JPRS ID: 8564 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070009-4
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• Document Page Count: 99
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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N'Uk OMFICIAI. U5~ UNI.Y
JPRS L/8564
10 July 1979 ~
FOUO No. 641
~
Sub-Saharan A~rica R~ ort
p
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,
JPR5 L/8564
io July 1979
. SUB-SANARAN AFRICA REPORT
~
FOUO No. 641
I
.
~ CON TEN TS PAGE
I
~
I INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
I Bokassa's Presence aC Kigali Summit Reported
(Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 30 May 79).... 1
, IC~mougue Said To Be Relying on Libyan Backing
(Jos-Blaiae Alima; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 23 May 79)....... 2
- Politicnl Significance of Spanish King's T~ip to Africa
Analyzed
. (Jose Oneto; CAI~IO 16, 27 May 19) S
Belgian-Born Mercenary Arrested in the Seychellea
(AFRIQU~-ASIE, 28 May 19)....~ 7
~ .
EDF Aid to Africa in 1978 Reported ~
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
25 May 79) 10
Soviet-African Trade Statistics Detailed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 25 May 79)... 17
West German Aid Detailed
(MARCHES TROnICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 May 79)... 22
Transport, Traffic Strategy Planned
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 May 79)... 26
OMVS Decisious Reoorted
(MARCHES TROPIC!1JX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 18 May 79)... 28
- a- IIII - NE & A 120 FOUO]
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CONTENTS (Contdnuea) Page
Traneportation, Communicationa, Planning Polici:s
Iteported
(Mahdi Elmandj ra; JEUNE AFRIQiT~, 30 r~ay 79)... 3Q
Briefs
Secret Angola-South Africa Meetings 32
Mauritnnian Leader ArresCed in Senegal 32
Mali-Egypt Cooperation Agreement 32
ANGOLA
Briefs � ~
French-Angolan R~lations 33 -
Recruitment ~f Portuguese Teachers 33
CAPE VERAE '
Pires: Agricultural Reforms Will Not Follow Foreign
Model
(Pedro Pires Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE,
28 May 7S) 34
CENTRAL AFRICAN EI~IRE -
Bokassa's Rule Believed Nearing an End
. (Sennen Andriamirado, Jean-Marc Zaidi; JEUNE
AFRIQUE, 23 May 79) 37
Establishment o: Liberation Front Announced
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 25 May ~9).... 40
French Civil, Fina ncial Aid To Be Continued
(MARCHES TROPICAUX =,,'T MEDITERRANEENS, 25 May 79).... 41
CHAD
Government Cutting Separatists Off From Frontiers
(Marc Yared; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 23 May 7g) 44
COMORO ISLANDS
Briefs
Radio Seminar 46
French Military Aid 46
First Anniversary 46
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CONTENTS (Concinued) pg8~
GABON
,Xenophobia, Wideapread Diss~tisf~ction Reported
(Sam Essono; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 28 May 79) 47
GHANA
Ecanomic, Development Loan Prospecte Uiecusaed
(MARCH~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
15 Jun 79) 49
Briefe
FRG Transportation Assistance , S1
MADAGASCAR
~ifficulties With France Reported Less Critical But
Persistent
(Elie Ramaro; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 14-27 May 79).......,. 52
Role~ Activities of SECREN Detailed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 25 May 19).. 55
Briefs
Mig 21's 57
MALI
- Briefs ~
Dissident Front Established 58
- CCCE Selingue Dam Financing Sg
MOZAI~IQUE
South African Contr{bution to Economy Streased
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 25 May 79)... 59
NIGER ~
ADDENDUM: Present Day Niger's Uranium Deposits
Discussed '
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 12 Apr 79) 62
Uranium Only One Factor, by Siradiou Diallo ~
Uranium: Modern Gold Rush ~
Akouta: Second Uranium Mine
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CONTENTS (Continued) page
TOGO `
~riefs
FAC Agricultural Assistance 76
UGANDA
Idi Amin's Possible Successors Discusaed
, (Marc Yared; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 18 Apr 19) 77
Idi Amin's Pol{.tical Legacy -
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 25 Apr 19) 81
- Recovery Plans for Ug~ndan Economy Discuased
(Jacques Latremoliere; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS, 11 May 19) 83
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS '
e
BOKASSA'S PRESENCE AT KIGALI SUP4IIT REPORTED
Paris JEU13E AFRIQUE in French 30 May 79 p 7 ;
(Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "From One Summit to the Other"]
(Text] A year ago, almost to the day, Che fifth Franco-African e4..~mit
gathered in Paris amid the agitation over and obseasion with deatabiY~za-
tion. Mobutu Seae Seko, PresidenC of 2aire, arrived in the French ca,pital -
in combut dress; he came direct from Shaba where, again, rebels had lnfil-
trated, manhandling his troopa. Some o� thr chiefa of state preaenC at
the summit then decided to come to t~e aid of the Kinahasa regime. France,
the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Senegal, and Togo sent troops. To observers, that ~
summit has remained the "su~i.t of fear."
The atmosphere was completely different at the sixth Franco-African aua~it~
held this year on 21 and 22 May in Kigali, capital of Rwanda. The obsee-
sion with destabilization was gone. The inter-African force sent to Zaire
in 1978 is packing up (see page 18). And the chiefs of state talked eco-
nomice: renewal of the Lome convention; the meeting of the United Natione
Conference on Trade and Development, which is sitting at Manila until 1 June; '
and Franco-African cooperation. Serenity would thus have reigned in Kigali
had it not been for tt?e eruption into the news of one of the participante~
Bokassa I, Emperor of Central Africa.
Surrounded by the press, let in by his peers, Bokassa I denied from the
time of his ,~rrival that he had ordered the massacre of children (aee "What
I believe" by Bechir Ben Yahmed, page 14).
`ihe emperor'~t presence in Kigali embarrassed the other chiefs of state.
Questioned about what he thought, Senegaleae President Leopold Sedar Seng-
hor said only that in his opinion Bokassa did not order massacres of chil-
dren.
The Paris summit in 1978 ~aas notable for Mobutu and the process of de-
stabilization. Will the 3:igali summit of 1979 be remembered for Bokassa I
and for incriminating dictators?
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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INTER-AFR.ICAN AFFAIRS
KAMOUGUE SAID TO BE RELYING ON LIBYAN HACKING '
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 23 May 79 pp 20, 21
(Artic:~ by Jos-Blaise Alima: "Qadhdhafi's New Man"~
[Text] Libreville, July 1977: the Palace of Congresses was the scene of '
one of the most stormy sessions of the 14th sumnit meetinq of th~ OAU. Be-
fore the embarrassed African chiefs of state, the head of Libyan diplomacy,
'Ali 'Abd al-Salam al-Turayki, launched a regular attack on the Chadian '
regime represented by Felix Malloum, president of the republic, and Wadal
Kamougue, minister of Foreign Affairs.
The words uttered by his Libyan colleague were so violent that Lieutenant
Colonel Kamougue rose, seized the microphone and hurled the fallowing at
the Libyan delegation: "Disillusion yourselves, gentlemen, We shall never
submit ourselves to the imperialism of Libyan petrodollars." Tensic?n
reached its peak and insults rain.ed all ,over. In the middle of the con-
fusion, Edem Kodjo, at *�hat time Togolese minister of Foreign Affairs, tried
to calm down his Chadian colleague. Kamougue's reaction was brutal: "You
can go to helll" he hurled at him.
A year later, the OAU held its 15th summit meeting in Khartoum. 'Ali 'Abd
al-Salam al-Turayki rep.?ated the offense by making a frontal attack on
Kamougue and by challenging his qualifications as a representative: "Thi~
former Foreign Legiun sergeant does not represent Chad but, rather, the Sara
minority," he hurled from the speaker's platform. Most of the representa-
tives of countries of Black Africa had difficulty in concealing ~heir in-
dignation, but this time they succeeded in calminq Wadal KamoUgue. The �
assembly concluded that Libya had chosen forever its camp in the imbroglio
dividing Chad. But this was without taking into account the about-faces
characteristic of the political strategy of the unpredictable Colonel
Qadhdhafi.
Less than a year after the IQiartoum rows, yesterday's enemies are now em-
bracinq each other. The unbelievable occurred on 5 May, when Kamougue took
a seat on board a Libyan aircraft to go to Tripoli. In view of the abrupt
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turn of eventis, especially the discarding of his leading protege, Col Mu'am-
mar Qadhdhafi decided ~o conclude an al.liance with the devil. Kamougue, the
- Eormex champion of Chadian integrity, until recently Libya's pet avereion,
sought Tripoli's support to impose broad autonomy of the south, the prelude
ta a pnssi.ble aecessic?n.
In th~ tiroubled history of the Chadian rebellion, Libya served as the main
sanctuary for the various opponents. From Derdei (spiritual chief of the
Toubou) tio Ahmat Acyl, all went through Tripoli, before slamming the door
on the inflexibility and annexionist aims of their hosts. Abba Siddick had
been let go for not having been able to prove himself in the field. It is
true that the original FROLINAT leader ~as more fond of ideological combat.
' When he could no longer benefit from Libya's logistical support, he took
refuge in Algiers, giving way to the Hissein Habre-Goukouni Oueddei pair
who were, moreover, to split at the time of the denouement of tho Claustre
Affair, in 1976.
To te11 the truth, Elissein Habre's .r~ationalism ended by irritating the
Libyans. In fact, Habre did not conceal his opposition to the occupation
of the Aouzou strip by Qadhdhafi's troops. That amounted to signing his
eviction notice. Goukouni, who was Derdei's son, alone became the "Libyans'
man." Not for long, because his desire to conclude an agreement with the
N'Djamena government was poorly received by his protectors.
`I'he events that broke out in Fei~ruary 1979 in the capital of Chad, by
causing a confrontation between the two components of the ephemeral na-
_ tional union government, were to resultin enabling Goukouni to get out of
Libya's ascendency.
Colonel ~adhdhafi, therefore, did not have any illusion when he warmly
greeted his coming into power. Moreover, Tripo~i went back on its decision
a few weeks later, calling the new government in Chad illegal. Better still,
the Libyan leader then exposed to the light of day his constant concern,
which is to bring about a split of Chad by every possible means.
Irony of fate: one of those who were fiercely opposed to this undertaking,
is now agreeing to play into the hands of Tripoli. It is true that Wadal
Kamougue was a fervent defender of territorial integrity. ~
This alumnus of the Brazzaville military academy, who is not at all a di-
plomat, pleaded for Chadian unity for over 2 years in international orga-
ni.zations. Kamougue, who was the principal coordinator of the 2 April 1975
putsch that overthrew President idgarta Tombalbaye, is convinced that he in-
carnates legitimacy of government authority, to a considerable degree. Un-
doubtedly, that is why he displayed inflexibility at the time of the nego-
' tiations with the rebels. His opposition to Hissein Habre is notorious.
It would have been unthinkable to see both men at the same table in a ca-
binet meeting. In August 1978, he was ousted from the government, but he
was entrusted with command of the gendarmeries, the best organized miliary
force that enabled General blalloum to prevent a downfall in February 1979.
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His dismi~sal tha~ occurred immedtately after the formaLion of the new gov-
Qrnment r~sulted from a settlement of accounts. Kamougue was, in fact, dis-
missed from his duties while he was in Sahn, where he had gone to negotiate
the winning over of southern officials to the N'bjamena regime. The 48 hours
' granted him by the members oF the provis~.onal Council of State t~ carry out
his mission were not enough to break down reticences. But his prolonged
stay seemed suspicious to the men who, moreover, were not very sympathetically
; inclined toward him. Consequently, he did not hesitate to grab the pole held
out to him by Colonel Qadhdhafi, who was irritated by Goukouni for having
st~ted that he was ready to make an alliance with Israel to fight against
the Libyan leader. This surprising alliance upaet has now brought together
yesterday's enemies. Even Abba Siddick has become reconciled with Qadhdhafi.
Will the 600 gendarmes who have been withdrawn to Moundou, in the southern
part of the country, for the sake of demilitarization of N'Djamena, be suf-
ficient to contain the advance of the "loyalist troops"? It is difficult
_ see how effective Libyan support might be to the advocates of inaependent
self-g~vernment in the south. Moreover, only yesterday, Kamougue was pre-
sented as being responsible fur the massacres of Chadian Muslims or~ whose
behalf Libya is claiming to intervene.
COPYRIGHT: Je une Afrique. GRUPJIA 1979
10,042
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SPANISH KINC'S TRIP TO AFRICA ANALY2ED
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 27 t4ay 79 p 21
[Article by Jose Onetoj
[TextJ The future of the former Spanish Sahara and the sub~ect of the Canar,y
Islands are the principal purposes of the King and Queen's trip to Africa, the
first trip made by a Spnnish chief of state to that continent.
The official visits of King Juan Carlos to ttie Ivory Coast, Guinea Conakry and
Senegal, involving the first contact by Madrid with an immense continent which
had important ties with Spain in a not-too-distant-colonial past, should be
c~nsidered within the framework of a new foreign policy strategy vis-a-vis the
Third Ldorld which also has millions of potential consumers.
Pioreover, in the strictly political sector, the sub~ects of the Sahara and rhe
Canary Islands which wPre brought up during two successive assemblies of the
OAU (Orgariization of African Unity) are topics which are giving real political
meaning to the monarchs� trip.
Barely a week after the trip to Algiers by Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez, days
after the visit to Madrid by the Mauritanian prime minister, Mohamed Ould
Bousseif, and on the eve of Juan Carlos' trip to Rabat to talk with King
Hassan II of Morocco, the journey to Africa takes on a clear poliCical inten-
tion, all the more so now that the sub~ect of the Sahara's future which was
under Madrid's control until 1975 has been brought up again.
Last week before the start of the Moroccan offensive against the sovereign
cities of Ceuta and Melilla, King Juan Carlos made a personal telephone call
to Hassan II to definitely set the date of an official visit which had been
postponed'in deference to Madrid's foreign policy. Last week in Algiers,
Adolfo Suarez solemnly recognized the POLISARIO (Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of Saquia, E1 Hamra and Rio de Oro]; the King personally set the date of
his visit to Rabat; and Madrid received the prime minister of Mauritania to
obtain inf.ormation concerning Nouakchot's desire to reach an agreement with
the POLZSARIO to end the war which is destroying his country.
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An entire str~~tegy is involved which is not unknown to the King and concerning
the develnpmer~t c;E whi.ch, particularly during the st~ge ~f F'rancoism, he wa~
not as promptly informed as should have been necess~ry.
Naw ttie rtiree counrries visired (nc~ Ivory Cnnst, Guinea Conakry and Seneg~l)
are connected coiCh tlie sub~ect of the Satiara through important positions with-
in the Or~lnization oE African Unity, an or~anization which is keeping Che
sub;ject of Che Cattary Islands permanently pending, becnuse of Algerian prea-
sure. Of the Chree cc~untries, perhaps, it is the Ivory Coast which has been
maintaining thc clearest position with respecC to the Spanish archipelago so
much so Chat President Houpttuet-Boigny from Che outset sust.ained the theais
that the Canary Islands claim was not only "untimely" but also the Ivory Co~st
was prepared Co do battle in Africa to defend its Spanishness.
Senegal's position, as express~d by President Leopold Sedar Ser.ghor, has also
been crystal-clear on the subject ot the Canary Islands: "5ince the Canary
Islai~ds are one of the regions of the S~anish Ki~lgdom, the people of Chis �
archipelago t~ave the same duties as the other regions of Spain,"
Finally, the socialist Guinea of Sekou Toure was the most active counCry when
the sub~ect of the Canary Islands was brought up at the conference of Che
Organization of Afric.an Unity (OAU) which was held in Khartoum. The first
meeting of the Spanish minister of Foreign affairs, Marcelino Ore~a, with
President Sekou Toure last summer was especially tense, particularly when the
Guinean president, using simply geographic criteria for his argument, defended
the thesis that because the Canary Islands are opposite the continent of
~ Africa they belong to the continent. On the basis of this a:gument, Cordoba
and Granada, former pr.ovinces of the caliphate, could be claimed by the gov- -
ernment of Rabat.
After having observed the hardest positiun with respect to the future of
Africanized Canary Islands, the government ~f Conakry seems to have softened
its positions.
With the new understanding between Madrid and rllgiers, the practical disap-
pearance of the Canary independence movement and the silence of leader Anton{o ,
Cubillo, coho is a paraiytic in an Algerian clinic, the future of the Canary _
Islands has entered a new "[empus" and is unlikely to be brought up in the
halls of the Organization of African Unity.
More serious, more important, perhaps, is the sub~ect of the Sahara which,
with the change .in Matiritania's position and the new Spanish position of re-
cognizing the POLISARIO, is entering new terrain ~ahere peace seems nearer.
Without a doubt, the King's trip to Africa will contribute to this.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Information y Publicaciones, S.A.
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TNT~R-Af'ttLCAN A~~AIRS
g~LGtAN-KURN M~EtC~NA1tY AIt~t~ST~b IN rN~ S~YCNELL~5
peris A~ItiQU~-ASI~ in ~r~nr.h 28 M.~y ~9 pp 15-16
_ [Artir.le: "A Mercenary N~.med L~fev~r" j
[Text~ Who was that B~lgian "tourist" r~cently ~rreat~d in
the 5eyche11eg7 Our aperial ~c~rregpondent in Victoria conducted
an l.nvegtigation locally. Here ie wi~ut he di~cnvered.
He i~ H~lgian und wag born on 2 April 1932 in Jumec (Ch~rleroi) where hi~
current hnm.e ~ddregs is 5 rue d'Argent~~~il. He ig 1.8 meters tall, has blue
eye~ nnd ~ black mugteche and b~ard. He hae three passports: one Belgian
_ bnd cWO Comc>rian~ the latter signed in June 19~8 in Mordni by 5aid Ahmed
5nidnli, director of the minister of the interinr'e pereonel eteff. Nie Belgian
pasgpnrt~ Nn P. O70 334-22435~ ~how~ that frnm January to April 1979~ he
traveled frequ~ntly b~tae~n Keyna, the Comorns~ Mayotte~ Iteunion~ and the
Seychell~~.
His name is Alfred Lefevre. He aucceeefully completed his training at the
5chaffen parutroop training center on 13 October 1951. He is a a~ercenary~ e
hired ngeagsin. 'I'here ie every indic~tion that he has been involved in nucneroue
commandn aperatians in Africa and the Arab countrie~. In fact~ he doe~ not
deny thie nnd ~dmite he belonged to the group of inercenaries commanded by the
Woefully famoue Hob benard aho nverthrew the Ali 5oilih regime. When he vas
arregced in late April on Mehe Islend by 5eychellee authorities, he was carrying,
an "nrder" dated 25 .iuly 1978 appointing him second lieutenant and eigned by
C~lonel Said Mueraphg M'Hadji~ one of Bob Denard's elisses aho aas then
~oann~nder in chief of the Comorian armed forcee and military police. Aleo
found in hie baggage Was a whdle collection of photographs in which he is
flanked by "c~mradeg" some of th~m women all armed to the teeth. But
the most compromising item wae fdund among his clothes, namely a uniform
identical in every respect to those ttorn by 5eychelles off icere~ with helmet,
beret~ and various insignia and badgee. He also had letters allegedly t~rritten
by girls from Moroni, but theae Were actually caded mesgages.
Thi~ Lefevre ig unquegtionably a tough customer. i~lhen initinlly interrogated,
he promptly and calmly admttted he vas a mercenary and intended to join Ian
Smith's troops in 5ali$bury. But he saore he had no intention wfiatever of
7
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N'Oh OFFIC;t,1f. l'Sh' U~(,Y
ar~~nt.r.ing nny ~cind ot aetic~n against the 5eyc:helle~. In that cg~~, w}~nt wn~
- he J~~inK thcxr'1 ;t~~r~~lv ::ikht~ccing like ~~ny ~ther touridt, hc explt~in~d~ Wittt
Sey~ht~lic~q c~fftr~.~r +~nit~c~rm tn hig suir~aye~ r~ uniform thr~[ would probubly
hr~ve enabled him ~c~ mu,~�t ~i "~dup" or orgaciize an attempt ~n ~he liveg df k~y
5~ychell~~s offici~ls. I.efevre ar~ued th~~t these uttiforms ar~ r~gdily ~v~tlabl~
in Mdmbsssr~, Kenya, and h~~ h~~d bougl~t h;s "~n~ a souvenir," Come, cc~m~ nt+w;
W}~ds w~~5 hi~ a;tsigncd mi5si~in ;.n the Seychell~s? He 11ad none. He hgd cnme thpr~
frem Reunion ancl w~s ~;~ic~~; tc~ le~~e f~~r Nairobf from where he pr~pogpd to ,join
his pnlq it~ ithod~~;~i~~, t:,,ar. c~,nnecri~~n5 ~iid }~e h~ve with the thrpe individuul~, -
c~~rryin~ c;c rmfin p~i~; r~rt ~,rho i~ad precc~dc~d h:m to the 5eychelles gome 2 wcekg
earli~r and hc~d l~~ft ir, hurry wi~en they ~elt ehc:y were under aurvei.llnnce?
ile sa.id hc~ did not kr~ow~ whut hi;~ questi_oners uere tal'~cing ubuuC ~nd cduld nnt
underr~tand why thev wan~c~d to irnpl icate t~im in "al leged venture" ~bout whieh he
knew ~.b,olutely nc~rhtns�.. ,'~fttir tiiat, as a p,n~d "profes~ianal" he precticnlly `
ttc~ lonKer an5wf~rc�d .an~~ ~,u~~5tiuns. Iie now seems to be quietly awatiing hie
- rele,ise: the Iiel~iar c,~, >u: it~ ~take h,~:a rc~c~uzsted that he be set free, tit7d
"they" have ~~lr~ _ _
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F'OK di~'~ICtAL U5~ dNLY -
to ghow proof of th~ change thar h~~ tgken plac~ in Che counCry under Cha
uegi~ n~ Cha Army. Ic ib ~rue thgt the political landscepa of Niger h~s
changed n gr~nt denl in fiv~ yenr~~ The preeidenti~l palace in Niamey,
nn impoging edifice whU~a Soudenn-Muuresqu~ architeceure i~ ref lected in
the weeerg di th~ riv~r, ig nnw nnly the ehadow nf iCeelf~ Formerly Che
~eat of d feverigh act:tvity~ it ig now tot~lly de~erted~ Outeide of the
rnre official receptinu~ thut he dffprg thpre, the current preeident,
Colonel 5eyni Kountrhe, obstinneely CAQip9 in the official rasidence of Che
chief of sCOff of th~ Niger Army, while the pglace remnina closed and _
forbidden to th~ public. In nrder td ~haw thig very clegrly~ armed eoldiera
dreeded in ~I~nrt unifnrm~, n~nchalnnt and debonnnire~ watch before itg
_ entrance, In the ggrnge~ dozena of Mercedeg (including rwo Mercedeg 600g),
unused nfter che events of April 1974, very genCly gaeher duat~ abandoned
to the effectg of time.
The building of the former N~tional Assembly is not unaffecCed. Certainly,
the deputiea of the form~r regime were sent back to their prnfessional
_ accupc?tiony. The studio apartments which served them as residencea during
the sessiona hgve been closed. Because, a neighbour telle us~ "certain
dignitaries of the new regime hc~d a tendency to change the deputies'
residence into a house of assignation." However, the building still houseg
the servicea of the Ministry of ~oreign Affairs And Battalion Commander
Moumoumi U,jermakoie Adamou, Che foreign minister, hxs taken the ermchair
of ex-preaident Boubou Hama. The officigl residence thaC the letter used
to occupy nn the river-bank today aerves as a recepCion hAll for the membera -
of the government. As for the immenge assembly hall where the deputies , -
huddled together, from time to time it serves as a meeting place for cadre
conferences. -
The men who presided over the desCinies of Niger for 15 years have all left
the front of the stage. Furthermore, all of the country's influential
political personages were arrested during the night of 14-15 April 1974.
, Pulled from their beds wt~ile sound nsleep, those dignitaries were first
transpnrted in ,jeeps to the Tondibia Cadet Camp, some ten kilometers from
= Niamey, and then for the most part transferred the next day to tha city of
the Entente Council, not far from the French embassy. It was from there
they were taken to different military camps in the interior (Agadez, Zinder,
Tahoua, etc.) as political detainees.
Pol~.tical detainees who, under the African sun, did not have a great deal to
complain about. Housed in relaCively comfortable villas customarily
reserved for officers, the dignitaries of the former regime led a life
rathec of inen ~n retreat inside the military camps than a prisoner's life. _
, Adequ~,tely fed, they passed the best part of their time playing cards or
billiards or bowling. Some of them got together to talk over their ideas
on human destiny, while oChers, disillusioned, preferred to withdraw into -
isolution in order to meditate on the fragility of political power. This
is unusual in Africa. However, generally they all finally agreed to
definitively renounce all political activity once they were freed. This
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E~'Ott UF'~ICtAL US~: nNLY
wnd a promi~e that they hurrted to �orgQe, df cnur~e, n~ aonn a~ Chey ~aw
on~~ ~guin th~ lighr of liberty.
Ae fnr rhe Inv~tid~, thAy w~re admitted Co the hu~pital at Niamey. And
, in cgbe~ nf complicatinn they were cran~porr~d to Perig. Some former
mini~terg w~re thu~ cared Eor in tlie Frpnch ~epital before they were
r~turned t~ th~tr deCentinn C~mp~, It doeen't mgCCer that certain one~~
like Mr Atduddour 7.~cc~ra, former �in~nc~ mini~ter~ died in detentian. As
for th~ oChers, mUyt ~f them t~ave tod~y recovered their freedom.
'Che technocrate prumated by ex-president Diori Hamani were the firet onee
freed. They were libernted a few month~ efter their arrest, even when
they wer~ ciot reeurned r~ their ministerial pogt~, becauee they were
c:~nn~c:ted with the le~dermhip of importr~nt gt~t~ corporntion~ or of
- c~ntr~l admini~trationq. Th~n it wus the turn of the leaders of the RDA
(African Uemocratic Itally, whose former president biori was the first in
line) Co brenthe che nir of liberty.
Le~ving a~ide ~nme former cleputies and minister~, like Mr Herou Kouka
(Public Worke) und Leopold Kaziende (N~tionnt Uefense), ex-president Houbou ~
Nama w~g by fgr the most illustrious figure. They were freed in smoll
groups and since then ttiey t~ave liveci a life of penceful retirement in
Niamey. The unly problem is that certain of them, such as Dr Herou Kouka~
Iwv~ noC been authorized to take up their professiona again; and that $ man
like Mr Boubou Hamu, who worked in palitica for a quarter of a century~ ia
curiously at pregent without e:~of. He is obliged to live at the houee
of hi~ ~on. Should the government of Colonel Kountche nbandon those men
to their fate? Without aid and Kithou[ resourcesl
Myeterious Fa[e of Detainees
Certainly not. Ln view of their advanced nges, there are good chances
that, f.lithful co the African traditions particularly devoCed to asaistance
Eor the aged, the autharities of Niger will not delay in giving them
asaistance. In one w~y or another....
Nowever, other fo:mer detainees have not delayed in making their reconversions
effective. Thu., the predecessor of Colonel Kountche in the post of chief
of staff of t}ie Niger Army~ Col Balla Arbe, has devoted himself since his
liberar.ion to trade betwecn Pfaradi and Kono (Nigeria). In the meantime, a
half-~ozen personal.ities are still under detention in the company of
ex-president Hanani Diori. And~ with them, some ten militiemen who had
p~rticularly distinguis}ied themselves in repression. President Kountche,
who has the only decision-making power in this area, categorically refuses
- to announce the date of their liberation. "I shall not reveal that date to
anyone," he told us last March, witli an air that was half amusement and
half irritation.
Certainly, the chief o� state and his comrades in the Supreme Military
_ Council (CMS, thc Supreme Organ of the State) hesitate to take that atep.
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It is tru~ ChF~~ rh~ hos~ility rhat som~ of Ch~ir compatr3ot~~ who were
aever~ly re~ted earlier~ continue to h~rbor eow3rd the leadere c,~ Cha forcn~r
regime ~ugrifies in part thi~ watchful waiting.
Strong, 5trueeured Army _
Thus the memorie~ of the excesaes committed by fnrmer Interior MinieCer
Diambalg Maige heve not been tot~lly effaced from popular memory. It has
even happened Cht1C the chief of state has received delegationa arriving
from the interior of the country especially to demand that one or nnother ~
former digniC~ry be kept in prigon. The reason? Five years aEter the fgll
of Mr Hamani Uiori'~ regime, certain citizens of Niger are etill ca111ng
for revenge.
Neverthelesg, ev~ryChing ullows us Co believe that the latter group will not
sCny in prisnn forever~ In spite of the thick veil of myeCery that
surrounds the debates of the CMS on this painful question, iC is still
permitted to believe thae those unforCunate people will cerCainly not be
long in recoverin& their freedom. For examp~,e, Mr D~ibo Bakari, former
leader of the Sawaba, who w~s arrested in 1975. Todgy, more than ever,
the Niger Army needs to erase from its memory the themes and the atigmata
of its April 1974 coup d'etat. In a country where inflexibily tolerant
spirits are rather inclined toward indulgence, if not forgetfulneea and
pardon, than toward revenge and the humiliation or the gratuitous putting
to dEath of one's opponent, public opinion understands leas and lese the
indefinite prison residence of Diori, Djibo and their companions. Certainly,
people are pleased, even proud to know that they are wel? treated (eee
JEUNE AFRIQUE No 801). "We are zot barbarians in Niger," a young official
told us, although his family had for all of that suffered under the former
regime. However, in a general way, everyone would prefer to declare:
"Among us there sre no political prisoners."
The Army seems more and more disposed to turn the page as it considers
itself stronger and better structure3. The companions of the first hour
who had shown some slight inclination to rebel against the advances of the
regime have been pitilessly eliminated. Such was the case of Ma~or
5ani Souna 5ido, who h~~d the reputation of being the man who really over-
threw Diori. Arrested for plotting in July 1915, he was detained in the
Agadez military camp until he died in 1978 of the aftereffects of an
epileptic seizure.
In March of 1976 it was the turn of Battalion Commander Moussa Bayere and
CapCain Sidi Mohamed to attempt a coup d'etat. At the head of the cadets
of the T~nidibia can;~; ~:iey had no trouble in surrounding the st~ff, from
~ which they tried to rally the officer corps to their cause. But they
failed noC far from there, before the residence of the chief of state.
Arrested, thay were tried at the same time as several civilians, including
Mr Ahmed Mouddour, the secretary general of the Confederatiun of Unions
of Niger, and F2r ldrissa Boube, director of the National Secret Police.
All were condemned to death and shot in a rather expeditious manner. Other
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recnlrirrnnt camp~niony were to know n kinder faC~. Such wae Che cc~se of
Lieutenant Cyrille~ whn i~ still in pxi~on~ ac~d above nll that of Ma~or
Idris~a Aroun~, who, ~ft~r being long canyidered a~ the number two man `
of the rggime~ guddcnly fe11 i.ntd di~graee. He w~e appo3nted aeverel monthe
ago to repre~ent his country in Peking.
"Power Not a Game"
A11 of these t~rriEying activities hgve hgd the effect of making the CMS, `
and wieh it tt~e of�icer corps, more coherent and more solidly ranged behind
their leader, Co1 5eyni Kountche. ~~rthermore, the latter today seeme
coafident ~nd more assured. Certainly, with hia sharp featurea, hie aevere
and penetr~ticig lonk, the chief of state of Niger still exudee austeriCy
nnd rorrectneag. ~ive yQars of exercieing Che supreme power have not
changed him in either his physicnl npper~rance or hig habits. Lean body, -
energetic gestures and his strict militar.y habit bear witnesa, if there
ia any need for it, that he has not gained n kilo. Up and about every day
at the first glimmerin~s of dawn to begin an overflowing schedule which
is not completed unCil very late tt~at evening, Seyni Kountche fleea from
trivia and denies himself any distr~ctions.
This rigorous life repels and upsets even his closest collaborator~. It
is reported that some of his relatives, unhappy about his behavior, nr longer
speak to him. For those amoag them who are so brave as to knock at hia -
door, he orders in a dry and peremptory way: "Let them come to aee me in
the village during my vacaeion." As he does not give himself more than a
few rare moments of leisure each year, this reply is equivalent to a
declaratiun that he will not receive etiem. When one of his cloae relativea,
an employee in his government, had been compromised in an affair of
= deviation of funds, he took pains to demand the ~7ost severe punishment for
the guilty person. Such is the appearance of the man who has been presiding ~
for five yenrs without drum or trumpet but with a faultless rigor over ~
the destintes of Niger. Was he aware of the sir.e of the taek before he
rose to the supreme pnwer? "I knew," he replies, that "power was not a
game, but a burden and a responEibility that it was necessary to prepare for
_ with rigor ~nd application."
Development, Social Justice
On the other hand, the chief of state has now conquered the timidity and
the clumsiness of the staff ~~fsicer. By the tone of his voice as well -
as by his manners and his gesrures, one feels the presence of a confident
man, sure of himself and perfectly at ease in his role. Even if, in the
course of the conversation, f~e shows that he has not entirely lost hia
proud and touchy side, nor even the suspicious mania of the military maa,
he makes a visible eff~~rt to overcome those handicaps. He seeks to put his
conversation partner at ease and lead him to share the contained passion
which entirely devours him: The development of his country with unity and
social jusCice.
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~OR 0~'~ICIAL USE O1tI.Y
Thia is a aub~ect that is particularly in style in the salone of Niamey.
_ The uranium boom leaves no nne indifferent. Everyone, and not only in
Niamey, knnws furthermore that ti~anks to t.ts rich mining potential, this ~
counrry wi11 become one of the most proaperous 3n Africa by the end of the
nexC decade. Which means thae the citizena of Niger are now being part3cularly
courted. Bueinesamen, experts and financier~ ghow up from all directione,
~ostling each other at the Niamey airport before running acrosa each other
in the minieterial antechambers, Some Western banks such as the National ~
Bank of Paris (French) and the City Bank (American), drawn by the odor
of royalties, are applying for the opening of agencies on the epo~.
The oil companiea are not idle. Terhnicians of Conoco, Texaco and Eeso have
been proapeceing for years around the basins of Che Niger River and Lake
Chad. The "indications that have been found a11ow us to have real hope
es of this moment," a high official informed us. Curiously, the French
ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants of Francej Company, which several years ago had
abandoned its research activity, has suddenly come back in force. To etart
_ dri111ng again alongside its Anerican sisCers.
Doesn't the attraction of the great wealth to be extracCed from the aubsoil
run the risk of having a harmful effecC on the Niger people? Carried away
- by the vertigo of petroleum and uranium (to speak only of those two
minerals), aren't the compatriots of Col Seyni Kountche going to desert
their fields and pastures and crok~d themselves into cities that are lesa
and less well equipped to accommodate them? This situation is all the
more worrisome since it risks annihilating the great efforCs undertaicen ~n
the course of recent years to struggle against the drought and to develop
agriculgure. The beautiful experiments in integrated cultivation attempted
around Lakes Tabalak and Baga might have no tomorrow. Extensive irrigation
pro~ects, such as.those being carried nuC at this moment at Nkonni, might
be threatened. Tf~e shores of the important storage lake, where some 30,000
farmers drawn frotn several surrounding villages should come together, might
someday be depopulated to Che profit of the Arlit strip mine or the oil _
fields of the Lake Chad basin.
Mitigating Effects of Drought
This is a problem which is painfully demanding the attention of the Niger
leaders. "We do not want to be at the mercy of a single export product
or even of mineral products alone," President Kountche told us. How to avoid
it, though. All the work that has been done to mitigate the effects of the -
drought and to create conditions for the development of agriculCure is
being continued by the chief of state. Good intentions are not lacking.
They are there, however: Every year that goes by is marked by a higher -
percentage of ore expo~rts in the foreign trade balance. The process seems
inexorable.
Another sub~ect for worry for the Niger leaders, which is only the natural
consequence of the phenomenon mentioned above: corruption and the perversion
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~
of moral velues. Up to now ehe citizens nf Niger have lived modestly, if
not frugally. Ian't Che sudden in~ection of cgpital 1~kely tn ov~rturn
that Sahelian wgy of life nnd awnkec~ an appetite for money? "I ehall use
~ the most extreme m~a~ui~eg ag~inet cnrruption and ite misdeeds," Colonel
Kountche told us, In fact, strict measuree are being prepared. And the
chief of atate ~lternately sendg nut warninge and patriotic appeale~ However,
- ie iC sufficient to keep tho~e cadrea from temptation by warning them againet
bribery, a deeply entrenched phenometton a11 over the Thi.rd Wor1d?
Reconciliation Around Army
In fact, such scourges are easier to cambar in an open soc3ety where free
democratic debate contributes to moralizing political stgndarde. However,
President Kountche do~s not believe thaC Africa is completely ripe for such
institutions. At the same time that he recognizes that the vocaCion of the -
Army is to atay in its cantonments, he thinks Chat it has a role tio play in
the current phase af developing a mentality. "The greatest democracy that
we need at this moment is the democracy of Che granary," he declared in a
peremptory tone. To be understood by thae is that Africans right now need
to satisfy their hunger more than anything else. And that they are happy
enough when they have enough grain in Cheir granariea. "Democracy? Z am
in complete agreement. Yes, in two, evea three generations," Seyni Kountche
concludes in a burat of laughter that goes a long way toward expreoaing his
ideas on that sub~ect. ~
As of Chis moment, the concern of the chief of state is more Chan anything
else tc bring about unity and national reconciliation around the Army.
Convinced that his compatriots have an unhappy memory of the fratricidal
struggles which formerly opposed the partisans of D~ibo Bakari and those of
Hamani Diori, he declares: "The Nigeriens do not want to hear political
parties mentioned.'' Then, after a moment of reflection, he returna to
the subject, not without letting a malicious smile play around the corner
of his mouth: "Oh, that wi11 certainly happen some day. Very naturally...
when conditions are ripe.... Yes, later...."
National unity? The leaders of Niger visibly fear "destabilizing maneuvers'~
teleprompted from abroad. Above u11 since the wealth of the subsoil cannot
be sold~c~ri.thout arousing ~ealousy and coveCousness. The case of Chad is
there to prove it. That is why, in Niamey, they follow the evolution of
the situati~n and the armed conflicts in the entire subregion with very
special attention, and they are pleased to insist on the fact that Niger
is a little neutral country, hopeful above all to maintain relations of
good neighborliness with all nationc without regard for their political -
and ideological options. "Our only ideology," the chief of state declared,
"is to act against the drought and against hunger. To drag Niger out of
its underdevelopment. All the rest is nothing more than a~umble of words
that we cannot understand." In spite of the fact thaC the Niger leaders
feel some uneasiness about the domineering designs of some of their powerful
neighbors. Wedged between t~?ree rather strong powers--on the African scale--
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(Algeria, Libya, Nigeria), Niger se~ma eo be having a harder and harder ~
time keeping ita neutrglity intact~ Nevertheleas Colonel Kountche and hi~
comrades in the CMS are ~ore than ever resolved to keep Chemse~.vea our of
- Che political rivalries thar are tearing the region apart.
An Eagerly Awaired Evene
- Moreaver, ChgC is what explains their lack of enChusiasm about any idea of
a defense pact or even an alliance of a political nature~ However~ it 3e
not out of Che queation Chat in the courae of the important speech that
President Kountche will give on 15 AFril he may provida greater detail8
on the poliCical line that Niger intends to foll.ow after the turnittg point
marking Che completion of the first five years of military power. An _
eagerly awaited event. And not only by the Nigeriens, even if many of
them will be impressed by the fine arch of triumph, the magnificent grass-
covered stadiwn and all the infrastructures which the city of Doaso hae ~
bui1C in record time among iCs palm trees. ' '
Without counting the fact thaC the issue of the confrontation which wi11 .
put face tq face the cultural groups of the different regione of Niger on
Chis occasion is now arousing more interest than political queations.
Nothing surprising abouC that. Not having power to participate in a ~
democratic debate, in Niger as elsewhere in Africa the Africans are passion-
ately interested in sports. There is nothing degrading in that. Provided
Chat they can grow out of it.
In Niger, the austerity preached by President Kountche is not an empty
word. This is born out by the fact that the Mercedes belonging to the fleet
of the former Hamani Diori regime have been put up on blocks or sold to
private citizens. The ministers now roll down the streets of Niamey only
- in model 504~s and the service chiefs in 2 CV's. The latter have rights
to only 4 liters of gasoline daily. Cor~rary to what happens in other
African countries, here no one plays ~ames with playboys and plutocrats!
Uranium: Modern Gold Rush
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Apr 79 pp 50, 52
[Article by Ph. B]
[TextJ If the soil of Niger is poor, the subsoil is on the contrary very
rich. Uranium, cas~iterite, phosphates, coal, iron, cop~er... and perhaps
oil: so many deposits exploited or still untouched which sweep away the
opinion of a colonial g,overnor for whom Niger was "a country of sands,
without a future."
A recent industry (1971), uranium mining is a trump card for the country.
An oxygen tank, delive~-ed in the nick of time, it is the symbol of the
economic take-off and of the beginning of Niger's modernization. The
reasonably assured resc~urces come to 74,000 tons and the supplementary
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eseimgt~d r~snurccs woiild probably nmount t~ 86,~On Con~. At Che clo~e of
1978 prnduceion wa~ cul.cul~Ced ~t 2,200 tone. With rupidly increeeing
woxld dQm~nd~ and rtie ore pr,icep being regularly reevaluted (in 19'l9:
'14~500 fr~nce CFA [African Fingncial Communityj a kilo)~ the effecCs of
the uranium exploit~tion cn Niger's ecnnomy ~re for ChaC reaenn very
import~nt.
~he urnnium deposits, which were discovered by the French Atomic Energy
Commiasion (CEaJ, are found principally ~long the southern and weatern
- bdrders of the Air Massif (northern part of the country). Tha firat deposit
to be exploited d~te~ fron~ the beginning of tt~e 1970s. The Air Mining
Company [SOrtAIEt], crenCed in 1968, exploitm with g sCrip mine at Ar1iC ~
(250 kilo-meters south-southe~st ~f Agadez) the ore inside a perimeter
measuring 6 kilometers by 3. At pressnt, twn deponeis ar~ known: Arlit,
which is exploited (reserves: 10,000 tons) and Ariege, whose discovery
dates from 1976 (reserves: 10,000 tons). A third deposit--thaC of ArtoiB--
is now being cored (reserv~s estitt~Ced at between 20,000 ~nd 25,000 tons).
In 1978 the production oF 50MAI~t rose to 1,800 tons npproximately (1,441
Cons in 1977) and rhe sCeady production expected when production has reached
its peak wi11 be between 2,000 and 2,500 tons per year. The prnduct ia
exported as a concentrate of sodium uranute which tiCrates about 10 percent
uranium.
However, S.Ll1Ce 31 AU$U3C 1978, a second company, COMINAK (Akouta Mining
Company)--creatad in 1974--is ~xploiting an underground mine at Atouta,
10 kilometers southwest of Arlit. The exploitable reserves are on the
order of 44,000 tons. At the end of 1978 production rose to 350 tons of
uranium (or 450 tons of magnesium uranate). The ob~ective for 1979 ia to
reach 1,750 tons and, after I980, 2,000 to 2,200 tons a year. Theae two
companies--50MAIR and COMINr1K--are soon to be ~oined by the Mining Company
of Tassa N'Taghalgue [SMTT]. This company will exploit the Arni deposit,
located four kilometers southwest of Arlit, wh~re the exploitable reaerves
amount eo some 20,000 tcns of uranium. The first production could occur
in 1981 or 1982.
Other deposits are the objectives of prospecting: permiCs have been granted
tu an enCire gamut of foreign companies, the state hoping to diversi�y ita
partners in the development of its mining industry. Such is the case of the
Imouraren deposit, located less than 100 kilometers south of Arlit and
where the exploitable reserves are probably on the order of 66,000 tons.
And on the horizon for 1g85 are the pro~ects of West Afasto (southwest of
the Arlit concession), EasC Afasto (on the eastern border of Arlit), D~ado ,
(on the borcier of the Tibesti massifs) and that of Abokorun-Azelik (see
the table).
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Uranium Produc~ion "
Year Tons of Uranium
Before 1972 410.5
1972 861.0
1973 948.3 ,
1974 1,116.9
1975 1,305.5
1976 1,460.2 ~
1977 1,609.0
1978 2,200.0
Tota1 9,917.4 ~
Capacity for Uranium Production (pro~ected figurea)
1979 3,850 ~
1980 4,100 ~
1981 4,300
1982 9,000
1983 9,000
1984 9,000 '
1985 9,000
- 1990 9,000
Large Income from Uranium ~
At the beginning of the 70's, uranium provided little income for Niger.
Frunce was at that time the only master of the game, the participation of the
stute of Niger in SOMAIR amounting to only 8 percent (it then roee to 16
percent and is 33 percent today). The only purchasing country, France
unilaterally fixed the purchase price of the ore and as a counterpart
invested an annual compensation on the order of 1 million CFA francs.
Today the situation has turned around. Following new agreements with
France, signed in 1974, Niger decides the uranium prices. Every year
(between October and December), the sales price is determined by Che Niger
government, the directors of the SOMAIR and COMINAK companiea and the
stockholders of those two companies, who are the ones who buy the ore.
The starting point :ts not a world price because there does not yet exist any
uranium "OPEC." However, a de facto rule is determined on the basis of
the contracts that are signed throughout the world. The sales price is
then fixed between x and y dollars. Starting with those relatively fluid
data, Niger and its partners fix the price: 24,500 CFA francs per kilo in
1979 as opposed to 23,500 in 1978 and 20,000 in 1971.
For the ways in which paymenta are made, a partial payment, called a
provisional payment, is now made which corresponds to 80 percent of the
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vnlue of the de:livery deeermined by ~he seller's samples. The buyere~ who
are Che SOMAIIt nnd COMTNAK stockholder~, mugt pny the invoica in lees ~han
rwo montha. buring thtit period, they proceed to a contradic~ory sempling.
After ~n ngreemtnt (wh~tch someCimey requires resorting to arbitration), '
ttie selling price nf th~ ore is definiti.vely eetabllahed and the buyere
have 45 dnys--~dded to ehe 2 months--ta pny Che b~lance.
~
In a few yeure, uranium ha5 thus ber.ome the primary export product of Niger
(about 70 percent of ~11 export receipts). The continunl increase in
production and yales and the constant upward mnvement of prices permit
the counCry to yhnw ~ppreciable budget receipts. Niger's income under the
heading nf uranium has ~hus increased from 400 million CFA france in 1974 Co
4 billion in 1975, tt~en to 7.6 billion in 1976 and 10.5 bi].lion in 19~~.
Those receipts are increasing in such an impressive way that, over and
above the rax on profits, Che royalties paid on production and the cusComa
duties paid for e.cports, Niger--in its role as owner of 33 percent of the
shares of 50MAIR and 31 percent of the shares of COMINAK--ae11s iCa part in
producCion bnck to its parCners. _
With a yearly production on the order oF 5,000 to 6,000 Cons of inetallic
_ uranium in the 80's, Niger will become one of the first-rank world producers
(in 1978, world production amounted to 30,000 Cons). The role that thia
country will play in providing energy for the industrialized nationa can
be seen. On the other hand, the covetousneas of the industrialized nations
with regard to Niger is clearly visible.
The result is that the authorities are practising a"prudent realism."
The rate of production is wisely regulated and the revenues taken from the
ore are devoted to the development of the country. The sales feed a
National Investment ~und [FNIJ which grants priority to the development
of the rural sector, to health and to education, as well as to purchasing
state parricipation in the capital of diverse companies.
Other Mineral Resources
However, mining prospects are not limited to uranium.
The production of cassiterite (tin ore), at E1 Mecki, Taraoud~i, Timia,
Agolak and Guissat has been held aC the same level since 1974: 117.5 tons
of concentrate in 1976 compared to 127.5 tons in 1975 and 126 tons in 1974.
Exports, sperifically to Belguim and Nigeria, rose to 110 tons in 1976
compared to 120 tons in 1974. The exploitati.on of two coal depos~ts, located
at Anou-Araren, 50 kilometers northwest of Agadez, began under the segis of
the Niger Coal Company of Anou-Areren [SONICHARj. The reserves are
estimated at nearly five million tons (but of inediocre qualiCy) and they -
should serve for producing the necessary electricity to supply the uranium
plants at Air and the city of Agadez.
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The prc:spective coal production 3s calculated aC 120,000 tnna in 1982, and
it ~rt11 be r~iaed to Z75,000 ~ons in 1987.
Cloee Co L�he mine a st;eam generating p1anC with two generatore of 16
megawatte each ia under consCruction. Ir will produce 120 million kilowatts.
The worke of uncovering the deposit were begun at the end of 197~ and they
will be campleted in 1979.
Some calcium phosphatie deposits hgve been surveyed 150 kilometera to the
south of Niamey. They are p~rt of a"phosphate province" covering Benin,
Niger and Upper Volta, inaide a perimeter which correaponds Co Che national
park of.the W[translation unknown]. The coring campaigna are being carried
out by the BRGM (Bureau of Geological and Mining Research) in connection
with ONARF.hI (National Office of Mineral Resources). Reaerves amounting
to 500 million tons are spoken of.
Indications of Petroleum
The iron deposit at Say and ita exploitation--about 650 million Cons
titrating 51 to 53 percent iron--is currently under study~ The study is
being conducted by the ONUDI (Organization of the United Nations for
Industrial Development) at the request of the Niger-Nigerian Cooperation
Commission.
Some petroleum has been found in the Tin Touma well (N'Guimi dietrict).
Four groups of companies: Texaco-Esso, Texaco-Esso-Global, Conoco-Shell
and Niger Sun Oil-Phillips 011 Global, began in fact in 1975 to carry our
poeitive drilling. The authorities, however, are remaining prudent and
discreet.
Research is continuing, a permit has been granted to ELF [Gasoline and
Lubricants Company of FranceJ and Esso has begun a new drilling campaign.
Whatever the reserves may be, between now and 1989 Niger could have enough
fuel available aC least for its own consumpCion. This resource, added to
uranium, would make Niger into an economically rich country and would
reduce to zero its imports of hydrocarbons which every year amount to about
four billion CFA francs.
Akouta: Second Uranium Mine
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 12 Apr 79 p 53 ,
[Text] Seen from the air, Akouta in no way t;reaks the uniformity of the
desert. Located in the heart of the northern part of the African continent,
on the southern boundaries of the Hoggar and connected by tracks to the
closest agglomerations (Iferouane: 120 kilometers; Agadez: 250 kilometers),
this spot is the oppasite of Arlit--which is a greenish crater, a living
rent in that sterile zone. Here, the only things visible are a factory
building and the urban zone of Akodan, which is being completed. flowever,
_ there is a connection between Akouta and Arlit: uranium.
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M
, R~aserves: G4, 000 ton~
` For Che uttd~r~round deposit a� Akauta, the adventura b~gin~ l~ter Chan th~t
of Ar1it. ~allowing ~rudies on the prospect nf radiaactive minerals carried
~ out jointly by t1~e ~'rench Commie~ion for Atomin Enezgy [C~A], URANIGER
~ (expnngion unknown]--].ater diasolved end replaced by Che NaCional Office
. of Minernl R~sources (ONEIt~Mj--nnd Japnn (OUItD: Overseas Uranium Resources
Develnpment), a preliminnry report was submitted f~,vorable to the
. explnit~tion of the site. This report wga presenCed to the authoriCies
in 1974. It estimated the r~gcrves at 44,000 Cons of an ore whoae assays
a vary �rom 2 to 5 kiloq a ton. In addition, the ore conrains molybdenum.
On 12 Augu~t of Che same ye~r, ~ compgny was con~rituted. Thia was COMINAK
(Mining Company df Akoutn), where the state of Niger, the CEA and OURA
are found side by side. In 1975 Spain (ENUSA [National Uranium Enterpriae,
Inc.J) will ~oin them, having bought a part of CEA's ahares.
The pro~ect was sturteu, and it was finished on 1 August 1978. The under-
ground mi.ne is near to a factory ma,nufacCuring sulphuric acid (45,650
tons wi11 be produced per year) which has been operntional since 1 January
1978. The first shipment o� mggnesium uranate left Akouta on 31 Auguat
1978.
The remarkable aspect of how this deposit was put under exploitation was that
the periode of time between the first studies and Che effective exploitation
were practically nil. A delay of only two months was observed! "A slowdown
due to the defectiveness of certain vats, which had t~ be entirely redone,
and chiefly due to the problems of shipping the material from Cotonou," -
the secretary general of COMINAK indicates. Moreover, expenses committed
by the treasury between 1918 and 1979, established at 43 billion CFA
francs, were raised to 45.5 billion. A financing which was effected in
three ways:
Starting with the company's own capital (the social capital of 3.5 million
CFA francs and advances made by the stockholders, which amounted to 7
billion); by medium-term credits agreed on by the banks and guaranteed by
_ the stockhulders; finally, by two credits for a total value of 9.9 billion
yen, invested by OURD (Japan).
Two Thousand to 2,200 Tons Yearly
Today, 1,191 people work at Akouta (35 engineers including 2 from Niger; 185
skilled workers including I8 from Niger; 971 laborers from Niger). By the
end of 1979 the number o� jobs will rise to 1,574 and in 1980 to 1,750.
Between 31 August and 31 December 1978, 350 tons of uranium were produced
Chere. That production will rir~e to 1,700 tons in 1979 and will reach a
sustained annual rate of 2,000 to 2,200 tons beginning in 1980.
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Ineuff3cient Ronde '
If the people respon~ible �or COMINAK are satisfied wieh the functioning
o� the mine, they comp:Lain neverthelees about the poorness of the routes of
commun3Cat3on. The Akaura depoeit is 1,100 kilometers from Niamey and
3,200 kilometere Erom the port of Cotonou. Ninety percent of the
transportation of material is taken care of by surface routea~ Thie doee
not happen without constant problems: a break in loading (ship to Cotonou,
t hen railruad between Cotonou and Parakou, and then a road), bad roads which
are cut during the rainy season, long delays for cuseoms inspection in the
port of Cotonou~,.~ Also, the average Cime for a shipment between a suppller
and Akouta is about four months.
The volume and the weight of the transported tnaterial lim~,t the use of ~
aerial tranaport. "Only 3n a case of emergency or for material of small size
do we call upon airplanes," a representative of COMINAK insists. "And even~ -
if we wanted to transport heavier and bulkier freight, we could not do so.
Air Niger atill does nnt have any large cargo planes but only some DC-4s
and DC-6s," he adds.
There is still one hope: The uranium road, 700 kilometers long, financed
by Che mining partners, which will connect Tahoua-Agadez and Arlit.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
12,116
CSO: 4400
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~
TOGO
- BRIEFS
FAC AGRICVI,TUR,AL, ASSISTANCE--France and Togo on 14 May at Lome aigned an
aid agreement amounting ta 105 million CFA [African Financial Community]
for ~he f3,nancing~of an integrated agricultural development pro~~ect in
the southern part of Togo. The agreement was aigned by Mr Akakpo-Ahianyo,
Togolese minisCer of foreign affaira, and Mr Bertrand Desmazieres, k'rench
ambassador to Togo. This pro~ect, subaidized by the FAC [Aid and Coopera-
- tion Fund], is subdivided into four aegmente: It will permit the strength-
ening of the organization and involvement of the peasante with a view to
their regroupir.g into village associations, to conduct activities in the
plan~ations nnd on the crop by providing producCion equipment through an
agricultural service, and it will also asaure the conatruction of roads,
diapensaries, we11s, etc. The pro~ect furt~hermore will include E atudy
of an irrigated rice cultivation area and will finally conduct teats on
hybrid coconut plantations. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDIT-
ERR~'iNEENS in French 25 May 79 p 1308] 5058
CSO: 4400
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;
E'Ult c)l~ iC tAG lJ5l: c1NLY
~GANDA
IDI AMIN~S PO5SI$1.~ 5UCC~550:~5 UISCUSS~ti
Paris J~UN~ AFRIQU~ in F'r~nch 18 Ap r 79 pp 29-31
(Artl.cl~ by Marc Yarod)
fTpxtiJ Abruptly yenti ~o the rescu~ tio hold Idi Amin
b~.da's hand in ~he fa~:e of attacking Ugandan opponents
and Tanzantan fnrces, Libyan troops departad ju~~ a~
~uddenly. t~ouammar uadhdhafi's military interventi.on
in Uganda backfirQd: his deieat by Tanzanian forces
was proportinnal to the threats which he made 3 weeks ago
in regard to ~ulius Nyerere, whose own means of suppor.t
remains a my:tery. After rushiny haadlong into battle,
Idf Amin Dada yielded ground while wafting to move out.
The navQment r,o replace him is u~ der way. 9ut actually
nothing i~ at stake. ~or our contributor Marc Yared had
to wade through a veritable labyrinth to clearly make
out the stiape of the Ugandan oppositiion. Other figures
are cropping up beside the best-known presumed succes-
sor, former president Miiton Obote, overthrown by
Idi Amin Dada in 1971. Zt appears that it will be dif-
ficult to replace Amin Dada because there are many candi-
dates and especially because the legacy is hardly bril-
liant.
The leaders of the Ugandan oppositior? are waiting to settle in their capital
of Kampala in order to immediately form a provisional government. It re-
mains to be seen whether the Ugandan opposition will manage to come to an
agreement on a platform an~? an administration.
_ Just 1 month ago, accorciing to certain sources there were 28 small groups
and movements (there were "only" 18 according to others) with the avowed
aim of overthrowing the tyrant of Kampala. A common feature: until Janu-
ary, they all rer:ruited their cadres and mast of their militants from
among the hundreds of thousands of Ugandans exiled in Kenya, Tanzania,
Zambia, Gambia, Nigeria, Great Britain, the United States and Canada. Di-
verqent factors: ethnic hostilities, ideoloqical rifts and personal rival-
- rtes.
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i~01t UI~I~1GlAf. USL c1N1.Y
in gimple tier~lg, two tnajor factSong, recQntly irreconcilable, can be die-
tinguiehed witihin th~ oppogttiion.
Cnnserva~ive grnups, qanc~rally catiholi.c and monarchi~t, which cnntiinue ta
bQ no~talgic for tih~ :~mall kingdoms wt.ich ~orcned Uganda during the first
year~ of indopend~nc~. mhe Ugandan National Organizatiion (UNO), tihe Free-
dnm Group (~'G) ~nd thr. Ugnndan Action Group (UAG) c~specially include sup-
porCerg nf ~he former kingdom of Buganda, a soutihern rogion which was re-
putiedly the richest in Uganda and inhabitQd by the naganda tribe, the larg-
est in the countiry. The UNn w~g �ound~d in May 1977 by an intellectiual,
Mr Roger btukgsa. mhe ~G was estiablished in the Unitied States by a lawyer,
Mr Joshu~ Luyimb~ze-zaka, former minister of the F~yal Bugandan Governmen~.
mhe UAG, which is particularly active, is led by Mr Paul Muwanqa, a veteran
of Ugandnn politiical life ~nd ambassador to Paris before going into exile
in Great ~ritain in 1975.
other monurchist movementis find recruits among minority tribeg. This ie
the case oE the Ugandan National Movement (UNM), which particularly in-
cludes militants who are natives of the western region of Ankole. Just
4 months ago, the UNM was lEd by Mr John $arigye, son of a former king of ,
Ankole and ambassador from Uganda to Bonn until 1973, prior to choosing
exile in zambia. Mr F~ariqye was replaced as head of the UNM by Mr Edward
Rugumayo, General Idi Amin's former minister of education. Finally, the
Organization of the Return is composed of Ugandans who are natives of the
western region of Kigezi. It is led by Bishop Kivengere, formerly based
in the United States.
At the other end of the political sp~ctirum are the left-winq parties, which
especially include members of the L~ngo and Acholi tribes established in
the nor=h. The Ugandan People's Congress (UPC), of socialist allegiance,
is led by former Minister of State Dr Milton Obote, who took refuge in Dar
es Saiaam beginniny in 1971. It is this movement which tried in late 1972
--unsuccessfully--to liberate Uganda by launching a military expedition
from Tanzania. For the first time since 1972, Dr Obots made an appeal in
Dar es 5alaam on 11 and 18 ,lanuary 1979 for a general insurrection against
the government.
The Ftevolu~ionary Organization of Ugandar.s in Exile (ROUE), established in
May 1978 and recruiting its supporters 3.n both Kenya and Tanzania, probably
benefited from the technical assistance of Israeli military experts and the
financial support of American evangelist Billy Graham. RDUE is led by
Lieutenant Calonel David Oyite Ojok, exiled to Tanzania since 1971.
The Marr.ist Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) was foun~ed in 1971.
Its leader is Mr Yoweri Mu~~yeni, a brilliant leader of the student move-
ment. it was FRONASA which organized the abortive revolt of the Tororo
garrison on 2 March 1979.
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t~'Ult ~it~ t~ Lc: I ~\L U;+I; c1N1,Y
'I'h~re hnvt lony be~tt cunflicts bc~twuQn c:atl~dlic monarcht~tip, rtw~ti oftien
B~gc~nd~n, and lefti:~~~, Lang~ and AC1~o11 for tihe mogti p~rt. 'rhe forn~r
r~ j~cti fr~rm~r i~regidenti Milton Oboti~'s reingti~tic~ment a~ haad oE ~],iber-
~ ated Uganda, gincQ in their ~yc~s he i~ guilty of having destiroy~d tih~ king-
dom of E~ug~nda~
In the LQyinning nt 1979, a 1ib~r~1 mnv~ment known es tihp drganization �or
~'re~ Ugand~ny (OF'U), c:omposnd of in~ell~ctual~ and membars of liber~l pro-
_ Eegsion~, alane ~riad ~o reduce ~he differ~nces between the oppoeitiion's
two hogtilc~ campy. The o~'U was also simultan~ously l~d by a 6agandan,
_ Ur Yugufu Lule, for~ner vice chancellnr of ehe Univergity of Makarere~ and
by an Acholi, Ur M~rtin Aliker, a famous dentist currently prac~ic~ing in
Kenya. According ~o certain source~, 1t was the OFU which eatiablished in
F'ebruary tiha ~ave Ugnnd~ Movement (5UM), a clandestine guerrilla group
which became famous for itis aces of subntage in Kampala.
EtaconCilia~ion amocig tihe various oppositifon fac~ions took place in two
periods. F'irsL�, slightly m~re than a yQar ago, President ~7ulius Nyerere,
althougti an intimate friend of Dr Obote, agreed to diversify his aupport,
w�elcoming and brin~ing into Tanzania libQr.al or monurchist organizations
such as the 0~'[t and UNO.
An initial yenezal congress, secretly hQld in Dar es Salaam on 31 January
1979, led to a fi~sco, since pro- and anti-Obote elements could not agree
on a joint F~latform. Being unable to put off the military counteroffensive
against Idi Ami.n's troops any longer and anxious to give a Ugandan cover to
this operation, President Nyerere then gavQ t}ie green light to Obote's gup-
porters. On 19 February, ~332 guerrillas under the command of Lieutanant
c.olonels Ojok and Okallo crossed the border at the side of rhe Tanzanian
Army. mhe war of liberation had begun
Following the initial victories against the tyrant of Kampala, all opposi-
tion movements tr~ed to get on the bandwagon. The "Mwalimu" in turn made
new concessions. It no longQr required Dr Obote's highly controversial
presence at the general congress o~ the Uyandan revolt. It was at that
time *_hat 200 opposition deleyates, including university professors,
busine5smen and guerr.illa~ and representitig 150,000 Ugandan exiles, met on
15 March iti Moshi in norttiern Tanzania.
The Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) was established. At its head
_ was an advisory t~oard chaired by Mr Edward Rugumayo (UNM) and an 11-member
executive council chaired by Mr Yusufu Lule (OFU). The principal members
of the e~cecutive council are t,ir Faul Mwanga (UAG), in charge of military
affairs, I,.ieutenant Colonel Tito Okel'.o (UPC), chief of operations, and
Mr Yoweri biuseyeni (FF2rJf7ASA} . The FLNO has been s~tting up its administra-
tion since ?.7 biarch i:~ the liberated zones or the southwest, inhabited by
3 million people, ar.ci has chosen the ci~y of Masaka as its provisional
gen~ral headquarters.
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~
it ig stiill tuo early to knnw tha name of idi Amin's fu~ure auccessor as
head o� Uganda. Mr Yusufu I.ule, chairman of tihe executiv~ council, will
very lik~ly be the nexti chiof nf ~ti~te if the revclutionarieg have their
wey. Bec~use of hig fidvanced age (68 years o1d)~ hi~ moderation, his be-
longing to tihe cngjority Bag~ndan tiribe populating ~he first ~erritories
l+_bc~ratied, hie �ormer dutiies ati tihe Univerai~y o� Makarere, ~he mos~ res-
pectied in ~~t~ ti t~frica, Mr Lule is tih~ s~atesman most suitied to ba accepted
unanimously. 8u~ who wi11 be the stirong man o~ ~he new governmen~? Obo~e,
who remains tihe be~t known, altihough not the most popular? Museyeni and
O~ok, brillian~ revolutionaries "with long tee~h"? Everything will depend
on Presidenti Nyerera's atititude. But who hasn'ti noticed thati Mr Benjamin
Mkapa, his right arm and diplomatic chief, has participatec3--and not only
on the sidelines--in the Ugandan revolutionary congress of Moshi?
COPYR2GHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJiA 1979
11915
CSO: 9400
J
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roK n~'rxCCAL U5L UNt,Y
.
UGANDA
IDI AMIN'S POLITICAL T~GACY '
Paris JEUNE AF1tIQUE in French 25 Apr 79 p 14 ,
(Article by F'. V.]
[Text~ Will Idi Amin Dada's departura put an end to the use of violence
as a means of resolving political differances in Uganda? Those who con-
sider the yeneral to be personal],y responsible for the country's political
practices think so. There is no~lack of ambi~ious demagoguas it1 the world,
appealing to the petitiest passions. But it is only in certain nations that
the right conditions exist for tyrants to be able ~o l~ad a considerable
political and m.tlitary force, to crush all their opponents and to exercise
absolute power. Uganda is one of those nations, having inherited the con-
ditions of division from British colonization.
To stimulate cotton and then coffee growing and to be allied with a stable
social class, Great Britain had issued titles of ownership to the nobility
of Buganda. Thus it created a class of property owners whose wealth and
power grew with the development of exports and the impoverishment of their
tenant farmers. The Asians, whom Great Britain brought in to build the
- railroad, remained and settled as merchants, ruining the wealthy Ugandan ;
shopkeepers and one of the most prosperous crafts indu3tries in Africa.
The Protestant and Catholic missions developed a unique educational system
in the area. On the eve of independence, Uganda had more universities per
inhabitant than any other country in black Africa. This Christian elite
was contemptuous of the class of peasants, rich or moderately rich, which ,
emerged above the tenant farmers.
~
, -
The way in which Uganda became "the pearl of Africa" (to use Sir
Winsten Churchill's expression) thus produced hatred. Each faction appeale3
to ethnic and religious ties, as well as to thE resentment which had built
- up in the pas t.
The army was no exception. As long as it served the interests of Great
Britain, it main~ained its unity and preserved order. With independe~nce,
it became the manifestation of local forces. Groups were Formec~ to place
~
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the army in ~ha service of this or thati faction. zdi Amin undera~ood ~he
advantiage to be derivad from tihati. He would use i~ untiil his down�all.
- mhe new Ugandan governmenti is ~he result of the mosti balanced poasible
proportioning o� ~t~e various oppositions to Idi Ami.n. At its head is
Yusuf Lu1o, a man who had opposed Milton Obotie, but who remained above his
passions in exile and has aonstantly tiried to unite opposing facti3ons.
The force on which he relies is currently raduced to a Tanzanian army o�
12,000 men. Opposing him are al1 ~hose who have benefi~ed, in one way or
another, From the regime of Idi Amin. They often came from formerly des-
pised social classes, but quickly rose socially under the general-president
- who defied--to ~he point of murdering them--the members of the elitie who
were products of Christian educa~ion.
Yusuf Lule's governmen~ is trying in the short term to avoid vengeance and
settlements of accounts. A return to violence would force the leaders, re- -
gardless of their virtues, to establish a system of police supervision and
in turn to seek security with their native tribes. Both the Westernized :
humanist Milton Obote and the unscrupu].ous boor ldi Amin made use of the
process, each in his owr~ way.
It is certainly because President Nyerere has understood and wanted to
avoid this mechanism tihat he has not insisted on his friend Obote being
put in power. And it is for this same reason that Yusuf Lule insisted, on
the day after ldi Amin's down�a11, that the law be scrupulously respected
and th.3t no one be allowed to take the law into his own hands.
'Phe provisional government has given itself 2 years to form an axmy re-
spectful og the constitution, recruited from among the population in gen-
eral anc: not from among certain tribes. But however meticulous the re-
gional and ethnic proportioning may be in the army and administration, the
most important thing is that political forces learn to share power and to
- respect democratic principles. Perhaps the 8 years of the general's rule
will have served as a lesson for the Ugandan political class.
4 COPYRTGHT: ~eune Afrique CRUPJIA 1979
11915
CSO: 4400
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UGANnA
RECOVERY pLANS FOR UCANDt1N ECONOMY UISCUSSED ~
Paria MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 May 79 pp 1171-1173
[ArCicle by, Jacquea Latremoliere: "ProspecCa for Ugandan Economic
Rebuilding"]
[Text] The arrival af Tanzanian Croops, flanked by some Ugandan National
Liberation F'ronC commando units, aC the Tororo station on the Kenyan frontier
marked an important turning point in the initially personal conflict pitting
the wretched Mwalimu, concealing a keen determination beneath the gentle
naivete oF a country vicar, and Marshal and Preaident for life Idi Amin
Dada, whose athletic frame, ferocious truculence and lack of morality have
too ofCen overshadowed the fact Chat under his rule, the ~xceptional human
and natural resources of the country remained, happily, unchanged.
This arrival was of immediate importance: it meant safeguarding the national
electric and industrial potential--the Owen Falls inatallationa in particular
are still intact--and the reeatablishment of rail links with Nairobi and
Mombasa, interrupted since the beginning of the war, but slowed down ad-
ditionally by the technical and monetary difficulties resulting from the
emergence of the East African Cammunity in 1977, which difficultiea the
Tanzanian military successes did not resolve. In accessory fast~ion, they
- were tc put an end to the speculation prevailing recently in London about
Ugandan c~ffee, adding 45 pounds per ton to the price, although the existence
of major stocks in Mombasa avoided the risk of an "accordion effect" in the~
deliveries. The increased demand which will be produced by a halt to the
American boycott will, it is true, constitute a new reason for maintaining
or adding to these increases.
This was the end of the military operations with icmn~diate economic effects,
not to be confused with the end of the hostilities, which could only result
in the definitive exclusion, by means of a knockout, of Marshal Idi Amin
Dada. No one knows at pres~nt what has become of him. The preaence of his
family in Iraq was reported, where it seems that he himself took refuge in ~
the course of an aerial odyssey also reported to have taken him to Libya,
The reasons for his probable return to Uganda have not been made really
clear: a demonstration of personal stubbornness, which cannot be ruled out,
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for "Big naddy" wne in hie time ~ determined eoldier, or a decieion born
of despair, with ita veritable origin in the refueel of hie allios of yester-
day to b~ compromised by ofFering him hoepiCality?
' Whatever the case, the facC that he is surrounded by 3,000 Ugandan army
saldiers, the lasC unirg of a phalgnx which cannoti expect to be pardoned,
and which aeema to hAV~ esCablished iCaelf within the Moyo-Atiak-Pakwach-Arua
rectangle, on Che triple U&gndan, Zairian ~nd Sudaneae frontier, leada to
Che fear, in view of the slow naCure of the advance of the Tanzanian rroopa,
that Che suffering of the people caughC beeween the cruelty of the vanquiehed
and the demands of a victorious army living off Che country may not end ao
soon, The exCension of the sacrifice Chia campaign entails for Tanzania,
given an already tighC budget aitua~ion,.could also lead iC to aeek compen-
sation on the apoC,
The enormiCy of Idi Amin Dada as a personality also conceals the political
consequencea and the issue at stake in his resistance or fall, on the one
hand, and on the other, the economic reality in a ataCe which has auffered
a terrible hemorrhage, buC probably not ruined on the scale of rhe maesive
_ atupidity of its tyrant.
Political Aapects of the Fall of a~tegime
The miliCary and finAncial support provided to Idi Amin Dada by Iraq, Libya
and the Palestinians is but the contemporary aspect of the 1aCent conflict
which developed in this part of Africa between 1918 and 1945, between the
Arab world and Great Britain, concerned with protecting the mining and
agricultural wealth of its possessions in East Africa from Islamic expanaion-
ism, by means of a political barrier of which Ethiopia and Somaliland were
for a long time the eastern element and Kenya the main bulwark. This ia
, still the case today, even though the United States, the FRG and the other
nations of the European Economic Community have taken over economically from
Bri.tain to a great extent.
When that nation favored the coming of Idi Amin Dada to power, replacing
Milton Obote, whose socialist tendencies seemed worrisome to its interests,
it apparently did not attach enough importance to the fact that he was a
member of one of the minority ethnic groups in Uganda won over to the Moslem
religion. The key fi~ure himself doubtless failed to realize the conse-
quences, which others would speedily analyze for him. And this led to the
political development of the Ugandan govert~ment in the course of these
recent years, marked by its break with Israel and the confirmation of
sympathies with the "hard-line" Arab countries and, through them, the USSR.
~t also ?.ed to tr,e collapse of British commercial positions in Uganda, and
its assets in the country, whi~h dropped between 1971 and 1978 from 100 to
10 million pounds sterling, while at the same time the expulsion of the
Anglo-Asiatics deprived Brit~in of its principal agents of inf~.uence. The
~ blocking of the traditional financial aid provided by London to Kampala
(about three million pounds per year) and the diplu:natic break following
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the Cnt~bbe affflir marked klte end oF Ctiiy unhgppy period, AC ite conclueion
Che number oP I3riCish nationaly in whgt had been one oL� ehe jewele of the
~mpire in Africa cnme to few~r than 200, while Ch~ represenCaCion oF
British inCerests in the Ugandan capital was provided--a sign of the timea--
by the ~r,encti ~mbAeqy,
~ The overthrnw of President Idi Amin Dada's regime by Mr Nyerere's Croopa
put Chese problem~ in a different light today. British diplomaCs did not
wait for Chat to encourage inCernarional opposition to this regime, promo~ing
the boycotting of Ugandan exports by the large American or international
coffee compnnies, such ay Folger, Dtaxwell, Ceneral Foode, Nestle and Hill
Brottiers, which suspended their purchases in Che spring of 1978 even before
the decision by the Carter administration.
Par~llel to Chis, agreemenC had been obCained from the European CommuniCiea
Commission, which had paid out to Kampala n million pounds sterling for the
stabilization of cotton exports in 1976, for the blocking of the Ugandan
allocation package in tt~e fourth EDF (EuropeAU Development Fund], an un-
precedented procedure �or an organization for ~ahich independence in Che
cooperative actions pertaining to the relarions of its members with the
beneficiary nations is the golden rule, the tendency being even to com~ensate
for reductiona occurring on the level of bilateral relations, as was the -
case with Benin.
In view of ttiis diplomatic action, PresidenC Nyerere's miliCary offensive
coul~i not bu~ arouse an echo of keen sympathy in London. rir Callaghan's
government must have been one of the first to recognize the government of
Mr Yusuf Lule, and it took actiori immediately afterward with the Brussels
Commission with rebard to removal of the block on the four-year program,
the allocation to Uganda of urgent aid in foodstuffs dispatched by air from
Nair.obi and Mombasa, and azd in the amount of 300,000 units of account for
the purchase of inedici.nes, without prejudice to the step of convoking the
members of the commissian to urge them to develon extrtiordinary sid for the
disaster victims.
Is this remarkable zeal on the part of Great Britain likely to cause a
reaction on the Ara!~ side? It is impossible to say. Libya and Iraq, dis-
illusioned b~ the behavior of their Ugandan protege, would doubtless hesitate
to undertake a new crusade in favor of a man whose crimes could not be over-
looked just because he shares their religion. The division currently
prevailing in the Arab world would. not make this an;~ easier. It seema ~
moreover that, on the Tanzanian side, there is an awareness of ~the risks
to be avcided in this connection and that riilton Obote, who has taken refuge
in Dar-es-Salaam, was excluded trorn the position of power for which he was
naturally a candidate because of the erunity he had arousud in the Middle
East. Will Professor Yusuf Lule, who deserted Islam, have better luck wit~
_ the countrxes in the Arab League? What is to be feared, on the other hand,
if the resistance by Idi Amin Dada in the Northwest should be prolonged, is
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unofficial supporC from Sudan, perhaps more motivated by th~ deaire Co avoid
an overflow onro ita rerritory than by religioue solidariCy.
Is Reest~blishmenC of the East Africun Communiry poasible?
As to t;?e forma of associaCion which shoul,d prevail between Tanzan}a and
Uganda fx�um now on, one mighC think that the resurrection of the East
African Community would have ~he Approval of London, with the balancing of
Tanzanian appeCites by the economic weighC and the Western aympaChies of
Kenya. As of the present, this is Che solution insistently mentioned in
the ehree capitals by a numerous, active and high-quality contingent of
Ugandan emigres, almost all of whom sought refuge in Great BriCain, beginning
_ with the new prime minister himself, �
The formula, a direct producr of the colonial past--it was then called the r
Conference of Governors, and later the East African High Commission--
comprised, represented, through the creation of a~common economic space and
the unification of major services--central bank, porCs, railroads, aviation,
telecommunications ,~nd re~,earch--a powerful tool for the penetration by and
influence of British tech:tical aid, But is its reestablishment posaible?
The crumbling of the greaC technical "corporaCions" has led in ell sectors
to unequal treasury and profitability s~.tuations, making rec~nification
difficult, lndeed Uganda, because of its position as an enclave, has always
favored the community, rlarshal Idi Amin Dada even having gone so far, after
its dissolution in 1977, as to propose a bilateral successor to Kenya. But
it must be remembered that if one sets aside the transit activitiea toward
Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, the extent to which the three partners supplement
each other economically is limited. In the finest hour of Che community,
trade among the nations did not exceed seven percent of ~~reign trade as a
whole, Further, the balance was only posiCive for Kenya, which met the need
due to food shortages in Tanzania. The administration of the community was
moreover burdensome and costly: it included nearly 12,000 employees, whose
wages were covered to the extent of 50 percent by Kenya, 30 percent by
Tanzania and 20 percent by Uganda, the distribution of these quotas being
a subject of disagreement between the first two,
To summarize, reeGtablishment of the technical structures aeems difficult,
as does that of the administrative bodies of the community, for which
Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam are not eager, since they now see their ~rue
partners in different directions. One cannot however exclude the possibility
that President Nyerere, who will have to make his excuses to the OAU for the
distu,~~ing precedent he has just been guilty of with regard to the principle
of the inviolability of the "colonial frontiers," would resign himself to
a non-structural community plan, which would clear him of all suspicior~ of
_ imperi4lism and even perhaps allow him co find a counterpart, without being
too obvious, for the expenditures to which he agreed but which have not been
paid out. A system of periodic conferences among the three chiefs of state, '
with precise tariff agreements, the lack of which moreover was the great
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wcalcnesy af Che old cotmnunity, would perh~pg br~ ~zblr. to ofEset the prejudice
of Kenya, which is h~rdly c~nxiaue to encnurage rhe icirroduction o� the
political bacilli oi iCe tteighbors to the souCh inro iCe territory. _
The French Poeition
Ie ie in this atill variable poliCical context thaC ttie French economic
position in Uganda must be evalu~ted. It is f~r fram negligible, fox France,
which exported to it pr~ducts worth 190 million rrench fzancs (in particular
vehicles and tr~nsmission equipment) and purChased coffee and orea (copper,
wolfrnm and cobalt) worth 35 million francs, is as a result the third moat
imporCant cuetamer rodny und the seventh-rAnking aupplier.
The development of our rrade relations with Kampala in the courae of recent
years is obviously linked wieh the eclipae of Gre~t Britain and also the
boycottzng o~ Ilganda, beginning LA9C year, by Amarican firms. Making ex-
ceptian of ehe tragic Airbua Af Fair in Entebbe, it should moreov~er be
remembered that the small French colony in Uganda, made up of diplomata,
missionaries, businessmen ~nd cooperative assistants (17), i.e. about 100 ~
persons in All, did not suffer from the ferocious eccentricitiea of the -
former chief of state, and ehe recent hostilities have not done any harm
to any of its members.
- In the months to come, it will be interesting to follow the effects of
events on the implementaCion of our contracts and the results of the varioua
negotiations in which our firms are engaged. The dissolution of the East
African Railways and the related esCablishment of the Uganda Railways
Corporation facili!~sted the contract signe~i in 1978 by Ch~2 corporation for
seven 2,000-horsepower diesel locomotives, the most powerft~�, in Africa,
to be delivered by Alsthom For 45 million francs, 30 to be ~tiid in cash by
Uganda and the balance covered by a five-year loan from the Societe Generale,
with COFACE guar~ntees. The deliveries are scheduled for the autumn of 1979.
Another purchase of railroad stock, still larger, is under study. It will
be possible to judge the artitude of the new authorities toward us from how
that devel.ops .
The Regie Renault, wtiich earned a very poFular posi*ion for itself in
Uganda with the victory by Rodrigues and BalimmujaKo in the 30 TS in 1978
in the "Rally o� the Economic jJar," in which Idi Amin Dada himself and his
wife Sarah participated, tias signed a contract, not yet carried out, in the
amount of 20 million trancs for the delivery of Saviem trucks. Thomson-CSF,
in negotiations with the Ugandan government for the radar equipment for the
Entebbe airport, found itself forced by evenCs to order the withdrawal of
the technicians entrusted with the study. Another public works equipment -
transaction ~.n an amount equivalent to the Saviem contract is planned for
the modernization of the road network. The Degremont firm seems well placed
for the extension of the Kampala water supply system, managed by the National
Water and Sewerage Corporation, financed by a 45 million Ugandan shilling
loan from the Islamic Development Bank (a Ugandan shilling is worth 0.60
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French fr~nca?. Finally, F'rench firms are inrereated in the rebuilding of
~ a augar re�inery in Lugazi, as well as the expanaion and modernization of
the texCile complex in M'Bale, with a aix million dollar loan from Abu-Dhabi. -
The reentry of Anglo-Saxon competition on Che market will not alter the
transactione on which agreementa have already been reached, buC it may make
others more difficult. SimilarLy, the reunificaCion of Che old technical
deparCments of the East African Community would be likely, should it occur,
Co be reflected in a certain monopolization of the aupply function to rhe
detriment of our builders.
These dangera would of themselves justify increased vigilance and more
frequent inCervention, which might be extended to agriculture, in which
certain sectors, such as cotiton and coffee-growing, have in recent years
suffered a decline in yield and quality less Co be blamed on the negligence
of Che suthorities thAn on the collapse, difficult Co repair in the short
run, of the research and staffing syatem which Great Britain had developed
and succeeded in mainCaining througtiout the community period. There are
needs in this connection which without a doubt France is currently beat
situated to meet on the African market. Negotiations have already been
undertaken in this connection, in particular with regard to cotCon. ,
Ugandan Economic Recov~ry '
The conditions under which our economic activities in Uganda should be
pursued henceforth, whether investments or exporta of gooda and services
are involved, should also be evaluated as a function of the losses cauaed
by the recent hostilities. In this connection, the picture of a country
bled and ruined for years by the folly of a dictator and stripped of any
financial resources of its own would probably be an exaggeration.
The dictatorship and Che hostilities which followed had a murderous effect
on men. They certainly did not i~nprove the condition of the road infr~3-
structure. The~ served to hinder the normal exercise of farm activities,
threatened or destroyed certain harvests, but the yield in any given year
causes the shortages in the preceeding ones to be forgotten, and nothing
in this sector is beyond repair. The energy potential, hydroelectric
equipment and the industrial infrastructure in general did not suf.fer. To
a certain extent, thz deflationary policy pursued by the government in the
mining sector, for the copper in Kilembe in particular, which accounted for
up to 10 percent of the total Ugandan exports, dropping to only 3.5 percent
in 1978, may have benefited the country through the possibility of liquidating
stocks it created in a period when the difficulties encountered in the
marketing of Zarian copper added to the advantage p:;ovided by conti.nuing
high prices.
It should not be forgotten, in assessing the administration by the fleeing
government, that Idi Amin Dada was not alone in power, but was surrounded
by a team of administrators of indisputable valu~~, which he had no difficulty
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in ruLlying in u country in whict~ mission work, both CaCholic and Prntestant,
c'~tea back more th~n a century, nnd in which the elite, because of Chie fact,
_ L~eor witne~s to qt~ite ~ remurkuble intellectual level, -
- 'The whims of the dictc~Cor obviously did not make Cheir work emooth, Some
of them, auch ~s rtr K~njura, governor,of the CenCral Bank of Uganda, who was
imprisoned in Luziru at the end oF 1978, paid with their Freedom and perhapa
their i1V~9 for ~heir devorion Co the country. Tn Paris, r'r Loubega, former
minisCer of foreign affairs, is well remembered, where }~e viaited last year
and engtt3ed in a number of talks at the Quai d'Orsay--a clear-thinking man
with a very open spirit, enrirely aware that his duCies held more threats
thari Adv~tnCnges for him.
These are rhe ?nen who, between the bloody vagaries of Che dictator, provided
a relative balance i.n the daily life of the Ugandan econocny and probably
made it possible to safeguard the easential,
In uddition, the decline in farm production which the miniater of planning, -
rir Moses Ali, was courageous enough t.o report publicly in 1978, can be
ascribed ~~bove all to economic circumstances and the disAppearance of
technical structures, �or which the Ugandan government was responsible
a very sma11 extent, The aging of the coffee plantations and the lack ec
cadres account for a 35 percent drop in produciion. Nor could one blame
the government for the earnings which were not realized as a result of the
breakdown in American purchase contracts, when the United States had in 1977
paid $250 million for almost 95 percent of the Ugandan coffee crop, itself
accoun.ting For 80 percent of the e:cport total.
Uganda is not alone in having experienced Chis decline in farm Figures,
and the situation in Tanzania is no better. If coffee production decla.ned
from 230,000 tons to 149,000 in 1975, the volume climbed again to 164,000
tons in 1977, including 12,600 tons of Arabica, simply because of the
65 percent increase seen in prices in 1976. Since that date, foreign sales
have brought in 2 billion 942 million Ugandan shillings, or 1,.7G5~20.Q,000
French francs, as compared to 1 billion 160 million in 1971. Restabilization
of prices maintai.ned the value at 1 billion 170 million francs in 1978,
These values, however, are obtained by extrapolation, the greater part of
the Arabica, which comes from the provinc,~ of Bugisu, having been smuggled
to Kenya and ;udan, and the difficulties of shipping the Robusta to Mombasa,
and a very small part of it to Djibouti and Aden by air, having del~yed
the sale of the harvest until ~he American firms made their decision.
The decline in cotton production has been steady since 1973-74. From -
400,000 bales, the volume dropped to i33,400 in 1975-76, with an additional
45 percent decline occuring in 1977, when the total was only 74,300 bales.
The production of tea, tobacco and sugar followed the same dor,rnward curve,
although at a slower rate and with a temporary re~overy in 1975, although
there was no lack of concern on the part of the administration which, on the
contrary, multiplied its efforts to impzove ginning equipment, to guarantee
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a supply of fertilizers and inaecticides and decreeing the standardization
of fuel prices so that production distribution could be carried outi at a
normal rate, '
Setting aside the aging of the plant stock, which we mentioned above, the
truth is that these drops in production in Uganda resulted from the galloping
inflation (50 percent) experienced in the course of the past 3 yeara, itself
related to the ener;,y crisis, to which a landlocked nation is more seneihive
thai�i ochers. ~lere, as in other continental African countriea where agri-
culture predominates, t~he population reacta by reCreating to the traditional
sector, imported products being out of reach and the increase in domestic
prices of foodstuffs making iC more profitable to cultivate them than export
products. With a rural population of 90 percent, Uganda obtained a third
of its monetary income and 50 percent of its global income from farm pro- �
duction. The situation was reflected as a whole in a decline in Che firsC
of these percentages, with the latter remaining the same or even Cending to
rise.
The industrial situation reflects the same populnr reaction, the main dif-
ficulty lying in the scarcity of a labor force turning by preference from
the factories to its food crops, However, government incentives, included '
in the 1977-1980 three-year plan, were not lacking. To be obtained either
from foreign Linancing or domestic resources, 560 million Ugandan shillings
. were allocated for the modernization of spinning mills, 260 million for the
sugar refineries, and 100 million for Che other food industries. The wood
~ industry beriefited from allocat~ons of about 98 million, th. paper industry
, 58 million and the metallurgical industry (iron, corrugated tin and pipe) -
~ 150 million. Mining production, which has a very wide range of ~are materials
such as wolfram, tin, beryllium and cobalt, received an allocatioti of
60 million Ugandan shillings to increase both the tonnage and to improve
exploitation conditions. And finally, 80 million was included for an ancient
cement facility producing 130,00~ tons per year, so as to inereas~ iCs out-
: put to 300,000. .
Whatever damage was done to this economy, the financial situation of this '
large country with a papulation of 11 million is such that one can regard ~
it as one of the solid factors on the African continent. Eloquent witness
to this is provided by a per capita gross national product of $240, a devel-
opment budget fro;n domestic resources of 2 billion 100 million French franes,
equal to three-quart~rs of the operational budget, a trade balance surplus
of 928 million francs, a foreign debt of 112 million dollars, on which the
_ service accounts for only 0.2 percent of the gross domestic product, and
1.6 percent of the exports of goods and services, although the balance of ~
payments surplus, 700 million francs below the trade balance surplus, re-
flects a certain flight of capital.
The quality of its population and the variety of its production are such
- that Uganda, which has already benefited from a number of foreign contri-
butions, will not have difficulty in finding others which still may be
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070009-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070009-4
~'qR O1~~ICIAI. U5~ ONLY ,
r~e~ded tc~ bind up it~ wnund~. It i~ undermt~ndgble thgC Cregt gritr~in~ link~d
to thia ~duntry by g~~nCsmpnCal attachmpnt~ ir attempting Co help find thpm.
It wnuld not be de~ir~ble~ howev~r, if ~xce~efve publiciCy going ev~n beyAnd
the gU~?g~~t10A8 of the Ugandan government ~nd diacnuraging po~eible invere- ~
mc.nCd by p,~inting teo black g picture~ wpre to prnve marF h~rmful then ueeful
co it in the end.
COPXItICHT': ~en~ MCreux et Cie~ Paris 1979
5157
CSO: 4400
J
91
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070009-4