Democrats it has had the obvious effect of weakening its impact
on public opinion and the possibilities of intervention.
No doubt this four-man political team does not give the impression of being
in perfect harmony. Mr Abdoulaye Ksne is often sharply critical and does not
hesitate to launch incisive attacks, albeit from the side2ines, aga.inst Mr
Sen~or himself. The ataunchly conservative nature of ~Ir Babakar Gaye's move-
ment, ~ahose goal is a"nonfeudal" kind of unionism with a reexaud.nation of
nationalizations and state ma~ority holding takeovers as well as a strengthen-
ing of cooperation with Senegal's traditional friends, F'ranoe, the IInited
States, the EEC and Saudi Arabia, apparently includes nothing that might gi~ve
investors cauae for concern.
But, at a time wher~ Islam is mobilizing from one end of its historic territ~ry
to the other the echos of this movement rece~tly resounded at the symposium
on Iala.mic thought at Tam~n*asset in a country profoundly marked by reli-
gious societies, the religious nature of the movement aould turn it into the _
receptacle arid the instrument of forces its foundeYS had not necaesarily en- -
~ visioned~ It is true tha.t what is asked of opposition movementa is in no
way a community of thought and of action, rather the reeogaition of a politieal
system in which differences are settled by paxliamentary means alone while
the restrictions of the law are at all times suspended with referen~ae to
~ parties without official reao~gnition or which axe subveraive and Khich are
left outside the system.
I IInder the circumstances, can we say that the qusstion of a successor to
i
~ Presiden~ Senglaor, who, as he willingly admits, ia attracted to a sta.te of
~ semi-retirement by ~o many topics he would like to meditate on, has now been
settled? It would be more accurate to say tha.t what will happen can in any
event be foreseen~ The head of the government, Mr Abdou Diouf, an energetic
- and capable politician, often appears to be the official successor, There _
- can be no doubt that he is thE one most naturally singled out for later leadl.ng -
and vitalizing the Socialist Party. But, while the PDS [Senegalese Democratic
_ Party] has only 17 deputies ir. the present National Assembly as opposed to the
Socialist Party's 82, it is in luck. Partial elections in the rural councils
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which grovern the communities established in 1972 have indicated a coneiderable
stren~rthening of support for the PDS. The merger of the two ma~or labor
~ uni~ns, the UTLS [expansion unlalownj, allied with the PDS, which reaeived the
lion~~ ahare in the recent eleations of union delegates to the enterprise
commil:tees, at the expenae of the CNTS [National Confederation of Senegalese
4rorkera], which is linked with the auaterity policy conduc~ed by the govern-
ment, one that disfavors workers (the 10-percent hike in Wagea that rrent into
effect at the staxt of the year follor+ed a freeze that ha,d lasted aince 1975),
will work to thz advantag~e of the PDS.
And finally, in the exercise of its poxer, it i.a the Socialist Pa,rty toW3rd
whicsh the extreme ieft's usual criticiems of corruption and mism~aanag~ement are
directed, criticisms endoWed with fresh current interest and virulence by
the recent National Office of Cooperation and Assiatance for Development
(ONCAD) scandal, while the PDS is left untouched and even to a certa3n extent
stands to g~in from them.
With satisfaction Mr Abdoulaye Kane notea these develapments and aeems to re-
~a,x~d as insacapable the gxadual merging of the subetance of the Soaialist
Party into the PDS, going so far a~s to show concern for the end result of
such a process, the disappearance of an oppoaition wort2~y of ttie name. I
- Senegal ha.a not yet reached that point. But, like that of Mr Senghor himself,
the figure of the PDS leader extends beyond the borders of Senegal, repre- i
senting at the same time a tradition and a national need~ Without pre~udi-
cing the final outcome of the succession, when it comes, r?e may well imag3ne
- that, whatever his personal preferencea me4Y be~, Mr Sen,ghor feels that, in
terms of the hi~er interests of the state, he ha.s two irnns in the fire to
_ assure its success.
Moderate Economic Advaaces Farmin8 �
Senegal has never experienced the spectacular growth in farming and industry
recorded in ivory Coast. Furthermore, the relative age of their foundationa
condemn them to carzying the burden of outmoded economio forna~las. In the
farm sector the range of posaible speculations ia narrow. However, on the
~ whole, despite setbacke attributable to droughts and market priae fluctuatione, ,
the expansion curve has been rising si.nce independence. ~he fact ~t thia
development is not more pronounced does not in itaelf ca~~titute a reason for ;
mistrust on the part of i.nvestors and we may legitimately ask ouraelves
whether it would not rather 3ustify an increased effort on their part.
The faxm situa.tion remains, however, perplexing. From 1960 to 1975 P~uction
rose by only 2.6 percent a y~ar, altog+ether nearly 40 percent~ not enough to
compensate for the effects of a 2.9-Percent ra~e of populr~tion growth. It
supports 70 peraent of the population but contributes only 18 peyceat to the
- gross nationa.l product, It ie still based on peaauta, accounting for an
average 60 peresnt of overall production, 80 percent of commercialized farm '
income and with averag~e volumea of about 900,000 tons aad medioare yielde
running frora 500 to 70~ kg per hectare. Considering the fact that, taken as
- a whole, farm production hae chang+ed little and that pear~ut production still
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commandeera 50 percent of the cultivated aseas in the regions of Diourbel,
T'hies, Luga and Sine-Saloum, 35 percent in Casamance and 28 peraent in Eastern
Senegal, we come to the conclusion that the oft-proclaimed intentions of -
liberating the country from the tyranr~y of market pricea by diversifying pro-
ductxon have hardly gone beyond the stage of speech~s or memorandums.
Diversi.fication, the icing on the cake for single-crop countries, in Senegal
as in the Antilles, is easier said than done. In a country where rainfsll
varies from 800 mmi in Nioro on the Gambian border to 300 mm in Podor on the
river, with Casamance alone benefiting from levela in excees of 1 meter,
there axe few alternativea to the crop the population is used to and Whiah
the religious societies ha,ve ~mposed and rigidly control. It also assures
the ONCAD, the SONACOS [National Marketing Compar~y of Senegal~, whiah sells
xt to the oilWOrks, the oilworks themselves, even though the latter job the ~
material for the SONACOS, and the Equalization and Price Stabilization Office,
~ ~rhich benefits from the difference between the price of peanu.ts ae of arrival
at the factory and the transfer price eata.blished da31y on the basis of xorld
market prices, siza.ble profits. Although the purchase price from the producer
ha.s not chang+ad aince ~975, while the family consumer price index has aince
then grone from 188 to 219 (against a base figure of 100 for 1970), the com-
bined wei~t of these factora does not work in favor of effective diversifi-
cation.
Especially i.n the food sector, however, it would be pasticular~y opportune,
since Senegal has to annually imPart 35 billion CFl [Africaa Finaricial Com-
munity] francs worth of food products, including 360,000 ~ons of grain, riae
and wheat, worth 16 billion CFA francs, Paddy production has not kept up .
with the demand, declining from 133,800 to 83,671 tons between 1975-1976 and
'1977-~978~ A ma~or effort ha.s nevertheless been made to increase millet and ~
i sor~iim production in terms of both regulation and purchase prices r~rith an
eye to the uae of millet flour in making bread. Since this pro~ect hae en-
countered technical difficulties that have not yet been reeolved, the opera- ,
tion has unfortunately resulted in a stockpile of millet that is hard to die-
pose of~ The same error in timing has led the government to push rice im-
. ports because they produce a profit for the Equalizatfon Office and, thro~gh
artificial inflation of the retail sales prices of sugar, the local production
= of which has not yet reached the level set in the Fburth Plaa, and in fact
supplyan underground import traffic in this product from Gambia.
i In 1974-~975 cotton production seemed to ha,ve gotten off to a good sta.rt, ~
i with the launching of. an integrated operation with the spinni.ng and weaving
. induatry which could have relieved Senegal of the burden of annu.a~l.ly import-
i.ng cloth worth over 3 billion CFl fxanca.- But it has not met the expecta,-
, tions of the SODEFITEX [expaasion unlrnown], a~oi.nt econompr company respon-
, sible for the promotion of this crop, sinoe the marketed volume has dealined
from 45,000 to 37,000 tons of cottonseed~ For the same reason, spinn~ng aud
weaving mill prod.uction ha.s dropped 38 percent while some of the cotton pro-
duced is exported in the form of fiber.
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k'ishiiig is one of the sectors whose economic health is leas queg~ionable,
It particulaxly benefits frnm a larg~e skilled labor force, almost 5 percent
of the working population~ or more than the civil serviae. Ita contribution
to the gross national product has been conetantly rising since 1960, g~oing
beyond 5.5 percent in 1976~ while the number of incoming boatloads increased
15 percent a yeax between 1970 and 1974. ~e slight deoline in induatrial �
fiahing that had been noted since ~975 wa.s reversed in 1978 aud, due to the =
= equipping of new units, 1979 should prove to be a very favorable yeax, which
is reflect8d i.n the growing importance of cannery operatione. Yielde aould
be even better if part of the Daka.r fishing fleet did not, paxadoxically
enough, work for the Venezuelan canneries. Moreover, along with the thinning _
out of the shri.mp beds on the continental shelf, the shortag~e of freezing
faailities and of aurveillance over territorial fishing xatera constitute
the critical factors in t1Lis industry.
Industrial Prospects
The results obtained in i.ndustry are comparatively more satisfactory than
thoae in faxming, gi.ven the fact that ita contribution to the ~ross national ~
product went from 12 percent in 1962 to 23 percent in 1974. The peanut ~
indus~ry crises that occurred between 1967 and 1972 were obviously reflected
in oilworks opera,tions and, due to the drop in rural purchasir~g power, in
consumer industries like beverag~es and tobaeco and, all the more eo, in the '
import trade~ To a certai.n extent, however, this drop in purchasing power
was compensated for by the opening of border nations to the Senegalese pro-
cessing industries. On the whole, ~owth came to 10 percent between 1972
and 1976 with #hs recovery affecting 3ust about all aectors except sugar, ~
leather and te~tilea where stagnation has become a habit. Following the
excep~tional results obtained in 1977, phospha.te mining has been matntained
at a volume of 1.5 million tons, 90 peraent of which ie for Taiba. Despite
a rate of increase of about 12 percent, cement prnduction, amounting to abou~
360,000 tone, is uader the country~s needs~ estima,ted a~ 2 million tone, ait2~
out ar~y cam~incing explanation having been found for postponement of the exe-
cution of projects pending nor for the pointless draining of hard currency
w~ich the Senegalese econom~r has thus been conde~ed to.
The very nature of the nation~s industries, almost wholly centered about t'tie
Cape Verde region, reflects the effects of the eaonomia oapital miasion of
_ the former federation, which was for a long time assigned to Dakmr. This
resulted in weak integration, forcing the enterprises to buy 40 percent of
_ the material needed for their opera~ions from abrdad, with the added eaport
volume remaining under that of the intermediate consumptione thus imposed~
On the whole, industry h~s experienaed a deficit trade balance vhile the
number of 3oba created has been lows about 28,000 or 1.5 peroent of the
working population. _
On the other hand, bad luck ha,s compromised or condeamed the three ma~or
pro3ects: Port Sedar, the Dakar marina and the induatrial free zone, whose
_ competition would have permitted industry to get out of the poor aituation
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it is having a ha.rd ti~e ridding itself of~ The first of these pro~ects~
providing for the construction of a gigantia petrochemiaal complex, will ha.ve
to be abandoned due to a defaulting of the Iranian capital whiah has hitherto
supported it. The scope of the second project will ~P reduced to meeting the
needs of inedium-sized and small naval repair facil.ities~ nonetheless including
the cons~truction of a floating dry dock represQnting a relatively large in-
- vestment: 17 billion CFA francs.*
Justification for the third pro3ect is derived precisei~ from the apparently
low level of integration of Dak~s industriee. It is, however, rase that
theae enterprises depend on foreign sources for both their supplies and
~ their outlets, T'hose which can be called enterpriaes do not hesitate to
abandon already amortfzed installations and the high coat of produation fac-
tors (wagQS, electricity, rents) is not calculated to attract ner? ones to
Dakar. At the present time only two enterprises of relative i.mportanae are
in operation inside the zone. The establishment of a~ew others ia planned,
to say nothing of several minipro3ects, If confirmed, the lowering of ad-
mission requirements to 100 million CFA francs in investments aad the areation
of 100 3obs wi11 reveal the poor success of a formula which to suaceed re- _
quires extremely low wag~e levels which Senegal, despite its economic ahort-
comings, ou~it to really congratulate itself on not ha.ving experienced.
For Economic Recovery -
There is no way of hidin~ the fact that, while Senegal's books~ as they stand _
toda.y, do not reflect a catastrophic situation, they do not exactly give riae
to erthusiasm either. A per capita gross national produat eta~ant at 120f000
- CFA francs, an organically deficit trade balance, a balanee of payments with
a balance conatantly in the red whiah the riae in peanut eud phoaphate market _
~ priaes had alleviated in 1976 almoat to the point of achieving balance but
with no prospects for the future and the exiatence of some seators with no
- previous history of development, like fishing or tourism - the number of
entries is steadily rising, having eacceeded 200,000 in 19']S axid ~uatifying
- a hotel prog�ram allowing for the addition of 10,000 unita to the 5,000 now
in existence c~a~not let us forget the anomalies that afflict Sen~galeae
economic meehaniama, leaving us with the impression that we have not made
the best of the available development instruments under financial conditions
that are still healtY~ys the pu~lic debt accounta for about 20 percent of tD1e
- gross na.tional product (costly eurod.ollar loans unfor~i,~unately conetitute a
growing portion of thia) and to this day income from eaports covera no more =
than 12 percent of the oost of servicirig the foreig~n debt.
No co~parison is more revealing of the anemic nature of the economy and its
' slow evolution that that of the import strui.ctures in ~96o and 1975s dependence
~ on food imports saarcely reduced (25 peraent instead of 33), volume of oil
*~e execution of the new Dakax marina pro3ect now in progress wae described
' in our iasue No 1742 of 30 March 1979.
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and semi-manufaotured products on the rise, from 5 to 12 percent and from 12
to 20 percent respectively. The most encouraging factors are a drop of 50
per~ent in consumer g~oods and a rise of from 15 to 23 peraent in capital g~ooda.
- All tnis is still weak development~ If the criticisms leveled against the
luke~-wa.rm attitude of French investora by President Senghor axe really Well-
founded which has not been determined we might aleo look for an at
least partial explanation in orgaaizational defecta, the ahortoomings and
errors of management which an eY~~nAtion of the Senegalese econo~qr reveals.
Moreover, private investment ie not the only kind and we should not forg~et
that F`rench public aid is atill by far the most important kind of forei~ .
5.5 billion CFA francs for FAC [Aid and Caoperation I~nd] investments,
3 billion for traa_ning, 15 billion ~or technical assistance, 4 billion for
scientific research, 350 million in food aid, subsidies to which tae ougtit to
add 15 billion CFA francs in Central Bank medium or 1on~term loana, all
~ totaling almost 43 billion CFA francs in commi.~ments for 1978, With ita eub-
sidiary organizations, the IDA and the IFC, the IB'~D contributes 9 billion
- CFA francs, the FID 6,2 billion, the B~AD [African Development Bank] and the i
FAD [African Development F`und~ 1.6 billion, the U.S. AID 3 billion, the ~
FRG 2.2 billion and Canada 1, billion. Taking into account Arab financing, i
- the total of 'bilateral and multilateral commitments thua representa a sum in ~
the neighborhood of 70 billion CFA francs, 3ust for the ~iscal year under ;
consideration. '
We axe surprised at the size of these gources of support in comparison with
those granted ather African countries of comparable population and economic
_ importance, as well as at their atill weak impaat on development. .
The explanation of this phenomenon could reaide in the gap that separate~ a
certain geopolitical im~ge of~Senegal from the reality of its resources.
The fact that for three centuries the aountry had belonged to the European ~
world, the quality of its elites and the role of lead.ership it has played
for several decades at the head of a federation of territories rrY;ich i~t ~ows
it has guided toward emancipation have led it to attach more importanae to ~
-the superstructures than to the foundations~ The etructure shoxed no signs
of wealmess.so long as the services provided by Dakax still con~tituted a I
~ monopoly. With the development of cc~mpetition a=ad the appearance of the ~
crisis, the ina.dequacy of the means of production set in motion is apparent ~
not only in the stagna.tion of tonna~e volumes, but alao in the drop in commer-
cial revenue and the abar?donment of the porta.
The firat lies in an I
~ere are only two solutions to this state of affaira, ;
adaptation of the mode of government a~:d the standard of living oP offiaials ;
to the countr,y's current economia dimensions as they are determined by its ;
political borders and the resources of ite farmers and wa~s-earnere. Whatever i
precautions may be taken aga,inet deatabiliza.tion, thia solution would involve
obv3.ous risks in a country in which the population is more attaahed to the ~
values of a consumer society than are those of the neig#~boring aauntriea.
~
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The second aolution c~naiats of restoring Senegal., through organizations like
the OMVS (Organization for the Development of the Senegal River) and the ~
OMVG (Organization for the Developmsnt of the Gambia River) to its traditional
role of international promoter. To the ext nt thie solution is the one chosen
by the Senegalese Government, the days to come rrill be endowed xith ez.ceptional
importance for it. In fact, the atudies and negntiations dealing with the
Diama. Dam were approved between 25 and 28 SBptember wi.th the opening of bids
on the pro~ect. The financial etake is relatively modeat (17 billion CFA
fraucs for the dam alone). But in making their decision, the graaters of
Eur~pean, French, German and Arab f~nds will be stealing a march on the fl~ture
by considering that t~hey have definitively acquired control over the financing
o# the ManAntali Dam, thus broar,hing in a positive way the problem of the
- mining of Fgl.eme iron along with the consequences that will have on the hydro-
elactric facilities and river navigation struatures.
If, as we hope, no new delay affects this decision, a new dimension opened _
to Senegalese activities xill thus bring to the nation's econom~y an element
of dynamiam and coherence which it has until now lacked~
COPYRIGHTs Rene M~oreux et Cie., Pasis, 1979
11,466
CsOa 4400
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TANZANIA -
_ UK PAPER INTERVIEWS NYERERE ON RHODESIAN SETTLF~MENT PLAN
LD040930 London THE OBSERVER in English 4 Nov 7y p 1 LD
[Article by Jonathan Dimbleby in Dar es SalaamJ
[Text] The Rhodesian peace talks will break down unless Lord Carrington
_ agrees to lengthen the proposed transition period before an election and to
remove General Walls from control of the armed forces, President Nyerere of
Tanzania said yesterday.
The presiden~ who is chairman of the presidents of the front line states
said in an interview with THE OBSERVER: that he differed from the Patriotic
Front on some details of the interim administration.
"The Patriotic Front has agreed to a new constitution. The British are tak-
y ing over. That's fine, but there is now an atmosphere of Gilbert~�and Su11i-
van farce about these things. The Patriotic Front helped the British end
a rebellion. The idea that the British should now 'get tought' with the
Patriotic Front is ridiculous. The front can't succumb to this pressure.
They--all of us--need to be satisfied that the interim period will lead.to
free and fair elections.
"The British say that two months is long enough, that the ceasefire can't
hold up any longer. They say it's a matter of co~onsense. But no leader
of the Commonwealth that I've spoken witr. believes that ~wo months is rea-
sonable."
President Nyerere went on: If you have a ceasefire it will be as a re-
So
su'lt of agreement. If there11is no agreement then there is no ceasefire.
w~,iy the fuss about two monthsY A short period like this is clearly intended
to favour the parties already inside Rhodesia.
I "The Patriotic Front wi11 have to go home, organise the ceasefire, and get
, their parties which are illegal at the moment--prepared for an election.
How can it possibly be fair to expect them to came out of the bush and have
elections in two months?"
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On another issue which deadlocks the con~erence--the future of the two op- -
posing armies--President Nyerere was more conciliatory. He acknowledged -
that "The British appear to be stating that there is going to be equality
of status and role as far as the maintenance of the ceasefire is concerned.
This is reasonable. But after the elections the new government will have to `
build a new army. For this reason there must be no auggestion that during
the interim one of the armies is 'constitutional' and the other 'terrorist."'
Significantly departing from the Partiotic Front's position, President
Nyerere accepted that the new governor appointed by Britain for the interim
period would have to use "the existing machinery" of state. But he insisted
that Lord Carrington must make it clear to the Patriotic Front that "the
symbols of oppression" will be removed.
As soon as the governor takes over, he expects General Walls to be relieved ~
of his command. He also expects the police to be cleaned up by the appoint- ~
ment of British officers. Only by th3s means would the "equal status" of
the opposing armies be established: "This is the least the British can do." ,
Again differing from the Patriotic Front. President Nyerere accepted that i~
there was no need for the United Nations to play any role in the interim i~
r
period. But he does not accept Lord Carrington s interpretation of the
role of "Coffinonwealth observer."
He suggests that a way out of the deadlock would be for the Commonwealth to
play a"peacekeeping role" under British Government authority--an idea Lord
Carrington has so far rej~cted.
President Nyerere argues that the British should recognise that "their power #
cannot be completely metaphysical. It has to be real. If the Commonwealth .
- is prepared to contribute armed forces to help strengthen the authority of ~
the governor and to monitor the ceasefire, why doesn't Lord Carrington ac- !
cept"? ~I
i
President Nyerere made it clear that if Britain were to accept such a role ~
for the Commonwealth then in turn the front line states would not expect zhe I
Patriotic Front to allow ~he issue of "international supervision" to lead
to a collapse of the talks. -
- David Martin writes: In what is seen as a co-ordinated move Mozambique
- yesterday also attacked Britain's handling of the talks. Britain was "organ-
ising the conditions for a civil war in Zimbabwe" and its proposals were
deliberately "ambiguous and vague" a statement from Maputo said.
The statement, obviously approved by President Samora Machel, said that only
an "international military force not previously involved in the conflict"
would be able to ensure peace.
Britain's handling of the conference threatened its chances of success the
statement said.
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/ The front's co-leaders, Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo, were also on the offensive
yesterday. At a press conference in London they inaisted that integration
of guerrilla and security forces must begin before independence if "disaster"
was to be averted.
Zambian sources said last night that a"contingency plan" exists for Presi-
dent Kuanda to fly to London this week to talk to Mrs Thatcher if the Rho-
desia talks are deadlocked.
President Kaunda called in Br'itain's high commissioner in Zambia on Friday
night to outline his objections to Britain's proposals. Simultaneously an
' aide delivered a message to London.
_ Sources said that Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia were co-ordinating their
strategy.
COPYRIGHT: T}le Observer Ltd, 1979
cs0: 4420
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