JPRS ID: 8713 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS THE FINAL DEFEAT OF FASCIST GERMANY

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T1~ F I NAl 4E1~`EAT ~f FASC I ST GER1~Y

16 OCt~R i9T9 ~ F4t~0 3~J79 ) i OF' Z
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JPRS L/~8713 -
16 October 1979 ~
_ USSR Re ort _
p
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(~OUO 30/79)
The Final Defeat of Fas~ist Germany
,
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~7P RS L/ 8 713
16 October 1979
USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 30/79)
THE FINAL DEFEAT OF FASCIST GERMANY
~
Moscoca ISTORIYA VTOROY MIROVOY VOYNY 1,939-1945 (V DVENADTSATI TOMAKH)
[~Iistory of World War II 1939-1945 (In ~taelve Volumes)] in RussiFn 1979
signed to press 19 Oct 78 Vol l0 pp 2-9, 11, 51, 52, 85-88, 123-138,
160, 218-220, 232=234, 264-267, 278-281, 294, 308-310, 355, 356, 373-375,
~ 377, 395-397, 420, 421, 438-460, 475-506, 536, 538-543.
[F~ccerpts from Volume 10 (The Final Defeat of Fascist Germany) of work
edited by D. F. Ustinov, G. A, Arbatov, V. A. Vinogradov et al.,
Voyenizdat Publishers, 330,000 copies, 543 pages.] . ~
CONTENTS PAGE
Chief Editorial Commission 1
Editorial Collective 1
Author Collective 1
Original Table of Contents 2
Publication Information 5
List of Maps 7
Introduction 8
1. The Military-Political Situation.in Europe and the Plans of
the Warring Sides 13
2. The Liberation of Poland 14
3. Defeat of Hitler's Troops in Eastern Prussia 18
4. The Crimean Conference 22
S. Advance of the Soviet Army in Eastern Pomerania and_Silesia... 36
~
- a - [III - USSR - 4 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Continued) PBge ~
6. Li:beration of Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and
Yugoslavia 37
7. The Soviet Navy's Combat Activities 39
8. Advance of Soviet Troops in Western Germany and Northern
~ Ita1y 40
9. Military Actions in Che Atlantic and on the Mediterranean
Sea 42
].0. Th~ Resistance Movement of the Peoples of Europe. Further
Revolutionar~ Transformations 43
11. 'I'he Taking of Berlin. The Final Liberation of
Czechoslovakia 48
12. Unconditional Surrender of Fascist Germany 49 ~
13. Organizational and Ideological Work by the Communist Party.. 51
14. Conzinued Growth of the Soviet Union's National Economy.
Transitian to Peaceful Construction 53
15. The War Economies of the Principal Capitalist Countries..... 54
16. The Art of War of the Armed Forces of the Warring Countries. 55 .
17. International Relations. The USSR's Struggle for a
Democratic Yeace 80 ~
Conclusion 111
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~ Chief Editorial Commission: D. F. listinov, G. A. Arbatov, V. A. Vinogradov, `
~ S. G. Gorshkov, A. A. Gromyko, A. G. Yegorov, A. A. Yepishev,
A. S. Zheltov, P. A. Zhilin, Ye. M. Zhukov, S. P. Ivanov,
N. N. Inozemtsev, V. M. Kozhevnikov, V. G. KuYikov, S. K. Kurkotkin�,
Ye. Ye. Mal'tsev, D. F. Markov, A. L. Narochnitskiy, N. V. Ogarkov,
P. N. Pospelov, I. Radziyevskiy, S. I. Rudenko, A. M. Rumyantsev,
M. I. Sladkovskiy, T. T. Timofeyev, P. N. Fedoseyev, and
S. K. Tsvilun
~ Editurial Collective: N. I. Shekhovtsov (Editor in ~hief), Yu. G.
Perechnev, F. V. Danilov (Assistant Editors ~,n Chief), V. L.
Israelyan, I. Ye. Krupchenko, M. M. Mal~akhov, A. I. Pushkash
Author Collective: N. I. Shekhovtsov (Chairman), Yu. G. Perechnev
(Assistant Chairman), N. F. Azyasskiy, A. V. Basov, A. M. Volkov,
N~ A. Volkov, I. I. Gaglov, F. V. Danilov, I. Ye. Zaytsev, G. F.
' Zastavenko, N. I. Kostyun~n, G. S. Kravchenko, I. Ye. Krupchenko,
M. M. Malakhov, T. K. Nikonova, P. A. Nikolayev, A. I. Pushkash,
A. I. Radziyevskiy, R. A. Rudenko, V. B. Seoyev, V. Ya. Sipols,
S. A. Sukhachev, V. K. Trusov, and N. N. Yakovlev
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ORIGINAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ~
. �
Introduction . . . . . . � � � � � � � � � � ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ~ ~ 5
Part One
The Final Victories in Europe '
Chapter One ~
The Military-Political Situation in Europe
and the Plans of the Warring Sides
1. The Inter:zational and Doanestic Position of the Principal Countries 11 ~
Participati.ng in the War . � � � � � � � � � � � ' ' ' ' 28
2. The Status of the Armed Forces of�the Warring Countries ,
3. The Strategic Situation in Europe and the Intentions of the 37
Sides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~
~
Chapter Two '
The Liberation of Poland ~
52 ;
1. The Domestic Political Situation in Poland . . . . . . . . . . . f
2. The Situation in the Central Sector of the Soviet-German 58 I
Front. The Plans of the Sides . � � � � � � � � � � � ' ' ' ~
3. The Advance of Soviet Troops From�the Vistula to the Oder 70 ~
i
Chapter Three I
~
Defeat of Hitler's mroops in Eastern Prussia ~
~
i
1. The Situation of the Eastern Prussian Axis at the Beginning ~
of 1945. The Plans of the Sides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 !
2. Penetration of the Defenses and Division of the Enemy's j
Eastern Prussian Grouping � � � � � � � � � � � ' ' ' ' ' ' 99 ~
3. Defeat of Fascist German Troops Southwest of Konigsberg 111 i
4. The Assault on Konigsberg. Liquidation of the Enemy ~
116 ~
Grouping on Zemlandskiy Penninsula . . . o . � � � � � � � � � � ~
_ Chapter Four '
The Crimean Conference
1. Prelude to the Crimean Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12~
2. Coordination of Plans for the Final Defeat of German ar~d . 131
Japanese Aggressors � � � � � � � � � � ' ' ' '
3. Definition of the General.Principles of Establishment.of the 134
Postwar Peace . . � � �
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Chapter Five
Advance of the Scviet Army
_ in Eastern Pome~-ania and Silesia
1. Liq~sidation of the Enemy's Eastern Pomeranian Grouping 139
2. Liberation of the Silesian Industrial Region . . . . . . . . . . 149
Chapter Six
Liberation of Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia `
1. The Situation on the Southern Wing of the Soviet-German
Front . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
2. Defeat of the Enemy Grouping Surrounded in Budapest and
Liberation of Hungary's Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
3. Break-up of the Enemy's Counteroffensive in the Vicinity of
Lake Balaton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
4. Liberation of Western Hungary and Austria's Eastern Regions 186
5. Advance of the Soviet Troops in Czechoslovakia 199
6. The Final Liberation of Yugoslavia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Chapter Seven
The Soviet Navy's Combat Activities
1. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the Concluding Stage of the
War in Eurore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
2. The Northerr, Fleet's Defense of Marine Lines of Communication . 229
Chapter Eight
Advance of Soviet Troops in Western
Germany and Northern Italy
1. On the Western and Italian Fronts in January 1945 234
2. Soviet Troops Reach the River Rhine . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
3. Encirclement of Fascist German Troops in the Ruhr Valley 249
4. Disintegration of the Fascist German Army's Western Front 257
5. Conclusion of Military ~ctions in Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
Chapter Nine
Military Actions in the Atlantic and
on the Mediterranean Sea
- 1. The Struggle of the English and American Navies Aqainst v
Fascist German Submarines � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 26~
2. Support Given by English Naval Forces to Military Shipments
to Ports in France, Belgium, and Holland . . . . . . . . . . . 273
3. Use of English and American Naval Forces on the Mediterranean
Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
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Chapter Ten
The Resistance Movement of the Peoples of Europe.
Further Revolutionary Transformations ~
1. The Resistance Movement in Uccupied Territories of European
Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
2. Further Revolutionary Transformations in Countries of
Central and Southeast Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
Chapter ~,leven
The Taking of Berlin. The Final Liberation
of Czechoslovakia
1. The Military-Political Situation in Europe as of Mxd-April 1945 310
2. Preparations for the Berlin Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
3. Defeat of the Berlin Grouping of Fascist German Troops. The
Taking of Berlin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
4. The Prague Operation. The Final Liberation of Czechoslovakia . 347
Chapter Twelve
Unconditional 5urrender of Fascist Germany
1. Failure of Plans for Separate Surrender . . . . . . . . . . . . 356 ~
2. The Signing of the Document of Unconditional Surrender 364 -
3. Steps Taken by the Allied Powers to Satisfy the Conditions
of Fascist Germany's Unconditinnal 5urrer,3er . . . . . . . . . . 368
Part Two .
~ Politics, Economics, and Art of War
Chapter Thirteen -
Organizational and Ideological Work
by the Communist Party ~
1. The Growing Role of Political Leadership in the Soviet Armed
Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
2. The Basic Directions of the Party's Organizational Activities . 382 ~
3. Ideological Work in New Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
Chapter Fourteen
Continued Growth of the Soviet Union's National
Economy. Transiti~n to.Peaceful Construction
1. Deyelopment of the National Economy's Principal Sectors 397
2. War Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
3. Restoration of the National Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
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i~ Chapter Fifteen
The War Economies of the Principal Capitalist Countries
1. The Economies of the USA and England . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421 ,
2. Economic Failure of Fascist Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432 ~
Chapter 5ixteen
Art of War of the Armed Forces of the Warring Countries
1. Typical Traits of the Art of War of the Soviet Armed Forces 439
2. The Art of War of Armed Forces of the U5A and Great Britain 450
3. Unique Features of Fascist German Art of War 455
Chapter Seventeen
International Relations. The USSR's Struggle
For a Democratic Peace
1. Relations Among the Allies in the Concluding Stage of the
War in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
2. Thp Conference in San Francisco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
3. Reinforcement and Expansion of the USSR's Relations With
Countries of Central and Southeastern Europe 471
4. The Potsdam Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475
5. The Nuremberg Trials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500
Appendices
Chronology of Main Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509
Name Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 515
Geographic Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525
List of Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 536
Abbreviations of Archives in the Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . 537
PUBLICATION INFORMATION
[pp 542-543] This volume is based on documents of the USSR Central
State Archives of The October Revolution, High State Government Bodies, and
State Administrative Bodies, the USSR Central State Archives of the National
Economy, the USSR Foreign Policy Archives, the Archives of the USSR Ministry
of Defense, the Central Naval Archives, the Central Naval Archives
Department, the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Railways, the
Archives of the Main Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet, the Military Archives
of the German Democratic Republic, the Archives of the Hungarian Peoples
Army, the State Archives of Great Britain, the National Archives of the
United States, the State Archives of the Federated Republic of Germany, and
on documents and materials of the USSR Ministry of Defense Institute of
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Military History, the Division of CPSU History of the CPSU Central Committee
Institute of Marxism-Leninism, and of other institutions and archives.
Illustrative materials were selected �rom the USSR Central State Archives ~
of Motion Picture and Phot~graphic Records, the USSR Foreign Policy Archives,
the State Historical Museum, the State Museum of the USSR Revolution, the
Central Mus~um of the USSR Armed Forces, the Central Naval Museum, the
TASS Pictorial Review, the USSR Novosti Press Agency, the ~Lithuanian SSR
Art Museum, the photograph lihraries of the USSR Ministry of Defense Military '
Publishing House and the Izobrazitel'noye Iskusstvo and Sovetskiy ~
Khudozhnik, publishing houses, the GDR bIilitary Archives, the Czechoslovakian
Institute of Military History, the Hunga.rian Ministry of Defense Military j
Publishing House, the Military Museum of the Yugoslavian Peoples Army, the
personal archives of Marshal of the Soviet Union K. S. Moskalenko, Army .
General A. P. Beloborodov, and news photographers M. V. A1'pert and Ye. A. ,
Khaldey, and from foreign publications. i
y T. K. Nikonova selected the photographic illustrations. '
The author's ma~s were laid out by N. F. Azyasskiy, A. V. Basov, and M. M.
Malakhov and drawn up by colleagues of the Division of Cartography and
Photographic Records of the USSR Ministry of Defense Institute of Milita.ry
History--N. S. Glazunov (Chairman), T. A. Borisova, V. A. Kazantsev, P. I.
Smirnov, O. A. Smirnova, L. P. Suvorova. :
i
}
The maps were prepared for printing and printed by the military topographic
service of the Soviet Army. !
sed as the basis of some I
Materials written by the following authors were u
of the sections: A. A. Babakov, G. N. Goroshkova (deceased), V. V. Zelenin, (
. S. K. Ivanov, L. L. Kruglov, G. A. Kumanev, Ye. S. Kurbatova, N. I. Makarov,
V. S. Parsadanova, S. A. Tyushkevich, I. K. Yakovlev, A. S. Yakushevskiy. !
Certain chapters and sections were reviewed by M. I. Kozhevnikov, V. V.
Korovin, A. S. Nikolayev, M. V. Novikov, I. S. Palashevskiy, an~ :C. N. Chaban. 'I
Consultants for the volume included I. Kh. Bagramyan, P. F. Batitskiy, P. I.
Batov, I. M. Galushko, N. M. Gribachev, I. I. Gusakovskiy, P. I. Yefi.mov, ;
~
I. G. Zav'yalov, P. I. Ivashutin, M. I. Kazakov, V. N. Karpunin, P. S.
Kutakhov, V. S. Makhalov, K. S.Moskalenko, I. G. Pavlovskiy, P. A. Rotmistrov, ;
F. A. Samsonov, N. D. Sergeyev. Ye. I. Smirnov, L. N. Smirnov, B. S. '
Tel'pukhovskiy, S. L. Tikhvinskiy, V. F. Tolubko, V. I. Chuykov,and N. A.
Shchelokov. ~
N. K. Glazunov is the editor in chief of "History of World War II 1939-1945." ~
P. N. Sharpilo is the senior editor of Voyenizdat's editorial board of ;
military historic literature. The proofreading board includes G. M. ,
Moshkin, N. I. Murzayev, A. M. Noskov, B. I. Pavlov, and O. F. 5uvenirov. ~
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- N. N. Vinogradov is the literary editor. T. K. Nikonova compiled the
Chronology of Main Events and the indexes.
The author collective was assisted in its organizational and proofreading
efforts by V. T. Yeliseyev, T. A. Zaytseva, V. D. Kozinets, A. M. Konev,
_ V. G. Konovalov, V. N. Levchenko, M. A. Pushkaruk, R. B. Samofal, Ye. M.
Fedotov, and G. A. Khvilevitskaya.
P. A. Akat'yev, T. N. Gorbunova, M. G. Grishin, N* M. Zhabinskaya, and
S. S. Yudin assisted in preparation of the volume.
The editorial board and the author collective express their deep gratefulness
to all institutions and persons who had assisted in preparation of this
volume.
LIST OF MAPS
[p 536] 1. The Stategic situation in Europe as of the beginning of 1945.
2. The ganeral course of militazy actions in Europe. January-May 1945.
3. Combat activities on the Budapest axis. January-March 1945.
4. The Vistula-Oder operation. 12 January-3 February 1945.
5. Defeat of the eastern Qrussian grouping. 13 January-25 April 1945.
6. Advance of the Soviet t�,roops in eastern Pomerania and Silesia. 8
February-4 April 1945.
7. Liberation of western~Hungary and eastern Austria. 16 March-l5 April 1945.
,
8. The Moravian-Ostrava offensive operation. 10 March-5 rTay 1945.
9. Liberation of Czechoslovakia. ,7anuary-May 1945. ,
1
~ 10. Combat activities of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. January-May 1945.
11. Combat activit~.es of the Northern Fleet. January-May 1945.
12. The final liberation of Xugoslavia. 20 March-15 May 1945.
13. Allied troops reach the Rheine and ~ross it. ~
14. Advance of Soviet troops in Western Europe. January-May 1945.
15. Conclusion of military activities in Italy. 9 April-6 May 1945.
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16. The Berlin operation. 16 April-8 May 1945.
17. The USSR war economy in 1945.
18. Map symbols.
Note: State borders on maps Contained in "History of
Wor1d War II 1939-1945" are those in existence at the
time of the events under discussion.
INTRODUCTION
LPP 5-8]
[Excerpts] The year 1944 drew to a close. It entered the history of World
War II as one of decisive victories for the Soviet Armed Forces. The great
successes enjoyed by the Soviet Union in its m~litary efforts and production
were the admiration of the entire world. The Wehrmacht suffered a number
of shattering defeats on the Soviet-German front. In the second half of 1944
the Soviet Army clearecl the invaders out of its country and continued its
liberation of countries in Central and Southeast Europe. The success of
the USSR's offensive operations and the significant growth of its military
power tilted the balance of forces more in favor of the anti-Hitler
coalition. Soviet art of war climbed to a new, higher level.
In i944 the Allied armies undertook military actions of greater vigor. A
second front was opened in Europe in June. Germany found itself pressed in
a vice--by the Soviet Armed Forces from the east and by American, British,
and French troops from the west. The fascist bloc disintegrated in
response to their combined blows. World War II was nearing its end. The
peoples of the world came to see that the final defeat of fascist Germany
was ~:uiavoidable.
Volum~ 10 is devoted to the concluding stage of World War II in E~Zrope
(January-May 1945). In terms of the number of military-political events
occurring, the intensity of the struggle, and the results, this stage had
tremendous significance not only to the victorious conclusion of the
, war in Europe but also to its outcome as a whole as well as to the postwar
peace. The principal result of events with which this volume deals was the
total defeat of the Wehrmacht and the victory over fascist Germany. Despite
the objective conditions the road to final victory was not easy: The
strength of the Fascist German Army was still impressive. Th~,~;-constantly
shrinking Soviet-German front permitted the German Command to concentrate
large troop groupings on the most important axes, and through fear,
repression, and chauvinistic propaganda it forced them to resist with the
' desperation of;;the doomed. :Kaintaining a stubborn defense in the east and
carrying on secret negotiations with Anglo-American representatives, Germany's
fascist leadership tried to make a sepa~ate deal and achieve, in the end,
a war outcome acceptable to itself.
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As before, in the final stage of the war in Europe the Soviet-German front
continued to be the decisive front of World War II. Beginning in January
1945 it was here, from the Baltic Sea to the Drawa, that the Vistula-Oder,
eastern Prussian, Vienna, Berlin, Prague, and other major offensive operations
were conducted. The Soviet Armed Forces had to surmount the enemy's
strong, cieeply disposed defenses in Poland and eastern Prussia, and to
operate in the forested mountains of Czechoslo~~akia and western Hungary and
Austria. In its savage engagements the Sovi~t Army forced large water
obstacles and maintained its offensive in complex weather co:~ditions. As a
~ result the enemy's main strategic g�roupings were crushed dnd the conditions
were created far a finul blow at fascist Germany. The Soviet Armed Forces'
Berlin and Prague operations meant a victorious end to military actions in
Europe. On 2 May Soviet troops captured Berlin by storm. Having survived
the deprivations an3 i:rials of 4 years of war, Soviet soldiers unfurled the
Great Victnry Banner above the Reichstag. The outcome of the 1945 operations
demonstrated the power of the Soviet Armed Forces and growth in the
sophistication of their art of war.
The defeat of fascist Germany was completed through the combined efforts of
armies belonging to c~untries in the anti-Hitler coalition, in which the
USSR Armed Forces played the decisive role. The war in Europe ended where
it started. The unconditional surrender document put an end to the
aggressor's criminal policy and war strategy. Fascism in Germany ceased to
exist as a state political system and a military power.
Simultaneous blows by armies of the anti-Hitler coalition at fascist Germany
were a typical feature of military activities in 1945. They were made in
accordance with decisions adopted by the heads of state of the USSR, the
USA, and Great Britain. In them, the times and directions of the blows
were specified, interaction among air forces was coordinated upon, and the
line at which Soviet and Anglo-American troops were to meet each other were
spelled out.
Events on the Soviet-German front facilitated the actions of the Western
Allies. Capitalizing on the successfulness of the January offensive by the
Soviet Armed Forces and on fascist Germany's necessary reaction to it of
transferring formations to the east, Anglo-American troops regained lost
ground in the Ardennes, broke through to the river Rhine and, on crossing it,
annihilated a large enemy grouping in the Ruhr industrial region. Because
reserves were lacking and the Wehrmacht command was afraid to remove even
a few divisions from the 5oviet Army's axes of attack, the German strategic
front on the west disintegrated in..the face of strikes by superior Allied
~ forces, and the Anglo-American armies rushed toward the Elba, encountering
" hardly any resistance.
This volume demonstrates that the final victory was aided to a great extent
by the national liberation struggle of peoples of Europe enslaved by
- German fascism, and by the actions of foreign formations, created with the
help of the Soviet Union, and of the armies of countries which turned their
weapons against the invaders and took an active part in the concluding
enqagements. 9
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As in the entire course of the war, the outstanding victories the Soviet ;
Arme3 Forces enjoyed in the operations of 1945 were achieved owing to the
organizationa]. activities of the Leninist Communist Party. Special chapters
� in this volume devoted i:o the organizational and i.deological work of the
CPSU and to grnwth of the country's economy reveal the multi~aceted activities
of the party airned at m~~bilizing all materia?_ and spiritual forces of the ;
Soviet people at clefeating the enemy. Considering the unique features of _
conducting military activities outside the USS~t, the party took steps to
heigh�ten the alertness of the troops anc3 elevate their philosophical ~
awareness, and iL- inspired the soldiers to fulfill thier mission of inter- ~
national liberat:ic~n. Active work was done to indoctrinate all the people in
the spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism. The party
Central Committee d.irected the activities of inilitary councils and political ~
agencies of the a~:my and navy at organizing party-political work in accor-
dance with the new situations and the missions at hand. '
i
The military successes concerned witti the Wermacht's defeat had a yood '
~ logistical foundation. As before, the Communist Party devoted its main '
attention to mobilizing the country's entire potential for the needs of the ;
war. At the same time the growth rate of the principal sectors of the '
economy increased, arid ttie natior,al economies o� liberated regions were ~
rehabilitated. The war economy attained tremendous successes. O~aing to the
selfless labor and truly heroic efforts of laborers, kolkhoz farmers, and ~
the intelligentsia, by the beginning of 1945 production of the principal i
types of military equipment and armament attained its highest level in the ~
entire war. The Soviet Armed Forces possessed significantly more combat !
equipment and weapons of be~tter quality than the enemy. This was one of -
the most important factors making it possible to cond~~ct major offensive
operations si.multaneously along the entire Soviet-German front without
significant pauses. The victory of the USSR economy over the economy of
fascist Germany is persuasive evidence of the advantages of socialist
production over capitalist production. The unity of the front and the rear
and of the army and the people, which is in keeping with the very nature
of socialism, was a guarantee of success in the struggle against the
aggressor. At the same time, foreseeing a swift victory, while the war
was still going on the party took. steps to restructure the national economy
for peacetime needs. ~
This volume extensively examines the foreign political activities of the
warring countires. The victories of the Soviet Armed Forces had a certain
influence on the situation in the world, tilting the balance in favor of the
anti-Hitler coalition, and they raised the authority of the Soviet Union
even higher. Conferences attend.ed by government leaders of the USSR, USA,
and Great Britain in the Crimea and in Potsdam in 1945, during which plans
for coordinating war operations and for resolving the problems of postwar
peace were adopted, had special significance in 1945. The entire course of the
war, the results of these conferences, and defeat of the fascist bloc in
Europe were a practical demonstration of the fact that countries with
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different social structures could cooperate in a struggle against aggression.
The Soviet government's principled and consistent policy of uniting all
progressive forces, and the decisive role played by the USSR, its army,
and its navy in the struggle against fascist Germany hElped to maintain
the unity of the anti-Hitler coalition and to conduct the war in Europe to
a complete victory. The hope for disintegration of this alliance l:arbored
by Germany's leaders suffered failure. At the same time, as the end ~f
the war came nearer differences in the courses taken by the leadirig powers
of the anti-Hitler coalition in relation to countries being liberated from
the invaders became more and more distinct. However, the brilliant
victories of the Soviet Armed Forces and the USSR's world authoritY were so
great that the governmerits of the USA and Great Britain could not resolve
_ international problems without the Soviet Union's participation.
~ In the savage struggle, the Soviet Army not only defended the achievements
of Great October but also liberated a number of countries in Europe from
the invaders. "Under the guidance of the Communist Party, the Soviet
people and their valorous armed forc es inflicted a shattering defeat upon
Hitler's Germany and its satellites, defended the liberty and independence
of the socialist fatherland, completed their great mission of liberation,
and fulfilled their international duty honorably."*
The USSR's all-out assistance to countries fighting for liberation from the
fascist yoke was a manifestation of the Soviet government's Leninist
foreign policy. Favorable conditions were created outside these countries
to permit their laborers to fight for revolutionary transformations.
Liberation of countries in Central and Southeast Europe facilitated the
actions of internal revolutionary forces, which led finally to confirmation
of a new social structure. In the class struggle, the working class, united
with working strata of the peasantry under the guidance of communist and
workers parties, was a true expression of the national interests of the
given country and the people.
After the war in Europe ended, fascist military criminalshad to be puni~hed
severely. A special part of this volume is devoted to the international
trials of Hitler's ringleaders who had unleashed the Second World War~ The -
Nuremberg trials entered history not only as an act of condemnation of. fascism,
aggression, and compulsion in international relations but also as a warning ~
against repetition of similar malicious acts.
The military-political events in Europe in the concluding stage of World War
II attract the attention of researchers in many countries. This is natural,
since the most important problems of postwar reconstruction of Europe, the
nature of development of international relations, and change in the balance
of world power in favor of socialism are closely associated with these events.
*"Tridtsatiletiye Pobedy sovetskogo naroda v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne.
- Dokumenty i materialy" (The 30th.Anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory in
the Great Patriotic War. Documents and Materials), Moscow, 1975, p 3. ~
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Works by reactionary bourgeois historians contain unconcealed or masked
�alsifications of the events of 1945. Western falsifiers try to distort
the nature of the decisions of the Crimean and Potsdam conferences, to
belittle the significance of operations conducted by the USSR Armed
Forces in the concluding stage of the war in Europe, to prove that their
successes depended on development of military activities on the Western
Front,and to fir.d fault with the Soviet Army's mission of liberation. The
volume demonstrates the groundlessness of such assertions. -
The defeat of Hitler's Germany put an end to the war in Europe. Peace ruled
once again after almost 6 years of armed conflict on the European continent.
Now countries of the anti-Hitler coalition had the possibility for concen-
trating all of their efforts aqainst the aggressor in the Far East--militarist
Japan. Thus conclusion of military actions in Europe predetermined the
outcome of World War II as a whole. ,
~
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PART 1
THE FINAL VICTOFRLES IN EUROPE
CHAPTER ONE
THE MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION IN EUROPE '
AND THE PLANS OF THE WARRING SIDES
[p 51] Thus as of the beginning of 1945 the military-political situation
in Europe was generally favorable to countries of the antifascist coalition
and, on the other hand, extremely disadvantageous to Hitler's Germany. The
USSR possessed powerful armed forces which firmly held the strategic ~
_ initiative on all fronts. The USn and Great Britain possessed significant ,
forces:
The defeat of fascist Germany was coming closer. It was the objective of
the plans of countries in the anti-Hitler coalition. Decisive actions by
the Soviet Armed Forces were to have the main influence.
~
Continuing to control the territory of Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Austria,
large parts of Poland and Czechoslovakia, and parts of Hungary, Xugoslavia,
_ and Italy, and still possessing a significant army that was still battle-
worthy, the Nazi leadership int.ended to offer stubborn resistance on all
fronts with the objective of protracting the war until such time that the
situation would change in favor of Germany. The fascist leadership continued
to view the Soviet-German front as the main and most decisive front, and it
was to it that all of its attnetion was welded. It understoad quite~well
that the fate of the Third Reich and subsequent development of events on the
Western and Italian fronts would be decided precisely here in the final
engagements.
i All of this required new efforts on the part of the Communist Party, the
Soviet people, and the armed forces, and an intense struggle to attain final
victory over fascist Germany and to establish peace in Europe.
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CHAP'I'ER TWO I
THE LIBERATION OF POLAND ~
(
[pp 85-87] The Vistula-Oder operation, one of the greatest operations of
World War IT, came to its conclusion when Soviet troops reached the Oder ~
and seized bridgeheads on its left bank. Its results had great political and ;
military significance. With the participation of the Polish lst Army and ~
partisans, Soviet troops liberatad a significant par.t of Poland and crossed i
into German territory.
i
The Fascist German Command tried to halt the advance of the Soviet Army. It
was with this objective that the Nazi co~nmand rejected al1 subsequent
plans for offensive actions against Anglo-American troops on the Westezn
Front and transferred 29 divisions and four brigades into the zones of i
advance of the lst Belorussian and lst Ukrainian fronts from other sectors of ~
the Soviet-German front, from Gezmany's internal regions, and fran the
Western Front.l How~ver, this did not rescue the enemy from a shattering
defeat. Thirty-five enemy divisions were annihilated, and 25 lost from 50 (
to 70 percent of their manning.2 As many as 147,400 fascist enlisted men
and officers were taken prisoner, and about 14,000 guns and mortars, up to ~
1,400 tanks and assault guns, and much other armament and military property I
- were captured.3 The loss of tremendous amounts of territory, of major I
industrial regions, and of a great quantity of troops and armaments severly
weakened Nazi Germany and brought it closer to its final defeat. The i
successful actions of the Soviet troops set the stage for subsequent blows !
aqainst the enemy in Pomerania, Silesiat and then on the Berlin axis. i
The grandiose offensive between the Vistula and the Oder elicited the I
admiration of laborers in many countries. It also received considerable
praise from some bourgeois officials and the press. The prime minister of '
Great Britain wrote the following in a message to I. V. Stalin on 27 January E
1945: "We are delighted with your glorious victories over the coimnon enemy, I
and with the powerful forces with which you opposed hi.m. Please accept ~
our warmest thanks and congratulations on the event of these historic deeds.i4
The American newspaper THE LOS ANGELES TII~S noted: "...the advance in j
southern Poland offers the greatest hope of a swift end to the war."5 THE `I
LO~IDON TIMES wrote: "Movement of such a powerful army over frozen ground on !
~
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a front of hundreds o� miles distinguisties it especially franformer battles,
and it represents a masterful achieve~nent in the art of war."6 Although
its greatest wish is to bury the significance of the Vistula-Oder operation
in silence, bourgeois historiography has not been able to do so in the postwar
years. Thus H. Guderian, �ormer chief of general staff of the Fascist German
Army's ground troops, recollected: "The terrible month of January confirmed
all of our apprehensions concerning a major offensive by the Russians....
In the first days of February our position became critical on both the
Eastern and Western fronts."7
The defeat of fascist German troops in the Vistula-Oder operation was an
indication of the power of the socialist state. The successful combat .
activities of the troops were dependably supported in logistical respects.
Laborers in the Soviet rear supplied enough armament and equipment to the front
to pernit successful execution of the sizable missions.
In the course of the Vistula-Oder operation the Soviet Command demonstrated
a higher level in its art of war. The strategy selected by the Hq SHC
[Supreme High Cnmmand Headquarters] for defeating the enemy--using powerful,
deep, divisive strikes--fit perfectly with the present situation. This
strategy foiled the German Command's plans for successive defense at lines
prepared between the Vistula and the Oder and for wearing down the Soviet
troops. The Vistula-Oder operation is a brilliant example of preparation
for and conduct of a major strategic operation. Its results demonstrated
that decisive objectives may be reached not only by encirclement but also
by deep and powerful frontal strikes. One of the most important prerequisites
for penetrating a hostile defense and for exploiting a breakthrough in
depth was correct organization of command and control and maintenance of
continuous interaction among all arms and services. The Vistula-Oder
operation attained tremendous scope: It embraced a zone of more than 500 ]an;
it took the Soviet troops only 23 days to penetrate up to 500 km at an
average pace of almost 25 km per day. Even in these conditions control of
the troops remained firm until the end of the operation.
The decisive prerequisite insuring success of the operation was swift
penetration of the tactical defenses and defeat of the first echelon and
the enemy's immediate operational reserves. Despite their greater depth,
the tactical defenses were broken by the middle of the second day and, from
the Pulawi bridgehead, on the first day of the operation. Swift penetration
was insured by correct selection of the axis of the main strike, and by
creation of powerful groupings. Decisive massing of inen and equipment in
the breakthrough sectors made it possible to achieve an overwhelming
superiority over the enemy. Tactical defenses were broken mainly by
combined-arms armies. Separate tank corps and, within the zone of the
lst Ukrainian Front, tank armies participated in the final stages of the
breakthrough.
Tank armies and corps advancing with the support of the main forces of the
air armies played the main role in pursuit. Bypassing enemy centers of
resistance, the tank fonnations surmounted intermediate lines of defense
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and water obstacles on the move. Operating apart from combined-arms for-
mations, the tank armies insured swift advance by the rest of the forces
of the fron~s. Swift pursuit deprived the enemy of a possibility for
_ organizing defense in depth. His reserves did not have a significant
influence on the operation prior to the time that the Soviet troops reached
the Oder.
Aviation played a major role in the operation. In the periad from 12 January
to 3 February the 16th and 2d air armies flew 25,400 sortiea and fought in
214 air battles, in which the enemy lost 209 airplanes.8 In unfavorable ~
~ weather, Soviet airmen demonstrated greater combat proficiency, the
undebatable superiority of their aviation equipment, and its competent use.
The victory in the Vistula-Oder operation was attained owing to competent
leadership of the troops, mass heroism, and active and continuous party-
political work. Thousands of enlisted men and officers were awarded orders
and medals for their heroism, their great military proficiency, and for
successful completion of their missions; many were awarded the Hero of the
Soviet Union title, and army commanders generals S. I. Bogdanov, P. S.
Rybalko, and V. I. Chikov, corps commander General V. A. Glazunov, and
officers A. Ye. Borovykh, N. I. Goryushkin, I. I. Gusakovskiy, S. V.
- Khokhryakov, A. P. Shilin, and P. I. Shurukhin were awarded this title a
second time. For exemplary fulfillment of their combat assignments in the
advance from the Vistula to the Oder, 1,192 formations and units of the
lst Belorussian and lst Ukrainian fronts were awarded orders. Many ~
regiments, brigades, divisions, and corps were given honorary titles in ~
honor of the cities in the capture of which they had distinguished them- :
selves. Moscow gave a 25-gun salute to the troops i.n honor of the
victories in the Vistula-Oder operation. ,
Footnotes
1"Sbornik materialov po sostavu, gruppirovke i peregruppirovke sukhoputnykh
voysk fashistskoy Germanii" (Collection of Materials on the Composition,
Grouping and Regrouping of Fascist Germany's Ground Troops), Issue 5,
pp 16-20, 36-42.
2"Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945. Kratkaya ;
istoriya" (The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. A Short
History), Moscow, 1970, p 466. :
3 Arkhiv MO [USSR Ministry of Defense Archives], f. 233, op. 2356, d. 572, '
11. 252-253; f. 236, op. 2673, d. 2747, 1. 15. i
4"Perepiska Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov 5SSR" (Correspondence of the '
Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers), Vol 1, p 358. '
5 Cited in PRAVDA, 23 January 1945.
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6 Cited in PRAVDA, 27 January 1945.
~ Guderian, H., "Erinnerungen eines Soldaten," p 392.
8 Calculated from data in: Arkhiv M0, f. 368, op. 6476, d. 494-495, 11.
13-66; d. 496, 11. 4-12; f. 302, op. 4196, d. 132, 11.14-60.
~
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CHAPTER THREE
DEFEAT OF HITLER'S TR(JOPS IN EASTERN PRUSSIA
[pp 123-126] The victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in eastern Prussia and _
nAthern Poland had great military-political significance. It led to the
defeat of a major strategic grouping of fascist German troops. In all during
the combat activities, the Soviet Army completely destroyed more than
25 enemy divisions, while 12 divisions suffered from 50 to 75 percent losses. ~
Annihilation of the eastern Prussian grouping significantly weakened the
Wehrmacht's forces. The German Navy was deprived of a number of impbrtant
naval bases, maritime ports, and harbors.
Fulfilling its noble mission, the Soviet Army liberated the northern regions
of Poland that had been seized by the fascist invaders. A historic decision
to liquidate the eastern Prussian cradle of German militarism was reached
at the Potsdam conference of the heads of three Allied powers--the U5SR,
the USA, and Great Britain, held in July-August 1945. Konigsberg and
its contiguous regions were ceded to the Soviet Union. The RSFSR's
~ Kaliningradskaya Oblast was formed out of this territory in 1946. The
remaining territory of eastern Prussia was placed within the composition of
the Polish Peoples Republic.
The eastern Prussian operation was coordinated in the overall in~kent of the
Iiq SHC with operations on other strategic axes. Separation and subseque:~t
annihilation of German armies in eastern Prussia supported, fran th~ north,
the military actions of the Soviet Army on the Berlin axis. After forces
of the 2d Belorussian Front reached the Vistula in the vicinity of Torun and
nor.th of the city at the end of January, favorable conditions were created
for destroying the eastern Pomeranian grouping. In terms of the scale of
the missions which had to be executed by the fronts, the diversity of forms
and methods of combat activities eznployed, and the end results, this was one
of the instructive operations of the Soviet Armed Forces, one conducted with
. decisive goals. The eastern Prussian.operation was conducted by troops of
th~ee fronts, strategic aviation (the 18th Army), and the Red Banner Baltic
Fleet. It was an example of the Hq SHC's correct determination of the axes
of the main strikes by the fronts, which were selected following deep analysis
of the situation, allocation of the appropriate manpower and materiel, and _
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organization of clear interact~on among the fronts, which struck on
independent axes separated far from one another. Not only did the fronts
have to create powerful strike groapings; the necessary forces also had to
be allocated both to widen the offensive at the flanks and to provide
protection against probable counterstrikes from the narth and south.
The plans of the Fascist German Command for disposing its reserves in such
a way as to counterattack the flanks of the advancing fronts, as had been
' done by the Kaiser's troops in 1914, turned out to be unrealistic.
Bold massing of the manpower and materiel of' thefr.onts in narrow sectors
and deep operational disposition of the fronts and armies corresponded to the
plan of making deep strikes with the fronts and with the need for successively
increasing the power of these strikes with tl~ goal of surmounting the
reinforced, deeply disposed enemy defenses.
Soviet troops successfully completed their mission of penetrating highly
fortified defenses and exploiting the offensive in eastern Prussia.
Because of stubborn enemy resistance and poor weather, penetration of the
tactical defenses required a longer time: They were penetrated on the second
and third days of the operation by the 2d Belorussian Front and on the fifth
and sixth days by the 3rd Belorussian Front. To complete the breakthrough,
not only the reserves and mobile groups of the armies but alsa the front's
mobile group (in the 3rd Belorussian Front) had to be committed to battle.
However; the enemy did have to commit all of his reserves to the battle in
the tactical zone as well. This is what made it possible for the fronts to
advance even faster later (more than 15 km per day for rifle divisions and
22-36 km per day for tank formations) ; by the 13th-18th c?~ys they not only
encircled but also divided the entire eastern Prussian grouping and
completed their mission. Prompt exploitation of the offensive by the command
of the 3rd Belorussian Front on a new axis and ~ommitment of two tank corps
and armies in front's second echelon~~gPd the situati.on and made it possible
to increase the rate of advance.
A faster rate of advance was also insured by the continuity of combat activities,
which was achieved through special preparation of the subunits and units
for offensive action at night. Thus after being committed to the engage-
ment, the llth Guards Army advanced in ba.ttle 110 km to Konia,sberg,
traveling the greater half of this distance (60 km) at night.
The eastern Prussian grouping was defeated in lengthy and hard battles. The
operation lasted 103 days; an especially great deal of time was required
to annihilate isolated groupings. The reason �or this lay in the fact that
isolated German troops defended themselves in fortified regions, on
terrain and in weather conditions unfavorable to the offensive, and in a
situation in which the enemy was not completely blockaded from the sea.
During the eastern Prussian operation the troops had to repel strong counterattacks by
the enemy as he tried to restore his ground lines of communication between
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separated groupings and the main forces of the Wehrmacht. But swift _
maneuvering of manpower and materiel by the fronts foiled the plans of
the Fascist German Command. It was only able to create a small corridor I,
along the gulf west of Konigsberg.
Soviet aviation, which had unshared supremacy in the air, committed major
forces to the operation. Interaction between several air armies and naval i
aviation was successful. Capitalizing on even the slightest improvements in
weather, the air force flew about 146,000 sorties during the operation.* ;
It performed reconnaissance, struck enemy troops and defenses, and played a i
tremendous role in annihilation of enemy fortifications, especially during ~
the assault on Konigsberg.
The Red Banner Baltic Fleet provided considerable assistance to the troops. ~
Facing complex basing conditions and considerable enemy mining, naval
aviation, submarines, and torpedo boats'~perated against the enemy's marine ~
lines of communication in the Baltic Sea, disrupting his shipments; they ,
assisted the advance of ground troops on the maritime axis with strikes by ;
bombers and ground-attack airplanes, with artillary fire from motor gunboats '
and railroad batteries, and with the landing of tactical assault forces. ~
But the Baltic Fleet was unable to coinpletely blockade the enemy troop ;
groupings pressed against the sea because of a lack of the ships necessary
for this purpose.
Frontal troops accumulated valuable experience in fighting for major population ~
. centers in cities, which were usually captured on the move or following i
short preparatior~s. Wherever the enemy did manage to organize defense of
such cities, the garrisons were encircled and annihilated in the course of (
a planned raid. Assault detachments and groups, in which the actions of-
sappers were especially effective, played a significant role. i
Political work systematically conducted by the military councils of the fronts i
and armies, by political agencies, and hy party and Komsomol organizations ~
kept the offensive spirit high in the troops, and it maintained their desire
- to surmount all difficulties and complete their missions. This operation was i
. evidence of the maturity of Soviet troop commanders, and of the great art- ,
fulness of their troop management. During the operation soldiers and !
commanders displayed the highest degree of bravery and steadfastness in hard ,
fighting. The Soviet Armed Forces did all of this in behalf of the ~
liberation of mankind from fascist tyranny.
.
The motherland gave a high assessment to the warti.me deeds of its sons. '
Hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers were awarded orders and medals, and
those distinguistiing themselves especially were awarded the Hero of the
Soviet Union.title. Front commander Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M.
~
*"Sovetskiye Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941- ;
1945 gg." (The Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945), j
p 364.
:
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Vasilevskiy was awarded a second Order of Victory for competent leadership
of the troops. Soviet Army Air Force commander Chief Marshal of Aviation
A. A. Novikov became a Hero of the Soviet Union, and generals A. P.
Beloborodov, P. K. Koshevoy, and T. T. Khryukin, pilots V. A. Aleksenko,
Amet-Khan Sultan, L. I. Beda, A. Ya. Brandys, I. A. Vorob'yev, M. G.
Gareyev, P. Ya. Golovachev, Ye. M. Kungurtsev, G. M. Myl'nikov, V. I.
Mykhlik, A. K. Nedbaylo, G. M. Parshin, A. N. Prokhorov, N. T. Semeyko,
A. S. Smirnov, and M. T. Stepanishchev were awarded the Hero of the Soviet
Union title a second time.
The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet made mention of the bravery
displayed by pilots of the Normandy-Neman Air Regiment, which finished its
battle road in eastern Prussia. During the war valorous French patriots
flew more than 5,000 combat sorties, participated in 869 air battles, and
knocked down 273 enemy airplanes. The regiment was awarded the orders of the
Red Banner and Aleksandr Nevskiy. Orders of the Soviet Union were awarded
to 83 persons, 24 of them in eastern Prussia; in addition the Hero of the ~
Soviet Union title was awarded to four valorous pilots--M. Alber, R. de la
Puap, Zh. Andre, and M. Lefevr (posthumously). After the war the 41
Yak-3 warplanes in which the French pilots had fought were given to them as
a gift from the Soviet people. Pilots of this regiment returned to their
homeland aboard these airplanes.
The glorious victory in this operation entered military history as the
pinnacle of valor, bravery, and heroism of Soviet enlisted men, officers,
and generals. Orders were awarded to more than 1,000 formations and units
for exemplary fulfillment of their combat assignments, and 217 of them
received honorary titles--Insterburg, Mlawa, Konigsberg, and others.
Moscow gave a 29-gun salute to the valorous soldiers in honor of their
~ victories in eastern Prussia.
Thus as a result of the victorious conclusion of the offensive of the
Soviet Armed Forces in eastern Prussia and northern Poland fascist Germany
suffered irretrievable losses. Loss of a region of the highest importance
_ to ~he war economy had an unfavorable effect on the general status of the
country's war econoniy and significantly worsened the strategic position
of the Wehrmacht on the Soviet-German front.
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CHAPTEF FOUFi
TiiE CRIMEAN CONF3:~RENCE
[pp 127-138] l. Prelude to the Crimean Conference
The offensive proceeded successfully along the entire Soviet-German front
at the beginning of February 1945. The Nazi leadership's plans for delaying
the forward progress of the Soviet Armed Forces at fortified lines fell
through. German defenses were broken, and Soviet troops advanced with
battle up to 500 km on the Berlin axis, seized a number of bridgeheads on
the Oder, and were at the approaches to Germany's capital. Eastern Prussia
was cut off fr~m the country's center. The liberation of Poland was
basically completed, parts of Czechoslovakia were liberatlostaalmost a11~of
of Budapest was but a few days to come. Fascist Germany
its hold on the Silesian industrial region, an important raw material base
for many war industry enterpxises.
The offensive of the Soviet troops brought the end of the war in Europe
closer with every day. Nevertheless, continuing to increase its resistance
the Nazi leadership still hoped to aggravate the conflicts..in the anti-Hitler
coalition, and it tried ~to drive a wedge between the A11ies with all of
- its strength in order to achieve its goals.
On 27 January the fascist heads of government convened to discuss the
situation. Hitler turned to his closest assistants with the following
question: "What do you think, are the English enthusiastic about Russia's
forward progress?" He went on to report that by his order, invented
documents were "left" for the Western Allies leading them to believe that
"a German army of 200,000 troops (con�nunists and former prisoners of war--
Editor) who were fully convinced by the ideas of communism" was entering
German territory together with the Soviet troops. "On receiving this report,
the Western Allies will feel that they have~been stabbed in the back."~ The
conference participants agreec~ that entry of the Soviet troops into Central
and Southeast Europe would be in conflict with the interests of Great Britain,
and they came to the unanimous opinion that the chances for a change in the
West's position would increase with every kilometer that Soviet.soldiers come
closer to Berlin. The designs of the Nazis depended on the anticommunist
mood present in influent;.al circles of the USA and England. According to
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C. Moran, a close friend of Churchill, the latter "no longer speaks of
Hitler, he talks only of the danger of communism. He sees the Red Army
as a cancerous tumor spreading from one country to another. This has
become an obsessive idea to him, and apparently he can think of nothing
else."2
_ Remembering the prewar policy of the West in its relations with the USSR,
the possibility that the anti-Hitler coalition would fall apart was believed
in Berlin. However, they forgot. that the successes of the Soviet Union on
the fronts of the armed conflict,and, equally so, the new balancE of power
in the international arena had a decisive influence on the strength of the
coalition. Because of the clearly greater efforts being made by the Nazis
to undermine the unity of the West, Roosevelt felt it necessary to declare
the following to the American people in a radio message given in January
1945: "I wou'_u like to caution you most seriously against the harmful
consequences of enemy propaganda. The wedge which the Germans tried to
drive into the Western Front (in the Ardennes--Ed2tor) was less dangerous
from the standpoint of ending the war than is the wedge which they are
constantly trying to drive between us and our allies. Every rumor, even
the most innocuous,.having the purpose of undermining our trust in our
allies, is identical to a real enemy agent in our ranks: An attempt is
being made to undermine our war effort. Malicious and groundless rumors
are being spread here and there--against the Russians, against the English,
and against our battle commanders. If you study these rumors carefully,
you will find that each of them bears the stamp 'Made in Germany'.i3
The tasks of ending the war in Europe and problems of postwar reconstruction
urgently rec~uired discussion and coordination of the policies of the
"Big Three"--USSR, USA, and England. At the beginning of 1945 final
agreement was reached to convene a new conference to be attended by the heads
of state. Yalta was chosen as the site of the conference on proposal of the
Soviet side.
This conference was unusually important to the Western Allies not only for
political but also for military considerations. At the end of 1944 the
_ Anglo-American troops suffered a serious failure on the Western Front.
While prior to the breakthrough by German troops in the Ardennes the
Enc~lish government believed that the war in Europe would end by 30 June 1945,
as early as in mid-January 1945 the War Office discussed the possibility _
that it would end not earlier than 31 December.4 The situation on the
Western Front was believed to be rather serious in Washington and London.
Fears concerning the consequences of a protracted war in Europe were
intensified by intelligence reports indicating successful progress by the
Germans in creation of an atomic bomb. U.S.Assistant Secretary of State
C. Bohlen was witness to the fear of the army's defeat in the West expressed
for some time by General D. Eisenhower, shaken by the December counteroffensive
of the Germans.5 The counteroffensive of fascist German troops in the
Ardennes forced the USA and England to focus their attention mainly on what
the Soviet Army would do and on the plans of its command.
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They were also forced to reckon with the situation in Asia. At the end o�
194~ Japanese troops seriously defeated the Chinese and advanced success�ully
on the continent, preparing a base from which to continue the war (in the
event the last island defense~ were lost in the Pacific). -
By this time only some of the ground forces of the Japanese army had partici-
pated in major operations. They were fully ready for combat in the event
that Anglo-American troops invaded Asia and the main islands of Japan. Until
this time, the Japanese Navy carried on the bulk of the war. In the opinion
of prominent Amer~can diplomats A. Harriman and C. Bohlen and the American
Committee ~f thE Chiefs of Staff, 18 months would be needed to defeat Japan
(after the�defeat of Germany). Owing to this, they believed, the Yalta
negotiations wou.ld have to Le focused on getting the Soviet Union to promise
to enter the war in the Far East.6 In the estimation of American chiefs of
staff, were the USA to invade the Japanese islands withaut help from the
USSR, its losses would be at least 1 million men. They felt that protractinq
the war in Europe would have serious consequences to operations against
Japan. On 22 January 1945 the committee warned the president that orders had
already been~ti.ssued to study and prepare plans for a campaign against Japan
in the event that continued war in Europe would necessitate postponement of
invasion of the Japanese mainland until the end of 1946.~
Both Roosevelt and Churchill placed great hopes on the Soviet Union for a
swift end to the war in Europe, and they tried to enlist its assistance in
the final defeat of Japan. "We must have the support of the Soviet Union
to defeat Germany. We desperately need the Soviet Union for the war with
Japan as soon as the war in Europe ends," read the "Memorandum" prepared by
U.S. gavernment departments for the President and the American delegation in
Yalta.a Roosevelt was "fully resolved to obtain, in Yalta, a written promise"
from the USSR to enter the war in the Far East.9
The British Prime Minister exerted a great deal of effort to oppose the -
Soviet delegation at the Crimean Conferenc~ with a unified Anglo-American '
bloc. He still continued to entertain the nution of Anglo-American occupation
of not only Western but also the largest possible part of Central and 5outh-
east Europe.l~ Churchill even tried to sca.re the President. His message to
Roosevelt on 8 January 1945 was intentionally written in an alarming tone:
"The conference (in Yalta--Editoz~} may be decisive, since it will occur at the
moment when there are such great disagreements among the Big Powers and when
the shadow of war is becoming increasingly longer before our eyes. It now
appears to me that the erd of this war may be more disappointing than the end of
the last."11
On the way to the Cri.mea the executives of the USA and England decided to stop
on the island of Malta and holcla conference to prepare agreed-upon answers to
questions concerning the end of the war against Germany and Japan. Churchill's
proposals quite obviously reflected the desire to impose England's ~x~litical
course in relation to the Soviet Union upon the government of the USA. Mean-
while the American government, which had a clear idea of the balance of power
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in the anti-Hitler coalition, gave England not more than a modest role.
Churchill's position, which threatcned a crisis in relations with the US5R,
failed to alarm the U.S. The British Prime Minister's"suggestions" were not
successful. Washington did not want to commit itself with some sort of
promises to the English beforehand, and most importantly it did not want to
be led on a leash by the British Prime Minister.
Recommendations suggested on 16 May 1944 by the Committee of the Chiefs of
Staff were confirmed in the "Memorandum" cited above. In particular it
stated: "We must apply all effort to relieve friction between Great Britain
and Russia, encouraging three-sided cooperation, upon which a strong peace
depends." American troop commanders declared this intention not at all due
to an abstract devotion to peace but rather on the basis of the real authority
the USSR held in the coalition.
The military circles of Great Britain were also apprehensive of aggravations
in Anglo-Soviet relations. General H. Ismay, England's chief of staff and
minister of defense, noted the following in his assessment of the capabilities
Washington and London had for dictating tYieir conditions at the Crimean
conference: "Were the English and American governments to take matters to
the extreme and threaten the Soviet Union with force, what would be done with
the 200-300 German divisions still fighting in the war? Should the English
and Americans continue to fight the Wehrmacht with one hand and the Red Army
with the other? Or should they forget everything they had said earlier about
their resolve to annihilate Nazism, to win the Germans over to their side,
and to turn on their recent ally with their assistance? We would have to
come to the conclusion that this turn in policy...would be absolutely
impossible."12 British Field-Marshal B. Montgomery later wrote in all
frankness on the same question, recognizing that the English people "would
never allow themselves to be sent into battle against the Russians in 1945,"
and he explained this simply: "The Russians were heroic during the German
war, and if the British government were to express the desire to fight them
in 1945, it would have found itself in a difficult position at home."13
It was recognized in Washington that there can be no more postponements of
discussion of political problems with the Soviet Union, which previously
had been the avowed tactic of the USA, a tactic stated by former Secretary of
State C. Hull as "no discussions...at this stage."14 This is why Roosevelt
rejected separate examination of political problems at Malta behind the USSR's
back. He agreed with Harriman that the Russians must not be confronted with
ready-made decisions. This opinion was shared by prominent American
diplomats, to include U.S. Ambassador (D. Vaynant).15 Nevertheless
Roosevelt sanctioned the Malta conference of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Committee, which went on from 30 January to 2 February 1945.
Roosevelt arrived on Malta on 2 February. In a brief ineeting with Churchill
he gave general approval to the decisions reached by the Combined Chiefs of
Staff Committee. However, the President rejected tying down the USA with
England on political questions, preferring to resolve the corresponding problems
at the conference of the "Big Three" in the Crimea.
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News of the Soviet Army's new victories had a significant influence on '
American and English executives disaussing the current problems. Evaluating
the results of the most recent Soviet offensive, H. Baldwin, a reviewer for
the NEW YORK TIMES, was forced to recogniz~: "It relieved the burden of our
strategists.... Tn terms o~' strategic significance, the Russian winter
offensive is grea~er than both the battle in Western Europe and the ir?vasion
af the Phillipines.... Apparently both Russian and German officials agree
that this general offensive is being conducted not to attain tactical gains
or for territorial c~nquest, but rather to end the war.... The battle of the
~i,tans--this figh~ between the world's two strongest armies--has resumed, and
it instantaneously altered the strategic countenance of the entire war."
Pointing out the fact that the Sov:iet-German front is the m~in front of the
world war, the place where the Soviet Army was opposing the Wehrmacht's main
forces, Baldwin went on to note that as in the past, the Western Allies were
placing the main burden of the war on the USSR. "The present offensive,"
he noted, "began at a time when the Allies were not in a position to offer
immediate supp~rt by making a powerful strike from the West."16 While the
Soviet troops were fighi:ing savage battles on German territory the A'lli.es
stood at the country's western borders, placing their troops back in order
following the December failure.
As the time of the Crimean conference came closer, it was said more and more
frequently in Washington and London that Germany would soon fall in the
face of. Soviet arms, and that Roosevelt and Churchill would have little left
to talk about. As E. Roosevelt, the U.S. President's son validly wrote after
the war, "The Red Army ground up the Nazi troops with unprecedented speed,"
Representatives of military circles in the USA and England even suggested
- that the Russians had made their last breakthrough of the German front in the
East and that the fascist state may �a11 before the end of the conference.l~ ~
These estimates are evidence that the West could z~ot but see that the Soviet
Union was capable of ending the war in Europe on its own.
2. Coordination of Plans for the Final Defeat of German and Japanese
Agqressors -
The Crimean conference was held from 4 to 11 February 1945 in Livadiya, near
Yalta. The discussion was started with an examination of the situation at
the fronts. The actions of the Soviet Armed Forces were reported by
General A. I. Antonov, first deputy chief of General Staff. He briefly
stunmarized the results of the January offensive of the Soviet troops in
Poland, eastern Prussia, and Hungary. General Antonov relayed the wishes
of the USSR government to accelerate the offensive of the Allied troops,
which was very much favored by the situation, and to p.revent transfer of
troops by the enemy to the Soviet-German front from Norway, Italy, and the
Western Front by striking his lines of communication with airpower.18
U.S. Army Chief of Staff General D. Marshall reported that the Allies were
hoping to go over to the offensive in the northern sector of the front on
8 February, and to follow that with a strike in the southern sector a week ~
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_ later. He devoted considerable attention to the actions of Anglo-American
bombers, laying special emphasis on the fac~ that the Reich's fuel produc~ion
had decreased by 60 percent as a result of air raids.19
After exchanging their opinions concerning the situation at the ~ronts, the
conference participants began to coordinate upon the joint military actions '
against Germany. I. V. Stalin asked his allies to state theiz~ wishes in
relation to actions of the Soviet troops. Churchill expressed sincere delight
in the power which the Soviet Army had demonstrated, and he wished "that the
offensive of the Soviet Army would continue just as successfully." Stalin
answered that the Soviet Army's winter offensive was conducted as a gentlemen's
agreement, since the deci.sions made at the Tehran conference had not obligated
the USSR government 'to undertake it.20 Churchill and Roosevelt expressed
their common wish that operations of the Allied troops would be coordinated
more carefully in the future.
The Allies confirmed in meetings on military questions that the offensive
would begin on the Western Front on 8 February. However, citing a shortage
of forces, they did not promise to engage in active operations on the
Italian front. In the same way, a,merican and English military experts
denied the requests of the Soviet side to prevent transfer ot German troops
from Norway and Italy to the Soviet-German front. Interaction among
strategic air forces was planned in general terms. The 5oviet Army General
Staff and the heads of the Allied military missions in Moscow were given the
job of coordinating the corresponding operations.
A conference commun~que ~zoted: "We have examined and determined the military
plans of the three Allieil powers for final defeat of the common enemy....
Our joint military plans will be made public only after we have completed them,
but we.are confident thai:. the very close working cooperation achieved at the
present conference between our three staffs will bring a faster end to the
war."21
The concrete approach taken by Soviet representatives to discussing the
problems promoted the success of the talks on military cooperation in the
concluding stage of the war. British Field Marshal Montgomery subsequently
wrote: "...Stalin made almost no errors.... He had an astounding grasp of
strategy, and I do not recall even one false step by him in our talks on
questions of strategy."22
Draft resolutions written by the European Consultative Commission "On the
German Occupation Zones and On Administration of 'Greater Berlin and "On
the Control Mechanism in Germany" were approved at the Crimean conference.
After undergoing some changes associated with recognition of France's right
to an occupation zone, these resolutions served as the basis for subsequent
agreements on postwar Germany.
The communique on the conference results stated: "It is our firm goal to
annihilate German militarism and Nazism, and to create the guarantee that
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Germany wauld never again be in a position to violate the peace of the whole ;
world. We are fully resolved to disarm and disband all German Armed Forces, '
to ance and forever annihilate the German General 5taf~, which has many times
promoted resurrection of German militarism, to confiscate or destroy all '
German military ec~uipment, to liquidat~e or assume control over all German
industry that might be u~.ilized for war production; to subject all war ~
criminals to a just an d swift punishment, and to extract compensation in '
kind for all of the destruction caused by the Germans; to wipe the Nazi Party
and Nazi laws, organizations, and institutions from the face of the earth; ;
to eli.minate all Nazi and militarist influence from public institutions and i
from the cultural and economic life of the German people, and to implement ,
other joint measures in relation to Germany which might be found necessary
for the future pc:ace and security of trle entire world. Our goals do not
include annihilation of the German people."23 '
i
For the general purposes of achieving unconditional surrender of Germany, the ~
Allies decided to view it as a single country subdivided into occupation ~
zones. Supreme power over each zone during the period of occupation was to
be entrusted to the commander in chief of the troops of the appropriate
powers. When general problems came up, the commanders in chief were to act ,
jointly within the framework of the Central Control Commission, which was '
later renamed the Allied Control Council for Germany, the activity of which
was to be based on the principle of unanimity of all members.24 It was i
suggested that this organ was to work out joint policy on general German
problems.
All of "Greater Berlin" left within the 5oviet Zone was to be occupied by
troops of the three powers (to which the French aontingent was later added)
in the appropriate sectors. The plan for joint occupation of Berlin was
based on the idea that this city was to become the location of the Allied ~
Control Council. "Greater Berlin" was to be administered by a combined ~
Allied commandant's staff, which was to operate on the basis of the principle ~
of unanimity. ~
i
During the conference the heads of the American and English governments once ~
again argued in favor of diuiding Germany into several independent states. ~
They insisted on creating a commission to study postwar reconstruction of
Germany and the possibilities for its subdivision.25 However, acceptance
of this decision did not mean that the Soviet government was agreeing to , i
subdivide Germany. Later, owing to the principled position of the Soviet
Union and on its initiative, this question was removed from the agenda of
the Allied negotiations.
Examination of reparation requirements occupied a large place in the
conference meetings. The Soviet Union had suffered the greatest material
loss in the war. The Soviet government's demand for at least partial i
compensation of material losses was just. But at the same time the USSR did (
not insist upon imposing a sum of reparations upon Germany which would ruin I
its economy. Developing its reparation plan, the Soviet government always
i
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intended to create conditions under which the German people would be able to
exist at an average European standard of ].iving in the pos~war years.26 In
relation to the total sum of reparations, the Soviet and American delegations
agreed that it would be $20 billion, 50 percent of which was to go to the USSR.
The losses inflicted by Germany were to b~ compensated mainly in kind. It
was agreed during the conference that reparations were to be exacted in three
fonms: in the first 2 years after Germany's surrender, a one-time exaction
from its national wealth (mainly with the goal o� annihila~ing its military
potential); annual deliveries of goods from current production; utilization
of German manpower. A Combined Allied Commission for Reparations staffed by
representatives of the US5R, USA, and Great Britain was instituted in Mascow
to work out the details of the reparation plan.27 The English government
did not lend its support to the total sum of reparations specified by the USSR
and the USA, pointing out that it would return to this issue as the work of
the reparation commission proceeded. Later even the USA withdrew its support
from the just sum of reparations for the Soviet Union agreed upon earlier.
The Allies discussed the posit;ion of the French among the Great Powers. The
USA and England opposed France'~ participation in the work of the European
Consultative Commission until Nov~ember 1944. The Soviet government had to
fight hard to achieve equitable recognition of France's position in inter-
national problems. Speaking with De Gaulle in Moscow as long ago as on
8 December 1944, I. V. Stalin said that the general "must know that I have
~ had my differences with England and America concerning the French National
Committee in relation to the question as to whether it is to be treated as -
the government or not." De Gaulle noted that in his opinion, Stalin had
won the game. I. V. Stalin agreed with him: "We play to win. But France
will win even more.i28 A new step forward was made during the Crimean
conference in relation to recognizing France's rights of German occupation
and control of that country.; Though Roosevelt did say that "this is only a
matter of courtesy in relation to the French,"29 the heads of the three
Rllied governments decided to apportion an occupation zone in Germany for
France, and they ask its Provisionary Government to send a representative to
the Central Control Commission.
The American government was extremely interested in gaining the USSR's
agreement to enter the war with Japan. The Soviet Union wanted to end
World War II as quickly as possible, and to relieve the peoples of the world
from more sacrifices and destruction. Justice in relation to peoples of
Russia, violated in the past by Japan, had to be restored as well. This is
why Stalin confirmed that 2 months after termination of military.actions in
Europe the Soviet Union would fulfill its promise. On 11 February 1945 the
heads of the three Great Powers signed a secret agreement on the Far East.
Three conditions for the USSR's declaration of war against Japan were _
agreed upon in this connection: 1) maintenance of the status quo of the
Mongolian Peoples Republic; 2) restoration of Russian rights in the Far East
treacherously violated by Japan in 1904, namely: return of southern Sakhalin
and all islands contiguous with it to the Soviet Union; internationalization
of Dairen (Talien) and resumption of tenancy of Port Arthur as a naval base
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of the U5SR; resumption of Soviet operation, jointly wi~h China (though
insuring the preferential interests of the Soviet Union)~ of the Eastern
Chinese and Southern Manchurian railways; 3) transfer of the Kuril Islands
to the USSR.30 This agreemeiit gave concrete form to the general principles
followed in Allied policy spelled out in the Cairo declara~ion signed by the
USA, England, and China ~3nc1 published on 1 December 1943.
The USSR's promise to enter the wdr in the Far East guaranteed defeat of
militarist Japan in the near future. In the eyes of the American government,
this agreement had special value also because it defined the borders of ~
possible advance of the Soviet Armed Forces. In other words the American
side was motivated by the same notions that led it to agree on the occupatian
zones in Germany.
3. Definition of the General Principles of Establishment of the Postwar Peace
The Crimean conference was held at a time when the war in Europe was nearing
its conclusion. It was vitally important to determine the postwar peace
arrangements. The problems of foreign policy in gener~l and questions of
postwar establishment of peace in particular were always in ths center of ~
attention of the Politburo of the party's Central Committee. The Soviet
foreign policy line was defined for this instance as well. Problems associ-
ated with freeing the peoples from fascist occupation had to be discussed on
priority during the Crimean couference. The peoples of Europe, mainly those
li.berated by the Soviet Army, wished to prevent resumption of power by those !
who were directly responsible for the misfortunes they had suffered. ~
The "Declaration on Free Europe" was adopted at the Crimean conference. It
stated that the thr.ee governments had agreed to coordinate, during the time
of temporary instability in liberated Europe, all of their policy aimed at
helping liberated peoples as well as peoples of former satellite countries in '
their resolution of pressing political and economic problems by democratic
methods. "Establishment of order in Europe," the d~claration read, "and '
reestablishment of national economic life must be achieved in such a way
that would permit the liberated peoples to annihilate the last vestiges of ~
Nazism and fascism and create democratic institutions of their choice."31 ~
The principles of the declaration were in line with the goals of the anti-
fascist war of liberation. The meaning the Western Allies gave to this
document is another matter. Influential circles in the USA and England thought ~
it possi.ble to use it as an excuse for interfering in the internal affairs of ;
the countries of Central and Southeast Europe with the purposes of restoring ,
the notorious "sanitary cordon" along the USSR's western border. "These
circles," Harri.man wrote, "wer.e troubled by the idea that the Red Army would ~
occupy Eastern Europe (Central and Southeast Europe--Ed2tor). Nothing could
prevent this. The Red Army would push the Nazi forces back into Germany and,
in the process of the war, occupy these countries. Theref~re we must use ;
all of our strength to give the peoples of these countries the possibility ;
to create their own governments after their liberation."32 '
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What Washington ~nd London meant by "their own.governments" was revealed in
the debate on the Polish ques~ion, which took up a great deal of time in the
_ conference. There were two Polish governments in existence at the time of
the meeting of the'$ig Three": the provisional national government, which
exercised real power in the country, and the emigrant government in London,
which had long lost its ties with the people. The governments of the USA and
England continued to ignore existence of the Polish provisional government.
This raised the objections of the Soviet side, which desired to help the
Polish people select a democratic way for the country's development. In the
end, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to recognize the provisional government,
but they suggested adding some officials of the London government to its
comp~sition. Accepting this proposal, the Soviet side agreed upon a compro-
mz:.a which in the end turned out to be an advantage to the Polish people,
since creation of the reorganized Provisional Government of National Unity
meant liquidation of the London government.
p decision was made in the Crimea concerni.ng the eastern border of Poland and
enlargement of its territory. A conference communique stated: "The heads of
the three governments feel that the eastern border of Poland must follow the
(Kerzon) line, deviating in some regions 5 to 8 kilometers from it to Poland's
advantage. The heads of the three governments recognize that Poland must enjoy
significant territorial qains in the north and in the west."33
The decision of the Crimean conference on the Polish question was a victory
of Soviet policy, which was aimed at creating a strong, democratic Poland
tied by knots of friendship to the USSR.
The conference also examined the problem of uniting the democratic forces of
Yugoslavia. The heads of the three Great Powers recommended that Marshal
J. Broz Tito and (I. Shubashich) form a provisional combined government. They
proposed expanding the Rntifascist Assembly of National Liberation to
include three members of the last prewar Yugoslavian (Skupshchina), which had
not compromised itself by collaboration with the invaders. Thus reorganized,
the antifasciGt assembly was to become the country's provisional parliament.
The discussion begun at the conference in Dumbarton Oaks on the problem of .
creating an international organization to maintain peace and to insure
national security was continuec~ at the Crimean conference. Later, this
organization came to be called the United Nations (UN). The greatest
difficulties in writing its Charter were encountered during discussion of the
order of voting in the Security Council. In the Dumbarton Oaks conference
(21 August-7 October 1944) the representative from the United States of
America proposed the so-called right of veto. What it meant essentially was
that decisions of the Security Council would be effective only if all
permanent members (USSR, USA, England, China, and France) agreed to it,
though in this case the vote of the council member involved in the given
dispute would not be counted. The Soviet Union rejected this order of voting,
since rather than conducting a patient search for mutually acceptable
decisions, powers holding the majority in the Security Council could resort
to force and begin a war.
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Back in December 1944 Roosevelt made the proposal that the principle of
unanimity of the permanent mambers should hold in relation to all questions
with the exception of those having to do with procedure, and "in relation to
disputes in which a member of the council (including permanent members) is
a participant, on the condition that a decision is made to employ peaceful means
for resolving the dispute."34 Roosevelt's wording, which later came to be
called the Yalta formulation, was adopted at the Crimean conference.
The 5oviet delegation suggested inviting the Ukrainian and Belorussian SSR
as charter members of the United Nations. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed
with this. It was decided to convene a conference to establish the UN on
25 April 1945. Countries invited to it included the United Nations members
as of 8 February 1945 and those "joining nations" which would declare war
against the common enemy prior to 1 March 1945.
The Crimean confprence of the leaders of the USSR, USA and Great Britain had ,
great historic significance. It was one of the greatest international. .
conferences during the war, and it was the high point of cooperation among
the three Allied Powers in the struggle against the common enemy. In the
presence of good will, even when the most acute disagreements were present
the Allied Powers could arrive at agreements permeated by a spirit of unity
and common interests.
A communique on the results of the Crimean conference asserted that the three
Great Powers confirmecl their unity both in the conduct of war and in organi-
zation of peace. "It is only through the continuing and growing cooperation
and mutual understanding among our three countries and among all peace-loving
peoples that we can realize the highest goal of mankind--a sound and lasting
peace...."35 This cooperation was also displayed in practical measures. A
permanent mechanism for consultation among the ministers of foreign affairs
of the three powers was created at the conference. It was foreseen that
they would meet once every 3 or 4 months as necessary. 'Phese conferences
were to be held successively in Moscow, Washington, and London.
All of the work of the Crimean conference was influenced by the immeasurably
greater international authority of the Soviet Union and its peace-loving
policy. The results of the work done by the heads of the three Allied
governments were met with great enthusiasm by all of the world's progressive
society. They served as the basis for the democratic, peace-loving principles ~
of postwar reconstruction of Europe developed at the Potsdam conference soon
after the victory over fascist Germany.
Fantastic versions of the Yalta conference, in which the USA and England had
supposedly made unjustifiable concessions to the Soviet Union, were forwarded
in bourgeois historiography after the war. The right-leaning American
historian A. Ulam noted that the Crimean conference "acquired an ominous
reputation" for some people in the West.36 The starting point for this line
of reasoning was the.speculative suggestion that the USA and England could
have imposed their points of view on the USSR but that for some incomprehensible
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reasons they did not do so. Such "condolences" have nothing to do with
historic reality.
In connection with the forthcoming ~rimean conference (Dzh. Kennan), advisor
to the U.S. ambassador in Moscow, presented a memorandum asserting: "I
fully recognize the realities of the war, and I understand that we are too
weak to win it without Russia's cooperation. I recognize that Russia's
military efforts are competent and effective, and that they must be rewarded
to a certain extent in the negotiations for peace."37 On this basis Kennan
believed that the USA and England would be unable to implement their plans
in Central and Southeast Europe independently.
The American researcher A. Rapoport notes that in the USA, "the opinion
exists that East Europe was 'sold out' at Yalta," mezning that the USSR's
influence in this area could have been avoided by a combination of decisive
diplomatic and military actions after and even during the war. "To attempt
to have done so would have meant continuing the war in Europe after the fall
of Germany. Although one or two American senators may have argued such an
approach on occasion, this plan of action could not be treatec~ s38iously in
the political climate which evolved at the end of World War II. Such
were the "possibilities" of the USA which, in the opinion of modern reaction-
aries, Washington had supposedly allowed to slip away.
Such an approach is alien to the Soviet Union. To it, the Crimean conference
is a clear example of the possibilities for cooperation among states with
different socioeconomic structures. It was testimony to the unity of the
anti-Hitler coalition in its efforts to defeat fascist Germany and it
persuaded the peoples of the world that the war would end victoriously in
the very near future. Suffering mankind saw a guarantee of imminent victbry
in the cooperation between the USSR, the USA, and England. As the war came
to an end, the USSR desired mostly to establish a strong peace, and equitable
cooperation with other coun'cries. The road to this goal was paved by the
policy of peaceful coexistence followed by the Central Committee of the
Communist Party and the Soviet qo~vernment since the first days of the
October Revolution.
Footnotes
1. Cited in: "Istoriya mezhdunaroc~ ykh otnosheniy i vneshney politiki SSSR.
1917-1967 gg. V trekh tomakh" (History of ~he International Relations
and Foreign Policy of the USSR. 1917-1967. In Three Volumes), Vol II,
1939-1945, Moscow, 1962, p 400.
2. Moran, C., "Winston Churchill. The Struggle for Survival 1940-1965," '
London, 1966, p 173.
3. "The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt," 1944-1945
Volume, New York, 1950, pp 508-509.
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FOR OrFICIAL USE ONLY ,
4. Erman, Dzh., "Bol'shaya strategiya. Oktyabr' 1944-Avgust 1945" (The
Great Strategy. October 1944-August 1945), p 349.
5. Bohlen, Ch., "Witness to History 1929-1969," New York, 1973, p 170.
6. THE NEW YORK TII~S , 8 February 1.97 0.
7. Harriman, A., "Story of Our Relations With Russia," in "W ngressional '
Record," Vol 97, col. A, 5665.
8. Cited in: Yakovlev, N., "Franklin Ruzvel't-chelovek i politik" (Franklin
Roosevelt--The Man and the Politician), Moscaw, 1969, p 487.
9. "Istoriya diplomatii" (The History of Diplomacy), Vo1 IV, "Diplomacy
During World War II," Moscow, 1975, p 552.
10. "Istoriya vneshney politiki SSSR. 1917-1976. V dwkh tomakh" (History of
the Foreign Policy of the USS R. 1917-1976. In Two Vulumes), Vol 1,
- 1917-1945, Moscow, 1976, p 476.
11. Churchill, W., "The Second World War," Vol VI, p 297.
12. Ismay, H., "The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay," London, 1960, p 392.
13. Montgomery, B., "The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of
Alamein," London, 1958, pp 380-381.
14. Cited in: Kolko, G., "The Politics of the War. The World and United
States Foreign Policy 1943-1945," New York, 1968, p 110.
15. Clemens, D., "Yalta," New York, 1970, p 96.
16. Cited in: THE I~EW YORK TIN~S, 17 January 1945.
17. Ruzvel't, E., "Yeqo glazami" (Through His Eyes), translated from English,
Moscow, 1947, p 234.
18. "Tegeran-Yalta-Potsdam. Sbornik dokumentov" (Teheran-Yalta-Potsdam.
Collection of Documents), pp 106-107.
19. Ibid., p 109.
20. "Tegeran-Yalta-Potsdam. Sbornik dokumentov," p 112.
21. Ibid., pp 185-186.
22. Montgomery, B., "A History of Warfare," Cleveland, 1969, p 544.
23. "Tegeran-Yalta-Potsdam. Sbornik dokumentov," pp 186-187.
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24. "Istoriya vneshney politiki SSSR. 1917-1976," Vol 1, 1917-1945, p 477.
, 25. Ibid., p 481.
26. "Tegeran-Yalta-Potsdam. Sbornik dokumentov," p 128.
27. "Istoriya vneshniy politiki SSSR. 1917-1976," Vol 1, 1917-1945, p 479.
28. Cited in: "Sovetsko-frantsuzskiye otnosheniya vo vremya V elikoy
Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg. Dokumenty i materialy" (Soviet-French
Relations During the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Documents and
Materials), P 380.
29. "Istoriya vneshney politiki SSSR. 1917-1976," Vol 1, 1917-1945, p 477.
30. "Tegeran-Yalta-Potsdam. Sbornik dokumentov," p 199.
31. "Tegeran-Yalta-Potsdam. Sbornik dokumentov," p 189.
32. Harriman, A., "America. and Russia in a Changing World," New York, 1971,
p 32.
33. "Tegeran-Yalta-Potsdam. Sbornik dokumentov," p 191.
34. "Istoriya vneshney politiki SSSR. 1917-1976," Vol l, 1917-1945, p 499.
35. "Tegeran-Yalta-Potsdam. Sbornik dokumentov," pp 192-193.
36. Ulam, A., "The Rivals America..and Russia Since Wprld II," New York,
1971, p 51.
37. Cited in: Bohlen, Ch., "Witness to History 1929-1969," pp 175-176.
38. Cited in: Rapoport, A., "The Big Two.~.~ Soviet-American Perceptions of
Foreign Policy," New York, 1971, p 99.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ADVANCE OF THE SOVIET ARMY IN
EASTERN POMERANIA AND SILESIA
[p 159] Thus by the end of March the Soviet Army completed the liberation
of Poland in interaction with the Polish Army and reached the coast of the
- Baltic Sea and the Oder and Neisse rivers. As a result of the operations
fascist Germany was deprived of important regions of war industry and
agriculture, and its armed forces suffered further irreplaceable losses.
The successful advance by Soviet troops in eastern Pomerania and Silesia
forever ruined the Wehrmacht Comanand's plans for flanking strikes.
Retention and expansion of the bridgehead near Kustrin by troops of the
lst Belorussian Front had important operational significance.
All of this created the necessary conditions for subsequent strikes against
the enemy on ~he Berlin, Dresden, and Prague axes.
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CHAPTER SIX
LIBERATION OF HUNGARY, AUSTRIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND YUGOSLAVIA
[pp 218-219] The military and political results of the final strikes by ~
_ the Soviet Army against the southern wing of the Soviet-German front were `
as follows: The three Ukrainian fronts successfully completed their mission
of destroying the enemy and liberating the peoples of Hungary and the
greater part of Czechoslova~Cia and Austria from German fascism. During -
battles on Hungarian territory, in eastern Austria, and the battle of
Vienna, the 3rd and 2d Ukrainian fronts defeated 27 enemy divisions. The '
F'ascist German Command was forced to transfer major forces to this region
from other sectors of the Soviet-German front and the Western Front. Arrival
of Soviet troops in Austrian territory hastened surrender of fascist German
troops in north Italy and created the threat of isolating fascist German
troops present in Yugoslavia. -
The successful actions of the 4th, 2d, and 3rd Ukrainian fronts in wintAr
and spring 1945 helped the Soviet troops to complete their mission of -
defeating the enemy on the Berlin axis. Liberation of the peoples of
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Austria, and Albania from fascism
became possible owing ta the selfless, victorious struggle of the Soviet
people and its armed forces, led by the Leninist Communist Party.
The people of Yugoslavia and their armed forces, which fought a, war of
liberation for 4 years, made a great contribution to the victory over
German fascism. Bulgarian, Romanian, and Czechoslovakian troops operated
actively on the side of the Soviet Army in the last stage of the war. The
reactionary intentions of the Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, and Yugoslavian
bourgeoise of retaining the regimes present in their countries prior to
World War II fell through. -
In addition to having great political signi~icance, the defeat of larqe
fascist German troop groupings in the south by the Soviet Armed Forces
~ demonstrated the superiority of Soviet strategy, operational art, and
tactics over the art of war of the Fascist German Army. The operations of
the Soviet troops were conducted in a complex military-political situation
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and with insignificant overall superiority in forces over the enemy. Each !
of the operations was typified by uniqueness of intent based on strict
estimation of the real situation and correct assessment of the forces and
possibilities of the sides, flexible maneuvering, and purposefulness in ~
attainment of goals. Organization and maintenance, by the Hq SHC, of .
strategic interaction among three Ukrainian fronts during their advance in
the Carpathians and Hungary was instructive and interesting in these operations.
The problem of preparing and conducting successive strategic operations
mutually coordinated in depth and in front was successfully solved in the
south. '
The major political and strategic results attained by the Soviet Army in
its offensive on Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, and Austrian territory, as
well as in other engagements and battles of World War I2, were mainly the
result of the tremendous organizational activity of the Communist Party ;
which provided daily inspiration to the Soviet peaple and encouraged them
to acts of heroism in combat and labor with the goal of achieving a complete
and final victory over Hitler's Germany. These results are clear
evidence of the high moral-combat qualities of the Soviet troops, and of
the burning patriotism and faithfulness to international duty displayed by ~
these soldiers of liberation.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE SOVIET NAVY'S COMBAT ACTIVITIES
[pp 232-233] The Red Banner Baltic and Northern fleets took an active
part in the 1945 operations against the Fascist German Armed Forces.
~ , Starting in September 1944 the Black Sea Fleet began clearing mines from
the waters and coasts of the B1ack and Azov seas. The Danube Naval
Flotilla, which was taken out of the composition of the Black Sea Fleet,
was subordinated directly to the commander in chief of the navy. During
times of combat it interacted with troops of the 2d and 3rd Ukrainian
fronts, being operationally subordinated to them. The Dniepr River
~ Flotilla interacted with troops of ~~he lst Belorussian Front. The main
~ efforts of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were directed at interdicting the
' enemy's marine lines of communication and defending friendly lines. More-
over it interacted with advancing ground troops to annihilate the enemy's
~ maritime groupings, and it fought enemy surface shipping, preven~ting it
from providing regular direct support to the flanks of ground troops from
' the sea.
i
Fascist German Navy units operating in the Baltic Sea did not have a
! significant influence on the progress enjoyed by Soviet troops on the
~ maritime axis. The superiority of Soviet aviation and its active offensive
� actions in eastern Prussia and Pomerania prevented the Fascist German
i Command from maintaining superiority over the Baltic Sea, despite the fact
' that almost the entire surface fleet, which was superior in quantity and ,
composition to ships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, was concentrated here.
' Occupying the ports, the Soviet Army deprived the enemy fleet of its naval
' bases, which effectively reduced its combat capabilities.
Attempts by the Fascist German Naval Command to interdict northern lines of
communication by submarines alone suffered failure. The Northern Fleet, which
had accumulated a rich amount of experience in submarine warfare by this
time, repelled all attacks together with Allied ships. In 1945 the Fascist
, German Navy lost a large quantity of ships and well-trained personnel. The
struggle on ~he Baltic and Barents seas ended with total defeat of the
Fascist German Na~vy.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
~
ADVANCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN
WESTERN GERMANY AND NORTHERN ITALY i
[pp 264-266] Allied expeditionary forces conducted a number of major ~
operations in Western Europe and Italy in 1945. On the Western Front, they ~
cleared the enemy from all territory west of the River Rhine, and then they
crossed this water obstacle, and encircled and liquidated the fascist i
German troop grouping in the Ruhr industrial r~gion. 5ubsequently ;
exploiting the offensive deep into Germany, the Allied armies reached the ~
River Elba, advanced eastward to an area south of Berlin, and joined the ~
troops of the Soviet Army. Allied troops advancing in Italy together with ~
Italian liberation forces compelled the enemy to surrender. !
1 i
Planning and conducting operatior~s on the Western Front and in Italy, the ~
Allied Command based itself on the notion that the enemy would render
resistance with all available farces and resources. This is why much
attention was devoted to concealment of intentions during the operations.
� The Allies created significant groupings supported by large quantities of ~
aviation on the axes of the mai.n strikes. The troops were concentrated
at night as a rule, with all camouflage and deception measures being I
_ implemented.
~
Major formations and formations intended for the offensi~e were disposed in ~
depth. The assault echelons of the armies usually contai~d twowrps each, ;
and the second echelons contained one corps each. The combat formations of f~
these corps were organized int~ two and three echelons. Armored divisions ~
and brigades were usually placed in:_the second or third echelons of the i.
corps. The infantry and tank attack was preceded by powerful air and
artillery preparation. Thus for example preliminary air preparation in the
operation to encircle fascist German troops in the Ruhr industrial region ~
lasted for a month, and its objective was to isolate the enemy from the ;
rest of Gern~any. The time of air preparation varied from 40 minutes prior i
to an attack by infantry and tanks (on the Italian front) to some 10 hours (
- to 3 days (on the Western Front), and it entailed massed.strikes aqainst
enemy defenses, mainly in the breakthrough sectors. The time of artillery ~
preparation was from 45 mi.nutes to 8 hours. '
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The enemy's tactical defenses were penetrated by infantry formations supported
by tanks, artillery, and aviation. Whenever troops were operating at
strategic depth aviation was usually employed to supply the quickly
- advancing armored and mechanized formations. Airplanes landed at airstrips
located near the front line. Thus for example cargo airplanes and warplanes
with their armament removed flew 20,000 sorties and carried about 60,000
tons..of cargo in April on the Western Front.
A typical feature of offensive operations conducted by the Allied troops in
~lestern Europe and Italy in 1945 was that in most cases they crossed .
significant water obstacles, as a rule following planned preparations.
5ometimes it happened that the troops seized bridgeheads on the move,
capitalizing upon the situation. this was the case on the right bank of the
Rhine, in the vicinities of Remagen and Oppenheim. Much attention was
devoted to all-out operational and logistical support during the crossing
of water obstacles. Extensive steps were taken to insure surprise when
troops of the 21st Army Group crossed the River Rhine. Dummy sectors were
simulated and the concentration of troops and combat equipment on the
planned axes of attack was carefully camouflaged with this purpose. Special
assault landing barges and launches were brought in beforehand, as was a
large quantity of equipment to be used in erecting bridges and crossings.
The troops underwent training in conditions close to those of real battle.
Prior to crossing a river, intense air and artillery preparation was conducted.
Owing to this the enemy defenses on the opposite bank were basically
suppressed, and Allied formations successfully completed their missions, as
a rule encountering weak enemy resistance.
Also deserving of attention is the experience the Allies gained in using
airborne troops, which played a significant role in the crossing of the
River Rhine by troops of the 21st Army Group. Airborne troops were landed
(dropped)..in the enemy rear 8-12 km from the forward edge. Airborne units
were landed 13 hours after infantry and tanks crossed the river. The airborne
troops operated energetically, in accordance with the plan. �
On the whole, the armed forces of the Western Allies made a significant
contribution to the victory over fascist Gern~any in the concluding stage of
the war in Europe. However, it should be kept in mind that military
actions on the Western and Italian fronts were conducted at a time when the
German Supreme High Command no longer possessed the manpower and materiel
it needed, since almost all replacements that could still be mustered were
sent to the east to block the road of the Soviet Armed Forces. ~
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CHAPTER NINE i
~ . I
MILITARY ACTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AND i
ON THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA ~ j
~
[p 278] Military actions in the Atlantic and on the Mediterranean Sea ~
I
ended with defeat of the Fascist German Navy. 2ts surface fleet had been
almost completely knocked out of action back in 1944, and it did not play a i
significant role in the combat activities of January-May 1945. Despite
their large number, surface vessels could not achieve effective results in
the Atlantic basin without the support of other naval and air forces. !
Quantitative and qualitative growth of the manpower..and equipment of ~
A11ied antisubmarine defenses surpassed quantitative and qualitative j
growth of the German submarine fleet. In the concluding stage of the war, +
therE were more than two antisubmarine ships and 8-10 antisubmarine
airplanes for every combat ready German submarine. This ratio was even I
more disadvantageous to Germany if we campare the quantity of o,perating ~
Allied antisubmarine forces with the quantity of submarines actually i
present at sea in the areas of canbat activities. j
I
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The mission of interdicting enemy marine lines of communication, assigned ;
to German submariens, turned out to be unrealistic due to the overwhelming +
superiority of the Allies at sea and in the air, and owing to the tremendous
defeats suffered by the fascist army on the Soviet-German and then on the '
Western Front. The Allies managed to keep their Atlantic and inaritime lines j
of communication operating regularly. Fascist Germany concentrated its
main efforts on the Soviet-German front, and it could not allocate i
significant manpower and resources to the war at sea. Moreover the best ~i
trained naval personnel had been transferred to the ground troops on the
Eastern Front.
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CHAPTER TEN
THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT OF THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE.
FURTHER REVOLUTIONARY TRANSFORMATIONS
[pp 279-281] The resistance, which assumed broad scope in occupied countries,
played an important role in the struggle against fascism. Partisan actions
and armed uprisings, and the heroism of soldiers of the national forces of
liberation will be ~ntered into the chronicle of this struggle forever.* The
; most important factor in creating favorable conditions for activation of
! the resistance movement on territory still occupied by the Germans in
, 1944 was the successes of the Soviet Armed Forces, as well as of troops from
countries belonging to the anti-Hitler coalition. Feeling the defeat of
fascist Genmany to be near, the peoples of the occupied countries i.nten-
sified the struggle for their independence. The working class marched in
the advance guard, headeci by the communist and workers parties. As always,
communists proved themselves to be true patriots and internationalists,
and consistent champions of the liberty and independence of peoples.
However, the resistance movement in Europe would never have attained such
broad scope, had it not been for the heroic, selfless struggle of the Soviet
people and their armed forces, a struggle having no equals in history, and
without the great battles against Hitler's army and troops allied to it.
"The successes of Soviet arms," wrote Italian Comanunist Party Chairman (L.
Longo), "were a powerful stimulus for the peoples of Europe, who rose in the
struggle against fascism. They also provided tremendous help to us when
after the Nazi troops invaded Italy the moment came for transition to
partisan action~, and when all democratic and antifascist forces in the
country united themselves about the banner of the armed conflict."**
* "Tridtsatiletiye Pobedy sovetskogo naroda v Velikoy Otechestvennoy
voyne. Dokumenty i materialy" (The 30th Anniversary of the Vzcto'ry of
the Soviet~People in the Great Patriotic War. Documents and Materials),
P 5�
Cited in: IZVESTIYA, 26 April 1975 ~
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_ The nature and scope of the movement of liberation in different countries ,
varied in 1945 as well. In Yugoslavia, combat activities were conducted in
the enemy rear by formations of the Peoples Liberation Army and by partisan
formations subordinated to it, and for practical purposes it was part and ~
parcel of the combat activities of Yugoslavian armed forces fighting to
liberate their country.* National uprisings were the culmination of the
resistance movement in Czechoslovakia and Italy. On still-occupied ~
territory of Poland, Hungary, and other European countri:es, the resistance ;
movement also developed depending on internal and external conditions. ;
The antifascist struggle of this period was typified by intensification of ;
the influence of communist and workers parties, significant improvement of ;
the armament possessed by partisan forces, better experience, and highe~c
organization of the partisan struggle. ~
As the Soviet Army advanced westward the possibilities the USSR had for
rendering assistance to resistance fighters increased. The Soviet Army
could noW interact on a greater scale with forces of the resistance movement,
and the training of commanders for partisan detachments was continued. Many
thousands of Soviet peop~e operated actively in the resistance movement of ~
peoples in occupied countries. For the mostFart these were officers and enlisted I
men who had escaped from fascist camps. Finding themselves far from the i
motherland, they felt it their sacred duty to fight against the common enemy. ~
Some detachments consisted entirely of Soviet citizens.
Workers, peasants, intelligentsia, and in a number of cases patriotically
predisposed bourgeoise took part in the resistance movement. The union of
the working class and peasantry under the guiding role of the proletariat '
was the backbone of the all-peoples antifascist fronts in occupied countries
of Europe. The urban middle class--craftsmen and petty merchants strangled ~
by the taxes and plunder of governments of occupation that brought small- ~
scale production to ruin--also aligned itself with progressive forces fighting �
against the invaders. ~
Participation~of some micidle bourgeiose of Czechoslovakia, Italy, and other
countries in the resistance movement was dependent on class interests, which
were contrary to the social requirements of the working class and the
working peasantry. Fearing the growth~..of awareness and organization of the
laborers, the bourgeiose attempted to take sole charge of the liberation
movement, to displace the communist-led leftist parties, and to defeat them ~
in the end.
Betraying the national interests of the peoples, the major bourgeoise in '
most European countries collaborated openly or covertly with the fascist ;
German invaders, thus completely discrediting itself in the eyes of the
* These actions are examined in detail in Chapter Six. ~
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masses. Anticommunism and anti-Sovietism were the principal motives of
its policy. In certain cases the major bourgeoise aligned itself with
national fronts at the end of the war in order to keep from isolating
itself and to maintain the possibility for influencing postwar reconstruction
of its countries.
As the defeat of fascist Germany came nearer the struggle concerning the
path to be taken in social development of the given country increased
more and more in the resistance movement. The communist-led peoples-
democratic direction fought not only for national liberation but also for
deep socioeconomic transformations. On the other hand leaders of the
bourgeois direction did everytliing to limit the fight to one of national
liberation and to preserve the foundations of the capitalist structure.
Despite the fact that the resistance movement had its unique traits in '
each country, on the whole it was international in nature. Its participants
were united by a common goal--liberty and independence of peoples oppressed
by the invaders.
The communist and workers parties were the most active organizing force behind
the national antifascist fronts. Through their selfless, consistent struggle
against fascism and for national independence and democratic freedoms, they
won high authoiity in the eyes of the laborers, who became persuaded first-
hand in the difficult trials of the war that communists were true patriots.
The following national fronts were fighting at the beginning of 1945: In
Yugoslavia--the Unified National Liberation Front, in P~iand--the National
Democratic Front, in Czechoslovakia--the National Front of Czechs and Slovaks,
in Hungary--the Hungarian National Front of Independence, and in Italy--
the National Antifascist Front. Creation and reinforcement of the national
fronts was an event of tremendous political importance, mobilizing the broad
masses in the struggle against the common enemy. This struggle continued
. to be the most pressing task of all progressive forces interested in the
fastest possible achievement of liberty and independence of countries
oppressed by German fascism.
The Soviet Union continued to render all-out assistance to the resistance
movement, as well as to armies and formations of peoples-democratic countries
fighting against the Germans on the Soviet-German front. The ruling circles
of the USA and Great Britain followed a different line; from the very
beginning they tried to subordinate the resistance movement to their class
interests. They applied effort to see that this movement would not trans-
form into a mass struggle having deep socioeconomic transformations as its
objective. The policies of the USA and Great Britain were based on the
desire to insure maintenance of capitalist orders in countries liberated
by their armies, for which reason they provided full support to bourgeois
circles. An example of a case where these goals were achieved can be found
in Greece where, as we know, reactionary bourgeoise came into power as a
result of armed English intervention.
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Development of the resistance mavement followed an ascending axrve in most countries, ~
from the lowest to higher forms of warfa re--from sabotage and minor di-
versions to broad partisan actions and armed uprisings. Tremendous losses
on the Soviet-German front forced the German Command to transfer ~
occupation troops to that front from European countries. All of this
created better conditions for the struggle against the invaders. .
Thus the victories of the Soviet Armed Forces helped the peoples of Europe ,
in their struggle for liberation and had a decisive influence upon it,
increasing its scope and activity. The Soviet victories also had a significant ;
influence in that they broadened the front of anticolonial, national ~
liberation movements in countries of Asia and Africa. �
[p 294] The resistance movement was a natural response by the broad masses ~
to the predatory actions of fascist Germany. It was also simultaneously ;
directed against internal reactionary forces, which collaborated with the
invaders in behalf of their own class goals, betraying the interests of
the laborers.
Greater organization and unity of resistance fighters was typical of the I
resistance movement in 1945, as was the fact that members of the resistance
fought in the enemy rear in close asso~iation with troops advancing from
the front. The influence of communist.parties, the principal organizing
force of the resistance movement, increased significantly. The culminating :
events were the antifascist uprisings, which clearly demonstrated the will
of the people in the struggle for liberty and independence.
~
Aid given by the Soviet Union to patriotic forces of countries in Central !
and Southeast Europe oppressed by Nazi Germany and the direct_participation
of Soviet people in the antifascist armed conflict outside their motherland
promoted expansion of the resistance movement. One of the most important
features of this movement in a number of countries was its subsequent ;
transformation into peoples democratic and socialist revolutions, which ;
began and reached their victorious conclusion during the struggle for
liberation; the basic problems of creating new organs of state rule were
solved, land was redistributed, and other social transformations were
brought about.
The working class and its forward units--the communist parties--played the '
leading role in the antifascist struggle. The victories of the Soviet Armed I
Forces, which soundly defeated the fascist German troops, created favorable
conditions for development of the resistance movement in European countries
occupied by fascist Germany. i
[pp 308-309] The resistance movement of peoples in occupied countries of �
Europe was typified in the concluding stage of the war against fascist "
Germany by greater organization, broader application of the methods of
armed conflict, and closer interaction with troops of the anti-Hitler ,
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coalition, especially with the Soviet Army, on the territory of countries
of Central and Southeast Europe.
By their heroic struggle, peoples of European countries under the yoke of
German fascism made an honorable contribution to their liberation.
The Soviet Armed Forces, which soundly defeated the Wehrmacht, played the
decisive role in liberation of Central and Southeast Europe. This also
created conditions favoring the struggle of democratic forces against internal
reaction and for progressive social transformations. The liberation
movement transformed into an unprecedented class struggle against the
structure of exploitation as a whole. Upsetting the supremacy of
reaction, the peoples of Poland, CzechosTovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria,
Romania, Hungary, and Albania assumed a road of revolutionary transformations,
which opened the way for a transition to socialism. The influence of
communists--the most heroic and consistent fighters against fascism--grew
everywhere. The international communist movement became the most unified
and organized force, one bringing lasting peace and social progress to all
people.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN ~
' I ~
THE 'PAKING OF BERLIN. i
THE FINAL LIBERATION OF CZECHOSIAVAKIA ~
I
[p 355] The Berlin and Prague operations were the final operations of the
Soviet Armed Forces in Europe. Having correctly assessed the military- ~
political situation, the Supreme High Comnand Headquarters selected the i
Berlin axis as the main axis of military activities. Troops of the ~
i
lst and 2d Belorussian and the lst Ukrainian fronts participated in the !
defeat of the Berlin grouping. Concurrently executing their own missions, ~
troops of the 4th and 2d Ukrainian fronts conducted an offensive, as a ~
result of which they liberated part of Czechoslovakia and contained sig- i
nificant forces of army groups Center and South. The Berlin operation is ~
an instructive example of swift liquidation of encircled enemy groupings. ~
During it, two major groupings totaling almost 500,000 men were si.r.~ultan- ~
eously eliminated in 10 days. The fact that the course of combat activities !
in terms of both the times of their occu~rrence and the directions of a~vance .i~
of the front basically corresponded to what was planned is clear evidence {
of the high proficiency of command personnel and staffs at.all levels. ~
~
The taking of Berlin--the capital of the fascist state arid its most ~
important military-political and economic center--by Soviet troops foiled i
all of the designs of the Nazi leadership to protract the war and cause ~
division in the ranks of the antifascist coalition, and it accelerated ~
unconditional suurender. The victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the ;
Berlin operation created favorable conditions for liquidating the last ;
major grouping of fascist German troops in Czechoslovakia. ;
The Prague offensive operation was the concluding operation in the war against !
fascist Germany. Prepared and conducted in extremely short time and in a '
complex military-political and strategic situation, it entered the history ~
of war and the art of war as a model of flexible and mobile t~:�oop command ;
and control, of close interaction among the troops of three fronts striking i
on convergent axes, and of highly maneuverable actions making use of the most ~
decisive forms and methods of armed conflict. I
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she Berlin and Prague operations were the crowning glory of Soviet art of war; . ~
they embodied the tremendous experience of the Soviet Armed Forces, accumulated ;
in the previous years of the war. I
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CHAPTER TWELVE
UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF FASCIST GERMANY
[pp 373-374] The demand for unconditional surrender of fascist Germany in
1945 was necessitated by the need for final liquidation of fascism. A
regime of occupation was established as a result of fascism's responsibility
for aqgression, and as a means for insuring satisfaction of the requirements
of unconditional surrender. Germany's unconditional surrender did not
infringe upon the national merit of the German people, nor di3 it under-
mine the foundations of the country's national existence. On the contrary
the defeat of German empirialism--this most evil and mortal enemy of the
laborers--marked the liberation of the German people, the leading forces of
which had ..always fought a selfless struqgle for social and national
liberation of their compat~iots, for their vital interests, and for
maintenance and assurance of peace. This is precisely why the Soviet
government, which insisted upon total demilitarization and democratization
of Germany, saw its main goal to be that of helping the German people ~
assume the broad avenue of peace and social progress, and to promote national
resurrection of the country and reinforcement of its independence.
This approach to unconditional surrender and to the goals of Germany's
occupation was a manifestation of the internationalism and democracy of
foreign policy based on Lenin's pri.nciples of peace, equal rights, and
national self-determination. The honest, humane diplomatic methods of the
Soviet state, which performed the function of an occupying power for the
first time in its history, were such that the concept itself of "occupation"
acquired entirely new meaning in comparison to its former meaning. The
policy of occupation followed by the governments of the USA, England, and
France in the Western part of Germany differed fundamentally. It was least
of all aimed at imparting democratic attributes to the life of the ~German
people. Foll~wing their i.mperialist interests,~;~these countries c3id every-
thing to preserve the ..supremacy of capitalist monopolies and create a
springboard for war against the USSR. They saw the future of Germany not
as a rival but as a kindred class ally..
The Soviet Union followed a policy of all-out assistance and support to
democratic forces, a policy based on consideration of the national interests
of the German people. Giving a high assessment to the contribution made.by
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the Soviet Union to the struggle for satisfying the agreements made at the
Crimean and Potsdam conferences, the Governing Board of the Socialist Unity
Party of Germany noted the following in October 1949: "This noble and
magnanimous struggle by the Soviet Union in behalf of the interests of the
German people deserves the greatest thanks from all honest Germans."*
In their congratulations addressed to the Soviet people in connection with
the 30th anniversary of the uictory of the Great Patriotic War and
Liberation of the German people from fascism, First Secretary of the
Central Committee of the 5ocialist Unity Party of Germany E. Honecker,
Chairman of the GDR State Council W. Stoph, and Chairman of the GDR Council
of Ministers (Kh. Zinderman) wrote: "The people of the German Democratic
Republic will never forget that the people of the Union of So~riet Socialist
Republics, upon the shoulders of whom the main burden of the war had lain,
brought us liberty at the price of uncountable sacrifices, constantly '
offered disinterested assistance, and paved the way for a bright socialist
future."**
Finally the requirements of Germany's unconditional surrender laid the
foundation for security in Europe and foresaw development of neighborly
relations among all countries on the basis of the principles of independence
and national sovereignty, equal rights, noninterference.in internal
affairs, mutual advantage, and peaceful coexistence between states with
different social structures.
'That these principles are realistic can be...seen in the results of the
Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe held in August 1975. It
initiated a. new stage in relaxation of tension, and it was an important
step in reinforcing the principles of peaceful coexistence and achieving
the relations of equitable and mutually advantageous coopera~ion between
states with different social structures. "The results were worth the effort,"
L. I. Brezhnev noted in:his Accountability Report to the 25th CPSU Congress.
"The conference collectively confirmed the inviolability of the presently
existing borders. The principles of international mutual re'_ationships,
ones that completely--in letter and in spirit--satisfy the requirements of
peaceful coexistence, have been summarized. Thus favorable conditions have
been created for maintaining and strengtheni.ng peace on the entire continent:'***
Further relaxatior, of international tension, for which the US5R and other .
socialist countries are untiringly fighting, is leading to greater stability
of international ties, to reinforcement of international legal rules, to the
triumph of justice, and to creation of favorable possibilities for insuring
economic and social progress of all peopies.
* Cited in: "Za antifashistskuyu demokraticheskuyu Germaniyu. Sbornik
dokumentov 1945-1949 gg." (For an Antifascist Democratic Germany. Collection
of Documents 1945-1949), p 6500
Cited in:. PFiAVDA, 9 May 1975.
Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim Kursom" (Following Lenin's Course), Vo1 5,
p 468.
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PART TWO
POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND ART OF WAR
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
ORGANIZATIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL WORK
BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY
_ [pp 395-396] In the concluding stage of the war in Europe the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, which now had almost 4 years of experience in
leading the country during the most bloody and savage of all wars,
continued to concentrate the state's main efforts in the decisive sector--
_ mobilization of all manpower and resources in behalf of a swift and
total victory. With this purpose the party did everything possible to
raise the effectiveness of all of its party or.ganiza~ions, and it directed
their activities at achieving more efficient and effective fulfillment of
the Central Committee's decisions and the State Defense Committee's
assignments. It distributed its forces with a consideration for the
new tasks facing ~he country at the end of the war, and it did a tremendous
amount of work to select, train, place,aZd indoctrinate party, soviet, and
administrative personnel.
The Communist Party devoted special attention to management of the Soviet
Armed Forces, and of troops fighting outside the Soviet Union. Relying on
~ the military councils, commanders, political agencies, and party organ-
izations, it firmly and consistently implemented its policy in the army
and navy. Under party guidance the Soviet soldiers honorably completed
their great mission of liberation and defended the interests of the Soviet -
people. Tn the numerous engagements of the concluding stage of the war in
Europe the personnel of the Soviet Arn~ed Forces once again demonstrated
bravery, heroism, and high combat proficiency. Responsible for this was the
great effectiveness of party-political work conducted right during the course
of all operations, ihe party Central Committee armed the army and navy
party organizations with a clear program of action. Military councils and
political agencies competently completed the tasks posed to them. Nurtured
in the ideals of patriotism and proletarian internationalism, Soviet soldiers
successfully completed their international duty.
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The party devoted considerable attention to managing state and social ;
organizations. Intensifying its influence on the masses, through them '
it directed the growing enthusiasm of the Soviet people at solving the
priority problems--achieving final defeat of fascism and rehabilitating the !
national economy.
The activity and creative initiative of the working class, the kolkhoz I
peasantry, and the Soviet intelligentsia grew significantly as a result of ;
the party's tremendous organizational activity. Through all of its work ;
it insured further reinforcement of the military-economic and political
power of the Soviet Union, and strengthening of its rear. Owing to this
the front received new combat equipment, armament, and gear continuously ~
and in adEquate guantities. ,
The party organizations were the spxrit of production collectives, constantly ~
replenishing them with new, fresh forces, from among the best representatives ~
of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry, and Soviet intelligentsia. ~
Ideological-political work among the people played an important role in '
solving the tremendous problems facing the Soviet Union in the concluding
stage of the war in Europe. The party o�rganized and conducted this work
with a consideration for the national economic tasks and the military-politica'.
situation. Raising the political awaren,ess of the people, the Communist
Party indoctrinated the Soviet people in the spirit of socialist patriotism
and proletarian internationalism.
The leading and guiding activity of the Communist Party and its organizational
and ideological work were the main factor in total defeat of fascist Germany
and in the victorious conclusion to the war in Europe.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
CONTINUED.GROWTH OF. THE SOVIET UNION'S NATIONAL
ECONOMY. TRANSITION TO PEACEFUL CONSTRUCTION
i'~
[p 420] The first half of 1945 was typified by further reinforcement of
the Soviet Union's domestic and international position. Relying on the
advantages of the socialist structure and Marxist-Leninist ideology, the ~
Communist Party promoted a new rise in the creative activity of the people.
Firm economic foundations and the spiritual,strength of the Soviet society
_ made swift conclusion of the war in Europe and transition of the economy
to peacetime operation possible.
In addition to the continuation of war production, an extensive amount of
work was done to rehabilitate the national economy; more and more industrial
enterprises were switched to production of peacetime goods. While the
country was at war, it concurrently took confident steps on the road to '
peaceful construction. The strength and inviolability of its domestic
position were especially evident on the~background of the acute antagonistic
contradictions typical of the economies of capitalist countries.
The titanic activity of the Com�nunist Party insured reinforcement and
development of the USSR's war economy in the concluding stage of the war
in Europe. Its activity was the most important source of the historic
victory enjoyed by socialist society over fascism.
The better economic and political organization of the socialist state made
~ it possible to mobilize materiel and manpower much more completely and
quickly, and to utilize it more effectively. The Soviet people's military,
economic, ideoloqical, and political victory in the war against fascist
Germany was attained under the leadership of the Communist Party, as a result
of its tremendous political and organizational activity.
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN ~
THE WAR ECONOMIES OF TEiE PRINCIPAL CAPITALIST COUNTRIES
, j
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[p 438] The principal capitalist countries met the end of the war with their
. economies exhibiting different levels of develo,pment.
;
The United States of America, which was oceans away from the region of combat `
activities and which suffered no losses of any sort on its own territory, I
grew richer from the war. Transformation of monopolistic capitalism into ~
state-monopolistic capitalism was accelerated, and capital became dramatically ~
more centralized. The largest monopolies enjoyed tremendous profits. The
most i.mportant international trade markets were in their hands. All of
this presaged an even more active offensive against its weakened competitors ~
in different regions of the world. At the same time the country's social ~
conflicts associated with transition of the economy to a,peactetime status,
which was accompanied by mass layoffs of workers, became more acute. Con- !
currently the state paid the industrial companies tremendous monetary `
compensation at the expense of the taxpayers for uncompleted military pro-
duction and unutilized production capacities. i
The English economy was weakened. The possibilities this largest of the
. capitalist countries had for influencing international relations were
limited. However, the sphere of British dominance continued to be quite I.
vast even after the war. As before, England was the financial and economic , i
center of countries dependent upon it. Its monopolies continued to exploit :
the colonies. The social essence of the country's domestic policy was the ~
same as in the USA--further reinforcement of monopolies. This policy had !
a class antagonistic nature in relation to the laborers, and it aggravated
the social conflicts. '
~ ;
Having suffered an.annihilatory defeat, fascist Germany co~?pletely lost its 1
markets, and its own territory was occupied. The economy was severely under- ~
mined and disorganized.
The influence of the USA on the economies of countries in Western Europe I
_ intensified during the time of the world's postwar reconstruction. As a
result many of these countries obediently followed the foreign policy course
of the American government. ~
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN
THE ART OF WAR OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE WARRING COUNTRIES
[pp 439-459] 1. Typical Traits of the Ar.t of War of the Soviet Armed Forces
As in previous years, in the concluding stage of the war in Europe the
Communist Party Central Committee and the Soviet government made maxi.mum
use of all of the state's material, military, and moral possibilities to
attain a final voctory over the enemy. The tremendous scope of the struggle
on the Soviet-German front necessitated further reinforcement of the armed
forces and provision of modern combat equipment to them.
Despite the difficulties of wartime, the inestimable havoc caused on
territory temporarily occupied by the enemy and the sacrifices suffered
in the previ.ous years of the war, the Soviet Union produced a sufficient
quantity of combat equipment and armament, and it had more manpower than
did fascist Germany. The standing army was outfitted with armament and
combat equipment of superior quantity and sophisticated quality. The
process of creating new models of armament continued on into 1945. The
I1-10 ground-attack airplane, which possessed improved armament and armor,
was used for the first time in February. Quantitative and qualitative
growth of ground attack aviation made it possible to increase the amount of
air support given to ground troops. The quantity of tanks and especially of
medium and heavy self-propelled guns increased. The troops enjoyed growth
in the quantity of inedium and large caliber guns, automatic weapons, military
engineering equipment, and communication resources.
In comparison with 1944 the organizational structure of the Soviet Armed
Forces did not experience significant changes in 1945. During the combat
activities the 2d and lst Baltic fronts.were disbanded, and their armies
were transferred into the composition of the Leningrad and 3rd Belorussian
fronts. Of the 22d, 5th, and 39th_.armies, which were placed into the Head-
quarters Reserve, the last two beqan regrouping in the Far East. The 9th
Guards Army was formed once again. Units and formations of the 5upreme
High Command's artillery reserve continued to grow larger.
Now that the Soviet Armed Forces were outfitted with modern weapons their
fighting power increased significantly, the possibilities the units, formations,
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and major formations enjoyed for fighting and maneuvering grew greater, ~
and they became more independent in operations. Fronts participating in the
eas~ern Prussian, Vistula-Oder, and Berlin operations had from five to ten ,
combined arms armies, one or two tank armies, and one air army, as well as '
a large quantity of reinforcements. Each of these fronts contained 54-82 ~
rifle divisions, 2-4 separate tank and mechanized corps, 1-2 cavalry corps,
9,000-12,000 guns and mortars (76 mm and higher), and 1,000-3,600 tanks and
self-prc;~~elled guns. The fighting strength of combined arms armies increased,
and tank armies possessed from 600 to 925 tanks and self-propelled guns; the ;
quantity of airplanes in frontal air armies was 1,500-3,200 units. The
enlargement of the fighting strength of fronts and armies due to the decrease
in length of the 5oviet-German front permitted the Supreme High Command to
create, in 1945, more-powerful troop groupings in sectors of the front about
twice smaller than in 1944, using a greater density of personnel and equip- ~
ment per kilometer of front. !
Soviet strategy, which was distinguished by purposefulness and decisiveness,
was based in operational planning on the greater military and economic
possibilities of the country, further growth of the power of the armed forces, ~
- the tremendous amount of experience accumulated in preceding years, and the i
exceptionally high moral-combat spirit of all personnel.
i
The Communist Party initiated even greater organizational and indoctrination ~
work in the armed forces. After military actions moved outside the USSR ~
the military councils of the fronts, fleets, and armies and the political ;
agencies and party organizations of the army and navy restructured all of ~
their work in application to the new conditions. Utilizing the accumulated
experience, commanders of all ranks artfully employed the available manpower ~
and equipment to complete their missions. ~
i
Defeat of the largest enemy groupings, liberation of the countries of Central i
and Southeast Europe from the fascist invaders and, finally, the final
victory over Nazi Germany were the military-political goals of the concluding i
stage of the war on the European continent. They were attained through ,
major offensive operations on the maritime, Berlin, Vienna, and Prague axes, !
in which the total depth of advance was over 800 lan, and which had the ~
objective of total defeat of fascist Germany. ~
Simultaneous initiation of major offensive operations and continuity of their ;
conduct throughout the entire campaign were distinguishing features of the ;
Soviet Army's strategic offensive in 1945. This became possible owing to '
dramatic reduction of the length of the Soviet-German front and further
changes in the balance of power in favor of the Soviet troops. This method ~
for conducting the strategic offensive was extremely effective, since it
prevented the enemy from maneuvering his reserves. ~
I
The eastern Pomeranian, lower and upper Silesian, and then the Berlin and '
Prague operations were conducted in the wake of the Vistula-Oder operation
and in the course of the eastern Prussian operation, without interruption or -
after short pauses. The conduct of strategic operations that were successive ~
in depth withir. the framework of a single campaign was clear evidence of
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the greater power of the Soviet Armed Forces, and of the maturity and
proficiency of the Soviet Supreme High Command, which insured prompt develop-
ment of plans for subsequent operations, prompt assignment of new missions
to the fronts, creation of strike groupings on new axes within the shortest
time possible, and provision of appropriate materiel to the these groupings.
This was the most decisive and effective method of combat activities, and it
led to deep separation of the enemy's strategic front on some axes, and in
the end it hastened the enemy's defeat.
As before, correct selection of the axis of the main strike as well as -
sensible distribution of inen and equipment on different strategic axes
played an important role in fulfillment of the missions of the troops. Thus
artful selection of the axis of the main strike in the eastern Prussian
operation made it possible for Soviet troops to quickly cut off the entire
enemy grouping from the central regions of fascist Germany, to divide it,
and then to destroy it in parts. The axis of the main strike in the Vistula-
Oder and Berlin operations coincided with the planned main strike axis for
the campaign. This strike was made by Soviet troops in the central sector
~ of the front against a large strategic enemy grouping, the defeat of the
latter opening up possibilities for capturing Germany's capital--Berlin.
Creation of superior forces and resources on this axis within extremely short
time insured attainment of the planned military-political goals. At the
~ same time the strike on the Vienna axis resulted in the defeat of major
forces on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, while the strike on
the Prague axis led to encirclement of a significant enemy grouping in
Czechoslovakia and its subsequent capture.
The purposeful and decisive nature of Soviet strategy corresponded fully with
the operational principles of fractionating the enemy's strategic front
followed by encirclement and annihilation of his isolaLed groupings, to
include reserves transferred from other sectors. Thus not only the enemy's
main forces but also a significant proportion of his reserves were destroyed
in the eastern Prussian, Vistula-Oder, Berlin, and other operations.
The total duration of strategic operations also decreased in 1945. Thus while
in 1944 most operations took from 45 (L'vov-Sandomierz) to 85 days (defeat of
the enemy in the Right-Bank Ukraine), in 1945 the duration of the larger
operations, with the exception of the eastern Prussian operation, did not
exceed 25-30 days; moreover the Prague operation was only 6 days long.
There were several reasons for the length of the eastern Prussian operation
(103 days). First, the main forces of Army Group Center managed to withdraw
to Zemlandskiy Peninsula to the environs of Konigsberg, and to the Heilsberg
fortified positions. Second, being isolated only on land, the enemy
continued to receive ammunition, fuel, and other materiel, which undoubtedly
increased his possibilities for resistance. Moreover the Soviet troops, -
which had suffered serious losses in previous battles, had to successively
annihilate enemy groupings defending themselves in fortified regions.
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The depth of strategic operations varied from 120 to 500 ]an. A distin-
guishing trait is that the depth of operations was often dependent not '
only on the combat capabilities of the advancing troops but also on the
distance to the line that had to be attained. Thus the depth of the ~
Vienna and Prague operations was the product of the distance of the Austrian ~
and Czechoslovakian capitals from the Soviet-German front line, while the ~
depth of the eastern Prussian and eastern Pomeranian operations was qoverned ,
by the distance to the coast of the Baltic Sea. In the Berlin operation
the Soviet troops were limited in their advance by the River Elba, where ~
- they were to meet up with the Allies. ;
The strate ic o erations of 1945 I
g p generally surpassed the operations of 1944
in terms of the rate of advance. The average rate of advance in the concluding i
stage of the war was up to 25 ]an (the average daily rate of advance of tank I
armies varied from 20 to 40 lan, while in the Vistula-Oder operation they ~
achieved the maximum rate--50-70 lan). The tank armies were utilized uniquely I~
in that following their committment to the engagement, as a rule they oper- i
ated significant distances away from major combined-arms formations (often
50-SO lan) . I
i~
Massed use of tank major formations and formations played a positive role in i;
attainment of operational and strategic goals. Several tank armies and
separate tank and mechanized corps were used in each of a number of frontal ~
operations. Thus in the Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations the lst Belorussian I
- and lst Ukrainian fronts each possed two tank armies and two to four separate i
tank and mechanized corps. Supported by aviation, these units were pre-
cisely the decisive force in attainment of the high rates of advance. Having !
great striking power and mobility, they penetrated enemy defenses swiftly I
to strategic depths, reaching the flanks and the rear of the enemy groupings. ;
Bold and artful actions by tank major formations and formations made it '
difficult for the enemy to maneuver his reserves, and it created advantageous ~
conditions for their defeat in parts. i
Operations conducted in 1945, such as the eastern Prussian, Berlin, and ~
Prague, are models of combat actions aimed at encircling large enemy ~
groupings. No less interesting from the standpoint of the art of war were
the actions aimed at encircling the enemy in the cities of Schneidemuhl,
Poznan, Oppeln, and Breslau, in lower and upper Silesia, and in other ! r-
reqions.
The means of encirclement employed in 1945 were the most diverse. In the
eastern Prussian operation the entire enemy grouping was cut off by performing ;
an enveloping strike from the lower reaches of the Narew River toward Elbing. i
During the offensive, two fronts pressed significant German forces to the !
sea, and their division and annihilatiQn was in fact performed by armies ~
of j.ust one front.. i
What was new in the defeat of fascist German troops in eastern Prussia. was
that the grouping, which was.separated and then divided into three parts,
~ -
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was annihilated successively, beginning with the largest part based at
Heilsberg. Soviet forces that were subsequently freed were regrouped on
another axis-- in the vicinity Konigsberg and Zemlandskiy Peninsula. The
reason it took a long time to annihilate the encirled enemy at Poznan,
Breslau, Budapest, and ~ther cities can be explained by the fact that the
Soviet command left insignificant forces to complete destruction of the
enemy troops, and by difficulties in conducting combat activities. For
these reasons as well as because the enemy received reinforcements by sea,
his encircled iivisions on the Baltic coast (in eastern Prussia. and
Kurlyandiya) were able to offer prolonqed resistance.
Two to three fronts worked simultaneously at strategic depth to encircle
� strategic enemy groupings, subdivide them, and subsequently annihilate them
in the Berlin and Prague operations. In this case enemy encirclement was
planned to occur as a rule in conjunction with the enemy's subdivision,
which made it possible to defeat him within short time.
The nature of the terrain, which made it possible to perform deep strikes in
the Vistula-Oder operation, and the inclination for a high rate of advance
served as the grounds for the Soviet command to make powerful divisive strikes
in the directions of Poznan, Breslau, and Cracow with the goal of fractionating
the enemy's strategic front. In the eastern Pomeranian operation the enemy
; defenses were subdivided by deep strikes conducted by two fronts reaching to
the sea.
The combination of strategies listed above was typical of most strategic
operations of 1945. As a rule they began by penetration of enemy defenses
simultaneously on several axes by powerful strike groupings,. Subsequent
deep wedging-in by Soviet troops fractionated and subdivided the enemy front
into a number of isolated sectors.. This created the conditions for exploiting
the offensive by strike groupings on converging axes with the goal of
encircling both strategic (in the eastern Prussian, Berlin, and Prague oper-
ations) and operational (in the Vistu7:a-Oder, eastern Pomeranian, and other
operations) groupings of German troops.
Presence of strategic reserves and their competent concentration on the most
i.mportant axes at the decisive moment had tremendous significance to
preparations for the op~erations and to attainment of the final victory. ~
Large reserves of perscnnel, armament, ammunition,, transportation, and
communication resources were accumulated beforehand under the supervision of
the Supreme High Command Headquarters. They were basically created by
placing combined-arms and tank armies and separate formations belonging to
different arms and services into the Headquarters Reserve. During preparation
for and conduct of the campaign, 23 combined-arms and four tank armies were
taken out of the composition of the operating fronts, and only two of the
armies placed into the Headquarters Reserve were new (9th Guards Army and
Polish 2d Army).
~ One unique feature of operations conducted in 1945 was simultaneous deploy-
~ ment of strike groupings.on.all strategic axes. This is why most armies
present in the Headquarters Reserve were transferred to the fronts back in
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the time of preparations for an offensive. Newly created strategic reserves '
were used basically to exploit the offensive on the main axis--the
Berlin axis. Thus the 3rd, 28th, and 31st armies, placed into the Head- '
quarters Reserve out of the 3rd Belo~ussian Front,significantly reinforced
the lst Belorussian and lst Ukrainian fronts in the Berlin operation. In
a11,15 of the 18 combined arms armies transferred from the Headquarters
Reserve into the standing army were moved to the axis of the main strike.
This made it possible to maintain significant superiority in men and
equipment over the enemy, and to achieve major results, which in turn had ~
a decisive influence on the course of the armed conflict on other strategic ~
axes of not only the Soviet-German but also the Western Front. Strategic
rese~-ves were also maneuvered when the fronts needed additional forces to I
complete new missions. Thus ~e 19th Army was transferred to the 2d Belorussian
Front in connection with its mission of defeating the enemy in eastern !
Pomerania, and the 9th Guards Army was transferred to the 3rd Ukrainian ~
Front to create a strike grouping in the Vienna operation.
Reinforcement of the front with reserves and creation of strike groupings
on new axes made significant troop transfers necessary. They attained
especially great scale during preparations for the January offensive, when
many formations and major formations had to be transferred hundreds ~
and even thousands of kilometers. Significant regroupings were performed I
in the course of combat activities as well. Troops of the 19th Army were ,
advanced from the vicinity of Vologda to eastern Pomerania, troops of the ~
3rd, 28th, and 31st armies were transferred from eastern Prussia tQ the I
Berlin axis, and troops of the Polish 2d Army were transferred from Warsaw '
to the vicinity of Schneidemuhl and then to lower Silesia. In addition to
this, an entire front underwent regrouping: After the eastern Pomeranian :
operation the 2d Belorussian Front was transferred from the vicinity of '
Danzig to the lower reaches of the Oder. The Prague operation began after ~
the main forces of the lst Ukrainian Front were turned from the Berlin '
Axis to the Prague axis and the main forces of the 2d Ukrainian Front were ~
concentrated in an area north of Vienna. ;
Performing major regroupings, the Supreme High Command Headquarters achieved
a superiority in men and equipment over the enemy on the axes of the main !
st~ikes. Typical traits ..in the organization and conduct of the regroupings
included transfer of troops and equipment in limited time over great distances, I i-
flixible maneuver of reserves, and competent concentration of forces at the i
decisive moment on the most important axis. This was made possible due to ~
the supremacy of Soviet aviation in the air. i;
In 1945 the Soviet command achieved effective strategic interacti~n among
armed forces groupings operating in different sectors of the front. It was I�
organized by the Headquarters, during preparations for the concluding cam-
paign in Europe, and it was constantly maintained throughout it. The efforts
of the troops on all axes were efficiently coordinated, the moment of going
over to the offensive was clearly determined, the axes of the main and auxil- '
iary strikes were spelled out, and the deadlines for reaching planned lines ~
were planned. Organizing interaction, the Headquarters devoted special ~i
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attention to coordinating the actions of the fronts in behalf of insuring
the success of the troops on the main axis.
Interaction during the offensive in January and February took the form of
simultaneous frontal strik~s between the Baltic Sea and the Danube. Thus
the enemy in Poland was defeated si.multaneously with active operations
by Soviet troops in eastern Prussia and in the ~arpathians. Successful
combat activities in the vicinity of Budapest and Lake Balaton as well as -
containment of ma~~or enemy forces in Kurlyandiya had important significance
to achieving the planned objectives in the central sector. From the
-standpoint of organizing interaction, the concluding strategic operation--
the Berlin operation--is instructive; it was planned and conducted by
troops of the 2d and lst Belorussian and lst Ukrainian fronts. A concurrent
offensive by troops of the 4th, 2d, and 3rd Ukrainian fronts in Czechoslo-
vakia and Austria contained enemy forces on the territory of these countries
and prevented the enemy from rendering assistance to the Berlin grouping.
Strategic interaction among different branches of the armed forces was
organized as a rule in the interests of the ground troops. Interaction of
strategic aviation with ground troops involved utilization of the former
against the enemy's airfields, communication centers, and major rear ~
objectives, and usually to amplify the strikes made by frontal air armies.
Several air armies were often brought in to support the actions of a single
front, as was the case in the assault on Konigsberg and in the Balaton and
Vienna operations. Interaction of ground troops with the navy and air force
- could be~.seen i.n the eastern Prussian, eastern Pomeranian, and Berlin
operations, as well as in blockade of the Kurlyandiya grouping. Interaction
with the air.defens e forces was achieved by broad use of the air force to
i cover objectives in the frontal rear. This made it possible to use frontal
I air defense resourc es to provide direct cover to the troops.
The experience of c oalition.strategy enjoyed further development i.n the
concluding stage of the war in Europe. It experienced significant alterations
at its foundation.. As before, the most important questions were resolved
by the heads of state employing personal correspondence, and conferences
attended by the leaders of the powers were conducted in critical periods
of military events with the participation of representatives from the Soviet
Armed Forces Genera 1 Staff, and the Allied committees of the chiefs of staff.
Bilateral and multilateral meetings of chiefs of staff or their authorized
f representatives and of permanent military and economic missions of these
i countries were held.
i Interaction between the armed forces of states in the anti-Hitler coalition
j took the form of coordination of combat activities in time, as a rule when
j this was extremely necessary for the Allies (as with the events in the
~ Ardennes), or it took the form of providing orientation in a particular
~ situation (as befor e the Berlin operation). Operational interaction of
~ the armed forces was more concrete, taking the form of establishing lines at
: which Allied troops were to encounter each other and separation lines
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governing the activities of aviation, and coordination of ineasures con-
cerning administrative problems. On the whole despite absence of a single
agency to coordinate the overall effort, this system was sufficiently
flexible, and it played a positive ro1e.
Interaction of the Soviet Army with Allied troops operating on the Soviet-
German front (Bulgarian, Polish, Ramanian, and Czechoslovakian units
and formations) was different. It was distinguished by great mutual
understanding, military efficiency, and combat effectiveness. Efforts were ~
coordinated with the help of perraanent representatives
between executives and correspondence between them, and directacontactnbers .
I
tween commanders of interacting troops. This insured unity of understanding ~
~
of the operational missions, and purposeful command and control in joint ~
operations.
I
Use of Soviet military specialists in the armed forces of Poland and
Czechoslovakia to help organize training with a consideration for the
experience level had great significance. Representatives of the Soviet ~
Military Command and the General Staff, advisors, and instructors were '
assigned to the operational and troop staffs of Allied troops. ~king,part ~
in joint combat actions as components of the fronts and.armies of the Soviet i
Armed Forces and performing concrete missions in the operations, Allied
units and formations liberated major centers and areas in their countries
(Warsaw, Prague). The Main Com4nand of the Polish Army and the commander of
the Czechoslovakian I Army Corps executed missions assigned to them under
the guidance of the USSR Supreme High Command Headguarters, and under the ~
political guidance of their national governments. Problems concerning ~
operational use of troops were resolved as a rule by the Soviet Command. I
Interaction with the troops of Romania and Bulgaria, the armies of which I
were distinguished from Soviet troops by their organization, armament, I
equipment, their training and indoctrination system, and their training I
level, had somewhat different characteristics. In general, interaction of
the troops of these countries with the Soviet Armed Forces entailed their ~
subordination to the Soviet Command. Thus the Romanian lst and 4th armies
fought as part of the 2d Ukrainian Front, while the Bulgarian lst Axmy was ~
operationally subordinated to the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. I
Romanian and Bulgarian forniations contained 5oviet operational rou s.n ~
5 P~ gs
that rendered assistance in organizing the c~nbat activities and controlling
the troops; these groupings were canmanded by Soviet advisors and signal I
otficers. The staffs of these fronts also contained Romanian and Bulgarian
operational groups essentially performing the functions of intermediate links
_ between their troops and Soviet troops. Interaction with the army of '
Yugoslavia was unique in that joint cambat actions were coordinated upon '
in meetings between Soviet and Yugoslav tr~op cammanders at different levele. :
_ A system of strategic management was developed and tested in the field, I
and the functions and work methods of the uppermost agencies of the Soviet '
Military Com~aand were clearly s,pelled out by 1945. As before, the Supreme ~
~
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High Command Headquarters managed the armed conflict through the General
Staff and the directorates of the Peoples Commissariat of Defense and the
Peoples Commissariat of the Navy. Greater centralization was one of the
typical features of Soviet strategy. Because the length of the Soviet-
German front decreased, the quantity of frontal major formations declined,
the proficiency of the frontal command.. i.mgroved, and it became necessary to
organize closer interaction, the Headquarters recognized it suitable to
abolish its representatives in those fronts which were operating on the most
important strategic axes, leaving them only on..the flanks, in Kurlyandiya
and in Hungary. The evolved system of supreme command agencies insured
successful planning of strategic operations and flexible management of the
armed conflict. Frontal troop commanders began to suggest proposals
more frequently to the Headquarters and the General Staff, which in turn
helped ~e latter to estimate the situation on strategic axes more deeply and
correctly, and to determine the eflmbat capabilities of the Lronts better.
The Soviet fronts waged their offensive almost simultaneously on all
strategic axes and over a huge area. Despite this, the Headquarters of the
Supreme High Command reacted quickly to the current situation, promptly
reached new decisions, and implemented them firmly.
As in preceding years, the Supreme iiigh Command Headquarters carried full
responsibility before the party Central Committee and the State Defense
Committee for the course of the armed conflict on the fronts, for the
battleworthiness of the troops, and for the activities of all military
executives.
In comparison with the second half of 1944 the total number of fronts decreased
in 1~45. They were headed by famous t~oop commanders such as marshals of
the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevskiy, L. A. Govorov, G. K. Zhukov, I. S. Konev,:
R. Ya. Malinovskiy, K..K. Rokossovskiy, and F. I. Tolbukhin, and generals
I. Kh. Bagramyan, A. I. Yeremenko, I. Ye. Petrov, and 2. D. Chernyakhovskiy
(until 18 February). The frontal staffs were led by generals A. N. Bogolyubov,
M. V. Zakharov, S. P. Ivanov, F. K. Korzhenevich, V. V. Kurasov, M. S.
Malinin, A. P.,Pokrovskiy, M. M. Popov, L. M. Sandalov, and V. D.
Sokolovskiy.
The significant rise in the fighting and numerical strength of the fronts
and armies, the greater quantity of more-sophisticated types of infantry
weapons, artillery, tanks, and airplanes, and the tremendous amount of combat
experience accumulated by the command all had a significant influence on
development and improvement of operational art and tactics of the Soviet
Army.
Frontal and army offensive operations were typified by a reduction of their
duration, decisiveness of objectives, utilization of different forms o~
operational maneuvering, and greater results. As a rule the fronts con-
centrated their efforts on a single operational axis, making their
penetration in from one to three sectors. The fronts allocated 50-70 percent of
their rifle formations, 70-80 percent of their artillery, 80-�100 percent of
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their tanks and self-propelled guns and usually almost all of their aviation
to the breakthrough sector, which occupied 10-15 percent of the total length
of the front's zone of advance. This insured creation of a high density -
of inen and equipment and significant superiority over the enemy, and it made
it possible to penetrate the enemy's tactical defenses within l.or 2 days.
::reation of powerful strike groupings by the fronts and armies in short
time was a distinguishing trait of strategy in 1945. This can be explained _
by the greater possibilities all arms and services had for maneuvering, and
by rapid regrouping of operational and strategic reserves.
~ After the enemy's tactical defenses were penetrated Soviet troops exploited `
the success at operational depth. All arms of the ground troops and
aviation were employed extensively for this purpose, though tank formations
and major formations played a special role. They, as well as the second
echelons and reserves, had the decisive role in conducting an uninterrupted
offensive, in conducting pursuit, in penetrating enemy lines of defense on
the move, and in destroying his withdrawing formations and incominq reserves.
A unique feature of many operations in 1945 was pursuit, which was conducted r
at a high rate and to a great depth. As a result the enemy was deprived of
the possibility for utilizing previously prepared lines, and his reserves
were annifiilated in parts by Soviet mobile troops and aviation before they
could even get to the front line. Pursuit of the enemy was the most
effective during the Vistula-Oder operation; it began in the 2d~or.3rd day
of tlle offensive and continued.:without a halt until the Oder was reached.
Frontal and army mobile groups and aviation as well as the strong forward
detachments of advancing major formations and formations played the main
role in this pursuit.
Soviet troops successfully surmounted many water obstacles during their
offensive operations, and usually on the move, as was the case when troops
_ of the lst Belorussian and lst Ukrainian fronts surmounted the rivers Pilica,
Warta, Notec, Obra, Bobr, Oder, Spree, and others. The:crossing was usually
started by mobile troops and the forward detachments of rifle formations.
Their success was insured by a swift crossing to captured bridgeheads by
the main forces of the combined-arms armies together with their reinforcements.
Soviet troops also improved their proficiency in crossing rivers following
planned preparations. The crossing of the Oder by troops of the 2d
Belorussian Front and_of the Neisse by troops of the lst Ukrainiar. Front is
of special interest. Artillery and engineering troops as well as specially
prepared assault echelons of the rifle troops played an especially
important role in planned preparations for the crossing of large rivers.
Success depended to a significant extent on suppressing the enemy's defensive
firepower on the opposite bank, on timely preparation of crossing resources
and crossing equipment, on swift accumulation of inen and equipment on bridge-
heads captured by the assault echelons, on competent utilization of the
possibilities offered by naval river flotillas by the combined-arms '
commanders, on effective support to troops fighting to widen the bridgeheads,
on their air:cover, and on powerful artillery f ire.
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Making extensive use of the accumulated experience, Soviet troops sig-
nificantly enriched the theory and practice of organizing and conducting
combat actions against large cities, most of which were taken as a result
of bold bypass maneuvers by mobile troops, surprise approach of the city
by large forces, and their swift attack from several directions. Such
actions made it possible to destroy enemy garrisons in swift battles with-
- out causing any considerable dan?age to the cities. This was the strategy followed
in liberating Marienburg, Bydgoszcz, Lodz, Cracow, Radom, Czestochowa,
� Bratislava, Brno, and others. Meanwhile cities such as Budapest, Vienna,
Poznan, Elbing, Schneidemuhl, Kostrzyn, Danzig, Konigsberg, Breslau, Berlin,
and others that had been carefully prepared by the fascists for a lengthy
defense had to be liberated by Soviet troops in savage battles. Rifle
subunits reinforced by tanks, artillery, and sappers supported by artillery
and aviation played the decisive role in their assault.
Defensive operations by the fronts and armies were insignificant in number
in 1945. Soviet troops usually went~over to defense in the concluding stage
of an operation, basically to secure captured lines, make preparations for
the next offensive operation, and repel enemy counterattacks. Thus when troops of the
3rd Ukrainian Front were conducting a defensive operation in the vicinity of
Lake Balaton, the Soviet Army, which had a complete grasp on the strategic
initiative at that time, conducted major offensives.on the other axes of the
Soveit-German front. The unique �eatures of actions by the Soviet troops
included: steadfastness, high artfulness in organizing antitank defense,
greater activity and stability of antitank defense owing to rapid creation
of new defensive lines in deptr., prompt occupation of these lines by the
troops, and swift regrouping of units and formations, especially antitank ~
resources, in threatened sectors. The supremacy of Soviet aviation and its
powerful strikes against advancing enemy groupings went a long way to increase
stability of defense and created favorable aonditions for maneuver.
The Soviet Army`s tactics developed under the influence of the growing level
of the latest combat equipment possessed by the units and formations, further
growth ~n the proficiency of the enlisted men and officers, and improvement
of their moral-combat qualities. This made is possible to conduct the
offensive at a high pace, to make large-scale ma.neuvers on the battlefield,
and to achieve decisive defeat of enemy groupings. The greater combat
capabilities of the Soviet troops meant that the objectives of rifle _
divisions and corps penetrating prepared enemy defenses could be increased to
; 20-25 km. At the same time the breadth of the zone of advance on axes of
the main strike decreased somewhat, and it usually ~id not exceed 1.5-3 lQn
for divis~ons and 3-5 km for corps. Growth in the density of inen and -
eqwipment to 6-8 rifle battalions, 230-300 guns and mortars, 25-40 tanks
~ and self-propelled guns providing direct infantry support, and 2-3 engineering-
sapper battalions per kilometer of breakthrough front promoted a reduction in
the ~ime required for artillery preparation, an increase in the depth to which
enemy defenses were simultaneously suppressed, and penetration of tactical
defenses within 1 or 2 days.
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,y
The breakthrough was the most complex and difficult stage of the operation, ~
since the advancing troops had to surmount outfitted tactical defense
positions, suppress a powerful system of fire, and destroy dense combat
formations of enemy troops. As a rule the success of the breakthrough
defined the progress of the entire operation. Defenses were penetrated by
the coordinated efforts of units and formations in all branches of troops. ~ _
. Creation of high densities of inen and equipment in the breakthrough sectors
made it possible to decisively strike the enemy throughout the entire depth
of his combat formation. Careful preparations made by units and formations
for the offensive right in the area of combat activities made it possible to
assign missions to the troops more concretely and to organize efficient
interaction of infantry, tanks, artillery, engineering troops, and aviation
throughout the entire planned depth.
The tactics of penetrating fortified regions underwent further improvement.
The method employed was successive annihilation of permanent gun positions .
coupled with simultaneous destruction of the enemy's covering troops in the i
field. Special assault groups and detachments consisting of rifle, artillery,
tank, sapper, and flamethrower subunits were created to blockade and annihi-
, late permanent gun positions. A prelizninary softening period during which '
aviation and artillery concentrated their strikes against permanent
installatinns was conducted prior to penetration of the enemy's especially
strong fortifications (for example in the vicinity of Konigsberg). i.
Armored formations as well as specially created reinforced forward detachments
of rifle divisions, corps, and armies played thedecisive role in uninterrupted _
pursuit of the enemy to great depth. Breaking deeply into eriemy territory
they broke down withdrawing enemy units into isolated groups, encircled and
annihilated them, and blocked access of enemy reserves to defensive lines
prepared in the rear. Swift, bold actions by Soviet Units and formations
during pursuit and close i.nteraction of armored troops with rifle troops and '
aviation promoted attainment of Yiigh rates of advance. , ~
The defensive actions of the Soviet troops were typified by a high degree of ;
organization and firepower, decisive maneuvering of units and formations '
from unthreatened sections of the front to threatened axes, and bold counter- '
attacks. In this case the troops capitalized on advantageous terrain, and
i
creation of a deep system of trenches;. communication trenches, and obstacles '
raised the stability of the defenses, facilitated the maneuvering of inen and
equipment, and affo~ded protection to troops and combat equipment from ~
artillery f~ire and strikes by enemy aviation. Artillery played the decisive ;
role in repelling enemy attacks. Massive strikes by German tank formations ~
were successfully repelled by the forces and resources of deeply disposed
Soviet antitank defenses. Antitank strongpoints and artillery-antitank
reserves acquired important significance; thei:~ extensive use, particularly ~
in the Balaton operation, significantly promoted failure of the enemy's
counteroffensive. ;
_ On the whole the tactics of the offensive and defensive actions of the
Soviet Army were distinguished in 1945 by improvements in the organization ~
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of breakthrough tac~ics, pursuit of withdrawing units, assault of cities,
_ maintenance of stable interaction between infantry, tanks, artillery, and
aviation throughout the entire depth of the battle, creation of a powerful,
insurmountable defense.in short time, development of the artfulness of
maneuvers performed in offense aMd defense; and flexible control of units
and FormAtions on the battlefic~ld.
As in 1944, the principal missions of the Soviet Air Force were to maintain ~
air supremacy and conduct joint actions with ground troops. Improvements
in combat use of aviation followed the lines of decisive massing of air
power on the axes of the main strikes of the campaigns and operations,
raising the effectiveness of actions against objectives deep in the enemy's
strategic rear and against his reserves in the course of penetration of
enemy defenses, maintenance of close i.nteraction with mobile troops, and
their escort at strategic depth. This necessitated concen~ration of large
air forces within narrow sectoxs for penetration of enemy defenses. Thus ~
formations of five air armies and aviation of the Baltic Fleet were called
in to defeat the Konigsberg grouping in short time. Because Soviet aviation
enjoyed air superiority, bombers of division. and corps strength could make
massed strikes on a greater scale (strikes by bomber corps against Konigsberg,
against accumulations of the enemy northwest of Warsaw, and in the vicinity of
crossings over the Vistula). Air support to actions by mobile troops improved.
Ma'intenance of close interaction was promoted by operational subordination of
ground attack and fighter formations to tank army commanders and to tank and
mechanized corps commanders. _
Active operations by the navy played an important role in 1945. Its forces
participated in the blockade and liquidation of fascist German groupings
pressed to the coastline, in providing cover to the maritime flanks of
friendly ground forces, in the landing of assault troops, in supporting the
crossings of water obstacles, and in interdicting enemy marine lines of
communication and protectinq friendly lines. Extensive maneuver of mobile
coa.stal artillery in short time from one operational axis to another, and
massing of naval aviation against enemy convoys and warships at sea and
against naval bases and ports with the goal of preventing evacuation of
enemy troops pressed against the sea were new tactics of the Red Banner Baltic
Fleet. The following were typical of the actions of this fleet: swift
regrouping of its forces westward in the course of the offensive of the
~ ground troops, transfer of a significant number of torpedo and patrol boats,
-i gunboats, and minesweepers by rail, orga.nization of maneuverable basing of
' fleet forces at previously unimproved or knocked-out points along the sea-
~ coast protected by sizable minefields, and preparation and landing of
~ tactical marine assault landing groups in short time. However, the shortage
~ of ships and the extremely limited possibilities for basing the Red Banner
; Baltic Fleet kept it from complet~.ng its mission of blo ckading enemy
~ groupings. In January-March 1945 the Germans managed to evacuate 13 divisions
and a brigade by sea from Kurlyandiya and Memel.
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Naval f~orces continued to improve the tactics of protecting their marine
~
lines of communication. In antisubmarine defense, creation of special
hunter,--killer groups consisting of surface ships and aviation and having
the mission of detecting and annihilating enemy submarines at sea became a
more widespread practice. Losses of ships at sea were reduced mainly by
employing covering tactics such as ring defense of transporters sailing in
convoys and reinforcement of forward defenses by setting up a second screen i
of security ships, and by making broad use of fighter aviation for air '
defense purposes. '
~
The National Air Defense Forces played a great role in operations of the
Soviet Army. In addition to defending the country's most important '
economic regions and administrative centers, a significant part of their '
men and equipment were assigned to cover rail and water lines of communi- .
catio:z and other objectives in the frontal rear (crossings over the Vistula, i
Dan~:be, and Oder, providing cover to regroupings of strategic reserves,
anci defense of industrial objectives in Ploesti, Silesia, the Dombrow coal ~
basin, and other regions). Antiaircraft artillery and fighter formations
of the air defense forces participated in aerial blockade of surrounded
enemy troops in Budapest, Poznan, Breslau, and other cities. The IV, V,
and X air defense corps, which possessed 1,740 antiaircraft guns, 1,300
antiaircraft machineguns, 323 searchlights, and 235 fighters, took part in
just the Berlin operation alone. Improvements in the combat applications
of National Air Defense Forces and resources went along the lines of their
- greater massing for dependable cover of principal objectives in the rear,
establishment of close interaction with frontal air defense forces, and
decisive maneuvering of antiaircraft artillery and fighters with the goal ~
of creating high densities on the most important axes.
The work of rear services agsncies in 1945 was typified by bold advancement ~
of all rear units and services as well as materiel to the troops, prompt ;
movement of rear units and services behind the advancing front~, flexible ~
maneuvering of reserve rear personnel and equipment during operations, and
broad utilization of Western European railroads to bring materiel to the
troops and perform operational shipments during the regroupings of frontal ,
and strategic reserves.
Thu.s Soviet art of war, which assimilated and generalized the tremendous .
experience of preceding years, attained an even higher level of development `
in 1945 and demonstrated its superiority over the art of war of the Fascist ~
German Army. Important problems were successfully soived, to include pre-
paring and conducting a strategic offensive along the entire front and to
great depth, planning and conducting a number of successive strategic ~
operations in depth, organizing interaction among arms and services, and
regrouping fronts and armies over great distances.
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2. The Art of War of Armed Forces c~f the USA and Great Britain
The politics and strategy of the USA and Great Britain were governed in 1945
in many ways by the goals and conditions of the war in Europe, which evolved
mainly as a result of the victorious offensive of the Soviet Armed Forces.
In this stage of the struggle the Western Allies required their troops to
act more decisively on the Western Front. England and the United States
attempted to create advantageous political and strategic positions in Europe
before the end of the war on this continent, Thus beginning in Feb,ruary
1945 the strategic offensive became the principal form of action of Anglo- �
American armed forces on the Western Front.
The general structure of the armed forces of the USA and England remained the same
in the concluding stage of the war in Europe. They consisted of two basic
branches--armies and.navies, As before, the air forces were within the
composition of the army and nav~z. Despite swift development of aviation and
its greater role, it was never separated out as an independent branch.
Development of the armed forces proceeded mainly along the lines of outfitting
them with new, more sophisticated models of armament and combat equipment.
A distinguishing feature of the ground forces of the USA and England in Europe
was presence of a large number of tank divisions, brigades, and battalions.
Thus by the beginning of April there were 25 tank divisions on the Western -
- and Italian fronts. Anglo-American divisions were almost completely motor- ~
ized. The typical infantry division possessed 1,440 motor vehicles, while
the armored division had 1,141. There was one motor vehicle for every 10
men in the infantry division, and one for every nine men in the armored
division. Despite the high availability of motor transportation, however,
the operations showed that the maneuverability of the Allied armies was low.
One of the reasons for this was the cumbersomeness of the divisions. Thus
the length of a column of march formed by a reinforced infantry division was
250-300 km.
Numerous American and English rear services were created to provide logistical
support to Allied expeditionary forces in Europe. While during the operations
of northwestern France (in the second half of 1944) their strength was about
- 526,000 men,...by 30 April 1945 it was about 980,000-- that is, about 20 percent
of the total strength of expeditionary forces in Europe.
The organization of units and formations in the U:S. Army did not experience
significant changes, with the exception of armored troops. Reorganization
of the armored division was finished by the beginning of 1945. Now that
tnak regiments were abolished, the division consisted of battalions. The
quantity of tanks was decreased by 25 percent, and the division became less
- cumbersome and more maneuverable. Moreover separate tank battalions were
formed and attached to infantry divisions (one or two battalions to a
division); they.were also used as a tank reserve in the corps, army, and
army group. In this case the battalions were brought together into tank
groups (two to four battalions in each).
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The air forces of the Allied expeditionary troops in Europe had absolute
superiority over the enemy. As be~ore, the air armies continued to be ~
the largest major formations of the American air forces. They were sub-
divided into strategic and tactical depending on their purpose and the
nature of their mission. The strategic air army consisted of two or three
air divisions and other units, and it had a strength from 1,600 to 3,000
airplanes. The tactical army included two fighter air commands and a
bomber air command, as well as other units, and it possessed from 600 to '
2,000 airplanes.
~
The air force began to receive massive quantities of B-29 strategic bombers, `
Lockheed P-80, Northrop P-61, and Bell P-63 jet fighters,and the Douglas
A-26 light bomber. From the moment the expeditionary forces landed in
Western Europe until the day of victory over fascist Germany, 274 new and '
old airfields were built and restored just for American tactical aviation ~
- alone. Such a large volume of construction was possible only owing to
extensive utilization of prefabricated parts and structures (pierced steel ,
planking, airfield equipment), and owing to a high level of job mechanization.
The U.S. Navy continued to develop, and strike and escort carriers were built
at a high rate. Aircraft carriers assumed a firm foothold as the main strike
force of the navy. The program for� 1945 foresaw construction of two
carriers with a displacement of 45,000 tons each and two with a displacement
of 27,000 tons, 12 escort carriers, and cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.
During this period marine aviation was complemented by several new types of
airplanes, but they did not participate in the combat action$, though some
of the craft did undergo field trials.
The strength of the British Armed Forces did not change significantly by the ,
end of the war with fascist Germany. In this case more than 50 percent of
the total number of combat formations and of the strength of the ground troops
consisted of troops from British dominions. The USA made the principal con-
tribution to growth in the number of divisions operating in Europe in 1945. ~
At the end of April, 61 of the 88 Allied divisions were American. Significant
growth in the nwnber of American divisions could nat ~ y~e an effect on~ the weight '
carried by each particular Ally in determination of the coalition's strategy.
The organizational structure of the British Armed Forces, including the
organization of the division, remained as before. The British Royal Navy
attained it maximum strength in January 1945, and it did not experience ~
significant changes until the end of the war in Europe. ;
The mission of Anglo-American troops in the last stage of the war in Europe,
in 1945, was to defeat enemy troops in Western Germany and then gain its ~
central regions. The strikes aimed at attaining these end goals were to be ~
performed in three stages, each of which represented a strategic operation, i
I
As in the previous years of the war, the plans for actions by the armed forces '
of the USA and England were drawn up by the Combined Allied Command. There ~
were great difficulties in coordinating upon plans for the coalition's
strategy in the Combined Committee of the Chiefs of Staff and in the staffs
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of the Allied expeditionary forces. These difficulties were surmounted
either through mutual compromises or through pressure exerted by one member
of the coalition upon the others; they were surmounted quickly as a rule
when the situation necessitated an immediate decision. Thus disagreements
arose in 1945 concerning selection of the axis of the main strike. Each of
the countries tried to maintain its political interests uppermost, all of
which boiled down to one thing--increasing their influence in Europe. The
conflicts generated mistrust and openly unfriendly relations between American
and English generals and officers,which had a ruinous effect on the course
of the operation. There were often cases in which English troops were
conducting an offensive iahile Americans stood in place and vice versa. The
German Command was able to transfer its troops from one axis to another,
and to parry the blows of the Allied armies with smaller forces. This was
precisely one of the main reasons that Anglo-American troops bogged down
at the Siegfried Line.
Selection of the axis of the main strike was based primarily on the signifi-
cance of that axis which would lead by the shortest route to the most im-
portant economic and political centers, ar~d, in addition, ~~hich was characterized
by terrain permitting the use of all arms and services and created conven-
ient conditions for organizing logistical support to the main grouping.
For this purpose the Allied Command concentrated large strategic groupings
of ground troops and air forces on the axis of the main strike, insuring an
overwhelming superiority over the enemy, especially in technical combat
resources.
The strategic offensive on the Western Front was conducted by three army
groups (6~h, 12th, and 21st) as well as by significant tactical and strategic
air forces. An army group contained 20-40 divisions, 8,000-16,000 guns and
mortars, and 2,000-4,000 tanks. The tactical air army interacted with it:
Moreover stxategic bomber aviation (up to 2,00 airplanes and more) was called
in for its support. The Fascist German Command did not have a possibility
for allocating a sufficient quantity of ground troops and aviation for
stubborn actions on the Western Front. This is why all offensive operations
by Anglo-American troops in Europe in 1945 were conducted. as a rule with
an overwhelming general superiority in men and equipment, especially ~
aviation and tanks. Preparations took less time than in previous years,
and the operations themselves were conducted with more-decisive goals and
to a greater depth than in 1944. The reason for this lay mainly in
political considera~ions, in the desire to occupy Germany's central regions
before the Soviet Army could.
The goal of the offensive operation was to defeat opposing enemy groupings,
capture important operational or strategic objectives and lines, and create
the conditions for conducting subsequent operations. Thus the goal of the
offensive by the 21st AYmy Group in the,Ruhr operation (23 March-19 April? was
to cross the River Rhine, defeat the forces of the enemy's lst Parachute
and 5th Tank armies, and to encircle and annihilate the main forces of the
Ruhr grouping in interaction with the 12th Army Group. The main strike was
usually made against the weakest area of the defenses--the flanks of the
operational groupings. Up to two-thirds of all manpower and equipment
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(especially in armored divisions) and almost all aviation were concentrated
on the axis of the main strike. Airborne assault parties were employed to
increase the depth of operations and the rate i~f advance and to permit
crossing of water obstacles on the move (for example during the cro~sing of
the Rhine).
The operational structure of the army groups usually consisted of a single
echelon. This was explained by the desire to attain maximum power in the
initial strike. ~'orces and resources were massed in narrow breakthrough '
sectors on the axes of the main strikes. Thus the 21st Arn1y Group created
the following densities on the axis of main strike in the operation to
cross the Rhine (February-March): one division for every 3.2 km, and '
100-130 guns per kilometer of front line. As a rule the operations were
conducted by forces 2-2.5 times superior over the enemy in infantry, 4-6
times in tanks, and 10-20 times in aviation. ;
An offensive operation conducted by army groups began with per,etration of ~
enemy defenses by frontal strikes in one or two sectors, and only after the ~
defenses had been reliably suppressed. Large tactical and, in a number of
_ cases, strategic air forces played the priority role in fire suppression of ~
' defenses. An offensive operation conducted by army groups and field armies
was usually preceded by air preparation, which was subdivided into pre-
liminary and immediate (the former:occurring several days before going over
to the offensive). Preliminary air preparation was undertaken with the
goal of weakenin~ the defending enemy, disturbing control and the work of the '
rear, and preventing approach of enemy reserves. Tmmediate air support was ,
conducted prior to the attack by the main forces of the assault echelon of
the field armies (it lasted from an hour to around 5 hours). During it,
bomb strikes were made in the breakthrough sectors with a great density of i
suppression, attaining up to 300 tons of bombs and more per square ~
kilometer. ~
Although aviation played the main role in fire suppression of the enemy, I
artillery was also given a significant place. Artillery preparation for an '
offensive lasted from 30 minutes to several hours. Sometimes it was '
substituted by a 10-15 minute artillery strike with the goal of achieving ~
surprise. Support was provided to the attack of infantry and tanks by
successive concentration of fire or by a moving barrage to a depth of 2-4 km.
As a rule the offensive entailed advance from line to line, without deep ;
penetrations by the troops into the enemy rear. Whenever the troops en-
countered strong resistance, they halted. The advance was resumed only
- after aviation and supporting artillery dependably suppressed the centers of ~
resistance. The excessively methodical and extremely cautious actions
typical of offensives undertaken by Anglo-American troops slowed down their
rate of advance, which often permitted the Germans to slip away from ~
attacks and withdraw their troops to lines in the rear. ~
The command of the expeditionary forces twice attempted to penetrate the
defenses of the fascist German troops in several sectors and then to exploit ' ~
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the offensive along convergent axes.(the operation of the 21st Army Group in
February-March, and crossing of the River Rhine and encirclement of the Ruhr
grouping in March-April). However, it was successful in encircling and
capturing German troops only in the Ruhr industrial region. The success of
this operation was promoted by absence of reserves at the disposal of the
Wehrmacht Command, as well as by the dramatic decline in morale of the German
troops elicited by major defeats on the Soviet-German front and in the west.
American troops managed to quickly gain the rear of enemy troops operating
in the Ruhr, and to create a sufficiently dense inner front of encirclement.
The German Command had neither the manpower nor the equipment to render -
assistance to its armies. During the crossing of the Rhine and encirclement
of the enemy's Ruhr grouping, the depth of the operations was 120-160 km,
w~th the average rate of advance being 12-15 km per day.
The U.S. and Great Britain made broad use of their air forces both in
independent operations having the goal of undermining the potential of
Germany's war economy, and in joint actions with ground troops and naval
forces. Operations conducted by strategic aviation were not decisive to
victory in the war; however its concentrated strikes against enterprises of
some industrial sectors were effective. Aviation did siynificant damage to
plants producing synthetic fuel, and certain results were achieved in dis-
organizing the work of transportation in the enemy rear. Strategic air
formations were also used for direct support of ground troops, to assist in
the landing of naval and airborne assault parties, to lay mines across the
enemy's marine lines of communication, and to annihilat~e his ships and
destroy his naval bases. In this stage of the war in Europe the principal
missions of the air forces were placed in their final form, to be written
into American and British postwar manuals and regulations concerning the
use of air forces: air surveillance of the region of combat activities,
direct air support to ground troops, air reconnaisance, and military air-
lift support.
Operations conducted by the strategic air forces of the USA and Great Britain
offered little to be learned in relation to attaining air supremacy, since
it was being maintained constantly by the Anglo-American air forces. Never-
theless every operation was mandatorily preceded by raids against enemy
airfields by Anglo-American aviation with the objective of maintaining un-
shared supremacy in the air, without which it would have been impossible for
either the ground troops or the naval forces to conduct their operations
successfully.
The ground troops were provided immediate support throughout the entire depth
of operations by continuous strikes by major air forces. Massing on the main
axis was the fundamental principle of the use of tactical aviaticn. It was
broadly employed to isolate the region of combat activities from enemy
reserves and to prevent the enemy from bringing in materiel. With this
purpose it struck road junetions, bridges, crossings, columns of troops,
and enemy equipment.
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American and English navies gained more experience in preparing and con- ;
ducting special antisubmarine operations in the Atlantic, convoy escort
operations, and combat activities aimed at annihilated enemy naval forces
at bases and interdicting marine lines of communication. These operations i
led to development of new naval strategy. ,
Thus the art of war of the armed forces of the U5A and England enjoyed
further development in the concluding stage of the war Europe, which had
a significant influence on its postwar level.
3. Unique Features of Fascist German Art of War ;
Powerful strikes by the Soviet Armed Forces and troops of the Western Allies ~
deprived fascist Germany's war machine of the possibility for utilizing the
economies of previously occupied countries, and they elicited a dramatic
reduction of the industrial base and loss of strategic raw material sources,
which predetermined the rapid fall in production of armament and combat '
equipment. Thus the Nazi leadership became directly persuaded of the ;
fallaciousness of the motto "war feeds on itself," which prior to the attack
on the Soviet Union was one of the leading principles of the German general
staff in its planning of the "lightning" wars.
;
A tendency toward organizir#g production of defensive resources not requiring
considerable ex~~:nditures of manpower and materiel became typical of fascist
Germany's war industry. Production of hand-held antitank grenade throwers
increased significantly, attempts were undertaken to create remote-control
high-explosive antitank rockets, and production of �surface-to-air missiles
was organized. Nazi Germany's war industry was unable to satisfy the needs "
of the troops for aviation and armored equipment; it was forced to completely
halt construction of surface vessels, and to concentrate its basic attention
on new series of submarines.
Defense was the principal form of the Wehrmacht's combat activities. The
German Command tried to win time to reach political objectives by maintaining ~
a stubbor_n strategic defense in the East. This is why the most battle-
worthy forces were transferred to the Soviet-German.front. Posing its
objective as fighting "to the last soldier," the fascist leadership under-
took the most barbarian methods of war.fare. However, extreme cruelty and
inhumanity never became the means for either achieving the goals or compen- ,
sating for strength.
The Wehrmacht's defense of the Eastern Front was typified by high activity of ;
troops holding onto important regions and lines. Their actions were i
ac~ompanied by broad use of counterattacks, which sometimes mushroomed into
a counteroffensive (in the Ardennes and at Lake Balaton). By maneuvering its
troops, the German Command managed to create powerful strike groupings on ~
the main axes. As an example up to 70 tanks and assault guns were concen-
trated per kilometer in the breakthrough sector near Lake~Balaton. But
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despite the persistence of the military leadership in attaining its posed
goals, all attempts to attain at leaststrategic gains were reduced to nought
on this front. As a rule the Soviet Command was able to deduce the enemy's
plans and simultaneously organize repulsion of his strikes. The superiority
of Soviet strategic thought revealed itself graphically and persuasively
in the course of the eastern Pomeranian operation, when the efforts of a
major enemy grouping at cutting off, by a flanking strike, and annihilating
Soviet troops that had reached the Oder were foiled.
One of the most wlnerable places in the defense of the fascist troops in
_ 1945 was the lack of reserves. The reserve army consisted of newly formed
units and formations and those withdrawn to the rear for recuperation and
replenishment. The German Supreme High Command tried to resolve the reserve
problem by taking large numbers of personnel out of aviation and the navy
and placing them into the ground troops. Losses in the units and formations
were compensated by formation of local detachments, ancl large number of
militia subunits were created. Transferring troops from the Western Front
to the Soviet-German front was an especially broad practice (the 6th SS Tank
Army, the 12th Army). The main mission of the reserves ~as to plug holes
punched into the strategic front, to make counterattacks and, much more
rarely, to occupy important deep defensive lines and to conduct counter-
offensives (Ardennes, Balaton). The strategic defense was conducted by
ground troops in close interaction with the air force and, on the maritime
axis, the navy.
The main mission of fascist Germany's air forces during the period of
strategic defense was to support ground troops. The fascist leadership was
forced to abandon its practice of striking strategic objectives in the
Soviet Army rear. Some of the aviation was used to cover industrial and
administrative centers as well as important objectives. -
The navy continued to support ground troops operating on mariti.me axes.
. Reserves and materiel were transferred and some groupings blockaded from
land were transferred by sea. It should be noted that by as early as the
beginning of 1945 the Fascist German Navy experienced limited basing
possibilities. This hindered its actions, and especially its fight against
the marine lines of communication of the anti-Hitler coalition.
No special changes of any sort occurred in the structure of strategic
management of fascist Germany toward the end of the war in Europe, though
attempts were made to find new organizational forms. An order merging
the operational staff of the armed forces with the general staff of the
ground troops was issued on 24 April. The purpose of this decision was to
create a single organ of strategic direction. Operational Staff B--a unique
branch of the Supreme Command--was formed to manage defense of Germany's
southern regions together with the "Headquarters of the Western Troop
Commander." The "Western German Defense Headquarters" was organized in the
north and commanded by Grand Admiral Donitz. But none of these measures
was able to influence the development of events.
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The Fascist German Army acquired a great deal of experience in conducting
defensive operations in the las~t three and a half years. The Wehrmacht's
defensive actions mainly involved maximum application of all forces and
resources in the first operational echelon. The actions of troops in the
main defense zone were distinguished by stubbornness and stability, and
rather high activity expressed as a large quantity of counterattacks and '
counterstrikes. Because of the Fascist German Command's repressive
measures the troops fought savagely even in completely hopeless conditions
(Budapest, Konigsberg, Breslau, Berlin).
One unique feature of defenses in 1945 was the high degree of engineering
preparation of the terrain to a great depth (200 km in eastern Prussia
and 500 ]an between the Vistula and the Oder).
Army group defenses consisted of a tactical and an operational zone. The
tactical zone contained two areas--the main area (the "main battlefield")
and the second area (the "corps reserve position"), and by the end of the
war it attained a depth of 10-20 km. The operational zone consisted of a
third area (the "army reserve position"), which was 20-25 km from the
forward edge of the main area, and the "army group reserve position,"
which was 50-80 lan from the forward edge. The defense system of the army
group included previously prepared fortified regions, which increased the
overall depth of defenses from 60-100 km to 120-150 km. An example of this
can be found in the structure of defenses on the Kostrzyn-Berlin axis, �
where the field defenses were for practical purposes part of the Berlin
Defensive Region.
Static ("stable") and maneuverable ("holding") defenses were the principal
types. The latter type was employed when there were not enough forces to
organize "stable" defenses, or wher~ troops had to withdraw to stratzgic
depth. Som~times the combat activities followed the principle of "elastic
defense"--a combination of ~tubborn, prepared defense on the main axes and
lines, and maneuver on secondary axes and intermediate lines. It should
be noted that the German leadership showed preference for static defenses in
the concluding stage of the war in Europe.
The operational structure of defending armies and army groups usually
consisted of a single echelon and reserves allocated.from it, consisting of
tank corps or tank and motorized divisions. The enemy fought hardes-~: in
the tactical zone, especially in the main area, to which he committed not
only corps but also army reserves. The main burden fell on infantry divisions
reinforced by artillery and tanks. Tank and motorized divisions were in
the reserve of the army or army group, and they were used in counterstrikes.
As a rule they were employed in battles for the tactical zone. Thus the
XXIV and XL tank corps (the army group reserve in the Vistula-Oder operation)
were committed to the battle for the second area of defense. In the Berlin
operation the army reserves were committed to the battle for the (Zelovskiye)
Heights in the second area.
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Counterstrikes were made from one or several directions from the base created
by troop groupings wedging themselves into enemy lines. Such was the
strategy of the counterstrikes made by the eastern Pomeranian, Gorlitz, and
other groupings. The enemy made counterstrikes on the shortest axis with
the goal of breaking the blockade of encircled troops. This was what the
12th Army and the encirled Frankfurt-Guben grouping did during the Berlin
operation. However, even with numerous counterstrikes the Fascist German
Command was unable to restore the torn front of its defenses. A lack of
reserves and the tendency to hold occupied lines without a consideration for
the evolved situation led to unnecessary losses. An attempt to create
stable def enses along large water obstacles (Narew, Vistula, Oder, Rhine,
and others) failed to justify itself as well. Thus as in previous years,
in 1945 the Fascist German Command failed to solve the problem of creating
stable operational defenses.
Tactics was the strongest aspect of the Wehrmacht's art of war. Typical
traits of tactical defense by German troops was stubborn retention of the
"main battlefield," meticulously planned combat activities for it, and
swift, decisive, and competent maneuvering of tank units and subunits in
the eve.nt that defenses were penetrated.
Due to large losses on the Eastern Front the fascist command was forced to
constantly change the organizational structure of its units and formations.
Most divisions had a reduced manning. Although the numb~r of regiments
remained as before, they were reorganized with a two-battalion composition,
while field air divisions and light infantry divisions had a two-regiment
composition. The number of armored units in tank divisions decreased for
practical purposes to 110-120.* The number of personnel in the units and
formations constantly changed as well. This forced reorganization continued
until practically the last days of the war.
Fascist German troops acquired experience in maintaining tactical defenses
back in 1943-1944. Significant reduction of the front line in 1945
permitted the German Command to create powerful, deeply disposed defenses
on the most important axes, making use of diverse engineering resources.
The defenses became continuous, and they were structured according to the
principle of combining trenches with strongpoints and centers of resistance.
~ The defense system made broad use of rivers, canals, population centers,
the dense network of highways and railroads, and manmade obstacles (trenches,
slides, traps, and so on); permanent (reinforced concrete) gun positions,
hardened command and observation posts, antitank ditches, various wire
! entanglements, concrete and wooden dragons'� teeth, and metal hedgehogs were
i erected. Minef ields were created especially frequently.
~
I
' * Bagreyev, A., "Voyennoye iskusstvo kapitalisticheskikh gosudarstv (1939-
~ 1945 gg.)" (The Art of War of Capitalist States E1939-1945)), Moscow,
' 1960, p 88.
~
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Much attention was devoted in organizing the defenses to selection and
utilization of the terrain. Preference was given to that terrain which
favored organization of strongpoints and antitank defenses, which permitted
deep disposition, which offered good approaches for friendly troops, and
which was concealed from observation by advancing troops.
The defensive tactics of fascist German troops pursued the goal of defeating
the main forces of the advancing troops ahead of the forward edge of the
"main battlefield," or at least within it. Whenever Soviet troops wedged
themselves into the main defense area, persistent, numerous counterattacks
were made with artillery support. German troop commanders adhered fully
in their use of tanks to the troop command manual, which stated: "Tanks
should be used in an offensive manner. They are the decisive reserve in
the hands of a combined-arms commander, and they are especially useful in
counterattacks as well as against enemy tanks."* Very frequently, especially
in the Berlin operation, tanks were used as small subunits (platoons,
companies) for action in ambushes. Antitank defense was provided by
artillery (including antiaircraft), tanks, and assault guns, and minefields
and other antitank obstacles were created.
Thus in its defensive battles, the Fascist German Command relied on strong,
well orqanized mortar and artillery fire, a braad network of engineering
obstacles and manmade and natural barriers, and on the stability and active:
nature of the actions of friendly troops. However, despite all of the strong
aspects of German defensive tactics, the German defenses could not compete
with the great artfulness of the Soviet Command, and they did not play the
role for which they were intended. On the whole, inconsistency between goals
and real potentials was typical of the art of,war of Nazi Germany throughout
the entire war, and especially in 1945.
* * *
The art of war vF countries in the anti-Hitler coalition developed in 1945
in a close relationship with growth in their military-economic potential
and with the combat experience acquired in previous years. In the concluding
stage of the war in Europe the-Soviet Armed Forces as well as the armies of
the USA and Great Britain basically conducted strategic offensive operations
having the objective of the Wehrmacht's total defeat. All of these operatior.s
were conducted by allied armies maintaining a superiority in men and equipment.
The major strategic operations of the Soviet Armed Forces had a decisive
influence on the combat activities of the Anglo-American troops. The Soviet
Army's January offensive, which developed over a tremendous front, caused
failure of the counteroffensive of fascist German troops on the Western Front
and created favorable conditions for the Allies for switching to active
operations.
*"Polevyye ustavy inostrannykh armiy" (Foreign Army Field Manuals), Moscow,
1936, pp 163-164.
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As in the previous years of the war, the decisive events of 1945 occurred
on the land front. Defeat of the armies of fa~cist Germany was precisely
_ what led it to unconditional surrender. Actions of the navies of the USA
and England were basically aimed at protecting Allied marine lines of
communication. Fascist Germany's surface fleet and aviation, which had
been significantly weakened, and the still rather strong submarine fleet
could no longer do tangible harm to the warships and transporters of the
Allied powers. Their powerful navies supported shipping without serious
losses.
The adventurism of the ruling circles of Fascist Germany revealed itself
especially clearly in 1945. It made its impression on the entire military
system of the country and, in turn, on its strategy. Faulty at its
foundation, and structured on the basis of an exaggeration of the role
played by subjective factors, its war strategy turned out to be incapable of
fulfilling the social nesds of the German monopolies, and it ended in total
bankruptcy. Attempts by the Nazi leadership to gain time for resolving
political problems by maintaining a stubborn strategic defense failed: It
was unable to achieve any of its objectives.
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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN .
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. ;
_ THE USSR'S STRUGGLE FOR A DEMOCRATIC PEACE ~
[pp 475-499] 4. The Potsdam Conference ;
The end of the war in Europe and defeat and surrender of fascist Germany ~
posed a number of complex foreign policy problems in all of their acuity ~
before the great powers--the USSR, the USA, and England. Their positions ;
in relation to defeated Germany's politics and economy had to be i
quickly coordinated, and questions concerning the German-Polish border s
had to resolved. Coordination also had to be achieved in the policies of ~
the three powers in relation to the former allies and satellites of Nazi
Germany, as well as in relation to a number of other problems. ~
Havi.ng endured i.mprobable suffering during World War II, the peoples of
Europe impatiently awaited decisions on the questions which would eradicate ;
fascism and militarism in Germany, avert the danger that it might start ~
another war, and insure solution of all unresolved problems on the basis ;
of the principles of democracy and justice. Another conference by the i
executives of the three powers--the USSR, the USA, and Great Britain-- ~
was needed for this purpose. ;
i
Preparations for the conference began immediately after Germany's surrender. ~
The English governmer,t was especially anxious, believing that the sooner
the conference would be convened, the stronger would be the positions of !
England and the USA in it. Churchill was also anxious because Paliamentary
elections were to be held in the beginning of June. Not being certain how i
the English voters would vote, he wished to take part in a meeting of the ~
leaders of the three powers before the elections. However, the American i
government suggested scheduling the conference for mid-July 1945. This is ~
precisely the time at which the United States planned to test its first ~
- atomic bomb. The USA apparently believed that this event would serve as
its main trump card at the conference.
;
In the forthcoming conference the English government intended to take the i
most unbending position in regard to all issues and to try to impose its
conditions upon the Soviet Union. Churchill wanted to "make battle" with ~
~ ;
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the Soviet delegation, especially in the concluding stage. He even i:ried
to conceal the fact that he hoped m~ore for "an open split" than for agree-
ment with the USSR'a proposal concerning the western border of Poland.l
The U.S. President also suggested taking a hard line at the conference, but-
under the present conditions he did not feel it possible to go as far as
Churchill wanted to. This was explained to certain extent by the fact that
the United States was still fighting a war with Japan. Therefore the U.S.
government did not feel it possible to aggravate relations with the USSR,
since it required its participation in the defeat of Japanese aggressors.
The governments of the three powers expressed the unanimous opinion that
Berlin would be the most appropriate place for the conference. However,
because the city was severely damaged, a decision was made to hold the
conference near Berlin, in Potsdam.
The Potsdam conference was opened on 17 July. The Soviet Union's delegation
was headed by I. V. Stalin, that of the United States was headed by H. Truman,
and that of England was headed first by W. Churchill and, as of 28 July,
the new Prime Minister, C. Att1Pe. The conference was also attended by the
ministers of foreign affairs of the three powers--V. M. Molotov, J. Byrnes,
and A. Eden (who was subsequently replaced by A. Bevan), as well as by other
diplomatic and military officials.
The German qilestion was the principal one discussed in Potsdam. Following
its defeat arid unconditional surrender, Germany was occupied by Allied
troops, which exercised supreme power in the country. The country's
subsequent course of development had to be determined without delay, the
policies of the occupying powers had to be coordinated, the goals of the
occupation had to be spelled out, and a number of other important political
and economic problems had to be solved. The borders of Germany had not
been established, and it had neither a government nor any sort of organs of
national rule. The country's economy was in a state of shambles. Total war
waged by the Nazis led the country to complete ruin. In a discussion of
the question as to precisely what Germany was then, Stalin noted that it
was difficult to give any definition other than that of a."broken country."2
Basing themselves on decisions on Germany made by the three powers in the
Cri.mean conference, in the European Consultative Commission, and in the first
meetings of the Control Council in Germany,3 representatives of the USSR, USA,
and England examined measures concerning demilitarization, denazification,
ar~d democratization of Germany, as well as many other important issues
J associated with determining the subsequent s~ate of the German people.
The "Political and Economic Prir~.ciples To Be Followed in Dealing ~Vith Germany _
in the Initail Period of Control" were adopted in Postdam. The goal of this
agreement was to develop Germany as a democratic and peaceful state. "German
militarism and Nazism will be eradicated," read the concluding com~?unique of
the conference, "and the Allies, on agreement with one another, will also
implement other measuresnow and in the future so that Germany would never
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again threaten its neighbors or peace in all the world."4 At the same
time the three powers declared that they had no intention of annihilating
the German people or placing them in slavery. They declared their �
interition to give the people of Germany the possibility for reconstructing
their life on a dcmocratic and peaceful basis, such that with time they would
_ be able to assume their place among the free and peaceful peoples of the ~
world.
As an elaboration upon decisions made at the Crimean conference, agreement was
reached in Potsdam that the goals of Germany's occupation were to completely .
disarm and demilitarize it, as well as to liquidate all German industry
that might be used in war production, or to place it under surveillance. In
order to forestall the rebirth of German militarism and fascism forever,
a deaision was made to disband all of Germany's ground, naval, and air '
forces, the SS, the SA, t~~e SD, and the Gestapo together with all their ~
organizations, including the General Staff, as well as othPr military and
paramilitary organizations serving the interests of maintaining military
traditions. All arms were to be transferred to the Allies or destroyed, and
production of weapons, military gear, and implements of war as well as all
types of airplanes and sea-going vessels was prohibited. '
The decisions of the Potsdam conference foresaw abolition of the National
Socialist Party and organizations under its control, forestallment of their ~
rebirth in any form, and prevention of all fascist activity or propaganda.
All fascist laws were repealed. Active members of the National Socialist Party
were removed from imoortant posts in public organizations and in major enter-
prises. At the same time all democratic parties and free trade unions were
permitted and encouraged, and the population of Germany was given the freedom
of speech and press within the framework of the occupation.
It was established that during the occupation Germany was to be viewed as a
single economic whole. This pertained to industry and agriculture, wages
and prices, import and export, the monetary system and taxes, and transpor-
tation and communication. Creation of central administrative departments
was foreseen in the areas of finances, transportation, communication, foreign
trade, and industry.5 ~
It was confirmed ir. Potsdam that during the initial control period supreme
power would be exercised in Germany by the commanders in chief of the armed ~
forces of the USSR, the USA, England, and France, in their occupation zones
respectively. In relation to problems common to all of Germany they were
to act jointly as members of the Control Council. -
The Soviet delegation made the proposal. that the main arsenal of German
militarism--the Ruhr industrial region--should be placed under the joint r
surveiliance of the USA, Great Britain, USSR, and France in administrative
respects, and that it should be administered by an Allied council composed
of representatives of these countries.s However, the United States of
America and England would not agree to establishing surveillance over'~he
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_ Ruhr with the participation of the USSR. Their ruling circles had begun
considering the question as to how to transform Germany into an outpost
against the Soviet Union and to utilize its military economic potential,
which was concentrated mainly in the Western occupation zones, in their
own interests.
One of the questions that graphically revealed the i.mperialist nature of U.S.
and English policy and elicited acute debate was reparations. An agreed-upon
decision on it was not obtained until the very end of the conference.
Reparations were to be a means of economic disarmament of Germany, and
concurrently a means of partial compensation for the damage inflicted upon
:atates ~acrificed to the aggression. It had been agreed upon back in Yalta
that Germany was obligated to compensate for damage inflicted by it upon
other countries during the war; the USA had agreed with the Soviet Union's
proposal of adopting $20 billion in reparations as the basis ftir discussion
in the reparation commission. Now, at the Potsdam conference, the U.S.
reneged on iics former position on this question.
The territory of the United States of America had not been occupied by
Hitler's troops; on the contrary, as in World War I American monopolies
grew ricti from military shipments. Naturally the USA could not make any
special rPparation claims against Germany, and the fact that the USSR was
interested in compensating by reparations for at least some of the damage
inflicted upon it by the invasion of the fascist barbarians was of little
concern to American ruling circles. More likely they wished the reverse.
They even hoped te capitalize on the difficulties the Soviet Union was
experiencing in order to impose, upon the Soviet Union, decisions concerning
a number of questions that would be advantageous to them. Moreover they did
not want exaction of reparations to cause the position of the German
bourgeoise to weaken, fearing that this would have an effect on the ratio
of class forces in Germany.
The American delegation voted against establishing a particular sum of
reparations. At the same time it made the following proposal: Each of the
occupying powers would exact reparations within its own zone. This meant for
practical purposes that the USSR would have the least advantageous conditions
for obtaining reparations. The most important industrial regions and military ,
economic centers of Germany, which could support reparations, were in the -
Western zones. Nor can we fail to consider the fact that American troops,
which had occupied part of the Soviet zone during the time of combat activities,
removed a significant quantity of industrial equipment and other property
from there, to include 20,000 rail cars.
The fascist German aqaressors did tremendous harm to the national economy of
the Soviet Union. Ne+Jertheless the Soviet Union i.mposed highly modest
- reparation rPquirements. "We lost very much equipment in this war, terribly
much," noted I. V. Stalin at the conference. "We need to compensate for at
least one-twentieth of it."~ Even bourge~ise researchers recognized the
, Soviet governmen~'s demands to be valid. Thus the West German author W.
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MarienFeld described the sum of Soviet reparation claims, $10 billion, as '
fully understandable, legal, and undebatable if it is measured against ~
the scale of devastation caused by the war in the USSR.B ~
The American representatives and the British de].egation aligned with them !
took a position of obstruction in regard to the issue of repaxations for
the Soviet Union from the Western zone. Thus on 30 July U.S. Secretary of ~
State Byrnes submitted a proposal in which the problem of reparations for i
the USSR was made contingent on a solution to the problem of Poland's '
western border and establishment of diplomatic relations with Romania,
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland by the Big Three.9 On the following day,
when this question was once again raised at the conference~Stalin noted the '
~mpropriety of establishing such an artificial relationship between problems ,
that were essentially different and he declared that the Soviet delegation i
would vote on each of them separately. It was deci~ed in the end that the !
reparation claims of the USA, England, and other countries having a right
to reparations would be satisfied through the resources of the Western zones
and German investments abroad. The USSR reparation claims were to be !
satisfied through the resources of the Soviet occupation zone in Germany.
Moreover the Soviet Union was to receive 25 percent of all industrial ~
equipment exacted for reparation purposes from the three Western German ~
occupation zones (10 percent without compensation,and 15 percent in ~
exchange for food, coal, lumber, petroleum products, and other goods). The i
USSR agreed to pay Poland's reparation claims out of its own share.l0
The fate of the German navy and merchant marine elicited a sharp debate. '
Churchill essentially tried to separate this problem from the question of !
overall compensation for harm done by Germany to other countries. He !
wanted to subdivide the German fleet in correspondence with the number of ;
ships each of the three powers had lost during the war. This attempt was ;
unsuccessful: It was decided to share the navy and merchant marine of
Germany equally between the USSR, England, and the USA. On proposal by j
Great Britain, most of the German submarines were to be destroyed. Creation i
of triumvirates to prepare concrete proposals on distribution of warships ~
and merchant vessels was foreseen. It was decided to transfer German
warships to the corresponding p~wers until 15 February 1946, and merchant ~
vessels after the end of the war with Japan.ll ~
The question of eastern Prussia, which had served many times as a spring- 1
board for eastward expansion by German aggressors, was raised once again '
at the conference. The head of the Soviet government proposed giving the
Konigsberg region to the USSR, and he recalled that "President Roosevelt ,
and Mr Churchill had given their consent on this regard during the Teheran
conference and that this question had been resolved among us. We would i
like," he continued "to have this agreement confirmed at the present ~
conference."12 Representatives of the USA and England agreed with the
Soviet proposal to transfer Konigsberg and adjacent regions to the USSR,
and the agreement was documented in the resolutions of the conference.
~
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The question of punishing fascist war criminals was also discussed. The
conference resolutions declared that war criminals and those who had par-
ticipated in the planning or implementation of ineasures leading to, or _
having as their result, atrocities or war crimes, were to be arrested and
brought to trial. The governments of the three powers confirmed their
intentions of bringing the principal war criminals to a speedy and just
trial. This decision was in line with the valid demands of peoples who
had suffeLed terrible sacrifices and improbable depr~vations as a result of
the criminal actions of the German fascists who, having unleashed the war,
wiped out and enslaved millions of people and committed uncountable crimes
against mankind.
It took a great deal of time and effort to achieve agreement in relation to
Poland. The question of the Polish emigrant government in London was
examined first. On 5 July the USA and England recognized the Polish
Provisional Government of National Unity, created in accordance with
resolutions of the Crimean conference. However, the emigrant government
in London headed by T. Artsishevskiy was in no hurry to end its activities.
A resolution adopted on proposal by the Soviet delegation expressed
satisfaction in connection with formation of the Polish Provisional
Government of National Unity, recognized by the three powers. The reso-
lution asserted that as a consequence England and the USA had ceased to
recognize the former Polish government, which "no longer exists."13 Thus
the fate of Artsishevskiy's government was conclusively decided.
An acute struggle developed in conjunction with determining the postwar
Polish-German border. Basing itself on resolutions of the Crimean conference,
the Soviet delegation submitted, to the American and English delegations,
a draft treaty establishing the western border of Poland along a line
passing from the Baltic Sea through Swinemunde to the Oder, placing the city
of Stettin in Poland, then up the Oder to the mouth of the Neisse, and
from here along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovakian border.14 This
proposal corresponded to the actual situation, inasmuch as the overwhelming
majority of the German population had abandoned this territory, and it was
already under Polish administration. Giving various excuses, American and
English representatives argued against the Soviet proposal. The British
delegation could agree to transfer only part of eastern Prussia, Danzig,
and parts of Pomerania (but not as Far as the Oder) and upper Silesia to
Poland.15 On 22 July Churchill announced that although his government
allowed the notion that Poland should be allowed to increase its territory,
he did not want to go as far as the Soviet government would have wished.
In accordance with the decision made at the Crimean conference that the
Polish government was to be consulted on this issue, the Soviet delegation
insisted upon invitation of Polish representatives to Potsdam. The
delegations of the Western powers tried to reject inviting representatives
from Poland, but the Soviet delegation managed to achieve compliance with
resolutions arrived at in the Crimean conference. On arriving in Potsdam,
the Polish representatives, led by (Berut), were met by the heads of
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government and the foreign affairs ministers of the three powers, and they ~
made a detailed presentation of their point of view concerning establishment
of Poland's western border along the Oder and the Western Neisse. The
Soviet delegation gave complete support to the demands of the Polish ~
government. But American and English representatives tried to postpone
resolving this issue. Churchill's acknowledgement that in the event of his
reelection he was going to "take on" the Soviet government on this issue
was typical. "Neither I nor Mr Eden," he wrote subsequently, "would ever ~
have agreed to a border along the Western Neisse.'~16
As long as England was represented at the conference by Churchill and Eden, ~
the Polish question and a number of others had to be carried over from one
meeting to the next, since it was impossible to reach agreement among the I
three powers. This is recognized by some English historians, who write that
Churchill was not at all sorry that the talks were proceeding so slowly. The
situation finally changed somewhat after 26 July, when the results of the
elections in Great Britain were announced; the Conservatives were completely I
defeated, for which reason Churchill and Eden were replaced in Potsdam by ~
Labor Party leaders Attlee and Bevan. Of course, the position of this '
government in Potsdam was essentially a continuation of the policies of
the Conservatives. But at the same time the Labor Party leaders apparently I
did not feel it possible to begin their foreign political activities with I
failure of the conference, and this opened the way for agreement on the '
issues under discussion. !
The Potsdam agreement established a new Polish-German border along the Oder
and the Western Neisse, beginning at the Baltic Sea just west of Swinemunde ~
(placing Stettin in Poland). This border was confirmed by a decision of the ~
conference to repatriate Germans remaining in Poland, as well as in ~
Czechoslovakia and Hungary.18 I
Of course the conference resolutions did state that the final determination ~
of Poland's western border must await a world coraference. However, the ~
very fact that expulsion of Germans from territory to be transferred to ~
Poland was foreseen at Potsdam meant only one thing: This decision was final.
Later the border decisions were documented in treaties signed by the Polish
Peoples Republic on 6 July 1950 with the German Democratic Republic and on ~
21 December 1972 with the Federated Republic of Germany. ~
~
The need for accelerating preparations for a peace settlemer.t with former ~
allies of fascist Germany became pressing in connection with the end of ~
the war in Europe. The delegations decided to institute a council of
the foreign affairs ministers of five powers (USSR, USA, England, France,
and China), and to have it write up peace treaties for Italy, Romania, j
Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland as a priority task. Moreover the council was
_ ordered to make preparations~for a peace settlement for ;~rmany, one which .
would be acceptable to the German gover.nment, whenever such a government is '
formed. " 19
- i
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The conference emphasized that the council must be represented by the
~:ountries that had signed the surrender conditions in all matters having
to do with writing the texts of peace treaties with particular countries.
In regard to the peace settlement with Italy, France was interpreted as the
country which had signed Italy's surrender conditions. Other council
members were to participate in the discussion of issues pertaining directly
to them. Despite institution of the council, it was believed necessary to
continue periodic consultations among the foreign affairs ministers of
the USSR, USA, and England, as had been agreed upon back during the
Crimean conference. After the Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers was
instituted the European Consultative Commission terminated its activities.
Coordination upon the policies of the three powers in relation to European
countries that had fought on Germany's side but then broke ties with it
had an important place in the work of the conference. This issue was posed
by the American delegation in the very first meeting of the conference.
Truman suggested supporting the petition of Italy--one of the main allies
of German fascism--to join the United Nations. He also felt it
desirable to cancel Italy's surrender conditions such that they could be
substituted by certain obligations imposed upon Italy's government, as
followed from the new situation in the country. At the same time the
President demanded immediate reorganization of the governments of Romania
and Bulgaria and emphasized that diplomatic recognition of these countries
and the signing of peace treaties with them could occur only after their
governments were reorganized.
The English representatives opposed the American proposal concerning Italy,
feeling that repealing the surrender conditions would be premature. As
far as countries of Central and Southeast Europe were concerned, it has
been noted even in works published in the USA that Churchill and Truman had
suggested a program insuring organization of Romania and Bulgaria according
to the Western model, and maintenance of these countries under Western
influence.20
Naturally the Soviet government could not agree with such demands. Stalin
stated directly that if Ttaly's position was to be made easier, similar
problems concerning Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland would have to be
resolved concurrently; namely, the effort would 'nave to begin with restoring
diplomatic relations with them. On 20 July the Soviet delegation submitted
the corresponding draft resolution for examination at the conference.21
This was one of the problems that initiated a sharp struggle in the conference.
The approach taken by the ruling circles of Eng,land and the U5A to its
solution was predicated by their desire to keep the outposts of capitalism
in Europe from weakening in any way, and to prevent progressive social
changes in European countries. Despite the considerable pressure exerted
by the USA and England the Soviet delegation averted the attempts by the
Western powers to interfere in the internal affairs of countries in Central
and Southeast Europe. At the same time the Soviet government was able to
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make certain that the decisions reached would insure favorable conditions
for further development of peoples democratic countries and reinforcement
of their international position.
The resolutions of the Potsdam conference stated that the three governments
felt it desirable to remedy the present abnormal situation of Italy,
Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland by signing peace treaties. They
went on to state that signing of such treaties and recognition of the
democratic governments of these countries would open up the poss~bility for
supporting their request for membership in the UN. "The three governments,
each speaking for itself, are in agreement to study, in the near future
and in light of the conditions existing at the time, the question of
establishing, to the extent possible, diplomatic relations with Finland,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary prior to signing peace treaties with these
countries."22
The U.S. put its "heavy artillery" in motion during discussion of debatable
assues. Blackmail with the atomic bomb was given a special role in this
regard. On 16 July, the day that the American delegation arrived in Berlin, ~
it was briefly reported that an atomic explosion had been successfully
performed early in the morning.23 The Americans informed Churchill of ~
this. On 21 July a special courier delivered detailed information on the ~
explosion to Potsdam. This immediately influenced the position of the U.S. i
delegation. When on the following day U.S. Secretary of War H. Stimson
acquainted Churchill with it, the latter noted that he now understood why
Truman had changed his behavior so, taking a hard line. The British Prime ;
Minister felt it useful to inform the Soviet delegation about the bomb, i
such that it could be used as an argument in the West's favor in the ~
negotiations.24 Describing Churchill's mood, A. Brook, the chief of the ~
British Imperial General Staff, noted in his diary that the Prime Minister j
felt himself capable of annihilating all industrial centers and people of ~
Russia.25 ;
On 23 July the U.S. reported that the first atomic bomb would be ready for i
i
use in the beginning of August.26 Although this bomb was to be dropped on
Japan, it was decided to also use it as a means of political pressure on
the USSR. U.S. Secretary of State Byrnes believed that presence of such '
a weapon would make Russia more compliant.27 This was the beginning of ~
America's notorious "atomic diplomacy."
;
Following the 24 July meeting of the conference President Truman, put*ing on '
and emphatically pompous appearance,went to the head of the Soviet dei`.egation, !
Stalin, and toid him that the Americans had created a new bomb of extremely `
destructive power. He was forced to confess with irritation, however, that ~
this did not mike any special impression on his i.nterlocutor. "The Russian ~ ;
Premier," Truman lat'er wrote, "showed no interest at all."28 The calculated '
move by the Americans clearly failed. The "bomb" mechanism did not work I
against the USSR. This meant that the USA could not hope to dictate its ;
will at the conference. Some of the English and America.ns hastened to the ; ~
~ ~
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concl.usioii that Stalin w~s supposedly unable to understand what discovery
the discussion was about.
But they were wrong. riarshal of the S~vi.et Uizipn G. K. Zhukov recalled how
I. V. Stalin related his talk with T.ruman to V. M. Molotov in his presence
after returning from the meeting:
"V. M. Molot~v immediately said:
'They are trying to jack up the price.'
"I. V. Stalin laughed:
'Let them try. We will have to talk with Kurchatov about speeding up our
work today.'
"I understood that he was talking about creating the atom bomb."29
The question of ending tlie war in the Far East--that is, defeating the
Japanese aggressors--as quickly as possible was also discussed at the
conference. The USA showed great interest in having the US5R take part in
the fight against Japan, fearinc~ that otherwise the war would drag on and
require considerable sacrifi.ces and efforts on the part of the USA. The
Soviet delegation confirmed that the USSR would keep to its pledge and join
_ in the defeat of the Far Eastern aggressor at the time agreed upon. Coordina-
tion was also achieved on the response the Soviet government was to make
to an appeal to it by the Japanese government, which was trying to avoid
unconditional surrender at any price. On 26 July the governments of the USA,
England, and China published a declaration in which they demanded immediate
unconditional surrender by Japan.30
Al1 decisions reached at the Potsdam conference were documented in the
minutes, which were signed by the heads of the governments of the three
countries. Most of them were included in the Report on the Potsdam
Conference of the Big Three, which was approved by the three sides and
published immediately after the conference.
As decisions were made on particular issues at the conference, the
governments of the USSR, USA, and England brought them to the awareness of
the French government, ask.ing the l.atter to state ~~ts approval of these
decisions. On 7 August French Foreign Minister G. Bidault gave the
- diplomatic representatives of the three powers in Paris six notes stating
the position of France on the decisions reached in Potsdam. In prinicple
the French government expressed its appr~val of them, but citinc~ absence
of its own representative at the conferer',ce as well as the need for obtaining
additional information and far discussing seme of the issues jointly, it
quali~ied or made reservations concerning its positior_,~,in relation to certain -
concrete issues. Thus the French government approved of the main goal of
Germany's occupation, but it stated reservations concerning the suitability
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of creating the German political parties and central administrative '
d~oartments. Bidault interpreted these issues mainly from an anti-
communist standpoint. Discussing the issue with (Dzh. Kefferi), the ,
American ambassador in Paris, he stated the notion that these measures
could lead to "Bolshevization" of all of Germany. The French government
declared that it had no objections against the agreement on Poland's western
border. It expressed its consent to take part in the work of the Council
of Foreign Affairs Ministers and the Allied Reparation Commission.31
Despite the differences in the approaches taken by the participants of the ,
Potsdam conference to the questions examined at it, it ended its work
successfully with adoption of agreed-upon decisions that put an end to the
many years of the bloody war started by Hitler's Germany and laid the basis
for postwar reconstruction in Europe. The Potsdam conference marked a
victory of democrat32 principles in determining the paths to solution of
the German problem. It was a severe but valid verdict against the forces
of fascism and war. At the same time the decisions made in relation to
Germany were permeated not by a spirit of vengeance but rather by concern :
for the future of its people, for creating conditions favoring its ~
democratic development. Denazification and democratization of Germany were
viewed in the conference decisions as the best means for keeping it from
once again becoming a seat of war in Europe.
As a result of the Soviet delegation's efforts the principles of democracy
and progress triumphed also in relation to problems associated with the
fate of countries in Central and Southeast Europe. Owing to the hard line
taken by the US5R the attempts made by the USA and England to impose
decisions that would make it possible for imperialist powers to intervene
in the internal affairs of these countries with the goal of restoring
capitalist regimes were unsuccessful.
The democratic and just decisions made in Potsdam were predetermined by the
role played by the Soviet Union at the conference. Despite all of the ~
hopes the ruling circles of the Western powers had for weakening the USSR in
the course of the war, the latter emerged from it as a mighty power. The
authority of the Soviet Union grew immeasurably in the entire world. The ;
governments of the USA and England could not ignore its position, and they
were forced to seek mutually acceptable solutions at the conference.
The status of military actions in the Pacific theater of war was examined
at the conference. Three powers--the USA, England, and China--adopted
a declaration proposing unconditional surrender and an immediate end to the
war to the government of Japan. The Potsdam declaration also presented the
fundamental principles of Japan's postwar development, and it contained
refe:rences to the need for lia;iidating Japenase militarism and creating
the conditions for reviving and reinforcing democratic traditions in the
country. Concurrently the conditions of the Cairo declaration concerninq
expulsion of Japanese invaders from occupied territories and limiting the
sovereignty of Japan to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku,
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and other smaller islands were reconfirmed. After the Soviet Armed Forces
entered the war against Japan, the Soviet Union also signed the Potsdam
declaration.
Successful conclusion of the Potsdam conference was graphical evidence
that despite existing differences in their positions, at their dE:sire the tYsree
powers that had cooperated in the war against the common enemy could find
the grounds for cooperation in peacetime as well. At the conference, the
Soviet government graphically demonstrated its good will toward such
cooperation.
The Potsdam conference entered history as:an event of tremendous international signifi-
cance. The historic decisions adopted at the conference,corresponded to
the liberating, antifascist nature of the war fought by the peoples of the
three powers and countries allied with them. Contrary to the assertions of
bourgeois historiography that the Potsdam conference uras supposedly "the m~t unsuccessful
of all Allied military canferences, "33 and that the Potsdam conference was in the .best
case "an agreement to disagree,"34 it was the most i.mportant turning point
from war to peace in Europe.
Decisions made in Potsdam have withstood the test of time. Even today they
continue to be the foundation of postwar peaceful reconstruction in Europe.
Implementation of the principles of Potsdam, USSR Council of Ministers
Chairman A. N. Kosygin noted in a message to the U.S. President, the French
President, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain in connection with the
25th anniversary of the Potsdam agreement, still "means recognition of the
stability of Europe's present boundaries and of the political realities
resulting from World War II and postwar development, and assurance of
reliable security on the European continent."35
5. The Nuremberg Trials
History contains many examples of cruelty and inhumanity, and of bloody
crimes by imperialism, but never had atrocities and crimes been of the
scale achi~ved by the Germans. "German fascism," noted G. Dimitrov, "is not
simply bourgeois nationalism. It is brutal chauvinism. It is a system of
government based on political banditry, a system of pro~�ocations and torture
in relation to the working class and revolutionary elements of the peasantry,
the petty bourgeoise, and the intelligentsia. It is Middle Age barbarianism
and cruelty. It is bare aggression against other peoples and countries.'~36
7he fascists tortured, shot, and gassed more than 12 million women, elderly,
and children, and they cold-bloodedly and ruthlessly exterminated prisoners
of war. They leveled thousands of cities and towns to the ground, and they
exiled millions of people from European countries occupied by them into
labor camps in Germany.
Typical of German fascism was the fact that concurrently with its military,
economic, and propaganda preparations for their next act of aggression,
monstrous plans were also prepared for mass extermination of prisoners of
war and peaceful citizens. Extermination, torture, and plunder were elevated
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to the rank of state policy. "We," Hitler said, "must develop our technique
of depopulation. Were you to ask me what I meant by depopulation, I would
say that I imply elimination of entire racial units..., eli.mination of
millions in the lower races...."37
SS Reichsfuhrer Himmler's department, the supreme high command of the armed
forces, and the main command of the ground troops took a direct part in
the development and enactment of the plan for mass extermination of peaceful
citizens. They created the sinister "industry of human extermination,"
which made German monopolies rich. In order to enslave those remaining
alive, the Germans barbarically destroyed historical monuments and national
relics, and they annihilated the material and spiritual culture of the people.
Crimes became normal behavior, the common practice of the rulers, officials
and servicemen of Nazi Germany. The entire system of fascist institutions,
organizations, and casnps was aimed against the vital interests of entire
nations.
This is why just compensation was demanded by all honorable people, becoming one
of the prerequisites for maintaining firm peace on Earth. Soviet soldiers and
soldiers of countries in the anti-Hitler coalition paved the way for
internatior.al justice, organizing the Nuremberg trials of the principal Nazi
war criminals. Of course, under various excuses reactionary circles of the
USA and Great Britain began a campaign to keep the fascist conspirators
from coming to trial. Even during the war American reactionary sociologists
tried to persuade their readers that the war criminals were nothing more
than mental patients who neAded treatment. A proposal to deal with Hitler
in the same way that Napoleon had been dealt with in his time was discussed
in the press; as we know, Napoleon was exiled for life to the Island of
St. Helena without trial by decision of the victorious countries.38 The
precise words used varied, but the goal was always the same--to punish the
principal war criminals without investigation and trial. The main argument
suggested was that their guilt in the crimes was undebatable and that it
would supposedly take too much time and effort to collect the legal evidence.39
Accoding to Truman, as early as in October 1943 Churchill tried to
persuade the head of the Soviet government that the principal war criminals
should be shot without tria1,40
The true reason for such proposals was the fear that the unseamy side of the
activities of the governments of Great Britain, the USA, and other Western
countries--their assistance to Hitler in creating his powerful war machine
and their encouragement of fascist Germany to attack the Soviet Union--
might surface in"an open trial. The ruling circles of the Western powers
became apprehensive that public court examination of the crimes of German
fascism might mushroom into condemnation of the imperialist system, which
~ostered it and placed it in power.
Bourgeois falsifiers of history tried to distort thF position of the USSR
concerning the question of trying the principal war criminals. Thus for
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'ft~ ~ I I~l Df F'EA1 ~ FASC I ST ~IEftMAN~?

it OC1~ER i9T9 c~0u0 3~l79~ Z~ z
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example W'est Germ.3n journalists Heydecker and Leeb assert that supposedly `
"the Soviet Union was also far lining the Nazis up against the wa11,~~41 `
This assPrtion has nothing in common with rea].ity. It w3s precisely the
USSR that suggested and defended the idea of trying the fascist criminals.
All freedom-loving peoples of the world supported the Soviet Union's
- position.
The So~~iet Union consistently and unswervingly fought to see that the Nazi
- ringleaders woiild be brought to international trial, and that the declarations
an~ international agreement~ on punishing all war criminals would be complied
with strictly, since nothing can encourage crime more than the absence of
certain punishment. Moreover the program of the United Nations for
' destroying fascism also contained the demand for severe and just punishment
� of all who had conmitted the most grievous crimes against mankind.
That the entire responsibility for the crimes committed by the Nazis lay
with the fascist rulers and their henchmen was stated quite early in
memoranda published by the Soviet government: "The Disturbing C ruelties
of German Authorities in Relation to Soviet Prisoners of W ar" dated
25 November 1941, "The Universal Plunder and Destruction of the Population.
and the Nbnstrous Cruelties Committed by German Authorities on_Soviet territories TY~ey
(~ptured" dated 1 January 1942, and "The Monstrous,Crimes, A trocities, and
~iolence of the F ascist German I nvaders in Occupied Z ones and Responsibility
of tYie German Government and Cammand for These Crimes" dated27 April 1942.42
ThQse documents were sent to all countries with which the Soviet Union
maintained diplomatic relations, and they were broadly publicized.
The inevitability of criminal x~esponsibility of the Germans for their
_ atrocities was expressed in a declaration of friendship and mutual
assistance signed on 4 December 1941 by representatives of the USSR and
Poland. This declaration also established an inseparable relationship -
between punishment of fascist criminals and achievement of a lasting and
just peace.
On 14 October 1942 the Soviet government once again declared most
resolutely and steadfas�tly that the criminal German government and all of
its henchmen must suffer and will suffer deserved punishment for atrocities
they committed against the Soviet people and all freedo~r-loving peoples.
The government of the USSR emphasized the need for immediate trial and
punishment by a special international tribunal, with all the strictness of
criminal law, of all ringleaders aEfascist Germany who had been captured
during the war by countries fighting against Germany.43 The task of
just and severe punishment of the fascist elite became an important element -
of the USS R's foreign policy.
,
The Soviet government's declaration was met by world society with great
interest and understanding; this wa~ especially true of the governments of
countries that had falleiz sacrifice to Nazi aggression. Thus the government
of Czechoslovakia stated that it interpreted this document as an extremely
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impor.tant step on the road to achieving unity in the United Nations in
resolving the problems of punishing the atrocities c~mmitted during the
war. ~+4
The goverr,ments of the USA and Great,~ritain also issued declarations back
in October 1941 stating that the Germans were responsible for their
monstrous crimes. Roosevelt noted in this case that the atrocities committed
_ by the Nazis awaited their severe retribution, and Churchill emphasized that
"retribution for thes? crimes will from this day forward become one of the
_ main goals of the war.'~45
- References to strict pur:.:shment of fasc~.st criminals were also made in the '
Moscow declaration signed by the leaders of iche L'SSR, USA, and Great Britain I
on 30 October 1943 and in other international agreements. In turn, the j
following was eiztered into the minutes of the P~tsdam conference: "German I
inilitarism and Nazism will be eradicated...,~~46 l
Attempts by international reaction to block a public trial of the ringleaders j
of the Reich failed. Tr.e nations that won a great battle against Nazi I
Germany perceived trial of its rulers as a just act of retribution, aizd
a natural culmination to World War II. i~
The idea of an international criminal ccurt was brought to life by
cist war criminals which ;
organization of the trials of the principal fas ,
- lasted for almost a year--from 20 November 1945 to 1 October 1946, and by
the activities of the international military tribunal c~~~ated on the
- basis of the London agreement, signed on 8 August 1945 uy the governments
of the USSR, USA, Great Britain and France and approved by 19 other ~
countries. It was at this time that the charter of the tribunal was ;
adopted. One of the fundamental premises of this charter was that the
international military trihunal was instituted for just and speedy trial and
punishment of the principal war criminals of European Axis countries.47
The tribunal was international not only because it was organized on the
basis of an agreement approved by 23 states, but also,as was indicated in
ttie introduction of this agreement, because it was instituted in behalf of
all the United Nations. The struggle against German fascism had to become, '
and did become, a worldwide concern, uniting nations in both hemispheres, !
since fascism and its misanthropic ideology and policies have always been ,
and are a direct threat to world peace and social progress. Countries of
the anti-Hitler coalition managed to achieve agreement on a policy which ~
included the task of military destruction of German fascism and assurance of
the conditions for a just peace. "Cooperation in completion of this great ~
military task facing us," Roosevelt stated, "must become the starting point
for cooperation in the even greater tasks of establishing peace in all the
world."48
The USSR finished preparing for the court trials of the principal war criminals
in relatively short time, since back in 1942 a ukase of the Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Soviet.laad fonned ~~raordinary State Commission for the
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Determination and Investigation of Crimes Committed by the German Fascist
Aggr~ssors. Its composition included AUCCTU Secretary N. M. Shvernik,
All-IInion Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee Secretary A. A.
Zhdanov, writer A. N. Tolstoy, academicians Ye. V. Tarle, N. N. Burdenko,
B. Ye. Vedeneyev, I. P. iraynin, and T. D. L~~senko, pilot V. S. Grizodubova,
and Nikolay,Metro~politan of Kiev and Galicia.4�3 Over 7 million workers
and kolkhoz farmers, engineers and technicians, scientists, and public
- officials contributed to the case materials.SU The commission established
cases of monstrous crimes by the Germans with the help of documents and
~ by questioning many thousands of eye witnesses.
Soon after the London agreement was signed the international military tribunal
� was formed on a one man, one vote basis with the following representatives: ~
- from the USSR--USSR Supreme Court Assistant Chairman Major General of Justice
I. T. Nikitchenko; from the USA--Federal Supreme Court Member F. Biddle;
~ fran Great Britain--Lord Justice Sir G. Lawrence; from France--Professor of
Criminal Law D. de Vabres. Alternates of the tribunal's members were
appointed: from the USSR--Lieutenant Colonel of Justice A. F. Volchkov; from
the USA--North Carolina State Judge J. Parker; from Great Britain--one of -
the country's leading lawyers, (N. Birkett); from France-- (R. Fla'ico), a
member of the Supreme Court of Appeal. Lawrence was ck~osen chairman of the
first trial.
The prosecution was organized in similar f~shion. The main prosecutors were:
from the USSR--Ukrainian SSR Procurator R. A. Rudenko; from the USA--R.
Jackson, a member of the U.S. Supreme Court (and a former assistant to
President Roosevelt); from Great Britain--Procurator General and House of
Co~nons Member H. Shawcross; from France--Minister of Justice F. de Menthon,
subsequently replaced by C. de Ribes. In addition to the chief prosecutors,
the case for the prosecution was supported (evidence was presented and wit-
nesses and def.endants were questioned) by their alternates and assistants:
from the USSR--Assistant Chief Prosecutor Yu. V. Pokrovskiy, and assistant
chief prosecutors N. D. Zorya, M. Yu. Radinsk?y, L. N. Smirnov, and L. R.
Sheynin.
Documentary and investigatory units were organized under the Chief Prose-
cutor from the USSR for preliminary questioning of defendants and witnesses
as well as for proper formulation of documents to be submitted to the
tr.ibunal. The documentary unit was directed by Assistant Chief Prosecutor
D. S. Kadev, while the i.nvestigatory unit, which was staffed by N. A. Orlov,
S. K. Piradov, and S. Ya. Rozenblit, was headed by G. N. Aleksandrov.52
USSR Academy of Sciences Co~responding Member A. N. Traynin served as the
scientific consultant to the Soviet delegation.
.
It was decided to hold the first trial of the principal war criminals in
Nuremberg--the city which was the cit~del of fascism for many years. It was
the site of congresses of the Nazi Party, and parades of storrntr.ooper
detachments were held there.
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The list of deferidants to be tried by the International Military Tribunal
included: H. Goering, Reichsmarschall, Commander in Chief of the LuftwaffF:,
commissioner of the so-called Four-Year Plan, and since 1922, Hitler's
closest confederate; R. Hess, Hitler's deputy as leader of the Nazi Fa;:ty,
and member of the Council of Mir.isters for Defen~e of the Empire; J.
Ribbentrop, minister of foreign affairs, and Nazi Party representative for
foreign policy; R. Ley, head of the so-called German Labor Front, and one
, of the leaders of the Nazi Party; W. Keitel, field marshal and chief of
staff of the Supreme High Command; (E. Kal'tenbrunner}, SS (obergruppenfyuier),
chief of the Imperial Administration of Security and the Security Police,
and the closest confederate of Himmler; A. Roseni~erg, Hitler's assistant
for ideological training of inembers of the Nazi Party, and Reichsminister
for the occupied eastern territories; (G. Frank), Nazi Party (reykhsleyter),
president of the Academy of German Law, and governor-general of occupied ~
Polish territories; W. Frick, minister of the interior and imperial
- commissioner for military administration; J. Streicher, gauleiter of
Franconia, ideologist of racism and anti-Semitism, and organizer of the i
Jewish purges; (V. Funk), minister of economics, president of the Reichsbank, '
and member of the Council of Ministers for Defense of the Empire; H. Schacht, i
organizer of the Wehrmacht's rearmament, and one of Hitler's closest ~
advisors on economic and financial issues; G. Krupp, head of the largest ~
concern of war industry, who took an active part in preparing and imple-
menting the aggressive plans of German militarism, and responsible for
the death of many thousands of people herded into labor camps in Nazi
Germany; K. Donitz, grand admiral, commander of the submarine fleet and,
as of 1943, the navy, Hitler's successor as chief of state; E. Raeder, grand ~
admiral, and commander in chief of the navy until 1943; (B. Shirakh),
organizer and director of Germany's fascist youth organization, Hitler's
vicegerent in Vienna; (F. Zaukel'), SS (obergruppenfyurer), general
- commissi.oner for utilization of manpower; A. Jodl, colonel general, chief
of operations for the Armed Forces Supreme High Command; F. Papen, one of ,
the organizers of the seizure of power in Germany by the Fascists, and
Hitler's closest supporter of Austria's "annexation"; (A.Zeyss-Inkvart), '
leader of the fascist party in Austria, deputy governor general of Poland,
and Hitler's vicegerent in the Netherlands; A. Speer, Hitler's closest
advisor and friend, Reichminister of arms and munitions, and one of the
leaders of the central planning committee; (K. Neyrat), former minister of
foreign affairs, member of the imperial defense council and, following
seizure of Czechoslovakia, protector of Bohemia and Moravia; (G. Frich),
- closest assistant to Goebbels, propaganda ministry's chief of the internal
press division, and director of the radio broadcasting division; M. Bormann,
Hitler's assistant for the fascist party heading the party office since
1941, Hitler's closest confederate. ~
They were accused of beginning an aggressive war with the goal of establishing '
world dominance by German imperialism--that is, of crimes against peace,
of tne murder and torture of prisoners of war and peaceful residents in
occupied countries, of driving civilians into Gezmany for forced labor,
murdering hostages, plundering public and private property, purposelessly
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destroying cities and towns, inestimable destruction unjustified by _
military necessity--that is, war crimes, and of extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other cruelties committed in relation to the civilian public
for political, racial, or religious m~~`~~?~.~--that is, of crimes against -
humanity.
On 18 October 1945 the International Military Tribunal accepted the indict-
ment signed by the chief prosecutors representing the USSR, USA, Great ~
Britain, and France; on that same day--that is, .more than a month before
court proceedings began, copies of this indictment were given to all
defendants to allow them time to prepare their defense. Thus to insure a
fair trial the rights of the defendants were scrL}pulously observed from the
very beginning. Commenting on the indictment, the world press noted that
this document spoke in the name of mankind`s outraged conscience, that this
was not an act of vengeance but of the triumph of justice, and that not
~ only the ringleaders of Nazi Germany but also the entire fascist syster:i
j was to be tried.53
Almost the entire fascist leadership was on the defendants' bench, with the -
exception of Hitler, Goebbels, and Himmler, who had committed suicide,
paralysis-stricken Krupp,whose case was singled out for individual examination
- and suspended, Bormann, who had disappeared (he was tried in absentia), and
I,ey, who hanged himself in his cell at the Nuremberg prison on learning of
his indictment.
i �
~ The defendants were given extensive possibilities for defending themselves
against the accusations, they all had German laywers,(some even had two),
~ and they en~oyed rights of defense of which defendants had been deprived not
only in the courts of fascist Germany but also many Western countries. The
prosecutors furnished copies of all documentary evidence in German, and they
! helped lawyers to seek and obtain documents an~ summon witnesses requested
by counsels for the defense.54
The trials at Nuremberg attracted the attention of millions of people in all
the world. As the tribunal's chairman Lawrence emphasized in its behalf,
"the trials, which now must begin, are unique in the history of world
jurisprudence, and they have the higYiest social signific~nce to millions of
, people over the entire globe."55 The proponents of peace ,.~.nd democracy
' saw in them a continuation of postwar i.nternational cooperation in the
struggle against fascism and aggression. It was clear to all honor.a~le
people of the world that a condescending attitude towards those who had '
criminally scorned universally recognized rules of international law and
committed crimes against peace and mankind would have been a great danger.
Never before had a trial united all progressive elements of the world in
such a unanimous desire to put an end to aggression, racism, and obscurantism.
The Nuremberg trials r~flected the anqer and perturbation mankind expressed
f~r the crimes for which the guilty had to be punished, such that such things
would never happen again. The fascist organizations and institutions,
misanthropic "theories " and "ideas," and criminals who had assumed dominion
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over an entire cUUntry and made the country itself a weapon of monstrous
atrocities were on trial.
The Nazi regime in Germany was incompatible with the elementary concept of
law; terror became this regime's law. An unheard-of provocation organized
- by Hitler and his closest confederates--burning of the Reichstag--was the ~
signal to begin. the most savage repressions against progressive f~rces in
~ Germany. Works by German and foreign writers of whom all mankind was
rightfully proud were burned in bonfires on thc streets and squares. The
fascists created the first concentration camps in Germany. Many thousands
of patriots were killed and tortured by stormtxoopers and SS butchers. As
a state structure, German fascism was a system of organized banditry. The
country possessed a broad network of organizations endowed with tremendous
power, which made a practice of terror, compulsion, and crimes.
The tribunal examined the question of recognizing the organizations of _
German fascism--the SS, 5A, the Gestapo, the SD, the government, the
general staff, and the supreme command of the German Armed Forces--as well
as the leaders of the National Socialist Part~ to be criminal. The criminal ;
nature of these organizations had to be recognized so that national courts
would obtain the right to try individuals belonging to organizations recog-
nized to be criminal. Consequently the principal "concrete physical
persons are subject to criminal liability" was preserved. The question of
the guilt of individuals belonging to criminal organizations and the
question of their liability for such membership was left to the national
courts, which had to resolve the issue of makiny the punishment fit the crime.
There was only one restriction i.mposed: The criminal nature of organizations
recognized to be criminal by the tribunal was not subject to review by the
courts of individual countries. ,
The Nuremberg trials were public trials in the widest sense. Of the 403 court ~
sessions, not one of them was a closed session.56 More than 60,000 passes ;
- were given out for the courtroom, some of them being given to Germans. All
that transpired in court was entered into the records. The stenographic ~
notes for the trials filled almost 40 volumes containing more than 20,000 ~
pages. The trials were conducted simultaneously in four languages, including I
German. The press and radio were represented by about 250 reporters, who ~
transmitted reports on the trials to all corners of the globe. i
~
An atmosphere of the strictest adherence to law reigned in the trials. Never ;
were the rights of the defendants infringed upon in any way. In addition to ~
analyzing the facts, the prosecutors analyzed the legal problems of the ,
trials defined the urisdiction of, the tribunal ~
, j , gave a legal interpretation
of the crimes, and rejected the groundless arguments of the counsels for the '
defense.s~ Thus the chief prosecutor from the USSR demonstrated in his ~
introductory remarks that the legal regime of international relations,
including those applicable to a coordinated fight against crime, rests on
other legal foundations. A treaty signed between states is a source of law
and the sole possible law-forming document in the international sphere.58
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The London agreement and one of its parts--the Charter of the International
Tribunal--were based on the principles and rules of international law that
had long been established and confirmed by the 1907 Hague convention, the
1929 Geneva convention, and a number of other conventions and pacts. The
tribunal's charter embodied, in legal forms, those international principles
and ideas which had been forwarded ov~r a period of many years in defex~se of
legality and justice in international relations. Over a long period of time, -
peoples interested in strengthening peace forwarded and supported the idea
that aggression was criminal, and this found its official recognition in a
number of international treaties and documents.
As far as the USSR is concerned, it is known that the first foreign policy
act of the Soviet government was the Decree of Peace signed by V. I. Lenin
and adopted the day following the victory of the October Revolution--8
November 1917; this decree declared aggressio:. ;:o be the g-reatest crime against
mankind and forwarded the premise of peaceful coexistence among states with
different social structures. The Soviet Union is doi.q everything to
� make this highly important principle of its foreign policy a law in inter-
national relations. A special article of the 1977 USSR Constitution
documents the peace-loving nature of the Soviet Union's foreign policy.
Trie entire historic road of the USSR is one of a purposeful struggle for
peace and the security of nations. "Not a single nation," F. Castro
noted at the First Congress of the Commi~.nist Party of Cuba, "has ever
desired pe~ce and defended it,as the Soviet nation has.... History also
shows that in distinction from capitalism, socialism does not need to impose
its will over other countries by means of wars and aggression."59
The fascist aggressors who found themselves on the defendants' bench knew
that when they made their treacherous attacks against other countries they
were committing the most severe crimes against peace, they were aware of their
criminal acts, and therefore they attempted to cover them up by falsely
forwarding them as defensive acts. Their hope, USSR Chief Prosecutor R. A.
Rudenko emphasized, was "that by insuring victory, total war would mean
evasion of punishment. But victory did not follow in the footsteps of the
crimes. What followed was the total unconditional surrender of Germany.
What came was the hour of stern punishment for all crimes committed.~~60
The Nuremberg trials were exceptional in terms of the irreproachability
and strength of evidence of the indictment. The evidence included testimony
by numerous witnesses, including former prisoners from Auschwitz, Dachau,
and other Nazi concentration camps that had been eye-witnesses of fascist
atrocities, and material evidence and documentary films. But official
documents signed by the defendants had the decisive role. Testimony from
a total of 116 witnesses was heard in court, to include 33 summoned by
prosecutors and 61 summoned by the defense in regard to individual cases;
moreover, more than 4,000 pieces of documentary evidence were presented.
"Zhe indictment against the defendants," read the tribunal's verdict, "is
based for the most part on documents written by the defendants themselves,
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the authentici~y of which was never debated, with the exception of one or
two cases.~~61
Thousands of documents from the archives of Hitler's general staff and the
ministry of foreign affairs, from the personal archives of Ribbentrop,
Rosenberg, Goering, and (Frank), correspondence written by banker (TC.
Shreder), and so on; which revealed the preparati~ns for and initiation of
the aggressive wars, were laid on the table of the International Military
Tribunal and spoke i.n such persuasive language that the defendants were
unable to oppose them with even a single serious argument. They had been
~ certain that documen+~s with the "Top Secret" stamp would never come to
light, but history decided otherwise. Extensive publicity and irreproachable
legal foundations were the most important traits of the Nuremberg trials.
On 3 January 1946 (O. Olendorf), the head of one of the operational groups
responsible for mass extermination of the peaceful population, testified:
J~zst his group alone annihilated 90,000 men, women, and children in the
southern Ukraine in a single year. Peaceful residents were exterminated
on the basis of an agreement betwaen the supreme command of the armed forces,
the general staff of the ground force;s, and Himmler's department. The chief
prosecutor from the USSR noted that orders signed by Keitel, Goering,
Donitz, Jodl, Reichenow, and Manstein, as well as by many other Nazi
generals left a trail of blood to numerous crimes committed on occupied
territories.63 On 7 January testimony was given at the trial by (E.
Bakh-Zelevski), SS commander and a member of the National Socialist Party
since 1930. He describ~d the events of a conference held at the beginning ~
of 1941 in which Himm].er ~eclared that or~ of the goals of the campaign against
the USSR "was to exterminate up to 30 million individuals of Slavonic
origin...." Being asked by lawyer (A. Tom) how this goai was explained,
the SS commander replied: "...it was the logical consequence of our entire
Nazi philosophy.... If one promotes for several decades the idea that
Slavs are an inferior race and that 3ews are not even human at all, pre-
cisely this result is unavoidable...."64 Wanting to have nothing to do
with this Bakh-Zelevski helped to revea' the misanthropic essence of
fascism.
The N3tional Socialist Party and its leaders were nurtured by monopolistic -
capital and militarist circles, and fascism was brought to life by the
greedy goals of German imperialism. It,is no accident Prussian militarist
E. Ludendorff marched side by side with Hitler and his closest confederate,
R. Hess, at the time of the Putsch in Munich in 1923. Nor was it a
coincidence that influential representatives of financial capital such as
_ H. Schacht, (E. Shtaus), and F. Papen joined the fascist party. Papen
wrote in his book "The Road to Power" that in the struggle for power in
t.he Reichswehr, the decisive factor was "not only a certain group of -
generals responsible for the events culminating with 30 January 1933,
bat also the entire officer corps as a whole."65
Having insured establishment of the fascist regime, monopolies and militarists
began preparing the country for aggressive war. As early as in his first
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confcrence with his generals, on 3 February 1933, Hitler posed the goals of
future aggression--to gain new markets, to seize new living space in the
east, and to ruthlessly Germanize it,66
The trials revealed the criminal methods by which Germany's economy was
switched to a war footing, the way the ominous motto of "guns over butter"
was implemented, the way the entire country was militari.zed, and the decisive
role played in this by monopolistic bosses who occupied key positions in
the war economy. German monopolies avidly financed not only the general
piratic plans of the fascists but also Himmler's "extraordinary measures."
The defend~nts tried to persuade the tribunal that only Himmler and professional
assassins from the SS subordinated to him were guilty of all atrocities.
It was demonstrated irrefutably, however, that the mass murders and other .
atrocities had been conceived and planned not only by Himmler's department -
but also by the supreme high command, and that extermination of peaceful
citizens and prisoners of war was conducted by SS and Gestapo butchers in
_ close cooperation with the general staff. Thus Former concentration camp
commandant R. Hess declared under oath that Soviet prisoners of war brought
to Auschwitz by officers and enlisted men of the regular German army were
- among those who died in the gas chambers and incinerators,67 and (Bakh-
Zelevski) reported that he had kept H. Kluge, (G. Krebs), (M. Veykhs),
(E. Bush), and others regularly informed about extermination of the peace-
ful population (under the guise of fighting partisans).68 Speaking in 1943
to students of the military academy in Berlin, Field Marshal G. von
~ Rundstedt taught: "Annihilation of neighboring nations and their wealth is
~ entirely necessary to our victory. One of the serious errors made in 1918 -
' was that we spared the lives of civilians in enemy countries.... We are
i obligated to annihilate at least a third of their residents ...."69
; Assistant Chief Prosecutor T. Taylor concluded from evidence submitted to
~ him of the criminal nature of the Nazi general staff and the supreme high
' command that they had emerged from the war soiled by crimes. Expressing the
opinion of all prosecutors, he spoke persuasively abou'c the danger of
~ militarism in general and German militarism in particular. German militarism,
i Taylor noted, "were it to return, would not necessarily do so under the Nazi
! label. German militarists will tie their fate to that of any person or any
; party that would desire to restore German military power."~~ This is why
I militarism had to be completely uprooted.
~ -
The International Military Tribunal entered the following in its verdict in
I relation to the German generals: rhey were responsible for much of the
misfortune and suffering of millions of inen, women, and children; they had
' disgraced the honorable profession of a solflier; without their military ~
leadership, the aggressive longings of Hitler and his confederates would
have been abstract and fruitless. "Modern German militarism," the verdict
emphasized, "came into flower for a short while with the help of its most
recent ally--national socialism--with the same success and with even greater
sucGess than in past generations."71
~
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An especially great deal of revenge-seeking literature attempting to white-
wash the Nazi criminals and to prove the unprovable --the blamelessness of
the Nazi generals--has appeared in recent years in West Germany. The pro-
ceedings of the Nuremberg trial completely refute such falsification. The
trials revealed the true role of the general staff and monopolies in the
_ crimes of German fascism, and it is in this that its unfading historic
significance lies.
The Nuremberg trials helped to tear the screen awa.y from the secrets of -
World War II's beginnings. They persuasively demonstrated that militarism
was the nutrient medium in which fascism had dcveloped so swiftly. Assistant
American prosecutor (R. Kempner) emphasized in his speech that one of the
causes of the world catastrophe was the fabrication of a"communist danger."
This danger, he declared, "was a fabrication which together with other things ~
led in the end to World War II.i72
Trying to camouflage its goals, Hitler's clique regularly howled about the
supposed danger on the part of the USSR, declaring its predatory war against
- the Soviet Union to be "preventive." However, the "defensive" masquerade of
the defend ~ts and their defenders was quite clearly uncovered during the ,
trials; the falseness of the "preventive" nature of the attack upon the
Soviet Union, asserted by HitlPr's propaganda,was revealed to all the world. -
Basing itself on numerous documents submitted as evidence, testimony by
witnesses including Field Marshal F'. Paulus, and confessions by the
defenda,lts themselves, the tribunal wrote in its sentence that the at~ack
upon the So~~iet was made "without a shadow of legal justification. It
was out-and-out aggression."73 This decision still continues ~o be
significant today. It is an important argument in the struggle of pro- -
gressive forces against falsifiers of the history of tne Second World
War's arisal who try to justify Hitler's aggression against the USSR with '
the goal of revenge against the socialist countries.
The Nuremberg trials entered his~.ory as antifascist trials. The misanthropic ~
essence of fascism,i.tsideology, and especially its raci.sm, which was the ~
ideological foundation for the preparations and initiation of aggressive
wars and for mass extermination of ~eople, was revealed to all the world. ~
The Nuremberg trials showed fascism for what it really is--a conspiracy by i
bandits against liberty and mankind. Fascisn is war; it is the violence '
of terror and tyranny, it is negation of the human worth of non-Arian races. ~
And this is inherent to all successors of German fascism, no matter what !
forms it takes. The trials graphically and persuasively demonstrated the '
entire danger of the resurrection of fascism to the fate of the world. The ~
last words of defendant Ribbentrop once again confirmed the close relation-
ship that had existed between the ru].ers of C,ermany and the circles of
political reaction which began provoking new wars before the bloodiest war
of mankind's history had barely ended, with the goal of est-ablishing their
- dominance over the world. The trial proceedings appeal to us: We must not
permit understatement of the crimes of fascism; the young generation must not
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be taught the entirely false and by essence blasphemous version that there
had never been an Auschwitz or a Majdanek, a Buchenwald or a Q~avensbryuld,
and that there never were gas chambers and murder-busses. The trials were
also especially significant because the fact of condemnation of the aggressors
' is a very serious warning for the future.
The chief prosecutors concluded their presentation on 30 July 1946. In his
concluding statement made on 29-30 July, USSR Chief Prosecutor R. A. Rudenko
summarized the court proceedings against the main war criminals, noting that -
they were being "judged by a court created by peace-loving and freedom-
loving countries expressing the will of all progressive mankind and defending
its interests, a mankind which does not want a repetition of the disaster
and which would not allow a gang of crir~?inals to enslave nations and
exterminate people unpunished.... Mankind cries out to bring the criminals
to justice, and it is in its behalf that we, the prosecutors, state the
accusation in this trial. And how piteous are the attempts at disputing
the right of mank.ind to judge the enemies of mankind, how groundless are the
attempts being made to deprive peoples of ~~heir right to punish those who
made it their goal to ens~ave and extermYnate nations and to pursue this
goal for many years in succession by cri.minal means."74
' Sentence was pronounced on 30 September and 1 October 1946.
The tribunal sentenced Goering, Ribbentrop, Keitel, (Kal'tenbrunner),
Rosenberg, (Frank), Frick, Streicher, (Zaukel'), Jodl, (Zeyss-inkvart),
and Bormann (in absentia) to death by hanginq, Hess, (Funk), and Raeder to
life imprisonment, (Shirakh~), and Speer to 20 years, (Neyrat~ to 15 years,
and Donitz to 10 years imprisonment. (Frich), Papen, and Schacht were
acquitted. The tribunal declared the goverriing board of the Nation~l
Socialist Party, the SS, the SD, and the Gestapo to be criminal organizations.
In a Special Opinion the USSR representative to the tribunal declared his
disagreement witYi the decision to acquit (Frich), Papen, and Schacht and
to not recognize the general staff and members of the governing cabinet to
be criminal organizations, since the tribunal did have sufficient evidence
at its disposal proving their guilt. Following the Control Council's
denial of the appeals of the condemned for a reduction of sentence, the
executions were carried out on the night of 16 October 1946.
"...wQ share the opinions of the Soviet judge," read the lead article in
PRAVDA. "But despite publication of a'special opinion' by the Soviet
judge we cannot fail to emphasize that the verdict of Nuremberg over the
Nazi murderers will be evaluated positively by all honest people in the
entire world, since it is a valid and deserved punishment for the gravest
criminals against peace and the good of all nations. A historic trial has
ended..." 75
The reaction of the German public to the trials was typical. On 15 August
1946 the American Information Bureau published questionnaire results in
its regular review: The overwiielming majority of the Germans (about 80
percent) felt the Nuremberg trials to be just and that the guilt of the -
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convicts was indisputable; about half of the respondents replied t.hat all '
convicts should have been sentenc2d to death; only 4 percent had negative
feelings about the tri.als. In accordance with the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal subsequent trials were to be held "in places specified
by the Tribunal" (Article 22}, For a number of reasons--for example
deviation of Western powers from the Potsdar.i and other agreements made
during the war and immediately after its conclusion--the activities of the
tribunal were limited to the Nuremberg trials. Nevertheless the activities
of the International Military Tribunal and the significance of its verdict
have everlasting significance. The historic role of the Nuremberg trials j
lies in the fact that for the first time in the history of international ~
relations it made aggression and aggressors punishable in the eyes of
criminal law.
The International. Military Tribunal recognized aggression t~ be the gravest
international crime. For the first time in history state executives
guilty of preparing for, initiating, and conducting an aggressive war were
punished as criminals, and the principle that '7~eing the head of state or
an official of a.government department and, equally so, acting in response
to instructions from the government in the execution of criminal orders are ,
not grounds for absolution from responsibility." The verdict noted: "It
has been asserted that internatio;lal law can examine only the actions of
sovereign states, and that it cannot set punishment for individuals," and
that lf a state commits an unjust act, "persons actually performing this
act are not personally responsible but are protected by the doctrine of
state sovereignty. 6 In the tribunal' s opinion both of these premises had to
be rejected. It had already long been recognized that international law
imposes certain responsibilities on indi~iduals as well as on states.
Moreover the tribunal noted: "Crimes against international law are
committed by people, and not by abstract categories, and it is only through
punishment of individuals committing such crime that the provisions of
international law can be observed.... The principle of international law
which under certain circumstances protects the government of a state
cannot be applied t~7actions that are judged to be criminal according to
international law."
The principles of the tribunal'~ charter and verdict, confirmed by resolu-
tions of the U.N. General Assembly, were a significant contribution to
- existing international law, and they became its universally recognized rules.
Concepts such as international conspiracy,.planning, preparation, and
conduct of an aqgressive war, and incitement to war were introduced into
the lexicon of international law and modern national jurisprudence, and �
they were recognized to be criminal and, consequently, criminally
punishable acts.
The trial proceedings and verdict of the tribunal serve the cause of. peace
on Earth, being simultaneously a stiff warning to aggressive forces that
have not yet abandoned their adventuristic plans. The results of the
Nuremberg trials encourage alertness on the part of all who do not wish
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a r~petition of the bloody tragedy of the past t,var, all who are fightiny ~
to maintain peace.
The situation today is entirely different from that in which Hitler's fascism
- arose. But even in today's conditions we must maintain constant and
high alertness, and we must right fascism actively in all of its manifes-
tations. It is in this as well that the lessons of the Nuremberg trials
have great significance.
It is widely known that in o-rder to rehabilii:ate fascist military criminals,
for a number of years people in the West have argued for their mass
amne~ty, citing the rules of general criminal prescription, and that
petitions for early release of the convicts have been submitted. But the
" Nuremberg trials persuasively revealed the fact that fascist war crininals
and their crimes against the world are by nature international crimes, and
therefore such arguments r.anrot be used; the trials revealed that these
political adventurists had not stopped at any atrocities to achieve their _
criminal goals, atricities which filled the land with n~oaning and wrath.
Can any sort of "prescriptions" erase :~rom the mernories of nations (Oradur
syur Glan) and Lidice, the ruins of Cov~ntry and Smolensk, (Khatyn) and
� (Pirchyupis), and much, much else that had become an expression of fascist
cruelty and vandalism? Can we really forget the basement of the Reichsbank,
in which (V. Funk) and (E. Pu~') stored chests f illed with gold crowns,
dentures, and eyeglass frames cbtained from the death camps, later to be
cast into ingots and sent to Basel and deposited in international accounts?
We know that civilization and humanitarianism are indivisible, as are peace
and hu,-nanitarianism. But we must effectively reject humanitarianism which
shows mercy to butchers and is indifferent to their sacrifices. And when
we say that "no one is to be forgotten and nothing is to be forgotten,"
we base ourselves not on a sense of vengeance but rather on a feeling of
justice and z concern for the future of nations. The peoples of the world
~ were freed from Nazi oppression at too high a price to permit neufascists
to cancel out the results of World ~lar II. "The prupose of our appeal to
surmount the bloody past of Europe, L. I. Brezhnev declared, "is not
to forget it but to sse that it never recurs."78
Being a document of international law, the tribunal's verdict is a constant
warning to all in different corners of our planet who attempt to implement
, a misanthropic policy, a policy of imperialist predation and aggression, of
inflammation of war hysteria, and of creation of a threat to peace and
the security of nations.
The lessons of the Nuremberg trials attest to the fact that despite
~ disagreements on certain points, the tribunal's verdict expresses the
unanimous opinion of the representatives of four countries in their
condemnation of the ringleaders of Hitler's band and of criminal organizations
of German fascism such as the governing board of the National 5ocialist
Party, the SS, the SD, and the Gestapo. The hope held by world reaction
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that dissention ai;iong the judges would be inevitable and that the trials
would never come to their conclusi~n were never justified.
* * * ~
The power of the Soviet Union and the lea3ing role it played in the defez~
of Nazi Germany caused unprec~dented growth in its international authority.
It was no longer possible to resolve international problems without the
USSR's participation. The Soviet Union fought to see that peace would be
. established in Europe on the basis of the principles of democracy and
progress, which correspond to the interesi:s of the masses on the entire
' cor,tinent. This was graphically revealed in decisions of the Potsdam
conference aimed at eradicating fascism and militarism in Germany and at
creating the conditions for postwar resurrection of Germany as a democratic -
~ and peaceful state. ~
The Soviet Union is also greatly credited with the fact that it prevented
exportation of counterrevolution in countries of Central and Southeast ~
Europe that had assumed the road of free and democratic development.
One of the most important problems connected with the transition from war
to peace was that of creating an international organization to maintain
peace and security. Soviet diplomacy did much to make the United Nations ~
adhere to these goals.
The lessons of World War II attest to the qreat significance the joint zctions
of the great powers had in the struggle against their common enemy--fascist
Germany. T~e lessons of the Nuremberg trials persuade us of this as well.
The tribunal's verdict expressed the common opinion of representatives of
the four countries in its condemnation of the war criminals and the criminal
organizations of German fascism. The Nuremb~rg trials proved that a will
to cooperate can insure unity in actions aimed at attaining a noble goal--
~ excluding unjustified wars from the experience of mankind.
True to Lenin's principles of peace and peaceful coexistence among
states irrespective of their social structure, the Soviet government
manifests deep interest in seeing that cooperation achieved during the
war between states of the anti-Hitler coalitiaii would continue even after
_ the war.
� Footnotes
1. Churchill, W., "The Second World War," Vol VI, pp 581-582.
; 2. "Tegeran-Yalta-Potsdam. Sbornik dokumentov," p 219.
3. Israelyan, V., "Antigitler.ovskaya koalitsiya. (Diplomaticheskoye sodru- ~
zhestvo SSSR, SShA i Anglii v gody ~�~toroy mirovoy voyny)" (The Anti-
Hitler Coalition (Diplomatic Cooperation Between the USSR, USk, ar.d England t
During the Second World War)), Moscow, 1964, pp 584-585.
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4. "Tegeran-Yalta-Potsdam. Sbornik dokumentov," p 386.
5. "Tegeran-Yalta-Potsdam. Sbornik dokumen~ov," pp 387-392.
6. AVP [USSR For~ign Policy Archives], F. 0639, op. 1, p. 4, d. 57, 1. 7.
7. "Tegeran-Yalta-Postdam. Sbornik dokumentov," p 341.
_ 8. Marienfeld, W., "Konferenzen uber Deutschland," Hanover, 1962, p 196.
9. "FRUS. The Conference of Berli:z (The Potsdam Conference). 1945,� ~
Washington, Vol 2, 1960, pp 484-485, 491-492. -
10. "Tegeran-Yalta-Potsdam. Sbornik dokumentov," pp 392, 393.
11. "Sbornik deystwyushxhikh dogovorov, soglasheniy i konventsiy,
zaklyuchennykh SSSR s inostrannymi gosudarstvami" (Collection of
Effective Treaties, Agreements, and Conventions Signed Between the USSR
- and Foreign States), Issue XI, pp 128-129.
12. "Tegeran-Yalta-Potsdam. Sbornik dokumentov," p 295.
13. Ibid., p 396.
14. "Istoriya diplomatii" (The History of Diplomacy), Vol 4, p 677.
15. "FRUS. The Conference of Berlin," Vol 1, p 781.
16. Churchill, W., "The Second World War," Vol VI, p 581.
17. Wheeler-Bennett, J., and Nickolls, A., "The Semblence of Peace. The
Political Settlements After the Second World War," London, 1972, p 337.
_ 18. "Istoriya vneshney politiki SSSR" (History of USSR Foreign Policy),
- Vol 1, "1917-1945," p 490.
19. "Sbornik deystvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglasheniy i konventsiy,
zaklyuchennykh SSSR s inostrannymi gosudarstvami," Issue XI, p 122.
20. Fleming, D., "Cold War and Its Origins. 1917-1960," London, Vol 1,
1961, p 290. ,
21. AVP, F. 0639, op. 1, p. 2, d. 32. 11. 7-8.
~ 22. "Tegeran-Yalta-Potsdam. Sbornik dokumentov," p 398.
23. "FRUS. The Conference of Berlin," Vol 2, pp 1360-1361.
24. Churchill, W., "The Second World War," Vol VI, p 225.
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25. Bryant, A., "The Triumph in the West, 1943-1946," p 47a.
26. "FRUS. The Conference of Berlin," Vol II, p 1373.
27. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1957, p 347.
28. "FRUS. The Conference of Berlin," Vol II, pp 378-379.
29. Zhukov, G., "Vosnominaniya i razmyshleniya" (Rerollections and
D2liberations), Vol 2, p 364.
30. "FRUS. The Conference of Berlin," Vol II, pp 1474-1476.
31. "FRUS. The Conference of Berlin," Vol II, pp 1548-1555.
32. "Pravda o politike zapadnykh derzhav v germanskom voprose. Ob
otvetstvennosti zapadnykh derzhav za narusheniye Potsdamskikh
soglasheniy i v~zrozhdeniye germanskogo militarizma (Istoricheskaya
spravka)" (The Truth About the Politics of the Western Powers in
the German Question. Responsibility of the Western Powers for
Violating the Potsdam Agreements and For Resurrection o` German
Militarism (A Historical Reference)), Moscow, 1959, p 15.
33. "Deutsche Geschichte seit sem ersten Weltkrieg," Stuttgart, Vol II, i
1973, p 356.
34. Howe, Q., "Ashes of Victory. Wor1d War II and Its Aftermath," New
York, 1972, p 391.
35. Cited in: PRAVDA, 2 August 1970.
36. Dimitrov, G., "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya v dvukh tomakh" (Selected Works '
in Two Volumes), Vol 1(1906-1937), Sofia, 1967, p 606.
37. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (v semi tomakh)" (The Nuremberg Trials (in
Seven Volumes)), Moscow, Vol 1, 1957, p 483.
38. Traynin, A., "Nyurnbergskiy protsess. Sbornik statey" (The Nuremberg
Trials. Collection of Artic:les), Moscow, 1946, p 20.
39. "Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States, Representative to the
International Conference of Military Trials," Washington, 1949,
pp 18-20.
40. Truman, H., "Memoirs," New York, Vol I, 1955, p 284. ~
41. Heydecker, J., and Leeb, J., "The Nuremberg Trial. A History of Nazi
Germany as Revealed Through the Testimony at Nuremberq," New York,
1962, p 79.
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42. "Dokumenty materialy po voprosam bor'by s voyennymi prestupnikami i
podzhigatelyami voyny" (Documents and Materials Concerning the Struggle
Against War Criminals and Insti,ators of War), Moscow, 1949, pp 93-146.
43. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoy voyny.
Dokumenty i materialy" (Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union in the
Patriotic War. Documents and Materials), Vol I~ pp 192, 314-319.
44. "Mezhdunarodnyye dok.umenty Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" (International
Documents of the Great Patriotic War), Moscow, Issue II, 1943, pp 145-
146; Lebedeva, N., "Podgotovka Nyurnbergskogo prc,tsessa" (Preparations
for the Nuremberg Trials), Moscow, 1975, pp 45-48.
45. TIMES, 27 November, 1941, p 4; "Documents on American Foreign Relations,
June 1942," Boston, Vol IV, 1942, pp 662-663.
46. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoy voyny.
Dokumenty i materialy," Vol III, p 339.
47. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (v semi tomakh)," Vol I, pp 63-73.
48. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoy voyny.
Dokumenty i materialy," Vol I, p 474.
49. Ibid., pp 322-326.
50. "Sbornik soobshcheniy Chrezvychaynoy gosdarstvennoy komissii o
zlodeyaniyakh nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov" (Collection of Reports
by the Extraordinary State Commission on the Atrocities of Fascist
German Invaders), Moscow, 1946, p 430.
51. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (v semi tomakh)," Moscow, Vol VII, 1961, pp 307,
551.
52. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (V semi tomakh)," Vol I, pp 89-91, 101, 183.
53. PRAVDA, DAILY EXPRESS, NEWS,CHRONICLE, TIMES, DAILY TELEGRAPH, 19
November 1945.
54. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (v semi tomakh)," Vol I, pp 92-93.
55. Ibid., p 245.
56. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (v semi tomakh)," Vol VII, p 311.
57. Ibid., pp 200-205.
58. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (v semi tomakh)," Vol I, p 460.
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59. Cited in: PRAVDA, 20 December 1945.
60. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (v semi tomakh)," Vol I, p 463.
6'_. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (v semi tomakh)," Vol VII, p 312.
62. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (v semi tomakh)," Moscow, Vol IV, 1959, pp 62?_- ~
629.
63. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (v semi tomakh)," Moscow, Vol VI, 1960, p 737.
64. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (v semi tomakh)," Moscow, Vol III, 1958,
pp 357, 358, 367.
65. Cited in: Saviky, S., "From Nuremberg to the New Wehrmacht," Warsaw,
1957, pp 303-304.
66. "Der Nationalsozial.ismus. Dokumente 1933-1945," Frankfurt a/M., 1957,
p 161. '
~ 67. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (v semi tomakh)," Vol IV, p 422.
68. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (v semi tomakh)," Vol III, pp 352, 354.
69. Cited in: Kan, A., "Zagovor protiv mira" (Conspiracy Against the
World), translated from English, Moscow, 1961, p 118.
70. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (v semi tomakh)," Vol VI, p 677.
71. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (v semi tomakh);'Vol VII, p 434. ~
72. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (V semi tomakh)," Vol I, p 691.
73. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (v sEmi tomakh)," Vol VII, p 359.
74. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (v semi tomakh)," Vol VII, p 195.
75. PRAVDA, 2 October 1946.
76. "Nyurnbergskiy protsess (v semi tomakh)," Vol VII, p 368.
77. Ibid.
78. Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskim kurom. Rechi i stat'i" (Following Lenin's
Course. Speeches and Articles), Moscow, Vol 4, 1974, p 117.
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CONCLUSION
[pp 500-506] The thunder of the last artillery salvos of the war in
Europe faded away in May 1945. The long and hard struggle of countries
in the anti-Hitler coalition was graced with a brilliant victory. Germany
suffered total military, economic, and moral-political defeat ar.d uncondi-
tional surrender. Nurtured by imperialist monopolies, German fascism,
one of the main aggressors of the world,was vanquished. Peace won in
the most savage struggle settled over the European continent.
The day of 9 May will forever remain in the memory of all mankind. It
opened a new page to history, marking the triumph of the forces of peace
and progress over the sinister forces of reaction. All people of the
planet received this grandiose victory with delight.
In the last stage of the war in Europe the military actions were such
that the armed forces of fascist Germany found 'thenselves facing the armies
of Allied powers advancing from the east and west. Its military-economic
potential had been dramatically reduced, while in countries of the anti-
fascist coalition it attained its highest level in the war. Moreover the
Nazi leadership found itself almost totally alone in the sphere of
international relations, which attested to the complete bankruptcy of its
foreign policy.
Typical of the armed conflict in 1945 was the fact that the dueling sides
placed the greatest number of inen and equipment on the battlefields of
Europe in the entire war--18 million men, about 260,000 guns and mortars,
up to 40,000 tanks and self-propelled guns (assault guns), and over 38,000
airplanes.
Presence of a second front in Western Europe beginning in mid-1944 caused
some changes to occur in the ratio of fascist German divisions on the fronts
of World War II. The German Command was forced to transfer a part of the
forces from the occupied countries and its reserve to the Western Front.
Nevertheless the main events of 1945 occurred, as in previous years, on
the Soviet-German front, which ~ontinued to be the principal one. Its
decisive role stemmed not only from the fact that a larger quantity of
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enemy divisions was concentrated here but also from the fact that the 5oviet
Army tiad to be opposed by the Wehrmacht's best, se].ect formations.
The political and military ledders of fascist Germany understood quite well `
the uncompromising nature of the armed collision between socially difFerent
states--imperialist and. socialist. Tliey felt it entirely possible to
conclude a separate peace with the USA and Great Britain, a notion which
was entirely excluded from the relations with the Saviet Union. This is
why engagements on the Soviet-German front were extremely savage in nature
~ ir. the concluding stae~e of the war in Europe. In terms of their scope and _
- intensity they could in no way be compared with combat activities of the
Anglo-AmeLican troops. BetwPen 1 January 1945 and the end oF the war
the Wehrn~acht Command trans�erred 42 infantry, 6 tank, 4 motorized and
cavalry divisions, and 5 brigades of various sorts from the west to the
Eastern Front. During the offensives of the Soviet troops, the fascist
leadership redeployed the most battleworthy di~~isions from the west. The
German Command denuded the Western Front more and more, transferring more
and more troops into the Wehrmacht reserves to hold the defenses on the Oder;
the majority of combat equipment coming from the plants and repair shops
was also sent to tYie east.* This permitted the Anglo-American troops
to undertake offensive operations on the Western Front in the beginning
of February and, on the Italian Front, in the beginning of April.
The results of the combat activities of 1945 attest to the significantly
greater theoretical and practical level of Soviet art of war. All strategic
operations conducted by the Armed Forces of the USSR were characterized by
decisiveness of goals and high effectiveness. The largest enemy groupings
~vere defeated on the Berlin, eastern Prussian, Vienna, and Prague axes, and
territories containing the most important economic and political centers were
occupied (eastern Prussia, the Silesia industrial region, the oilfields of
Hungary and Austria), which dramatically weakened the economic and military
potential of fascist Germany. The main blow of the concludi.ng stage of the
war in Europe was directed on the Berlin axis. It was the shortest road
for Soviet troops to Berlin, capture of which had the most important
military and political significance. The greatest strategic operaL-ions
were conducted on this axis. During them, fulfilling their international
mission, Soviet troops quickly liberated Allied Poland, and, invading enemy
territory, they quickly defeated a major enemy grouping at Berlin. The
objective posed by the Supreme High Command Headquarters--completely defeating
the armed forces of fascist Germany and forcing it to surrender unconditionally,
and completely liberating the peoples of Central and Southeast Europe from
Nazi oppression--were attained.
* Liddel Gart, B., "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna" (The Se~ond WtSY~ld War),
p 629.
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The victory over this experienced, strong, and cunning enemy was the result
of simultaneous conduct of strategic operations on a front stretching from
the Baltic Sea to the Drawa River. Soviet troops conducted the offensive
without interruption until the enemy's final defeat. In the end, the
Soviet Army annihilated 98 enemy divisions and captured 56, and 93 divisions
laid down their arms in connection with unconditional surrender. The enemy
lost more than 1 million men on the Soviet-German front just killed alone,
and the trophies gathered by ~the Soviet troops included about 30,000 field -
guns, more than 12,000 tanks and assault guns, and 6,000 warplanes.
From 12 January to 8 May the Soviet troops advanced westward in battle over
800 km--from the Vistula to the Elba. They captured eastern Prussia,
eastern and Western Pomerania, half of central Germany, and Berlin. As a
result of the Soviet Army's operations Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and part of Austria were liberated. The German people were relieved of
the fa~~~st yoke. The Yugoslav Army completely expelled the invaders from
its country. The successes of Soviet arms were a decisive factor in
liberation of the Albanian people.
The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet instituted the following medals to
commemorate the historic victories of the Soviet Armed Forces: "For
Liberatio;~ of Belgrade," "For Liberation of Warsaw," "For the Taking of
Budapest," "For the Taking of Konigsberg," "For the Taking of Vienna,"
"For the Taking of Berlin," and "For the Liberation or Prague." These
medals are testimony to the victorious procession of the Soviet Army and
of its mission of liberation. Nurtured by the Communist Party, the
soldiers displayed their best qualities--combat proficiency, perfect mastery
of their equipment, and the capability to make the greatest self-sacri-
fices for the glory of the motherland.
The Soviet people attained their long-awaited victory at high price. More
~ than 1 million enlisted men and officers died in battles to liberate
countries of C.`entral and Southeasf:Eutr.ope. In the concluding operations the
Soviet Armed Forces losi 11,550 guns and mortars, 12,500 tanks and self-
propelled guns, and about 11,800 airplanes, and they expended over 60,000
rail cars of ammunition and 1,480,000 tons of fuel. Laborers in the
liberated countries hold their memory of the Soviet soldiers sacred.
Memorials and monuments were erected in honor of the army of liberation in
Warsaw, Prague, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia, Budapest, Vienna, Berlin, and
other cities. The mission of liberation of the Soviet Armed Forces was
reflected in literature and art.
In the concluding stage of military actions in Europe the Soviet Army "
transformed into a top-class army of that time, and the country achieved its
maximum in development of its productive capacities during the war, which
made it possible to considerably improve the equipment availability of the
armed forces. In comparison with the same month in 1944, in January 1945
the quantity of airplanes in the standing army and reserve of the Supreme
High Command Headquarters increased by 1.4 times, the number of tanks in-
creased by 2.2 times, and the manning remained the same. Thus the
:
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r~~, o~~~~:crn~. usr: ov~,Y
operating fronts possessed significantly more armament, combat equipment,
and ammunition than in previous years.
mhe artfulness of strateg:ic leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces displayed
itself with unusual clarity in 1945. The State Defense Committee and
the Sup.reme High Command Headquarters worked out their plans clearly and
effici~ntly, their designs we:.e calcula~ted and far-sighted, the methods
of achieving their nbjectives were mobile and decisive, and materiel was
consumed economically. They held the upper edge o~?er the strategists of
, fascist Germany in the competition of will, knowledge, and artfulness of
troop command ancl control.
As in previous years of the war, the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union continued to be the headqu?~ters responsible for
supreme political and strategic direction. It painstaki.ngly nurtured its
military personnel, raising a large family of troop commanders who artfully
led the troops of the Soviet Army. In April-May 1945 the highest order
- that can be earned by a troop commander--the Order of Victory--was awarded
to marshals of tYie Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevskiy, G. K. ?hukov, I. S.
Konev, R. Ya. ~ialinovskiy, K. K. Rokossovskiy, and F. I. Tolobukhin. In
June this order was awarded to A. I. Antonov, L. A. Govorov, I. V. Stalin,
and S. K. Timoshenko.
The victory over Nazi Germany and its allies in Europe was attained owing
to the efforts of all r.ountries of the anti-Hitler coalition. The valor
and bravery displayed by soldiers of the USA, Great Britain, and France
cannot be debated. In 1945 the military actions of Anglo-American troops
in Europe were better coordinated with operations of the Soviet Armed Forces.
Cooperation between parties of the coalition expressed i�tself as mutual _
information on the plans and course of operations, and as exchange of
experience. Inflicting serious blows on the enemy, the Anglo-American
troops entered the western regions of Germany and Austria and the nor~hern
part of Italy. During the offensive the Americans liberated part of
Czechoslovakia--about 20,000 square kilometers with a population of 3million.
In addition, in May the command of the Allied expeditionary forces accepted
the surrender of fascist German troops in Denmark, the Netherlands, and
Norway, and more than 16 million persons were relieved of the fascist yoke.
In the concluding stage of the war in Europe the Polish lst and 2d armies,
a Czechoslovakian army corps, the Romanian lst and 4th arm~es, the Bulgarian
lst Army, and Hungarian units fought courageously within the composition of
major frontal formations of the Soviet Army. Pilots of the French Normandy-
Neman Regiment ended the war shoulder to shoulder with Soviet soldiers. The
joint struggle against fascist Germany strengthened the friendship of the
peoples of the Soviet Union and those of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.
The resistance movement, which developed broadly in occupied countries, played
an i.mportant role in the struggle against fascism.
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The events of 1945 occurred in the conditions of complete political iso-
lation of fascist Germany. In February-March the number of countries in
a state of war with Germany increased to 56. Its sole ally was militarist
Japan, which continued military actions in the Far East and on the Pacific.
The loss of important industrial and agricultural regions dramatically
intensified economic disorganization in Germany and led to the collapse
of war production. But even in this hopeless position its rulers undertook
desperate atten~pts to delay impending puriishment. The inhumanity o� the
fascist state system revealed itself in its most monstrous form in the last
months of the war. The fascist leaders concerned themselves not with the
I people ar~d the German state but rather with how to retain their power. This
led to rampant military reaction. The final defeat and capture of fascist
German troops occurred on the territory of Germany itself, which was an
important political factor. The outcome of the Second World War to Germany
is evaluated in the diary of the headquarters of the Wehrmacht Supreme
High Command as follows: "...as a result of the operations in the east,
west, and south, the German Reich, which had once terrorized the entire
world, transformed into a caricature of its presumptuous claims...."* These
and other conclusions similar to them, reached by fascist officials,were
woeful testimony to the bankruptcy of the adventuristic state policy assumed
in response to military defeat.
In May the fascist state and the fascist party were liquidated, the
Wehrmacht's general staff and administration were disbanded, and the principal
instigators of the war, who were subsequently handed over to the court
of the international tribunal, received their deserved punishment for the ~
crimes they had committed. They were held responsible in the Nuremberg
trials to the entire world for aggression and barbarianism, for enslaving
and cruelly murdering millions of totally blameless people, and for crimes
against peace and mankind. The annihi7atory defeat suffered by Germany,
moral-political condemnation of faac~.sm, and puriishment of war criminals
all created the foundation for ~o~ng away with fascism.
International treaties written by tY~e governments of the USSR, USA, and
Great Britain had tremendous significance to the fates of the peoples of
Europe in the chain of events of the concluding ~tage of the war with fascist
Germany. The extremely swift development of international events caused
more and more new political problems. The greatest credit belongs to the
Big Three for the fact that coordinated decisions were reached in relation
to almost all of the most important international issues directly associated
with ending the war in Europe. This meant that states with different
social structures could fruitfully cooperate in a struggle against aggressyve
forces threatening mankind. This conclusion has great significance today.
In 1945, decisions were made on the boun~ary line between Soviet and Anglo-
American troops, the policies to be followed in relation to countries
* KTB/OKW, Vol IV, p 5.
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liberated from fascism were clarified, the mechanism of activity of the
United Nations was worked out, and the principles of dealing with the
conquered enemy and practical recommendations on organizing the postwar
peace and international security were determined. ~
The Declaration on Liberated Europe adopted by the Allied powers confirmed
in particular that tne three great powers would continue to work together
to solve the most important problems pertaining to the liberated countries.
The three governments declared the need for annihilating the final vestiges
of fascism in these countries and creating democratic institutions as
desired by their peoples.
Political and economic principles to be followed in dealing with subjugated
Gexmany were worked out, and decisions were made concerning reorganization
of its political life on a peaceful and democratic foundation, disarmament
of the war economy, partial compensation for damage done to other countries
during the war, and punishment of fascist criminals who had heaped
' uncountable sufferings and woes upon the peoples of Europe. Problems were
also solved in relation to establishing peaceful relatioziships with countries
that had fought on Germany's side--Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and
Finland. All decisions on international problems were the culmination of
political, economic, and military cooperation among states that had stood
in opposition to German and Italian fascism and its allies in Europe and
the Far East. These decisions were adopted owing to the principled and
purposeful nature of Soviet foreign policy. In its international relations
the USSR government tried to correct the consequences of the war as quickly
as possible and allow the peoples of countries liberated from fascism to
determine their own fate. While military actions were still going on the
Soviet Command immediately transferred all administrative authority to local
national powers as soon as the situation permitted. Moreover the Soviet
Union and its armed forces provided disinterested assistance to the
public of liberated countries: They supplied food, reiidered medical care, ;
and helped to rehabilitate and readjust the devastated economy.
As a result of the historic victory over fascism the peoples of the world
were persuaded that the policy of the USSR was the most progressive and
just foreign policy. The foreign political activity of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union played an outstanding role in insuring national inde-
pendence for the peoples of Central and Southeast Europe, and it earned their
respect and widespread recognition.
An anti-Soviet tendency in the most reactionary circles of Great Britain
and the USA, represented by Churchill and Truman, began to reveal itself
di~tinctly in the highly complex international relations of the first half ,
of 1945. The ruling circles of the Western powers were seriously concerned
by the growth of the USSR's influence as well as by the failure of their
own plans and hopes that they had tied in with the defeat of fascist
Germany. Attempts at altering the democratic regimes of countries in the '
Central and Southeast Europe were undertaken both in the Crimean and
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the Potsdam confprence. But these attempts were unsuccessful, being warded
off by the Soviet Union. In the concluding stage of the war the ruling
circles of the USA and England exhibited a tendency of transition to "cold
war" policy and negotiation'~rom a position of strength." Immediately after
the Potsdam conference the governments of the USA and England k;~gan
grouping reactionary forces about them in violation of the treaties they
themselves had signed; they did not even ignore their enemy of yesterday in
this--German i.mperialism. Thus in the first months after the end of the war
in Europe the forces of the world began to undergo intense po~arization,
with the forces of progress and democracy adhering to a po'licy of peaceful
coexistence on one pole and the forces of reaction on the other.
The victory won by the Soviet people and their armed forces persuasively
demonstrated the decisive advantages of their social and state structure,
and the superiority of socialism over capitalism. The socialist country
proved its viability and indestructibility. The USSR transformed into a
mighty world power, the international authority of wY.ich no one could
ignore any more. The war between the Soviet Union and fascist Germany was
not only an armed conflict but also a collision between communist and
- fascist ideologies. The victory of the Soviet people was a triumph of
the policies of the Communist Party related to repelling another imperialist
invasion of the world's first socialist state, a triumph of Marxism-
Leninism, Soviet patriotism, and proletarian internationalism, a triumph of
the indivisible friendship of the peoples of the USSR.
There are many various conceptions in the West concerning the causes of
fascist Germany's defeat in t:ze past war. The course of the war for
German imperialism is pictured to be a fatal coming together of random
events and mistakes. It is persistently a~ued that under more-favorable
circumstances, the outcome of the war may have been different. Reactionary
bourgeois historiography is pursuing the goal of diminishing the role of the
Soviet Union in the defeat of Nazi Germany, and of whitewashing the defeat
suffered by the Wehrmacht and the German General Staff. However, the
peoples of the world have been afforded the possibility for persuading
themselves that the outcome of the armed conflict was directly associated
with the political goals of the war and the economies of the warring states.
This objective dependence was precisely what exhibited itself with special
force in the duel between the USSR and Nazi Germany. The victory of the
Soviet people was chiefly a victory of socialism over fascism.
The Soviet people defended their socialist fatherland. Entering into mortal
battle with fascism, they also brought freedom to other peoples enslaved
by Nazi Germany, who under the iniluence of the victories of the Soviet Anned
Forces initiated a broad struggle of liberation against the invaders.
- The war aqainst fascist Germany has left a feeling of pride and a feeling
of sorrow in the memories of the peo~les of the world. Pride because
reactionary forces that brought slavery to the people were vanquished.
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Sorrow because this victory was won at an immeasurably high price. It
cost the lives of tens of millions of inen, women, and children, and it
was accompanied by colossal devastation. The sacrifices were inestimable.
But they were not wasted. Fascism's defeat rescued mankind from enslavement.
Dozens of countries liberated from fascism recovered their independence.
Years will pass, but the memory of the great victory of freedom-loving peoples
over fascism will remain sacred in the memories of new generations of
people.
The victory over fascist Germany brought peace t~ the peoples of Europe.
But World War II had not yet ended; it was still going on in the Far East
and on islands of the Pacific Ocean. However, the fall of fascist Germany
predetermined the swift end to the war against militarist Japan.
[423-11004]
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