JPRS ID: 8563 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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I ~

9 JULY i9T9 CFOUO i7179~ i OF i
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JPRS L/8563
9 July 1979
~FOU017/79~ ~
,
USSR R~e ort
p
MILITARY AFFAIRS
FBIS FO~REIGN BR0~4DCAST INFORMATIOfJ SERVICE .
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JPRS L/8563
9 Jul.y 19 79
USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOU(? 17/79)
CONT~N`f ~ PAGE
Eteliability af Ballistic Missile Desigr? =
(A.A. Kuznetsov; NADEZEINOST' KONSTRUKTSII gALLISTICHESKIKH
~T, i9~a~ i
Capabilities of Soviet Armed Forces Diacussed
(Wolf Perdelwitz; STERN, 7 Jun 79) 36
,
.
- a - (III - USSR - 4 FOUO~
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N~c~k a~~tcrnt. ttsc: o?vt,Y _
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+ UnC: 623.451
RELIAHILI'I'Y OF BALLISTIC MI5SILE DESIGN
Mo~eow NADEZHNOST' KONSTRUKTSII BALLISTICH~SKIKH RAK~T in Ruagian 1978
signeci to press 19 Oct 18 pp 1-32, 255-256
(Annotation, Preface, Introd�cticn. Chapter 1, and Table of Contents of
book by A.A. Kuznetsov, Mah:tnoatroyeniye, 3~150 copies, 256 pageaJ
. ('I'extJ This textbook pre4en~:s the fundamenC~ls of stondardixxtion of aecure-
ment and prediction of reliability of ballistic misail.e design at Che
preliminary design stage and ~3hows the relationship between design reliabili-
ty and the safety factors eMpl,oyed in ~rucwral strength calculations. The
author describes the methodolo,gy of reliability t~sts. Efficiency is acopted '
as a criterion of optimal reliF~bility.
'Chis textbook can also be of us~~ Co engineers and Cechnicians working in the
area of aircraft design. ~
P'REFACE
The course "Efficiency and Reliabi.tity of Aircraft and Rockets" presents the
principles of efficiency as a crite+rion for evaluation of the optimum in
design of aircraft and rockets (LA) and as a criterion for comparing LA with
one anothe~. The course consists of a number of parts. One of them, namely .
reliability of ballistic missile destgn, is discussed in this textbook.
The high cost of a rocket and the limited time budgeted for developing and
perfecting rockats make it impossible to petform a large number of tests for
reliability, each c` which should Cerminate with destruction of the structure
being tested. Therefore ~n order to determine design reliability, designers
employ calculations at the prc?iminary specifications stage and at the tech-
nical proposal and preliminary design s~age a method of predicting
reliability.
This textbook examines basic concepts of LA efficiency, theory of reliabili--
ty and the essentials of failures and presents methods of calculating
reliability of equipment components and systems to initial fai~.ure, methods of
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calcul~Cing rrli~bility of structurel .omponenCg, nnd methods of calculnt-
ing reliability of sections conststing of seriea, pnru11~1 or mixed Con-
necred nomponente, d~p~ndene on ur independent of on~ nnother in rellabili-
Cy. 'I'he Cextbook pMesenCS meCt~ods nf c~lculating r~liobility of u rocket
body, rhliability of cxplnsive deviceg, and reliabiliCy of inechanicnl com-
ponenCs. CliupCcr 8 present~ m~Chods nf determining r~liability of nn LA a~~
based on ttie presented material. Chnpeer 9 exumines an interval ev~luation ;
of reli~biliey, when fiducic~l probnbility is not designaCed a priori buC is
det~rmined on the basi~ of experimenCUl datu; the reader is giv~n fin idea
_ of o~timiz~tion of reliability of design componentg and determin~tion of
nn optimal safety Eactor vnlue.
'~he ~ppettdix showr methods ot calculating reliability of etruceural elements
and section~ based on normal distribution tables.
'The author is grateful for comments by review~ers L. I, Volkov, Ei. C.
Shcherbakov and ~3. A. I?mitriyev. The nuthnr is nlso grateful to A. A. zoloCov,
V. A. Komyagin, t�i. I. Tita~, and V. N. Yarotskiy for assist~nce in preparing
the manuscript.
INTRODUCTION
Designing an ?.A is inseparably linked with optimization of its parnmeters.
LA efficiency is the most general criterion for evaluuting the degree to
which a solution is optimal.
Designing a rocket involves selection of optimal design arrangements and
calculation of the structure for strength. Optimal design arrangements
should also be selected taking into accounC e~ficiency. At the present time
selection of a design arr~ngement, thaC is, arrangement of power components
in a b~3y or compartment, is performed by the alCernative method, a method
of comparing with one another on the basis of some criterion several
elaborated designs of the same bay or compartment and selecCion of the optimal
layout~ Bay or compar[ment reliability is not considered thereby. Figuring
the efficiency index and its utilization as a criterion in optimizing design
parameters can alter one's ideas on optimal design arrangements and compel
one to reexamine existing concepts. Comparison and evaluation of rockets
are also impossible without calculating efficiency.
Efficiency of an LA as a criterion for evaluating design solutions as well
as for comparing LA is of particular value at the initial stages of develop-
ment of an LA, when drawings are available and only calculations are pos-
sible. ~
Reliability is a component part of efficiency. Without knowledge of reliubili-
ty, it is important to determine the efficiency of an LA. Consequently, if
one does not know how to calculate reliability it is impossible to design
and evaluate an LA on a scientific basis. Failure to figure efficiency is
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Co~~illy impermtsytb.le wh~n ndopCing -.amputcr de~iKnin~. Llc:cc:roiiic: com-
puCnr~ m~ke Lt pn~siblc ~~ct eurly gCnge~ oE GA destgr~ (ut the pr~l.imin~ry
~peClEicttttons, t~chnical propogAls, and preli,minary ,design sCUgu) Co
se1~Ct LA pnrEimeeera baged on ~ sci~ntific Eaundntion, th7C i~, on eFficierr~
cy. itt~bility tn c~lculnte effiniency deprives the pro,~ect engine~r and
d~sigt~er oE this possibility. Of cour5e ~fficiency i~ determined nor only
by rcliability alone, but reliability i5 ~ cnmplex ~nd l~ss sCUdied c:om-
p~nene nf ~EEiciency.
RelicibillCy i~ one of the most important opernting chnracCeristics of LA.
This ch~ructerisCic c:~innot b~: given tn a Cin.~hed product but i~ ;ncor-
por~?ted during th~ design process. WhAtever magnitude of reliAbiltty cnn
be incnrpor~ted during Che design process, rhis magnitude can also be nbtained
ns ~ r~su1C oE completinn work fnr Che operntion sCage. In order tc~ ensure
a~pecifi~d magnitude nf reli~biliry at the dpsign stage, it ig necessary to
be ~ble to determine its cptimal value ~nd to be convinced of the correct-
ness of securing relittbility. In this case calculation of reliabiliry in
no way differs from calculations for ballistics, dynamics, aerodynamics,
sCrength, etc at the ciesign stage.
~ Calculation of reliability ia ~ way Co reduce outlays on modiCicAtion ad-
1u~tt;ients during resting LA. T'he reliAbiliCy value is determined most
pr~cisely d~iring testing. But Chis demands large outlays boCh of Cime and
money.
A calculnted estimnte oE reliability is less accuraee than an experimental
evaluation, but it is cheaper and takes less time. 'fhe less ~n iCem~s
reliability, the greater the cost of testing and development complerinn.
Calculations of reliability can reduce development costs as a result of
optimization of the testing program on the basis of thorough verific:~tion ~
of less reliable components.
A calculated reliability estimaCe makes it possible~: 1) to eliminaCe a,
given type of test iE it i~cLbvious that no great risk would be involved;
2) to reduce demands on tests both in volume and complextiy; 3) to make
design changes which increase equipment reliability prior to Cesting, whic:h
will substantially shorten final development rime and reduce the cost of
Cesting; 4) to eliminate additional tests on Chat equipment reliability of
which has been determined analytically with sufficient accuracy; 5) to
determin~ all the least reliable parts and assemblies.
Taking r~Ita~tlity re4uirements into account at the initial stages of
design cost:~ hundreds of times less than subseqaent correction of errors
during testii:g and operation.
Design reliability is essentially probabLlistic strength. Probabilistic
strength more adequately reflects nnCural phenomena than determined strengxh
(strucCural support capability and external loads constitute random factors).
In this regard calculations of design reliability promote refinement of
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yCrcn~Ch C~lculations pezformed Eor determined vnlues. Thi~ refin~m~nt is
especially import~nt in connection witi~ the observed tendenny to rcd~ice :
etie sn�ety EncCOr in str~ngCti cnlculntions ~imed nC inCreasittg LA ~EEicien-
r.y. Onty dey tkn relif~h i l lty c:silculutions mukc ir hn:~~ible Co Jerermin~
rn,�un~~bl.e y+if~Cy I'ric:lur vr~lu~:w C~r culcul,~tlan~ nn cleCerml~lecl qunntLrley.
'The projec:C engineer ~ind mi~sile designer are respongible for reliabi'li~y
of th~ cnCire missile as a whole, buC Chey rhemselveg c~n ensure spe~ified
~trucCural re:tiAbility of the rocket ttnd cereain parts of Che pneumxtic-
hydraulic sysCem. The remaining parCs of the rocket (control and power
supply systems, on-board c~ble network, motors, etc) come as finished itc~ms
(comhonenC iCems). ~ngineers of other areas of apecinlizntion ensure their -
relir3bility. 'Therefore this book deals primarily with LA strucCurnl design
relinbility, selection and securement of which ~re primarily the Cask of
engineers and designers. We discuss only in general terms reliability of ;
other LA components.
CHAPTER 1. CENERAL INFORMATION
1.1. Erficiency as the 5cienCific B~sis of Rocket Engineering and Desi~;n
~~nd Cumparisons BeCween Rockets
1.1.1. Ceneral Information on Efficiency
Efficiency is the most important combined characteristic of any flying
vehicle (LA). The efficiency of an LA is defined as its capabiliCy to cor-
respond to its designation. Efficiency is determined by the quality of an LA
and conditions of its employment (Figure 1.1). .
The quality of a product is defined as the aggregate of product proPerties
determining its ability to satisfy certain requiremenCs in conformity with
its designation (GO5T 15467-70. Product quality. Terms).
A property ~f a product is an objective feature of the product, manifested
during its construction, operation or consumption.
tn a standard all terms and definitions are given applicable to a producC,
which may consist of finished items and (or) products. The terms and
definitions which apply to Che product also are applicable to Che componenL
items and products.
All properties of an LA which determine its quality (henceforth designated :
LA parameters) can for design purposes be represented in Che form of a
diagram (Figure 1.2).
Uesign parameCers is a term meaning a minimum set of parameters which deter-
mine the countenance of an LA at, the design stage. This set contains tac-
tical, mass, power and geometri_ parameters.
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M.acca 12
r-
Cmcua+otma 13
14 ,Qpyzue c4ouefi4c
aemamensNOZV annQpuma
Figure 1.1. Components of Efficiency
Key:
1. Efficiency of missile system 4. Efficiency of ground flight con-
2. Efficiency of ground launch trol equipment
support equipment 5. Quality of flying vehicle
3. Efficiency of missile 6. CondiCions of employment
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Key tn Figure 1.1 (continued)
7. R~nge nf �1ighC 13. Coet
8. Payload weight 14. Other properties of t~~isail~
9. Warhead yield 15. SCraregy and tactics of em-
10. Target nccuracy ployment
11. Reliability 16. InEormaCion on targets
12. Mass 17. Actions by adversary
18. Weather and climatic condiCions
' /1apaMempe? AA 1
.
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6annucmuvecn~re5 ,QUHQ,~uvecrruc~4
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TCXl10/!OZlLVeCK4C7 IGOMCIAPf/VQCHUC~ -
3~rcnoyama~tuoNNeie ObaeMNe~e 17
Cm�mt~cmuvecKt~e9 MatcoBale 18
OmNacumeneNa~elp
Figure 1.2. Parameters of an LA
Key:
1. Parameters of LA 4. Tactical
~ 2. General design 5. Ballistic ~
3. Flight 6. Economic
6 -
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~OK O~~IC IAL USl: ONI~Y
Key ro rigure 1.2 (con~inued)
7. '~echnologic~l 13. Aerodyn~mic -
8, on~~ arion 14. bynamic
9~ St~t3sCical 15. Powet
~ 10. Relntive 16. Ceomeeric
11. 5pe'ciEtc design 17. VolumeCric ~
12. S rrec~gCh 18. Mr1ss
Prel.tminary' design specifica~ions include flight pnrameters (for example,
maximum r~{n~e I.max). 'fo these parameters one must also acld specifications
nf the selected Euel; decision on missile body and noae cune shape, etc.
We shnuld note thaC some parameters can be specified during the design
process (for example, mass of pnyload~. The aggregate nf parameCers
speciEied prior to preliminary design and determined in the process of _
designing should determine the LA in such a manner Chat one can begin
designing t~e internal bays or compartments.
'The condittons of employment (see Figure 1.1) are those exCern~l factors
which exert substantial influence on LA eEficiency: strategy and CacCics
of missile employment, information on rhe rarget, actions by the actversary,
weather and climatic conditions of employment, etc. All conditions of em-
ployment, other than the first, are characterized by a differing degree of
information uncertainCy. Ufiilizing them in designing an LA, one must employ
a game forr~ularion in solving various design problems (Cake into consideru-
tion incomplete information under condiCions of LA employment).
Efficiency is evaluated by numerical indices (characteristics, criteria)
which reflect the designation of a weapons system: target hit probability,
mathematical expecCation of number of destroyed targets, probability of
destroying no less than a specified portion of Che target, mathematical
expecration of number of destroyed elements, mathematical expecCation of
destroyed portion of Carget area, mathematical expectation of magnitude of
inflicted damage, etc.
Probability of targeC kill as an indicator of efficiency is employed when
the result of a missile launch aC a target can be only CargeC destruction
or nondestr'uctin*:, Urhich applies primarily to small targets ("point" targets),
wh ich do ndt exceed 0.2 radius of the warhead killing zone [22].
Mathematical expectation of number of destroyed targets is applied as an
indicator when missiles are fired at several targets.
The remaining efficiency indices are utilized when missiles are fired at
large targets and the result of the launch may be complete or partial
destruction of targ,et elements, a given change in capability to function
if targets are func~loning entities, such as military-industrial installa-
tions, etc [22].
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Often the des37ner does not fully know the strat~gy and tactica of employ-
ment of tihe misaile he is designing. Semetimes CnCCiCB and srr~tegy change
or ~re reelttbar~red, depending on rhe efficiency obtnined in reste. An
efficiency index is nor alwnys s'p~cified in the prelimin~ry specifin~Cions
and perfnrmance d~tn.
If optimi.r.ntion oE LA parameters is performed on efficiency, one must
specify the required eEficiency tndicaCor. In this cnse Che designer is
correct in selecting an efficiency indicaCor which should be critical Co
the npCimized design parameCers of Che LA.
The efEiciet~cy index is determined by analytical methods and method~ of
sCatistical modeling. Analytical meChods consist in establishing relaCion-
ships between LA parameters and efficiency indices under specified condi-
tions of employment. S~aCisCical modeling cnnsisCs in multiple reproduc-
Cion of a mathematical model of the conditions of employment and in deter-
mining efEiciency indices as functions of inean statistical characteristics
~2Z~�
Efficiency indices do not permit one to predict the results of individual
miasile firings. Only with a sufficienCly large number of cases of em-
ployment of mi~sile systems under similar conditions will the average
result be close to that determined with the aid of probability criteria [22].
The term missile system is defined as the LA and all ground equipment cori-
necCed wiCh prelaunch preparations, monitoring, launch (ground launch sup-
port equipment) and control of ttie missile in f light (ground flight cori-
Crol equipmenC) [22].
Usually Che Cerm efficiency is employed for evaluation of an already
designed LA. In this inst~nce Cest results are processed in such a manner
as to obtain the required ~fficiency indicator, and this value is compared
with calculate~' values, thus d~termining the degree to which preliminary
specifications have been met.
Efficiency is utilized as a scientific foundation for designing an LA when
design parameters are obtained from the condition of maximum efficiency under
certain discipl.ining conditions. Efficiency is required by designers primari-
ly in this role.
1.1.2. Efficiency as the Scientific Basis of Missile Design
The task nf designing an LA consists in elucidating, under all conditions ~
of employment, properties of the vehicle (optimal design parameters) which
would ensure maximum efficiency of the LA. Opti.mal design parameters can
be determined for each specific set of condiCion;; of employmene, while for
~ other conditions of employment Chis LA will be less efficient than it could
be. If optimal design parameters are determined for certain average in-
~ tegra~ conditions of employment, taking into account the frequency of
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~rC' u _ S-'r~E~~V. , Y_ '.5n ~rkt,.,., . ....rr.r.. v>~r .~ae.v. o s - ~ e :,:i � . . ~U, a . . n.. .x, ~4 ra
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F'Oft nFF'ICCAL USI: ON1.,Y ,
rniillz~Cl~n oE uiich ~c~ c~C :~pecifl~ condLrt.nns, the LA wi11 bc leab ~EEiciene
Eor uny conc:rete conclirions uf employment, bur nn the av~rug~ 1t wi11 b~ most
efficient. The first statement oE the problem is the aimplest.
FrequenCly an LA is designed even wi+:hout srudying the noncrete conditions
of employment. The conditions oE employmene ~re concretized for the d~aign
engineer by the preliminary specif~;cations, which stare range (maximum),
p~yload mass (properties of th~: LA), weather cundiCions, etc (Figurp 1.3). ~
They also ensure specific conditions of employmem~. JusC whaC Cheye condi-
tions nf employment are is determined at A higher hierarchic .level of LA
developmenC.
npocrrmuooeaMUr
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yvtmoM ytnc6a~~ r,ar�tNeHan no m~~MUVaKp,uy ~cdoNap
6 .
~l,1~L'7Hr.~~/'D~7;srrrreoBar;rr ~pa~oaNanumuvccnoe
: qvrm,~,v rm~CKmaBNOtma npOt~rmupOBaNUt ~
8~~~.'a np,~cnmNe.~t nopa- OnmuMUaauc~A na~aMt.n
,�c^~c79 Rra yvema pod no .*~u.h'tpuro
~.~~~�nn~aen~:m� 8 a eMmuln~,cmu 9
5'vtm]0 yvtm 1 I?
N~ly/'~tmu 9vem ~
0utdt~i mov~ocm~t
vea~nrc cmFenedu Madusnotmu
Figure i.3. Cond.ltions of N?issile Design
Key :
1. Missile design 7. Graohic-analytical designing
2. D~~signing oi multirole missiles 8. Selection of design parameters
3. Designing of missiles for a without considering efficiency
specified goal 9. Optimization of parameters
4. Designing of missiles taking in- based on a criterion of ef-
- to account conditions of employ- f.iciency
ment L0. Taking into account warhead
5. Designing missiles on Che basis yield
of preliminary specifications 11. Taking into account missile
6. Computer designing, taking ef- accuracy
, ficiency into account 12. Taking into account reliability
9
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v
_ _ _ _ _
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' Gnmput~r dc~gi~;ning nf mi~gile~ cdnatituee~ ~utnm~tion of thp d~~igning
procee~ with th~ nid nf ~eleCeroni~ eompue~r~. WiCh thi~ on~ e~n immedi~tely
re~olv~ func~inn~l rel~eion~hip~ ~mon$ the varioua pnr~m~t~r~ dnd LA ef-
ficien~y ~nd d~t4rrnine dc~.ai~n pnrdmet~rg, a?nximizin~ ~ffieicney. A'~r thi~
~nc muat know what ~rrs~:i~tt~y, r~linbiliey und other eompon~�t~ of efftCi~ncy
~r~. tln~ mugt b~ ~ble to ueiliz~ ehe~~ conc~pte ~nd thh funetion~l relation-
~hip~ bttwc~en them ~n~i de,~ign p~rameter~. Une mu~t gbl~ t~ cnn~erueC n
desi~n prnbl~m ~l~dritilm, to write ~nd d~bu~ ~ progr~m fc~r ca?lcula~ing op-
tim~l de~i~n p~rnm~terg on ~ cnmpuC~r.
Craphdan~lyti~gl mi~di~e degigning. negignin~ nf t.A ig pr~~ntily ~till per-
fdrmed by the t~pprdxim~t~ ~r~phn~n~lyti~~l method~ c~ggentiglly "m~nunLly"
(~ee ~'igur+~ 1.3). ~ven with this method nf degign~ hnw~ver~ nne c~n uCili~e
~ffici~ncy [nr further optimiz~ti~n of obtained pnr~m~terg. To gchihv~ _
~hi~, ~dme pnrameterg mu~[ b~ alter~ri in guch m m~nner a~ to obtgin u
maximum LA effiriency value under r~rt~in di~ciplining cnnditiiong (for
example, wS.rh ~~peeiEi~d LA r.ogt or with a~pecified lgunch w~ight~ ~CC).
,l
'I'he met~~nd prdposed in this bedk ig d~igned for opCimizatioa nf obtain~d
LA p~r.~m~~~ra from the ~t~ndpnint of ubtaining e cnnximum ~ffl~ienCy vnlue.
'Tc~ ~chieve thig we hav~ ex~min~d the ~olutinn of a number of problemg in
which it is ~esumed rhat LA pdr~caeters are nlready gpecified at the
ptelimin~~ry design st~ge. Th~y ~re subs~quently gubj~ct~d to change for
th~ purpo~e of maxiroizing efficier?cy. 1'}t~se chgng~g are the followin~
_ it~er:~tion during optimization of d~sign p~r~meterg.
Eormalizr~tinn of the problem of optimizing de~ign parameterg for reliabili-
ty with ~pproxim.~te gr3phoanalyCical designing can b~ repregented as fol-
lows:
x,-vpt; t=1~ a;
~ 3~min;
Ma,~ ~ curst; L~,= a const;
X~ ~y tT~(.C~~ssO~ ~a 112~
~ ~pt// ~
Nn~~const. �
tn this case optim~l design parameters x~ are determined as a reault of two
itcr~tions. With the first itergtion design parameterg are determined
optimal without considering reliability, on the ba~sis of expenditures 3
under disciplining conditions specified in the form of payload weight M~~r
and r~axicnum range L~X. Here Q j(xi)=0 functional relationship between
desiga parameters.
In the second iteration we optirrize only certain of the obtained design
parameterg, connected with reliability of sepgrate parts cf die LA (fra~me,
10 ~
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~ropulgie~n uni~). C~el~~r I.11 ecmp~nent~ (~nr~trnl dy~C~m, pnwhr ~upply ,~y~thm,
~tc) l~av~ a rel~~bility which i~ in cottfnrmity with the ~ppCified p~yln~d
w~i~ht. W~ ghould note thnt d~timiz~tidn on relinbility nf ~~rt~in d~gign
pr~ram~t~r~ ig pcrCc~rmed wiCh previnudly ~pc~cifieci cli~Ciplining eonditiona
u?ich~n~ed (h~~~r=coiist ~nd l~y~~x~~nn~~). 5p~ciEi~d r~li~bility N~~c:nn~t r~ldn
t~ dn~ ~f thr cli~eiplining eonditidny In tt~i~ iterue~un nn optimir.:~r.ion ut
dt~+igr~ po~rcim~tc~r~. Cti~n~;in~ ~ertnin de~ign pnrnm~ter~ (thi~knc~~~ ~C ~hell
Hhc~c~t, cro~~ 9tCtLl~h~1 ~r~~ nf ~tring~rd, ehc~e i~, gtructural m~~g, ~tc) ~nr
~~hi~vfng Ch~ r~li~bility ~p~cifi~d tn th~ diaeiplin~ng cunditiong, nn~ mu~C
algn Chnng~ nther d~~ign pnrum~t~r~ (pngin~ thru~t, w~ight nf fu~l, ~te)
d~C~rmin~d in the fir~t it~rution in ordpr tn 1~~ve r~n~~ unrh~ng~d with
Mr~~r~Cnnet. in thi~ Cg~p Ygunching w~ight nf ehe LA of cour~~ ~hang~g, t~t
with th~ aiready ~ppci.fied tihr~e disriplining ~nnditiong, ourlnyg (lnunching
wei~ht nr ~ogt) ag ~ crit~rion of nptimizotinn will be minima L
~.1.1. ~fficiency gg Sei~nCific B~~ig of 5p~cifiC Mig~ile Uhgigning
tn degtgning n gp~cifir LA it i~ algo ~geentigl ea uCiliz~ ~fficiency ~s ~
sri~ntifiC m~Chod of prab].em golving, ~uch gg ~or selecCing an optimal
~~f~ey ~c~etor valu~ f, employed in gtrength calculntinns. U~ue11y etruc-
tural celculationg for strengCh nre performcd for breaking loadg N~~~ whirh
are determined with th~ farmule Np=N'f, where N~ is th~ oper~ting lo~d; f--
g~fety factor (f~1.5). t~ptimizing reliebility as a component part of ef~
ficiency, one can dptermine the nptimal re~iability value for gtrucCural
compon~citg, end then the aptimal safety fgctor and mass nf the materigl
r~ceivin~ ~he ~xt~rn~l lo~d with a given bay or compartmcnt gtructurul
lnyout. Comparing design grrgngementg in thig manner~ one can d~termine
the aptimal, efficient d~aign which ensureg ma~;imum eEficiency nf the LA~
~11 ather conditions being ~qugl.
Uesigning missil~es is inseparably linked wiCh c~lcul~ting the structural
design for g*.rength. ~
' Method~ of making structural calculations on mis~iles for atrength boil
down nt the pres~nt Cime chiefly to pethods of ~tatic determinism. goth
the load and the load-carrying capability of the structure are assumed to
be determined, Whil.e loads are considered to be operating for surh gn
extended time that they can be considered static (~igure 1.4).
'fhe follvwing ace degignated in e"igure 1.4: Np external breuking load;
N~ external operaring load; f-- safety factor; ~n~~, vp.~, oe gtresses
of licait proportionality, yield point, and ultimate ~trength respectively;
d-- sheet thickness; 5-- gtringer cross sectional area; ak impact
strength; Wnq :,A transfer function from external loads to structure
, sCresses; rs_i endurance limit.
But 1 ads change fairly rapidly in flight. 5tructural stresses also chaage
rapidly. Oscillations of a flexible body filled with liquid must also be
taken inCo account in calculating str,~ctural strength by che dynamic
determinism meChod.
11
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h~r~~~ their young ~amr~d~e in raany unit~. Though prohibieed, flogging
i~ cu~romnry--whefl "comrad~~' courta" ~~gemble in bArrecke quartere at =
night~ The ~~med foree~ ~e~eidn~~ in eh~ ine~~i~~ ~f eh~ Savi~e Union
or~ g~nt tn h~lp with th~ harvesr ev~ry eummer. In the epring th~y r~-
pnir fro~t damag~ to ro~dB, c~nele nnd r~ilroad~. Amd in the fall 8nd
winter, dwiag to th~ ahort~g~ of lAbor, they hAVe to help out in indu~-
try.
Th~ Main ~nemy in the WQ~t: thp FRC and the United St~te~
There i~ ther~for~ ltttle militgry training. Even crack divisions of -
the R~d Army cannot ke~p etep with the highly trained NATO forces. Com-
bat rpgdin~g~ of the Soviet forcee suffer~ anyway from the fact that ~
recruits are immediately egeigned to combat fotmatione. In NATO, on the
other hand, these arp assigned to epecial training c~ntere~ with the re-
~ult that the combat force~ axe fully ready for action at any time.
IdeologiGgl tr~ining ig all the more inteneive~ with 18 houre a week
d~voted to political instruetion. In th~ indoctrination, the United
5tateg and the ~RG nre portrayed ns the main adversaries~ only their
"imperialist cravings for aggresaion" conatituting a"danger to peace."
in eddition, the 90 mi~tutes' leisure time to v~hich every soldier ie en-
titled in the evening is often enriched with political drill and "vAlun- .
tary" service. In the M~oecow Military District, it even happened during
pauseg in cambat during a maneuver that regiments were asee~:,?aled around ~
hurriedly installed loudspeakers to hear explanations of the deciaiona
of the latest party congrese.
The ultimate in gung ho was accompliehed one Sunday by the political
officer on board of a de8troyer in the Black Sea. To "strengthen anti-
imperiali~t consciousness" he organized a competition obligatory for all
gailors. The winaer was the one who could take apart and reassemble a -
a~chinegun the fastest blindfolded. The navy ~ournal quite seriously
voic~.d iCs enthusiasm, calling iC "exemplary."
The daily schedule in force aince the end of 1975 would lead to collec-
tive refusal of orders in Western armies:
0600 Reveille
0610 Early-morning gymnastics and cleaning of accommodations
Washing, dressing, making of beds
0650 Political information
0725 Breakfast
0800 Pirst to sixth training hour
1400 Lunch
1440 After-lunch rest period
1510 Maintenance of personal weapon and equipment
38
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~~k O~~tCtAI. U5~ bNtY
1530 politic~l training M~ndaya gnd Thuraday~
W~~p~n ~nd ~quipm~nt ~~rvtci.ng Tu~ed~y~ and ~'rid~y~
Sports W~dnp~d~yn ~nd Saturdaya
~~~0 Prtvat~ study (p~rty ~?9~~t~biy)
194d ~~ppet
2010 L~i~ure tim~
2140 ~v8ning walk-~hrough and rol~ ca1].
2Z00 R~atregr
Int~ellig~nc~ offic~r defectnr A1~kg~y My~gk~v told 5'i'~RN: "Th~ ordinary
~oldi~r liv~g ~ mi~~rable lif~ in tha Sc~vi~t Army. During hi~ military
gervie~ he i~ ~trietly prohibic~d from l~~ving th~ ~tation of hi~ unit.
Nie whola day i~ filled with duty down to the laet minute; he ie engaged
in drill ~lmo~t th~ entire ~im~. Only v~ry few eometimge get furloughe _
to vieit their f~mili~s at hom~--a rar~ r~ward for the best."
When h~ drop~ int~ b~d dead tlred ~ft~r lb hnur~' work and dri11, th~
snldi~r oa campulenry military s~rvic~ sti11 do~e not get any r~st. Hie
bed gtande in ~ hall with 70 or 100 other bede. The crowding and sm~ll
are downright intolprable, the generally old barrnckg being hopeles~ly
~v~rCrt~Wd~d. Th~re ig no locker for one'e few privete belnngingg.
begpite the fact t`~at nll ~lcohol is bannpd from 5oviet barracks, soldiere
and officera in some units drink like fi~h. And among the troops on th~
Chinege bordpr, Western intelligence servl..es noted to their amazement
that A mririhurina-like drug~ "anakha~" has come into use in addition to
alcahol. The f light, by the divieione, into aarcotice becomea explicable
when one looke at e po11 publiahed in n 5oviet militery ~ournal which cau?~
up with frightful data 3 yeara ago: three-quartera of those doing com-
puisory military service were repelled by the tedious drill. In the mean-
time, the flight into narcotics is not all. At the 20th Guard Army, 73
young soldiers committed suicide Within s period of 3 years.
According to the NATO intelligence services~ the number of desertere too
is exceptionally high. With embarra:.s{ng consequencea f:~r Seviet armament:
so far defectors hav~ enabled the Ameiicans to place every aingle n~w
"miracle plane" of the 5oviets on their nwn runWays. In November 1975
they even very nearly got hold a~ a modern guided-miseile destroyer.
After a mutiny on the Baltic Sea, the crec~ of the "Storoshevoy" had taken
over the ship and headed for ~.weden. The 5oviet Naval Command stopped
the flight attempt with fighter planes and nr.her destroyers in the last
minute. total of 50 mutineers died in the process.
NATO e;cperts conclude from such incidents that large parts of the Soviet
armed forces (the estimate is more than half) are unfit for an offensive
war--particularly the troops stationed deep in the interior of the coun-
cry and on t,i~e Chinese border. Creat fighting gtrength and high level
of training is being certified only to the forces of the R~d Army directly
confronting the NATO forces, the 32 divisions stationed by the Soviet Union
39
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in th~ "fraCernal countri~s" of the Warsew I'act and the 7 airborn~ divi-
gion~ in weet~rn Ftu~ai~--the elit~ of thp Red Army. These "Advance area
divielone" are the only ones among the 167 Soviet combat divi~ions up to
rambet ~trengCh and immediately r~ady for actton.
Thp stronge~t conting~nt i~ the 10 armored and the 10 armored infantry
divi~iong (motdrized infantry) ~nd Che artillery division in the GDR.
Men~uverg obeerved by We~tern intelligences ~ervices have shown thet theae
ran leav~ their barr~Gks r~ady for combat within 4 houre. After another ,
8 or 10 daye they can be reinforced by the 30 diviaions, with 375,000 men~
gtationed in the 3 western military disiricte of the Soviet Union--in the
B~ltic, B~loruesia and the Carpathian mountaing.
Wirhout thig reinforcement, an attack on Weatern Europe would be suicide,
becauge Soviet soldiers serve in "throwaway divisions" without reaerves
of their own. With their 10,000 men they are not quite half as atrong
as divisiona of the Bundeswehr (FRG Armed Forces] with their up to 17,500
men. The 5oviet divisiona are worn out in an offeasive and right away
replaced by new formations. The allied troops of the Waraew Pact~ however~
appear to be hardly suited for this. According to a new U.S. srudy, "it
i~ doubtful whether the non-Soviet armiea would remain politically reli-
able in a massive offenaive action."
Life in the crack units, almost all of which bear the Citle of "guard~"
is hard. By contrast, despiCe all the haragament, service on the Chinese
b~rder and in the interior of the country, is a bit slovenly, and �~rhoever
handles himself astutely can somehow scrape through. Among the occupa-
tion forces in the Warsaw Pact states, the drill is taken aeriously--like
the draconian drill of ill repute in the old Prussian army. Discipline
is rigorous.
Even the noncommissianed officers have 87 different types of punishment
with which they can bully t~?e soldiera, ranging from punitive duties to
solitary arrest in a dark cell with only bread and water. The aoldiers
in triese crack divisions are trained only for combat. They are spared
work in the fields or in roadbuilding. They can go out but seldom, and
then only in groups under the command of the one most senior in service.
Even with the "fraternal" forces of their host countries, contact is '
limited to the official level, and there is no cordiality. Thus, among
the GDR soldiers of the National People's Army [NVA~, the Soviets,are
merely circumscribed as the "unit next door." They are unloved, and the
constant appeals by the SED leadership "to learn from the Soviet brothers"
get on the nerves of the NVA officers, who have become independent-minded.
The voluntary isolation of the Soviets fias its reasons: the soldiers
should not be exposed to a culture shock. Some are anyway. Soviet Army
drivers have a hard time finding their way in the--by Soviet standards--
rapid and dense GDR road traffic. There are frequent accidents, and,
40
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~Ott (J~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
fright~n~d by the rruffic~ the Red C~grdi~td pref~r tn gn ah~gd nnd driv~
th~ir c~rg into the ditch. Nor do the 5ovie~e divisione ~ver etuy in the
GDR more than a year~ They ere then exchanged and ~enC to th~ Bgiric for
wor~l rearmament,
Th~ 21 5ovier divisinng in th~ GDtt and the addieion~l 11 in the other
W~ryaw ~aet gtgtes gec preferential tr~aement in the gupply of n~w arm~-
ment. But th~ lat~gt NATO invegtigatinng hHVe shown that the EagC ~n~oys
only an ingignificant superiority with its modern combat tgnk~--11~U00
cdmp~r~d with 9,500 in Western ~uropp. 'Che Chr~atening "Russian steam-
roll~r"--~stimated gc 1~,000 to 60,000 tanks, depending on one's po~itical
point of vi~w--con~ier~ two-third~ of v~n~rnbl~ veterane.
The Austrian expert on the East Dr Friedrich Wiener stat~s: "Theee old
vehicles, worn out in 15- to 20-year use by Che troops, are pgrked in
larg~ campg. It cannot be asaumed that in times of tenaion new formations
can be eetablished from these supplies." No wonder; batteries and copper
wiring of many of these veterans hnve long eince been sold on the black
market by the guard crews, as shown by constantly reported trigls.
But this armored ~unk has still a twofold political value. The Warsaw
pact can introduce it as a quid pro quo in the negotiations about troop
reductione in central Europe, and Che NATO command can put pressure on
Western governments fcr greater armament expenditures by pointing to
enormous Eastern tank stocks.
The most important Western defense politicians all agree that such an
increase is not necessary, for alone the immense quantity of the Soviet
firing equipment worries many NATO generals. According to calculations
of the U.S. CIA intelligence service, the Soviet Union spent the equiva-
lent of 270 billion dollars on its armed services last year. The intelli-
gence service of the Chinese People's Republic added up the expenditure~
of their disliked red brothers to as much as 350 billion dolla:~s--as much
as the whole Second k'arld War cost the German Reich.
In a~urope of detente such enormous armament seems absurd, for the USSR
needs detente on its western border just as urgently as NATO. The situa-
tion on the Chinese border is so tens~ that even now large parts of the
Red Army are standing on the Ussurf. Therefore not quite half can be
marshaled for a war against the West. Despite increasing hostility in
the Far East, the Soviet Union cannoC risk withdrawing troops for instance
from the GDR, because these t:nits insure the survival of the communist
regime.
41
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Table 1. NATO and U3SR Weapone
NATO U9SR,
Tanks 9,500 21~000
Gombat aircraft 2~000 3~500
Capieal ships 274 404 -
Submarines 241 248
Table 2. NATO and Wareaw Pact Grownd Forcee -
United Stetes 982,000 Soviet Union 2~000,000 ~
Greae Brieain 1$8,000 Bulgaria 115,000 -
Canada 34,000 GDR 105,000
FRG 327~000 Poland 220~000 r~-
Belgium 66,000 Romania 140,000
Netherlande 82,000 Czechoslovakia 135,000
Luxembourg 550 Hungary 83,000
Denmark 27,000
Norway 18,000
Italy 223,000
Greece 120,000
Turkey 360,~00 =
Iceland -
PortuRal 180.000
Total 2,607,550 2,798,000
~ Table 3. Weapon Totals and SALT II ~ ~
Permitted
under
USA SALT
II USSR
~
Total of Strategic Nuclear Weapons 2,060 2,250 2,570 -
Missiles with multiple warheads 1,046 1,320 795
Submarines and long-range miasiles
with multiple warheads 1,046 1,200 725 "
Intercantinenta2 missiles with -
multiple warheads 550 820 600 ~
Heavy intercontinental missiles '
with multiple warheads ~ 0 * 308
*Frozen at preaent voluane ~
Millions for Armament In Order To Be Taken Seriously
Moreover armament costs--worldwide a million dollars every minute--are
getting to be too much for all sides. While, in the experience of NATO,
42
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}
~ach new w~apon co~t~ five times gs much ne ~~s predece~sor~ ie i~ worth
_ orty rwice as much.
Nev~rtheless the huge military expenditure~, hindering th~ ,~rogreeg oE the
country, make sense frnm tha point of view o� the Kremlia: only because
of iee war equipmene ie the developing country of Che Soviet Union taken
seriously by the world and by the countries of the Weet ae a big power with
claima to global domination.
For the Soviet Union, a�ter all, is not only the counCry of eputniks and
leaders in aporta, of revolution and miesilee; it is above all an extremely
poor country, at the technological lave]. of the early fifties and a~tth a
backward agriculture that cannot give the populace enough to eat. :
It i.s only to the milieary that the Soviet Union owes its atanding in the
world, and the milttary is therefore treated gently. One-sevenCh of the
yegrly national income is devoured by armament. Such a demonetration of
devntion is important for the Soviet leadership--particularly for ita own
survival--because armament makes it easier for the marshals and generals,
all personal privileges notwithet~nding, to have a quite limited say in
governmenC. Of the three pillara of the US5It--the party, intelligence
and the army--the military has the least influence on politice.
Instead they are allowed to live well. In the "classless eociety" the
officers corpe has become a class of iCs own. In an army which did not
even have any ranks 60 years ago, there are now up to five differenC
messes, and the 4,200 calories that every member of the Red Army has been
entitled to since 1972 can vary a great deal depending on whether a Ye-
cruit or a colonel gets them.
Officers bf the rank of ma~or and up earn a good deal more than the
governcaent bureaucrats, are given servants and a car, live inexpensively
in houses away from barracks, and in officers' stores for little money
buy the kind of things their civilian fellow citizens can only dream
about.
The Communist Party has a firm hold on the armed forces. Up to 90 per-
cent of the officers are party members. Each unit, in addi~ion to a com-
manding officer, is ruled by a Communist Party functionary, en~oying equal
rank, ag "represenCative for political matters." Moreover the party sees
to it that most of the higher commanders do not get their posts until they =
are almost old men, because there is no such thing as a Napoleon at the
age of 65 (someone that old no longer thinks about a coup).
The KGB secret service too has drawn its own net of command and eapionage
over the armed forces. KGB officers--both overt and covert--have in:~il-
trated the forces. The most feared are the secret snoopers: while they
know everyone and everything about him, no one knows them.
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Th~ interest of the party and aecrat ~ervia~ in th~ ~rm~d forr~~ i~ und~r-
standab].R. Just as [thg ermed forcee~ in Germany in Kaiser W31h@lm'~
times, :he Red Army in tha Soviet Union of today ie the achool of the na-
tion--~~s the Communisr ParCy sees ~,t~ And it is the moet important Rue-
gian xac3st stronghold in the mulCipeople stata of the Soviet Union.
While the proportion of Russiana is visibly shrinking below the 50-percent
mark, they are hnlding on to the~r rule in the atatie. Whoever wants eo :
get ~omewhere ag a soldier has to be Russian.
With the Army, the Russians Rule in the Multipeople SCate
The language of connnand ~.s Russian~ and with a few exception~ the officere
corps is Russian. The aim o� being a crucible o� society in the multi-
people staCe, however, has not yet b~en reached by the Red Army. The con- ~
Crasta between Georgiana and Mongols, Ukrainiane gnd Kirgizians are notice- ~
ab1e.
Th~ arniament of the Soviet Union pritaarily has domestic political and alli- ,
ance-political reasons--to preserve what has been accomplished in the coun- .
try and in central Europe. Just as at one time the U.S. Cavalry with ita
massacres of Indians and Mexicans created the superiority of the present
U.S. leading stratum, so the Red Army today is insuring the domination of
the Russian party over the greater part of Europe and one-third of the
Asian Continent. The Soviet generals are convinced that "once our taruke
are stationed somewhere, communism is firmly anchored there." And if it
happens that thinga don't work out, as for example in Hungary in 1956 or
in the CSSR in 1968, you ~uat put more tanks in motion.
. In international affairs, on the other hand, the Red Arnry has as yet not
been very useful to the Communist Party leaders. But, in the estimate
of Western intelligence services, this will soon change. Whereas the
United States--for decades "world gendarme No 1"--since World War II has
interfered 215 times in foreign conflicts and wars, the Soviet Union dared
do sa only 115 times, albeit increasingly so since the mid-aixties.
For, since not quite 10 years ago, the pure land power has also risen to
be a sea power. The Russian "bear" has learned to awim. Owing to increased
- expansion of its Red Fleet, the Soviet Union today can operate worldwide.
Through the buildup of air transport gower--something only the Americans
had previously--it has gained additional global mobility.
The results have already been felt by the West. When civil war broke out
3 years ago in the former Portuguese colony of Angola, the United States
no longer could risk the previously customary employment of marine infantry.
In a constant operation, r:,v~ets flew thousands of Cuban soldiers in
long-range transport aircraft across the Atlantic to Africa and thus de-
cided the civil war.
The Chinese too, who in the first war between two communist states attacked
Vietnam at the beginning of this year, came to feel this new mobility.
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With an aerial brid~~ for thouegn~le of tone of armam~�nt goode, th~ 3oviete
flaw to th~ aid of their haraesed frieeds tn Viaenam.
A1,~ne irs p~rantiel for worldwide militdry ine~rvant~dng wil~ ~n~bla th~ :
Sovi~t leadership in th~ futura to lend mor~ effective suppoxt to the
revolutionary movement~ in the Th3rd World than heretofore. ir thue wiii
be able to conduct ~ pincer movement against the West, dependent on raw
mater3als. For the eighties, therefore, NATO intelligence ~xperte pre~ict
an increaeing nwnber of "subetitute war~."
On the other hand, the Red Army will not be able to afford for decades auch
thinge ae a lightning nttack against central Europe and the FRG~ Tlie lateet
defense white paper of the ~RG Government therefore for the first time no
longer conCains the term "th~eat." And rightly so.
~
A U.S. study about the grm~ment configuration completed at the end of 1998
shows that it is nnt the Weat but the East that is lagging. Even the
feared Soviet medium-range SS 20 atomic misailes, ~ust directed again~t
targeta itt Weatern Europe by the Soviet Union~ eo far are rather eomething
like a p~per tigpr. Not 600 miss~les have been installed, ns coid war- ,
riors in the West were lam~nting~ but--as of end of March--only 57.
PHOTO CAPTIONS
1. p 21. Photograph of rows of soldiers stripped to the waiet.
"Early-morni~g gymriasticg for Red Cuardistg, the elite
of Soviet forces. Their daily routin~ is tough; every
minute is filled c~ith drill. But the overwhelming
majority of the Red Army doea not consist of crack divi-
sions. Training and discipline are poor~ and soldiers
often are dispatched to help with the harvest or to build
roads."
2. pp 22-23. Photo of countryside being overflown by misailes. "With
the Stalin organ, the fear of the Germans againet the
Soviets began. Since ~lorld War II the Red Army has de-
veloped more and more new rockets--from salvo guns for
tf?e field~~rtillery to intercontinental misailes threaten-
ing every point on earth. In rheir atrategic missile
forces serve 350,000 ~~n--not combat aoldiers but highly
qualified technicians. This very month Washington and
Moscow plan to sign the new SALT agreement for limiting
armament. It compels the Soviets to ~unk aome of their
atomic missiles."
.
3. pp 24-25. Photograph of parading Canks. "Tanks on Red Square. The
impressive posture conceals the fa~~ that the 'Rugaian
steamroller' to a large part consiats of poorly trained
soldiers with antiquated arms." _
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4. ~ 25~ Photograph of soidiere pre~eneing ar~s. "Neroea are in
h~,gh r~gard~ The picture of ehe h~ro~c R~d Army ~e da-
ceiv3ng. Only the oecupation forcee 3n the aeetarn
'fraeernel countr3ee' euch ae ehe aDR can gat ready for ;
combar wirh3n a faw houre." -
y. pp 28-29. Photc~gK~ph of ~oldiere hoi~ting Red Flag. "Fira~ on th~ _
brink of ennihiietion~ ehen viceory. AfteY 8 bloody
4-year atruggle against H3,rier Carmeny, Sgt~ Milton
~ Kentariya and Mikhaii Yegorov on 30 Aprii 1945 ho3at
rhe flag of the USSR on the Reicheeag (parliamaet~
buiiding In Serlin. The invaeion of ~he SovieC~ fo-
mented a traumatic fear of the Ruesien~ among rhe Qer-
mans which pereiets to thie day."
t
COPYRIGNT: 1979 Gruner + Jahr b Co. _
;
8790
CSO: 1826 END
t
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