JPRS ID: 8716 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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JFRS L/8716
17 October 1979
,
~u~b-Saharc~n Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. 651
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JPRS L/8716
17 October 1979
Sl1B-SAHARAN AFRI CA REPORT -
FOUO No. 651
CONTENTS PAGE
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
~ Ja~anese Trade With Africa Detailed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAIV~ENS, 7 Sep 79)..... 1 ~
Japan 1979: Economic Situation
Foreign Trade With Africa, by Jacques Clere
Transportation Outlook for 1978-1988 Discussed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAI~EENS, 24 Aug 79)..... 1?
Briefs
GDR Expeditionary Forces 26
BENIN
Stability, Good Management Contribute to Progress
(Philippe Simonet; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 12 Sep 79)......... 27
- Briefs
Student Unrest - "`~31
CFiE1D
Points Included in Lagos Agreement
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 31 Aug 79)..... 32
Lagos Agreement Viewed as Moderately Hopeful
(Editorial; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
31 Aug 79) 34
- a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO] _
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CONTENTS (~ontinued) Page
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Some Mysteries Still Remaining Concerning Coup
(Pierre Gardel; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 29 Aug 79)............ 38 ~
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Teodoro Nguema's Political Ideas Said To Be Unkno~.-n ~
(Pierre Gardel; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 29 Aug 79)............ 40
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Africa Loses One More Dictator ~
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(Hamza Kaidi; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 15 Aug 79) 42 i
MADAGASCAR
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Briefs
Military Agricultural Operation 45
Soviet Equipment Specialists 45
RHODE SIA
Lifestyle of Whites Changed
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 12 Sep 79) 46 ~
SOMALIA
WSLF Leader Discusses Ogaden Liberation Struggle '
(:Abudulahi Hassan Mohamud Interview; ASAHI :
SHIMBUN, 24 Sep 79) 49 ~
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
JAPANESE TRADE WITH AFRICA DETAII,EI)
Japan 1979: Economic Sitization
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Sep 79 p 2~29
[Article: "Japan 1979: Economic Growth Continues, Slight Inflation, Very
ModeratE Unemployment"]
Text] In 1979, with a very moderate rate of' unemployment (less than
_ 00,000 unemployed), a price increase held down to approximately 6 percent
and a growth rate also on the order of 6 percent, Japan offers an enviable
example of stability and economic competitiveness, even though the latest
(23 July) increase of the discount rate to 5.25 percent by the Eank of Japan
indicates a recent inflationary thrust which may be difficult to contain in
' view of the new gasoline price hikes. ~
However, in 1974~, at the beginning of the crisis, when its unsettled economy
seemed destined on a long term basis to deflation and regression, Japan was
considered the big loser by the "bookmakers" of the economy.
As the JOURNAL DE GENEVE (issues of 13, 1W~ 15 and 16 July~ noted recently -
in a series of articles on the "new Japanese chal~.enge," today the Japanese
are once again being visitedf spied upon an.d questioned by a great ma,ny
experts and officials of a11 kinds who are trying to understand the workings
of an astonishing system, where the rigidity of the social structures acco-
modate themselves to a very great economic adaptability. In 197~, the yeax
when the rate of inflation in Japan reached the alarming figure of 30 per-
ce~t, many observers thought that the decline of Japan had just begun. The
economic situation which was still depressive in 1975 and during the first
half of 1976, confirmed the pessimistic diagnosis of the future of Japan.
But the most leaxned forecasts could not withstand the test.of the facts.
Today, more than ever victorious, the Japanese econom;~ is ready for a com-
mitment. Better yet, ~he vast Japanese industrial empire has pr~fited from
the cri~is to further improve its ability to ad.apt.
By what methods did the Japanese manage to overcome the 197~-i975 crisis?
Essentia.lly, ~~byr integrating into their actions the corrective measures
imposed by the constraints produced by the enexgy crisis."
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Thus~ in a very short time they restored a high growth rate, an assurance
~ of a~high level of investment. Faced with the crucial problem of the secu-
rity of their supplies of mineral and energy raw materials, they succeeded
in record time in diversifying their purchases so as to better protect them ,
against the threat. of shortages. In tk~is gigantic effort of recovery and
adaptation, the ro~e of the MITI [Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry~
has been essential; "the MLTI is an amazing economic war machine whose _
intervention and advice have been decisive during these transition years." '
It is well known that the laxge industrial countries have denounced Japanese I~
commercial expansionism with increasing irritation. And today the United ,
States, Europe, Australia, New Zealand and many other nations complain about
the strorag competition of Japanese products and denounce with equal firmness ;
the protectionist practices of the Tokyo government. i
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In response to these cri~icisms, the Japanese have developed a series of ;
initiatives to corrECt their international public image. The fact that the !
trilateral conference was held in Tokyo last April is an exa.mple of this j
strategy. At the same time, the authoritiss in Tokyo decided to grant more j
facilities to the heavily indebted poor countries, in order to increase ;
their influence d.nd prestige with the Third World nations (specifically '
those from South East Asia~ on the occasion of the fifth session of UNCTAD j
which was held in Manila in May. ~
_ While Japan is thus trying to develop its economic relations with South ~
Ea.st Asia, and al.so and primarily with China, ~Africa~ ~printed in italics]
remains an interesting trade partner, representing 5 percent of its foreign
trade in 1978. Sino-Japanese tra.de constitutes about 3 percent. But it ~
appears probable that this percenta,ge will rapidly increase during the next ~
few yeaxs, "because the Japanese methodically invest in the major sectors
which the Chinese are opening up to international economic cooperation."
We believe that it is useful to publish these fPw pieces of information and
observations in or~.er to be better able to place Japan's foreign trade with
Af`rica within the present context of the Japanese economy. (
Foreign Trade With Africa I
Paxis MARCHES TROPICAUX ET P'IEDI'i'ERRANEENS in F`rench 7 Se~ 79 PP z~29 - 2~33 I
[Article by Jacques Clere: "Trade Between Japan and Africa in 1978"~ I
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- [Text] Africa's share in Japan's foreign tra.d.e is about 5 percent. But it i
should be noted that this share ha.s constantly gone down since i9?6, decrea- ~
sing fxom 6.03 percent in 19?6 to 4~.86 percent in 1978, due to the fact
that exp~:ts decreased more rapidly than imports and lost 2.20 poi~nts over
thesP 3 years. This evolution has been summarized in Table I.
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Table I. Africa' s. Share in Japan' s Foreign Trade in 1976 1977 1978 `
(in millions of yen~
~~n.~a..
Fj~tpo~Ltion~ I~p~natlon~ ~ ylpbwa
~i~- j)
- 1976
Monde 19 936 6'.8 19 229 168 39 163 786
Afripue ..5. 1 746 836 615 982 2 3ou 6 t!!
Pan de ~'A rique % Ej . . . . . . . . 8,75 3.20 6.03
1977 I,
?,~a,q~ !~Y 21 648 070 19 131 ~80 40 779 850
Ahique 1 787 885 575 607 2 363 492
Psrt de 1'Afridue .~6 } 8,28 , 3.01 5.80
1978
Monde ~ 20 555 B40 16 727 624 37 263 464
plriQue . . . ~ . . . . . . 1 346 573 464 266 1 810 839
Part d~ I'Afridua 6 6,55 2.77 4,8b
( j............
V~riati~n 1976-1978 ..(7,....... - 2,20 - 0,13 - 1,17
Key:
1. E~cports
2. Imports -
- 3. Global Trade
World
.5. Africa
6. Africa's shase in percentage
7. Change 1976 - 1978 .
An important remark needs to be made when considerir.g these figures: as a
matter of fact, a special place must be assigned to two African countries _
which present characteristics which clearly set them apart from the rest of
the continent, specifically South Af~ica and Liberia.
Let us study Table II. One notes that out of a global Japanese African
volume of 1,810,839 million yen in 1978, Liberia by itself represented -
393~396 million yen 21.72 percent , while South Africa represented
~25~976 million yen 23.52 percent~. But the profile of these two countries
is fundamentally different from that of the other African countries.
As far as ~Liberia~ [printed in boldface] is concerned, if one breaks down
the figure of its imports (3~,720 million yen) from Japan, 98 percent of
it fa11s under the hea.ding "Ships and Navigational Materials" (Chapter 89
o~ the Brussels Nomenclature).
On the other hand, out of a total sales to Japan of 38,675 million yen, one
notes that: 2,348 million yen also fa11 under heading 89 of the Rrussels
Nomenclature; the major shaxe 35~~�23 ~lion yen (91 percent~ of the
global figure is modes~ly classified as "non-specifie~i" products.
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Table II. Trade Between Japan and Af~ica in 1976, 1977 and 1978
(in millions of y~n)
[.~au~b~. a, J.yen wn rA~.i~u. (1 ~ - - " ~ ~wye.uwn. w. ~.~ow.w rrw.w.,K. ~�11r,i~w ( 2,
I!)V1l7� H7YtY)~ ~
t97! 1f77 if7~ ~~OOtl76 1~)~ if1l 1!A l~i001~7/ ~
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ I .
M~~oc ...(tl). 15IIt IlS23 1~0~1 !2 M~rx 10~75 10)7I ~~77 f0 i.
(5):::::.:... �.~5)::::::::::
Cwu ~t M~ a 9 100 10 ]S! ~ 552 N Guu n M 1 17 1 -
' aos~a ~iso� ,s~.u :s~ ~io~;... ~ ~oa ues ~oi: :ao I
r�~,w a. ~ e~e f~es ~ u~ ef rwaa s~~ tos ~~s �t ~
L~Ly< 1~~ 7~ )RO 7] S9J 76 4M 60 977 2f 76I y 707 �
C9rcu. l7670 10]6R /67~0 O Eprpw.� . 70f0~ 2151/ 171/7 ~S
~ ~ Sa.C+n . U 777 71 ~1! 17 65{ N SouA+e . t~ 507 1S ~S7 Il Sy ~7
. .1 .~:...5~~.... . 700/ - ~5~ 72
w.,,~u~. >>os t~oo ~.ie u s.n.,.�oe.~.i .
~ s~~~9d eet ~ se~ ts~ M.w~u~... j 1 s~u ~ 7~s ~ se~ u ~
1
c.me,. .I . > >u ~a .oe w s�~a+ 1 ~ ~ ~a ~ a~ ~ ew ~o
eo,~e. .1 . .e~ : ~s> >ey N o.ma. 3 - ~ ~ -
s:.~~. ~.o,,. . 5 ~coi ~ ii~ ~ se> >i~ c~w........ 4 . - ~os w~
c.+~.e,.e,,. b. ~~su ieu~ ~o,s~ ~u s~.,~.-~w~,.. ~i w ~sa
. ~
c~,~.. i ii~as ~sus ~s~s n ceuQi.a~... ~is~i t~a~ ~~~a
iwa 1 ~ se~ i~so ~ n: n c~.~. 1 ~a iw a s� n~o �
e~a� 1. ~on s~s~ ~ sre a r~......... 1~ t us ~n ~o �
M,r, . ~a a~ ~ ao~ ~fi u,~ t u~ ~ ss~ ~:es u
. , .
vo~~. . sos ~ oes , os~ ui M� ~~ss : w. a~ ee
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c.,....~ ~ ~~s:e �>i~ tsoo~ N�n.�von.... ~t~i ~ou �i
M,o.n� 2 iasen :~oie~ io�oo ~io u~.~........ w~ � +o+ n .
ti.o... . 2 ~u~ ~i~~ .so: ea Ma.,~........2y{( a:as su~ ~~s~ ~ j ~
. . 25 ; ~ ao~ ~ s~> > so~ ~oe Np~r ~LM . 101 ia > > -
Cn~ernyn 2b ~se> >+~,s ~oao ~os e..~e....... 2-J.[ w: ~oi~ ~s~s ~wo ` ~
_ Tcn~a... 21 : !57 11S ~~S /7 C~m~oun j~ 7~1~ /I1~ ~q1 EO I .
C.nivr.~a~. 28 ~)1 {V S7~ 15{ Tc~~A ^~(j~........... N12 ~~~I ~~77 5f
G~tw zq. ~ 91 / S 10! ~~I1 Q C~nbNripw GO 1~!1 1!5/ 601 70 ~
c~ 0. ~~~s ~~u ~~w e~ c.e~ t a~ i n~ i�a i~ I
A~n : 1 ! 967 199! 1l6~ SO Conpo 1 72~ 71H 1 77~ f0] (
e,,.~,a Z........... ~sf fn ~ 7s~ toe z.r,�......... 7s~u t~7u ~7~u u ;
�npM� 1 i~7 f ~s~ t S~~ ~IJ twuM . M p ~ ~ ~ .I
Em.ov. . . ~eew ~~oee ~o~s~ e~ . uaoe sn~ ,
O~~M.n . . . ~ 900 ) 17! 7 {U EIMaw . ~ 37~ / 19~ ~ 4i
Sa-.~� 1 77f S01 ~5~ ~7 SoinNN . N~ 1 N{ fl~ t0 ~ .
>o~ s� ~n t~s ~e~ nt a~.~i~e~ ~ a~t t> >s _ .
o~.....t55~........~...... . .
a� ~n �o �e ta ref a
(SQ~,, ui.~o .,~,i~ ~s.~:~ u ae.;. .(.50\/ ~.n. ~r.. ~se
A~~q.~A.S~d ~ 1~.. . 7107]1 t0]101 7M{S~ AN~pu~Arf,A \Sl~. ~J)~1) l~15./ t111t7 1~ ~
1 71~ ~I~ ~ 7tt ~H 1 7~~ 177 t~ ~1/ !~t N/ ~0) N~ J{Y fl '
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Key to Table II:
1. Exports from Japan io Africa _
2. Imports by Japan from Africa _
3. Base figure
4~. Morocco 30. Congo
5. Ceuta and Melilla 31. Zaire
6. Algeria 32. Burundi
7. Tunisia 33~ ~gola
8. Libya 3~I-. Ethiopia
9. Fgypt 35~ Djibou~ti
10. Sudan 36. Somalia
li. Mauritania 37. Kenya
12. Senegal 38� ~an~
13, Ga.mbia 39 � Tanzania
14~. Guinea 4~0. Seychelles
15. Sierra Leone 4~1. Mozambique
16. Ivory Coast 42. Madagascar
17. Ghana ~3. Ma.uritius
18. Togo 4~. Reunion~Comoro Islands
19. Benin 4~5. Namibia
20. Ma1i 4~6. Malawi
21. Upper Volta 47. Zambia
22. Canary Islands 4$. Botswana
23. Nigeria 49. Swazilaa~.1
24~. Niger 50. Liberia
25. Rwanda, 51. South Africa
26. Cameroon 52� Western Sahaxa
27. Chad 53~ Lesotho
28. Central African Republic Indian Ocean
29. Gabon 55� Other
Consequently, as a country known for its free passage and its flags of
accomodation, where Japan holds substantial maritime intersts, it is appro-
priate to classify Liberia separately.
~ The case of South Africa is different: as one of the largest industrial
countries, a veritable "ore country," its foreign trade has few points in
common with that of the other countries of Africa. And when one examines
the figures in detail with regaxd to Japan, one notices that;
- 97 percent of the exports from Japan to South Africa consistsof products
from the fron and steel industry and the heavy industry, equipment materials,
ships, electronic materials, etcetera;
- the exports from South Africa to Japan are those of a highly industrialized
minin~ country, eridowed with a high level a$ricultural power; as evidence
of this:
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Millions -
of yen
Corn and grains 36 55~ -
Sugax 20 864
rlineral products 12 227
Fyrites 41 559
, coal ~ z5 58?
Precious stones and metals 29 7i?
Ore and products from heavy industry 13 92$
Th~se seven items by themselves represent 180,472 mil.l.ion yen, or more than
82 percent out of a total of 219,322 million yen.
This is why, in order to provide a picture which is closer to the reality
experienced by the rest of the African continent, we decided that it would
be more useful to prAsent the figures and comments, while isolating Liberia
and South Africa most of the time.
Overall E`volution of Trade '
I
Table II provides a country by country evolution of trade between Japan and i
Africa during the calendar years 1976, 1977 and 1978. The figures are ;
expressed in millions of yen. Let us recall that 1 French fra.nc equals ap- ;
proximately 50 yen, which could also be ex~:ressed in the following form: ~
i
1 million yen are worth approximately 20,0~0 French francs. ~
The evolution of Japanese-African trade is presented in a more condensed ;
form in Table III and in graph IV. ~
It is evident th~.t the ~volution, as well as the Japanese-African ba~.ance ~
of trade and the export-import ratio, has become increasingly less favorable
for Africa. This is made even worse by the reduction of trade.
There is an even less favorable fact: while the export-import ratio of ~
Japan with regard to Liberia and Sout~ Africa put together has dropped from
4~29 to 218, for the rest of Africa this same ratio has more than doubled,
going from 189 to 381. From ax. African point of view, this means that
(aside from Liberia and South Africa) the export-import ratio has deterio-
' rated to a disturbing degree, having dropped in 3 years from 53.03 percent
(1976) to 26.27 percent (19?8).
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' Table III. Evolution of Trade Between Japan and Africa from 1976 until 1978
(E~cports - Imports - Ba].ance - Eacport-Import Ratio~ -
(in m311ions of yen)
. (1) E~oortadom Iwyewtio~~ 2, \5 h
~ M tehan � ) / v~rtur~
YAfiiqr~ ~'AhMu~ eot~ a ~ ~~W~e~` %
1976
Liberia et Afri9u. '
_ du Sud . 1 041 729 24~ 107 1 284 B~6 � 798 a22 429
Reste de I'Atrique 703 107 ]72 ~75 1 075 98Z ?~30 232 1 t9
7ou1 . 1 744 836 {lf !62 2~i0 tt~ ~ 1/2~ tS~ 2~3
- 1977
liberia et Af '9u
du Sud ...~l] ~ 876 424 244 e71 1 121 295 �~31 5S7 35!
Rastedel'AhiQupe ~7~1146I 3307J6 1242197 � 5~07Z5 _ 276
ToLI U 1 787 885 S75 607 !~67 4~2 + 1 212 27~ ]11
1978
~ Liberia ~t Afri ue
du Sud .~b~ . 581 375 257 997 819 972 � 30~ 37t 21 e
R~sts d~ I'Afriqupe ~ 7~785 19B 206 269 991 467 ? 57e 929 J61
- Total ..k ~.7 1 346 573 464 266 1 810 B~! ? k2 ~07 280
Evolution 1976��1978~-
Liberia �t ff~' ue
duSud.~fJ~. - 14173?. + td890 -
Raste ds I' r''~} + 82 091 - 166 606 - 84 515 + 248 E97 + 192
~ . L.......
Key:
1. Exports to Africa
2. Imports from Africa _
3. Global trade
4~. Balance -
5. Export-import ratio
- 6. Liberia an3 South Africa
7. Rest of Africa
8. Tota1
9. Evolution 1976 - 1978
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- Tabl~e IV. Trade Balance Japan-Africa
Milliuds 0~ yens ~3~ ~TaEt~au lY ~
B~lance commerciale ~1~
~ JAPON - AFRIQUE~2~
iH
~ ~
~
\ ( 6 )expoK~rions
rtrs t'Af1ue
UiEA~~ E~
7
\ lf9i~UC JU SuD
p ~
~0~ (J .r..a. cun~u \ '
~ ~v ~
\ (9) ~mpo~r~no~z Q~
Drovenan[a d'Afriqut '
C~ -
7~ uecou
i~ \ ( ~roia.rt suy :
i R
iij \ "~~~uarl~r4i0af ii~%
- SO \\`'~fi ~%i% ~
./i~ '~ii
i _ .%'~i~ ~i~i
\ G// ~ ~ ~ j . ,
i:~ ~ . ~~i
\ j/% .
~ ,/~i i;/ ~V~ . ~
: %;i~ ` � i ~i '
~i%~ i: ~j~~ .
. ~
: i y .
.ii .
E~parllmpo ap1977 5 y. E:poAlmport/[` ~
1976 1978 l~/ �
_ . . . . _ . ~ ~
Key: I
1. Trade balance '
2. Japan-Af`rica i
3. Billions of yen
4~. E~cports
5. Imports
6. Exports to Africa
7. Liberia and 5outh Africa
8. Rest of Africa
9. Imports from Africa ;
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- Japanese Imports from Africa ~
For a11 of Africa~ the main products imported by Japan are given in Table V.
Table V. Principal Sa1es by Africa to Japan in i978
(entire continent~
(in millions of yen)
Products Values
1. Pyrites 58 287
2. Copper 45 991
3. Corn and grains ~0 920
4. Precious stones and metals 33 017
5. Coffee 26 803
5. Cotton 22 614
7. sugax 20 864~
8. Fresh fish and shellfish i6 755
9. Cocoa .................o..................... 16 302
10. Aluminum 15 051
11. Iron, cast iron, steel 14~ 068
12. Mineral products 12 912
13. Petroleum 11 387
14~. Oilseeds 9 979
15. Natural phospha,tes 7 078
16. Ivory 5 451
17. Wool and other ha.ir 4~ 680
18. Lumber 4~ 058
19. Hides and leather 1 026
TOIi~ ~~~�~��~�~~�~~~�~~~~~~~�~~�~��e�~�~~~~. 367 ~3
or 79.1 percent of the overall total ,
In Table VI, the ma.jor suppliers have been ranked f`rom 1 to 27 (out of 4~8
countries, excluding Liberia and South Africa,.ha.ving substantial trade with
Japan) in decreasing order of importance. With regard to each of these ~

- countries, we have noted the main products it exports to Japan. :
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Table VI. The Main African Suppliers of Japan in 1978
(excluding I,iberia and South Africa)
(in millions of yen) ,
Countries Main Products Values
Copper 3~I- 408 '
1. Zambia '
~ 2. Ghana Cocoa-Aluminum-Stones and gems 22 1~9 !
3 Zaire Pyrites-Copper and ores-Ivory 17 Z1~85 '
4~. E~ypt Cotton-Alumi.num 17 187
5. Sudan Cotton-Oilseeds 12 54-9 +
6. Ivory Coast Coffee 11 780
7. Morocco Fresh shellfish-Phospha,tes 9$37 ~
8. Mozambique Corn-F~esh shellfish-Pyrites-Coffee 9 00~1-
9. Algeria......... Petroleum 8 012 i
' 10. Uganda. Coffee 6 995 ~
li. Cameroon Lumber-Coffee 5 834~
12. Swaziland Pyrites-Papex pulp 5 164~ ~
13. Ma.dagascax F`resh shellfish-Coffee-Pyrites 5 011 ~
14~. Ma.uritania Pyrites-Fresh shellfish ~ 5~ ,
15. Ethiopia Coffee-Hides-Oilseeds 4 4~6 j
16. Libya Petroleum 3 707 ~
17. Kenya Ivory-Coffee-Plant fib~es 3~~
_ 18. Namibia Copper-Lead .........................o....... 3 006 ~
19. Senegal Fresh shellfish-Phospha.tes z 650 +
20, Chad ....o...... Cotton ......................e............... 2 622 ~
21. Tanzania Coffee-PZant fibres-Ivory z~55 1
22. Congo Ivory-Pyrites-Lweber 1 778 ~
23. Nigeria Fresh shellfish-Oilseeds 1 559 ;
24. Rwanda Coffee 1 535 ;
25. Angola Coffee 1 317 I
26. Benin Cotton 1 265 ~
27. Gabon Pyrites 1 23~1-
Tot~ zoo 997
or 97.~4~ percent of the overall total of sales ~by Africa
(excluding Liberia and South Africa) to Japan
. Petroleum. - It comes from two suppliers: Algeria (7,775 ~llion yen~ and '
I,ibya (3, 612 mil].ion yen) .
. Fresh fish and shellfish. - The global tonnage amounts to 32,~38 tons
(16,755 million yen), of which 23,04~3 tons consist of shellfish alone~ The -
fish and shellfish are caught by factory-ships operating off the African
- coasts, and which process them immediately into canned or fro~en products.
The ma.jor supplier is Morocco (fish: 2,290 tons; sheZlfish: 8,6~1-9 tons) '
for a value of 3,64~0 million yen. It is followed by Mauritania: 1,9~9 ~1- ~
lion yen (6,827 tons), Sene~al: 1,528 million yen (5,150 tons), Madagascar _
" and South Africa.
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. Coffee. - It represents 26,803 million yen (36,353 tons) and comes prima-
rily from the Ivory Coast: 9,~98 million yen (13,114~ tons), TJganda: 6,695 ~
million yen (10,061 tons), Cameroon: 1,871 million yen (2,372 tons)~ Rwanda,: -
1~535 ~llion yen (1,633 tons), Ethiopia: 2,94~ million yen (3,583 tons),
- Angola: 1,221 million yen (1,628 tons) and Tanzania: 1,097 million yen
(1,385 tons). -
. Cocoa. The number of cocoa suppliers is far less and, out of a global
value of 16,302 million yen (18,097 tons), Ghana: 15~~53 ~lion yen (17,418 -
tons) is the quasi exclusive supplier, the rest being provided by the Ivory
Coast and Cameroon.
. Oilseeds. - The global figure is 9,979 ~lion yen for a tonnage of
91,3G-9 tons. It is divided as follows: sesame: 4~,362 million yen (26~802
tons); peanuts: 3,209 million yen (16,196 tons); karit~: 1,568 million
yen (20,720 tons); cotton: 750 million yen (22,018 tons); other: 90 mil-
lion yen.
With regard to these figures it is interesting to note tha.t the Japanese
have recently published articles about and taken out patents for the use of
karit~ in the preparation of ~shortenings~ [printed in italics] (ba,ses and
additives) for phaxma.cology and cosmetology.
The ma.jor suppliers of oilseeds are (in milli~rs of yen~: Sudan: 5,328
(sesame-peanuts), South Africa: 981 (peanuts), N~,1.i: 683 (karit~), Upper
Volta: ~6 (kaxit~ - sesame), Nigeria: ~5 (sesame - karit~), Ethiopia:
532 (cotton - sesame), Ivory Coast: ~45 (karit~ - sesame) and Togo (karit~),
Benin (cotton), Mozambique (peanuts~.
~ . Corn and grains. - There are two suppliers: South Africa: 36,550 million
yen and Mozambique: 4~,37o million yen.
. Cotton. - It represents 22,614~ million yen (56~153 tons). The main
suppliers are: Egypt: 9,z66 million yen (17,364- tons~, Sudan: 6,4~10 million
yen (14,501 tons), Chad: 2,502 million yen (8,4~7 tons~, South Africas
976 ~llidn yen (3,365 ~ons), Benin: 97~ ~llion yen (3,961 tons), Cameroon:
893 million yen (3,176 tons), Ivory Coast: 646 mill.ion yen (2,241 tons~
and the Central African Republic, Upper Volta~ Ugan3a, Tanzania.
. Lumber (unworked and squared). - This represents 4~,0~8 million yen and
comes primaxily from Cameroon: z,o33 million yen , from the Congo: 599
million yen, from the Ivory Coast: 4~1 million yen, from Gabon: 271 million
yen, from Mozambique: 205 million yen, and from Zaire: 195 million yen.
. Natural phosphates. - The mai.n supplier is Morocco: 5~259 ~llion yen,
fol~owed by Senegal: 1,085 million yen and the Western Sah~.ra: 658 million
yen.
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. Pyrites. - These represent 58,287 million yen, of which 36,013 are iron ;
pyrites, 6,970 are copper pyrites and 5~525 ~e manganese pyrites. It will ~
be noted that, exclud.ing South Africa, iron pyrites are also produced in
(expressed in mi~liors of yen) : Swaziland: 3, 205, Ma,uritania: 2,4~8 and ~
Mozambique: 1~078; copper pyrites in Zaire: 6~919; and ~r,anganese pyrites ;
in: Gabon: 904~, the Congo: 450, Ghana: 222. :
. ;
. Precious stones, gems and metals. - The first place is held by Ghana: !
2,223 million yen, followed by Zaire: 148 million yen and Zambia: 200 ~
(South Africa: 29~717 million yen, of which precious stones: 4,84~ and ~
platinum: 24,658). ~
. Copper. - The main suppliers are Zambia: 33~938 ~llion yen, followed by ~
Zaire: 3,206 and Namibia: 2,210 (South Africa: 6,~1 million yen). ~
i
~
. Aluminum. - Out of a total of 15,051 million yen, we find: Egypt: 7,616, I
Ghana: 4,118, Cameroon: 673 (South Africa: 2~599)~ ~
. Ivory. - This item is very important, even though it concerns only 5~451 ~
million yen (364~ tons). The ma,in supplier by far is Zaire: 224 tons~ ;
followed by Kenya: ~I-8 tons, the Congo: 4~1 tons and the Central Af~ican ~
Rapublic: 18 tons. '
I
The world price of ivory vasies axound $65 per kilogram (approxima,tely i
290 French francs) and the figures show that the Japanese are purcha.sing ,
it at tha,t price. Now, if one knows the price of the smallest "netsuk~,"
one can only admire the talent of the Japane~e in the area of added ~
value: However, it is sad to note that, at the rate of 4~0 kilograms of '
ivory per average animal, this corresponds mathema,tically to 9,100 animals
killed; being familiax wi#h the hunting methods used in Africa, one may
. estima.te that in reality this would represent a global slaughter of nearly
20,000 animals a year
. Antiques. - Let us mention, in closing, this very special market, which
- represents 375 million yen (approximately 7.5 million French francs)
the value of officially declared sales. The Japanese are enlightened
amateurs and the pieces coming out of Africa are very likely quality,pro-
ducts. The main suppliers in this area are: Nigeria (126 million yen~, ~
followed by Zaire (72), Egypt (50), Guinea (29~, Ivory Coast (19~ and i
Cameroon (16).
Japanese Exports to Africa
The total of Japanese exports to Africa has increased in i978 up to ~
- 1,34-6,573 million yen 785,198 of which goes to countries other than ~
Liberia and South Africa. As could easily ha.ve been foreseen, this only
involves manufactured products and the m~.jor items ha,ve been grouped to- _
gether in Table VII.
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Table tT~I. Principal bcports from Japan to Africa in i97$
(f~ussels Nomenclature)
(in millions of yen)
1 - N~virRS ~1 mst6n~1 Ot n~vy~tion f89) . . . 41~ 264
2 - Voitwes. a~cteurs ~t cycNs (e7) . . . . . . . 2~.185~ '
3 - Fer, fonte. sci~rs 1731 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14! 70S
4 - Machinef et engins mlcaniques (B41 . . . . 1M 564
5 - Mschines tlectriQues. R~d'~o-N 1851 . . . . 12S J6~
6 -Teatiles symhliiques continus Ifils et tissvs11S1) - � . � � � � � � � 26 O~i
7- Te�ii~es synchbdQues disco~t~nus (libres1156) 2S ~~1
8- Caoutchouc (feuilles, crlpes et articles msnutacturls (40) Z3 1
9 - Conserves de viande et Doisson I16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 089
10 - Ins~ruments C'optiQUe�photo (90) . . . . . . 14 437
i t - Matlriel lerroviaire (88) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 149
12 - Instruments de mus~r;~ ei d'enregistnment (92) 12 10 421
13 - Produi~s chi:niQues 128. 29. 38) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : ~ 10 079 _
14 - Outiuape. couteiterie, erticles de m6sal (82.8J) � � . � . � � � � � 9 432
:5-Horlogerie1911 B 783
16 - Maulres v~astia~es et leurs artictes (391 . . . . . . . � . . . . . . . .1. 6 480
17 - Habiliement 1611 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~7 5 220
18 - Produits tlramiQues et porcelaine 1691 . . . . . . . ~ 3 996
Totsl........~~.9., 7 292 575
soi~ : 96 % du total gEnlral des e�ponstions ( 2~, !
~.~......M...,.....~.....,......,...�,~.,.....~..~..~...,....~..~.,-...--..
Key:
1. Ships and navigational ma.terials
2. Cars, tractors and bicycles
- 3. Iron, cast iron, steel
4. Mechanical machinery and engines -
5, Electrical machinery, radio - television
6. Continuous synthetic textiles (threads and fab~ics~
7. Discontinuous synthetic textiles (fibres~
8. Rubber (sheets, crepes and manufactured products~
9. Canned meat and fish
10. Optical and photographic instruments
11. Railway materials
12. Musical and recording instruments
~ 13. Chemical products
14~. Tools, cutlery, metal products
15. Time pieces
16. Plastic materials and articles thereof
17. Clothing
_ 18. Ceramic and porcelain products
19. Total
20. Or 96 percent of the overall total exports
Excluding Liberia and South Africa, Japan's major African clients are repre-
senttd for 97.4~3 percent of the total, or 765,000 million yen by 28
countries out of 4-6 having substantial trade with Japan (excluding I,iberia
and South Africa). These countries have been listed, in decreasing order -
of importance, in Table VIII.
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Tahle VIII. The Principal African Clients of Japan in 1978 ;
(in million of yen~ '
I
- ~ - N~~~, . . . . . . ~o~ 900 ~ 0 - Mo~~nw~tw . . . . . . ! bE5 ; -
2 - Alpki~ . . . . . . . . 16J 417 17 - MN~wI . . . . . . . . . . . E 09S I
~ - E9rv~� . . . . . . . . ee ~.0 18 � Medsg~scu . . . . . 5 ~!1 ~
4 - lWy~ . . . . . . . 73 992 19 � T.ambi~ . . . . . . . . . . . 6 580
5 - K~ny~ � � � � � � � � � � 31 994 2p - Maurica . . . . . . . 5 414 ~
! - CDi~ d'Ivoire . . . . . 30 151 21 - Zaire . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 4 966 ~
7 - Csnari~a . . . . . . . . 24 008 22 � Nifler . . . . . . . .`Z2 4 902 ~
8 - Tanrenie . . . . . . . . 23 301 Z~ - S~erra�Leone . . . . .2 � 663 ~
. 17 5gH 24 - CpUouti 9 94~ i
9 - Sou~lan . . . . .
tJ M~,~~ 14031 25�Rwanda ~~0!
11 - Ethin 10 757 z8 � O
P~ uq~nd~ . . . . . . . . . . ~ J! 1 i
12 - Ca~,sroun. . . 10 O60 27 � G~bon . . . . ] 31? ~
13 - Ghana . . . . . . 8 615 28 � Tunit~e . . . . . 3 191 I
ld � C~~~~a ei M.idis 8 552 Toul .\29).. 7E5 008 '
} IS An,;,,~e . 1~ 7 Sd8 I
~ _ . .
I
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Key: !
1. Nigeria 16. Mozambique '
2. Algeria 17. Malawi ~
3, Fgypt 18. Ma.dagascar ~
G~. Libya 19� Zambia ~
5. . Kenya 20. Ma,uritius
6. Iyory Coast 21. Zaire ~
7. Canary Islands 22. Niger ~
8. Tanzania 23. Sierra Leone
9. Sudan 24~. Djibouti ~
10. Morocco 25. Rwanda i
11. Ethiopia 26. Uganda ~
12. Cameroon 27. Gabon ~
13. Ghana 28. Tunisia
14~. Ceuta and Melilla 29. Total
15. Angola
Japan's major African clients ase, by products and values (in millions of
yen); j
;
i
. Canned meat and fish. - Nigeria (14~,784-) - Egypt (2,4~0) - Ghana (1,~79~ ~
and 5outh Africa - Ethiopia - Zaire. ~
. Rubber (sheet, crepes and manufactured articles). - Egypt (4,970) - Algeria l
(4~,?90) - South Africa (2,905) - Nigeria (2,393) - Sudan (1,813) - Libya ~
(i,z53) - Kenya (672) and Liberia - Ethiopia - Tanzania. i
. Continaous synthetic textiles (threads and fabrics). - South Africa (7,021~ - j
Egypt (3,~0) - Sudan (3,288) - Ethiopia (2,381) - Nigeria (2,306) - Tanzania
(723) - Ghana (655) - Liberia (636) - Malawi (575) and Kenya - Rwanda..
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. Discontinuous synthetic textiles (fibres). - South Africa (8~383~ - Nigeria
(4,p72) - Egypt (1,829) - Sudan (1,566) - Ethiopia (1,299) - Algeria (1,218) -
Kenya (1,060) - Niger (952), and Tanzania - Libya - Mauritius.
. Iron, cast iron, steel. - Algeria (~1,566) - Nigeria (35r5~3~ -~uth
_ Africa (13,369) - Libya (11,834-) - Egypt (10,249~ - Kenya (8,4~39), and
Tanzania - Sudan - Mad.agascar - Angola - ~nisia - Ethiopia - Mozambique -
Ghana - Morocco - Mauritania.
. Mechanical ma,chinery and engines. - Algeria 48,712~ - South Africa (35,15z)
- Nigeria (17,380) - Egypt (9,894~) - Tanzania ~5,617); and Sudan - Kenya -
Canary.Islands - Libya - Angola - Zaire - Mozambique - Malawi - Ivory Coast -
Ethiopia. '
IIectrical ma.chinery - radio - television. - Nigeria (32,796) - Libya
(17,228) - Fgypt (16,357) - South Africa (13,934) - Canary Islands (6,9~9) - -
Ceuta and Melilla (4,149)~ and Tanzania - Kenya - Ivory Coast - Morocco -
Ethiopia - Sudan - Uganda .
. Cars, tractors and bicycles. - South Africa (78,851) - Nigeria 66,076 -
I,ibya 31,878 - Algeria (1~,226) - Egypt (1~,085) - Ivory Coast ~12~553 -
Kenya ~12,2803, and Cameroon - Tanzania - Canary Islands - Liberia - Morocco -
Sierra Leone - Ghana - Sudan.
. Maritime and river navigation. - Liberia (3~1-7,226~ - Algeria (24~880) -
Egypt (12,137) - Ivory Coast (11,278) - South Africa (10,788) - Morocco
(4,652) - Mozambique (1,397) - Ma.da.gascax (1,187).
. Inorganic chemical products. - South Africa (1,405) - Tanzania (3~1~6~ -
Egypt (27?) - Kenya (114~) and Zambia. _
. Organic chemical products South Africa (2, 283) - Tanzania (4~65) -
Nigeria (279) and Ivory Coast - Kenya - Egypt - A~geria.
. Plastic materials and plastic articles~ - South Africa (2,238~ - Nigeria
- (1,661) - Algeria (385) - Tanzania (310) - Fgypt (307) - Kenya (233) -
Libya (191), and Morocco - Canary Islands - Angola.
. Clothing~ - Nigeria (1,042~ - Benin (591) - ~t (~13) - Libya (396) -
Niger (365) - South Africa (338) - Kenya (311~ - Djibouti (287~ - Togo (2~0) -
- Morocco (222), and the Canasy Islands - Ceuta and Melilla - Malawi - Liberia.
. Tools, cutlery and household articles. - South Africa (2,359) - Nigeria
(9~1-8) - Egypt (913) - Libya (~2) - Morocco (211~, and Kenya - Angola -
Algeria.
. Meta1 articles. - Nigeria (1,092) - Algeria (674~~ - South Africa (378) -
E~ypt (333) - Su~ (230), and Tanzania - Libya - Kenya.
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. Optical and photographic instruments. South Africa (5,293) - N:tgeria
1~889) - Canary Islands (1,270 - Algeria (1,058) - Libya (907) - E~t ~
~ 820) - Ceuta and Melilla (5263~ and Morocco - Kenya - Sudan - Tanzania -
Tunisia - Ivory Coast. ~
~
. Time pieces. - Can Islands (3,707) - Libya (1,685~ - Egypt (i,z55) -
Ceuta and Melilla (809 - South Africa (742~, and Ethiopia - Nigeria. ;
. Musical and recording instruments. - South Africa (2,404) - Nigeria (2,203) ~
- Libya (1,3~) - Canary Islands (836~ - Egypt (774~) - Ivory Coast (3?4) - '
Algeria ( 294~) - Kenya ( 246 and Swaziland - Ceuta a.:3 Melilla - Mauritius . ~
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris i979 I
84~63
cso: 4~00 ~
_ ~
~
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~ iNTER-AF'RICAN AFFAIRS
. ~
TRANS~RTATION OITrIAOK FOR 1978-1988 DISCUSS~D ~
Au~ia HARCI~S TROPICAUX ET ~DITII3RAN~JS in French 24 Aug ?9 pp 2308-10
[Article~ "The Decade of ~anaportation in Africa: 1978-19~
[Text] Aftsr the heada of atate of the seib~r countriea of the OAU (Grgani-
~ation of African Unity) at their June 1973 =eeting adopted. the "Declaration
of Cooperation for the Develop~ent of Z~anaportation and Coaaunicationa" it
required more than 5 years Yor the UN to ratify ths declaration aryd--in
Deceaber 1978--tc> procla~io oYficially the inauguration of the "'Decade of
TSre~neportation ~.nd Co~auni.cationa in At~ica~ 197a-1988."
Deapite ita protaacted~ slox progresa through the.naze of the various inter-
national ~uriadictions, thia declaration--reinforced by the countersignature
of the United Nationa General Aaae~bly--deea8 to hold proaiae for the future.
Indeed~ an isportant doawisnt concsrning thie "decade" has ~ust~besn pub-
lished by th~ United Nationa. It ~should be esphaaized that this.ie the firtt -
ti~e a ooxprehensive stuc~y concerning Africa has been carried out, and the
fir~t tiae a atrategy e~bodying apecific ob~ectives haa been elaborated xith
preciaion an~d sufficient ob~ectivity to aerve aa a baaia for ac~ion during
the ysara ta come. ~
The authora of thia atudy are seabera of the Econotic Co~iaeion for Africa--
tt~e, ar~sni~ation thst xeua desigaed, noreover, to bs the pxiae oontractor for ~
- the pro3ecta t+hich are to be undertaken. Ths Coaaisaion'a role xill accord-
ingly be to ar~nitor, activate~ auperviae and ooordinate the inaugurstion of
the succesaive phaaea of the overall plan, xlaich ie achaduled to be spaced
over the 8-yeur period frn~ 1y80 to 1988e
i~hen one conaiders that tranaportation and co~uunicationa facilitiee are the
keyetoneo oiP all eoono~ic progress~ it is underef.andable that the first
- oomprehenBive choice to bs aade by Africa would rsflect that orientation.
Ta open up the landlocked oountries of the interiori to 3ap~'ove~ or create~
�a~or tranaportation axee that xill ~ake poesible the.continuoua exchange
of persone and grooda= to hariwnize the rar~,y eaisting. regulationat aaid to
develop tslecosaunications xith a viex to creating,~genuine local econoaies
4nd obtaining the p~cticipstfon of the rural population in the eoonooic
sxakening of a continent thst poaaeaees a grext hwian potential and energy
potential--thede, are the ~ajo�r the~es of thid report.
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- The firat ~haae of this "decade" covsrs the 4-yee~r period fron 1980 through
1983 ~~ncerna a total of 49 countriea--circu~tancea xhich in thea8elves
beapeak the difficulties in coapiling, selecting and rePining hundrede of
pro~ecta involving a continent ~rhich hae ~sr~r faceta.
The coet eatiiatee nacle for all these pro~ecta total $8 billion. This dua
has no great aignificance per ee: it ~ay p~ove to be too saall or too large
but is in any caae i~preciae~ ~or it ia eub~ect to reviaion. All this is
reaaon enough to accord only litited aredenw to thia estiaste. ~n the
. othar hand, it is useful to knox the bucig~stary pe~rcentagee alZocated to each
individusl sector, to esch type of activity and to each int~astructure.
Fbr exasple, nat~onal pro~ecta ths~t i~psct one or fore otber oountries
rvpreaent approxinately 70 percent (g5.k~ billion) of the total budget.
Thie fact reflects a deter~i.nation to develop--on a p~riority bsaid--the
interetate infraatructure that is an indlaputable p~erequiaite fcr any
econoaic awakening. Projects that concern only individual atates account
fc~r one-fourth of the total br~dget.
The typea of action envisaged--irtveattent, training and research (in the
bxoadeet aense of the tera)--are diatributed in the folloxing proportiona.
Fira~ of all, capital investsent (equipaent purchasea~ conatruction, and so
forth) alene account for 95 pexcent of the overall budget. Thia aerve~ to _
e~phsaize (if Buch xere necessary) the treaend.ous ePfort that xill be
requirsd to adapt the tranaportation and conu~unicationa netxork in such a
xay aa to enable aubstantial pxogrees in the current ecanonic situation.
The 3 percent allocated for training appsars quite ~odest by oo~pariaon in
viex of the fact that ~95 aillion (1.2 psrcent of the budget) ia allocated
for reaearch (feasibility etudiea~ angineering atn~?eys, planning). The
couisaion has requested that the departaent of trtining be e~aeigned apecisl
priority. -
Lnatly~ an exaaination of the diatribution in teras of atructure ahoKS that
priaacy has been given to highxaya (50 percent of tP1e budget) folloxed by
railxays (20 percentj, porta (1$ percer.t) and airlines (7 perc~nt), xith
fluvial xaterxa,ya an~d nariti~e tranap~rt at tho bottoa of the ecale. Tele-
- conmunicatione--fncluding the poatal eervicea--sccount for 6 per~eent.
After establiehing the gsneral objectives and grouping the various activitiee -
into mA~or categ~oriee~ the atuc~r aakes a aector-by-aector analyais of the
pro3ecta. ~
iav_, ~
1(
Highxay~ ard Highxay T~ansport
Eatimated to total approximately 100,000 kilo~eters, the existing highxay
netxorIc reaaina relatively und~eveloped in that its infraatructure has not
been adapted to the various greeent-day sodea of traneport and because
aaintenance has manifestly been inadequata. "At`rica ia a victii of ita
geography, its lack of financial resources and its lack of technicians~"
ie tha co~uent moat usually heard.
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_ These characteristics are iore or less intensiPied depaiading on the region.
In Burwtidi~ Rxanda and the northeastern regione of Zaire, for e~xau~ple~
highxay transport is very poor ard comaunications are difFicult. In Yeet
A,f~ica, on the other hand, ~.he netxork of "all xeathe~" highxayg Will bs
nsar completion in 1982. In North Afrioa, xhere an intarnational hi~~n4Y
n~tKOrk he,s long b~en in place, the eituation ia eubat~ntially better~ the ~
3outhern I~torocco-Cairo trunk highxa.y ie oovpletely negc~tiable by vehicuL~r
traffic, khile the Trans-3aharan highxay linking Algeria to Ma~li and Niger
is xell on the xay to coapletion.
~ Tiro basic oonce:pts guided the Commission in the elabora.tion of its pro~ecte.
The firat concept is that development oP ~t.he various highxays should be
articula~ed around e~a,~or international azes, which xill in some meaaure
serve as the skeleton of the highxay infYastructure onto Khich the ad~acent
roada xill be grafted. Five transnational hi~tPa,ys will be covpleted soon:
~ the Mamba,sa-Iagna, Cairo-Gabon, Dakar-N' D3a~nena~ Lag+og-Nouakchott an~d TScana-
5ahara highxa,ys. Four others are in the p].anning stage~ the ~ipoli-
~ Windhoek~ Nouakchott-Cairo, N`Djamena-Kaasaxa and Beira-Lobito hi~Kays.
The second concept is the necessity of ending tha isolation of the landlocked .
countriea (countries xithout an outlet to the sea,), xhich are quite often
linked to their neighbore by roads (or even trails) on i+hich traffic ie
interrupted during the rair~y sesson. Fbr exanple~ the N'Ga~oundere-Chad
route--which providea direct accsds froa Caaeroon to Cha,d--ie rendered
~ i~apa,asible f~.^om year to year. Fbr ~ar~r yedra traffic haa therefore been
diverted toKard the Nigerian hi~xay Khich rune froa l~faiduguri to N' D3aaena,
but xhen Iake Qiad overfloxs (aa in 1963) congestion xesulta~ xith all the
attendant consequenoea. Plana also csll for putting the 313-kiloneter
stretch fron N'Gaoundere to Guid3lba (on the Chadian border) into grood
condition.
Tha 80 pro~ects xhich ha,ve accord~ngly been atudied, ~or inclusion in this
initial phase (1980-1983) ~~~tute a unified xhole, and their ooapletion
xould unquestiona,bly asaigt in end.ing t,he isola,tion of the interior regiona
and to a subgtantial extent facilitate the apvenent of peaple and g~oode. ~
Rail T~ansport
F~a~ented rail linee xhich coae to an ab~upt end in the aiddle of a country
or at a national bordar: this ia the xay the Af~ican rail netxork appsara -
on a aap. Excapt in North Africa and 5outh Afycica,, the denaity of thie
natMOrk ie lou. I~or a total area of appzoxiaately 30 oillion aquare kilo-
aeters there are in Afriea only 80 ~ 700 kilor~etera of railroad, or an avsr,age
of 2.5 kiloaeters of railroad p~r 1,000 equare kiloaeters. A comparison
xith the Ewropear~ rail n~txork~ xhich tsaa ~60 kilosste~sa of railroa~d per
1~0~~ equare kiloaetera (300~000 kilo~eters of railroad ~or a total of ~
~�75 million aq,uare kiloaeters Af area)~ de~netratea At`rica'a povsrty in
thia regard. Ten countri~ hava no rail systea at alle The Geu~bia~ Nig~r,
3onalia, Ch~d, Rwanda, the Cent,ral At~ican ~}~ire, Lib3ra, Leeat~ho, Guinea~-
Bisaau and Equatorial Guinea.
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In addition to their lox density the railroada ar~ disparate in the~t they
are currently of ~hree dif`terent types, xith thoae o~ i.k35 aeter gauge
and 1.065 meter gauge accourcting for 75 ~ercent of the network~ not to
uention va~iou8 railroads of a purely local character (1.005 mater.an~d
0.60 aieter gauga) rrhich nonethaless repressnt 4 percent of' the overall
network. There ie aleo dispaxity in ter~a o~ aotive poxsr (dieeel, elec-
tricity and ~teaan). Only 6~500 kilometere of line ara electrified (in
North Af`rica and in South Af~ica,). Dieael is the vative poxer ioat covaonly
used at preeent.
Because of all these oonstrainta--to ~rhich duat be added an inadequate
infrestructu~e--t~a~fic on this network moves sloxly, at an average dpeed
of 40 kildmetere per hour for paadenger tra!`Fic and 30 kiloaetera per hour
for f`reight tra~fic. The fa~oe~ Ca,sablanca-Tunie "etreaaliner" csn of couree
bear compa,rison Kith our E~uopean exp~eae trains. but it ia virtually th~
onlq one of ite kind.
The initial ob~ective~ as etatsd, ia to ~chieFVe optiatua utili.$ation of
- sxisting capacity through i~prove~ent of the infYastxucture and equi~aent.
The a0cond. ob3ective ia subaequently to initiate a pro~ dedigned #,o
unify~ haroonize and link togetheT the varioua nstione,l. eyete~s, xith the
pri.me~ry e,i, of opening up the iaolated regions. E1rsn aore that? on 6xpanaion
of ~the rai]s~oad netKOrk, eapha~sis is pla~ed on iaprovesent a~d Btandardi~a-
tion of ;he exieting lin~s. EScpanelon of the nstKOrk ( save for several
exceptions, as for e~canple the Trans-Gabon Railiroad) haa acoordingly been
postponed to the seoond phase o~ the p~o~ (1984-1988)� Preparatory
studies Kill be undertaken during the firet par~ of the "decad0," hoxever.
A total of 20 studies and pro~ects have been evaluated and proposed. We aay
cite in thie connection the stu~dies for the Parakou-Niatey and Togo-Nigar-
Upper Volta linea; tha restoration in Case+roon ot' the Ebeka-Idal.ouas line
(80 kilo~etere) and Ddea-~eka line (27 kilometera)i and the ree~toration
in Guinea of the Conakry-Karikan line.
Nasitime Transport
' The countries of Africa beca~e involved in aiaritine traneport only recently.
_ The eaergence of 3ITRAM (Ivorien l~aritiae Tranaport Co,pany) as one of the
lines serving the Keat Af~ican coa~t ia a relativaly recent developnent~
deapite the fact that the prepond~~ance of Af~ica's iaternatioru~]. trade--
awre than 95 percent--movea by sea as a oonaequence oP the insufficiency of
interstate oo~uunicatione on the oontinent. It aust be acknoxledged thst
AFrica,'e merchant ~leet (conaisting o~ 291 unite, snciud~ 69 coastMie~
vessels) is very saa].1 and regresenta only 0.7 pereent o~ total xorld
tonnage--a circumstance ~ich leavea to forsign eoapanies the taak of
handlli,g 97.5 percent of the 11f~ican tsade.
Except for the aforeaentioned SITRAM~ the Black Star I,ine~ the Nigerian
national ahipping line and a PeK ot,hera, the Af`rica~n navigation ooapanies
are at~7.1 enterprie~s (operating iyrom one to five ahipa each) irhich are often
not very profitable becauee of an inaufYiciency of auiageaent ca~dres trsined
in tha field of naxitime transport.
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Although only 13 of the 49 Af~icaz? countriee have no direct acceds to the
sea, the African people have nonetheleas not been oriented toward a maxitime
vocation, the lone exception being the population of the &~.rbary Coa,gt, xho
- "iz~ modern ti~aes" plied the M~diterranean. A substan~Cial inveataent has, to
be sure, been made in this sector, but the reaaone for thie inaufficiency
muet be sought elaeKhere snd are of an hiatorica,l character.
Deapite this situa,tion, the authors of the plan have allocnted anly a rela-
tively sma11 part of the budget to the development~ of maritiae transport,
undoubtedly because of the large amount of capi~~~l required and tha la~ck of
_ specialists but also because a solution of thia probZea does not appe~.r to
be urgently ess~ntial to the progresa of the A~ican econo~qy.
Nevertheleas, beca.use economic independence ia one of the leit~wtifa of the
African leadership, strong enphasis xas placed on the need for all the
states of the OAU to adopt, very quickly, "the code of conduct for the
Conference l.ines." This code stipulates the division, on a baais of
equality, of traffic between a given country and the Conference lines that
serve 1t. This is the eo-called 40~40/20 rule~* xhich has already been
iittplemented by a number of countries includ.ing the Ivory Coast.
The projecta approved relate principally to the training of techniciane to
a,ssume the functions of mana,gement an~d operation of the future Af~ica,n
shipping industry, and projects to provide the indispensable technical
asaistance.
Provision has also t~een made for th~ purcha,se of a very limited number of
ships, for a surn Which nonetheless representa more than 60 percent of the
tota,l value of the funds alloca,ted to maritime transport. Specifically~ llk
ships will be purchased for Ethiopia for a total of $124 million out of the
overalZ tota.l of $198 million.
Pbrts
A~ the conclusion of World War IZ Africa poasessed. only a very fe~ modern
porta. On the Kest coa,at, for example--other ~han Dakar and to a lesaer
degree Takoradi--there were only ao-called "xhasf" ports. In thoae dqys,
passengers for Lome or Cotonou xent ashore by borroWing "boats" which
shuttled betxeen the ship and the xharf. The situ~tion has sir.ce changed
considerably. There are now a total of 49 major ports in Africa (12 in
North Africa,~ 12 in East Africa, 18 in West Af~ica and seven in centxal
Af'ri ca ) .
*Reciprocal traffic, in the amount of 40 percent for each party, the remain-
_ ing 20 percent being awarded to third parties--the so-called "cross-traders."
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This representa progr~ss that is at least encouraging~ but p~ogresa t,hat
is only superficial. ',ihile it is trua that the equipment in theae porta
is generally xorn out ai:d an tiquated and that atorage facilities are inade-
quate~ the lack of effici~ency and pxoductivity that prevails on the xh~ves
derives in great part froa bad aanageatent. The paca of cargo harxiling is
abnornia,lly slo~: 7 or 8 ton~s per gang-hour for aiscellaneoue cargo, a
figure xhich sometimes drops to 5 tonB per gan~-ho~. Thie sta~e of af`fairs -
cauaes significant del~ys for shipping and conaequently producee congostion
in the ports.
The Economic Commiasion for Africa ha,s been very seneitive to this problem, �
in consideration of the fact that of the total of k~9 ports 16 serve ae
outleta for the landlocked countriea. ~br this reason emphasis has been
placed on t,he acceierated training of personnel xifi.h a viex to relieving--
as quickly as possible--the congestion that preyails in the ports. Gn page
74 of the report one accordingly reada~ under the heading "Pbrt Staff an~d
Iabor": "In every case the develop~ment of human resourceg must come ttell
- bePore the groxth of the ports. Tha training of personnel is therefore a ~
priority con~ideration and involvea all categ+ori~ of port amployees. One '
- of the solutions proposad is the organi~ation of theoratical and practical
training cours~s. This type of training can be instituted immedia,taly, .
without any need for the creation of special centers."
It is therefore not su,rprising that a aignificant proportion of the projected
, investwent for the ports has been allocated to training. ,
Other measurea--in this case, of a material character--have also been
pla.rmed, notably the expansion of the transit facilities at Lome~ xhich is
destined to become one of the outlets of Upper Yolta and Niger. In addi-
tion~ the projected development of the port of Kobo in Nigeria can help to ~
provide a aolution for the c:onstant congeation of the Nigerian ports.
Waterxays
Little by little~ xaterFrays have become the "poor relation" of the transport-
ation field. Other than a few ~a,3or axea (as for exa~mple the :3hine and the '
Seine), watez~rays havo been neglected by investora. The same phenoaenon
exists in Africa as Well. "Underprivileged" la the word applied to them by
= the authora of the report.
Without pursuing this analysis further, it should be pointed out that t,he
notorious irregularity of the flox of the African rivers does not predispose
to the develogment of this means of transport, a meana xhich is~ horrever,
very economica,l ~ On some rivers the Water depth normallyr drops 'belox the
minimum of 1.10 required for profita,ble na,vigation. Moreover, many of the '
rivers are divided into impassible reaches by rapids and Katerfalla. At
the present time the majority of the xaterirays remain in their natural
states that ia to say, poorly auited to commercial utilization.
The river ports are either ur?derequipped or ill equipped and are poorly
- linked to the hinterland. There are aiany farms aw~ong the rivers and~ lakes
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i _
~ but they have remained in the artieanal s+.,a.ge, in particular on the Niger~ ~
L'aka Tangat~yika,, I.a.ke Victoria and the affluenta of Lake Chad. Several
ma~or companies operate plantations on the Benoue (xhich is navigable one
i s.n~d a half months out of the yeart) and on tho Congo upstream from .Brazza-
~ ville.
I
~ In-depth stud.ie~ will 'be undertaken concerning the potential for navSgation
~ on certain rivers--the Volta Noire, the Ganbia and the rivera of Rxanda--
and also concerning the possibilities for improving the navigabi~.ity of the
~ Benoue and Ca.samance rivera.
! A numb9r of conatruction projects are also pxo~ected~ including expaneion
of the port of Bujumbura in Burundi and the cons~ruction of a port at Gaya
I in Niger. A total of $102 million has been alloca,ted for the riverxays~
~ representing 1.?_ percent of the total sums allocated for the firat phase
of t~e "decade."
Multimodal ~ansportation
I
i 2he Commis~ion experts who have studied the use of containers throughaut
~ Af`rica remain predominantly skeptical concerning the progresa of thie ne~ns
of transportation. The shaxe of funds alloca,ted to the container sector
substa.ntiates thie viex~ only $6.40 million~ xhereas (as xe have atated)
' overall ex,penditure for the firet phaee of the "deoade" hae been pro~ected
as $8 billion.
This ahould not ca.use surprfae. What purpose, indeed~ xould be aerved by
expaxiding oontainerization on a large scale at a time xhen facilities for
disp~,tching t`reight ~re atill scanty~ khen the porta remain congeated~
- and xhen trie ports, railroads and highxays remairi poorly integrated? The
progreas of multimod.a.l transportation must necessarily be slow in Af'rica,
for it is linked to improve~ent of the entire infraatructure.
Fbr the present~ therefore, only country-by-country studies Kill be mada,
in order that a better approach ico thi~ problem xill be poasible. This is
the deciaion that ha.s been ta.ken with respect to multisodal transportation.
Air Tranaport
Tn 1977 the African airlines accounted for 5 percent of the international
passenger traffic and 3.3 percent of the international freight traf'~'ic.
Their participation in intra-Af~ ican air transport remains rela,tively
undeveloped by comparison: 30 percent of passenger traffic and 4 percent
of freight traffic. The domestic netxork, moxeover~ lacks cohesion~ xith "
service being centered ~rredominnntly on the North-South axis. One expla-
- nation is that once an African sta,te posseesea "its oxn line" it displa.ys
a tendency to keep the line ,jealously for i~tself~ to the detriaent o~ its -
development. The "jet," the present-day sym'bol of a certain kind of
poxer~ is not yet a factor for unity in Africa. This protectionisn~ at the
national level did not go unnoticed by the Commission's investigat,ors~ xho
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reported ttae fact quite ob~ectively. Hence the primary emphasia pldced on
the neceasity for cooperation ~among the states in an effort to enhance the '
comnercial potential of the existing lines.
Another factor (in thia case an econonic factor) has aleo helped to retax~d
the grouth of this meana of transportation~ namely opera,ting costs. Direct
costa xere estima.ted in 1977 17.3 centa per ton-kilo~eter (conpered ,
xith the xorld average of 14.2 cents) an~d the indirect--or structural--coste !
- to be 16.6 centa per ton-ki~ometer (coapared xit,h the xorld average of
12.9 cents).
Be that as it may, there are regions in Africa Where the airplane is sti..~
the sole meana of conmunication, and its development is therePore ioperative.
The pro3eats approved for this sector fall into two categ~ories: the train-
' ing of personnel~ and the expanaion and improvement of the infraetructure.
The Co~miseion has left to another organization--the Af`rican Civil Aviation _
Commiasion--the task of stuc~ying the p~oblem of experding the air fleet.
- In 1976 the African countries operated a total of 37? aircraft. At the
beginning of 1978 it xas estimated that in tha courge of the ensuing 4 years ,
it xould be necessary to acquire a total of 171 aircraft--inclwding 60
long-range airliners--representing a total of $2.2 billion. The financing
o~f these purchases xill be dealt xith wtider a sep~a~cate procedure. ~
I
Telecommunica+.ions, Radio, Television~ Postal 5ervice !
It is a truiam in Af~ica, to say that telephonic and telex coDUnunict~tions
are mediocre, that the radio an~d television netWOrka are relatively ua~de-
veloped and of slight significance, and that fihe poatal aervices ar.e highly
unreliable. There are 0.44 telephonee per 100 inhabitants, compa~red to ~
4.5 per 100 in South America arjd 5.2 per 100 in Asia. ~
I
It is obvious--the authors of the report emphasize--that a large-scale ;
effart must be made quickly to alleviate the isolation of the residenta of
the rural areas and--more generally--to make the actions undertaken in the
other sectors more effective. T'he principal ob~ectives pmpoaed in this
regasd, are as folloirs a
1. Telecommunicationa ~
a. Improvement and expansion of the national netxorka~ xit~h the goal of
one telephone per 100 inhabitants, and one public telephone per 10,000
- inhabitants, by the end of the "deca~de."
b. Connections for capitals that lack transit to the outside xorld.
c. Haraonization of rates. ,
d. The development in Africa of a telecoamunic,~,tions industry. ~
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2. Radio and Television
a. Iaprovenent and expanaion of the inf'rastructure of the radio and teYe-
vision netKOrks xith a~ viex to assieting the economic and social development
of the rural ,areas.
b. An exchange of prograas among the i~ctividual state~.
c. Consideration of ineasurea to bring about an increase in the nusber of
radio receiving sets among the population (at the present time the ldast
expensive radio receiver coats $20).
d. The de~relopment in Af~ica, of a radio and television equipment industry.
3. ~betal Services -
a. Development of the infrastructure throu~ the creation of aultinational
- transit centers.
t~. Organization of mobile ~ail delivery services in rural come~unltiea.
At the conclwsion of this brief analyBis several~connenta oome na,turally to
ai.nd. Hox will all the projecta mentioned in thia report be financed?
Asauming that the appropriate organizations xill grant the credit requested~
how Kill it then be integrated into the multiple~ bilateral and multilateral
aid granted to the individual ata,tes through the fnternediary of the nuneroua
� national a,nd international organizationa--the OCDE [Oooperation and Economic
Development Organization]; the EPCi the EEC/ACP [Af`rican, Caribbean and
Pacific countries]~ the EDF [E~ropean Developnent ~.ind]; and others--not to
mention the regional African organizations that function aa the payeea in
thie tra,rieaction? One can anticipa,te that--at the very leaat--a eituation -
difficult to clarify xill rssult.
.
Let us also once again consider Af~ica's polltical problens, xhich do not
- pr~dispose to optimiam. Will these probleas not act as a b~ake on coopera-
tion a~:.g the individual states~ Which ia, hoNever~ indiapensable to the
aucCesaful~. i,dplementation of thie pla,n? The ,Af"rican leadera hope over the
lon,g term;. to ',3chieve economic inte~ation--an Af~rican comnon ~aarket at the
continen:ta~ :.evel. Will the economy take precedence over politica?
In ar~y evc~:.t~ the report draxn up by the Economic Comeissian for A~ica,
and approved by the conference of the ~inistera of t,ra,nsportation is acheduled
for pr~sentation to the UN next November, for ths approval of that boc~y.
There is not yet any reason for ekepticisa concerning i~ple~aentation of thi$
vast progran.
CO PYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1979
10992
C50 i 4~00
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- ~ rvr.W ~~IU V~\YL ~
1
. ~
I
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
i
~
BRIL~k'S '
~ ;
GDR EXPEDITIONARY FORCES--Six-Chousand men: these are the East German forces ~
of the "Afrikakorps" presently stationed in Angola, Mozambique ar~d Ethiopia.
According to South African inteiligence sources, these Germans adapt themselves i
very rapidly to combat and living conditions on~the black continent, even faster '
than the members of the Cuban expeditionary corps. Pretoria has passed on a .
dossier on this particular question to the Bonn goverament. [Text] [Paris i
VELEURS ACTUELLES in French 1 Oct 79 p 34]
i
CSO: 4400
i
;
i
i
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~
;
. ~
;
,
,
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BENIN
STABILITY, GOOD MANAGSMEHT CONTRIBUT~ TO PROGRPSS -
- Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Sep 79 pp 36-39 .
~Article by Philippe Sisoast: "The Expsrts Are Optisietic"~
~TeztJ The World Bantc is optivistic regarding the medius-rsnge econo~ic
f~ture of Benin. This ia the conclusion tt~at can bs drsxn irom the 1nts~
natione~l financial o~ganization's lateet report on the country. Thie ~e-
port ia more extensive than the bank�a previoua report on Benin covering
the period 1972-19'J3. Ttie nex report cov~rs the entire period aince
Lieutenaa?t Colonel Kerekou~s rise to poKer. The report describee thoes
Years aa "a period of political atability" folloxing a dosen y~eara of
troublea and incesaant changes in gover~ent.
The World. Baak expecte that Benin�s groea national product `rill grox by -
6 percent per year~ in real tera~s~ betNeen 19?8 and 1985 (d~,aregarding
, inflation). This grotrth xill result froi an incrsaaed rste of invsatosnt
over the next 4 years (22 percent of the GI~ accozding to baalc e~rperte).
Thia rspid econosic e~cpanaion ahould allox sn increase, in ree~l terma~ of
2 percent psr year in per capita conau~gtioa and thus producs a noticeable
increaae in the atsndazd of living.
Tha Wor1d Bank aleo believsa that thia greKth can bs acootpliahed without
produciug a deiicit~ in Bsnin~a balancs of pay~eAta. What xi,Il happ~n~ it
believss~ ia that foreign a1d xill offset a~y tre~d~ dsfiait. It aay svan
- happen that Benin xill be able to incrsaae ita rseervss of forsign sxchsnge
during the aext !eN ye~rs. 'This xould rsault froa the ~act ttsat 85 psrcent
~ of all imestnenta in Benin xill bs ~ir~aaced by for~ign ce~pita.l. The other
side of the coin ia obviously an incrseae in Bsnin�a forefgn indetytsdnssst
the delrt eervice (the reps.~ent of loans), Mhich ia currently eq,uival~nt
to 4.5 percent of the valne oP e~cporta~ xill by the sarly 1980�s aaount
to 1.0 to Y5 percent of the value of exports~ This l~vel of indeb~edrlsaa--
xhich is coason for develo~ing conatries--is'viexed. by ths world Bank as
"tolezable~ especially," the baalc adda, "xith the support of the Nigerian
Gover~snt behind. the tMO ~~or inveatment projecta that ase planaed."
The tKO pro3acts rafezzed tb involve the sugar and ceasnt irrduatriea.
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;
This vision of the future ia all the more comforting in viex of the fact !
that Bsnin ia one of the poorsa~ countriss in the xorldt 170 dol].ara per
capita incone (1976 eatim.te). Tha picture of Benin~a pe,et ax~d prsesnt
that the '~orlrl Bank'e expsrta paint is not all bright hoxevsr. Ecoaonic
grorrth la a nox phsno~enon for genin. Per ca~pita incose haa been atagnant
ior ~any year~ due principally to population groxth xhich remains at about
2.8 psrcent per year. Ths econoAic groxth that haa occurred ovar the la$t
feW ysara ia esaentiallq due to tsede atid induetry. Agriculture~ xhich
- still eaploys 60 percent of the Ko~k force~ did not incrsaae ita avsrage
production betxeen 1972 and 1976, ;
The i~rportance of the agricnltural sector is obvious~ both to the dis-
tribution of incone and the standara of living for ths ~oet diaadvant~ged
claases.
Induatz-y employs only 2 percant of the active papulation (but its groxth
rate kas about lI p~rcent per year bstKSen 1972 aad 1976). Ths reet of ths ;
- papulation ia engaged in trede Which thua provide$ a~ploy~ent ror alaoet ;
~ 40 gercent of the active population. If one xere not axare of theae tWo
Pacts one might think that Benin had already entered ths poet-~nduetrial '
era.
In reality~ the aize of the tertiary sector ia explained and 3ustified in I
part by tt~e nature of t,he tte.naport.ation syate~ t,ha,t connscts Benin Kith
its neighbors~ particularly Niger and Nigeria.
Ia the strategy that haa besn adtipted by the govern~ent in a~ttsra of ~
economic arid eocial develapnent responsive to Benin'a needa? Since 197~+ ~
the ob~ective of public officiala has been the nationalization of the '
" econo~r and greatsr state eontrol over all sactors of activity. The large ~
modern busines$ea are nox undsr governxent controlt xater s~d eleetricity~
be~nks, Puel distribution~ brsxeriea, textiles, etc. Nox the govet~n~ent ie ~
trying to reorganize the xvxe~l sector through the introduction of ne~+
institutionai provincial agenciee for svzal develapisnt a~d n~ex far~a of '
~ coo~erstive production unite~ particnlarly in Borgou Province. ~
~
As a result of thia extens9.on ~f the public sector one might expect to ~
diaoxgauization in govern~ental finaaces. Accosding to the World Bank~e ~
- re~port this haa not happened. Oa the contre~ry~ and thie la appasently otte ~
ef the moat positive pointa coneerning the nerr regi~e�s ~anage~ent, the ,
governaent~s finaaeial aitua.tion t~a isproved conaiderably over the laat ~
decade. ~
j
The budgetary deficits Mhich hafl chasscterized the 1960'e and xhich had ;
been financed by trsnsfer8 fro~ the F~ench traaaury he~ve bsea eli~insted. ;
Grouth of govern~snt expenditurea haa besn controlled by the authoritiea '
' pa~rticula,rlq by a ca~paign sgainat Maate ar~d i.nelYiciency. Ae ror gov~rn- !
nant receipta, they have been conaidersbly incz~sased aa a r0ault o! ths ~
groiott~ in i~port taxes aad inco~s ta~csa. The b~nk belisvea tl~t t~his ~
i
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prudence in the management of the public sector has given more strength
to the economic g~owth.
After coeipliments such as these the docuffient's authora are even freer in
their criticis~ of soa~e aspects of the Cu2Terit 3-year plan for
economic development (19'77-79). The principal reproach concerna the rate
of investment set by the govern~nent for the firat 2 years: it would
approach 60 perceat of the grosa national product. The experta feel that
such a level is neither possible nor desirable~ it exceeda the level of
valid pro~ecf.s, the capability for financing fron foreign ca.pital, aad the
capacity of the country to abaorb the investment. The report goea so far
- as to say that "The inclusion of this eaaggerated development progra.m in
'the plan dimini~hes the credibility o~ the document." The bank esti~ates
that the level of investment that is posaible in on the order of ]25 billion
CFA fre.ncs or about half of the figure praposed by the govern~ent in its
plan (244 billion CFA frerics).
The bank's report also criticizes the "export-substitution" orientation
that the Beafn authoritiaf~ have given to thair economic developmsnt policy.
Acc~niing to the bank, auch a policy, xhich conaista of broadening domestic
markets rsther thar? orienting production toxatd t,he ezport maxkets~ xill bn
seriously handicapped by the emall scale of Benin's economy. According to
the expsrt,a at ths bank, Benin's in~dustrial experien.s ahoxs thst pro~sctd
have aucceedsd xhsn they coabinsd the three folloxing conditious~ a ls=ge
doneatic aad r~eighbo~ibg sa.rket~ Kell-develsped technology, a~l a modsst
initial lewl ~f o~psrstions.
In spite of these disagreements the iiorld Baak approves of the ma~ority of
iuvesttenta prapoaed by the plan, all t,he xhile feeling that it xould be
- xiser to stretch them out over a longer period of time. Thers ia hoxever ou~
_ se~3or pro3ect on xhich the bank staaps ita clear ~e?rk of disapproval~ tt~st
- of sn oil refinery. ,
The report shoxs that Benin~s econonic develop~ent is still hindered by
certain deficiencies in nanpower. "Thia observation may appear surprising~"
the report reads, "for a country xhich has had, since World 4far II, a
reputa.tion for aupplying all of French speaking Af'rica r?ith qualified
~ adminiatrative personnel." The repor~ makes no attempt to sxp].~.in ~his -
paradox which has already been noted. in this publication (JEUNE Ab'AIQU~
No 97U). The raport confines itaelf to observing that it xill be neceasary
to strengthen the system of education ani training.
One of the biggest prnblems facing Benin, that of its relations xith its
neighbors, and particularly with the largest of thea in terms of poxer,
size, and resourcAS, Nigeria, ia dealt frith in a cautious manner by the
i '+lorld Bank, The paragraph concerning t,his question is herexith quoted in
almost its entiretye "Benin has traditionally played a role of trade and
transportation Sn the region and events of the past several yeara have
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demonatre.ted xell that the country has the capacity to turn the o�ppor- .
tunities prnvided by ita neighbor$ to ita oxn adv~ntaga. Nevertheless
a note of caution should be sounded. For example, the reduction in importa _
- effected by Nigeria during the apring of 19?8 had direct repercussions on
the Banin trensportation economy aid the saae xill be txve as Nigeria ,
develops its oxn ports. Over the long term the current plan to eatabliah
a joint customs union xith a common foreign duty, combined rrith the exiat-
ence of a laxge industrial base in Higeria~ could easily lead to aignificant
imports to Benin from its neighbor. Neverthelesa a serall-scale aad
undiversified economy auch ss that Pound in Benin must necessarily keep the
lid on foreign inports and the policies oY Pree trede that have benefited
this orientation in the past should be retainad." Is this trede liberalism~
in the long run~ compatible xi~.th the economic nationalism that is sought
by Lieutenant Colonel Kerekou's regime? The World Bank stoPs short of asking _
the queation. But would it ha.ve been a valid question within the ~ran~exork
of the report? ~ ~
Generally speaking hox credible is this report? According to its preface
the contents of the report xere diacussed xith the Benin government and
some changes xere made to the text. In other Worda the report xas noic
able to ~o too far in ita criticism. But on the of.her he~nd it is a
confidential document for "restricted" distnibution, a11 of Which serves
to increase the confidence tha.t it ia due. In at~y case it haa marit in -
that it raises some of the principal problems that ase fa,ced bq Benin'a
ecano~y and it is thought provoking Por anyone xho is concerned about
Benin's future.
COPYRIGHT e Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 19'j'9 ~
7779
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BENIN
BRIEFS
STUDENT UNREST--Beninese authorities are trying to find a way to calm student
unrest which has disturbed the university the last 3 months, mainly over the _
. problem of the poor transportation system. After reacting vigorously by ~
calling the complainers "anarchists" and "agent~ of imperialism," the
government is now playing down the situation. A special commission of the
Beninese People's Party central committee fias reportedly been formed to
"find concrete solutions" before the election scheduled for 20 November.
[Excerpt] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in ~'rench 26 Sep 79 p 35]
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CHAD -
POINTS INCLUDED IN LAGOS AGREEMENT
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 p 2363
[Text] Here are the nine points of the "Lagos Agreement" signed during the
night of 20-21 August by the 11 Chadian groups in the capital of Nigeria:
First point: The signatories call for an immediate cease-fire in Chad
and request that the neighboring countries refrain from interfering in
Chadian domestic affairs. A 100-km zone around Ndjamena will be demil-
, itarized. The cease-fire will be controlled by neutral troops composed
of contingents from several countries, excluding those bordering on Chad.
The neutral force will also operate in the cities of Abeche, Faya,
Moundou and Sahr and will be responsible for protecting "important
Chadian personages."
.
Second point: Creation of an independent control commission responsible
for guaranteeing enforcement of the cease-fire and seeing that the neutral-
ity of the national radio is respected until a transition government is
formed. This commission will be presided over by the secretary general
of the OAU or by his representative and will be placed under the moral
authority of the president of the transition government. It will be
made up of two representatives from each participating or observing coun-
try represented at the Lagos Conference and by a delegate from each Chad-
ian group that is a signatory of the agreement.
Third point: Use of any clandestine radio station is forbid3en.
Fourth point: Release of all political prisoners within 15 days follow-
ing the forming of the transition government, and amnesty for all polit-
ical exiles.
Fifth point: The temporary r~ational union government will be made up of
members of all signatory groups, with an 18-month term. The temporary .
government will apply a political program leading to free elections that
will give birth to a new government.
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Sixth point: Dissolution of the Armed Forces and creation of an in-
tegrated National Army. ~
Eighth point [as published]: The agreement to become effective immed-
iately. ~
I~inth point: A copy of the agreement to be sent to the OAU.
The signatoxies of the agreement are:
Abdoulaye Adam Dana (First "Volcan" Army)
Fatcho Balam (National Democratic Union)
Mohammed Abba Said (First Army) ~
Acyl Ahmat (First Army of the People, Revolutionary Democratic Council)
Abba Siddik (original FROLINAT~.[Chadian Nationa.l Liberation Front]) ~
Moussa Medela ('!Western Forces" of~FROLINAT) '
_ Hadjero Senoussi (FROLINAT�) `
Aboubakar Abdel Rahmane (People.'s Liberation Movement of Chad")
Goukouni Ouaddeimi ("Peopje's Armed Forces"--FAP)
Hissein Habre ("Armed Forces of the North"--FAN) '
Wadal Abdel Kader Kamougue ("Armed Forces of Chad"--FAT) ~
~
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 197J '
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CHAD
LAGOS AGREII~4ENT VIEWED AS MODERATELY HOPEFUL
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 pp 2363, 2365
[Editorial: "The Lagos Agreement (21 August 1979): Moderate Hope for Chad"]
[Text] Most Chadian circles are in agreement in considering the results of
the latest Lagos conference "unexpected." And indeed, for the first time
they have seen, in addition to the strongly affirmed reconciliation between
, the representatives of the north and the gouth, the beginning of a geniiine
_ plan for rebuflding the state that is likely to straighten out the country's
economy, which today is plunged into "total chaos," to use the expression of
Goukouni Ouaddeimi himself. However, the euphoria that followed upon the
announcement of the agreement in Nd~amena was succeeded by certain reserva-
tions and the feeling that it will be necessary to await the forming of a
new government--the date for which is still uncertain--and its first
measures, in order to appraise the chances for success of the new charter
and the solidity of the reconciliation between the two most outstanding
representatives of the north and south, Goukouni Quaddeimi and
Col Abdelkader Kamougue.
Among the rappr~chement factors may be noted first the desire to look for a
solution among Chadians by limiting as much as possible the influence of
two too-powerful neighbors who might be suspected of wanting to "vassalize"
- Chad: Nigeria and Libya. The formzr did not hesitate late last April to
order an embargo on oil deliveries, in order to weaken the resolution of
Goukouni and Habre, who had been opposed at the second Lagos conference to
- recognizing certain groups they had judged to be too receptive to the
interests of the Nigerians. As for Libya, she sti11 occupies the Aouzou
strip, and during the first 2 weeks of June she armed the columns of
"Libyan mercenaries" who in the north approached to within 15 km of
Faya-Largeau before being cut to pieces by FROLINAT troops commanded
personally by Goukouni Ouaddeimi. To counterbalance their influence,
three French-speaking states were invited and participated in the second
Lagos conference beside Chad's six neighboring states: Senegal, Benin and
the Congo. Likewise, the neutral ~orce that is to be responsible for
controlJLing the cease-fire in Nd~amena, Abeche, Faya-Largeau and Sahr and
protecting "important Chadian responsibilities" is t4 include no contingent
from the countries bordering on Chad. It will be furnished by Benin, the
Congo and Guinea, Senegal having refused.
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On the other hand, Goukouni Ouaddeimi has publicly acknowledged the errors
committed after the second Kano conference by the government to which he
belonged. "Those of us who held the po~aer in Nd~amena," he has said, "made
decisions that were against the principle of African solidarity." Thoae
unfortunate decisions explain the French-speaking countries' reluctance to
recognize the Chad Government's representatives at the Kigali Franco-
- African conference and the refusal to the OAU to allow it ta sit at the
Monrovia summit. The most serious error was the attempt by the Ndjamena
goverrrment to subjugate the south militarily at the time of its military
- expedition from Bongor toward Pala and Kelo. Hissein Habre's troops were
routed there on the road from Lai by the units of the Chad regular army,
fighting in their native country under the energetic~command of _
- Colonel Kamougue. -
Goukouni and Habre must have concluded that it would be very difficult
militarily--if not impossible--ior the northerners to conquer the south
militarily, just as peaceful conqu~st of the north by southern cadres had
been showa to be unfruitful. ;
As conqueror of Hissein Habre's troops, the south speedily strengthened
its unity under the vigorous i.mpetus of Colonel Kamougue, and restored its ~
economic potential. Cut off from Ndjamena, it easily formed a new
administration wiCh cadres who had withdrawn from the north and the capital
and come to seek refuge in their native country. From then on the south
was in a situation where it was negotiating as an equal with the Ndjamena
~ goverr~ment, which for its part was weakened by internal dissension, but
at the heart of which Goukouni Ouaddeimi's prestige was strengthened by
his victory in the north, whereas Hissein Habre's was much damaged by his
defeat in the south.
The Chadian delegates of all persuasions present in Lagos drew the logical
conclusion from this power struggle, while entriisting the highest responsi-
bility to the country's two "strong men." Goukouni Ouaddeimi was made
president of Chad, Colonel Kamougue vice president. In their persons
are represented the Moslem populations of the north and the Christian ;
or animist populations of the south.
Together they have proclaimed their reconciliation on high. "With your
agreement I am certain that we will succeed in uniting Chad," Goukouni
- Ouaddeimi stated to Colonel Kamougue, while the latter answered him,
_ "Today you are the president of Chad. You are from the north, you are a :
- Goran, but Goukouni is the president of Chad."
He had previously affirmed "The commitment is made to serve the country '
selflessly from now on. There will be no more south or north. Speaking
on behalf of the Chadian Armed Forces and the people of the southern zone, -
I assure you that we are in favor of unity for Chad." For their part, the
other groups represer.ted in Lagos unanimously declared their acceptance
without restrictions of the nine points of the agreement.
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The understanding between Goukouni Ouaddeimi arrd Colonel Komougue and the
continuation of the unanimity manifested in the Nigerian capital appear to
be indiepensable to enforcing the agreement, and that condition alone
demonstrates ita fragility. As the Ivorian daily FRATERNITE-MATIN said,
"The 11 Chadian groupa, including thoae wl~ose le~ders repreaent only their
own ambitione, have thus agreed to make peace. We would have liked to
write that that country is on the threshold of peace," but this is Chad
_ "and zt is al ~~ys possible that there is someone there who, because he did
not fall heir to the position he expected in the government, will take to
the bush in the desert."
The difficulties involved in er~forcing the agreement are underlined by a
number of diplomatic observers in ftdjamena. They are particularly foresee-
able in the matter of forming a government charged with preparing for
elections to be held in 18 months' time. What place will be reserved
- in it for Hissein Habre, who until then is d~efense minister, and of whom
- it is repeatedly said that he has voiced serious reservations on several
- points of the compromise drawn up at Lagos?
_ The departure of the French troops, of whom the Paris government reminded
us that it had already decided to withdr~w them and that it had kept them
there only on the express request of the Ndjamena government, was demanded,
says the Lagos communique, by "all parties" present at the conference.
According to the same rumors circulating in Ndjamena, Hissein Habre was
fiercely in favor of their being maintained until the neutral forces are
put in place. Thus he joins with the position of the Cameroonian
President Ahid~o who, on his return from Lagos, where he attended the
conference, published a couununique on 23 August in which he characterizes
as "unrealistic and unrealizable in the near future" certain of the agree-
ment's clauses, especially those concerning the putting in place of neutral
i forces "without this being called into question by the countries that are
supposed to supply the troops." Consequently, President Ahid~o is hoping
I that Chad's new authorities will ask that the French troops be maintained -
~ "until the principal decisions of Lagos are implemented."
Among those decisions is the creating of an integrated national army. Thus
it will be necessary to combine troops as different as those of the _
FROLINAT, which are trained and accustomed to conducting desert operations
akin to guerrilla warfare, and those of the former regular army, more
traditionalist and closer to conventional armies of the Western type.
Moreover, they have confronted each other in the past. The task will ba
a difficult one.
Drawing up a foreign and a domestic polir_y will also be difficult.
Goukouni Ouaddeimi belongs to the FROL'INAT, which proclaims itself a
revolutionary movement that demands socialisza. Colonel Kamougue has the
reputation of being closer to a liberal system of the Western kind.
I
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Abroad there are two unknowns: the attitudes of Nigeria and Libya. Together
they have at their disposal, among the 11 groups, "proteges" with whose help
they could exert pre:srure on Ndjamena.
Nigeria, whose military contingent in Chad left unfortunate memories among ~
the population there, is supporting Aboukabar Abdel Rahmane's People's
Liberation Movement of Chad. In the recent past the government of Lagos
has shown that it intended~tc~ make its conception of what the Chadian
reconciliation requires prevail.
As for Libya, whose occupation of the north of Chad was surprisingly not
contested by anyone at Lagos, only a common front of the ma~ority--if not
the whole--of the groups represented at Lagos, appears capable of
dissuading her from renewing her attempt to control the north with the
help of bands armed by means of Libya's attention.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreax et Cie., Paris, 1979 ~
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
SOME MYSTERIES STILL REMAINING CONCERNING COUP
Par~.s JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 29 Aug 79 pp 16, 17
/Article by Pierre Gardel: "'W~e Are Free."'/
LText/ A red star gleams on the light khaki uniform. The offi~er, a
second lieutenant, carries a simple scarlet plastic plaque which replaces
the traditional array of decorations. These Equatorial Guinean military
personnel are...in Gabon, at Cocobeach, a border town without a border
town's characteristic features. No customs office, no visible police.
A short beach where coco trees are few and far between. Invited to the
celebration of Gabon's national holiday (17 August), the 'Equatos' as
they are called here, didn't arrive until 18 August, to the discomfiture
of the local authorities--deputy, prefect, and customs director--who hadn't
planned on paying for beer two evenings in a row. _
The 'guests' came by boat from the Guinea district of Kogo, the other side
_ of this arm of the sea. In the building of the Democratic Party of Gabon
(PDG), they exchanged toasts and clinked glasses freely to liberty regained,
to the arrest of the ex-dictator Macias Nguema.
Still at Cocobeach, but a few hundred meters (and three bottles) away; a
rough shed sheltered the misery of Luis, Antonio and Bartolome. During ~
the times of the 'Senors' (the Spanish), the first of the trio had guided
planes along the runways of Malabo airport, the capital of Equatorial Guinea.
Dismissed with the rest of the staff, he then worked in a textile shop
which liquidated, slowly but surely, the colonial stock. Once the funds of
the Equatorial branch of Mata were exhausted, Luis had to go back to Kogo
and return to a subsistence economy before finally choosing exile.� He has -
- lived too long at Cocobeach to not traffi,c a bit in soap, oil, or other
product become rare in Macias' Guinea. Antonio and Bartolome had arrived
the evpning before. Fang before being Equatorial Guineans, they had come
to Cocobeach to see Gabonese relatives.
All were afraid to talk. They gl~nced furtively at a local male nurse,
a fellow national who belonged to the family of dictator Macias, but
above all they feared administrative hassles with Gabonese authorities.
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According to them, everything was calm in Guinea. At Kogo there wasn't _
even any revengeful settling of accounts. "People we~e in Macias' militia
because they had to be. Anyhow, since the coup d'etat their life doesn't .
seem to have changed any." At the words 'work', 'food', they responded
with sad smiles and an awkward silence.
But for all that there is no question of throwing doubt on the importance ~
of the coup d'etate, 'E1 Golpe,'. On this subject they became enthusiastic.
"We are free." 'The rest will come once the government is constituted. Macias?
"H~ shouldn't be killed, but kept a prisoner the rest of his life. He
should suffer as much as he has made us suffer."
At Libreville, at the entrance of a popular noisy dance hall, the Equatorial
Guineans are a little hastier. By Radio-Malabo they learned of tlie arxest ,
of the former dictator. To questions abaut the fate he deserves they ,
responded by an expressive gesture, a rapid movement of the hand across
the throat. Here tou, the past of the new master of Guinea close to the
dictator didn't seem to bother anyone. "We doci't have the right to doubt
the authors of the liberation." Teodoro Obian Nguema is a'good' man, '
according to a refugee who remembers having studied with him at the college
La Salle de Bata. He declared his intention of returning soon to his '
- liberated country, but at the same time he intended to go back to his work
in Port-Gentil after his vacation in Libreville.
No one doubts that Equatorial Guinea has been liberated, bu*_ a return to
the country has not begun. But the notables who ~urrounded President Macias
and who first fled to Gabon, were able to leave. This is notably the case
of the minister of the economy, Oyono, of the commander of the military
sector of Bata, of Macias' personal physician, and even of the ex-dictator's
first wife (pregnant) who passed the frontier with six suitcas~es and chests
full of money, immediately confiscated by the Gabonese government and .
remitted to a delegation of the new Equatorial Guineas regime come to
Libreville on 7 August.
Among the Equatorial Guineans other news circulates, not always verifiable. ,
According to the rum~rs, Macias Nguema was arrested on 11 August, alone in
the forest, carrying a suitcase stuffed with money. Wounded on the hand on '
this occasion, he was taken to Bata. As for the famous Cubans, they seem -
to have disappreared into the landscape. As much as it is believed that ;
the putsch had been rapid and without rough edges, it is believed that its
success is due to treason by the Cubans in Macias' immediate entourage. ;
But no one has seen a Cuban or the body of one--even after th.~ hard fighting
at Ncue and during Macias' counteroffensive towards Bata. Sor~e think they
left the country long ago, not being suited by Macias' Marxist-Leninism. '
Others think they are still there in their roles as instructors and ~
technicians, refusing to take part in the fighting. Mysterious Cubans in
a coup d'etat which has not yet unveiled.all its mysteries. ~
f
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
TEODORO NGUEMA`S POLITICAL IDEAS SAID TO BE UNKNOWN
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 29 Aug 79 p 17
/Article by Pierre Gardel: "A Last Minute Democrat"/
/Text/ "The dog has changed his collar, but he is sti11 tied up." The
expression comes from Antonio Ondo, one of ~he principal Equatorial Guinean
opposiCion party refugees in Madred. He and many others are not yet confident
in the new strong man of Equatorial Guinea. To be sure, Teodoro Nguema
has overthrown the tyrant Macias Ngyema, but has that earned him the lable
of democrat? He who today presides over the Revolutionary Military Council
was not loo long ago the vice minister of defense of the fallen regime. And
this position and the confidence it supposes explains the success of the
coup d'etat.
Teodoro, by whom dPmocracy has arrived, in effect di'rected the forces of
repression of the country that he has just liberated. In December 1969 he
was present in the area where a Fang, two Nigerians, and a Bubi were executed.
He was there as a military chief, while the rest of the public had been
forced there by the guard. His presence had also been noted at the executions
which took place in the Place of the Clock, at Bata, etc. Can he take
refuge in "orders from higher up"? Some doubt it. "Juan Manual Tray*, one
of those rare Guinean military professionals, directed the president's -
- military establishment, Fori~unato Okenve occupied the position of secret~ry
gener`_1 of defense, but they had no power. The simple Lieutenant Teodoro
was in fact the real head." It was he who masterminded the elimination of
~ those Guineans trained by the Spanish Army. In 1965 there were 11 cadets to
the milttary academy of Saragossa: Teod~ro of course, but also Maximiliano,
shot in 1970 in the prison of Santa Isabel, Jesue Eguoro, clnbbed to death
in 1972. But Theodoro's star never checked in its rise. Because of his
kinship with Macias? Without a doubt. But also because of his role in
stopping the conspiracy fomented in 1973 by the Britisher F. Forsyth.
*Afterwards he was placed under house arrest at his residence in the
village of Musola. ,
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Only recently did the future strong man exhibit a certain independence. He
played mediator between the a~l-powerful master and those foreigners who
had the misfortune of falling into his hands, such as the captain of the ;
Spanish ship Ukola. From that it could be deduced that Teodoro Ngyema was
pro-West, but, finally, no one could pride himself on knowing his political !
ideas. The new regime has carefully refrained from any precise declaration. ~
Even the announcement of the liberation of political prisoners has not ~
sufficed to convince those familar with Macias' pretensions to liberalism. i
For if Teodoro Nguema has proved himself as a putschist, he must still ~
prove himself as a democrat. ~
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
AFRICA LOSES ONE MORE DICTATOR
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 15 Aug 79 pp 20, 21
/Article by Hamza Kaidi: "One Dictator Less"/
LExcerpts/ Will 1979 enter into history as a black year for tyrants?
In 6 months, five despots have fallen one after the other. After the
' bloody regimes of Pol Pot in Cambodia, M~ohamed Reza Pahlavi in Iran, Idi
Amin in Uganda and Somoza in Nicaragua, that of one of the planet's most
sinister scourges fell in its turn. On 5 July Equatorial Guinea radio
- announced in a brief communique that a military junta led by Col Teodoro
Nguema Mbazago, vice minister of defense, had overthrown the dictator on
the evening of 3 July.
_ Cousin and close collaborator of the fallen dictator, Colonel Nguema, who
frankly acknowledges Marxist-Leninist leanings, was a student at Spain's
Military Acadeny at Saragossa. He distinguished himself by his zeal in
suppressing an attempted coup d'etat in 1972. Nor did he hesitate to .
eliminate his 11 classmatee, ~ne by one, among whom figures another dignatory
of the regime, Jesus Esgoro, minister of justice from 1968 to 1973. In
1976 he denounced a budding conspiracy against 'Guinea's unique miracle,'
which won him promotion to the rank of vice minister of defense and the
governorship of the island of Fernando Po, renamed Macias Nguema Island.
This man who had served the dictator Macias Nguema so well, today presents
himself as a liberator. Calling himself Teodoro Nguema Mbazago, he leads _
a~unta whose members are also mostly Nguema, and is thus the second chief
of state of Equatorial Guinea.
Independent since 12 October 1968, after close to two centuries of Spanish
colonialism, Equatorial Guinea`is composed of two distinct territorial
_ regions: the Rio Muni, a 26,017 sq km rectangle squeezed between Gabon and
Cameronn, facing the Atlantic, and the island territories or" which Macias
Nguema holds the capital city Malabo (formerly Santa Isabel).
In 1973 the pop~lation of this state of 28,051 sq km was estimated at
300,000. Since then there has been a steady decline as thousands of Equatorial
= Guineans fled the country's Cerrorist regime. Nearly 70,000 found refuge in
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Gabon, 40,000 in Cameroon, 8,000 in Spain and 5,000 in Nigeria. Leading
his rival Bonifacio Qndo Edu by a short nose, Macias Nguema, elected chief
of state in 1968, did not delay in getting rid of his rivals physically.
His collaborators and partisans, anyone who might cross him, paid the price _
of a thrist for power.
Macias then turned against the leaders of other political gr~ups whom he
accused of conspiring against him. This was the beginning of a series of
assassinations. Tn 1970 he created a political party at first baptised
� PUN (Party of National Unity) and then PUNT (National Workers Party). He '
proscribed all other parties and concentrated all powers into his own hands,
proclaiming himself president for life, 'Guinea's unique miracle,' leader of
the nation and the party, grand master of education, science and culture,
commander in chief of the army, minister of defense, etc. -
- His relationships with other countries were more curious yet. He readily
practiced an official racket: after a Soviet airplane fell on Equatorial ,
Guinea territory, Moscow had to pay a fine of $75,000 for damage to the
mountain. Spain was only able to obtain the release of six priests through
a ransom of $100,000. Five passengers of a French helicopter which had
to make a forced landing were released only after payment of $25,000.
- In spite of all this, the Western nations observed total silence about the
misdeeds of the despot. All the news from Equatorial Guinea was censored
by the Madrid government up until the death of Franco.
The United States was the first to break with the government of Malabo, in
1976, followed by Spain in 1977. Only France continued good relations with
the Macias regime, imitated, it's true, by the OAU, who hardly dared bring
up the least misdeed of the despot. Although Moscow had severed diplomatic
relations with the dictator--who had adopted an additional title, 'grand
inquisitor of colonialism'--it continued tQ supply oil and military goods
to Equatorial Guinea. In exchange, Macias granted a base for its 'fishing
fleet' at San Carlos, 20 km from Malabo. As its part Cuba maintained a
sizeable technical mission which assured the continued functioning of the
airports at Bata and Malabo, the electrical power centers, and the two radio
stations of the country. Moreover, the army and Macias' guard were officered '
by Cuban instructors. During the war with Angola in 1975, the base at ~
San Carlos served as a staging area for military goods destined for the
MPLA. The Soviet cargo carriers left armaments there which were then picked
up by small Angolan boats.
But the relationship between the Kremlin and the master of Equatatorial
Guinea Guinea was never cordial. In spite of their insistence, the Soviets ,
were never able to get concessions for research and development of cobalt
and wolfram (tungsten). The contract for the base at San Carolos itself
had to be renewed every year.
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In the end, the Soviets got tired of their burdensome protege, especially
after finding the ear of his faithful lieutenant more receptive. But
what could the vice minister of defense do, governor of the territory
where the capital was situated though he was? The soldiers of Teodoro
Nguema were armed only with qome old Mausers dat:ing from World War II and
had little ammunition.
In February 1977 a Bulgarian ship, the M.S.Bulgam, unloaded a mysterious
cargo. A box accidentally opened revealed abou.t 20 grenade throwers. In
August 1977, an airplane from the Czechoslovakian air lines deposited at
Malabo airport a cargo including, among other things, about 20 Czech 7.62 mm
machine guns. In March 1978, 500 AK47 Kalashnikov combat guns were sent
by the Czechoslovakian firm Omnipol to a Polish port, from which they were _
loaded onto the M.S.Ustinov, destination Equatorial Guinea.
In January 1979 relations between the dictator, who was then taking long -
vacations on the continent, and his vice minister, suddenly deteriorated.
_ Only the lack of communications (there was only a small boat to serve as
liaison between the island and the continent)_prevented them from being
unraveled. Then, in August, the crisis came to a head. Col Nguema Mbazogo
put his wife on the first plane for Madrid, where she arrived on 2 August. _
The next day he took action. For the moment we do not know what means of
transportation had been used, and abave all, who had put them at the dis-
position of Colonel Nguema. The garrison at Bata, around 300 men, led by
- Cuban instructors, didn't move. B~st the putschists were disag�reeably
surprised to find the dictator absent. He was at Mongo, his birthplace,
about 5 km from the Gabon frontier.
A helicopter (the Cubans must have had a strong hand in all the aeronautical
material) was put at the disposal of the insurgents. The detachment for
Mango had no Lrouble in encircling Macias' bunker, protected by his personal
guard of 70 men led by 18 Cubans. He attempted to resist, refusing to
surrender. But on 6 August it was confirmed that all the armed forces had
join~~ the putschists. The Nguema 'miracle` faded away.
With Macias Nguema's disappearance from the scene, Africa sees itself rid
of two vampires in the space of 3 months. An old saying says there is ~
~ never two without a third. When will the third be? "
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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MADAGASCAR
BRI EF S
MILITARY AGRICULTURAL OPERATION--The OFFICIAI~ JOURNAI~ has published a
decree establishing the Military Agricultural Production Qperation, Omipra.
Omipra is a public body respcnsible for various crop developments and
100,000 new hectares of rice'-growing. The army is in charge of the
operation. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79
p 2655]
SOVIET EQUIPMENT SPECIALISTS--About 10 Soviet technicians who will work
on maintenance of tractors and other agricultur.al equipment from the USSR
are expected to arrive soon. Their arrival is covered by a contract
signed 6 September by the Malagasy rural development and agrarian reform
minister and Zapchasteexport/Tractorexport representative, Baziliev.
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAIIX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 28 Sep 79 p 2655]
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_ ftIiUll~S IA
LIFESTYLE OF j~iITES CHANGED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Sep 79 pp 38-39 ,
~ex] A disillusioned white said the other day at the Gol~
Club bar in Salisbury, "I really don't know what country I could
take refuge in." The fact is there reall,y are no more countries
where you can find blacks who earn a pittance by shining ,yokr
shoes. Here in Rhodesia itself a~ter these miserable elections,
you no longer can find even one who wants to push your Rolls,
which has run out of gas, to the nearest gas station and wait
. in line for you for a dollar, because o~ the fuel shortage
created by those dirty Arabs:
ho doubt, all the luxurious joys of living have not yet dis-
appeared in the 3 months since Mr Smith handed over the funda-
mental leadership oP the country to the blacks. However, one
had been warned ~or a long time that any concession to these
apes would cause a ridiculous drop in the standard of living.
One has certainly tried to find a middle ground, so that the
whiice minority could actually continue to control some puppet
black ministers, so that one could~ all the same~ have his
breakfast or his whisky served when he wanted it and one could
have his car washed for nothing.
IIut it is dreadful that Abel Muzorewa who was considered sub-
missive and reasonable, dared to establish a minimum hourly
wa~e for his black brothers. And nevertheless, the experts
(some whites, the only experts in the country, obviously) had
assured that the country's tottering economy, could not support
this measure.
Fortunately, in fact, one continues to enjoy agricultural workers,
maids and gardeners for next to nothing:
The fact is that, despite wretched wages~ there are a,lways
people looking for work. There are alwa,ys even two or three
bla.cks who scramble for every job o~fered. But precisely this
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failure of his employment policy has cost Mr Aiuzorewa the sup-
port of a large part of those who were responsible for his suc-
cess ~in the elections. So that a large number of those who
voted in April for the Methodists who graduated from American ;
universits.es are now ready to side with their enemies the guer- ,
rillas or at least agree with them in believing that the bishop',s
government has sold out to the whites. Which does not improve
things flor the latter.
'~It is not a question of driving the whites out of here, says
Stephen Nguru, a young black, 27 years old, who has a wife and
a child and who, having just lost his job in a factory, contents
himself for the moment with the meager wages of a caddie on a :
golf course. We do not want to carry out a revolution. We .
merely want mo~e jobs, more money to live better, what then:
- If not, we will get rid of the bishop."
Under a sweltering sun, Mr Nguru earned 650 CFA francs for an ~
18 hole game, from which he must deduct 125 francs f or r.is round -
trip in a bus frora his house to the golf course, located in a ;
Salisbury suburb. That is enough for him to support his family
- 2 or 3 days. But he recognizes he is lucky, f or there are some- _
times 30 caddies at the gol~ club waiting vainly to be hired.
Reverend Muzorewa �-~ured. the country, asking his black brothers '
to be patient. But his problem is that he must spend 1.5 million
dollars a day to conduct the campaign against the Patriotic I~ront
guerrillas a,nd that the West stubbornly persists in refusing to ,
lift the sanctions imposed on Smith's regime--and the latter are ~
very poorly supported by a black population which has been wait-
ing for more than 20 years to take over power. ~
It is enough to walk in a supermarket to realize the distance ;
which has to be covered for the living standards of the blacks ;
and whites to be approximately equal. On Saturday morning, one ;
sees white ~amilies pile up meat and fresh vegetables in the ;
wheeled baskets at prices which would be enou~h to tempt Euro-
pean and American housewives. At the checkout exits, young !
blacks almost fight each other to carry the groceries o~ these ~
ladies and gentlemen to the parking lot and stow them away in the
trunlc of a cadillac ~or paltry tips. ;
Domestic help, which the whites value the most~ earn 5,000 to !
15,000 CFA francs a month, ~ low enough wage to allow the most ~
poorly paid whi~es to have their boy or maid at home. Of~icial ~
statistics indicate that the whites employ about 150~000 blacks ~
as domestics. Now since less than 250,000 whites remain in
Rhodesia today, that means more than one domestic per home.
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Most of the latter worlc b days a week, getting up at dawn to
serve tea and only goin~ to bed late in the evening a~ter havin~
~ finished the dishes. In addition, the maids' rooms have no
light or heat most o~ the time.
The whites are sure of it: the blacks adore their white employers.
Why certainly: The pro~f of it is the condolences they publish
when one of them is executed by the guer.rillaa or in a criminal
attack. Nevertheless, the courts hear every day the complaints
of the blacks about ciiscriminatory treatment or racist remarks.
No doubt, such behavior still exists elsewhere. However, the
ap~eals of Rev~erend Muzorewa, asking the whites in Zimbabwe-
- Rhodesia to change their attitud~s, will be useless~ so long as
- political and economic power is not transferred into thQ hands
of the blacks. In spite of all the conferences and international
pressures and in spite of the guerrillas, Smith and his clique
have definitely decided to resist that, as l~ng as possible...
no doubt, until death. One could repeat a famous slogan of the
Algerian war: "the suitcase or the coffin." But ~ahere can they _
go? riy dear, even South Africa becomes unlivable for a lady ~.nd
a gentleman from Salisbury:
COPYI~IGTiT : Jeune ~ f rique GRU'?JIA 1979
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0
SD~L~I
WSLF LEADER DISCUSSES OGADEN LIBERATION STRUGGLE
Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 24 Sep 79 Morning Edition p 6 OW
[Report by Masataka Ito on interview with Abudulahi Hassan Mohamud,
secretary general of the West Somalia Liberation Front, in Ogaden; date
not given]
[Text] --Ogaden's area is 150,000 square km, and it has a population
of 2.5 million. Harar, Ethiopia, was the capital of the Somali people,
but it was occupied by the Ethiopians in the late 19th century. There
had been no clear boundary between Ethiopia and Somalia until after
World War II. Even now most Ethiopians in Ogaden are either government
officials, soldiers or merchants. Ogaden is a typical colony.
~
--When the Ethiopian Government began collecCing taxes in Ogaden in
1958, the Somali there for the first time realized that they were under
Ethiopian rule. So they immediately organized the West Somalia Libera-
tion Front [WSLF] and began to fight against *_he division dispatched by
Emperor Haile Selassie. The armed struggle was launched in 1963, much
earlier than the armed struggles in Rhodesia and Namibia.
- --I cannot tell the size of the guerrilla force. All I can say is that
there is not a single indigenous Ethiopian in Ogaden, and the whole
population can become a fighting force. At least 20 percent of the dis-
placed people have taken up arms as regulars or militiamen. Their
weapons are rifles, handgrenades and landmines.
--Approximately 20,000 Soviet and Cuban Croops are stationed in Ethiopia.
The main force of Cuban troops is in Ogaden. The enemies r~re holed up
in cities with their communication lines cut. Eighty percent of Ogaden
is in the hands of the WSLF.
--�We are receiving aid from Islamic countries, but I cannot identiry them.
Reporter's note: The WSLF has missions in Somalia, Syria, Iraq and
Algeria, and apparently these countries are providing aid to the WSLF.
CSO: 4120 END
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