JPRS ID: 8781 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000200020045-8
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• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 45
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS ~/8781
26 November 1979
~ Near Ea t`~ ' -
s North Africa Re ort
p
(FOUO 46/79)
' FB~~ FOREIGN BR~ADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPR5 L/8781
26 November 1979
I~EAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 46/79) _
CONTENTS PAGE
NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Effects of Smara Attack
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 18-24 Oct 79) 1
0 ALGERIA
Favorable Outlook for Economic, Commercial Relations With
Belgium
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 23 Sep 79)........ 4 �
Directives on 1979-1980 Planting Season
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 Oct 79)..,..... 6
Snags in Fruit, Vegetable, Fish Price Controls
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Oct 79)......... 7 ~
Road Construction Inaugurated
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 12 Oct 79)........ 9 -
Briefs
Islamic Development Bank Loan 10
New Air Route 10
Distrigaz-GDF Contract 10 -
APTEP Advertising Nlonopoly Confirmed 11 -
~
MOROCCO
Negotiations With Algeria Proposed
(Ali Yata Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARE'.F3I, 18-24 Oct 79).. 12
- a- [III - NE & A- L~i FOUO]
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CONTENTS (,Continued) Page
SUDAN
Economy To Determine Survival of Numayri Regime
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 27 Sep-3 Oct 79) 20 .
Ba'thist Leader Says Numayri's Removal Only Solution -
- to Economic Woes
(Badr-al-Din Mudaththir Interview; AL WATAN
AL-'ARABI, 27 Sep-3 Oct 79) 26
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D10RTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
_ EFFECTS OF SMARA ATTACK
_ Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic i8-24 oct 79 P 35
[Article: "King Hasari: Smara Is a Moroccan Lesson`r]
[Text] King Hasan II left no room for doubt about his intentions when he
' selected an honorable statement by the Prophet as the basis for the sig-
' nificant speech with which he inaugurated the current session of the
Moroccan Parliament last Friday. The Prophet's statement says, "The strong
believer is better and dearer to God than the weak believer."... "Yes, a
strong Morocco is better and dearer to ~od than a weak Morocco." ~
Observers here noticed the significant sense that the Moroccan monarch
wanted ~o convey by emphasizing the strength of Morocco and the unity of -
its popular groups at this stage. This affirmation came only 6 days after
the battle of the city of ~Ynara in the Sahara.
- Addressing the elected candidates and the Moroccan people, the king said at
the outset of his speech, "We ~aant a Nbrocco whose political and unionist
- ranks are united just as they are united today, so that this Morocco can
stand as one wall and as an impregnable stronghold against all ambitious
desires and against all those who allaw themselves to be enticed into think-
ing that they can with the stroke of a pen or with a gunshot remove from the
surface of the earth the plans we have been making for centuries and centu-
ries."
With hi_s customary diplomatic skill the Nbroccan monarch addressed the
Polisario and those who stand behind it without naming them. He also
referred to the results of the battle of the city of Smara and said,
"Nbrocco has always been giving lessons [to others], but, unfortunately,
we see that people have forgotten these lessons. Ever since the old days -
and until today, the Moroccan ranks have never been split in facing a
threat to bl~rocco, +o its existence, to.its borders and to its integ~�ity.
M~orocco has given many such lessons, but people, God forbid, did not want
and do not want to benefit from these lessons."
The battle of S~nara became the subject of commentary in different political
= and popular Moroccan circles.
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The nawspaper AL-'ALAM which speaks for the Istiqlal Party that is led by
the Moz~occan Minister of Foreign Affairs M'Hamed.Boucetta described the
cit,y of ~lna.ra as "the city which bonds knowledge and the holy war. The
r~ewUpaper considered the attack on this city "an Algerian attack on sacro- _
~anct Islami~ objects.~~
� In an appeal that was made to Arab parties, organizations and officials
after the S~nara operation by the Central Co~ittee of the Istiqlal Party, -
which is considered one of the most influential N1Qroccan parties, the -
- Central Committee stated, "~'he strong close ties between the Algerian and
the Moroccan people--and especially in the area of the common struggle
against colonialism--and the comnitments with which we have encompassed
ourselves in the ups and downs of this stru~ggle force upon the Algerian
peop~e themselves a special responsibility.
The appea]. that was made by the Central Committee added, "The non-aligned
position of the remaini::g Arab brothers and their siler~ce harbors weakness
in facing the conspiracy to fragment the Arab land. This ma.tter is incon-
sistent with the Arab peoples' unification aspirations, all of which oppose
separatist trends wi~ether they be territorial or religious.~~
Meanwhile the newspaper AL-MUHARRIR which speaks for the Socialist Union of
People's Forces [USPF] and is led by Abderrahim Bouabid stated, '~The two
treacherous attacks on ~na.ra and Oued Draa indicate that the opponents of
Morocco's territorial unity have gone to extremes in a plan to escalat~ not
only the style of the aggress, but also its nature, its means and its goals.
The battalions that were used in the attack on ~nara and Oued Draa, the kinds
of weapons with which the attack was carried out and the intensity and vi-
ciousness of the confrontation affirm that the guerilla war has given way to
' a classical war that usually takes place only between regular armies." '
The Executive Office of the National Rally of Independents which is chaired
= b,y former Prime Minister Mr Ahmed Osman condemned "the aggression on Slnara
severely and coirur?ended the officers and the soldiers of the royal armed
forces for the victory they achieved."
After denouncing "the attack," the statement of the Party of Progress and
Socialism lthe Cotrnnunist Party) whic~~ is led by Mr Ali Yata asked that the
unity of Morocco's territory be completed by liberating the areas of Ceuta
and Melilla. The statement said, The circumstances which the area of North-
west Africa is experiencing are quite serious. They may lead to the out-
break of a comprehensive war that would devastate Algeria and Nbrocco and
= bring about major catastrophe tliat taould overpawer the two fraternal
nations. Aithough Algerian leaders have refused al'1 efforts at mediation,
it has become evident that [their position] springs from an erroneous
n
premise.
Observers here think that the ~nara operation has removed the probability
, of any hope for mediation in the area in the foreseeable future. Info~med
?
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diplomatic sources here stated that all mediation ef~orts had been sus-
_ pended even before the two recent operations--that of Smara and that of
Soutti Oued Draa--because Algeria had maintaine~3 its position of consider-
ing the struggle to be one betti�~een the people of the Sahara and Morocco.
Morroco, [on the other hand], regarded the struggle to be one between
Morocco and Algeria.
Reports repeated recently by the Spanish and the American media about the
presence of Cuban advisers in Ma,uritania and ir~ the bases of the Polisario
have increased the tension in the atmosphere between the ~wo c~untries.
COPYRIGHT: 1G79 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8592 .
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ALGERIA =
FAVORABLE OUTLOOK FOR ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITFi BELGItJM
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Sep 79 pp 2269, 2270
[Text] For the fourth conaecutive time Belgium was represented at the
International Fair at Algiexa, and this year tTie ~epreaentatton of more than
40 companies, federationa and agencies, was enhanced by tTie 16 to 19 September
_ visit of an important official miseion, governmenG spokeamen and business-
men headed by Prince Albert accompanied by Lucien,0utera, minieter of
foreign trade,
Economic.and commercial relations between Belgium and Algeria are already
at a high level. Assuring them of a favorable outlook, Outers echoed
Prince Albert's remarks, declaring that Belgium ~ranted to establiah mnr~
personal ties "with a country which is our primary partner in Africa and '
which in years to come will be our primc~ry partner among the countries of
the Third World." .Outers affirmed that betw~en now and 1980 Algeria arould
become one of Belgium's 7.0 most important trade partners.
Rapidly increasing rates of foreign exchange between Belgiutn and Algeria
is now on the order of 2~million dinars per year. The Belgian Oftice of ,
Foreign Trade, of which Prince Albert ie president,,recorded tF?at the value
of Belgian exports to Algeria went from 10,340 million Balgian francs in
1977 ra 12,718 million in 197$ and statistics for the .f.iret 4 months of
1979 confirm that the increase continues: 5.1 billion as compared to
4.1 billion in 1978.
Wfiile currently favorable to Belgium in spita of increased exporte from
Algeria of which 90 percent are getroleum products, the balance of trade
will soon became favorable to Algeria wh:n the contract for natural gae
that Belgium signed with Sonatrach goes into effect in 1982:
At the 16th FIA, Belgium,(and for the firat timE the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg was at its side with three exfiibitors~ presented: model pro~ects
- from the Belgian Office of Engineering Research as well as from assembly
plants (steel, textiles, petroleum refining, extraction of natural gas,
chemicals and petrochemicals, production of electricity, etc~); electrical
and electronic products (for surveillance and inveatigation); maci~ine tools
_ for working metal (especially presses, lathea~ and drills), etc.; metal
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products, especially of aluminum ..(extrusions and sheet metal); chemical
products (insulation panels, paints, etc~); transport goods (semis, tank
trucks); elevators; wrapping paper; textile industry goods (accesscries
for textile machines); water treatment products; insulating materials;
heating and air conditioning; supermarket and store fixtures; glastic
- coverings; materials for finishing surfaces; model pro~ects from Belgium in
vocational training.
We have already many times, and especially during the official visit last
- 15-17 May of Henri Simonet, Belgian minister of foreign affairs, insisted
on tfie importance of the projects now being studied between Belgium and
Algeria (see MTM of 29 Sep 73 p 2575, 19 Jan 79 p 128, 25 May 79 p 1295). .
According to AGENCE ECONOMIQUE ET FINANCIERE of Brussels, the contracts
now being negotiated are work an overall total of more tfian 50 bill~on
- Belgian francs. They concern construction (public housing), transportation
(railways), hydraulics, housing, gas, and numerous other industrial sectors.
"Algiers," AGEFI notes, "stated it was quite satified with the visit of the ~
Belgian missian and means to extend economic ties with our country~ especially
in the exchange of knowledge, technology, techntcal assistance, and training.
The two parties have already decided on: (1) a ma~or Bel.gian exhibition in _
Algiers next spring; (2) setting up an exchange system for information in
hydravlics, building construction, and energy; (3) opening an office of the ~
Federation of Chemical Industries in Algiers; (4) a visit to Belgium by the
_ Algerian ministers of foreign trade and scientifi~: research in the next few
months.
It should be noted that Belgium Day at FIA, 17 ~eptember, presided over by -
Prince A1bQrt, was a great success. Tfie prince was received the next day
by President Chadi B~end~edid and Mr Abdelgfiani, prime minister. Also
during his visit he talked with Abdelghani Akbi, miniater of commerce,
Salah Goud~il, minister of transport, Abdelhamid Srahimi, minister of ~ _
_ plannin$ and territorial management, These discussions dealt with strength- ~
ening cooperation between Algeria and Belgium, particularly in tfie area of
railways.
COF'ifRIGHT: Rene M.oreux et Cie., Paris, 1979 -
8860
CSO: 440Q
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ALGERIA
DIRECTTVES ON 1979-1980 PLANTING SEASON
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET P4EDITERRANEENS in French 12 Oct 79 pp 2753, 2754
[Text] The Algerian 1979-80 planting season officially began on 1 October,
to close 31 December. A meeting to coordinate the various officials of
the Ministry of Agriculture and the Agrarian Revolution was held in Algiers
on 1 October.
This meeting, APS noted, was held as a reminder that for the third
consecutive year the country has registered a ba~ fiarvest of cereals and
tfiat this situation cannot be blamed entirely o~~ climate conditions, but
that organizational and tecfinical weaknesses, such as not doing the work
according to the times imposed by the seEd varieties and the vagaries of
the country's climate, insufficient uti~ization of the land in maintenance
and.organization, nonusage of elementary techniques which could affect
yield, and chronic insufficiency of weeding.
The role of each organization concerned as spelled out in a ministerial �
_ directive last 23 September. Tfie success of the season largely depends on
local level scheduling and on-going follow-up on operations.
,
For scheduling, APS continued, a plantin.g calendar was set out for each -
ecological zone: a sowing calendar by species and variety, a schedule of
claims for pooled materials, as well as distribution of ineans of production
(seed and fertilizer particularly).
_ The maxi:num manpower available from the administrative and technical agencies
will be a:;signed to those locations during the season, their prerogatives
and tasks ~clearly defined and f.or wfiich they will be held accountable.
The direc:tive emphasized that a well conducted planting season neceasitates -
effective participation by all the agencies involved, MARA ~Ministry of ~
Agriculture and the Agra~ian Revolution) as well as the decentralized
- political and administrative agencies of the governorate.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
8860
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ALGERIA
SNAGS IN FRUIT, VEGETABLE, FISH PRICE CONTROLS
' Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French S Oct 79 pp 2694, 2695
[Text] The embryo strike begun the penultimate week of September by fruit
and vegetable vendors in Algiers had extended by tlze 24th to almost all _
the principle city markets. The strikers were protesting the application
of price controls they judged "arbitrary" and were supporting 20 of their
colleagues being prosecuted for breaching price regulations. The AEP
- reported: "We've had enough of being scapegoats," declared an old stall
- keeper seated tailor fashion on the empty planks of his bootfi. According
to him, the prices set by the price control agency--as part of straight~ning
out the large cities "wouldn't enable the vendors to even recover their _
expenses."
The vendors' strike ended 28 September. On that day the stands in Algiers'
principle markets displayed their wares~ prices were posted as required, -
- and those prices were clearly below those o� the preceding week in those
same markets. However, lesser quality mexchandise was offered and those
vegetables which had been the sub~ect of dispute were less evident.
As for fish, the stands were still empty the middle of last week~ Yfie fish
sellers still~re~ecting tfie official prices. On 26 September there was a
- meeting to study problems relating to fish in tfie governorate of Algiers
in tfie government headquarters, presided over by Ould Kablia, governor of
Algiers. At the meeting, in which Mustapha Hachmaoui, party commissioner,
also participated, were also the governorate's director of prices and
commerce, a rep resentative of the state secretariat for fisheries, ship
outfitters, fish wholesalers and retailers. -
In a preiiminary statement reported by the ALGERIAN PRESS SERVICE (APS),
the governor of Algiers noted tha*_ the purpose of the meeting was to study
the problems and difficulties cfiaracteristic of tfie fishing industry and
"to put an end to the anarcfiy of prices at T~oth the wholesale and retail
levels."
Following rhe discussion, APS continued, a table showing three categories _
: of fieh was set up, with a ceiling price at bath whol.esale and retail -
levels. The prices set, it was noted, wi11 be authorized by a governorate
decree. -
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_ For category B(dog-fish, bonita, mackerel, aole and rates) the wholesale
reiling is 16 dinars and conaumer price is 18 dinars. _
Fiiially, for the third category, including eels, congers~ octopus, -
- a~igelfish, squid and mullet, wholesale prices are fixed at 8 dinara,
retail at 10 dinars. For sardines the production price ia 5 dinars.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979.
8860 -
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ALGERIA
ROAD CONSTRUCTION INAUGURATED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRaNEENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2754
= [Text] In the presence of three government officials, Ahmed Ali Ghozali,
- minister of public works, Abdelmad~ed Aoch~cfie, minister of urbanismo ~
construction and housing, and Said A~t Messaoudene, minister of light
industry, as well as the governor of Algiers, the national party commissioner,
- the commander of the military sector, and the president of the APW jGovernorate
Popular Assembly], the Algerian prime minister, Abdelghani, symbolically
positioned on a bulldozer,'proceeded on 4 October at Birkhadem to inaugurate _
the construction of the south by-pass which in 24 months arill link Birmandreis
with Quatre Chemins in the distri~t of Boufarik.
APS noted more precisely that the 20 km-Iong road will start at the ~unction -
of RN-1 and the Birmandreis bypass and is composed of two sections:
(1) circling Birkfiadem from tfie west; and (2) Birkfiadem, Quatre Chemins.
Traffic of this section once it i~ opened for use in 1981 is predtcted to
be 15,000 vefiicles per daq. Tfie highway will consist of four lanes, with _
the possibility of expansion to six lanes divided by a central park~~ray.
Sonatro, a national public company under the Ministry of Public Works will
be in charge on` the construction. The expected cost is 160 million dinars.
Other pro~ects are the eastern exit route fr~m Algiers, the southern by-pass,
and the western exit.
COPYRI~AT: Rene Moreux et Cie,, Paris, 1979
886Q
CSO: 44U0
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ALGERIA
BRIEFS
ISLAMIC DEVELOPIKENT BANK LOAN-�-The Islt~aic Development Bank (BID) has _
granted a$35 million loan to Lhe SNS (Algerian National Steel Company)
~
to buy steel products, The contract was signed at Algiers on 19 September
in the presence of the Algerian minister for heavy indu~try, Mohamed
Liassine, by Hocine Arezki, general director of SNS, Mr Benhalima,
representing the BEA (Algerian Foreign Exchange Bank), and Almied Mohamed
Ali, president of the Islamic Development Bank. The BID president was
received by President Chadli Bend~edid and spoke with several members of
the Algerian Government ori developing commercial relations between Islamic =
countries with the participation of the Islamic Development Bank. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2626] 886Q
NEW AIR ROUTE--A new air route Oran-London will be opened 28 October by
the English airline, British Caledonian Airways. Liaison between the
_ English capital and Oran will be assured by a weekly flight every Sunday.
- The national airline Air Algerie will cover the same route beginning next
_ 7 November. [Text] [Paris NIARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
12 Oct 79 p 2754] 8860
DISTRIGAZ-GDF CONTRACT--The Belgian ministerial committee on economic and
social coordination has approved a proposed agreement between the Belgian
company Distrigaz and Gaz de France to receive Algerian natural gas for
Belgium at Montoir from 1R82 to 1985. Approval of this contract by the .
Belgian authorities will enable Distrigaz to honor its contract with
Algeria w~iile waiting for construction of the methane terminal at Zeebruge
to be completed. In 1982 Montoir will get 1.5 billion cubic meters of
natural gas; then 3 billion a year until 1985. 1'fie methane received at
Montoir wi11 be used in France. In exchange the Belgians will use an
equtvalent tonnage produced in the Frencfi part of the Nortfi Sea and which
= tfien is transported to France throngh a gasline on Belgian terrttory.
However, the Distrigaz-Son.atrach contract specifies 5 billion cubic metexs
per year, and Distrigaz must resolve the problem of the remaining 2 billion.
- It is generally thought that the same type ~f arrangement might be made with
the future Netherlands terminal at Emshaven. [Text] jParis MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in ~'rench 12 Oct 79 p 2754J 8860
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AN~Y AI)VI:RTISING hi0NbP0I,Y CONFIRMED--In its report to the interministerial -
council meeting in Algiers on 1 October, the ALGERIAN PRESS SERVICE made
the point that this councily fiaving examined "the queation of advertising
in Algeria as well as outside" had empfiasized that "all proposed advertis- _
' ing nnlst go through the National Agency for Publishing and Advertising must
go.through the National Agency for Publisfiing and Advertising (ANEP)
accor.ding to the criteria conforma~le to Algerian policy. [Text] [Paris
MARC~iES TROPICAUX ET MEDITE~RANFENS in French 12 Oct 79 p 2754~ 8860
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MOROCCO _
- NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALGERIA PROPOSED
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 18-24 Oct 79 pp 34-36
[Interview with Ali Yata, Secretary General of the Party of Progress and
Socialism,by `Adil al-Samlali: "Where Do Moroccan Communists Agree and
Disagree with Regime on the Question of the Sahara? Let Us Impose Nego-
tiations on Algeria; No One in Nbrocco Is Deprived of F~eedom of Speech, _
_ but..."]
[Text] AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has studied the opinions of a large number of _
Moroccan politicians and officials regarding the guestion of the Sahara,
and it finds that it is its journalistic duty to present the opinion of
= the Par~:y of Progress. and Socialism (the Moroccan Communist Party) on the
question oi the Sahara, on other domestic Moroccan questions, and on
' Morocco`s foreign policy so as to complete the political and social pic-
ture that AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has been trying to convey to the reader
about the conditions of this Arab country in the context of the struggle
over the Sariara.
- The correspondent of the magazine in Nbrocco met with Mr Ali Yata the
secretary general of the party and addressed sever~l questions on this
matter to him.
J The Part,y of Progress and Socialism [PPS] is the official name of the
Marxist Communist Party in Morocco. It is officially licensed, and it
is chaired by Ali xata who is a veteran Moroccan politican and a member
of the Moroccan parliament.
It is not strange that there be a licensed co~nnunist party in Morocco. -
The democratic experiment in this Arab country was able to make great
progress in establishing its foundations, thanks to the sophistication
and the wisdom of the Nbroccan monarch, King Has&n II.
- Moroccan public opinion is thus expressed in different accents and mov~~-
ments in a number of parties that are stretched out from the right to ~;he
left. They have considerable freedom in expr~ssing their opinions and
causes in the context of their political and ideological content.
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The fact is that the Moroc:can regime, through the experiences it has had,
~ has been able to overcome many complexes and sensitivities that wou~d have
prevented, for example, [the existence] of multiple points of view, plat- _
~ f'orms or parties in other Arab countries. -
Morocco was tYius able to overcome with considerable success the upheavals,
the tragedies and the catastrophes triat other. countries in the Third World _
ha.ve been sub jected ~i,o as a result of the closed nature of their political
experience.
The question of the Sahara brought the different parties, inclinations an~i
affiliations together on one common ground with regard to protecting
national uni~ty and defending national soil. Differences in points of view
that were originally due to differences in political and ideological prem-
ises were taken into consideration.
[Our] colleague 'Adil al-Samlali the correspondent of AL-WATAN AL-`ARABI
in Nbrocco met with Mr Ali Yata the secretary general of the PPS and con-
ducted this interview with him. The interview dealt with the opinion of
this Marxist party on the auestion of the Sahara and on other domestic
questions. This interview took place in the context of the interviews
that AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI is conducting with different Moroccan politicians
on the basis of their different political and procedural positions.
The exchange that took place in that interview between Mr Ali Yata and
~ AL-WATAN AL-`ARABI follows.
[QuestionJ What is your view of the current situation and of the prospects
of the development of the struggle between Morocco and Algeria regarding
the question of the Sahara?
[Answer] It is known that friendly and fraternal countries have been
engaged recently in mediation efforts between Morocco and Algeria for the
purpose of overcoming the tense situation in the area. Among these efforts
one must mention those of the Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba and those
of Mr Yasir 'Arafat the chairman of the Executive Cou~i-r,tee of the PLO.
It is also known to us that all these efforts have fail.ed because the
Algerian leaders do not recognize the existence of a struggle between
Morocco and their country, and they claim that the struggle is between
Morocco and what is called the Polisario.
The fact is that the Algerian leaders refuse to communicate with the
Moroccan leaders because they believe that they are in a strong position
~ and that they are capable of forcing Nlorocco to surrender.
This is an erroneous appraisal because Morocco is not in a weak position
as the Algerians imagine. ~zrthermore, M~orocco is determined to defend
its territory. When I say Morocco I mean the Nbroccan nation in its
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_ ~ntirety. I know of no nation in histor,y that surrendered wYien it was
- quite determined to defend it5 legitimate and sacred rights. -
The Algerians are refusing negotiations thaL would remove this tension.
They are in effect wasting a valuable opportunity. With i,heir conduct
they may be working towards igniting a war that we hope will nct take
place because it will be a loss to both countries.
Let Us Tmpose Negotiations on Algeria
[Queti~;iori] 4~Iklat are ttle prospects for the development of tYie problem with
~llgeria in particizlar?
[Answer] The prospects will be those that we ourselves make. It is my
_ belief that we can force Algeria to negctiate, and we can forc~ Algeria
to recognize our rights, that is, to respect our territorial possessions.
[Question] How do we do that?
[Answer] First, we are to protect our territory by not permitting the
mercenaries of Algeria to set foot on the soil of our country. This is -
possible because we have enough willpower and military power to protect
our soil from all sides and to protect every one of its posts.
Diaturally, the classical regular army would not suffice for carrying out -
this mission. It must be strengthened by forming groups of volunteers.
Moroccan youth--and there are hundreds of thousands of them--are quite
prepared to undertake this mission.
Secorid, we are to improve our eco~omy in a manner that would ensure the
needs of a country that is in a state of war. On the other hand, we are _
to fulfill the wishes and the demands of the people. Our adversaries
depend on the Moroccan economic crisis. They are.forcing a war of attri-
tion on us because they are convinced that it wi11 lead to a stifling
economic crisis that would force Morocco to surrender. It is for this
reason that we are~advocating improving and strengthening our economy
so that we may intercept [the effort toJ exploit our economic crisis to
eliminate us.
Third, we are to meet the legitimate demands of the masses and primarily
the workers (labor) because defending the homeland and [ourJ territorial "
possessions cannot be done without the participation of the popular masses.
Fourth, we are to make a complete and a radical change in our foreign policy. _
Our foreign policy is one of non-alignment, but actions during recent years
have proven that our foreign policy is aligned and that it is often sy~npa-
thetic with the West. I cite as evidence what happened in Zaire during the
two Moroccan interventions and the support that the traitor al-Sadat obtained
' in the da,ys of his first initiative.
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We ~nust, therefore, change our foreign policy, and we must ma'~e it a policy
that is in practice established on the bases of independence and noninter-
ference in the affairs of others. Our po~icy must support all the just
questions, and it must work with a spirit of initiative f'or the Az~ab cause
at whose forefront is the question cf the Palestinian people.
a These are ~Lhe four conditions t;hat must be honored so that our position may
be strengthened. We will ~orce Algeria~ to negotiate with us as our position
strengthens, and then new prospects will appear.
A Poisoned Gift -
[Question] Speaking of President al-Sauat, how do you vies.; the Egyptian
initiative to supply Morocco with weapons? _
[Answer] We consider al-Sadat's initiative of support for Morocco and,
according to his statement, the weapons that [he offered as] aid, to be
tantamount to a poisonous gif+ that hurts Morocco more than it benefits it.
The statement~ that al-Sadat made on this subject while the Havana Confer-
ence was in session had a poor effect. Many of the Arab brothers believed
that Morocco had gone back to dealing with al-Sadat and to denying the com-
mitments of the Baghdad Conference. This is what forced many of the
brothers to hesitatc iL~ supporting Morocco.
I believe that Morocco does not need al-Sadat's assistance. He, of course,
needs the assistance of all the brothers, including the people of Egypt.
We gain nothing by dealing with al-Sadat or by accepting what he claims to
be offerin~ to Nbrocco. ~
~ [Question] Why did you refuse to take part in the Moroccan delegation to _
the recent Conference of non-aligned countries in Havana?
[AnswerJ I refused to participa.te in the Havana Conference not for personal
reasons as was alleged by the official report that was announced by the
leadership of parliament. I refused to go for political reasons. I was not
notified about the participation until 2 days prior to the departure of the _
Nloroccan delegation to Havana.
I did not take part ~n drawing up the political plan that the Moroccan dele-
gation was supposed to defend at the conference. I was also not able to
obtain any information regarding this plan.
In my judgment preparations for a conference such as the Havana Conference
should have been made seriously. This did not h~,ppen, and it is this that
made me refuse to take part in the delegation that represented our country
in H~.vana. ~
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[auestion] jdhat is the role that ,your party is pla,ying in defending tlie
= question of the Sahara on the foreign scerae?
[Answer] In spite of the fact that, like any opposing ar~d completely inde- _
- pendent party, our material capabilities are limited, our delegations are
touring the world. They do not always go only to the socia.list countries,
but they also go to Western countries and to fraternal countries in the
; Arab world and in Africa to defend our national cause, to expla�in the point
of view of our party on the matter and to fight against ttie assertions of'
" our enemies and adversaries. `
A Position That Is Not Harmful -
- [Question] What is your evalu~,tion of the position of the Soviet Union and
of the socialist countries on the guestion of the Sahara and on Morocco's
- position?
[Answer] Except for Cuba, the camp of the socialist countries in general -
has a positive position towards Nbrocco. Cuba has its own view on the sub-
ject and has its official position which it defends. It is our opinion that
the conduct of the other socialist countries does not hurt the National
Moroccan question. A11 these countries have good relations with N14rocco and
deal with it in various areas.
[Question] Do you believe that the good relations which tie the Soviet
Union to both Morocco and Algeria can help the Soviet U�,?ion carr,y out ~Ln
initi.ative that would reduce the tension in the area?
fAnswer] The Soviet Union's position on the tension that is prevailin;; ir?
the area is well-known. It does not view this tension favorably, and ~Ct is
saying that it must be removed. The Soviet Union is simultaneously asking
Morocco and Algeria to communicate with each other, to renounce force and
violence and to tr,y to solve the prc-~ble~ by negatiating and using peaceful
means. This is the Soviet Union's official and practical position.
[Question] I mean did the Sov-:.et Union in fact carry out an initiative in
this direction?
[Answer] I believe that if the Soviet Union were asked, it will not refuse
_ to make efforts to help Nbrocco and Algeria restore matters to their former
~ course.
The Democratic Experiment Has Positive Features...But
[Question] Two years have now gone by since the democratic experiment [was
begun] iri Morocco. What does the PPS think about the democratic pract~ces?
[Answer] The democratic sequence did bring about positive factors tha~; no
one can deny. Our party which had been banned for years was among the
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beneficiaries of this sequence; the socialist Union and the National Asso-
ciation of the Students of Morocco regained their legal status.
i 1~~ the course of the seguence democratic freedoms for all citizens were
recognized., relatively, of cou^se. An~ it may be said that no one in our _
- country undei~ the current circumstances is deprived of the freedom of
speech, the.freedom to assemble ~nd the free~om to ~stablish societies ~
within the framework of the laws that are in effect. i~1e consider this -
very important, and we hope that other coui~tries i:~ our Arab homeland, _
on the African continent ancl in the Third World in its entiret,y will
experience it.
This does not mean that we have reached our goal ancl that matters are as -
well as they can be in the democratic field. There are numerous weak points:
_ elections are not above reproach; the authorities interfere in favor of the
agencies that support them; and the standard of the representative institu-
tions is below par because their powers are limited. This pertains basically
to parliament. .
_ I am not saying that parliament is a superficial institution, but I am say-
ing that parliament is not allowed to participate fully in legislr~ting and
in overseeing the ex~cutive organization [of government].
[Questioii] How effective is your representation in parliament even though
you are the only representatile of your party in parlia.ment?
[Answer] I am trying in parliament to carry out my mission as a represent-
ative of a group of poor people and as a fighter for a progressive party.
Had the elections been carried out satisfactorily, our party`s representa-
tion would have been more significant than it is at present, and I would
have been able to do more than what I am doing under the present circum-
stances.
' [QuestionJ Are you establishing alliances in parliament?
[Answer] My contacts with the unionist brothers ~(the Socialist Union of
People's Forces [USPF]) are continuous. I have cooperated extensively ~
but not exclusively with the unionists, and I do try to ma.ke agreements
with other political authorities. ~
4~e Are Read.y ~'o Take Part in Government �
[Question] You have advocated more than once the formation of a national
coalition government to confront the circumstances that Morocco is exper-
iencing. On what basis do you see the formation of this government?
[Answer] You believe that the formation of this government has become
necessary and urgent. But we cannot imagine that a coalition government
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be formed without prior agreement over a program for this government and
_ over the means that will be given to the government to implement its
program.
[Question] Have you been contacted to take part in such a government?
[Ariwer] We have heard that there have been official contacts with the
USPF. It has been said in some circles that the monarch, King Hasan II,
did contact Brother Abderrahim Bouabid, the secretary general of the
Socialist Union and that he also contacted the Political Bureau uf this
party and also its current members. But as far as we a're concerned, there r
_ was no contact. i
[Question] What i.f you were offered [an opportunity] to participate in the
government?
� [Answer] We have a desire to take part in the government so we can serve
our homeland in a more useful fashion. It is known that being in the gov- -
ernment is not our only concern; we will serve the country whether we are
- in the government or not.
_ [Question] There are occasional communications between you and the Socialist -
Union. What is the nature of these meetings and what are their results?
[Answer] We have had numerous communications with the Socialist Union
- especially in the last year. We have been meeting and consulting with each
other. We freguently are in agreement about serving our homeland. The
_ results [of our commiunications and agreements] are evident in the common
efforts of the two parties. These results became evident, for example,
while t,he Conference of the National Association for the Students of Nbrocco
was in session.
[Question] Where in your opinion does the popular mobilization [effortJ for
defending the Sahara stand now?
- [Answer] We still believe in the need for popular mobilization, but, unfor-
tunately, we notice that the authorities are not making sufficient efforts
to help the masses mobilize. -
[QuestionJ What in your opinion are the political organizations from which
the government must be formed?
[Answer] In my opinion this government must include all the active, genuine,
national parties, that is, the representatives of all the vital forces in _
this country.
[Question] Does this mean that you would bear the conseguences of the policy
of the present government that you are criticizing?
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~Answer] Not at all. The present government is made up of three parties
oril,y: the N~.tional Rally of Independents, the Istiqlal Party ~,nd the
Popular Movement. There are other parties in Morocco, such as the Socialist
Union, that may pla.y an important role. Our strong party [is anotherJ; it
has influence in several circles and especially among youn~ people. There
are other forces that are respected [by the people].
[Question] What are the solutions that your party is suggesting to get
the organization of the Greater Arab Maghreb out of the crisis it is
= experiencing?
- [Answer] The solution in our opinion lies in having the Algerian leaders
refrain from interfering in our affairs. The question of the Sahara is
purely a Nbroccan question. If Algeria d.ecides to respect our territorir~l
= unity just as we respect in word and in deed the territorial unity and the
- regime of Algeria, it may be said that the problem would be finally sol.ved.
I believe that if Algeria accepts the notion of our territorial unity, a11
agreements will then become possible. Morocco will be willing to make many
concessions [as long as] its territorial unity is respected. Mr~rocco will
be willing to look into ~.11 the suggestions [that are offered] including
that of the comanon utilization of resources.in this area.
_ COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
$592
cso: 4402
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- sUn~x
ECONOMY TO DETERMINE SURVIVAL OF NUMAYRI REGIME
- Paris AL-WATAN I~L-'ARABI in Arabic 27 Sep-3 Oct 79 pp 32-33
[Article: "Sudan: Game of Balancea Has Again Saved Plumayri Until Further
Notice; R~:gime's Future Is Strongly Tied to Improvement of Economic Situa-
tion"}
[Text] Khartoum--The future of Numayri's regime is tied by a large de-
gree to improvement in the economic and living conditiona. But the politi-
cal crisis is pending a fundamental soJ.ution. What is this solution and
how [will it be brought about]? -
Once again President Ja'far Muhammad Numayri has escaped hia regime's cri-
~ sis by playing the same tune: Arab and local balances. But the economic -
crisis that has led the regime to its predicament is still pending and can-
not be poatponed.
~'hus, President Numayri will be able to continue for a time by spre~ding
promiaes left and right, by blaming others for the regime's miatakes, by
moving on the Arab arena to get aid and by misleading.the Araba into be-
lieving that his relations and ties with President al-Sadat's regime do not
force him to be tied to the Camp David bandwagon.
President Numayri has promised to find a solution to the economic crisis
- by introducing economic and financial changes.~ Badr-al-Din Sulayman, Che
new miniater of finance, has resorted to devaluing the Sudanese pound for
the second time in a year. Thie is the second devaluation for the Sudan-
ese pound. It has been devalued by almoat one third its price this time.
But the minister's cancellation of the restriction requiring the acquisi- -
tion of a permit from the Central Bank of Sudan for importation hae been -
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received with strong criticism here because it is believed that the deci-
sion will in~ensify the economic confuaion and will eliminate control over
the ~ale prices of imported commodities.
1'he prevalent belief is that the Sudanese president acquired some Saudi
aid during his latest visit to Saudi Arabia to solve rhe deteriorating oil
problem. Sudan's oil spending amounts to 120 million poun3s annually.
The new economic and financial measures have set two official pricea for
the dollar. The first price is 50 piaeters per dollar and is used for ex-
ports, imports and soft-term (short-term) loans. The exports here include
cotton, peanuts, sesame, corn and [vegetable] oil whereas the imports in-
clude flour, grains, ferCilizers, tea, sugar, cigarettes and spareparts.
The second price is an incentive price of 80 piasters used for the accounts
of repatriates and foreigners. It is now the right of these people to deal
with banks other than the Central Bank of Sudan. Thia price is the same
price that the dollar gets in the black market and is intended to eliminate
the black market, to offer facilitiea to repatriates returning with money
from abroad and to provide hard currencies to the ar_ate treasury.
The measures have also included the formation of a tE~chnical committee to
reconsider restoring nationalized properties and companiea to their own-
ers. This means turning away from the last vestiges of the socialism that
- President Numayri adopted one day.
But what are the causes of ttae economic and living crisis being experienced
by Sudan?
The truth is that there are numeroua causes, foremoat being the excessively
and wastefully increased government apending, the administrative and finan-
ci~al corruption, the commissions collected by the regime's leaders and in-
fluential figures, inflation and the oil crisis.
However, there are other causes that have helped the conditions to deteriarate
and caused the state tressury to ir~cur grave losses due to miamanagement
on the part of the government.
Story of Job Emendation .
- The Socialist Union, which is the ruling and the only political organiza- ~
tion recogreized officially, had previously adopted the so-called "job emen-
dation" which is tantamount to a[new] cadre to improve the living condi-
tions of the government and public sector employees and workers.
The first part of this cadre was applied without sufficient atudy and its
costs exceeded all calculations and expectatione, considering that they
amounted to nearly 1Qd million Sudanese pounds (200 million dollars). This
caused the minister of ~inance at the time to declare that the treasury
could nnt pay the costs of the second part of the emendation. ~ ~
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However, the civil servants and the workera resented this and demanded im-
plementation of the second and final part. When the government procras-
tinated, they threatened to go on strike. The railroad workere did ac-
tually proceed to atage the strike and all the government And Socialist
Union efforts to dissuade them, by both promises and threats, failed.
Worker demonstrations marked in the city of 'Atbarah, the main communica-
tion link (600 kilometera north of Khartoum), and political cizants and slo-
gans were raised--(parties rather than suffering) and (Ma~or General Baehir -
rather than the field marshal president). Maj G~n Hasan Bashir was the
number two man in the regime of Lt Gen Ibrahim 'Abbud which ruled from
1958 to 1964. _
The state treasury incurred loases estimated at 4 million pounds daily and
~ the strike caused complaint and conetraint all over Sudan becauae the ra~l-
roada are the major means of transportation (2,600 kilometera) ~n this vas~
Arab country, which has an area of 1.5 million square kilomeCers, ~nd is the
biggest African country. The strike, which was ataged last Auguat, caused _
bottlenecks in the distribution of conaumer commoditiea which, to atart
with, have become scarce under norraal conditions. _
Problem of al-Jazirah Farmers
In addition to the worker crisis, an agricultural crisis also erupted. This
crisis was embodied in the strike of al-Jazirah pro~ect (south of Khartoum) _
farmers who refused to cultivate cotton this season--this has been coopera-
tive farmer-government cultivation s~.nce the days of British colonialiam.
- The government is a 50-percent partner in the pro~ect in return for its
supplying services, expertise, pesticides and marketing means to the farm-
ers.
Z�he farmers felt that there was tampering in the marketing process and that
some officials had made enormous profits [out of it]. They also felt that
cotton cultivation wae no longer rewarding and that the government was se11-
ing cotton abroad at a certain price and then Cold them that it had eolcl
it for a lesser price to deny them the collecCion of their full share of
50 percent. .
When the Ministry of Finance wanted to levy a certain aome on the pro~ect _
annually, regardless of any consideration, the farmers re�used to cultivate
cotton. After difficult settlements, mostly promi~es, the farmers returned
~ to work.
But obaervers do not expect the cotton crop thts year to yield more than
70 million Sudanese pounda in revenues whereas thie crop has been produc-
ing yearly revenues of 220 million Sudanese pounda or 40 percent of the
gross annual national income.
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As a result, the budget will suffer a big deficit whereas the farmer will not
be affected tt�at muclz because he has the other half of the land which he
cultivates with crops which the government does not share with him. Mean-
while, the government has to pay the wages of the employees and the work- ,
= ers and the casts of the services that it supplies to the pro~ect.
~ The fact is that governmental mismanagement, laxity, negligence, the lack -
- of planning and the lack of relations of good and sound cooperatic between
- the government and the farmers are the factors responsible for the catas-
trophe that has hit the Sudanese cotton season this year. Cotton is con-
sidered Sudan's white oil.
- Political Crisis
- These, generally, are the main economic factors 3nd the living conditions
prevailing in Sudan at present. But what about the political side?
The political forces rushed to exploit the crushing economic crisis embod-
_ ied in inflation and in the unavailability of the essential consumer and
food com~odities to goint out the regime's role in and responaibility for
= the crisis. The popular reaction was reflected in t:~e student demonstra-
tions and the worker strikes. ,
. The armed forces were perhaps the main force that the regime tried to win
over to its side. In their meetings with President Numayri, t?ie comman- ~
ders and officers expressed their resentment over the widespre~:~ corruption,
laxity and political vacuun resulting from Che ruler's deteriorating popu-
larity.
Numayrj.'s reply was to assign Lt Gen 'Abd-al-Ma~id Khalil (42), the chief
_ of stafi, to the post of �irst vice president which had been vacated with
the dismissal of Abu-al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahim. The purpase of this ap-
pointment was to appease tlne armed forces and to create a balance betvreen
. the regime and the army. ~
Numayri also resorted to bolstering the Muslim Brotherhood's tiea to the _
regime by appointing Dr Hasan al-Turabi to a ministerial post, namely that
of minister of justice, in add~tion to its membership in the [Socialist
Union's] Political Buresi~~ The truth is that the M:~slim Brothere (the
Nat:tonal Charter Front) :3upport the regime because they fear the alterna-
tive. They claim that t~e regime h~s taken an Islamic direction to 3ustify
their cooperation with it. ~
As for al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, he has a mutual feeling with the regime, namely ~
the feeling that each n~eeds the other. What is required of al-Sadiq at
present is to rally al-Ansar [partisane] behind the regime. But the prob-
lem o� al-Sadiq is that al-Ansar are revenge-oriented and they still seek
r~venge for "martyr" al-Imam al-Hadi al-Mahdi who was killed by the regime
in the earl~ 1970's. ,
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A1-Sadiq ia incapable of overcoming thie thinking among al-Ansar and ~1.-
Ansar don't want their thinking to be overcome. Yes, Numayri has pleased _
al-S~diq and al-Ansar by ousting Abu-al-Qasim Muhammad Tbrahim (~he hero
of [the attack on] Aba Island where al-Hadi a1-Mahdi wae killed) but ~1~-
Ansar are still asking: Where is al-Imam and if he has di.ed, who !s hie
succeasor? The truth is that a1-Sadiq al-Mahdi does not want the imamate
- becauae if he accepta it, he will be compelled to cling to his previous -
demands when he used to insiat that the imamate muat etay clear of� po1~-
tics. In any case, the cloaest description of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi ic~ t~iat
"he is in the opposition, but through legitimacy." ~ _
Attempt to Fragment Unionist Democratic [Party]
~ The regime is attempting at preaent to direct ita blows to the Unionist
Democratic Party by trying to win over to its side aome of the pex�aona~iw
ties connected with this party in one ~ray or another and trying to nt~r~c~
the party's bases that are compriaed of inerchants and buainesamen,
In addition to Vice President al-Rashid a1-Tahir who is closely connected
with this popular party, Numayri has resorted to the appointment of Dr
Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad to a ministerial post. Hamad ie a personality with
its political weight and ia cloae to A1 al-Mirghani, the leadera of a~.-
Khatmiyah sect which forms the partiy's apiritual aupport and whic~i io cus-
tomarily sympathetic to Egypt, regardless of the nature of the regime exi,at-
ing in Cairo.
Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad, the current minister of communication and the candi-
. date to replace Abu-al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahim to the poaition of the Social-
ist Union Secretary General, had been previously accused of corruption,
jailed and then released by Numayri's regime.
- It is well-known that the Unionist Democratic Party is the outcome of the
merger of two parties in the late 1960's, namely: 7.'he National Uni.oniet _
Party which was led by the late president Isma'il al-Azhari and the Peo-
ple's Democratic Party which was led by Shaykh 'Ali 'Abd-al-Rahman who be-
came al-Azhari's vice chairman in the new party and who has been considexed
the party's chairman aince al-Azhari's death.
But Shaykh 'Abd-a1-Rahman's old age and poor eyesight have helped to high-
light the brilliant role played by al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi who is ~1ow
considered the party's actual chairman and the leader of the Sudaneae op-
position. Al-Hindi has proven his ability by re~ecting the reconsiliation
, offer made by President Numayri in 1977. Conaequently, he has refuaed to
_ return to Sudan from exile except on the basis of the full restoration of _
democracy and of a pledge by Numayri to resign.
The Unionist Democratic Party is conaidered the political arm of a1~Khat- -
miyah sect. However, ita leadera, especially al-Hindi, have been able to
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go far beyond the narrow sectarian affiliatione and to open up to national,
- democratic and pan-Arab positions that have helped to broaden their popular-
ity and not to cause it to be confined to the middle clasa and to the busi-
- nessmen. Meanwhile, the party's spiritual leaders, represented by the
s~ns of Shaykh 'Ali al-Mirghani, the sect's late leader, have continued
to sympathize atrongly with Egypt and have been compelled to appease Numayri
because he is an ally of President al-Sadat.
The communiet party, which is led by Muha~nad Ibrahim Naqd, is now more
loyal to Moscow than ever before. The party lost heavily at the popular
lev~el in the wake of his support for Hashim al-'Ata's coup in 1972 and as
a rssult of the blow it was dealt by the regime. -
In any case, Numayri's future is dependent largely on the improvement or the
further deterioration of the econom':, situation. If this situation im-
proves, Numayri has another chance to survive while waiting for a solution
_ for the problem of his political isolation. If there is no improvement,
surprises will occur, especially since the army commanders have their ambi-
tions, since the parties are lying in wait and since the south is getting
restless because its economic situation is much worse than thaC of the
north.
Copyright: 1979 AL-WAT.AN AL-'ARABI _
g494
CSO: 4802
~ 1.
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SUDAN
BA'THIST LEADER SAYS NUMAYRI'S REMOVAL ONLY SOLUTION TO ECONOMIC WOES -
' Parie AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 27 Sep-3 Oct 79 pp 34-35
[Interview With Badr-al-Din Mudaththir, Member of Ba'th Party National Conr-
mand, by Kamal Hasan Bakhit; "Badr-al-Din Mudaththir: There Ia no Way to
Deal With Economic Crisis as Long ae Nwnayri's Regime Exiata"]
_ [Text] The Ba'th Party has its extension on the Sudanese arena by virtue
of its being a pan-Arab party. The aympathy that this party receives on
this arena:emanates from the masses' deep faiCh that they are Arab and that
. they are an indivisible part of their nation and of its national and pan- _
Arab aspirations. It ie natural for AL-W,ATAN AL-'ARABI, which has already
presented the views of a number of Sudanese political and partiean pereon-
alities on the Sudanese and Arab isauea of the hour, to address the same
queations to the Ba'th Party by virtue of the bond that tiea this party
with ite Sudanese masses. So we conducted thie interview with Badr-al-
Din Mudaththir, member of the party's National Command and one of the firaC
Sudanese Ba'thists.
[Qu~estionJ President Numayri has acknowledged *he presence of the economic
crisis. Is this admission enough to change popula~ complaint in Sudan?
[Answer] To start, it must be said that this adtniesion has come very late
and after the economic cr.isis has taken roo't and has en~ulfed wi.th its
whi~lwind all the sectors of our people and all utilities and aspecta of
life in the country. So, this admiasion is a foregone concluaion and
mea.ns nothing in favor of the regime, whether politically or economically.
H~~wever, the important things that Numaq~ti has not acknowledged are very
many:
First, that this economic crisis is tied to the nature of his regime an~d
that it will continue to deteriorate and to oppreas our people, regaxdlese
of what sedatives he resorts to as long as such sedat~vea are based on a
partial diagnoais and on ~ustifying the crisis.
Second, that the true causes behind the emergence of this crisis lie in
the fact that the regime has tied the Sudanese economy to the international
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capitaliet market and to the international organizations controlled by the
U. S. imperialism and the fact that the regime follows the instructions of
- these organizations, such ae the World Bank and others. -
- The causea also lie in the fact that the regime has wasted the public _
treasury's resourcea on extravagant spending for the ao-called May anni-
versary celebrations, the anniversariea of Numayri's assumption of the
presidency and the anniversaries of his return to power in July 1971.
The causes further lie in the enormous salaries given to the regime's fol-
lowers [al-mahasib] and beneficiaries, the membere of the so-called People's
Assembly and of the so-called Socialist Union and to the special security
- and oppression agencies.
The causes also include the fact that the loans and aid advanced to Sudan
go to the pockets of the regime's leaders in the form of commiseions and ~
misappropriations and the fact that whatever remains of this aid and these
loana is wasted as a result of laxity in the administrative apparatus
and lack of enthusiasm au~ng the workers who are convinced that "it ia
rotten at the top."
The causes fur.ther include the fact that the regime's leaders in the vari-
ous phases through which this regime has ~nne in the past 15 years have ;
been aware of Numayri's temperamental dispc;sition and his fondnesa for the
game of balances that outs one group from ~ower to bring another so as to
maintain a balance. Consequently, thie awareneas h~s made all these lead-
ers realize that their turn is inevitably coming and has caused each of
~ them to think of benefiting pereonally as much as possible from Che period
of his etay in government.
The causes and aspects of the crisis are numerous but Numayri cannot ac- ~
knowledge them the way he has acknowledged the presence of the crieis.
Here we find Numayri at present, in his attempt Co mielead the people into _
believing that he is working to anlve the economic criais, doing nothing _
other than to move along the same axes which have entrenched the crisis.
He brings Badr-al-Din Muhammad Ahmad Sulayman--the communist of the
1950's who was also the attorney for a number of foreign firms and who then
became chairman of the board of directors of the Sarkis Izmirilian Company
and a shareholder in thia company and others--and appoints him miniater of
finance and national economy to reform the Sudanese economy by devaluing
the Sudanese pound by 11 percent of the value of the dollar and to try to
extinguish the fire by pouring more oil on it [sentence as published].
. The minister promises to'open up to foreign capital and to give it all le-
gal facilities and guarantees to bring it into Sudan, re-examines and
liquidates the public sector establishments and opens up the avenuea of -
the Sudaneae economy to foreign and national capital.
This is why the Sudanese people are entitled to reiterate what is being now
said in Sudan about Numayri planning to solve the economic crisis by expand-
ing the base of millionaires so that his regime's base may become broader
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than what it has been so far, considering that there were only 70 mi.zl.i.on-
aires in the country. `
The third, and important, thing that Numayri has not acknowled~ed ie that
the crisis is very atrongly tied to his entire treasonous palicy at ~he
level of the issues of the national and pan-Arab struggle, led by the issue
of democracy and the central Arab iesue of Palestine and the Azab ~truggle
against Zionism and imperialism.
The link between the local domeatic iasuea and the pan-Arab struggle has a3.-
ways forced itself on the two sidea of the atruggle in our countxy--the re-
gime and the opposition--in a manner that grows clear~r year after year and
to the degree whereby not even the fiercest regionalists, who previously de-
nied the pr~sence of such a link, can now ignore the aepects and conae-
quences of this link.
The economic crisis became deeper and more comprehenaive when Numayri
openly placed the regime within the U. S.~Zion3et-al-Sadat anti-Arab a1-
liance. After the Cam~ David accord, after the defeatiat atance tal~en
at the Baghdad eummit, and after the boycott by Numayri's lackey regime _
of the conference of Arab ministera of economy and of foreign affaire, we
have found that the popular opposition has become mcre comprehensive among
the various people's groups, such as the workera, farmers, etudente and
professionals. We have also found that thia opposition has aleo turned
from seasonal opposition into continuous opposition: One atrike ends and
an~ther starts, student demonstrationa subside only to have the wQrker
strikes begin and develop into sit-in strikes, etc. This is happening at
the same time in which the national and pan-Arab political meaning ar~d
_ scope of the group strikes and atrikes for certain demands, of the entire
popular movement and of the union organizations are becoming c7.earer.
_ Arab Aid Will Be to no Avail .
[Question] How does the Ba'th Party view Numayri's endeavors to move
. closer to some Arab countries and will this serve him economically or po- '
litcally?
[Answer] Economically, nothing can, as I have already said, bil:ng the
country out of ita economic crisis under the canopy of Numayri's regime.
Matters have reached the point where the following equation ts dictated:
There is no way to deal with the economic crisis is Sudan as long as Nu-
mayri's regime exists. -
I do not think this equation needs any explanation. Everybody knowe how
the oil deal that Numayri concluded recently with one of the Arab countries
to solve the fuel crisis, which he claimed to be the cause of the economic
crisis because it led to the atoppage of work in factories and farms~ did
_ not find its way to Sudan at all and how it was sold in the international
black market, and in Rotterdam Port in particular, at twice the price for
which Numayri bought it--a price that has not been paid yet.
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.
Numayri bought the Rotterdam deal [sic] at a price of 18 dollara per bar-
rel and sold it at 30 dollars per barrel and most of the sum [the profita],
~ estimated at 4.6 million dollars, went to the accounts of the regime's
leaders in Swiss banks. The iest was spent on the requirements of the re- ~
gime's security and on propaganda and information abroad on the pratext
of conf.ronting Che campaign to which the country is exposed.
Our party, the Socialiet Arab Ba'th Par+ty, streases that any aid advanced
to Numayri by aay Arab country will only end with the fate of the well-
known oil deal that has come to be known as the Rotterdam deal.
Moreover, such aid is ultimately no more ~than a sedative to prolong the life
of this regime, to enable it to engage in all forms of oppression and to
help it perform more roles in the service of the U. S.-Zionist-al-Sadat
alliance. In its final analysis, such aid constitutes an aid for al-Sadat
himself and a deviation from the Arab consensus against al-Sadat's regime
and against the Camp David line.
Politically, any move at the Arab level by Numayri will be no more than an
attempt to mislead the Arab countries to believe that he wants to back
down on his connection with al-Sadat and with the Camp David line whereas
he is in fact bolstering hia regime's ties with al-Sadat's regime at a11
the military, security and economic levels. _
Numayri's Arab movement comes on the basis of full coordination and collu-
. sion with al-S~dat to serve the common goals that the two have. The fore-
most of these goals is embodied in the endeavor to enable Numayri to play _
the role designated for him in the second page of the Camp David line [sic].
The second of these goals is that al-Sadat, like Numayri, is interested in
enabling the regime of his ally in Sudan to obtain Arab aid, be it in cas~ -
or in supplies, such as oil, to slow down the tempo of the deteriorating
economic crisis.
The third of these goals is the attempt to benefit from the influence that
some of the Arab countries have over the traditional Sudanese leaders to
push these leaders in the direction of completing the so-called national
reconciliation at a faster pace.
[Question] Do you mean by this al-Sadiq al-Mahdi? ~
[Answerj Yes, because orie.of the moat important goals of the regime's
recent domestic political measures is to prepare the climate for a strong
entry into the regime by al-Sadiq al-Mahdi. Abu-al-Qasim Muhammad Ibra-
him and his group are not against Numayri's general course and they are
no less enthusiastic for the Camp David line than Numayri himself. But
they have been ousted becauae they obstructed the reconciliation with al-
Sadiq, being aware that this reeor~ciliation will enable Numayri to further
reduce their weight in the game of balances which he has mastered. This
group thua embarrassed al-Sadiq al-Mahdi through the attack it launched
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- against him by way of the Socialist Union's information media and agencies
_ that were controlled by Abu-al-Qasim's group. This attack turned the re-
conciliation into a source burning al-Sadiq al-Mahdi and causing him to
lose his popularity among al-Ansar instead of bzing a source for bolater-
ing the regime.
This explains Numayri's ouster of al-Sadiq from the Po].itical Bureau in the
theaterical of the recent changes which were coupled with placing all the
state resources, including the railroads, at the service and disposal of
aY-Sadiq al-Mahdi's efforts to regain the loyalty of some of al-Ansar ar~d
to reinstate himself as their imam before returning to the regime. It is
believed that this return will be strong and capable of saving the regime
' from its inevitable fate, especially in the wake of the recent uprising
which, both Numayri and al-Sadiq are aware, constitutes the prelude [irhasah]
to the coming general popular revolution.
Ba'th and Unionist Democratic Party
[Question] Is there an explanation for the ~oint statement ~3sued recently
by the Ba'th Party and the Unionist Democratic Party? What are Che faunda- -
- tions on which the relationship between the two parties is based?
[Answer] This statement was no surprise for our people in Sudan. It was
evident from the outset that the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party was againet tha
National Front in its previous structure, considering that this front in-
cluded the traditional reactionary right in Sudan, represented by the Na-
tion's Party (al-Sadiq) and al-Turabi group (Muslim Brotherhood), which the
Ba'th Party considered a part of the regime.
~
The reconciliation which started in 1977 has proven the soundness of the
position taken by our par.ty, considering the fact that the Aba Island mas-
saeres in 1970 and the execution of hundreds without trials in the July
1976 uprising which took place under the name of the National Front have
not prevented agreement between the opposed right and the ruling right
- when their interest has required such agreement.
When the Unionist Democratic Party, led by al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi, re-
fused to get involved in the reconciliation game, this refusal conatituted
a clear indication of the possibility of pushing the polarization [opposi-
tion] movement in Sudan toward its progressive national and pan-Arab hori-
zons.
The joint statement issued by our party and the Unionist Democratic Party
has come as a reflection of the broad com~?on background on which both par-
ties stand. It is natural that coordination between the progressive pan-
Arab and national forces is most strongly tied to the vastness and depth
of this background. This coordination is not a superficial act but a tac~
tical reflection of a common program, namely the masses' program in their
struggle against Numayri's dictatorial regime.
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- The ~oint statement of July 1979 defines clearly the basea on which thia
relationship is founded and which can be summed up in the following:
First, deep faith in the bond between the national struggle issues in our -
country and the central pan-Arab issues in the Arab homeland. The atate-
- ment underlines Numayri's connection with al-Sadat-Zionist-U. S. alliance
which is hostile to our nation, rejects all the steps taken by al-Sadat -
~ and all the liquidatory and transactional solutions for the Arab issue and
abides by the Baghdad summit resolutions and ~he resolutions of the Arab
ministers of economy and of foreign affairs in their capacity as the mini-
mum-limit resolutions that represent the separating line between loyalty
to the pan-Arab cause and pan-Arab treason. -
Second, rejection of the capitalist path and underlining the socialist
option.
Third, democracy for the masses. T?-.e statement declares that the progres-
sive national alternative sought by the masaes is the alternative (regime]
that struggles for restoration of the masses' democratic righta and for
preservation of the citizen's and homeland's dignity under the supremacy
of the law and of legitimacy.
. Fourth, struggle for a united Sudan in which the opportunities of social
and economic progress are availahle, heeding the regional self-rule in
the south and taking it beyond the superficial form in which Numayri's
regime has impri~oned it to turn it into a real accompliahment in the
spheres of development, services and of enhanced interaction and soli-
1 darity between the two parts of the country on a democratic bases founded
- on mutual respect and trust.
Fifth, solving the issue of the traditional sector in the country and in Su-
dan's semi-desert areas by utilizing thi~ sector's resources and by provid-
ing essential servic~es to the citizens.
Sixth, an independent course at both the national and pan-Arab levels, con-
sidering that the statement rejects leaning on any of the international _
walls and all forms of political and economic subservience.
Seventh, the national and pan-Arab alternative for which the masses are
struggling is the alternative that emanates from the depths of our people's
history, that ties their religious and pan-Arab heritage with their present~
that respects the citizen's religious beliefs and the freedom of religion
and of faith, that devotes its profound respect, care and attention to the
religious institutions so that they may carry out their sacred and divine
message, that seeks to spread the spirit of love and amity among the citi-
zens and that treats the citizens equally in both righta and duties and
does not subject them to any form of discrimination because of religious
beliefs.
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These are some of the central bases on which the relationship is founded
between the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party with its profound struggle and organi-
zational experience and its pan-Arab organization and the Unioniat Demo-
_ cratic Party with its broad masses and ~ts historical national leaderehip
that has been experienced in struggle and that has played a ma~or role in
confronting Numayri's regime.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
8494
CSO: 4802 END
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