JPRS ID: 8559 WEST EUROPE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/09= CIA-R~P82-00850R000'100070004-9
_ _ R~

~ 6 JULY ~ _ ~ i u r i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~OR O~~tC1AL U5~ ONLY
.
~ JPF~~ L/8659 ~
6 July 1~979
CFOUO 42/79~
- West E u r~ e R e o rt ~
p p
~~IS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATlON SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R0001000744Q4-9
NOTE -
JPRS publicaCions conCain information primarily from foreign
newapapers, peri.odic~ls r.nd books, but ~lso from news agency -
transmissions and broadcasts. MaCerials from foreign-language ~
eources are translated; those frGm English-language sources
are Cranscribed or reprinted, with the ori~,inal phrasing and
other characCeristics reCRined.
He~d~.ines, ediCorial reports, ~nd material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [ExcerptJ in the .firsC line of each item, or following tt~e
lasC line of a brief, indicate how the original infnrmation was =
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or exCracCed.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
. tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in contex~.
Other unattributed pareatheCical notes within the body of an _
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
~ The conCents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes oE the Lt.S. Government.
For further information on rep~rt content -
call (7031 351-2811 or 351-2501 ~Greece,
Cyprus, Turkey).
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R0001000744Q4-9
_ ~'OR OFFICZAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/8559
- 6 Juiy i9~9
~ ;
WES1' EUkOPE REPORT
(FOUO 42~79)
CONTEN7S PAGE
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
ITALY
~ NATO's Air Da�ense StraCegy Reviewed
(Salvatore Bellassai; RIVISTA MILITARE, Mar-Apr 79)...�� 1
COUNTRY SECTION
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Government Study on Reactor Safety Noted
(Wolfgang Barthel; STERN, 17 May 79) 13
Nuclear Reactor To Produce Heat for Houses
(Peter Thomsen; STERN, 17 May 79).���������������~~~���� 16
FRANCE
New Miseiles Displayed at 1979 Le Bourget Fair
(AIR & COSMOS, 9 Jun 79)..�..��..�..�.�.�.�.��.����.���. 18
Firat French Laser Guided Weapon Noted -
(Pi~rre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 9 Jun 79).������������� 21
Decision on Or.servation Satellite Awaited
(Pierre Langereu;c; AI,~ & COSMOS, 9 Jun 79)�������������� 23 _
New Misailes, Radars~Presented at Fair
(Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 9 Jun 79) 24
Communist Party Called 'IeolAted'
(Michel Labro, e3:.a]..; L'EXPRESS, 12 May 79)������������ 26 ~
_ a _ [III - WE - 150 FOUO~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
FOR OF'FICIAL U5E ONLY '
Page
CONT~NTS (Continued)
Cammunisc Voters Polled on Attitude Toward Party -
(Albert du Roy; L'EXPRESS, 12 May 79)..����������������, 31
CommuniaG Party~s Relations With Moacow Diacuased
(Branko LaziCch; L'EXPRESS, 12 May 79)������~�~��~~��~~� 35 -
Briefa 38
October Armored Man~uvers 38
MiliCary Weakness Hinted 38
AComic Shelter Census 3g
Pirate Telephone Network
SPAIN
~
Popular Resistance to Nuclear Plants Demonstrate,
(CAMBIO 16, 27 May 79).��...��...���.�.��..�.�����.����� 39
~
-b-
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~OR OA'~'ICIAI~ USE ONLY
_ , '
TEI~ATER NUCLEAR FORCES ZT~'Y
NATO'S AIR DEFENSE STRATEGY REVIEW~D
Rome RIVISTA MILITARE in Italian Mar-Apr 79 pp 65-72
(Article by artillery Colonel Salv~tore Bellassai, antiaircraft artiillery
expert, participating in international working group activitie8 and couraes
in the United States, Greati Britain and Canada on air defense means end pro-
cedures, formerly head of the Antiaircraf~ Artillery Bureau in the Inspec-
torate General, at present in command of the Sabudia Antiaircraft Artillery
5chool: "Air Defense and Antiaircraft Problems at the eeginning of the
1980's"j
[Text] The changes that have taken place in the strategic situation of the -
Mediterran~an zone durinq the last decade and the lessons learned from the
limited conficts that have occuLred there entail, in our opinion, a need
for a drastic review of the doctrines and defensive equipment of the At-
lantic Alliance member countriea in this area.
- Italy is in the canter of these changes and, therefore, extremely concerned
by them. Once more, it sees its military choices that is to say, in prac-
tice, the general concept of dofense and the physical nature of the inatru-
ment of war fntended for implementing it conditioned by its position in
- the area in question. -
The factors of imbalance that have contrihuted to modifyinq the preexist-
. ~ng situation substantially on the basis of which it is important to
point out the points of reference of the current organization were ea- -
tablished in their time may be described in the foll~wing political-military
terms:
The still unresolved friction between Turkey and Gree~ce has da;~gerously
weakened the southern flank of the Alliance and introduced an umpteenth
factor of imbalance in an area already of itself too turbulent.
Many of the nations facing each other on the Mecliterranean basin have taken
on anti-Western orientations progressively. Soviet military presence in
this sea now openly makes use of sir and naval bases qranted n?ore or less
1
FOR OFFICI~?i. USE Oh'LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
'I
~OR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY '
spontaneously by governments deli.berate].y or casually it~volved in bloc
politics.
Poworf+il naval air forcos of the Soviet Union equal, i� not sup~rior, to
- r.he allied forces and consistently inclined, in particular, toward conducti-
ing amphibiaus operations, are present in Mediterranean watiers. _
The tactical air forces, which are closely associateA in Soviet military
doctrine with land forces "in an efficient binomial under the order of
the Armed Forces Group ccmmander," were inereased recently quantitatiively
and quali~ativaly. At preaerit, they amount to over 5,000 combat aircra~t
with a very high performanca, a sizable part of which are an im4nanen~~ ve,ry ,
dangerous threat to the entire Italian peninsula.
A well-known, authoritative military writerl who realizes what a prof.ound
change there has been in our country's strategic situation in compariason
~ wfth a few years ago has analyzed the possibilities offered to the poten-
tial adversary by the very efficien~ war machine that this adversary has,
and he believed it possible for one of the following hypotheses to occur:
in case of a general conflict, investment in force of our eastern frontier
or ~imite~ pressure on it; in case of a local conflict, acquisition by
the enemy of "bases of presence" or of "territorial pledgea."
The following is to be foreseen as a common factor in all the hypetheses:
Massive support by the tactical air forces of the ground effort (and, at _
the same time, conduct of air operations in depth in case the enemy in-
tends to secure possession of bases useful for the continuation of hos-
tilities against the NATO allies).
Carrying out of amphibious operations (probably more axtensive, on a larger
scale and dangerous, in case of local conflict).
After the terms of the matter have been stated in this way, the author
identifies an operational strategy that has, from the ground point of view,
as strongly characterizing distinguishing features the area of the reply and,
locally, the elasticity of the defensive modulus, to the effect that a reply
capability in any�direction is opposed to an attack capable of coming from `
any point of the com}5ass, although not unifortnly.
At any rate, it should be pointed out that, b~cause the strategic terms on
which our defensive orqanization was established in its day, it has been .
_ absolutely necessary to modify the orqanization itself thoroughlyf in other
words, adopt a whole series of ineasures that wfll concern "the military
division of the national territory, the organized physical nature of the
war equipment, the shifting of the battle corps, the defensive modulus."1
1 Gen L. Salatiello, "Bases for a New Conceptfon of Defense," RIVISTA MILI-
TARE, No 3, 1976.
2 -
FOR OFFICIAi. L'SE Oti'LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
FOit OFFTCIAL USE ONLY
Ac~ivity so vas~ and complex cannot be impr.ovised, but, because a very _
~horough process of renovation is in progress, at the completion or which
there should be a war instrument consistent, to a considerable degree, with
~he new general stra~eg3c situation, iti would be appropriate to single out
- tha oossible aubsequent modifications required for tackY.ing any emergency
situation adequately and wi.th prospects of succeas.
2'his activity, and especially activity pertaininq to a delineatiion of the -
Armed Forces, cannot overlook, moreover, the lessons derived from some o� ~
~he unexpected, characteristic events of tihe "Yom Kippur War," including
the possibility, even in a modern con�lict, of achieving strategic and tac-
tical surprise and effectiveness o� antitank and an~iaircraft misaile ays-
tems.
Others, much more capable and competent than we, can and should make an over- -
all examination of the new operational aituation. In this article, the in-
tention is merely to make an examination of the r.epercussions that in the
framework of the changed general strategic situation the impending enemy
_ air threat exercises ~n the de�ense possibilities of the field are?y and of -
the vital areas of the nation's territory.
Because we are aware that this aspect, believed by some wrongly to
be marginal, has, on the other hand, basic repercussions on operati~nal ef-
fectiveness and, therefore, on the credibility of the war equipment, we do
not feel that the present shortcomings should be minimized and we shall
seek, therefore, to point out the measures that miqht eliminate or reduce
their occurrence.
Air Threat, Air Defense, Antiaircraft Defense
The immanence of the air threat, the enemy's destructive potential, the de-
termining effect exercised by the air forces on the conception, organization
and conduct of grour.8 operations, are now realities that are recognized and
, are present, not only and not so much owing to a positive evolution of na-
tional military thinking~and doctrine as because of the intrinsic logic of
war events that have demonstrated their complete validity. ~
It is now agreed that the initial phase of a modern "three-dimensional" -
conflict will be characterized by a massive effort made by the enemy po-
tential for a rapid achievement of air superiority, absolutely required for =
any subsequent positive development of operations. Therefore, a heavy at-
tack will be launched on the components of the detensive organization that
may check or prevent achievement of that preliminary objective, namely air
bases and deployment of antiaircraft artillery. Achievement of success in
this phase will determine or at least influence the intensity and effec-
tiveness of the attacks that will be launched subsequently against the
allied ground forces, the size of the air support with which they can be
provided, thetr maneuvering possibilities, availability and survival of ~
the logistics organization.
3
FOR OfiFICIAi. L'SE Oh'LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
FOR OFF~CIAL USE ONLY
Tne second phase of the battle will be characteri.zed precisely by violent
air attacks against field army uni~s and tYieir support. In ~his phase,
the ac~ive air de�ense and antiaircraft facilities that have been able to
face up to the first attack will be able to safeguard these units' freedom
to maneuver and to ensure their survival and movement capability.
It is intuitive that ~he abova-indicated tasks cannot be assigned to one
single weapon sys~am. Instead, in order to attain the desired effective-
ness, it is necessary to make massive use af a mix (this is the term adopted
by NATO and literally means mixture) of weapon sys~ems supplementing each
other, incorporated up to the degree regarded as operational].y moat ap- .
pr~priate in a uniform defense system.
- The range of active means regarded as most suitable for guaranteeing the
requisite degree of protection from air offensi.ve operations to the ground
forces and sensitive points on the nation's territory includes the follow-
ing:
Piloted and radio-guided (surface-to-afr missiles) in~erceptors of the mili- `
tary Air Force.
All-weather, medium-range (�or brevity, medium systems) missile systems for
overall defense of the combat zone and of rear areas. :
Light systems, missiles and conventional weapons, all-weather or fair-weather, _
self-propelled and wheeled, for direct defense of maneuvering units and other ,
selected objectives.
Self-defense systems, missiles and conventional weapons, qenerally all of
t h e m fair-weather, portable and self-propelled, for specific self-defense
of minor units of all arms and services.
Because regardless of their availability in larqe numbers (and this has not
been true up to now of the Italian Army), antiaircraft weapon systems will
be unable to meet completely the many defense requirements of the combat
zone,it will~benecessary to set up specific priorities beforehand.
At any rate, their action will have to be incorporated with the action of "
individual and unit automatic weapons, even though not specifically organ-
~ ized for antiaircraft firing. Countries that have a very respectable anti-
aircraft armament, first among which is the United States of America, have
officially approved this concept2 which, on the other hand, has given ~
rise in our country to questions and some irony emphasizing the impor-
tance of using massive firepower, delivered in any way whatsoever from the
ground, in order to hit or deter attacking aircraft from continui.ng their _
action. In order to put better emphasis on the importance of the firepower
2 FM 44-1: "U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Equipment."
4
FOR OFFICIAT. L'SE Oh'LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
FOR OFFYCIAL US~ ONLY
= of portable weapons in tierms o~ an~iaircraft self-defense, the publication
= cited in No~e 2 provides ~he following data:
In Korea, the United States Air Force :lost 544 aircraft ow3ng to the co-
ordinated action of the antiaircraft weapon syffitems and o� the inEantry's
portable weapons, almost �ive ~imes the number of aircraft lost in air-to-
air combat. _
In South Vietnam, losses for the same cause amounted to 410 aircra�t and
2,100 helicr~pters.
- In. Nortlz Vietnam, fire by portable weapons contributed to inflicting very
considerable losses (sti11 hPld secret) on the United States Air Force.
The coordinated use of the active means of antiaircraft defense, on the
_ other hand, generates an "equalizing function," underestimated up to now.
In fact, it not only ensures freedom of the ground forces to maneuver and
protection of vital objectives f~r purposes of conducting the operations,
but also, together with antitank weapons and ground artillery, it assista
~ in reducing the initial quantitativ~ inferiority of the friendly forces by
- imposing a high attritfon rate on the enemy.
In this connection and especially in the realization that as has already
been said the enemy's air offensive will be unleashed right at the atart
of hostilities against components that may oppose subsequent action, anti-
aircraft artillery will be used immediately and directly in the battle. _
Then, the significance of the new motto chosen by the antiaircraft artillery _
of the American Army "First in Battle" is better understood.
Is that role acknowledg~d for the antiaircraft artillery of the Italian
Army? Everyone is aware of the scant specific weight given to that spe-
cialty, althouqh we want to beliQVe that it is not yet too late to stan- _
dardize organization measures, to acquire new means and to adjust technical
and logistical measures to the new situation noted by all.
- Returning to the main topic of this article, the shortcomings found in the
or3anization of our countzy's and our Army's air and antiaircraft defense
will now be indicated and ~ome proposals will be offered pertaining to their
pos sible reorganization. _
The first shortcoming results from the limited extent of the area protected
by ar.tive means of air defense. Z',tiat area, coincident roughly with the east-
central Po plair~, has been regarded traditionally as the probable zone of
development of military operations in a possible conflict in which Italy
would h.ave to be involved. Actually, in the light of the changes previously
dis cussed, this matter conflicts substantially with the possibilities of-
fered to the adversary by the strategic situation of the Mediterranean and
by the intrinsic capabilities of the war equipm~nt that the enemy has.
5
FOR OFFICI~?i. L'SE Ob'LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
= The second consiats in the fact that thA Army's antiaircraft artillery
already exceayively reduced in size in compari~on with ~ts constitutional
tasks practically doe$ not exist or, rather, is noti sufficiently avail-
ab].e for performing those tasks. A~ any rate, employment of its units seems -
to be excessively subordinated to air defense zequirements, with tihe excep-
tion of a small amount t4 which vE:ry special tasks are as~ignad, moreover.
Above all, it is a mystery to no one that, at preaent, the large units of
the f.teld army do not have any antiaircraft component of their own, although
that pa~amount requirement has been pointed ou~ in the publications of the -
most recent doctirinary series (Publication No 900). -
Possible Changes in the Air Defense Organization
The remarks made above lead to the belief that it is neither advisable nor
rational to oppo~e the powerful enemy air threat with a"paralyzed" dispo-
sition of air and missile bases concentrated to a considerable extent in
a limited area, oriented toward opposing attacks coming from a previously
determined east-west direction.
It is quite true that, as h~? been said authoritatively, "we are not.alone ,
in the Mediterranean," but although without a desire to treat our pre- _
sent companions ironically the fact remains that it is not acceptable
to delegate provision of our de�ense solely to the presence in this sea of ~
the formidable United States Sixth Fleet, which might, in turn, be heavily ,
engaged by the opposing naval air force that no:�longer conceals, but rather
displays, its air, naval and amphibious capabili~ies. Therefore, there ~
still is a need for facing up to the threat by making s~itable changes in
~ the present dispositions of the active means in the air defense organiza-
tion and by making our defensive and counteroffensive capabilities suffi-
ciently more effective.
Of course, with this there is no desire to a3vocate the establishment of
a constant, impenetrable protective umbrella of aircraft and missiles over
all the nation's territory (which not even the two superpowers are able to
indulge in), but th~ problem is tackled, all the same, as follows:
By specifying, witk~in the limits of the entire peninsula, vital areas re-
gardless of where located, with a high priority for purposes of survival
of the ;:ation's military, industrial and adminsitrative organization. -
- By singling out the areas most exposed to enemy air threat and, because
it may be rega-:ded as likely to come equally:�rom any direction, by pro- ~
viding a 360� reaction capability.
By modifying the position of the air and missile bases accor3ing to the
results of the analysis mac3e.
By making a qualitative and quantitative increase in the distant detection
- systems (early:warning radar) and the low and very low altitude detect~on
6
- FOR OFFICIAi. L'SE OIv'LY
, ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
- FOR OI~'FICIAL U5E ONLY
;
systems (gap-filler radar), in the data collection, procesaing and disaemi��
_ nation oenters and in the weapons systems ~hemselves. -
Repositioning of dispositions is undoubtedly a big problem. This problem, -
tackled already in principle by the Italian Air Force, al~o involves a need
_ for revising and making more effic3ent the a3.r:defense detectfon, report
and control organization, which is one of the b~:sic componenta an which
the success of the air battle depends.
Problems of Anti aircraft Artillery -
The foregoing remarks likewise justify a substantial revision of the con-
cepts on which the present organization of the Army's antiaircraft artil-
lery was established in its day. That revision must necessarily concern =
the �ollowing: establishment of tasks and of amployment dependency, re-
organiza~ion of the organizational nature of the units, making the pre- -
sent armament more effective, a different allocation of the antiaircraft
components of the large units.
With regard to the first point (~asks and employment dependency), once our -
premises have been accepted, it is unthinkable that the few existing units _
should continue in defense carried out with substantially static~cri-
teria and, as such, conflicting thoroughly with the developments of inethods
of modern military operations of a limited area that is not said to be _
the one in which the decisive battle may be waged. The following should
especially be borne in mind with regard to the~antiaircraft units:
They may find it necessazy to have to confront rapidly an omnidiractional
threat by taking appropriate deployment steps in time.
They are not at all sufficient, in the present size, to perform their con-
stitutional task direct medium, low and very].ow-altitude defense of field
army units providing the units with the requi3ite freedom to maneuver.
With regard to the second point, while the doctrinary statement of the pro-
blem seems now to be fully acceptable, the same cannot be said of its im-
plementation in practice. The organizational structure of the antiaircraft
units seems to be only partially adequate for the requirements in some per-
sonnel (eapecially officers with operational tasks) and equipinent sectors
(transportation and communications). Although the allowance reduction of
the organizad groups in the large units and others not part of a division ~
_ is theoretically understandable in the present shortage situation, it re-
presents an unfortunate measure especially disassociated from a long-range
view of the employment of these emergency units. In some sectors, the ar-
mament that they have is tending to become obsolescent. It does not seem
that timely replacement is possible or especially that it can be made ade-
quately effective in the categories of light systems and self-defense wea- =
- pons. -
7
~ FOR OFFICIAt. LTSE O~VrI.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~
FOR 0~'TICIAL USE ONLY
Remarks on the Lessons of the Yom Kippur War
It must be realized that solution of the problems of antiaircraft defense
involves a very heavy organizational and �inancial effort, perhaps at the _
limit of the not great possibilities of the state machinery anc1, especially,
o� the military apparatus. Therefore, the po~iti.on of those who assign a i
rather low priority to those problems may appear to be understandable, if
not logical.
On the basis of a deliberately agn~stic point of view, we ask ou selves, '
then, whether there really are concrete factors capable of supporting our
views concerning the urgency for an extensive reorganization and revitali~
zation of Italy's antiaircraft defense. Because war represen~s ~he proving
ground for mil.itary doctrines.arcd equipment, we believe that the lessons
derived from the most recent and "modern" of the conflicts ':hat have oc-
curred in the Mediterranean area the Yom Kippur War can provide an ;
objective answer to our query. ~ �
We do not belisve that it is appropriate to reexamine in detail the series
of events by now very familiar, scrupulously described and accurately
analyzed by students and experts that occurred in October 1973 in the
Sinai and on Golan Heights, the two main theaters of operations in the
war. As we were saying at the beginning, it has, above all, been demon-
strated that, in spite of any different expectation, the availability of
very sophisticated air and ground means for the surveillance in depth of the
- rea of a battle that has not yet started (for e~tample, the artificial sa-
tellites used by the United States in support of their Israeli allies), _
the real intentions of the enemy were not made clear to the Israeli in
time and did not prevent the Egyptians from carrying an imposinq mass of
mechanized and armored forces as quick as lightning across the Suez Canal,
regarded among other things as a natural obstacle with considerable intrin- _
sic impeditive power. ~
The erroneous analytical evaluation of the situation attributed to Israel's
~ intelligence service is not the cause of the surprise, but rather the con-
sequence of the surprise itself, which upset every previously estahlished
plan precisely because it was regarded a priori as impossible.
The arguments of those who would like to attribute to the specific geo-
graphical and operational area of the Middle East peculiarities capable of
giving rise to:'the belief that a similar situation cannot be repeated in
the European theater, make one think inevitably of the tragic consequences
undergone by the French Army in the spring of 1940, precisely because it was
believed that what.happened a few months earlier on the plains of Poland
could not be repeated on the Rhine.
Only the availability of operatiorially efficient units with a very high
professional level within an extremely limited amount of tima (just a few
hours) enabled the Israeli Army to put an initially very dangerous situation
8 -
FOR OFFICI~. L'SE Oh'LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~dx nr~ir.rnt, us~ orrLY
in k~alanCe ag~in ancl td gd nn subsequen~ly td Carryiny duti viatioriaus coun~~r-
- t~ffensive operatiiong.
- An ~lementary deductiion from the above-degcrib~~ eventi~ may b~ a~ follows:
iti ig n~c~g~ary tio have unitis witih full pergonne~. cnmplemenC t~nd equipment
right from tihe ~tiarti of hostilitiieg. mhis do~s not meqn that tihey must ne-
cegs~rily be pr~~c:ed~d by ~hose "states of increasing tenglon" on wh~ch NATb
r~1i~g eo much fnr mobilixing and bringing its forc~s up to full atrength. `
W� might dare say that the political and military stxucture of the Eagtern
aountries, with a very high degree of centralization, makes ttiat eventuality
taighly probable.
mh~ abdve-mentioned requirem~nti, valid for all units of all branchea and
_ specfalitiies, ie indiepenaable for air defense and antiaircraft artiillery
units~, intiendedfor undergoing tihe firgtimpacti of the enemy air off~nsive, for .
~ carrying out an "equalizing �unctiion" of the initial superioritiy of enemy
forces, for safeguarding the freedom of the field army units to maneuver
and tihe integrity of thefr operational and logistic support.
g~cause w~ are aware of tihese multiple functions, we have taken tihe liberty
of belfeving that the measure reducing the personnel allowance of the or-
, ganic antiaircraft groups in Che ltrge units is nct very farsighted.
The s~cond great lesson of the Yom Kippur War is the demc~nstrated tacttcal
eff~ctiveness of antitank and antiaircraft missile systems. The fiqures
speak very clearly. in the very hard-fought battles in the ffrst week of
- the war, Israel lost 850 tanks (about 50 percent of its armored force) an8
130 aircraft (25 percent of its Air Force). This second fact is espec~ally
significant, if it is realized that, while all types of aircraft, includfng
transport, reconnaissance, liaison and other aircraft, are included in the
total number of operational airaraft at the start of hostilities 522
the aircraft shot down were almost all fighter-bombers, the heart of Israel's
military Air Force.
- mheir heavy losses are to be attributed mostly to the very broad availability
and the resultant dissemination, at every level, of technologically very
sophisticated but at the same time structurally simple, crude missile
systems, easy to use especially in their purtable versions (antiaircraft
self-defense weapons and, w}iy not7, antitank weapons).
We should like to point out that the remarks made so far result from events
that ac~ually happened, not from hypotheses or arbitrary deductions. T'he
following is particularly well known:
Eiqhty percent of the losses� suffered by the Israeli Air Force were concen-
trated in the first week of the war, because, fn those days, it attempted,
without succeedinq however, to win air superiority, to prevent suppliea from
reaching the battle and to annihilate the forces that had landed on the
other side of the Suez Canal. The attempt failed, serving only to prove
9
FOR OFFICI~. L'SE Oti'LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~
~OI2 O~~ICIAL US~ nNLY
"tihe virui~nc~ df tihe ~gypti~.an antiiatrcrafti c~efen~~, which co~~ z~ra~l ~
very high pric~ in tierm~ of loeses righti on tihe firsti day."3
On tihe Gclan fronti, ~t~?e Syriane advanc~d protiected by a eimilar ey~tem of
antiiaircraft d~f~nge tihati fleprived israel's soldier~ of a valid air eupporti
and ~ti any rate on~ capable of checking ~he ~nemy advance with somewhat ef- ,
�ectiive regu~tis.
The firs~ task assigned to tih~ israe].i tacttcal for.ce ferried acrose tihe =
Suez Canal in the ga?p carelessly l~fti open between two Egyptiian armiee w~
to destroy the surface-to-air mi~sile bases, tilte commau~d poats and the
radar emplacementis of the enemy's antiiafrcraft defense gystem. Only when
thie objectiive had been atitiained was israel's ~actiical air force again abie
- tio bring to bear in tihe batti~.e itie potientiiai (in the mean~ime partially ~
restiored with American atd), checking the attiemp~s by tihe Egyptiian Arnwd
- ~orceg to countermaneuver.
By recapitulating in their entiirety the facts described up to ncw and draw-
ing the proper conclusiona from them, it does not seem bold to mafntain the
following:
Effective antiaircraft defense can prevent, even a prestiqious, powerful
force, from winning air superiority, an indispensable premise for achieving
success in ground operations.
Broad availability of conventional and missile antiaircraft weapon syatems
affects the operatiions themselves to a degree equal t~, if not greater than,
the availability of "traditional" componentis: infantry, artillsry, armored
equipment.
Until antiair.raft defense is quantitatively and quali~atively adjusted to
requirements, the friendly forces can use the indispensable air support and
achieve their tactical objectfves.
Therefore, it can be believed that the crftical importance of the stake
amply justifies the assignment of maximum priority Co a eolution of the
problems of air and antiaircraft defense and recogriition that the anti-
aircraft specialty has a very hiqh specific weight in the qeneral econonry
of a battle.
T'his criterion, unc]oubtedly very burdensome both from the economic pofnt of
view and from the L?ore strictly military point of view, may find a different
degree of application depending on the overall potential of the country
wantiing to carry it out. At present, only the Soviet Union permits itself
its total application, because it has acquired an antiaircraft armaaient
capable of making the space above the disposition of the ground forces
3 A. De Marchi, "Reflections an the Fourth Arab-Israeli War," RIVISTA MILI-
TARE, No 3/1974.
10
FOR OFFICI~1i. tI5E 01'LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
- ~Olt O~~ICtAL U5~ ONLY
imp~n~tir~bl~, a~ leasti ehedretiic~lly. A Wargaw ~act army (equal to a large _
~rmy corp~ in W~sti~rn armies) ig able ta deploy th~ following over a front
50 kilometers wide and 100 d~Qp: 114 zU-23/2 self-cdnt~inad tiwin mounte, _
12H zSU-x3/4 self-propellod quadrupl~ mounts, 23 batteries (138 pieces)
nf 5-60 57-millin?Et~r ~ruck-drawn gung. And thati ia only insofar ae con-
v~ntional weapon~ are concerned. With regard tn medium-range miesileg:
1g SA-2 Guideline lanchers and 27 SA-4 Ganef launchers. With regard to
light syetemss S batteries o� the very effective 5A-6 and an undetermined
- number of new Ge~ko SA-8. Finally, concerning self-defense miasile systems,
- about 60 Gaskin SA-9 unitis mounted on self-prnpelled amphibious vehiclea are
deployed alongsidc~ the well-known Stirela SA-7 capable o� being launched fram
the shouider (150 launching pogts in a single divi~ion).
Itialy cannot have anytihing like thati, but it is also unthinkable that the
Hawk systiem ("shared" with the Integrated Air befense, which is a monapoly
o� the Air Force) and a9out 20 ligh~ 40/70 antiaircraft batteries (which
will shortly celebrate their silver wedding anniversary with the Italian
Army) can be all that tt~e nation qives its sons (as used to be said) for
defense of the field army fron low and very low-level attacks.
Conclusions
_ If there is a desire to avoid falling into immobility, the enemy of effi-
= ciency and, therefore, of the military institution, which, by its very
nature, tends toward the achfevement of the highest possible degree of ef-
- ficiency, it is necessary r.o have the courage to take the necessary inno-
vative measures in the face of the new situations.
Once the strategic picture on the basis of which a certain type of defen-
sive organization had been set up is changed, the organizations itself is
changed. In the specific case of Italy, it is indispensable to restructure
the organization of air and antiaircraft defense, which, in the present
state of affairs, are able to carry out concrete, valid action only within
limited sectors of the air space concerned, even though it has achieved an
appreciable degree of operational effectiveness.
- One problem within the problem is the matter of antiaircraft defense of the
field army. Availability of weapon systems to an extent suitable for re-
quirements, the need for them to have features capable of making their ef-
fective, constar:t and coordinated employment possible in any operational
and environmental situation, an attitude for adjusting their action to the
requirements of the other components of thw instrument of war, are the car-
dinal points on which a determination of the employment doctrines and of the
pertinent application procedures, in addition to making the weapons and
equipment of the antfaircraft artillery more effec~ive. _
At present, and more so in the future., that is an essential component of the
Armed Forces, whose existence and maneuverinq capability anfl, therefore,
in one word, credibility will subsist only if and insofar as a balanced,
11
FOR OFFICIAi. L'SE Oti'LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
' ~Ott UFFICYAL USE ONLY
farsighted policy of support ot tihe spir3.tua1 resources an8 of making the
material resources adequatie will tiake proper account o� the irreplaceable
- f+snc~ion of defense againsti enemy ~ir atitiack.
_ COPYRIGHT: RIVISTA MILITARE PERIODICO D~LL'E3ERCITO ANNO CII NUMHE1bD 2/1979
r
10,042
CSO: 3109
~
12
F~R OFFICIAi.. L'SE Oh'LY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~'Olt O~FICIAL US~ dNLY
COUNTttY 5ECTION FEDERAL 1tEPUBLYC 0'~ GERMANY
- GOVERNMENT STUDY ON 1tEACTOR SAFE'fY NO'TED ~
Hamburg STERN in German 1~ May 79 pp 216, 219
[Article by Wolfgang Barthel: "Sixeeen Thousand Seven Hundred Dead at
Once"] _
[Text] A government study reveals thaC the Federal German
nuclear power planCs are also more dangerous than their
managers admit.
After the near catastrophe in Harrisburg, Germany's atomic power supporters _
are tirelessly giving assurance tFiat an accident like that could not happen
in FRG. "German reactore are designed to cope even with serioue accidente,"
said Klaus Barthelt, chairman of the Board of Directora of the largest
atomic power producer, the Kraftwerk Union (KWU). An acci3ent like that in
Harrisburg is "precluded by the higher German safety requirements," _
emphasized tfie Hesse Land government, which has ~uri~sdiction over the
Biblis reactor, without being asked. From Federal Mr.niater of Economica
, OtCo Graf Lambsdorf, to the ~erman electrical workers, the advocates of
nuclear energy are united: even afCer Harrisburg, the people of the FRG
can sleep peacefully.
They cannot. For the last 2-1/2 years, a study of risks has been in the
works in the Federal Ministry for Researcfi, in which the safety of German
nuclear power plants is supposed to be closely examined. The study is
almost finnished--and is devastating in its findings so far. "The result _
does not substantiate the previously assumed plant safety of the Germany
nuclear power plants," states a ministry summary concisely. It makes
clear that a catastrophe like that in Harrisburg can occur here, too, at
any time.
The German risk study was commissioned in 1976 as a counterpart to the
American "Rasmussen Report" (named after the American physica professor
_ Norman C. Rasmussen). In ti:e American opinion, the probability of the
occurrence of an atomic catastrophe was stated as one in a billion reactor-
years--about as high as the probabilfty of a large meteor crash on a city.
According to the Rasmussen thesis, 3,300 immediate deaths should be expected
in such a case. Originally, the scientists had not even examined long-range
effects, such as cancer or genetic damages.
- ]:3 .
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
- ~
~Oit O~~ICYAL US~ ONLY ,
An aromic caCa~trophe in Germany would have far worae cotte~quences.
A~aording Co the German risk ~tudy, up eo L6,7do would die immediately in
eunh an accident--peopl~ whc~ would receive ehe deadly radiation dose of
. about 500 rems or more. The minietry adds; "The number of 16,700 dead 3s
reached particularly by an eapecially unfavorable combination of weaCher
conditiinn, wind direction~ and population distribueion, in which fallout
of a large parC of the radioactive material 4~om the paseing clouds over
heavily populated areas is assumed."
- Such a catastrophe would occur if a melted reactor core were to eat Chrough
the reactor pregeure vesael into the so-called "sump water." According Co
the srudy, the sump water would turn to ateam, and 25 houre after the
accident the presaure would be sn great that an exploeion would burst the ~
reactor's concrete ahe11. Z'hen the way into the atmosphere would be open ~
for the r~dio~ctivity.
- The consultants' conaolation: Such as incident, coupled, moreover, with
an extremely unfavorable weaCher situation, will occur only every 100 billion
reactor-yearsr according to their estimates.
Even greater catastrophes are conceivable to the experts, although with
an even lower Cheoretical pro6ability. The miniatry says: "The basic
question--aC whaC magnitude of probability do sCatements about the resulta
of damages become pointless?--requires another careful deliberation for the
- concluding report." The Bonn officials fiave obviously recognized Chat even
the most unlikely catastrophe can occur at any time.
The Bonn study diacusses only the light-water reactora which have been
uaed t~p to now in the FRG. A report of the Society for Reactor Safety (GRS)
says about the nearly completed fast-breeder reactor in Kalkar on the
Lower Rhine: "An independent assessment of the risks of this type of
reactor has not yet been unde~rtaken in the FRG, because a definite blueprinC
for a large-scale installation does nnt exiat as yet." And about a planned
high-temperature reactor, the GR~ writes: "To calcula':e the frequency of
accidents, one needs to know the probability of failure of all systems
which are necessary for controlling the accident; these probability values -
frequently cannot be determined on the basis of a plant deaign."
Stated simply, only when tbe reactors are in operation can one find out how
safe they are.
The risk study also does not provide any data about the number of persons
who have to suffer the long-term damage after an atomic catastrophe. In
this connection, the Institute for Reactor Safety of the Tecfinical
Monitoring Association already in 1976 presented a classified study of
"radiological effects of massive releases of fission products fxom
pressurized-water reactors." According to this study, up to 150,000
additional cases of cancer must be expected in case of an extreme accident.
14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~'OR 0~'~IC~IAL USE ONLY
Neverth~less, KWU-~c+se Barthelt pereistentJ.y hopes "that reeson sufficea
to keep a German nuclear energy industry alive." After e~e riek study
one would prefer to aek, who wi11 keep ehe people alive in case of a
catastrophe?
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner + Jahr AC + Co.
9328
CSO: 3103
15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~
~OR O~FICIAL USE O~I1~Y
~ ~ ~
ll?~~i\
COUNTRY SECTION FEDEI2A.L pEPUBLIC 0~ GE1tMANY
I
NUCLEAR REACTOR TQ PRODUC~ HEAT FOR HOUSES
Hamburg 5TERN in German 17 May 79 pp 219-220
. ~
[Article by Peter Thomsen: "Heat on a Cold Patb"] _
[Text] In Juelich, acientista are working on a technique ,
or transporting heat by pipeline into houae?~olds.
In the 1950's, when the Americans were considering how ~::a powers of tha ' i
atom could be put to peaceful use, they thought only of electricity.
Since then, all nuclear power planta in ti~e world have been working
according to the same proceas: the heat produced by nuclear fisaion turna ;
water into ateam, the steam drives turbines~ the turbinea drive generatora. '
~
This one-sided fixation on electricity ha$ a definite deficiency: our most ;
important energy problem, the need for heating energy, can hardly be
solved this way. -
~
"We don't have a particularly urgent need for electricty, but we do for
heat," the German atomic physicist Prof Rudolf Schulten recognized year ago.
Since 1957, Schulten has been working on an atomic reactor which can
produce not only electricity but also heat at a very high temperature. j-
In August 1966 this "high temperature reacCor" began operation in the ~
Juelich nuclear tesearch inetitnte at Aachen. This week, a plant is being ?
opened in Juelich �~hich ahould pYOVe the significance o-f the SchulCen
reactor. i
The installation consista of the two parts "Eva" and "Adam," and is to test I
a completely nera process, by which heat will be carried on a cold path to ~
the consumer. "Eva" (an abbreviation for "Individual Fiaeion Line Test
- Installation), with the help of heat from the reactor, cocrverta a mixture
nf natural gas and steam into two other, particularly energy-rich gases:
hydrogen and carbon monoxide. Altfiough a great deal of heat (over 800�) :
is required for thier production, tfieae two gases are normally cold. They .
can be carried to tbe consumer over oridnary pipelines. There they find ~
the counterpart to "Eva," which tfie scientiste promptly ci~riatened "Adam."
16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
, ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~'nEt OF~ICIAL US~ ONLY
"Adam" reveraeg the chemicnl reacCio[i of "~va." Wi~h ehe help of a v
- caCalygt, hydrogen ~nd carbon monoxide again t~ecomp na~u~ral gas and aater.
In thie reconversion, gll Che energy thar aae put into tlie pxocese by
"Eva" ie released as heat.
The posaibilitiea of ehis energy-syaCem are extremely ateracti.ve~ Unlike
the "long-dietance" hoe water fieating systems common CoBay~ whicH can be
transported a maximum of 10 km because the water coole off By ttiat point,
the coo~ gases can Ge carried over great distances wittlout problems, Sixty
to 100 km are conaidered tihe moat economical distances for "atomic power
from the gas linea," as the people gtJuelich caLl their invention.
~ This would solve the old problem of economically eransporting the heat of
an aromic power plant to the consumer, while on the oCher hand keeping
Che nuclear power plant far enough away from citiea for safety reaeona.
- The reactor type wnich the Juelich scientist have in mind for "long-diatance
nuclear energy" also meeta safety requirementa~ The high-temperature
reacCor ia much lese sensitive than a Harrisburg-type water reactor in case
of a temporary cooling failure~ because it is deaigned for operating
temperatures of approximately 1,000�.
The miracle reactor may face the dreaded "core melt-down" at temperatures
of 1,000� because tfien its metallic innards give way. In the high-temperature
reactor, on tbe otfier hand, Cfiere is no metal. It fuels~ uranium and
thorium, are embedded in graphite. Thia coal-like material cannot melt.
It converta directly to gas--but only at 3,800�.
At preaent, however, the long-diatance Fieat from the atomic reactor ia
atill in an experimental stage. The experimental installation "Eva and
Adam I" has an output of only 300 kilowatte--~ust enough to fieat one
residential block. And the people at Juelich produce the fieat for "Eva" at
present with electrical heating rods which simulate the high-temperature
reactor. They cite safety considerations as the reason for temporarily
doing without the reactor: tfie gas plant is not to be coupled with a
wor~Cing reactor because natural gas and Tiydrogen are explosive gasea.
Even had they wanted to, they would not have ~ieen able to. The fiigh- _
temperature reactor in Juelicfi fias been inoperative for a pear because of
a malfunction. Water from tlie steam generator had entered the reactor in
May of 1978. Tfie search for the leaks still goes on.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Gruner + Jahr AG ~ Co.
9328
CSO: 3103
17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~ I~ I
- FOR OFFICSAL USE ONLY
i.
i i
r, ,
i-
;
,
- COUNTRY SECTION ~RANCE i
� i
' I
,
t
, I.
_ :
I
NEW MISSILES DTSPLAYID AT 1979 LE BOURGE'.C FAIR
. ;
- paris AIR & COSM05 in French 9 Jun 79 p 147
[Excerpts] The General Department for Weaponry (DGA) wi11 bring together, as '
' it usually does, an impressive array of materiel in the Defenae pavilion. ;
Among this material will be the new French atrategic ballistic m3sailea
MSBS [Sea-to-Ground Strateg3c Ballistic Missile]/M20, MSBS/M4, and SSBS ~
[Ground-to-Ground Strategic Ba,].listic Missile]/S3 (1/5-size models), the
PLUTON nuclear-payload tactical missile (1/10-size model), and full-size ;
models of the EXOCET (NIlK 38 and AM 39), ROLAND, CROTALE, MAGIC, 3UPER 530 ~
and AS 30 LASER tactical missiles and the C 22 target missile. The DGA is j
also presenting a mockup of the new SHAHINE ground-to-air weapon syatem mounted I
~
on the ANIX 30, and a Gazelle helicopter armed with HOT antitank miasiles.
~ j=
Aeroapatiale-Tactical Missiles Division (France) is presenting at ita stand
(Hall A) and in the static exposition its array of misailes of all kinds, but ~ i
- particularly two new onea: the AS 15 T'r (all-weather) light anti-aurPace-
missile missile, by itself and in its lauching container, as well as the EXO-
CET NSNI (sea-to-sea) 40 entiship missile, in two-tube and four-tube mountings.
Aerospatiale's Tactical Missilea Division has produced more then 400,000 mis- , I
siles of all types for 45 c~antriea. As o~ 1 January 1979, the atate of sales .
- was as follo~wa: 139,417 ENTAC missiles for 13 countries; 198,189 SS 10 and
SS 11 missiles for 30 countries; 8,309 S512/AS 12's for 21 countriea; 26,088 . i
H0~ for 9 countries; 90,59~+ MILANs for 17 countries; 5,909 RoLA1~1~s for 5
countries; 5,737 AS 20's for ~ countries; 3,855 AS 30's for 6 countries; 1,069 :
MM 38's for 20 countries; 103 AM 39's for 2 countries; and 1,800 CT 10 and ~
CT 20 target missiles for 5 countries. ~
: .I
Euromissile GIE, formed by Aerospatiale (France) and Messerschmitt-Bolkow- ; t
- Blohm (FRG),is prssenting at its stand and in the static exposition the three �
weapons systems which it manufactures and markets, under Franco-German coop-
eration, ~or 26 countries (ef AIR & COSMOS, No 76k). These are: the MILAN ~
light antitank missile, 90,000 of which are in production for 18 countries,
.
with half of them for France and the FRG; the HOT heavy antitank.missile, !
1a (
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i_
.
i
_ _ _ _ _ ; . ~ , �
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
FOR OFFICTAL U5~ ONLY
14,000 of which are bein~ manufactured for 10 countries, 3.ncluding 35 percent
for France and the FRG; and the ROLAND ground-to-air weapon sys~em, ordered
by 5 countt~3.ea (2,200 missile~ and 80 launching stations), including the United
States, Which has acqu3red a licence to manufacture the all-weather ROLAND.
Quite recently, on 31 May, the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
~DSARC~ decided in favor of mass production of the "U.S. ROLAND" by Hughes
Aircraft and Boeing, The contract is said to involve 180 launching units and
6~1.00 missiles mounted on the U.S. M-109 tank, for a totel of $2.3 billion.
~t xemains only to obtain from the Congrea6 the appropriations needed for
8oi,ng into production. _
The SEP [European Prope~lant Co] (France) is presenting at its stand (He11 A)
the RITA 2 powder-fl,iel rocket engine far the French M3BS strategic ballistic
misailes, which illustrates the firm's ability to build roving-type rocket-
_ engine structures for space applications. It is also showing Kevlar struc- ~
tures Por rocket engines, mainly for the RAFALE artillery rocketa. A range
of composite materials intended for aerospace applications is elso being pre- ~
' sented.
At the 1979 Fair, MATRA [General Mechanics, Aviation and Traction Company]
(Fraace) is presenting for the first time a 1,000-kg laser-guided bomb (BGL)
designed for the ATLIS-2 Jaguars equipped with laser designation pod.
- The firm is also shawing its array of missiles: the 530 air-to-air missiles,
2,000 of which have been ordered by 12 countries, and ite aucceasor, the
g~~ 530D, designed for the Mirage F1's and Mirage 2000's of the Air Force, ~
which will receive the first specimens during the third quarter of 1979; the -
MATRA 500 MAGIC air-combat air-to-air missile, 5,000 of which have alreac~y
been ordered by 11 countries; the DURANDAL antirunway rocket, more than 4,000
of ~hich have been ordered by 7 countries; the BELUGA antitank grenade launcher
(holding 151 grenades), several hundred of which have ~ust been ordered by a
foreign country; the CROTALE ground-to-air missile weapon system from Thomson-
CSF [General Radio Co), ordered by 9 countries (2,60U missiles); the OTOMAT _
antiship missile, u00 of which have been ordered by 5 countries; and the MAR-
TEL antiradar rocket, produced solely for the French and British armed forces.
This missile has been in service since 1973 on the Mirage IIIE's of the 3rd
, 3quadron (cf AIR & COSMOS, No 76$).
MATRA is also having discu:;sions with the American company Rqytheon, builder
of the PATRIOT ground-to-air missile, with a viea to eventua]. adoption of this
missile by the NATO countries.
ELECMA, the electronics division of SNECMA [National Airplane E~gine Design and
Construction Compar~y] (France) , is sho~ri.ng the altimeter Por the ASMP air-to-
ground tactical nucleax m.tssile, development of which has been assigned to it
by the DTE [Missile Technology Directorate] and Aerospatiele.
19
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
_
FOIt OI~rICIAL USC ONLY
, ~
~ , ~
1
bt
Y r~~~'~ : ~p
1 1 0: 1~I~
~ t! f ~
. ~ C.. ~.I I. ~ I ~
~ ' ~ l.~,t '
1..,
I
f
- ~ ~ / ~ '
~ Model of the AS 15TT air-to-surface missile ,
. i
~
i
.r I
> ~~1 ~
i~~'~ � ~ I
i
a - ; ~ y~ ~ s ~
~ } ; ~ ~ k t. j
~ ~ r a., ~ t ~a~4 ~ x~i ~ ~ 1 .
..a~i.. , ..z , . _ . 54'.,.l.~f~ . a.
MATRA 550 MAGIC and SUPER 530 air-to-air missiles on a Mirage F-1 ~
CQPYRI'GHT: Air & Cosmos, Paris, 1979
11267
CSO: 3100
20
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~'OR 0~'~ICrAL USE ONLY
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
FIRST FRENCH LA5ER GUSDED WEAPON NOTED
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 9 Jun 79 p 157.
~ [Ar~icle by Pierre Langereux: "First French Laser~Guided Weapon System'~]
[Text] The first launchings of laser-guided missiles and bombs done in France,
with materiel of French manufacture, will take place before the end of the -
year. These will be launchings of Aerospatiale's AS [air-to-ground] 30 LASER
missiles and of MATRA's [General Mechanics, Aviation and Traction Company] new
1,000-kg laser-gui ded bomb (BGL), equippe d, respect3vely, with Ariel and EBLIS
self-guiders from Thomson-CSF [General Radio Co]. The launchings will take
- place at the CEV [FliESht Test Center] with the aid of a single-seat Jaguar
fighter equipped with the ATLIS 2 laser illumination and target designation
pod developed u,nder Franco-American cooperation by Thomson-CSF, prime con- ~
tractor, and Martin Marietta. This pod is equipped with a laser illuminatQr
built by the CILAS [expansion unknown] (CGE [expansion unknown] group).
' . , ~+k:~ ~ ~s
.
� Y~
MATRA-SAMP [expansion unknown] 1,000-kg laser-guided bombs (BGL~
' This set constitutes the first French laser-guided weapon system, development
of which was staxted in ~977 after an operational pre-evaluation which demon-
strated the interest of this technology for the launching of precision weapons _
from a single-seat airplane flying at low altitude--something that~ had never
been done, even in the U.S., where only two-seat planes had been used for
laser-guided "smart bombs." The formidable effectiveness of these precision
~ weapons had been demonstrated mainly during the Vietnam war, when two patrols
of American A6 and A7 planes succeeded in destroying 17 bridges with 20 laser-
guided bombs in a 2-hour mission, without losing a single plane:
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
_
~'OR OFF'ICIAL USE ONLY
,
,
~ Two series-production prototypea of ~he ATLZS 2 laser pod have alreedy been ~
flight-tested, on the Jaguar in France and on the F-1.6 in the U.S~ More than ~
20 f:Lights have been done on the Jaguar with deaignation of various teetical i
te,rgets at low a].~itude (sometimes less th~.n 100 metera) and at high speed, to ~
- prepare for the launchings of missiles planned for this year. On the F-1.6,
the tests have involved the dropping of bomba equipped with laser se].f-guidera. ,
A memorandum of agreement is presently under negot3a~ion between the French 1
- and Atnerican governments to prepare for adoption of the ATLIS 2 syatem by the ~
USAF on the F~16 and by the French Air Force on the J'aguar--an operation being
caxxied oui; wi.thin the frameWOrk of the standardization of NATO weaponry~
7.'his agreement prov3des for the manufacture of ~three additional preseries pods,
_ ~ox caxrying out fl3ght tests on the Jaguar and the F-l6.
- k'urthermore, integration studies for the ATLIS 2 pod have been carried out by
Thomson-CSF and Martin Marietta for the new French airplanes--the Mira.ge 2000
and the Mirage 4000 in particular--and also for the upgrading of American -
planes such as the A7, F4 Phantom, etc.
COPYRIGHT: Air 8n Cosmos, Paris, ~979
1~267
CSO: 3100
22 '
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
i~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
NOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
COUN'fRY SL~CTION YrRANCL
D~CISION ON OBS~~tVATION SATELLITE AWAIm~D
Parts AI~t & COSM09 in French 9 Jun ~79 p 173
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "Deciaion in Oc~ober on the 3AMR0 Military Ob-
aervation 5ate7Llite"~
(Text] A government c~ecision xi.ll be made next October concerning the pro-
posed French BAM~tO [expansion unknrnm~ militery observetien ~ateilite, about
Which Miniater of Defense Yvon Bourges announced recently that it vould be
included in the fiPth military progrem 1avr, ~:~ich begina in 1983. 3everal
t~ypotheses have been advanced concerning the finsnci~l modalities for carrying
out the pro~ect and its technical. conce;~+ion. It should be kept in mind that
the setting-up of a reconnaisaence ataellite syatem for France ig ~n impor- -
~ tant mat~er, since the investment is estimeted at about 6 billion france:
(CP AIR & COSMOS, xo.766.)
A Military Telecommunications Satellite
The,armed forces are elso interested in a military telecommunications satel-
lite, the cost of khich would be less than that oP the obaervation setellite.
It is even being considered, es a first stage, to aimply have reserve8 chennels
on public telecommunications satellitea auch as the "Telecom 1" satellitee of
Posts and Telecommunicationa, ahich the French government has decided to build.
COPYRIGHT: Air & Cosmos, Paris, 1979
~1267
CSO: 3100
23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
'
FOIt 0~~'IC~AL US~ ONt.Y
CtlUNTttY S~C~ION g~~~
Nf;4i M~~~IL~S, RAUAR3 P~~~NTED AT ~'A~~ -
Parig At~t & COSMO~ in ~r~nch 9 Jun 79 ~~51
[Articl~ by ~ierre Le~ng~reux: "7'hom~on-CSF' Miagiles, Doubl~-Barrels, Red~rs
~d Se~f-t}uiderg"~
(TextJ ~'homson-CSF (aeneral. RaAio CoJ (France) is preeenting, et ita etand
~nd in the static exposition, vgrious nesr items in the are~ oP grouud-ta-eir
qnd air-to-ground aeapons aystema, launching radars, miss4le eelf-guiders,
etc.
The big new item is the appearance of the SICA [:xpansion wnknoWnJ 10-km
gr~und-to-air Weapon system f~r defenee of sengitive points of importgr?t units.
R'he 8HAHINE is the first veraion of it (mounted on the ANIX 303A teak), snd ie
intended for Saudi ArabiQ. The first launchings of SICA miseiles have begun ~
eucceasfully: on the third launching, the missile intercepted at 9,9~+0 metere
a small target trnred by a'C'P 20 target miasile before destroyirag the mi~aile
itself (ef AIR b COSMOS, No 767). The 3ICA uses the concept of total control ;
of the air situation and of coordination of firing in real. time. Moreover,
it can gutomaticall,y exchenge data xith a control and command system. Each ~
3ZCA battery comprises four to aix launching unita, grouped e~round one or tuo
alert and acquieition units, mounted on tracked or wheeled vehicles or poei-
tioned in shelters. Between nrn+ gnd the end of the year, two comple~e eyatems ~
xill be integrated, one on e~ vehicle corresponding to a mass-production ver- .
sion (SHAHINE), delivery of ahich vill begin in 1980, and the other in e shel- ~
ter, for training purposes.
Thomson-CSF xill also present for the~first time txo nex double-be.rrel anti-
aircraft aeapons systems, oP 20 end 30 mm, desi~ed to complement the ground-
to-air defense aystems based on missiles.
The 20 aan double-barrel Weapon is ~.ounted on a four-wheeled Hotchkiss-Brandt
Yehicle derived from the CRaTALE v~hicle. It uses integrated fire control
and can optionally accaaodate a su:~~veilleace eud target-desi~ation radar, ~
eun IFF [Identification of Friend o.~ Foe] interrogator, and a laser rarige-
finder. ~
~ 24 ;
~
FOR OFP'tCIAL USE ONLY ;
; _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~OR OF~IC~AL USE ONLY
mhe 30 mm double-barr~l rteapon, chri~tened bftAQON, compriees a~urret, de-
Velop~d by ~homson~CBF' with th~ SAI~i [expa.nsion unknownJ company, which is
equipped witih two 30-mm xss 83i c~nnong gnd mounted on e~ chaesie of a tank
of the new mAM [expsneSon unknownJ femily produced by the FR(} firm Thyssen-
ften~eh~l~ Contin~oue olert, eimultaneou~ ~racking oi' several t~rgets in
bearing and dietance, and target design~tion arp carried out by Q Thomeon-
CSF ~'t}xeen ~re" radar identical to th~t which equips ~he 30~-mm double-barrel
we~pon system on the AMX 30 SA tsnk (preaen~ly being maes-produced for export)~
A new femi~y of active electromagnetic aelf-guiders, built entirely with sdl.id-
at ate circuita, is being developed by 7'homson-C3F for the nea generatione of
. air~to-air, ground-to~air and surface-to-air missilea. In addition, Thomaon-
CSF' is con~inu3ng to masa-produce the ac~ive electromagnetic self-guiders for '
the KORMORAN air-to-sea missiles of MBB [Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm~ (FR(})
and for tk?e 0'rOMAm sea-to-sea miasile of MATRA [(~eneral. Mechanics~ Avie~tion
and Traction Co) and OTO Melara. It is also completing development of the n~w
Arie1 and EBLI3 laser se?f-guiders~ Finally, it is making a proximity fuse
for MATRA.'s SUPER 530 air-to-a,ir misaile.
Thomeon-CSF is also developing the command electronics for Aerospatiele's
AS 15 TT ~all weather] air-to-surface missile, designed to be fired from heli-
� copters or from coastal batteries. For the helicopters armed with AS 15 TT
missiles, Thomaon-CSF has developed the new Agrion 15 radar, characterized
by ita transhorizon target-desfgnation (range of 60 nautic~l miles on a patrol
craft, no matter xhet the condition of the sea) and fire-control abilities.
~ The Agrion 15 will be flight-tested in 1981 with guided lgunchings of AS 15 TT
, miasiles~ It may e~lso be used for control of firing from coe~stal batteries.
~ , ..;r-~
.,r,,,
~
�`Y~_~:
.
I J , ~
, {
' .
20-+mm double-barrel xeapon on Thomson-CSF CROTALE-type vehicle
COPYRIGHT: Air & Cosmos, Paris, 1979
_ 1~267
CSO: 3100
25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~
FOR O~FICIAL US~ ONLY ;
~
, '
i
~
- ;
~;0~"'f~tY ~:ti"r'I'I0~' FRANCF ;
r
i
;
i
i-
.
,
c~r;h?l'~'I5T PAI;TY CALLED ' ISOLATID' !
i
~ari~ L'~XPRESS in ~rench 12 May 79 pP 36~ 38~ ~ ~
i
TArticJ.e by Michel Iabro ~~1acques Noure ~ and Van~a Luksi~
_ ~
~Text~ At M~adrid airport on 2 t~larch 1977~ Eurocommunism was christened in '
euphoria. "antia~;o Carrillo~ the secretary general of the Spanish Communi~t '
Party~ who had returned to his country 3 months previously~ welcomed hia !
"ren~h and Italian comrades~ Ceorges Narchais and Enrico Berlinguer. ~
. ~
~xo ,years later~ 1 month before the first European eleations~ xhat remains !
of the holy alliance among the three Communist Parties of southern Europe? ~
?tothinR~ or almost nothing. They are divided on the question of Europe: the ;
PC~ ~rench Communist Party is against it~ while the other tWO are for it. ~
'~'he Italians and Spanish severely criticizQ the behavior of the French Commun- ;
ists toxard the l~nion of the Left. Among the three of them~ the PCF ie the j
one that maintains the most ambiguous relations with the Soviet Union. Finally~ !
~till more spectacularly~ the Italian and Spanish Cotn~unists have opened their
party to the outside~ while the French were closing theirs~ and even for- +
cing their opponents to be silent.
The 23rd Con~ess of the PCE'~ xhich opened m9 1:ay in Sa:int Ouen~ xill con-
firm these four basic differences betxeen the French party and its txo nei~hbors. ~
~
~
The election campaign for the vote on 10 June might at least have alloxed the +
~'rench and the Italians~ xho are already ~ynbers of the European Community~ ~
to reach an agreement on the first sub3ect of dissensions Europe. But it is
just the opposite. The txo joint meetings in Marseilles ~snd Turin, xhich r+ere ~
decided on after 7 months of hesitation~ srill not kipe out their diEagreement. ~
;
T,on~:wy, last winter. The P~~'~s conducting a campaign in Lorraine against the ;
plan to reor~anize the metallurgical industry~ and denounced the Brussels
_ "Furocracy." On 7 February, Giorgio ttapolitano~ one of the PCI Italian Com- f
munist Party leaders~ met in Brussels aith the aceator of this plan~ Etienne
- Davignon~ the nemesis of the French Communists. The PCI thinkd that it is im-
possible to face the economic crisis in a national context~ and that one must
{herefo~ negotiate on a community level.
26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~'nit n~'~ICIAL U5~ nNLY
t,ond~y ~~6 :'~b~uary ~ hie~~ure~ in ~,ccnrd wi1~h the L'~v3~non p1~n ~ proposed in
the Lurope~n I'ar~.iament, were ~dopted by the ~'re?ich 5oci~li~ts~ ~he Cerman
~ocial Uemocrats~ and tho Stalian Communist~~ 7'he l~'rench Communi~ts voted
~~p~a?in~t them ~
I~'ri~la,y P'~arch ~ L' }IIIi~AI.I'1'l~: publ ish~d a long interview with Marchais ~
who ca~tSgatied German domination. dn the same day~ at the 25th PCI Congregs~
~er1ln~;uer doffed his hat to Helmut Schmidt's forei~n pollcy. I~~or the ~'rench-
man~ Furopean uni~ri is equivalent to the liquidation nf national sovereignty.
h'or the Italian~ it ig a precondition for the real independence of the Community
co~m trie~~ fle thinks that only ~ unlted ~urope would permit new relations with
the American power. Therefore one must try not to 11mit the authority of
fiupranational or~anizations~ ae the PCI' does~ but rather to increase it.
While the PCF' favors the exchange of communiques with the parties the.t are
hostile to the Common Market the sma11 Britiah Communist Party~ the minus-
cule '~lest Cerman Communist party~ ~he Luxembourg Communist Party~ and even -
the Creek Pasok~ the only Socialist Party opposed to the expansion of Europe
the PCI is increasing its contacts Kith the Socialists and Social Democrats.
Satisfied with hiy meeting in Bonn with the Social Democrattc Party~ Sergio
5egre, in charge of for~ign affairs for the Ttalian party~ landed on 19 I~'ebru-
ary at the Paris home of F'rancois Mitterrand. The same day~ he met xith hi~
_ rrench counterpart, Maxime Gremetz~ at Communist Party headqua.rters. The next _
day L'Ui~'ITA~ the PCI organ~ had a t'~ree-column headline: "Cordial Di~cussions
in Paris Between Segre and Mitterrand." The interview with Cremetz was an-
raunced in a subhesd~ withou~ ad3ectives. The Italians' desire to Work xith
the European ~ocialists is so great that they had considered the cxeation
of a~oint group in the European Parliar~ent. The FCF" s hostility forced them
to give up the idea.
h'archais' nationaliet crusade affronts the Spanish even more. Especially since
- the PC~' puts a categoric veto on their country's entr,y into the Common Market.
"'rle knew that Nr Chauvin rras French, but we didn't knoW that he xas also a
Comr~unist," said an old activist in Ciempozuelos~ an agricultural village in
the Nadrid region. For the Spanish party~ the enlaxgement of the Community
~atiGfie^ a double need: stowing Spain in the ca.mp of the Western democracies,
and rebalancing the Common Narket toxard the South. "There are contra.dictory
economic interests in the process of European unification~" admitted Manuel -
Azcarate~ the number 2 man in Spain:The II~npe of today is a Europe of cap-
italism. "o what? That doesn't prevent the French Communists from remainin~
there. ~1hy should it prevent us from entering?"
A second subject for disagreement is the xay in Nhich that PC~' shot an arrox
at the I~n io n of the Lef t. -
- Cordoba~ Th~sday 19 April. The crowd squeezed inside the City Hall. ~Jith a
- crucifix on his left and a portrait of the young Franco still hangin~ on the
wall at his ri~ht, the nex Communist mayor, Julio Anguita~ received the con-
~rat~ulation: of the governor~ the archbishop's representative~ arxi the local
leader of the Center Party which~ as a si~n of national reconciliation,
did not field an opponent aginst him. Anguita had just been elected thanks to
27
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~
FOEt OF~YCrAL US~ ONLY
n mur~icip~l pact r~ipned the day beforo in Mndrid by the ~~Ci~ 3panish Com-
munist party and thQ Socialist~~ after ~overal weeks of polemie~~ nut this
was :~Smp1y an election a~reement~ The PC~ doe~ not want a"unl.on of the left~"
Much Yos~ a Joint Program. That would reotore the image of a Spain cut in two~
and thus revive the memory of the civil war~" Rayg a leader. Itealism has ob-
11~at.ion~~ ~imilarly~ the pCI chose the historic compromi~e rrith the Chrietian
c~emocratic r'art,y~ ~ven thouph it hag now returned to the opposition~ `
",'his refi~Sal to apply the policy of a unifSed left at home does not provent
t,he apanish and the Italiann rrom criticizing the abandonment of this strategy
in T'rance . The hardening of the PCi' stands itt the we~y of the open image they
want to ~rive in their own country.
"ihe ~ympathy shown for '"rancois N,itterrand's 3ocialist Party in Rome and N~adrid
is syMptomatic of this illness. "The Socialist Party Congreas left us with a
favorable impression~" said Manuel Azcarate. "Mitterrand courageously defended _
the unity of the left." On 8 April in Rome~ L'UNITA had a five-column headline:
"Mitterrand's Unified Lines Wins~ Choice of the Left confirmed." The next
day~ in Yaris~ L'HUMIA1dITE had a two-column headline: "PS Con~ess~ Still to
the Right."
The difference in attitude xith respect to the USSR the third shift xas
evident at the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Soviet revolution~
in 1977 in Noscox.Berlln~uer's apeech was eritical.Carrillo was forbidden to
speak. t4archais was not there. The incident is very significant of the dif-
ferent behaviors.
The realism and competency of the Italians~ As early a:~ 1956 Palmiro Togliatti,
the*~ the bos~ of the PCI~ published the Krushchev report~ xhose authenticity
wa~ denied by the French and 5panish. Since then~ the Italians have relations
of equal powera Kith Moscow~ which allow them a more independent policy.
Berlin~uer is the only one who~ while keepin~ his distance~ is regularly re-
ceived by Arezhnev.
The brutality of the Spanish. Carrillo, the ex-Stalinist~ criticized the Soviet
~y~tem in a book; he said "a bureaucratic class wields excessive politica.l
power."
The incoherence of the French. They denounced Stalinism too late and too
gvperf icially. At the same time, they fell out xith the I~SS~t without~ for
- all that~ convincin~ the I~'rench voters of their good faith. Moreover~ this
daring wa~ short-lived (see Branko La2ltch's article). The 23rd Congress
marks a return to orthodoxy. "The net result for the socialist countries is~
an the whole~ positive~" Ke read in the introduction.
But it is mainly in their internal life that the three partie~ differ most
clearly.
N.adrid~ Saturday 21 April~ in working class neighborhood of Hortalexa, A
"group" a~eeting the Spanish have abolished the xord "cell" open to all
28
Ft~R OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
FOIt nF~ICIAL US~ ONLY
- i.h~: r. er ident~ of the nei~;hborhood ~ whether or not t.h~y are Communists ~'Chat
avrr~in~*~ tho discuc;csion concerned the rec~ult of the municipal elections, t~~ny
critici~m~ were made~ enpecially on the poor results in the Dasque country~
Lui~ Lara~ ~ Madrid leader who attended the meeting~ explaineds "The ima~e
we wa~nt to ~ive Ss that of a hospitable~ open movement~"
1.aKt ,year, the ~C~ Con~e~~ voted to abandon the reference to Lenin~ :'ot unan-
imo�~;1y~ but b,y 96a votes to 2~+8. After ~ev~ral montha of impassioned debate
in the ~ections~ A~ for the PC'' activi:~ts~ they 1e~rned that their party would
make no further reference to the dictator~hip of the proletariat from hearin~
Ceor~e~ biarch~.3s on tE~:evieion ~
fiome~ the same Saturday, The meeting room of the Cinecitta Communist aection,
near the movie atudios~ in the middle of horrible low-coat housing units. In
the room were workers~ adolescenta with "Afro" hair-dos~ elegant young women.
On the a~enda was European unity. The discussSon was contentious. The older
people had trouble understanding why their party is pro-~uropean. Lina Fibbi~
_ the specialist in international relations among the party's leaderA~ explained
the advantages of the political strengthening of Europe. Without gainiag
unanimous approval far from it.
The Ttalian sections~ like the Spanish ones~ are "open." Mere gympathizer~~
and even active members of other parties, can attend them. During prepara-
tions for the Congress, the 5ocia1lst delegates attended 3~021 Communist
5ection meetings. The Christian Democratic delegates attended 1~194. "Thi~ -
practice prevents our members from sa~�ing deceitful things~" explains a
pa.rty leader~ But internal democracy has its limita.tions. "In the party~ you
can say anything, but you can't do anything~" states a former leftist xho
is now a PCI theorist.
You ca.n say anything? P'aples, Saturday 3 March~ the pazty regional Congress.
"We have knelt before the tabernacle of the historic compromi~e," lamented
a. ~ti~dert. "We are frater-bo,ys for the Christian Democrats~" a worker com-
plained. Berlinguer praised them for their critical attitude. A comment by
Paola, a Roma.n Communist doctor: "Self-criticism is becoming our ideology.
fde are the party of flagellation."
You can't do anything? Milan~ Tuesday 13 Nfarch. In order not to cut thetnselves
off from the Christian Democrats, the PCI regional councilors voted not to
reopen the 5eveso file~ as had been demanded by their own local authorities.
:~reedom of expression at the base is mainly used as a weather-vane by the
leadership. The political line remains its exclusive perquisite. And democratic
centralism is exercised from the top doxn. ?ievertheless, "the ~xistence of
streams of thought is the proof of an obvious democratic development~" thinks
Giorgio Dominese~ the spokesman of the Venetian Christian Democrats.
The Paris Pur~;e
These streams of thought are expressed durin~ the Congresses. At the beginnin~
- of April, in Rome, Ciorgio Amandola and Pietro Ingrao, xho represent txo
29
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
- " 'I
~Olt O~~ICIAL U5~ ONLY
~'act3dna in the party leader~hip~ confronted eaah other on th~ ro~trum ove~
the ner.iou~ne~s o� ~the economic olump. Can you ima~ine noland Le~oy and Charle~
T~'iterman expren~~.ng very divergent views from the ro:~t~um of the 23rc1 Congres~ ,
in ~aint ~uen? Can you ima~ine ce1.l meetings in the Red euburbs op~n to active
members of th~ Socialict Party or the 5pH Ita11y fo~ the Itepublio when the
FCT' leadership would 11ke to silence even its opponent~ at theae meetings? .
'The symbol of thie desire to pre~ent the image of a paxty without any false
notes is Paul L~aurent~ formerly an advocate of opening up the Communiat Party~ ~
who was ohar~ed on 29 April at the PLM-Saint-Je~cques house with purging ~
the leadership of the Paris i~'ederation~ which he had aotually set up himself.
The peculiarity of the F'Cr' does not seem to be about to disappears the Spaniah
and Italian Comtt~uniats have succeeded in inte~rating their paxty into the
domestic political situation. The f irst in a constructive opposition in Nadrid~
the second ag candidates for power 1n Rome~ 51nce then~ they have been led to
preaent themselves as "3ust another party~"
i'or 17 years~ the r'rench party has been trying to get out of the ghetto. With ~
more or less 1uck. And for the greater benefit of its Socie~list ally-opponents. ~
All at once~ the reintegration process has been interrupted~ discipline has
been reinforced~ and or.thodaxy has returned. Once more~ isolation cannot be ~
far behind. '
Statistics of the 3 Communist Pa,r~r.'.es ~
_ ~
^rance: 700~000 declared members~ 5,787~~f36 voters (20.6 percent)i Italyi 1, ~
1~800~000 declared members~ 12~620~509 voters (34.4 percent)= Spains 300~000 ~
declared members~ 1~915~000 voters (10.9 percent).
i
r,OrYAiCHTs S.A. Groupe Express 1979 '
~
8429 '
CSO: 8019/1336 ~
i
; i
~
30
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
FOit O~~ICIAL USE ONLY
COl'"~f'1'cY ,",rC;'('7Q~~ i~'ItAMC~ _
COP"11;;'~I5T VOT}?R3 PQLLF.~~ Otd ATTITUI3~ TO'+JARn PAfiTY
Paris I~' F'X~irSS in I~'rench 12 May 79 Pp 3$-39
rArticle by Albert du Roy]
_ ~'~ext] This survey was made for L'EXPRCSS by D~'QP E'rench
Public Opinion Insti.tute from 2~ t~ 2,5 April 1979~ on a
sample of 1~004~ persons who stated that they xere personally
clo~e to the Communist Party.
7'he ~tron~ reputatSon for discipline of the Communiet voters will be severel,y
_ tested in the comin~ months~ if one can believe the 1FOP-L'~XPAESS survey
publi~hed belox.
i~'our ~eneral sub~ject~ currently enliven the discussions xithin and around the
Communist Party. On one of them European union a clear ma~ority of Com-
munist voters approve of the party leadership. So Georges Marchais is right
� not too be too worried about the vote on 10 June. ~specially since the Com-
munist campaign was designed to make up for all dissatisfactions~ insofar as
po~sible.
But in the long run~ disappointments are predictable. On the other three bacic
subject~~ there is a~onsiderable gap between the party apparatus and a part
of the electorate: 37 percent of the Communist voters think that the internal
operation of the party i~ not democratic= 31 percent consider the overall
net result of the ~oviet regime to be nega.tivef 38 percent do not think that
the 5ocialist Party has "turned to the right."
'I'his gap is ~oncerned xith three issues on Hhich the Communist Party has chang~d
- direction recently= abrupt cessation of the opening of the garty and disci-
plining of opponents= disappearance, the press and in speeches~ of criti-
cisms of the Eastern countriesi treakup of the Union of the Left and denun-
ciation of their Socialist ally. The good election results that have been
regularly achieved by the Communist Party since 1973 xere mainly due to this
nex chasacterisitc image~ xilled by Narchais, xhich Marchais is nox abr,~n-
doning . What will be the long-term consequences of this about-face in the
electiona?
31
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
1
FOR n~~ICTAL USE ONLY ,
rhe Communiat Paxt ~
'th~ drift i~ obvious 3n the replie~ to question r,o. 5~ ' Y
ha~~ praised the merit~ of leftist unity too much to be able to break it up
without feelin~; the consequencees 58 percent of the vnters axe in favor of a
r~in~l.p candidato on th~ very ~irst round of the 1981 presidential election~
contrar,y to th~ party'c~ off icia~ position~ At the present time~ suoh a can-
didat~ co~xld only be a Socialist. 'i'his obviou~ 1.ack of underetanding of the i
- off icial position will be corrected only at the cost of stren~thenin~ the ;
anti-5ociali~t campaign~ ~
;
'1'he 2~rd Con~,*ress mi~st therefore initiate a~trategy of withdrawal ~
Ss the pC llemocratic?
Cne of the criticisms o~ten made of the Communist Party is that its internal '
~ operation is not democratic~ Do you personally agree with this criticism of ~
;
the Communist 1'arty~ or not? ~
Yercent ~
Agree completely 12 37
Agree somewhat 25 ~
1`isa~ree somewhat 23 '
Pisagree completely 21
t'o opinion 19
Qn the democratic operation of the Communist Party~ or the lack of it~ three ~
catep;ories of Communist voters stand out. Those 50-64 years old are maxkedly ;
1e~s critical than the younger peoples only 27 percent agree with the stated ~
criticism, and 51 percent disa~ree~ This is the age group that discovered the '
"Communist vote" between 1936 and 1950, the height of the Stalinist era. ;
;:snior managers, professionals~ and small businessmen most frequently criticize I
the undemocratic nature of the Communist Party: 48 percent a ma3ority ~
to 40 percent. The farmers, whose Communist vote is often a kind of expression ~
of their dissatisfaction~ include a paxticularly large number of respondents i
with no opinion (34 percent).
~ '
As for the Communist Party's working-class voters~ they are in agreement with ~
the average position of the Communist voters~ on this question and the others. i
The Communists and Europe
The Communist Party is not tn favor either of extending the European Community ~
to new countries or of stren gthening the powers of its institutions. Do you _
personally approve or disapp~:~ove of the Communist Party's poeitions on Europe? ;
~
- Percent ~
Approve completely 23 ~
Approve somewhat 30 53 ~
Disapprove somewhat 18 '
D isapprove completely 9 27 ~
~'o opinion 20
32 ;
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
'
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
'Phero i:~ cleax approval ~ in a11. categorie~ ~of the Communist 1'arty's anti-
f~'tiropean position. It is a li~ttle clearer among retired people (57 percent
approval) and farmers (56 percent). It is a littl.e less cleax among ~enior
managers~ professionals~ and sma].l buginessmen (34 percent disapproval) and .
employees and middle managers (31 percent), _
'Che Communi~ts and the USSCt
In your view~ is the overall net result of the Communist government in the
Soviet Union...
Percent
Very positive 6 39
Somewhat positive 33
Somewhat ne~ative 22 31
Very ne~;ative 9 -
ro opinion 30
The cleava~res are very clears diapute with the Soviet result is inversely pro-
portional to a~;e. While it is strong at 18-34 (3? percent consider the result
nega.tive~ as opposed to 39 percent who consider it positive)~ it decreases up
to a~e 65 and older (only 23 percent consider it negative).
1'egative judgments are as frequent as positive ones among senior managers~ pro-
fes sionals~ and sma.ll businessmen (36 percent on each side), and almoat as
frequent among m3ddle managers and employees (39 percent to 37 percent).
Among the farmers who vote Communiat~ 41 percent have no opinion on the Soviet
Union.
The P5 "Turn to the Right"
The Communist Party often criticizes the Socialist Party f or "turning to the
right." Do you agree with this criticism of the Socialist Party~ or not?
Percent _
A~*ree completely 20 48 ,
A~rree somewhat 28
Disa~ree somewhat 19 38
nisagree strongly ~ 19
r'o opinion 14 -
?t is mainly among the young Communist voters (age 18-34) that the accusation
~ made against the Socialist Party has trouble "getting through": 41 percent
do not agree. Similarly, among the employees ard middle managers~ from xhom the -
~o cialist Party recruits a large share of its voters~ 47 percent do not ag?ree.
On the other hand~ the Communist argument is widely approved in the Paris
region (50 percent agreement)~ xhere the party apparatus is powerful~ and
amon~ farmers (56 percent), a class in which the Socislist Paxty has :*ever
been well esta.blished.
33
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
. . . . . ~I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~'Olt 0~'F'ICIAL US~ ONLY
I
~re~idential ~lectl.on: A ~in~1e I,eftist Candidate '
On the first roun.d of the 1981 presidential election~ wou~.d you lilce.. ~ ,
A'or there to be a sin~le leftist candidata 58 percent ~
~~'o~ the PC to put up it~ own candidate 32 percent ~
~o opinion 10 percent ~
= The "unionists" win everywhere. But more clearly among the senior managers ,
and professional (60 percent) and employees (61 percent) than among the
workers (56 percent). ~
~
Piarchais or 5eguy ~
Sf the Communist Party were to put up its own candidate on the first round I
of the 1981 presidential elections~ whom would you prefer Geo~ges r1archais ~
or Geor~es ~eguy? ~
Ceorges i^.a.rchais 55 percent ~
Georges Seguy 14 percent ~ I
"lo opinion 31 percent '
~
Ceorges Seguy~ the head of the CGT ~uene~al Confederation of Labor does not i
get a higher score among the workers (13 percent) than in the other cate~c,riea. !
i
Geor~es Marchais gets his worst score among the aenior managers and ro-
fessionals (42 percent) and among the employees and middle managers ~41 per- ~
cent), who most frequent]y take refuge in abstainin~ (42 and 36 percent).
COP.YRIGHT: 1979 s.A. Groupe Express -
- ~r29
cso: ~o19/i336
34
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~OR O~FICIAL USE ONLY
COIn~'f~Y SECTION A'RANCE
COMMtti?IST PARTY' S REI,A'I'IOPtS ~JITH r10uC0~J DISCU55EU
~ ~'aris L'EXPRESS in I`rench 12 riay 79 pp 4~0-41
CArticle by Branko Lazitch7
(Text7 There are two gauges for estimating the political line of the PCF'
French Communist Party and its changess the party's attitude with regard
to the 5ocialists~ and its relations with its Soviet counterpart. On the
fir~t point~ we axe submerged in daily information. On the second~ secrecy
is now the rule of the day~ amon~ the Communists thetnaelves and among the
commentators.
Paradoxically, this happens every time the PCr'srelations with Moacow improve.
' ~1hen they worsen~ as was the case beginning in 1975~ the differences are
- brought to the �ront of. i;he stage. On the other hand~ the present reconcil-
iatlon, which began in 1978~ is taking place in secret. But~ on the part of -
t.he commentators~ remainin~ silent on this sub3ect results in preventing
a search for any correlation between these two complementary prbcsduress
normalization with rloscow and Nar against the Social Democrats. ~
. But that is the situations the preparatory documents for the 23rd Congress~
the forum for open discussion in the press and in the paxty organizations
~ ~ug~le away the P~oscow-PCF file.
In~tead af openin~ it~ the opponents themselves have dixe:cted their thoughts
to the criticism of the "real socialism" in the East. But in the PCF, the
USSR i~ never 3udged in terms of realities whose structure ha.s not changed
for a quarter of a century but in terms of the state of the relations
between the tHO "sister parties~" and their fluctuations.
A recent indicator of the freeze and thaw is the PCF's change of heart with
re~;ard to Leonid Yliushch. October 1976: Pierre Juquin~ in the name of the
party, attends a meeting in honor of Pliushch and against human rights viola-
tions. He shakes the dissident's hand in public.
This gesture~ translated into political terms~ does not mean that the paxty
has undergone a conversion to dissidence~ but simply that its relations with
N;oscow are at their loHest point. It is not this handshake that brings on
35
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
_ ~ ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
i
a qua~r~l with 1~lo~cow~ It ig becau~e thero ia digco~d with No~cow that thi~ , -
pub]ic handshake has taken place.
rar~.y i97~= the party pulps an election b~ochure (of which more than 1 million ~
copien have already been printed) for the simple rea:on that there appears on
the cover a photo of thi:, 3ame hand~hake wi.th ~'liu: hch, a photo taken in 197E .
'I'hG conclu~ion to be drawn is clearo at this time~ the part~? is no lon~er
seeking to provoke Moscow~ it wants to appease them. ~
Apri1 1979+ a~eat leap forward. in the direction of the USSR. L'HUMANITE
~treats Pliushch as a simple opponent and puts him in the same bag as Sol-
� ;ienyt::in, rloW~ the author of this attack against the dissident~ a contribution
to the Con~ress discussion forum~ is none other than N'ernand Grenier. A former ,
member of the Central Committee and a former minister~ Grenier was for 30
years in charge of the I~'rance-USSR association. He was decorated in December
1g7~ by the 3oviet government.
Czechoslovakia Land of Contrasts
~o in the absence of documents~ Communist society provides signs that make it '
possible to decode the political enigmas. Concretely~ contacts with Moscow axe
increasin~;. In April~ two meetings took place in Paris: under the ae~is of _
'rance-~;SSF~~ and then on the occasion of the (unprecedented) visit to the CCT
b,y the chairman of the Soviet trade-unions~ Alexis Shibaev. In the last 6
- months, many members of the Political Committee Charles ~'iterman~ Roland
Leroy~ Naxime Gremetz, Jacques Chambaz~ Geor~es Se~uy~ and Guy Hermier have
had contacts with Soviet leaders. But, oddly enou~h~ not Geor@;es Marchais~
t~nless he did so by the intermediary of the East German leaders~ to. whom
he paid a long visit in L~ecember 1978.
l.,o~;ical].y~ the news and~ a fortiori~ the commentaries on repression
in the ~.st are becoming rare~ if not nonexistent~ in the Communist newspa.pers.
. In less than 1 year, the change is striking. In Niay it'7B~ Y~'i Orlov's sen-
tencing to 7 Years in prison gave rise to an editorial protest in L'HUMAtdTI'E.
In March 1979r r:ustafa Jemilev's sentencing to 4 yeaxs of exile did not inspire
a sin~;le line. Even the news was censored.
- Another example: in the last few days of April~ the international press was
talkin~ about the persecution in East Germany of Professor Robert Havemann,
a member of the German Communist Paxty since 1932. ;~1ot a word in L'HL'MANITE.
And what can be said of the PGT's opinion of the situation in Czechoslovakia?
It has markedly changed. All the news on Jaroslav Saba.ta~ the spokesma.n (in
prison) for Charter 77~ have been suppressed for 3 months. But L'HUMAP~ITE does
not hesitate to advertise for tourism in Czechoslovakia~ a"land of cha.rm
and contrasts,"
The polemics with the Soviet press have disappeared~ as well as the denuncia-
tions of the "negative aspects" of Soviet society. Txo months before the 22nd
Con~ress~ which was held in Februaxy 1976~ the PCC Political Committee -
published a statement expressing "its deep surprise and formal reprobation" -
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
-
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~
~o~ o~~tcint us~ oNLY
nn t.hr. nub,ject of' thc Cula~t ~yntem, and the hei~;ht oi' auda~ity d~m~nd~d
- an pxi~lanatinn i'rom tha :;oviet authoritie~~ In 1979~ ~ months befor~ the 2~rd
Congr~sg~ ahich opened on ~ h;~y~ the pr~paratory doGUment flecxeed in ~dvances
"Th~ net re~ult of th~ t~ocialist countrien ia~ on th~ whole~ positive."
mhe tlormalization of Bi1l~ncnurt
Coin~ into netail~ the ~'rench Communist presn stateg that "even the net result
of the nociali~t countrie~ in agriculture is positive." That the prero~atives
of the Supreme Soviet (Nhich is actually a cheering ~ection) are expandin~~
'1'hat the participation of the xorkerg and union~ in the managem~nt of businesees
~nd of the economy as a whole ig ~roWing~
So it is not nurprising that the active members of the H'rench Communiat Party
- acaording to the official version have also been uon over by thia reneued
enthusiasm for the Soviet t'nion. At the meeting of the Communist gection of
- Renault-Billancourt~ thQ statement of the "generally positive net reault of
the socialist countries"was unanimously approved~ uith one abstention.
Aillancourt has not lost hope. It is being normalized~ like the xhole Com-
munist Party.
COPYRICH'I': 1979 S.A. Croupe Express
R?+29
CSO: 8019/1336
37
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~ ~ ~
~OR O~~ICIAL USL ONLY j
,
i
~
COUN~RY S~C~ION ~N~~ i
1
1
~
~
I
i
;
~
~
1
BRTEF5 4
OCTOSER ARMORED MANEUVLRS--Giscard wi~1 aCCend, in October~ Che mosC 1
extenaive military maneuvers of the armored forces since World War II. ~
They will be held in Sgone and Doubs Departmente [in north~eatern France~. ~
(Text~ [Paris PARIS MATCH in ~rench 22 Jun ~9 p 51~ ~
~j
1
~
MILITAttY WLAKN~SS HINTED--The governmenC hag refused Co permit the military ~
equipment law to be submitted to the Parliament during the June sesaion. '
This is being done to avoid difficulCiea with the RPR, which wanted to ~
make a pointi of the matCer, so Che discussio~ will be put off until the ~
fall, An explosive report on Che queaCion neverthelesa riska being made f
public in mid-June; in it it is revealed that the French Army, in case
of war, would today be in the same situation as it was in 1939, all other ~
things being equal. (Text] [Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French ?
4Jun79p3]
pTpNRC gHEI1~ER CII~13U3--The cost of making besements and underground garage
into atomic attack shelters would p~obably come to from 2 to 10 percent
oP the cost of netir buildings, according to e stuc~y done at the requeat
of ~Prime Ministe] Raymond Barre. A ayatematic check on existing sbelters
and on the infrastructure com nents that cau be used to p~o~tect the popula-
tion is a].re~ und~enray� bccerpt,~ ~Iaris VA,LEUft3 ACrUELI~S in ~cench
12 Jun 79 P l:U '
pIliATE TELEpgpl~; N~FTC~tK--About 30 fsrms beloaging to fgrmers oppoaed
to tbe expe,asion of the Iarzac military camp are said to be intercoa-
nected by a pirate telephone network. Thia xill enable the farmers aad
their lef tist sympathizers to caordiaate their variaus actlpne a.n~d
counteractions during the su~ner in apite oP surveillance b the police.
~ ~ext] ~Pra~ris YALEfktB ACTtJELLt~S in P~Cench 12 Jun 79 p 1~
cso: 3ioo ~
38
POR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
_
~ FOR OFFICYAL USL ONLY
COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN
POPULAR RLSISTANCE T~ NUCLEAIt PLANTS DBhI0N3T1tATED
Medrid CAMBIO 16 in Spaniah 27 May 79 pp 72, 75, 77 ~
[Text] The nuclear power plant designed by Weatinghouse, which Spanieh tech-
niciane are building in Lemoniz (Vizcaya), could turn out, after all, to be
the firaC "casualty" of Che crisis which the aComic energy program has been
going through aince the accidenC at Three Mile Island in Pennaylvania a month
and a half ago.
"At the moment, iC is true that we are not playing any part in it~ except
morally. But there is no doubt that in the future the matter will be our
responeibility," Javier Olgverri from the Euskadiko Eaquerra said in Washing-
- ton last week. He was one of the four members of the delegation sent to the
United Statea from the Basque General Council to study the cauaea, problems
and conaequences of the Hsrrisburg accident.
Despite their different preconceived ideas on nuclear energy, and apecifically
on the construction of Che Lemoniz plant, the four men, who represent the PNV -
[Basque Nationalist Party), Euskadiko Esquerra, PSOE [Spaniah Socialist Work-
ers PartyJ, and UCD [Democratic Center Union], managed to agree enough to
write a long technical report to the General Council before leaving Washington.
In this capital, they met with experts from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
and the atomic "forum" and with scientists opposed to and organized againat
nuclear energy. Also, they traveled to Harrisburg, where besides visiting the
damaged plant, they diacovered--to their surpriae and admiration--how the -
"independent" etate of Pennsylvania has almost complete control over the con-
struction, functioning, risks and civil emergency plana related to the nuclear
plants going up in the state.
In the next few weeks representativea of the Catalan Generalitat are expected
. to make a similar trip to the United States. And while the time is coming
when the regions will at least partially control their atomic plar.ts it is
plain, according to the law, that the municipal councils where they are being
' constructed or are going to be constructed have veto power over them and can
refuse to give permission to begin, continue, or complete the pro~ects.
39 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
I
FOEt O~~ICIAL USE ONLY '
;
Serioue noubC~
~v~n ehe ex-MinigCer of Ch~ Interior and n~xC presidene of the Industry and
Energy Commietee of the Coreeg, ltodolfo Martin Vi~la, expresgpd serious doubtg
nboue Che advigability of 1ocaCing nuclear planCg near ciriea. In hig recent
working-vncation stay in Waehington, which coincided with rhe holding of Che
firsC large-scale demonstrgtion in Chig capital gince the Vietnem era and the ,
largesC ever held in the world in protesC against the use of nuclear energy,
Martin Vi11a said: "A1Chough nuclear energy ia the only recourse for Spain,
thoughC must be given to new safeCy guarantees. Perhaps the mosC appropriate
- thing to do would be to build the plants in rural areas far from the large
urban centere; gnd if theae are lacking, the nearby population could even be
moved away to live in anoeher place before the plant began to function." The
ex-miniater, an industrial engineer by profession, who hopes anon eo be
appoinCed president of Che committee of ehe CorCea which will regulate indus-
- trial and energy mattere, wi11 have more to say, and do, on the eub~~act in the
near future. It appears certain that the government has decided to divide the
nuclear reaponsibility, which up to now has fallen mainly on the ahoulders of
the CorCes, and secondarily on the auronomous insCitutions in every region ~
where a plant is being or will be constructed.
The decision would immediately affect the Lemoniz plant, which the Iberduero
- company is building and which ia turning into yet another problem for the
difficult relations between the Basque country and Madrid.
In the case of Lemoniz, the subject is important: the mayor of this Guipuzcoa ~
town and the ma~ority of the municipal corporation belong to the PNV. What ;
will they do? ~
Last week Iberduero told CAMBIO 16 in Bilbao Chat no more plants will be built ;
in the Basque country by their company if the Madrid government or the Basque ;
- General Council so decide, after a referendum, to bring the preaent Lenaniz !
p1anC to a standstill. `
The company added that, so far, the possibility of compensation in case the i
work was halted had not been consider.ed.
i
~
Ulises Ruiz, a PSOE membex who was part of the committee that traveled to
Harrisburg at the request ot the CGV [Basque General Council], told this maga- ;
zine that he knew nothing about the possibility that the UCE government would
d~legate the responsibility for taking charge of the Lemoniz affair to the
Basque General Council, both with regard to the calling for the referendum
approved by the CGV, and for the final decision on compensating Iberduero. ~
Both the UCD and the PNV, says Ruiz, agree that Lemoniz should go forward. ;
"They are trying to minimize the problem so as not to come to a atandstill," ~
he said. "On our part, we need a prudenC waiting period so as to first study
the definitive report which will be made public within 6 months, and aLao to I_
find out what new eteps the Iber~uero company has taken."
40
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~OR OFFICZAL USE ONLY
The committee from the Intern~tionnl AtomiC Energy Ag~ncy, whiCh visiCed
Lemoniz and ies p1gnC l~~e Thurgd~y ne Che r~que~e of ehe Bggque G~neral
Cnuncil, age~rred ChgC th~ p1gnC ig vinble, buC Ch~e however much c~r~ i~
tiaken in ehe construceion and �unctinning of Che }~lants~ the poggibility df
an ~rcident alwayg exist~. The aromic expereg of rh~ OIEA also comm~nCed that
Che communications in the grea gr~ noC gdequaCe ~.n�caee of an emergency. _
Meanwhile a cortunitCpe nf experts from Iberduero quietly visited WashingCon and
the Harrisburg plant last month, withoue telling the press. Their directors
and stockholders could b~ concerned by rhe way the situation ie d~veloping.
But iC is noe as bad a~ aL1 ehae. To move the Lenwniz plant Co annther eiCe
oueside nf Lemoniz would cost gnm~ 10 billion p~setas, which seems a grear
de~l, but which involves less than 10 percent of the eoral value of their
operations. Even thgt would raise another topic with a poliCical coloration:
the locating of the planCS which supply the Baeques with elecCric power within
a stone's throw (and radiation range) of ehe Castilian towns. Even Martin
- Villa, who happens Co be from Leon, admits slyly that "we people from Leon
would always have the opportuniCy to leave Bilbao itt Che dark."
Three of the four persons sent from the Basque General Council, all but Che
one from the PNV, participated, nlthough only as observera, in the demonstra-
tion on Sunday, 6 May, when Washington heard the streeC proteata of tens of
thousands of people, something unknown since the Vietnam era. "We won't go,"
the angry youths had ahouted 10 yeara ago along their traditional march be-
tween the White House and Congress. "We won't glow;" proclaimed the 75~000
people who took part in the antinuclear demonstration.
Election Issue
Beyond the limited effect of the demonstration itself, the protest served to
make it clear that the nuclear issue will be one of the ones most discuased
during the presidential election campaign which is already beginning in this
counCry and which will culminate in Che presidential election in November 1980.
Carter, who inevitably had to hear the shouts of the demonstratora pasaing in
front of the White House, co~mented that he understood their concern, although
his viewpoint is that the nuclear industry is necessary, and no nuclear plant
should be closed down unless it is shown that it represents a real danger to
' the neighboring population.
~ More than 20 million North Americans live less than SO kilometers from a
nuclear plant, and precisely for that reason, the controversy arising from the
Harrisburg accident not only is not ending, but is growing daily in this co~n-
try, where its repercussions have been much greater than in Spain.
The news items which the leading North American newspapers uncover every day
are not encouraging. Although the damaged Three Mile Island reactor is al-
ready out of danger--it was finally cooled down exactly a month after the
accident occurred--the Department of Health admitted at the beginning of thia
month that the radioactive contamination undergone by the people living in the ~
surrounding area was double that which was previously announced; as a reault,
41
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100074404-9
~
I
~Ott O~FICIAL US~ ONLY
1-10 pergnng in Chat area of penneylvsnig tt?~y be ~xp~~C~d Co show eymptomg of
~anc~r in rh~ n~xe f~w yenr~.
'Th~e~ eseir+~e~g ~rg ba$ed, howev~r, on gcienti�ic r~pnre~ abnut Che effecC~ of
radiogceiviey nn th~ human bndy which very few congid~r Co be vglid Codey. A
report publiehed by the Nationgl Acgd~my of Science~ nn 2 Mny gt~ted, for ex-
gmpl~, that: "No minimum 1eve1 nf radiogcCive contaminarion existe aC which
it can b~ staeed fnr cerCain ChgC ehere is no danger Co heglth." Women and
~hildren have ewice the chgnce of inen of contrgcCing cancer becguse of thaC
r~di~tion, added the report, which was ~mbiguoug about exact etati~tice be-
c~uge, ft pointed oue, 30 y~Ar~ of waieing are needed before canc~r or leukemia
- d~riv~d �rnm low-l~vel radi~tinn cnntaminatidn arisee.
Buri~l of Wastes ,
In ehe segte of SouCh Carolina, which deriveg half of iCs electricity from
atnmic reacCors and which Co daCe has had thp only "cemetery" for nuclear waste
in the eastern United States, the dangerous burials have been ended. Last '
week, trucks transporting the contaminated wgaCes collected aC Three Mile
Island were halted when they entered Chat atate's highways. SCate police,
under orders from the governor, forced the truckg to turn around. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, after many doubta and presaures from industry, decided
at the end of ~1pri1 to close the other nine plants operating with Babcock and
Wilcox reactors, similar Co the one at Harrisburg. Another two plants, one in
New Jersey and the other in Michigari, have closed on Cheir own in the last 2
weeks. The Oyster Creek plant built in New Jersey by Westinghouse--the
- license holder for the majority of the plants with construction permits in
Spain--was ordered to stop operating by the Nuclear Regulatory Commiseion
after its experts confirmed that at the beginning of May the cooling valves of
the reactor had been damaged and that there was a potential for the same dan-
ger which at one time had caused the pantc at Thr~ee Mile Island.
Nuclear Insecurity
Committees of the House and Senate are successfully investigating and uncover-
ing new aspects of nuclear danger. On 9 May a congressional committee approv-
ed a bill to suspend work for 6 months on all nuclear plants ur.der construc-
tion while their risks are reevaluated. It is true that no plant has been
planned in this country since 1975, the year when the last of them was givect
its license. And the lack of demand is not due to worry about their safety,
which 2 months ago was not in question; but simply because nuclear energy in
the United States is not considered to be cheaper than that produced by other
methods, which, by the way, destroys the arguments of, the defenders of this
type of energy in Spain.
COPYRIGHT 1979. CAMBIO 16 INFORMACION Y PUBLICACIONE5, S.A.
8131
CSO: 3110
END
42
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100070004-9