JPRS ID: 8585 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070030-0
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 30
• Content Type: REPORTS

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FOft OFF'IC'IAi, t?~M: ONL1'
JPRS L/8585 -
23 July 1979
Near East North Africa Re ort
p
~FOUO 30/79) ~
FBIS FOREIGN BROAGCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
JPRS publicationa contain information primari:y from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from n~ws agency
transmisaions and broadcasCa. Material~ from foreign-language
sourcea are trgnslated; those from English-lgnguage sources
ar~ tranacribed or reprit~Ced, with the origfnal phrasing and
other characteriatics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports~ and material enclosed in brackets
[J are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as ~TextJ `
or (Excerpt) in the first line of e3ch item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
proceased. Where no processing indicator is given, Che infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were n~t clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
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given by source.
The conCents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
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JPRS L/8585
23 July 1979
NEA R F~4ST/NO RTN AFR I CA REPO RT
(FOUO 30/79)
CON1'~NTS PAGE
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
No Obatacles to Unity, Hammadi Declares
(Sa'dun Hammadi;AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 25-31 May 79)....... 1
Implications of Arab League's Move to Tunis Malyzed
(Souhayr Belhassan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 20 Jun 79)........... 6
;
IRAN
Shari'at-Madari Describes his Political Position
(Shari'at-Madari Interview; LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUI:,
' 25 Jun-1 Jul 79) 12
IRAQ
Briefs
Mirage Deal 14
MAURITANL'~
Bousseif's Death Restores Balance of Forces Within CMSN
(Abdelaziz Dahmaai; JEUNE AFRIQU~, 13 Jun 79)........... 15
lfOROCCO
Prime Miaister Says Not Oae Inch of Sahara Will Be Ceded
, (Maati Bouabid Interview; AL-WATAN A~.-'ARABI,
' 25-31 May 79) 17
Morocco Criticizad for Lack of Social Justice
~Ali Gharbi; AFRIQUE ASIE, 11-24 Jun 79) 28
-a- (III -NE &A-121FOUOj
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CONTENTS (ConCinued) p~8e
TUNI5IA
DeaCouria~i Campaign Againet A~-Qadhdhafi Drnounced
(Fathi Abdallah; AFRIQUE-ASIE~ 11-24 Jun 79)............ 31
PRFT Secretary General Aescribes ~rdeal in Pri~son
(Zine E1-Medkhouri; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 11-24 Jun 79)......... 34
Fate of Long-Term Prisoners Described
, (Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE APRIQUE, 27 Jun 79)........... 39
WESTERN SAHARA
_ 5ahara Problem Oae of Main Themes of .TACA Security Seminar
(CAMBIO 16, 10 Jun 79) 44
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIItS
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NO OB5TACLES TO UNITY, HA1~4WDI DECLARES
Paria AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic '15-31 May 79 pp 28-29
(Interview with Dr Sa'dun Hammadi, Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, author
' unknown: "Syrian-Iraqi Unity Enters the Phase of Discuasing Party Unity
and the Form of Federation"]
[Text] Our inCerview with Dr Hammadi was noC a diplomatic one. He wanted
, to lay it on the line and stated his country's position regarding aensitive
nnd important current Arab issues in a frankness seldom adopted by an ~
Arab official.
Fez, from our correspondent:
The conference of foreign ministers of Islamic countries in thie city known
Eor its Islamic character was one of the most succesaful conferences demon-
strating Arab solidarity with their Muslin brothera in facing the great
issues which concern the Arab and Muslim worlds.
The Arab cause dominated the conference resolutions, which etressed that
~ just peace will not prevail in~the Arab world except through complete with-
~ drawal and giving the Palestinian people their full rights, including the
right to se]~f determination and establishing their independent state in
Palestine. The conference also condemned the U.S. role and its efforts to
gain support for the Camp David accords and President Sadat's treaty with
, Israel, through cajoling or threatening Arabs. The suspansion of the Sadat
'i regime's membership was a punitive measure expressing the censure of 500
j million Moslems of Sadat's surrender of the holiest of their hnly places,
~ their land aad .7erusalem.
I The Conference's interest in Jerusalem, the second holy city in Islam, is
I demonstrated by formation of a special committee, headed by King Hassan II
of Morocco, to carry out a political and informative program on a worldwide
scale to assert the city's Islamic and Arab character.
~
' Dr Ha~adi headed his country's delegation to the conference. We interviewed.
, him on this occasion, discussing the followins~ questions:
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(QuegCionj Now do you aesese the resulta of the lOth Conference of Islamic
, ~oreign Ministers?
(Answer] The resulCa have been posiCive, the program sound~ everything went
ae well as one could poasibly wish and the sesaion wae a etep forward in
developing the conference's cultural, economic~ political and social
institutiona.
'I'he resolution suspending EgypC's memberahip is in keeping with the cen-
ference principles. It was the last impoxtant resolution adopted, and iCs
bignificance lies in the fact that it is an internaCional resolution
larger than the Arab world. It expreased the Islamic opinion in the Egyptian-
Isrueli treaty and in what Sadat has done.
t~'rom now on, no one can say that the Islamic public opinion regarding the
Camp David accords or Preaident Sadat's treaty with Israel is unknown. The -
resolutiona will serve as a atarting point to expand the campaign to
isolate Sadat's regime in the future.
I did not notice any axes in the conference. There were some little differ-
ences around secondary matters which is normal in such meetinga. There were
no real conflicts.
True, the Arab countries initiated Egypt's isolation; however, the other
nations followed suit. Some non-Arab countries such as Pakietan and Iran
were ~ust as enthusiastic as the Arabs regarding th~ measures.
[Questionj You have said lately that Jerusalem cannot be regained by d~p-
lomatic means, are we to understand that its recovery cannot be realized ~
except tihrough war?
[Answer] I believe that the whole ARab-2ionist conflict can be solved only ~
by the Arab's own power. We are certain that Israel understanda only the
language of force. Jerusalem can be regained either by war or potential
_ war which Israel would lose. This is what can help to reach a just solution.
[QuestionJ There has lately been talk of returning the Middle East problem
to the UN. Is there agreement among the Arab countries which attended the
Baghdad Sumcnit to submit the Palestinian problem to a special UN session?
[Answer] There was no voting on such a matter. However, I believe that
all Arab coimtries favor a special UN session to deal with the Palestinian
problem.
[Question] With regard to the Gulfs do you think the United States is
capable of creating events which would justify its intervention? What is
Egypt's role in such a matter?
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lAnewerJ I b~lieve thc~t with the ddwnfnll di the Shc~h's regtme, it is much
n~r~ difficult for the United 5tnCea to sCir up trouble in tlie Culf sCc~Ces.
~ven wh~n that regin;~ wue playing A protector role, it wns noe easy for tt~e
United States to do so becauge iC knew r.hat the reacrion in Che C~~lE sttttes
wnuld rio,~ be small. An agression would not go unpunished.
- Now Che e~tuation is more difficult and the United SCntes will hgve to think
longer tt~nn before. However, President 5adat~ wiCh the arrognnce and
irrita~,ion he is known for due Co the opposition l~e encou~itera, the un-
- expected renctiona und t~is own psychological circumatnncee will stir up
tcoublp in thc Culf region, ~lthough he is going to fail.
(c~ue~tionJ You huve recently visited Lebanon~ do you see a poasible
solution to the crisis Chere?
[Answer) A successf~l solution may i:~t ab~ee 100 percent with Che point of
view of either side. It is a conciliator~ solution and consequently should
be pleasing to all parties, including other Arab countr~es. Ir should put
an end to dealing with the Zionist enemy. It seems to me also that there
is no ob~ection to consulting with countries outside the Arnb world und
to seeking their approval and cooperation. Finally, tl~e solution sho~ld
include a program of economic aid to help Lebanon overcome ita bAd
economic situation.
[QuestionJ How do you see the course of conditions following the declara-
tion of the renegade major Sa'd Haddad to the so-called "free Lebanon"?
[Answer) I cannot answer that. I have seen one positive indicator in my
recent visit, namely, the antagonists are convinced that neither side
can impose his point of view by military force.
'it~i~ is a positive factor, which constitutes a good background for a solu-
tion. As long as one of the parties hopes for a military victory there is
, no way to reach a solution.
This is the only positive thing i have seen. Others are negative and
are not encouraging.
[QuestionJ Some observers believe that the obstacle to Iraqi-Syrian
unity is lack of agreement over unifying theparty.
_ [Answer] I have nothing to add to what I said on previous occasions. I
do not know what creates this impression. It is probabl.y psychological
more than factual~ It is as if there are those who believe that the
Iraqi-Syrian unity should be achieved as soon as possible or as if there ~
is wishful thinking of obstacles. Such great matters cannot be achieved
in a short time.
I can say that there are no obstacles whatsoever. We are in a phase where
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each side is gtating iCs point of view regarding two great problems, (1) ~
unifying the party, (2) the form of the state. The 1aCter requires a long ~
time, parCicularly the writing of a constitution. Preparing an instrumenC
embodying rhe organization of a cooperative requires eeveral monCha. ~
~
[QuestionJ You have visited Moroccan King Hassan II. What did you discusa ;
Cogether? ,
(AnKwerj 'The visit was a courteay one, not for talka. However, I pre- ~
5enled to his ma~esty our viewa on Arr~b conditions, particularly Che ~
~Arab-ui~nist struggle.
I discussed with his ma~esCy the implementation of the Baghdad reaolutiona
which we are working on and the Islamic Conference. His ma~esty gave me '
some information regarding the area of north-west Africa. i
;
[Question] Is there anythig new in the Iraqi position on the Sahara problem?
[Answer] We trust that it will be solved aoon, within a framework approved _
by ~11 parties. '
[Question] It has been rwnored that there are attempta to normalize Iraqi- ~
Sudanese relations. '
i
[Answer] I have no knowledge of such a thing. ~
[Question] Deterioration of relations between the two countries might '
have a negative effect on Iraqi support of the Eritrean revolution. '
~
[Answer] This question should be addressed to the Sudan.
;
[Question] The Islamic Conference has discussed the problem of Islamic
minorities oppressed in some countriea. What is Iraq's position on this ~
problem such as the Moro Liberation Front in the Philippines? ~
[Answer] We support the cultural and economic demands of Muslim societies
all over the world. Also their demands for justice and equality. It is
time to take into consideration Muslim minorities in other countries.
Islam is a great force in the world. It is a religion with a philosophy
and culture which are worthy of respect. Since it respects other reli-
gions, the other religions and peoples should respect the Muslims and Islam. ~
We do not call for secessionist movements in countriea with Muslim minori- ~
ties. We do not believe in partitioning the world on a religious basis.
However, we believe that theproblem of Muslim minorities in the Philippines ~
must be solved in a just way. It cannot be dealt with only with arms and ;
by f orce. ~
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I [Queytion] D~ ynu think ChnC relationa between the Ar~b Sociglist Ba'th Pnrty
~ rind tti~ Iraqi Communist Pntty have been severed compleCely? If this ie
~ rrue, wtiat is ehe future o� the National Fronr?
[Answer~',,'The National Front livea. We have not expelled the Communiat
; party. ~~~f it wants to remain it can. However, it doea not act inCernally
; and intQrnACionally as a friend and ally. -
~ ~
i A11 we~i~~nt ~nd insist upon is Che aupport of Che charCer and the spiriC
~ of the.National Front. We ask others to do the same. Should the
i CommunieC.Party abandon its old attitudes it would be welcome. We cannot
~ accept as part of the NaCi.onal Front a political organization wl~ich ia noC
~ commit~ed to the Front's principles.
~ COPYRIGHT: 1971 al-Watan al-'Arabi
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
IMPLICATIONS OF ARAB LEAGUE';S MOVE TO TUNIS ANALY2ED ~
Paria JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 20 Jun 79 pp 69-70,72
(Article by Souhayr Belhassen]
[Text] After h~~ving moved from Cairo, the Arab League is to be inatalled
in Tunis but nc~;: without problems. On1y 80 officials reported to their
positions on 26 May. In a few days, on 27 June, the Council of the League .
is supposed to elect the new secnetary general at an extraordinary see-
sion; however, nothing has been set up.
In Tunis, in La P1ace de 1'Afrique~ the flags of 21 Arab countries are
fluttering in the wind around tha equestrian atatue of Habib Bourguiba. ~
They mark the preaence of the Arab League in Tunia eince 12 April at a
time when the committee of aix (Tunisia, Algeria, Kuwait, Syria, Iraq,
Saudi Arabia), which is responsible for implemeating the decisions of the
Baghdad Conference, had begun its work. Four hundred foreign officials
were expected in Tunis at the end of May where they were supposed to report
to their positions. In a six~story building which contains 100 offices,
located on the ~irport road, at the northern exit point of the capital.
Real estate companies and a~;encies were called upon to make a liating of
dwellings suitable for housing 100 Arab families. This massive arrival
was e-.cpected resolutely by the ownere of villas who were making fantastic
future plans!
From the university stenographer on down, everyone is a candidate for em-
ployment by the league and, for the first time, the Arabization of educa-
tion is unanimously accepted. It is true that ther~: are nearly 400 posi-
tions to be filled, not counting those reserved for non~Tuniaians. One
thousand officials and employeea of an international org~nization: that
is a figure which is of significance~to an overpopulated city auch as ~ Y
Tunis where it is increasingly difficult to drive and where the in~ection ,
of a new salaried group will not taice long to have inflationary e~fecta.
Already prized by Tunieians, Tunis ahould enchant other Arabs. In the
minds of many nationals, the gentie way of life and the seaside resorts
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! will win over viaitors who, were it not for the league, would never have
_ come'to Tunsia~ "For the first time, economic policy and the idea of
! making.Tuniaia a Switzerland of Che Arab world have become credible," a
~ , banker'dreams aloud.
' Those opposed to the leagues coming to Tunia are mixed couples the wives
of wh~.ch fear that an Arab presence will be too heavy! "There is already
~ talk o'f~replacing Sunday by Friday," says a concerned Frenchwoman who has
, always~li~ed in Tuniaia.
ci
"The A~ab League without Egypt ia a purely theoretical concept! We cannot
cross off 40 million Egyptians by a reeolution, even if it is a summit
; resolution. The league's cal:ling is to ahine forth from Egypt~" we are
told by a law professor! As the result of this tranafer, we are going to
: witness a long-winded or declared confrontation between moderate leader.a
and those of the ateadfastaess front, each of whom is going to pull the
covers over his head with this mental reservation, profoundly anchored in
most of those who opted for Tunisia, that this country is capable of
nothing and will allow itself to be led by the strongeat countriea." As
a matter of fact, it is known in Tunis that the Saudi inte~vention was
decisive. It was Saudi Arabia which induced the Tunisian lead~ra to ac-
cept the leagus headquarY:ers.
Moreover, diplomats accredited to Tunis agree in thinking that the charm
shown by Algiers toward its neighbor to the east is designed to take
Algeria out of its Maghrebian isalation and to make of it, in a way, the
~ regic?nal spokesman within the league, while consolidating the poaitiona of
the gteadfastneas front. Nr.mmerous are those who think that a transfer of
the league to Tunis is proviaional, that other countries, more experienced
; than Tunisia in inter--Arab problems, are better able to resolve them.
~
' "The Arab League in Tunis is our ravenge." One person out of two who was
asked whether he was for or against the installlation of the organization
~ in the Tunisian capital had this conception of "turnabout is fair play".
i Tun3sia is the only Arab country which hr~s had conf licting relations in-
~ side the organization. At the outaet, Bourguiba called for a choice of
the egalitarian principle, a concept linked with the position occupied
~ by Nasser and which, therefore, experienced all the mis-adventures of
� Nasserism.
i Tunisia had barely ~oined the Arab League when it lodged a complaint against
Egypt's interference in its af�airs. On 13 Qctober 1958, ~.n its resolution
~ 1948, the league re~ected his complaint.
~ ~
; Since then, Tunisia has taken exception to Egypt~s leadership which is -
seeking to impose its foreign po ~tcy options. And Bourgui~aa has not stopped
' expressing his hostility to such activities, often with brutal frankness.
~ "Never," he explained on 13 September 1965, "have the Arabs more fiercely
; killed one another than since Egypt assumed the sacred mission of uniting
-i them".
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More Troubles Than Positive Aspects
He t~as also refused on many occasic:na to parCicipate in meetings of the
league and renounced attending the Arab summit meetings in September 1964 _
and 1965. Opposed to the principle of "all or nothin~" as regards the
Palestinian problem, Bourguiba was baniahed from the Arab nation.
It was Iraqti=where on 22 March 1979 the Baghdad summit chose Tunis as Che
Headquarters of the Arab Leasue--which was most deCermined to heap criCi-
cism upon Tuniaia and Bourgui~a to the point thaC Che latter renounned
. going there even though he was already at the Iraqi border.
The "turnabout is fair play'~ is also to be understood with respect to
- the West in Chp face of which there is ao longer the "colonial" noCion of
an Maghreb and Mashiq. "Therefore, from now on~" a pr~fesaor of hist~ry
said, "every time there is an option of destiny placed upon the Arab nation~
the Maghreb will be asaociated with it in a direct and inescapable manner."
"The league is coming to :unis," he added. "Is thia not proof that Che
Maghreb and Machrek are more than solitary, Chat they constitute a living
organism. The Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian natione are proud of this
transfer. The Arab warld has come to knock on ~heir door!" This adher-
ence to the league's coming to Tunis is general; however, it is not without
nuances. And the most clearheaded individuals see in iti more troubles
and dangers for Tunisia than positive aspects. _
` The head of a department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this diplomat
is critical with respect to the "victory of Tunisia which does not honor
the Arab world" since it is dedicated to its division. On the other hand,
- the hope which he shares with a number of his colleagues is that Chey may
be able to go beyond the stage of ~gy~tian paternaliam and keep only the
qualitative option.
To put himself in a constructive, if not opt9.mistic frame of mind, is
also Che ob~ective of the minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohamed Fitouri,
who expresses well the thought of those in favor of the tranefer. "For
a third of a cen tury," he said,"" the league was not able to meet the
aspirations of the Arab citizen nor eve~cything he expected of it. We
must give him a new hope [esprit] which involves realism, moderatian and
perspicacity." According to him that requires "a modification and updating
af the charter and regulations of the league."
The administrative apparatus, still according to the head of the Tunisian
diplomatic sector, should sim at quality rather than quantity and should ~
no longer endure the plethora of officials. Finally, if certain organiza-
tions duplicate the work of'other international organizations, all the
more reason to abolish them.
Tunisians, therefore, do not intend to cross their arms and let thinga hap-
pen. They intend to act in the sense of a rationalization of the league,
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k ~nk 0~'~ICIAI.~ U5~ UNLY
,
~ rti
gd thgt'the lAtCer ~?ill nn lnng~r b~ domin~t~d by aord~ rer'er than grcinn.
~hpr~ mu~t Le p~rgnnn~l ch~nge~; the ~pirit of ehe lp~gue wi11 nf npcpg-
~itiy fdllnw. A Cnngequenc~~ it ia thnught~ which wil]. nn~ only be paei-
tiv~ tor th~ Ar~b~~ but gl~o for thh Nnrth-South dialog.
pr~t~neioug nr Neive
mhi~ dpt~rmination bringB e smile tn the lip~ of thoep who are ronvinc~d
th~t the l~~gu~ wi11 not lagt mor~ than 3 year~ and who find ~unieiane
pret~ntiou~ ~r naive.
"We hev~,b~~n ungble tn do enything at the Maghrebian l~vel," I was told
by e high oEf icial of Ch~ Mgghrebian p~rmanent coneultaCive cnmmitt~~
whoge hea?dquart~r~ ie in Tunig. "Let ~verydn~ l~grn to swe~p hia~ own
. gtnop before ettempting to take care of ehe hnugekeeping of others!"
iiow are Tunigia and the Tuniaians going to h~ndle an event which hae suct~
profound repercussione for th~ national coascience? -
When for the first time there aae talk about the traasf~r of th~ league
in November 1978, the government reacted with regerve. Only ~iuurguibe
could put forth a refusel (according to his familiarg~ thie choice wae
not much to his liking). And facing up to the eventual feeling of frus-
tration which probably followed that choice.
The government was wrong to hesitate. According to a communigt~ the
Le~gue ie a card in the governmeat's hand which. responding to the Tunisian'g
desire for Arat~nesg, satiafies a demand. "It is~" he said, "an appeasemeat
factor at the level of the country's domest�c eituation."
"At the point we now are~ there ia no doubt that the government and th~
party are going to be forced to integrate thia new factor into taeir
gtrategy," said a minister and member of the political bureau.
The Young People are Enthusiastic
There is nothing :.ut the gover~ent aad the DesCourian Socialiet Party.
The supporters and, above all, the opponente of the government Will try to
tap this "new element" to their profit. That is why members of the opposi-
tion are generally in favor~ even if the reasoas differ.
"It is a setback for the policy of Westernization which the governmeat has
been conducting for 20 years. Whether it vants to or not, it will be
forced to bring its Nescern positioas back into balance~ as the prisoner
of its own Arab image and the fact that the Arab League is in Tuais~" said
a man of the lef t who goes further in his aaalysis: "The government is
running risks to the degree that progressive Arab factioas from nos+ oa
are going to find points of eupport." It is possible, in fact, that one
day the Tunisian mass media will report the inflamed revolutionssry speeches
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which ar~ mgdp at time~ within the leagu~ and Chet personal couCgct~ end
thp trgctB will do the rest.~.
If th~ politi~~l claee~ thp intelligenteia or the holdere of the ~coaamic
control.~ ~rp dividpd over the edvantage~ and dieadvantegea of the trene-
fpr~ thp young people ere fr~nkly enthueiaet~c.
"Thoge vho thought Ch~t in the cradle of the Maghreb it would be pngeible
to continue to live removed from thie univeree of canflicts are quite
aaiv~," dgid a young profeg~or. "When the Araba are eick~ there ie no
oa~ig that ie really spared. The eun and eand aesume the reeponeibility
for heating up and communicaCing the dieeaBe. That is hosr we come Co the
realization that Che Craneparence of the Arab world ie perfect and total
from th~ Maghreb to the Meshriq."
Youthful lyriciam ergses differencea and wipes out obat~cles. "If Tunisia
becomes the r~lay point for contradictiona~ opporCunities and hopes of
the Arab world, where ie the harm ia it?" a sociology etudent aske. "We
were bein~; moved backsrard away from the Arab world. Today~ we are goiag
to bask in our own light." And he added~ "Tunieia experienced the Arab
problem at the level of ite fantasies, ~ust as e livi~eg peraon thinke
about Paradise."
In fact, thie hope eeems to conatitute the persoaality of the Tunisian.
If it does not~ how are we to explain that Arab union aad, beyond that~
Arab unity have become a concrete problem in Tunieia to the point that the ~
political class hae to do something about it? The queetion has beea posed.
In a digcreet manner in Kef in May 1973 atiea Boumedi~ne pnopoeed union to
Bourguiba. Aud in a shaCtering manner in Jerba in January 19a4. Today it
is being posed in the country. Aad in the region. In oae vay or another,
will the league act as a catalyst or a detonator? Por the time being,
some leaders think that the league can protect Tunisia against the exceasea
of neighboring Libya.
Tunisia-East: The Reconciliation
w'hen questioning young people, whether theysre students or unemployed
persons, chaouch (orderlies) or bus drivers, teachers or vaitera, ve get
the feeling that above and beyond the intellectual, Cactical~ operational
and strategic options of the Bourguiba of decolonization, above and
beyond the political and intellectual divisions, history is renewing the
bond between Tunisia aad the East.
"We are vitnessi~g," said a young researcher for the CERES (?Center for
Socialist Study~ Research and Education]~ "the reconciliation which neither
the sacrifice of the Horoccsn soldiers at Golan aor the ideological and
emotional verbiage of the Algeria of Ben Bella aad Boumediene ar~ sufficieat
to hac~per [comblerj. The Arab cuaaensus on the choice of Tunis gives proof
chat a deeper~ more eyathesizing experieace~ precisely tl:.at of the Tunisia
of Bourguiba responds to this reconciliation and this rediscovered identity."
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shi
' The d~bgre ~rdu~ed amnng certgin univergity etud~nt~ by th~ inHtullnrion
of the L~ague in Tunig i~ intere~Cing. '~o thp degree Ch~t Tuai~ian ~oci~ty
i~ p~rc~ived eg g free eocieCy whiCh i~ pureuing it~ d~gtiny in a r~lex~d
mann~r and which confronts new eituation~.
We think that if the government re~lly permit~ dielog it will hev~ to r~-
coneider ite pc~r~meters ee a funetion nf thi~ ma~or ev~nt nad hav~ en np-
portunity to dige~C it~ Ju~t like the adolesrent who ov~rcnm~g the npgg-
Civi~m of hi~ 18 ypars to ~mbraee hi~ dei~nitive car~~r ag an adult gnd
m~ture man, Tuni~la~ with thig Arab dimen~ion~ would acquire it~ defini-
tive id~neity. We would th~n cloe~ the gourguibian parenthesis.
Managing the Crieie at B~gt
Thie is a eimple ~nd almosC simpligtic hypothesis einC~ the generarion whirh
had mgde up its mind tn divorce the ~ast ig etill there. And iC i~ thig
gener~tion which ie leading the country. Made up of the legitimate defen-
dera of a certain Bourguiba, this generation proclaims itg refu~~l to take
Che problematical Arab into its retrograde manifesta[ic+ns end regregeive
optione.
A minister now in dffice~ who is among the big namea~ becomes almoet en-
raged: "The Arab countriea are thinking af us because they cannot do
anything else. Tunisia Was chosea because the other countrie,~ were elimina-
_ ted. At best we are going to manage a crieie. But at worot~ we do not
even icnow. We were strangers to th~ violence and demagogy ahich are ehaking
~ the Arab ~mrld. Now the Tunieian governmQnt is changing and~ becauae of
chis~ ie preaenting tieaknesaes which could be aggravated by foreign mani-
pulations! In reality~ we are allowing our heads to be turned by the foam
ahich threatens to become a wave capable of carrying ua aaay."
A PDG IexPansion unknown] sees in it the loss of Tunisia's immunity; "Ne
are going to trundle along the cvntradictions of the Arab world. Tuaisia~s
metier is to maintain the balance between the African axea~ the Arabs and
the Mediterraneana, It is true that Bourguiba did rather direct it to~ard
the West; however~ is that a sufficieat reaeon for us today to turn toaard
the Arab world?"
Therein lies the moral of the story. In the light of the transfer of the
league, it seems that betxeen the leadership class and the holdera of
power in general, on the one hand~ and the mass of the rising generatione~
on the otr.er hand~ seneitivity to the e3sential problems is different.
C4PYRICHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
8143
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SHAR2'AT-MADARI DESCRI9ES HI5 POLITICAL POSITION
PBrig L~ NOUV~L OBSEItVATEUR in Fren~h 25 Jun-1 Ju1 ~9 pp 43-44 LD
[Intprviea orith Iranian Ayatollah Shari'at-Madari in Qom by Josette Alia:
"The Mosques' Creat Revenge"--date not specifiedJ
(Excerptsj ~ihat Was my reason for going to s~e Shari'at-Madari? Becauee
the revolutioaary celebratioae are no~+ over and the day of reckoning has
come. Khomeyni's popularity is starting to fall. He is a strict Muslim
and plans to epply a pure and difficult Islem ahich ~tirs up oppoaition
not only among secular groups~--vhich does not worry him--but also vithin
the religious party. This internal opposition~ vhich seems to be led by _
Shari'at-Madari, has a theological and political aepect.
The first main point on ahich opinions are divided is vhether a member
of the Shi'ite clergy can, ~rithout sinning, take a direct part in political
actioe vhen Sh3'ism regards all po~+er as necessarily carrupting. This
quarrel goes back maay years (to 1905) and is dividing the Iranian clergy
aiore than ever before. So~me support Khomeyni's viev that they cannot impose
a real Islamic regime aithout directly exercising power. Others support
Shari'at-Hadari in fearing to soil their hands s+ith politics. They muet `
certainly inspire the people--but from the aasques.
Of course, this point of dogma has political implicatioas. For example,
at the present timc people are fighting for or against the constituent
assembly. Khomeyni is proposing that a council of "wise men" appointed
by him should draft the construction and then submit it to popular
referendum. Sadeo Qotbzadeh, his political adviser, explained: A
dem~cratically elected Chamber of Deputies must be installed as soon as
possible. Othervfse there is a danger of the revolution leading to a
dictatorship~ as has been the case !n other countries. Therefore ahy
waste time ai+aiking the deliberations of 200 constituent assembly members
who vill not gtve t6e country a legal gover~ent for a long time?" The
secular groups and the~moderate clergq re~ect this argument. They think
that a referendum in such conditiona aould simply be a plebiscite for or
- against the Imam, and nobody doubts that he vould be given full popular
support for a text dravn up by him vithout any real discussion in the
coimtry,
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~ F
'I'hig i~ Che first Ma~or differenCe of npinion which has eris~n nmong rhe
r~ligidus lEnderg for ~i months and it could hnve ~Prious cnn~equencefl,
Shc~ri':~t-Mnduri~ whn gupportg the mod~rnCe~, hns .ju~t cnlled on hi~ pnrey
eo d~mnnstrate fdr a constituent nssembly and h~nce agoineC Khomeyni,
5hnri'nt-Mad~~ri ha~ ~ gregt deal of influence: the whole nf Az~rb~i~.hn
(in~luding rhe 2 million AzprbaijaniB in Teh~ran) following him. I~ the
war of the ~yntolluhs ab~ut to etart?
"I dectded Ch~t this demnngtrgtion should be canceled," Shari'gt-Madari
told us quietly, clasping hig delicnte whiCe hands--bishop's hnnda.
"You see"--he scr.atched his forehead underneath his turban--"th~re could
be provocaCions and bloodshed~ There nre still too many disCurbnnces in
th~ cnuntry in Kordistan and Khuze~tan~" 'I'his gtntement caused ~stonish-
ment. Has he been thregtened? Zs h~ giving way to pressure from
Khomeyni? Has he changed hi~ views on the constituent assembly? He smiled
and his eyes sparkled behind his little bl~ck spectncles, *Io~ he has not
changed his views. Quite the reverae. If there in any attempC to fot..e
~ referendum withouc previous elections he will refuae to take pnrt in the
vote nnd will call for a boycott. That says everythinq. The religious
front will not be split and the war of the ayatollahs will not take place
in the street next Friday. However~ a trial of strength has begun behind
the scenes in the mosques. Who will ~rin?
The only important question is how far it is possible to go in an tran
which has ~ust lived through 30 years of dictatorship and which ie not
prepared to abandon the freedom it has only ~ust regained.
"The shah practiced populism without the people; now the imam is practicing
populism with the peoFle. That has a name: fascism~" and Iranian intellec-
tual told me. He believed in Khomeyni like everybody else until he came to
power, The illusion lasted 1 week--a short spring~ Now, after 4 montha of
Islamic revnlution the secular left is already fighting with its back to
the wall. But it is still fighting, A newspaper~ KEYHAN, falls, taken from
inside by an Islamfc committee, but other clandestine newspapers immediately
spr~ng up. Women are banned from working as 3udges so women magistrates
occupy the justice ministry and organize a sit-in until Che miniater gives
way. However, this last resistance sometimes looks like courage without
hope, which is reminiscent of Prague's final days before the Soviet nor7nali-
zation~ The most active leftwing groups fear Islamic normalization and some
are preparing to go back underground. During the recent disturbances in
Khuzestan [number indistinctJ Trotskiyists, 17 trade union workers and later
40 Fedayeen were arrested. A young Trotskyist, who has known the Savak and
the shah's prisons, told me "we.are Khome3?ni's first political prisoners. Our
struggle has started again for.~.20 years,"
COPYRICHT; 1979 "le Nouvel Observateur"
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IRAQ
BRIEFS ~
MIRACE DEAL--Paris, Jul 79--M Iraqi Mission 1ed by the Defenae Minister~
- 'Adnan Khayrallah, recently made a visit to Prance. Iraq was intending to
order a further consignement of Mirage F-1 ~ets as well as the eventua]. ,
purchase of the Mirage 2000. [Text] [Paris MONITEUR DE L'AERONAUTIQUR in
French Jul 79 p 7~
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~
~ F'OIt nl~ ~IC Ct1L U51~; (~NLY
~
i
! MAURITANIA
I
~
;
1
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{
i bOUSSEIF'S DEATH RESTORES BALANCE OF ~ORCES WITHIN CMSN
~ Paris JEUNE AFRIQU~ in French 13 Jun 79 p 17
(Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "Fragfle Rebalancing")
;
, (TextiJ The death of Prime Minister Admed Ould Boussei�, on Sunday 27 May
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 961), led, on the following Sunday 3 June, to the re-
: signation of Col Moustapha Ould Mohamed Saleck, chief of state and chair-
man of the Dfilitary Committee for National Safety (CMSN).
This departiire had been in the air since 6 April, when the president ac-
tually lost authority. The tragic death of Bousseif only precipitated
events, because Ould Saleck soughti to exploit the situation to his benefit.
; Bousseif's successor, LtCol Mohamed Khouna Ould Heydala, minister of Defense,
chosen by the CMSN on Thursday 31 May, found an opportunity there to reveal
himself as the new stronq man in the Mauritanian Government. One of his
; friends, LtCol Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Louly, a finance department officer and
~ minister (of Civil Service, Higher Education and Vocational Trainingj since
10 July 1978, succeeded Ould Saleck in his dual functions. The new presi-
~ dent, a native of Tidjikja, is reputed to be a good administrator. Lieute-
nant Colonel Heydala has formed a new 15-member government (compared with
36), including eight military men: Defense (retained by the prime minister),
; Interior, Plan and Fishing, Equipment and Transportation, Information and
~ Telecommunications, Education, Youth and Spocts. Permanency of the CMSN
is ensured by LtCol Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi. Ahmedou Ould Abdallah retains
~ Foreign Affairs and Yedali Ould Cheikh becomes minister of Justfce. The
` new government is also marked by a restoration of ethinic balance.
I �
i Khouna Ould Heydala, 39 years old, born in a larye tent in the Nouadhibou
f region~ started his military career on 1 September 1962. He took training
courses in France, at Saint Cyr Coetquidam and then at Saint Maixent, and
i he alternated in co~nands at Rosso, Bir Moqhrein and Zouerate (at the time
' of the POLISARIO (People's Front for the Lfberation of Saquia el-Hamra and
~ Rio de Oro] attacks).
4 The Zouerate attack, on 1 May 1977, was the first serious alert experienced
by the Mauritanian Army. Khouna Ould Heydala came out of it increased in
i
l
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stature. W~ wer~ able tn eay the following of him in J~UPi~ 1~FitIQUE, No 859
(24 June 1977)~ "in epite of hie training at Saint Cyr, Khouna Heydela ie
still a pure product of the degert. He has to his cr~dit a large number of
pr~stigiou~ acCions that, if they are not known tio t!ie ittternatiional presa,
are reported extensively in fliacussions under country tenta or in the living
room o� citiy dwellers. 7'hat is where public opinion exalte it~ heroee or
~ gtigmatizea cowardly or ambiguoua attitudes. Heydala is calm, even earene.
'I'he hinterland did not regard the Zouerate operation as a defeat, in spite
of what might have been written."
A few months later, he was promoted to th~ grade of lieutenanti colonel ex-
ceptionally. Nevertiheless, a judge in the town of Atar sought to condemn
him for "collusion with the POL2SARI0," this man of the north some of whose
relatives had joined the POLISARIO Front. The accusation raised an outcry
_ and the whole army, from officers to tiroops, supported E~eyr]ala. Prestige
also worked for him in succeedin~ Bousaeif.
Heydala, who is surely the least political of the Mauritanian military, was
- appointed chief of staff after the 10 July 1978 coup d'etat. He was, how-
ever, one of the first to protest, with LtCol Ahmedou Ould Abdallah and
Maj Maouia Ould Taya, against the methods of Preaident Moustapha Ould Saleak.
After the "second white coup d'etat," on 6 April 1979, he was appointed min-
ister of Defense.
The death of Ould Bousseif restores balance to the force ratio within the
CMSN between advocateB of a moderate line and those .in favor of a more com-
mitted line with regard to the POLiSARiO. The appointment of Khouna Ould Hey-
dala confirms this restoration of balance. This situation wfll not fail to
give rise to pressure from all sides. Because each one wil..l be tem~ted to
make this unstable balance lean in his favor. Ever since 31 May, throuqh _
the voice of its minfster of Foreign Affairs, Ibrahim Hakim, the POLISARIO
has been threatening to reswne military drives aqainat Mauritania.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1979 ~
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f ~
G
I ~
~ ~
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~
~ pRIML MINIS'TEEt 5AY5 NOT ON~ INCH OF SAHARA WILL B~ CEU~b
~
;
' PnrlH At-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arnbic 25-31 May 79 pp 24-26
i
~ (Inrerview wiCh Mnati Bouabid, Che Moroccgn prime minister, by Faris Bazzi:
Interview With Man of the Phase in Morocco; Maati Bouabid to AL-WATAN AL-
~ 'ARABI: We Have Great Hopea in Efforta of Africa's Wise Men buC We Will
~ NoC Cede One Inch of Sahara; Rabat Is Committed to Baghdad Itesolutions and
Is in Full Agreement With PosiCion of Arab States; No Negotiations With
I POLISAItIO; We Are Prepared To Negotiate With Algeria on Border Violations
i and on Unity of Greater Maghreb; We Have Opened Dialogue With All Moroccan
~ Factions but We Re~ect Blackmail")
~
! ~ -
~ (Text] Rabat--Maati Bnuabid, the pxime minister, or the first minister--
which ie his official title in Morocco--has been able to attract attention
~ to liimsel� and to the accomplishments he has realized in a ehnrt period and
' t~l,-WAT.1N AL-'ARABI felt the urge to conduct this interview with him on the
~ issues and problems preoccupying his mind, the mind of Morocco and of the
Arabs under the present conditions.
~ They describe hiro here as "the man of the phase." The fact is that Maati -
i 6ouaUid, the first minister, or the prime minister, came to power under ~
i exceptional internal and external conditions.
~ Morocco's struggle to emphasize its historical and legal right to its Sahara
~ is going through conditions thaC require introducing fundamental changes on
; the strategy followed by Morocco so far. The defenae burden, the development
~ requirements and the world inflation crisis have been reflected in the country's
j economic and living conditions and have created some kind of social tension
~ that requires Co be dealt with urgeatly and in a sound manner.
I
~ Thus, King Hassan's choice fell more than 2 months ago on Maati Bouabid
to become his first minister and to carry along with him the burdens of
! government and the responsibilities of dealing with the situation.
~ Maati Bouabid has engaged in political action and legal action as a lawyer
` for more than 20 years, and his positions have been inclined toward opposi-
' tion. However, thiR has not prevented him from taking part in shouldering
~ the official responsibility in recent years. He was one of the ministers
} in~ the former ~overnment of Ahned Osman.
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The wisdom of tr,~ choice ia evident ia Che fact thgC Bouabid poseesses the
quality ChBC mak~~ him fit Co shoulder responaibility. This quality ie
liig ubtlity to embark on dialogue with Che various political faction~ and
with the unionigt movement aimultaneously by virtue of his sCrong paet re-
lationa.
In fact, the firat minieter has proven in the firat months of his government
tli~e he is capable ~f managing this dialogue Rnd of leading it toward
satiKEactory reaults that have helped to disperae many of the cauaea of
don?~atic rension. He has been able to do this througi, the meaeures that
he has adopted, especially in the spherp of responding to a number of ~
unionist and labor demanda.
This interview with Maati Bouabid was conducted in two atages: The first
was in his suite at a private hotel where he was following closely the con-
ference of the Islamic miniatera of foreign affairs and the aecond at the
royal palace ia Rabat.
Perhaps the reader will noCice the patience of the Moroccan prime minister
and his willingness to field a large number of questiona dealing with various
issues and topics. At the same time, the reader may noCice his careful
selection of his words, and he did us~ his skill and his proficiency
as a lawyer to express his reservations in anawering some delicate questiona.
I prepared for the interview by stating that I had many queations in my bag
and his answer was: "Let us begin wherever you want. A~ournalist must be
inquisitive."
We Accept No Negotiations Over Our Sahara
~Question] Morocco has reconsidered the prevtous peaceful atrategy which
_ it followed to settle the Sahara issue. This change was noted in the message
which King Hassan II addressed to his people on the 8th of last March. The
political statement which you made before the Parliament also referred to
this change. What are the motives and the causea that made you adopt thia
change?
(Answer] Your citing his majesty's message of 8 March ia in its place,
because the message was a comprehensive address that made clear Morocco's
past, present and future position. This message has become like a national
charter embodying and crystallizing the consensus of the Moroccan people
and ad~usting our country's position and strategy on this issue.
In fact, our policy concerning the Sahara has not changed but has rather
been made clear and precise. Morocco's position is fully clear: We accept
no bargaining and we refuse 'to cede our right to our national eoil and to its unity. "
At the same time, we are working to reduce the tension in peaceful ways.
We should keep in mind that we decided recently to bolster our diplamatic and
information strategy because many countries are atill unaware of the real
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i CEIUS~g of this t~ension. We will work with a11 me~na ro make our cau~e known.
We will ul~n deul wiCh oCher countriec~ according to th~ir position toward
~ our nurional cause. Wc wi11 continue our efforrs tn thig sphere nC the
! variuug Africnn and international levels. ~ven rhough we cottsider the
iysue of~regaining our Saharu terriCorie~ a purely domestic iasue, we wi11
' not fnllow th~ course of leaving the seats empey but will bolseer ~ur presence
i in ntl meetings.
~ ,
((2uc:sCipn~ It is noticed thne the concentrated dipLomatic efforts exerted
~ ~o t~r liuve not reduced the Cension prevailing in the nrea.
~ [AnswerJ Since rension erupted in the area, g number o� fraCernul und
; friendl.y~countries and of regional and internaCional organizaCions hgve not
sCopped exerCing commendable efforta to put An end to Chis eacalaCing teneion.
; Morocco has always welcomed these commendable efforts and sti11 believes in
' their benefit, especially when theae initiaCives come from well-meaning
~ penple and from the supportera of peace and 3ustice.
tiis Ma~esty King Hassan IY has gotten us theoreCically, practically, materially
and spiritually accusComed not Co be pessimistic and to favor Che signs of
hope over the elements of despair as long as there are diplomatic efforts
on what they call conflicC and what we rightfully call fabricnted tension.
; [Question] Why has the Committee of Wise Men failed so far in aeCting a
date for convening an African summit conference to discuss Che ~ahara issue?
; bo you think that the visit made by the Nigerian and Mali presidents to
~ Nouskchott, Algiers and Rabat will produce close: views on the issne? -
~
[Answer] These efforts should not be hastily ~udged as abortive efforts.
~ The formation of the Committee of Wise Men produced initial psychological
' results. Moreover, this committee has been confronted with obstacles for
whicf~ we have not been responsible. The visit made by His Excellency
General Obasanjo, the president of Nigeria; His Excellency Moussa Traore,
the presidenC o� Mali, and by the general secretary of the Organization of
African Unity is no doubt within the framework of the mission entrusCed to
the Committee of Wise Men.
Morocco has expressed to the two presidents its readiness to cooperate
' Eully with this committee. The Moroccan government and people, including
the Saharans and their representatives, have expressed their adherence to
! the irrevocable national unity.
, We have great hope that these efforts will produce satisfactory results,
~ especially since the presidents entrusted with this mission by the African
` s~mmit are well known for their wisdom and their experience. They are
confident that the African problems must be solved by the Africans themselves.
~ In uny case, I can refer you to a statement made by Che Nigerian president
at the end of his tour in which he said: "Our efforCs cannot be described
~ as a complete failure or a complete success."
{
~
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Issue Is Algeria's Issue
[Quesrion~ I3ut why does Morocco refuae Cn negoCiate with Che POLI5ARI0? '
(Answer] (The prime minister inCerrupted me tn say) The best name we can
give Chese penple is the "JARISARIO" (sic]. (He thett went on to say) Our
hands have a~.ways been open for any negotiation seeking to achieve Che unity
of the Arab Maghreb peoples so thaC the Maghreb's economtc resourcea may be
utilized 3ointly. This is wh~t Hia Ma~esty Hassan II ha~.`. said frequently.
I repeat again Chat I call the so-called POLISARIO the "JARISARIO." The
issue is the isaue of Algeria. The thing that we ask all the Arab brotherg
to know is rhat Che Sahara is a Moroccan sahara, that we acquired it legally,
th~t it tias always been Moroccan and that we will not cede a single inch of
our land. If negotiation means ceding a single inch of the Sahara, then
the Moroccan king, government and people can never accept such negotiation.
King Hassan II has said that the Moroccan people made their pledge not to
cede a single inch of the Sahara during the Green March.
Nistory makes clear the Moroccanism of the Sahara. We regained it legally
~n accordance with Che Madrid treaty. If the negotiations with those who ,
supply the POLISARIO with weapons is to put an end to the border violaCions
or to utilize the resources of the Arab Maghreb, then we will not aC all
~ppose such negotiations, but raCher we call for them. ~
[Question] Observers concerned with the Arab Meghreb affairs say that the
recent changes in Mauritania have helped to bring closer the Moroccan and
Mauritanian viewpoints concerning the Sahara issue?
(Answerj The changes in government that have occurred in the fraternal
MauriCania are, naturally, a domestic issue that concerns a sovereign state.
As for the Moroccan-Mauritanian relations, they are firm at both the political
and economic levels. These relations proceed fundamentally and in principle
on the basis of the single common destiny.
King Hassan II will spare no efforts to bolster these relations ar~d to ~
formulate them within an ideal framework of cooperation and good neighbor-
liness for which his majesty is eager--cooperation which his majesty hopes
will prevail in the entire area.
The Moroccan and Mauritanian efforts are consolidated to achieve this goal,
and it is within the framework of this goal that the contacts and the con-
sultations are held. The latest visit by brother Lt Col Mohammas Ould Bouceif,
the Maurtanian prime minister, to Fez is part of the exchange of opinions
and of the constant consultations and dialogue that characterizes Che re-
lations between the two fraternal countries. We can congratulate ourselves _
on the outcome of this visit which will inevitably strengthen the ties thaC
bind us in all the spheres.
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A11 the Atrempts to diminiah this solidar:tCy and this cooperaCiott dre nothing
_I but desperare aCtempCs that will inevitably end in dismal failure.
, ,
I F'r~nr.e N~~s Btgger Ro1e
~
((2urstton] I~'rance is being accused, by virCue of its relae4ons with tlie
~nrcu'S;~F~req, nf noC playing the necessary role eo make the movement for
~ rpF1CE 1.n.,�,the areu dynAmic.
~ ,
[AnswerJ.,, Naturally, rrance is noC a party Co the dispuCe ur to the Madrid
i treaty. BuC rrance, along with Spain in their capttcity as the two counCriea
~ fdrmerl.y colonizing the norChwestern part of Africa, is better awAre of rhe
! dossier of the real Moroccan borders, of the phases of shatCering Morocco's
; territorial unity and of Morocco's legitimate rights. Thus, Frnnce has aC
; its disposal all the historical and legal elements that permit it to play
I a positive role in bringing to an end the fabricated crisis existing in
the aren.
i
; [Question] Ir seems that there has been a coup in the Spanish policy toward
~ the Sahnra issue in favor of Algeria and the POLISARIO in Che wake of the
~ visit made by Adolfo Suzrez, the Spanish prime minister, Co Algeria. Do
~ you have any inclination Co cancel your agreemenCs with the Spanish govern-
ment if this turns out to be true?
i
j [Answer] Perhaps the word "coup" is bigger than the basic position. The
i tliing t1iaC I personally know and that all oChers know is that Spain signed
the Madrid treaty and that our [presumably meaning its] National Council
I approved it and thus Spain became committed to this treaty at both the bi-
lateral. and international levels. The Spanish officials have stated on
I frequent occasions that they abide by this treaty.
f
~ Morocco is currently present in the Sahara in accordance with an international
i ruling made by the International CourC of Justice and in accordance with a
trilateral agreement sign~d by Morocco, MauriCania and Spain in response to
i the wishes of the members of the Jemaa, which Spain always considered the
true representative of Che Sahara inhabitants.
~ As I have already said, our relations with other states are n~t established
on the basis of circumstances. Moreover, our ~udgement of positions should
i . , not derive its elements from circumstantial positions.
I [Question] So, where does the road to peace in the area start, in your
I opinion?
[AnswerJ The road to peace is clear. But paving this road is what requires
1 efforts. This means that our national sovereignty and our territorial unity
must be respected so that cooperation and solidarity may replace tension and
~ conflict, and se that we may devot~ our efforts seriously to building the
foundations of the greater Arab Meghreb. This is not inaccessible for the
~ peoples of M~rocco, Algeria and Mauritania that are bound by the ties of
religion, blood, neighborliness and common struggle.
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~Que:~rion~ It has been reiCeraCed th~?C Che Soviet Union h~s ofEercd Co
supply Morocco with the weapons ~nd military equipment rh~e 1C needg. Y~
there gnyrhing to prevent Morocco from acceptfng this offer, especiglly if
the United States refrains from meeting your demanda?
[Answer] A11ow me to put your question in a broader �ramework--the frnmework ,
of comprehensive cooperation wiCh all countries. Our internaGionnl relaCinna
in ci11 the spheres emanate from three bases: Our naLlonal sovereignty, our
' vitnl. interests and the nonalignmenr for which our foreign policy has been
knowntiinr.~~we gAined our independence, Tn our general policy, we work
r.easelessly to realize the element of balance in our internaCional relations
~s ~ principle. Therefore, we prefer to evaluate these re].ations on Che
basis of rheir ultimate total outcome rakher than Che basis of their pnrCi~l
beginnings.
[QuestionJ Why does not the UniCed 5tates meet all of Morocco's requeats
for defensive weapons?
[Answer] My reply to this question is the same previous reply, becttuse I
consider this question complementary to the preceding one.
Morocco Committed to Rabat Summit
[Question] And now permit me, Mr Prime Minister, to move to the number one
Arab issue. I have heard from diplomatic circles thaC Morocco ugreed witli
King Husayn during his latest visit to Morocco to exert efforts to bring the
Middle East issue back to the United Nations.
[Answer] The position of the king, government and people of Moracco toward
the sacred Arab issue has been clear since the beginning and it is based on
the principles approved by the Rabat summit of 1974.
Proceeding on the basis of the Rabat conference resolutions and in light of
the principles behind these resolutions, Morocco has held and conCinues to
hold contacts with its Arab brothers at the various levels. Proceeding on
the basis of these same resolutions, Morocco has defined and continues to
define all its ~ositions on the Arab arena. Morocco has not at all swerved
from these resolutions as the principles of its Arab policy. ,
In the light of this position, we found ourselves at the Baghdad conference
and after it in full agreement with all the Arab countries that seek to
achieve a comprehensive peace based on Israel's withdrawal from the occupied
territories, especially from Jerusalem, and recognition of the national
rights of the Palestinian people who are represented by the PLO. Our re-
lations with Egypt ace subject to the same criteria.
E:~
[Question] President al-Sadat has said that Morocco is the party that pre-
vented the ~gyptian delegation's participation in the conference of the
Islamic ministers of foreign affairs which was held in Fez recently.
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(Andwer] Moroc~u i~ a ho~tinK country ~nd we r~~eiv~d m~H~~?Yea frc~m 5yri~,
Ir~q, Liby;a ~nd tf~e I~LU ~~king that the ~gyptiun deleg~tivn nol p~rtic:ip;~te.
~~eing ;a li~c~t rouncry, Morocco hnd nd p~wer Co accept or not r~ccept th~
N:gyptien delegation. We ref~rred thc mes~Ageg to the Cener~l 5erretnri~t
~f' the Igl~mic Conf~rence dr~~niz~tion ~nd thi~ ~eCreC~riae i~ the dide thnt
td~k th~ d~ri~ion.
fQu~~rio~,] lt sc~cm5 ti~at y~ur relations with 5yria hav~ bh~un tn lmprnve
~~Ct~r tht tenaion thnt they exphrienced recently.
[AnHw~rj We ~lways wi~h th~t nur rel~tions wi11 be ~ood ~nd bntsed nn rlurity,
mutual re~pect and ndn-intervention nnd non-meddling in ineernnl ~ffair~~
cgprci~lly our relatiott~ with our brvtherg in the Arnb ~nst--parCicularly
Syriu, ~n who~e G~l~n lieights pure Syrinn and Mnrocc~n blood mingled.
H~dd~d...(Bnuhm~ra)
CQucstinnJ How do you view the gitu~tion in Lebc~ndn in the w~ke of the de-
cl.~rrition of the so-called "~re~ Lebanon" by turnco~t Maj Sa'd Haddnd7
( M~werj The maliciou~ goal~ and the ba~e ends sought by the cvil elements
re~p~nsibl~ for the Leb~nese civil war are now very obvious. 1 menn by
the~e goals and ends shattering the uniCy of this ppeceful country and
:~chieving Isr~el's expansionist ambitions Chrnugh som~ mercenary elements
that are subservient to Israel.
1 would ].ike to bring back to mind her~ g phase of our hietory. The fifth
cvlumns that preceded colonialism succeeded at timea in buying some agenta
nnd ~ncouraged them to ~stage rebellions againgt the central government wit}~
the aim of cre~ting troubles and sowing sedition in preperation for the
colont~list march.
One sucti agent was a person known as (Bouhmara). His fate was the same as
that of all agenCs and traitors. At the end, (Bouhmara) was seized, put in
a cage and taken throughout city streets as an example for those who may
learn.
Perhaps the question of Haddad in Lebanon is not different from the issue of
Bouhmara in Maroccv, even though the titae, place and name are different. W~
hope that an end wi11 be put to this tragedy so that security and reassurance
may be established throughout the fr~ternal Lebanon wichin the framework vf
territorial unity and the reunion of the various sects and factions.
[QuestionJ It is said that Morocco has decided to withdraw its forces that
are present in (Shaba) Province in Zaire.
[Answer) The Moroccan armed forces present in Shaba went there on the
request of Zaire's government and head of state. These forces will be with-
drawn when Morocco receives a request in this regard. You know that Morocco
has placed these forces at the disposal of Zaire as part of the African forces
_ sent there on a decision taken after the Shaba events lagt year.
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My Cnvernm~nC Hag L~rge Ma~oriey
(QupgtinnJ I~ei11 hgv~ in my b~g quegtion~ conn~et~d with th~ dort~gtie
condirions in Morocco. Why hasn't th~ USFP ~Sociali~C Union of People'g
Force~J takpn part in your goverc~m~nt? Uo you thtnk hat th~ USFP'~ p~rCici-
pation in the Nation~i 5ecurity Council has fuifiiled Che need to echievp
thp ngtional coalition?
(An~werj It i~ known that in accordnnc~ wieh the congtitution~ the king is
- the party thgt appoints the prime miniet~r and the mintsterg. Thp pre~~nC
cabinet ie a coaliCion cabinet that h~s e large ma~ority in the Parliamenr.
In ~dditi~n to other partiea~ the USFP constitut~s the oppoaition rrhich we
hop~ ie~ gnd will continue to be. positive and congtructive oppoeition.
As for the National Security Council, which ie concerned aith certain ieeueg
under certain circumstancee, its formation reflect~ th~ national .~neeneus
nn the territorial ieaue.
I Re~ect Blackmail
(Queation) Can you t~ll us how you have overcome the tenee situation
experienced by Morocco recently?
(Answer~ On the inetructions of King Hasean II, we opened a dialogue with
_ all the parties concerned. Almed Osman, my predeceeeor~ had etarted the
dialogue. When I came to power. I met With all the trade unioee and with '
buainessmen. listened to them aed adopted their proposals.
T'her~ aere reasonable proposal~ from some trade unions, especially from the
UMf (Moroccan Labor Federationj and the UCfM (General Federation of Moroccan
WorkersJ. These two trade unions said that they are avare of the country's
financial and economic capabilities and know that rgising the miaimum vages
in the induetrial and agricultural eectore would put the country in a dif-
ficult situation economically, eapecially under these conditions that are
connected with our national issue: Then they presented their proposals and
drew the attention of the officials to t~ke the poasible meaeures.
But the CDT (Ceneral Labor Confederation] made demands which I studied with
them for more thaa 4 hours. Ahmed Osman had also studied these demande With
- them. Before the strike of 10 and 11 April, several arrests had taken place.
The confederation's demand aas that the unionist detainees be released before
the start of the dialogue on the unioniet demands. They then said that if
the government wanted the trade unions to refrain from staging the strike
set for 10 and 11 April, then the government had to commit itaelf to this
and to releasing the detainees in particular. I found that this was a kind
of blackmail and that the state had to take a strong stand. Nithin the
framework of a strong seate, dialogue is nare useful and beneficial. I said
to them: I, as an official, ~rill not adopt any deciaion now under the prea-
aure of the unions aad of the blackmail in which you are engaging. It is
impermissible to declare a strike while the dialogue is going on.
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'Chey thougtit that the governtnent h~d diginC~egented Co the point wh~re ie
~duid not ~~ke any m~~gure. 5b we ~dnpeed the t~~Cp~g~ry me~gure~. ~'h~y
w~r~ net vpngeful nr m~liciou~ tn~~aure~ bue nne~ that prdved thnt th~
gov~rnm~nt w~~ in the b~~e gtnte. 'Th~ n~n~ur~g we gdopted w~r~ within th~
bnunda nf th~ 1~w. We expell~d n ttumber nf phnpl~ rp~~dn~iblh fnr th~
gteik~e~ in ~rcnrdanc~ with the lgw. ir i~ g vpry p~inful ehing tn ~~e
ppnpl~ pu~h~d td commit act,~ nf vinl~ting l~w and ard~r by explditing these
p~npie'g livln~ ~nndition~. 'I'he p~r~nng re~pnnsible ~~n thu~ expn~e ~uch
~CUpiC to gtrict gent~nc~~. ~'h~y thn~ghC eh~t th~y wnuid ~~i~~ pdWhr. Yh~,
It i~ with ~urh gimpliciey th~t they pu~h~d th~ ppoplp.
Mnrdrrd i~ prnud ~f b~ing gn urtivh memb~r in ehe intern~tinnnl communitv
~nd in t~ie int~rn~tinn~l nrg~nixgtidne. It ie ale~ proud that it i~ fnr~most
dmnng rhe developing countri~g that act in ucrordanre wirh the democr~tic
principle~ and th~t regp~ct~ the rightg of individu~l~ 8nd of group~ aiehin
the limiC~ of [he l~w. -
Howev~r, it ig natur~l ~nd even ~ssenei~l th~t the individugl and ~ollective
dem~crgtir liberties rem~in ~ompgtible aith the requ!remenrg of reepnneibiliey
in ~11 the philo~ophi~~l, political gnd mnr~l senee of the ward 'reeponeibil~ty.'
Ag fdr the civil serv~ntg who h~d problemg aith their dep~rtments or aith
the judici~ry--and the courts in Morocco are independent of eh~ ~xeeutiv~
government agency--Cheir problemg ~re the result of th~ir feilure to respect
this fundament~l principle.
Civil 5ervants Have Nn Right Ta Strike
(Qucgtion] don't you think that striking is a legiCimate right of the
workar's?
(AnsWer) The constitution says something definite. The right to atrike
is legitimate for a11. Yes, bu[ the right to strike will be codified inso-
far gs the civil servgnts are concerned. There ia the ba~ic civil servants
l~w Chat prohibits striking.
5ome people imagined that the state had reached a far degree of disintegrs-
tion and so they pushed the people to become victims. I wi11 say it again,
this is painful. I can tell you that the firet ~ct I will carry out after
anewering the Parliament ia that I will start codifying the right to strike
for all.
The constitution, to which all resort, stipulatea the presence of an execu-
tive agency, a legislative agency and a judiciary agency. We have an admin-
istrative judiciary that has said repeatedly that this government or that
department made an oppressive decision and then proceeded t9 abolish the
decisions.
Ii the decisions we have made are oppressive, the Court of Cassation or the
Higher Council can say th~t these decisions are un~ust and oppresgive. Ne
Will then abide by the court's decisions.
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1 b~1i~v~ in danbcr~~y ~nd i wi11 d~f~nd fr~~dom eo th~ ~nd. I have ~p~nt
20 y~nr~ d~fpnding libprei~~ ~nd d~mocr~cy. Ndu th~t ~ dceupy thig pn~ieion
nf r~~pon~ibiliey, i wili n~vpr act again~t fr~ed~m ~nd wi11 n~v~r bpcome
nn oppr~~~ive man. Hut ~ vi~1 say onc~ mor~: ~reedom and democrecy do
ndt mesn CI1$btl. if ch~~~ ~rupe~, th~n m~y dpmocr~cy r~~e in peace~ b~cau~e
eh~o~ bring~ ~h~ oppo~t~~ of whae eh~ oeh~re expect. tt bringe dictat~r-
~hip.
i.~~ '1'h~m Re~ort to Courte .
[Que~tion~ What ~bouC th~ d~tain~es?
(Msvpr~ 'Che courte hgve only ie~ued det~ntion eent~nc~s. Th~y have aiso
found numerous peopie to be not guilty. Ae i have already told you~ there
ie a Higher Cduncii ~rith an adminietrative chamber thnt ie concerned with
the ~dminietr~tiv~ ca~~~. Any civil gervant can rpsort to thie chamber
and eny that such and ~uch g miai~t~r c>r the gov~rnment har decid~d to
exppl m~. i belleve that th~ decision ig un~u8t and I demand that it be
aboliehed. The admini~trative cha~~nber has already aboliehed severai de-
cisione taken by c~rtain departmenta.
((~u~stion~ Nave any of the peop~e expelled submitted such a petition?
[MgverJ The truth is that I do not knot~t.
(Quegtion) Some opponents and obeervere have deecribed your decisiona to '
raise the vegea as e patchup operation seeking to safeguard the continu~d
interesrs of the foreign aad locel capitai.
(MsverJ First and before anything �lae, I vould like to te11 tho~e vho
say this that a patchup operaCion arould be of no use to capital~ by the
admisaion of C:arl Harx himself. But if ire vie~+ these measures from the angle
of the broad masees vho have beaefited from them, than all the measures vere
taken on the strength of the requirc ,~~edy groups and in response -
to the vishee of the ma~ority.
I can say that the impact of these measurea at the popular level has beect
positive and calls for pride. I� the economic reaources permitted offeric~g
more, the government vould not h~aitate to offer more. The MoroccPn people
deaerve~ as King Nassaa saye, all the good in the irorld. The eye le dis-
cerning but the hand cannot reach out far enough. So~ what can ve do,
especially eince Norocco, as you knov. is facing challen$es, and must possesa
the means to confroat thea.
Ne Will N~tch Prices Carefully
(Question~ But if the state does not interfere to control prices~ tfie wage
increase that you heve declared vill not g~eatly improve tti~ living atandard
of people vith limited incomes, especially since the private aector hae the
full freedom to set the prices. Inflation vill thus consume any aage increase.
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(Angw~r~ The gdv~rnment is fully deCermin~d Cn fighC inflaeidn gnd all f~rm~
af i11~g~1 ho~rding o~ romnwdiCi~b. It ig n1~o deCermined Cn cnnfrnnt monupo-
lixgCion ~nd wi11 not hegitgte to adope Ch~ firme~t deterrene mea~urea po~eible
ag~ifl~t ~il nppnreuni~e~ and eil those who tamper with the penple's livelihood.
tQu~~~ionJ 'Ther~ r~m~ing n final qupstion. You h~ve announced ChaC you
will ~eeottsider some of th~ ~xi~ting e~nnnmic gtructures. Can we know the
brned lin~g nf y~ur gavernment in thie regard?
(Angw~r] ~e-ex~mingrion of Ch~ exieting economiC etructurea requiree time,
ynu know. I hav~ ndt yet eompleted nry second month in the prime minieter's
gpat. I think Ch~C yau agree with me that Chis ia not a aufficient period
tn Cnrry.out eurh work ~v~n though I hgve general ideas and principles on
the iggue~. Unti1 I cnn give you a detailed view, I will leave Chia iseue
fer anoth~r oppnrtuni~y, Cod willing.
C~pYitICHT: 1579 A1-Wat~n a1-'Arabi
8494
CSO: 4402
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MOROCCO CRITICIZED FOR LACK OF SOCIAL JUSTICE ~
Paris AFRIQUE ASIE in French 1i-24 Jun 79 p 17 ~
[Areicle by A1i Charbi: "Justice~ Nothing More!"] ;
~
[Text] There are concepts which stop one ahort. Those put Eorth to the ' ~
international press by Nassan II, in connection unfortunately with the ~i$ic i
paid to Morocco by Charles Andre Julien are of that kind. He calmly com- ~
pared the "Islamic" justice of Khomeyni with the "justice, nothing more~" '
which he seeks to provid~ fn his kingdom. ~
a
One would think one was dreaming. Harely a month has elapsed since the !
denth of secondary school student Mohamed Grina, folloaing torture by the ;
royal police. For 20 years, political prisoners have been croaded into ~
prison cells and sometimes die there~ for lack of care. Hundreds of peraons ;
have disappeared: militants like Hussein el-Nanouzi, 200 Saharans carried '
off after the "green march" and a hundred military officers and officials `
involved in two coups d'etat. !
~
i
Those who are fortunate enough to be working have just been given a gift by :
the government of a supplement of 50 centimes per hour (2 or 3 francs a day~ ~
a hundred francs a month). The interoccupational minimum growth wage has �
in fact been increased from 1.40 to 1.90 dirhams. `
;
One must also linger over what the recent surveys (see the periodical LAHALIF i
for March-April) tell us about the real content of "social justuce" in ;
Morocco. ~
~
1
In the relatively privileged urban sector, 33 percent of the households j
(estimated tc include five or six persons) live in a single room, 37 pP~rcent +
in two rooms, while 48 percent of the households lack running water, 3~ per-
cent have no kitchen, 32 percent have no electricity, and 18 percent have `
no toilet facilities.
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A~ tn thp Children oE the peuple--on~ cnuld ~lmo~t sp~nk nE ~ p~dpl~ o~
Childr~n, sincp hal~ n~ the pnpulation ig under 15 ye~rg nf ~g~--thp ~ustfc~
to whieh thpy ~re entitled ig quite glmply heinous.
in thlx y~nr c,f thr rhild ~nd 1n a e.nuntry wher~ ~n int~rnation~l r.ongrrHa
nn chilc~h~nd w~� held Eew weekg ago in T~ngierg, the inEant mortnlity
r~te is th~ highest in the world: 150 per thousand in the rur~l sector, 1t~0
' ppr thousand in th~ urb~n aector.
Kw~~ahlnrk~r, an illness ~aused by nutritinnal lacks, can be ahen in alt thp
hnsptt}~lq. The spectre nE it hoverg ov~r a number oE regions in Morocco
wh~rc ~h~rp is no medical care. Additinnally:
There is p schnol ~nrollment rate oE 50 percent, and one child out oE twn
has had nn schooting ~t ~11;
Ther~ i~ ~ SO per~ent failure rate in the primary schuols'and ~ dropout rate
of 17 p~reent. Only one child out oE three is promoted to the secondary
level; and
There is a loss of 50 to 60 percent of the enrnlimcnt during secondary
schooling. And, in conclusion, onty 20 percent of the b~cni~ureste
candidates pass the examinaeion.
This examination was a public scandal this year more than in earlier oness
'Chc l~aks df examination material were so extensive from one end of the
country to another that the subject matter was written on the blackboards
before che examinations began. It was available in the merke~s for a hun-
dred francs.
All che rejects from the school system--the vast majority--are subject to
shameful child labor exploitation.
A hundred thousand children are working today in the city'of Casa Blanca
alone. However, chis do~s noc prevent this population between 15 and 19
years of age from suffering from the highest rate of unemployment in the
country: 33.7 pecent.
The rapid, maddening increase of abandonment of newborn babies, juvenile
delinquency, runaway children, the use of the most miserable, but nonetheless
- harmful drugs (wax polish, plastics, gasoline) draw the picture of the
despair of the young people in the kingdom of Hassan II.
' And that is the life of the people and the opportunities in life offered
~ the children in Morocco!
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"Justic~, nothing more"? One can judge the value of thpge words whpn th~y
ar~ gpnken in the luxury of the paleces in Fe~~ Rabat, Cagsablanca, M~rrak~sh
and Agadir by a king who ie at the same time the richeat l~ndowner in thc
_ country, ~ producer and exporter of citrus fruits~ avocadoea~ ftowers. Ne
is ~lsd th~ nwn~r of ~ hunting prnperty of 1,500 hectareg of go~d land in
Ch~nui~, where pheasants nnd g~zelles today.
Such wnrdg would meen thp cnndemnation oE thp regime if he wer~ not
~ust~ined and supported by imperialist interests ~nd provided with military
and Cinancial aid by France. And also~ it muBt be said, if he wer~ not
supported by all of those who are willing to guar~ntee him by the weight of
thetr mornl and intelicctuat authority.
COPYRIGHTs 19~9 Afrique-Agie
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~ 'CUNI5IA
; ,
UES'Cql?~tAN CAMPAICN ACAINST AL-f~AbHUNAFI O~NOUNCED
~
P~ri!~ A~~IQUE-ASIE in ~r~nch 11-24 Jun 79 p 13
~ [Areicle by F~thi Abdnll~h: '~The Crus~de"]
[Text] Away with A1-Qadhdh~fi! This is th~ most civil form oE ~ttach us~d
in Tunisin againse the npi$hboring colon~l to the e~st. Nouri confides in
priv~te, so that no dne will be unawar~ df it, that a"danger" thr~~eens him
from the east. 'fo m~ke mgtters very clear, he even went to Mpdenine, gathered
his oEEicers eogether gnd, by means of discr~et littt,e rouches, gave the
"peril" a precisp form.
~ Others preEer to go bnck to an old clash of arms almost a year ago to juseiEy
the clnims of ~ provoc~tive ediCorial. Even Mohamed Masmoudi, the "Libyan"
thanks to whom Tunisia has suffered so many misfortunes, h~s eneered the
fray, pointing an accusing finger a: the man whom he credited, not so long
~Ko, with all the virtues of revolution and united Arab patriotism.
What e strenge crusade nnd what a strange alliance of ministers, the regime,
and breaking the ban, in order in a single voice to denounce, to warn, to
; atert, tn advise about the "nuisance of a Libyan neighbor."
ic is erue that A1-Qadhdhafi and his regime have never enjoyed the favors of
; the Tunisian political class. Except when opposition members of the govern-
menc or businessmen have gone to ask for them. On such occasions, a few
dollars more.
Dispute and Machiavellianism
baes he perhaps cause them to despair? Doe~ he perhaps disturb their moral
and intellectual calm a bit coo much? Does he perhaps in the end fail to
' fit into their framework of a"responsible and moderate" chief of state?
~ tt hardly matters, and in any case our intenCion is not to resolve this
i mystery.
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0ut th~ gtr~ng~ ehing is thae Chi~ ~nei-Al-Q~dhdh~Ei cam~~ig~ in eh~ pr~gs, '
both gov~rnm~nt--nr guv~rnmene ~ffili~tpd-��~nd "opposieion," ig so gratuitous
eh~t nne cannot h~tp but look for a sl~~ping pertn~r elaewherp than in Tunis.
There ig nnt--dr there fa not any longer Eor the momene ~t lease--any di~puee
~bout th~ Continent~t ~helf between eh~ ewo eounerlee, f~r is known,
nor eny "h~gt~y m~rg~r" which would ,~ustify ~uch virul~nc~. Well, th~n7
Unlpqg thp Tunisian ~~Eri~ndg" of A1-QadhdhaEi and his en~mi~s~ r~concil~ fnr
~~nrr ~~t hfa expense, h~ve tak~n up aom~ehing which c~me from ~lsewhere. And
unirc~q th~t ~isewhere is Frence. For how can one f~il to note the 9imii~riey
betwr~n wh~t ig gaid in Peris about the Libyan president ~nd his Areb and
Afric~n pulicy, hig Islam and hi~ sociai projects, end What is r~iterered in
Tunis, oEten in the same phrases? Machiavetlianism, it is bping said~ has ~
b~en push~d to the point--doubtless due to en exceasive deal--of puahing
inta the handa of the colonel 8 presumed sentimental affair draEt~d in the
most knowledgeable Tunisian police laboratory of politic~l action. Along
with, obviously, car~fully planned leaks and che necpagary ~~pipelin~s" to a
subsidized pr~~s. Do you know Mias Nenayen? Hedi Nouira, surely!
It is being murmured in Tunis that the lynching throughout the Libyan cnlonpl's
ranka cannot fail to have an eEfect on Tunisian domestic policies. It is
even being claimed that the attack on A1-Qadhdhafi today defines the line of
divisi~~ between those who can lay claim to "dialogue" with Nouirs, 5ayah,
~Arhat and company~ and those who will be forever excluded from it. One
must be critical oE Qadhdhafi to be able to sit down et the gaming table
wich the princes uho govern in Tunis. Ethics--the Masmoudi case--doean't pay
her~, it ts true, but embition sometimes finds combinattons which even the
r.lrvaresc mathematicians do not yet understand.
, P.~rticularly since Nouira must deal With what he has! An illuminating story
is rirculating in Tunis abouc his recent altercation (the word is perhaps e
bic strong for this submissive character, but we use it nonetheless) with
the "supreme combatant." Which nonetheless earned him a"sulking session"
abroad with the princess, as if there Were not enough ptaces to go and sulk
in Tunisia.
* The organ of Mr Mestiri's liberals, AL-RA'Y, has also joined in the
campaign to discredit theLibyan leader. The popular Union Movement (MUP)~
sponsored by Mr Ahmed Sen Salah, refused to participate in this maneuver
which can only serve the interests of the enemies oE the Arab cause and
encourage A1-Sadat'~ propaganda designed to prepare the public for an attack
on the Jamahiriya.
Nouira is prime minister, Sayah is head of the Destourian Party, Farhat
is minister of national defense, and Masmoudi is a former minister of
foreign affairs.
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, Whr.n h~ nttcmptcd td present ~ propn~el n~ gmnesty Cn ehe pr~sid~nt of the
r~p~blie, ~dur~uib~ ytif~ened suddenly and his ,~gw tightened: ~~13ut thig is
politi~g h~rp. 5ince whrn do you decid~ poliCical mattcr~?" An embarrasse
murmur Ernm Ndutr~, whc~ h~d dpfinirely thought rhat aEter 10 ye~rs in "pnwer"
he would bc t~kpn gerinusly~ Then n p~ternAl Bourguibg, spe~king as if to
an ~rrunt adnl~scEnt: "5t~y nut of pnlirics, edncern yourselE with ~dminisCrg-
tion. Th~t's thr nnly r~nsnn yo~'r~ ther~." Suddenly, hE was in ~ corner.
Th~~t cJ{d nnt prevent him frdm conCinuing and eCting on en order from Bourguib~
in hc~r[q--whrr~ the pr~sid~nt hgd gone '~Eor d~ntal care"--celling for ehe
rrlr.E~sr uC 26~ tr~d~ union members ill~gally kept in prison fnr more than A
yp~r.''Chi~ measure was fr~dulently repres~nted as an "amnesCy" by the
Tuni~i~n press.
Fricnd Farhat, ~nr his part, helpful fellow that he i~, is setting out his
militnry mark~rs--Eor whetever nped may arise. Although the man being
wish~d "ldng tiEe" all ~lnng thp columns has ~ppar~ntly recovered (he does
ndt ev~n need his cnne ~nymor~ for his daily walks) a ct~utious man is
alwnys two nthers. On "J" d~y, it would be well to be in good company. And
fin~lly the inevieable 5ayah continues to urge faith on the parC of the
shoddy nestourian rnnks (that is Nouira's opinion), the motive force of
whirh has drained ~w~y. ~rnm cell meeting to cell meeting, he is making
pr~paratinns for the congress.
Diverse concerns but a common (foreign) enemy. Excellent ingredients for a
div~rsion.
COPYRICHT: 1979 AEriquc-Asie
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TUNISIA
PRPT SECRETARY GENERAL DESCRIBES ORDEAL IN PRISON "
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 11-24 Jun 79 pp 14-16 '
[Article by 2ine E1-Medkhouris "I Accuse"] ~
[Text] It is a poignant reporC which AFRIQUE ASIE offers iCs readers on an '
exclusive basis today. It is a letCer writCen by a Tunisian militant, Zine
E1-Medkhouri, known as "Abbas," who is secretary general of the Revolutionay
Party of the Tunisian People (PRPT), a movemenC opposing the Destourian '
Party, from the cell where he has been incarcerated since August 1977. It
is a letter addressed to the "Friends and Comrades" in the Third World, the
West, and in particular, in France, where he and his wife, Annie, lived and
studied.
This horrifying account of which we are publishing lengthy extracts need no
commentary. It is the story of the torture suffered after his arrest nearly
two years ago, in the ,jails of the Supreme CombattanC, the man who firmly ~
committed ~imself when he took power almost a quarter of a century ago to
respect for the rights of inen. ,
But the Tunisian torturers, tra~ined in specialized schools in France and the
United States, continue as in the past to pursue, arrest, torture and massacre
all those who, in Tunisia and outside the national territory, rise up against
the bloody repression imposed upon their people, against those who denounce
the policy of personal power within the country and alignment with imperialism
abroad.
In principle, Zine E1-Medkhouri was to be tried on S June. Indeed! ~
When I was arrested, they were very happy. This was a good catch, "a big
fish," for them. My calvary began in military vehicle which took me from
Kalaat es Senane to Tadjerouine, when one of them asked me how the "weather
in Algeria" was when I left, and I answered that it was fair. They began ,
to poke me in the sides with their elbows and to spit in my face. My hands
were secured behind me, and the manacles were tight and cut my wrists.
This continued until we reached Tadjerouine, where they switched me to
another vehicle, outside the town in the dark of the night. From there I
was taken to a two-story villa near the Djendouba National Guard post, and ~
the infernal cycle of questions and blows all over the body continued.
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i My hands wcre Still secured behind me. 'Chere we:~e a dozen of them, three
i nP ehem completely drunk. This was during Ramadan, ~nd I wA~ thirsty Hnd
' hun~ry: I had b~en given nothing to eaC or drink since my arresr. I was
' bleediing and so was my comrade. Toward 1000 hours the DST [Directorate oE
' TerriCorial Surv~illance] arrived from Tunis. One of ehem, an ofFicer named
; Mohamed,H~d,ji, ~lmosr killed me while loading his pistnl opposite me. They
~ tossed,me ineo a white Volkswagen at their feeC, so th~t I would nnt see
; the road, and they told me that it was now or never thnt they would g~t rid
; nE m~,'for they were covered and they h~d orders eo make me talk at nll
costs,~and that if I should die they would only be my executioners. They
hnd tape recordings of telephone orders Co ,~ustify them. Moreover, if I
died .nu one would know, and what I would undergo would make me regret I was
ever~bor.n. They said that only fools or yoga veCerans could survive what
was awaiting me. Later, I found that they were not bluffing.
~ Tn Tunis, I was taken ro ehe second floor of the Minister of Interior. I
spent the first three days standing, without food or drink. I will not
; detail the thirry-seven days I spent there, but this was the daily agenda.
In the morning, I lay sCretched out in a cell without a bed. With me, in
this cell, there were always two uniformed agents and a noncommissioned
officer. They were relieved every six hours and they had chairs to sit on.
A huge bare bulb lighted the cell 24 hours a day. They did not let me sleep
more than an hour cit a stretch. In the afternoon, they took me to the
office of Mohamed Hadji on the fourth floor, where they asked me questions
' interspersed with insults, spitting in my face, slaps, blows with their
, fists and kicks to my legs. At ~.900 hours--they were real night owls, the
bastards--they came back to get me for the torture which lasted sometimes
. until 0400 hours. This is what it involved.
f I was naked, hands and feet tied up, and a rod was passed behind my knees
i and elbows. The bar was raised and my extremities rested on the edges of
i two tables. This was called the helicopter: the body balances, maintained
; solely by the tendons of the knees suspended from the bar. They threw
; buckets of water on me. My head hung down, the veins in the neck swelled
: with blood and my feet got no blood. They put on a record, or stuffed a
filthy cloth in my mouth, pushing on my chest so that I would swing until I
' fainte~ or my nose began to bleed. Then they put me down, threw water on
ne to awaken me, and began again, slapping the soles of my feet with a pick-
' axe handle or a piece of hose. There were three who took turns: Abdelali
Hab Hab, Bechir Saidi and one other. Mohamed Had,ji and a man named Mohsen
supervised the operation. When my feet swelled and began to split, they
~ made me walk in the water and then began again.
i
~ The held a very sharp pencil just in front of my eyes, and while my two
~ hands were secured behind my head, they began to strike at my knees and
~ thighs with a piece of pipe, or stepped on my toes. I had to tolerate it
~ without moving because if I had, the point oE the pencil would have put out
' an eye.
i
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'fhey exringuished their cigaretres againsr my lips in order~ Ch~y said,
thAt I could "not kiss women any more or make apeeches." ~
They sprend my legs, while my hands were se~ured behind my head, end beat my
genitals wieh a rubber pipe. "Ten blows for every Cime you made love to
' Annie." They wanted to make me pay for the years I had spent in France wiCh
my wiEe. I spent more than three months with my genitals swollen with pus ,
r~nd bleeding, trying to treat myself with herbs my mother broughC me. '
Thry titepped on my toes with Cheir shoes, wliile aC the same time others ,
twisted my fingers and pulled my hair, banging my head a~ainst the wall to
drive me crazy.
They tried to force a huge, very sharp drawing pencil up my anus.
They forced me to balance a chair on my head, while stan~iing on one Eoot. ~
IE I wavered and the chair fell, they rained blows upon me.
Dear friends, this schedule lasted for thirty-seven days. I was coughing ~
and spitting blood and could no longer walk: they dragged me. They made
some comrades confess just by showing them the condition I was in. They
signed statements admitring to things they had never done. Here I can only
recount the main things. I cannot tell you everything, it is too revolCing.
Ie would rake a whole book to describe it. I tried to kill myself, but I
was too weak and could not. The investigating judge wanted me to confess
and say I was sorry for what I had done. I said that I had never asked any-
one for pardon except my mother and my friends, for the pain and trouble I ,
had caused them, and that I had no regrets, that it was for the government .
to ask pardon of ine for the evil done to me. He authorized the DST to come
and get me any day, at will, unCil the month of March 1978. The men came
~ to the prison from time to time to fetch me, and brought me back in the
evening. To this day, I am still in the hands of the investigating judge. �
Well, here in prison it is as horrible as at the DST. They do not beat me,
but they have other means and time on their side. Here they classify me as ,
"special." The "special prisoners" are the dangerous ones, and they must
,
not be allowed to come in contact with the other prisoners. They are .
"contagious," as they say. Their goal is to destroy us morally and ruin
us physically. The director of the prison, Mahmaud B, told me that he i'
would crush me like a cockroach. Colonel Sadok Znaidi, the director of '
penitentiary administration, Cold my mother and me that it is a question of ~
honor between him and me which oE us will break first. They wanted me to
ask the chief of state for pardon and to promise to "settle down," something
I cannot do without betraying myself.
Suddenly I was transferred to E Wing, which is called "khabaah el'abra," or ~ F
the exemplary wing. It is reserved for those under sentence of death. This
was to affect my morale. Since I have been here I have seen two executions--
one of the prisoners was 20 years old, and a very sympathetic fellaw. At
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lh~ t~~ginnlnK 1 spc~n~ ehree-and-;~-~~n1E monthg in isnl~tinn in a I~arp wet
chll measurin~ twd mctc~rs by tf~ree. I gaw no one and thcy tneit me out to
wnik fnr 15 rninutes every 24 hdurs all alone in ~~mall ~ourtyerd with
htgh wdlls. [ wag ~iven and I still gpt my food ln ~ pl~i~tic dish, gin~:c
glags and metal are furbtdd~n me. ~vhn the little m~t~l filthr in my pipe
w~x taken fr~m m~~. ~'hrough a Nindow, they h~nd mp a bnwl nf brnth with two
~r thr~c smull chunks ~f rdtten cabbage er,~ Carrnt. As mh~t, I~rn entttled
tu big whitr ~;rubs. I also have 25n grams df dry bl~ck brr~d h~ch day.
'I'hr J,~llur ran in~p~ct the cell thrnugh e littlp gpy hnte ~t any mnmpnt.
If my muther yends me Ioud, they tasth it and Change the reripi~nt befnrp
givink Ic to me. For mediCine, thpre !s n~thing but nspirin t~bletg to
treat evi~ry tll. My mother sends me medtrtne for my ~ilmentg, but I must
b~ctlh ~nd sufter puni5hment each timp td gpt them. They gtrip mp edmpletely
n~kc~d and search everywhere before and ~fter I gee my l~wyer nr rny mothec.
'These visits take place in an isolated room with a he~d guard present.
OnCe I showed my mother the bruises frCm binws on my body. The next day thc
bST came to get me cn give me a be~ting. I was not supposed to do that.
My comr~des and I went on a hunger strlke to protest my det~ntion in isola-
tion. Then they put us three to a cell for eight months~ and conditions
remained the sarne. Later, thr_y put us all together in a lnrge ronm, ~nd
things improved a little but whenever something hnppened, it Was I who paid
the price. By means of a hunger strike, we demanded the improvemenc of the
conditions of our detention--I, three comra~~~s and five common law prisoners.
'I'hey put us all in the dungeon, which is a black tunnel Eull nC excrement
which one r~aches by a stairaay leading 21 steps down. We wore Eilthy,
torn uni[orms, without undershirts or shorts, shoes or socks or cigarettes.
Wr wrre in the blackest darkness, surrounded by excrpment~ our feet chained
to iron rtngs tn the floor by heavy chains 30 cencimeCers long. Ne saw [o
our ne~ds where we sat, where we slept. The tunnel sloped a little and an
ocean of filch formed at the bottom. As a special prec~ution, I had been
chained at chae end, directly to a ring sunk in the floor sa that I could
not even get up or change posicion. We were entitled to three litecs of
water ai~d nine little black rolls every 24 hours, for the nine persons shut
In the dungeon.
~crangulation
We were on a hunger strike all nine days we spent In this dungeon. ilhen they
took us out, my whole body and above my more private parts were covered
wi[h disgus[ing pimples, and my eyes would no[ stop running. Now I could
no longer tolerate the light. Afterward they puc me in F Wing~ room 1,
with the worst bandits. We were packed in together, with a single toilet
and one small faucet for all. One had [o wait for a quarter of an hour to
urinate in the morning. We took our "walk" in groups of five in the court-
yard. Rape and unimaginable things nccurred in there. The people Were
hungry. Organized gangs imposed their laa. They raped the younger ones.
There was a prisoner boss~ and the guards aere in connivance....
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.
Ste~~ntly I gdt a letter from Annie and Ann~ Merie and one Annte p. My moralp
Ir~ n~t b~d. My he~lth ig imprnving--thE g~abi~g and the pimpl~~ ~rp gone~
but I hx~v~ white hafr grouing lfke mu~hrooma. I el~o h~v~ prablpm~ with my
blanJ ctrculr~liun, r~b~vr all in my legg, and my teeth are e littl~ loose fn
my mouth. In brief~ things ~re bettpr. I am regaintng atrength whtl~
~aaiting annth~r bnut oE isolation or punishment. I cannot find aords tn
telt ynu how mu~h I migg you and how gratpful I am for what you have done
and are doing Eor me, my cnmradea and my people.
I et~o und~rst~nd those Who havP not written. We are but a drop oE teArs
in mi~~ry in the ocean of in~uatice and exploitation throughout the world.
But dn~ muat nnt underestimate the role a iettpr or a postc~rd can piay. It
i~ very important. Natur~lly this will noe g~r us releaeed. They gay that
a fly in the snup doesn't kill~ but does produce vomiting. These people
here are of the same ilk as that old Pakiatan~ v~eteran who had Ali Bhutto
EXpCUCE!d to show his total contempt for the opinion of all mankind.
Bpfore concluding, here ~re two true tittle tales.
The firat happpned in the month of October 1978 in D Wing. A soldier aho
desertpd Was arrested. They really fixed him. With the complicity of two
guards, some prisoners attempted to sodomize him. He fought and began to
~sr,renm. They took him to a cell and left him aith a dangerous maniac, uhn
immed[ately began tn beat him. Ne gcreamed all night, and no one could
st~ep. The 5creaming did not cease until mornings the soldi~r was de~d~
strangled, and now the maniac is awaiting trial. The family was not allowed
to see the body. I knew this miserable little soldier well. He lived on
Sebka Street in Tunis.
Nere is the second story. There is a fellow here who had an altercation aith
someone in a bar in Tunis one day and pitched a bottle of beer at the other
fellow. But that damn bottle, instead of hitting his adversary's head~
missed him and shattered into smitherines against a framed photograph of
the president hanging on the wall. The police came and took the Eellos+ away.
He told them that it was coo bad about the photograph and that it should
never of been in the bar in the first place. He got six months on the prison
farm for "attempted assination of the president in a photograph."
But there are some bastards~ bad jokers, in prison, and they told him this
was unfair and advised him to appeal. Like an idiot he appealed, and the
appelate court increased his sentence by six more months. This makes a whole
year he gets to sleep on a straW mat.
Well, I greet and embrace you all. Your friend~ brother, colleague and
comrade, Zine E1-Medkhouri.
COPYRICHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
515~
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PATE OF i.ONC-T~ttM PRiSON~ttS DESCRIBED
P~ris JEUN~ A~RIQU~ in ~r~nch 27 Jun 79 pp 17-20
; ~Article by Abdelaziz nahmani: "Political Prisoners in Tueisia"~
[Text] In Tunisia~ the prisone are occupied not only by
th~ lebor unioniets aho aere arreated after laet year's
worker upriaing. Political prieoners--some of them
since 1968--continue to serve aentencee of between 10
and 20 years of imprisonment, if not et hard labor.
Because they were coneidered l~laoiete or leftiate at the
time, thoae who are celled members of the "Perspectives"
Group keep languishing in the ~aile aa?id almoat general
indifference. Their fami~ies are mounting a publicity
drive but hardly anybody hears them. A noisy campaign
is doing the Tunisian prisoners more harm than good.
Too many demands entail the risk of delaying their re-
lease. And so, the circle is closed tight again: dis-
cretion leada to forgetfulness; but Che latter often
serves as an alibi. For the ~ailers, of course.
There are six of them who, down through the years~ have become veteran
` Tunisian politic~l prisoners although they are only between 35 and 40.
' Ahmed Ben Othman Raddaoui, a university etudent, by bimself managed to
pile up 22 1/2 years in sentences (he has served nine so far). He has
13 years lef t to aerve to the end of fiis sentence. Nourreddine Ben Kheder~
an economist, and Gilbert Naccache, an agricultural engineer, are half-
' way through a 17-year sentence. Rached Bellalouaa~ an urban development
eacpert, likeWise has been in jail for ~oore than dight yeare. ge has 4 1/2
years left to serve. Mohamed Sglah Fli~s and Abdallah Rouissi, both teachera,
i each have served half of their 10-year sentence. Held at Bor~ Erroumi,
! in the northern part of the country, these men are not dangerous criminals.
! They are extre~e left-wing intellectuals ~rho subscribe to a mixture of
; Trotskiyism and Maoism, known in Tunisia during tt~e sixties under the name
? of "Members of the Perspectives Group."
- During 20 years of independence, Tunisia had a certain uuaber of political
; trials. Most often they involved young people, college students,
~
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h
~o~ otrnicinr. us~ ox~.Y
int~ll~eeuala, 1~bor Utl~Ofl~BtA of a11 kind~, in ell v~1k~ of 11fg gt~d with
diff~r~nt ideologip~ Ccommuniets, ~a'thi~es, ~tuelim Br~thr~a). Th~se
trigie inv~rigbiy revolvp arnund Articla 8 of the ConAtiCution vhich vieh
~uper6 ~mbiguiey procl~i~rt "Fr~edome of opinion, of the preoo~ of pubiica-
tion, of ae~mnbly, and aseociation gre gugranteed aithin the framevork of
th~ lav." G~nerally, thp accused coneidered only the firAC part of thie
article gnd the ~udgee only the second part.
In prac~icel t~rme~ things gre hardly any eimpler. The au~horities oftee
cit~ "r~e~on of ~tate" to hinder thoee ideas~ "i~?ported ideologiee~" and
thae~ Erp~doms from eonstituting a~novb~i~ end threatening the establiahed
ordpr.
Thp accug ~d in theae political triale came �rom outside ox in~id~ the
single party ahich, according to the moment aed the circ�+mgtances, ie more
or less rigid or more or lege tolerant. Thus, stiff and sometimes un~ue-
tified sentencea ver~ rather ua~cpected],y viped out by sCrong remittance
of spnt~nce or by presidential pardone. All of thie makee the lo~g and
painful detention of th~a ai~c "~a6ers of the Perspectives Croup" incom-
prehensible; they vere gentenced tvice, in 1968 and thea again in 1974.
"Hoetagee?" "Forgotten men?" Diseidente, rathar, advocating ideas ahich
are no long~r in vogue, vithout po~+erful protectors abroad euch ee the
diaeident Soviet Jevs. It is certaia that their putpoeee and their
Writinge vere exceesive, intoleraat~ and provocative. But they ~+ere made
to pay a price that vas entirely too high, vay out of proportion to the
seriousnesa of the crime. They vere turned into martyre. The eituation
is shaping up as a test of strangth betNeen a poverful, well-organized
goverrnment machine and a handful of bare-hand~ed individuale. The latter
should boa to the former and ask for perdon. But their pride prevents th~
from doing that even though they knoN that their ideas no longer repre-
sent auything more than a maYginal current.
Forcunately for them, a handful of faithful follovers and relatives keep
helping them tenaciously. Some do so quite discreetly and others do so
vith aome noise. Untiriagly, they go from door to door vith the hope of
securing their relpase. But one-may vonder whether these little campaigns
"demanding their immediate release" di8 not co~plicate the ~oatter or post-
poae the proapects of that release--provided of course tbey have not just
become alibig.
In the Bor3 Erroumi prieon, the political detaineea are completely isolated
from the common-laa prisonera vho aerve sentences of more than 1~ yeara at
~hard labor~~ In mid-?!ay 1979, the pol~ticals vere 33, including our 6
veterana. With a fear rare 0cceptione, t6eq lived tvo to a roam. A11 of
them are fed at the expense ot their ~aaoilies at the rate of 15 dinare
(p160) per priaoner~ paid through a~moatflly group draft of S~0 dinarg.
That does not include the food parcels, the laundry, and the books vhich
autheriaed relatives bring tfiem tvice a month. A year ago. tisoae prisoners
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,
We~~ vn a~d-day hunger ~trike to gpcur~ ~n improvc~n~ne in Ch~ir living
ec~nditidn~~
Pr~s~neiy, th~y ~r~ ~n~iel~d ed r~eeivp ~om~ local naw~papers~ such ae
L'AC'CION, AL-AMAt, tA ptt~SS~ and DiALOCU~. Th~y can algo waCch Tuniei~n
tel~vi~idn programe with eh~ hplp of ewo sets purchesed by the fami~ie~
a~nd a11oW~d by th~ prieon ndminiseration.
With'th~ir bdoka, thpy h~v~ put tog~thar e good library and Ch~y sometimes
read works sent from Pgrie whieh ar~ not yet in rhe Tunie bcokstoree.
Bu~ c~n~or~hip ig on guard and c~rtain Works ~re re~eeted, euch as the
be~t-~e11er "L'dr~hegcr~ roug~"--th~ Work "red" having been d~leted by the
cen~or~. Thp priaon~re rry ed ~eudy together ae best they can. Above a11~
laa gnd for~ign lgnguag~~ (p~rticularly Engliah and Itali~n). Soccer ie
Ch~ir big p~b~ion nnd the mcploita of t~i~ T'unieian t~gm in Argentina,
during rh~ world rhnmpionship games, W~r~ greatly celebrated. 'Tha group
has it~ own writ~r, Gilbert Naccaeh~, whoee many novele are being read,
commentpd ~n, ~nd criti~iz~d a~ if in a literary c1ub.
Th~ir main preoccupation remain~ health, which is shgken in every possible
aay, not inaluding the laek of 8pace end the cramped exercise area. They
have kidnpy and dental problemg and their hair falle out. Bellalouna ie
afraid that he has an ulcer. They are most afraid of getting sick on
Saturday or Sunday. On thcse days, Mr Abdessal~n Chetmi, the prieon
Warden, a m~n they ron~ider corr~ct, little inclined toaard zealouaness~
takes off for the Wpekend. Since he is the only one vho can make decieions,
his absences sometimes are very unpleaeant.
Were they tortured? According to their Witnees testimony, the lastest
. torture goe~ bark to 1974, for all of the prisonera, With a prolongation
of several session~ for Ben Othman in 1975. Then there is Ben Kheder,
who Was severely interrogeted in March 1978 for having given his support
to the movemene of Habib Achour. The former secretary-general of the
: UGT'r (General Union of Tunisian Workers) is today their cell neighbor,
~ although he is deprived of contact With them.
Everything began on a certain friday~ 15 Irlarch 1968. About 100 college
students Were h~lding a meeting in the school of liberal arts and human
, sciences. Those young people aere demanding t6e releaee of Mehamed Ben
Jennet, a theology student, sentenced to 20 years at hard labor folloaing
~ the demonatratioas and serivus inctdents on S June 1967, the day of the
Israeli attack on Egypt and other Ara6 countries. The meeting aas suddenly
broken up by a counterdemonstration' of students affiliated witE~. tFie PSD
(Destourian Socialist Party~, the one and only party. There aas a clash
' and then the police intervened; there ~ras counterviolence and a general
strike at the university and other schpols.
Wae thi$ the almost annual rite of college student highjinks~ such as the
strikes of 1963, February 1965, and tfie Decamber 1966 demonstrations?
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In March 1968, ~rr~~e~ w~re mor~ num~rous. And, between 9 and 16
Sppe~nber~ 134 accuepd appeared before the SC~Ce Security CourC,
pecia~.ly esxabliehed for th~ occasion 2~qontha earlier. Where did this
severiey come from? Lseentielly from the famous'May 1968 of France.
a�,aecially go gince mo~t of th~ gcrue~d aer~ former residente of the
:in Quarepr and Pre~idenC Habib Bourgui6a did net want Parie violence to
be repegted in his country.
In Sept~mher 1968, there were communiste, Ba'thists, and "Members of the
P~r~pectives Group" in the dock. The latter (including our six prisoners) �
were given the aei�fest eentences. In 1979 one ~night aak oneself what this
"perapectiviem" might eti11 mean aC a time when we know only too well how
Trotskiyiem and Maoism developed, especially in a Muslim country. All that
aeems to belong to another time and keeping that group in prieon might
appear a11 the more illusory and gratuitous.
At the ria~e there wa~ no ~ustification for the charge of "plotting againet
Che gecutiiey of the staCe. In realiry, these were nothing buC tracta, ,
vehement writinga againaC Che regime, clandestine meetings (since theae
tiny extreme left-wing groupa were not recognized). There Wae also the
charge of slaeder against~:the president of the republic and the eecretary
of state for national education. Furthermore, there were charges of
slander againat foreign political personalitie8, such as Hubert H. Humphrey,
at thaC time vice preaident of tfie United Statea,and Tran Van Dong, South
Yietnameae miniaCer on a visit to 1~niaia.
This indeed is ancient history. Bspecially ahen one knowa that the secretary
of state elandered was none other t~ian Ahmed Ben Salah who later on broke
with the regime; that the interior minister taas Be~i Caid Eesebei who
likeaise disaociated himaelf. Attorney-General of the Republic Abdelma~id
Ben Slama, who called for "utmost severity" and "utmost harshaeea" in the
sentences, likewise changed much, just like Habib Achour who got the workers
to go out into the etreEts to demonstrate against "those lost collegiane."
Then they had to go through a second trial in 1974. That alao seems long
ago. Interior Miniater Tahar Belkhodja, whoae police were behind the whole
affair, in turn ~oined tbe ranks of those vho asked for less rigidity and
more democratic freedoms. Thus everything i~as changed--for tfiose in
authority, as for the members of tk~e "Perspectives" Group. In 1968 however
President Bourguiba had referred to tfiem as "revolutionaries in sheep's
akin, just in from the Latin Quarter." ~las that not already an admiasion
that they were hardly dangerous?
I recently had an opportunity to ask Education Minister Mohamed M'Zali for
news about thew because a good number amoag them are teachers and their
trials Were tied to uniyersity troubles. Mr. M'Zali replied: "Last year
we again did something wit6 Mr Hedi Nouira. We examined their record. Not
a Word of repentance. Not the slightest indication capable of producing
g thaw and leading to their release."
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; Sevaral we~ke befor~ thi~ reyiew of nc~~ir fi1e~, ehey ~~il~ed to get out of
; prignn: Th~C w~g on ehe eve of 1 Jun~ 1~78. They had 6een oxdered eo get
th~ir thing~ togeeher ~nd c1os~ eheir euiecae~s. They had tiaken Cheir
leave of th~ir fellow prisoners when ttie order was counCermended. In
; 1976 likewise th~ir release hnd hung by ~ust a thread.
That"~~inally r~i~e~ ehi~ qu~~tiun: hnv~ th~y become a political football?
' For ahom? And why?
i T
~ Illegnl Det~nCions?
;
Nourreddine Ben Kheder and Gil~iert Naccache were aenCenced Co 16 1/2 years
of imprisonmene in SepCember 1968~ Atuned Ben OChman ltaddaoui was sentenced
to 12 yearg; Rached Iiellalouna to 11 1/2 years, Abdallah Rouiesi and
Mohamed Flias to 2 yenrs. In May 1974, like othera~ they benefited from
a preaidential pgrdon which, in the case of some of them, involved house
arrest~
Since universiCy troublea did noC stop, Ben Othman Raddaoui was errested
again in September 1971 and Flisa and Rouissi were again arrested in Feb-
ruary 1972. There was a new thaw at Che end of 1972 and there were more
' releases. But, several weeks later, flen Kheder and Naccache were ac-
cused of having brought a for6idden newapaper into Tunisia, LE TRAVAILLEUR
, TUNISIEN. They were sentenced to another year in prison. Bellalouna was
; arrested in turn in July 1973 for having given shelter to a fugitive who
~ had been sentenced. Then came the arresta of Ben Othman and Rouiesi
in December.
On 20 April 1974, they learned of the abrogation of the 1970 pardone.
i Although released in July 1974, Bellalouna several days later was heard
to say that he no longer had the benefit of this decree. In August 1914,
; Ben Othman and Rouissi were slapped with supplementary sentences of 10
' years.
Since 1975, these prisone.rs have tried to show that their arrest wae
"illegal" because the 1970 pardon was not "conditional." It shonld purely
and simply have canceled the 1968 sentences.
Beyond the legal arguments on Fioth sides remains the human drama represented
by these endless detentions.
~
I � COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique~GRUPJIA 1979
5058
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WE3TERN SAHARA
SIWARA PROBLEM ONE OF MAIN THEMES OF JACA SECURITY SEMINAR
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 10 Jwt 79 pp 41, 43
/Excerpta% The meeting Which cons~ituted the first public appearance of
the lnstitute for int~rnational 2esues (INCi) brouqht together in Jaca,
Huesca Province, representatives of 12 European and Africen countries. ~
In the absence of spokesmen for the POLISARIO Front--Layachi Yaker, the
Algerian deleqate, deplored the failure to invite tihem--Moroccans and
Aiqerians undertook the debate about the former Spanish colony in the
Sahara.
Abdallah Leroui, profesgor of hiatory at the Univeraity of Rabat, ineisted
that hfs country had entered the Sahara legally and aseerted that it had
obtained from Spain, by meana of the Madrid Agreement, only administrativ~
control of the territory, for it h~d never lost sovereignty. He noted
that, of all the Arab countries, only Alqeria and South Yemen had recog-
nized the Democratic Saharan Arab Republic. He cliecounted the report
favorable to the POLISARIO Front issued by the UN missfon sent to the ter-
ritory before Spain withdrew froa? it, statinq that the wideapread demon-
strations of support for the front had been ataqed. �
According to the hiatorian Laroui (spelled as published%, Morocco views
the Sahara conflict not as a war of liberation but rather as a atruqqle
involving commandoes orqanized by the Alqerian Ariay, although Saharan
fighters are used. Accordinq to this thesis, the only two ar?tagoniats
would be Morocco and Algeria.
Algeria Aqainst Morocco
Most of the role played by Yaker, advfsor of Presidents Boiaaediene and
Chadli and visible head of Algerian diplomacy, aras devoted to refutinq ~
this argument and mafntaininq that the conflict is actually betWeen the
- Saharan people and Morocco, which has occupied their country aqainst their
will. ~
,
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i ~
~ mo Yaker, iti i~, a ma~e~r of an ut~r~eolved decolani.xatil.nn probiem end of
~he Sali~ran peopl~'g ~x~rctaing tihe righti tio s~l~-de~ermina~ion, r~rog-
~ nixe8 b~? ~h~ Uni:~ec1 Natiione and by ~he Organtza~ion ~or A�rican Unitiy
~ (OAU) . ~ `
; ,
~ The Algdrl~n r~pY~~~ntiaeive, whoae rh~torical skill made him tihe star o~
the gatihering, describ~d a~ illegal the agre~n~ which aae a3gned by
~ Spain, Mdrocco and Mauritania in Madrid in 1975, and which led to the
transfer o� administirative control of the Spanteh colony tio tihoee tao
, countries.
- The 3ahara, A bangerous 5etiting
Laroui blundered spectiacularly on gtating, at one point in the discuesion,
that the Spanigh arm~d �orces had been prepared to turn the Sahara over to
Algeria immediati~ly before tihe "Green March."
Alberto eallarin, UCD /nemocratic Center Union% senator, chairman of the
Senate Defense Committee and vice-presiden~ of the INCI, in~istea thnt he
name names and furnish concrete evidence. The Moroccan histozian acknow-
ledged that hc had none, but stated that his asaertion was a political
facti because the Moroccan people believed it.
Boti11 Diez Alegria, on Spain's part, and Layachi Yaker, speaking for Algeria,
vigorously denied the existenca of any agreement to that effect.
One of the most interesting statements about the issue was provided by
Swiss journalist Arnold Hottinqer, the correspondent for the NEUE 2URCHER
2EITUNG in ~he Arab countries, who compared the Sahara conflict to that in
~ Palestine. In both instances, the "new natiion is composed of refuqees"
who have decided to fight for /their/ /in italica% country. The war is
utilized by the political leaders to generate a"new mentality," that of
Palestinian or Saharan nationalism.
To Hottinger, the clesert war can become prolonqed like that in the Middle
East and could have similar unfortunate consequences for all the countrfea
involved. Mauritania has already been adversely affected, and Morocco
could also suffer in the future, given its difficult internal situation.
~ The major powers have not shown marked interest in the conflict thus far=
but the circumstances could change in the fairly near future if one of
the superpowers decided that the POLISARIO situation offered it the op-
~ portunity to become involved in local political affairs, as did the Soviet
Union in Egypt when ft offered weapons to Nasser in 1955. The small de-
sert war could become anothei setting for a confrontation bett~~rreen the major
powers, which could produce unfortunate consequences for the entire Maqhreb
and for Spain in particular, considering the proximity of the Canarfes to
the scene of the conflict.
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