JPRS ID: 8594 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070039-1
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 72
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 39
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/8594 rok o~F~irini, usr. otvi.v
30 July ~1979
~
Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
FOU~7 No. 643
t
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NOTE
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- sources are translated; Chose from English-l~nguage sources
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_ other characteristics reCained.
Headlines, ediCorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
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mation was summarized or extracted. ~
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or Cransliterated are
encloaed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
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JPR5 L/8594
- 30 Ju1.y 19 79
Sl1B-SAIIARAN AFRI CA REPORT
FOUO No. 643 .
CONTENTS PAGE
INTER-AFRICAN AF'FAIRS
Commentary on Africa, Havana Summit
(Fode Amadou; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 11 Jun 79) ~
Future Development of Africa Examined
(Habib Boulares; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 21 Mar 79) 3
African Development Fit;ancin~ Reportei
(Jacques Latremc~liere; MA1tCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS. E Jun 79) 18
Nigeria, Libya Said To Be Imrosing Quarantine on Chad
(Siradiou Diallo; JYUNE AFRIQUE, 13 Jun 79) 28
Author's Review of Book on Itfdustrial Africa
(Pierre Cl:auleur; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
22 Jun 79) 33
, Reportage on Various Euro-African Symposiums
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEN$, 22 Jun 79) 36 _
Briefs
Neto's Reported Intermediary Role 39 -
Savimbi on South Africa 39
. ANGOLA
Briefs
Cooperation With GDR 40
Anticipated Coffea Crop Results 40
Iron Ore Contract 40
- a- ~IlY - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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CpN'PI.N'PS (CUUt� Lnuc:~l) P~~e
CFIAD
Brief~
Frozen Funds 41
Headquarters Transferred 41
CENTRAL ArRICAN LMPIR~
, Posaible Successars of Bokassa Suggested
- (Jos-Iilaise Alima; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 27 Jun 79) 42 -
AcCivities of Opposition Within Nation Noted
(Pierre Gardel; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 27 Jun 79) 44
l~riefs
Bokassa's Ouster Sou~ht 47
GABON
- Details on Manganeae, Uranium Mining Published
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANE~NS, 15 Jun 79) 48
Briefs
Threats to Tourists 49
GHANA
Nkrumah Image May Not Suffice To Bridge Civilian-Mtlitary
Gap
- (Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 4 Jul 79) 50
Doubts Expressed on Civilian-Military Co-Existence
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 6 Jul 79) 53
GUINEA
French Aid Rpported~.y Cautious in Face of Heightened -
Expectatioc;s -
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 4 Jul 79) 55 -
- MALI =
Briefs
Diamond Prospecting Agreement 57 ~
Japanese Trucks 57
PRC-Mali Cooperation 57
- b -
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roK orrrc rn~ crsL oNLY
CON7'~NTS (ConCinued) Page
MO~AMI3IQUC ~
Brief:s
Road Assist~nce 58
- Mozambique-GDR Agricultural Cooperation 58 _
_ NIGEIt
Iiriefs
Somair Uranium Report 59
S~YCHELLES
Current Economic, Political, Defenae SituaCion OuClined
(AFRIQUE ASIE, 11 Jun 79) 60
InCegrated Economic Approach
~ Political, Labor, Defense Organizations
~
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INTLR-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
COMMENTARY ON AFRICA, HAVANA SUMMIT
Paria AFRIQUE-ASIE in Frencfi 11 .Tvn 79 p 28
[Article by Fode Amadou; "Afr~ca and the Havana Summ~t Conference"]
[Text] Coming to p:lead "respect for Che original principles of nonalinement"
- on the eve of the preparatoxy meeting of Colombo and the HavanP sucmnit,
President Josip Broz Tito was heard with attention by the Algeri'a~? and
Libyan leaders. The latter also feel that the movement of the nonalined is
- faced today with a?1 "imperialiat strategy of ~ragmentation" which threatens
its existence as a henceforth determintng factor on the internaCional
political acene.
Very few men in the world inspire gs much respec` and consideration among the
' Algerian and Libyan leaders as Presi~dent Tito, the former leader of the
_ [Yugoslav] partisans, the artisan of this country's national liberation,
Che stateman who for more tFian 30 years fias been striving to give a socialist
content to a dearly acquired independence, and finally the patriarch of the ~
movement of nonalined nations of wh~ch Tito was one of tne foundera together -
with Nasir, Nehru, and Sukarno.
Since the tim~: of the Algiers s~mttnit of Septembex 1973 whi.ch marked in a
� sPnse the climax of the movement of nonalined nations, the latter has been
experiencing an identity criais. It must again position itself with reference
to the ma~or political currents which agitate the world and to tfie worldwide
strategies which are being set up. The quantity (Chat is, tfie number of its
followers) has in the last analyais militated against quality, and the
ideological conflicts, carefully ~ield aside so far, have ended up by surfac-
ing. Even the idea of a new international econom~.c order, voiced in Algiera
as a rallying cry and as the battle horse of the nonalined nations against
exploitation and the imperialist plunder of the Third World, has been -
marking time. There has been an increacing tendency to replace it with
partial makeshift solutiona. Sitnilarly, Cuba's militant action and its
_ activP support of the struggles of national liberation in Africa have pro-
vided a pretext to those wfio nevertfieless enjoy "privileged ties�" with the
~astern campto denounce interferences from outside of the movement and
de~nand the replacement of Havana by a c$pital that is "less conspicuous"
for the holding of the Sixtfi Sumcnit jof Nonalined Nations].
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A rear-guard batCle ia even takin~ plac~ noW ih order to "provide cadres"
for ehe pr.esidenC of the movement wTio, folloain~ tradition, wi11 have to
be the CubAn head of etaCe, 'Fidel Caatro. YYaoslav~a and India are the ~
_ driving forces of thie c~mpatgn. Al~eria and Libya (visited a few days� -
apart by President Tito) expres~ed their reaervatione regardi:ng the solutione
that he advocated.
The question of Egypt's partictpation at the fortficoming summiC conference
was also the sub~ecC of an exchan~e of v~eWa between Algerian and Yugoslav
_ leaders. While condemning firmly the separate Egyptian-Iaraeli peace
treaty and while calling for the "uncondiCional withdrawal" of Israel from
the (Arab] territories that it has occupied eince 1967~ Algters and Belgrade
are not againsC an Egyptian preaenca at the Havana aummtt for fear that the
' movement would crumble. But for Algeria the "suapension of Egypt, which has
failed to honor its commitmenCs as a nonalined naCion by making a quasi-
alliance wiCh imperialism and Zionism, is necessary. Egypt would t~e aBle
_ to retrieve ita place in the famtly of nonalined naCione as soon as it would
uphold once more Che Egyptian people's tradition of anti-imperialist struggle.
" One of the ma~or beneficiaries of Tito's visit in Algeria is unquestionably
the POLISARIO Front. Applauded s~t length by th~e Algerian depnties during
t6e formaJ. seasion held by the People'g National Assembly in fi~s honor, the
Yugoslav head of state tn effecC cs~me out in favor of the "right to
independenco of the Saharan people." On the eve of the Havana auimnit where
the POLISARIO Front wi11 try to consolidate the gains it liad made in
Colombo, this new support to the atruggle of the Saliaran people is significant.
It is not exclnded that Yugoslaroia will soon reco~nize tfie SDAR [SaRaran
Democratic Arab Republic].
Whereas Morocco has already begun its ma~or d~plomatic maneuvers on tfie eve
of the OAU's swnmit slated to be held in Monrovia in July 1979~ that of the
nonalined nations in Havana, and of the United Nations General Assembly in
- September 1979, tlie res~gnation of the Manritanian president, Movstapha _
Ould Mohamed Saleck following tfie deatfi or Pri'me Minister AMned Ould
Bousseif undoubtedly creates a new political aitnation whose dimensions and
consequences will have to be analyzed. But for the time being the essential
thing is that the Saharan polit~cal leaders feel tFiat they have excellent
proapects on the international level while, on the baCtletield, their
- fighters conCinue to win impreas~ve roicto~i~es.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
2662
CSO: 4400
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INTER-AF'RICAN AFFAIRS
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA EXAMINED '
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 21 Mar 79 pp 32-42
(File pzepared by Habib Houlares: "What is Africa Preparing for Its ~
Children?" Based on statements of Edem Kodjo and Adebayo Adedeji.] '
[Text] What Davelopment for Which Africans?
Africa of the year 2000 is already here. A child born in 1979 will be 21
years old by the turn of the century. Today's youth will then be in polit- _
ical and economic control of their countries. Many adults of today will -
still be alive. Africa of the year 2000 is beinq shaped, at least easen-
tially, by established systemg of government, education and developmc~nt.
Since 1960--~the "year of Africa"--the continent has undergone 2 decades of -
- developmpnt. The results are madiocre= in any case, highly questionabls.
If nothing has changed in terms of inethods and concepts, the future hardly
appears brilliant. On the eve of the 3rd decade and in light of the re-
sults obtained, Africans are wondering: Does Africa have a chance of
emerging from underdevelopment? What strategy must be adopted to achieve
this goal? First of all, what is the actual goal which we should seek to
achieve? In other words, what development for which Afric,ans?
Thought and Action . . .
To answer all these questions and many others, of a more technical nature,
o the OAU (Organization of African Unity), supported by the ECA (United Na-
- tions Economic Commission for Africa) and UNDP (United Nations Development
Program), organized a conference in Monrovia (Liberia) from 12 to 16 Febru-
ary 1979, to which it invited about 40 African figures from the world of
~ economics, science, culture, finance, diplomacy, education, health and de-
velopmental forecasting.
. . . to Control the Future
JA [JEUNE AFRIQUE] responded to this meeting, which represents an original
,
effort to consider such questions. This "tell-all" file gives African
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readexs, citizens and leaders the opportunity to go deeper than permi tted
by the fl.eeting prasent into examining the ma~or questions detercnining our
survival. It is based on documents of the Monrovia conference. Although
broad passages have been excerpted from the document submitted by Edem
- Kodjo and Adebayo Adede~i, OAU and ECA secretaries, we hava been careful
_ to retain only ttiat which represented a consensus in this confezenca.
Such as it is, this file is intended to reflect the general opinion of the
participants and it must be approached in fihis way even if, out of concern
for reference, we have made a point of inentioning the origin of certain
texts. In doing so, JA is fulfilling a function in keeping with its mis-
sion to make available to Africans items for thought and actian, which wil~.
enable them to control their future.
Preparing for the "2000 Horizon"
With the acquisition of national sovereignty by most African countries,
the continent entered a new era of transformat3.o~; in all areas. Of course, _
- neoco].onialism has ruined some of our programs in several areas, intro-
duced to us the Cold War and conflicts which, just yesterday, were ravaging
other parts of the world. We have fnught against these forces for the last -
20 years and the frontiers of colonization are gradually becoming less dis-
tinct.
Everything h3s not been perfect economically. Sut positive results have -
turned up h~~re and there, evidencing a(relativ~) success of our efforts.
Various reports of internatj.onal bodies, such as the IN~' (International
Monetary Fund) or the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment), bear this out very we~l. The real problem nevertheless re-
mains: What development for Africa in the future and particularly on the
horia.on of the year 2000?
Where Are We?
In view of the situation of our countries, it would be tempting to answer
that Africa has not yet started down the path of development and that the
results obtained are hardly satisfactory. What is Africa's situation in
the world? kfiat image does it project? Where are we?
It must be admitted that the continent is in a state of absolute poverty:
it contains the 25 poorest countries in the world, those which have expe-
rienced droughts and tHe most terrible natural disasters. Against this
background of poverty, unemployment and inflation, it is time to reexamine -
' our structures, to reexamine ourselv~s, to free ourselves.
We must act quickly in view of the important impending international nego-
tiations, with which we will soon be faced. We must reinvent a strategy
of deve lopment.
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"Counte rdeve lopment" '
What must be done? What kind of development? Unti1 now, the path which
we have �ollowed has led us only to "counterdevelopment," with its harm-
�ul effects and paseion for growth at any price. Africa needs a develop-
menL which will guarantee its peoples a consistent etandard of living.
This requirement has been pointed out in varioua international bodies, par-
ticularly at the World Employment Conference in 1976. The satisfaction of
basic needs was recommendad: food, housing, health, educat3on and jobs.
But in considering this more daeply, we realize that these basic needs do
not constitute development in its entirety. "Man does not live by bread
alone." Moreoever, will what we consider basic and vital today be so to-
morrow? Needs, even vital needs, change. That is why our strategy of de-
velopment must be dynamic and must change in relation to the new realities
of the world in which we live.
How can we come to terms with the economic reality of the world through an
intelligent aoquisition of science and technology? How could the educa- -
tional system train creative Africans capable of assimilating other civili-
zations?
Formulating a Code
How can we overcome obstacles of an internal nature: political difficul-
ties, economic isolation, enduring colonial structures, a limited market?
How can we overcome natural obstacles: enclavement, insularity, exposure _
to natural disasters? How can we overcome major international obstacles
which are the result of a world economic order, a source of injustice and
- exploitation? This does not mean challenging the interdependence on which
international trade is based, but rather refusing to have the fruits of
investment diverted abroad via multinational corporations.
Faced with this situation, we cannot accept throwing up our hands in des-
peration. We must formulate a code capable of establishing, under gaod
condi tions, development prospects for the horizon of the year 2000.
A Dis turbing Analysis
After 2 decades of political independence, the economic emancipation which
in theory was to closely fol~low political independence and bring about a
noticeable improvement in the standard of living of the masses, a standard
of living which would then have continued to improve, is still only a hope
for most African countries.
r
Despite the structural modifications of the last 20 years, the fact is
that the African economy is still basically underdeveloped: low per cap-
ita income, a very considerable percentage of the population employed in
agriculture, low levels of productivity, a limited and fragmented indus-
~ trial infrastructure, dependence on a limited, and thus vulnerable, range
of basic products for export, a transportation system basically centered
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around exports, total separation between traditional and modern sectors, �
a high percentage of illitierates, short li�e expectancy, predominance of
foraign companies in banking, trade, finance, industry and manage~m~nt.
Foreign Dependence ~ -
Althaugh these are only a�ew signs of AErica's underdevelopment, they
nevertheless suggest the extent of the task facing African nutions.
'Phe African economy 3s presently the most open and most vulnerable in the
world. It depends excessively on foreign trade and other foreign stimuli, -
' technologies and skills. The development strategies which governments have =
implemented since independence are themselves ef foreign origin, since they -
are based on economic development theories conceived during colonial and
neocolonial periods to rationalize the colanial production structure in
Africa.
Undeve loped Resources ~
As may be e~p~cted, these foreign theories of development and economic
growth tend to reinforce A�rica's economic dependence. They actually link
the rate and direction of internal socioeconomic development and its ori-
entation to export markets and to the importation of skills, technologies,
durable goods, services and modern consumer products. These ttieories
place great importance on parameters such as savings and investments, im-
ports and eycports, the balance of payments, foreign aid and investment,
but do not place adequate importance on natural available resources, the
abili ties of African contractors, skilled labor and local technology, or
on the nature and dynamics of the domestic market.
The policies, programs and projects based on these theories and strategies _
only reinforce the existing production process, destabilizing export prices
and reducing the means available to African governments to finance the im-
pleme,~tation of their development programs.
The result of all these factors is that the African economy has not -
achieved high growth rates, has not been able to diversify its activities _
or to increase its autonomy and internal development.
The vertical orientation, centered toward the north, of the African economy -
has also made it difficult to establish intra-African economic cooperation.
~Even if they maintain the aontrary in their speeches, many African coun-
tries remain conditioned by their loyalty to economic ties established
prior to independence. ~ienty years after independence, this loyalty has
inev~.tably prevented the developrnent of policies and instruments vital to
the es tablishment of intra-African economic cooperation effective at the
regional anol subregional level.
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Dependent on the Pas~
But it would be dishon~st to claim that 3.t is exclusively the fault of
others than ourselves if we hava not made decisive progress 3n the area of _
regional cooperation. In fact, despite all our dec~larations and even de-
spite the many reasons favoring the establiahment of closer economic co- -
operation, the national problems which absorb every African government
daily have prevented them from de~roting much time and attention to a de-
tailed analysis of the basic principle~ of socioeconomic development, such _
as recognizing the urgent need to establish economic cooperation in a region
composed of relatively sma11 and economically weak countries.
Thus the absence of both national and regional progress has combined to
keep ~he African economy in an underdevelope~d state with a production
structure which has basically remained the same as it was during the colo-
nial period. Rather than satisfying our own needs, we continue to devote
our resources to producing goods for export, since that was the old eco-
nomic order. At the same time, we are dependent on the rest of the world,
which provides us with the basic goods that we need.
Satisfying Needs -
We seem to have forgotten that agricultural production for export, for ex- -
ample, was encouraged, maintained and supported by the colonial administra-
tion because this was in the interest of manufacturing industries in the
mothe r country. Why must we continue to implement this aspect of colonial
economic policy 20 years after independence? Isn't it high time that we
begin to produce to satisfy the needs o.f our economies and our peoples and
- to promote the internal development of the African ~conomy?
You only have to walk through certain African urban centers to note the
existence and aggravation of situations which governments say they want to
correct and change: slums, traffic jams, begging and unemployment, affect-
ing young and old people desperately seeking a means of subsistence, with
all of this flanked by a display of wealth, high income ar:d lavish consump-
tion. Our department stores and shops are filled with imported consumer
goods for the wealthy, which proves that our urban dis~ributiun systems
continue to be an extension of the marketing systems of advanced industrial
- countries.
But the situation in the cities could be described as tolerable in compari- -
son to that of rural areas, where most of our people work and spend their
lives. Not only is there a shortage of drinking water and electricity, but
education and health services are inadequate, the environment is hostile to
man and services necessary for production activities are insuff~.cient. Ur-
banization proceeds chaotically, as does the exodus of young people to the
cities, leaving behind them a population of aging farmers.
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nr~in of Cur~ency
_ moday we are up again~t an alarming phennmenons our inability ~o satiefy our
�ood need~ nurg~lve~t tihus we are obliged to impor~ si:aple foods, which re-
~ults in makinq ~he drain nf currency worao and making us even more clepen- -
dunti on the re~~ of the wnrld.
Now h~ve we reached thi~ deptor~ble gi~uatiion during the period following
indept~ndence, a period which we initiially tihought was filled witih so much
_ ~resm~:ae?
Fir~t of all, it seems to me that we have es~abliahed goals and objeatives
for development without duly considerin~ our values and without correctly
meaguring our needa, resoarces and passibilities. Y~ is ati thia level that
;.t ig urgenti ~o ~l~rify our conceptis ~nd definitions, ~o understand pro- _
ce~geg and their effects, tio develop mechaniams to cont~arol the reaul ts, to
rectify processes and correctly ad~ust their effecta. Thus tihe way in -
whlch economic growth is traditiionally measured leads to placing emphasis
on developmental factors which are not the ones which should be considered.
Stresg has always been placed on currency and investxnents, which have been _
considered essential for development. To the extent that money is con-
verted into fixed and reproducible assets ultimately representing the im-
plementation o� the Cechnologfcal proceas, investments are of criticc~l im-
~ portance for development. Therefore, we should not forget the pertinent
questions whic:h should come to mind every time that investsnents are dis-
cussed: What type of investment is appropriate? Could it be financed lo-
cally or is it necessary to appeal to foreign sources of financinq? These _
questions have not always been asked and when they have, they have not al-
' ways been answered.
Moreover, if economic growth can be obtained to some extent by using for-
eign production factors, this method is very expensive. it is necessary to
pay for the services provided by these production factors, resulting in a
significant drain of resour.ces in African countries as well as in other de-
velopinq countries. Furthezmore, when all attention is given to consider-
ing foreign production factors, there is a tendency to forget that St is
necessary to define local produc:tion factors. Finally, when a country is
largely dependent on foreign production factors, it is less able to estab- -
lish its sovereiqnty over its own natural resources and to have the upper
- hand over its development policy.
True Autonomy
The re has almost never been an attempt to analyze the factArs on which de-
velopnnnnt depends: quantity, composition and quality of nattiral available
resources= volume, composition and quality of hun~an resources, particularly
at the level of business leaders, who contribute so actively to promoting
changej situation and features of domestic markets; techniques to be used,
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particularly witih a vi~w tio t~lcing advantaqe oE the mos~ precious re~nurce
of A�ricar? coLn~ri~g: laborf probable development of these �actors. Added
tio this is the �acti tihati tihe gu3de variable used tio formulate pro~eotiions
i~ inevit~bly ~he grnwth rate of fore~.gn economies. ,
We have acknowledged thati iti was reasonable to hope tiha~ trade with ad-
vanced countriea would in one way or another bring about the internal so-
cioeconomic upheavals required to achieve autonomous development and eco-
nomic growtih.
' And that was in spite of the fact that the raw materials which we were able
to export were much tioo limited for their exporta~ion to mean ~hat we could
acquire a broad range o� skills in the areas o� management, tiechnology,
producti.on and marketing tihrough the tiransfer, adap~ation and development -
of techniques at the local 1eve1 and through stimulatiion of local bu~i-
- nesses for producing durable goods and providing services.
New bemand -
We di3 not realize ~hat the Third World could not continue to tiry to export
an increasing amount of the same range of products--regardless of whether
they are staple faods, agricultural produce or raw materials--to advanced ~
countries, which cons~itutie a much more limited group.
- We did not clearly perceive the major changes which have occurred in the
l~festyle and consumption patterns of advanced countries, which have caused
a change in the demand for imports. The result has been that the share of
world trade represented by exchanges among advanced countries has grown
considerably, since they alone had the tschnology, means of production and
marketing necessary to meet the new demand.
It is partly for this reason that we have subsequently witnessed a concen-
tration of actual demand for goods and services subject to international
trade among these countries and that Africa and the rest of the Third World
have experienced problems of assistance and indebtedness.
if Nothing Were to Change
What will Africa be like in the year 2000? Zn the absence of a radical--
and rapid--chanqe in method, the prospects are very gloomy. Here are the
projections:
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_ The Unttied Nations predictis ~h~ti ~he population of developing Africa, which
wag 401 million inh~bitantis in 1975, wi11 reach 813 mtllion by the year
2000. ~hese disturbing projec~ions were made on the bagi~ of op tii.mistiic
' hYPothesee.*
Accnrciinc~ to the~e pr.o~eations, life expec~anay bir~h, which ~.s cur-
rently 45 years ~or a11 developing African countiries (i.e., 10 years less _
tihan the world average), would ~heore tically reach 56.6 years ~oward ~he
ye~r 200b. The prn~ectiions also indioate an increase in population betiween
- 15 and 65 years old, whiCh would rise from 212 million in 1975 to 437 mi.l-
lion in the year 2000. The African population of workin~ age would in- -
crease approximately 3 percen~ annually between 1975 and the year 2000, or
approximately at the same rate as tihe population as a whole. The annual
grow~h ratie of the working populatton should accelerate, reaching 2.8 per-
cent in the 1990's.
it also follows from these projections that th~re wi11 be 216 million chil-
dren between 5 and 15 years old by the year 2000 (as opposed to 105 million
in 1975). Today only 60 percent o� school-age children receive a primary
education. If we wanti to educate all school-age children from now to the
year 2000, it would be necessary to build elementiary schools at an average
rate of 5 percent per year.
Even assuming that the fertility rate should start to decline and that in-
fantile and juvenile mortality rates would remain stable, the age pyramid _
would gradually become wider toward the topt children of school age, adults
of warking age and married co~les be:tween 20 and 25 years old repr~sent an .
increasinq percentage of the total population. The birth rate will remain
high u*~til this widening of the pyramid reaches women who havP pa~sed
child-bearing age.
_ With some difficulty, therefore, we can accredit the view accordinq to
which the gross birth rate would drop from 4F,.3 percent in 1970-75 to
39.1 percent in 1995-2000.
And even if family planning becomes a reality in future years, Africa will
not be able to avoid a population explosion during the next 20 or 30 years.
It is also predicted that 37 percent of the African population (or 306.5 -
million as opposed to 100 million in 1975) will live in cities around the
year 2000.
if they occur, the population explosion, the increase in the school-age and -
workinq population, the development of urbanization and the increase in
* Reduction of qross birth rate from 46.3 percent in 1970-75 to 39.1 per-
cent in 1995-2000, of reproduction rate (3.10 and 2.55 percent, respec-
tively) and of mortality rate (19.8 and 11.4 percent, respectively).
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~oK c~r~rr,znt~ usz oNLY
dem~nd fnr sncial gervices wi11 h~ve gerioug ~ff~C~s on food, clothing,
eduaation, h~using, healtih serviceg, ~db oppor~uni~ieg, urban congestiion
and gen~ral political and eoci~l etiabilltiy.
Accdrding td preliminary pro~ectiona, ~h~ working pdpulation would reach
225 miliion eow~rd eh~ y~~r 2000 and only hal� o~ tihog~ in ~he ~ob m~rketi
between now ~nd ~hen could ob~in a paying ~ob, wi~h tihe nther half becom~
ing parti of the mass of unemplnyed ~lre~dy presenti in Africa.
in 1975, more tih~n ~0 percenti of ~he entire Africari workin~ populatiion, or
a total of more ~han b0 million persons, were victims of unemployment or
underemploymenti. If no e~fective policy were egtiablished, by the y~ar 2n00
mor~ tihat~ 70 million per~ons, or 3'~ perc~nti of ~he working populatia~,
wnuld be withouti 3obs or unc~eremployed.
Prnceeds and incomes
On the entire contiinent, only the four main oil-producing countries plus
six countries whiCh do not export oil?but which hav~ high per capitia in-
come~, achieved the developn?~ntal goal establiahed for the 2nd decade by
the Uni~ed Nations. mhis means thati 10 countries controlled 45 percent of
Africa's gro~s damestic pro8uct (pig) in 1977 and that only 25 pprcent of
- the entire African population had an income increasing at an annual rate of
3 ~0 4 percent, which was the qoal to be achieved. The other 39 developing
African countries, especially those with a low income and the least ad-
vanced countries, were far behind.
The largest sector of the African ~conomy ig agriculture, dn which more
than 65 percent of the population depended in 197'l, as opposed to 75 per-
cent in 1970. More than 50 percent of those employed worked in this sec-
tor. Per capita income in 1977, other than agricultural income, was 4.8
times higher than per capital agricultural income (as opposed to 4.9 in
1970). Since per capita income 3.s very low in developing African countries
($200 in 1977 at current prices), the fact that such income gaps are still
beinq recorded s~~gges ts that extreme poverty is widespread in agriculture
and that the living conditions of persons whose incomes are below the pov-
_ erty level are not improving. Within tihe agricultural sector itself, there
are huge disparities in the distribution of incomes.
Food Shortage
Zf food production con tinues to increase at only 1.9 percent annually, as
in the 1970's, the increase in supply between now and the year 2000 will
represent only 60 percent of demand. Thua the aelf-sufficiency of develop-
ing African countries will not be more than 60 to 68 percent by the year
2000. This situation would be very serSous. Even today, more than one-
fourth of the African population does not consume the minimum allowance of
essential calories.
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Yti tg tih~ aeridusnesg nf tihe food gitiua~ion which cau~ed African miniaters
of agriculture ~o publiah in November 1976 tihe ~'ree~own dea].ara~idn, which
urg~d the F'~~0 and ~CA to coopera~~ with the OAU tio develop a regional food
pl~n which would ~nable OAU member naCiotts to provide for their own fond
n~eds withitt 10 years. Thi~ �ood plan wa~ dev~loped and approved ati tihe
agricultural mini.stierg conferance held in Arugha in Se~tiember 1978, buti
fir~ti it is up to the various governments to implement it.
gased nn curren~ trends, howevar, it ig conceivable thati if A�rican coun-
triea do noti resolutely implement stra~egiea ~nabling them to cope wi~h the
~ growing demand for staple fooda, they will noti bQ able to provide for more
than 81 percent o� their needs in 1985, ae oppoaed to 90 percent in 1972-
74. 7'hus in general, nxtions would have to firmly demonstrate their polit-
ical wi11 to develop agricultiure and rural areas and make a partiicularly
intense efforti in this direotion in order to be able to provide for 94 per-
centi of their needs in 1950, as planneci. if agricultural produc~ion does
not increase at least 3.5 to 4 percent annually, undernourishment wfil be-
come widespread, exports will dimint~h and Africa will not have the meana
to fmport necessary staple �oods.
For nearly 2 decades, the value added, at constant prices, in the manufac-
turing sector for all devaloping African countries has increased an average
of 6 percen t annually and its share of the PIB has risen from about 8.6
percent in 1960 to about 10 percent in 1970 and 11 percent in 1977. And it
is sattsfyfng to note that the percentaqe of heavy industries in total
manufacturfng production has increased notiiceably, rising from 32 percent _
in 1970 to 39.8 percent in 1977.
Weakness of Industrialization
Extrapolatinq these trenc~s to the year 2000 and using 1977 as a reference
~ year, we note that the manufacturing sector's share of the overall PIB of
developing African countries would increase fr.om 11 percent in 1977 to only
16 percent by the year 2000. The percentaqe of heavy industries in manu-
facturing production as a whole would be 67 percent as opposed to 39s8 per-
cent currently and the share of developing African nations in world produc-
tion from the manufacturing sector would increase from 0.6 percent to 0.9
percent. The strong disparities among the various African countries would
become more accentuated.
Even more disturbing, employment in the manufacturing sector would absorb
only 12 percent, or 27 million, of the adc]itional 225 mf llion workers.
To develop the manufacturing sector at an annual rate of 11 to 12 percent,
the group of developing African nations should show an annual PIS qrowth
rate of approximately 8.8 percent. In the ca3e of nations which are not
oil producers, the PIB growth rate correspondinq to a 9.1 percent increase
in mar~ufacturing production would be 6.6 percent annually, whiah is much
higher than the 4.7 percent achieved durinq the 1970's. For oil-producing
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countries, ~he PIB groG~~h rate corresponding tio an arinual 14 percent in-
_ craas~ in manufac~uring production would be 11.7 percen~ annually. And
- ~hiH average, tio be maintained until tiha year 2000, would represent an his-
tori~. record. -
Good and Bad 5urprises
mhe Ch8l1C@S of achi~ving ~he African development which we wanti in future
y~ars may be af~ectad by bo~h good and bad surpriae~.
Among the bad surpriaes, let us point out four poasibilities:
1. The Eailure of development efforts of so-called fron~-line nations ag
a result of a more tragic development in aou~hern Africa, and particularly
in south Africa, and le~dinq to a tirue war of liberation. We only have to
see the effec~s of Zimbabwe's war of liberation on a countiry like Mozam-
bique to measure the possible economic consequences of guch a possibility.
It is obvious that the continent's total liberation, while putting us in
control of the enormous wealth which we are not yet or only insufficiently
using, would promote an accelerated developmer.t of our nations. But the
effort which that requires on our part could also, during the next 10 or
20 years, affect the economic development of several of our nations.
2. The decline of Africa's share of the world market because of inadequate
_ policies followed by the continent's na~ti.ons. For oxample, it may be noted
that Africa has forfeited to Asia rhe first place which it occupied 10
- years ago in the world lumber market and now controls only one-third of
this market, as opposed to two-thirds formerly.
3. The continuation or worsening of crises affecting certain countries or
the crea*_ion of other centers of crisis. Our collective well-being thus
demands better management of our economies and that the continant be a zone
of peace.
4. A world economic crisis whose conaequences on our economies would be .
significant and difficult to predict.
The good surprises could include situations completely opposite to those
which we have i~t mentioned, such as significant mining discoveries in our
countries, particularly in the lQast advanced countries.
� Now to Emerge from the Dilemma
How can we rise above the distressinq forecasts and projectfons? To answer
this question, we must ask ourselves what kind of development Africa needs,
It seems to me that any reply must fnclude the followinq basic features:
autonomy and self-sustained development, democratization of the developmen-
tal process, disalienation, cr~ation of a different political and socfal
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~
j ~ox n~~~crnL usL ot~LY
environmen~, res~ora~ion of the self-con�idence of African peoples and ~ha
will to achieve effecti..ve and significanti cooperatiion among African nations.
None o� th'e~e featiures ia new. Anc~ in the varioua declaratione o� African
governmenta, a number of thesa concepts have been praised ~o the skies,
6uti the timQ has come to make ~hem the baeic pillars of an African atrategy
of dc~velopmenti, to endeavor ~o aee that they are no longer jus~ poli~ical
slogans, buti a framework of policy and action.
With imaginatiion, willpower and hard work, Africa will be able to avoid ~
the diaastrous future which seems to be '.mplicit in the projections. But
our action and strategy musti be based on the featurea of the framework of
action deacribed above.
in my opinion, it would firat be necessary to state clearly ~hat the ulti-
mate goal of developmenti musti be the development o~ human beings--i.e., the
realization and actualization of their creative potential, due not only to
improvement of thsir material living conditiens, but also to satisfaction
of their mental needs.
In other words, African leaders and planners muat first accept ~hat devel-
opment is in the service of the people, that it represents something more
than the analyses of economists or mere quanttfiable concepts: capi~al-
production ratio, disparity between savings and inveatment, grosa domeatic
product.
in almost all national plans for development as well as in the s~atements
of our leaders, goals and objectivea have often been defined in terms of
development. However, when it is a questton of translatinq these goals
into policies, proqrams and projects, wa revert to variables and parameters
of qrowth. Growth of the PIB (gross domestic product) and PNB (gross na-
tional product), capital-production ratio, savinqs-investment ratio, for-
eign aid, etc.
It has often been noted that a very brief analysis has been made of the
status and probable development of the factors detezmining development:
availability, composition and quality of human resourcesj situation and
features of domestic marketsj technoloqies to be used and their ability to
� absorb laborj popular values, culture, aspirations and preferences, just
to mention a few of theae factors. ~
This leads ua to the second point of this new framework of action: auton-
omy and self-sustained progress. We other Africans have always vigorously
stressed the necesgity of achieving an increasinq deqree of national auton-
omy. There is no doubt that we are sincere in our statements. But have we
asked ourselves what are the effects of this principle with regard to poli-
cies and prograias? Have we tried to atate clearly in practical terms the
relationships between autonomy and self-sustained davelopment on one hand
and a domestically produced developmental process on the other7 If we had
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ro~z o~~rzctn~ c~si: aNr,Y ~
done so~ we would have realized that all other variables are dependen~
variables wi~h respeat tio the population.
In such a davelopmen~, tihe population (and here z am including gkil7,g, in-
ventive ~bilitii~s, crQa~ivity and business ven~ures as well as ~he sndency -
to consume and tio aupply an adequa~e and growing marke~), natiural resourcea
(~v~.i.lability of far~ile lands, �oreats, oresr water, energy mone-
tiary w~altih (total revenue and its dig~ribution, savings and itis converaion
into stocks of durable gooda within the economy) and technology--resulting ~
�rom human abili~y to devise methods making it possible to solve problem9
, more effec~ively--all have vital roles t.o play.
The population is ~he initial factor and driving force, as weii as the end
- to which all developmen~ leads. For the population to ba able to play thia
dynamic role in the prncess of development, the indi.viduals composing the
population must develop values propar to autionomy. This will xsquire the
cultivation, bo~h individually and colleatively, of atititudes 9LCI1 as the
- will to succeed in life through produc~ive labor, to experiment, to demo7-
strate initiative and to broaden one's horizona. Autoncmy i~lies under-
taking economic actii.vities which will increase socfety's ability tc~ operate .
in the long term for the well-being of all its`members.
It should be said that autonomy and self-sustained progress do not neces- _
sarily mean self-su�ficiency.
Obviously, autonomy can develop only in an environment favorable to democ-
ratization of the process of development, i.e., to the active participation
of the population. It is understood that governments must control the
strategic levels of the economy, define policies and stipulate the direc-
tion of change. But if they do not provide ample possibilities for the
people to participate actively in devising, planning, programming and im-
plementing programs, development will continue to be considered something
which concerns only the government and not the population.
This development of self-confidence amonq the population is also linked to
disalienation and to restoration of national self-confidence. As a result
of colonialism, the African is today alienated from his own society and has
been transformed into a being experiencing a feeling of inferiority/supe-
riority.
As a result, one of the vital needs of a characteristically African concept
of development will consist of vigorously tacklinq a process of disaliena-
tion. In other words, all factors tending to inhibit the full expression -
of "man's natural identification with work qiving him pleasure and satis-
faction and with a society which alone enables him to discover his iden-
tity" must be radically eliminated. In t~heir place, there should be a sys-
tem permittinq constant innovation without disintegration and a society
which, while beinq differentiated, remains flexible and permits social mo-
bility basecl on ability, which is in turn the result of equal opportunity.
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Self-Con�idence
All these �actiors should lead to the restioratton of Afriaan peoples' self-
confidence, tha~ precioue asget which was lost during the colonial pa~iod.
So stronq was colonial domination thati Africans ~hems~lvee came to partici-
" pate 3n denigra~ing their own history and their own cul~u~re. If a large
amount of loat ground has been recovered, much a~ill ren~ins ~o be done be-
fore Africans fully rediacover their ability to for.mulate and organize `
their own concepts~ which are essential �or assuring the aocioeconomic ~
transformatiions to achieve growth drawing its strength from Africa itself.
On~ factor a�fecting aelf-confidence--both individual and n~tiional--ia the
atiaqgering and growing nwabar of A�rican scholara, techni~ians and special-
ists who, in an effort to escape from intolerance in their coun~ries or
discouragad by the unfavorable workinq conditiona which they find there, -
_ settle abroad, thus strengthening ~he akilled labor force on which such a
larqe part of the power o� advanced countries is based. _
I do not see how we can achieve structural modification of our economies
and our societies, or avoid the dangera of stagnation or decline as well as
those of poverty and increaeing unemployment, without making realistic ef- -
' forts to retain ar recover the factors of change, in which the mem-
ber nations themselvea have invested such a great deal. I have~ reasons for
believing that conditiona makinq it possible to contribute signi=~.cantly to
national development and recognizinq the value of such con~ributions would
- in this respect prove to be much more effective tools than purely financial
compensation. _
Therefore, to the question of what is the kind of development which Africa
needs, I will answ~r that we must implement a developmental process placing
the individual at the very center of the developmental effort; a develop-
- mental process which is simultaneously human and humanitarian without nec-
e~ssarily relaxing the discipline required for development, but permitting -
the human personality to developt finally, a developmental process which
does not alienate man from his society and his culture, but which strength-
ens his self-confidance and enables him to identify his interests with
those of his society and to develop his abilities and determination for
autonomy. To achieve thsse developmental goals, society must actualize and ~
stimulate latent energies and, by assuring their interaction with material
. resources throuqh the use of technology, satisfy social needs in a just and
equitable way.
Identifyinq Interesta
How can we achieve this typ~ of development? Action must be taken on three
different levels: domestia, multinational African and multinational extra-
African. In this respect, the central role of the state-nation must be
borne in mind. Whether desire d or not, as William Bundy said, "The 20th
century has bnen a period of nationalism. Although pierced by internal
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_ ~OTt bF'FICl'AL t151? (1NLY
subgroups on one hand and on the other by aspira~ions, concerns and organi-
zatiions ~ranscending it, the stiate-nation remains the principal driving _
forae o� organized humari action. For a more cons3.derable part of the world
population for which this has never been ~he case, the state-natiion repre-
senta something which the people can consider ~heir own, regardless o� the
extent to which they disapprove of its policies ox even su�fer tihe rc~pres-
sive aation of the state-nation." The state-nation must consequently as-
sume a very large share of responsibility to help its citizens to satisfy
. most of their needs in terms of an improvement in li.ving conditions. How-
- ever, that does not imply autarky by any means.
Three Levels
In the cours~ of human hiatozy, no state-nation has ever been able ta
achieve complete sel�-sufficiency for all its needs. This is why there has
always been international trade and other forms of international economic
relattons. Therefore, the important thing for us is the extent and form of
interdependence involved. And in our guest in this direction, we must al-
ways bear in mind that the stronger the autonomy of a country, the stronger
is its ability to resist the effects of adverse extarnal economic condi-
tions and to formulate and implement autonomous decisions in regard to
other nations.
As for A�rican countries, there are reasons why it will not be enough for
them to concentrate on domestic factors of production, distribution and
consumption to assure autonomous, internal and self-sustained development. -
In the first place, many African nations are too small and too weak to as-
sure an autonomous, internal and self-sustained development. Secondly,
~ there are enclaved countries whose development is inevitably tied to pos-
- sibilities of economic cooperation with other nations. Finally, even in
nations of reasonable geographic size and in which income levels are appre-
ciable, economic cooperation arrangements may be very useful, especially
when they are concluded with countries having different climatic and socio-
economic features.
. `
An important complement to national autonomy is collective regional auton-
omy, which can and must be considered at various levels (bilateral, multi- -
lateral, subregional and r~gional), as we are already doing.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
11915
CSO: 4400
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
= AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FINANCING REPORTED _
_ Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Jun 79 pp 1529-1532
[Article by Jacques Latremoliere]
- [Text] The 15th annual meeting of the board of governors of the ADB [Afri-
can Development Bank~ was held in Abidjan from 14 to 19 May. It coincided
with the sixth annual meeting of the fund of tha same name (the FAD (African
' Development Fund]), which the bank manages. Since 1976 the bank has also
managed the Nigeria Trust Fund (NTF), whose funds are provicied solely by the -
Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Those organizations are in fact independent. Ninety percent of the African
Dev~lopment Fund's resources are contributed by the major industrialized
countries of Europe, America, and Asia, with the bank itself providing only
2.8 percent. The bank obtains its own funds from loans that it floats on -
the international financial market and backs with capital that is still en-
tirely African. Under the bylaws, the nonregional states--to use the cus-
- tomary vocabulary--are entitled to 50 percent of tt~.e votes on the fund's
board of directors, but so far they have remained absent from that of the
bank, on which all of the independent African states except Angola are repre-
sented. Their economic orientations also differ, since the bank reserves
the highly profitable projecta for itself, with the FAD and the NTF support-
ing the more risky operations and those spread over a longer period, particu-
larly those in the agricultural area. Lastly, the bank is not legally respon-
sible for the fund's obligations. Despite those differences, the activities
- of the three entities are often presented under the sinqle label of the "bank -
group"--a generalization that may be challenged in principle but is justified
by the lonq-term objectives and the upcoming offering of shares of the bank's
capital to nonregional states.
Certain figures in the balance sheets presented at the annual meeting en-
courage optimism. But others, on the contrary, inspire a more reserved
3udgment.
The former certainly include those reflecting the very develop~nent of the
institution. 'The bank began its work around 1966 with 45 employees. Today
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it has 505, including a managerial. sta�t of 169. Its budge~, which totaled
- 12.03 million units o� account* in 1978 (an 3norease o� 33 peraen~ over 1.977),
will be increased t,o 15.5 million in 1979 owing to the additional expense of
operating and maintaining ~he new hoadquarters in Abidj,~r.. The bank's author-
ized capital, which was initially aet at $300 million, tc~taled $1,024.23 mi1- -
lion on 31 December 1978, and of that amount, 391 million represented fu11y
paid-up capital, while the uncalled capita7. amc~unted to 633.37 mil~ion. _
Z'he FAD's initial subscriptions totaled $86 mi111on. The first increase ~
- amounted to 45 million. The first buildup of funds, for the period from
1976 to 1978, took place through aubscriptions th at tota].ed $359 million
thanks to contributions from new participants (Italy, the Ur?ited States,
Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait) and additional Japanese and Ameri~an oamanitments
of 45 million and 27 million respectively. The second general buildup of
- funds will cover the period from 1979 to 1981, and the participants, now '
numbering 23 �ollowing the addition of Argentina, the Uni~ed Arab IInirates,
and South IG~rea, have agreed in principle to pay in $a40 million. Lastly,
' Nigeria has �urnished a total of $63 million �or the NI'F's operations.
Table 1: FAD Participants and Their Contributions
as of 31 December 1978 (in millions of UCF's)
= 1. FRG 37.50 12. Italy 30.00
2. Saudi Arabia 18.00 13. Japan 82.94
- 3. ADB 11.50 14. Kuwait 14.40
4. Belgium 9.00 15. Norway 22.00
5. Brazil 6.00 16. Netherlands 18.00
6. Canada 67.50 17. United Kingdom 21.89
- 7. Denmark 17.00 18. Sweden 27.00
S. Spain 9.00 19. Switzerland 18.57
9. United States 50.00 20. Yugoslavia 6.00 _
10. Finland 6.00
11. France 9.56 7.b tal 476.86
Later we will see what sort of performance has accompanied the considerable
increase in the technical means and funds utilized by the bank group. But
the moral and psychological effects are not the least interesting aspects.
The most significant element here is the fact that African elites have taken
over in practice the responsibilities of development. In this connection,
it is not insignificant that Abidjan was chosen as the headquarters of the
* The dollar conversion rate for the bank's units of account [UC's] is as
follows for the various years: 1967 to 1971: 1 UC =$1; 1972: 1 UC =
$1.08571; 1973 to 1976: 1 UC =$1.20635; 1977: 1 UC =$1.21471j and 1978:
1 UC = $1.30279.
Conversion rates for the FAD's units of account [UCF's] are as follows:
~v . 1974 to 1977: 1 UCF =$1.11111f and 1978: 1 UCF =$1.199937.
19
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ADB, which now has a modern building in that ai~y. More than any other city
on tihe African continen~, Abidjan has shown not only unequaled development
in tha area of town planning but also such maturity of mind, proaedural orga- -
nization, and txanqui]. adaptation t~o the requiremen~a of businese ~hat i~ is
far ahead o� the others. ~
High-leve 1 economic teams recruited from the governments of the various mem-
ber countries have now been brought together, with the help of international
technicians, at a center for general and advanced training where salutary and
permanent debate concerning plans and ob3ectives is possible. As was pointed
out by the president o� the Republic of Ivory Coast in his opening speech,
the bank group's institutions currently represent the best image we have of
the union of Africa.
Houphouet-Boigny recalled: "The work don~ in common happily transcends the
quarrels we have not succeeded in eradicati:zg in other areas. This has been
possible because a human ideal--that of our con~inent's progress--has been
pursued by technical and economic means leaving no place for any passion
other than that for the quality of one's work and the high awareness that
each has o~f his role."
- The conf idence that the nonregional states have just manifested by agreeing
to subrscribe the bank's capital under conditions of representativity that
assure the African managers of a maj~~rity voice whatever the circumstances
constitutes the touchstone of the seriousness and competence of the ADB's
departments. Its managers like to recall that within the framew~ork of the
initial objectives set for the bank--that is, to finance economic and social -
developnent programs for the member states, with priority being given to ~
interstate projects fostering compl ~nentary economies--they intend to stick
strictly to purely banking techniques and to refrain from seeking out and
~ selecting objectives and priorities, a job they leave to others.
But considering the upooming considerable increase in the bank's financial
resources and the role as a mainspring that it will be called upon to play
to an increasing extent in relation to other credit organizations in the fi-
nancial planning of projects, it seems improbable that its know-how will not
gradually prevail over doctrine. For all financial backers, that will be a
guarantee of sound utilization and, in the long run, a more effective factor
for unity than theoretical pacts or even institutionalized communities, which
more often than not are devoid of any real economic substance.
Unfawrable Economic Conditions
But while the bank's development and the grsiter initiative which an almost -
general consensus sees for it in the economic construction of Africa bear
witness to the activity and methodical spirit of its managers, one cannot
ignore the fact that while the incrsase in the volume and number of loans _
by the bank group in 1978 has made it possible to lessen the difficulties
being eno~untered by the member oountries, there are some respects in which -
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it also mirrors the efEec~s of the difticult finanoi.al situation being forced
on those countries by the wor7.dwide criain. _
Economic activity 3.n all of Africa s7.owed down in comparison with the 2.2-
percent growth rate recorded in 7.977--and th~ 1977 rate was already inade-
quate, considering that population growth averaged about 2.6 percent. By _
causing a general decline in farm production and a food shortage in some of
~he member coun~ries, drought, the invasiona of locuats in East Africa, and _
the slowdown in investments constitute the internal faetors of that decllne.
The drop in the value o� exports, tied to the sudden drop in the exchange
. rate o� the U.S. dollar--the currency in which the value of primary products
is quoted--inadequate demand in the industrialized countries, and higher im-
port prices are the chief extsrnal compon~nts, and they are made worse in
some oountries by the need to devote a large share of the volume of imports
to cereals. _
It is true that the decline is unevenl~y distributed. Some countries, such
_ as Cameroon, Kenya, and Ivory Coast, have withstood it better than others
thanks to favorable weather conditions enabling them to offset the effncts
of a sizable decline in the price of products such as cocoa and o~ffee.
~ Other oountries, on the other hand--examples are Tanzania and Egypt--have -
tried to find an answer in t}~e intensification of foreign aid or a etimula- -
tion of the tourist industry.
_ In this picture, the member countries that export minerals have not been
- more favored proportionately than the others. Sagginq demand in the indus-
trialized countries for petroleum anfl its byproducts has been the chief cause
of the drop in export earnings in the producing oountries. Elsewhere, as in
Zaire or Zambia, the decline in copper export earnings has led to a drop in "
treasury funds and a w~rsening of the burden of public debt. The setback
in production and low iron ore prices have had similar effects in Mauritania
and Li.beria. The stagnation of phosphate prices at a low level in compari-
son with the boom experienced in 1975 has seriously affected the trade bal-
ances and payments balances of Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, and Zbgo.
All in all, we see a high rate of inflation that may have reached and exceeded -
20 percent in some countries and a trade deficit that is more of a handicap
in countries with low national income levels than in the others (for Africa
as a whole, the rate at which imports covered exports fell from 105.5 per- -
cent to 96.6 percent between 1972-1975 (taking an annual average) and 1977,
but during the same period in the countries where the per capita GNP is less .
than $400, it fell from 73.6 percent ~to a probable rate of 64 percent in 1978.
Lastly, the deficit in the balance of private services and transfers rose
from $2.3 billion in 1973 to $4.5 billion in 1977 because of the rise in
freight and the cost of insurance.
The net intake of foreign capital may have concealed these overall deficits,
but they have led to a rapid expansion of external public debt in most of
the member countries. For the membex countries as a whole, that debt now
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~OEt d~~tC~AL USL ~NLY
tntal~ $4~,~73 millic~n, represen~ing an increase of 11.5 percen~ nver tihe 1~75
figure, which ~o~aled ~27,683.2 million.
The bank'g 1978 annu~l report no~es: "Whar is par~icul~ly tirnubling in tihig
reg~rd ie tihe facti ~hat an incre~~ing ehare of ~his extiernal public debti rep-
resentg sh~r~~term laans frc~m priva~e sour,ces. This g~~~e nf things hag ~h~
effeet of leasening the element of liberality p~esent in the rut~~ing bo ~~1
of tihe ex~~rna1 public debti anc~ tihus of increasinq tihe burden of debt service
in ~he m~nber cnun~riee."
The circumg~nce th~~ the 1eve1 df nver~ll productiion has b~en declining
gteadily and progr~~~ively in Africa aince 1974, with the resul~ing decline
in per capita re~l inonme, hag neceggarily had an unfavorable ef�ect on ~he
fo~~~nation of 8omestic savingg. 7'his can be seen in the lower peraentaqe o�
inve~tn?enti credits--when they exigt--within national budgetis. The Ab8 make~
j_e possible to guarantee tihose inveat~men~s under inf ini~ely more favorable
conditiiong tih~ woulfl be pog~ible by turning to "privatie sourc~s." As a
supplementnry snurce nf indebtedne~s, however, the bank nev~rth~less congti-
tutes a leseer financial evil, although it meats an eoonomic need. By opening
up its share capitial to nonregional states, the bank ia asauring itgelf on
the international financial market of a lift that was becoming easential by
the fact af fts development, to be sure, but also b~cause of the aebtor posf-
tion of most of the African states in relation to ~he regt of the world.
Operaeional Actiivities
It is in this context that one musti evaluate the development of the bank's
loan operationg and also the effort it has begun to make to vary the nature
of the chosen investcnents by directing them more intensively toward vital
sectors such as agriculture and agroindustries. Considering the rising de-
mand, the African Development Fund's resources alone would rapidly be in
danger of becoming inadequate to meet that demand.
In 1978, for example, the bank financed 33 projects, thres of which were -
multinatfonal, in 28 meir,ber countries for a total amount of 157.91 million
units of account. The corresponding fiqures for 1977 were 31 projects, in-
cluding one multinatfonal, for an amount of 126.78 million units of account,
the increase being about 20 percent. Loans fn 1978 averaged 4.79 million
unit~ of account per project and 5.74 million per country, compared to 4.09
and 5.76 million in 197~. All the projects that the bank has cofinanced
with other lenders and the borrowing countriea th~nselves total 814.91 mil-
lion unfts of acoount, givinq the bank a participation rate of 19.38 percent,
up 2.38 percent over the 1977 rate, while the contribution by foreign lenders
, comes to 47 percent and that of the m~nber countries repreaents 31.17 per-
cent of the ooa4nitments.
For it~ part, the FAD in 1978 increased its activities by 22 percent in com-
parison with 1977. It qranted 31 loana totalinq 155.07 million FAD units
of account (UCF) and oovering 27 projects, includinq four studies. They
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were divided anr~ng ~4 coun~ri~g. Thig cdmp~rsg td 29 pro~ect~ (ag pub].ish~d~
~~~ibiy lc~an~ in~~nded] td~alin~ 127.5 millian UC~''~ dovering ~4 pro~~ati~
and involvinq 17 ceun~riea in 1977. F'or 1978, thex~e�ore, there wag an average
df 5.3 millidn per pro~ecti, comp~red to 5.~ million in 1~~7.
The Nigeri~ Trug~ Fund had gran~ed 13 loane by the end of 1978 fdr a~otial
~f 5~.94 millidn U~~''g. ~t?~s~ covered pra,~~c~g of v~ry div~rs~ kinds in 15
dif�er~n~ A�ric~n cnuntri~~.
Cdngidered ~g a whole, therefnre, the bank gr~up (AUB, ~AD, ~nd N~~') gran~ed
loang ~o~ling $423 mil~ion in 1979, compar~cl ~o $32~ million in 1~77. The
twd figcal years of 1~77 ~nd 197g repregent a toti~l of $749 millidn, while
~he total loans gzanted from 1967 through 1976 tiotaled only $631 mi].lidn.
P~ymenY~ by the bank improved by 18.43 p~rcen~ betiw~en 1977 and 1978, th~nks ~
tn ~ con~id~xable loo~ening up of ~^rocedur~~. At ~h~ ~nd of 1978, the accu-
mula~ed paymen~ total~d 272.24 million unitie of a~oount~ nr abou~ 49 p~rc~nti
o� the total amoun~ of the loans granted up to ~hat ~ime.
In the case of the F'AU, the incrEase in payments wns even more notice~bl~
(53.32 percettt) between 1977 and 1978. Ag of 31 Uecember 1978, they totaled
73.26 million UCF's, or 16.71 percent of the loans gran~ed. The correspond-
ing figur_e for the NTF' on the same date was only 4.13 million UGF"s, but
that figure cannot be regarded as indicative of the fund's activities, since
12 out of the total of 13 projects it has financed were not approved until
1977 and 1978.
Mn~t of the f inancing granted by the bank in 1978 wae devoted to qovernment
services, chiefly because of the size of two multinational projects in that '
sector. But on the whole, a certain decline in invegtments of this type ig
noted, since they fell from 44.6 percent of the total in 1977 to 40 percent
- in 1978. A sisnilar decline is noted in the area of transportation (fran I
26.2 percent in 1977 to 15.5 percent in 197a). On the other hand, loan op- ~
erations on behalf of aqriculture and industry rose from 12 and 17 percent ,
in 1977 to 22.42 and 20.96 percent in 1978, a developmen~ ref lecting the ~
bank's desire to beqin supporting a sector that has lonq been neqlected for
reasons of bank profitability. Agriculture was only in fourth place in the
sectoral diatribution of the ADB's acctunulated commitments on 31 December
1978, with a rate of 14.2 percent--behind government services (telecoumuni-
cations, electricity, water aupply, and sanitation) with 39.5 percent,
transportation with 26.4 percent, and industry and development bankinq with
_ 19.6 percent. The reqional distribution reflects same degree of evolution
in favor of North and Central Africa over Weat and Eagt Africa, which remain
far out in front, hcnaever, as far as accumulated commitments are concerned.
Commitments to aqriculture are naturally much more prominent in the FAD.
In 1978, at 59.25 million UCF's, they represented 38.5 percent of the total
loans, thus further improving the 1977 rate, which itself was 35.5 percent.
They involve improvgnents and equipment (well drillinq and silos) as well
23
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24
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ag ehe dig~emin~tiidn o� new me~h~d,~, notably in i~r3.g~tiion, and ~he mnderniza-
~ian of pl~ntia~iong. Sinc~ 1~74, ~griCUltiure'g ghar~ nf ~he ~'An~~ accumula~ed
ldang (4~0.~2 miilion UC~''g) h~~ amounted tin 165.9~ million divided anwng 40
~ro~e~tg~-aheAd n� ~r~n~por~~~idn, educa~ion and public henltih, ntiher govern-
ment g~rviceg, ~nd indug~ry.
Nonreqinn~l Par~icipa~inn in &~nk Capi~1 _
Ag f.ar back a~ ~he AUg'g 13th annuxl me~tiing, in Maurl.~~.ug in 1977, it was
decided to b~gin a g~udy of ~he problem of mobilixing n~w fundg. mh~~ gtiudy
wag submi~~ed ~n ~he bnard of governorg a~ the mee~ing in Libr~ville in 197~.
2~ cnncluded tihati ~he time wag appropri~tie ~nr oppning up th~ bank'g eapi~~l
tn nonreqion~l gtates.
According to th~ bylawg, tihe amounti available for tihe bank's operati~n~--
~ommitn?entg in the form uf loans and guaran~~es granted by the b~nk--cannot
~xc~ed aii amount equal to ~he tot~l o� i~s aubacribed capital, reeerveg (ex-
clud.ing the ~pe~ial r~serve), and surplus. The increase in needg, which wa~
_ tiied simul~anedusly ~o development and to a partiicularly critical ecdnanfc
situatiion in the African countries, therefore made it esaential to increase
Che capit~l, and ttle African states were not equal to the task.
Tabl~ 3: SeC~orgl and Regfonal Distribution of ADB
Cbmanitments, 1967-1978 (in millions of units of account)
Multi-
East Central North West national
Afrfca Africa Africa Africa ro ects Zb~
Agriculture 31.07 23.8~ 15.36 18.11 - 88.39
Transportation 43.90 35.02 26.70 36.75 21.97 164.34
Telecomnunications 13.60 19.80 1.65 11.40 10.00 56.45
Electricity 14.31 3,25 48.55 28.55 10.00 104.66
Water supply and ,
sanitat�on 13.84 20.21 10.00 40.75 - 84.80
Zndustry and develop-
ment banking 34.96 12.30 27.91 31.49 15.20 121.86
Public health - - 2.00 - 2.00
Total 151.68 114.43 130.17 169.05 57.17 622.50
1'able 4: Sectoral Distribution of Accumulated FAn
Commitments, 1974-1978 (in millions of UCF's)
Number of Averaqe amount
ro acta Am_
ount of loans
Agriculture 40 165.92 4.15
Transportation 32 139.97 4.37
Government services 21 81.01 3.86
Social sector 19 88.32 4.65
Industry 1 5.00 5.00
Zbtal 113 480.22 4.25
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~O~t tl~~IC~Ai. U3~ ONLY
~1~o be~ame apparen~ ~h~~ i~ Mrouid b~~ome in~r~aeing].y dif~3.au1ti tio ler
- ~he ~'AD-~~hati i~, in taoti, tihe large indugtirialixed na~ions witih liberal
~c~nomi~e--en~oy ~he key position in, if r~o~ th~ r~~pon~ibilitiy �or~ ba~ic
operaeiong ~chiefly agricuitural) con~i~~ing o� 50-y~ar 1o~ng wi~h 10-year
payment defermen~s and a ms~nagemen~ oonaaigsion o~ 0.75 parcenti a~ ~~ime
when mogt o� tihe bank'g 1aan~ w~re m~?tiuring in from 12 ~0 20 year~ witih a
x- to 5-year qraae period for repay3nq the p~inoipal~ with int~r~gti r~ti~e
ranging from 5 to 7 percen~, and wsth ran annu~l ~ommibnent cnmmi~gidn of
U.63 p~centi being charged, moreover, on the portions of Che loan~ not yeC
paid nu~.
La~tly, the presence of nonregional menbers c~n the board of directorg ehc~uld
in iti~~lf consir~erably facilitatie negotiati~n on ~he intern~~ional �inanaial
m~rke~ of the loans necegsary.for the bank'~ opera~ions. �
At T,ibreville, howaver, the AD8's board of governore imm~diat~ly eatablished
two basic cri~eria for the seleation of naw p~r~ner~s memb~rghip in the FAD
and the existenae of large bilatera~l aid programs linking the nonr~gional
gtates to states belonging to the bank. Thoge criteria correapond, in fact,,
to two valuea that canr~ot be measureds thn int~regt shown in Afric~'g ecn-
nnmic growth by the newoomerg and the resulting confidence thaC would permit
their joining ~he bo~rd of directors. Allowing them on the board of directorg
is a logical necessity, but it seemed esgential to set certain limits on the
consequences of that logic, and aueh limit8 would be acceptable only to those
who have shown such an in~erest �rom the atart.
The decision to open up the bank's capital to thnse nonregional statea-~a ~
decision that has now be~n reached in Abidjan--is therefore the reault of a
series of bilateral and multilateral talks spread over a year following the
selection of 25 countrieg having different political and social systems.
None of them, however--with the siqnificant exception of Yuqoalavia--has a
sociaii~t structure, and this despite the fact that at least nine of the cur-
rent member states officially claim to be based on a eollectivist economic
system ana even a Marxist-Leninist ideoloqy. That is not the least of the
many reasons justifying use of the term "historic" to describe this decision.
'i~ao-thirds of the bank's new capital, which will total $6.3 billion, will be
supplied by the reqional atates. What this represents for them, in aubstance,
fs the quite heavy obliqation bo increase their participation in the paid-up
capital by $690 million, with the possibility of paying 50 percent of that
aanount in national currency or of spreadinq their payments over 15 years in
the form of foreiqn exchange. The contribution by reqional states in terms -
of paid-up capital and loane susceptible of aubscription on the basis of
their unaalled capital is estimated at $1,943 million.
In other words, 56 percent of the total additional funds will come from coun-
tries which have agre~d that regardless of the number of directors repre-
senting them on thQ board (the new ratio wi11 be 12 reqional directors to
six nonreqional directors), they toqether will have only 33 percent of the
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voti~g. Thig in~ureg ~h~ durabili~y u� the A.~ria~n eharaa~er nf tihe in~~i~u-
tion, ie~ ~b3~ctiiveg, and i~~ pro~edures ~nd wi11 make 3~ po~~ible tid reach
- an ~nnu~i amnunt df AbB loan~ eot~ling $1.3 bill.ion in lg8~i, or 6.5 ~imeg
tro re than in 197g. mhe ehor~-t~rm ob~eotive, which will be achieved by ~hen,
ig tn reach ~h~ point of having $2.50 in 1n~ng �dr P.Bbh Af~'~.C811 inhabi~an~.
A link hag also been e~~ablighed between eub~eriptiion~ of tih~ Abg'~ ca~i~al
by the ndn~eg~,onal stiateg ancl ~heir contiribu~ion~ td the ~'.~b'g futurQ movea
to build up itis resource~, the purpo~e being ~o ~ll~y tihe �~ar, expressed in
Libreville, of s~eing th~ ~An weak~ned by th~ increa~~ in the bank'~ capieal.
mheoreti~aily, the resc~urc~e o� the ADS and the ~'AD w311 grow a~ tihe s~tne
rate ev~n though th~ termg of ~h~ir lo~ns are tio beCOme increa~ingly gimilar.
The "higtoric decision" to open up ~he bank's capital tn nonre~ianal states
was adnpted unanittausly by ~he bonrd o� governorg, the only exaeptions b~ing
' Alg~ria and Li.bya. Since such an opening up c~nnoti in reality b~ avoided if
~h e b~nk intendg tio ~chieve tihe ob~ectives iti has geti for 1~~elf, why did
they ~b3ece? Libya's nb~eceion ae~ng to be in tihe nature nf seqreqation on
principle and of hostili~y toward any re~ponsibility by non-~?fricans in Af-
rica's development. Algeria, on the.other hand, baseg i~s s~and on an au~
tarkiCat oonception of con~inen~al grow~h in which it, owinq to its techno-
logic~l lead nver tihe current m~nber states, would asgume a prime position
- in ~he designing and carryinq out of major project~ and the leading role in
industridl developnent. Attention should also be draarn to a quite unexpectied E
sper,ch by Tanzania in �avor of worldwide calls for tenders in connection with
prcjects financed by the bank, without limiting the competition to enter-
prises in the current and future member states. Since the list of "nonre- -
qionals" admitted to the qroup of stockholders ie atill officially unknown,
it is df�ficult t. qaqe the significance and consequences that auch a step
would have. _
It was Kwame D. Fordw~or, chairman of the bank and the fund, who best expressed
the significance of this annual meeting, the perfect orqanization of which
is a tribute to the services he has rendered. In a speech delivered on
14 May, he recalled that "since history has hardly been kind to the Africans,
they decided to make history thaaselves, with no action likely to canpromise
or shaka their firm determination being tolerated." But, he added, "Since
1966 the world has learned a lot. Ir ;'Ag gained in understandinq and in
maturity, and perhaps it has also ~~econ~ n;~re .apable of compasaion. And
we ourselves have finally realize~i that we need the outnide world as awch
as the outside world needs us." It is a fact that taarikind's progress is not
po~sible without the generous and s.rene optimism of certain qreat-hearted
men of quality. .
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1979 .
11798
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.
NICLRIA, LIBYA SAID 9'0 BE IMPOSING QUARANTIN~ ON CNAD .
Parig ,JEUNE AFRIQUE in ~r~nch 13 Jun 79 pp 14-16
~Article by Siradiou Diallos "Chad in Quarant~ne"]
[Text] In th~ political ~rpna in which nations confront each other as cold
mon~ters without pity or ~entiment, it is not good to be weak. '~his truth
is borne out among Afric~n nationa ag well.
Proof is seen in the cas� of Chad. Expomed for years to Libya, which has
occ~pied a part of its territory (the Ac,uzou Strip) by force, Nd~amena has
nFVer succeeded in pushing its rich and powerful agresaor back. Nor even
getting it condemned by the OAU or thE~ UN, generally so quick to defend juz:t
causes. 5trong in the guilty silence of the ma,~orit~~ of the nations in
� AErica and the world, Colonel Qadhdhafi ha~ become atill more arrogant. He
demands a government in Chad devotad to hia ends.
A Hoslem government4 The Xeligion, ptysique and ideological color of its
members matter little. Provided t1~at they take ordera from Tripoli. With a
view, doubtless, to confirming de jure the de facco occupation of tre Aouzou
Strip. Ur~less the head of the Libyan state is dreaming of annexing all of
Chad? Who knows? In any case, since his former proteges, in particular
Hissein HF.bre and Goukouni Cueddei~ refuse to cooperate, he has sworn to .
have their hides, even moreover if he has to make a pact with ehose he
denounced and combatted just a Eew months ago--Gen Felix Malloum and Col _
~ladal Abdelkader Kamougue.
Tl~ese are two men ahc~, When they served as chief of state End minister oE
foreign affairs in Ndjamena, respectively, aere the tazgets of attacks of
care vialence on the part of the representatives of Colonel Qadhdhafi. But
complete reversals by the Libyan leader no lon~Qr surprise anyone. In this
instance~ the contradiction is only a seeming one. Basically, Colonel -
Qadhdhaf! retains an implacable logic.
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Men mutter litCle in hig unghgke~ble determin~tion to impoge his will on
Ndjamena. Moreover, rhi~ ig not ehe firge ttme th~t rhe ~nd h~s ,ju~tified
thQ meang in polieie~. It ghduld succe~d againl On1y the thing ig that, -
to dat~ Colon~l Qadhdhafi h~s not h~d lu~~k with those h~ hag sponsor~d. Is
thta why, without ch~mging his gtrgC~gy at all, he has modified his tactics4
Perhaps. 'Che E~ct rpmgin~ CheG th~ Libyan chief nf atate, whose actions in
Chad w~re ccunt~r~d ~or ~ ldng tim~ by powerful Nigeria, d~cid~d, ~~ainst
all expecta~idns, eo mgke common cause with th~t n~tinn henceforth.
Of courge thi~ ig but ~ gurface allignce. But the f~ct is there. ~Lagos and
Tripoli, the two congenital enemieg, hav~ ,~ust cooly sh~ken hands, in order
to launch g v~rit~ble ultimatum to rh~ "national unity" government est~blished
in Ndjamena. ~ollowing the third conference on "n~tional reconcili~tion in
Chad," held on 26 and 2~ May in t,~gns, the neighboring countries called upon
Hiasein Habre gnd Goukour,i to form a"leggl government."
The prespnt leadership team is accused not nnly of being "ill~gal" but also
"dictaCori~l, Eascist and unrepregentativ~.~~ This is an agtonishing con-
demnation on r.he p~rt c~f representatives of governments which are the product
of military Coups d'etat, who have never ccnsulted the people in the slightest
way to know whether they th~mselves are represented or not. Curiously, the
five governments in Lagos--LiEya, Nigeria, Nigt~r, the Central African Empire
a~d C&meroon--only th~: last mentioned had the courage to disassociate itself
from this decision.
Yaounde b~lieves in fact that the role of the neighboring countries should
be limited to "aiding the pec+ple of Chad to ~chieve reconciliation, and not
- to impase a government or to take the place rf the authorities in Ndjamena."
It should be noted that the government of Cameroon is the only one of the
five which is the product of a legal regime, and rhe only one to observe
strict neutrality in its procedures with a view to helping tbe sick man of
Africa survive.
As to the four signatories of the Lagos ultimatum, each is pui�suing a goal
which is admitted to a greater or lesser extent, but is real. For example,
Sudan, which supported the citizens nf Chad opposed to the expansionist
intentions of Libya for a long time, seems to want to reverse direction.
Not that the differences separating Khartoum and Tripo.',i have been magicsily
smoothed away, but because by abandoning his allies in Chad~ Generan Numayri
hopes to win compensatior. from Colonel Qadhdhafi. There is talk of Einancial
aid and oil supplies. In particular since the Iraki oil faucet was shut oEf
following the boycott decisions adopted at the Bagdnd surtanit against Egypt
and its allies~ which in fact inc~ude Sudan, this latter country has been
experiencing difficulties. And this is the re~son for the reversal oE -
Khartoum, wi:ich has opted for closing its eyes to the agitation of Tripoli
in Chad.
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- Simitarly, Emp~ror Hokgsna 1, whn aenC no represent~Cive either to rhe K~,no 1
nor t~~e K~no YI conferencQ, did r,ot he~itnCe to aend a delegation to the mosC
recent Lag~s conference, or to count~rsi~n Ct~e ultimatum addreased to Ndjamena. -
Civen this "understanding~" Qadhclhafi i~ believed to have promised the '
emperor substanti~l aid~ whiCh wuuld offset the lossee resulting from a _
pog~ible bxeak with Paris. We would wager ChaC if QadhdhaEi will pay the
- price~ the ~mperor, whoae coEfera are alwaya equally empCy, would not
- heaitate to make arrangements eo Che ndvanrege of Colonel Kamougue's souChern
forces. The Libyan chieE of state is believed to have asked him to allow
his new protegea henceforth to establiah logiatic spaces in rhe Central
African Empire, not far from the boundary With Chad. This matter is said to
be under study in Berengo at presQnt.
As Co Niger~ squeezad between Algeria and Libya to Che north, and Nigeria Co
Che south~ its diplomats must walk a tightrope. Qadhdhafi demanded and
obtained from former presidenC Namani Diori nnC long ago permission to install
a powerful radio transmitter in Niamey~ Gen Yakubu Cowon, then in power in
Lagos, immediately made a point of pro~:esting that, as he sai.d, "This broad- '
casting station is designed solely to spread destructive propaganda among
the Moslem masses in Che northern part of NigQria." And he fumeds "We will
not let Qadhdhafi do what he wants in th~ region." Thus the Libyan under-
Caking called "The Voice of Islam" never came into existence.
Now that Lagos and Tripoli are makfng a show of alliance aC the expense of
the people of Chad, Niger has lirtle choice. It is falling into a step to
avoid having to displease either one or the other. The new love between
Nigeria and Libya saw the light of day during the first conference on recon-
ciliation in Chad held in Kano in the month of March. Or, more precisely,
at the end of the conferer.ce, for the provisions of Nigeria and Libya were ,
at the beginning diametrically opposed. The rapprochement was, in the view
of all observers, brough about by the haughty, if not downright contemptuous,
attitude of Hissein ~Nabre toward the head of the delegation from Nigeria,
Ceneral Yar 'Adua. ,
He had wanted to force Hissein Habre to join in the unity government
established at the conclusion of the conference. He came up against a
categorical refusal from the former jailer of Mrs Claustre. Instead of
abandoning his proposal, he insisted in such a clumsy fashion that Hissein
Habre, vulnerable and stormy by nature, thought the Nigerian officer wanted
to impose his conditions upon him. Increasingly irritated, the head of the
armies of the north ended up by shouting in his face: "I don't have to take
orders from you. From now on keep out of other people's business. I am not
at your disposal."
The Nigerians, who up to then had hoped to make of Hissein Habre their
protege, along with Mohamat Choua, the leader of the old third army, were
thunderstruck. They realized suddenly that with his intransigence, the Tubu
chieftain is not easy to manipulate. The rage of the chief of the general
staff of the army of Nigeria was to erupt again in April, during the so-called
Kano II conference.
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On ChgC oc:a~sion, Goukouni and Hissein Nabre ,joined Cogeeher to oppose to
Che end any proposed expansion o� ehe Nd~amena government to include orher
liberation movements, some of which it is true are purely fictional. Gen
Yar 'Adua utilized every strategum to get Chese ewo interlocutors to yield.
He even summoned to aid him the imam of the Nd,jamena mosque and some Chadian
businessmen known for their ties with the two former rebel chieftains. A
waste of time. The Nigerians could not however accepC Che loss of �ace.
And so, having failed in dialogue, they prepared Co have recourse to stronger
methods.
LaCe ~t night, Gen Yar 'Adua made Che rounds of the heads of the delegaCions
from the neighboring counCries, to inform Chem of the decision of the Lagos
authorities to arrest Hissein Habre and Goukouni on the spot. In order, he
explained, to "facilitate understanding and reconciliation among all the
children of Chad." No sooner said than done. A government established with _
the blessing of Lagos and Tripoli was even hastily drafted on paper. The
Nigerian authorities intended to impose their will on Nd,~amena by any means.
To this end, Colonel Magoro, Che commander of the Nigerian detachment
sCationed in Che capital of Chad, received orders to surround the ciCy and
disarm all the supporters of Hissein Habre and Goukouni. But the plan failed,
for before it could be put into operation, these r.wo leaders succeeded, no
one knows how, in warning their supporCers in Ndjamena.
And so Chad radio begain ro rale againsC Lagos and Tripoli. A general
mobilization in Ndjamena was ordered. Weapons were distributed, even to -
young recruirs. The capital airport, as well as the area of the ferry service
across the river, occupied previously by Nigerian forces, were retaken with-
out firing a shot by the Armed Forces of the North (FAN) and the People's
Armed Forces (FAP), controlled by Hissein Habre and Goukouni, respectively.
Twice Nigerian mflitary aircraft tried to land in Ndjamena but were prevented.
Then Tripoli and Lagos, their plans for hegemony blocked, stepped up their
pressure on Ndjamena. Libyan columns ventured ever deeper into the territory
of Chad, while Colonel Qadhdhafi's military planes flew to the aid of the
southern forces of Colonel Kamougue. Mystere 20's, DC 3's,and Fokkers from
_ the Tobruk base in Libya unloaded weapons and Libyan advisers in Moundou and
Sahr. Some of these planes flew from Libya to the south of Chad, to Niger
via Agades, sometimes landing in Garoua, in the northern part of Cameroon,
without the authorization of the government in Yaounde. The Libyan ambassador
in that city was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs more than once
to hear the admonishments of the government of Cameroon.
Lagos, for its part, was not Zdle. Nigeria closed its frontiers with Chad.
But since the two countries only share the boundary at Lake Chad, this de-
cision had little practical effect. Only the trucks which regularly carry
Nigerian merchandise across the territory of the Cameroon were halted. On
the other hand, the Lagos decision to interrupt supplies and fuel were
immediately reflected in real difficulties in the capital of Chad. And so a
number of towns, including Ndjamena, were threatened with an electrical
blackout within a short time.
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- In view of these open hostiliCies, the governmenC in Nd,~amena reacted soon
- enough. F'irsC of all it violentty condemns the dQCisions adopted in Lagos,
which it termed "intervention in Che domeatic affairs of Chad." Then the
immediate withdrawal of rhe Nigerian conCingenr based in Nd~amena was demanded.
And to add to the confusion, the French governrnent spoke of withdrawing its ~
expeditionary corps. Against the wishes of Che "national unity" governmentl
WhaC will be the outcome of this aombre drama being played out both in Lagos
and in Tripoli? It ia likely to lead ro the splintering of Chad. In any
case, having begun as they did, Nigeria and Libya seem decided, now that the
deadtine of the ultimatum they issued has passed, to recognize, if not to
establish, a g,overnmenC in their service ir? Moundou. With Chis in view,
Cen Olusegun Obasan~o has issued a call to arms to all his �riends in AFrica
and elsewhere. Indeed he was seen in Dakar at the end of May, where he
tried unsuccessfully ~o rally the chiefs of state of the member nations of
the CEDEAO [West African States Economic Community]. Just as he was seen in
Kigali, interposed by Niger (See JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 961).
If any such operation should succeed, it would set a dangerous precedent.
It would very simply illustrate Che saying to the effect thaC Che sCronger -
of two adversaries is always right. In any case, Che present regimes in
Nigeria and Libya are, we repeat, ill qualified to speak of "legitimacy" or
"degree of representation." Above all to such men as Goukouni and Hissein
Habre, whose legitimacy is based on rebel armies. And who need no lessons
in patriotism from anyone, quick to rise up, weapons in hand, against all
forms of injustice and imperialism.
Whether it be the doing of Tombalbaye, of France, of Libya or Nigeria.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1979 -
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~ INT~R AFRICAN AFFATRS
AUTHOR~S REVIEW OF BOOK ON INDUSTRIAL AFRTCA
Paris MARCHFS TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANFENS in F~ench 22 Jun 79 p 16l~5
~teview by the aubhor of his book nL~Afrique Induatrielle," by Pierre
Ghauleur of the Academy of Overseas Sciences. Preface by Gaston Leduc,
member of the Institute of France~ president of the Academy of Overseas
Sciences. Published by Ci. P. Maisonneuve and Larose, 15 rue Victor Cousin,
?5~05 Paris: one volume, 3L~l~ pages, 16 x 2L~ cros, 12 photographs; '
_ pricet 120 French francs
7
~Teat
7 Heyond the political eddies that the independence of African states
has provoked and which periodically return to the forefront of events,
another aspect of Africa is beg3nning to emerge in the background, gradually
giving it a different character.
Indeed, the industrialization of Africa ceme into the pictura 30 years ago.
' Industrialization continues, with each state having in view achievement of
economic independence, which is the only thing that can give political inde-
pendence its true worth.
In the Republic of South Africa, industrialization, which has taken off in
an impressive manner since the war, has been structured on the initiative of
private companies, but within a framework prescribed_by the state.
In North Africa, the situation is different. In Algeria, the impetus of the
state has been fundamental and decisive. It is the expression of a modified
Msrxist philosophy, according to which the other industrial sectors, metallur-
gical industries as well as mechanical industries or construction, originate
in heavy industry, considered to be industrializing. At the same time it
determines, starting with oil, the most elaborate chemical industries, and
above all, the fertilizer industry, which is essential to the progress of
agriculture.
~,inisia, on the contrary, has practised, xith respect: to industrialization,
a more traditional liberal policy, as has also, incidentally, Morocco, where,
promoted by the king, it made an encouraging start, checked since the war
in the Western Sahara.
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For black A~rica, two trends have marked and continue to mark industr~.al
efForts by the etates; one, deliberately marxist, at least in theory, as
in (~uinea, Angola, and ~thiopia, and the other, derived from state capi-
talism, ae in the Ivory Coast, Senegal, and in particular in powerful
Nigeria, but the efforts of all of them fit into a eocielistia national
climate, as a reaction to ~?bat was formerly colonialism.
Th~ geographical characters of the states, the ideological strugglea, the
_ language differences, and the specific.aspirations of each region have
- resulted in induatrialization~s being developed in a very variable way.
Mai�,,y works have dealt, and continue to deal, with the progress of the Afri-
cen econon~y. ~,`very day brings new elements to the awareness of the efforts
being made. Ebery day at least one book devoted to Africa comes out some-
uhere in the world. Every sta~e, moreover, has ita own experts or the inter-
national experts seeking out a more comprehensive economy. Numerous maga- -
zinea,3ncluding_MAFtCHES TROPTCAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS and INDUSTRIES ET T~A-
V1UX D'OUTR~-MER, have published thorough studi~es on the tropical products,
the commerce, econon~r, and industr~alization of the various states.
Houever, the work is generally undertaken along the lines of the "colonial"
tradition, expressed by the language differences. D~glish speaking persons
mostly study English-speaking countries, while French speakers study the
French-speaking countries more.
Now, industrialization is essentially a function, not only of the way raw
. materials, techniques, and technicians are utilized, but also, and above
all, of the range of markets for .lisposal of their products.
The ECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa) had outlined the
desirable development of the African econoir~y, but its application has long
been hindered by the nationalistic policies, sometimes blind ones, of cer-
tain states. Many plans have been made without taking into account the -
plans and programs of neighboring states, resulting ult3mately in aberrant
situations.'
Fortunately, some time ago, the leaders of the African states, having learned
from experience, undertook to reconstitute gradually some regional sraces
in which industrialization will be able to develop. I have had the privilege
of observing the rfse of African industry for o'vex 30 years, and of directing
in MARCHES TRDPICAUX and in INDUSTRIFS ET TR.A'JAUY D~OUTr'tE-MER the studies
devoted to its evolution, in particular by Pierre Platon and Rene Charbonneau.
It seemed worth~?~hile to present an over-all view of the various studies,
which, while it could not claim to be exhaustive, nevertheless offers some
reference elements useful for establishing which pro~ects will henceforth be
situated to advantage~.in a regional setting.
A,s is stated by Professor Gaston Leduc, who kindly wrote a preface to the
general survey of these articles, a c~rtain number of lessons emerge from
them: industrialization assumes the existence of able men, materials to be
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~proceased, capital to invest, an energy supply, often a very large one~ and
of course, markets where buyers can be found for the products resu].ting
from the multiple combittations of the~e different ~actorg.
In the ceaseless search for atructure, it ie obvious that Europe has a role
to plqy. It laid the ~irst markers for this cooperation in the establish-
ment of the Yaounde Convention, and it has broadened its prospects, on the
indu~trial lavel, by the Lome Convention, which~ incidentally, 3s in process
of being renewed.
The new opportunit3es for dialogue wh~ch the United Nations oFfer to African
countries and industria].ized countries are of a sort that permit the needed
organiZation of a more harmon3ous interdependence, profitable to all. -
COPYR,I~HTs Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1979
121 !~9
C.SOs l~too .
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INTII~ A~SCAN AF~AIR3
0
,
R~EPORTA(}~ ON VARTOU3 EURO-AF'RICAN 3YMPOSIUMS
Paris MARCHFS TROPICAUX ET M~DITERRANEENS 22 Jun 79 p 1646
(Dakar Club's French-African 5ympoeium in Lyonj
Text 7 On Thuraday 7 June, at the Lyon-Satolas airport, Mr lliawara, pres3-
ent o~ the Dakar Club, had assembled nearly 200 heads of enterprises or
management personnel o� enterpriges, from the Ahone-Alpes area and several
neighboring areas, mainly from enterprises in the PMI ~Sma11 and Medium-Sized
Industries`7 sector, around 11 African delegations.
_ F~om now on, it is the vast, dynamic PtfiI aector that N,r Diawara hopes to
reach, being convinced, and for good reason, that effective industrial coop-
eration between El~rope and Africa must be achieved with the PMI, most of
ahich are at the level of the African enterpriaea. ~
~ 19?? at Royaumont and in 19?8 in Birmingham, the Dakar Club had already
organized some very useful meetings between officials of the African admini-
_ atrations and French and British businessmen.
In I,yon, on 7 June, the participants discussed the problem of establishing
induatries, emphasizing the need for industrialists to form associations
vith local partners very quickly, and to consider, above all, the country~s
_ needs, setting aside the typically F~ench criteria for the creation of
enterprises.
Numerous industrialists were received by the African delegations, those of
Ttiir:isia, Morocco, Ivory Coast, and Senegal experiencing the largest flow
of visitors. .
The day ended xith speeches by the president of the Lyon professional group,
Mr Robatel, and by Mr Diawara, who reminded the industrialists in attendance
that "Africa constitutes for ~ance, for E~rope, and for the regions an -
opportunity that should be seized." He hoped that this day Would have as
_ an extension the establiahment of a regional site for coordination "between
~
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the F4~enah and African public ~uthoritieg and the indu~tri~ligt~." Thig
itiiti~tive, if it were spread on u~urope-wide seale, "aould ~nebl~ th~
- EEC to gath~r valu~bl~ infnrm~tion that ~ould 1e~d to a more die~riminating
apec3alization in the c,uropenn regi.ong and the European indu~tri~l ~ector~~"
concluder3 th~ formdr Ivory Coant minister of Plnnning.
~ro-African Symposium in par3s
L~~C 12 ~nd 13 June, I2~N~ONTR~5 A~1tI~AIAt~~ drganized g~uro~
Africen symposium th~t was held at the ~urope Houae, rue des F~ancs-Bour�
geois, in paris. ~ ~
The great ma3ority of th~ participantg, nbout 60 in number, w~r~ ~'rench and
Oet~ma,n businessm~n and Africgn repres~ntativeg of banlcs, ~hamb~rs of com-
' ' merce, or or~~nizations concerned aith small and m~dium-sized ent~rpriseg.
: The ob~ect of this meeting, a sequel to the meeting at Wildbad Kreuth
(Bavaria), on uhich xe reported 3n No 171~9 of this publication, 18 May 1979,
was to facilitate contacts betWeen ~ropean investors in the medium range _
and African statvs concerned with furthering their industrial development.
During the talks, chaired successively by Jean-Paul Benoit, head of depart-
mental staff for r;r F'routeau, secretary o.� state for Small and Medium-Sized
Industries, and by Paul Huvelin, president of the F~ench Center for the Pro-
motion of Yndustry in Africa (CEPIA), the main speakers aere Pierre-Claver
Damiba, president of the West African Development 3an1c (~pAD); Lakoure
Derant, general manager of the Central African States 9ank (9EAC); Jacques
Ferr~ndi, formerly general manager of the ~ropean Develo~ment Bank (EDF);
_ Christian Megrelis, general manager of Export Assistance International;
Sheikh Hamidou Kane, dele~ate for ~urope of the industrial zoae of Dakar;
Nikolaus Graf, director of international affairs of Siemens AG; Paul
Huvelin; and Mr Dupressoir, head of the industry division of the Central
F1~nd for Economic Cooperation (CCCE). The latter provided congress parti-
cipants with interesting details on the Society for Promotion and Participa-
tion for ~conomic Cooperation (PROPARIO), an organization founded in 197?
and intended to encoura~e concerted actfon among r~ench industrialists and
public and private promoters in developing countries, to contribute to
improvement in the r,onditions oi' technological transfer, and to participate
in the creation and development of industrial enterprises of inedium size in
the PVD /-Developing Countries 7.
The symposium was c~osed by Jean-Pierre Prouteau, secretary of state for
PMI. The minister assured participants of the assistance of his services,
with a view to extending cooperation, to which F~ance is particularly
attached.
NeW Symposium on Industrial Rkdeployment in Africa
On Monday, 2 July and Tuesday, 3 July, at the University of Paris-
Dauphine, place du Marechal-de-Lattre-de-Tassigny (Porte
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Univereity of Par3s-Bguphine gnd th~ ]~lTPL ~expgrtsion unknown�7
Reeear~h Centar, with tha Tnstitute for ~terprige, are holdSng an important
eympoeium on the th~me of n~re~tern enterpri8es and industrialix~tion
policies in Af'rica."
So it wi11 not be a sole~y univ~rsity eympoeium, but a Uni~$rsity-Tndu.stry
~ meeting, like the one in 1q77, algo due to the Univeraity of Paris-Dauphin~,
on the "gengraphic redeploym~nt of indu~try throughout the World."
Particlp~bin~ in the symgosium on 2 July and 3 July, under the chairmanship
of Jean Bai11y, president of I,afarge, and Alain Bienayme, professor aL ParSe-
Deuphine, w311 be D3im Sylla, ~~nergl delegate of the Inter-AFrica Bank
_ Companyj f~eorges NQStorenko, chairmgn o� SCOA CF~est African Trading Com- _
- pany ; Faly ~a, chairmgn of Dakar M~r3nej Paul Hunelin, president of
CEI' ; Albert Teneodire, director ~f the YTA Intiernational Institut~ for -
3ocigl. Studies in (}eneva; Claude riillet, I'UK ~Pechiney-Ugine-Kulhmann
Compar~y delegate in Central Africa; Michel de Vos, of the Batelle Insti-
tute an the University of Qeneva; Jean Duhamel, adv3ser to the president
oF OPTORO fexpansion unknot,m 7; Abdouleye Fadiga, governor of the BC~AO
- ~Central Bank of the West Afr`ican States ; Jean Dromer, ~resident of
_ BIAO ~Internatidnal B~nk for k'est Africa~; Rainet Steckhan, director of
the ~ropean Office of the World Bank; Yves Rolland-Billecart, director
general of the CCC~; gnd Nicolas Thiery, vice president of the Institute
for Eaterprise.
Airing the symposium, concrete problems oP an economic, soci.al, fiscal, and ~
financial order wi11 be studied. -
Information may be obtained at the Institute for Enterprise, 6 rue Clement
Marot, 75008 Paris
COPYRIGHTs Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1979
t2t49
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INT~R-AFRICAN AFFRYR5 .
BRIEFS
_ NETn'5 REPORTEO INTERMEDIARY ROLEr-The Angolen chieP af st~te as gnndwill
~nbassador between Mozambique and Portugal? The request was addreased to
President Agos~inho Neto by Comnander Melo Antunes, one of the prime movers
o~ the Portuguese revolution of 14pri1 1974. The ob~ective ie to inFluence
President Samore Machel to obtain improved reletions between Maputo end
Lisbon, disturbed by Partugal's financial claims in connection with the
Cabora 8assa Oan, and by the nationelizetion of Portuguese benka in
Mozambique. [Paria JEIRVE AFRIQIIE in French No 965 p 37, 4 Jul 79]
SAVIMBI ON SOUTH AFRICA--Jonas Savimbi, leader of tJNITA, has declared that
white South Africane are Africana. Everqthing that affecta South Africa
affecta ua too and everything that affecta us affecta that country ae well.
When we ahall assume power in Angola, t~e ehall seek a dialog with the Re-
public of South Africa and not the path of war. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE
in French 18 Jul 79 p 39J
.
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ANGOLA -
SRIEF3
COOPERATION WITH GDR-~The German Democratic Republ3c ~nd Angolg have
eign~d a number of ggreemente on ~cientific and eechnicgl ~ooperaCion, on
the trainit~g df c~drea and on the delivery nf F.ast Germ~n urban equipment.
Theee agreement~ were concluded during a visit to the GnR by Carlog Alberto
Van-Dunem, the Angolan minister of coordination~ who met with Udo-Dieter
Wange, the East German minister for light industry and the food indugtry.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Jul 19
p 19k3j
ANTICIPA~^,D COFF~E CROP RESUIII'S--i�Sinister of Planning Jose ~duardo doa Santos
has repor~ed to the national commisaion created for coordinating harvest
operatians that the fourth Angolan coffee erop since independenee is ~gti-
mated at 32,000 tona, or 7,000 tons more thaxY last year. According to the
International Coffee Organization'e latest figurea, the last coffee aeason
prior to independence produced 3.451 million 60-kg bags of coffee (or
207,000 fions), lt the sa.me time last year, Luanda authorities were forced
to mobilize the populatiaa in order to pick 80,000 tons, ~at g~oal wa.s
far from having been attained, The minister went on to say that, counting
e~ciating reserves, Ang+ola hopes to export 70,000 tons of coffee this year,
which xill bring in almost $190 million. [Excerpt~ [Paria l4ARCH~S
TROPICAUX ET I~DI~o~~AI~iS in ~'rench 15 Jun 79 P~ 623 ] 11466
IRON ORE CONTRACT--A branch of the Auatrian consortium VOEST-ALPINE AG,
the AUSTROMINERA,L jexpansion unknown] acting as an independent entity of
coneulting engineers, has signed a consultation agreement wfth the
People's Republic of Angola. According to the terms of the contract,
AUSTROMINERAL must atudy the possibility to continue the e~cploitation
of the Cassinga iron ore mine which was interrupted by the civil war.
AUSTROMINERAI. wi12 also dr~w the plans for a new iron ore mine in he
vicinity of Quissala-Quitungo, which will be slated to produce approxi-
mately 2 million tons of super-pellets per year. [Paris MARC~S
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Jul 79 p 1943~
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CNAti
B1tIEFS
~ROZ~N FUND5--Some 30 ~illion CFA francs (600 millian French francs) are
r~~orted frozen in ehe coffers of the Central Bank uf Ch~d in Ndjamena.
Frer.ch military gu~rds ~rp blocking the ~~CE89 of government guthorities to
bank pr~mises, such that they are having the greaCeSC difficulty in paying
the salarips of their employeeg. [Text~ [Paris JEUN~ A~~IQU~ in ~'rench
27 Jun 79 p 34] 5157
H~ADQUARTEfi5 TRANSFERRED--The officials of the majnrity of the mixed economic
companies in Chad have transferred their headquarters from Ndjamena to
Moundou, and their funds as well, out cf fidelity to thpir southern origins.
Colonel K~mogue's team is thus able to cover ita payroll, since it ha~
collected some 12 billion C~A francs elsewhere. [T~xt) [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE
in French 27 Jun 79 p 34~ 5157
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C~NTRAL A~ItICAN ~MPIR~ -
PO55IBL~ ~UCCE550It5 b~ BOKAS5A SUGG~5T~D
!`aris J~UNE AF1tIQU~ in French 27 Jun 79 pp 21-11
[Articl~ by Jog-Bigise Al~mat "Boka~~a H~~...Succ~sgorg"]
[Text] Nag the countdown really begun for Emperor Bokassa? The inquiry
commig~ion whi~h reached $angui on 1~ June (see JEUN~ AFRIQUE, No 963) will
not oE COUY9~ publish its conclusions for some weeks. African magiatrates
will ~gain have had difficulty in carrying out their work under desirabie
conditions. Already iC is doubtful if Che imperial horde will allow them to
investigate in Eull Ereedom and calm. The ~amiltes oE some victims have
already been removed far from the capital. As for thoae who remain, they
were warned in arlvance, on pain of reprisal, to give only accounts oE the
facts Eavorable to th~ g~rengo monarch.
Under such conditions, it is gomewhat surprising that a leader oE an opposi-
- cinm m~v~ment woutd link the outbreak of a possible papular rebellion with
the publication of the report of the inquiry commission. In reality, mgtters
are d~veloping as iE the pretenders were surprised by the suddenness of recent
events to the point of being incapable of deriving any advantage from them.
One cannot, hoWever, say that Bokassa is confronted by a totally empty field.
On the contrary, there is even a worrisome plethora threatening to deal a
fatal biow to the people oE the Central African republic who are thirsty for
change.
Por there are now emerging from every quarter men determined to be done with
the imperial dictatorship but at the same time incapable oE believfng in a
"holy alliance" which would allow them to achieve a common goal. To date,
the names most frequently mentioned have been [hose of Sylvestre Bangui and
Antoine Patasse.
The two men have in common the fact that they established their headquarters
in Paris and have thus benefitted--even if the latter denies ic--from the
discreet and benevolent complicity of the French authorities. Both were also
high-ranking servants of the emperor. A fact which may work against them.
Former prime minister Ange Patasse defends his position: "Nor. everyone can
- work on the outside. For my part I preferred to struggle within the system
and the Central Africat people know this very well." Indeed. The fact that
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Bangui ~nd p~tagge are in Frgnce may congtiture a serious handicap. They are _
dieCanr Erom thp the~Cer nf, oprr~tinng. And, mo~t import~nt, ~~rench
guarantee--assuming that paria has the means and the desire to eatablieh
onu of ics proeegpg in power in $angui-~is likely ta b~ viewed askance by -
the other Afric~n 1~~ders, who will certainly remain alooE from Che b~ne-
- Eiciaries of any such op~ration.
And that is why ther~ i~ an incr~gging efforC to spot the rara gvis in Africa
itgelf. This individu~l h~s a n~me, Abel Goumba, and a political record.
- It was he who, following the accidental death of Barthelemy Hoganda, the
founder of thp Central African Empire, in 1959, served as interim head of
the government for several months. Abel Coumba~ 46 years of age, a former
teach~r who eurned his departure into exile in 1962 to advantage to take up
m~dic~l studies, ~till has his fuCUre before him. An employee of the World
Health OrganixaCion in Coton~u, he has the reputation of a moderate tiberal
_ and~ it is said~ the eupport of the Ubangi Patriotic Front (FPO) which has
it~ hegdquarters in Brazzavill~. It ig in fact on the choice made by this
organization that the outcome of the struggle ~eing waged by men who have ~
brutally discovered the delights of thQ political game will depend.
While the FPC~ is being courted ~y one and all~ negotiations have begun
_ between Abel Coumba and Ange Paeasse with a view to rapprochement. But one
cannot exclude a priori the emergence of a man from the interior such as
Barthelemy Yangongo, former minister of information and the nephew of
BarChelemy Boganda, nr again former president David Dacko, whose lack of
personality, it will be recalled, was the determining factor leading to his
fall in 1966. The development of the succession process may ~ery well hold
some su~prises.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1979
5157
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
ACTIVITIES OF OPPOSITION WITHIN NATION NOTED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Jun 79 pp 22-23
[Article by Pierre Gardels "His Ma~esty's Cubans"]
[Text] A Cuban on an Ubangi island! Equipped with this informaCion, the
imp~+erial army plunged into a ma,jor maneuver--encirclement, lar.ding, attack.
' Caught in the trap was an unfortunate albino fisherman, who inquired in the
Sango dialect what was going on. They are still laughing about iC in Bangui.
The empire thinks Cuban. The emperor himself stopped his car to leap like a
devil from it and pounce on a French hippie. "You're a Cuban. You'll see
how I deal with Cubans." The traveler and his backpack ended up in Berengo,
the seat of the court, for an interrogation lacking in gentleness. Once his
French nationality had been established, the so-called "guerrilla" was given
3,000 francs and a little note of apology from his majesty. �
The Cubans arp everywhere. Some officials want this believed and they are.
_ successful in part, particularly in Catholic circles. Questioned about the
massacres of children and the (prohibited) mass planned for them, a priest
led the conversation to the Cuban threat. He believes in it to such an
- extent that one might wonder if he would not in the end prefer the bloody
Bok~,ssa.
"They are at the Congolese frontier, ready to plunge toward Berengo." This
priest believes that their pretext will be that they come ko oust the emperor. -
But a nun, equally persuaded that the terrible "bearded anes" are there, _
thinks that they come instead to the aid of the tyrant, threatened by his -
own people and abandoned by his former friends. Whom should one believe?
Same Uniform
According to a diplomat stationed in Bangui, one should believe neither.
"Crossing the Congolese frontier is impractical. The Cubans are, after all,
- conventional soldiers." What is understood is that they are white men who
could not get through there. It is true that, excluding the Berengo road,
there is no link between Bang~i, the capital, ar.d the rest of the country
except primitive tracks, unusable at this beginning of the rainy season.
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There remains acceas by river. ~~The Zarians would hasten to intervene on
the emperor's behalf. The Congo doea not dare embark on such a venture."
Confusion is reported ta have been cauaed--and this ia not the opinion of an -
individual in diggrace Coday--by supplying the Central African army with ,
beCtle dress--uniforma exacCly ehe same as those worn by the Zarians in the
course oE Che earlier parade along Jean-Bedel Hokassa Avenue. The similarity
of uniforms is s~id to have deceived Che CenCral Africans, unaccusComed to
aeeing their troops dressed in a single, consistent fashion. In one day's
time, one can see in Bangui red berets, blue berets, peaked caps, uniforms
for every type of camouflage, khaki, and even stage type uniforms--green and
red with golden epaulets--straight out of Napoleonic memories.
IntervenCion by Zaire
Nonetheless, in view of the majority of the Central Africans, there is no
doubC about the presence of 2aire in January events. Some of the soldiers
struck down by the people are said to have worn the insignia of the Popular
Movement of Che Revolution (MPR), Che single party in Zaire. While awaiting
clarification on this point, it must be noted that the Zairians have an
easier role than the Congolese. From the Bangui Rock Club, where the finest
flower of French diplomatic and Portuguese spice importing circles amuse
themselves and acquire a tan, one can see the town of Zongo, in Zaire, on
the other sfde of a river on which long dugouts ply ceaselessly.
It is not easy to get behind the spectre of the Cuban or the Zairian gendarme.
Who will bring Bokassa down? One can live for years in Bangui, freque~ting
embassies willing to place their bets on others, and never meet a single
Central African who will admit he belongs to the opposition. In Paris, high
officials are hastening to set a date for the succession. But the dominant -
impression on the spot is that of splintering and lack of leadership. With
each leaflet, a new group emerges. The only organization which expresses
itself regularly is the Central African Liberation Movement (MPLC), to which
numerous ramifications are ascribed. Some of which will certainly end up in
the Congo! _
Rotten Fruit
The distribution of leaflets is perhaps a primitive method, but the results
are convincing: large numbers of people have read them, if indeed no one
has risked keeping them. One was described to me from memory: a series of
drawings representing a tree surmounted by the imperfal crown. Two individuls
note that the fruit--labeled corruption, repression, taxes--is rotten. They
pull the fruit: free, but it grows bzck. Rotten again! The two figures
= finally decide to cut down the tree, which causes the crown to fall. For
this allegory, a Central African citizen would risk death, a journalist the
worst persecution. The oppos~tion is certainly wise in working in small
groups with affiliations which are hard to prove.
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MatCers are aimple for the officials: chaos is orchestirated abroad. And
ae there is indeed a need eo explain the success of thia "netwnrk remo~e-
- conCrolled from ouCeide Che country," Pr3me Miniater Maidou explains that
"This network has a certain number of inembera in the atudenC population of
the demenCed" now because of a proclamation (which otihera drafted buC which
he read) denying that a aingle child had been murdered~ the prime minister
overestimatea these very remarkable agieators. Or rather he would like to
undereaCimate Che popular oppoaition.
The emperor for his part ia not deceived. He has apoken of bombing certain
aeighborhooda in Che capital and even going to ground in Berengo to die
there after killing the empress and the miniaters. An end worehy of him.
In the meant~ne, he has withdrawn two of his children from their schools.
Due of fear of the Cubans? More nearly due to fear of posaible vengeance
sought by Central African parents. -
COY'YRIGHT: Jeun~ Afrique, GRUPJIA 1979
5157 ~
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CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE
BRIEFS
BOKA5SA'S OUSTER SOUGHT--The E1~?see Palace has finally made its decision:
president Giscard d'~sCaing h~.s asked his adviser, Rene Journiac, Co seek to
put an er~d ro the binody regime of Bokassa, ~~before summer if possible." On
Che other hand, the chief of state Celephoned Robert Galley, hi~ minister oE
cooperation, Co criCicize whaC he c~lled "pseudo ever.ts" in Bangui h~rshly.
Mr Galley fmrt~ediaCely changed course, but despite Chis it is almost certain
that he will soon leave this post. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French
25 Jun - 8 Jul ~9 pp 33] 5157
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GABON
lluTAIL5 ON TIANCANESE, URANIUM rIINING F'IIBLISHED
~'aris AIARCHLS TFtOPICAUX i;T NI~DI~~A~~S in Frenah 15 Jun 79 p 1613
- [Text1 The I+Iokta Compan.y~s report for 1978, presented at the general meet-
ing o~` 8 June 1979, provides ~he following details on the activities of the
' Gabonese affiliates, COMILOG (Ogooup Mining Company; holdings, 16.93 percent) _
and COI~IUF' (Franceville Uranium Mines Company; 28.12 percent).
The CON'iILOG ahipped only 1.69 million tons of manganeae in 1978 as against
1,86 million in 1977 despite a rise in trading aativity in the seaond ha,lf.
Ir. cociparison with preceding years, 1978 oa.me to a alose with a balance _
sheet in sharp decline. Sales prices, expreased in dollars, will merely _
be maintained in 19?9, but thia price stability, whic:~ strengthens the
position of ferromanganese producers, enablea us to predict xather favorable
- shipmants in terms of tonnage. As for the dioxides to be used in the manu- _
facture of batteries, an increase in deliveries and prices is anticipated. -
In the course of the year, the COMUF increased its capita.l from 4,04 to 5.05
million CFA [African Fir:ancial Community] francs by incorpora.tion of re-
servQS and a distribut',on of bonus shares. Frodu ction a.mounted to 1,022
tons of uranium as against 901 in 1977 and eales came to 1,050 tons as _
against 1,026 th~ year before, The inatallation of a workshop to produce
solvents for use i.n local production of commeraial concentrates, with an
annual ca.pacity of 1,500 tons of uranium, wae completed in October 1977
and opera.tions have been satisfactory.
Carrying on with its efforts toward improvement, the company has ordered _
a new plant for the manufacture of sulphuric acid, which is scheduled to
go into operation at the beginning of 1980. And finally, the decision has
been ciade to build a new ore crushing and leaching plant adapted to the
~olvent workshop. The reservea that have been confirmed are in fact sizable
enough to ~ustify replacement of the existing plant, which had not been
desi~ned to last for the duration of the deposits as estimated today nor
to handle the production we can now reasonably hepe to atta3n.
COPYItSGHT: Rene NIoreux et Cie, Paxis, ~979
- 11,466
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GABON ~
- BRIEFS
THREATS TO TOURISTS--President Bongo is very worried. Incidents againet
~ European touriats, especially Fren~h, in Gabon are multiplying. Bongo fears
that a popular organization oppoaed to his re~pressive a~nd arbitrary regime
has decided to diacourage WesterEi tourism in Gabon. He is therefore request-
ing the help of French apecial services to unmask his o~ponents. [Text]
[Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 22 Jul 79 p 63]
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~~x orr~~rnt, usL oNLY
GHANA
- NKRUMqFI IMAGE MAY NDT 5UFFICE TD 8F2TDGE CIVILTAN-MILITARY GAP
- Peris JEUNE AFRIQl1E in French Nn 965 pp 14, 15~ 4 Jul 79
[Excerpta of erticle by Frencois S~uden (from inv~stigation by Mohemed Maiga
_ in Accra): "Ghane: Is it Revoluti~n7"]
[Excerpts] pn initial image of Ghana: on thie demp evening of 21 June~
- on Independence 5quere in the heert of Accre, e tremendous ovation burst
for~h from thoueands of voices~ accompanied by dance rhythms. Huge portreite
of tSwame Nkrumah appeared everywhere~ displeyed by excited young people. ~
The People's Nationel Perty (PNP) of Herry Limenn~ cleiming the philosophy
of the deceased oeagyefo as its own, ,just won the firat round of the generel
elections~ both pre~idential and legislative. It had been ten years since
such an electian took plece,
A second image of another Ghgna: the revolutic:nary council of the ermed _
' Porces~ formed et the time of the 4 June coup~ applied its lew: to cleanse
the Ghanaian stebles. On 1~ June, a body of lieutenants end corporels issued
the death sentence for former president Ignatius Kutu Acheampong and for
~ Gen Etuka, former border guard commander.
.
At the same time, in the Teshi militery prison cemp near Accra, sorne fifty
superior officers awaited ,judgement by court-martial. Among them were
- Willien Frederick Akuffo; Akwasi Afrifa; Col Roger Felli; Gen Rabert Kotei;
~ Admiral Joy Amedune~ and Vice-Merehall George 8aekye. Ten dqys leter, on
Monday 26 June, the 6 men were shat in a public execution. The Ghaneian
army lo3t its leedere.
Just like these two images of civilian votes and military purge9, the imege
of Ghai~a seems to have st.rangely split at this time. There is firat of ell -
the legitimate country, with its elections which were held under normal
conditions on 18 ~une in spite of tlie pawer coup.
Harry Limann, the 46-year old career diplomet, certainly does not owe his
victory to f~rne he was virtually unknown to the electorete nor to
, his timidly leftist options, but rather to the constant and ostentatious
~
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rw~ ~rrl~iru, uDG UNLY
r~~~renceg to Nkzvmnh which ~ccur thr~ughout hi~ ~p~ech~s. During the who12
camp~ign, h~ Cnr~fully nvnided ev~n th~ n~me o~ enci~lian~ m~ntioning only
"netianol r~~orm.~' Th~ d~egyefo'e poathumoue ch~riem~ did the reet.
C~u~ grea~ ond ~s d~gp the Gh~nei~n wish m~y b~~ tn e~~ civiliens regein
pnwpr g~t~r 5 ye~re of mil3tery incompetence, e~imple ~ect mu~t temp~r eny
conclusion on the implicetidng n~ th~ 1g ,~une ~1~ction, ~or the tim~ b~ing:
voter turnnu~ w~~ v~ry lnw l~gg then 50 p~rc~n~.
bn~s this me~n ~lienation from ~ politic~l Cla~e cruelly 1~Cking ~n new mpn
and new ide~s7 M~yb~. At le~st~ thie ie the npinidn o~ the young group of
4 June. 'They conetitute the reel Ghana. They hold th~ real pow~r.
A Cleen Sweep ~
?hey ere led by Jerry aawlings, a 42-ye~r old ~ir force cap~ein oP mixed
nrigin~ with ~ Ghaneien mother and g Scotch fether. Rawlings somewhat
resert~tiles ~Serekou in 1972: e netionaliet ebove ell~ diagueted by the tur-
pitude of hie leaders, concern~d with reesteblishing the ternished
_ reputation of an army tainted with shem~ and ecendels. Rewlinge hae been
perceived es a new Mengistu~ becauae he hes mentioned the need for en
"Ethiapian solution," and beceuse the Snviet Tees prees egency wea the first
to announce the 9UCCE99 nf his frienda' militery uprising (he himself wes
~ailed aFter a firet attempt at a coup on 15 Mey). In fact, his revolution
is above all a morel one~ where intermediete ranks are wielding the broom.
He ia much more likely to refer to Fenon and "7he Wretched of the Eer~h~"
which he readily quotes~ then to Lenin whom he hae never reed~ or even
fdkrunah whose writings he hee anly gla~ced et. This offspring of e 8ritish
functionary who hea never acknowledged hia son~ intends tn sweep the premises
and return them clean to the civilians in three months. But Rawling8 is not
alone. The ~unior officers around him~ the unpeid aoldiers, the etudents
from the country's three univeraities Who go on meeting in endlese generel _
assemblies~ the radical union members~ end the thousands of unemployed in
Accra's shantytowns~ all went much, much more.
A Powder Keg
The early deys of the coup were marked by episodes of looting which parti-
cularly affected Syrien and Lebaneae shopkeepere. Severel senior officers
_ were held by their men who thr.eetened to hang or lynch them. Both Rawlings
and Comnander Menseh, inatigator of the coup, attempted to calm them down, _
sometimea in vain. Neither the starving unemployed nor the redicel in-
tellectuals want the civilians to return to power.
Does Jerry Rewlings run the risk of being overWhelmed shortly by aupportera
whom he does not yet control ~iequately? Will he take a herd end fest peth
ta~ard e popular republic, under the same Marxist-Leninist ideology Which
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in~lu~nc~d M~thi~u ~Sprpknu~ his Cnun~~rp~rt in 6~nin7 Ig he b~ing manipul~-
t~d by ~dm~dn~ more determined than himnel~'~ Mnh~m~d N~guib w~n by N~~eer7
Nnb~dy c~n tg11 yet, ~ven if
Gh~n~ eeema tn hav~ b~cnm~ ~ pnwd~r k~g whnee
~xpln~ivr. ~dre~ hn~ guddanly b~en ignit~d.
_ N L'ontegioue Neighbor
A tru~ Ghgn~i~n r~vdlutian wnuld cnneigt in put~ing an ~nd tn th~ prect~c~s
which ~r~ ~t thp drir~in ~fi ~hig dieae~er. Thie i~ no doubt the ~ntention
n~ Cnpt ~awlinge gnd hie eventu~l Civilien succeesars. Wf11 they have
- pnough ti~np and megns7 1'hie u~nuld requir~ unity betw~en milltary Ghane~
bent nn purging~ end political Ghane, in eeerch oF popularity. IP this
unity were to be achi~ved~ i~ a true pluralieti~ d~mncracy w~re insteted
- in th~ cnuntry, ~h~ French-epeeking st9tee which eu~round it~ most of which
stil.t function under th~ one-perty ~y~t~rn~ Would be et the same time re-
ggeured end enxious.
'fhey would be reaseured bec~use a nation led by "fundamentel revolutionary
committeps" which are being dem~nded by aome of Rawlings' close
associetes would be e dengerous n~igh6or for those who espire to
ecnnomi.c liberalism. But they would ht anxious beceuse d~mocrncy is
cnntagious and becau~e nothing 0f r~vt t~ces plece in Ghana can leeve
bleck AFrice indifferent.
The civilian end military arQ eech powerful enough to oppose the other~ end -
neither is strong enough to prevail definitely. Each eide containa its own
dissent and contradictions. fJkrumeh's shadoi,i seems to be the only unifying
factor between Jerry Rawlinga~ for Whom "Ghena hes lost its soul eince the
fall of the osegyefo," and the men who already seem9 to emerg~ as the
next president, Harry Limann, leeder of the PNP. Hnwever, will e conmon
memory and a common referznce point, as prestigious as they may be, -
suf~ice to govern together?
= COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 19'l9
11,023
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I
rur v~rl~l~u, U~L' U1VLY
CI{ANA
UOiJBTS ~XPI2ESSEU ON CIVILIAN~MILITARY CO-EXISTLNCE
pgris MAItCH~S TItOP~CAUX ~T MEbITERI2AANEENS in ~rench 6 Jul 79 p 1391
[~xcerpes] C~pCain Jerry Rawlings' "house-cleatting" in Ghana gurprised and
angered Africa and the resC di the world. Ghana had indeed always been
admired and respecCed for the pegceful and �riendly dieposition of ita
_ population. However, the execution of three former heada of atate and oCher
well-known officials in this country of about 10 million inhabitanes~ where
family relations, or even friendly and neighborly ones form a background of
conviviality, and where respect for hwnan rights had become exemplary,
cauged a great deal of anger, deapite th~ denunciaCion of the crimes of
corruption reportedly perpeeraCed by the victims.
Thus the numerous local proteats, but especially those from abroad, from the
United Nations, the United Statea, Great Britain, heads of eCaCe and gov~ern-
ments of the OCAM [Afro-Malagasy-Mauritian Coromon Organizationj recently
meeCing in Cotonou, seem to have been the cause of his [Captain Rawlings'J
about-turn. Fear of economic sanctions--with Nigeria having decided to stop
its oil deliveries to a country 90 percent dependent on iC for its oil supply--
- certainly played a part as well.
Be that as it may, Captain Rawlings made a point of reassuring for the moment
the Ghanaian people and his friends abroad thaC Che country would henceforth
- respect iCS tradition of law and ~uatice and its obligations regarding human
righCs according to Che principles set forth by the United Nations. However,
he also pointedly underlined thaC his 4 June revolution was indeed motivated
by the wish to bring more 3ustice at all levels, social, economic and political, .
while noting that without this revolution, the army would have gone back to
- its barracks without having accomplished anything to refurbish its image. ~
- Thus, it is Chis particular point--to rehabilitate the army's image--that
raises some questions on the future of the country and the actual chances of
a real return to a civilian regime.
As things stand, this aeems to be a certainty, but will the military not
attempt to oppose to an arnry now baci: to a rigorous moralistic spirit a
group of unscrupulously ambitioue poliCicians who are ready to effect any deals
in order to impose themselves?
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rux u~r~l~ltu, u~~ UNLY
~o~ e modug vivendi ro be e~rgblished between miliC~ry gnd civilittne gnd
~nr th~ grmy cgdr~~ nnd gdminisCrg~ion to be clean~ed, tiime, pgeience nnd
tace wi11 be n~eded. Wi11 Che Itevolueiongry Council be gble tio fgc~ it~
Cc~gk und wi11 ie ~ucceed in gvoiding the piCfglls ~f previnug regim~g7
Thig ~~ems very ddubtful ~nd the vi.olent repres~ion performed aC ehe b~gin-
ning did not nCtu~1].y give it gn gurg of sginthood~ Indeed, it hurts it~
repue~eion, ~g w~11 ae thgt of Ghana'g and gll of Africg's, and ~his ig wh~C
wag felt in g number of tteighbnring countrieg, not~bly in Nigerig, which is
ies~lf engaged in g reCurn Co civilian rule and wgs the firgC eo be affecCed.
Finally, if the firse megeures aimed ae cleanaing tihe local trade fn food
producea ~howed healehy sorC-Cerm resules, the Weae is expressing some
doubes on their lnng-eerm effece. Thege measure~, and especiglly ehe
tigheening of price conernls which compell~d merchantg eo sueCgin a log~
more often ehan not, are opposed to thoee sugg~st~d lasC year by the
Interngtional Monetary ~und to Gen Akuffo for the purpoae of etabilizing
ehe economy. As a result, diasatisfacCion accompanied by revolCe are liable
to resurface, made all ehe more dramatic by Che facts that the country may
find itself deprived of aid and ouCside assieCance because of poor calcula-
tions or simply the incompeCence of ita leadere.
At present, however, it is not clear whether anyone would profit from an
accelerated desCabilizaeion in Ghana. It is easy to understand why the
countries of West Africa, which are generally pro-Weatern, would entertain
any worries following recenr events. Theae countriea are of courae fearful
of Che indirect and unforeaeen consequences for themselves, all the more
so because Ghanaian seudents are evidently hailing the new revoluCionary
regime. .
-
COPYItIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1979
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GUINEA
FREf~N AYD REPORTEDLY CAUI'IOUS IN FACE OF FEYGHTENED EXPECTATIUNS
Peria JEUVE AFRYQLE in French No 965 p 16~ 4~ul 79
~ [Excerpts of article by 5irediou Diallo]
[Excerpts~ Six montha after the visit of Presi;dent Valery Giscard d'Estaing
to Conekry (December 1978), Guinea ~d Frence eigned e~ import~nt cooperation `
agreement in Paria on 26 June.
Frence's recent cancellation of the Guinean debt (together With those of the
other most disadventeged African lande) hss been fevoreble to reectiveting
cooperation between the two countriee. But Guinea would like to go further
and fest~r. This was the wish expresaed by Preeident Sekou Toure in December
19~8 to his French counterpert, alao steting hie hope thet the egreements
would be signed by Jenuery by Jen~ary 1979. Thie hes now been accomplished.
In the meantime Guinea set its priorities With respect to what it i,iould like
to echieve with French essistance: mainly energy and mining. Two pro~ects
are regietered i~ these two ereae: the Souapiti Dan~ end the Aye-Koye
aluminum plant., The totel coat is now estimeted at neerly 2 billion dollers.
Next cane agriculture and food production~ road end railway networks (re-
building of the Conakry-Kenkan railroad), conatruction end public worke
(rebuilding of the capitel), end in perticuler~ the proposed conatruction
of two pavillione for the OAU aummit meeting ~ich Conakry plene to host in
1981. _
Obviously the implementetion of theee pro~ects will require coneiderable
financiel meene. At this ~uncture, can France do more finencia11y7 Es-
pecially since some concern is becaning evident in certain husiness circles:
Conakry ie aix months lete in peyinq bill~ due to French firms. The country~ _
lacking in currency~ is using what little it has to import foad products.
Guinea is atill suffering fram ehorteges, in spite of e relatively good 1976 .
harvest. This fa ceused by freudulent rice export to neighbAring countri.~s.
The goverrxnent iteelf hae delivered some to Liberie~ in the wake of the
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rux ub'r~lulnL u~L UNLY
- trnubl~g which nCCUr~d in Mey~ in nrd~r ~n ~id its count~rp~rt in Monrovie.
5~Cnn~ly~ pnlltiCg Cnn~ir~ue tn rul~ in ~11 areee including the technir~l -
firld. pdmini~tr~tiv~ trivin r~m~in~ without ~depting t~ ~connmic r~quir~~
m~ni.a. And it ~g tn b~ ~e~red thgt th~ n~w gnvernmenti~l gtructurpg ineteted
on G~un~ wi11 nnt m~ke much diFf~rpnc~.
in ~my c~ge~ ~g far as the ~'r~nch gnverrroment i~ conC~rn~d, ~he n~w ngreem~nts
~r~ m~rely g~nerel guideline~ Por coop~rn~inn~ wher~~e th~ Guine~n ~uthori-
ti~~ se~m dnxinug to ~e~ them take mnre conCr~t~ ~'drm. Thi~ ~mbiguity S~~Ii1g
tn ent~il th~ risk n~ prdducing e c~rtein ~nnunt n~ diseppointment on the
p~rt of' Cuinea. Whn~ is c~rtain is thet these egreements wi11 not produce
a miracle, at le~st not in the neer future.
CC]F~YF~IGHT: Jeune qfriqu~ GRUPJIA 1979
11~nZ3
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MALI
BItIEFS
bIAMdNb pltdSl'~CTING AGIt~F2t~iT--A trade uninn agreement for diamond proapect-
ing w~s ~igned on 26 June in Bamako between ehe goverrnnent of Mali and
the 5MPM [expansion unknown], a branch af the COGEMA, General Company for
Nuclear MaCerials, Cogether with the BRGM, Che Bureau of Geological and
Min~ral ProspecCing. The principal goal of this agreemenC is the sparch for,
gnd as detailed an identification as possible of, diamond beda in Mali.
This ~greemene will also promote the exploiCaCion o~ auch beda on Che
bgsis of. a feasibility report. jExceprt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEbITEKItANEENS in French 6 Jul 79 p 1926]
JAPANE5E TRUCK5--A ~otal of 55 trucks donaCed by Japan were delivered to
the Maliatt authoritiea in Bamako on 30 June. This donation, which
~ollow~ a first delivery of 43 trucks a year ago, partially implements the
- promise by Che Japanese government to give Mali "200 trucks with a view
to assisting the country in solving the enormous difficulties it is
encourtering at present in the marketing of its products during theae
drought-plagued years," said Alioune Blondin Beye, Malian minister of
foreign affairs and internationsl cooperation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEBITEF.RANEENS in French 6 Jul 79 p 1926] -
PRC--i'IALI C00 TION--At the concluaion of a nearly month-long miasion tha.t
- took l~im to China, Korea and Manila for UNCTAD pro~ects, Malian Minister of
- Finance and Trade Col Amadou Baba Diarra reported on his discusaions with -
Chinese authorities. He �irst of all dealt with Sino-Malian achievements
- in the field of cooperation which is credited with 27 completed pro3ects
aiid 11 in pro~ress, like the factory for the manufacture of pharmaceuticals,
kegardin~ future operations, an agreement cavering five projects has been
si~ed in Peking fors three dams (two at Bamako and one at Kenieba~, the
installation of a transmitting and receiving center at the level of the
14alian rlinistry of Foreign Affairs and the extension of Chinese technical
assistance for the Seribala Sugar Refinery. And lastly, negotiations are
in progress for Chinese construction of a second bridge in Bamako, [Text]
- [Paris MARC~S TROPICAUX ET N~DIT~RR.AN~r,1S in French 15 Jun 79 p 1603] -
~ 1466
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MOZAMBIQU~
BRTEF6
_ ROAD ASSISTANCE--The African Development r'und (ADF) granted a loan for
~ 8 millton uniea of account (approximaCely 2,048 million ~ranca CFA) to
the Itepublic of Mozambique on 30 May. This loan will f3nance the Atto
Molocue-Rio Ligonha road pro~ecC. This road w~.ll cross one of the most
densely populaCed and ri.chest regions of the counCry. It will also
cross an area renowned for its mineral richea such as mfca, kaolin and
tan~alum, the production o~ which is slated to start in 1980, Construction
of this road will moreover contribute toward promoting the economic and
- social inCegration of the country. [Excerpt] tParis MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Jul 79 p 1943]
riOZAMBIb~U ~IrGDR AGRICULTURA,L COOPERATION--T~Tozambique a~nd the GAR have ~ust
si~ed ttn agricultural cooperation agreement in Ma,puto providing for GDR
teckinical and scientific aid to Mozambique in this field, The agreement,
initi~.led at the end of GDR Vice riinister of Agriculture Dr Neu's visit to
Mozambique, also provided for the exporting of tropical fruits and other
produce to the GDR as well as GDR financing of a development study on the
Chirin~o River region in the northern part of the country. This agreement
i~ in addition to a series of agreements signed by the two countries re-
gardin~ severa,l sectors, particularly military and fina,ncial, [Text [Paris
P+IAItCI~S TftOPICAUX ET MEDIT~ ~ in French 15 Jun 79 p 1623] ~14 6
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NIGER
BRIEFS '
SOMAIR URANIUM REPORT--The Mokta Company's report for fiscal 1978 was pre-
sented at the stockholders meeting held on 8 June 1979. It provides the fol-
lowing information on the activities of the.Air Mining Company (SOMAIR)--of
whose capital the Mokta Company owns 7.6 percent--in 1978. SOMAIR produced
1,711 tons of uranium in 1978, compared to 1,440 tons in 1977. Deliveries
totaled 1,851 tons, compared to 1,465 tons the year before. Increased sales
and the higher price o� uranium enabled the company to show oonsidera.bly im-
pr~ved results: SOMAIR distributed 6,523 million CFA francs in dividends, _
compared to 5,180 million in 1977. Construction of the road linking the Air
mining zone to Tahoua has begun and should be completed in 1981. SOMAIR has
completely paid its share (87.5 million Luxembourg franes) into the capital
of the financing company, and it has guaranteed loans up to a limit of 5.5
billion CFA francs. In addition, construction at the Amou Araren deposit of
= the thermal powerplant destined to provide Air with electric power is in the
process of completion. SOMAIR has subscribed 675 million CEA francs in the
capital of SONICHAR [expansion unknown], the company set up to praduce elec-
tricity. [TextJ [Paris MARCE~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAI~ENS in French 15 Jun
79 p 1606j 11798 -
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SEYCHELLES
~
CURRENT ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, DEFENSE SITUATION OUTLINED _
Integrated Economic Approach
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 11 Jun 79 pp XIII-XIV
(Article: "On New Foundations"] ~
[Text] A valid economic analyais of the Seychelles must take into account the
following characteriatics: a total land maea of 444 square kilometers divided
into 92 islands scattered over nearly 1 million square kilometers of ocean,
and a rapidly growing population of a little less than 65,000 persons.
During the entire 19th cenCury and up to 1971, economic activity consisted
essentially in producing copra and cinnamon for export, fiaheries, and a small
marlcet-gardening industry.
~ The first ma~or turning point came with the opening of the Mahe international
airport which gave the Seychelles the capability of developing a large tourist
industry.
W.tth the blessing of the colonial power, tourism very quickly became the
country's leading industry and its primary source o: foreign currency.
Tourism's growth led to increased public works pro~ects and the construction
of tourist support facilities, particularly on Mahe, the main island, and to
a lesser extent on nearby p:aslin Island and La Digue Island.
But tourism did not bring prosperity to the Seychelles. Grafted onto such a
shaky economic base, it only increased the country's foreign dependence and
aggravated its already e~sisting social disparities. The great ma~ority of
the visitors live in large hotels owned by foreign interests, and almost all
of the payment for their stay is made to large international tourist agencies
in their home countries.
The worst, however, is that a large part of the country's agricultural activity
was abandoned in favor of development of the tourist industry. To feed the
local population, augmented by a large influx of tourists, it was, trterefore, -
- necessary to resort more and more to imports. The large cocoanut plantations
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were neglecCed by their ownere who preferred Co bank on Land epeculnCion
which had r~ached g fever piCch in the coun~ry. Tn addition~ workers on these
plantationg loat rheir ~obs.
Liberation nf ~he Seychelles on 5 June 1977 found the country in n eituation
where the aprawling expanaion of one aector of the economy wae threaeening to
' destroy Che othera. To ltty the foundaCione of a mare equ~.table socieCy, it wae
Chus ~noat urgenCly n~cessary to rebalance the economy in euch a way as Co
firat lessen itg foreign dependence before being able to reach the st~ge where
ehe r.ountry could rely on its own resources.
T~ accomplish ehis, Che government decided to shift the emphasis from Courism
ro agriculture, fiaheriea, and amall indusCriea. This policy has often been
erroneously interpreted as opposieion Co any subsequent expaneion of tourism~
- Actually it ie designed to control tourism's heretofore reckleas growth, in an
effort to preaerve the natural beauty af the Seychellea and take into account
the poasibiliCies and needs of other aectors of the economy.
Touriam Still Important
BuC rouriam will continue to play an important part in the economy. Eapecially
since ateps lnave been taken Co allow a larger part of the income generated
by this activity to remain in the islanda. One auch atep is the tax syatem
now computed on a hotel's volume of business and no longer on its declared ~
- profits. Another atep is the development of local home arts and crafts
industries and family guest housea belonging to Seychellois.
_ A national.development plan for 1978-1982 was published 1 year after the libera-
tion. It clearly outlined the goals and priorities of the government's action.
Medium-and-long-range goals call for improved material conditions for all
Seychellois in such matters as increased per capita income, nutrition, educa-
tion, housing, health, 3ob opportunities, etc. These goals also provide for
optimum use of the country's physical and human resources, preaervation of
the natural environment, and attainment of a high level of self-sufficiency
in supplying the country's food needs. _
For a small country like the Seychelles with limited resources and a rapidly
increasing population, ach3eving these goals is a difficult and uphill task.
But, as noted in the plan, "these goals can be accompliahed only if a concerted
effort is made on all fronts and in all sectors. As a matter of fact, one
of the most characteristic features not only of the plan but also of the
overall government policy, is the integration of all economic and social
aspects plus the careful consideration given to what repercussions and col-
- lateral effects any measures taken may have at all levels.
The concrete application of this integrated approach is indicated by the capital -
- expenditures ("investmenCa") program. Noteworthy in that program is the impor-
~ tance assigned to economic sectors scheduled for extensive development in the
next few years, such as fisheries and agriculture, and also the considerable
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emphneis plac~d on Che basic infrgaCructures required tio carry out economic
- pro~ecCs and enhance Che population'g living conditions. In addition, such
social welfare sectors ae educaCion, houaing, health, and community centera
wi11 be allotted the very high~eums absoluCely required Co make aure they
operate eff iciently in the inCeresta of not on~.y a minority able to pay, but
Che populaCion as a whole.
The development pl~n ~lso cn11s for such measurea as are needed Co reduce
5eyche~.lea foreign dependence in aeveral fislds, the moat important being
the financial aecCor. The country does,in fact, depend enormously on
_ foreign grant aid and loans to finance ite esaential pro~ects. At the present
Cime, the country's entire development program is financed by foreign sources
and even the government's operating budget is aupplemented by aid funds. The
relatively large amounti of aid obCained and the favorable terms of the loans
granted clearly indicate how serious ly Che government's ecouomic reorientation
effort is taken on Che international level. Especially aince the Seychel~les
is one of the very few Third Wor1d counCries which has not 3mposed exchange
control regular9ons and whoae currency is freely exchangeable. _
But Che government intends to reach a stage where it will be increasingly
independenC of foreign sources of capital and where the country will generaCe
enough resources to attain a high level of self-financing. ,An important first
step in thaC direction was the creation, in 1978, of the Development Bank in
which the Seychelles government holds a ma~ority interest. Each time it is
possible to generate a surplus, the national budget will transfer funds to this -
bank whose purpose is to finance certain long-term inveatments the local banking
system cannot handle. Thus for the first time in Seychelles hiatory, the 1979
budget includes such a payment of 10 million rupees, a large portion of which
will be allocated to the purchase of land for housing and agricultural develop-
- ment.
Other measures were also taken relative to taxation and the financial system
for the purpose of improving the tax yield without thereby affecting production
or employment, and increasing the level of local savings.
BuC these measures Cake a long time to produce results. Consequently, finan-
cial constraints, coupled with a shortage of technically qualified personnel,
are the main obstacle to an even more rapid development of the Seychelles
economy. As President Rene explained it in submitting the 1979 budget: "Even
though we would like to do even more in such areas as education, health, and
welfare, we must act solely within the limits allowed by our revenues....We do
not wish to become a country of beggars. We must act in such a way that other
nations help us because we are working hard for ourselves, and not out of
charity."
Range of Salaries
While total income must be taken into account in planning the country's
overall economy, it is necesary at the same time to act in such a way as to
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obCa3n n better diarribution of thia income wiChin Che society. Thia ia wha~
the government has proceeded to do by Caking action on two levela simultaneously.
The firat is what 3s called indirect redistribution and consista in expanding -
the free services furnished the people. This has been done on a large scale
for education and health. 'The second action has to do with Che range of sa~.aries
and the system of direct taxea. The government began by setting the example
- when it substantially increased the lowest civil service salaries--some were
even doubled--and froze the salaries of the most senior civil aervants. In
so doing, the salary spread, which ranged from 1 Co 20, was reduced to from
l to 13 between the lowest-ranking civil service employee and the moat quali-
fied and highest placed officia~.. Likewise, a national minimum monthly wage was
set for the enCire private sector.
~'hese combined measures plus tighter and tighter price controls on essent3.a1
- goods or staplea have made it possible to improve considerably, even now, the
living standard of all Seychelles workers. Much obviously remains to be done.
Experience shows, however, that firm determi~iation ta give foremost conaidera-
tion to the people's interests can move mounta3na.~
Capital Expenditures Program 1978-1982 (in millions of rupees) -
Annual Expenditures at 1978 Prices
Ministries or
Departments Total Cost
1978-1982 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 -
Agriculture 62.30 14.88 17.56 11.41 7.92 10.53 -
~ Fisheries 105.31 73.50 20.40 8.00 3.32 -
Forests 8.10 5.31 0.75 0.78 0.63 0.63
Tourism 2.20 - 2.20 - - -
Civil Aviation 42.01 ' S.97 16.05 13.39 6.60 -
~ Adminstration &
Information 21.50 2.30 11.05 8.15 - -
Police 23.84 5.60 8.45 5.75 2.24 1.80
Electricity 70.53 13.96 26.03 11.66 7..28 11.60
Finance 15.74 3.17 3.55 3.10 3.22 2.70 -
Water 71.20 31.06 12.74 8.70 11.60 7.10 _
Sewerage 37.50 - 3.00 10.10 14.20 10.20
Public Works:roads 28.20 2.10 9.75 8.15 2.90 5.30
Public Works:bldgs
& ~taintenancp~ 24.59 0.84 7.87 5.23 5.30 5.35
' Port 77.14 15.22 30.55 4.67 14.20 12.50
Community Centers 22.50 2.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Labor-Health 29.14 3.54 11.78 11.07 2.72 O.Q3
Education 96.31 10.50 35.69 22.54 14.54 13.04
Housing 95.92 9.34 19.k1 22.71 20.95 23.51
Land 27.00 - 5.00 9.00 7.00 6.00
TOTAL 861.03 199.79 246.83 169.50 129.62 115.29
Source: Republic of Seychelles National Development Plan 1978-1982
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New I'oliCical, Lgbor, bef~nse OrggnizgCions
pari~ MRTQU~-ASI~ in ~rench 11 Jun 79 pp XXV-XXVI
~ (Articlp: "Le~rn, Aesert 7'hem~~lves~ Defend Themselves...."j -
�
('text~ In spire nf th~ m~chinnCione of the ruling claseee, ehe demagoguery nnd
paterttulism of neocolonialists, Se,ychellois have recogn~.zed the necessity af
uniting behind the SPPF [Seychelles People's Progressive FronC]. -
The cnnnery's first rer~l po~.ieicnl parCy and firsL people's organizaC~.on--
the Seychelles People's United Party (SPUP)--wae formed in June 1964 by
� France Albert Rene, a young 28-year old lawyer.
Thi~ parCy's program called for independence of the Seychellea and estiablish- -
menC of g socieCy in which all oppr~saed peraona wo~uld be freed of material
fears `or their fuCure and could regain their dignity. The party made rapid
gaine annong the working classes thanks Co ehe tirelesa action of ita militante.
This action was aimed not mere].y aC strengthening the party but was alsu deaigned -
to organize Che people at all poasib].e levels so as to permit everyone to
participate in the common struggle. As a resulC, oCher people's organizationa
have sprung up in this country domi;nated by colonialism and in which workers
had never theretofore been able to make themselves heard.
In August 1964~ as soon as the SPUP had succeeded in rallying a certain number
oE workera, France Albert Rene formed the country's firsC labor uni~n, the
Transport And General Workers Union. Less than 1 month laCer, thia young
union succeeded in organizing a strike at the American satellite tracking -
_ station for better working conditions and pay. This was the c~untry's first
organized strike. It was quite unlike earlier spontaneous strike actions
that had been very quickly neutralized by employers.
Spurred by this demonstraeion of Che union's effectiveness, oCher unions were `
organized, and at the.same time, other organizations--women and youth--wnre
~ormed within the SPUP.
But the British and the Seychelles ruling cl.asses reacted vigorously. Because
the mass organizations were displaying such vitality, lthese ruling classes
decided to organize themsclves in an effort to divide and confuse the people.
Hence a few days after ~he establishment of the SPUP, another political party,
- the Democratic Party, was formed. Its platform opposed independence and called
- for the country's integration with Great Brit~in. Hence also the appearance
of two other labor union groups, one upholding Che employers' interests, the
other stresaing the necessity of preserving the neutrality and apolitical char-
acter of labor unions. Both groups opposed those who were convinced Chat -
labor unions constituted a revolutionary forcz representing the workers real
interests and fighting to put an end to the exploitation of workers.
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Thes~ organizneionn of Che bourgeoigie eucc~eded in occ~sionally migleading _
rhe very unenligh~~ned 5~ychellois wieh eheir demagngic ~nd paeernali~tiin
language. gut Chia deception was ahort-lived becguse their ectione f~r
from refleCted their words.
LitC1e by 1ittle, revolutionariea convi.nced Che m~~ority nf Che people whn
Chus sided wieh the new governmene which eme~ged from the country's liberg-
Cion on 5 June 1977.
~or rhe people's org~nizaeions, Chis opened a new chap~er in the hisCdry of
ehe Seychelles. They Could now count on government support in accompliehing
Cheir tnsk. AdmitCedly rhie had some effect on their ineernal atructures
and a~so triggered the appearance of other ot~ganizationa deaigned Co meet the
new needa of both the country and the revolution.
7'hreatened frnm the outeide by the recruitmene of inercenariea organized by
the ouated presfdent, James Mancham, with ehe financial help of some of his =
friends, Che young socialist state had to concern itself with its defense -
from the very outser. On 9 June 1977, President France Albert Rene iasued -
an appeal Co all Seychellois: "Becauae of the circumstancea, we have
decided to ask th~ people themselves to defend their freedom and their country. _
We are, therefore, going to create a people's militia.... All thoae persons
between 16 and 60 deairing to 3oin this militia must regiater tomorrow....
But let me clearly atate that nobody wi11 be paid. Moat acCivities will take
place after working hours and primarily at night."' _
~ The poeple heeded this appeal and a very large nwnber of volunteers responded.
Today there are militia groups composed of inen and women in all of the counCry's
districts and villages.
Members of the militia received military training enabling them to contri-
bute to the country's defense jointly with the army formed during the same
period. But the role of the militia units is not limited to this defenae
aspect. Their importance from a poliCical training standpoint and in generat-
ing a real community apirit has steadily increased.
The sama may be said of the army which, though organized professionally, atill
~ has an important political role. Its very conception contraets sharply with
the traditional design of a special group of armed men apart from society.'
Seychelles soldiere are soldiers first, but so as not to be social~ parasites,
they must provide for their own subaistence by farming, stock raising, or
fishing. Thia enables them to exert a political influence very cloae to the
people.
As f~r the Already existing organizations, they had to face the ticklish pro-
blem of adapting themselves to the new conditions. The first to do so was the _
SPUP which at its second party Congreas from 30 May to 2 June 1978 agreed to
reorganize into a national front, the Seychellea People's Progressive Front
(SPPF). This change confirmed the ~act that the SPUP had accomplished ita
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,
, ~dit d~F'ICIAL US~ nNLY
misainn ns th~ p~rcy nf ehe gCruggle Cnr independ~nce gnd liberty, gnd rhne
hgving agsumed power, ie nnw hgd to b~ converted ineo a vnngunrd orgnnization _
Capable of shcnaing tl~e way to rhe popularion ~s ~ whole.
'Thi~ is g fundament~l pvn,luttdn, bec~use under the one-party system, ng -
approved by the ma3oriCy of Che people during discussions on the new conati-
- tution, the SPP~ wi11 h~?ve n d~cigiv~ role to play. The decigiotts made
dem~~Cratically within the pgrey--decision-making in which all oth~r people's
~ org3niz~rinn whict~ wi11 Chen be obliged to implemenC Chero.
This same reason prompted the e�forts mad~ to unify ~11 such people':s organi-
z~tions as labor unions, women's and youth associaCions.
On S June L977, it became obvious at the labor union level that it was
important for g11 workers to unite in one gingle cenCral national union so
Chat they could continue to parCicipate fully in building and directing
a new socieCy. After many discussions, ~ congress convened in March 1978
founded the central union called the Naeional Workers Union.
Gift F'rom Algeria
It was during this eame period that the different women's organization~
decided to merge inCo the Seychelles Women's Association. Seychelles women,
who had coritinuously played a very active part in Che struggle for the country's
independence and liberation and in the various mass organizations, have thus
now combined their efforCs to promote social ~ustice and defend their rights,
= their emancipation. As for the young people a great deal of aCtention is
being pa:~ to the development of "Pioneer" (for 12-16 year olds) associaCions -
and young "Pioneer" (6-12 years) associations.
J. All of these organizations will soon have their awn offices and facilities -
both aC central and district levels. An extensive program for the construction =
of community centers is underway, and also for the construction of a"Maison ~
du Peuple" [National Community CenterJ which is to be financed by a generous
~ gift oE 1.1 million dollars from Algeria. This overall program will increase
opportunities for contact between the people and the government. Most of all,
~ however, it will enable rhe people to take an increasingly more active part
~ in building socialism in the Seychelles.
SPPF Leadership
When the Second SFUP Congress founded the SPPF, it also elected the fol~:;wing
SPPF Central Committee: Chairman, France Albert Rene; vice chairman, Maxime
Ferrari; secretary general, Guy Sinon; treasurer, Esme Jumeau; secretary for
" propaganda, James Michel; secretary for organization, Ogilvy Berlouis; politi-
cal secretary, Jacques Hodoul; assistant secretary general, Mathieu Servina;
assistant treasu:er, Rita Sinon; and Central Committee members Philibert Loizesu,
- Sylvette Frichot. ulivier Charles, France Bonte, Langia Pool, and Jotin Mascarenhas
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asia
' 8041 END
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