JPRS ID: 8611 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080012-9
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: REPORTS

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l~Olt ON'I~I('IA1. UtiN: !)NI.Y
JPR~ L/8611
8 August 1979
I'~lear East North Africa Re ort
p
(FOUO 31 /79~ ~
~
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FB~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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FOk OF~'ICIAL US~ ONLY
JPRS L/861~.
8 August 1979
_ NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT ~
cFOUO 3i/~9)
CONT~NTS PAGE
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Congressional Resolution Barring PLO Entry Into UniCed SCates
Denounced
(Shafiq al-Hut; AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 1-~ Jun 79)........... 1
PLO Calls for More SovieC Aid, Guerrilla Activity
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 1-7 Jun 79) 3
NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Editorial Denounces SCatement by Hassan, Praises Algeria, Sahardns
_ (Editorial, Simon Malley; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 25 Jun-8 Jul 79). 9
ALGERIA
Belgians Making Preparations To Receive Algerian LNG
(Susan Traill; TIiE MIDDLE EAST, Jul 79) 11
Development of Algerian Energy kesources Discussed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDIT~RRANEENS, 29 Jun 79)...;...... 13
Minister of I.ight Industry Visits SONITEX Unit
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEKS, 22 Jun i~,).......... 16
Status of Mechanization of Agriculture Described
(MARCHES TRO'?l.:;UX ET I~DITERRANEENS, 22 Jun 79) . . . . . . . . . . 17
Achievements in Seven Years of Agrarian Revolution Examined
(MARCHES TROPICAIJX ET MEDITERItA1~EENS, 22 Jun 79) . . . . . . . . . . 19
-a- [III -NE &A-121FOU0)
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rucc UC r l~ lliL ua~ u?vL Y I
CONTE:;TS (Continued) pa8~ j
1
Briefe ~
- CFP Actiivities 2~ j
Maritime Transpurt Commisaion 21 -
Oil Term~nal Operational 21
Emigre Workers ~ 22 I
Cuban Techniciana ' 22
EGYPT !
i
Possibilities of Egyptian-Libyan Conflict Analyzed ~
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 29 Jun-5 Jul 79) 23 i
I
- IRAN ~
New Regime Ponders Fate of Krupp Hol~inga ~
(CAPITAL, Jun 79) 26 ~
I
MOROCCO '
' I
King Hassan Described as 'At Bay', Prisoner of 5trategy of i
DefeaC
(Hassen Zenati; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 25 Jun-8 Jul 79)........... 29
Effects of Austerity Measures on Country niscussed
_ (Susan Morgan; T~iE MIDDLE EAST, Jul 79) 31
TUNISIA
Tobal Statement on Behalf of National Opposition Movement
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 25 Jun-8 Jul 79) 34
Trial of 44 PRPT Militants Recounted
(Souhayr Belhassen; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 11 Jul 79)............ 36 �
j Political, Social, Ec4nomic Climate of Cour.try Described
(Jean-Louis Buchet; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 11 Jul 79)............ 38
Attempt To Poison Trade-Unionist Achour Report
(AFRIQUE-ASIE, 25 Jun-8 Jul 79) 42
, BriEf s
Oil Exploration 44
WESTERN SAHARA
Saudis Again Trying To Resolve Saharan Problem
(Susan Morgan; THE MIDDLE EAST, Jul 79) 45
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~'OR UCT~'ICIAL US~ dNLY
INTCIt-AItAB Ari~'AIRS
CONGItESSIONAL R~SOLUTIpN BARRING I'LO ~NTRY INTO UNITED STATES D~NOUNC~U
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 1-7 Jun 79 p 42
(Arricle by Shafiq al-Hut: "The Ugly American Decision"J
[Text] Several days ago the American Congress approved a proposal prohibi-
ting ~ny member of Che PLO from entering the United StaCes. This resoluCion _
came as a reacCion Co the visit I made last April after being invited by a
number of American universities and institutes to give some lectur~~ on the
PLO attitude toward the U.S.-EgypCian peace ereaty and the Camp David accords.
I will mention at this time that a number of political commenCatots, both
Arab ~nd non-Arah, insisted on regarding the entry visa granted mc at the
time by the State Department as signaling a positive change in Washin~ton's
policy toward the PLO. Even though I disagreed with those holding this
opinion and refused Co a~tribute more to the American position that was
merited by the facts, I now wonder what those commentators might say about
, the position of the new, old Congress. It is a posiCion characterized by
disgraceful hostility as much as it is by great ignorance. Tkie PLO is not
a poliCical party in the usual sense of the word, nor is it an organization
in rhe usual sense of the word eithzr. Rather it is the national framework '
and temporary substitute for the usurped nation. It includes all people of
Pales~ine, since they are the legitimaCe members of it, no matter what thcir
political or intellectual identity, males as well as females, active in its
organs or not. Every Palestinian is a member of the PLO, and membership here
means Palestinian citizenship which cannot be taken away from anyone.
Therefore, Congress, which either is ignorant of or ignores this fact~ through
its racist resolution has taken a position with regard Co the entire Pales-
tinian people, not ~ust the several hundred persons acCive in PLO organs, in-
cludino the top leaders. I don't think our peoule are tihe losers in such a
situation as much as the United States is, as far as its governm~nt, people,
and interests are concerned. There are those among us who have expressed
their delight wiCh this thoughtless resolution because it contributes, though
indirectly, toward mobilizing our people against American imperialism, which
was and remains the sole support of the state of the Zionist entity. Also,
a
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this r~:;olutidn tendg ta widen ~nd decnen the gap bc~tween the E;overnmettt oE
the United 5C~.teH ~nd a numb~r of mdder~ta :1r.~b ~dvernment;~ which h~ve snn-
wt;~eenrly ~ried tn m:~ke Amcarica l~~erer ~hd 11~ve begged us ta m~k~ ~ dtytinc-
tia~t ME~ewr.en Waqhington ~nd `Ce1 Aviv. ~}~e ben~fitg af thi~ r~salutio~ ~re
Cnmpound~d becauy~ ie ~o~n~g ~e c~n approprt~~~ Cim~ Co gt~ew the P~legtinf~~n~,
~11 eh~ paleseini~ng, the �algpnegg of ehe urgen~ ~ppeal~ beit~g made to ~h~m
r~ p~reiCip~te in the ereacherdus ne~oeiaefdn pro~e~g f~r ehe s~ke ~f wh~t iy
c~lled "~dminigtr~tive ~utonomy." On~ ~gpece ~f ehe r~golutidn requires the
pnlestini~n tn give up hi~ n~tinn~l ideneiey as a c~nditidn fdr recdgnixing
him ~nd gr~nting him ~n entry vi~a, not td the United Staees ~ldne, but alsd
to Che ~oneempeible negdtiating rabl~. _
'I'hig r~sdluCion refle~Cg th~ actu~l st~ee of c~ffi~ial tl~it~kfn~ in W~shin~tda
~nd in dthcr ~apiCalg with ~n imp~ri~li~t hiseory, whi~h usu~lly cdneains
three st~ges eh~r m~y b1~nd eogether.
The first ~eage is to drive the ~dver~~ry ato~y ~nd elimfnate him if pa~~ible.
If th~t is difficule and impossible, Chey be~in the geGUnd ~t~ge whiCh is an
~ttempt to contain ~nd encircle the gdvery~ry. I� that is impossible, the
third st~ge th~n begin~, which is to ~ctu~~ly negoti~te with him.
Brezinski once eold a man of polish origin like himsQlf who w~y a ralleague _
when he wns n professor, "Ye~ur friends the P~legtini~ns ~re no thre~t :~o
Ear to our higher interestg, ~o why mu~t we bc worried ~bou[ them dr atta~h
nny significan~e Co them?"
Thiti was in a personal note in which ~rezinski w~s replyin~ ea his fetrnd,
wt~o had taken him to task for his offensive phrase, "gye-bye I'L0," a phra::e
which Brezinski Iater disavowed, but which remains, it seem~, the slogan oE
the U.5. government and its Congress in Washington.
vow wr. are in a contest with history and Che general laws df life. Who knows
when the day will r.ome when Congress will apologize for its d~r.ision to _
withhold entry visas to its country from us? I think that uill happen when
the P~lestinian revolution possesses the cnpnbility to ~dopt a re:aolution tv
withhold an entry visa for American interests in thf~ region. Is it dffftculr
to imagine this? Perhap~, but it is cerCainly not inconceivablc.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 A1-Watan al-'Arabi
7811
CSO: 4802
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~Ott Ut~~'tCtAI. U~L OvLY
IN~~tt-Ai2Ag AI~~AIi~5
r~) C11LL5 ~Ott MOtt~ 5dVt~T A~b, GU~t2fitLLA ACTLVI'I'1'
i~? AL-WA'~AN AL-'Aii~?~3I in Arabi~ 1-7 Jun ~9 pp ~8-~g
~Article: "intensif~ing t~per~tinns in the Interidr; Asking Soviees for Mnre
~upp~rt"j
[~x~~rpt~ '~h~ t~~leg~iaians dre not earefully gcru~inixing the autonomy nc~-
gdtiatic+n~ uhfr.h th~ thtee p~rti~cip~ntg, ~~-S~dae'g r~gime, isr,~el and the
Utl~tea St~teg~ beg~n in th~ir "~bgenc~." R~ther they are focu~ing th~ir
.~ctentfan nn ~dnfrdnti~rg eh~ n~gativ~ con~equ~nc~g di the Isrg~li-~Rypti~n
~r~~ty. '~ey ~re intangifying their ffiilie~n~ t~etivity in both the Pelegtin-
i~n ~nd Ar~b aren~~, br~th intern~lly gnd externally.
5uc~e~~ive develdpr~ents in the Lebane~e aretta ~nd the entry of President ~1-
5adat's regime in the tunnel of n~gotiationg With Igrael ov~r Palestinian
autanoin~+ have promptpd the Pa1es[inign resistance, ~atah tn be exnct, to
c~stabligh a"pl~n df a~tion" for th~ current and future stageg in order to
meet n11 eventunlitieg.
"C1~e Central Coasmitree df ~~t~h held a serieg of ineetings la~t ~pri1 undcr the
ch~trmanghip af Y~sir 'Ar~f~e. At their cnnclugion, agreement wa~ renched on
the ttece~9ity o� fdt~ul~ting the abov~-m~ntidned pl~n.
pale~ttni~n gOUCCeq eXpeCt the n~xt stage to Witness gregter Isr~eli-~gyptian
politi~~1 end military presaur~ on th~ Leb~nese scene for the purpose of
muting thc Syrian nnd palegtinian d~cisions nnd bringing an end to their role,
ahich is ~n obstacle to both the Cadp tiavid agreement~ and the measures of
~omprmmise and negoti~tion ~ith I~rael.
Une of th~ leaders oE Pat~h Who parcicipated in drawing up the abovc-mentioned
plan nf ~ction tdl~i me, "The next 3 monthb are auch more dangerous than those
al~ich the re$i~tance has fac~d during the last 14 years. The Palcstininn pro-
blem ~s a Wholc Enres th~ aw$t dangerous and caost criticul situarion it has
facrd in 21 years. We ar~ facing ~ crucial stage which may be the final
cl~apter in eii~in~~?cing the Palestinian problem in accordance With the American-
I~ra~li plan.
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~~oK or~~ctnL usc ortL,Y
11rCIc1e~ of th~ i'~leqeinian I'lnn
AL-WATAN AL-'A[tAtil h~g lr.nrn~d eh~C ehe Pnlegtini.~n pl~n ncC3on wnq npproved ~
at rhe bf3~inning 1~~e rfay and its impl~menraCion was bcgun. According eo _
~ infdrm~d sourc~s, iCs mose promin~nt poinCs may b~ summarized as follows:
t'ir~t, ineenaifying miliCary ~cCivity in Che oecupied Cprr~eory. '
5erand, seriking ~g~ingt Americ~n inC~reses in Che Arab world. ~
'1'hird, c,xp~ndin~ th~ fr~~mecoork of cnnsulCaCions wiCh the SovieC Union.
~'ourth, dp~ning up p~Leseintnn-Arab eone~ctig, especially with S,yria nnd Ir~q.
~ifth, ~cCing with fl.exibility nn Che Leb~nese sc~ne. -
. Sixeh, aupporeing democr~tic dinlob~~ in eh~ I'alestinian arena and thereby
bringin~ about palestinign n~Cinnal unity.
WiCh regard to the first point, the resistattce will undertnke to sCrike deep
inCo I~rael at a11 the main military and production complexes. These oper- _
ations are expected to increase during June and be accompanied by a tr~ns-
form~tion of palestinian mass action in Che occupied territory inCo cases of
ctvil insurrecCion.
Aw Eor thc :~econd point having to do with striking againsC American interesCs
In t~ie are~, it was agreed that any move in this direction be ~oithin ttie
Eramework of an overall plan specifying the time and place, with the stipu-
lation that detailed lists of all Ame:tcan interests in Arab states be cam-
pt1c~J.
Pale~tini.3n RequesCs of rtoscow
Concerning the third point, it was agreed that a high-level Paleatinian
delegation headed by Mr 'Arafat be sent to the 5oviet capital at the first
passible opporCuniCy, preferably before the U.S.-Soviet summit to be held
in June, to ask the Soviet leadership that the Middle East crisis in general
and the Palestinian problem in particular be an issue of special Soviet con-
cern at the bipartite summit and that pressure be applied to link the Arab
problem and the SALT II agreement. A request will also be made for increased
so~iec mtitcgry and political supporC of the PLO in the coming stage. Con-
tacts are actually being made now between the Soviet and Palestinian leader-
ships to set a time for the Palestinian delegation's visit.
informPd Palestinian sources confirm that the coming visit of the Palestinian
delegation to rioscow will be the most important Palestinian visit to the
Soviet capital, both from the standpoint of the problems Co be disctissed
and the consequences.
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~'Ul~ U1~ 1~ 1'C I ~L U51: ONI,Y
tn tl?c con~exC o� opening up Yalestinian cont.~cts wiCh Arah :~taCc~ti, Syrir~n-
['alc~stin3nn mecrings are being held cont3nuously Co agree on Che sec:~~s of the
_ next sCa~e. The mnsC recenC meeting was held berween I'res.ident Haf.iz al-A~qad
nnd Mr 'Ar~tfat. A PalesCinian delegation is e~:pected to visir. traq st~orely,
nnd Cli~ PalesCinian-Jordani~n diglogue is expectpd to resume wirhin the nexC
2 we~k;;.
in ~ddiCion, Palestinian delegations are visiting the Gulf sCates and the
Maghreb. There are orher delegaCions visiC3.ng European and American cnunCries.
Yalertinian political activity is paying particular attention to the non-
aligned summie conferance eo be held this year in Havana. ExLremely importanr
resolutions ~zre expected to be ~,'",Sll~'t~ on the Palestinian problem. A resolution
ro freeze EgypC's membership in the non-aligned bloc is also expecCed to be
issued. '
in ~ desire *_n clarify Che picture of the Palestinian position, AL-WATAN
AL-'AFABI corr~spondent ~n Kuwait Mazin Shaddid asked several qi~estions con-
cr.rning the laCest problPms of Palestin'.~.~n leaders Ma~id Abu Sharrar and
_ Bassam Abu Sharif. The former is the permanent secretary of the Revolutionary
Counril of FaCali and is responsible for unified Palestinian informaCion. The ~
laeter is the spokesman for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palesein~
and a senior assistant to Dr George Habash, secreCary general of the Front.
Tt~e qu~sCions and answers are as follows:
[Qusetion] The stage after the Egyptian-Israeli treaty is a subject of in-
terest to all the parties and forces concerned in the region's crisis. How
does the Palestinian resi~tance view this stage?
(riajid Abu SharrarJ The treaty has made the entire Arab world confront a new
stage of struggle requireing programs and alliances which take into consider-
ation the developments that have taken place and the separatist operations
which the Arab arena has caiCnessed and will witness.
Undoubtedly the treaty has placed the Arab regimes face to face with a his-
tbric question: Who is for the treaty and who is against it? In other words,
who is with Israel and America and who is against them?
Formerly, the regimes could avoid a clear answer to this question. Today the
margin for maneuver is extremely limited. A1-Sadat has not left any room for
maneuvering. He is with Israel and America and nothing stops him from
attacking anyone who opposes him. He too asks the question clearly and wants
a precise answer: "Who is with me, my policy and my alliance with Israel and
America, and who is against me?"
- We think the slogan "Arab solidarity" is actually incapable of taking a de-
termined stand against America and Israel. A new militant alliance must be
made among Che Palestinian revolution, Syria and Iraq in order to establish
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an e~~sCern Front. T}~i;; would reflecC posiC3vely on Jordan. A1so, nc~ for- ~
mulntion of a Paleseinian position should be more distincr ~~nd crystal c1n,~r '
due ~o thc clangc~rs surroundi.nS the revolution. I beli~ve that Che siCua~ton ~
of rhe Pale;:C:inian ~ren~~ now encourages the achiev~ment of Ch3s, ~~specially
in vic~w of Ch~: fact rhat ehe last National Council program is leading us
Coward this ob~ective.
[Bassam Abu Sharif] Afrer the signing of the treaCy, in accordance with which
rl~e western front was removed from the front of confrontation wiCh the enem,y
and transformed into a�ront of confrontation againsr us, imperialism is now
striving to bring the eastern front under its hegemony too. Th~retore, it
will proceed to carry this front through another dissolution. However, if _
it fails, it wi11 inevitably resort to violence, using its local tools to
strike againsC the forces oppos3ng its pro~ecC.
We think that these steps which are required of the progressive regimes ar~
a true, pracCical translation of the slogans raised. They may be summarized
as follows:
1. Establishing an eastern front under the slogan, "Our battlc~ is a battle
- of~~xistence, not one of borders.j'
2. Transforming the economy of the region into a war economy.
3. The necessity of blending traditional military thinking calling for a
classic collision by amassing a huge quantity of tanks and airplanes with the
line pursued by the Palestin3an revolution, in other words the path of a
pc~ople's war.
However, it must not mean we are demanding this now. Rathe.r we are demanding
sound preparation for such a war, and in the meantime, we call for opening
the borders to guerrilla activity. From now on it is no longer accepCable
to talk about any obstacles, whether political or geographical, preventing ~
the launching of guerrilla activity.
We are confident that this activity will place the enem,y in a constant state
of.instability, and this will certainly be accompanied by a transformation
of the arena of occupied Palestine into a real battlefield, thus proving
every day to the enemy and the world that the land of Palestine will remain ~
an arena of battle despite all treaties.
We,Expect New Fires
[Question] Talk about "separation" and "continued separation" may mean that
you expect divisions to occur in the Arab arena?
[Majid Abu Sharrar] When we talk about division, we don't mean the usual -
kind, but ano~her form based on the ignition of new fires in the region and
leading to Arab internecine fighting, the division of some existing structures
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ancl the abolition of others. Perhaps what happened in Yemen racently is a
sample. While Che Arab countries were rushing tio put ouC Che f:ire, wn found
Amer:ica proceeding to kindle the struggle by establishing a military bridge
to suprly arms to North Yemen.
.
W~ a15o beli~ve that Che states which hesitate to rush into bat�tlc aga�insr
the rreaty will face riots and inCernal unres~ provoked by ~he reactions of
their masses. -
[Bassam tlbu Sharif] With what is happening, it is natural for a separation
to occur within the Arab forces. Separation is a logical, scientific step
_ which should be made during Chis period.
Lebanon Is One of Che Arenas Which Ts a Candidate for an Explosion
[Qu~stion] On the basis of what you have pointed out with re~ard to an at-
tempt to subdue the states opposing al-SadaC, how do you see the effect of
this on Lebanon?
[Majid Abu 5harrar) Lebanon has suffered a great deal for the Palestinian
cause. It has paid a higher pri.ce because of Arab mutual contradic.tions.
We in rhP Palestinian revolution are most eager to spare Lebanon all the
expected repercussions from the present struggle.
However, this eagerness on our part requires the isolationist forces Co com-
pletely review their plans and programs if they want ta spare Lebanon the
repercussions of the coming struggle. As long as these forces are connected
with Israel and plan io divide Lebanon and strike against the nationalist
mavement, this means they are trying to inundate Lebanon with the consequences
of the present struggle.
[Bassam Abu_ Sharif] Lebanon is one of the main arenas mobilized to receive
reactionary, imperialist violence against the forces of liberation and all
the forces opposing the "peace" treaty, especially in view of the fact that
the Lebanese scene is full of fascist pockets allied with the 'Lionist enemy
and willing to be a tool to strike against the Palestinian revolution and
- the nationalist movement.
Dialogue With Jordan
[Que~tion] Talk about the eastern front,and oppositian to the treaty ance
again brings up the problem of relations with Jordan. How far has the Pales-
tinian-Jordanian dialogue gone, and what do you think about its progress?
[Majid Abu~ Sharrar] There are serious difficulties which have so far pre-
vented the attainment of significant.steps with Jordan in this regard. How-
ever, improvement of the position on the eastern front wilt determine the
nature of the relationship with the Jordanian regime, and that will decide
the outcome of this dialogue. If we can form a militant Palestinian-Syrian-
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r
_ Iraqi alliance wiCh the establi5hmenC of the eastern fronC, this will push
Jordan toward more progressive positions wirh regarcl to the struggle. It
will E~uC more distance between Jordan and the snares of Che Egyptian-~sr~eli
treaCy.
'I'hc ~~reblc~nt i~; noC onE~ oL d~legnt.ions ar dlsct.�s'fonG. It i.s a J~r~hlem of
- objecCiv~ conditions by means of whtch we can improvc, Chc~ Ar~ab position in
gerieral and consequently make p~litical gains wiChin tihe Jordanian arena. _
i ~ t ~ ~
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Bassam Abu Sharif Mt~jid Abu Sharrar
COPYRIGHT: 1979 A1-Watan al-'Arabi
7811
CSO� 4802
8
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- ~'OR O~i~~C~AL US~ ONLY
NO1~TH A~RICAN A~~AZRS
EUITORIAL nEdOUNCE5 STATEMENT BY HASSAN, PItAYSES ALGEItIA, SAHARANS
Paris AFRIQUE-ASZE in French 25 Jun-$ Jul 79 p 12
(~~itorial by 5i.mon Malley: "The Arab World; the Maghreb: War"?]
fTexe] Pres~.dent Chgdli Bend~edid's admonition Co King Haesan TI, through
the int~rmediary of the aecretgry general of the UN, is clear. No ambiguity
whatso~ver. The Algerian penple wi11 never eacrifice the principles tha~
_ have characterized their hisCory eince they took up arms in order tn drive
out--defeat--the French colonists and to free themselves. They will never
consider that the destiny of the Saharan nation is an affair beeween the
Algerian and Moroccan governments, because every Algerian knows thgt it is
a question of a war of national liberation. The only valid interlocutors
- are these fighters of Che desert; Chese men and women who, under the leadzr-
ahip of the martyr E1-Ouali--whose third annivereary of death they hr~ve
~ust commemorated--had pledged to not abandon their atruggle as long ae
the Moroccan and Mauritanian armie8 occupied a single particle of their
land.
That is, if the despot of Rabat carries out his decision of the "right of
pursuance," if he violates the Algerian land, all of the people will rise
as a single man to teach him a lesaon that he will never forget. A people
in arms that have defeated the most powerful Western land, naval, and air
armies cannot accept defeat. They will prove to this apprentice sorcerer
and to Chose miaerable, low-down politicans, corrupted by the royalist
party and that of the oppoaition that support him because they are in his
- pay, that a~y aggression against Algeria will mean war--a war that will
fatally entail the definitive liquidation of the monarchy.
And neiCher recourae by the king of Rabat to the Security Council after the
Saharan victory at Tan-Tan, nor his attempts to sabotage the forthcoming -
Franco-Algerian negotiationa will divert the Algerian government from its
indomitable will to continue and to increase its aid to the Polisario.
At the very moment when imperialism and Zionism are intensifying their
intrigues and their machinations in order to further divide the Arab world,
9
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in order ro inc3t~ cnnfli~tg ~g~in~C egch ~noCh~r, ~.n urder tio grau~e
- untngoni~m~ nnd c~nCradicCion~, tihe threat of this bloodth~.rstiy man i~
pa~e3culgrly ~i~nif~.cant. He who eanceioned ~nd support~d th~ ~~cree
n~gotiationa between the IsraelieancL~$yptians that the 1~tCer w~r~ going -
Co d~v~lop aC Cgmp U~vid gnd th~ ~eparat~ peace treaty in xny cg~e mugt
r~~lixe thae Algierg ig ne3.th~r a~.one nor i~olat~d.
Prdgreeaiv~g an~ revolutionarie~ Chroughout th~ woi~~d, e~peciglly Cho~~ in
Africg, the Arab world, A~ia, and Latin Am~rica, will be ae ite side---gs
wgs the cgge whenever itg borders were threatened and ite sovereign right~
violated--becauae ehey know that itg revolution ig algo theirg, th~t the
prot~ction and de�enae of the latter ~.s a common duCy.
On th~ eve nf Che Monrnvi~ and Havgn~ suauni.t~, ehe ch~ef of Algerian diplo-
macy, Moh~nnned Benyahia, was a~ clear as anyone could be at the ministeri~l
m~eting of the nonaligned, in Colombo, when h~ said: "The direct tie thaC
exists between the si.Cuation in Africa and Chat of the Middle ~eaC is no
longer something that has to be proved. It is asgerted a~ much by ehe
synchronized straeegy elaboraeed by imperiglism, always determined to matn-
tain its ascendgncy or tb re--establi~h it in th~ two region~~ a~ by an
ever-increasing awareness among our peoplea ~f their common destiny and of
the urgent neceasity to atrengthen the front that unites them in one and
the same decisive atruggle."
To ignore the warning of Preaident Chadli Bend~edid is to forget thoae
memorab2e words of the deceased Preaident Houari Boumedienne: "We will
defeaC any aggressor with our planes and our tanke, and if we no longer
have any, with the arms of our men, our women, and our children--the arms
that forged our national dignity, our liberation, our freedom..."
COPYRIGKT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
8255
CSO: 4400
10
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~Oit 0~~'ICIAL U5~ t~NLY
ALG~I2IA
B~LGtAN5 MAKING pit~pAI2A'TIbN5 Tb I~~C~IV~ ALG~ItIAN LNG
L~ndon TH~ MIDUL~ ~AST in En~ligh Jul 79 pp 92, 93
[Articl~ by Sug~n Tr~i11, in Brug~el~]
C~'~Xtl ~nergy planners in gelgium siderable volurne of explosives.
breathed n sigh of telief in the [t is now thought likely that the
early summer when, three years explasives terminnl will be
lnte, the government at Inqt gav~ C1.osed oncp the Sonatruch gea
' the ~nn�ehead for the con~ stgrts to ~nme in,
struction of a liquid natur~l gns A rnntract worth 5.6bn
(LNG) terrninel and rnlated Belgian francs he~ been pleced
fecilities at the North 5ea port with the Mglo�butch con�
of Zeebrugge, sortium Zeehouw�zeezend for
'I'he new facilities sho~ld heve the next two phnse~ nt the
been rendy to receive 5mn cu.m harbour constructian and the `
e year of Algerien L~'C et the gel~ian ga~ di~tributi~?n flrm,
~tart uf a 20�ycnr rnntract with bi,trigaz, ia working out ~inal
Sonatruch in 1987. Now, b~mng deteil~ di the termin~l ~tructun,~. `
any further setbacks, they are In the meantime, bistrigaa ha,
unlikely tc~ be completed before lost no time in seeking alter�
the end of 198~. netive supply routes to cover the
gut at lenst the decision hay period itom 1982 to 19t~~ while
dispelled doub~q that the the Zeebruggc fecilit~es are
Zeebrugge terminat would ever being built.
be built. 'i'he pn~ject hes mme With a"take o~ pey" clau~e in -
up against persistent political the contract signed with the
and environmental problems. Helgien~ in 1975 Sonetrach ha+
Helgium's F'rench�speaking becn ~ured of delivery or an
Walloni~ re~inn demanded com� indemhity af lbn Bel~ien frenrs
pen,ation for the siting of this a month. The indemnity is
mpjor pmject in ~lenders end daunting but it seem~ that
the putt of Antwerp made gelgian policy maken were
know~n it:+ diss~ti,facti~n et the more daunted by the prospect of
de~�elopment of a potential rivel. lo~ing the contract aince
Prepcuntiun wvrk on the Algerinn gas is a key clement in
hnrbaur infra~tructure was held the country's medium end long -
up by difficulties oc�er siting the term energy plen~ end
berthing facilitiey (which will 5onetrach i~ not ~hort of alter�
take ~hip+ of up to 1?5,000 ton.~), native customers.
the terrnins~l, stc~raKe Wnkg and Ga~ provides 2~'';: of
regarification plant in e port $elgium ~ energy nerd~ and it i~
which el+~ hendles e con� likely to be u~ec1 increa~inRly e.~
11
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~
~Oit n~~ICIAt U5~ dNLY '
~
i
i
I
- a ehemiral trr~let~~~k as th~ ~onvey ~rnuinn gn:~ tu thp Sn~~irt I
, pricr ~f ail ri~r+, ;\t p~rsrnt Uninn, whirh fn turn N~nul~l '
E3el~iutn relir+ In~tiel~~ on supplY gas to ~~~e+tern ~utupe, i
~upplies frum N~~iland'~ Belgium mny deridr t~ tink in ;
5luzhter~n flrld, l~ut thz buteh with ~~~ettdn of th~ Sn~~i~t ;
re~rv~s nrp nuu?inti nut und pipaline crn~~inK enuthprn
~ dpliveri~a tu f~l~;iwn ~it~ due ta Gprmnny tn Frnn~~r, 'I'hr new
- pnd in 1~J,1. Itunign Governmrnt, hu~rever,
C3as yuppli~*+ from the \orth h~s h~d s~COnd thaugl~ts nn thiy
3ea, which br~;an in 1J~ will link�up, ;
in~rea,e tu ~bn ru,m n~~rnr but $wnp arr~ngrmrntg: !
Alg~rinn ga, i~ rrc~u ~~,r the mujor When the govprnment an� ;
replucemrnt for Dulrh +upplies nnunCed its deriainn on
nv~~ the nrrt 10 yt~~~r. , zrebrugge, tt al+n nuthorised ~
in 1990, hn~~~e~~rr, n further Distrigaz to eign nn dutlinr ~
bbn eu.m a~~eHr a~ili b~ ne~ded agreement with Gna de ~rence
nnd by then gelgium Nitl pro� W lend the Algeri~n Kus nt the
bably went tu di~~ervih~ itg narthern ~~en~h ~~~rt of St. '
sourres tn a gn~n~rr extent, Naznire, A new LNG terminal ~
pt~eeibly loukinK tu Nigerie, the wi11 be cumpletrd thrre next ~
5oviet Union dt Itnn. bependin~ vpar. ~
on whet eventunily hnppen, to i
plens for a second pipeline to ~
~
The St Nazaire facilitie~ wi11 be able to Cake up to 3.Sbn cu.m ~ yegr ~
of the Sonatrach-Distrigas deliveries and various posgibiliCi~~ are being '
explored for the remgining 1.Sbn cu.m. This could be ~hipped to Marseilles ;
nr Holland, but the ultimate decision will depend on swap arrangementg
being considered by Caz de Fran~e under which the 5t Nazaire gas would be ~
taken onto the French network in exchange for Dutch ga~~ and possibly at ;
a later date, gas from the proposed Wilhelmahafen complex in West Germany. ~
With a well-developed pipeline system through Belgium to ~rance, the ;
northern gas could easily be stopped in Belgium. Gaz de France is study- ~
ing the coat involved, the volume and the timing of the different options ;
and in the meantime the Belgians are holding exploratory talks with other ~
distributors. ~
'Che Sonatrach-Distrigaz agreement thus seems certain to hold. The final '
details to be worked out between the two sides concern shipping. Algeria
and Belgium will share the shipping of the gas on a 50:50 basis but they
have yet to settle how this will work in practice. '
COPYRIGNT: 1979 IC :iagazi~es Ltd.
CSb: 4420
12
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I
~d~t O~~IC~AL US~ ONLY
ALG~I2IA
U~VH:LOPM~NT 0~ ALG~ttIAN ~N~RGY 1t~S0UItC~S DISCUSSEll -
p~rig MAItCH~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITE~RANEENS in French 29 Jun 79 p 1720
(~exeJ Alg~ri~, which is preparing for the "poae-oil ~r~," has ~ust b~gun
_ ~n imporegne phg~e in the implem~ntaCion of it~ pl~n for dpveldping iCg
e.ergy rpgnura~~, in which natural gae i~ ~xpecCed eo tgke over frnm oil gs
the n~ in source of fnrpign exchange.
The aommissioning by President Chadli Bend~edid of Che second liquefied gas
module in the Hggsi It'Me1 compl~x on 18 June and Che beginning of work on
that same day on the construcCion of the first trans-Mediterran~an g~~
pipeline which will provide Italy ~nd a parC of Western Europe wiCh mgssive
suppli~g of Saharan natural gas, both of which events were reported in our
columns last week, represent one of the key aspects of thi~ pla~, named the
' Valhyd Plan, covering the period from 1976 to 2005.
f Algeria hopes to obtain earnings of about 156 billion dollars, 93 percpnt of
it coming from foreign ~ources, from the exploitation of its gas in the
period between 1976 and 2005. The Valhyd Plan calls for the building of six
units for the liquefaction of natural gas in Algeria, three'of which have
been built or are under construction in Arzew, in the northwestern part of
the country, and the building nf gas processing units in Hassi R'Mel and
at other oil fields.
The overall cost of the Valhyd PYan is estimated at 33.4 billion dollars, of
which 17.4 billion will be obtained from foreign credit.
Processing Plant and Compressing Station in Hassi R'Mel
The gas processing plant commissioned on 18 June was begun on 31 October
1976. Named Module II, this unit is the counterpart of Module I, commissioned
on the same date last year by the late President Boumediene. It is designed
to process gas in the crude stage to produce gas for sale (60.5 million cubic
meters per day), stabilized condensate (11,000 tons per day), and liquefied -
propane gas (2,667 tons per day).
Built according to the Hudson Engineering Corporation procedure by the
Japan Gasoline enterprise, Module II has th~ee production lines with 26
13
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~
- ~OIt d~~~CIAL U5~ ONLY '
prdduein~ w~lls. Ies cnmp~.eeinn required eh~ ~mplhym~nC of ~ l~r~~ nnd
highl~~ skilled gtaff enC~Ling 4,223 p~rsdng ~e ehe p~gk period. ~
,
The H~ggi R'Mei ngCurgl ~gs nompresgion ge~ei~n, c~mmi~~~.on~d on th~ ~~mc~
dgy, h~s turbo-group~ div3ded by modu].~~ ~nd locat~d in gcouseical pnnlogur~g.
_ Th~ codling gyerem~ for Ch~ g~$ ~nd lubricgting oi1 ~nd the g~~ proofing ~re
a3r cool_ing gysCems, ,
r
tt~in3~atiori ig pffeCtpd by me~n~ nf a s~r~~s ~f S2 w~11g. The build~.ng df
tties~ ~C~Cien~ r~quir~d rh~ use o� foreign pereonn~l for a total df 700,000
labor hnurs ~nd Algerign p~rsonn~l for g CdC~l of 1,500,000 hnur~.
Onne compl~C~ed, the Haggi It'Mel compression gyet~m c~n in~ect 180 million ~
cubiC meC~rs nf g~s per d~y into th~ gubeoil.
Th~ Tr~ng-Medieerr~n~~n G~s Pipeline
Th~ trens-Medit~rrgnean gag pipeline, the cnmmisgioning of which was effe~ted
by Presidene Ch~dli Bend~edid, will link the Hasgi R'Mel f ield with Minerbio,
in the North of Italy, nver a toC~l distance nf 2,498 kilomeCers. This
prn~ect, which wi11 be equipped wiCh 12 compregsion statians, will crogs
Tunisia and thp Sicilian ~traiCS. In a firgt phase, it will have ~ cgpacity
of 8.3 billion cubic meCers per year, reaching a capacity in its Yin~l
phas~ of 18.5 billion cubic meterg per year.
The Algerian-Italian gas pipeline, the AP5 national new~ agency gCre~ges,
is made up of four main sections, one in Algeria~ one in Tunisia, one across l
the straits of Sicily and the Italian section. `
~ The Algerian section, linking Hassi R'Mel and Oued Safsaf, is 500 kilometers
long and 48 inches in diameter (1,220 millimeters). It includes among other
things the Hassi R'Mel shipping terminal, two section stations, four inter-
mediary locations where the future compression staticas will be located and
a receiving terminal and metering station near the Algerian-Tunisian frontier.
The Gompression stations, of which there are four, will be built in later
phases and each of them will be equipped with three turbo-compressors with
a unit power of aboue 30,000 horsepower. They will be built at the 110~
236, 359 and 465 kilometer markers.
Th~ completion of the section will require 220,000 tons (550 kilometers) of
pipe. A part of this tonnage, i.e. 43,000 tons (116 kilometers) will be
produced by the National Steel Company (SNS) in the E1 Had~ar and Ghardaia
plants.
In,addition, 400,000 tons of material and equipment essential to the com-
pletion of the section located in Algeria will be transported by the National
Railroad Transportation Company (SNTF) and the National Highway Transportation
Company (SNTR).
- 14
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~ox o~r~c~tnz us~ drtt,Y
The s~ctiion crdgsing 'Tun~.g3,~n e~rriedry, fdr ieg p~r~, wi11 bc ~7b kildmet~r~
ldn~ wirh ~ di~m~C~r af 48 incheg (1,22d millimeC~rg)~ Ie wi11 run sdueh-
w~se en noreh~~se fnr ehe mosC p~L~ti ~nd wi~.1 ].~ttk tih~ Aigeri~n-~uniaiun
frnnti~r with C~p ~on, on ehe Tunisign nd~~e. IC will b~ ~quipp~d wiCh
Chr~~ compre~sion gC~Cion~ of varioue CBpgC~.C~.pS.
- The ALgerian-Itali~n g~~ ~~~~i~.n~ w3ii ~n int~ th~ Medit~rr~n~~n nt Cap gnn
in Tuni~i~ ~nd wi11 ~m~rge ~n Ch~ ~ur�gce ~gain i.n Sinily, 160 kilomee~r~
~way, Maz~r~ d~l Vallo~
- The subm~rine ~~cti~n wi11 b~ m~d~ up of ehr~~ ~h~nn~lg with ~ di~m~t~r nf
20 incheg each. Twd o� them wi11 follnw eh~ gduChern gubmarine rour~ gnd
the third the northern roue~. The three wi11 b~ lncaeed at a maxicn~l d~pth ~
of 625 met~rg.
Th~ Italian g~ct3on, fin~lly, wi.11 crogs 5icily, Ch~ sCr~it~ nf M~s~ing,
C~l~bria, B~silicgC~ and C~mpenig dv~r ~ digC~nne df 1,418 kilom~t~rs,
fin~lly linking L~zio wiCh ltnme ~nd Itome with Minierbn. It will be equipped
with five compr~ssion stgtions with g total capgcity df 185,000 hors~power.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Mnreux eC Cie, Pari~, 1979
5157
CSO: 4400
15 _
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~OR tl~~~CIAt, U5~ ONLY
AI.G~RIA
MINIST~R 0~ t~GHT INUUSTItY VISI~S ~ONITEX UNI~
P~ri~ MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Fr~nch 22 Jun 79 p 16b1
(T~xt~ Within th~ fr~~~work of a tour h~ m~de b~3inning 3n Jun~ ehrdugh ~
number of wil~y~te in th~ ~~gt~m p~rt of Algeri~, Mint~t~r df Light indu~try
Said Ait M~eg~ouden~ vigited ~ numb~r of indu~trial facilit3~g in th~
Conatantine region on 4 and 5 June.
Amdng ehe un3Cg to which the minister turned hi~ attencion wag the N~tional
Text~le ~ndu~trieg Company (50NITEX) in Cha~b Er-Sa~ Congtantine. t~ a~~
noted in Algi~r~ that it began operations in 1967 for spinning and weaving,
1971 for dyeing and 1971 for th~ ne~a spinning faciliti~s. The production
from January to May of 1979 totaled 519~536 kilograms for the ~pinning
section, 837,565 linear meters for the weaving section, 100~422 kilogramg
for the dyeing aection (colored) and 451,938 kilograme (unbleached), with
964 laborera and employees, including 151 women. _
The SONITI:X unit in Constantine produces about ~ qugrter of the n~tion's
- needs in thread (3,000 tons per year), ~rorking clothes, military fatigue
unifonus, etc.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Parig, 1979
5157
C50: 4400
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~~tt d~~~GIAL U5ts dNLY -
AL~~ItIA _
STArU~ OF I~GHANIZATION A~It~CtiLTUI~ ~ESCRI~Ell -
i
P~riB MAItCH~S TttOPICAUX ET M~UITERi2ADiE~NS in ~r~nch 22 Jun 79 pp 1162-1163
[~ext] "Ju~t afe~r ind~p~nd~nce w~~ won, our country? h~d only 9,000 tr~ctors.
Tdd~y, ~eearding rd the ,~t~eigeicg up td 31 riec~mb~r ~97~, we h~ve 66,U00
tr~~~org (53,000 with tir~g ~nd 13,000 c~t~pill~r eypeg), ~o which mu~t be
add~d 11,000 h~rv~gtprs and an impr~gsive volum~ of v~rious ~gricultur~l
m~chin~~," thg dir~ctor g~n~r~?1 of the N~tiongl Agricultural ~quipm~nt Office
(ONAMA) $tated in Bord~-Menai~l 1~~t 6 Jun~, gdding th~t "exc~pt for several
rhougand h~ctare~ d~velop~d ~inc~, how~v~r, our area has not increa~ed."
This mechanixation i~ inevitably reflected in impr~~sive replacem~nt parts
figur~~. In th~ reporC he wrot~ on the ~tgtement made by the director general
of the ONAMA, Mr Said Smail, correspondent for the daily EL MOUDJAHib~ gayg
th~t h~ stated ChaC Algeria apen~ 2S billion a year in replacement parts~
tires and batt~t~ie~, and that the range of equipment in cir~ulation accounted
fnr a tot~1 volume of 250 replecement p~rt~ listings.
To say thar from the farm equipment point of view Algeria is the most mechanized
country it~ the Third World is an assertion doubtless ~ustified by the figures
mentioned. However it appears that this would lack ob~ectivity if the official
repart did not at the same time take into very frank account the very numerous
practical problems this mechanization poses. The best illustration of this
is provided by the fact that in the ~ame issue of the daily EL MOUDJAHID in
which the statement by the director general of the ONAMA was reported, an
APS dispatch f rom Oran was carried discu~aing th~~e difficulties at length.
A local official di th~ National Union of Algerian Peasants (UNPA) stresaed
in the article that "only 10 percent of the farm equipment is in good con-
dition, 500 tractors having broken down in the wilaye as a whole for lack
of replacement parts." Reports of this sort are a common occurrence.
This reveals a situation which not only lacks ~ustification on the basis of
the substantial sums spent to import farm equipment which is costly in
foreign exchange, but whiCh is also and unfortunately the reault of multiple
shortcomings in its use, organization, and responsibility in general. Would
this situation be leas critical if the equipment in question were domestically
produced in a greater proportion than it presently is? One can only doubt
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~dR (~~~ZCIAL U5~ ONLY
eh~e on legrning from eh~ ~~m~ iggu~ d� ~L MOUllJAHZU (12 Jun~) ~bnuti ehe
in~r~dible p~r~lygi.~ frdm which eh~ �grm mgchinery comp].ex of the N~tional
Mech~nie~1 Eng3ne~ring Compgny (SONACOME) in Sidi B~1-Abb~g hns be~n guf-
fcring for month~ on ~nd.
The reporC first notea Che size of the etake invested in this unit, which _
was buile wirhin eh~ fr~m~work of ~"produee in hand" contiract gigned with _
ehe W~~C G~rm~n Deuesche In~u~trieanlagen Ge~el~gchgfe (DIAG) compgny, with
tesCing ach~duled to b~$in in 1976 wiCh tt view to "product~.on o� 33 f~rm
mgchin~ prdducC~, innluding h~rv~ster-tihregh~r~ ta be produced at ~ r~Ce
, of 45 per month." Autihor M. A. Mahmoudi goe~ on to describe thp "rather
incdnclugive tests." "In a two-year period, only 100 harveeter-threshers
w~re produced, i.e. an average of G per month. It took i,300 workers, some -
20 ~dmini~trator~, and moantains of raw material~ to produce 4 harvester-
thr~shers p~r monthl In addition Co that, 1et us note th~t some pares were
not produced here, euch ae ehe gear boxee which Che manuf~cturer imported
f rem the ~ItG, although in principle and ob~ectively, all the p~rts, from
- the nuCs ~nd bolts Co the engine, ghould be manufactured in Algeria."
It is noC surprising Chat such mediocre performance has provoked a sharp
polemic b~tween the German builder and the Algerian auehoriCies. The basic
thing in any case is th~ demonsCraCion of Ch~ determination to change the
situatinn, to "take up the challenge." This was seen with Che appointment
at the end of 1978 of a new director, Mr Benina, formerly of the valve plant
in Berrouaghia. In 4 months, 100 harvester-threshers were produced, which is
� already a more encouraging average.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
5157
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~
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~ ALG~RIA
ACHIEVEMENTS TN SEVEN YEAFtS OF AGRARIAN REVOLUTION EXAMINED ~ -
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Jun 79 p 1662
[Text~ On 17 June Algeria celebrated the aeventh anniversary of the
implementation of agrarian reform. IC was in fact on 17 June 1972 thae
President Boumediene presented the first land allocation deeds in Khemis
el Khechna. Since ti~en, almost 100,000 landless peasants have been made
benef iciaries of the agrarian revolution, and about 4,000 cooperatives have
been established.
At the press conference held in Algiers on 17 June in connecCion with this
anniversary., Aissa Nad~em and Mohammed Abdelaziz, member of Che Central
Committee of rhe FLN, secretary general of the National Union of Algerian
Peasants (UNPA), and secretary general of the National Commiasion of the
Agrarian Revolurion (CNRA), president of the Agriculture and Agrarian
Commission of the National People's Assembly (APN) and deputy, respectively,
discussed the state to which the agrarian revolution has advanced after
sev~n years of implementation. Mr Mohammed Abdelaziz said in this con-
nection that 1n291,071 hectares of public land were placed in the National
Agrarian Revolution Fund between the launching of the first phase and
31 December 1978. As to partial or full nationalization of surplus private
land, this has led to the recovery of 640,075 hectares for the agrarian
revolution.
In all, 1,931,146 hectares of land have been recovered for the agrarian
revolution, including 1,145,376 hectares of useful farm area. The agrarian
revoluCion also benefited from recovery of 1,165,725 date palms. _
On the other hand, 1,406,825 hectares were distributed, representing 76 percent
of the total land area recovered. Moreover, nine percent of the fertile farm
land remains undistributed. The balance is developmental area and in some
places even unsuited to cultivation.
~
The secretary general of the CNRA expressed the hope in this connection that
all the areas suitable for cultivation will be distributed in order to improve
national farm production and to meet the food needs of the population.
, "Above all since we know," he specified, "that Algeria does not have a large
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~oR o~~icza~ us~ orn,Y I
a larg~ farm area." It has ~ii ~.n all 7,200,000 hectarea of arable land, ;
i.e. 0.40 hectares per inhabiCant. ~
It is a matter, he said, of covering 80 percene of Che domeatic food needs .
in order to guarantee the economic and food security of Algeria. ;
With regard Co the farm cooperarives, Mr Mohammed Abde].aziz stated that ~
5,980 cooperative units have been established, 80 percent of them being '
Agricultural Production Cooperatives of the Agrarian Revolution (CAPRA), ~
which is a trEmendous number. He also mentioned the existence of 674
Communal Multi-Service Agriculture Cooperatives (CAPCS) and 31 Fruit and ~
Vegetable Cooperatives (COFEL). In this connection, he stressed Chat the j
service aspect of the CAPCS had been converted into trade in farcn products ;
solely, thus depriving the peasants of farm and other equipment. ~
I
Assessing the construction of the socialist villages, the secretary general i
nf the CNRA stated that of 779 programs, 375 of them registered, 93 have ~
already been completed. In this connecL�ion he stressed that the agrarian ;
revolution is encountering tremendous difficulties in this sector, f or ~
neither the national companies (DNC, SONATIBA [National Infrastructure and :
Building Construction Company], SORECAL) nor the privaCe construction enCer- I
prises wanted to undertake the construction of the socialist villages. ~
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979 ~
i
5157 '
CSO: 4400
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~ox or~zcz~ us~ ornY
ALGERIA
BRIEFS
CFP ACTIVITIES--The 1978 reporC of the French Petroleum Company (CFP)
indicaCes that the group was able to obCain 11.8 million tons of oil in
Algeria in 1978, as compared Co 10.6 million in 1977 and 9.7 million in 1976,
from Che Hassi-Messaoud, Haoud-Berkaoui, Mereksen and Stah deposits, in
connection with the CFP interests in partnership wiCh Che National Company -
for the Transport and Marketing of Hydrocarbons (SONATRACH). The same report
notes that new agreements were signed perCaining to the undertaking of de-
velopment drilling and the supervision of construction of the installations
at the Alrar gas f ields, supervision of development operations at the In Salah -
gas fields, and also the development of the distribution network. [Text] �
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR~TEENS in French 22 Jun 79 p 1662] 5157
MARITIME TRANSPORT COMMISSION--The status of maritime relations between Algeria
and France was the sub3ect of the work of the mixed Algerian-French commission
on maritime transport which meC on 11 and 12 June at the Higher Maritime
Institute in Bou-Ismail. In the course of the meeCing, the APS national press
~ agency stressed, the mixed commission, for which the maritime agreement signed
between the two countries in 1967 provides, also studied means of rational-
izing and improving the procedures at maritime conferences held between
Algerian and French ships outfitters, and also that it studied the possibility
for cooperation in the training and ship-repair sectors. Like France and the
FRG, Belgium insisted on the principle of sharing freight on a SO-50 basis
in the agreement recently signed with Algeria. "It is generally believed that
it was a'take it or leave it' matter," the transportation of gas probably
being the deCermining factor. Thus the Belgians and Algerians will share the
freight to be shipped through Belgian ports, including French freight,
equitably," according to the DUNKERQUE EXPANSION. [Text] [Paris MARCHES ,
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Jun 79 p 1163] 5157
OIL TERMINAL OPERATIONAL--The new terminal for the 28-inch Haoud
E1-Hamra-Arzew oil pipeline is operational. The West Algerian Transport
Administration (RTO) project, to which Mr Belkacem Nabi, minister of energy
and petrochemical industries, paid a visit on 19 June, will receive condensate
and GPL [liquefied propane gas] from the deposits in the southern part of
Algeria. The project, the second of its kind in the Arzew industrial zone,
is equipped with seven storage tanks ranging from 35 to 55,OQ0 tons capacity. ~
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- ~'OIt 0~'~'ICIAL US~ ONLY
It also h~s a cnntrol room for the gas pip~line (40 inch) ~nd annther fdr -
the loading of veasels from stations loc~tied ae the Arzew nil port ~nd Se~
Lines. Witih the commissioning of the new facility, the direcCor of rhe I2T0
said, Che west adminisCratinn is now gdminiatering 3,123 ki~ometers of pipe-
line and emp].oying 1,491 persons. Since it wtts estgbllshed in 1967, the
, west transport administratiion has transporeed 230 million ton~ c~f oil ~nd
46 billion cubic metera of natural gas from the gnuthern p~rti of Algeri~.
[TexC] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAN~EN5 in ~rench 29 Jun 79
p 1720] 5157
EMIGRE WORKERS--New measures designed Co speed up the reCurn of Algeri~ns
working in Fr~nce have been adopted by the Algerian governmenC, -
Mr Abdelhamid Brahimi, Algerian minister of planning and riational developm~nt,
told the ALgerian National Assembly recently. However, the minister gave
no indicarion of the nature of ehese measures. He said thgt the number o�
~obs created in 1978 (175,000) is expecCed to increase this year to the
benefit of ALgerian emigrants to France, following recent French governmenC =
measures designed Co reduce foreign manpower. [TexCJ [Paris MARCH~S
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 Jun ~9 p 1720] 5157
CUBAN TECHNICIANS--Technicians of Che Cuban firm, UNECA, are to assisC
the Algerian state-owned construction company, 50REC Sud, in building
1,000 housing uniCs in Biskra, under the Cerms of a wide-ranging Algerian-
Cuban cooperation agreement--the first such accord Co be reached beCween
the two countries. One hundred Algerians are also to be trained in con-
struction in Cuba as preparation for ~oint activities in urb~n planning
and public works as well as light industries, hydrocarbons and petro-
chemicals. [Text] [London THE MIDDLE EAST in English Jul 79 p 96]
CSO: 4420
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~Ott O~t~'I~;t~1L 1Jg~ hNLY
~
LGXp'T
PO55~nILITI~5 dr ~GY~'TIAN-LIgYAN CON~LICT ANALYZ~D
paris AL-WATAN AL-'AIt~1~I in Ar~bic 29 Jun~-5 Jul 79 p~S
(Areicle: "Th~ ~gypCian�Libyan ~rnnr: Live Ammunition bri11 fnr Che
~~ypti~n Patrol OffiCer"]
[T~xt] It is n~t unlikely ehae Cfle UniC~d SCaCe~ arill ~ondu~e ~ live ~
~mmunition dri11 on th~ ~gypCian-Libyan border to tegC ~resident ~1-S~dnt
gnd to m~ke sure th~t he is qual3fi~d to play the role of patrol officer
for which h~ has often nominaeed himself.
Inform~d sources in Washington are noe hiding their apprehensions thet
this gummer might be "a hot and a very dangerous summer" alon~ th~
~gyptian-Libyan borders.
In spite of the fact ehat U.S, newsp~pers have focug~d th~ir ~tt~neion on
thc oil crisis in a manner that has pushed the Middle ~ast ~risi~ Co a
secondary level of importance, the quesrion of the "i~flemed bord~rs"
between Libya and Egypt did find a place in more than one of the principal -
newspapers that h~ve been known for having a Coop~rative r~latiottship with
the bepartment of befense and the bepartmenC of 5taCe in Washingron. Thig
, has led Co speculations that reactions to any increase in the price of oil
which the United States and the West may consider burdensome would become
evident in preparations for a blitz operat~on that would taYget Libya as a
principal oil producing country. Such an action would serve as a warning
to the other oil countries.
The deteriorating relations between Egypt, on the one hand, and Libya and
the different Arab countries--with the exception of Sudan~-on the oeher,
do naturally make the Libyan-~gyptian border the perfect ~tage for such a
"limited" operation. FacCors perCaining to this geogxaphical location
would prevenC any entanglemenC between Egypt and Ierael from turning into
a general struggle in the Middle East in spite of the ties that exist
between Libya and the opposition countries.
In [he course of 3ustifying possible Egyptian actions on the Libyan borders
in advance, BUSINESS WEEK Magazine, ~he spokesman of financial and business
circles in the United States, stated that the intransigent Arab countries
23
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~dk d~'~I~tAL U5L dNLY
that h~d r~~elved td ~verthrdw f'r~~i~l~ne ~1-S~d~t'g r~~ime ea put ~n ~end -
td hig policy of ~pp~a~~tn~ne wieti tg~r~ei "w~r~ i~tein~ ~t~y~ gp~arh~~d
their ~~mp~ign ~g~ingt ~~yPt."
At th~ g~m~ eime ~~ver~1 medi~ ~ourc~g have ind~~at~d eh~e ~very ~in~~e
the Cnmp n~vid ~~cardg w~r~ gi~n~d, reng.~;on wc~g gecretly and opp y riging
on th~ ~~ypeian-Libyan berd~r.
~gYpei~ng Go We~t
~'h~ f~~~ ig Chae ew~ we~ks ~~u whil~ ~h~ v~nguard~ of eh~ I~r~~].i n~goei~~in~
d~1~g~tidn w~re ~rrivtn~ ~e ~h~ M~n~ Houge Hoe~1 tn Al~c~ndri~, gdditian~i
b~tegli~n~ nf the Egypeian ~rmy w~r~ eaking up n~w po~3tion~ in ~he midsC
~f th~ w~gtprn 5~h~r~ ne~~ th~ L~by~n bard~rg, ~nd ~gpe~ially n~~r eh~
bdrd~rg af ~he oagig ~re~. ~h~y were r~inforcin~ eh~ Croopg that h~d be~n
~m~g~~d earlier along eh~ bord~rg by Chp Supreme Military Cumm~nd in
~e~ord~ne~ wieh in~eruction~ ~nd ord~r~ from th~ Supr~m~ Poli~ic~i Comm~nd.
A~COrdingiy, g significane nwnb~r of rock~e ~nd artill~ry ccrmpgni~g h~d b~pn
ghife~d from eh~ w~~e~rn ~nd eh~ e~gt~rn bank~ of th~ Su~z Can~1. ~hi~ h~d
taken p1~c~ 3 or mare monthg ggo, ~pe~ifically aftpr v~r6~1 agr~em~ne h~d
been re~ched on the dat~ of handing ~1-'Ari~h ove-r to ~gypt aft~r ehe
gepar~t~ p~ace treaey b~tween ~gYpt and Israpl wag signed.
NenGe, U.S. ~ources Goneluded ehat guch acrion~ ~u~tifted their in�~r~nc~
th~e "th~ possibiliti~~ for a gecond blitzkrieg ~imilar r,o the 1977 ~gyprian-
Liby~n war had become tmminent~" Specif~cal~y, it wag not unlikcly thae
Cnirc~ might be tempt~d by Libya's oil rev~nue~ which amount to 10 billion
dollars ppr year. Cairo might ~specially b~ tempred by the implications
of ate~nking the bord~rs and the Libyan forces. Colonel al-Qadhdhafi, who
i~ bping openly accuaed by Cairo of financing many sabotage and terrorist
incid~nt~ and accidents in ~gypt--perh~ps to ~ustify the expected hostile
ag~r~g~ion--would b~ th~ target [of guch an attack].
But what is causing concern in both Cairo and in Waghington is the fact that
an Egyptian military campaign against Libya may have unfavorable consequenceg
or cause complicationg in the heart of the Egyptian army. Recent reports ,
hgve proven that important elements in the ~gyptian army were opposed to
any miliCary action against Libya and were eympathixing with the policies
of the Arab rejectionist front.
5ome informed analysts believe that the purpose behind engineering another
blitzkrieg on the border between Bgypt and Libya may go beyond that of
warning the oil countries, attempting to introduce change into the Libyan
regime or encouraging such a change. Its purpose, with ti.S. encouragement,
n~ay be to evaluate the magnitude of the developed Soviet arms which Libya
obtained; to find out the extent of Libya's nse of those arms; and to learn
how much of these weapons were being sneaked aWay to extremist Arab countries
and to revolutionary organizations throughont the world. The prevailing
opinion in U.S. circles--and this is based on intelligence reparts supported
by special Egyptian reports--is that Libya has three times the developed
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~dEt t)1~'CtCTAL U5~ dNLY
we~pdns tti~t itg ~rmy af ~~,dd0 gdldt~rg ~~n u~~e. `Thig gitu~tidtt giv~g
Liby~ tt~~ ~ap~bility td fnterv~n~ witti ~ff~~tiv~ a~~i~e~nc~ in "h~t"
~~~d~ iik~ Ch~d ~n~ Y~men~
- W~r ~nd di1
~~ver~1 infarm~d ~aure~e~, hew~ver, think eh~t gny ~gypEian-Ltby~n war, na
m~tter ~taw bri~f gn~ how ltmie~d, m~y nc~t b~ without ~ffeet~ ~n th~
internatidnal oi1 gitua~ion ~nd nn th~ Unie~d 5taC~~' oil ~upplies. tt
ig kn~wn that g p~r~ene nf U.S. oi1 impor~~ ~om~ from Libya whag~
~eagr~phi~ loe~ti~n ig ~1o~er to U~5~ ~nd ~t~rop~an tnark~et~ eh~n 5~Ud3
Ar~bi~ ~nd the Gu1f ~eae~~. Cong~qu~ntiy, sny int~rruption in the fidw
af nii, na m~tt~r haw brtef, wt11 h~ve unf~vor~bli~ ~~fe~t~ on the p~ont~my
di the weg~ ~nd of th~ Uni~ed 5tat~g.
ft~l~~iong b~twe~n th~ Uni~~d ~tae~~ ~nd Liby~ ar~ pdor c~n every level. in
~pie~ of th~ ~peei~i efforeg made 6y ~i11y Care~r, Pr~sident Gare~r'~
broth~r, ehp U~S. gov~r~n~ne can~inu~~ ta refug~ to auehorize ghipm~ne of
~hr~+~ 747 go~ing ~i~plan~~ and ~tght ~-i~d c~r~o airplgn~g eh~e Li6y~ ha~
~lready patd far in full. Th~ D~p~~tm~nt uf St~t~ and th~ ~epartment df
befense in W~ghingtott are bgging eheir oppogiCion eo gucA auCharization on
ehe f~~t tihat supplying Liby~ with addittonal airborne pquipment eh~t woUld
- give iC en addition~l mflieary rapability wonld b~ prohihited und~r the pr~sent
~onditiong of U.S.-Libyan r~lationg and it? thp lighe d~ Liby~'g policy in
the Middl~ Ea~t and in Africa. `
ziottist $ourc~s and behind rh� sc~n~g ag~nt~ hav~ been playing an ~ctive
role in maintaining the tension in relations b~tween Libya end the United
5tat~s and in promoting cfrcumstanc~s conducive to an ~gyptian military
campaign Chat would target Libya. They are pnbl.icizing and ~pr~ading n~w$
that worri~g American~. Among ~uch news is the report which gtate~ that
v~lunt~er pilotg frnm North Kor~a wer~ b~ing trained on 24 MIG airplanes
wl~ich Libya h~d purchased and that there were more than 2,000 5oviet soldiers
manning the radar stations and the gutded missile stations, training
Libyan troops and participating in s~botage operations that were taking
place in Egypt~
'Che prevailing view is that the explosion of the sitvation on the Libyan-
Egyptian border has becom~ nothing more Chan a question of time. It is a
que~tidn of consid~Yations that are related to t~ie oil situation, and this
will become evident after the Geneva ConfeYenc~.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 A1-Watan al-'Arabi
8592
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I~'dk t~l~~~GIAL UgL UNLY
~IZAN
N~Cd ~t~CI1~ POND~ttS ~A~~ d~' K~tU~~ KOLbING5
tt~mburg CAPt~E1L in Germ~n Jun 7g p~
(AreiCle: "Wh~t the Per~ign~ Are Planning Td na Wieh Krupp. Insh~llnh."~
[TexC] Dr Wilhelm S~h~id~r, h~ad of the ~r3edrich Krupp ~oundrie~ Corp. ~ti
Bnchum, ghoaed n~ 1~ck of polie~ ~et~ntidn ~nd at the ~nd nf April devdeed 2
ddyg td rir Mahmnud Ahm~dzgdph-H~rv~ri from T~hrgn~ ~he gteel mun~ger wglked
with Che P~rgian, in Che ngme df All~h,newly ~ppoittC~d mining and indugCry
miai~e~r of Sha'~ overthrow~r Khomeyni ~nd ~t Ch~ s~me Cim~ hig deleg~ee tn ehe
Krupp wdrks bdard of dir~eCor~, throUgh du~ty pl~nt yard~ Cu binst furngce~
and rumbling gte~l meleing crucibl~s. Scheider guided him acros~ iron gang-
ways aldng ehe train~ ~f raller~ and patiently explgined the businc:gs ~igureg.
"After ~11, he ia our principal stockholder," sgld the buginess mgn~g~r, giving
th~ re~son for hig effnrt t~n b~h~lf of the guest from the Orient. It wgs only
ar megltime, when the Mo~lem, faithful to the Koran, reached for the w~ter,
that the German did nor go along but follcnaed hi~ own life style and drank
wine. "1'h~re gre limit~ to my love fnr the principal ~tockhold~r," he gaid.
In the middle af May, Krupp had a second Iranian to welcome, this eime ~t the
cnmpany headquarters, F'riedrich Krupp Corp. in Eesen. Dr Reza Salimi, state
aP~retary in the Ministry of ~conomics and I~inanc~, introduced him~elf to
Berthold Beitz, head of the Krupp Foundation, as the new represenCative from
Iran in the group of shareholders and as bogrd member in the Krupp corpor~tion.
The Pergian made his firat appearance in the Villa Huegel's Park Room whose
wallg are cov~red with Gobeling showing Christian themes.
True, Ch~ Krupp managers had gathered as much information as they could ubout
Khomeyni's watchdog. They knew that Salimi, formerly ~ student at the Paris
Sarbonne, had lain low during the Shah regime as a case worker dealing with
electricity price lists--"for political reasong," as saii~i explained later
in a personal converstion. Md mining minister Ahmadzadeh-Hervari who, as
professor at the Technical University in Tehran, remained politically alonf
during the Shah-era, had retained his knowledge of Cerman from his 4 yearg as
a student ~t the Clausthal-Zellerfeld Mining Academy.
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f~'dti d~~'IGYAL U5L dNLY
Uue it wng much mor~ impnre~nt fnr ehe Germ~ng Ca find dut hnw eh~ n~w gnv~rn-
m~ne d~ ~he ~~i~mi.G ItepUbliG nf ~r~n ng~~g~eg ~he 25-p~r~~nt ~h~r~ i.n ehe
Krupp Cdrpnr~tidn nnd th~ fdundry whi~h it inh~riCed frnm eh~ imperi~l P~r~i~n
~e~re. "We ~lwnyg,~~ r~poreed fnUndry fin~nce m~n~g~r br Cu~ne~r ~leaken~tein
n~e~r eh~ ~ dgy~ wiCh tt~rv~ri, "w~ne~d ed gt~~r Ch~ ~nnv~r~~tidn c~r~fully
t~w~rd~ finding dut whgt iq goin~ e~ h~ppen n~w, bue w~ n~ver goe ~d ehe pnine.
Th~ minigeer remain~d nnneommitegl."
Th~ G~rm~n~' thirge fdr kndwl~dg~ i.~ und~rgtgnd~bl~. Fdr th~y ~~n by n~ m~~n~
- b~ rere~in tih~r Khnm~yni'g ~glnmie r~vdlutidn ~g~in~e Ch~ Sh~h wili nne in tihe
end hie Krupp, rad. ~dr p~rsnnal gymp~thy b~tiw~~n Che Krupp 1~~d~r~hip and ,
eh~ Sh~h muge h~ve pl~yed ~ role wh~n Ch~ eh~n Per~i~n-~mp~ror w~g w311.ing ed
sh~11 dut mdr~ eh~n ~ billidn mgrks b~ew~~n 1574 ~nd 1978 fnr hig ~hgr~ in
ehe hegvy indugtry ~dn~ern. ~n th~ megn~ime, under eh~ pr~g~ure of ehe ~urn-
pean gCee1 ~rigig, the Krupp works ~anumulgted logg~g nf nM 189 million. And
eh~ Krupp Cnrporaeinn-parene-comp~ny man~uvered ~o clo~ely to eh~ br~ak-even
point Ch~t fnr ehe i~sC y~ar eh~r~ r~m~in~d ~n ~nt3r~ DM 6.25 r~il.li~n in profiCg
f.dr th~ P~rgi~n~. In ~pit~ df i.e, rir Alb~rt Lu~,~~, wha ~s the e~rpor~Cinn'g
fin~nc~ m~nag~r negoei~eed ~he det~ilg b~tween Krupp gnd Ch~ emperdr, b~1i~v~~
th~t Ch~ pri.c~ wg~ ndt Cdd high~
But sn far ge Lpn5C~ eh~ tir~de, highly pr~is~d by Beitx ag "exempl~ry" ~nd
by Chp ~ed~r~l governm~ne gg g"pi~c~ df re~lity of wdrld-~cnttomic ineerdepen-
denCe," h~g brought benefits to only one side. The Persian billion-payment
improved Krupp's financial and c~sh gitu~ttott so thrat even ehe decline in
gales and ehe drop in price in the steel bu~ineg~ did noe rock ehe Ruhr colos~ug.
~urthermore, wiCh the Sh~h's bl~gsingg, Krupp'g buginess Crgn~aCtinn~ with Ir~n
flourished as never before. With riM 370 million, exportg to Persia reached
their peak in 1977. The Ir~nians, on the other hand, have hardly tgken advnn-
t~~e of their opportuniCies for cooperation with Krupp becauge Cheir economic
~nd adminigtrative forces were overburdened anyhnw and because, according to
Lukac, "we had gaid quite clearly, that no handout was to be expected from us."
On Tehran's cr~dit side of the cooperation with Krupp were at Che end only a
few duzen Persians who had come to the Ruhr for training.
5ince the power change in Tehran, the Krupp leadership musC be prepared for
the pnssibility that the Iranian revolutionary government might cancel the
agreement with them before it can be transformed into a partnership. True,
according to the contract, the Persians cannot get rid of their share whenever
they feel like it, but can sell only with the approval of Krupp's board of
directors chgirman Beitz, and Lukac by his own testimony had by mid-June "no
indication, no information, no aviso that such intention prevails." And it
was music to the ears of the firm's leaderg in Essen and Bochum when the new
economic and finance minister Ali Ardalan (incidentally the only one from the
new guard with whom Lukac had been briefly in touch even at the time of the
Shah), said in March about the participation in Krupp: "We are happy about
it." In the meantime, he and his colleagues on the board of directors have
been following with suspicious professional interest the way in which the
Iranians have since recently been dealing with the Siemens Subsidiary, Kraftwerk
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~tlit dt~'~'ICrAL UJ dNLY
Cpnw~r ~ea~idn] Unidtt (KWU) which--wirh d~liv~ri~~ nf Krupp pr~du~tg--ig building
Gwn ~tnmiC ~n~rgy ~t~tinn~ ~t Bu~h~hr nn Ch~ P~r~i~n Gulf. ~n gpiee df ~x3~t-
in~ ~nner~ce~, eh~ ~gl~mic r~valu~3c~n~ri~~ h~ve e~neinu~d owing i~ ~verdu~
in~e~lim~t~e p~ym~ae~ ~nd eh~y r~fu~~ ~l~d, ~g ine~mp~ei.bi~ wieh eh~ t~~~hing~
nf ehe Prdph~e, t~ ~r~die i~g ~C~oun~ w~.eh in~~r~gt--~v~n ~e Ch~ ri~k eh~r Che
buil.ding gftie wi11 n~w 1ie 3d1e and tihe alre~dy p~ecC~d 3.nge~llneidn~ wdrCh DM
5.S billion wiii d~c~y wiehout e~r~ ~nd turn ~nto ser~p m~tai wirhin 1 Co 2
y~~r~.
"On~ mu~e noe ~xeiud~ eh~ p~~~ibiliey," r~m~rk~d ~ Krupp dire~enr i.f go~n eh~r~-
~Et~r, tih~~ in eh~ G~~e nf Krupp ~1~0, th~ p~r~i~ng might suddenly ge~ nff; ~nd
h~ prab~d 8i~er~~C1y ~m~n~ eh~ n~w bdard of dir~eeox m~mb~r~ ed find due wh~tih~r
Khom~yni himgplf hgd ~1re~dy divulg~d gnyChin~. ~ut eh~ informgCinn obe~in~d
frnm Ahm~dx~d~h-Herv~ri ~nfl 5~1imi ("W~ only conetiieuti~ ehe provigiongl govprn-
ment") r~cn~in~ ung~eigfgcrory. 7'h~ Ayetoll~h, so Chey ggid, in hig congulCa-
eidn~ with Ch~ mini~e~r~ in Qom, 3~ mor~ ine~r~~e~d in exis~~nt3.~1i~~ qu~gtiong,
for exgmple, wh~Ch~r Che 1a~t imp~ri~l prime mini~t~r g~khti~r 3s ~ce3.v~ in
eh~ und~r~round who h~~ r~pea~edly ~etack~d offi~eg of eh~ r~volution8ry com-
mire~e~ gfe~r ~x~cueiong wer~ egrri~d out, gnd und~r wh~t ~g~um~d n~m~g ~owdrk~r~
df ehe Sh~h h~v~ gdn~ und~r cover ~broad. ~n gpiC~ of tih~ cnntiinuing grnC~ of
~u~p~nsion, an~ ~on~al~tion rem~in~ f~r Krupp. mhe compgri~ntt of Khom~yni'~
commiBS~rg w3th eh~ir predeceggors on the Krupp bo~rd of direcCorg, whn were
loyal Co the emperor ~nd trained at U.S. univera3ties, comes out in f~vor of
the n~w ones. "Th~y ~re mu.^~ more pleaeant," remarked Lukac, "Chan thos~
polished Harvard people be�ore."
COpYRIGHT: 1919 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
9011
C50: 4403
28
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H'dH d1~'rtGtA~ U5~'. dNLY
rtUkUCCU
KING HASSAN D~SCtt~H~~ A~ 'A~ ~AY', pitt5dN~i2 d~ STttAT~GY 0~ U~~'~1T
p~rig A~Ft~QU~-AS~~ in ~'r~nch 25 Jun-$ Jul 79 p 13
(ArCicle by Ha~~~n Z~n~ti]
[T~xt] ~v~ryon~ wi11 h~v~ ~nd~d by m~king the ob~erv~tion: th~ "ri~ht of.
pur~uanc~" r~~pp~ar~ in th~ panoply of ~t~~san II each tim~ that hi$ occupg-
Cion eroopg in th~ W~gtern Sahgrg undergo g g~rioug militgry ~etback.
Thig wg~ Ch~ cage rec~nely negr A~sa, 66 kilometerg below Goulimin~ in
South Morocca, beyond th~ Oued Dra~ that goes along the Anti-Atlag moun-
t~ina. Mondgy, 4 June, at dawn, with he~vy artillery in plgc~, the county
s~~t of Caidat was ~tt~cked by a Saharan column. Result: 112 Moroccan
soldiers, officerg and a~gisCant officers, killed; about 100 hundred
wounded; a barracks, th~ power house, pogt office, motor fuel tankg, armorie~
gnd munitions depots, about a dozen trucks, 9 all-terrain vehicles, and
4 heavy gung de~troyed. -
And then Tan-Tan, occupi~d a eecond Cime gince this past January by the Front.
Royal reaction was not long in coming: for example, Oum Dreiga, Sabkhat or
Droues--those multiple murderous battles that have characterized the occu-
pation of Western Sahara for two years. Hassan II brandishes "the right of
pursuance"...against Algeria. He even goes a little further this time, by
announcing that he has given a"written order" in this regard to his officere,
after having consulted the "defense council" and having consequently obtained
the endorsement of all Moroccan political parties, including those of Che
"opposition." The latter can be "happy" to have extracted an order for
which they had long clamored. The same with the Moroccan army staff which
for an even longer time has had experience with these colonial type practices.
It may seem inopportune, at the moment when peace initiatives are being
increased, for the king of Morocco to again brandish the "right of pursuance"
against Algeria and dramatize the situation a little more by announcing that
he h~s already given an order "in writing" to his army--perhaps wieh Che
29
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I-
~dit tl~'1~'YCIAL U5~ dNLY '
ine~entton of bl~ckin~ ~r ~f Carp~doing ~ny poli.~i~~1 gpprageh ea ~ g~lutidn
whog~ urg~ncy nn on~ ~ny lon~~r d~ube~? ,
Aeeuglly, H~~~~n i~ g1r~~dy pl~ying ~ io~ing ~~m~. A f~w week~ b~for~ ;
the forthcoming OAU (drggn3zgtion of African Unieyj aummit, which i~ to ~
C~k~ p1~c~ in Monrovi~ ati Ch~ b~ginning of Ju1y, hi~ diplomatic obgrruction
policy ge~mg ro h~v~ m3.~fir~d. He will n~e ~ven be ~b1e to b~n~fiC gny ;
~.ong~r from M~ur3Cani~n ~uppore whpn it b~comeg a qu~gCion o� confirming Ch~
S~h~r~n peopl~'g right to ~~lf-d~termin~eion--bec~u~a Nouakchott for gome ~
w~~k~ hag b~~n r~iter~ting ehgt ~.t ~.s in favor nf eh~ ~ppl~.cation of thig
r3ght Cn th~ zone ehat it occupieg. ~C ~ven gav~ ~.C~ con~enC "in wr3.eing"
(~t, too) to the eecr~t~ry general of the UN a~ far back ae 1975. It
rep~at~d it again at the Cime of an official viait thae was made in Algiere.
'Ph~ common diplomatic ection that was ba~ed on th~ digtribution of roleg
b~ew~~n Rab~r gnd Nouakchott wag well planned: in connection with th~ '
form~r, ~hreat~ of withdrgwal from the African organization; with the latCer,
eh~~~nligting of the undecided. But this time thig strategy of obstruction ~
will probably confront a hurdle. Under these circum~Canceg, one can under-
gtand, on Che eve of the Monrovia summiC, Ha~san II'g attempC ut a�ingl ~
maneuver to divert attention from the basic problem: that is, th~ right of
the S~haran people to self-determinaCion and the reducCion of the mntter to
a conflict between one country and anoCher, Morocco against Algeria. ~
The UN, moreover, is only one stage in a seriea of formidable dates for ~
Che Moroccan monarchy: Che summit of the nonaligned in September in Havana
and the United Ngtions General Assembly session, scheduled for 18 September. ~
Numerous countrieg of these two international organizatia~ns in fact are '
waiting for the OAU's verdict before coming to a conclusion on the substance
of the 5aharan question. As long as the African organi~ation confirms its j
previous resolutions and acknowledges the Polisario as the sole legitimate j
representative of the Saharan people throughout the entire territory of the t
SDAR [Saharan Demacratic Arab Republic~, neither the nonaligned nor the I
United Nations will be able to counCer this. '
To ~gain block the Saharan case in the UN thus becomea a vital political ,
necesaity for the Moroccan monarchy--a way perhaps of gatning a little
time, while waiting for some solution that is forged outs~~ide these inter-
national circ~stances to fall to it from a French or an~~.American
sky. In reality, Hassan II has become a prisoner of a strategy of defeat ~
which risks leading him to the worst. After the Saharan ~uassacres, ~.~ill he ~
take the responsibility of a general conflagration in the Maghreb? One must
be careful, because this monarch at bay is ready for anything: after me,
the deluge...
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
$255
CSO: 4400 30
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~OE~ 01~~~CTAL U5~ UNLY
MOItnCCO
~~'~'~C'TS d~ AUST~EtITY M~ASUIt~S ON COUN'Ti2Y nTSCUSS~U
Londnn THC MIbbL~ ~A5T in Cnglish Jul 79 pp 86, 8~
[Articl~ by Susan Morgnn, in It~b~t]
('C~xtJ ~v~n gdv~rnmene nffici~ls now admit ehat th~ Moroncan economy is
fncing probl~ms, and rhat the counery may well be enCering a period o�
gev~r~ soci~l unrege.
Th~ severe gusterity measures which have been in force for a yenr--revers-
ing Che previous four years of ambitious capitgl-ineensive industrial
growth--have had some effect but they are viewed by the Government ~s no
more Chan a first step.
The UirecCor-General of Che Treasury, Mohammad Tazi, is full of praise
for the impacC the austerity programme had had in cutCing the trade gap
from MDS.Sbn ($2.15bn) in 1977 to MD6.2bn last year. It has also had a
dramntic effecC on the foreign-currency shortage, which Tazi considered
the Cop preoccupation.
Now, with Che 1978-80 plan (only parts of which have so far been pub-
lished) in its second year, the cuts will continue,. Tazi told THE MIDDLE
EAST that some social unrest was inevitable as a result. But, he said,
the same economic remedies had been applied in Europe, where social con-
ditions were "more serious."
For the Moroccan opposition, however, hardship Co the workers, whose
standards of living have been seriously eroded, is a serious problem.
- They consider that higher wage demands (expressed in waves of strikes
throughout the counCry) are thoroughly ~ustified.
The Government acknowledged this on Labour Day when it announced wage _
increases for the lowest paid. Minimum industrial and agricultural wages,
which Finance Minister Abdel-Kampl Reghaye himself admitted to be among
- the lowest in the world, were raised by 40% and a 15ti increase was
awarded to the worst-paid public employees. But the opposition, com-
plaining Chat these increases did noC even keep up with inflation,
described them as "derisory."
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rox oi~~ZCIAL U5~ ONLY
'I'he ~u~ti~r~.ey m~gsures h~vn noe dnly fu~~.~.ed 1~bour unresC; they nr~ n~~o
f~le in ~om~ quartierg eo h~v~ nguged g~vere di~tiore~.ons ~.n eh~ ~conomy.
Dugin~ss Conf~.denC~, p~rC~.cu~.arl.y ~.n Che imporrgnt pr~.v~te secCor, hgs
been bndly ~ffecred.
The influential ~conomic review CEDZ~S ZNF'ORMATIONS hae labelled th~
giCu~Cion "digturbing" and descr~.bed the cred~.t reserictions gg rigorous
and undisarimin~eing." Growth ~.n some areag of ehe economy--notnbly cnn-
srrucCion--ha~ either been minimg~. or nonexisCene. Capital. investmenC,
_ which rog~ by 30y in 1977, fell by 14~ ~gst year.
The Gnvernment for ~.ts part is cr~.t~.ca~. of tihe privaee secCor for noe
acting independently and initiating ita own pro~ects. Businessmen com-
p1~in, however, thaC ehis is not feasible in the unfavourable economic
climate. They also maintain that the Government has delayed paying Chem,
which in turn has meanC ehey have been unable to pay suppllers.
UebC burden: ~fforts to expand exports last year were affected by a con-
eiderable oversupply of Morocco's chief exporC, phosphaees, on ehe world
markeC. 5o alChough tonnage was u~ on 1977 levels, earnings had reached
only MD1,400mn by the end of the third quarter, compared with I~ID2,111mn
for the whole of the previous year.
The overall increase of 6% in last year's exports was due to a large extent
to a strong recovery in agricultural products, led by citrus fruit (see THE
MIDDL~ EAST No 53, p 101), and by outpuC of phosphate derivaCives. Phos-
phates and phosphate derivatives together are estimated to have earned
1~2.4bn last year and the pro~ection for this year is MD2.6bn.
At Che same time, workers' remittances, encouraged by a preferential
dirham rate, rose by 23% over 1977 Co I~3.2bn. Tourist receipCs also im-
proved slightly, reaching MD1.65bn in 1978, compared with I~ID1.Sbn the
previous year.
The cuts in spending, meanwhile, did enable the Government Co reduce both
domestic and foreign borrowing; the latter actually fell from MD6.7bn
in 1977 to MDS.Sbn last year. But Che country remains heavily indebted
and debt service payments are going to mount until 1981�.
The debt servicing ratio is already estimated at 35% this year and some
believe thaC inclusion of repayments for unofficial arms purchases would
make this figure still higher. Adding to Morocco's predicament is the
repayment now falling due on the principal and interest of a substantial
portion of the short-term Eurodollar loans accepted during 1975-77. Debt
service payments, which represented 5% of the 1976 budget, accounted for
no less than 10%.
32
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- A1sa on ~he neg~eive s~de ~s the app~rent fa11-o~f ~.n S~ud~. aid, which
cushioned the counery for p~rti of lase year. Observers ar~ sti~.11 wonder-
ing whether K~.ng Khaled's recent visiti to Morocco, with Defence Min~.sCer
Prince 5ulean, w:t11 change 5audi policy.
Although ie is generally recognised that Che austeriCy measures are vital,
few Moroccana have any illusions about the d3fficu].ties they wi1.1 continue
to face in the next few years.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 IC Magazines Ltd.
Cso: 4420
33
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rnn or~zcr~ usL oNLY
TUNISZA
TOBAL STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF NATIONAL OPPOSITION MOVEMENT
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in F'rench 25 Jun -8 Ju1 79 p 35
[Article: "Tunisia: Clarifica~ion by Ibrahim Toba1"]
[Text] In the name of the Tunisian National Oppoaition Movement, Ibrahim
Tobal made the following statement available to us:
~ The political action undertaken by the Destourian regime against the
militant, Zine el-Abidine el-Medhkouri, secretary general of the Tunisian
People's Revolutionary Party (PRPT), was accompanied in the Tunisian and
foreign press by a series of slanted--that is, false--news...
' 1- The Tunisian National Opposition Movement formally denies belonging to,
or directing, an alleged "nationalist and progressive front for the libera-
tion of Tunisia," and does not even know of its existence. The same is true
for the PRPT, which has always been able, throuGh its search for support
from abroad, to ~ ealously maintain its independence at all levels. One can
ask for no better proof of this than the fact that not once was outside
material help to rhis party ment~oned jn the bill of indictment.
On the contrary, the police investigation formally establishes that the
PRPT budget consists wholly of contributions from its members, to the
exclusion of any other contribution. The utilization of this alleged
"front" makes it possible to fraudulently claim that the PRPT is an
"appendix" of a neighboring country, Libya, w~.th which we state that the
PRPT has never had any relations. The same is true for Algeria; where no
PRPT cell has ever existed. Moreover, the PRPT has always had relations
as an equal with a11 Arab revolutionary movements, without allowing the
least interference in its domestic affairs.
2- Relations between the PRPT and the Tunisian National Opposition are
militant relations, the same as those that our movement enterCains, and
34
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wi11 continue to eneer~gin, witih a1~. revol.uriottary oppos~.tion movementa in
Tunisia. The P1tPT is closer ~o us, being given rhe aoc~.al compos~tion of
its miliCants and its political program which is a natural exCenaion of
the Tunisian National Movement, betrayed by Bourguibism and Deseourianism.
We now wish to renew our aupport tio this party and our uncondit~.onal suppore -
to ita leadera who are impr3soned in the worst conditiona that a Tuniaign .
revolutionary milieant has ever experienced ~.n the ~ai1s of ehe admin3.stiration.
We also wish to denounce the torture that they have undergone and to hail
eheir steadfase courage, their resiatance, and their resoluteness with
respecC to principles, that remind us o� our own militanta who were tortured
- and murdered by the Destourian militia between 1955 and 1962 and who died
faithful to themselves and to their country.
3- Finally, we wiah Co denounce the aCtempt of the Tuniaian court, under the
sway of the government, to reduce the political aspect of the Crial to
nothing and to put it simply on some other level. With respect to all of the
indicted leaders: belonging to a nonrecognized organization, offense against
the chief of state and members of his government, etc., are ascribable tio
the Criminal CourC of Investigation of the State, which has already tried
other opposition groups for the same reasans. The incompetence of the petty -
courC is thus flagrant. This choice comes from a deliberate decision of the
government for the purpose of avoiding the root of the matter which is, and
will continue to be, poliCical: to impose a revolutionary alternative in
Tunisia."
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
8255
CSO : 4400
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~ox or~zcx~, us~ oNLY
TUN;CS ?A
TRL~L ON' 44 PRPT MZLImAN'r5 RECOUN'r~D
Paris J~UNL' AFKIQUL' in French 11 Jul 79 p 42
[Article by Souliayr B~lhassen]
[TexC) "I was bc:aCen and torCured. My lips and sex organs wc:re burned. My
fing~rs were crushed. I was n~C pc:rmitted Co sleep, eat or drink. I w~s
t}ireaCened with death...." With his bndy tensed, face anim~ted and quick
gesCures, Zinc: Medlikouri, principal defendanC in the Crial of the 44 mcmbers
o~ thc: TunLsian People's Revolutionary Party (Pltlfi) described tlie torrures .
to which he was silb~ecred in police sCaCions to Che impassive president o�
t}i~ court.
11 Charged
El~~ven arrested workers and students appeared to face charges before th~
correctional chamber of the Tunis court of first instance. The other de-
fendsnts had been released on bail or were fugitives from the law. Arrested
for the most part in 1977, the prisoners are charged with carrying weapons,
establishment of and membership in a clandestine organization, dissemination
of. false news and insults to the president of the republic and the government.
A l:no ~ t a 11 of Chem denied these charges .
Ttiree of the defendants, former workers who had immigrated to France in the
region of Saint-Etienne and Lyon where they were active in the unions oP
Rhone-Poulenc, did, on the oCher hand, acknowledge membership in a national-
ist Arab organization established in 1975 whose objective is "to install a
nation,31 and democratic government." Although they did not deny that they
had crossed the A lgerian-Tunisian border in possession of revolvers, bullets
and tracCs, they violently objected to the fact Chat Chere is a border between
two Arab countries. The notion of border being "a delay-action bomb left by
colonialism." "And r.?~en," Zine Medhlcouri said, "we must one day be able to
de:fend ourselves against the armed militia which is scourging the country."
Referring to a recent statement by Mohamed Sayah, director oF the sole
party, in which he recalled that the PSD (De,tourian Socialist Party) has
36
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~
~d[t df~'~'~CIAL U5~ dNLY
n~~-_~ r ha~ .LUthurir.aCidn, Mudhicduri ~aid eh~e what i~ un~~n~~i~utional ty n~~
tl~~~ ~~~~t~bli�hmenC n~ a~~o~iaeia?i bue eha 1~w whieh pL~~hibi.e~ ie. A~ far.
~1i~s tC:1C1:y ~nd ~h~rg~~ oL dnfam~eion, tha d~f~ndaneg r~pli~d eh~r ~h~y h:~d
mc~ely an;~lyxad th~ real ~ituation in the country.
Nu~ p~liCiCal
~h~ I~ezrro~aeinn n1 thu dnf~nd~ntg rQV~$1~d n~e on'ly ~he eartur~s Gd wlti~h
tkiey Iwd 'o~en ~uU,~ected but ~lgo pnli~u p~~rttee~. ~huy dne ni the d~Eendantg .
wa~ kidit~ped. Anaeher, free dn braiL, r~ve~led ehaC h~ w~g ~ m~mber ~ ra-
~i.n~i.il ~~11 n~ the I~Sn L~ vindiC~t~ himyelf. A~hird s~id, "My r,iait w~g
o~~~nc:d syyCem~Cie~11y rd ehe puLne Ch~C th~y w~r~ ~b1~ td imit~ti~ th~ h~na-
wriefng o~ ~ friend and inviC~ mu to a mE:etitn~ in a caf~ whc:r~ I w~~ ~r-
resCed.'i
Th~ f~ct Chae ttie tri~l w;~s h~1d in g sin~;le session and th~r iC toalc pl~ce
before a gimple correcCional court ~Ct~st~ eo desire eo keep from trgnsfnrm-
in~ Lt into u veritable poliCical Cri~l, during thie pc:ridd of pre p~r~Cion
for. the PSD c~ngress.
5cnt,nc~s of 1 eo 7 and 1/ye~rs in prison and 16 acquiCals were ordered un
30 Junr. fot ehe d~f~ndants. zin~ Medhkouri w~s given ehe h~aviesC s~_n~encc;.
A3 f.or Br~him Tobbal, who lives in Algiers, he was sentenced to 6 year~ in
prison.
COPYitIGH:: GItUPJIA, Paris 1979
8 L'+3
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~ucvr~7n
I~OLt'rICAL, SOC?AL, ~CONOMIC CLIMAT~ 0~ COUN'TItY D~SC~2IB~D
pari~ J~UN~ A~ttIQl1~ in ~ranch 11 Ju1 ,9 pp 41-43
[ArCtclp by J~an-Louis gucheCJ
(Text) ~he buginnin~ on 20 Junu oi the Crial of th~ 11 pltPT (Tunisign
penpl~'s ItavnluCion~ry Parey) miltC~nt~, ~ sm~ll opposition group, did littl~
Cn diseurb the app~renC c~lm n� poliCical lif~a in Tunisia. A kind of l~ssi-
tude secros to have reptaced the tenaion which onQ could discern aC the end
of 197g, ~fter the cc~nviceion of Nabib Achnur, former secret~ry $~nergl of
the UG'C'f (Tunisian Gen~ral Ped~rgtion of Labor), and oCher labnr union l~~d-
crs. Ir is true that numcrous oChnr union t~ader~ who were convicred aft~:r
ehe tragic riots of 25 January 1978 were released. Of the 30 who are stiLt
in ~rison, only th~ top leaders, we are made to understand by the government,
will nue b~ quickty set free.
At ehe b~ginning of June scant atCention was p~id to Che fact that Presid~:nt
Habib Bourguiba had returned from one of his long and frequent trips to
E~irope. Today Tunisian~ are almost accustomed to seeing the social-democr~tic
mov~mettts (oppnsiCion movements Colerated but not recognized by Mr MesCiri and
Caid ~ssebi) expressin3 moderaCe criCicisms in their new~pnpers (AL-RA'Y and
D1::IOCRt1TIE). Moreover, the functioning of the governmental machine is non~
the wor~e beca~ise of it. In b~tween twn "tours of inapection" in the gov-
ernorates, Prime Minister Kedi Nouira has been doing hia ~ub without inci-
dents and without pr~blems. He is running things, and running things rather
well, as witnessed by th~ 1978 figures which have ~ust been released. Growth ~
w~la 9 p~rcent (compared to 4.1 percent in 1977); and, for the first time in
three ycars, the balance of payments was posiCive. During the first five
monCh~ in 1979, the trend reportedly was the same.
Against this backgroun3 of fairly good economic health and relative politi-
cal detente, Tunisia sce:ns more than ever faithful to its reputation of
b~lance and mnderation. Could it be otherwise at this time of tl~e year?
After a particularly hot start of summer, o:fices have remaincd open aC
lunchtime since 18 June, a fiction which a~ans that Tunisians are going to
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~~OEt d~~'~GIAL U5~ dNtY
- d~ little w~rk. Tuni~ has F~11ec~ i[ttd a half-~1eep; ehune whu h~v4 eh~ mc~ns
I~av~ gdne tn thetr ~um�~ar 1ldmes in ehe luxury vill~s in Ch~ n~rth~rn ~uburbs,
thu d~h~rg, ehu gra~tt ma~~riey a~ ~uni~tan~, daily f1o~k ed eh~ bc~~ehdg in
th~ sdt~eharn suburb~.
Th~re nre ~lrc~dy gr.~~t n?~mbc~rg d~ tauri~tg. H~rely und~rw~y, th~ gttd5dtl is
pednnur~GF~d ~xrull~nt~, ~nd rhe hnt~1 ro~nagars dre rubbing their hands. ~hu
ruunery is geteing ready td ttv~ ~s in Supe~mbur ~r eh~e rhyehm n~ ehig cdagt~l
f~~~d~ wt~Ieh, frdm Gamm~reh eu N~baul and Nar~n~m~~, fram Saugn e~ Jerb~, is
witn~�gstn~ th~ prdli�~raeidn af 1u.~c~ry eompl~xe~ ~nd ~urdp~~n p~id v~C~Cian
f~rtlietea (ugin~s~. ~t gh~uld bc~ added, fin~lly, ehar ~tgroad~na b~:~in~ nn
25 Ju1y, ~ parind ~f in~cttviCy if th~re ev~r wa~ nna.
Hd~~~vc:r, ~1i~ ~uth~riCieg ~~y eh~e the pr~~ene poliCical gieu.~~ion ig n~e ~n-
tirely ~e~ndind ~et11. Thu~e ~unun~r menth$, r.h~y s~y, wL11 b~ uctlized td
put the �inighing touches on pr~p~rati~n~ f~r Che f~n (D~se~uri~n SdCi~li,ge
pd~~y~ can~r~s~, prQpar~ei~ns which were gC~rt~d ~t th~ b~ginning nf the yc:~r
wieh eite esC~blighmtnt of reflec~ion (reflexion] congnitCees. _
An c:vene ~ssnci~t~d wiCh ehe reCurn nf parligmenC, ehese meetingg will t~ke
pl.3ce b~ginnin~ 5 Sepe~mber. We ~lready kn~w certi~tn Chings about th~ge
mcerin~q. It is nn longer ~ question, for example, as intim~ted gaveral
monr.hg ~go by rhe ydun~ liber~lg in the eneourag~ of Nouira, of an "overtura"
in ti~c dir~:c~ion ~~f mnderae~ p~r~onc~ltties of the oppasiti~n. And 3ei11 l~ss
iq it ~ qu~stion (even if Che qu~stion is taken up) of introduein~ n multi-
~.~?rry ~y~r.em of ~ny kind whtch wduld p~rmit the social democrats, 3nd Ind~ed
oth.:r p~?rti~s (cor,ti~nuntstg and th~ MUP--Popular UniCy Mnv~menC--CLOyC to Bc:n
Sa13h, forn~ r srrdng man af th~ 1960's, notably) to p~rticip~te in th~ politi-
cal debate in broad daylight.
The ~ccent is on ~he strangthening of the party and the developmcnt oE
"d~mestic democracy." Nouird who is also, even if one at times on~ tends to
fc~rget it, secretary general ~f the party, $eems prepared to go quite f~r in -
tiiis regnrd. The priroe minist~r Cold us on 15 Junc that h~ was in favor of
pc:rmitting "the expression of factions within th~ party," addin~ that the
con~ress could orien~ itself in that direction. On condition, ot couYSe,
that these factions "do not becom~ parties ~clans)." That taould permiC the
establishmc:nt of "a solfd consensus, a veritable synthesis, which takes into
consideratian the differenC aCCitudes expressed."
Will these pl~ns of Nouira (~hose government is made up in grent pu:C of
technocrats who are not PSD "figures") bc wcll accepted by the apparet? In
an,y case, Moh~med Sayah, director of the PSD xnd veriCable patron of the
party, says that he is also in favor of broad disCU~sions in the con~res~.
Mor�~over the somewhat schematized opposition between a tough win~ which is
safd to be led by Sayah and a liberal faction headed by Mouira seems to be
out of place. "There are, of course, differences of tempe:rament betw~en the
- two mLn," on4 leader emphasizes, "however, they are above all most noticeabie
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"in eime n.~ ~rL~ig. After ~11, it is Nauir~, whu f~ pl~yino thc~ tun~~; ~na
~ay:.~h hag td dan~e td i
'~his r~~~gtti~iou of the dlfferent at~itudes itiside the 1'~D is said Co he
~are d: a paek~g~~ df u~ien~~~ion8 whi~h ~~e ed b~ gpeCifi~d du~ing th~
rdnorags, in d~megeie paliey and it~ternueidn~~l r~1~ei~ns. driene~einng whieh
~hduld nuC c~us~ ~urpri~e: Nduira d:~~~ n~e g~em r~~dy ea davi~C~ Erdm eha
1lna fdlldwcd up ea nut~ ~oieh ~ ee~t~,in ~maune a~ ~UC~Bgg~ ~g f~r ehe Edr~ign ~
g~ctdr, it fs mdr~ ~ gv~n ai c~n~tr~:nts ehan pa~sibilteies dE ehoi~e.
Are w~ th~n td believ~, gdeeit~g ~~ide the promise df g~e~eer fl~xibiliey
within ehe p~rey, ehae eh~ eongress in ~epe~mb~r ig eo be ~bnve all ~�orn~L
rQn~l~svaug? ~hat is r~nadily ~ege~d by the appagition. -
F'c~r a sympaehi~er wieh ehe $dei~1=demd~r~CiG mnvecnene, ehe prep~r~ttan nf
the CUtigCeS~ "is ~ 1ac o: wind. Naehin~ will happ~n Ch~re, ~s usual." ~oi
~ttoehc~r, ~n MUF' ~~tivigC, "ndthino wi11 ehanb~, including the insid~ ot th~
pnrey. The gdvQrnmc+.nC ~~nn~C ch~nge.~~
Th~:te is, vl course, ~n dbvidug sid~ t~ken in thesQ rem~rks. Hnwevcr, eher~
is a1~u n greae deat nf eruCh. ~~r, gine~ gnu~guib~~g i1ln~gs in t969, the
pnlitical sy~tem has b~co~ne pro;ressively 3ick, "Thn 5uprem~ Cnnb;~tnnt Cuuld
pr~c~ar. the: evenr, ittsure ~dapeati~ns, preparc~ changeg," we wc:re r~ld by a
m-.n a~~o d~~ca rlos~a ro pr~sid~ne Bourguib~ in eh~ 1960'g ~nJ sti11 ha~ gre~t
~dtnir~Cion Eor him. "Nduir~ is eff~ctive; hrn~ever, he is gatigfied wtCh
m.~ns~in~ from d~y to day." In r~altty, the pres~nt te~m c~nn~e pcrrnit t1~in~~
tn chnngc eoa abrupely, Wh~C e1g~ cgn b~: dona without darrQQing ~ft~:r-
tl~urguibism und~r...$nurguiba?
Howcv~r, one ~hould nut b~lieve that the government is totalty insensitive
to ~utsidc influences. "It is not just by chance," a liberal ateorn~y satd,
"th.-~t at a ti;~ne when some are demanding a multiparty sysCem there is so much
~ enik oi democr~cy withtn the party." In ehis regard, in ~pite of nppE:ar-
nnc~s, the condregs could h~ve results. It is a secreC to no one that,
vis-~-vis the membcrs of th~ dppositian, feelinga are nu~n~ed wirhtn the
guvern~nc:nt, ranging from professed toter~nce tn d~:clared hdgtilf~y. Betwcen
rhe: two catihps, n deg�ree o~ b~lanc~ will be cnn:irmed ar the end of Che con-
gregs, whieli will not f~tl to be reflected in the subsequent evolutton nf
Che quesCion.
Whil~ stnting th~t thc pr~blem of the multiparry Sy3tCtil c~nnoe be considered
as th~~ "priority o: piioriCies" and showina his irritation at seeing that
occ~sionally it is m~de "an end in ttself," at a time when the urgencies of
develop~nc:n~ are weighinb hcavily, Nouira did not exclude the possibitity
that the sy~rem could evotve along these lin~s in a moderate ~mount of time--
~ in five yc:ars perhnps, "if ev~rythin~ goes right and if the objectivas of
, develo~.4~~~n~ are attained." The argument is not n~w; hoc,tever, to those who
ure tod:~y d~mandtng an open political debate, one could retort thgt they more
~
~
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~dtt (~~~I~IAL t15~ ONL:Y
d~t~n recr~it amd?ig Che ~am~nre~ble middle z~.~gg~lg df Twiig ehan amdn~ ~h~~
~ phar f~rtaurg i~t ~h~ i~?e~ri~~ the eduntry. ~
~~Mu1~ip~r~y ~yge~m or n~e,n ~ un~ver~ity prt~~~$g~~' ~n ehe fring~ o. eh~
poli~ic~l g~~n~3 as~erted, "ie i~ ndt with r~te~ d~ groioth th~t one re~ponds
td eh~ grdund gco~11~ wt~ieh ~re gh~king ~unig~~n gdrieey." Thuh he rn~n-
ti~nr_d "y~uehs (6n ~xi rc:~ne und~r 1$ y~ar~ of ag~) whd hav~ n~e kn~wn the
gnurguibigm af ind~pend~n~~, wh~~e ~mbi~i~n~ ar~ fru~tr~eed, whd ar~ 1~~e
~d ttieir ~tm duvi~~$ ~nd whd ~~nnot �ind thei,r p1~ee in th~ pre~~ne syytem."
An~1 rt~en: '"~hi~ nuw uninn mov~mene, which h~s ~merged wi~h ehe ~h~ng~~ ~f
th~ pd~t �ew ye~rg, uaed, ~f edur~a by Ach~ur, but whd~e ~xi~C~ne~ rh~
gnv~rninunl d~~g n~t wi~h to r~cognixe." And fin~lly, "ehn fund~m~ne~ligt
faceion, in re~cti~n ag~in,~t tha eh~ng~s ~nd vi~-a-vis whieh an ~mbigudu~
pa~itidn ig ~ddp~~d whieh ~me11~ of polit3~cking policy."
'~hu pi~eure dnubcless ig b:~ck. Ho~aver iti w~g ~fE~:ctively ~~~ted eh~e
nc:ith~r th~ gnv~rnm~ne ndr ehe ap~d~tCidn h~ve wigh~d ru run ha~d-on ag~in~e
thc~ fund~man:~ligts whn ,~rapd~e eo qu~gtinn cerCain ba~iC pogition~ ~~cquisj
d; Buu~guibigm (such as th~ statut~ on wom~n). And no nnn ig un3war~ of th~
f~re th~t the presenr C~1ttltOSg ~lgo ~ttained ehanks to the con~tane gur-
vefll~nce o: y~ung peo~l~ and the energatic resumpefon ~~i cuntrdl ovur the
en~~rpriges. Is it neeessary to recall ehc rnundup~ of thc un~mpldysd less ~
th~n 21 years of ag~, ~g well as the contrdls ov~r ~he unions? After ~11,
Tuni~i~n palieictans geem to b~ saying, for many re~son~ it i~ bc:tter to
live hure than ~leewhere in Africa. Thgre is real dev~lopm~nt and a minimum
of frecdoms.
ThcreEoLe, r~ther than secking to innovate, onc t~kes refugc: in what is
known ~nd is working: ~ good dose of liberalism to in~ure regule~r grcx~th,
zest for volun:arism to moderate regional imbalances and social inequalitfes.
The rest shoutd fotlow. That ts a g~~mble which can be successfut, barring `
any accfdent. BuC in Che swtunertime who rememb~rs these accidents. i
COPYKIGHT: GKUPJlA, paris, 1979 I
I
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~OR d~~ICIAL US~ ONI~Y
TUI~I3tA
ATT~T TO POISON TRADE-UNIONIST ACHOUR REPORTED
f
~Paris AFRIQU~-ASI~ in French 25 .T~-8 Jul 79 pp 34, 35 ~
~~Article: "Tunigia: Achour Poison,~d")
~(TextJ Habib Achour, gecretary gener,~l of Che UG7'T [Tuniaian General
Federation of LaborJ, ~.mprisoned in tlie Nador prison, was the victim of an
aCCempt at poi8oning during the after~?on of 7 June. The trade-unioniet
leader was auddenly stricken with ato~oach paitte, vomiting~ then fainting a
ehort time after eating. The doctor who aas called to hia bedeide had a
very difficult time of reviving him~ and there is concern over the poseible
consequencea of thi8 "indiaposition" on the future state of Achour's health.
"Habib was the victim of an attempt at poieoning aimed at hie physical
elimination," etated the Movement for Popular Unity (MUP) in a cammunique
given to the presa. Achour eata only food from his reaidence. When the
food Wes divided into tao aeparate portions, the first for Achour and the
aecond for hie fellow-prisoner, Abderrazak Ghorbal, a mmber of the execu-
tive bureau of the UGTT, "the 'toxic' elemeat wa8 preaent only in the por-
tion meant for Achour, aince his fellow-prisocler, who had also eaten from
the same meal, did not suffer from 'food poisoning."' ~
In spite of the ineietence of Achour's family to have him examined by a
doctor not connected with the penitentiary servicea, the authorities refuaed
to grant the requeet. Tn addition, Aamesty International iesued a communi-
que informing the Tunisian authorities of their concern regarding the
circumstan~es of What the authoritiea describe ae food poieoning.
The Tunieian prese, on ordera, of course deniea these facta and statea that
it ie a queation aimply of food poisoning reaulting from having eaten
"food that was epoiled from heat." But thia is not the firat Deetourian
attempt at physical elimination. Did it not cauee Salah Ben Youesef to be
killed in 1961? Did it not try aeveral timea to have Ahmed Ben Salah
assaseinated? Did it not order the maseacre of huadreds of innocent peop]e
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I
~
~ ~dit d~~'~CtAL US~ dNLY ~
on 26 Jgnuary 1978? Uid 1.e nae ~guse the arreeti gnd Y,orCu~~ of hundred~ of
pr~gr~g~ive mil.irgnte gnd trade-unioniet~? Did ie not ~lwgy~ dieplay iC~
mo~e pro�ound disdain for human dignity, for trade union ~nd poliCical
- fre~dom? And what i~ Che mean~ng of keep~.ng ~ 67-year o1d man who euffers
_ from diabete~ in prSgon, in deplorable and d~ngerou~ circum~tianceg?
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afriqu~-Aei.~
8255
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~
7'UNISIA
BRI~FS
OIL EX~LO~ATION-~ToCgl ~xploration Tunis~.e, g aubsidir~ry of Compagn~.e
~r~ncgise des Petrnlea (CFP-ToCa1), is tn inveeti TD4mn (gbout $9.7mn)
in oi1 exploraeion on g 6,720 gq lan concesgion in central Tunisi~, und~r
the C~rme nf a four-year agreement with the sCate-owned ~ntreprise Tuni- -
sienne d'Activites Petrolieres. [TexC] (London THE MTDDL~ ~AST in
English Jul 79 p 96~
CSO: 4420
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~Oit O~~ZCIAL U5~ dNLY
W~ST~ItN SAHA1tA
5AUDIS AGAIN TRYING TO R~SOLVE SAHARAN PROBLEM
London THE MIDDL~ ~A5T in Engliah Jul 79 pp 18, 20
[ArCicle by Susan Morgan]
[Text]
Preasure ia mounting fnr a solution to the tix~k Ihin~~ n vtn~;c furihi r, m~~i thc tiaudiy
Sef~nrnn dispute, with n Hurry of diplomatic .uh.c~qucntl~~ n4kc~ 1CinK I lu~~~,in ~~f .'~~r'nn
activity in Meghreb capitnls. Seudi Arabia, 1~~ r~mlim~c th~~ ~m~c~yv ~vith n tri~~ t~~ Rnh,~t
in part.icular, has been trying to push nnd Al~;irN. l~u~~i+in hrirfed T're~ic~~~nt
fonvard a plan for settlement to Morocco Gi~rnrd in Pnrig ~~i~ pn~greaa in the mnttrr
and Algerie in an attempt to further brG~re rrluniina to brief the Suudiy ~?n
stabilise anci unify the Arab world against ii~~~~~n~~�n nwultR,
PreHident Sndat'A Peace Treaty with Israel. 'i'he ~u~i{u~rt nf rrNnre, which hnq cl~~ue
Mc?rocco e5pecially is seen ns a weak link in linkq ~~~ith ~t~~nxr~i nnd which h~~ run�
the apparently united Arab anti�Egypt tiist~~n111' ~~U~N~~~�tcd ita ~x~licy un lhr Sahnrn.
front. 9ti +~s ~~itnl to the succe~s uf the Seudi
Thia ie not lhe first time the Seudis have plan. For the US is applyinK prc~surc in a
tried to mediete nn the Sahara but their diff~~r~nt ~iirrcliun in nn ntteinpt tc~ prevent ~
letest initiative, lAUnched two months ago, ;~q~,~�~~~~,~ (ry,�> ~;,,in~; uver cnmplelelv tc~ the
is seen as the fimt really serious attempt. anti�F:~,h~~it Ar~ih hlc~c.
The Saudi plan, which apparently includes '1'he US i~ rcc~~nsidering its ban ~~n the ~
suhatantial aid for both Morocco and ~nlc ~~f ~~~cn~~~na tu ;Vlamcco under prcw~urc
Algeria end guarantees for ell parties with from thc .lc~~~i4h lubby in Washington. And
rewpect to the Bc~u Crne ph~~;~phnle tnines, in thi~ m:+~iect the visits to Morc~cco last `
was given xn enthusinstic mti~xmse by munlh nf .le~~~igh US Senetnr ~Jacob Javits
Mc~rncco, informed sources qnid. Aut the nnd [inder�Serretnry of Defence Charles
mnin problem will be to find n formula Duncen iire significent. Previously
accepteble to King Hnaaan who hn~ ataked �'ashington rrfused to give Morocco
. so much on his "recuperation" of the weapons for use in its Sahere war, hut
Sahara. recpntly some spnre parts end emmunition
The war, now in its fourth ycnr, is un� have been sent. Moreover, M~nx:cen
doubtedly a drain on A4orocco's ec~momy, sources s~id that President Jimmy Certer
and the resumption of bAdlynccdcd Saudi may visit Momcco lnter in the year.
aid, allegedly cut off lxst year, mi~yt aeem Only France would be in a~~ositicm tn ~ive
very attrective. The broed lines of ihe plan Morocco the weapuns it needs end so Ie~.~en
were put to Morocco earlier this yenr, nnd in the leverage which Waahington may have
Mey Crown Prince Fahd of Snudi Arebia '
_ discus.4ed the matter with French l'n~sident
Giscard d'Estaing, informed sources ~u?id.
The visit to Mo~ la9t mcmth of King
Khaled end Defence Miniater Princ~ Sulten
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~ox orrzciaL us~ oN~Y
uver ltnhnt, Suudi Arnbin rnn ~;ivr m~~i~ry �
hut it cnnnnl Kive nrmp, Su lhr liutllr fur
Murc~cr.nn nlleginnce i4 un, wiih the US n~,d � ~
Snudi Arabin on ~~~p~~yhe HI(ICH ulthau~;h ~
y~~lh wuuld like fa are un ~~~~A tu Ihr cunNict, '
, But tha finnl uutcc~me will ~~rubnhly be
decided by whnt ~sitinny Ihe nlher pnrtic+s
tc~ the S~hNren diyputr ndupt ~ the 1'olienrin
~ kuerrillps bnrked by Al~;crin nnd i,ibyn, nnd
Mnuritpnia.
On the Krcwnd, Poli4nrin is hnvinK in� _
crenqing succes.q nnd Mnurilnnin would be
mnre thHn willing to give in 1~~ ita demnndq if
it did not h~ve to rc?n;+ider re~iriynls frc~m
Murocco (see The Middle ~axt, No 59,
p36). .
Mnrecrver, Al~eria w~der ita nrw lender�
ship is so far shuwing no yi~;iiy uf nduptin~ �
_ thc morc moderete line nn Ihc Snharn which
had l~een expected. And tl~r ali~;ht etrnin in -
relatinns with Libyd which l~nd develn~~eci
uver i.ibynn policy in Africn in ~eneral hna
l~cen relieved by a srrira of liiKh level
meetings, particularly by Colunel Qnddnfi's
vigit tn Algicrs last month.
The Seudi plan was nn duuht diacu:~yed At
thewe meetings ~nd a a~mmun ytnnd WA9 �
appnrently worked out wl~ich w~iuld en4ure
that at least some of Paliynrio'a demnnds
would he antisfied. Cerininly Alticrin end
Libye would concur with thc Snudi desire
to keep Momcco in the Arnb G~ld, nnd to this
extent the Saudi plan wna Kiven u mure
sympathetic hearing thnn would Mher~+~iae
have been the case, informed ~cwrcea snid.
. At present, therefore, th~ hnlnncc Peema
to be tipped in favour of thc Smidi initiniive ~
and algo in favour of th~~ ~~:+Inhli~hment of
tiome kind of Sahnrun cntily with . ~
~iarentees for continued Monxc~~n ex�
~loitAtion of the phosphnle dc}~wita in the
tcrritory. It remains to br ~ecn, howe~~er,
whether the Seudis havc fuund n furmule
which allc�~s King Ha~ann 1~~ w~ve ;;ce if he
ngrees to relinquish the Sithnrn. lf not he
may choose to join the Uti�i,+rncli�F.~,yptien '
alliance. �
COPYRIGHT: 1979 IC Magazines Ltd.
CSO: 4420
END
46
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