JPRS ID: 8539 TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS TOILERS OF THE SKIES

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• Document Page Count: 211
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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,7r. tt5 L/6539
25 ~7una ~979
~
T?RANSLlITIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS
(F~UO 16/79)
TOILERS OF THE SKI~S
- U. S. ~OINT PUBLi~;;ATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
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NOT~
Jptt5 publicgtions conti~in i.n�ornwCion prim~rily from fnreign
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Crangmiasione and broadc:asts. MnCert~ls from fdreign~lnnguag~
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other chnrncCeristics reCnined.
Neadlineg, editori~l reporCs~ and material enclo~e~ ir~ brack~Ce
(J ~r~ supplied by Jp[t5. prncessing indicaeors such uq ['~exCj
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lase line of a brief, indicaCe how Che original information wns
- processed. Where no processing indicaCor is given~ rhe infor-
marion was summarized or extracted,
UnEamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a qu~s-
tion mark and enclosed in pnreneheseF were noe clear in the
original but have been supplied asap~.ropriaCe in context.
Other unatCributed parenthetical notes within the body af an
item originaCe with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of. this publication in n~ way represenC the poli-
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~7PFtS I~/R539
, 25 Jund 1979
TRI~P~SLI~TIONS ~PI USSR P1I LITARY I~FFIII RS
~ c~ouo L6/~9 )
TOILERS OF 7HE SKIES ~
Moscow TRUZ~iENIKA NEBA in Russian 1.978 signed to press 31 Jul 78 '
pp 1.-20 8
(nook by G. N. Pakilev, Voyenizdati, 20,000 copies~
CON7ENTS PAGE
AnnoeaCion 1
Introduction 2 `
- Chap[er 1. The FirsC DeCachments 7
CI~apCer 2. A Test of Courage 21
- The Landing of: Airborne Assault Groups During the War 24
The Transportation of Troops, Cor~bat F.quipment and OCher
Cargo by Air 41
Into Partisan Territory ri7
Pages From the Fighting History 64
Chapter 3. Airborne Landing Operations of Foreign Armies 7R
Chapter 4. Development 89
Chapter S. Ships of the Air ~I7
' a - (III - USSR - 4 F'OUOj
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CON'rEN1'5 (Caneinued) - I'~p,e
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Ch7ptar 6. 'Ttie ~'eacctime Routine 109
~ A Scl~nnl of Prnficiency 11.2
Our Win~ed Yrnf~ssion 130
Combat Assisrants of Chc Fl.icrs t42
r
Rcadiness 1~i8
C~nclusion 1G9
Photor,raphs and captinns.~~ 17~i
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PU$LICATION DATA
~nglish titlr~ : 1'oilers of the Sky
Russian titlc : Truzhentki Neba
. Author (s) : C. N. F'akilev
Editor (a) : I. P. ~~orova ~ _
~
Publishing Nr;use : Voyenizdat
Place of Publication : Moscow
D~te of Publicatton : 1978
~ Signed to press : 31 Jul 78
Copies : 20,000
COPYRICIIT : VOYENIZDAT~ 1978
- � c _
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I~OR 0[~1~I.CfAL USI. f1Nl,Y
ANNO'I'A'I'IQN
'I1ii.~ boolc Uy Colonel Ceneral of Aviation C. N. Pakilev, disCin~uis{ied
military pi1oC of. thc USSIt, ~andidntc of mt.litary scie?ices, givcs an
~~rcount of thr. separate stnges in thc hLsrory of Che MiliCury Transport
Avia~ioci ancl of the courage, heroism and skill of the militury fliers who
perfortned milieary transport missions during ehe Greae Parrio~ic War. It
discusses certain facees of the organization and development of the Air
Force Military Transpor~ Aviation and discusses Che people--toilers oE Che
skies--And the military eransports anci those who czeated Chem.
11ie book was written for those who are inCerested in Soviet nviation, its
hislory nnd its ordinary work today.
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. INTRODUCTION
We gre now in the third year of the lUrh Five-Yeer P1an~ Under the
lead~rghip of the Communiat Party the SovieC people are implemenCing Che
great program of continued national economic development ouClined at the
25Ch CPSU Congress. The program of conCinuing struggle for peace and
international cooperation, for the freedom and independence of naCions,
which was adopted at Che Party congresa and which constiCutes nn organic
continuation and another stage o� Che Program for Peace, is being steadily
realized. 'The Soviet Union's peace-oriented foreign pol.icy is finding
increasingly broad r~cognition and is serving as a powerful ~actor restraining
the imperialist aggressors from engaging in military advenCurea.
The danger of war has not been eliminated, however. Despite detente,
imperialism still constiCutes a threat to peace,because the class nr~ture of
the capitalist society has not changed. The world has still not been
secured against the imperialist military adventurers and miliCarization
embraces all aspects of life in the capitalist world. Active miliCary .
preparations are under way in the United Statea of America and other NATO
nations, and the U.S. military-indusrrial complex is preparing to begin _
creatin~ a new type of weapon of mass destrucrion. MilitarisCic groups
in the U.5.A~ and the most reactionary forces of other imperialist nations,
with xctual support from the Beijiag leaders, are attempting to topple xhe ~
structure of detente. All of these 3evelopments pose a serious tlireat
to mankind.
Under these circumstances the Soviet people are steadfastly pursuing the
Program of the Communist Party of the 5oviet Union, in which iC is stated:
"...Since the danger of war from the imperialisC camp remains, and since
total and universal disarmament has not yet been achieved, the CPSU considers it
essential Co maintain the Soviet State's defense capability and the batele -
readiness of its Armed Forces on a level permitting it to dea~ a decisive
and total defeat to any enemy bold enough to encroach upon the Soviet
homeland." 1
Thanks to the concern demonstrated by the Communist Party and the Soviet
Government, by all the people, our nation's Armed Forces are constantly in
_ step with scientific and technological progress.
The Soviet people were highly pleased with a statement made by Comrade L. I.
Brezhnev, Ceneral Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of
the �r~sidium of the USSIt Supreme Soviet,during the celebration of the 60th _
anniver:lry of the Great October 5ocialist Revolution: "Never before has our
nation possessed such enormous economic and sciencific and tect~nological
power. llever before has its defense capability been so strong and reliable."2
The task of strengthening the Soviet ~Jation's defense capability is
legislatively fixed in our nation's highest state act, the Constitution
of the USSR~ which states: "The etate protects the nation's security and
its d~fense capability and provides the Arm~d Forces of the USSR with
everything necessary." ~
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The Par~y and Government's cancern for Che Soviee Armed ~orces i~ clenrly
r~flect~d in the incre~a~ed strength and improvement of our hom~lnnd'g ~
Air Force.
"7'hanks to Che constant concern of the Commuttist Party and the Soviet
Government," remarked Marshal of ttie SovieC Union D. F. Ustinnv, member of
the Politburo of the CP5U Central. Committee and USSR minister of defense,
"Che Air Force of the Armed Forces of the US5R is presenCly outfitted with
modern combaC equipment and weapons and li~s highly trained regular personnel
infinitely devoted Co communism and everything necessary to r~liably defend
the achtevements of the Great Uctober Socinliat Itevolution."
And this is perfectly natural. The ~iir rorce is assigned nn importanC role
at the contemporary stage of development of operation~l militury art. World
Wnr II and the wars in Vietnam and Che Near East, as well ns post-war
exercises have deu~onstrated that without supremacy in the ~ir it is
practically impossible Co expect success in the operations of ground, .
airborne, n~val and air forces.
Zhe role of the Air Force in strategic and front operations was clearly
defined during the Great PaCriotic Wnr. IC revealed Che need for three types
of air forces--long-range, front and air transporC.
The Soviet Military Transport Aviation (VTA), as a branch of the Air Force,
has undergone considerable changes in recent decades, changes brougtit about
by the revolution in military affairs which has determined the trend in
- the development of r.he Armed Forces.
Our Transport Avia~ion today has extensive capabilities. Its fleet of~
aircraft evokes a feeling of patriotic pride in everyone who deals with it
in the air or on the ground, pride in the SovieC people who created this
powerful combat equipment.
- One of Che basic and most difficult missions performed by the Military
TYansport Aviation is thaC of landing airborne forces. Ttie Military Tran~port
Aviation is equipped with modern heavy and medium aircraft for successfully
performing this mission. They permit us to land airborne troops from low
altitudes in difficult weather, by day or at night, and to airli.ft any
equipment of any branch of the Armed Fozces.
The com~lexity of landing troops and equipment by air also results from ttie
fac[ that such opprations involve various services of the Armed Forces and
branches of troops. As a rule, airborne landing operations take place over
a large area and involve extensive airfield maneuvers and a large number _
o� atrcraft.
The timely and precise performance of airborne landing operations requires
thorough and extensive training on the part of military transport aviatiun
~ units (chast), good skill and con~tant combat readiness on the part of all
personnel.
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= Th~e MiliCary Transport Aviation tiae b~en fnced with new CaAks in i~~ecenC -
years, C~sks resulting Erom th~ f~ct that the airbortte Croops huve~ be~n
o~tfiCted with new models of operaCional equipmenC and Chat parachute nnd
aupp~ly-dropping equipmenC nnd views on the combat opergtions of airborne
troo~~s have changed. 'I'his hns made it necess~ry to reconsid~r esC;iblished
for~ of interaction between Che Military 'rransporC Avi~Cion and tt~~e
Airborne Troops (VDV) and to seek new ones. -
The Air F~~rce's Military Transport Aviation also performs difficult air
transport aiissions, sott?etimes as ~ service Co the national economy. Military
Tran~port Avi.at3.on piloCs also help mop up Che serious aftermath of r~atural
disas ters .
Military TransporC Aviation pilots successfully cope with complex and
diversi~ied missions requiring great skill and hard work. Long-range and
very long-range flights are performed rapidly and precisely by aircraft
flying singly or. in groups. In the expanses of the "fifth ocean" the ships
of the air fly in various ;,atitudes, over unfamiliar routes, at maximum
ranges and over terrain with few landmarks, makinb landings at unfamiliar
and undeveloped airfields. Each such flight is a serious test of the moral
and political qualities and the fighting efficiency of the crews operating
the ships of the air.
Numerou3 books have been written about Soviet aviation of Che past and
preseat~ books which contain extensive coverage of the creation of the
Soviet State's Air Force and its development during the war years and in
time of peace. Very little, however, has been written about the Military
Transport Aviation, a relatively young branch. One of the reasons for this
is probably the fact that there is still no precise and well-developed
account of the creation of the Military TransporC Aviation as a separate
branch of the Air I'orce. Problems pertaining to the development of the
Military Transport Aviation have for a large number of reasons been resolved
by various military and civilian departments. Due in part to this tlie
n history of the Military Transport Aviation has frequenCly been interwoven
with the history of other branches of the Air Force and with that of rhe
Civil� Aviation.
During the years of the Great Patriotic War, ai~ transport of troops and
cargo wa~ performed by special air groups formed out of the Civil Air Fleet
and by units and separate crews of the front and long-range air forces.
In most cases special air groups were formed to carry out airborne landing
operations, which were charged with landing troops and combat equipment and
transport operations, but the Air Force did not officially have a transport
aviation as a separate branch. It did not come into being until after Che war.
The nature of the tasks invol.ved in transporting and landing troops and
military cargo, however, the order issued by the People's Commissar of
Uefense on 9 July 1941, which read: "...Personnel of the Civil Air Fleet
(GVF) listed as mecnbers of special air groups of the Civil Air Fleet are
considered to be inducted into the Red Army...," and the 26 April 1942
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decree passed by the Staee Defense CommitCee (GKO) on subordination of the
Main Directorate o� the Civil Air Fleet to the commander of Che Red Army
Air Force 4 provide us wiCh the bnsis for regarding the opera~ions of air
units involved in transporting troops and cargo as separaCe stnges in the
organizational development of the SovieC Military Transport Aviation. 'As the
auChor presents examples from the history of the Great Patriotic Wsr, he
therefore does not discuss in each separate case the aubordination of the
subunits and the units performing air CransporC mi.ssions buC describes their
operations as separate elements in the development of Che cdmbat.employment
of rhe aviation for landing troops and cargo, as wel.l as air Cransport
- operations, that is, the history of the Air Force's MiliCary Transport
Aviation.
Aespite certain di�ficulties the history of the organizational developmenC
of the Military Transport Aviation has become more and more clearly defined.
_ The process has been furChered by the work of military historians and by an
~ analysis of documents descr3.bing steps raken by the Party and Government to
develop the Military Transport AviaCion and by the study of daCa on the
MiliCary Transport Avia~ion's employment for landing troops and equipment
and for trar:sporting military cargo. ~
Military Tiansport Aviation veterans, participants in and wiCnesses to its
development and growth, as well as those who now serve in the air units, in
which the history of past years, especially the combat experience of the
Great Patriotic War, is being co]lected bit by bit, have played an invaluable
role in the reconstruction of it3 history.
Personnel of the Soviet Military Transport Aviation hold sacred the traditions
of their branch of troops, all of those achievements, large and small, which
in the final analysis comprise its history, and sCudy with a great feeling
of gratiCude the experience of the older generations, the generations whose
lot iC was to pioneer the new branch of aviation and blaze new trails-- -
unexplored and difficult but absolutely essential, as reality has demonstrated.
The author of this book has,not undertakea the task of describing Che entire
~ history of the Military Transport Aviation. The main focus has been on
providing an account of the tasks facing the air units performing transpnrt
operations in various periods, of the more important phases in the development
of the military air transpoxt and of those fighting traditions of' courage,
heroisra and military skill which form the foundaCion of good combat readiness
on the part of military airmen today.
In addition to archival materials, the author makes extensive use of his own
persoaal experiences while serving in the Military Transport Aviation, as well
as the memoirs of veteran airmen covering the period of the Great Patriotic
War and various st,~ges i.n the organizational development of Che Air Force.'s
Mil.itary Transport Aviation.
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The authar wi.~l be grAt~ful for comments and opinions on the book from
those who read it. This will be of invaluable assist~nce for his continued
work on Che history and development of the MiliCary Trunsport AviaCion.
?
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- CNAPT~it I
THE FIR.ST DETACHMENTS
The employment of aircraft for military purposes by various naCions dur~ing
World War l demonsCrated Ch~t in addition to reconnaisgance, sCriking nt
forces and facilities on enemy tierritory and combating enemy aircrafC,
planes could also be used for transporting nnd landinE troops. Thie was
prev~nted by the imperfect developmenC of aircraft equipmenC at that time,
however, by Che limited numbers of heavy aircraft available tn Che belli~-
erent~, and by a lnck of experienced piloCs. AC Chat time aircrafC were
only used on a practica.l level for dropping scouts and saboteurs inCo Cl~c
enemy's rear area. But even this co uld only be done by ~xperienced pilots,
since landings 1n the enemy's rear had to be made ~t unequipped l~nding
siCes. $ecause of this such �lights wEre ~nly undertaken occasionnlly and -
did not become widespread.
J
Fairly effective use began to be made of aircraft for purposes of sabotage
and reconnaissance during the civil war years. On the ~astern Front, for -
example, special missions were successtully performed in the enemy rear by
Red pilots of tha air grot:~ commanded by I. U. Pavlov, a former pilot in
� the Czarist army who went over to the side of the Bolstieviks. Pilots in
that air group delivered scouts and ammunition into the enemy rear,demon-
straCing exceptional boldn~ass and courage. I. P. Satunin, flying a F'arman
aircraft, which served the purpose fairly well, especially distinguished
hlmself with his bravery and skill.
One example of the employment of aircraft foi dropping a landing group in
the enemy rear is described in the book by D. N. Kratov, "Slavoyu bogaCaya"
' [Rich With Glory]. The author describes the outrages perpetrated by Che
Basmaks near Garm in Central Asia in the 1920's. In the process of
eliminating that band of counterrevolutionaries a landing group consisting
_ of only four machine gunners headed by a commander and a cavalry brigade
commissar was dropped into its rear. The landing group was flown in by
the valorous pilot Levchenko. The appearance of our fighte~s was so
unexpected that the large band took to flight and was toCally destroyed.
After the civil war ended our nation turned to peaceful deveiopment. It
was necessary to heal the wounds inflicted by the war and to overcome the
devastation, hunger and illiteracy. The Red Army and the Red Air Fleet
had to be outfitted with the latest combat equipmenr.
Led by the Communist Party,the Soviet people set about the performance of
these great tasks. -
~ "Our effort to create an army was only successful because it was made in a
spirit of overall Soviet development...." 5 This statement was made by
V. I. Lenin back in January 1920, when the principles underlying tl~e
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develapmenr. nt the Soviet ArmNd ~nrce~ w~r~ b~in~ formulntpd gnd Ch~ cnurd~
to be tak~n in their build-up wgg b~ing d~fin~d~ ~ cnur~e ing~parnbl,y
link~d aich rhe buiid-up nf the ydung 5oviec ~~pubiic'g dgf~n~~ rgp~biliry.
At the ~nd of th~ 192~'~ and during th~ fir~t h~1f o� th~ 1930'e reaction~ry
imp~rinli~t ~rnupg gtrpp~d up their gggr~ggive a~Cion~, thpr~ w~~ ~ rgpid ;
build-up ~f th~ bourgeoig nrmie~ and th~y w~rp outfi,tt~d aith improved
t~chnical equipa~nt. In Chi~ attuation th~ 5ovi~t Union wau forc~d to ~~rry
out nn all-arnund gtrer?grh~ning nf !t~ nwn d~f~ng~ ~apabiltty. Ag th~ ~
I'grty ~nd Coverna~nt cnntinu~d their nntivg gtruggl~ Edr ppnce and CO11CCt~V@
, se~urity~ they nleo dpm~ngtrgted condtent concern fnr th~ Arm~~d ~nrceg, a
reliable menns of restrgining the aggreeeors. A great degl of attention wa~g
given tn the continued dev~lopm~nt oE militnry theory~ which wae bag~d on -
Lenini~t doctrine on th~ n~ture of a future war.
- The principleg were d~fin~d for the org~nizgtinngl developm~nC of the
5oviet Arsied ~orce~~ for their technical ~quipment ~nd cntabgt training~
gnd a gcientific bn~ig founded on Murxigt-Lenini~t tegchingg and tha
~xperiencp of pagt w~rg w~g produced for r~solving i~suee p~rtaining to
the operation and battlt--sll in conformity with th~ development of 5oviet
techni.rnl military nnd theoreticnl vi~wu.
The scientific publications ~nd the practical vork of M. V. Frunze were
- highly importric~t to the developmenc of 5ovi~t military theory. U~ing ~s
guid~lineg the principleg put forth by V. I. Lenin~ he prnvided th~e basig
for res~lving the a~~t importaat problems involved in the organiaationul
dev~lopment of the Armed ~orces and ia gtrengthening rhe nation's defenge
capability. Among other things frunze urged us to gchieve a high level of
maneuverability of fotces, regarding this as one aay to compensate for our
technical military backWardness.
Developmen~ of the the~ry of the offeasive op~ration in deptn, advanced for _
its time, aag gn important achiev~ment in military theory of the 1920's and
1930's. Viewing a war of the future as an engagement between vell-equipped
armies, Soviet military theoreticians gave us a basically n~n+ development
of the nffpnsive operation and of tne forms and methods of aarfare~ Which
mde it po~sible rapidly to destroy an eaemy's qperational groupings for
the achievement of atrntegic euccess.
Prominent military theoreticians M. N. Tukhachevskiy~ V. K. Triandafillov~
G. S. Isserson~ A. N. Lapchinskiy and others contributed a great deal to
the development of principles of che theory of the operation in depth.
Yladimir Kiriakovich Triandafillov's book "Kharaktcr operatsiy eovremeanykh
armiy" ~The Nature of Operations Coaducted by Abdern Armies) contained
reco~eadations for scudying the material aspecc ef operations set by M. V.
Frunze and for meeting the demands made of their ~rganitation in this reapect.
It aould be difficult to overestimate the icq~ortance of this work in the
developmeat of Soviet strategy and operational art. It vas the first to
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~o~ o~~icini. us~ ox~.Y
cur~el.ate v~riau~ ~t~p~~t~ of ttte ~ombnt oper~tinn~, th~ n~neuvering nE
trnnp~ gnd re~r gervi~e dp~rgtidns ~nd tn prnvide ~ pre~ig~ly d~fin~d
conc~pt of th~ logigeiral titructure ~f ~n op~r~tion within th~ fr~tn~u~rk
of the ~rmy'g pdgsibiliri~~ ~t that eime. V. K. ~rignd~fillnv reveglad hoti+
clne~~y the course oE operations depended on th~ ~tnte af th~ t~et ~erviC~~~
~iabnr$ted on th~ qu~~tinn nf che poK~ible grdp~ oE op~rati~ne and Wse thp
firgt td fnr.mulate th~ cnnG~pt nf an upurntinn in depth b~~c~d ~n the depth
of the ~r~n whieh it cover~d dnd tl~e depth tn ahirh thp troop~ gdvnnC~d
during ch~ ~pnr~tidn, l~~ying spccial ~rres~ un th~ impnreanr~e of m~npuv~ring.
tie wrt~Ce that ".~.th~ begt ronditians ~dr m~n~uv~ring fre~ly ~nd fnr thp
broad ~ppli~~eion oE C~CtiCAL nnd oper3tinttgl ~rt e~?n be ~chi~v~d... by
increaging the mobility ofGcandern mtllSnng-gtrong ~rmieg by improving
~ their meang di tr~n~port...." ~
Ia hi~ nnte~ m,~de with ~ vieW to revising thc~ bnok V. K. Trigndufillnv
a~gigned priori[y td combined airborne ~nd ~round trattspart grnupg for thp
ex~CUtinn of ~tr~tegic tni~sious, While de3i~nating aitbdrn~ infanCry,
pargchuc~ gnd ev~n tank landing force~ for the accomp~.iehment of tneCic~l
mi~sions~ taking inCv !lCCOt32tt char~Fes ocrurring in Che tmnn~r nf nttock at~d
the likelihood thnt points of cnn~estinn aould davel~p ~long the en~my~g
vithdraal. routeg. In the vutline for n Euture book ?ri~nd~fillov expr~g~ed
~oacepts l~ying the foundation for u neW sta~~ in the developtaent of the
utrgt~~ic and tactical art of the Armcd Forces of the US5R.
Snviet military ecience~ srhich had di{lectically nbsorbee! previuug ~xperience
in conducting combat opergtions :~nd the achievetaents nf teCtinicnl military
chought, thoroughly developed tt~e tt~eury ~E the oEf~n~iv~ nperatinn in
~~epth. In it~ ~x~cutinn che ground f,~rceu wete pcovided aith th~ possibi~-
ity of employing aircrn~t for a cotally new type nf rombet m~neuver--a
maneuver by air into the enet~~~s rear area. Operationg by the Air Force
became especially important at thi.s point.
The works of 5oviet military leaders not only raised que~tions pertaining
to offensive oper~tiong, in ttie zesolution of Which aircraft Were ugeigned
at~ important role, but also thorougt~ly substantiated them. The Air ~orcc
s~as faced With the n~ed to rti~ster a tot:~lly neu type of combnt operations
in the enemy's r~ar urea~ th:~t of droppink by p~rnchute or landing airbnrne
forces.
Marahal of the Soviet Union M. tt. Tukt~aChevekiy, co~candec of the Leningrad
Milicary Uistrict at that ti~, had a special role in the resolution of
issuea pertaining to the c:aplUyc~c:nt of air transport for military purposc~.
E~c believed that greac changes :+ould ineviCnbly have tn be made in the
relative strengths of the difterent branches of troops and reco~ended
that their level of technic~l equi~cr~r~t be raised and their esaneuverability
increased.
Fu.lfillment of the pre-~+ar five--fe:~c plans, ahich made it possible to cceate
a solid materi~l fouadation for resc ucturing tt~e army~ had a great de~l to
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do vtth th~ ru~e~~~fui impl+~m~ntution uf eh~ th~r~eti~dl principl~~
gdv~nc~d by 5nvi~t milic~ry gCs@ttC~� `Th~ 1~ve1 nf t~nhnir~l ~quipm~nt -
of th~ Armpd ~~rc~g ~1.en i~prnv~d ~ r~gult of eh~ ~COnomie refurm~ ~nd
th~ grouth of indu~trlai production.
A 15 July,l929 d~erp~ of th~ Pulitburo nf tih~ Ali-tlnion Cammunigt P~rty '
~bol~h~vtk)~ "Un th~ Stat~ nf th~ U55it'~ U~f~ng~~" propo~~d "~t~p~ing up `
� th~ pr~~~nt ti~t~ of improv~~n~nt of th~ Etgd Army'~ ~quspment...." ~
Ia th~ ~r~a of avigtidn it dc~fin~d g prioriry t~~k that of "bringing
it up to th~ l~vel of th~~~ir ~otceg of ~dvanced bourg~oi~ ngtion~ gs
rapidly as po~~ible....
BecauBe oE the incr~~~ed import~nc~ of aircraft in modern warfar~ the
Communist Party and th~ Sovipt Govarnment dgvoted a great deal of attention
to the aircraft industry.
Th~ impl~m~ntation of i.~nin'~ prngram for indugtriglizing th~ n~tion mad~
it po~gibl~ Within an extr~mely ghort time co cr~ate a larg~ material
ba~e, ahich g~rv~d th~ foundation for devaloping the young airctiaft
indu~try. The rapid d~velopm~nt of this brench of induetry, ahich had
pr~ctically bg~n created ~n~w~ h~lped u~ co reach the point in th~ 1930'~
~t ahich dur Air ~orce was ~quipped with v~rioug typee of airrrgfc deeignpd
for coaducting reconnai~s~ncc~ covering grnund force~~ co~ating enemy
aireraft gnd delivering ~trii:eg ~gain~t troopg and facilitieg ca enemy
t~arritory.
While our aircraft industry produced an ~verage of g60 aireraft per year
in 193U aed 1931, production aas up to 2GU0 in 1932 and in 1933. The
number of aircraft in thQ Air ~orce increaeed 2.7~fold and the number of
heavy bombera almost 7-fold during che lst ~ive-Year Plan.
A 23 March 1932 decree of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR~
"On the principles for Organizing the Air Force of the Wotkers and Peasanta
Red Army," coatained new scrategic and operational-tactical principles
pertaining to the org,anizational developa~nt and the combat emplo3rment of
che Air Force ia case of on armed conflicc.
The transition to a brigade structure for th= fighter~ ground-attack gnd
bomber air forces had already begun at the end of the 1920's for improving
the organizational structure of the Air Force. IA the 1930's the brigades
of heavy bombers aere combined into corps capable of performing operational
m3ssions independently.
5uch Were tha theoretical, material aad orgaaizatioaal preconditions for
the formation of air subuuits designated for transporting troops and cargo.
Practical work performed by the staff of the Leningrad Military Districc
helped to establish aad substantiate the basic principlea underlying the
theory of the operation in depth. One of the military qames conducted ia
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1928, for ~x~mple, d~glt with th~ sub~ect nE "up~r~tion~ of an airborn~ -
1~ndtng gtnup in nn offet~give dp~r~tion." Uuring th~ er~iniag i~ w~?~
nec~ee~ry tn r~~o1v~ ~uch ep~cifiC prgcti~~l t~~u~~ ug how Cd l~nd gn
~irborn~ forc~ Sn a larga ~ffea~iv~ operation and hdw to deliver the
pergonn~l along with the nece~eary combat aquipment and ammunition.
Whi1~ the landing of troopg by air wa~ no long~r a~nea thing gt th~t time~
tha ttian~porting of hegvy u~gpons and ammunition by air proved to be a
problem uhich va~ only regolved by th~ leadera nf th~ nation'e A1r Force
gft~r a great d~cl of determined aork.
t~ir~t nf all~ it uag nece$eary t~ determinp whgt gort of aircraft with ah~t '
mann~r of technical adaptgtiong Woul.d be capable of landing troopg, cnmb~t
equipm~nt and other caxgo by parachute or by, unloading th~m on the ground.
Th~ fir~t exp~rimental landing~ wer~ performed with th~ old twin-engine
~arr~n-Gnliaf~ Which 1and~d p~rgonn~l, and th~ P-1 light bomber Which
drnpped t+eapons and ~mmunition in ~pecial gupply-dropping containers.
The first training classpe were begun at the end of Ju1y 1930 ngar Voron~zh.
The eingle Farman had to m~kg two sortie~ to dtop 12 ealdiers, eince it had
a load capacity of around 700 kilogra~ and could only carry six nr gev~a men
on one flight. 'Three p-1'~ w~re modified for h~uling veapons and ammunition.
Th~ main objective of the experimental landing~operation consigted in workiag
out techniques for drapping aeapnng and men by parachute. And d~~pite the
relatively su~all landing area (800 x 600 meters), the landing aas a fairly .
accurate one. The fir.st group of gix par~troop~rs Kas dropped from an
altitude of 50n meterg over a period of 5 geconds. A flight of P-1 planes
dropped aix cargo parachuteg with the Weapons and ammunition frnm an ~lti-
tude of 150 meters. The second group of paratroopers left the aircraft at
an altitude of 300 meters and landed precisely at the designated spot.
The aorld's first parachute landing operation had been a success and the
experimeatal plaa had been totally fulfilled.
Aa airborne landing Was made from ANT-9 aircrafc in maneuvera performed by
the Noeca+ Mi~itary Digtrict in September 1930. The landing operation ia
those maneuvers had a tactical misaion: 11 armed paratroopers Wer~ dropped
iato the "enemy's" rear area.
The�firgt landing operations graphically demnnstrated the fact that such
air-drops of troops and Weapons Were highly realistic and promising. A
determined effart aas initiated to study the capabilitiea of aircraft
and pargchuting ~quipment and to develop airborne landing techniques. In
March 1931 the EtKKA [Wori:ers and F'easants Red Army ~ command made the
decision to create an experimental airbome landiag detachment of 164 meu
la the Leningrad Military District. A heavy bomber squadron consisting oE
1.2 TB-1 a~rcraft and a cotps air detachment consisting of niae P-S aircraft
Were assigned to the detachment.
11
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?Th~ experim~nt~1 a3.rbnrne landing d~tachm~ne, eh~ �ormaeion nf whieh w~~
aegigned Co p. N. Niki~hpv, wa~ d~gignat~d ~or p~rfectin~ ai.rUorn~ op~rgtinn~
invoLving ~ircrgft 1~ndingg. Ae M. N. 'C~khachevekiy'g ingigt~nca, it ~lgo
included g par~chute det~Ghm~nt which was tr~in~d by L. C. Minov, an
in~pector~pi,tot for th~ ItKKA Air Forc~. Aft~r tC~ form~tior. Ye. U. Lukin
~ aggumed cdmmaad ~f th~ ~xperimental ~irburne deCaChm~nt.
It was on 1 Jun~ 1931 that th~ o~tachm~nt wag formed in which the fir~e
nir trangpnrt gubunitg of th~ Air ~ore~ ware crc~ated, gnd pergonn~l of eh~
Military ~r~ngport Aviation consid~r: th~t to be tha birthdgt~ ~f the Soviet
~iilitgry Tr~ngport AviaCion
This wa~ the beginning of Che development of d new type of Soviet aviation~
which in time hec~me ~n independent branch of the Air Force, performing
complicat~d and important missione.
The militgry rr~ngport d~tachments encountered n~ny difficulti~e at firet,
however~ and were forced to resolv~ a large nuuiber of design, technical
~nd prnduction problea~. ~
A d~sign section was set up und~r the Directorate of t~e Air ~orce ot the
RKKA nt ehe end of 1930. It was h~aded by military pilot P. I. Grokhovgkiy.
Num~erous technical deviceg for lgr?ding troops and transporting combat
equipa~ent wer~ developed under his leaderahip. The design s~ction~
' ahich was soon turned into a special design bureau, developed a suspension
gystem for hnuling motor vehicles, light guas and other militaty cargo
beneath the fuselage of the TB-1.
The work performed by that creattve team was considered highly important
by the Air Force leader~hip. Chairman of the Revolutionary Military~ksnis
Co~mcil of th~ U5SR, K. Ye. Voroshilov, and Air Force Chief Ya. I.
~ conatantly inquired about the work of Grokhovskiy's apecial design bureau
and provided hic~ aith whatever ae~istance he nended. ~
Among Grokhovskiy's nost interesting and effective inventiona, in addition
to the widely used suspension system are the aviobus and the aviobus
platform designed for dropping men and cargo from low-level flight, a
compartment (the "Grokhovskiy cage") suapended beneath the aircraft between
the landing gear, tiltable cradles suspended beneath the aings, heavy-duty
El.iders for towing With bombers and numerous other devices aimplifying the
tra~sfer of troops end combat equipment by air.
Ia addition to the development of different types of landing equipment, a
large and intensive effart Was also under way to develop various types of
parachute systems for landing troops, combat equipment and cargo by
parachute. A great s~_rvice was pexformed in this area by such proaiinent
designers of parachute equipmeat as P. I. Grokhovskiy, M. A. Savitskiy,
' N. A. Lobanov, V. K. Mdrianov and many other enthusiasts, who apent a
great deal of energy and worked with coasiderable persistence to develop
training and landing parachutes and to place them into series productioa.
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Ong of the mogt di�ficulC prnblemg facing th~ Air ~nrC~ ~e ChnC eime wng
th~t of cr~ating ~ eran~pnrC madification di th~ b~mb~r Co b~ u~~d �c~r
landing peraonn~l ~nd cnrgv. And althnugh, eg m~neion~d abdv~~ the F~rm~n-
Goliaf tu~d been maii~ted Eor drnpping th~ firse lgnding grnups nnd the
lighter ~-1 and p-S nircrnft w~r~ ura~d fnr tran~ferring cargo, the Al.r ~nrc~
already po~se~~ed the 'TB-1 bomber, one of the be~t.
The TB-1 design (the pa~g~gnger mnd~l b~cam~ known ag th~ ANT-4) wng
utiliz~d aith th~ greategt ef�ici~ncy during thg period of pracCic~l
maet~ry of the variuug l~nding mgth~dg. A d~sign bur~~u h~~dpd by A. N.
Tupol~v.improved th~ ~irCrnft~ frnm which th~ 'TB-~ heavy bnmber w~g then
developed. Th~ lgtt~r gigni�icgnely ~xpgnded the poggibilitiee for
landing troopg ead Cnmbae equipment: itg paylo~d wag in~re4e~d to 5 ton~,
its epeed to 23U kilomaters per hour and it~ flight range to more than
250U kilomet~rs. Thi~ air~hip, an a11-matal monoplan~, had four engineg
ar.d fairly poa~rful rifl~ gnd C~nnon ortn~rt~nt. 7'he landing mndification
of the TB-3 wg~ mad~ 1ighCpr by remnving ~umt: of Che gru~m~nC, mr~inly thg
turret units, that space being utilized fnr cerrying the landing forceg.
2'he aircraft's bomb raclcg were modified for hauling various types df
equipment~ and becauge of this it could transport a light tank, a truck-
mounted 45mm cannon~ an armored car or two 76mia gune.
And so the Air Furce posgessed aircraft gnd parachute equipment at th~
beginning of the 1930's, ahich permitted it to master a totally new operation,
that of landing troops and equipment by air~ misaione being performed by
the firsC air traasport uaits (chast) for thia purpoge.
By the mid-1930's the technical equipment of the Armed Force~a of the US5Et
had been brought up to the level of our nation's ecnnomic development and
met its defense requirements. By the end of 19~5 the army had cnnsiderable
forces for that time (the Air Force, for example, hgd five air corpa
directorates and 19 air brigades) capable of protecting the state interests
of the Soviet Union.
' y ,
The results of the Work carried out by the first special-purpose air
detachment, ahich was a part of an experimental airborne landing det~chment,
were already in evidence in the fall of 1931. A pgrachute landina group
consisting of 29 goldiera Was dropped from three ANT-9 aircraft in
maneuvers carried out by the Kiev Military Distric[. Somewhat�later,
in courgea conducted for higher command persoanel of the Leningrad Military
Dietrict, the world's first combined pgrachute and air-landing opcration
was performed.
It was planned to use the C-63 and G-64 gliders developed by Grokhovskiy's
design bu~eau together with military transport planes, for the air-landing
of troops. These gliders could deliver from 17 to 50 men and a 1/2 ton -
of cargo to [he laadii~g site.
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The gucceggful perfnrm~ne~ by rh~ firge ~ir Crgc?gporC unirg ~nd aub~nit~
nf ~trborn~ tronp~ in th~ ~x~rCi~~g nf 1.931 d~mnngCtnCed Ctin fe~gibiiity
of cr~~Cing gp~cinl ~irbnrn~: c~nd n1.r ernngpore d~CgChlri~ttCH. Sn~n thar~nfC~r
ai~tbnrtt~ daC~cl~n~e~ts were~ fornu~d simult~n~.nugly in geveral milie~ry di~eriet~.
Combin~d ~irbocn~ und mntnrixad d~taChm~ntg w~ra Crdnt~d in ttt~ Mng~nw,
Uk~ninign ~nd n~lurug~inn mi].itnry digtriat~ in J~nunry 19~~, nnd the 3rd
Combin~d Airbornn and Mdtnriz~d Uetgehm~ne wng crp~c~d in tl~~ L~ningrnd
Nilitgry Ui~tr3~t nut nf th~ exp~rin~nr~l girbnYn~ nnd p~r~~huec~-1~ndin~
d~tachm~ntg. It in~lud~d ~ pgrgrhut~ b~Ct~linn, ~n uir-landed ~rnup
cnngieting nf gn ~rmar~d ~nd ~ mntnrized ~nmpnny ~nd nn ~rtill~ry bate~ry, -
and a~p~cinl gquadron n~ 'TB-1 gircr~ft gcench~d to the d~tgchment. M. V.
Boytsov wgg named Commander of the de~achmant.
Th~ recomm~ndatidng conrain~d in Che Statuta on Op~r~tional-~~ctieal Uge
nf th~ Combin~d Airborne and htotoriz~d I.~nding U~tiachment w~r~ work~d out
on g praCtie~l lev~l in the ~rd Combined Airb~rn~ ~nd Mdtorized L~nding
DetnchmenC. 'rhis st~Cute defined fnr ch~ first time eh~ cnncepC "~irb~rn~
lgnding forC~" ~nd the specifications for ~ p~ruchut~- ~nd ~ir-l~nded
nperation. parc~trooper~ ldcuted in eh~ nircrafr fu~~lagp nti in gpenigl
compartment~ ben~gth th~ plnne w~re to be dYn~ped by th~ gir~~.~fr enmm~nd~r
from gn altieude nf 6U0 ro 80d ur~tere, while the nnvigator dr~pped cargn
in special pnrachutes Erom the s~c~ nltitude.
Th~ concept of a"lou-1eve1 landing operntion" wns nlso d~fined, whcreby
epecia.~ trnlleyg for paratronpers, ~?~enpons gnd other cargd aere gugprnd~d
beneath the fu~~lage and drnppcd by tt~c aircruft comm~nder from a lnw-
altitude in a 1oa-level flight.
In an air-land oper~tiori the fightingmen were housed inside the ~ircraft~
while cargo was carried in bomb racks beneath Che fuselage and Wings.
'Ch~re Was also provision for u combiaed airborne landing operation, whereby
pargtroopers--the support decachraent~ ahich cgptured ~n area for the landing
of the airborne landing group from a low-level flight--were dropped first,
after which the air-landing of the main force~ was accomplished.
The entire landing process and the operations of the airborne group on Iand
v~r~ to be covered by fighters and ground-attack airc~aft.
The 3rd Combined Airborne and Motorized Detachment accomplished a gre~t
de~l by Way of working out the missions wnich might be assigned such a
formation. K. Ye. Votoshilov~ people's comr~issar for military and naval
affairs and chair~n of the Revolutionary Military Council of the U55Et,
praised the ~:ombat skill of the fightingnen in the Combined Airborne and
Motoriz~d Landing Detachment. An order issued by the Revolutionary
ltilitary Council on 17 ~tovember 1932 stated: "'Chis totally nea area oE
aork encail~d great difficulties for the first detachment. Thoge diffi-
culties Were overcone with bolshevik de[~ermination and persistence on
thC parc of all det~ch~ent Qersonnel and as a result of the constant
attention received fgom Comrade I. P. Belov, coamander of the Leningrad
Nilitary District."
lA
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In J~nu~ry 193~, by ~ dire~Civ~ d� th~ p~np].~'~ co~mi~~~r fnr m~li,t~ry?
and navnl ~fE~irg, the ~rd Cnmbined Airbnrn~ ~nd Mde~ri~~d Lnnding D~Cg~hm~nt
was ~xpand~d into ~ gp~ci.~l.-purpag~ air brigad~ (rh~ ~rd l1BON) , c~hich
ineludpd ewo h~~vy ~qu~dr~ng c~rri~d dn '~~-3 gircr~ft gnd nnp lighe
equndr~n tr~nspart~d by ~-5'g. Th~ ~qundrong wern conm~anded by vaterat~
military pilot~ L~b~d~v ~nd 5hitn~ngkiy. M. V. ~oyteov Nng giv~n C~mn~nd
of th~ ~rd Sperial-Pu~p~ge Air ~rigad~.
Air bri~ade~ p~ecern~d ~fc~r et~~ 3rd Sp~cial-Purpd~~ Air Drf.g~de w~r~
forrmd in 1934-1936 in th~ Kiev ~nd geloruggi~n milit~ry di~trict~.
CYa~tion uf th~ gpeci~l-purpnge ~ir briggdeB pcrmite~d the R~d Army cdnun~nd
tn tegC on a pr~cticgl l~ve1 the b~~ie prineipl~s und~rlying th~ th~nry nf
th~ o��en~iva op~arntic~n in d~pth d~v~lnped by ~nvi~t n?ilit~ry gci~nn~. On~
o� tha m~in r~quir~mentg of thi~ the~ry ngll~d fdr ~i~ulta~n~dug g~einn by
grtill~ry ~nd avi~eion ~nd tank, rifle and girbdrne fdrn~atidng nnd unirx tn
th~ ~neire d~prh di the en~my'g d~�~ng~. 'rh~ npergtiong of 1~r~~ ~irb~rn~:
landing f~rc~g dr~pp~d int~ th~ en~my'~ r~ar ar~~ by air tran~p~re unitg
had ~n impnrtat?t pla~~ in ~uch ~n operation.
The actunl dtopping of tha fir~t ~ueh ~anding forcQ agg performed in 1934
in exercis~s conducted by the Baldrug~ian Militery Uigtricr. nuring the
maneuverg nn airborn~ landing ~rdup c~n~i~ting of g00 armc3d fighters was ~
dropped frnm 'TB-3 h~gvy b~mbers modified for landing troops.
Between 12 and 17 5~ptember 1935 the Soviet romn~nd cdnducted l~rge `
maneuverg aith forc~g nf the Kiev Military Di~trict Eor purp~g~~ ~f
furth~ring and improving the combat und dp~r~tional-t~cticnl trnining �
of the persoe~nel. 2he rifle and cav~lry formatinne of g meChanixed
cnrps and an airborne landing fdree interacted in these maneuvers. Th~
exercise Was directed by Commander of the Kiev Military Uistri~t I. Yakir.
Th~y Were attended by K. Ye. Voroshilov, U55R people'g commiggar of defense;
his d~putieb 5. M. Budennyy, Ya. B. Camxtnik and ti. N. Tukhnchevgkiy; chief
of the genecal ~taff A. t. Yegorov; l~~d~rs nf the Communi~t pnrty ~nd ~thc
Covernment of the 5oviet Ukrain~, and military delegation~ from fnrpign
nations invited to ~ttend. The droppin~ of the nirbdrne landing force m.xde
a~ear impression on those present. Nnthittg lik~ it had rvet occurred in
milicary prectice. A total of 2,g53 m~en ~rmed aith carbincs and manning
29 medium m.tichine-guns, 10 guns, g tnnk and gix motor vehiclcs. 1~
Almoat simultaneously With the Kiev c~neuvers Eield ~xerciges were candurted
in the Leningrad Milit~ry Ui~cricc, under the romt~and of g. t~l. 5hnposl~nikov~
and in the B~lc~russian Milicary Distrirt. 'Chnse exerrises also included
airbcrne l~nding opcratfons. In the ~3elorussian Milit~ry Uistrict th~y
dropped 1800 paratrnopers and air-landed a force consi~ting oE 57U0 coen~ and �
artillery guns and other cnmbat equipment W~~ alsc~ trangferred by ai~i
makitig it po~sibl~ successfully to develop the offen~ive operatinn.
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~ven l~rg~r �~ir-lgndpd nnd p~rgetwt~-dropp~d lgnding np~rgtiong war~
empl,oyed in tronp ~xcccigea and n~neuv~r~ in Chc~ enguing year~. An
~ntir~ ri~l~ divi~inn wc~~ Crnnsf~rr~d by ~ir itt m~nnuv~r~ c~rri~d dut
by th~ Mo~cow Mi.lit~ry bigtriet~ fnr ~x~mpl~.
Sw~l.n~ up th~ r~~u1t~ di th~ cdmbnt tr~ining f~r 1g36, eha p~~pln'g
eommi~~nr r~~ daf~nga ndt~d: "thQ fir~C ~nd m~~t di.ff3.eult ~C~g~ in eh~
d~v~ldpm~nt df airbarn~ 1~ndin~ ~p~ratinn~--l~rge-gc~le m~gt~ry ~f eh~ 1~
techniqu~g--cnn b~ rongid~r~d ~cCOmpligh~d t~ nur C~mpl~te ~aCi~f~cCidn.
Th~ firgt ~irbornp lnnding nper~tiong h~d tlius ~grabligh~d u n~w ~r~g fnr
th~ pmploya~nt ~f ~vi~eidn--th~ l~nding of troop~ ~nd materiel by nir.
The man~uvers nf 1934-1~36 involving largn-gcal~ landing op~rntiong w~r~
thorou~hly gtudied ndt nnly by dur ~p~cinli~tg but by x~pr~gpntativ~g dE
forei~n n~tion~ gs we11, th~ 1~tCer hgving had th~ opportunity to gge
_ for rh2m~~lve~ the faet that w~ h~d compl~e~ly n~~ter~d th~e tran~f~rring
of troop~ and cdmbnt ~quipmant by air.
Nall-known German gcientist in the field of aviation Cporg~ FeuchCer
eeknow~.~dg~d: "~h~ Snvi~t Uninn aag th~ fir~~ naCion tn prnperly ag~egg
the importnnce ~nd to eoneentrate on the trnining nf pnrerhute-and nir-
landed unit~." L~
In 19~0, N~W YOFiK TIME5 military revi~wer NerbeYt ito~sinski wrot~ in liis
articl.~: "G~rmany's Air Pow~r": "..rThe cna~ ining of p~rgtronp fnrc~y
for capturing ~irfi~ld~ With air-land~d nsgault forces utiliziag the
airfields is g p~ge out of the history of the ited Army, which wag the
firsc to demonstrate such operations on a large s~ale in the maneuverg
of 1/35." 14
1'he 1936 Tempnrary Fi~ld Kpgulationg of th~ Et~d Army defin~d the air
trgnsport nf tr~ops gnd military cargo ~s one of the mogt important missions
of th~ nation's Air ~nrc~. Military theoretician~ dealing with the
development of air transport believed that the use of aircraft for militnry
hau1~ anuld go from thEnry td prnetice aithin the v~ry near future. They
stregscd the fact that uir transpnrt Would becofle especially essential
~+hen hauling distances Wcre too great or the amount di time nvailable too
limitpd, ahen there ~erc no suitable roads~ and in other situations of thig
kind. In hig thcoretical ~:ork "Vozdushngya nrmiya" ~T'hc Air ArmyJ~ brigade
coa~nder A. N. Laprhinskiy discussed, a~nng other gub,~ects, the maneuvering
of air and ground forc~g nnd th~ir materi~l gupport by mc3ans of air
transport. elttacning crucinl importance to air transport for supporting
airfield maneuvers by combat aircraft~ the author arote: "Air squadrona _
must make flights accoc~panied by their air transports so that they can
b~egia th~ir combac operetions ian~ediately follo~+ing a c~ve." 15
Eveats occurring shortly thereafter confirmed the correctness of these
theoretical viexs.
16
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Sp~cigl-purpo~~ ~ir unit~ for hguling troope gnd c~r~o underwent Cheir
fir~t ti~et in ~ombaC tn the military ~v~nt~ occurr~.ng n~ar Lake Khns~?n _
and on ehe Khalkhin-Gol Riv~r. The fact,that veteran figheer pilots,
including Heroes of the Soviet 1'h~.on Ya. V. Smushkevich~ S. I. GritseveCs~
I. A. i.ak~y~v and M. N. Y~ku~hin, who hxd already mad~ a nam~ for
th~wselv~~ in ttie ~ki~~ av~r Sp~in, ~nd m~ny aeher~, w~r~ d~liv~r~d by
air on 9CI1pdU1~ from Mogcnw to ttie ~irfi~ldg us~d in th~: nombat np~rgCinns,
wag noC the 1~a~t Factor contributing to Che ~uccpg~ of op~r~tion~ cnnducted
in th~ ~ar ~a~C. Th~nk~ to the op~rationg c~rried out by tli~ cr~we oE air
tirangporC unitg, Air Forc~ fighCing unit~ w~r~ ~bla to prepgr~ th~ms~lvee
extremely rapidly to deliver gtrik~s ngaingt Che enenry'~s fighCer aviation
and ground army.
nuring the ~ntire p~riod of combat operations in 1938 and 1939 transport
_ plan~g re-deploygd fight~r Unita and transferred the r~quired ~quipmPnt,
Wegpons gnd 8mmunitidn, ~v~n th~ fu~1 and lubricant~ required by the
fight~rg. T'he wnund~d were hauled from ttie area of combat operationa to
hospiCals of the ~ar ~ast.
A separate special-purpoae air squadron? created in 1932 out of a aeparate
apecial-purpose detachment formed in 1929~distinguished itself during thoae
yearg. This squadron, commanded by chief pilot for the people's commissariat
of defenae S. A. 5hestakov, performed missions involving the dropping of
forces in the rear of the Japanese forces to capture airfields gnd rout
the enemy.
The performgnce of the crews of military Cransport planes d~ring the
fighting near Lake Khasan and on the Khalkhin-Gol Kiver, were prgised by
command~ The separate air squadron received new aircraft adapted for
hauling troops and cargo, and the authorized number of crews was increased.
Aircraft were also extensively enliated for the performance of military
transport misaions during the Soviet-Finnish Armed Conflict of 1939-40
due to the fact that this campaign was carried out in the late fall and
winter and the fact that military operations took place in snow-covered
forests, among lakes and in ~lmost inaccessible areas, where roads were .
almc~$t non~xistent.
1'he Air Force's air tranaport units on the Finnish front were formed out of
the Civil Air Pleet and contained around 150 aircraft of various types.
They were mainly specially equipped ambulance-aircraft.
The air transport groups Were designated for delivering food, mail~
aa~auni[ion and other militury cargo, as well as personnel, where they
aere urgently needed. ~vacuating the Wounded s~as one of the main missions
of the special air transport groups, however. Suffice it to say that
15 percent of the total number of Wou~nded were hauled out by aircraft
of the air transport gtoup, aith 40 percent of the seriously wounded
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d~liv~red Cn hospital~ during Che firgt E~w hours nfeer Chey were wounded.
TYgnsport gircr~fe crewg hnuled mor~ thnn 220 tong of inedid~l equipmenC
and medicinee, ineludi.ng 3,000 liter~ ot� banked blood, from the inlerior
Co the ~ront fnr field medical-nid posts.
?
F].ighC cond~tCions were extr~nrdinaril.y difficult. Freezing weather and
blizza~dg, fligliCs over the Gulf of Finlgnd attd l~kes, and the nec~ssity ~
of landing aC the very front dem~nded gregti flying ~ki11 and cnurage on the 'r
part nf tt?e crews. It w~s in thia campaign ChBC the gregC honorary tiCle
kiero of the Snviet Union wAg conferred upon A. N. Yakovlev, the commander
of a flight of trnnsport ~ircraft.
It should be pointed out th~C at that Ci~e piloCS had to be truly resourceful
in addition to posseseing profes~ional akill in order to take even one
extra wounded individual on board a light aircraft~
WhaC didn't the pilots do in the performance of their missions: They used
special ~lings for stretchers, detachable compartmenCs and other devices
and goC out of the most diFficult situationa any way they could. Once,
while A. N. Yakovlev was hauling wounded to the rear area in the special
compartments, he witnessed an explosion on the ground. There was no room
on hia plane, b ut he landed anyway, and not only did he help the victims
but even placed two of them on the bottom section of the wing and delivered
them safely to a hospital.
Assessing the work performed by air transport groups of the Northwest :
Front, the chief of the medical directorate noCed that this was the first �
massive evacuation of wounded by air in the history of military operations.
Air transport of so ldiers and weapons assumed considerable scope durins the
Soviet-Finnisti Armed Conflict. Around 1500 tons of combat supplies was
also delivered to areas difficult of access for troops operating in the
enemy's rear area. At that time our aviation was, of course, not able
to meet all of the needs for urgent air deliveries, although both bombers
and fighters were used for this purpose. Parachute buckets and tanks ware
suspeaded from I-15's for transporting combat equipment and fuel. The
first massive drop of cargo in soft containers was performe3 in the winter ~
of 1940. The practical advantages of this method of providing Che troops
with ammunition, food, livestock feed and clothing are apparent, and during
the war against fascism, especially extensive use was made of this system
for delivering supplies to encircled partisans and troops.
The winter of 1939-40 with its extreme cold and heavy snows taught our airmen
a great deal. The crews of the Soviet aviation's first air transport subunits
passed the severe test with honor~ sparing no effort and no amount of work
to perform the assigned missions.
Lieutenant Colonel Ivan ,rigor'yevich Moskalev, who served in the above-
meationed air squadron during those years, described in some detail the
aervicing of the military transport planes in the wintertime.
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,
- The SepnraCe Sp~cigl-purpnsc Air 5quaclron tnok an acCive patit in Che
delivery of a~mmunition, medicines and w~rm clothing to the fighter units
and transported rhe wounded. The extrem~ cold complicated the work of the:
airmen greatly at first, but nn effeceive means of solving Che problem wns
then found. The engines were covered with warm c~tton hoods, and a means
was found �or warming eh~m up--th~ so-C~11~d "spider"--which made iC possible
to warm up tt~e engines and prepare tham for start-up within a maeCer of
30 to 40 minutes.
The aircraft were placed un ski~ in order to make it easier for ttte heavily
loaded planes Co take off from the undeveloped ~irfields, buC on the skis
they cnuld not be moved from the spot immediately. A sort of hi11 made of
fir branches lubricated with used oil was built in the parking area, nff
which the loaded aircraft slid fnirly easily and taxied to Che take-off
l~.n~ without stopping. .
Z'he hauling of inen and cargo by air during the years preceding the war
viv3.dly confirmed the need to develop this type of air Cransport and
facilitat*~~ the acquisition of experience in employing transport aircraft
in combat.
In Che summer of 1940 the Red Army carried out a campaign to liberate
Bessarabia, in which air subunits flying TB-3's took part.
Theoretical concepts developed by Chat time on the employmenC of airborne
landing forces were also confirmed by the dropping of airborne landing
brigades to capture Bolgrad and Izmail. The possibilities of landing troops
and cargo by air were tested again on a practical level in chat operation,
the combaC orders of aircraft involved in air-lifting personnel and weapons
were worked out, and questions pertaining to combat support for air transport
by reconnaissance and fighter aircraft were resolved.
. One of the oldest units in the Military Transport Aviation had an important
assignment. A separate special-purpose air transport regiment was formed ~
out of a separate special-purpose air squadron back in 1939. It was
commanded by N. A. Murzin. The regiment was to perform transport operations
ia support of the recently begun restructuring of the bourgeois economy
in the Baltic republics during Che period of their re~mification with the
USSR. Zhe fully laaded aircraft made daily flights to Lithuania, Latvia
and Estonia, carrying industrial equipment, agricultural implements, raw
materials for industrial enterprises, and food--everything essential for
the young Soviet republics to get their economies functioning smoothly.
Even while they were still being built up the Air Force's air transport
uniCs provided the national economy wit:: speedy and efficient assistance -
when it was needed. ~his tradition becume a glorious page in the history
of the Soviet Military Transport Aviation's development, vividly demon-
strating the unity of the army and the people.
.
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,
On the eve of the GreaC Patriotic War, due Co exacerbation of the interna-
tional situaCton, the SovieC Party ~nd the SovieC GovernmenC took eCeps eo
increase the outpuC o� uircrr~ft~ For a number of reasons, however, sCrese -
was laid on Che construction of combat aircraft, and we were prucCicnlly
unable to enlarge Che fleeC of CransporC planea. It was felt that bombere
could be enlisted fo~r traneporCing personnel and cargo by air. This view
reaulCed Co some degree in decreased atCention being paid Co the development
of military Crgnsports. This was one of the reasons for Che gup which
formed between the rapid development of Che airborne troops and Che Air
Force's capabilities for transporting and landing them.
The main reason~ however, was the facC that the SovieC Air Force had already
acquired a certain amounC of experience in CransporCing troops and combat
equipmenC by air, as well as various materiel needed to support the combat _
operations of the ground forces. Z'his experience, like Che theoretical
tenets developed by Soviet military science, were also applied and furrher
refined during Che Great Patriotic War.
~ The successes achieved in transporting troops by air by the beginning of
the 1940's were reflecCed in the draft Field Regulations of the Red Army
(PU-40), which, on the eve of the war, designated Che transport aviation
as a separaCe branch and defined its basic missions: the transport
aviation "is used for dropping and lending airborne landing forces, for
transporting troops greaC distances, for hauling military cargo, especially 1fGor
troops operating in the enemy's rear aren, and for evacuation operations.
This is how the role and place of the Crgnsport aviation within the naCion's
Air Force were defined on the eve of the war.
F
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CHAF'TER II
A TEST OF COURAGE
The 6reat Patriotic War b~gan. The yQnra of war�are ag~ingt fasciet Germany
provided n rigorous test of Ghe Soviet SCaCe~g viability and of the combat
capability of its army. Smashing Hitler'g forceg in Che Great Patrintic
War, Che Soviet Armed Forces defended the conquestg of the GregC Octob~r
Socialist RevoluCion, the Soviet social and sCaee structure and the freedom
and independence of our homeland~
Air transport units, together with the other branchea of troopa and avinCion,
acCively contributed ro the devastation of the fascist hordes.
A special military transporC aviation tiad still not been created when the _
war began. Air transport units, which were a part of airborne brigades in -
the 1930's, were subsequenCly placed under the Air Force, becomi.ng a part
of the Long-Range Bomber Aviatiori. Air sub>>.nits were formed to replace them
in the airborne forces, which became a special branch of troops immediately
prior to the war. Their manning and equipment, however, advanced exCremely
slowly and involved great difficulties. Aic subunits of airborne txoops were
tnainly used for the combat training of parAtroopers and were employed
pracCically not at all in the execution of combat misaions.
The need for prompt materiel support for the different branches of Croops
in the form of air deliveries of cargo and reserves also increased to an
extraordinary degree during the Great Patriotic War, which increased ttie
magnitude of tasks performed by air transporC units.
One of the main missions of air transport units during that period was that
of supporting landing operations by airborne strategic and tactical groups,
that is, landing groups employed in support of operations carried out by
major field forces of ground troops and airborne landing groups employed
with clase support by ground troops. The latter were designated for .
~ capturing tactically advantageous objectives and positions which will
enhance the chances for success in an offensive by the forces of a front.
For a number of reasons landing forces continued Co be used only on a limited
basis during the Great Patriotic War. Nonetheless, considerable use was made
of airborne landing forces for their primary purpose.
Air transport units performed an important role in supplying ground forces
with supplies and equipment: ammunition, fuel, combat equipment, food,
clothing, and so forth--practically everything which could be delivered by
air to meet the needs of the front.
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Th~ tim~ly deliv~Yy nF guppli~~ a~~ a~p~cinliy impnre~nt wh~r~ th~r~ w~re no
rn~?dn, Wh~n rc~ad~ baenm~ ~mp~~g~ble in eh~ ~pring ~nd E~11 ~nd wh~n~it w~g
nec~s~~ary en help ~neSrrlad ~ gr~~p~ of dur �~ce~~.
Air erangport formaeione ~1go g~~ved a~ ~ tn~an~ of liaignn with th~ pgrti~an~,
those uniqu~ "i~nding" ~roupg which op~rat~d in tha an~my'~ r~~r and h~d to
hav~ ammunition~ combot equipmeat and ~ood d~~iver8d and thg efck aad
vouaded ~vacuated.
~ D~liv~ri~~ nf c~mbar ~quiprs~ttt ~nd oth~r c~rgo by air rompri~~d th~ bulk oE
th~ migsiong p~rformed by air trgngport uaieg du~ing thn initial p~riod of
the var.
Vartou.~ p~raonnel and ~quipm~nt Were ealieCed fo~ thg performanc~ of traneport
mi~eioae during the GrpaC Yatriotic War~ a~ I hnv~ already pointpd out. In
th~ beginning nc~ functidng of th~ milltary er~neport aviation wer~ perfora?~d
ia part by kh~ High Comu~nd'~ h~avy bomber aviation, uhich Wa~ r~form~d ng
the Long-Res~ge Aviation (AgU) in 1942. 2~rn fdrmntiong of h~~vy aircraft fnr
hauling Croope ~nd cgrgo by air aere form~d as part of the Long-tt~ng~
Aviation that eame year. .
;he lst Air Tranepare Uivi~inn wa~ created in tM rch 1942 out of 300 crewx
trained at th~ traini,ng centerg of ti~e Civil Air Fleet. They b~gan p~rfarming
combat miseions ia July 1942. V~ry goon ther~aft~r, th~ lat Air Transport
Division wae transformed into ~ bomber diviaion ae a reault of the ~uccegg-
ful employment of Li-2 gircraft ae night b~.nberg~ and becam~ a part of the
long-range aviation. Thie w~a gtill the Air ~orce's first traaeport formation,
hoaever. and~ in the final analysie, no matter what the long-reng~e air
regiments and diviaione outfitted with Li-1 aircraf t were called~ their
exiatence increaeed the traasport capabilities of our aviation.
I have already meationed the fact that many air uaits and formations vere
involved in transport operations. The Civil Air P1eet continued to be
practically the main reserve of air uaits for performing traasport operations
duriag the aar years, hoc+ever.
Special air groupa were formed during the first days of the war~ which wece
subsequently reorganized ae separate regimenta. Bomber-transport and
aabulanceaquadrons, signal aquadroas aad gpecial air traasport aubuaitg
vere formed out of theae.
1he task facing air subunita performing transport mibaions aas aa enormous
one, streauous and intense. It Was dangerous and far from egsy vork: ia
the course of a night--troops and cargo a~re raainly transported at night--it
aae aecessary tn make not one but two or three, and sometimes aore~ flights
to or beyoad the forward edge of the battle area. In addition to making a
precise drop or aa accurate laadiag ia aa uafamiliar area~ the crews $lso
had to be prepared to overcome the enemy's air defense and to repel attacks
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Fo~ o~pictnt. us~ orn.~r
by f~~c~~C fi~he~er~--th~ GtiV~P pe~vld~d thc~ er~n~p~re aircg~fe by nur
combne ~vi~tidn rpmnin~d ingignifi~dnt [dr g iang p~ri~d of tima~ ~nd
mor~ nft~n eh~n n~t, th~re a~~ nnnp dt g11.
The upprntidng n~ ~ir fdrm~tidn~ ~nd unitr~ ~n1i~Cpd for g p~rformn~nce dE
. miiitgry tr~n~pnrC mig~iong aere ~l~o ~~mplir~t~d by Ch~ f~ct th~e th~y
var~ ~ubnrdin8t~ e~ v~ri~ug offtr~g--frnm N~~dq tter~~ Supr~me liigh Cnmmand,
to th~ comm~ndg o~ ~epar~Ce frnnta and ~ir armiee. 7`hig cr~ated c~rCain
diffi~ul~i~~ wich r@np~ct tn pianning ~nd ~rranging tro~p and earg~ haul~
by ~ir.
Du~ to rh~ hprerogen~ity of th~ ~~empnt~ rempriging th~ found~tion di th~
air tran~pnrt unit~~ thp trgining nf th~ Elight ppr~nnn~l ~1~~ vgrt~d.
Th~ l~nrling nE troopg ~ad th~ excr~me difficult fli~ht roudition~ r~quir~d
r~ high l~v~l df prnf~~ginngl ~kill And th~ ~bility to Ely by in~trumeaCg~
ginr~ th~ commanderg of th+~ trnngport crpwg cnuld not cnunt on rh~ t~rrgin
for th~ir orieetntinn: fligh~s td th~ foruard ~dg~ of th~ bAttl~ area
and e~peci~lly flight~ into th~ ~fl~my'g rpgr area uer~ usu~lly p~rfnrmed
at nighe nr in weaeh~r limiting vi~ibility. A~ th~ tr~n~port pilntg
acquired rdmb~t ~xperience, th~y dev~lnp~d t~ctical prncpdur~g fnr egc~piag
pur~uit wh~n ner~~g~ry. c?ne suCh terhnique aee tn fly at lnw gltitud~--n
so-called low-level flight--ahich a~g gtrirtly forbiddpn in the Civil Air
Fleet in peacerime. The war dictated itg nan lnwg, hnwever, nnd tha former
Civil Air Fleet pildtg, like the military airmen, suecegefully maeter~d the
techniqu~ of loa-level flying.
Air trangport unitg of the Air ForCe created during the firat deyg of thc
war aere outfitted mainly with 1igf~t ~ircraft~ und only individual air
transport subunitg had the twin-~ngine Li-2 plan~s, vhich prnved themselveg
~ to be excelleat aircraft and constituted the maict means of air tran~pdrt fdr
a long time. The Moeco~? 5pecial Purpose Air Group aad th~ lgt Aic
Traasport Diviaion of the Air Force aere nutfitted vith thege aircraft.
A number of units of the Long-R~nge Aviation Were outfitted vith Li-2'e
in 194z. The Sth. 6th and 7th long-range air corps had been re-outfitted
wiCh Li--2 planes by the summer of 1943. There aere 10 regiments aith Li-2's
at the beginning of the wur and 19 at the end of the War. Mogt of these
regimeats aere used for air transport miseions.
At the end of 1942~ the special air force u~aits began to receive C-47 heavy
aircraft purchased by Che Soviet Covernment ia the USA. Thi~ aircraft's
aeroaautical engineering and perform~r?ce characteristics and its transport
capabilities made it pus~ible to perform considerable hauls of both pergonnel
and combat equipmer~t. Uuring this time our induatry Was building up produc-
tion of our own military tranaport planc~. E~y the end of the war the flpet
had tripled as a regult. Almost all of the TE3-3's aere replaced with Li-2's
and C-47's.
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Ia addition t~ ap~cia~ ttia~n~part plgn~~ And botcb~rs m~d~fi~d ~for d~l3.v~ring
airbocn~ tandin~ gr~up~ ~r~d for tir~porc~ng trdop~ gnd vgriou~ ty~~g of
c~r~o, th~ A-7, G-11 ~~d Bn~-~ ~a~$ule fdre~ ~nd egr~o glider~ b~~~n to b~
u~ed un A fnirly axe~n~iv~ b~gig.
~h~ p~cec~din~ provid~g g g~n~r~l d~~cription of ehg tagk~ and c~p~biliti~~
of gi~c traa~pore unitg during th~ Grp~e P~trioti~ W~r.
Tn th~ followin~ ~~etinn~ c~f thig ch~pt~r w~ Wi11 d~~crib~ rh~ perfnrm~nC~
~f ~p~cifie mig~ion~ by unitg ~nd gubunie~ of th~ Sovi~e Air ~oree invnlv~d
in th~ ~ir er~n~port af the tro~pg ~nd cargo.
= The I.~nding of Airbnrn~ A~ggult Groups Dviring th~ Wgr
The chi~f ~nd bagl.c misgion of th~ miiitary transport ~viation, that of
landing airborne ag~ault graups~ vgri~d in intengity during eh~ yp~rg of
th~ Cr~gt PAtrioCic W~r.
I h~ve glre~dy mencion~d the fa~t chgt airbnrne lgnding dper~tinng mgy be
tactical or op~r~tinnal. They gre aleo differ~ntiated according ro their
compnsition and to Cn~ purpnge and depth of ene dYdp.
Tactical girborne lunding operntiions were most frequently employec! by Ctie
it~d Arc,y during the ftrgt period di the war and in the concluding phase--in
the campaign in the Fnr ~ast, in which the combat nperations were highly
dynamic nnd intense. 5pecial lnrge air uniCs and units of tha Long-Itunge
Avintion and the fronr avintion were enliated to perform them~ the cr~w~ of
vhich possessed tt~e trnining required to air-land troops and to drop the~
by parachute. In January 1941, for example, 21 Li-2's from the M~oscow
Special-Purpose Air Graup and three T~3-3's from the 23rd Bomber Division
(subsequently tne 53rd Air Division of the Long-Itiange Aviation) were
aesigned to land t~ra battalions of the 201st Air Brigade and the 250th
Rifle 8egiment southease of Vyaz'ma.
Thorough preparations Were made for the landing operation. The attack
position had reliable air defense cover, which practically eliminated the
possibility of counteraction by eaemy fighters. Paratroopers were to be
landed first~ their atission consiating of capturing a landing area and,
- together with partisans, of providing security for the landing of the
combined parachute and air-landed echelons. The main body of the
lsading force was to be landed in the second phase of the operatioa,
2-1/2 houra after the first group had been dropped.
Thorougn coordination of the operations of airborne landing uaits. the front
command and the crews of the nilitary transport planes, preci$e calculatian
of tae time and close inceractian with the partisan detachments insured the
success of the operation.
24
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in Ch~ ev~niag ~f 1~ .fi~a~ry four Li-2'~ with ~ngin~~ muffled ],and~ci in
tha op~qu~ twilighe ~n ~~aow-cov~r~d fi~1d n~~~ th~ ~outhern edge of th~
villag~ c~~ xn~mpntcg, bringin~ ~n inieial party oE 6S m~n to pr~p~r~ E~r
th~ 1~nndieg of th~ ~irborn~ ~~~~ult group. The gaow wgg ~g much ~g
1/2 m~t~r thick on the temporary ~irfi~ld~ ~nd th~ gir~rgfr w~r~ nnC
pqui,pp~d uith ~ki~. Th~ gdc~d flying ~ki11 nf th~ pilntg p~armiet~d th~m
to land ~ucc~~~Eully~ howav~r. 'i'h~ cr~w~ complated the mi~gion. On
19 January th~ tniti~l p~rty ~pent the entirp day rp~dying the ar~~ fnr
th~ landing of Ch~ ~~~~ult group. Th~ paraerooP~r~ w~re ~~~i~ted by
pg~ctiegn~ ~nd lncgl rp~ideat~. At th~ end of th~ day a r~pnrt vent nue
tn th~ airfi~ld ~t whieh th~ op~r~tion Wa~ to originat~: "Landing~ can
be made on ah~~l~....S~ad the forr~g 3mm~diately...." Imm~diateLy, b~c~uge
the Hitl~rite~ u~re within 1.5-2 kilometerg of the ignding gita and were
not id~p.
Thrnughout the nexC three nighta, deepitie a gnoWetarm and rh~ bombing ~nd
m~chine-gunniag of th~ landing sit~~ the Li-2 and 'I'~-3 crews continued eo
land assault troopg~ weapone and ammuaition.
The follcn~ing ere excerpte from cnmb~t reports mad~ during thgt period nn
the performance of creag of t~ie Z3rd (53rd) Air Divieinn:
"On the night of 20 January 1942 the crew~ of C~ptain Filin and Senior
Lieutenant Tiu~ hin aere assigned the urgent mission of air-lifting 45mm
cannona nlnng with their creWS and ammunition iato the enemy's rear area
to Comrgde 5oldatov'g aesault landing group. Uespite inclement weathEr,
the need to land at aa unfamiliar site at night and the fact th~t th~ ground
was covered aith a deep layer of snoW, the mission was accomplished."
"...On the night of 20 January 1942 t~o aircraft left Vnukovo Airport to
laad at the village of Lugi in the enemy's rear....1wo aatitank caanons.
40 boxea of shells gnd a combat crew of 18 men for the 45mm cannona, a
cargo weighing a total of 4200 kilograms, Were delivered. On the return
trip the aircraft hauled out four vouaded individuals. They were fired
upon aith antiaircraft machine guns near Zaamenka aad Voakreaensk." 17
,
The airborne assault force delivered by the air transport group captured
highly important lines of commuaication in the enemy's rear and held them
for several days~ immobilized the enemy and disrupted the work of the rear
services, thereby simplifying operations by troops of the Western Front's
left wing.
The skill~ experience, bravery and stamina demonetrated by the Li-2 and
TB-3 creWS contributed to the successful execution of the tactical mission
assigned by command for this phase. Another important factor was the fact
that aircraft of [he Moscow Special-Purpose Air Group were well prepared
for landing opera[ions, did not require additiunal equipment and were armed
with machine guns mounted ia turrets. The radio operator-gunners oa the
aircraft had to use their Weapons more than once to make it possible for
the paratroopers to land.
25
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The foilowfng ~tat~m~ne on th~ p~rfortn~nc~ by piloe~ oE th~ Z3rd Ai.r
Divigidn in Pebru~ry 1942 ig pr~~~nt~d a~ ~n ~x~mpi~. ic~ th~ beckgrnund
of eh~ mp~g~r].y wdrd~d cnmbgr dncument on~ ~~n eh~ p~ap1~ who p~rform~d
aith great ~ltrui~m ~nd tha ~ki11 th~ dang~roue b~ti nnb1~ wnrk nf deliv~rtn~
caYgo to our trnop~ and partisgng op~Yating in th~ ~nemy'~ regr ~rea.
"...On 3~~brugry 194~ ~ grdup of ~ix aircr~ft l~ft for Vnukovo Airport td
deliv~r food and gmmunition to untte of th~ Red Army op~rgting in eh~
enemy'~ r~~r. A tdtal of 3n,000 kilogram~ of food and 15,51~ kildgrgmg
of ammunitidn w~re dropp~d ro Liautenant G~n~ra1 Yafremov'~ f~rc~g
Ig kiiompter~ g~uthea~t oE Vy~x'ma (in th~ villggeg of Zh~ltovka~ ~nd
Zhulino ~t ~a altitude nf 2I1.2 metere) betsaeen 3 and 23 F~bru~ry.
A combinpd toCa1 oE 21 flightg w~re m~de by the aircraft involved.
A combin~d total ot 16 individual flights w~re made ~o tha villag~
of Lebed~vo, ZO kilomererg to th~ gouth o� Vy~z'ma~ Nhich delivered 19,~00
kilogram~ of ammunition ~nd 15,U00 kilogr~m~ nf food to Li~utenant General
Belov'~ forcee.
Twelve flightg by individual aircraft were m~de to Onufriyev's forc~g in
the vill~ge of Androsovo, 42 kilocneterg gouthwe~t of Vyaz'm~. A total of
11,OOU kilogr~ms of food and 1400 kilograma of ammuniCion W~s dropped.
A total of aeven individu~l flights were made Co Soldatav's forcee in the
village of ~eduliao, 25 kilometers gouthweat of Vyaz'ma~ which dropped
11~500 kildgrgms of ammuuition aad 5~000 kilograc~ of food.
11~ro flights vere made to the village of Zhelan~ye, 25 kilcmetera aoutt~weet
of Vya~'cm, ahich dropped 2,050 kilograma of food and 1500 kilograma of
ammuaition to Kirillov's partiean unit.
The misaion was carried out by a group coaeiating of the crews of Ma~or
- Varfolomeyev~ Captain Yezerskiy, Senior LieuCenant Sokolov-Shalayev~
S~ior Lieutenant Bobin, Captain Kosach, Seaior Lieutenant Borodkin~
Senior Lieutenant Kalygin and Major Afonin." 18
In Februriry 1942 a group of forces of the 29th Army, eacircled near Rzhev
on the Kalinin front~ found itaelf in a very difficult aiC,uatioa. The
decision was made to land the 4th Battalion of the 204th Airborne Aesault
Brigade, consisting of 500 paratroopers, in the area of the encircled
group. The area held by the eacircled group atretched 8 kilometers from
east to west and approximately 7 kilometers from north to eouth. Bonfirea
forming a triangle and a rectangle were to be lighted to designate the
landiag sites. The battalion was to be dropped by parachute, and it was
therefore very important that the aircraft arrive precisely at the deaig-
nated landing area and that the drop be concentrated in a small area.
The crews of the transport planes assigned to perform the misaion found
themselves in a very difficult situation. 1'he designated landing area
26
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w~~ ur?d~r r~rtill~ry ~ir~ by th~ ~n~my ~nd gine~ bnttil~~ w~r~ und~rwny ~1i
~rdund eh~ nrpn~ e~i~ pilnt~ ~nuid ~t~ num~rnu~ firpg d~~~11 pn~~ibin ~hnpa~,
mnking it ~xtr~m~ly dl~Fic:ulr, eu Eind tt~p innrk~r~. Sum~ nf Chp Cr~w~ w~r~
not gbl~ to find thp d~gign~t~d ~it~ and r~Curned CI� pnr~erddp~rg Cn Ch~
eirEield frnm wttich th~ ~11ght h~d originne~d.
'The aircraft with th~ paratrooper~ nn bo~rd proce~d~d to th~ landing area ~t
an altitude of 1,000-120U meter~ and na].y dropped to an ~ltitud~ af 300 m~tetiu
vh~a th~y w~re within ~~v~rn1 kil~m~t~rg o� the landing Htte,~rom whcre the
individugl gircraft drdpp~d the pac~~r~dp~r~ iato th~ d~~ignat~d gr~a. Mdr~
than 400 fight~rg of th~ ~U4th Brig~de entered thp b~ttl~ wiehout time to
find th~ir equipm~nt, prnvtding ~uppdrt for th~ ~ncircled group exh~ugted _
by m~ay d~ye of ~ighting. Aft~r Enur J~ys nf fighting the bregk-nut of
~ncirnlement by units of rh~ 29th Army W~g completed.
Unfortuaately, landing operations were n~t alaaye succegsful, ~egp~cially in
the first y~are of Ch~ w~r.
An operation h~~d~d by G~ M. Lin'kdv, gub~~quently Hero of th~ Sovi~t
Union~ near Lepel' in Belnrus~ia~ w~g nnt suCCeegful~ The incident~ whieh
took pla~e in 5eptember 1g41, wns later degcribed in G. M. Lin'kov'g bnnk
"Voyna v tylu vraga" (The War In ~t~e ~nemy'g Ete~r) (Mogcnw~ 195g) and in
A. M. Verkho~in'~ c~emoirs "5amolety 1~cyat k pareizannm" (plan,e~ Are ~lyinq
to the ParCisang) (Mogcow, 1966). A. M. Verkhozin was at thar. time d~puty
chief of staff of the ~irst Heovy t3omb~r Regiment, which was nssigned the
misaion of dropping Lin'kov's group. Th~re were no mark~rg tn indicate the
landin~ sic~--the shore of Lake Domah~ritskoye--and there Wgg no radio
commuaicatiun among the T!i-3 aircraft performing the drop~ and car~ful ~
preliminary preparation was therefnre rEquired. 'The cnn~a~ander oF the
airborne group did not accept the int~lligent suggestiong of Colonel I. V.
Pilippov, commander of the air regiment, hc~u~ver, and ingisted that the
entire group be dropped ar one time. As wge to be expected, the aircraft
crews aere not able to find the designated site in the dense~ loW-hanging
clouds. Three of the aircraft dropped paratroopers at different 81tes, and
three~~ did not return to the airficld.
G. M. Lin'kov attributed the failure ~o lack of experience on the part of
the pilots aad to the fact that t}~ey beca4e confus~d in the difficult
eituation.
Unfortunately, the flight crews Were frequently criticized fnr this gort of
thing. Tae reasons were different, however. The radio equipment carried on
board the aircraft was noe the best~ there Was no reliable communication
~tith ground, information on weather conditions along the routes Was noC
ala~ys accurate, there were consider~ble cieviations from the plnns for
dropping airborne groups and, fin~lly, the subordination of the air subunits
performing military transport missions Was not clearly defined. All of this
uaquestionably coasplicated the performance of the flight creWS and the
success of important missions frequently did not depend on the personal
qualities of the airmen.
27
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I w~u1.d iik+~ to m~ntian ~�~w mo~~ e~?e~ie~1 igedi.n~ op~r~tion~ e~rri~d due
during th~ fir~t p~rind of eh~ Gr~~t P~trS,~ric W~r to pr~vid~ gr~und E~re~,~
aith dtr~et ~~~i~t~n~~.
In July 1941, for ~xempl~~ ~~vgr~l group~ of paratrooper~ w~r~ dropp~d by
daci~ion of the co~nd~r of th~ 5outh~r~~e Front int~ rh~ r@ar of eh~. C~rmen
- fasciet trndp~ i.n drder ed di~~u~t th~ ~a~my'~ r~~r ~~rviee op~rationg~
A group of 23 p~r~tcoop~rs w~~ dr~pped 3nto th~ ~n~my'~ r~~r ~r~~ on
23 3ept~mber 1~41 during ~ eoune~rthrugt by fd~rc~g of th~ Primo~c~k~y~
Army uhich W~~ d~f~nding Od~~~a. S~ior Lieue~n~nt S. G~vrilov w~~ in
~ comm~nd of the Tg-3 aircr~ft whieh deliv~r~d th~ landit~g group.
A ractical laading op~ration wa9 caYried uut in July 1942,duririg the heroic
defpn~e of Sevagtnpol',t~ dierupt th~ aa~my'~ raar s~rvice op~rarions.
An airborn~ l~nding opergtion aag ur?d~rt~k~a to th~ w~gt of Novoro~~3y~k
in Februgry 194~ by ~ecl.gion of th~ romm~nd~r of th~ Tr~n~c~uc~gug ~ront.
it wa~ carri~d ~ut in eupport of a naval landing op~raCion.
The employment nf airborn~ landing oper~tiong became increagingly ~ff~ctive
toward the end of the wgr, as th~ fleet of tranepart plgnes grew and tha
por+er of the fighter and bomber air fore~s incr~ae~d. 'rhe results achi~ved
from th~ op~r~tions af airborne landing group~ in the aar against imperi~li~t
Japan in Augugt 1945 illugtrated this fact egpecial~y Well. Th~ emplnyment
of airborn~ landing groupa became moat expedient in th~ situation exieting
at that time~ in ahich anemy resistance had baeicn~ly been brokee and it
had become neceseary immediately to occupy atrategic pointa and induetrial
and military installations in the rear of Japanees forcea in order to
prevent the enemy from degtroying valuable property and facilities.
Tactical airborne landing groups drop~ed into the central cities of Manchuria,
on the Liaoning peninsula and in North Korea, ranged in eiZe from 200 to
500 men~ ahile thoee dropped on Southern Sakhalia aad the Kurile Islanda
vere even smaller--from 35 to 130 mea. The groups Were mainly mada up of
grouad troops, and the training and experience of the creas flying the
military traasport planes were therefore not the least important factore
by far.
By this time the Air Force already had apecial air transport units. Airborne
laading operationg in the Pat Eaat aere carried out by the 21st and 54th
sir transport divieions with Li-Z's which Were a part of the 12th Air Army.
The forces Were air-landed.
Flightg in the Far East Theatr~ of Military Operations preeented considerable
difficulty: not only did the transport planes cross the front line, they
also flew 200-300 kilometers into the enemy's rear area. Furthermore.
they had to land at enemy airfields aad at sites poorly suited for this.
Nonethelesg, the flights into the rear area of the Japanese forcea were
28
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~oa oF~i~tn~ us~ orn.~r
suCC~~~ful. Th~ ~~r~er~~pprg enp~cl brillianEly wieh th~ir mig~ion.
Ab~nd~ning eh~ ~irer~~t immedigt~ly upnn l~nding, th~y ~ng~gpd in bgtel~
vithnur pau~~ ~~d d~eupi~d ~~~1i~b1~ d~~~n~~, th~r~by ~nguring eh~
eucc~~~~ui 1~nding df ~h~ ren~in~ng er~np ~r~ngpnrt pi~n~~.
The firgt airborn~ 1~nding np~r~tinn agg ~nrri~d out on 16 Augugt ~n N~rbin.
AirboraQ g~oup~ a~~~ ~~b~~qu~tttly 1~nd~?d i~ Mukd~n~ Ji1in, Changchong, Luda,
Fort Arehur end Pyc+ngyang, W~11 ~g oh 3authern Sakha~ia ~nd th~ Kuril~
~~~~nd~.
Nh~n r~pr~~~nt~~iv~g of ~h~ Sdvi~t rc~tmnand pnt~r~d intd t~lk~ t+ith Eh~
~ngd~ng Army gt~ff on ~h~ prne~dur~ for it~ s~pitul~cidn, th~ ~ue~@~~
of tho~~ e~lk~ r~~u~,~~d En a~c~ngider~bl~ dpgr~~ from th~ ~~rprig~ ap~r~tion~
of th~ airbdrn~ l~ding graupa.
l~iora ~h~n 20 ~irborn~ ~anding apQr~tiong ~nvnlvieg ~ toCa1 of up t~ 11',000
m~ wpre c~rri~d oue dur~ng the ~atir~ ~~r Ba~t C~mpgign. fih~ir op~r~tioa~
vQre giv~n n high r~ti~$. 2`h~ ~irbdrn~ 1~ctding ~~r~~g pi~y~d ~n import~nt
roi~ and guec~~gfu~~y p~rfert~ed Eheir ~~~i~ned mi~~idng. Thig ~y~tpm nf
rapidly r~~olvin~ ptoblem~ ~ri~ing un~xppCtpoly in the ~aemy'g r~~r ~r~a
ie 8ti11 ~ntir~ly valid. S~7EEd d~ n.g~niz~tioa ~nd eim~lla~~g in th~
dropping of tha girborne grnupg ~r~ th~ md~t impdrtent faceorg. lg
It va~ mnre diffieult to p~rform gn operation~l l~nding mi~~ion th~n ~
tactical ~n~ gtnce ch~ form~r requir~d congiderable air trnnsport per8onn~el
and ~quipment. It wag rar~ ~dr th~ giz~ nf tactica~ ~irborn~ group~ tn
~cc~ed 1,U00 m~n, wh~r~~~ up tn 10~000 or mnre to~k pnrt in th~ op~ratinn~l
mi~siong. Furthermor~. guch dp~rgtiong invnlv~d a lnrge numbar of uircraft
from all of th~ air bt~ancheg, whirh pr~g~ntrd c~rt~in difficulti~g du~ to
the ghortage of varinus type~ of cnmbat plane~.
11~o dpprational girborne landing mi~gioag a~r~ rerri~d out during th~ v~r:
that performed by the 4th Aitbornp Cc~rpg near Vyaz'm~ on th~ w~~t~rn front
in January-February 1942 aad the dropping of rhe 3rd and Sth airborne
brigades on th~ Voronezh front in 5eptemb~r 1943.
The airborne l~nding operation conductpd in the r~rea of Vyaz'ma h~d the
ob~ertiv~ of cuttinq off enemy lin~g of coaiaunic~tion, which wag eo gimplify
the execution oE the over~ll oper~tional miggian of our fo~rces on the
vestern g~ctor of the Snvi~t-Cerc,an front. -
The plnn ftrr th~ ~irbnr~~ landing oper~cion wae worked nut jniatly by the
Air Force and airbnrne troop command~. over~ll cnmm~nd of th~ operatidn w~s
aegigned to the command~r oE ch~ Red Army Air Force, while the immediate
task of prepgring che corps for the l~ndin~ and for combat op~rations wag
carri~d ~ut by che ~irborae croop coc~and.
A total of 352 ~ircraEt aere ectivated co support the lgndiag and comb~t
operations of the landing force: 65 (40 Li-2 and 25 TB-3) trangpocts~
29
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102 Eighe~r~ u~~d ~~~~r~ pl~ae~ ~nd ed c~v~r ~h~ ~ef~~k pd~itidn, anJ
1~~ bnmb~~~ nnd grouttd a~~a~k p1~t~~~. "rh~ ~ir gr~up wag ~nmm~nded by
Ma~dr Ci~n~ra1 ~f Avi~tidn L. A~ ~drb~E~~vfeh, th~n rhipf nf th~ die~~tnr~t~
o� ~vi~tion ~f th~ lligh ~~a~and df ehe Red Army Air ~dr~~ in ~h~r~~ df
iong=r~ng~ Chp~vy) ~vtaEi~a. A~oia~ c.~~m~ad pdgt Wd~ up Eor eh~
e~~r~d~r a~ eh~ ~irbdYn~ ~~r~~~ ~nd ~h~ ~~nm~nd~r of th~ ~ir ~r~n~pere gc~up.
Th~ ~taff~ c~f th~ ~ir tr~n~p~rt gr~up ~ad th~ ~irborn~ fare~~ b~~~d eh~lr
p~~~ for th~ landing dp~r~tidn an the ide~1 qu~ntiey d~ a~r er.~t~gp~re m~an~.
~tt~ r~~1 ~cr~ng~h ~E th~ 4t~~~~rn ~raae'~ ~ir f~re~e~ W~r~ n~e e~k~n ihen
aceouat, h~w~ver, ~fn~e che ~p~~~ei~a p~~n aa~ c~~npii~d Without dir~e~
p~rtieip~ti~n by ehe ,~e~~f af eh+~ frone for Whieh ie a~~ b~ing arg~ai~~d.
Tht~ ig why ~n i~npa~g~bly ghdrr p~riod a~ eWO dayg W~~ g~e far condueting
th~. landing ~per~ti~n. Sisnpi~ ~rithm~tic ~hou~d thae th~ 6S CCAftg~fO~'C ,
� Q1~n~a ~,~~i~n~d ~a th~ ~p~r~tion ac~uid h~v~ t~ mak~ ~ t~~~l oE approxi~e~ly
G00 ind3vidu~l Elight~ in drd~r ta ~~liver th~ ~irbarn~ e~rp~. T~king
prab~bi~ ~~~geg inta ~ce~unc, av~n uad~r th~ mo~t f~var~bi~ e~nditiang,
~~eh trangpart er~a ~rouid hgv~ t~ mdk~ 12 ta 15 trip~ ~ night ~or ~ p~ri~d
o~ f~ur ea fiv~ d~y~.
Tha ~ma1l~t~t p~~gib~~ depth--30 tc~ 40 kil~m~t~rg frnm th~ frnnt lina-W~~
~p~cifi+~ci in ~rder tn get m~ximum ug~ fram th~ quancity ~E gic cr~n~pdrt
m~ang ~llnc~ted fdr th~ ~i~r~ian. '~he incerval b~taeen trip,~ ~ver~g~d
2 hour~ ~nd ~0 c~inut~g ~or th~ Li-2'~. Uuring th~t tim~ th~ creW sr~uld
hav~ ta fly td th~ drep ar~a di~t~nc~ of 180 kilometQrg by direct
rout~), find ehe obj~~tive, a~ke ~t lea$t t~ro p~~~~g to digrh~rge Ch~
l~nding ~orce, return Co ~h~ ~irfield of departur~, r~fu~l and iasp~ce thc~
nircraft~ take ehe n~xt lgnding group on board and tak~ off agaia. Thig
left no c~rs than 20 c?inut~~ t~ pr~par~ for the n~xt flight. Fet ~rom ~~1
of the cres+g cou1~ a~int~in thi~ fiight sch~dul~~ sinc~ many of th~m did not
have adequate ~xperi~nce in the ~nnduct of night landing op~rationg.
Thc~ air d~f~n~~ fight~r aviacion covering Kaluga wag included ~in th~ air
group but r+ag nnt under ch~ comm~nd ~f G~neral L. A. Corbats~vich.
Ceaarv.l Yp. M. Niknlayenko'g fight~rs cover~d th~ cabile graup of Ceneral
P. A. Belc~v'~ lgt Guard~ Cavalry Corps and cou~d therefore provide only
partial eupp~rc E~r th~: airborne landi~g op~rgti~n.
The airborne corps concentrated aear Kaluga~ like ~h~ trausporc aircraft
coac~ntrAted at th~ gt~rting ~irfiplds~ ch~r~fore had practically no cover
and wag easily detected by enecry ~ir reconnaignanc~. It ~hould b~a added
� that no agrial phntography of the landing area had beraa p~rformed and that
the drop sites a~r~ designated uith ~xtrpmely primitive markers.
During che serond hal~ oE 24 January, 46 trt~~~partg eook off carrying the
advaacg l~nding detach~ent~ s~hich vag to prepare the aay for ch~ landing
of the r~maining paratroopers. Due t~o poor orientation on ch~ part nf rhe
cceva. hoz+ev~r, ~ lar~e part of the peratroopers and cargo Wag dtopped 15 to
18 lcilonet~rs south of the specifi~ed ar~a and the advance d~tachmeet MAS DOC
able to petform its as~igaed cti~sioa ie time.
30
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D~~pi~~ th~ f~ee ehde iE l~~ked inEr~rm~~idn nn eh~ ~dvnnc~ d~C~chm~nt'~
~ieu~ti~n, eh~ ~irbnrn~ trdnp ~omn~~nd, nnn~th~ie~g, nrd~r~~i th~ 1~nding
~p~raeidn en edntinue. nurir~g the hight oE 27 Jnnu~ry, ~7 individu~l
~lighCg a~~p m~d~ ~nd dr~wid IlUO men wer~ d~liv~r~d tn Ch~a d~~ignae~d ~r~~~
~n~ of eh~ ~irfi~ld~ Wh~r~ the landing ~irnraft w~r~ b~g~d w~~ ~ub~ec~~d
to ~i~e~~ b~mbing eh~e ~~me night. 5~v~n df ~h~ h~~vy TB-~`~ ~nd ~ fu~l
d~p~t w~r~ burn~d, ~nd 12 ~irer~ft w~e~e dam~g~d by fr~~m~nt~. Th~r~ wer~
e1~o 1d~~~~ ~f ~ir tran~pdr~ p~rgdnn~l ~nd p~r~trddp~rg. 'Th~r~fnr~~ nn
l~nding ~p~c~tion ad~ carri~d dut �rom thn~ airfi~ld th~ firgt nigt~e~ ~nd
nn th~ marning df 2~ J~nu~ry the tr~nspdrt gir~cr~ft w~r~ r~mov~d cn ~irfigidg
in th~ inE~riar b~~~u~~ nf th~ d~ng~r annth~r ~n~my ~ir r~id. Af~~r
th~t, ~irfi~ldg in ehe initi~l. greA WeCe used fnr grap~v~rg.
D~~pit~ the f~~t thgt Cnnt~rt uith the landed farc~ a~s not eetablighad
until 31 J~nuary, th~ l~nnding di th~ ~drpg e~ntinu~d th~ following night~.
By 2g J~nu~ry thp air gr~up hgd dnly 12 ernngpdrt plan~g ~t ieg di~po~g1-~10
Li-2'~ ~nd t-~ro ~-3'~--~ttd ~lmogt ~11 of the Li-2'g had b~en demag~d by
~he1~ fragmpntg ~nd r~quir~d fi~ld r~p~irg.
The 1~nding ~p~c~?tion Wgg hnle~d on th~ night of 31 Janu~ry du~ tn ch~hge~
Sa th~ op~r~tiongl gieuation.
A total o~ 2,157 mr~n, 120 11ght machifle-gun~, 72 gntitank guns and 20 mortar~
vr~rp air-liEt~! intn ehp ~r~a b~tu~en 27 Jnnuary and 1~ebruary.
The remaining unita of th~ 4th Airbo me Corpg Were r~turn~d frnm tha area
of Kulug~ tn Mogcou dblagt~ Where preparativng aere underway for g neW
landing npera~ion.
Unitg of the ~3rd Army end the lgt Cuards Cavalry Corpg fighting n~ear
� Vygz'ma fnund thcroselves in a grave sicuation ia th~ firgt halE af
Febru~ry 1942. The aicugtion uas e~pecially difficult on the Yukhnovekiy
salient ~+her~ th~ main forces of the Negtern ~rant's center were pinned
dcnttt in bgttle.
On 1l~ F~bruary~ N~adquartern transferrEd rhe 4th Airborn~ Corps to the
Wes~ern Front, Which wag a~nigned tl~e raission of landing in an area West
of Yukhnov~ penetrating the eneay'~ defenxe front Erom the rear and joining
up vith unitg of ch~ SOth Army fc~r joiat nperations against the Yukhnov
Hitl'erite grouping. The cnm~ander of airborne troop~ wa~ given full
cosm~and this time. Steps were taken to keep preparationg for the operation
from b~ir~g d~t~eted. The ~~l~nning W~g forc~ed by ~n operation~ grc~up oE the
airborn~ E~r~~~ end by th~ cocr~and of the joint air group beforE th~ mission
vas a~signed to the ~orps comraander.
The Ianding site coincided with the arca oE operations oE ~ partisan
� dctachmpnt and che 250th Rifle Regimeat~ ahich had been moved there et
3~
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th~ b~ginning df Jnnu~ry 1942. 'Th~ npez'gCic~n w~~ 1gun~h~d frdm ~irf~.~ldg
axnund Mn~cow within Md~~aw'g ~ir d~E~n~~ xnn~ which w~re nn ~v~rug~ nf
240 kilom~ter~ fr~m th~ l~nding nr~ng. ~
Only slighCly mdre ~h8n 7n ~ircr~fC could b~ m~d~ nv~il~b1~ f~r Chi~
npereeinn well.
Qn Ch~ nighe of 17 ~abru~ry, 20 Li.-2'g wieh p~rnCr~op~rg on bo~rd f1.~w tn
the gr~a ~F Yurino tn reinf~rc~ ~n ~irborn~ ~rdup dr~pped th~r~ in J~nu~ry.
A tot~l o~ ~9 individual flighCg wprn m~de, but nnly 13 nrewe cumplat~d
th~ir mi.ssidng~ delivering ~round 300 men: Che pilots had great diffieuley
d~t~ting th~ m~rk~rs amnng Ch~ num~roug bonfires.
A landing dp~r~tian in ~ npw c~r~n which was begun 24 houra laCer~ was nnt
much mor~ guGCeggful. Although th~ p1~n C~11ed for r.h~ 18nding nf a guppdrt
~rdup with thrae "~~ver" hdming gC~tiong ~nd gigngl equipm~nt, th~ kinmin~
~Cations w~re nne d~live~ed to th~ drnp gre~. The drop ~ite~ wer~ indic~ted
with thp g~me primitive combingtions nf bonfirpa. ~urthermare, Ch~ Wegtprn
Front'g gtaff had order~d identical m~rkerg fnr thp area of the landing nnd
at ~iteg for r~c~iving cargo for the 33rd Army and the lgt Cu~rdg CnvnlYy
Corp~,without informing th~ air grnup's coaun~nd. The first landing w~~
complic~ted by th~ id~n~ieal merk~rs ~t three ad~acent areas, the large
numb~r of bnnfirc~ gnd f ir~e in the enemy's rear ~re~, eh~ abspnce of
radio naviggtion fncilitie~ in the drnp area, and inclement weather.
Another f~cCor w~~ the f~ct that th~ crews had rec~ived gtrict tnstru~tiong
noe td drdp the airborne group if there were Ch~ slightest doubt ns tn eh~
exact location nf the landing gites, in which case they were to r~turn with
th~ landing foree to th~ airfield of departure. As a r~sult~ th~ misaion
aa~ accomplighed on only 4U nf 101 flightg by individual gircraft.
A homing station aas sent to the landing area on the morning of 19 February.
The aircraft had an accident when landing, however, and the radio set was
damuged. 'The malfunction wns soon eliminnted, but even then the radio set
could not operate at full lorad and could not be u$ed as a homing gtati.~c~.
~lectric lights, which were easily distinguishable from bonfires nnd rockets~
wer~ used as referenc~ paintg for ~ub~Cqu~nt flights. Thig made ic far
easier for the creas to orient themselves. The landing aperation carried
out on the night of 19 ~'ebruary was the mo~t successful. The more relinble
system of marking th~ ~it~s and goad weather conditions made it possible
to carry out 152 individual flightg und to complete the mission~ landing
mor~ than 2.500 men. The weather deteriorated drastically once more the
folloWing night, hoWever, gnd nnly 27 of 96 individual flights Were completed
successfully. The landing operation continued three ~ore nights~ ending
on 24 February.
Colonel K. I. Lysenko had the follosring to say about the operations carried
out by the transport fly~re during that period:
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"I w~g ~~rving ~g cnmrt~nd~r nf nn air gqu~drnn n~ Li-2'~ gnd p5-84'g nt
the b~ginning nf 1g42~ In ~'ebrunry nur gqundrnn wn~ innlud~d in ~n ~ir
grnup put eog~ther eo drdp nn nirbnrn~ gr~up tnto thg ~n~my'~ rpttr ne~r
th~ city of Vyaz'm~. Th~ lgnding np~r~tinn weg carried nut batw~~en lg und
24 ~ebrugry.
"We~th~r conditidng w~r~ v~ry difficuly durin~ eh~r tim~. Th~ra w~~ a low
cloud cnver ~nd fr~quent gnowf~llg and fng~ cl~s~d mgny of the air�taldg.
"Th~ girbnrn~ lgnding op~rntion was c~rried ouC only ~t nighC--from Che
onseC nf d~rkn~~s to dawn~ LieutenanC Cn1nn~1Kloptsov, ~ur group Cnwnandpr
was killed one night nn his firgt fligl~t. An tnv~gCig~tion ehowed th~c
thQ ni~craft had losC its position in th~ inclemenC we~Cher und tind f~11en
in our terriroty without renching the forwnrd edge of th~ bnttle ar~a.
"'I'he cr~wg of muny oth~r unit~ gnd fdrm~eiong wer~ pnll~ted fnr drnpping
troop~ intn the en~my'g r~~r. The gt~ff in charge o~ the l~nding nperution
seat our crew first to recnnnoiter giteg ~nr the gubgequenC dropping nf
forces by the other crews~
"We flew every.night, sometimes apending 3U or 40 minuCes looking Eor the
~rop gite. Following us, the vther cr~wg dropp~d mnre than 1~OOU pxru-
troop~rg and a grear deal of cargo--ammurtition, wpapons ~nd so forCh--during
the night. Our crew cgrri~d out nine fli~hts~during which We drnpped 100
men gnd ardund four tons of cargn.
"Our plane Was hit over the forward edge of Che bnttle nren nn one nf thQ
flights. We returned to our airficld on onc engin~~ bonrded a gtundby
plane and took off again. The misyinn was completed.
"Once, when we were loadin~ a landing group, the armorers suggested that we
_ take two FAB-25 bombs on board. Croseing over the forward edge of the
baetle area, we selected the target--enec~y gntiaircraft batteries which
had fired upon u~ as we flew over the forward edge---opened the door of
the aircraft and dropped the bombs. After completing the mission, we
aanted to see the resulta nf our bomb ~trike on the w~y back. As Ke ~
approached the tnrget, howevcr, we aere unexpectedly caught in the beums
of thrce poWerful senrchlights, and lar~e-cnlibr~ machin~ guas and anti-
aircraft guns npened up with a b~rrage of fire. We had to maneuver skillEully
and fly c?t maxi~um speed to escape out of firing range. Our bombing of the
fascistg had apparently been ~ucce~sful~ which accounted for our reccption,
but the enemy did not make a single hole in our aircraft.
"'Ihe flighes m~de in Febru~ry 1942 were also difficult~ but all of our crews
involved in dropping ~irbvrne groups comple[ed [heir missions."
A summary oE the landing of troops and c.~rgo near Moscow in February L942
is given in a book by Doccor of tiistoYical 5ciences A. C. Fedorov:
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"7'he Nieletiire fnrce~ w~re dc~fending gtubborttly nenr Yuk.ttttov. x'hey wer~
pinning down cansiderab~.e fnxces of th~ Wesrern ~rone in th~?e ttre~, prev~nting
them �rom ~nining fnrces wi.~h ernops of th~: 33rd Army ~nd the lgt Guard~
Cav~lry Corps. In tihnt exe~emgl.y difficule sieuntinn, Army General G~ K~
Zhulwv, comm~nd~r af Che We~Cern Front, m,~de Ch~ decision eo c~rry our
anothgr gitibnrn~ lnnding operaeion Co rh~ west of Yukhnnv. Units of the
4Ch Airborn~ Corpg were ro deliver gtrike~ from ehe rear tn asaist Frone
forces wieh eh~ ~ncirclemenr nnd dp~tructinn of the enemy's Y ukhnov grouping.
Ov~rall cnmm~nd o~ the nirbdrnc operation was ggsign~d to Army General V. A~
Gl~zunov, comm~nder di the Ited Army ~i~borne txoope.
"...By th~ ~nd of 17 February, 72 aircraft had been concentra ted gt the
air�i~1ds, including 20 PS-84 transports at Che Vnukovo Airport.
"~..P5-84'g d~livered the r~maining aubunitg n� the 8Ch Airborne ~rig~de
from Vnukovo Airport to the area of Put'kovo and Beli on ehe night of
17 February....a total of 293 men ~r~,d ?2 bundles of weapons and ammuniti.on
were dropped.
The landing of unita of the 4th Airborne Corps near Velikopol'ye and Lugi
was~cgrr ied ouC on the night of 18 February, using all of rhe PS-84 tranapnrts
and ~H-3 heavy bombers....a total of 89 individual flights were mnde~ which
landed 538 men uttd 96 bundles of cargo. The landing operation continued
during the nighr of 19 February~ with another 2,551 men landed in the
dcaignated area. The landin~ operation wns curtailed the following night
due to a deterior~tion in the weather: there was a fog and the borrom edge
of Che cloud cover was barely 300-400 meters above ground. Despire the
difficult weather condiCions, 37 crews completed their miseions, dropping
476 men and 73 bundles of weapons~ A total of 1,676 men were landed on
the night of 21 February, 1,367 on 22 February, and 38 individual flights
were made on the night of 23 February, dropping 179 paratroopers. This
compleCed Ctie landing of the corps.
"A total of 612 individual flightg were made between 17 and 24 February to
drop uirborne forcea, 443 of whicn were successful. Three crews did not
reCurri from their combnt mission. Uuring that time 7,373 men and 1,524
bundles of ammunition, weapons, food ~nd various supplies were landed or
dropped from airfields near ttoscow." ~
A toCal of more than 10,000 men were transported by air in the strategic
lending operation of January and February 1942.
An analysis of the first large-scale operatiwholelasince itecontributed~to
that it was unquestionably effective on the ,
the success of our forces on the western front. There were many shortcomings
in its organiza tion and conduc t, however. The percentage of combat missions
euccessfully accomplished by the transport crews was low, for el~mghould be
almost one-fourth of the individual flights ended in failure.
added that the landing process itself was not satisfactory. A considerable
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portion of rhe pnratroopers lnnded out~ide the designgCed nrea ns n reaulC
of deviaeions from the prescribed route by snme of the crews and due to the
prim~.Cive marktng of the drop ~ites. Th~ inaccurnte drops delayed Che
aseemblying of units of ehe landing force. Ttic~ee days aEter the landing
operaCion had been completed ~he 4th Airborne Corps had managed to gaCher
, onY.y half of the personnel at the assembly poin~s.
This situaeion was basically caused by the following. In January and
- February of 1942 enemy aircraft were actively counteracting our air forces.
The SovieC tactical air force was not powerful enough to achieve air -
supremacy, while Moscow's sir deFense fighters could noC provide the
tactical fighters with support due to the considerable remotenese of
their bases from the forward edge of the~battle area. Furthermore, the
enemy's field air defense posed a great Chreat to the rransport planes.
The existing situation made ir necessary to schedule the landing opcrations
at nighC, although neither the air group nor Che airborne Croop command had
expexience in landing a large force at night.
ConCrol of the airborne landing operaCion was noC centralized in the first
phase. The duality of control resulted in exposure of Che landing group
and in a lack of coordination in Che combat support of the landing operation
by the Cactical aviation.
It was unrealistic planning which caused the landing operation to be drawa
out over such a lengthy period. The scope of the operation and the schedule
specified in the plan were clearly not within the capabiliCies of available
transport aircraft.
The fact that the air crews detailed for the landing operation were not ~
prepared to perform the assigned mission in a complex situation also had a
negative effect. The flight personnel must not bear all of the blame,
however. The trouble was that it was necessary to use crews selected
on an emergency basis from various units to perform the operation. As a
result, the composition, training, and experience of the transport aviaCion
in this case made it a heterogeneous, uncoordinated and hard-to-control
formation.
Poor navigational support and the primitive system of mmrking the drop
aites did nothing to help the aircraf.t find the landing area precisely or
to reliably identify the drop sites.
Lieutenant General I. I. Lisov had the following to say on this matter:
"The main cause of error in the dropping of inen and cargo was the lack of
homing radio stations in the landing area. WithouC them it was difficult
for the flight personnel to find the drop sites for the paratroopers at p
night, especi.ally in poor weather.
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"Th~ fiteg and bonfire~ ug~d ne light mgrk~re, wh~n fighting wae und~erway
in the pnemy'g r~nr~ Cnu1d not ~~rv~ gg rel.iabla referenca point~ fnr eh~ -
pilnt~~ ~inc~ tti~~c enuld b~ ~~~n ar ~ny different ~pot~. Thc~ �act thnC
many of the tirdn~purt crews were p~rfdrming thi~ typ~ nf mi~~ion in guch a
dif~irult gituntinn fnr cti~ ~ir~t eime w~~ ~l~a a~ignific~nt shortcomin~
in the landing opernti~n." 21
Th~ fgct ~h~uld b~ m~ntinned r.h~t ~nQ~y Aircr~ft wzre not cnnduceing ~trikp~
aginst the tukewff nirEields in ~ebruary, but 5nvi~t transporee and
_ airborn~ tronpg wer~ gub~~ct~d to inten~ive ~h~lling and bombing glong ehe
flight rnuteg and in th~ drop ~r~n~~
During thnt p~riod th~ ~orpg troop~ w~xe b~ing dropped from altitudea of
600 tn SOU m~rerg by individu~l gircraft at interv~ls of 5 to 10 minutg~,
- and thi~ ang rnntrolled by ~ach crew ind~pendently go gg to r~ach the
obj ectiv~ c~e Ch~ degignnted time. No checkpoint w~g ~gtc?bligh~d near the
fon+ard ~dg~ of th~ battlc nren ~ad the crewa Crogged the forward edg~ at
gltitudeg of 1500 metcr~ or high~r, recalling th~ bitter experiencg of
thc first phage of th~ landing nperntiong, when the trnneport plan~e were
gubjected to violent fire from enQmy gi~ defenee weapong ag they aCtempt~d
tn cross the forward edge nt low altitud~s�
The first experience in providing giL g~pport for dropping large aitiborne
asgault groups under ~ctunl battle conditions at niqht wgs fully ennlyz~d
by the Air ~orce coa~~and nnd by the command of airborne forces~ and thia
vas ef great importancp in the subsequ~nt developmcnt of the military
transport nvfgtion~
Cemmand concluded that there should be centrallzed control of all men and
. equipment participating :n aad supporting an operation. A chief with all
of the aeceBaary men and equipment gt i;is ~isposal should be in charge of
, planning air support and executing the laading operation.
It wae apparent that we had to have air transport capable of performing the
aseigned mS.saions and crewn apecially trained for landing troupa.
The landing of the 4th Airborne Corps had shown that the staging area ehould
be at least 100-150 kilometers from the forward edge of the battle zone and
- should have a reliable air defense.
All of the conclusions drawn and a number of specific recommendations were
taken iato account For compiling a draft guide or? tha combat employment of
airborne troops.
Deapite ita deficiencies~ the experience g~ined in landing the 4th Airborne
Corps in ti?e area of Vyaz'ma in J~nuary and February of 1942 hae at=11 not
loat ics values. This Was the first operational airborne landing operation
ia the history of military art in which a force as large as aa airborne
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corpa was trAngported and which was caYtiied aut under di~ficuit conditions
in th~ CacCicgl d~pth~ rhae ig, in an ntie~ aith a considerabie build-up of
~nemy gorces.
Tha aitiborne landing group, togethsr aieh rhe cavalry and patitieans opetiating
nn ehe Vygz'ma eeetor in rhe wint~r aE 1941-42, lib~r~e~d ~ con~id~Yabl~
area from the enemy, inflicted gtieat damage upoe rhe ltitlarites and
immobilize.d a number of units og ehe 2eatrum army group in thati sector.
Th~ fascist command wae forced to ramove troops from other secCore to
combat the airborne landing force. DeBptte thetr limited sCrength the
airborne troape aot only heid a front etretching 35 kilometers but aleo
engaged in gctive diversionary operations in the enemy's rear areg.
, Therefore, as already etated~ tihe landing of the 4th Airborne Corps in
January aad Pebruary of 1942 should be conaidered a eucceae in genaral~
sinc~, in addition to ite unquestionable inatructional value for the
subeequent improvement of airborne landing operatioae~ it halped to rout
th~ enemy in th~ battie n~~r Moscow.
1~+o pointa muet be etreaeed as we conclude the analysie of oae of Che
lergest operatione performed by the military transport eviation during
the Creat Patriokic War.
Ia the firat place~ I would like to mention once more the flight akill~
courage and altruiam demonstrated by the crears ~f the milltary transporta~
vhich performed extremely difficult miesions ia a complicated situation.
NP aleo know that not a eingle army in the vorld had even attempted to carry
out such a large landiag operation at night and in the Winter.
Ia the second place, our experieace in the laet aar is still valuable tuider
contemporary conditioas. V. I. Leain ~rrote tha following: "We canaot learn
to perform ou~ taeks With the new techaiques of today if yesterday's
exPerience did nor open our eyes to the incorrectnesa of the old
methoda." 22
A second large-scale airborne landing operation Was conducted under different
circumstaaces in the fall of 1943.
By the middle of September for~+ard unita of the Voronezh Front had reached
the Dnepr. aad the 3rd Guards Tank Army had even succeeded in croseing the
river scutheast of Kiev near Velikiy Burkin. Uaits of the 40th and 47th
armies began forcing the Dnepr simultaneously. In thia situation it was
decided to conduct a landiag operation to occupy a beachhead on the right
bank of the Uaepr ia order to mass forces there for the lauachiag of the
aubaequent offenaive.
According to the plan, the operation aas to be coaducted at night in the
tactical depth~ deapite the fact that the enemy had maseed freah forces
coasisting of motorized rifle and other uaits in the area. Al1 of the
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troopg being readiad fnr the landing operation w~re combin~d into a eingle ~
corpg. Th~ mi~~ion of landing the group wae assigned to tki~ 5th~ Geh and
7th long-rang~ air corp~, u~ing Li-2's, the lst Air Trangport Divigion (MAdN)
aad a glid~r-borne grdup o� airborne troops.
The air unitg deeignatpd for rraneporting the l~nding group, which numb~red
mor~ than 10,0~0 m~n--180 Li-2's~ 35 glidere and 10 Cow planeg--compris~d
an operatina~l group cocma~nded by Li~utianant General of eviarion N. S. Skripk~.
Ov~rall command wge exercieed by the cotmn~nder of the Voronezh Front and
his staff, although this Cime the front's staff did not participaee in Che
actual planning of the operetion.
it mugt be said that Che plan for setting up and conducting the operation wag
vorked out fairly car~fully and that it covered almost all agpects of the
landing of troope and of their operetions in the enemy's rear area, including
aerial recoannigs~nc~, air eupport for the landing operations by forces of
the 2ed Air Army and the Loag-Range Aviation, and broad interaction with
front arttllery. partieaiis and a aupport group dropped in the area in
advaace. The plaa still contained major deficienciea, however.
The first difficulty arose when~ during the rapid advance of front troopa to
the tMepr, the 2nd Air Army became faced with a aevere ehortage of fuel
and ammunition at foxward airfields and could not provide aupport for the
~ landing operation. The artillery was just approaching the area and was
alao n~C in a position to interact with the landing force. In addition~
errors had been made in the echedule for maesing the tranaport aviation
in the area of departure.
~ Army General N. F. Vatutin, front commaader, gave the order to carry out�
the landing operation on 24 September~ based on reconnaissance information
provided by the 40th Army. I.ieutenant General of aviation N. S. Skripko ~
did not receive ~he order to begin dropping the airborne group�until the
first day of the operation. The commandera of the airborne brigadea, in
turn, were not able to adopt their decision and inform the troops o� it
until 2 or 2-1/2 hours before take-off time.
The air tra:.sports were massed at Lebedin aad Bogodukhov airfields in the
staging area. When the procedure Was being worked out for loading the
airborne troops and the cargo onto the plaaies it was revealed Chat the
number of air transports available did aot conform to the landing operation
echedules compiled earlier. 23 In addition~ some of the aircraft were not
evea equipped for airborne landing operations. This resulted in disarray
of the landing operation procedure, and it was neceesary ~mmediaCely to
revi.se the schedules and the assigament of paratroopers to aircraft and to
redistribute the cargo, which had already been delivered to the flight
lines. Furthermore, the fuel traasports were late and communications between
the long-raage aviation's operatioas group and the airfields could aot be
relied upon.
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~ ReCalling th~ lnnding nf tronpd on th~ right bgnk of Ch~ Dn~pr in
September 1943~ Lt~utpnant C~n~rnl of avi~tinn C. S. Sch~tchikov~ then
command~r of th~ 62nd Long-ttang~ Atr Uivt~ion, wroCe in n lptter to the
authnr: "In th~ div~ginn und~r my Command Che aircrnft ~ommand~r~ ~nd
cr~a memb~rs looked for the ~roups of par~troop~rg ~C Che ~p~cified
eite9~ but they were som~Cime~ not th~r~..~"
Flight cr~w~ pgrticipaCing fnr the fir~t tim~ in a night l~nding operaCion
found themeelv~s in an pxtremely diffiCU1C ~ituaCion. The support group
ahich had th~ a~igeion of marking the l~nding siteg wag not dropp~d in
the area in advance, according to plun, nnd the navigators on the milit~ry
- transporte had to geC their bearings from the Dnepr gnd from the villages
set on fire by the HiCleriC~g~
~ A subeequent ~tudy of the nver~ll yitugtion and the regulte of the landing
oper~tion revealed poor interecCinn between th~ traneport gviation ~nd
the airborne landing forces. Again, no overall gir comm~nd hgd been eeC
up although transport and long-range bomber units, as well ns tacCical
aircrafC~ were involved in th~ lac~ding operation and ita support.
Questione of inCeraction between long-range air unite and aircrufC of
thp 2nd Air Army were resolved on the bagis of mutual coordinntion~ on
ahich a considerable amount of time Wns lnst.
No provisicns were made for continuous reconnoitering of the landing
area or for navigational support for the operation. Another important
factor wes the Eact that personnel of the air units had not undergone
special training in the performance of ni~ht landing operations~ not co
speak of ~oint exercises wit~~ the airborne assault forces. Around onz-third
of the Li-2 crews had abaolutely no experience in the landing of troops
and cargo.
Supreme High Command represe;lrative C. K. zhukov reported to Headquarters
_ on the regults of the landing operation and the difficulties encountered
in the offensive from the Bukrino brid~;ehead. A apecial order was written
' up on the basis of these reports Which stated~ among other things: "The
dropping of the massive airborne landin~ force at night demonatraCes
incompetence on the part of those setting up Che operation,because~ as
experience has shown~ the dropping of a large airborne group at night,
evea on our own territory, involves great difficulties." 24
Nonetheless, despite the errors made in organizing the drop, the combat
operations of t~ie landing force contributed considerably to the creation
of a fevorable situation for the offensive by 5oviet forces taking part
in the liberation of Kiev.
In the rear area of Hitler'a forces 5oviet paratroopers blew up briJges,
carried out raids against enemy garrisons, destroyed transport columns and
communication facilities, and so forth. This time, as well, the fascistr
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were forced to red~ploy their troops' and ro bri.ng up fnrceg en seal off rh~
airborne lt~nding forc~. Deepite rheir congid~rabl~ ~up~riority in m~n nnd
equipment the !{itler~e~~ w~r~ ~till not abla to degCrny tih~ l~nding force~
which wae eregting pr~~sur~ in the imm~digCe r~gr of tih~ir troope.
Reconnaieggnce information transmitted to the headqunrt~r~ of the 2nd Ukrainiad
Pront by the airborn~ Croopg wgs ~1so of grear importance. The force~ nf
that front w~r~ making preparnCions to force the Dnepr~ and inforn~tinn on
the enemy'g defense and the tactical depth was not the least importanC
factor contributing to the auc:cess of the offeneive.
This ia what PRAVDA wrore about the eventa taking place at that time:
"In thie... ' operation thare were three main forcea smoothly combined and
clogely inCergcting on the battlefield: Red Army uniCa fully armed with
poaerful equipment, which delivered the main etrike; partisan deCachmenCg,
which drove a hosrile Circasaian grouping out of the woods a.nd raided iCs
commwnication lines; and the airborne units skillfully dropped behind the
defeading Germane, which helped the offenaiv~ and disrupted the Gerroan
defense from the rear." 25
Commancl post exercises and war games on maps came into being as a result
of thar airborne landing operation. Elaborating a plan for airborne
operations, the headquartera of the Long-Range Aviation and c+f the Airbori.~
Troops conducted a~oint command post exercise involving the landing of
troops in October and December 1943.
During that same period the Long-Range Aviation command approved the Manual
on Air-Uropping Troops and ~argo from Long-Range Aircraft. This manual~
compiled on the basis of experience in conducting airborne landing operations,
precisely defined the duties of crew members aad the procesa of interaction
between the crew and the airborne landing group, from preparations for the
flight to the dropping of the airborne force. It also set the maximum
duratioa of a paradrop train at 40 seconds. Rigorous demande were made
of the crewa reqardinq thorouqh arientation for a landiag operation.
These were the separate phasea ia ei:e practical development of a system
for the combat employment of military transport aviation during the Great
Patriotic War in the area of tactical aad operational airborne landing .
miasiona.
Methods of utilizing aircraft for landing troops varied. Even this
iacomplete account of certain operatioas of the Great Patriotic War and
of the factors influencing the formation and development of the ~iilitary
Transport Aviation as a means of conducting airborne landing operations
gives an idea of the focus of the search for ways and means and of the
successes and failures characterizing one of the moat complicated periods
in the development of our aviation.
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'1'h~ Trgngportatian o~ Troopg~ Combnt ~q~~ipmpnt ~nd Oth~r Cgrgn By Air
One of th~ Tran~port Aviratinn'g m~gt importnnt ~obg during th~ war w~g thgt
of Cranepnrting per~dnn~l, we~pn?ig~ ~mmunitinn, m~dirin~ and nCh~r mat~rinlg
and guppiiee a~ ~ mean~ of ~uppnrt fdr Ch~ combgC operation~ of Soviet
troope. Althou$h ~ir h~ul~ occupied ~n impoxrent p1s~C~ in the overall -
system nf operaCional flight;~ rn m~~t tt~~ n~ed~ of the front and tu ~vacuat~
people and cargo from the comb~t ~ane to th~ rear ~re~, aviatidn w~e
nonethel~~s not th~ m~in form of trangportntion. It w~e only in a sp~ciai
e3tugtion~ when the t~rrain ur th~ cnndirion ~f rh~ gupply routpg made iC
impoesibl~ td ug~ nth~r forms of Cranspnrt~tion or wh~n immedint~ delivery
wae r~quired, that eviation bpCnme Che rtwin meane of deliv~ring troopg nnd
ammunition. ~
In addition to landing troops, Qir transport units of the Air Force a1a~
per�ormpd transport mis~ions r~quir~d fnr rhe ex~cuCion of specific
gtrategic aad tacticgl mi~ginng~ One nf th~ mogt importgnt are~s of th~ir
urilization involved providing reserves for an op~rational m~neuver
conducted und~r specinl combat conditions.
Whenever it was necessary rapidly to redeploy the reserve of Ne~dquarters~
Supr~me High Command, or to deliver replncemenb for mobile units engaged
in offensive operations in the operational depth, commund turned to the
aviation for transporting the troops. The Supreme or the front comm~nd
had the authority to make this decision.
The fact should be underscored that the need for air transportation of
troops considerably exceeded air transport capabilities. It aas precisely
because of the shortage of air tr~nsport equipment during the initial period
of the war that only once were we able to redeploy an entire unit--the
Sth Airborne Corps--by air.
At the beginning of the war the more or lesa large-scale transport missions
vere performed by heavy bomber regiments of TB-3's of the Long-Range
Bomber Aviation and by the Moscow 5pecial-Purpose Air Group, as well as
by special air groups of the Civil Air Fleet. Tactical units and formationa
of the Civil Air Fleet and special-purpose air divisions of the Air Force
(the 2nd and 4th Special-Purpose Air Divisions [ADON]) actually made up
the transport aviation nf the liigh Co~and. Their main misaion was one
of hauling cargo both for the ground troops and for the Air Force.
� ~lith the creation of the Long-Range Aviation (ADD) and the formation of
loag-range bomber units of Li-2's within it, those units took over part of
the air transport missions. In addit.ton, when there was a shortage of
special transports, low-powered bomber units flying Po-2 and P-5 planes
were enlisted by decision of co~and"to perform such missions.
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'1'he ~izn of the force ~~g3gn~d to ~ gp~cific mi~~ion d~p~nd~d on Ch~ valumd
and th~ di~t~ncp oE th~ ~ir h~u1~ a~nd dn Ch~ d~adiine~ ~nd Ch~ numb~r of
air treneport~ nctu~lly nvnilable fdr the purpd~~. 1'he 1~Et~r w~~ drdin~rily
the d~ciding f~ctoY.
M eacample of this i~ th~ nbov~~m~ntioned nir-lift of the Sth Airborn~ Curpg.
Thig opergtio~ wa~ undert~ken by connnand during the period of def~n~iv~
wt~rfare nenr Mogcuw in Octnber 1941.
Unitg oE the German Z4th Tnnk Corpg had p~netr~t~d iato the rear area of
the 13th Army on th8 1~ft flank of th~ Bryansk Front and were m~naciag
Or~l. Th~ lst Guard~ Moscow Itifle Corps w~s to take up a defense on the
Zusha River near Mtgensk in order eo c~var tha Orel-Tul~ eactor. There
was still a real threat that ~nemy tank unit~ would break throu~h to Tula,
hoaever. At this point Headquart~rs~ Supreme Nigh Command, mad~ the
decisinn to be~f up �orces on the Orel axis by redeploying the Sth Airborne
Corpg to ChaC area. Z6
It was necessary to transport 6,000 men with a double baCtle ecale ~f
amm~miCion~ 40 motor vehiclea, 10 45mm guns~ mortare and heavy machine
guna around 500 kilometers within a extremely ahore time. A total of
60 aircraft--20 (mainly Li-2's) from the lat Squadron of the Moscoa
Specinl-Purpoae Air Group and 40 TB-3 long-range bombers--were aseigned
to transport the corpa.
The flights performed by the trar.gports in the perfo mm~ce of thie important
miasion vere difficult and extraordinarily atresa-filled. For 2 and 1/2 Jgya
the cr~WS flew practically round-the-clock~ and they had to land the forces ~
literally under the eaeary's nose and against counteraction by enemy aviation. -
The last battalions deplaned at the airfield in Orel ~uat as fasciet
tanks broke into the city. The airfield was within artillery range,
and shells Were exploding on the take-off strip,and hangara and fuel
depots w~ent in flames. A few planes were damaged by shell fragments ,
and some of them caught fire. Removing the intact equipment from them,
the pilots left the airfield on the Zast planes. The miaeion had been
auccessfully accomplished.
The airborae landing group delivered by the transport aviation, together
aith a tank brigade of the lst Guards Rifle Corps, inflicted considerable
damage upon the enemy and secured g position on the Zusha River. Hitlerite
General Guderian was subsequently forced to admit that hia army auffered
unexpectedly large losses near Mtsensk. ~
This example of the use of transport aircraft and support of the maneuverinQ
of reserves in a rapidly changing situation conforms completely to contempo-
rary viewa on the role of sir transport in a war. '
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Th~ u~~ oE gircrgf t Eor tr~n~porting c~rgo fnr th~ fi~1d ~rmy, p~rtieui~rly
ahen aircr~fe had becom~ th~ c~a~n Eotm of tran~portation~ caa be con~id~red
equaily ~ucceeeful. ~
8ff~ctive u~e wag made of th~ pian~~ of air tr~n~port unit~ during th~
apring and fg~1 Ch~a~ ~nd wh~n roads b~cam~ tmp~g~~b~e in th~ uint~r.
in th~ apriag of 1943 troop~ of th~ North Cauca~u~ ~ront u~r~ ~ng~g~d in ~n
off~n~iv~ op~r~tion in th~ Kub~n'. ~'h~ 5~th Army, ope~~ting on ~h~ front'~
l~ft wing, wae gdvancing to th~ gnutha~~t ~nnd h~d p~n~trated deep intn th~
enemy's r~ar ar~a c~v~r th~ froz~n floodplains of eh~ Azov. T'h~ w~ath~r
su~id+~nly Warm~d dra$cically, hau~v~r, and th~ ie~ began to thaw~ ~h~ r~~r
unita oE ~he ~dvanc~ divi~ion~ fouad th~an~~lv~~ cut off by the ~n~tny,
vhich h~d c1o~~d rout~~ nf communie~eion beta~~n div~~ion~ of th~ S~th Army
and ttte r~~r unitg by land ~nd by Th~ 9th Sppci~l Air R~gim~nt oE
the Civi1 Air Fle~t, com~nd~d by Li~ut~riant Co~nn~l Ya. S~g~din, W~g
enli~t~d to gssi~t th~ 58th Army. Th~ raginent Wag givpn the mi~~ion of
aupplying advance units of tha 58th Army aith ammunition and food.
It ua~ a f~irly difficult gitu~t~on. Th~re aas no communicgtion aith thp
isolat~d unita or the ataff of the 58th Army. Bndeavoring to disrupt dur
air aupply drope, the enemy aa8 using fight~rs actively to blockade the
entire area occupied by the advance forces. Adepting ~heir operations to
th~ weather. hos+ever~ Soviet pilots croesed th~ gea and ti~~ floodplaine
in lou-level flight and puehed resolutely roaard their goal. Natur~lly,
thpre were loeees. The 9th Special A~r R~gim~at loat ~even gircraft ie
15 days. Despite the difficultieg the advance units of thp 58th Army
received 116 ton~ nf ammunition~ 12 tone of fuel, 2 tons of inedicin~e~ and
S00 kilograms of banked blood. After receiving the ammunition and regrouping,
units of the 58th Army saitched to an offensive aad harassed the enemy ahere
he least expected it.
The folloaing is another eacample of a euccessful operation perfora~ed by
means of aircraft. In January 1943 troope of the 40th Army began an
offene~ive operation in the directioa of Kastornoye. The 4th Tank Corp~
advanced on the main axig ia the first echelon of the 40th Army and had
penetrated 16 kilometerg inside the enemy's defense by the end of the day.
The folloaing day mobile units of the 40th Army nverran ti~e Hitlerite units
and burst into Corshechnoye. The route to Kaetornoye vas clear. ~y this
time, hoaever, the 4th Tank Corps had used up its fuel, and tank trucks
vere�prevented by snowdrifts from reaching it. Po-2 night bombers and p-S
bombers of the 2nd Air Army's Z08th Night Bomber Diviefon came to the
tankmen's assistance. The aircraft landed right on the road in Corshechnoye
by the light of bonfires and delivered the aeeded fuel to the tankmen. On
28 Jaauary the 4th Tank Corps burst into Kastornoye from the south and a
mobile group of the 13th Army and tank uaits of the ~8th Army~ from the north.
cloeing the ring of encirclement of the enemy gtouping.
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~
4
~
~?oa ot?rici~. uss oM.Y
Cre~+a of th~ l~t Ai~t 1'r~a~po~~ T1ivi~ion d~mon~~~at~d goed fligh~ gkil~ ~nd
eou~aga during eh~ir tranaporta~ion of ~roop~ and ear~o. Th~ ~?ni~ a~~ i~t~r
r~n~am~d th~ l~t ~amb~~t Dirr~~ion of th~ Lo~g-~t~ng~ Aviaticn~ ~lrhou~h
~htoughour th~ W~r it continued tn perfo~ Air tr~ft~pore mi~gian~ W~ii.
~
Th~ Eoi~owing i~ t~k~n from e docu~n~ o~ ~he W~r y~ar~ ~igc~ed by Li~ue~nnnt
G~n~ra1 of aviation 'T. T. Khryukin, m~mber of th~ i~liiit~ry Council of ~h~
3ourharn Profl t~ad eo~nd~r of th~ ~th Air Army:
"P~tom i~cQmb~r 1~42 to 31 J~nuary a343 the lst Loeg-Raag~ Air Divsion Wa~
operationally eubordin~t~ to the 3outhern Prone co~nd..., Ar~~ign~d
mf~aion~ oE ~~r~~gportin~ eombet matsri~i and food fo~ ground forcng of
ths Soutn~arn Pront ~ad u~icg of th~ 6th A1~ Army.
"IC p~rfor~ed ai.i of Cha ~ig~ion~ a~aigned by high~r com~mnd With excell~nce
and damon~tr~E~d brogd initiativa 3n it8 aork aith resp~ct to de~ivering
on ach~sluie cargo and ~~arga number of co~and personnei of tha Red Army
to descinatioas n1on~ itg route9....
"Duriag ehe period of ita opara~ional eubord~nation to the Sourharn Fron~
the lgt I.oag-Rang~ Air Divieion performed 1,35~ individual flighta totaling
2~381 houre of fiying rime f~r ~hat front and del~vared 1,983 toa~ of Eue1,
718 ton8 of a~nition, 250 tons of ~rar goode, 199 tons of food, 310 tons
oE oth@r typea of cergo and 4,510 people."
In February 1943 the diviaioa'8 crewe parfora~d aa air-lift of troop~ 8nd
fuel for the Southweat Front. At the ~am~ tia~e the division's 103rd Regim~at
vas making air runs for the Stalingrad Front~ helping tha forces With th~,
delivary of fnel, pereonael and medicin8a.
Advance imits of tha 2nd and 6eh tank aro~iae racQived a coneidarabla
amount of aseistance during the Koreun'-Shavch~nko oparat~on. The commander
of ehe 2nd Air Army dasignated the 326th Night Bombar Divieion~flying
Po-2'8 to dsliver auppliae to ths advaace tank uaita b~cauea of bod
roads. Beti?eea 8 and 16 February 1944~ flyi~g day and night in extramely
bad veather, the crerrs performed 822 iadividual flights aud delivetad
48 tons of gasoline~ 65 tons of ammunition aad 52S rocket missi~aa for
guarda mortars to the troopa.
Air lifts of personael and cargo to the forward edge of tha ba~tle atea ~or
the combat aviation occupied aa tmportant place ia the air tranapo~t mi~~iaa~.
Spacial-purpoee uAics, iacludiag the 2nd $pd 4th air divisioas~ had the
main Yola in the parformaace of this important ~ob. Diractly aubordiaate
to tha chisf of staff of tha Red Atmy Air Forca~ ~heae diviaions catried
parsonnel, techaical storee, fuel aad spara parts Erom caatral oupply
basas aa,d raserva Air Porce regimeats to eirfislda o! the air armiaa.
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Aaoth~r funcCinn ~f th~ 2nd ~nd 4th ~p~ci~l=purpa~~ ~ir divi~iong a~~ en
provide ~upport Eor th~ airfi~id m~n~uv~rin~ of ~~g~rv~ a~r uni,e~ of eh~
l~igh Command. gptt+~~n 1~nd 10 ~uly 1944, f~r ~x~mp1~, a trgngporc ~roup
oE ~ii~~~'~f~ ft'~i~ ~h~ 2nd ~pe~ial-Pu~pd~e Atti Uivigioct ug~igted wl,~h Che
operational co~e~ntr~Eion ~t th~ 2nd Air Army ~irfi~ld~ of bamb~r, grouad
attgck and figheer cdrpg frnm th~ Sth Air Army ~ad thr~~ ~~r divi~ion~ from
th~ 17~h Air Arary. ta 1944 ginnp er~ew~ of th~ 2nd Special-Parpos~ Air
Division ~r~ngpor~pd mar~ th~c~ 70,nUU m~n ~nd mor~ rh~n 72d0 ton~ of v~riou~
typ~g of cargo for th~ frone ~tr ~rc?i~~.
Bet~en 14 and 21 July 1944 a~ gr~up of lg Li-2'~ of th~ 2nd 3pecial-Purpo~~
Air Divi~i~n p~rform~d a mi~gion invoiving Eh~ dp~r~ti~n~i c~nc~ntr~tion
of uircr~fe ia th~ 1gt ~~ltie Fronc ~on~. ~n on~y four d~y~~-frdm
14 to 1~ Juiy~th~ group m~d~ 752 rripg eo r~d~ploy twn sir corps ~nd
on~ divigion of th~ Ntgh C~n~nd'g r~~~rv~ whieh wer~ b~ing tr~n~f~rr~d
fr~ tha l~t to the ~rd Air Ar~y~ ~nd ~advpd ~ fight~t corpg to g new
baee vi~hin the 3rd Air Army. A tot~l nf 3,113 mQn and 272 toeg nf C~rgo
ver~ mov8d by air.
'it~e u~e of rr~n~pc~rE ~vi~tton greatly rpdured th~ amount of time involved
in the trangpore oparations, but it ~1~~ cr~a~tpd a l~rg~ gap b~tw~~n the
artival of m~n and c~rgo d~liver~d by gir and th~ grcival nf ground
echeloag. It took only thr~~ d~yg for military cransport unit~ tn aav~
the firet and gecond echelnng of the znd Bomb~r Corpg Erom th~ Voronezh
~c the North Cauca~u~ Fronc in April 1943, but ~t took 13 day~ for rhg
third ~ahelon t~ ~rriv~ by land. Th~ corpg h~d already b8en ~ngag~d in
comb~t op~ration~ ~ix d~y~ by that time.
K. I. Lysenko, who served in comamad positions throughout the entire var ia
che 2nd Special-Purpose Air Division--es detacha~ent, squadrnn~ group and
regimeatal commander--t.e11~ in hi~ m~moirg about the circumstances uadgr
vhich the cr~w~ p~rformed their missiong of transporting front aviarion
pereanael:
"During the period oE th~ active offen~aive bq our troop~ ~ was t~+ice placed
in command of flignt groupB for redep2oying Air ~orc~ units to airfields
at thQ front.
"My firgt group, vhich consi~ted of six cre~?s~ oper~ted in Hay 1944. N~
vere eransferring che lst Guard~ Air Corpg to a ne~ base. The second
group~ consiating of eight cre~a, wag activ~ ia Augugt. Lt transferred
leatiing staff m~mb~t~ ~d ~~gin~~ri~g ~ad ~~ettutirgl p~r~onnel di the 2ad~
Sth and 17th gir armies.
"I recall only the names of the aircraft co~andera assign~d to those
gcoups: Larionov, Polyokov~ boriukin, Dudkin~ Kozin and Tarabarov in the
first group, aad Korshunov, 5nzoaov, 5lepav~ Demidov, Durnov~ Makhrov~
Pndayev and Sorokin in the second. The tWO gcoup$ together transferred
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~oR ox~~ci~. us~ orn,~c
owre than 3,C~00 men en ~l~rfi~lcl~ ~e eh~ frone and h~u1~d mar~ ~h~n 100 tons
of ~~c~oi n~king Eligt~t~ in ~h~ prnCegg. All a~ ~h~ cr~wg p~~~~rm~d
th~i~r mi~~i~ng WiCh ~x~~ll~n~~ nnd With ~a flighr ~C~id~ntg.
"...in Augugt 1944 dur grdup of tr~n~pnreg wn~ ed d~liv~r flight p~r~unn~i
and ~~~hnic:i~n~ tn ai~~i~ld~ ~t th~ Erdne. Th~ group wa~ td b~ ~$anre~d dh
_ th~ fliglit by fighe~rg. Ag th~ l~~d~r L W~g tn1d, prior tn e~k~-off, thnt
~11 m~ct~r~ h~d been ~ddrdin~t~d ~nd aa~g eold eh~ ~irfi~ld wh~r~a our grnup
w~~ td b~ mat by the ~gcdre fighter~. Upnn arriving at th~ airfi~ld
i~dic~t~d 8nd not Eind~n~ ~ny ~gcort pl~nne~ in th~ air t radin~d ehe unit
eoa~nd~r to ~~k Why ehere w~r~ non~. I W~~ told that th~r~ w~s no oiL
~nd thnt eh~ ~i~hterg e~uld r~~t r~k~ nff. In thig gieu~eion ~ h~d th~
gr~up drnp td 1dw-1~ve1 f light ~nd in~eruet~d eh~ cr~Wg to operate on th~ir
oWn in ~~~ord~ttc~ w~eh th~ egsignm~nt. A11 of the cr~wg p~rformed the
mt~~io~ u~ll gnd retuctted to b~g~."
Someth:ing wag le~rned from the pnrticipation by military tr~n~portg in
che m~teri~l suppore nf th~ 6ch Gunrda T~nk Army in th~ Khingan-Mukden
~peration c~rried our by the Tr~ngb~ykgl Front in Augu~t 1945. This
exp~rienc~ is ~ti11 instructiv~ today.
The pec:uli~~iti~s di th~ thentrc of military opergtions ~nd th~ ~normoug
scope af Che operntidn ~d~ it nec~~gary to u~e a considerabl~ number of
military transpores even in the pt~~pgrca?tory phase. The 12Ch Air Army
dp~r~t:tng ~n thQ Tran~baykal ~ront includ~d th~ 54th and 21st gu~rda air
trangp~rt divisions and the 23rd Separate Air Squadron, a total of 210
Li-~'g and 5-47's. From the second or third day until the end of the
operacion more than half of all the tranaports hauled cargo solely for the
6th Guardg Tank Arny.
The army's forward brigades Were advancing 110 to 120 kilometera a day and
itg notor transport fell behind the tank~ when the route led through
mountaindus areas. On tha morning of 11 August some tank and mechanized
corps were prectically Without fuel. Thgt day 49 planes of the 54th Air
Trangport Division carried around 87 tong of fuel frocn Chita to Yutoto.
CreWg of the Zlst Guards 'Transpnrt Division delivered almost as much.
Thanks to tt~e air bridge linking the bases ~nd forWgrd unita of the 6th
Cunrdg Tank Army a cotal of 2~000 tons of fuel~ 186 tons of ammwnition and
mnny tons of aater were delivared Withia a ahort period of time.
- The ~ength of the routes, the difficult Weather conditions (rain. fog and a
dense loa-hanging cloua cover), the absence of ground support for air
navigation ~homing stations~ radio beacon~ and so forth) and the lack of
laadmarks (it Was saostly steppe~ deserts and mountains) all created great
difficulties for che creWS of the cnilitary transports. The assigned
misalons Were performed successfully, however, due in pnrt to the fact
that the tank arcry did its best to help the airflen.
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. The tankm~n c~pCured ~nemy airfi~id~ c~r mad~ l~nding ~Crip~ and ~~t up
rafu~].ieg poinC~ in eh~ ~r~~~ nat G~].lin~ upoa tih~ er~ngpdre aviation for
fuel ~nd ammutiiCton until eh~y h~d dnn~ ~d.
During th~ ~ntir~ p~ridd ~f edmb~c ~p~rat,tnng ict Man~tturi~ eh~ 12th Air
Army'~ er~nsport ~vi~ridn eampl~t~d 3~006 fli~litg and transp~rted 3~749
Cotis of variou~ typ~~ ~f c~rgd ~nd 10~452 p@op1~.
Tha front gviation's n~~d ~~r gpara pgtit~ ro r~stnre its air fle~t incr~~~~d
sh~rply in tha ~~mbgt ~itu~tic~n.
In th~ ~pring of 1942 th~ gp~~i~l~purpd~n air r~giar~nC (duC of which th~
2nd Sp~ci~l-P~rpa~~ Air niviginn w~~ fdrm~d) r~c~iv~d g dir~acrive from
� Air Forc~ h~~dqu~rter~ t~ g~t up a~p~cic~l ai.r tr~n~port grdup nt nn
~airf i~ld n~nr Mn~eow, dir~atly gubordin~t~ to Cha Air ~arc~ chi~f of regr
s~rvic~g. An gir fr~ight transfer b~ge w~g ~et up ~c the ~ir~i~ld.
Arr~ng~mpntg hnd to be mad~ fnr ghipping spar~ p~rtg tn girfield~ nt the
front. An air trangport group congieting c~f 30 plan~s hgndled th~ delivery
of ihig cargo. 5quadrnn ~ngine~er I. C. Mnskalev was charged wiCh technical
~up~trvigion of the operation.
"F1ith our transport planeg," racellg [vnn Gregorovict~ Mosknlev, "we hguled
averything up to engines, t~ull pnrt~ ~nd prnpellerg for ground attack
planeg and fighters, in g~neral---everything trhich could be ldnd~d into a
fuselage or carried in bomb rack~....
"The comm~ndera of the frontg and armies ggve hi~h marks to the perforaance
of the tranaport creWS, and all of our creW members were awarded combat .
arder8. The awards were frequently preaented personally by the commander
of a front or an arrtry there at the frontline airfields." -
Air transportation of equipment and ~upplies reached its greatest scale
during preparations for offensive operationa and d'uring the p~riod of
intensive combat operations by the Soviet Air Force. In July and Augus[
of 1944 alonp~ for examplp~ 1,000 tong of technical stores and epare partg -
was delivered to air units on Li-2's.
Our experience in transportin~ trnops~ cambat equipment and other cargo by
air during the war demonstrated the effectiveness of this method of
deliveriz~g materiel. The enployment of military transports made it
poesible successfully to conduct combat operations both in un offensive
and in a defense and to step up the tec~po of an offensive and increase
the depth of an operation considerably.
Into Partisan Territory
The combat operations conducted by partisans during the Great Patriotic War
aere highly important. The eneay had no peace in the rear urea. When the
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~o~ o~Frciai, us~ ornY
figh~ir~g w~~ moge ineenge ae rhe front tihe HiC1~riCes w~rg forced to
withdraw con~id~r~b1~ f~r~e~ to combgt eh~ parti~ang.
- It would b~ impossible Co overesCimaCe the importi~nce of Cha partisan
movemgnt Co our vi.ctory and i.t would be equally imposgible to exaggerae~
the eonCribution mgd~ by Ch~ eranaport av3aCion in gupport of Cheir
_ combat op~ration~. '
Throughoue the war frontline uriits of the Civil Air F1aet~ light bomber
regim~ntg of the fronC avigtion and long-range uniCa continuously aupplied
the partiggn detachment~ wieh w~apona~ ammunition, radio equipmenC,
medicin~s, food and nther suppli~s. The delivery of newspapers and ~
bull~tins from the mainland Wg9 equally impnrCant~
Flights to the partisans deu~nded special skill: the ability to land on
undeveloped and, es n rule, scaall stirips, to take off in the dark without
proper faciliCiea and ~ good knnwledge of Che t~rrain~ the last in order
unerringly to find Che right area and landing site.
_ IC was apparent by the end of 1942 that air tranaporC uniCs would have to
apecialize. Groups designated for communicating with the partisana were
made up of the most experienced flight peraonnel. Specific partisan
daCachm~nts w~re assigned to each such air group. The 12Jth Separate
Air Ecegiment of the Civil Air Fleet (of the apecial Western Air Group
of the Civil Air Fleet), for example, served 21 partisan detachmen~s and
brigad~es in the summer of 1942, the number increasing to 37 by the end
of Che year.
During the war pilots for the special air groups had to fly be~ind the front
lina many times, making dangerous landings in the enemy's rear area at
night. Hero of the Soviet Union Captain B. A. Lakhtin made 91 landings
in Po-2's and R-5's, Hero of the Soviet Union Major G. A. Taran made
61 landings in Li-2's and S-47's, guards pilot Captain N. I. Zhukov
made 20, and Guards Senior Lieutenant I. A. Tarasov, 181. 27
The lst Air Transport Division was especially important in providing the
partisan detactunents with aupplies and keeping them in contact with
th~ mainlaad.
Although it was renamed a bomber division and its combat work was different,
the division continued throughout the war to perform special missions to
deliver personnel, ammunition, wea~ons, food, fuel, medicines and agitation
leaflets to the Ukrainian~ Belorussian~ Crimean and Latvian partisans.
In the performance of special asaignment~ for the staffs of the partisan
movement alone, division crews made 380 landings at night deep in the
enemy's rear area, delivering 695 men, more than 300 tona of ammunition~
around 130 tons of special cargo and dozens of tons of fuel. On the return
trips they evacuated 1,328 wounded and hauled out 30 tons of cargo.
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The lOlst Air Regiment commande~ by Hero of the Sovi.eC Union Colonel V. S.
Grizodubova performed wiCh specigl distincCion on those flighta. A. M.
Verkhozin served as regimental chief of ataff and Lieutenane Colonel
N. A. Tywrenkov as deputy regimental commander~for political affairs
during the war. The names of airme,n H. G. LuneCs, 5. S. Zapylenov,
V. M. Fedorenko, G. V. Chernopyntov, N. I. Slepov and I. S. Valukhov,
navigators A. D. Kasparov and N. N. Pokachalov, and many oChera were _
Well known to the partisans of Che Ukraine and Belorussia.
At the end of September 1942 the lOlst Regiment went from making isolated
flights to detachments fighting on temporarily occupied Cerritory Co
, performing combat work for the partisans on a broad scale. Ear,ii night
dozeas of heavy planes carrying ammunition, weapons (including cannons and
m~rtars), food and cloehing crossed the front line and dropped their cargo
to the partisans deap in the enemy's rear area.
It soon became apparent, however, that the planes would have Co land among
the partisans. A group of officers was detailed to select suitable
~ sites and to set up a flight line service. They wer~e dropped by parachuCe
at the pro~ected landing sites in immediate,proximity to the zone of
operations of the partisan deCachments. A copy of an account by Captain
Kudryukov, one of the officers sent Co the location of D. V. Yemlyutin's
partisan detachments, was preserved in the archives.
"On the night of 25 September I took off for the area of Bryansk as part of
an aircraft crew commanded by Senior Lieutenant Chernopyatov. The aircraft
co~ander and I had made an advance, detailed study of the site where we
were to land and which we detected without difficulty as we flew to our
destination. Personnel of Comrade Yemlyutin's detactunent received me
joyously. The next morning they helped me to find a landing site and
then to make it safe for take-offs and landings....
"I must say that my flight directly to the partisan detachment, followed
by the arrival of a number of comrades, raised morale to a new level for
uucompromising struggle with the enemy, and the partisans entered mo~e
boldly into c~mbat to perform their important assignments with the knowledge
tha~ Russi~ proper would came promptly to their aid when necessary."
The fact should be mentioned that, despite the enthusiasm of the partisans
and the efforts of the airmen in the detachr,ients, the landing strips were
not always satisfactory by far, and it was only good flying skill which
rescued the crews as th~y performed their extremely difficult missions.
I recall a well-known incident which occurred in June 1943 on a flight by
a crew headed by I. A. Grishakov. The partisans could see that something
happened to the heavily loaded aircraft during take-off. Deciding that it
had crashed, they set out to find it. As it turned out, however, the
aircraft commander had managed to save both the crippled plane and its
passengers.
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This i~ what happ~n~d. During eh~ t~k~-~ff from th~ clearly ungui.Cabla
strip the tnil aection nf th~ nir~r~fr gtruck a tr~e~ cau~ing eon~id~r~ble
damage to th~ stnbi].tx~r, th~ elevntor and Cti~ eail whe~1~ which then
fc.ll uff in the nir. in addieinn~ tha pl~n~ wa~ soon gCCncked by ~nemy
fightccrs. It reeaived gev~rnl hol~~ ~nd nrh~r d~mm~g~. Deepit~ a11 thi.e~
Major Gri~h~kov honornb~y extrieated tiim~el.f from the difEicult eituation
aad~ after a 6-hour flight~ lgnded ~nfe],y ~C Che homp airfield. '
That incid~nt demnn~tr~red nne ~+n1y the pilot'e grent frying ekill buC aleo
th~ aurvival qualitieg de~igned into rhe Li-2~ which wag sti11 abl~ tn fly
ia a seemingly hop~l~gs gitu~tion.
One of the problemg facing the division command and Che aircraft command~re
vae that of increa~ing th~ cnpubilitiea of the aircr~ft~ specif:caLly the
raag~ of the Li-z. 'T. A. 5trokach, chief of ~taff of the Ukrainian
partiegm m~vement aeked V. S. Crizodubova, couumnder of the lOlet Itegiment~
to install ~dditional fu~l tanke on the aircraft to make it poagible for
them t~ fly to partisan forceg of the Right-nank Ukraine. The engingering
aad Cechnical aervica did the design work, and extra fuel tanks aoon
appeared on the first aircraft. They were then installed on 25 more planea~
and thc crewe provided effectiv~ nsaigtance to partieans deap in the
rear area.
The diviaion's well-organized couununicntions service was highly important
to the succeasful execution of misaions. Fngineer-Ma~or Panov was in _
charge of it. In the most difficult aituntions the crews were able to
coatact ground facilities and to make proper decieions with their aesistance,
Once, for exnmple, aircraft commander Vladimi.rtsev's crew received an .
assigcu~ent to deliver an emergency load of ammunition to the parCieans.
Approachiag the desCination, the creu found that the markera below were
not those which had been described for identifying the aite. Aircraft
radio operator Bulakov contacted the mainland, explained the situation
and vas told that the partisans had been forced to change the markere for
a n~ber of reasons but had not been able to report this before the plane
had taken off. Ground issued new instructions, and the assignment wes
carried out precisely. When the same crew found itself in a difficult
aituation near Velikiye Luki--the aircraft was hit at the front line~ the
shell damaging t.`?e right engine and :;eriously injuring the navigator--the
aircraft picked up siena]s from a radio beacon. From the beariag and the
radio beacon the crew r~ached their airfield and landed safely without
a navigator.
Ia 1942 alone 3ivision signalmen serviced 715 night combat sorties to
partisans deep in the ec:~m~ 's rear area.
The combat work af the lst Air Division was especially intense during the
vinter of 1942-43. By day the crews performed operational transport
_ .nissioas and at night they bombed enemy installations and flew on apecial
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FOk OF~ICtAL US~ Ot~fLY
mi~~idna td ~upply th~ pnrti,gnn~ with ummunitinn. Ch~rkagsy~ Gomal',
~nbruygk, ~~ranovirlii, tt~x~knp, E~ingk, S~rny~ Moxyr', lf~guml'--ehig ig
fAr frnm c~ edmpl~t~ lide uf th~ ar~a~ witii whirh the divi~inn pi1~C~
mginC~iapd rnnCa~t during that p~ridJ dE Cim~: Mgny crew mpmb~r~ w~re
awardpd the m~dn1 "Pntitig~n nf rh~ Pgtrtntic Wgr" fnr their nctive a~gi~-
tanc~ to th~ partiegn movem~nt~
The folloaing ac~ excerpr~ frnm ~ f~w rdmb~r ddcuro~nt~ char~cC~rizing
operatinng of th~ l~t Air 'i'r~n~p~rt Uiviginn nnd thc eki11, cnurag~ gnd
hernism d~monetrstpd by itg flight cr~w~ in tha performance of combaC
a~~ignments.
~rom the combat r~cnrd nf rhe lOl~t Rpgtment, which w~g aigned by th~ chief
of staf~ of the Beloruggign p~rtiean muvem~uC on 16 April 1943:
"In tha performanca nf nn asgignment covering 95 individual flighte (during
th~ perioci 1 Augugt 1942 ro 14 Apri]. 1943--G.P.) up to 2nU men and 80 ton~
of combat cargo a~re d~livered to partiegn detachm~nCg.
"In addition~ gircrgft p~rforming mie~ions requiring them to land in
parCiggn d~tachmeatg evncuntpd up to 400 men on the raturn trips....
"Placing greaC value on th~ assistgnce provid~d them,the partignn view
fligh~ personnel oE rh~ 101gt Air Itegiroent their selflege and devoted
friends, adcnire their akill nnd ~xpre~s gratitude for Cheir work."
Frnm u renolution of the qblast Committee of the All-Rugsian Communist
Party (Bolshevik) and the Council of People'g Cnmmissarg of th~ Crimean
ASSR~ "Oa thp Work Perfnrmed by Li-Z~SOf tt~e 102nd Long-Renge Air Regin~nt
to Drop Food and Ammunition to Partis~ns in the Crimea":
"1. The Krimskaya Oblaat Committee of the All-Russian Coc~muni~t Party �
(Bolshevik) and the Council of People's Commissars acknoWledges the
enormoug job performed by the air group of the 102nd Long-Range Air
Regimen[ to drop food and ammunition to pnrtisans in the Crimea,who are
atruggling heroically against the Cermun fnacist iavaders~ the sWOrn
enemies of the USSR....
"2. I~e express our gratitudc to rhe technical flight and ground pergonnel
of the group of aircraft serving the Crimea and to the command of the
102nd Ir ng-Range Air Uivi3ion for its exemplnry execution of decisiona
of the Crimeaa Council of t}ie North Caucasus Front....
Secretary of the Kricnskaya Oblast
Committee of the All-Etussian Cocununist P3rty (Bolshevik)
L. Leaisher
Representative of the Council of People's
Commissars of the Crimean ASSk
I. Scyfulayev
14 Juae 1943."
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1'hi~ r~solution w~~ pramulgne~d i.n conn~cti~n with flt~heg p~rrorm~d by
airmen of ehe lg~ Militgry Tran~pnrt Uivigion to th~ Crim~gn pareignn~.
tu Aprtl ~nd Jun~ eh~ divi~ion s~rved th~ Ndrth Cnuc~~ug ~ronC~ c~rrying
out b~mbing aCtnnkg gnd performing trangport miseiong. In Ch~ firsC patit
of June fivp crewg of th~ 102nd Itegiment worked exclusively for pnrt~ean~
in the Cri~nea. They deliv~red 49 ton~ of food, 5 ton~ of nmmunition and
16 p~rntruoperg eo Che pgYti~nng in 18 individu~l flight~~
From an ~cti~:~ report nn as~istance providpd the Leningrad p~?rCisgns:
"3 Mgrch 1943... 17 airczaft w~r~ placed at the dispogal of Comrade Alekg~yev~
a repreeentative of the L~nittgrad partigan ~taf~... fnr dropping partis~ns
and cargo in the enemy's rear grea in occupied rayons of Leningrad Oblast.~,.
'Zhe maseing df pgrtisan detachmenkg~ groupg and cargo was accomplished by
the group on 5 nnd 6 March 1943....a total of 18 individual flights wer.e
perform~d, which moved 2x7 partieang and 11,250 kflograms of ~argo.
"On ~ and ~ Mnrcti 1943 cargo was packed and preperatione were made for
landtng partisan detachm~nti personnel....
"The landing operation was carried out on the night of 9 March 1943....
_ "On 11 March 1943 we received a report from the enemy's rear area to the
effect that all of the men and cargo dropped had been received in good
condition.
"The air group... commanded by Comrade Ma~or Or1QV hns performed an important
combat miesion....
"The Leningrad staff recognizes the exemplary organization of thts landing
operation on tae part of the airgroup command and ite brilliant practical
execution by the aircraft crews....
"With their auccessful gccomplishment of this large-scale landing operation
group command, the aircraft coma~anders and personnel have helped the
Leningrad partisan staff to begin performing combat and reconnaissance
miaeions in the enec?y's rear area without losaes and ia good time...."
Aad finally, excerpts from a document dated 17 April 1943 and signed by
Lieu~enant General P. K. Ponamorenko, chief of the Central Staff of the
Partiean Movement:
"The 1Jlst Long-Range Air Regiment served the Central Staff of the Partisan
Movement from 1 August 1942 to iz rsarch 1943 and from 12 March 1943 to tk~e
present has worked directly for the republic staffa of the partisan movement~
performing a great deal or work to sir-lift men and cargo to partisan
detachments active in the enemy's rear area,
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"Regim~ntal p~r~onn~l hgve performed Ch~ Eollnwing under ord~rg From the
CenCral Staff:
"44 individual flighte for the b~loruesi~n etaff, 111 for th~ Ukr~inian
etaff~ 26 for the Weatern Froat and 337 for the ~ryansk Front,,
"Up to 700 men and 1,000 tons of combae cargo have been moved in 518
indi.vidual flighte to partiean deCachmenta operating in the enemy's rear
area. ~
"In addition~ aircraft performing misaions involving ~ landing nmong
par tisan detachmentg have ev~cuaCed 1,493 wounded and 1,105 gick pereone
and Che children of command personnel on�their return tripa from the
parCisan detachments.
"Thanka ro skillful organization of the complex combat work the regiment
loat neither pereonnel nor equipment during their numerous flighes to
parCisan deCachmenCs.
"Aware o~ the difficultiea involved in delivering ammunition from beyond ttte
front line buC needing it on a daily basis, the parCisane speak wiCh �
apecial gratitude of the ~ob performed by the airmen to deliver them the
cargo.
"The akill demonstrated by the airmen as Chey performed flights in
difficult aeather and landed their heavy aircraft on ill-prepared landing
strips repeatedly evoked admiration from the partisans observing the
auperbly executed landinga and take-offs...." ~
Just who aere these brave and courageous people who elicited admiration
vith their akill and boldneas?
It would be impossible to write about or even simply to meation all of them,
since it would Cake dozeas of pages simply to list the names of those
brave and courageous airmen, who performed in the awesome wartime skiea.
I shall, therefore, tell about only a few of them, those who created our
aviation's fame togeCher with the others.
Stepan Semenovich Zapylenov cocmnanded a crew of the lOlst Air Regiment in ~
1942 and served as commander of that regiment in the rank of lieutenant
colonel beginning in May 1944. He has more than 200 combat sorties to
his credit, of which 132 were performed at night and 27 were made to
par tisans deep in the enemy's rear area.
Pxior to the war Stepan Semenovich served as deputy chief of the Moscow
Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet. His vast experience and knowledge and
his ability ro direct people helped S. S. Zapylenov to become not only an
outstanding commander but also a recognized and respected indoctrinator and
teacher of young pilots. He made a great contribution to the combat and
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gen~ral training o� airmen. Und~r hi~ lpgd�rghip regim~nCg]. pergonn~l m~de
1~739 individu~l combnC aurtieg, moat nf rhem deep into~th~ ~n~my'e r~~r
area. His twn drd~re of Ch~ R~d ~anner~ nrder of Alek~~ndr Nevgkiy~ Chra~
Ordera of th~ Red Srar~ the Order of tlie Patriotic Wa~ fir~C degree,~nd
medal~. including Che "ParCisan of the p~triotic Wgr,~~ first degree,gre
Eitting awarde For thig brav~ ~nd ti.r~lesg Eighr~r. _
Petr Peerovich Abramov began his service in the lOler Air Regimeat in
October 154'l. He p~rfnrmed 205 n~.ght combgt sort~.es, 49 0� them to deliver
ammunition gnd oCher cgrgo to the partigans. The following two incidentg
aCtest to the courage and skil]. of thi~ pilot. On 7 September 1943 P. P.
Abramov's crew d~parred with a load for partisans deep in rhe rear area.
Above enemy-held territory, Abramov's plane was atteckpd by a Hitlerite
fighter. The heavy airship's battle with the fasciet vulture lasted
almost an hour, buC the pilot's greaC ski11 permitted him to emerge �rom
the attack with the aircrafC intact and to complete an ouCsCanding misaion.
In AugueC of that same year Abramov's crew was assigned Che mission of
delivering an emergency cargo eo Yakhontov's partiean detachment. Several
eaemy fighters aCtacked his aircraft at the fronC line. The pilot made
four attempts to cross the front line before he managed, and then only
by dropping to minimum flighr altitude, to eacape pursuit and deliver the
cargo Co the parCisans. � _
The navigators contributed a great deal to the succeasful performance of
combaC miasions. I shall name only two of them--A. P. Bulanov and 0. A.
Akimov. The success of combat flights, eapecially on night misaioas, in
the enemy's rear area and in difficult weather~ depended on their knowledge
aad abiliCiea. Flighta by 102nd Air Regimeat crewa to the Crimean
partisans aucceeded in great part due to the skill demonatrated by
navigator Akimov, who guided the aircraft over the sea aad through the
aatiaircraft fire of shore batteries and was able to bypasa patroling
enemy fighters and to find aites indicated by the partisans in the
mountains at night.
The lst Air Division developed many valorous airmen, eight of which were
awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. These included B. G. Lunts,
T. K. Gavrilov, A. D. Kasparov~ I. D. Kozlov and N. N. Pokachalov.
Naturally, the lst Air Division was aot the only one to become famous for
its flights to the partisaas. Pilots of other air formations also provided
the people's avengers with a great deal of asaistancp.
5upplies were delivered to the lst Belorussiaa Partisan Brigade by the
lOSth Guards Air Regiment commaaded by Ye. T. Klussoa. Pilot N. I. Zhulcov
and navigator A. I. Starkov were the first to land among the partisans of
that brigade. They laid ouC the first routes, over which the partisans
received ammunition, explosives and weapons until the end of 1943.
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A nl.ghr light-bomber Kom~omnl air r~gini~ne form~d in Ch~ middlg oE 1942 nC
th~ ini~iariv~ oE ~ht~ Kom~dmnl Cuntrgl CommiCC~a prdviJ~d Ch~ 13~1nru~~~.un
p~rti~~n~ with cnn~ld~rablu ~e~ietunc~. Th~ regim~nt w~~ comn~nd~d by
Ma~nr M. D. Yerenkov~ a member of the Komgomo]: C~ntrgl Committee gnd an
experienced combgt piloe. During iea combat operation~ Che regiment
performed more than 5,000 sor~ies into the enemy'8 raar area.
The Komsomol regicnent's mig~ions included that o~ maintaining contacC between
th~ fronti command and the partiaana. Theee assignments were performed by
a epecially selected group hegded by Seninr Lieutenant b. S. Krichevgk,
depuCy equgdron coromr~nder. Th~ valorous ~irmen delivered weapons, ammu-
nition~ medicines and newepapera to the partis~ns in the moat difficult
weather and evacu~ted rh~ ~eriously wound~d and ill on Ch~ir return trip~.
They frequently had to land under enemy fir~ at sirea surrounded by fascists.
Krichevek's group performed 133 flighta involving landinga in the enemy's
rear area and 60 flights to air-drop cargo to the partisana. N.1 0� tha
piloCs in this group were awarded orders and medalg. The partisana awgrded
the group commander a pistol with the dedicatory inacription: "To Pilot
D. Krichevgk from the Partisans of Belorueaia."
I feel compelled to say a great many glowing words about Boria Fadorovich
Chirsknv, one of our veCerans and an active parCicipant in the Great
Patriotic War. Firet, however, I wi11 tell about en operation which became
known as the "Air Bridge to Slovakia."
During Che war Soviet air transport units provided assistance not only to
Soviet partisans but also to partisan detachmentg of nations in eastern
and southeast Europe aad to the Resistance movement in those nations.
The assistance given the Slovak NaCional Rebellion and the organization oE .
an air bridge between L'vov airport and the Banska-Bystrica area comprises
a glorious page in the history of our aviation.
By the summer of 1944, when the Soviet Armed Forces, had approached the
border between the USSR and Czechoslovakia, conditions had developed
conducive to an anti-Hitlerite rebellion in Slovakia~ which had been
. artificially separated by the fascist regime. Antifascist forces led by
party organs of the Comwunist parties of Slovakia and Czechoslovakia were
atepping up their struggle against the Hitlerites and their accomplices
and the national committees were becoming real organizers of universal
resi9tance to fascism.
As a result, at the request of Czechoslovak leaders and in accordance with
a Soviet-Czecaoslovak agreement and a treaty on friendship and mu~ual
assistance, an air-lift of Soviet aad Czechoslovak partisan groups from
the USSR to Slovakia was organized in the summer of 1944. As early as
July 1944 the staff of the Ukrainian Partisan Movement and the command
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of th~ l~t 1Jkr~iniun FronC wer~ �drmi.n~ group~ which w~r~ to gt~p up e11~
armpd eCruggle ggg~.nse G~rmnn ~ncl lncal �ngr3~Cg 3.n 5lavnkin, rn di~rupC
rear operati.on~ of Hir1.~r'~ ~rmy by ~v~ry pogel.bl~ m~nng ~nd Cn pnggge in
- poliCical work ~m~ng rh~ ma~g~~. ~
Hetw~~n Ju1y nnd Ch~ ~nd of 1944, 53 organixaeidn~l gr~~p~ totaling nrounJ
1200 peopl~ w~re nu~v~cl intn 5lovulcia by 5nvi~t f1y~r~. Theg~ $rnupg wnr~
formed intn 1grg~ parei~~n formaCion~ m~da up wainly oE Slnvgkg.
By Che end of Augugt ope~gCiong of thp pareisan detachmpnCg, th~ rnnkg of
whicli were cdntinunu~ly r~pl~ni~hed wiCh vnlunte~rs~ h~d Curned into
larg~-scal~ partisnn warf~re im m~~e of Slovakig. This fgcC could nnr
fail to ~voke aerious concern on th~ pnrt of th~ n~tion'~ f~gaigt rulerg.
On 23 AugugC they ~ppealed to Hitl~r for military uniCS. Wehrmacht comm~nd
begaa ~mm~diately to bring its forc~~ 3nCo Che ar~a of Ch~ upri~ing.
Partisxn fnrceg responded with vigorou~ offengive action. Uvring the p~rind
beCweett Z6 ~ttd 30 August the p~rtisan~ occupied g number of pnpulatinn
center~ including Banske-Bystrica~ whiah h~d b~~nme the political cenCer
of the reb~llion.
On 31 August 1944 the Czechoslovak ambassador to the US5R, (S. Firlinger),
appenled to Che Government of th~ 5nviet Union for military assisCance for
the uprising taking shape in Slovakia.
The commander of the lst Ukrainian Front was instructed to prepare for the
possibility of assisting the rebels. Marshal of aviation A. Yc. Colovnnov,
commacider af the Long-Itange Aviation, was ordered to organize an air-lifC
of weapons and awmunition for the rebels nround Banska-Byatrica.
�
The new strategic situation at the beginning of SepCember made an air bridge
the only possible way of helping the rebels. It was decided to air-lift
the 2nd Czechoslovak Airborne Landing Brigade and the lst Czechoslovak
Fighter Regiment to Slovakia, in addition to ammiinition and weapons. ~he
Sth Air Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General I. V. Georgiyev, with partial
participatioa by the 4th Guards Loug-Range Air Corps, was charged witti the
practical execution of that operation.
At the beginning of 5eptember Colonel B. F. Chirskov, deputy comcnander of
the 53rci Air Division, was assigned the ~ob of putting together an opern-
tional group capable of receiving a large number of transport planes at
night at an unfamiliar field airstrip in mountainous terrain~ unloading
them procaptly and sending them back to the mainland.
The group had a large job ahead of it. Among other things, it would have to
prepare tne airsCrip for night operations--establish a fir.ed landing course,
the site for unloading the planes, an engine warm-up site and aa alternate
runway; train people to service the flights (light tenders, unloading and
evacuation teams, and so forth); make the proper decision in each specific
instance as to the number of aircraft which could be accepted and their
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s~qu~ne~; ~y~epmati~~l~y mdnienr th~ wdrk of g11 e~c~m~ dn eh~ t~k~-eEf
dee~31; d3rpct l~nding ~pprnnrh~~, lg?idin~g ~nd e~k~-a~f~ ~nd m~ine~in gh+~
pregcrib~d t~mpo nf ~p~r~ei.nng; ~c~~ tn the r~p~ir ~nd r~linbl~ np~rnei~n
of th~ tal~phnn~ line Cn Chc individuul i.n Charg~ of ~ligheii~~ ~t~oup~ ~ad
m~lc~ c~rtain that tha radia ~~e a~g aiw~y~ ready immediae~ly to er~ngmie
eumm~nd~ to tn~ ~irer~~e at~d r~pdre~ td eh~ ~tnla~d; p~omptly ~cemove ~g~g~
~xriving f~om tti~ mainland ~~nd. c~mdufla~~ th~ ~trf i~lcl.
gorie ~~dnrovich Chir~kov ~h~red with th~ ~uthor hi~ t~coll~ction~ of
~v~ne,s occurri.ng in the f~11 af 1~44 ~t eh~ Tri Dub~ ~irfield in Slnvakia.
Th~ gr~up included the f~llnwing: Chir~kov hie~~lf ~g group aommand~r;
M~jor Migur~ his d~puty; Cgp~~in S~vindv, ehief of communication~;
LieuCea~nt Pnn~marev~ aid~-d~-camp; tao r~dio op~rator~ and gev~n guardg,
who al~o gerved.as m~asen~~rg ~nd g~n~r~l ~ggi~tant~ at the airfield.
Th~y h~d a pow~rful RAF radin eet for communicating with th~ mainland
aad with the ~ircraft. S1ov~k r~belg op~rating in th~ are~ of eh~ Tri Duba
airfield, wnpr~ nur pl~n~ l~ndad, h~lpaci the Sovipt flyers g~t th~ir
begringg on thp terr~in ~nd ghnwed th~m Eh~ b~~C gpot fnr cone~~ling
the radio get. Th~ ~po~ they gugg~geed m~t gll the c~mouflage requirgment~
gnd~ what ia ~gp~cinlly important, wag nnt far from chg girfi~ld.
The aircraft on ahich a~ arrived et the Tri Dubc~ girfield vng unlogd~d nnd
left the same night on g return trip to th~ mainland. Ac daWn the members
of the grnup began ingpecting the landing gite and outlined the l~nding
couree, the aide glide path fdr thd terr~in~ the landing gequence~ the
taxiing run~ the aite for the unlo~ding of the aircraft and for warming
up the engineg and the take-~Ef ~pqu~ncc:. They ~l~u t~nd to d~termine wh~t
sort af ~aaterials and auxiliary equipment aould be required for unloading
bulky cargo such ag gune, vehicl~s, hegvy mortarg and go forth.
The very first night, the night of 18 September 1944, enemy bom~ers carried
out a raid on the airfield readied for receiving the aircrnft. Both the
operationg group and the 5lnvak comradeg had to aork hard to fill in and
pack the numerous holes in the runway and co prepare the airetrip for the ~
aircraft to land aithin the limited time uvailable.
More than 100 tranaports carrying men~ equipment aasi w~apons landed at the
Tri Duba sirfield that same night. There Were no flight accidents. The
~ operations group, th~ flightline team gnd the evacuation team made up of
5lovak rebels performed their duties superbly.
B. F. Chirskov's group worked at the Tri Duba airfield almost six aeeks.
Each c~i.ght, after the last aircraft had departed, they hgd to make the
flight line appear abandoned and in~ctive and to camouflage the ~irfield,
thereby concealing the scope of the entire operation from the enemy's
reconnaissance service. Soviet flyers and their Slovak comrades coped
successfully With this difficult task. The number of bombing raids dropped
S~
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m~rk~dly aad r~conn~i,~~~ne~ ~ire~~fe, Nhielt ~pp~~~r~d in eh~ ~r~~ ~1a~~e
~vr~ry m~rniti~ ~nd ~v~ning, found nathin~ e~ indie~e~ th~e th~ ~3rfi~id h~d
b~gn u~~d during th~a night.
Th~ ~y~E~nm~tic ~fr-~if~ of eh~ ~nd C~~c1~o~~ovak Airborn~ ~ri~~d~ into
glov~t~i~ w~~ b~gw~. it 1~~tpd until ~4 netob~r. tt might bp ine~r~~ting
to r~vi~w inf~rm~eian 7~compil~d by a t~pr~~~nrative ~f lt~~dqu~rt~~~ an ~ic
tran~pore op~r~tio~~ b~tw~pn 27 S~pe~mb~t and Z4 Oetob~r:
~~anspox~~~ No. of pi~nes Naui~d ou~ ~n
~ r~turn titiip
D~tie
'u~ ~
^ ~ v
~ ~ ro ~
~ v ~
~ ~ ~ " ~ ~ ~ o+
a ~ H ~ ~ ~ w ~
27 Sep 44 106 13 13 13 -
7 Oc~ 44 334 47 47 47 111 -
8 Oct 44 268 44.5 45 45 153 0.4
9 Oct 44 96~ 62.'l 72 72 139 0.2
10 Oc: 44 7 1.1 20 2 18 3
14 Oc: 44 514 55 104 2
15 Oct~4~ 31 11 30 10 20
17 Oct 44 156 44.5 71 42 29 43 4.5
'34 Oct 44 45 24.8 39 18 21 72
Totai ~928 303.6 337 249 88 625 7.1
9y analyzing this information one can get 8ome idea of the enor~us amount
- o~ Work p~rformed by a relatively amall force involving flights of congid-
erable range. In che rapidly changing situation of that time such extensive
air transport operations aas only poseible aith extremely well organized
reception and dispatch of the aircraft.
Chief Marshal of AviatLOn A. Ye. Golovanov, farmer long-range aviation '
commander, gives an evaluation of the Work performed by the operations
group at the Tri Duba airfield during that period and his summation of the
performance of the air bridge to Slovakia:
"...Chirskov's group land~d safely and immediately began making preparations
for receiving aircraft, large groups of wiiich were to begia arriving very
soon: as many ag 80 to 100 planes a night. The ~ob would not have been an
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~~y oa~ ~ven und~r urdin~ry ~i~rCUtt~Canc~~. In thi~ c~~e, eh~c~ w~~~ ~n~my
- fight~r b~~~~ n~~rby, and ~ r~i,J cduld b~ ~xp~ce~d ~ny d~y~ M~ximum
camou~l~g~ mm~~gurp~ h~d tn b~ eakeci far th~a night np~rdtinn~, ahi~h m~~nt
.th~C thp ~~mb~r c~f 13,gheg dn ti� flight fi,eld h~d Co b~e k~pe eo a minimum~
A~rriving airer~ft h~d eo 6p unldad~d wieh gr~~t h~gt~ ~nd ~~nt off a~~in
iom~di~e~ly, ~inee ~he ~irfi,~ld ~~uld nnt p~ne~~~ ~ l~rg~ nun~ ~r of ~ire~~fr
~t dn~~ ~nd ir Wga d~ng8rou~ for th~m ta r~m~in uneil d~y~ima: eh~ ~r~~ wa~
ragularly vigie~d by ~n~my r~Cdnnal.~g~ncp p1~n~s.
'b~~pit~ al1 th~ ob~e~ei~~~ hda~ever, aur ap~r~ei~n~ gr~up m~n~g~d to dn eh~
impo~~ibl~ uttd~r eh~ very ndg~ di the en~nry. During ehe v~ry firgt nightg
following its arrival eh~ group mgda the pr~~aratiang n~c~~gnry fdr r~reiving,
unlnading and di~p~eehing Erom 80 to lUti,nr n~r~ girer8ft. 7'hay arrivpd ~t
ehe airfi~ld in Wav~g nf 15 ro xU plane~. 'This conv~yor line perfor.m~d
lik~ a smoochly ad~ugtpd m~ct~ine, althau~h en~nry ~ircraft bomb~d th~
airfield mor~ tnan one~~" 30
Thig ig haw Bori~ F~dorovi~h Chirgkov his~~lf, pr~ge~tly ~ gu~rdg m~~or
g~n~ral nf ~viation (~gerve), rgteg the wdrk df hig cnmrad~g:
,
"I vould 1ik~ ~o give prdper credit to the connnandQr~ of the nir regiment~
and crgws ahich landed ac the Tri nub~ ~irfi~ld ~r dropp~d n Cargd,
ther~by aesi~ting th~ ~eb~lling pe~ple dE 5lovakig; regimgntc~l cnannt?nd~r~
of th~ 5th Bomb~r Corpg Filin, it~vich, 5h~mrnyev, 5t~pannv, Yexergkiy and
Afonin, and r~gim~ntal cocmnandprs of the 4eh Gu~rd~ Bomber Corps
Uragomiretskiy. ~alenko, presnynkov~ Dmitriy~v ~nd m~ny oth~rs. ~hey
prepar~d their creW~ properly for each night flight to 51a~akia and
thoroughly considered all of the informatinn which I Cronsmitted tn the
mainland from th~ Tri Uubu ~irfield. 'It~i~ included~ among other informatinn,
- apecifications for finding thc airfield, the prncedure and ~equence of
action to be taken by the pilocs in the landing ~pproach~ infdrtt~ation
relating to use of the homing station for plotting a rectilinear approacn
route. the landing pattern for the night, che glide path folla+ing the
` fourth turn, prevailing wind~ at th~ airfield, and so forth. In addition
to this, the regimental coma~nders receivEd detailed critiques of errors
committed, vhich we also sent out every night in the reports on the last
aircraft departing for the mainland.
"All of these measures carried out by ti~e operations group gnd the air
regiment commands justified tt~er,~~lves by toCally eliminating flight
accidents at the Tri Duba airfield and considerably reducing conditions
which could give rise to them.
"I must not and do not have the right not to say a few words of praise
about aur flight personnel--the pilots, navigators, aircraft technician~,
radio operators and aerial gunners wt~o f1eW into Slovakia. I beqan to
- appreciate them fu11y duric~g the period when they were making fligtits to
the Tri Uuba airfield--their bravery, heroism, skill and infinite devotion
to the assigned work. Bach crew Was distinguished by these qualitie~~ and
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oae could only ~dmir~ th~ dilig~flc~ ahich thpy d~man~er~t~d ~e eh~ '~ri. Uub~
~irfi~ld. ~~tw~~n 1~nding ~nd t~k~-nff, ~ m~~rd~ ~f minue~g, th~y m~n~~~d
not only to unl~~d tt~~ pign~ but Algn to pue on ba~rd ~~r~tGti~r~ bn~,ring
wound~d 31ov~k ~oldi~r~ ~nd p~rei~~n~. I~ w~~ a~oy en ob~~rv~ th~m du~3.ng
tho~~ p~riod~: Wh~e ~ h~ppy cambination o~ milit~ry firmn~s~ ~nd r~gourc~-
fuln~~~, o~ t~nd~rne~$ ~nd ~~~e~rn for th~3~ wound~d comr~d~s in arm~.
My nur~~ wauld h~va ~nvi~d rh~ w~y in whieh ehey c~rri+~d ~hd tr~nsferr~d
th~ wound~d a~n wichout hurting th~m. Th~s~ er~wg it~clud~d fir~t d� ali.
those of our r~nown~d piioe~, H~ro~~ of th~ 5ovi~r Union M. T~ i~nov~nkd,
M. F. Ko~t~nkn and A. A. V~gi.l'y~v~ Comr~d~~ A. N~ Koe~lkov, N~ S. t.~rionov,
Y~. A. ~im~hin, V. V. 2~kharov~ P. Gubin, V. M. g~xbokov, Yu. Et. g~zbdkov,
G. Y~z~rgkiy gnd n~ny of our nth~r fin~ gireraft nommand~rg--m~n who
devalopad smoothly cnordin~ted nomb~t crews, who ingtill~d in th~ir m~n not
only br~v~ry ~nd skill but ~lgo infinite d~votion to the Communigt Party
and th~ hotn~land and develop~d in them a~~n~~ of comrad~ly du~y and
ae~igtanc~. .
"I ~tould al.~o lik~ tn menCion my cing~st assistgntg 3n the operetion~
gtioup--Ma~or Migur and Capt~in Savinov. They worked d~y and nighC, eot
kno~ting th~ word 'tired' at the eirfi~ld and at tha radio station, with
tl~air aelfl~s~ 1~bnr helping th~ group to accomplish thp extremely difficult
Laslcg ~ssigtt~d it by cdmQnand.
"A lot of water has gon~e under the bridge since the 'Air Bridge to Slovakia'
~nd~d, but the Soviet pilots who took part in tho~e flights have not
fargott~n th~ day~ and nights spent in the ~oint struggle of the Rusaian
and 5lovak peopl~s for freedom and independence.
"l'e vill never forget the warm treatment received by Soviet fightingmn~n
from the population of Slovakia~ or their bravery, honor, fraternal
asaistance and self-sacrifice for a comrade."
As ae discuss in greater detail the air bridge to Slovakia and the work
perform~d by the opera tions group at the Tri Duba airfield during that
period~ We also have to tell in greater detail about Boris F~~�arcvich
Chirskov himself, about his cocobat history. He ~oined tha Red Army
ia 1927 at the gg~ of 20. Upon graduating from the Borisoglebak School
for Pilots he becaaa~ a flight commander and then a squadron commissar,
taking part in the landing of inea and cargo during the Soviet-Finnish war.
The Great Patriotic War found B. F. Chirskov serving as commander of a
heavy bomber squadron. At the end of 1941 Chirskov was appointed commander
of the lst Heavy Bomber Regiment. The Guards title was conferred upon
the regimeat in 1942 for its successful actions against enemy airfields.
Chriskov's plane was shot down by enemy fighters on one of the combat
missions to deliver food and ammunition to Lieutenant General P. A.
Belov's cavalry corps. The pilot injured his leg when he landed near
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,
~ox o~~~ciaL us~ dxi,Y
th~ Ciey of Udrngdbuxh. lta wag r~mnv~d ed g hu~pienl in Klin but ~ddu
re~urn~d to hi$ unie gnd re~umed ~onmu~nd nf th~ l~t Gu~rd~ H~~vy Bamb~r
Regim~nt. ~
Chir~kov'e cYew d~liv~r~d fnod tn b~~ieged L~ningrad and h~uled many
childr~n out tn th~ mginl~nd.
_ F. Chirekov b~cam~ d~pury cnmm~nd~r di the 53rd Air Uivision in 1943.
In 1944, during tti~ fighting n~nr Umai~', ehn ~irmen h~lped d~l~ver fu~l to
th~ tgnkm~n. Arnund 4U Li-~'~, with whiCh tli~ diviginn 1?~d be~n outf3tted
by th~t time, were involved in thi~ mi~sion.
Afrer th~ wgr ~ori~ Fednrovich tnok p~rt in g number of axped3tione during
hie continuing ~ervice in th~ r~nkg of ouc glorioug aviaCion.
Algo talcing part in th~ ~ir trnnsp~rt nnd landing operaCions gnd Bpeci.fi-
cally in Che flightg to Slovakig were Nikolay Fedntovich zgyCg~v ~nd
Viktor Va~i1'yevich zakharnv. N. xgytsev is one of our well-known
vetgrans and w~g on~ of th~ mnst ncti.ve conmu~nders contriburing to the
dev~lopment and build-up nf the Milit~ry Trgngport Aviation even after
the war. V. V. Zakhardv, presently n major general of avi~tion, commanded
an Li-2 Crew in the fall of 1944 and rep~gtedly deliv~red ammunition and
men to the Tri Uuba airfield. zakh~rov performed flights and landings
, etrictly according to instructinns receiv~d from the �light operation
ofEicers. Only once did he recn~~in amnng ehe 5lovaks for a day because of
' engin~ trouble~ giving a high rating to th~ skill of t}~e operations group
supporting aireraft l~ndings in the cl~~ring nestled high in the mountains.
This is what V. V. Zakharov had to say about Che flights to the Tri Duba
airfield:
"Over a period of several munths the group directing the flights, headed
by Colonel Boris Fedorovich Chirskov, deputy division commander, always
met the crews landing with men and aaIInunition at the Tri Duba airfield.
"Our route covered around 1,000 kilometers at that time, buC the main
difficulty lay in negotiating the Ct?rputhians and mtiking the landing ~
approach. We usually flew at an altitude of 3,000 meters and began
breaking through the clouds in ~ spiral after 2500 kilometers, the only
possible maneuver in the area of Banska-Bystrica.
"The first thing we saw was the flare from a rocket with which Chirskov
signaled us. It was the 'shafC' around which we circled until the ground
became visible, and there was the landtng 'T' laid out with lamps. We did
not delay at the airfield as a rule, but rapidly unloaded the ammunf [ion,
[ook the c~ounded on board and dep?rted immediately on the return trip.
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, ~
,i
"Aware thaC Che Slovak partieans were expecting us~ we flaw almoat every
ntght, hauling in anti-tank guns, machine guna and a~nunition~ On one of
the flighte our plane began to shake--someChing wae wrong witih the ri.ghe
engine. The front line was behind ~us and we trad already croseed one mountain
` ridge. There were other mountaine ahead of us. The moet important rhin$,
however, wge the facr thae it would be imposeible to repair the engine at
the partiean aire. At ~he eame time, we knew thaC they were waiCing for
ue and that the 1. and 1/2 Cone o� amaiunition meant a great deal Co the
Yebels.... I decided to con~inue on to Tri Duba. We made a difficu].t
laading. Pilote know what it means to land an aircr~ft on one engina
at aight.
"The malfuncCioning engine forced us to xemain at the airfield until our
comrades could deliver the nacessary partie.
"The nexC morning we were amazed at the eteepness of Che mountaina which
completely surrounded the clearing and reminded one of an enormoua cup with
our airfield forming a velvety green bottom. I was even somewha~ frightened
at the Chought of whaC awaited an aircraft which might sCray even slightly
off course," I
The planes landed and took-off safely, however, a demonstration of Ch~
excellenC akill of Soviet pilots.
The operatioa "Air Bridge to Slovakia" convincingly demonstrated Che vast
experienca acquired by Soviat aviation in rransporting eroopa and cargo.
That operation was one of the moat successful of the Great PaCriotic War, �
and the following formed the baeie for its auccese.
In the firet place, the organization and planning of such operatione, as
well aa the ways and methoda by which th~ transport aviaCion performed
ite epeciEic and uuique miaeions, had already been worked out'sufficiently
by that Cime. Control of all the forcea i.:.volved in an operation wae
conceatraCed in the Long-Range Aviation command which wae directly in~
charge of the ass3gAed misaion and which reported the resulta to the
Supreme High Command ae the operation progreased.
Secondly, considerable forces with experience in flying under difficult
weather conditiona were drawn upon to perform a miasion. S uffice it to
say that whea the airborne landing operation began the Sth Air Corpa~
which was mainly responsible for delivering the troops and cargo to
Slovakia, had 127 crews trained to perform night landings without searchlights.
The corpa had Li-2's and C-47's which could be used for traneporting not
only troops and ammunition, but vehicles, field weapona and so forth,
as well.
,
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In the Chird place, the flighta were Choroughly organized and directed, which
wae an important facCor contributing to Che auccesa. Operating amoothly at
Che airfield, in addirion eo B. F. Chirakov's-group, was an operaCions
group headed by Ma~or General Bogdonov, chief of staff o~ the Sth Air Corpa,
whieh direcCed the loading and dispatching of aireraft.
lteliable radio contact made it possible in difficult weather to direct the
aircrafC landings in the small area in the mountains, to maintain Cwo-way
conCact with Che corps staff and to tranemit weather reports Co the landing
area av~ry 30 minuCes. The crews received reports from reconnaiasance
� aircraft every 10 or l~ minutea on the weather situation along the route.
The fact that the flighC profiles were worked out for Che entire rouCe aad
that the crews maint~ined the prescribed conditions precisely also
contribuCed to flight safety even over the front line and over enemy
territory.
~ As I conclud~ this page in the combat history of the Military Transport
Aviation, I refer ance again to the above-mentioned article by Chief Marshal
oi' Aviation A. Ye. Golovanov:
"WiCh respect to scale, the eupport provided for Che rebels in Slovakia
comprised one of the largest operations carried out by the Long-Range
Aviation during the Great Patriotic War. Six regiments of the SCh Air
Corps and the combat crews of se~veral regiments of the 4th Guards Long-
Raage Air Corps took part in it.
"We delivered not only small arms but also regimental mortars, artillery,
motor vehicles, anti-tank weapons, heavy machine guns and oCher military
equipment. In addition to flights to the Tri Duba airfield we also flew
to othPr locations in Slovakia, where we dropped weapons and a~nunition.
"During the Slovak uprising our aviation delivered to the rebels more than
1,O~J0 Cons of cargo, mainly weapons and armmunition. In the fall of 1944
more than 40 percent of the weapons used in many partisan detachments
operating in Slovakia was Soviet-produced. This is how we performed
our international duty."
He shall never forget the heroic selflessness of the Soviet people, who
came to the assistance of their brothars in their hour of difficulty.
It would be impossible to overestimate the importance of air transport
uaits for ensuring the success of operations carried out by the partisans
both in the USSR an~ in the nations of Eastern Europe. Theae were vital
links and real assistance from the mainland to the patriots in occupied
�~territory.
Long-range air transport units, the front aviation and Civil Air Fleet
units per�ormed a total of 109,000 individual flights, including 13,000
which involved landing among the partisans. The Long-Range Aviation and _
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Civii Air Fleet uni,ts alone traneported 17~000 tona of anmunition~ weapone~
tood~ radio Aete, medicine~~ mail and otheti cargo. Mora than 93~000
individual.s ware hauled out of aed returned to tha partiean datachmente.31
This ie far from a complete picture, but it is ~dequaCe for ~udging
avi.ation'~ importance in supporting the partiegn movement~ nnd eupplying
Soviet patriote in areae temporari~.y held by the enemy and in aseiering
the Yebels of the natioae nf Eastern ~urope.
Pageg From the Pighting History '
i shall dl.ecuss in somewhat greater detail the operations of cartain unSCe~
vhich uere called upon more fraquently than the othare to perform air
~ traagport missione during the Great Patxiotic War.
Pirat of all, I wou~d like to tell about the combat experience of one of
our uaits--the 2nd 5pecial-Purpose Air llivision~ which I have a].ready
mentioned.
1'he 2nd Special-Purpose Air Divialon was formed out of a aeparate apec~al-
purpoae air regiment of the Air Force, whose history goes back to the
1930'e. and the aeparaCe special-purpose detachment formed in 1929 and
outfitted with TB-1 aircraft, which has already been menr.ioned. The
pilc~ts in tha~t detachment, which became an air aquadron, took part in the
legen~ ary flighte of the 1930's and eet up the flights of V. P. Chkalov
and M. r:.. Gromov. 5uch famoua pilots as Chief MaYahal of Aviation A. Ye.
Golovanov, Chief MaYShal of Aviation B. P. Bugayev, minister af civil =
aviatioa, aad maay others also served in the regimeat. ,e
The 2nd Special-Purpose Air Division originally included eeveral regiments~
vhich subeequently underwent certain changes. Colonel V. G. Grachev
vaa named commander~ Ma~or H. Ye. Mazovko chief of staff, 5enior BaCtglion
Commissar S. Z. Koval' chief of the political sectioa, and Regimental
Co~i.saar A. I. Kozlov military commissar. ,
The divieion was subordinate to the etafi of the Red Army Air Force ar~d was
designated for tranefezring air unita from rear to forward airfielde and
from one front to another, for delivering urgently needecl cargo and
medicinea to fronts and armies and arrmunition and weapons to the partieaas,
aad eo forth. The flight crews were aleo asaigned apecial miesions aueh
as apecial flights to carry party leadera and membere of the government,
military leaders, members of foreign miseione and othere.
Nilitary traas~porta of the 2nd Special-Purpoae Air Division Were uaed
during the war for maneuv~ring air unite both within a front and between ~
tronce. One of the first important combat miseions a8signed division
commaad was that of transferring two compoei.te air corps and seven separate
divisioas, as well as numerous unita of the 8th, 16th and 11th air armies
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to airfiel.de n~~.~ the front in pr~pgrgrinn for eh~ counterolfeneiv~ negr .
Stalingr~d. The Divieion'~ lat Et~gim~nt alon~ performed 621 flighte at thn
aad of 1942, Craneporeing 5~b48 men and 285 tonr of cargo. The 2ttd and
3rd air Craneport regim~ntg tr~n~ferr~d 5,356`men arid 637 tone nf cargo.
In emergancy air-lifC~ of troopr and c~rgo in ~943 the Divieion delivared
125~628 man and 11~487 tone of ammunitinn aad other cargo to the fronte ~
and ro the pnYtieane.
Duriag the first period of exigtence of the 2ad 5pecial-Purpose Air Divieiou~
1942-1943~ from three to five tran~porta uer~ plnced at th~ diepoeal of
fighter~ bomb~r and gtound-attttck formatione for traneferring the pereonnel
of their units~ and for th~ gelaruseian and other large otfeneive operationa
of 1944. Equipment and personnel of thp 2nd Special-Purpoea Air Division
Wer~ ~mployed en masse: the riivieion aaeigned 15 to 25 aircraft to each~
as a regult of which the air for~,ationg w~re traneferred rnpidly and
without the enemy'~ knowledge.
~rnopa and cargo were air-lifted fairly long distances. Between 1 aad 10 July~
- 25 crews of the 2nd Special-Purp~ee Air Divigion transferred thg 2nd Bomber~
the lat Grou,t~d-AtCack and the lsc Guards Composite Corpe, tt~~ 7i::~ S'ighter
Corpa, the 236th Fighter Divieion and the 244th Bomber Diviaion j~t to
reinforce the 2nd Air Army taking part in the L'vov-Sandomierz operation.
The Li-2 crewa performed 296 flighte, tranaporting 4~5Z6 men and 176 tone
of cargo.
Even a brief listing of a feW missiong gives an idea of the difficulty and
importaace of the miseions perforsned by the Uivielon. Only highly akilled
pilots, valorous, brave and determined men, could have coped with them.
Thie exactly describes the airmen comprising the nucleus of the formation.
Suffice it to say that by the time the 2nd Special-Purpose Air Divieion
had been brought up to full streagth the Diviaion's party organization
contained 387 conmmunists and 41~ Komsomol membera. This fighting avant
garde accouated for 69 percent of all the flight pereonnel.
As I have already mentioned~ the Divtsion was formed out of a regiment
Which contained highly experienced crewe. Deapite thia fact, however~
personnel of the 2nd 5pecial-Purpose Air Division had to make a great
- effort in order to master the use of the aviation equipment and the art
of flying in difficult weather and in a combat situation within the brie~
period available. The pilocs learned to fly aircraft day or night by
instruments; the navigators--tQ provide radio suppott for the flighta;
the airborae gunner-radio operators--to maintain stable contact with
ground radio facilities; and the airborne technicians and mechanica--to
employ the aviation equipment competently and to maintain the aircraft
in a constaat state of combat readinesa.
Iihils in the beginning it Was mainly the regiment's supervisory personnel
who were capable of performing special nssignm~nta under difficult conditions,
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a],1 Divieion pereonnel eub~aquently achieved great euccees through deCer~niaed
training and pereistent drille~ and by April 19k3 mi~eione wer~ being
parfotia~d in diEficult weathar by practi~].ly a11 of th~ crews ~~'l~ighte
in low cloude, above little�known t~rrain, in~fog~ rain and enow~ bacame
routin~e in the Divielon. ~hie was achieved in great pare as a reeult of
the afforts put forth by the Diviaion staff. An order iseued by the
chief of s~eff ~eated the following: "More of tihe responsib3lity for the
combaC training of the cr~we muet now be aseigned to the aircraft commandere.
In addiCion to gerting up group clasBes and aseigning individual miseions
to the personnel, eupervisory peraonnel of the regiments and squ~drons are
to devoCe more of their time to inspecting~ monitoYing and ~esting crews
arriving ar the base on the combat training sub~eces."
The fact ~hould be underacored that thie order wae isaued by the Diviaion
~command under combat conditione~ when the pereonnel were perforaing
difficult daily caiasione as usual. A great deal could be said abouC the
_ skill, valor and courag~ demonstrated by Division pilote during the Great
Patriotic War. I shall diacuss only a few combat epieodes at thie point,
however.
At the end of April 1943 ehe crew of an Li-2 commanded by C$ptain G.G. Dudkin
delivered some ammunition at nighC to partisans deep in the rear area.
Oa the return trip the aircraft was illuminated in the darkneas by enemy
eearchlights. The pilot began to maneuver the aircraft in an atCempt to
break away from the rays of the searchlighta and to withdraw from Che anti-
aircraft fire. At that momenC an Me-110 fighter rushed up to the elow-
moving, poorly armed tranaport plaae, hoping to destroy it at close range
~rith impunity. Master Sergeant I. V. Vaeilenko, aircraf~ gunner-radin
operator, foreetalled the cnemy, however, aad wae able to aet the fighter
on fire with a turret machine gun. The crew of ~he Li-2 eucce8ef~ally
completed the mission and returned safely to their airfield.
Aware of how much the cargo was needed in the combat unite, the pilots
delivered ammunition and fuel right up to the front line~ eub~ecting
themselves to great danger ia the proceea. Despite coneiderable danger,
for example, Captain B. D. Mal'chinov landed hia aircraft carrying fuel
gupplies right at the Rostov Airport, and the taaks refueled at the
aircraft and immediately went off to battle.
In March 1944, while coming in for a landing at the airfisld in Yampol',
B. M. Shchupakovskiy's plane was attacked by three enemy fighters.
Shchupakovskiy was killed. The crew did not lose their aelf-possession
in the difficult situation. Communisr Senior Lieutenant D. A. Shevteov,
aircraft navigator, assumed command and managed to land the plane. The
"Junker~," however. continued their pursuit and began to atrafe the
airfi~ld. The Li-2 crew unloaded the plane under conatant fire, took the
paeeengers oa board and made a safe flight back to their airfield.
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Communist Captain N. M. Larionov'a crew demonetrated nourage and heroiem
ia the performance of e miesion. Z'he C-47 wae ehot at oa s flight into the
aagm4r'e rear area and one of the enginee caught on fire. Uespite this,
however, the pilot continued tioward tih~ target and at the designared eira
dropped am~nunition and food Co Croopa opetiaCing in ieolation from our
baees. Capeain Larionov mangged with great difficul~y to put ouC Ch8 fire
on the return trip and made it back to hie airfield.
Ae an airfield near the city of N~vel' enemy fighters attacked and set on
fire the Li-~ on which Lieutenant Fedotov was delivering cargo Co the front `
line. Deapite the fact that the airfield wae aub~ected to continuoue
eh~~ling, Lieutenant Fedotov's crew did everything poesible to extinguish
th~ fire. The airman not ouly eeved the~aircrefr but also completed the
combat miesion auccegsfully. '
In general~ I muat agy, the atruggle waged by the crews to save their
aircraft and the eelfleas effort~ of the techniciana and mechanica who
brought their aircraft, riddlad with holea from bullets and fragmeata,
back to the formation ie a sub~ect which deaerve8 apecial a~tenCion. -
Very little, after all, has beea told about the courage, reaourcefulnees
and great akill of the aircraft technicians~ who aere able to give nea
life to the winged machiaea helping to rout the enemy.
In May 1944 Senior Lieutenant Gal'chenko's crew had delivered a load of
combat cargo to the airfield at Berezhnitsa on a Li-2. Enemy aircraft _
attacked the airfield at that time. An eagine caught on fire. Senior
Sergeant Tkachenko, aircraft mechanic~ aho wae standing next to the plane.
began to Extinguish the fire, ignoring the continued shelling by enemy
fighters and the exploding bomba. The o dier crew membere followed the
brave mechaaic's example. Their joint effort saved the aircraft. The
crew carried out combat miseions on it uatil the very end of the Great
Patriotic War. , �
Their great awareaess and duty and the assistance provided each other,
by the crew members permitted bivision peraonnel aucce~afully to perform '
extremely difficult missions in highly complicated situations.
Troops defending Leningrad aad the population of the Hero-City received a
great deal of assistaace from the Division.
The 2nd 5pecial-Purpoge Air ilivision also took part in air transport
~ operations in the campaign ia the Far Last. A total of 5,595 mea and
53t3 tons of cargo was air-lifted during the operation to deatroy the
Guangdong Army.
Aivision flight peraonnel also coped excellently with misaions assigned them
d~~ring the War With militarist Japan. Com~uaist Captain i4. G. Dudkin's
cr~ew especially distinguished itself. On 19 August 1945 his aircraft was
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~oR o~rci~, vsE orn~Y
tihe first Co land at the airfield ~,n Mukden to arranga �or thg ~rrival of
the other tro~p transpnrte. M~nchu ~mp~rot K~n P~u-i was Chere aC the
kime~ awaiCiag an ~ircrgEt Co ta~~~ him b~ck to Japan. Our landing force
rapidly captiured the ~irfield, tne ~mperor wae taken prisoner gnd did in
fact depart--not on hia own a~xcraft~ however, but on Captain Uudkin's
Soviet traneport, and not to Japan but to the headquartera of the Soviet
command.
I shall now di~cuse in greaGer detail th~ operaCiona of one of Che gubuniCs -
of the 2nd 5pecial-Purpoee Air Division~ the 105th Separat~ Guards Long-
~ange Night Reconnaiesance Squadron. '
Deapite ita emall flight ataff thia combat squadron, which averaged three
to five C-47's, Cook an activa pare in traneport operetions Chroughout the
period 1y43-1945, delivering men and cargo Co desCinations quite frequently
located deep in the enemy's rear area.
1he loag-range night reconnaissance equadron was formed in May 1943.
Captaia G. G. Dudkin, who died in AuguaC 1943, was its first commander.
The cYews performed apecial miseione~ delivering acouts to the enemy's
rear area, providing liaison with the pa,rtisans, and so forth.
The squadron dev~loped some excellent specialisCs and first-clase pilots:
Captains V. I. Krasnov, Ya. A. Belov, and I. V. Rogulin, Senior Lieutenants
N. S. 5hishkov, M. A. 5arkisov and V. I. Bogdanov, and others. During ita
year of combat operations, the squadron performed 131 combat sorties deep
into the enemy's rear area and 2?~i flights to maea men and cargo at strategie
airfields, and 29 of the membe*s received sCate awards. 32
On 7 May 1944 the squadron became a part of the 2nd Special-Purpoae Air
Division. At that time i~ was commanded by Major V. A. Tsuteayev, veteran
pilot and combat commander. The crews' work increased even more in
intensity. In May 1944 alone the equadron's pilots performed 59 flights
to atrategic airfielda, tranaporting 336 men and 41 tons of cargo, and
laaded 9 men and 21 tons of cargo in the enemy's rear area with nighC
combat flights.
The aircraft crews frequently found themselvea in difficult situations as
~ they performed the re$ponaible missions assigned to the squadron.
Negotiating the front line and the air defenses of fortified enemy areas,
eepecially near large cities, and night flights in difficult weather and
over mountainous terrain--all of this required e~cceptional professional skill
and true courage. And the squadron's pilots emerged from the most difficult
situations with honor.
In July 1944, the squadron had only three planes. N~netheless, 29 flights
t~ere carried out that month to move personnel to new bases, and more than
200 men and 20 tons of cargo were transferred. A total of 34 paratroopers
y
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gnd 30 tone of guna and ammunition were traneported on 23 flighte deep into
Che enemy's rear area. The crewe performed 52 flighte laeting a toCal of ~
215 houre during th~ month. , ,
' The crewa of M. A. Sarkieov, V. A. TeuCsayev, S. G. Rymar'~ I. I. Saleznev ;
- and othera ~ealt with numexous difficulties. ~
~
A flight performed by the crew of Senior Lieutenant S. G. Rymar' turned
out to be a dramatic one. This crew, the begC in the squadron, wae .
ae~igned the important mission of evacuating leadere of Che Polieh liberation
movernent, including General Michal Rola-Zhymiersky; commander of
~.armia Ludowa , from aear the Pnlish city of Lublin deap in the enemy's '
rear area.
Aircraft commander S. G. Rymar'~ navigator Lieutenant V. V. Vybornyy~
aircraft technician Technician-Lieutenant F. F. Shkurat~ aircraft gunner-
radio operator Senior Sergeant I. V. Vagilenko and aircraft gunner Sergeant
Ye. G. 5taburov made thorough preparations for the flight: they would
have to fly in aa area of dense clouds and to refuel near the fronC line
in ord~r to make the return trip. The difficulty lay in overcoming a
� screen oF fire: ,the Iiitlerites were blockading the area of concentration
of Polish partisans.
Despite the inCenae ahelling, the crew safely crosaed the front line and
thea the screen of fire near the partisana, and the commander landed the
ship at the site designated by the Poliah comradea.
The soft clearing aurrounded by woods turned ~ut to be absolutely uasuitable
for use by heavy aircraft, hewever. The attempt to take off almost ended '
in tragedy. As the plane was gAining altitude the tail section caught on
a tree, damaging the elevator. It was only the pilot's excellent flying
akill and his peraeverance and courage which permitCed him to bring the
� aircraft down again. The p~ssengers and crew did not suffer. It was aot
posaible to repair the plane, however, and it had to be burned. The
partisans and the Soviet airmen worked together for several nights to
prepare a site in the clearing where another aircraft could land.
Oa 5 July, Ma~or V. A. Tsutsayev's crew landed safely at the site. It ~
included Captain Ya. A. Belov, navigator; Technician-Lieutenant I. P.
Ronakiy, aircraft technician; and Senior Sergeaat N. V. Strogan, aircraft
gunner-radio operator. Carefully calculating the aircraft's load and
taking all of the necessary steps, Tsutsayev took off and made a safe
flight to Kiev. All members of the crews of V. A. Tsutsayev aad S. G.
Rymar' were awarded Polish orders for courage and excellent flying skill.
Flight conditions became even more difficult in August. Airmen flying .
. into east Prussia and Poland ha~ to fly over mountainous terrain arid to
overcome the enemy's powerful air defense.
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A flight undertaken during thas period by M. A. 3arkieov'e crew (A. A.
Aalanikaehivili~ co-pilot; LieutenanC L. I. Chervyakov~ nevigator; 5enior
SazgeanC N. V. 3trogan~ aircraft gunner-rgdio operator; ~echnicit?n-
Lieutenant P. A. gykhanov~ apprentice airaraf t Cechnician) Co the area
nf Breelau ended in Cragedy. Near tha city of Ki.elce the aircraft wae
sub~ected to pow~rful anti-aircraft fire and began Co lose altitude.
Ordering ever~?one to abandon rhe plane~ aircrafC commander M. A. Sarkieov
did everything posgible Co keep the falling plane aloft. Only the ecouts
oa board the aircra~t aad Aelanikashivili and Strogan managed to bail -
out~ however. Aircraft coctm~nder M. A. Sarkisov and his comradee periehed.
Polieh partieane buried tha brave crew in ell.zhynski Woode, and after
the var the remaine of the Soviet airman were removed and buried wiCh
miliCary honors at the municipal cematery. in the city of Kielce.
During its four months of combat work ae part of the 2nd Special-Purpose
Air Divieion (from May through September 1944, that is, during the Red
Army's inteasive offenaive) the squadron performed 77 night combat flights
deep into the enemy's rear area alone, deliveYing 213 acouts to their
destinaCioa and dropping ammunition, weapone~ medicinea, newspapera and
~ther cargo--a total of more than 90 tona--to the partisana.
' The sirmen transferred 1,392 men and 142 tona of cargo in 246 flighta
carried out between January and August 1944 for put~poses of concenCraCing
men and cargo at atrategic airfielda.33 .
It is not difficult to itnagine t11e tension under which the airmen aorked~
conatantly eubjected to daager, ar the courage and the ekill they
demoastrated as they departed day after day on difficult aad impoesible
missioas, selfleasly giving their all to bring victory nearer.
A few yeara ago I read with great pleasure an article by N. Mar published
in the 29 October 1969 iesue of PRAVDA. I ehall end ehis accouat of the
2nd Special-Purpoee Air Diviaion's lOSth Separate Guarde Long-Range
Nigiit Reconnaiseance Squadron with a few lines from this articlet
~
"Tautsayev flew into the rear area, to the enemy, 50 times if not more.
flow many scouta did he land beyond the Bug, the DnesCr and Duaay, on the
Spree and Rhein?: It was his men who transported the leadere of the
Polish patriotic uadergrouad out of the rear area of the Hitleritee. It
vas their flying skill which helped the partiean brigadne of Fedaorov,
Lia'kov, Brinskiy and other paxtisan leadere.
"The airborne guarde paid a great price for the victory achieved in fire...." ~
In 1942 and 1943 the 2nd Special-Purpose Air Diviaion aas mainly used for
traasporting troops and materiel from the deep rear to the front and for
moviag air at~y personnel to new bases. whereas at tha end of 1943 and in
1944 Divisioa forcea were uaed in large groupe to support the maneuvering
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aad cuncentraCion of air forces nn tihe main a~cCor~ of tha lted Arnp?'e
offeneive~ Uuring the aar the 2nd Sp~cial-Purpos~ Air Divi~ion moved
more rhan 290,000 tn~n ~nd mnr~a ehan 2d~000 tong of cargo.
The Divieion'a f1~,ghC creWS wera aleo aesigned especialiy imporCant
mieaions: flytng Soviet etate delegatione to Teheran and San Francieco~
providing ~upport for the Yalte and Potedam Conferencee, moving the
"NoYmandy-de~mn" air regiment to Paria~ and oChers. ~x~callent flying
ekill aas d~monetrated on theee miaeione by Ma~or General of Aviation
V. G. Grachev, Divieion Comm~nder, Lieurenant Colonel F. V. Aeaf'yev~ '
Lieutenaat Colonel N. A. Zotov~ Ma~or A. S. Gorodilov, Major A. D.
Sadovnikov. Captain A. A. Babich and atiany otihere.
I have already diecusaed how the Divieiaa and its aeQarate subunite were
brought up tQ sCrength and the importance attached Co training and dxills
even under combat conditions. I would be remias,~hawever, if I failed
to mention yet another circum~Cance which helped to maiatain combat
training in the Division on a high level. I refer to the role of command,
firat aad foremost to that of Hero of the Soviet Union, Ma~or General of
Aviation V. G. Crachev.
Bq the time he was named commander of the 2nd Special-Purpoee Air Division.
Viktor Georgiyevich Grachev already had a solid background, including
experience aC command posts and as an instructor. He had aleo helped
transport men and cargo during the fighting againat the Japanese iavadera
_ on the IQ~alkhin-Gol Ftiver. And it was Ma~or Grachev'e creW which deliversd
Kh. Choilbalsan, leader of the Mongolian People'8 Republic~ to the area
of combat operations. V. G.. Grachev was awarded the Qrder of the Red �
Baaner for e~ocellent flight akill aad courage demouistrated in the fighting
on I~alkhin-Gol. ,
Prior to the Great Patriotic War V. G. Grachev commanded a equadron at the
Borisoglebsk Military Pilota School and served as commander of a regimeat .
of flight instructors. While serving at theae poets Lieutenant Colonel
Grachev developed the ability to train and iadoctrinate highly qualified
pilots. He was also assisted by excellent techaiquesin piloting aircraft
under aay conditiona, even the most difficult, in daytime or at night.
Viktor Georgiyevich Grachev's flying style was characterized by exceptional
aelf-command and great professional akill. Thia is why important flights
were assigned to him. The supreme high commander, the minister of foreign
affairs and othe r members of the Soviet Government and Party leaders and
prominent military leaders flew on aircraft piloted 'ny Geaeral Grachev.
The title Hero of the Soviet Unioa was conferred upon General V. G.
Grachev for courage demonstrated ia the performance of extremely important
assigaments.
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VikCor (ieoxgiyevich's merie~ ar~ noti limiCed Co hie parson~l flighCs~
of couree. 7hie brave indivi.dual and sup~rb pilot wg~ abl~a eo organize
in an excellent manner the intenee combat work of an air divieion which
m~da a contribution to the achievement of victory over the homeland's
anemiee.
The Moscow Special-Purpoee A3,r Grnup, subsequently tranaformed into the
let Guards Ai.r Traneport Diviaion of the Civil Air F1eeti, has al~agdy
been meationed. Thie was also one of the moet powerful sir traneport
formationg under the tiigh Command.
Ma~or V. M. KoroCkov commanded the Moscow Special-Pu~poee Air Group~
and Sen3or Battalioa Coamai.sear I. M. Karpenko aerved as iCe cnmmiesar. ~
Group flighC pereonnel poasessed good profgesional akill~ a thorough
undereCanding of their duty, perseverance, courage aad an ama~ing capacity
for work. Airmen with the Moacow Special-Purpoae Air Group coped
succeasfully with the difficult miseiona and took part in almoat all
of the large airborne landing operationa. ,
One report sent by Ma~or V. M. Korotkov, commander of the Moscow Spacia].-
Purpose Air Group on 5 October 1941 read: "The miseion of transporting
unita of the Sth Airborne Corpe was completed by the Air Group. Between
3 and 5 October 5,440 fightingmen and 12,5 tona of cargo (ammuaition
and co~nunications equipment) were moved."
The commander of the Airborne Forces noted the akillful work performed by
the crews and expressed gratitude to all pereoanel of the lst Squadron,
ahich took part in the tranaport operatione. An ordar ieeued by thn
commander eiagled out squadron commander V. N. Gvozdev and commisear
I. M. Kuznetaov.
The document presented below give8 aa idea of the conditions under which the
group had to work.
"Member of the Military Council of the North Caucaeue Front~ Admiral Isakov
Commander of the Sth Air Army, Major General of Aviation Goryunov:
- Operational report on completion of the cargo traneport mieeion on �
the nigh t of 26 June 1942~ �
1. The airgroup asaigned to me was given the miasion of continuing
to haul ammunition witii s landing at an airfield on the cape at Kheraones.
2. A total of 15 individual flights were made. All of the aseignments
were completed. A total of 28,380 kilograms of ammunition was delivered
to Sevastopol', 336 wounded people were evacuated, and 2,OU0 kilograma .
of apecial cargo was delivered from Sevastopol' to Krasnodar.
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Ati tihe moment our planee arrived and during tiheir stay at the
airfiald thay were und~r intenee fire from enenry field arrillery.
!lore than a huadred ehelle ware dropp~d on the airfield during th~
1 and 1/2 houre our plaaea remained there. 7'Fie airfield wa~ eimulraneouely
sub~ected to fierce a~rial bombing. A11 of our aircrafr reCurned eafaly F
to thair baoae.
Con~nder of the MAON, Ma~or Korotkov ~
Commtesar of the MAON~ 3enior BaCtalion Commissar Karpenko"
In !larch 1943, duri,ng the epring thaw, troopa of the Cen~ral Front were in
urgent need of anmaunition~~fuel~ and other eupplies. The mieeion of hauling
the cargo to troopa of the Central Front wae aesigned to 14 Li-2~s of the
let Air TraneporC Division of the Civil Air F1eeC (formerly Che Moscow
Special-Purpoae Air Group).
With no covering force the crews flew by day at low alCitudes, taking
advantage of iaclement Weather--fog~ and cloudinesa--to eacape detection,
aad flying when tha Hitlerita fighters were reluctaat to take to the air.
During a period of 19 days the group performad 1~394 individual flighte
Without a single casualty. During that time the airmen transported 1,589.24
tons of varioua types of cargo, evacuated 12,124 wounded individuals to tha
rear and tranaferred 1~592 iadividuals to airfields near the front.
Air lifts performed to asaiat the beleaguered citiea of Leningrad~ Odessa
and Sevastopol' occupied an important place in the operations performed ~y
crews of the Moscow Special-Purpoae Air Group. ~
In December 1941 Leningrad's defendera had stopped the enemy on the approaches
to the city but had not been able to preveat the enemy from reaching the
ehore of Lake Ladoga. The city of Lenin was cut off by laad.~ .
With the beginning of the blockade air tranaport operationa by the Moecow
' Special-Purpose Air Group to Leningrad increased aharply. At the end of
September, for example, 15 percent of all the cargo hauled by the Moscow
Special-Purpose Air Group was flown to Leningrad.
In October, pursuant to a decision adopted by the State Defenae Committee~
the maximum number of transports was assigned for delivering food to
Leningrad and evacuaCing skilled workers from the blockaded city. From
30 to 34 of the Group's planes flew to Leningrad each day.
The flights took place in extremely difficult weather and in the face of
powerful enemy counteraction. By day the planes flew in close combat
orders, making it possible to employ the aircraft weapons more effectively
and to organize a fighter escort. Single aircraft flew at night. The
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enemy frequenCly bombed the airfielde where Che transport plgnes were based.
Paecigt fighe~re literally hunesd the traneport~ over Ladoga. Thera wae a
ohortage of e~coxt fighCare and Che Li-2 cYews had to defend theroselveg on
their own~ '
The Elitlerites wexe not able to dierupt Che traneport flightg to tha ~
blockaded city, hnwever. The airmen's valor~ courage, flying aki11~
ageieCancs and willingness to'come to each other~e reecue produced a
victory. The large-acale air-lifCs of food and combaC cargo continuad
up to December 1941, when the famous frozen~~Road of Life~~ acYOes Ladoga
h~egan funcCioning.
I
"Lue to the heroic efforta of the airmen mora than 6,000 tona of cargo,
including 4~325 tona of high-calorie foodstuffs aud 1,660 tone of !
ammunition and weap34s, was delivered ro the blockaded ciCy from September
to December 1941. ,
The Moacow Special-Purpoae Air Graup contribuCed considerably to Che
' organized withdrawl of Soviet forces from Odessa and Sevastupol'. ~
The aituation of Che defendexa of SevasCopol', the main naval base of
� tha Black Sea Fleet, deteriorated significantly in the aecond half of
June 1942. The blockade of the city had lasted almoat 250 days, and the
defendera had received a great deal of asaistance from aurface ehips and
submarines of the Black Sea Fleet. It was becoming more aad more difficult
for shipa to reach the base, however, and the delivery of euppliee to
beeieged Sevastopol' and evacuation of the wouaded were becoming more
difficult with each paesing day.
An air group coneis ting of ZO Li-2 traneports aad commanded by Ma~or V. M.
Rcrotkov flew out of Vnukovo Airport on 20 June 1942.
The group wae made up of two squadroas. Lieutenant Colonel K. A. Bukharov,
one of the senior pilots, was appointed commander of the firat squadron,
and I. M. KuzneCaov was named commiaear. The second equadron wae commanded
by Captain V. A. Pushchinskiy, with I. S. Bulkia as equadron commissar.
The aircraft comoraadera were the most experienced pilote, those who had
made flights deep iato the enemy's rear area and to besieged Leningrad. �
The loads had to be delivered to the Kheraones Airport~ the only one
operating near Sevas topol'. The cape at IQiersonea, where the airport was
located, was continuously ahelled by eneiay artillery. Hitlerite aircraft
based at Crimeaa airfielde would bomb the airport at the slighteat sign
of aay movement there. Figures cited in the second volume of the "Istoriya
Velikoy otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945" [Hietory of the Great Patriotic ~
War of 1941-1945] (Page 408) give an idea of the intensity of the shelling:
"More than 700 aerial bomba were dropped and more than 5,000 artillery
ahella were fired at the airfield on the cape at I~ereoaea betweea
23 aad 30 June."
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- Despite rhe eelflee~ work performed under continuoue �ire by Che ~irfield
crew to ~.eve1 off the ~lying field and to cara for the runways, take-off
aad landing condition~ remain~d very difficul~. And when you conaider
the facC Chat all flights Co eha airfi~ld on the Khersonee cape wer~
~ carried oue by tha Li-2's at night~ you get an idea of the flight skill
and endurance needed by the airn?en to perform the miesione succeesfully.
The difficulty of ehe flighCe was increased by the fact that a considerable
porCion of the rouCe pas~ed over th~ sea, and neither the navigaCors nor
the pilots with the Moacow Special-Purpoae Air Group had experience in
flyiag over water. Navigators with ehe B1ack 5ea Fleet'e navel aviation
helped. It was also difficult to get one's bearinge nn the approach to
Kheraones: ehe direcCion of flight could only be derermined from pre-
arranged signals made with three searchlighCs. Nonethelesa, Che crews
of all 20 aircraft involved in eupplying SevasCopol' and evacuating the
wounded, flew Co the cape at Khereones regularly, every night. In 10
nighta Ma~or Korotkov's air group delivered around 220 tons of ammunition
to Sevastopol', evacuated 1~542 wounded ~nd 620 flight personnel and
technicians and 12 tons of cargo, making 119 individual flights in the
proceas.
On the night of 30 June, 12 Li-2's left on the last flight for cape
Khersones. That flight involved some dramatic events. _
After unloading the fuel and ammunition onto one-and-a-half-tonnera sent
from the forward edge, which lay 1 to 1 and 1/2 kilometers from the airfield~
the aircraft crews began to take on the wounded and others to be evacuated.
Captain M. S. Skryl'nikov, commander of one of the aircraft, received
an order to remove his Li-2 to the parking area and wait for special flight
instructiona. The commander and the other members of his crew (A. Kurilov,
co-pilot; A. Kudishin, aircraft mechanic; and M. Chikireva, radio operator)
spent nearly two hours in worried anticipation, not knowing what sort of
mission they would be expected to perform. The brief summer night dictated
~ haste, and all of the aircraft had already taken off. To all of his
questions, however, Skryl'nikov received only the answer: "WaiC."
The entire cape Khersones was being raked with fire from enemy machine
guns, and the wounded continued to arrive?since this airfield was the
only remaining link between the beleaguered Sevastopol' forces and the
mainland.
It was well past midnight when Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabr'skiy, commander
of the Black Sea Fleet, member of the Military Council N. M. Kulakov and
other representatives of the Black Sea Fleet command and from ttie Sevastopol'
Defense Zone arrived in Khersones. A large crowd had gathered on the
- flying field.
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Tension wae ~rowing, and panic could break outi any minuee. Thera were no
pl~aea gt Che airfield excepC for Skryl~nikov's aircrafC. The loud~, calm
voice o� Sanior ~aCCalion Commar?der B. Ye. Mikhailov, milltiary comm3.ssar,
- was heard: ~
~
"Comrades, move back from Che plane: I ehall remain here wieh you. ~
They wi11 come for us later...."
The military? commi.ssar's voice was heard over the raCtling and crackling
of the fire~ and calm was restored on the flight 1ine.
B. Ye. Mikhailov knew that Chis was the last plane, but despite the fact
that he could and ahould have departed a].ong with command, he remained.
In Che situation this was Che right decision. Organizing everyone who was
able to hold a weapon to resisC the enemy, the commissar foughC the
Hitlerite,e who had captured cape Khersones Co his last breath..~.
An account of the combat aperations of the Moscow Special-Purpose Air
Group would fill a small book about people with a highly developed sense .
of duty, salfleas aad with rare courage and proficiency.
The traditions laid down by veterana of the Great Patriotic War are still
alive in uaits and subunits of the Air Force's military transport aviation.
After the war some o� the airmen from the lOth Guards Air Transport Division
returned to the Civil Air Fleet and many remained in the military aviation,
~while others took a well-deserved rest or devoted themselves to peacetime
work.
People trained and indoctrinated by the celebrated aviators still serve
in our units today. They carefully preserve the memory of those courageous
people who taught them their difficult occupation. ,
Colonel Pavel Yakovlevich Yuger, Honored Military Pilot of the USSR and
one of the best commanders of the Military Transport Aviation, who trained
more Chan one generation of aviators, exchanged his military uniform for
civilian clothes quite recently.
As one of the best pilots he was among those bearing their famous banners
to the Victory Parade in Moscow in 1945.
Pavel Yakovlevich entered the Air Force at the beginning of 1940 with
special Komsomol authorization. He served in the Soviet aviation 34 years,
29 of them in the Military Transport Aviation.
Many heroes, many valorous people who knew and loved their work also served
in the ranks of the Militaxy Transport Aviation during the Great Patriotic
War and following the war. A great many interesting and instructive things
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could be written abouC many of them. I hopa ChaC their names wil;, yet be
given fame by members of the present genergtion~ by the children 3nd
grandchil.dren of those eold~,era who nchieved our Victory.
I mu$t eay a word about the enornioue importance of publicizing Che combat
tradiCiona of our aviators. A museum hae been establiahed in one o� tha
fau~us miliCary transport units of the Air Force's Military Transport
Aviation. It is located in heroic Belorusai,a, where the Soviet pilata
' flew especially frequently, delivering essential cargo to the partisane. �
The uniC command and its political section, especially officers N. M.
Mikhaylo~~, A. M. Sidorov and M. G. Sherzhukov, put forth great effort to
collect documents and materials telling about the heroiam and courage
of the aviators who took part in the war against fascism.
Rooms of combat glory have b~en set up in the units and aubunita of the
MiliCary Transport Aviation, and veteran councils have been created. Their
members iaclude five Heroes of the Soviet Union and more than 150 holdera
of ordera who served at Che front. They are making a great effarC to
collect materials on p~.lots of the Mili,tary Transport Aviation who
distiaguished themselves during Che Great Patriotic War. ~
The veteran council of the famoua Guards Red Banner unit, on the muater roll
' of which Hero of ~ie 5oviet Union N. F. Gastello is entered in ~erpetuity,
is especially active~. The council is headed by Hero of the Soviet Union
M. T. Laaovenko. The veterans maintain cloae ties with unit peraonnel,
and their visits, the congenial gatherings, their stories about the fiery
war years, their concern for documeats and relica of thoae yeare, and
their correspondence and weetings with relatives of the dead heroes have
a great positive influence on the young fighters, contributing to th;eir
ideological and political indoctrination and helping to atrengthen their
morale and to b uild up their pride in the previous generations. This is
a vital link between the past and the tasks and successea of today.
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CHAPTEK YII
~
AY1tBORN~ LANIIING OPERATIONS OF FOR~ICN ARMIES
Three decadee have gone by gince the end of Wnrld War II buC the war is
still being studied. MiliCgry higtorigng nf ~11 nations analyze the
events of tho~~ yeare, compare Che facC~ and derive concluaions~ which to
a considerable de~ree d~termine the 1i?ie o� developm~nt for the armed
forcee of varioue eCnCes.
Critical application of the experienca of Che last war, including thaC of
airborne landing operationa, taking tha changeg which have occurred in the
_ technical equipau:nt of the forces into account, permits us Ce derive the
necessary conclusions relative~to Che pres~nC and future employment of
airborne forcea ~
The compari~on of inethods used for orgnnizing and cocrducting eimilar
operations undertaken by the armies of the warring nations ia also of
definite intereat.
Thi~ chapter contains certain data concertting the employment of aviatinn
~ for delivering cargo, as well gs Che nrganization of girborne landing ~
operatione carried out in the armiee of the USA, ~ngland and Germany.
The Cc:rmaa Luftwaffe conducted a number of airborne landing operationa
durinb World War IL, making extensive use of the Red Army's gxperience in -
conducting auch operations in the 1930's.
The following airborne landing and air traneport operatione carried out by
the Cerman command were am~ng the more or lesa important onea:
'~he March 1938 landing operation at the Wogram airport during the
occupation of Auetria;
The April 1940 landing operation carried out in Norway for purposea
of capturing the airports at Stavanger and Oslo;
The May 1940 landing of an airborne group in Holland and Belgium
for the purpose of capturing airfields, bridges and cro8aings over the Rhein
aad Maas rivere and developing eubsequent operatioas againat The Hague
and Fto t terdati;
The Apr!.1 1941 landing operation carried out to capture a bridge in
the area of Corinch, Creece;
~ The M~y 1941 airuorne landing operation on the island of Crete;
The December 1942 sir transport operation perforr~ed to bring aupplies
to Paulus's encircled army near Stalingrad.
None of these operations, with the exception of those carried out in Hollar~
and Belgium, had a crucial effect on the accomplishment of the misaions
facing the ground forces.
,
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. 7'he airborne landing operntion~ conduct~d in Belgium and Holland in May 19G0, '
Which were accompgnied by eavaga bombing of peanaful cities, contr~bured
to the repid capitulatinn of thoee ~tatse. _ ~
r
, Th~ largest airborne landing operation wae carried out oa Creta. The
Ce~man command employed for its axecution the 7th Airborne Divisinn
(15,000 mea), the 5th Mountatn Rifl~ Divieion (8500 men), S00 bombers and
figb?tera (800 bombers and fighters according to other sources) for combat '
eupport~ and 50U U-52 traneport planes and ~0 transporC glidere (600
transport planes and 500 gliderd c~ccording to other eources) ~or the
laading operatinn itself.
Al1 of Che airborne units invnlved were formad into four attack groupa. ~
The primary miesion of the landing groups wae to capture the airfields with
swift action aad to s~upport the landing o� the mountain rifle division. ;
Tlie plau called for strikes by dive bombere for the sudden and aimultaneoue `
euppr~ssion of antiaircrafC nrtillery in the landing area. In addition, it
aas plaaned to land an aesaulC battalion from glidere onto the antiaircraft
artillery poeitioo,s.
lfiere were not enough Cransports to drop all four attack groupe at once.
The landing operation would therefore be carried out with two tripa.
_ The mountaiu rifle division was to begin landing immediately after the
airfield was captured. By 14 May 1941 all of the flying units taking
part in the landing operation had been massed at airfielde. � ,
On the eve of the operation the German aviation sub~ected the ieland to,.
� fierce bombing. The main dtrike focused on airfields and coastal instal-
laCiona and on Britieh ships located near the island.
Oa 20 May the Hitlerite air force again bombed the airfields,.antiaircraft
. artillery positiona and other targets. According to the plan, thia strike
was to be carried out immediately prior to the landing of the airborqe
forces. Take-off of Che transports was delayed, however, because clouds
~ of dust formed over the windlese airfielda when the bombers took off.
A gap in time reaulted between the bomber strikes and the beginning of the
airborne landing operation itself. The British managed rapidly to restore
their air defense in the area of the landing operation, aad the anti-
aircraft artillery greeted the leading air subunits carrying the landing
force with considerablz counteractio:.
~ Due to the breakdown in the plan, only half of the personne~ of all the
attack groups (around 7,000 men) could be landed the first day of the
operation. Not one of the assigned missions was completed. The landing
force was not able to capture a single airfield on the island auitable for
traasport landings.
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The remainiag parachuCe units ware dropped the following day, and an attempr
va~ made to land the mountain riflemen at a captured airfield.
An attempt wae made to put a navaL landing force aehore on the night of
21 May. It was uneucceaeful~ however.
The transport conClnued Co fly ia and land with units of the mountain rifle
diviaion on 21, 22 and 23 May.
Foreign military theoreticiana regard thia airborne landing operation a8
decieive in the capture of the isLand. An~analyais of certain facCore
- (the Hitlerites' air aupremacy in the eastern MediCerranean and the `
vireual blockade of the island), for example, placea it in a different , ~
light. Creta could probably have been taken by sea with fewer casualCiea.
The following are the main errors made by the Hitlerite command in the
conduct of Chis operatfon, in brief: !
--deapite ehe,fact that all poesible etepe were taken to keep the
preparatione a aecret~ the Britieh were alerted in advaace that the ~
Germans were readying an invasion of CreCe;
--the landing operation plan broke down ia Che very beginning;
--the troops were parachuted onCo still active atrong pointa of
the Britieh, which resulted in extenaive casualties;
--because some of the tranaport crewa lost their orientation, landing
fvrces were dropped at gea and in the mountains and foresta.
Aad now, a few words about th~ Luftwaffe's air traneport operation during
the Battle of Stalingrad, whea the Wehrmacht command attempted to relieve
ita forces encircled near that city. �
~ In December 1942 the Germane had approximately 320 U-52's~ arouad 40
U-86'e and 190 He-111's for air transport operatione.
The U-52's could only be employed from airfields located no more than
300 kilometera from the encircled grouping~ becauae there wae no fuel ~
for them in Stalingrad itself, and the U-86's had Co be eliminated fxom
traasport operations because of their amall range and load capacity.
The small number of large U-90's and U-290's firanspozts we:e aoon put ,
out of action by technical malfunctions. An atctempt was made to use
traasport gliders towed by planea. This undertaking was uaeuccessful,
however, aince the gliders were sub~ected to frequent attacka by our
fightera during the day and they were not equipped for flying at night
or ia clouds.
Flight pera~n~el of the hastily formed ai,r traaspo~tt units lacked practical
experience, and the aircraft frequeatly proved uneuitable for flying ia
difficult weather. The long flights ovzr the positions of our forcea and
back again, and vigorous counteraction by Sovlet fightera alowed the pace
of supply deliveries to the encircled Germaa troops. ,
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FurCh~rmore~ in order to eupply Paulus'e ~?rmy by ~ir,considerabie efforC
. wae required to hold those airfields clogegt Co Stal.ingrad.
During rhat period Soviet pilote destroyed more than a thoueand Germen
aircraft~ in the air and at airfielda~ moer of them CransporC planee. The
liitlerite aviation was deprived of the best Crain~d pilote~ Caken from
training unite. At Fiel~ Marshal Keaealring's admiseion~ thgr ].ose "wga
highly detrimental to the trgini.ng of new cgdrea of pilots." ,
In ite asseasment of Che Luftwaffe's Air Bridge operation near Stalingrad
the foreign press noted that the Germana' attempt at the end of 1942 to
deliver ~uppliee to Paulug's arary near Stalingrad was unsucceaeful. The
Germana failed because the Rusaians had oveiwhelming local air ~upremacy
and becauae the former had the use of only a emall number of hastily -
, co].lected bombers--from the remains of air transport units--�or air
transpor,t purposes.
This airborne landing operation was undertaken 2 and 1/2 yeara following
the Crete operation, but it too did not have a decisive effect on the
operations of the ground forcea.
It should be pointed out that in the war in the West the German fascist
forces carried out airborne landing operations against a demoralized enemy,
which offered little resistance. In 1940 ar~d 1941 the Hitlerite air force
was still powerful enough to suppress air defenses and to arrange for
considerable air cover for the military tranaport a~;iation and for the -
landing forces. Airborne landing operations during that period were
. therefore carried out in the daytime and in better weather conditions.
~ Operation "Air Bridge" near Stalingrad, on the other hand~ took place
under far less favorable circur~.stances, and this alone predetermined its
` failure to a considerable degree.
And naw, a few words about the German transport fleet during World War II.
The U-52 was the basic transport plane of ttie German air force.
With respect to technical and economic features the U-52 whi~:h was designed
, for a range of 500 kilometers, can be compared to our TB-3, although the
German plac~e had little u?ore than 1/3 the load capacity of the Soviet
airaraft and had only 1/2 the range carrying the same load.
Nonethelesa, the U-52 was highly superior to the TB-3 and the Li-2: it
was specially designed for the military transport aviation and was outfitt~d
~rith the necessary equipment for landing troops and towing gliders. The
dimensiona of the cargo hatches and compartments made it possible to load
light artillery systems, motorcycles, mortars, machine guna and other
weapons onto the air~raft. German industry produced the U-52 in large
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series for ~everal years, and thia permi.tted the Wehrmacht command eo '
tranepo~C Croope and combat equipment by aiY on en exCensive baeis in a
number of operationa, epecif~cal].y~ in the "Ai.r Bridge" operation, with ~
which the reader is familiar.
r
It is intereating Cd know that our Air Force received over 1,000 traneport
planes more than the number of transport modifications of the U-52 received
by German forces during that eama period. ,
Glidere~ specifically the DF'S-230, which could carry'nine men and their
_ weapons~ were also used in the airborne landing operations conducted by
the German air force. U-86 and He-111 bombers,'and in some caeee the U-90
_ and U-290 heavy transporta, were used le~s fraquen~ly for the perfo~man~e
of air tranaport missions. The laCCer wera naver extensively employed in
combat operationa, however, due to technical imperfectiona.
The following were among the mosC important airborne landing operaCiona
conducted during the lasC war by our allies~ England and the U.S.A.i
The July i943 Sicilian airborne landing operaCion, in which Cwo
airborna divisiona took part; ~
T~,: September 1943 landing of American f~rcea near Avellino, Italy,
to secure a beachhead for the landing of troops by sea;
The Normandy airborne landing operation of June 1944, during which
one British and two American airborne divisioas were landed;
The August 1944 airborne landing of a compoeite divieion which wae ~
landed east of Toulon, France; �
The Arnheim airborne landing operation carried out in September 1944
to land three airborne divisione;
The Rhein airborne landing operation of March 1945, during which
two diviaione were ~anded.
I ahall now give a brief account of the Normandy airborne landing operation~
which facilitated the landing of troopa by se$.
When they set up this operation, which was plaaned as the beginning of an
invasion of northern France, the Anglo-imerican command asaigned an important
role to the airborne troops, who were to prevent the enemy from bringing up
reserves to the naval landing areae.
~ Tt~.~ landing operation involved three airborne divisiona (two Americaa aad
one Britiah), around 1,384 transports, mainly C-47's, and more than
3,000 gliders of various types. The parachute uaite of all three airborne
diviaions could be dropped in the first wave with thia quantity of tranepor~
aircraft. The remaining units were divided up into a glider-landed wave and
an echelon to be brought in by sea for a naval landing.
The operation plan called for one American division to be 1$nded north of
Carentan, the aecond to the west of(Sover-le-Vikotiehl (the Cotentia peninsula);
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the B~itieh diviaion wae ~o be landed directly~at the area aelecred for
the BriCiah naval landing (the Hay of Seine).
, The Anglo-American command began preparatione.for the operation at the end -
of 1943~ performing th~m very rhoroughly. Divieion exerciaes involving a
praceice landing of troops and weapona wera eet up be�ore the �inal phaee.
The maesing at the poiat of departure of the units and formatione taking ~
part in the airborne laading operation was completed by 4 June 1944 in ~
a calm situation, withouC any sort of enemy oppoeition.
The landing was firat seC for the night of 4 June but was then poetponed
to 5 June.
Support for the operation received a great deal of attention. Despite
the fact that they had gained control of the air in the apring of 1944~
the Anglo-American command on the eve of the operation bombed all enemy
airfields within a radius of 600 kilometers around the coast of Normandy.
Strikee were carried out against coastal airfielda from 3 Co 5 June.
,
Diversionary operations were also undertaken. In order to mielead the
enemy as to the landing sites the Britiah and Americans set up a feint
assault landiag with dummies far away from those areas, on the southern ~
Cotentin peninsula and south of Havre. More than 1,000 British bombers
delivered bomb strikea against various targeta between Cherbourg and Havre
for the same purpoae. Special installationa ~ammed enemy radar faailitiea.
A fighter escort was not provided for the airborne ?,anding group, but the
landing area was protected by British and American night fighters.
T~ ,
Pathfindera were the first aircraft to take to the sir, followed from each
sirfield by traneports carrying airborne forces. The aircraft �ormed iato
the flight formation over their airfields of departure and thea set out for
their deatiaation in groups of 30 to 40 planea.
Special guide teams were dropped to mark the landing eites.
The British groups landed in the designated areas, but the Americans,
~hrough ':he fault of the aircraft crews, strayed off the route and eaded
up,outside the designated areas. ,
Around 10,000 airborne troops were dropped in 2 and 1/2 hours. A few
hours later the landing of the glider-berne wave beg~n in areas captured
by the airborne landing forces, and several more parac~.iute and air-landed
assault qroups were on the ground by the end of 6 June. A total of arouad
20,000 men were land~d in the 24~hour period.
Hore than 3,000 indiv3.dua1 flights were made during that peri~d to cover
and support the airborne forces. Only 24 planes aad gliders were lost
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en route to ~he drop area~ bur casualt3,ae were fairly heavy duri~ng rhe
landing itaelf--5 to 8 perc~aC of the pereonnel and 2~ p~rcenc of Che
maCeriel. .
The fighting ef�iciency of the American aubuniCs wae considerably reduced
� as a resule of their extensive dispereion. A total of 6S00 parachute
troops had been landed over an area 25 kilomeCers wide and 40 kilometere
long. Furthermora, errqre had been made 'in flying to the landing aites,
' ae much as 80 kilometers in many cases. A few eubunite were landed in a
flooded area.
Some of the glidere landing at captured aitea on 6 Jurte broke v^ on the
rough Cerrain. Approximately 20 percent of Che gliders never ev~en reached
their destiaation. .
Serious errora were also made in th~ landiti~ of the 8ritiah diviaion. In
some casea, for example, the Britiah bombera set out to provide support for
their troops mistakenly dropped bombs on their owm airborne aubunits oa
the ground.
On the first day of Che operation 49 of 12 gliders deaignated for delivering
materiel to the landing force came down in the area specified, aix made
, forced landings without even leaving England, three l~nded at aea and
14 disappeared without a trace.
The airborne landing of Anglo-American troops carried out in June 1944
- unqueationably contributed to the initial success of the naval landing
operaCion, but it wae not of decieive importance.
While demoastrating the expediency of employing airborne landing forces in
support of naval landing operations, tha Normandy airborne landiag operation
also ahowed that a troop landing operation, especially at night, requirea
careful preparation, organization, support aad precise adherence to the
adopted plan.
M~ention must be made of the obvious impracticality of Che Rhein airborne
landing opera~ion carried out by the Anglo-American fc~rces. 1'his operation
was undertaken maialy as a demonstration of force or even more, as aa
attempt to intimidate the nations of Europe, that Ls, for purely propaganda
. purpoaea. After all., Hitlerite Germany was not otfering major reaistance
there, in add�tion to which;by the time the operation w.as carried out
Allied troopa had already forced the Rhein in a number of places and had
reached the areas in which the parachute troops were to be dropped. ,
The Allied command sesigned more chan 8500 combat aircraft for aa airborne
landing operation involving two Anglo-American divi.aions, and the ratia of
combat planes to transpor*_ in rhat operation reached 4:2. The use of such
a large number of combat ~iircraft to support a single airborne landing
operatioa can meaa only one thing--that there were pract~,cally no other
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missions For Che air farcas nf our a].lies to perform. LesC we forget, tha
Anglo-Amarican conmmnd employed large airborne landing forces under the
excepCionally favorable conditions crea~gd by.the 5oviet Army's auccessful
offen~ive, which drew the moat efficienC formaCions of Hi~lerite ground and '
air forces away, to the eaet.
. t
~ From 1941 to 1944 more C11an 20,000 transport aircraft were built in the
U.5.A. The mai~ ones ware the C-47, the Dakota and the Halifax, as well as '
the tiamilcar and Horsa Crnop-transpnrt glidere. The besC of rhese was the '
C-47, which ha: a cruising speed of 260 kilometers per hour and a load
capacity of 3,000 kilograms or 27 men with heavy arme. By the end of tha ~
war, however, Chis aircraft's capabilities no longer met the air Cransport
demanda. For this reason the SovieC Government, which had conc].uded an
agreement with the U.S.A. for the purchase o� C-47's, adopted a decieion
Co curCail orders for this plane and commissioned a deaign bureau headed
by S. V. I1'yuehin to deaign a new tranaport. '
The German and Anglo-American comnnands' employment of airborne landing
forces demonstrated the fact that the succesa of an airborne landing
operation depends not only on the availability of sufficient.numbers of ~
personnel and equipment, buC also on how thoroughly it is planned and
prepared. ~
Despite all of the errora made in their organization and conduct, airborne
landing operations carried out during the last war demonstrated the
potenCial of the new airborne branch of forces and settled the development
of a new branch of aviation, military transport, the function of which has
grown immeasu*ably within the air forces of modern armiea. ~
After World War II ended foreign armies began devoting.an extraordinary
degree of attention to the development of ~irborne forces and the
developmeat of special aircraft and other equipmenC designed for use ~
in sirborne landing operations.
"We must take into account the experience of those who have conducted,a
war and must learn from them when we build our future army," 35General
William Lee, American military official, wrote two years after the end of
World Waz II in a foreword to a book by one of the creators of the American
sirborne forces. He referred to the need fox a detailed study of experience
in the conduct of airborne landing operations. .
Skipping over the development of the military transport aviation in foreign
nations during the decades following the war (this is a large sub~ect
requiring separate treatment), I shall ~rie�ly discuss certain plans and
pro~ects umdertaken by NAT4 and the Pentagon in this area in the 1970's. -
As it perfects new plans of a~grpssion the NAT6 command assigns an imgortant
_ place to alrborne landing operat~tons for the implementation of its predatory
designs. Furthermure, airborne landing groups of various compositions and `
with various purposes ar~ ~egarded primarily as a strategic means. This
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_ purely offensive means can be employed within very broad limits--from a
combine-arms battle to operations on an intercontinental scale. The
deve~.opmenC of inCercontinenCal operations is .being etepped up marked].y
in the armiea of imperialist natione. which eCgms from the devel.opment of ~
global weapona eyetema. They are plannad by the NATO command for purpoeas
of invading foreign territory following maeeiva strikea by s~raCegic
- nuclear forces~ in order rapidly to diaincl.ine the enE:my from offering
further reaistance or to achieve substantial rasu].Ca aC the very beginning
~f an arm~ed conflict and to capture a large base of operations from which '
to launch a broad offensive. ~
MiliCary air tranaport capabilities are very imporCant for the execution '
of such operations. Because of this thera is continuing improvemenC of
the forces and means used by airborne forces and for tranaporting them, ,
eiace the compoaiCion of an airborna landing group ia detiermined by the
quantity and quality of available airborne landing means--aircraft and
airborne laading equipment.
The 1971 "Freedom Volt" exerciae is an example of the focus laid on
perfecting methods of conduc~ing intercontinental airborne landing ,
operations. As reported in the American press, the 82nd Airbome Division
was flown from the U.S.A. to South Korea (to an area immediately ad~acenC
to the Demilitarized Zone), landed and immediaCely engaged in "combat"
missiona. The dropping of an entire, completely outfitted divieion at
once is c onsidered to be the optimal plan for such an operation. Beeauae
of a ehor tage of heavy aircraft, however, only one brigade at a time wae
' dropped in this case. The weatern presa pointed out the great difficultie~
involved in organizing air support for an airborne landing operation ~
performed at such a depth. .
In long dperatioas it is assumed that the build-up of airborne forcea
aad their eatry into the ~attle will be carried out in stagee. The rate
of the build-up is regarded as ona of the crucial factore deter~i.aing
thE success of the eatire operation. All the more, eiace iC may take
a long time to deliver the next wave of a strategic airborne landing
force,becr_use, as American military experts point out, at leaet 10 days
wuld be required to transport an armored diviaion a-iiatance of 12,OOi:
kilomatesa with the preaent quantity of heavy militar,y transports in the
U.S. Air ~orce.
The war in Vfet Nam and especially, the movement of weapons, ammunition and
vari~ua o ther cargo to Israel in October and November of 1913 ahowed that
the rapid maneuvering of personnel and equipment by air can influence
the course of combat operations considerably.
It ia the opinion of American military experts that the mobility of the
, armed forcea depends greatly on the conditio~ and combat capabilities of ~
the military transport aviation. The Pentagon considers it (the military
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traneporC aviaCion) to be one of the main meane of delivering personnel
and equipment from the U.S.A. to various areas o� the planet in good time.
ThaC is, great imporCance ia aCtached to the straCegic Cransport aviation.
Hecause of Chis the capabilities of air Cransport meane are being expanded.
Tha facC Chat ite capacity for traneporCing the heavy and bulky weapone
and combat equi,pment of the ground forceg--tanks, heavy self-propelled
artillery weapons and helicopters--is sCil1 1imiCed is considered to be a
weakness of the traneport aviation. ~
One official of the U.S. Defense Uepdrtment has atated that i� the Pentagon
poesesaed the capabiliCy of moving around 10,000 Cons of cargo as.far as
1~000 kilometers daily on heavy transports, and did not have to use inter-
~ mediate basea in the process, it could meer any demands made of the
- strategic transport aviaCion. In other words, if the U.S. Military Air .
Transport Service were in a position to transport an entire division with ~
all iCs armament every week from the U.S.A. Co Europe, let us say, the
Pentagon weuld have practically no obstacles to the implementation of all
its deaigns .
Based on ita experience with local wars and a number of exercises,
organizaCion and ~ontrol of tlie transport aviaCion of the U.S. Air Force
are being perfected; its C-13U Hercules, C-141 Starlifter and C-5A
Galaxy milita~y transports are being triodernized; the flight Craining of
the crews is being improved; and plans are under development �or employing
civilian transports (especially the Boeing-747, the DC-10, the Boeing-707
and other heavy, wide-fuselage planes). Z'he U.S. Defense Uepartment
intends to modify a large number of these aircraft operated by airlines,
as well as cargo planea, capable of transporting heavy combat equipment
aad other cargo.
The U.S.A. is also engaging in research and experimental deaiga work on
, fuCure military tran4ports.
The Boeing Company, for example, has designed a~et cargo plane with
12 engines. This aircraft is three times the size of the Boeing-747 and
is designed mainly for hauling cargo containers in the wing, which will ,
have a span of 157 meters. The aircraft caill be able to carry a payload
of 1,100 tons.
The American Lockheed Aircraft Company is working on the design for a new
heavy transport, the Spanloader. This "flying wing" aircraft is being
deaigned to haul up to 250 tons of carao a disCance of up to 9300 kilometers
or 300 tons nearly 6,000 kilometers. Its maximum take-off weight will be
550 tons and it will have a cruising speed of 800 kilometers per houx.
According to reports in the foreign press, the Lockheed Company plans
to make several m~odels of the Spanloader: a s~rategic military transport
- for hauling loads of 250-300 tons up to 9,000 kilometers without refueling;
a tactical military tr~ansport capable of landing on ordinary ground and on
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wateY~ which will make it poeaible to deliver cargo di.rectly to the
troop poaitions; and a tanker aircraft which can car.ry up Co 200 tons
o� fuel~ with a radius of operation of around 7,000 kilometers.
Becauae of rha energy crisia in the U.S.A. and other capi~alist nations,
research work is being performed to find new typea of aviation �uel. The
poasibility cf using liquid hydrogen as fuel is under study, despite
the �act that its low density would make it necessary to install ].arger
fuel tanks on aircraft. American experts believe ChaC the Spanloader's
design wi11 make it possible to install such tanks on it, which would give
it a flight range of around 19,000 kilometers carrying a cargo of 220 eona ~
aad a supply of 102 tons of liquid hydrogen.
~ The building of heavy transport planea like the Spanloader involvea the
resoluCion of a number af complex problems. Z"he technology for manufac-
~~tring the thick wings has to be masCered, their performance under varioue
rlight conditions musC be studied, systems muat be developed for controlling
and mainCaining flight stability for such aircraft, the effects of shifting
loads on Che structure must be studied, and so forth. In the opinion of
- aviation experts all of this will require a great deal of time, a large
effort and a great deal of funds. ~
The U.S.A. is also working on the development of a military transport wiCh
a short take-off and landing, capable of taking off from undeveloped
runways 620 meters long and carrying a payload of up to 12 tona. Such an
aircraft, the YC-15, is under going flight tests. This aircraft wiLl
mainly be used for performing tactical transport operations. It is also
being considered for strategic transport operationa, however, siace
it is prc:~osed that an improved model of the YC-15 would be able to fly�A
distance of approximately 4800 kilometers without refueling and carrying
~ a payload of 17 to 28 tons.
These have been a few facts from the history of World War II and ~rom
modern times pertaiaiag to the use of military transport aviation. They
were presented together intentionally: the experience of the laet world
war formed a basis for t~he s~ttempt to increase the mobility of the
- troops, the foundation from which the procedure for conducting ~:.ombat
operations in a number of local wars was developed and, finally, the
basis for continued efforts in this area.
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CHAPT~R IV
DEVELOPMENT . ~
The First poatwar decade was a period of development~ a period in which an
effort was made to find the optimal or.ganizaCion for the Air Farce's traneport '
aviaCion, which took shape to a considerable degree during the GreaC
Patriotic Wsr. The aircraft and airborne landing equipment necessary for ~
hauling and landing troops and cargo by air were improved.
The development of the MiliCary Transport AviaCion during Che postwar
period was affected by the experience accumulated during the war and by
the aubaequent development of Soviet military art, based on ~ucces~es
achieved in the economy, in sci.ence and Cechnology.
Thia stage can be broken down into ttiree periods.
The first period (1946-1954) was characterized by substantial qualiCative
- ehangea linked to the build-up of the aviation,'s combat capabiliCies. A
transport and landing air force was created within the Airborne Troops,
using piston-engine planes and with the extensive employment of landing
gliders. The tranaport fleet included I1-12's and Yak-14 glidera which
could carry up to 3.5 tons, a large capacity for that time.
~ Theoretical developmenta pertaining to the application and employment of
the transport aviation were based mainly on World War II experience.
During the second period (1955-1958) nuclear weapons appeared, and the
Air Force was outfitted with superaonic ~et aircraft, new radio
electronic equipment and heavy ~et aircraft.
The final stage in the formation of the Military Transport Aviation as
a service of the Air Force occurred during those years.
The third period, which began ia 1959, saw the continued improvement of
aviation equipment and an enlargement of the role of air transport. The
Military Transport Aviation entered a qualitatively new period in its
developmenC, based on the conversion from turboprop to ~et transporCs and
on the improvement of airborne landing syatems capable of dropping troops �
and cargo in any weather~ at any time of day, from low altitudes and in
short time.
The new means of warfare made it necessary considerably to increase the
mobility o�_all branches of troops. Modern concepts of combat operations,
. involving rapid changes in the situation and the possibility of vast zones
o.f devastation and radioactive cor;tamination being created by the enemy,
made it clear that means of delivery and evacuation would have to be further
developed an~ impz~ved. And air transport was accepted as one of the most
important suc~a meaas.
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I have given a general outline of the development of the MiliCary TransporC
Aviati.on following the war.
� I shall now deal in somewhat greater detail w~th certain prob lems which had
to be resolved during Che firsC postwar yeara.
The Airborne Tranaport AviaCion wae creaCed during that peridd~wiChin the
Airborne Troopy~ which had been made a apecial branch of Croops by Chat
time. At that time the Air Force had a coneiderable quanCity of tranaporC
planes, which provided the foundation for creating the sirborne transport
unite. Like the Airborne rroops, the Airborne Tranaport Aviation was an
agency of the High Command. Its adminis~tration was centralized under the
deputy air commander of the Airborne Troops.
The situation was fundamentally altered by Che creation of the special
Airborne Transport Aviation: the combat training of Che Airbr.~rne Troops
became the main mias.ion ~f this aviation instead of a subsidiary one as
it was prior to and during the war.
If necessary it could be used to perform military Cransport missione for
all aervices of the Armed Forces. .
Ia the summer of 1948 the forces began receiving new landing planes and
gliders (the I1-12, the I1-14, Yak-14 and the Ts-25), which~expanded the
capabiliCy of the Airborne Transport Aviation.
The Airborne Transgort Aviation was later renamed the Transport Aviation -
for Airborne Landings; iC was enlarged rhrough the transfer of a.number of
air transport units from the Air Force. The aircraft fleet of the Traneport
Aviation for�Airborrie Landings was ~expanded considerably by thP reorganization.
Theae steps were necessitated by an enlargement of the missiona assigned
the Transport Aviation for Airborne Landings.
Many difficult problems had to be resolved during that period. This accounts
�or the f~ct that a great deal of attention was devoted Co combat Craining
and that exercises involving airborne landings were regularly conducted,
with approximately 1/3 of the exercises sche.duled at night.
The nucleua of the group of specialists staffing the Transport Aviation
for.Airborne Landings was formed of veterans of the Great Patriotic War,
who had vast ex~;::rience in the performance of their work under iield _
conditions. The veterans improved their own proficiency and trained the
young aviaCors. :?ero of the Soviet Union V. F. Anisov, B. F. Chirskov,
P. Ya. Yuger, S. D. ~ud'ko, N~ I. I:uzne~sov and many others devoted an ~
enormpus amoun.t of tinte to the training of new cadres and indoctrination '
of the personnel.
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The personnei worked persistently on nighC flights, various combar orders,
. i3ights in the clouds and the landing of troops and cargo ouC o� clouds.
, The flight training of the air units ia~roved considerably, and by 1953
the abaolute majority oE crews in the TransporC AviaCion for Airborne
Landings were skilled in �lying under difficul.t conditions, both in the
daytime and at night.
Members of Che Air Force Engineer Service worked wiCh enormous enthusiasm
~ and energy during that period. Many specialists, even though they lacked
a higher education, served as senior uai t engineers and possessed a
brilliant understanding of the desiga and performance feaCures of the .
sircraft. Possessing good organizing abilities and infinitely devoted Co
ti~eir work, such specialists as Sbroco~,~Svistun, Tsurapa, Mosekov and others
- were able to uz~iCe Che personnel and to motivate them to work sel�lessly
, uader the most difficult of conditions. They were matched by engineers
Tolstikov, Kolbasov, Pochivalin and Kolonitskiy.
Youag engineers with higher training-Fokeyev, Reznik, Martem'yanov--were
also placed in charge of unit services during that time. The engineer
service of the formations was also joined by specialists with a higher
education, of which I should like to r..~ntion Nechayev, Tsimbalenko, Mironenko,
Belyayev, Kalinichenko, Samoylov, Tarap anov and Shulakov. ,
A great deal of credit for the orgaaization and formation of the Military
1Yaasport Aviation as a branch of the Air Force, as well as for tne
training and indoctrination of airmen for the Transport Aviatio n for
Airborne Landings, goes to LieuCenant General of Aviation K. N. Smirnov,
who co~mnanded the airborne landing aviaL.ien during the first postw.'r yea=s. -
At the beginning of the 1950's work was started to develop a new transport
= for airborne landings, the tactical and technical specifications for which
� provided for a large number of basically new capabilities for the airborne
: laading of troops and cargo.
~
~ Considerable progress had beea made by that time in the technical equipment
of the Soviet Armed Forces. The grouud troops were being motorized at a
~ rapid pace. New means of warfare made it possible to conduct offensive
operztions at a more rapid pace, whica required greater maneuverability of
all branches of troops on the scale of a battle or an operation.
' Grouad troop exercises and maneuvers conducted in 1953 and 1954 demonsCrated
the need for extensive involvement of air transport for maneuvering troops
' aad delivering ammunition, fuel and otaer supplies over great distances.
All of the air transport missions involved in the exercises were regarded
as missions of the Transpo.rt Aviation for Airborne Landings. The situation -
required that the capabilities af the Transport Aviation for Airborne
La.ndings be increased immediately, crith respect both to the airborne landing
of troops and the transporting of various types of ca~go for all services _
of the Armed Forces. ,
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Yt became urg~nt for the e>.isr.ing Military Tran~port Avintion fore~~ tn b~
cc~bin~d und~r n single comm~nd. This led Co the crention of the MiliC~ry
Trgaepntr~ Aviaeion within the 5~viet Army Air ~'orce.
Harshal. nf aviation NLko1~y 5emenovich Skrtpko, ~n imporC~ttt ~ir force 1ead~r,
commanded the Military Tr~nspdrt AvigCion during thig perind. One of th~
_ oldegt military pilors~,h~ occupies ~n imporr~nt pl~ce among outgt~nding
aviators of the 5oviet Air Force.
The son of a peasant and a Red Arnry volunt~er, N. S. 5lsripko received his
first order--~rder of the Eted Banner--for courag~ and valor demonstrated
in the storming of Spassk. The youag Red commander w~s in command nf nn
artillery batt~ry at that tim~. N. S. Skripko's future military career,
howeweL, was d~termfned by hig interese in avietion. In 1924 he entered `
the Air Force 5chool of Military Theory of the Worker,~' and Pe~gants'
xed Atmy. After two years of diligent and succesgful trgining ~nd a year
of senrice in an air squadron, 5kripko, an officer demonstrating initiative
~ aad determination, waa assigned to a flying school as a flight instructor.
As tie trained :~nd i,ndoctrinated the yaung airmen, Skripko also continued
to study. He le~rned to fly various types of aircraft, developed superb
tec.baiques for flying in the clouds, flying blind and at night, nnd
_ trained his mea to fly under difficult weather conditions.
- Ia 1922 Skripko, then commander of a separate air detachment, took part
� ia the m~aneuvers in Belorussia. The people's commissar of defense -
praised the performance of the air detachment and its commander. ?likolay
Semenovich became co~.ader of a training air brigade in 193G. He went
baclc to school in 1937. At the Higher Tactical Flight School the officer
vorked to improve his theoretical and his operational-tactical knowledge, `
- atudied navigatioi., continued to improve his flying skill and learned to
- fly the nea bombers.
Bet~een 1938 and 1941 Coloael Skripko co~aanded a light bomber regiment, a
comQosite air division and a long-range air corps.
The commaader attached great importance to the flight training of his airmen,
vhile at the sase tima working to coordinate material and technical support
aad strivia& to achi~ve precision and efficiency in the work of all services.
The corps commaaded by N. S. Skripko met the enemy fully armed at the -
~ begtnaing of the war. The bombers destroyed enemy columns and concen-
tratio~s of equipment With accuracy. tJikolay Gaste=lo, who performed ~he
i~ortal feat in Belurussia, receiveci his training in one of the units
of the 3rd Long-Range Bomber Corps~ commanded at that time by Skripko.
From Harch 1942 to the end of the War Major Geaeral of aviation N. S.
Sicripko served as first deputy comaander of the long-range aviation. He
- ditected the org,anizatian and coaduct of more thau one large air operation.
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TogeCher with officinls from Neadqugrter~ he helped cnordin~te ehe operaCione ,
of the long-range evigt~un on the Kerch' p~nin~ula nnd in huge bgttle~
from Stalingrad to Bnrltn.
_ N. S. 5kripko wag one of the firet to be awarded the rank Marehal of Aviation.
A higt~er gcedemi~ courge nf study gt Che General SCaff Academy wa~ another
etep 9.c? Skripko'~ trgining before ewitching to th~ Treneport Aviation for
Airborne Landings and then the Military Trgn~pnrt Aviatinn.
Marehal Skripko gave 19 yeara of his life to r.h~ organizaCional development
of th~ Military Transport Aviation and put a gr~at denl of effort and energy
- into tha work of reoutfitting itg uuitg with new turboprop aad turbo~et
plane,~. His knowledge and ped~gogical experience furthered Che indoctYi-
nati.on of more than one generation of airmen. Marehal Skripko'e etudente, _
including the authnr of thie book, have retained a feeling of great -
gratitude and deep respect for t~im. -
- For hie purticipaCion in the combaC training of the Air Force and his
- successful direction of combat operatione N. S. 5kripko has b~en awarded
tWO Ordera of Lenin~ the Order of the October Revolution~ four Orders
of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov, firet and second degreea~ the
Order of Kutuzov~ firat and aecond degrees, and many me~als.
:he Air Force Engineer 5ervice of the Military '~ranbport Aviation bore
a heavy load durin~ the yeare when the new Ar?-B and An-12 turboprop planea
were bping asaimilated. From 1954 to 1y57 the unita were continuously
, joined by graduates of military air engineering acadetniee and of the
VATU [Military Aviation ~ngineering School]. The office of the commander -
of the Military Transport Aviaticn devoted a great deal of att?:.~tion to =
traininq the young engineers and to their development as epecialists and `
as good organizers and commanders.
B. N. Mitin, I. I. Burmietrov, Yu. Kh. Rashragovich and I. V. Ermanaon,
who monitored the young specialista' adjustment in the formation on a
practical level, aere very active in this area. During thar period units
of cne MiliCary Transport Aviation were joiaed by WZ graduates Mishcherin~
Laporin, I1'yashev~ Khrenov, Shevchenko, Rodnishchev, Kichigin, Sleptsov,
7Cakovlev and others, who were in charge of unit air force engineer aervicea
and other aervices in their specialtiea by the time the coavereion to the
new aviation equipment aas made.
As it trained cadres in tt~e units the air fcrce ~ngineering service of the
Military Transport Aviation, beginning in 1954, maintained close coatact
vith the Mtonov Special Design Bureau and participated in the development
of the M-12 and An-8 aircraft during the stage when the m4dels were being
- built. Engine.~rs of the Military Transport Aviation contributed a great
- deal to the technical aspect of the aircraft.
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7 The uait commgnded by Hero o� the SovieC Union Colonel G. I. Bogomazov
(tri.th 3. N. Tro3.Cakiy ns senior engineer) wa~ Ch~ first t~ begin training
to fly th~ An-12'e. He piloted the aircr.~ft on ite fixst flight~ �rom th~
plant airf ield .
DifficulCiee wer~ ~ncountered in the first ~tage in tha adoption of the
An-12~ since complic~tions aroea in learning to operaCe th~ n~w aircraft
- equipment.
Technical classes were set up in the uaits. Technical documents~ diagrams
and poat~re were prepared from plant drewings~ Pilota and navigatore began
studying the new equipment, along with the engineering and tenhnical
personnel. In addiCion to acquiring a thorough und~retanding of the
aircra�t design, it~ pnwer unita and vgrious types of apecial equipmenC,
they also had to understancl ite aerodynamica, to grasp the phyeical nature
- of certain phenomena nQw to the flight and technical personnel, and to
familiarize th~mselves with the principles underlying the automatic control
equipment aad radar. The principles presented in the theoretical course
did not come ea~y to ttiose who lacked a secondary or aecondary technical
edtncation. To eliminate thie gap the engineere set up permenent conaultaCian
aervice.a and gave private leseona in tt~e units.
Practical training on the Aa-12 and An-8 aircraft was set up in the field.
Despite various difficulties Air Force ~ngineering Service personnel.
maintained the aircraft in good repair and supported the flight training.
Lesding specialists from the Special Design Bureau and planta did a great
deal to facilitate the adoption of the new equipment and to maintain it ~
in a state of good repair. Deputy chief designer A. V. Bolbot, deputy
' chief designer for the series Ye. K. Senchuk and the directors and
zepresentativea of the plants manufacturing the An-S and M-12 frequently
visited the units. .
Pilota and navigatore, engineers and technicians worked peraistently to
become experts on the new planea and to improve their operation and
structural realiability. This period was not without its complications,
however, situations in which only the crews' disregard for themselves
averted flight accidents.
During one flight on an An-12, for example, the crew was unable to lower
the nosewheel strut. The airmen made an intelligent decision to prevent
~ the aircraft from breaking up i~. landing wich the landing gear retracted.
Senior aircraft .echniciEn Bayra~galin tied a rope to himself, craWled
into the landing gear recess, corrected the malfuuction and adjusted khe
strut on the landing gear safety latch. Their excellent knowledge of ths
aircraft equipment helped the cre~+ out of what appeared to be a hopeless
situation. ?he crew r~as commended by command for courage and efficiency
in an emergeacy aituation, and Bayramgalia Was awarded the Order of the
Red Baaaer.
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_ ~o prevent such incidenCs the inepection window was improved and a cable was
installed fnr emergency lowering nf Che nosewheel strut.
Once, duriag ~ flight~ the fluid leaked fYOm the t~ydYaulic eystam on an
An-8 piloted by A. P. Yerofeyevakiy (S. I. Pakov wgs co-piloC~ ~nd A. M.
Ru~inov genior aircraft eechniciun). After apprniging the situation the
' pilote used fuel in plnce nf the hydraulic fluid~ They werg able to lower -
the landing ge~r gnd made a sa�~ landing.
It wag a difficult and painstaking mgtter to locate the defe~ts in the eystema -
and Co determine why they had occurred~ a matter requiring conaiderable
time and effort. The epecialiste could not immediately determine why the
wheelg on an M-8 were locking, for example~ deapite the fact that
Yepreeentatives of the Special Ueaign Bureau and the plant were helping. F
- The defect was found and eliminated only througli a persistent efforC
by all peraonnel of Che subunit (with Ma~or A. M. Karpushin as commander
and Captain N. F. Nefedov as engineer).
Despite the difficultiee encountered duriug the firet period of learning
to maintain and operate the aircrnft, subunits equipped with An-8's and
Aa-12's Were already participating in military exercises in 1958-59.
The work of modernizing the aircraft in order to exp..ad their combat
cepabilities was atepped up considerably at that time. Yu. Kh. Rashragovich,
Y~. K. derzhavin, I. I. Burmi~trov and N. G. Shcherbakov were among �
the leadera.
Vaeiliy Vasil'yevich Filippov, who ~oined the Military Transport Aviation -
ae chief engineer, did an enormous amouat of work to create and develop
the Military Traasport Aviation and to improve the engineer service. A
lieutenant recently graduated from the Academy imeni Zhukovskiy, he
began aerving as a squadron engineer in a regiment of the 2nd Special-
~ Purpo~e Air Division in 1943. Aware of the need for practical knowledge
aad desiring to gain a more thorough uaderstanding of his work, the young
lieuteaant req~sested an assignment as an aircraft technician. The career
of this aorker with the Military Transport Aviation, to which he devoted
the greater part of his life~ Was launched from that position. Engineer- _
Colonel General Vnailiy Vasil'yevich Filippov is now chief of the Ordera -
of Lenia aad of the Octcber Revolution, Red Banner Air Force Engineering
Acade~y? imeni N. Ye. 2hukovskiy, a scientist and indoctrinator of air force ~
cadres . -
Our discussion of the intense practical. theoretical and organizational work
performed by all peraonnel during the years of development of the Military
� TrAnsport Aviation must include something about party-pclitical work. It
wae the party organizations and political organs which mobilized the forces
and found Ways to accomplish the difficult tasks. A great deal of credit
for the development of political organs of the Militaxy Traneport Av3ation
goes to Lieutenaat Genesal Georgiy Frolovich Bezborodov, a political Worker
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- with a greaC deal of experience~ Gaorgiy Frolnvich ia well known both in
Cha milltary and civil aviation. Ke began his army caree~ ~s a Red Army
man before the war~ leter becoming a deputy poliCical inetrucCor. He served
as ehief of a politica]. section for many yeare. He headed Che political
directorat~ of the Ministry of Civil AviaCion. He was elecCed depuCy Co the
Supreme Soviet of th~ RSFSR. Kis vast experience wiCh party and staCe work
helped G. F. Bezborodov auccessfully Co cope with the difficult taske involved
in organizing political work in the Air Force Military TraneporC Aviation.
I ehould aLso mention the role of the young poatwar generaCion in the `
development of the Military Transport Aviation. During the difficult
and intense period of Cechnicnl rearmament the youth initiated aocialiat
competition Co master the aircra�t equipment as rapidly as poseible and to
advance their technical cni.litary knowledge. The appeal by the Red Banner
Komsemol air unit for a fitting tribuCe to the 40th anniversary of the
Armed Forces of the USSR and Che 40th anniversary o� the Komsomo], met
with broad reaponae among the nation's airmen at Chat time. That unit
praduced many rated specialiste and many excallent crews and aectiona,
whose deeds have served as a vivid example of the courage and indusCry
which have always distinguished peraonnel of the Soviet Armed Forces.
In sua~ary, it can be concluded that the Military Transport Aviation's
' transformation from a special branch of the aviation, a part of the Airborne
Ttoops, into an independent branch of the Air Force was the most important
occurrence in ies postwar development.
Turboprop planes opened up new possibilities for the emplayment of air -
transport, including its uae to support maneuvers of peraonnel and
equipment for all branches of troops. The improved technical equipment
of the Military Transport ~viatfon and the changea occurring in its
combat operations and capabilities during the period of developmenC of
the Air Force Military Tranaport Aviation broadened the range of employment _
of air transport and of th~ missiona performed by the Military Transport
Aviation.
r~
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CHAF'TER V
SHIPS OF Tki~ AIR -
Lach branch of aviation has ita own epecific technical equipment~ depcnding
on iCa purpose and the nAtura of Che miesions iC performs.
Several stages can be diacerned in the developmenC of the technical equipment
of the 5oviet Military Transport Aviation, eCages marked by the deveLopment
of tranaporr and airborne landing means based on the axperience of World .
War II, by Che reequipment of Che Military Transpor~ Aviation with Curboprop
planes and, fiaally, by an increase in nir transport'e role in modern
warfare baeed on the development of combat equip~nent.
As the reader knows, special milltary trgnsport planes did not come into
being immediately: Chey appeared no more Chan 20 or 25 yeara ago. ~rior
Co this'va~ious types of bambera and passenger planes were used for air
tra~aport neede at varioua times. Such aircraft as the R-5, TB-l, TB-3,
~ I~NT-9, K-5, Po-�2, PS-84, Li-2, Tu-4, I1-12 und I1-14 were moaC frequently
~ ada~ted for che.performance of airborne traneport missiona, and Chey xre
- Cherefore regarded as modifications of military Cransport planea. Our
units were equipped with some of them for a long time--up to the 1950's~
untii apecial military transports meeting modern demande began to be built.
As a branch of aviation the Military Transport Aviation ie intended for
the performance of its own unique and apecific miasiona: landing and
dr~pping by parachute peraonnel, combat equipment and other cargo;
transferring troops and combat equipment from the nation'e interior to �
various theaters of militar; operations; delivering various supplies and
equipment fo~ the forces, and so forth. It therefore requires specially
designed aircrafC with special piloting and aighting equipment, conveyora
aad loading equipment, airborne landing and navigational equipment.
The range and load capacity of military transports are extremely important.
It is also important that they have a large range of speeds, in order to
' deliver troopa and cargo to their d~stination rapidly, at maximum epeed.
The troop- or cargo-drop, however, should be carried out at slow speed,
in urder to drop the parachutiats or equipment safely and to avoid ecattering ~
them. The aircraft must have good stability and controllability, however,
while flying at low apeeds, evea with the failure of one or two engines.
Extensive requirements are made o: the take-off and landing capabilitiea
of modern military transports. After all, they may be expected to take off
and land on small dirt airfields. This fact is also taken into account
for destg:zing the aircraft wing structure: a high position fdr the wing
is the mc,st practical, since it makes both the wing and the power units less
vulnerable to damage during landings on undeveloped dirt stripa.
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Special atitention ia gi.ven to the �ueelage design and to Che epecial
airborne equipmant. As a rule~ the modern military traneport ha~ a low,
rainforced floor, tie-down devices, conveyors end mechanieme~ roiier tracke~
seats, cables upon which to gCC~Ch the parachuC~ ripcorda, a signaling
eystem and oCher equipment~ including epecial medical equlpmenC.
� Radio compasses, radar unite, aerro compasses, periecopic sextants,
automatic pilors, extremely pracise navigaCional ine~rumente. elecCronic
c4mputera--this is far ~rone8of~theglargagaircraft ande o makerlong~rgngech
help the crew to operat
flights at various latitudes.
The great posaibilities for using transport planea for mi.li.tary purpoe~s~
the significant increChe ierformancemanditherdaeigneofstheseCaircrafCfiG
rsquirements wade of p
have placed them into a class a1Z their own. _
As we have already pointed out~ the prototype of the apecial transporte
were bombers and pasaenger planes with only the fuselage modified for _
- performi.ng tranaport work. Large cargo doors were made in them, the
f].oors were reinforcecl and traneport and landing equipment was inatall~d.
- Cargo hatches were made at the bottom of the fuaelage in some of the
planes for dropping cargo by parachute. A major deficiency of these
converted aircrafC waitt~ecessarthto use cumbereomee ndrheavyhloadingthe
floor, and this made Y _
and unloading equipment.
Military transporta were also created for hauling containsrized cargo, which. ~
is loaded and unloaded with machines.
Specialized transport planes with turboprovementno� transport2equipment?
constituted yet another trend in the impr
Present-day military tranaporte are equipped with the more economical
turbofan jet engines.
Our d~scussion of the improvement of the technical equipment of the Military ~
Transport Aviation ~ould not be complete without mentioning the work
performed bybuted
aerreatadealato theidevel pme:ltyofhthe MilitaryuTra sport _
which contri 8
~viation.
Tupolev was one of the first to
Renowned Soviet aircraft designer A. N.
respond to the challenge of the time and to begin working on the development
- of aircraft for tzansporting troops and cargo. We have already mentioned
the role played by the ZB-1 and T~!-3 sircraft designed by Tupolev during
the y~:ars when ~eSeihea detlanesndesigaedeprimarily asabombersAhadta~number
were created. ~Y P
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of significant advantages for the Military TraneporC Aviation: a larga
:oad capacity, exteneive rnnge and flying altitudes for Chat time, ~and
the capability of utilizing di.rt airfieldg. In addition~ Che planee
designed by A. N. Tupolev could be modified for parachute-dropping or
landing troope, combaC equipmenC and oCher cargo. The TB-3 wae one of
the begt bombere of its time, and its employment in the Military Transport
Aviation was very imporCant Co the mastery of ineans and methode of landing
troope and cargo.
In the 1930'e the apecial-purpoae air aquadron wae also equipped with an
aircraft developed ia Tupolev's design bureau--Che ANT-9, which was even
_ faster, had betCer maneuverabiliCy and wae better ada~ted for military
~raaeport work. It was on a modification~of this plane, called the
"Kryl'ya 5ovatnv," that Hero of the Soviet Union M. M. Gromov made hia
:amous flight to the European capitals.
In the 1950's the epecial deaign bureau headed by Hero of Socialiet Labor -
A~ N. Tupolev, chief deeigner and holder of atata prizes, renewed its work
' on the developubent oE military transporte. This time as well the work `
= coacentrated on moderntzing heavy bombers for dropping troops and combat
' equipweat by parachute. ,
The Tu-4 atrat~gic bomber was modified for thie purpoae. Ita bomb hatches
were malified for handling parachute troops, and fixturea were installed
on the bottom for attaching the specially designed P-90 compartment,
daoigned for carrying combat equipment--motor vehiclea, gun mountinge,
aad so fortt~, to be dropped by parachute. The navigational, sighti~g and
other eqisipment ~n this aircraft approached the level required to perform.
military air transport missions. Tactical flight exercisea graphically -
- demonstrated the broad capabilities of the Tu-4 and established the trend
for subsequeat improvement of the military transport design.
The s4ccessfu], use of ~he Tu~-4 to meet the needs of the Military Tranaport
Aviation made it possible to develop and to substantiate, theoretically
and on a practical level, new methods of landing troops and cargo in tight
combat order, different aspects of interaction with other branches of _
aviatio n, and so forth. -
The Tu-4 was thus the predecesaor of that military transport plane created -
a decade later. -
Chief designer 0. K. Antonov made an outstanding contribution to the
creation of special trans~ort and landing planes. The team of his
Speci3l Design Bureau developed the An-8 and the An-12, which were
- outfitted with the latest equipment and were capable of landing with
airuorne troops or dropping them by parachute~ and ~~f transporting various
types of combat equipment and materiel in any kind c~f weather, in the
daytime or at night. The development of these planes represented an
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imporCanC advxnce with respect ~o improving ttie co~at capabilities of Che
Military Transport Aviation and in Che accompliehme t of ite miesions.
The firaC military Cransport plane wiCh turbine engines in Cha Soviat Uaion,the
An-S, wae~ bui1C in 1955. This ghip of the air~ which was given the name
"flying whale" because of its exrraordinarily large fuselage, had a recCan-
gular cargo compartment with a large hatch in the Cail section, a reinforced
floor and a set of tranaport and sirborn~ landing equipment making iC posaible
to land with troops~ combaC equipmeut and oCher cargo or Co drop them by
parachute.
The methods employed for loading and landing equipment led to the development -
of an aircraft of a fundamentally new, high-wing deaign~ whose high wing
and power uniCe permitted it tn be used for a number of epecific misaion~
typical for the Military Traneport Aviation. The aerodynamic arrangement
- of the wing and its lift augmentation devices were the ob~ecC of especially
thorough research and atudy.
The plane's high-wing design made it necessary to install the main landing
gear supporta on the fuaelage. Problems arose with respect to giving the
plane stability while moving on the grouad with lateral forces affecting
it aad eo insuring that it could be controlled in casa engine thruaC became
unbalan~ed.
A large group of experimeatal studiea were carried out through the creative "
effort ~nd the ~oint work of aircraft designers, pilots, engineers and
technicians of the Military Transport Aviation, which reaulted in the
achievement of good take-off and landing characteristics for the ne~oblems.
aad made it posaible to resolve a number of scientific and design p
For example, an efficient 3esign was found for a tail section with a
large cargo hatch--the dropping of cargo through the tail section of the
fuselage was a fundamentally new concept.
Safe methods for dropping cargo were firat developed using An-8's~ and a
syatem was then developed for calculating the behavior of the sircraft
and cargo during an airborne landing operation. Air-drop methods, including
a method of dropping cargo by means of pllot ~arachutes, was developed
through persistent, painstaking eacperimentation and an enormous amouint of
work. The resolu~ion of this specific but important problem ia the
practical work of the MiliCary Transport Aviation demonstrated the _
' enormous amount of work underlying every advance made in the ove.rall
improvement of inethods of transporting troops and cErgo by air. _
The An-12, a landing and transport modification of the general-purpose~
medium turboprop transport, ~as a?zew model of the transport plane.
The An-12 has good flight characteristics, excellent controllability and
good dep~ndability. The plane's take-off and landing qualities and its
- versatile landing gear allow for it to be used at airfields with dirt,
~
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gravel~ sand, enow and ice aurfaces. The fact Char ehe engines are located
high up on rhe wing conrributea to e~he aircraft's dependable operation aC ~
euch airfielda and reduces the likelihood thaC duet~ eand and oCher foreign
ob~ecte will find Cheir way into the engine. ~ ~
The problem of maintaining etability and conCrollability when Che ceater of
gravity ehifte during the procese of dropping hearry equipmenC wa~ resolvad
ia the An-12. The experience with the operation of the An-8's made i~ r~
poseible to achieve an expedient arrangement of the main landiug gear
aupports in the An-12. _
, The excellant quality and tha capabilities of the An-12 were atteated in the
best poeaible way by the awarding of the Lenin Prize to chief designer
0. K. AnConov and to Che group of leading specialiets who creaCed this plane.
The aext accomplishment of Antonov's Special Design Bureau was the development
of the giant An-22 "Antey," a heavy atrategic military tranoport, the
largeat turboprop plane in operation in Che caorld.
The An-22 is designed for landing troops and large pieces of combat equipmeaC
or dropping them by parachute. The airtight cargb compartment makes it
posaible to haul practically any kind of combat equipment in use in the -
Soviet Armed F'orces--from armored personnel carriers to supersonic planea. _
A cargo ramp with hydraulic drive augments the uaeful area of the cargo
- hatch and, together with a conveyor~ roller tracka and two overhead
traveling cranes, reduces the amount of time speat on loading and unloading
operations. '
_ The unusually large dimensions of the cargo compartment created a problem
with respect to the structure's strength and weight, a problem which was
resolved with a double-keel tail section and a number of other original
deaign features. Despite all this the giant aircraft, as well ae the
An-8 and the An-12, has good mobility on soft soil and good take-off and
landing capabilitiea.
Because of its aelf-sufficiency the An-22 ie used exCenaively in the Civil
Aviation for delivering ~argo to regions difficult of access for the
national economy--all typea of motor transport, bridge girders up to
35 meters long, railway cars and shunting locomotivss, vesaels with a
diaplacement of up to 100 tans, and all types of combat equipment. The
An-22's ecanomy of oparation cuts transportation costa P,lmost in half.
I remember vividly when rhe developmeat of tne An-22 was initiated. Oleg
Konstantinovicy Antonov came to us from Kiev, where h,'~s Special Design
Bureau was located, with a new model of the future asrcraft, in order to _
continue its development in close contact with military specialiats
representing the Military Transport Aviatio~. Bef~re tlie tactical and
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technical sper.ifications were establiahad for the new plane, we worked
together a long time Co find Che best version and held long discussions, ~
' going into the emallese details. SpecialisCe with the Military Transport
' AviaCion made many valuable reconunendaCions for improving the cockpiC~ Ck~e ,
control vane~ Che fan ad~uetment eyetem, the arr~ngemenr of the eha�t
- through which tha crew abandone the aircrafC~ and so forth. _
While I am on Che sub~ecC of the ~oin t work performed by military apecialiste
and 0. K. Antonrv's design bureau, I would like to menCion the extraordinary
consideration received from the workers of ChaC bureau--their patient
endeavor to take our orders and wishes into account. We worked Cogether -
a great deal during those years, but I do not remember a single instance _
_ in whY.ch Oleg KonsCantinovich or his assiatanCs did not agree to our
~ demands as they attempted to find an efficient solution to the currenC
problem.
This close cooperation is probably what insured our euccess in the search
for ways to accomplish the increasingly complicated tasks facing the
aviation.
,
I recall working on Che problem of increasi.ng the An-12's flight range, _
improving the inter-aircraft navigational system for flying in closa
combst �ormations, and modifying the piloting and navigational and sigtiting
sytems to make ~t possible to reach the landing area with greater accuracy. .
After completing the modificaCion of a model of the An-12 the aircrafC
engineers, technicians, pilots and navigators worked to improve all of the
aircraft of this series in service with the aviaCion. A new galaxy of
planes appeared in the nation's Air Force as a result of continuous, ~
all-around c~operation between the Special Design Bureau collective and ' _
specialists with the Military Transport Aviation. They completely
transformed the Military Transport Aviation, a fact which was especially
graphically confirmed by large troop maneuvers and exercises conducted in
_ the years following.
During the "Dvina" exercise An-12's dropped around 8,000 fully armed '
airborne troops within a period of 22 miautes. An-22 military transports
delivered various types of heavy equipment to the exercise area. The
landing of ~roops and powerful combat equi~ment was performed in the
- specified are~a within a limited number of hours and in strict accordance
with the plar~ worked out in advance.
T'he results achic:ved were not the limit for the equfp~nt or the �possibilit~es
~ of the peopie learaing to use it. Chief designer C?. K. Antonov defined
the purpose of the creative cooperation engaged in by those attempting
tu perfect ailitary transports 3.n the following manner: "A characteristic
new Eeatur~~ of today's equipmer.t is maxim~m optimization, that is, the
aehievement of maximum result with minima? outlay."
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_ With this goal in mind 0. K. Antonov's de+aign bureau has persistently
striven to make the heavy aircraft aimple to operate and Co make the ~
Cechnology employed for manufacturing the assembliee and unite as ~imple
ae poasib le.
- Nor are the airmen with the Military Transport Aviation idl~ in Chie `
respect. I have already mentioned the ~oint work performed by th~ deaignere
and technical flight pereonnel of ttie Military Transport Aviation in the
refinament and modification of the An-8's anc3 An-12's. They worked
equally hard to perfecC the design of the An-22. A apecial engf.neering ,
and technical group was created consisting of specialists with the
" Military Tranaport Aviation. It included A. A. Fedoskin, V. T. Tereshchenko,
- F. F. Ordynskiy aad V. A. Andrianov, as well as A. S. KosCrikov, Yu. K.
Zakharov and others. Th~ group was hPaded by Vladi.rair Nikiforovich
_ 2aseziko~ one of the most experieaced engineers with the Military Transport
aviation, who worked with the An-8's and An-12's.
A number of defects were eliminated in the accepCance procesa because of ~
this group's work, which reduced the amount of finishing work required.
Military Transport Aviation engineers noC only reaolved on their own meny
queations pertaiaing to the technical operation of the An-22's but, as a
rule, also made m~ny design recommeadations aimed at improving ita
. dependability. Changes were made in the design based on these auggeations, _
� Which improved the zeliability and efficiency of such important sircraft
~ systems as the fuel, hydraulic and de-icing systems and the control eyatem.
The work performed by our engineering and technical group was given a
high rating: the Mil~.tary Tranaport Aviation sFacialists received atate
avards and V. Z1. Zasenko was awarded the Order of the Labor Red Banner
for their work on the An-22.
The unique technical characteristics of the "Antey" could not fail Co have -
aa effect on the improvsment of tactical procedures employed by the
Mil.itary Transport Aviation. Research in this direction was accompanied
by an intense search far new operational formations for combat groupa o~
sircraft, which would make it possible Co perform combat missions in any
kind of weather, day or night.
- Applyin~; their experienca in the use of the existing instruments, pilota
and eagineers of the Military Transport Aviation, together with designers
ia the aircraft industry, went to work to develop new equipment which would
make it possiole to achievE maximum effectiveness in the uae of the Aa-22's
aad Aa-12's, as Well as maximum safety while operating them.
At last, our joint efforts met with success. The new interaircraft naviga-
tional system ~~as given :zigh marks by the commander in chief of the Air Force.
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After it was demonstrated to Air Force leadera, Colonel I. N. Novikov,
- Honored Mtlitary PiloC of the USSR and comroander of the unit in which it
- was tesCed, and his navigator, Lieutenant Colonel M,, K. Belikov, were
presented with valuable gi�Ca.
Soon afCer that the operational capabiliCies of Che An-22 were expanded for
hauling large groups considerable diatances.
For this ~urpose specialists with the Military~ 1'ransporC Aviation, together
with specialists in the field of materials strength, aerodynamics and oChers,
performed udditional calculations which showed that ~,t would be possible
to fly with a cargo exceeding the maximum permissible load, but only within
a epecific range of Cemperatures, wind speeda and alCitudes.
On the eve of the 30th anniversary of the Soviet people's Victory in the
Great Patriotic War an An-22 commanded by myself performed a record
5,000-kilometer flight c~rrying a cargo of 50 tons Co commemorate thaC
important date.
I remember that day as though it were only yesterday. The aircraft slowly
picke~ up speed, and one could distinctly fee2 the difficulty with which
it b uilt up the lifting force required to raise the mass of many tons into
the air. The most imporCant thing during take-off was not to raise the
noaewrleels prematurely, to permit the plane to gain the necessary speed.
13ow important it was at that moment for the pilot to remain calm, to have
confidence in himself and i^. the aircraft. One would have to feel this
power, responaive to man's will aad intellect, in order to appreciate the
aircraft's inexhaustible capabilities. We had now reached the final
meters of the runway. The aircraft had built up the necessary speed. The
noaewheels could be raised, This was a matter of 30'seconds or so, but it
- seemed like an eternity.... .
After that--a climb at maximum engine power and then what should be the -
least difficult part of the flight,if only the weather forecast were
- accurate. It was not, however.
There were dense clouds along practically the entire route, the temperature
was higher than pre~icted, and the headwind had grown stronger. For most
of the flight t_he ai:craft was controlled manually. The crew was forced
to perform extremely complicated calculations in order to determine the
best. flight conditionR .
Despite al~ the difficulties, however, the flight was successful--we not only
- completed it within the schedule but actually bettered all of the calculated
data .
The new record was recorded by representatives of the FAI [International
Aeronautical Fede=ation].
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All membere of the crew~ especi~lly ~ Honored Military Navigator of the
USSR Colonel A. Ye. ~amoCa~ senior �].ighC engineer Engineer-Lieutenunt
Colonel V. I. Yseinavichue and Honored MiliCary PiloC of Che U5SR Colonel
N. P. Sh~.bayev, aircraft commander, demonatraCed extremely great atamina
and courage, vast professional knowledge and good flying skill.
The flight on the heavily lor�.'.~ An-22 confirmed the theoreCical eBtimaCes
and bui1C up confidence in the reliability of the aircraft equipmenC.
The chief designer's gratitud~ meant a great deal to the airwen. When the
record-setting flight was completed ~Jleg Konstantinnvich sent the crew of
_ the An-22 a telegram wiCh the message: "Thank you for proving Che
- aircraft's capabilitiea." '
_ The des�.gn bureau headed by chief designer Academician S. V. I1'yuahin,
Hero of Socialist Labor, occupies a special place in the hi~tory of the
development of air transport equipment. He contrib uted a great deal to
the development of new types of military Cransports.
The firat was the I1-12. The main feature of its design was simplicity ancl
� reliability. Reliable both on the ground and in the air, Chis aircraft ~
could operate wiChin a range of 50 degree3 below to 60 degrees above zero,
that is, it was suitable for use in pr~~ctically a'l1 of the nation's
climates.
Z'he next aircraft, the I1-14, had improved serodynamics and better flight _
safety, and its more pow~rful engine3 gave it greater cruising speed~
The I1-12 and the I1-14 occupied a special place in the development of the
Military Transport Aviation, since they carried special navigational
equipa?ent for flying in clouds and had an improved de-icing system and ~
other devices making it possible to refine the technique for '~nding
troops under difficult conditions. They also had an important deficiency,
however. While equipped for dropping people by parachute, they were not
outfitted for dropping cargo. �
- The next stage of collaboration between personnel of the Military Transport
Aviation and S. V. I1'yushin's Special Design Bureau took place in the mid-
1960's. It was during this pe.riod that tactical and techni~al data were
developed for the creation of a basically new military transport design.
Huadreds of aviation spec~ialists--designers, pilots, navigators and _
engineers in various fi~lds--took part in th~ development of these tactical
and technical data. And finally, a specially created commission~ together
with S. V. I1'yushin and his co-workers, mec to discuss the model of the
future I1-76.
The commission heard a reporC by the chief designer on the data for the
new aircraft and on its prospects. Al1 were highly impressed with the
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' ~oaeibilirice cre3t~d by it. MPmber~ of the commi~~inn~ which wag h~~ded
by the tuChnr of thie bodk~ then set ouC for the ~hap. Tha lif~-~iza
mock-up ~oasiated of the 1~ft ~ide nf tha plane~ including an engin~~ th~
entir~ fug~lag~ and wing cpnter apction dnd purt ~f ehe tail a~~~tnbly. I
vae di~appoine~d when I~nw it. An e pi~ot who h~d flown thoueands
ot hourg nn varinu~ Cyp~tl ~f ~~rcrg�t--from Che U-2 to g high-~pe~d
- jet bomb~r ~and h~avy militgry Crgnsporte--I wae not impre~~~d with the gray
- hulk of the mnck-up which app~+~red awkward gnd cumber~omQ gnd gave the
impre~sion of being unwiQldy.
I~irclpd th~ mock-up, inapected the nos~ gnd then walked back to tha tail,
etopping by I1'yu~hia in a~tate df p~xplexity which I could not ~onceel.
_ S~rg~y Vlndimir~vich wa~ already in pooY health at this time and w~6
gitting in ~ ch~ir.
"It'g hard to believe, 5~rgey Vla~imirovich~ thgt thie model could ~mbody
all of the meritg of which y~u have gpoken."
"You air~men wi~1 eee the aircraft's merite later~" I1'yuehin answered. ~
In r~calling thie incident~ I ~rould like to eCrese the designerts genius~ _
hie ability to eee or, more precisely, to be firmly cognixant of the
merite of his cre~tions long before they were produced in their actual,
final form.
Sergey Vladimirovich 1eft. I wae left with hie aesiatent~ Cenrikh Vasil'yevich
Novozhilnv, vho actually bore the bulk of the respon~ibility for completing
the design. The moat impreaeive thiag about the aork of 5. V. I1'yuehin'e
successor, noa chief deaigner Heru of Socialiet Labor G. V. Novozhilov--was -
and remains his ability to grasp what is moat important in the proposals
of the ~ilitary specialiets, the requirem~ents of our epecific branch of
aviation. It Was perhapa thia ability Nhich made it poasible to achieve
in the I1-76 that about ahich we had only dreamed until quite recently.
Ia the aork per.formed to perfect the aircraft a great deal of attention
v~a devoted to the development of the cockpit and the navigator's station.
We algo had to create basically neW equipment Which would make it possible
to laad personnel and cargo accurately uader all conditions. The sighting
and navigational equipment on the new aircraft incorporated various radio-
technical support equipment making it posaible to fly at high or low
altitudes in practically any kiud of Weather.
A great deal of vork Was performed to perfect the I1-76 not only by the
deaigners aad the creators of the apecial instruments~ but also by
_ navigators~ engineers and representatives of various services of the
ttilitary Transport Aviation~ particularly Ceneral Valentin Konatantinovich
L'dal'tsov, a member of one of the aubcommissions in charge of accepting
the nev aircraft. Diatinguiahed Military Navigator V. K. Udal'tsov did a
gteat deal of aork to demonstrate the practicality of certain changes and
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r~Fin~m~nt~ in the ~quipm~nt de~ign. lti~ p~rofo~md pr~ctic~l knowl~dg~ of
th~ ne~dg nf Che Military Trgn~port Aviation gnd hi~ exCen~iv~ ~xp~ri8nn~
in"flying txgneport plan~e under the mo~t divaxu~ c1la~tic condition~ providad
him with the background for ineieting on eha adoption o� precir~ly th:.~
equipment which would be of greateot value in tha performance of air traneport
mieeione.
Engineer.-Colonel Genergl V. V. Filippdv glgo did ~ greaC deal toward
improving the I1-76 deeign. ti~ d~votad a great deal o� attention to
probleme of retaining maximum engin~ thruet~ probl~m~ pertaining to
t~mperxturc variations, to convenience af angine replacemenC and engine
start-ups under varioug climatic condition~ and to m~ny other specific
practical problems.
Uafortuaately~ it ~tould be imposeible to name all of thoso who gppliad thair
knowledge~ ~kiile and energy to the developmant of the new transport. It
wae the work of a large team of peopla~ gnd it aae crowned with well-daeerved
' euzcee~.
The Air Force received a baeically new aircraft with exaeptioaally good
transport cgpabiliti~g and ecnnomy. The overall arrangec?ent, the aero-
dynamic conff.gurations, the de-icing ayatem for the aings, the tail
aurfeces and the engine air intake eyetem were all neta.
The use of high-etrength eteele aad titanium alloys for aeeemblies bearing
the greateet loads aas also nea.
One of the nev features eapecially impraesed tha pilote: the aircraft
is eaeily controlled, preseure on the control wheel ie slight and the
lerge plane res~,onde Well to the controla throughout the entire range of
epeeds and at all altitudee. This is because the aircraft ia controlled
by meane of irrevereible hqdraulic control booatere.
While I am on the eub~ect of the operating convenience of the I1-76, I muet .
mention the etart-up of the engtnes, ahich takes only a limited aumber af -
minutes, and maneuverability: the plane can make a 180-degree turn oa a
taxiway 40 meter~ Wi~e.
The eircraft lifte off the ground ea8ily and gaina epeed rapidly....
In ahort, the more one flies thia plane the more there ie to tell about it.
~ and each flight on it makes one want to fly it more and aare.
Deaigns become obsolete vety rapidly in this age of ecientific and
technological revolution, of rapid advances in equipmeat. For this
reaeon that xhich seems like the moet perfect embodiment of scientific
aad technical achievementa today ie esaentially already aatiquated. ~
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l~or~ign axp~rt;e believe ~:hgt the n~ede of today c~ll fnr the Mtlit~tiy
TYan~port Aviation Co hav~4 eupgr-long-rang~, super-powerful~ highly
a~neuv~rabl~a~ ~lly,reather plane~ r.apabl~ of carrying a load of more than
100 ton~ and with ~ ra~g~ of mora than 10~000 kilom8ter~.
~
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- CtU?~+~R V~ . .
TEtE P~ACETr,.ME It~OUTIN~
Mi~th ttua pesaa~ge of 3 decttde8 ~ tha~ Which our p~op~,e a~nd tihs zeat n! man-
kind livad throuqh duxing World War rx has zaceded into history. The Soviet
~,~aopl~ ere engaqed in peaceful laboz, a~ are the Soviet fightl.ng man guarding
our homeland's sncurity. "Everything czeatied by the peopla muat be
- reliably protect~d,"36--theae wnrds uCter~d by Gettergi Secretary of thg
CP3t1 Centra~ Commi.titee L. i. 8rezhnev ati the 24r.h Cp3tt Congres~ expre~s the
bagic prinaipla underlyinq tha purpoae of tihe 3ovieti Arn~ed Forcee.
The daily life of military personnel in the Army and Navy, atirict, aadenced
and lil,led with military? and creative labor and touched with e epirit of the
romantic, gives the individuai ideoloqicai stability, develope his
character and a eense of r~eaponsibility, duty, coilectiviam and infinita
loyalty to hig patriotic and international duty, and educaties him politi-
cally, militarily and technically. Fighting men devoted to the homeland are
producad in the course of the combat and politS.cal training and in the prac- -
tical work, in an atimogphere of qreat militnry dnmandinqnese, fighting
~n prepered dt all times to come to the defenee o! the homeland, to
implea~ent the will o! their people.
in order to qive eome idea of What the day-to-day existence of the Soviet
Military Transport Aviation is like, an idee of the conditions under which ~
our swdern ai.rmen qrow stronq and m~ture, I ehail describe a few small
ev~ants tiaken from our normal workdays.
The concrete parkinq apron appeared to saq from the heavy hulls of the turbo-
prop giants. Self-propelled artiliery mountinqs and pallets of combat -
equ?ipment were loaded in the carqo compartments within a limitsd ntm~ber of
~ir?utes, and the subunits of airborne troops took their places.
A green rocket shot into tha sky, and after a short take-off ruit the lbrge
plaries rosa into tha sky, one after another. ~
new qeneration of Soviet airmen were at the controle of the combat
aircratt. They were fitting repla~ceaients for the veterans, winged youth
with a profound aaareness of thair duty to the homeland and with thorouqh
technical and special traininq rece~,vad a+~ highar aviatiers schools and in
uaits o~ the Mi,litary Transport Aviatio~.
]1a e~oarcise aas under way. -
Weath,er forcasts indicated the possibility o~ dense foq, but the crews
- P~P~ed ~ clrop the airborrse forces in any kind of weather.
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That morning Che fog did in fact becnme eo dense thgt the C~nC~ of the command
poet in the area of th~ landing and th~ treeg in the woods wer~ submarged in
a blanket of haz~. The landing aite wag elso ~nvigible,glChough it wae~ only
a few dozen mater~ away.
The time for the drop arrived. A few minutes passed, and, ~lthough~ ge
befor~~ nothing was vieible, one could hear the P1tS's~ rhe braking devices
on Che heavy cargo r~mp~ begin operating.
The report wae received 20 minutes lat~r thet tha landing operation hae ~een ~
com~leted. At almost the same moment the airborne troops buret forth from
the fog with a loud "hurrah" and rushed tha "enemy."
The Craneporte r~turned to the airfield, which was also in an area of denae
- low cloudg with limited vieibility. Nonethelese, all of the aircraft landed ~
eafely. The aircraft conm~ndere and crew memberg had performed the
mis~ion superbly, demongtrating good combat skill~ a good knowledge of
ihe equipment~ the ability to fly in difficult weather, and good coordination.
Aircrews and technical personnel continuously improve' their ekill under
the same or approximately the same conditions, performing imporCanC missions,
landing or dropping by parachute troops and combat equipment and supporCing
the exerciges of various branches of troops.
A aubunit of the M.ilitary Traneport Aviation ~aas assigned the mieeion of
- delivering cargo to the Far North.
1t~e temperature ~aas 50 degree~ below zero~ wiCh gale Winde up to 20 meters
per second. Fingers froze to aay metal they touched.
For six days the crews performed three or four flights daily ia unuaual and
difficult conditiuns. They were unusual not only because of the wenther
but also because of the fact that the fully loaded aircraft were forced to
laad on a frozen lake. The lake Was located at the base of a mountain~
aurrounded by hills on all eides~ with only a narrow canyon through which
to enter for a landing.
Naturally~ there were no radio landing aids on this flying field, if one
could call it that, and the airmen had to wark aut the landing approach
patterns on their own.
Finding their way among the peaks of the hills, they follm~?ed the course _
which they had worked out. Every crew member was under tension: the -
uavigators issued the necessary information--altitude, location, course,
- diatance, distir.ctiv~ reference points and outside temperature; the
radio operat~ra maintained contact with the aeareet radio facility; and
senior airborne r,echnicians kept a close eye oa the Terformance of the power
uaita. :~ot a aingle word wax wasted and not a siagle superfluous movement -
vas made.
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I.`nding~ ware made by vi,eual cnnract. Minutae seemed like an eCerniry~
Tha large aircrafr mad~a their way carefully through the narrow corridor ~
created by nature. Tha altimetere meaeured off the final meCers. A 13g,hC
touch-down~ a la~nding run over the ica--and the engines were ehut off. The -
cargc~ had been delivered.
The surning dawned clear that eummer Suaday. In the early houre, personnel
of one ~f the Military Tranaport Avintion unite were placed on alert. A
rragady, a pawerful earthquake~ had occurred in Tgahkent,locaCad thoueande
of lcilomet~re from them. People were in dtstr~es.
Tt?e aun had not rieen above the horizon when the first aircrafC lifted off
from the ru~?aay and set out on a course for the daeignated area.
Military Traneport AviaCion planes w~re the firet to arrive in the are8
of the earthquake~ carrying most of the medicinee, food end equipmenC for
aeteing up tent camp~.
We were ati g;;rfield X. Beautiful~ silvery planee with swept-back winge
aere lined up on the flying field, their engines, auepended beneath them
on gracaful pylons, appeared weightlesa againet the background of the
huge fuealagee. Theee were nea I1-76's.
Cleared for take-off, the aircraft mounted easily into the air~ carrying
subuaits of sirborne troope along with their weapons aad combat equipment.
_ The facea of the airborne troope were calm: for tham th~ flight wae a
sort of reapite before the "battle" aad each of them wae inwardly prepariqg
himself to perform the forthcoming miseinn and thinking hia own thoughte.
. The creWa of the landing aircraft were engaged in tenee work, ha+ever. The -
command Was received from ground to form up in combat formation. Each
of the airmen accurately performed hie ~ob as epecified in the flight
mission.
~
Aa they crosaed over the "front line" they had to alter their route to
avoid coming aithin range of radar facilitiea.
The crewa performed calmly and the pilots monitored the inetrumeata, Which
~rould bring the aircraft to the deaignated area. ,
A green light came on in the cargo com~artment, and the parachutists prepared
to ~ump. The hatch doors opened slos~ly, a green light flared up aad in a
matter of seconds the subunits had left the aircrsft.
The sirborne landing force Was delivered precisely to the designated area
on time....
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Today, we aan speak w3th pride of the fact that our Milieary Transport
Aviation has achieved great precision in dropping sirborne troope and _
cargo at d~signgted siteg. And thig is the regult of pergistent~ d~ily
efforts to improve the combat training and technical skill nf gll Military
TransporC Aviation personnel.
Our routine days of intense work are not yeC g matCer of history, and I
hope that afCer reading ~bouC pergonnel of Che Military Trangport. AviaCion~
about th~ training of the youag aviaCorg a?~d the improvemenC of cambat
readiness in the Air F'orce Military Transport Aviation the reader will
have a better concept of our existence today.
A School of Proficiency
- The auccE.ssful performance of the MiliCary Traneport Aviation's work depends
to a conaiderable degree on well-organized Craining, precise planning,
thorough support for the operationg of our air uniCa and aubunits and the
ekillful employmenC of various tactical techniques, and on the landing
of airborne forces day.or night, in any kind of weather, within Che time
epecified and within limited areas.
The combat training of fighting men in the Military Transport AviaCion ia
broad in scope and diverse. The airmen learn whatever may be required in
an actual. combat situation and their peacetime workdays are continuous].y
filled With soldierly activity, the objective of which ia the model
perforn~ance of their military duty and the achievement of a etate of
readineas to perform aay misaion for the homeland.
The professional training of airmen for the Military Transport Aviation has
its own specific aspects. Long-range flights. unfamiliar routea~
extraordfnarily diverse missions and prolonged flights--this is far from
a complete list of the difficulties encountered by the crew of a military
transport. Airmen of the Military Transport Aviation must be able to fly
faultle8aly at minimum altitudes, over deserts, mouatains and seas and
without visual reference points.
Powerful military transports traverse the air over our homeland, from khe
Baltic to the island of Sakhalin, from Novaya Zemlya to Kushka. Flighta
in the North are especially difficult. Freezing weather, blizzards,
landings under difficult conditions, all make it esaential to perform
painstaking preparati~ns for each flight and demand courage, mutual
assistaace and valor.
The creW of a military transport and its commander must first of all have a
thorough knowledge of ~he equipment~ aerodynamics and navigational techniques
and procedures and good pi'loting skill; they must be bold and resolute and
must have firm coafideace in the aircraft's capabilities.
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Good individu~l trgining for th~ ~peciali~tg ts n~ce~eiCnted noC only by
the need for sttwothly conxdin~ted teamwork but aleo by Che degree of
responsibility borne by girmen of the M111tary.Traneport Aviation. On long
flighC~ th~re ig ao one to rely on buC theaASelvee~ and the cr~w~ must count on
their own abilitieg, be able to apprgiae the air and grnund gituariong by
Chemselv~g and to m~ke the necegsery decieion and be able to iwplemeaC it
in various circumetan~ea, which aYe sometimea not covered by any sorC nf
ingtructions.
A number oE problems are encountered in the procees of improving Ch~ ~
profeesional ekill of the personnel~ one of which might appear peradoxic~l:
in this gge of scientific and technological revolution, extremely complex
equipment, electronic computera and all aorts of computing devices, man's ?
role, hie knowledge and akills. are becoming more and more important. It
is e~aentiel for these epeciglista to h~v~ thorough technical training~
great competence and g good knowledge of the theoretical and practical
asnects of Elying. Ke must master machine language in order rapidly to
- arrive at the optimal plan for performtng the aseigned miasion and feed
the data into a computer.
I.earning to operate the extremely complex modern equipment with which Che
Military TranspoYt Aviation ie equipped and acquiring the ability to
perform even the most difficult mission in any air or ground situation-- -
these Casks are accompliahed in peacetime wiCh the system of indoctrination
and profesaional training at air schoola and in Che combat units in the -
daily process of improving the airmen's practical skilla and conatantly
expanding their knowledge. The entire syetem of theoretical and practical
training, which never stope even for an hour, compriaes the achool of
proficiency, a school which develops competent and mature personnel~
people of unwavering convictions and knowledge, first-class specialists
of which the Military Transport Aviation is proud.
A number of higher military aviation schools train cadres specially for the
Military Transport Aviation. One of them has engaged extensively in the
training and indoctrination of future air force officers for more than
30 years now. Thousands of young people have received training at thie
school, acquired substantial knowledge there and become good military
airmen.
Tfie school has everything which is required for the cadets to gain a
thorough knowledge of cx+dern aviation equipment. They master the fine
- points in the employment of its capabilities in classes on combat aircraft
deaign and learn ab~ut sircraft desi~n and strength and about tlte theory
and deaign of jet engines in electronic and automatic aviation equipment
laboratories. The cadets have at their disposal a superbly equipped
training room with a trainer cockpit, aviation and radioelectronic equip-
ment classrooms and ather auxiliary facilities.
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Training in pref].ight procedures receives epecial aCtention. Fli,ghC
exercisea in the classroom~ aC the methods f~cillty in Che aircrafC
coclcpiC and on training equipmenC or a functionnl mock-up contribute to
a thorough mast~ry of tha laws nf aerodynami.c~ and navigarion. Radio
electYOnic and gutomgtic equipment make it pos~ible Co work out the action
to be taken by the crew in an emergency eituation~ which cannok be repro-
duced on a flight: failure nf on~ of the power units, part of the
electronic equipment~ the fuel supply or hydraulic syetem, and eo forth.
' Solid pracCical akilla are thoroughly mastered during aubsequenC flights--
With an instructor at fiYSt, and then solo. The good flight Craining
acquiYed at the school helps the young pilot-engineera succeasfully to ~
perform mteaiona on modern aircraft in the line units.
ConaCant, close contact between the instructors and the air units snd sub-
uaits in which the cadets receive their pracCical Craining~ makes it
possible to m~nitor the quality of Che Cheoretical preparation and fliaht
training of the achool's graduates and when necessary,to make changes in .
Che training progYam, which contribuCes to the achievement of ~Yim+!m
effecCiveness in the training of flight personnel.
/ Approximately the same syatem is used for training apecielista at Che higher
- military school for navigators.
Representatives of all services of the Military TransporC Aviation maintain
conatant contact with the achools. They are viaited eapecially frequently
by Ma~or General of Aviation M. P. Zayka, diatinguished military pilot,
and Major General of Aviation V. K. Udal'tsov, distinguished military
- navigator. Command's representatives speak to the cadets on the taska _
facing our aviation, on its future development, on the mastery of the
new equipment and the requirements made of cadres of the Military Transport
Aviation. ' -
Those in charge of the schools do everything neceasary to aee that their
graduatee settle rapidly into the combat rhythm of life in the air units. -
Thie is insured by seeing that they thoroughly master the basics of their
occupacion at Che achools. A feeling of great responsibility on the part
of the inatructors plays a prime role. As a rule, graduates of the
higher aviation schools euccessfully master the new equipment received -
in the combat units and demonstrate excellent knowledge and good flight
skills.
Ia addition, most of the young officers are active in public affairs. All
of them are al$o in good physical condition, a fact of no small importance,
and this helps them more easily to bear the difficulties of long-distance _
flights.
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A1~. of Chie helpa the officere ~oining the MiliCary ~ransport Aviation ~o
serve as a'fiCting replncement for our older generaCione of avl.atore.
I would like to mention Che productive work per�ormed by one other milltary ~
air engineering school, which traina engineers to serve on the ground.
The aucces~ful performance of migsions by miliCary transporta depends to
a great degree on the training of these apecialieta, and this ia why it is , -
eo important for the graduates of Chis school to posaess exteneive
_ knowledge and eolid practical akills.
Nor could i fail to mention those inesCimabte advantages produced by the
conversion of aviation achoola to the category of higher schools, which
meana that the cadets receive broader training in physica and mathematics ~
and become qualified engineers. Only a good engineering background
- permiCa the young apecialists eucceaefully to master the complex aviation
eyatems with which our air.farces are equipped.
Peraonnel greatly needed by the air units are trained by apecial achools _
- for warrant officera (praporahchiki) and ~unior aviation specialista. The
institution of warrant officer, recently introduced in the forces~ ie
already playing an important role. In Che future this category of service-
_ men will be assigned the important work of Craining junior apecialiaCa and
fighting men in the lower ranks.
Duriag their training at special schools the warrant officers acquire '
basic military knowledge and skille essential for the performance of
their aervice duties. Their development as commandera and indoctrinatora
is achieved in the process of their practical work in the unita. This
qualitatively new category of commandera is closest to the soldiera and
aergeants and is directly iavolved in the combaC training and ehe political
and military indoctrination of the peraonnel, in the servicing of the
equipment arid in the work of maintaining it in a state of combat readinesa.
The great importance attached to the aelection of candidatea for warrant
officers' schools is therefore understandable. These schoola accept the
- beat of those who are on active duty or in the reserve, who love their
work and choase a military career.
At a practical and scientific conference of leading political workera of
the Army and Navy Marshal of the Saviet Unior. D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister
of Defense, pointed out the responaibility involved and the difficulty of
indoctrinating the young fighting men and the fact that youth ~oining the
Armed Forces now are ahead of their predecessora with respect to their
development. literacy and range of interests. A conaiderable portion of
- the youth are inducted into the army immediately upon graduation, and it is
not an easy matter for them tn overcome the burdens of military service. In
addition, military service is now far more complicated than before. The
military indoctrination of these youth naturally requires graater skill on
- the part of commanders and political workers~ who have the ~ob of making _
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every �igh tin~ man clearly aware of the fact Chat he is performing
an imporCanC ~ob to prot~cC the socia].ist achievementa of rhe SovieC
people. _
The tr~ining and indocCrination of ~unior aviation specialisCs also receive
a great deal of atCention in the Military TransporC Aviation. AfCer
a11, the young recruits must become not only competent patriot-soldiers
of the Air Force, but also Crue experts in their military specialty
within Che brief period of Chree to five montha. Great importance is
therefore attached to the training subunits in which the ~unior aviation
apecialists are training,and their training is reinforced by experienced
officere and skilled meChods experts.
The aergeants and sailors--aircraft mechanica, radio and instrument
operators, maintenance men, engine specialists, and specialists in many
~ other fields--perform all o� the work involved in preparing for and
conducting flights. And preparaCion of the aircraft equipment today -
requires c onaiderable knowledge on the part of each individual coming
into contact wiCh it. A fuel truck, for example, or an oxygen tanker
ie noC ~us t a special vehicle but a real laboratory. The driver must
therefore be not only a rated motor vehicle specialist but also a laboratory
technician with a good understanding of his equipment and its capabilities.
Naturally, the quality of the preliminary work determines to a considerable
degree ~:he plane's state of readineas to fly. It is no less important
! that th~ aircraft be kept clean and that the engines and numeroua pieces
of equipment be checked regularly to see that Chey are in good repair.
Constant attention to the training of personnel for the Military Transport
Aviation contributes to the development of specialists with the higher
ratings. Aviation schools are only the first stage, however. Further
training takes place in the Military Transport Aviation's units and -
aubunits, where the airmen receive practical training to achieve the
higher ratings. They refine skills and abilities previously acquired
and expand their knowledge in the daily military work. _
There are unlimited possibilities fr~r improving one's professional skill,
and the mo re the fighCing man knows and the greater his abilitiea, the
more knawledge is required by commanders and the more aware must be their
approach to subordinates and to the organization of smoothly functioning _
daily training for the military sub unit.
.
Political organs and party organizations have the leading tole in the
development of ideologically strong airmen in the Military Transport
Aviation, and they perform their work as an inseparable part of the combat
training of the fighting men.
"As we or ganize the party-political work," Marshal of the Soviet Union -
D. F. Ustinov, minister of defense, points out, "we must also take into
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_ account the nature o� modern warfare. We muet achieve a aiCuaCion in
which each commander and political worker has a clear undersCanding as
he organizes the training and indocCrinaCion o~ the personnel oE the new -
moral, phyaical and paychological ~riale to be encounCered by our fighting
men and the reaerve of etrength--combat~ ideological and moral--esaential
to the defenders of Che homeland now being Crained." 37
Today's party-political work is based on the Chorough study of deciaiona of _
the 25th CPSU Congreas and the Conetit~ition of the USSR, focueing on -
iadoctrinating the fighting men with communiet conviction, good morale~
political. views and fighring efficiency and keeping them prepared to
defend the accomplishmenta of aoci~la~W and Che peaceful, creative labor
of the Soviet people.
~iational discussion of the draft Constitation of the USSR providad a good
echool of political indoctrination �or Che peraonnel. During the
discussion airmen of the Military Traasport Aviation made more than
2,350 verbal and written statements and declarations in support of the
ConsCitution, and around 120 suggesCiona and additions were incorporaCed
into the draf~ of this historic document.
The most difficulC and important tasks facing units of the Air Force
Military Transport Aviation are accompliahed through the party organizationa.
Demonstrating a thorough knowledge of affairs and delving deeply into all
aspecta of the life and work of unita and subunita, they help the '
commaedera to accomplish the combat tasks and to eliminate deficiencies
in the orgaaization of the training proceas. Party organizatione
constantly focus their attention on improving the combat capability
of the units and maintaining permanent com~at readineas. As they
pursue these objectives, party organizations eadeavor to raise Che
communiate' awareness and sense of responsibility for the asaigned work~
to insure that they fuaction in the avant garde an~i that they set a
pereonal example in the performance of their service duCies. Setting
a peraonal example gives them the moral right to persuade and indocCrinate
pereonnel who are not party members, seeing to it that they train with
excellence and perform their service ~oba irreproachably.
The comprehensive approach and ideological and indoctrinational work,
which was thoroughly substantiated in materials of the 25th party congress,
is presently being adopted more and more extensively in Military Tranaport
- Aviation units. This approach is essentially a matter of closely combining
ideological-political~ labor and moral indoctrination. With respect to ~
the military it means closely interiinking political indoctrination with
the combat training. The daily practical work, the combat training, life
and living conditions of the fighting mea therefore comprise one of the
- main focuses of the work performed by political organs and party organi- -
zations of the Military Transport Aviation. Political workers devote all
of their experience and knowledge to the complex process of moral-political
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and paychological indocCrinatian, which calla for the simultaneous develop-
- menr of political and mpral qualities and improvement of rhe individual's -
paychological aspects. The profeasional akilla of thP fighting men are
improved and their combat readinesa is strengthened in this manner.
Training commandera of heavy aircra�t is one of the moat important aspects
of the training carried ouC in units of the MiliCary Transport AviaCion.
A faultless knowledge of the aircrafC equipment, practical aerodynamics
and navigation constitutes the basis for mastering the specific skills
required for flight work and for piloC~.ng military transporCs. The fact
thaC the transports carry personnel, combat equipment and valuable cargo
means that the pilot must peform unerringly, demonstrate great piloCing
proficiency and have a feeling of exceptional responsibility during Che
performance of hia duties.
The moral-psychological conditioning of the aireraft commander and his
ideologicaJ. strength are especially important because of this. It is
not enough to poasess good piloCing sophistication. In difficult
situaCions an sircraft commander must possesg mental calmness, sCamina
and the ability to analyze a situation rapidly and to make intelligent
decisions on his own, since milieary transporCs frequently fly wiChout
direct contact with the flight operation officer and frequently in
difficult weather.
Development of the qualities required to organize the crew's work on the
ground aad in the air constitutes a~. important stage in the indoctrination
of a young commander. An aircraft crew can only perform a mission
successfully when the commander is able to explain the purpose of the
mission to his subordinates precisely and clearly and to organize their
work in apecific situations.
_ Such is the role of the military transport commander, and it would be
difficult to atCach too much importance to that role, because it is the
aircraft commander who bears full responsibility for the accompliahment
of Che mission and for the timeliness and correctness of the decisions -
made. And the most unexpected situations sometimes Arise during flights.
Captain Byshev's crew was assigned an operational miasion to deliver
cargo to airfield X. Around 40 kilometers from the airfield of departure,
while it was still gaining altitude, the aircraft wa~ struck by a strong
bolt of globular lightning. The flash blinded the crew, several instruments
went out of order, and the radar sight and aircraft intercom system (SPU)
failed. The commander's self-control, his confidence in each crew
m,ember and familiarity with the alternate instruments helped the commander
emerge from the dangerous situation with honor. In dense clouds, Captain
Byshev made it possible for the radio operator to report the incident to
the take-off airfield by shortwave. The crew members performed the
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necessary operations rapidly and accuratel.y~ understanding each other
without words. Dropping below the clouds, the aircraft landad safely
aC Che nearest ai.rfield. Such is Che role nf.good coordinaCion and mutnal
understanding on the part of the crew and of control and akil].ful action
on the part of the aircraft commander.
Personnel of the Military Transport Aviation strive peraistenxly Co improve
- their theoretical Craining--their knowledge of the equipmenC and tha laws ~
- of aerodynamics, navigation and tactics. The more technically sophisCicated
the crew and the better their tactical training, the more successful
_ will be the flights perFormed over a prescribed route and Che dropping
aad landing of personnel and cargo. When an airman hns an accurate
theoretical understanding of the aircraft's behavior under all flight
coaditions, from take-off to landing, he masters the skill of piloCing
and navigation more rapidly and is cognizanC of Che need for strict _
discipline and irreproachable performance.
Performance efficiency is one of the basic laws of flight work. Tlte new
weapons and extremely complex combat equipment necessiCate atrict
discipline in order to insur~ the competent and precise operation of the
combat aircrafC, the instruments, various devices and mechanisn~. The
latest weapons demand strict discipline boCh of the military team as a
whole and of each fighting man individually.
Troop discipline is primarily Che ability of the personnel to apply
maximum mental and physical effort to perform their service duties
irreproachably and to carry out the assigned mission with excellence.
Efficiency of performance and strict discipline are extraordinarily
important in the air force. The equipment of modern aircra�t with
extremely complex instruments has considerably reduced the amount of
time available to perform the individual operations ~nvolved in flying
' them. The rapidly changing situation, enormous distances and extremely
~ high altitudes all require that the airmen observe instructions and
flight plans exactly. It can be boldly stated that maintaining the
prescribed flight conditions constitutes the keystone supporting the
skill of Che crew and flight safety.
Combat skill is improved and good results achieved in the combat tr~ining
and the performance of highly diverse missions in the process of serving
in the units of the Mi?.itary Transport Aviatioc~, which are headed by
experienced and highly trained commanders and political workers, in
which all services--command, navigation, engineering, communications,
logistics, meteorological and others--are performed according to rigidly
conceived plans, which take into account the requirements of higher
- agencies and the daily training tasks.
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!leny goud thing~ can be ~nid nf th~ ~nmm~nd~r~ ~nd eh~ politiegl wnrk~r~
af the unit coaun.~nded until r~e~ntly by d~fi~er N3.kdi~y ivan~vich Trifnnnv~
a vet~rgn ~E th~ Gregt pntri~tic W~?r ~nd ~i~einguiAh~d ttgdin t~pprgtor of
the U33Et. Thig t~am gtrtve~ conatently to be fir~t.
An ~xc~llent Cr~ining b~~e hg~ b~en ~reae~ed in th~ unit, ac?d ~p~ci~2.
cia~~ro~ms for the mornl-psycholdgic~l Cdnditian3ng oE eh~ r~din nppr~tnrg
aad r~din tr~ining faniliti~~ h~v~ been get up th~re. ~ w~uld lik~ en
- mer,:idn the f~ct thgt N. I. Min~lcov, th~ r.ew unit cnnm~ander, h~,~ r~e~ived
an a~?r1y pr~morinn far th~ guce~geful per~ormanC~ ~f ~omb~?t ~nd politic~l
traiaing tgekg. A grent de~l of wdrk is dnn~ in tih~ unit to qu~lify
thpge epecinlists for the higher ratingg. A cnmpngite t~gm from the unit
regularly comp~tes for first pl~ce in the Air ~or~e in radio gp~re nnd
has t~~peatedly wnn prizes, nnd Sergegntg A. 'T~plnykdv, T~ ger~zin~ gnd
N. Ivgnova h~ve p~rtiripnted in A11-Uni~tt comp~ti~ion~. SuCh radio
opcrgcorg as Chese c~n ~ledtily cop~ With th~ m~~t difficult ~nd imporeant
tagl~ in any exercige.
Fnllawiag ~re t~ro more examples taken frnm the lif~ of our line unita
whict~ I recently visired.
piret of all, I shgll describe one day of enmb~t training--prepargtidng
for and che perfora~nce of training flights und~r th~ ~up~rvisian oE
Colonel Vasiliy Afanas'yevich polyaknv~ d istinguighed military p iloc
and commander of a Military Tranaport Aviation unit.
I chose to visit this unit deliberately. At one time I was chief of the
political section of the guards formation of which it was a part~ and no~f
I vanted to see what changes had occurred in the unit and What i~
is like today. '
Befote departing I inquired as co What was scheduled for Colonel Polyakov.
"For the next fea days, ordinary night flights," I aas told. ~ -
Truthfully s7eaking, I do not like the expression "ordinary flights": I.
- iadicates an attitude toward flights as something routine and ordinary. I
like to see the vezy description of the daily miasinn reflect a mood of
creativity and persisteat exploration.
The efforts of the flight crew and of each specialist should constantly
focus on the perforn~ance of t~ clearly defined task~ on working out the
= more difficult parts and perfecting their skill. When organizing and
conducting tactical flight exercises, it is essential to create a situation
approaching actual combat conditions, a situation ahich will h~lp Che
commoandere and other groups of key personnel' to devclop tl~eir tactical
thinking ~nd provide them With solid practical s~cills.
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In the cont~mp~r~ry ~ieu~ti~n thp d~mand~ cn~d~ nf th~ t~ctir~l tr~3nir~g
of Ch~ girbnrne fighterg nr~ m~unting ~h~rp].y. N~ on~ ahould cnunt on ~ome
sudd~n in~piti~eidn f~r Caping with g CriCic~1 ~iCugCinn, hoping Co petiform "
an g~~ignm~nt withnut ~~reful, Chnrnugh flight'pr~p~rgti~n~ "An ~ir b~tti~
muet bn wnn nn th~ ground~"--thie principle~ which hg~ been rep~atodiy
~tr~a~~d by Chi~f M~rghal o� Avi~tinn p. S. Kutakhov, cumm~nder in ~hs~f
_ of the Air ~'nrce, fully applie~ to th~ cu~bgt tr~intng of airmen in the
Militgry Tr~n~p~rt Aviation. ~~eh cl~~ ar ~x~rci~~ ~nd ~~.eh ftight
n~eignm~nt ~hould rpgult in gn gdvgnc~ in th~e improv~mene of ~~mb~t ~kill
and ~hould contrib ut~ to eh~ ~uc~~~~ful ~~~cution df ~ny air mi~alon.
Thi~ i~ pr~cisely what I exp~act to find in th~ uniC comm~a?nded by V. A.
Polyakov. `
I h~v~ lcnoan Vaeiliy Af~nng'yevich ~ l~ng tim~ and ~m very fond of thi~
eeneiCive and modest man, an excell~nt pilot and n gupprb cnmmacider, whn -
ehoare conetant concern for hi~ men gnd for the ~ob entrueted to him.
liig unit hae de~~rvedly b~~n award~d th~ Bann~r of th~ USSK Ministry of
' D~fen~~ fdr militgry v~l~r,gnd nth~r gwgrds. It hae b~en an exc~llent
unit for many years, occupying a place nf honor among the ~tand~rd bearera
of the Military Transport Aviation~ _
I vi~iC~d on~ of the clagerooma at the training center. The command~r wgg
conducting a meeting for eupervieory personnel on the planning and conduct
of flighCs. The gubunit commandera and their deputi~g were quite eerioue.
They all had notebooks and their faces reflected unf~igned interest in the
meeting to follo~+. in what the commander Would have to say.
T'he commander took his time, however. tie apoke calmly and did not attempt -
te explain everything at onca. One could tell that the maeting had baen
carsfully conceived.
It frequently takes a fairly long time to explain a flight assignment.
Every commander knowa that it is not such a sim~le matter to put zest into
a routine 3ob~ to be able precisely to formulate the idea underlying a
apecific mission and make it clear to each individual. In order to accomplish
_ this, one must have a good understanding of the personnel, their theoretical _
and practical backgrounde and capabilities, of the condition of the aircraft
equipment, the airfield and radio support facilitiea, and must know the
weather forecast for the days ir~ediately ahead and ahat means of material
and technical support are available. The commander muet coneider aad think
- over a great deal before arriving at a deciaion as to hoa the flights are
to be carried out.
After informing those gathered that night flights Were acheduled~ Colonel
Polyakov asked ihe unit chief of staff to present his ideas for orgaaizing
and 3irecting the flights. 'Ihe deputy commander then preaented his thoughts
on the subject.
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Th~a gubunit noannand~r~ ~1~n r~pdrted an eh~ir pl.~n~ fnr th~ flight d~y
and on ehe t~gkg to be aceompiighed on rh~ E1igh~t~.
Th~ unit conm~nd~r'g bri~f qu~etinn~ gnd commenC~ wer~ td the point gnd
demon~rr~t~d ~ good tcnowl~dge of the p~arsonn~l'~ training l~v~l.
AfCer gll rh~a r~port~ had be~n made V. A. poly~kav began as~igming Che flight
mi~~iong for th~ d~y. it w~g c1~gr frdm rh~ cdmmand~r'g very fir~t wordg thar -
he w~s not gi.mply ~xpl~ining th~ �light trgining requir~m~ntg b~t, the
comm~nd~r, w~g ig~uing ~n nrder eh~t the romb~t tni~gion bp accompli~hpd.
Agsignt~r~tg w~re cl~rly d~fined fdr the g~bunitg gnd flight operaCi~n
gr~up and the ~chedule wa~ ~~t~biighed f~r report~ and for the prep~rgtion
of pl~?nning tableg gnd gll dncum~ntg pert~ining tn pr~flight pr~par~kione....
~ The cumm~nd~r'e excepeional di~ciplin~ ~nd precigion ~nd the thorou~hly
conc~ived clgrification of ~g~ignmentg could not h~1p but aff~ct che men.
~verything wgg under~tood without any gort of gddiCional qu~eCions, and
thp offi~erg left ta prepare for the forthcoming flighr$.
ThaC evening th~re was another meeting with the p~rsnnnel--a diecu~eion
of currenC evente. Air ~orce Day was approaching and th~ conversation
Wag therefore about the history and the traditioas of the Air F'orce, about
$peci�ic matterg nnd about plans for the near future.
As enon as I went outside the next morning~ I iannediately sensed the
special rhythm of life typical of thia garrison. -
Although it was not y~t 0700 hours, many people wete heading for the unit
sports complex, Where the nctivity was especially lively. A~1 of the
persdnnel--officers, warranC officers and regular service personnel--rwere
lined up on the sports field. For 30 minutes they all performed a fairly
heavy schedule of calisthenics. There was time left for volleyball. Even
there, on the sports field, one could clearly feel how firmly the people
were united by a co~on regimen, a common cause aad a commc~n mission.
Incidentally, when I arrived at the flight personnel's messhall this impression
was confirmed for me in a special Way. Some of those sitting at th~ tables
aere not eating, although breakfast had already been served up. I asked
about tha;. I learned that they aere waiting for their commanders (the
personnel were seated at the tables by crew and no one would begin eating
uatil the crew coasaander sac down).
Tl~e eolidarity and concord of the military team is developed in the daily
service process, and it is important that these qualities be manifested
throughout, even in minor every-day details.
A class on flight preparations was under way. The officers were bent
over their work. The commander Was checking to see how each officer
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had d~fin~d rh~ ~~8~nc~ nf tha mtg~i~n, ch~cking on th~ proc~dur~ for
p~rforming pr~lin~tn~ry pr~pgr~eion~ ~nd deeign~ting rh~ ~itna for checking
Chg cti�a~' fiighe r~~din~~e.
All. of the crew~ had diff~r~nt mi~eiunes tiher~ w~re flighte at maximum
raage~ mgneuver~ and the landing of girborne f~rca~ under ~pecifi~d
circwnseance8. Some nraw~ w~r~ makl.ng preparatione for pollehing up their ~
piloting techc~iqu~s at Ch~ r~ng~, while othere were making preper~tions for
in~trum~nt flights and for toakl.ng landing ~pproachee in an encloeed cockpit
(in thi~ cg~~ th~ cockpit window~ are covered With eppci,gl hnod~, which
cut off gny view of land or of th~ natural horizon). The ob~~ctiv~ of ell
th~~~ diverse missions ia the eam~--to develop ekill.
In ehe flight briefing room the combat miseion i~ explained once more gnd =
the enti~e procedure for pe:forming it--from etarting the engines to cutting
them off--3.a gone over. .
After th~ ~pecific preparaCinng of all s~rvicee are explained Che arew~
coutinued to re~dy themselvee for the flight~ in their own gubunits.
The unit haa excellent facilitiea for training and drills. ~ach subunit
has its own clagsroom, properly aet up fnr the purpose and containing the
naceseary equipment. The pilote, engineers, navigators, radio operatorg~
gunnerg and other epecieliets have made funcCioning display~. diagrams and
mock-upg. A~ grea ha~ beea set up on the grounde~ Where varioua parte of
operationg performed in the air are algo refined.
Various flight patterns, landing approaches and other elements of flightwprk
are attractively depicted on one wall of the buildiag.
One has the feeling that all activitiea at the garri8on serve to achieve
a sm~oth tempo of combat training and work and that the people,derive
pleaeure and eatiefaction from this.
And now, a feW details characterizing the nature of the grouad training.
Ocze of the subunit commandere, for exam~~^, ^^~asa by reminding the
men of piloting errors c~ade during the performance of the preceding flight
mission. Wae this the right thing to do? I feel that it Was. It motivates
the men and forcea them to find aays to overcome shortcominga. that is to
say, of striving for the best poasible performance of the misaion.
The officera at Work in another clasaroom were carefully drawing some sort
of diagram~ in notebooks and on the board, looking through manuals an~
patiently making some sort of calculations. Most of them Wore the insignia
of firat-class pilota or navigators on their uniform jackets.
Captaia X, one of the aircraft co~andera, had draWn a runWay on the board
and Was making intricate circles on it.
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I w~ne up to t~im and ~~ked him how long ~go he h~d gr~du~eed. Ne tiold m~~
four y~~r~. Uur~.ng th~t time h~ had b~cnn~ g firat-n].~~e piloe~ h~d
1earn~d en fiy in prgeti~~ily ~ny condi~inng~ tneating the norm$, and had
beee promoC~d Ca tihe rgnk of captain. '
gg wa~ aow fac~d with the t~ek nf re~toring hia night piloeing ekill~: H~
had rec~ntly r~turn~d from le~ave end had only been able to work on d~y
~lighte gin~~ ti~turning.
"Are ynu going ovpr all o� the details eo thoroughly b~cauae you ar~ h~ving
some eorr of difficultiea?" I a~ked him.
"Not r~eally, bur I must perform the pntir~ grnup of exerciseg ~ithin ~
prescribed anauat of time, which meane I will have to strictly gdhere to
.the preacribed flight conditions, apeed, altitude and all of the other
condition~."
Yeg, the pilot would n~ed a great deal of ekill to perform the aesigned
misaion, aad Y wished him luck.
The entire cYew~ firat and foremost~ Ch~ aircraft commander, bears reapon-
- sibility for Che euccega of the flight and for the completion of the
misaion. In order succesafully to cope with the asaigned miseion~ the
commander must pr~pgre thoroughly on the ground and ob~ecCively eva:uate
his capabilitiea and those of each crew member. And such preparations,
vhich I found myself Witnesging, conatitute the basie for succeseful
performance of the flight aesignment.
The unit commander invited me to watch th~ crewa in a"flying on the qround"
drill.
In a special area the airmen were elowly moving along linea drawn on~the
asphalt, listening carefully to the co~ander's ordera and queations.
New commaads aere continuously given: tfie flight echelon~ wind apeed and
weather conditions were changed; the focus of the mission was changed for
the crew; and hypothetical problema involving the failure of individual
syate~ and the power unite aere introduced.
"Are such drills useful? Are there not too many conditionalities?" I asked.
"No, Comrade Commander, a conditionality does not interfere With a detailed
run-through of a forthcoming misaion," the colonel answered with conviction. -
"The airmen are accustomed to such drills and prefer them to any other
type of claeaes."
I must say that such drills are presently being employed fairly extensively
in Military Transport Aviation units and that they are unquestionably
beaeficial.
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prpflight prapar8tian~ w~r~ bpin~ cnmplet~d. And V. A. Polyakov und
I w~ttC trdm nn~ alaHgronm tn ~noth~r I exparienced g growing feeling of
= prid~ for our pilors gnd navigator~, g11 of nu~ epecigliate, who w~re
preparing for Cheir flighC~ with such enChueia~m and vigor ~nd denwneCrgCing
euch a good underetanding of ehe ~~b~ ~
One could not call thi~ routine Craining. It was intensive work~ the
refinement of eg~~nCi~l ~lem~nCg of a flight under th~ mogt divprs~
- coaditiona~ conditione whlch w~r~ ehgnged eom~what ~anh time. ~ach time
there was di~cov~ry gnd rregtivi.ty, and it would not allow of Che routine.
It wae tim~ to r~st up before flying. I wae amazed by the quieC which
eettled ov~r the camp despite the fact ehat it wae midday. There w~s no
movement of vehicl~s. Yt seem~d that even the voicea of children had
_ be~n etilled. DuCy personn~l saw tn it ChaC ailence wag observed and
thaC a certain order wn~ mainCained during the houra set aeide for re~ting.
We had arrived aC the airfield. Brief commands and the serioug discuesion
of ~p~cialietg with th~ varioue ~erviceg could be heard. It wa~ only t�re,
ae the airfield, thgt one could fully appreciate the intensity of thgt -
apecial preflight atmo~phere.
- The air suddenly shaok from the roar of aircraft enginea,atarted up at a -
eingle co~nand. All noise atopped 20 minutes later. The crews received
their final in~trucCions. The weather forecaeter~ the co~unications chief
and the heads of the other services gave brief reporta.
A command wae given:
"Attention: Raiae the Air Force flag":
The airmen froze at attention. The triumphant and exciting melody of the
never-aging march "~ver higher and higher..." was heard, and the gold-tinged
blue flag roae slowly into the late-afternoon sky.
The formal ceremony had ended.
"To the aircraft":
� The commander and I headed for the control toWer. Colonel Polyakov was
directing flights that day.
It Was becoming darker outaide. -
"117. Request permission for group to move to take-off position."
This wae the commander of one subimit preparing to drop a tactical airborne
force. ,
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"Permisgion granted"; ~
Lights blinking, the heavy ai.rcr~ft taxied on ~o the runway ~nd ~esumed
tgke-off pogition~ '
"121. Itequest permission fo~ t~ke-off."
Thege w~r~ the call numbers of C~pCain X, with whom Y h~d spoken dur3ng
preparationg fdr Che night ~light. The aircraft commander was requesting
permiseion to taxi on to th~ runway.
"Permission granted": ,
Rising lighCly from the concrete runway, the aircrafC roge into the eky one
after aaother. ~rom thia poinC the flighta could only be followed from
the blips on th~ rgdaracre~na and from reportg from the aircraft.
. I checked the tim~,wondering how th~ capCain was coping with his difficult
aesignment. ,
"121. Miaeion completed aC the range. Requeat permiesion Co enter return
pattern."
_ The captain had performed superbly~ right on gchedule.
A few minutes went by, and the familiar voice came over the air once more:
"Distant marker reached. Landing gear down. Requeet permiesion to land.~
Mother minute went by, and the sircraft smoothly reduced its apeed and
to a stop at the end of the ruaway.
"Five, five:" the flight operation officer announced.
~
This meant that the crew had made the landing computations and performed
the landing expertly. The performance of the other parts of the asaignment
would be appraised later, based on data from the objective control equipment.
The flights continued. From time to time reports were xeceived from the
aircraft commanders and the flight operatioa officer sent out commands
in responae. The exchanges were brieE and concise to avoid clogginq the
frequencies with excessive instructions.
This cadenced performance, the operations of all members of the flightline
crew and of the flight crews in the air, and the preciae reports received at
the control tower reflected the intense life of the military team faced with
the task of mastering the extremely complex aviation equipment.
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A n~w day dawnad, and uniC pereonnel g~the~~d in ~ tr~ining room. Diag~aa~
~ and poater~ showing how tha flighr aesignmenta hgd b~~n performed w~r~ nn
dieplay .
Colone~. Poly~kov summed up the night flighte.
- The men li~tened aCCenCively to their commgnder and teacher~ a veteran
miliCary pedagogue wiCh a thnrough knnwledg~ of hi~ ~ob and de~ply concerned
for the performgnce of each elemenr of training, each dee~il in�luencing
tha improvement of combat eki11.
Another phase had been completed, and the airmen were preparing theroselves
for even more difficu].t and at the same time~ more interesting~ taek~~ the
pQrformance of which would be a new atep upward in the gchool of proficiency,
the achool of life....
The follawing example gives an idea of the work performed by the unit ataff
during preparatinne for and the conduct of an airborne landing of troope.
Thia occurred quite recenCly. An exerciae was under way in which one
sub~mit of the Military Transport Aviation was assigned the mission of
dropping an airborne group of "southern forces" at a limited aite deep
in the rear area of the "northern forcea." Upon receiviag the "combat"
miaeion, the unit commander issued insCructions on preparing for the
exerciee and on organizing iateraction with the landing force and with -
the tsnita enlisted Co provide combat support.
The development and adoption of the plan for a landing operation ia a
_ Complex and creative proceas requiring vast knowledge in varioua areas
of military affaire. The commaader, his deputy for political affairs,
commandere of the various services, and party organizations have a
direct role in this process, as in all of the routine and unusual mieaiona
performed by peraonnel of the Military Tranaport Aviation. .
1he chief of staff, however, bears epecial responeibility in the preparations
for the performance of a landing operation. .
Based on the commander's inatructions, he assigns the miesions to the chief
of communications and radiotechnical flight support and to the reconnaiesance
aad weather service chiefa. When he issues the inatructions he indicates
_ the schedule for submitting reports and documents, becauae smooth and
well coordinated work on the part of the ataff as a whole would be impossible
urithout efficiency on the part of each officer. Finally, he assigns the
actual mission: The operations group and forward detachments are to leave
for the takeroff area for the landing operation, where they are to coordinate
the distribution of the landing force, the schedule and procedure for its
- concentratioa, the schedule and procedure for loading the combat equipment
and the personael, the sequence and conditions of the landing operation
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~nd~th~ orggnixation of contYO11~ communiceCinne and reconnoiCering of the
airfielde. After Che lnnding ~chedule is fircrad up~ it ie to be transo~itt~d
to headquartere immedintely. -
Z'hank~ to the emoothly coordinated woYk of the comimnder and etgff~ a plan
ie rapidly adopted ~nd reported ro command.
Staff o�ficers work in the units eh~mgelves during tha period of pr~paririg
for a landing operation. There, they can apot and immediaC~ly gpply
_ anything nnw and useful produced by the p~ople's ini.tiative ~nd can help
the airmen to improve rheir skill and the commanders to indoctrinate ~nd ~
train their men skillfully.
Preparatione had been completed. The report had gone up through the chain
of command:
"Regdinese confirmed. Prepare to begin landing opergtion."
A perind of anxioua waiting began. 'i'he staffs had taken their placea at
the command posta, although outwardly everything eeemed the same-~radia
exchan~e and line communications traffic recmined as before.
Mothei~ crucial period was approaching, in which the political workers had
a apec~al role--the firat meeting with the airborne troops at the loading
airfield. The aircraft commanders and aenior aircraft technicians, together
with officers of the Airborne Troopa, would appoint those reaponaible for
the loading and define tha tasks to be performed by the crews of the combaC
vehicles for the airborne troops during the procesa of the landing operation.
This firat meeting was important �or building up a feeling of general
camaraderie and a sense of mutual responsibility for the performance of the
assigned mission. There would be discussion of the loading procedure and
safety measures and the taska of the airborne troops while en route to the
area, on the final leg and when leaving the aircraft. Repreaentatives
of the air unit (this is always done by political workers) would present ~
certificates and banners to represChe bestgoff the~l.aanding forceerbo~e
Troops, which would be awarded to
meeting was brief but useful.
The next report was made:
"Loa~ing of equipment and personnel completed." `
Teasion mouated. Reports came in, one after another.
The weather reconnaissance aircraft reporced on the weathar in the landing
area: degree of overcast, height of bottom edge, wind force and direction.
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From the command post eh~ uniC commander directed Che take-oEf. rhe
. forn~rion inCu combeG orders, the flight to tihe landing eite and Che drop
itaelf .
~ ~ More reporte folluwed: ~
'"Take-o~f of eccompanying weaCher reconnaissance plane...."
"Tak.e-off of forward airborne landing group...."
Md finally, the report: '
~ ~ "Take-off completed." ~ , �
The vorkload mounted. The aseemblying of Che groups and their flight to the ~
~ landing area were depicted on radarscreens at the radar etatione and
.monitored throughout the entire flight.
~ The operations officer listened closely to the reporCs~ recorded them and
~ forwarded them through the proper channels.
7`he sirborae group of "southern forcee" was dropped within rhe 11mi.ted
area deep in the ragr of the "n~orthern forces" at precisely the right
apot and the right time. The director of the exercise Chanked the peraonnel
of the air unit for their skillful aad emoothly coordinated performance.
The combat misaion had been completed, but the staff'e work had continued.
They now had to collect~ summarize and analyxe data on the performance of
the crews~ commandera and the services, in order to derive leseoas for the
future. ~
; The day-to-day work of an air unit staff is like or approximaCely like what
I have just described. Naturally, however, neither the commander nor his
~ deputy for political affairs or the chief of staff could organize the
~ combat training and achieve the auccessful performance of the aesigned tasks
~ without well-organized work and interaction among all services comprisiag
. the military aystem.
The navigatioa and engineer service ie extremely important in the combat work
of air units.
The navigation service in the Military Transport Aviation ia in charge of
aircraft navigation and the dropping and landing of airborne forces. Ite
main task is one of achieving the greatest possible degree of accuracy and
dependability in the piloting of aircraft along the routea and to see that
they arrive precisely at the d2aignated areas at the right time. The
navigation service is also in charge of ensuring flight safety and precise
interaction With the other special aervicea.
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6ngineer ~upporti for the comUat operatione ~nd combat tr~ining nf ~ailir~ry
Cran~pnrt unite i~ provided by tha gir force engin~~r g~rvice. It~ main
tgek is on~ of tnaint~ining Che avigCion equipment in good repair ~nd in a
- staCe of con~tant r~ad3naea en p~rform a11. mission~,and of making certain
ChgC iC i8 highly dependabin and affeceive~
The young regular ape~ialieee and oth~r ~erv3cem~n ~~~tgned to uniCs of the
MiliCary Trengport Aviation find there a achool of real combat Craining and
becon?~ brave~ ideoingically ~erong, highly skilled apecialieCe in Che field
which they have sel~cted for Chemselve~. _
The developmen~ of the young airmen t~kes plgce under ehe auperviaion of
commanders and political workers and ia ehaped by the very tenor af the
day-to-day miliCary s~rvice. They learn the secrets to maetery of their
aelected ~ob and achieve a high level of combat readineas.
Our Winged Profession
Silver wingg on a light blue patch--the insignia of the military gvia~ion,
is 'infinitely preciou~ to those who have known the ~oy of flying and
the feeling of ruling the air.
Many fine things have been written about the airman's occupation. When Che
aviaCion wae aCill young, writer A. I. Kuprin made the following statement
about airmen: "I love their society.... The conatane riak, the beloved
and dangeroua work, the eternal focusing of attention; the s~ngation of
~ awesome heights and depths and the intoxicating ease of breathing, unknown
- to most people; weightlessnese and enormous speeds--all of thie seea~ to
expel or exterminate in the heart of a real pilot such ordinary, base
emotions as hatred, avarice~ cowardliness, pettinees, irritability, vanity
and di~honesty, leaving only the pure feelinga."
It is splendid to serve in the air force. The individual who masters the
air experiences a feeling of direct contact with the entire world and feels
the primeval essence of nature and its power. The enormous distanceg~ vast
spaces, varioue latitudes--and the individual aeea the earth in all ita
diversity and boundlesaness.
It is probably precisely thie elevation of feelings which accounts for the
sirmen's profound devotion to their profession, for their deep and genuine
love for it. �
Creat honor goes to that heroic airborne race which produced such temarkable
aces as V. Chlcalov~ A. Serov~ M. Gromov, V. Kokinaki, S. Suprun, N. Gastello,
A. Pokryshkin, I. Koahedub~ S. Critsevets, A. Vorozheykin. D. Clinke,
N. Chulayev, V. Lavrinenkov, and hundreda and thousands of other heroes.
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Theee p~op~a~ who er~ nwgre oF th~ ext~nr of th~ir re~pon~ibili~y ro Chn~~
who hav~ eneru~ted them with ~h~ impo~ce~nC and responeibl~ task o� preserving
peace and trgnqui.].lity in o~L 1and,gre ittfini~ely d~voe~d ta thi~ causa.
What is~th~e gregC �eeling o� love f~r our occupaCion cnmpoeed nf? What is
ie bag~d on? What nurCures and develops it? These eternal questions have
no doubt occupied the minds of mor~ ehgn on~ genergtion o� fli~r~, and
they can be answ~red in v~riou~ wey~. Bue it ie dnubrful that anyone
would deny eh~ cloge d~p~nd~ney b~Cwe~n love ~or Cha pro�egsion ~nd regl
skill on the ~ob, irrepro~chgbl~ moral principleg and a highly developed
fealing of duty. We c~n ther~fore gay th~t love for the occup~tion ie noC
an inborn quality but the result of ~ eingle~ cantittuous proc~se of
indnc~tringCion of tr~ining, based on the methodiCal principlea nf ~ailiCary -
pedagogica and psychology.
The military flier ia firaC and foremoet a fighCing man, and he must b~
prepgred to demon~trat~ hig ability and skill ~r any eime. Service in the
air forc~ involv~g gr~at difficulties and regtrictions. Continuous drills,
trgining. night flightg and bad wegther.... One musC be able Co get by
taithoue r~gt and entertginmenC, to forget gporte gnd showe temporarily,
to pooCpone visits with friendg.
Lov~ for the profession forces those who have selecCed it to explore,
demongtrate boldnpse gnd discover new wgys of doing thinge. The individunl
devoted Cn hig ~ob reggrdg his work as a~oy, ae a creative thing, as
having the greatest me~ning in life. -
It is not enough ~ust to love the air force, however. In order to be a real
tmster ia one's vork, to be able to utilize all the capabilities of the
modern equipaent, or,e muat pogeess great knowledge and solid akille.
V. I. Leain inetructed us that "that arnry is conducting itaelf�imprudently
or even criminally, which ie not training itaelf to uae all types of
aeapons, all means and methods of warfare Which it has at its diaposal~or
_ which the enemy may posseas." 38
The 5oviet Air Force is ateadily becoming better equipped each year, a process
' based on the latest achievements of science and technology. In order to
achieve absolute mascery of a modern aircraft the commander and crew must
posaeas extensive and thorough kr.o~rledge and a brogd tect~nical range.
- The role and purpose of the 5oviet Air Force in the defenae of the USSR gnd
_ nationa of the socialiat commonaenlth la now greater than ever before.
T1~e feeling of pride in their military prnfesaion, a feeling based on the
glorious fighting traditions of the Air Force and one of the combat branches
of the Air Force--the Military Transport Aviation--is effectively helping
to improve the combat training and the tactical and technical preparednese
' of the airmen.
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~on o~rcrtw usE ornY
The command~rs and politica]. etaff of the Mi.1.iCary TranaporC Av3aCion
~nd the parCy gnd Komsomol organ~z~tions regard eheir mias:Lon ge one of
thoroughly and profoundly explaining the foreign and domeaeic policy
_ of Che CPSU and the Soviet Government gnd of molding and developing in
the peraonnel communisC conviction~ loyalty Co Lenin'g legacy and a
correct understending o� Che nature and purpose of our Armed ~orcea, and
- of uaing Chie as the basis for developing in every eirman a love for and
pride in hie military profegeion. �
An importanC part of thig wnrk is the Cask of publicizing the milieary
apec3alCie~ ~nd their role ~nd importttnce in ehe overall effort to 3mprove
combaC readinese. There gre no aecondary specialties in the air force: =
They are all closely interlinked ~nd �orm a aingle system. Succesa in
the air would be impossible without precie~ and compeCent work on the
parC of technicians and mechanics and on Che parC of apecialists in the
rear ~ervic~~ com~unicationa and radio Cechnical unita.
Socialiet compeCition, which has the glogan "Have an Excellent UndersCanding
of the Aviation ~quipment and MginCain IC in ~xcellent Condition, and Be
Able to Uge the Weapons Expertly," is helping to promoCe creativa activity
on Che part of personnel of the units and the subunits in the Military -
Trangport Aviation. Productive initiativea and undertakings are being
produced. and Che ranks of experts and rated specialists are growing.
Theae people, devoted to their profession, are distinguished by vigorous ~
action, creativity and effort to look ahead and a capability for giving _
their all for the beloved cause.
Hho are theae workers of the peacetime skies, airmen with the Military
Traaeport Aviation of the 1970's?
They have various air force specialties and various degrees of experience
and each of them has his own personality and leaves his own mark in the
work, but they are all united by the main qualities: a highly developed
8enae of duty~ a love for their profession, awareness of their responsibility
for the assigned work and conatant readiness to put their full effort into
aerving the homeland. � _
I would like to discuss these representatives of the Military Tranaport
Aviation in somewhat greater detail in this chapter.
I recall the year 1959. It was late fall. At that time I was serving
in Belorussia in command of an air regiment. One time, the unit duty
officer reported that some officers had arrived to serve in the regiment. _
Five men entered my office. My attention was drawn to Major Nozdrachev, a _
tell, Well-built, trim individual with an easy smile on his lips. Everything
about him indicated confidence and great energy. I had the impression that
he could cope easily with any ~ob.
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Thig proved to be erue. He was placed in command of a subunit~ ad~ueting
rapidly to hia dutiea and developing i.nto one of Che more competent commandere. ,
- Our mi.litary service aoon separaCed us, buC noC for l~ng. ~ '
- I meC Ma~or Nozdrachev again in 1961. He had developed and matured~ and he =
- gave the appearance of greater firmneas, but the relaxed emile on hia lipa
= was the eame. ~
I witnesaed Vladimir Nozdrachev's aubaequent aervice.
- In 1967, it was Colonel Nozdrachev who had the honor of demonstrating the
force, power and combat capabilitiea of Che Military Tranaport Aviation in
an air parade at Domodedovo. He headed an air group which landed an -
airborne force on the flying field, and Chousands of spectators waCahed
with fascination as the heavy combat equipment was rapidly unloaded a~d the -
aircraft took off again within a matter of minutea. Crews commanded by _
V. V. Nozdrachev have performed many flights, and no matter how difficult
_ they were, no matter how complicated the situation, they always emerged
victorious. A great deal of the credit goea to their commandar, DisCinguished
Military Pilot Vladi,mir Viktorovich Nozdrachev. ~
All of th~s did not ~ust happen. Hia life had led him in thia direction,
naturally and from the very beginning. In 1945, at the age of 16, he
_ enrolled in one of the special Air Force achools--a family tradition: four
- members of the Nozdrachev family had devoted their lives to the air force.
_ lie aubsequently went to pilot school and atudied at the Military Air Academy
and the General Staff Military Academy. The young commander thirsted for
_ knowledge and demonstxated extraardinary abilitiea as an organizer and
commander. This predetermined the en~ire course of his flying career.
General Nozdrachev was a delegate to the 25th Congresa of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union. Holder of the Order of the Red Banner, Che Order
"For Service to the Ho~eland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," third degree, -
and many medals, he represented airmen of the Military Transport Aviation
at the historic assembly of communists in a worthy nv.tnner.
Military Pilot First Class Vyacheslav Vasil'yevich Yefaaov is of a somewhat
different mold. This young general is diatinguished by profound knowledge
_ and erudition and a solid mastery of flying ekills.
= Yefanov's development was probably determined to a great degree by what was
occurring when he ~oined the Military Transport Aviation: it was being
reoutfitted with turboprop aircraft~ and our air force was undergoing
aa advance in its development. This dictated the need for continuous, -
intensive study.
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xo~ oF~YCr~. vs~ orn.Y
Yefanov ie unhurried in hi~ delibergtione aad doae not talk much. The
deci~iong he a~keg ghow c~reful rhought and depth~ A thinking mgn who a~ek~
n~v waye to achi~ve the b~st r~gultg in Ch~ w~rk~ Y~f~nov is etrice and ,
demanding and con~i~eently ~eriv~e fdr abeoluGe �ulfillmen~ di th~ l~w~
. governing flight w~rk. And eh~rp i~ ~ gond expl~ngeinn fnr Chi~. 'Phie i~
What Yefanav hin~elf heg Co e~y on the eub~ect: "nur command~rs, m~ny of
whom were v~tergng of the Gr~at Patriotic Wer, ~lway~ s~t an exampl~ for
us. They taught ug tn b~ ~te~df~gt. ~rom th~m we legrn~d e~'lf-GOntrol,
combat akill gnd gbgnlut~ gdh~r~nce to the lgwg governing flight work. Th~y
aerg atricC with ug but nlwayg tried to make it pnsgibl~ for u~ to
demonatraCe initi~tiv~ gnd dev~loped our abilities ae organizere. I ' _
b~came aolidly convinc~d that the main factor in training ie th~ p~r~onal
example set by the communiqr-commander." '
The unit whieh V. V. Yefgnov hag commanded for a number of yenrg hag
succes~fully performed the difficult taskg ittvolved in tr~ining airborile
landing forceg under difficult conditidns. Aggin, Yefanov ha~ demnnstrnted
creativity, resourcefulnes~ and euch important commander's qualities ag
purposivene~s, strong wi1L, d~termination and profeseional competence in
evaluating the situation and making decisione.
Vyachealav Vasil'yevich has also learned another rule: diligence ia the
most typical feature of pilots with the Military Transport Aviation. It
is only natural that they are popularly referred to ag toilers of the ~kiee.
Md General Yefanov makeg a great effort to develop this quali:y~ so
essential in the day-to-day aervice. in hia men.
Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Lvanovich Overchenko has given a quarter of a~ -
century to the air force. Accepting the baton from the frontline soldiere
in 1950~ Vladimir Ivanovich has carried it fittingly all of hia yeara ii~
the air force, passing on the beat traditions of t`.e older generation
of airmen to the young pilots with painstaking indoctrinational work and
aritt, hig personal example .
A quarter of a century represents an entire era for the air force: During
that time it was completely re~utfitted aith jet and turboprop equipment.
Md communist V. I. Overchenko's flight history ia a brilliant illustra-
. tion of that era: He has flown the Po-2, the Li-2 and four modifications
of the An-12.
Vladimir Ivanovich has served as a flight instructor and indoctrinator of
the yo:~c~ airmen since 1962. In the course of his work as an instructor,
Overchenko nas prepared a large number of pilots for solo flights as air-
craft com:aanders, and as many as 30 of them have become pilots first-class.
Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Aleksandrovich Calyas, First-Class Pilot~ is a
typical representative of the postwar gen~ration of commandera.
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~
I reC~i1 ~n ia~id~nt which go~~ b~~k to eh~ Cime when h~ first ~~eumad
comm~nd oE an M-12 ~rew. On~,a~ during s night flight in icy wagChar~ Che
pilot m~d~ ~n ~rror when h~ lowared flap~ in th~ preianding giid~ pattere.
The aircreft abruptly went tnco a steep giida,~and 3,C bpc~me more difficult
_ to cnnCrol with ~~ch p~~~ing e~cond. The young commaeder did nor idga hig
head in th~ dgngeroue ~~:~~ation, how~v~r. He ~et the ~ngtn~~ for t~k~-off~
circled g second r�m~ ~ad 1~,~~ded, thia time obgsrving a11 the rulee.
A diff~r~nea of onYy 10 d~agr~~~ in th8 low~ring af th~ flapg wnuld not eeem
Co b~ much. It might have gon~ unnoticed in narmal veather, buC when it is
cold enough to produce ieing th~ in~xact obaervance of ingtructiong could
enteil undeeirable coneequences.
After landing, G~lya~ described his error honestly and in detail, which
h~lped him end his cdmrad~e as well to ma~tnr the,technique of landing in
fr~ezing we~ther~in tha pr~e~nce of icing.
in general, hone~ty~ eincerity and franlcaeas are quite typicel for Galyas.
He atill loves to fly~ lovea it above all elee~ and never tirea of
improving his flying akill. Wh~n piloC~ begr~n retrgining to fly the Aa-22,
the airman wae ready to acce~t any asgignment so long as he could fly
the new aircraft.
V. A. Galyas is now a highly qualified co~ander. i~bre than once my
service duties have made it necessary for me to accompany men under hie
command on tegt flights~ and I have alaays noticed complate coordination
of action on the part of all cre~r membere. It ie pleasant and interesting
to Work vith such people.
Anatoliy Ivanovich Serdyuk is alao a member of the glarious family of
sirmen.
"I knew that I wanted to be a pilot ahen I Was in the aecond grade~" he
dnce said. Ha+ doea one accouat for thia choice of a career at euch an
- early age? A boy's dreasa, the impreasion left by the firet Po-2 he eaW
and the etoriea told by hi~ cousin, a military navigator~ He joined a
mod~i aircraft club and Was very active in sports. When he came of age~
he took the entrance e~ms for admiss~on to a higher air achool for pilota....
The road only appears smooth from a distance-the yo~mg pilot experieaced
both joya and disappointments. Oae thing remained unchanged, hoWever: his
pereistence, diligence and datermination to master hia elected profession.
After serving three years, Matoliy Serdyuk became an aircraft commander.
Eiie flying skill greW month after month, aad his organizational abilities
became more clearly manifested. He Was a sub~it co~ander two years
later.
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~veryEh3ng would e~pp~gr to be going ~moothly: He wag eucceasful in Ch~
e~rvice and tlte futur~ looked gaod. 'The young communigt was bothered by
hie lgck o� tr~ining gg g commander, however. And Sardyuk made the firm
_ deci~ion to ren~w hi~ ~tudi~~.
Az~other three years of persieCent work and he gradu~ted with ~ brilliant
record from the Red B~nn~r, drder of Kutuzov Militar~? Air Acgdemy im~ni
Yu. A. Gaggrin.
- He Chen Cook over n new unit, and Chere were new cares. This wae only at
firet glancp, however: The eituation developed with Ch~ eam~ speed and at
the same intensity. The young commander understood what was most important:
precise organization, thorough preparation and control, an excellent
knowlpdg~ of the operating prinCipleg of Che aircraft equipment and th~
lawe of aerodynamica, and a profound sense of reeponeibility for flighC
safety on the part of aircraft commanderg. These are the elemente on
which the practic~l Work~of the personnel is based.~
There were all sorts of things to do: c.ompile a achedule, train a flight
operation group, and numerous other taske. The ek311 acquired by a com-
m~u?der during his years of eNrvice, his great potential for creative acr.ion,
his pergonal example, vill and organizational talent are reflected in a
high level of theoretical training and flying skill on the part of the _
airmen.
And +~hia is the goal, a goal which Major Serdyuk~ pilot by calling~ devotes
all his abilities and knowledge to achieve. _
Not ~veryone is fortunate enough to achieve hie dream right away, however.
Vyach~:slav Fedosovich Loginov did not become a military pilot immediately,
- aad the path which led him to the Military Transport Aviation was a fairly
difficult oae. Commuaiet Loginov is now a military pilot first clasa and
an aircraft com~ander.
Captain Loginov has earned great respect from his comradea for hia serious
attitude toward the job and for his conscientiousness in the service. His
creW is always one of the best and perforc~ every flight assignment with'
~ood or excellent ratings~ with no strain at all.
This is not Vyacheslav Fedorovich Loginov's first year in charge of the sub-
unit ~arty orgaaization. and he handles the difficult taska involved in -
combat and political training with great competence and party prictciple.
~
Captain Loginov has been aWarded the Order of the Red Star for the
performance of government asaignments.
School, the Leain Ko~omol and the Party have produced a true Soviet man
and a mature communist.
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t~mi.r Karimovich Akhm~Czyanov wag born in the h~rah year of 1942 in the
smail TaCar village of lt~rgalie Chistopol'skiy ltayon.
Damir was not fat~d to ~n~oy paternal tenderness and concernt h.is father~
K~rim MifCakhovich, di~d in 1943 ~t th~ wh~~l og a nn~-~~d-~-helf ean tiruck _
on an~ of the frontline road~.
Aa the ea~ gr~w o~der, hie moCher frequentiy told him abouC hie fath~r.
The boy knew evetything th~re wge to know about him without ever havieg
seen him. Isl~miya 5igb~tovna inetilled in hQr son a love not only for hie
eoldier-father but for Che army in general. Damir decid~d on a car~er in
the military whil~ ~till in echool. At thae time he had no idea how he -
vould accomplish thie, howaver. ' ~
Fate once brought th~ youth inCo contace with Lieutenant Colonel Krasnopevteev~
an inatrucror at a military air echool. He told namir about the difficult
and iatereating occupation af aircraft naviggtor.
Md the choice wae made. In 1960, Damir became a cadet at the Higher Red
Banner Air School for Navigators.
Higher maChematica, aviation cartography, aircraft navigation~ combaC
employment, tactics--far from a completa liaC of the dieciplines required
to become an aircraft navigator. ,
Cadet Akhretzyanov studied with determination and pereistence to tmeter all
of the knoaledge required for a career as a navigator, and tha inetructore
at echool gave hiR aork high ratinge more thaa oace.
On his very first day at the echool, Damir thoroughly grasped the fact
that careful flight preparations on the ground inaured the auccese of a
flight mieaion. In his fourth year, Akhmetzyanov was the beat�bombardier
in his class.
After passing the graduation exama, however, Lieutenant Akhmetzyanov was
aent to a uait of the Military Transport Aviation for training on the
Aa-12. It wae not eaey for tihe young tactical bomber aviation navigator -
to part aith his ~et bomber, but he had to bead his aill to military duty
and begin training on the uafamiliar turboprop aircraft. The better
acquainted I3amir became with the aircraft's t~ctical and technical
characteristics, With its purpose aad misaioas, the more reapect ha
developed for the aircraft~ a plaae which appeared awkarard at firat glance.
.
Rapidly completing his training, Lieuteaaat Akhmetzystnov Was firat assigned
to veteran navigator Yu. N. Fedorov. During his extensive flight duty
Yuriy Nikolayevich has trained dozeas of young navigatore and provided them
irith a pasaport to the alcies. This man combines a high level of proficiency
aad demaadingnesa vith the ability to train and indoctrinate those uader
him and personal concern for them.
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~
DamiY Akhmetzyanov improved hie combat ekill by the d~y and within a short
time had b~c~me dn~ of Ch~ be~t navigator~.
Tia~ wge not ~~endin~ etil].~ however. Th~ influ~nce of rhe gcientific and
technological r~volution in mtlitary aff~i~g wa~ incY~aeingly f~lt in the
meane and m~Chodg ~mploy~d by the Milltary Tranaport Aviation. Naw types
of aircraft and new and improved navig~t3on~1 gnd rad~Y equipment came
3nto b~eing.
NavigaCor Akhm~rzyanov began to feel that whgt he had learned ae the
military school was not enough. IC was essential to acquire a b~tCer
theoretical background.
Pollowing three years of eCudy at a miliCary academy~ Ma~or Akhmatzyanov
vas sesigned once ggain to his former unit as a navigator. Ag it
happened, Damir arrived to take over from tiie former teacher. It wae
not eaey for Yu. N. Fedorov to part with the team, which was like a
family to him, but the knowledga that he Was being replaced by one of the
mns~ capable of hie students fillad the veteran's heart Mrich pride for
hie work.
Na~or Akhmetzyanov'e moat characterietic trait is a highly developed 8ense
of reaponsibility, and thia ia what compels the navigator to prepare
paiastakingly for each upcoming flight, to ~,rork out the navigational plane
doan to the smallest detail, becauae there is no auch thing a$ trivialitiee
in the aavigation service.
The periodic technical servicing group of the technical maintenance unit
commanded by Engineer-Captain Nikolay Dem'yaaovich Shavlo has beea aa
rutatanding one for eight years.
It is understable why the group has held this title of honor for many years
in a row. Captain Shavlo devotes a great deal of effort and energy to
ensuring flight safety in the air regiment. The laboratory for mainteaance
and repair of the objective control ayatem ie aa object of special pride
and concern for him. Every component, even the amallesC, and every tape
has its apecial place in an arraagemeat based on the aircraft numbere.
~ This ia not the most important thing, of course3 moat important is the
preventive Work performed by specialista ia the group directed by Engineer
N. D. Shavlo. When Engineer-Colonel Geaeral V. Z. Skubilin inspected the
laboratory it Was no surprise that he ~udged it oae of the beat.
I would like to devote a few words to Captaia of Techaical Service Yuriy
I1'ich Rnmas.
Captain Romas is the aeaior instructor-technician on the best aircraft in
the subuait.
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Yuriy I1'ich und~r~eand~ the equipment on Che Au-12 frnm top to bnCtom~ _
operatee it competentl.y on the grouad and in the air, and continuouely
impYOVes his technical knowledge and practica]. ekille in working with the
aircrafC aquipment.
Unit command h~~ rapeatedly uged the excellent spec3a], tirgining of offic~r
Romae ae aa exampla for all of the technicians.
Wgrrent officnr Matoliy Ivanovich Yanov~kiy, senior airc~afC machanic~ ie
equglly devoCed to hia ~ob.
During his very firrt daye in the military~ Yanovakiy, of peasant origin
and the eon of a frontline soldier killed in action~ atood out for hie
induatrioueneae and efficiency. WhereveY he worked, wherever his milltary
care~r took him, he hae glways performed his dutie~ as a eoldier a~ad ~
citizen witt? honor.
Yanovakiy is distinguiehad by modeaty and eimplicity and by hia enthusiasm
for the wo,rk. Anatoliy Ivanovich lovea hie aircraft and he imparts thie
love to tha young apecialiata.
This ia what young commander Aadrianov hae to eay gbout his occupation end
- the path which led to it:
"Prom childhood I dreamad of becoming a pilot. And aow my life is inter-
~roven Witt~ the atr force.
_ "I remember ahen I was etill quite young~ I would yell each time an r~ircraft
flev over:_ 'Mama, mama, daddy's flying': This is perhapa hoa my attraction
- for the air force begaa--with love for aad pride ia my father. It was
my father, navig,ator first-class aad vetaraa of the Great Patriotic War,
who insti],led in me a love for that profeasioa aithout Which I caanoC
imagine my life. Underatandiag full We2,1 that it would be imposaible to -
achieve my dream without determined aad diligent Work~ I passed the
entrance exams and entered an air school in 1968. My years as a cadet
passed by rapidly aad were over almost before I realized it. Upon graduating
from the school in 1972~ I aas~aseigned to a flying uait.
"That Was the beginaing of my aorking career, a life filled With ~oyoua
and cr~ative apirit~, of flighta on a modera traaspoxt and participation
. in asaignments approaching actual combat miesions. This forced me to
engage in evea more thorough etudy of the aircraft equipment and the
documeats governing flight Work.
"Naturally, one doea not learn all of the secrets of flight akill at once.
I learned from my commandera, from the veteraa pilots aad from my senior
comrades. I began to study under the supervision of experienced
iastructors aad teachere and improved my flight skill.
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"After I had aseimilaCed the program, I wae pl~ced in command of an
aircraft. M unforgettabia timat my fir~t eoln flighr, my fireti gcte
a~ ~ comm~ader.
"I am fully awar~ of tha fact, of couree~ Chat my knowledge and akills
are eti11 too limited for me to con~ider my~elf a real experienced pilot
and commander. I want to become as proficient at the ~ob ae wae my father~ -
however, and Y am working hard to achieve this."
LieuC~nm.nt Colonel Yu. P. Kornev shares hie memoriea:
0
"Upon graduating from sacondary achool~ I had the good fortune to meet a
remarkable indiVidual~ V. M. Baraaov, a flight iastructor with the Iv~novo
~lying Club. He ia the ona who inepired me with a love fo~ flying.
"In 1958, at the age of 18, I became a member of the Ivanov~o Flytng C1ub.
Four months of theoretical etudiee seemed like an eternity: I wanted to
try my eki11 ia the air right away. It is righCly eaid that one~s first
impreesion is a lasting one. I etill have a clear memory of my firet
eolo flight on a Yak-18.
- "This was followed by f1lghCs to the range to work on piloting techniques.
I began With the spin and then went on to banks, chandelles, half-rolls~
rolls and loops, all of which added to my aelf-confidence~ and I truly
began to feel the ~oy of flying~ a~oy ahich hae no ccmparison.
"It aas no longer enough ~ust to fly for the pleasure of it, however. I
aaated to use my favorite activity for the benefit of people. ~
"Ia 1959 I entered a higher air school. In four yeara of training, in
addition to the Ya1c-18, I learned to fly the I1-12 and the I1-14. I
developed a great fondnese for those aircraft, especially the I1-14.
"In my last year at the achool~ I begaa to train on the An-12. Separate
syste~ and parta of a"real" aircraft were used as visual aids. I~
wanted to learn to fly the An-12 as rapidly as poaeible, which required
a great deal of theoretical conversion training. The training was finally
over. It aas 1963. It would be difficult to describe my feelinge when
I took my place as a co-pilot at the.coatrols of that beautiful giant,
an M-12.
"Oae aow sees that superb aircraft~ the I1-76, in the skies along With the
M-12. Compared with it, the An-12 ia not very impressive, to put it
delicately. Time takes its toll."
This 16 what Major N. S. Rad'ko has to eay:
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"Whi1e gtill a~tudent ~e Che L~ningrad physic~l CulCure and,3pn~C~
Tekhaikum, I decided Co b~com~ a flier~ a chiidhnnd dregm~ I b~g~n
prepgring to enC~r flighe school~ which tnok almost a year. And Chere
Y wae aC 1aet~ atanding in formation with my comredes. The chief of
the echool walked Co the cettter nf the format3on~ togetiher with group
of officerb~ and read ~ha order. Bveryone wae excitied, expectant~ When
nry nama vae read~ I felt that I waa the luckiege of individuale, with
all of the difficulti~e behind me.
~ "Somewhat 1gCer, I tmder~tood that Che real difficultiee w~re only bsginning....
"I rea11 the first time we were ehown the cockpit of a Yak-12U. I
_ thought that I would never be able Co learn all of the inetrumente, to -
be able to monitor Chem in the air. It eeems amusing noa~ bue that is
the way Z felt.
"I became a member of the Party in December 1964.
"~ach ti.~a you set out on a eolo flight you feel that you ~Ye now a
pilot. iihen you return~ however, you know Chat you etill have a great
dea]. of aork to do and begin practicing again."
Flyiag ia Craditionally a heroic occupation~ surrounded by an aura of the
romaatic. 3ome individuals may find their way into any field purely by -
accident, but thie ie probably not trua in the caee of pilotes t he flying
profession doeg not permit this. Its ranka contain etrong-~,?illed,
_ courageous people aho hgve achieved their dream and know the valua of -
continuous and painetaking Work to impYOVe their ekill.
~ -
As I com~lete this account of a feW members of that glorioua detachment
of Military Tranaport Aviation fliera, I would like to lay special stresA
on the fact that they all belong to that clasa of people who are
infinitely true to their duty, love their profession and are capable
of putting forth the maximum effort, because Chey do not simply perform -
certain dutiee, but provide a model of creative fervor.
There hes been a continuous process of replacement of command personael
in the ranks of the Military Traaspart Aviation during the past decade.
The older generation, who have inveated their knrn+ledge, skill aad part
of their livea to the formation and development of the tranaport aviation~
have beea replaced by those who became fliers in time of peace. They
have brought with them proficiency in the job and that sense of respon-
sibility which our veterana have taught the youth, imparting to them
their esperience and their love fdr the profession.
In our time. a time of acientific aad technological revolution~ service in
the Military Traasport Aviation has changed to an unrecognizable degree.
Aviation today is comprised of the latest aircraft, extremely complex grouad
equipmeat aad aa entire system of preparatioa, organization aad performance
of flighte.
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In order Co h~?adle Ch~ ~xt~ert~ly brogd range of work, th~ air epecialigtis
mugt hav~ a compl8t~ und~rstending of Che aircr~ft equipmenC, aerodyngmice ~nd
m~thodg gnd mu~t hav~ ~ broad opera~iongl-r~ct.~c~l per~pectiv~.
"5cience-Cechndlogy-tgceics-efficieacy--ehi~ i,~ the pracCical �ormul~ which
gti~phi~ally depictg th~ r~quiraments ~de tndgy wieh r~gp~Gt to th~ p~rf~ction
of flight methode work gnd the imprnvem~nt of ~ir tra.ining," states
Chief Mgr~hgl of Avi~tion p. 3. Kutakhov, Kerd di th~ Sovi~t Union and
co~mmnder in chief nf the Air ~'nrc~. "Whgt i~ the logical conn~ctidn?
Science op~ns up proap8ctg for th~ d~velopment of technology. Technoingy
provides the material bage for the eir force'a great combgt capabilitiea.
The commander and other airmen realize tha capabilitieg of the modern
equipment Chrough the art of organizing and conducting combat, that ig~
through tactics. And th~ higher th~ 1~v~1 of th~ girmen'g combat
traiaing, the more ~f�ective are rheir ~ctions. A acienCific approach
is e vitat reguirement of modern flight practice~ gnd all area~ of th~
training and indoctringtional prnceas mugt bn imbued with guch an
appro$ch."
Our flierg are capable of improving their flying ski11 in accordance
with the above formula, becauge we ar~ richly provided With people who
are devoted to their profesgion, who have mastered the powerful equipmdnt
and are capable of utilizing it with maximum effectivenees. The etrengCh
of our Soviet syatem lies in auch people.
The Combat Asaigtants of the Fliere
- The Soviet Military Transport Aviation to@ay performa extenaive aad important
� missions. And one should not think that they are performed by flight
personnel alone.
The aviators of the Military Traasport Aviation are not just the pilota, _
navigatora, aircraft technicians and gunner-radio operatore. In addition
to them, there are numeroug specia~iats in highly diveree fields, who
aupport the Work of the military transporte. Aad it is not aimply a
matter of support: Quite frequently the poeaibility o� flying and the -
successful performance of a miesion in general depend on the specialists
of the various servicea.
I have already mentioned the importance attached to the training of various
ground service speciali4ts. I shall now attempt to describe this eervice
using the example of one of the air materiel units.
It Was nighttime at the airfield. Officer N. F. Romashkin, graduate of a
highe~ air school and commaader of aa airfield service subunit, had not
left the flight line for almoat 15 houra. More than once duriag the day
he Would recall his favorite saying: "Bven if the sky should fall to
earth, the airfield should still be in a state of readiness for flights.
Therein lies the main principle underlying the aviation's combat readiness...."
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ltamaehkin',~ n~n undar~tnod Chig w~ll and wnrk~d wl.thnut latup. Truckr
in ~e~ggered form~tiion pa~~~d from on~ end dE eh~ runw~y ro th~ other~
sw~~ping Che ~now tn the ~ida. Th~ troubla waa Chat anoth~tr bl~ulcat of
~now aould tall gfter they had paseed~ It wae'fr~a$ing aeathar at thati
tima~ aad iC wao ~aay to aWaap thn ~now aaide aith tha atiff b~u~hee
mounted on tha special vehiclee. Toward avening~ however, tha tamparatuYa
ouddenly begaa to rise~ approaching ~aro and th~a runaay~ clegrad of ~now~
bagan to be cov~rad With n thin film of ic~~ ahich presentad a dangar
for the gircraft aad which could not be scraped off.
It ie very dif~icult to land an aircraft on euch a"ekating rink," and
no laes difficuir~ almoet impossible in fact, to taka off from ona.
Thie msant~that the thing dreaded moet could occurs Ths airfinld might
- beeoma iuoparable. Th~ poorarful planae aould et~nnd halplaaa in thaiti
parking areag....
t
, Tha ice-melting v~hicle~ hgd been in Itomaehkin's thoughte all day~ and he had
kept them at tha ready. Race~ving a report from the ~aeathar servic~ that
a aarm fropt wa~ moving in, ha cursed the "front" aad orderad the ice-
melting ve~iclee to be bYOUght up to the "aesgult lins"--tacti~~ also hava
a place in ~hie aork. -
An ice-melting vahicle is a pa?erful aeapon in tha batela to pravant an
airfield from icing ovar. It puahea a~?ide etrip of hot air amarging fYOm
a flat nozzle ahead of it~ turning the icy crust into steam. Tha art of
the operatioa coneiate in knoaing ahan to put thia vehicl~ oato tha runway
so that ice will not form again afrar it hae paaaad. Chaugao in
temperature~ humidity and Wind aad other aeathar data muet ba accurataly..
knam.
It was dark and daak. Romashkin aad the unit commaader drove a Casik
back and forth doan the ruaway, Which covared nearly 12 hectare~. They
- located the mcre crucial areas, aqueazed lumpa of aat snov in thair hands,
frowned vith displeaeu~e and made cer::ain calculations. At laet~ the ~
commander said in a reaoluta manaer: '~Now, qou caa put tha ice-melting
vehiclee to ~?ork, Nikolay Fadorovich. 11?is ia exactlq tha right tima.
Aad ~ove eome of the equipmanC to tha taxiways for tha time being."
Romashkin aet out toverd hia vehicles.
In the me~atime, covered vehicles aad buse8 aere n~ving in a atream ovar
the field, separating to approach the parkad aircraft. Stoppit~g on tha
ehoulder~ where the airfield road braachad~ the comrmndar obaervad the
traffic. Some of the vehiclea turned right and aere lost in the semi-
daskaess of mornin~, en route to aa assembly area. Fire trucke and am~bulaaces
Were stationed at the sites desigaated on the airfield~ aad a heavy tractor
aith mechanical aid equipment sooa ~oined them.
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Th~r~ w~ gnddenly ~ gr~at d~~~. of gction ~round th~ h~avy p1~a~e ~ptr~ad
out ov~r th~ concrete: the aircraft commandars w8re remnving th~ cover~
from engineg and Wingg, np~ning door~ and cl~axing ~way ~noar. ~1l,ght
pr~p~~r~eion~ b~g,~n.
The powerful ~ircraft ~ngin~~ ro~r~d to lif~~ breaking the gilenc8. They
v~r~ b~ia~ te8t~d pr~or to ~lying and War~ eh~ck~fl ~or ~11 operating conditiong~
Naneuvering gkillfuiiy graumd th~ ~~.rcr~ft, h~~vy ~pecializ~d truck~ fu~~~d
them gnd ~uppli~d th~m aith liquifl gnd g~eoug oxygen~ compreae~d air and
nicrogan~ carbonic acid and hydraulic fluid. Othare charg8d various
~ el~ctrical ~yetems on th~ planea.
Trucic~ and other ~qUipment w~r~ lo~d~d into th~ cargo comp~rtmenCs.
Ev~rywher~ ther~ w~~ mdtton~ it gpp~gred impoeeibl~ to malc~a out aaything
in the chans of moving v~hicle~ ~nd ppopl~, in the nnig~ of enginee,
telephones and various types of eignalg....
If one could riee abov~ the airport, on a helicopt~r let u~ ~ey, and eaa
the overall piceure~ it anuld b~ cl~gr that th~re uae nothing chaotic
gbout the aituation. Trucks and personnel were movieg along specific
routee, ahich raraly inters~cted~ and there was no eort of oncoming
traffic: everything occupied its own, rigidly designated place. ~v~ry
individual o~ tha flight line kaea e~cactly What ha waa suppoeed to do,
how he aa~ ~uppo~ed to do it aad o+here.
Ther~in lies the essence of military orgaaisation~ coordination aitd
interaction.
Is it a eimple matter to load a vehicle oato an aircraft ~rithin a matter
of minuteg? No, it ig noC.
TUe cargo hatch is opened and the ramp loaered and checked before the
vahicle even reacheg the gircraft. The driver l~nee the vehicle up and
driveg up the steep ramp into the cergo compartment~ carefully and without
relaxiag his coaceatration ~ven for a second. The glightest error could
damage the aircraft.... Driving a heavy vehicle iato an aizcraft is
also an art, a coasiderable one. The vehicle ig placed at a etrictly
defiaed epot in the cargo compartment and made fast~ the ramp ie removed~
the hatch is cloeed aad everything is carefuLly checked once more.
~ Finally, everything aas ready. 7'he pre-f~ight s~ork had been completed.
~e flight opergtion grouQ aas working iateatly at the panels in the airfield
control toaer. A dim light oa the panels lighted up various iastrumeets
aad devices. The tense faces of the operators were vigible above the
remote radar indicators.
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Innwner~bl~ ~ight~ d~~ign~ting runw~yg, taxiway~ ~nd aircr~f~ p~rking
Ait~~ ~ou1d b~ ~e~n Chrnugh ~hg gnowflgkug ~iying bayond~the larg~ windr~w~.
t?a~ by ~a~, h~e~vy air~raf~ l~ft c~n C1?~ir mi.~~ion~. ~hey had baYaly
1ilC~d of~ b~lor~ eh~y w~r~ last Su che ioa cloudw hanging over th~
a~rfieid.
It aa~ quiet in th~ control to~~r. On1y naw and th~n did ona haar tha
quieC, cnnci~e report~ of ~ircraf~ creaa ~nd tha brief comma~nda of the
flight op~ration offieer.
.
~rom tim~ to tim~ th~ ~v~n rhythm of the ~r~rk ags intarrupted by reporta
fro~ th~ rndar opara~orr oe th~a air ~ituation~ reporta from tha command
poet nn th~a perfor~anc~ of ~ fligh~ ae~ignmenra by tha c~~vs of aircraf~
= alr~ady m~ny hundr~dg or even thousand� of ki~otm t~re aaay.
Flights w~re under way.... `
Noa?, ~ft~r parforming ch~ir aeeignm~at~, che ainraft v~ra raturning to thair
~irfteld. Chi~ of the mo~t cruciai awmentg Wag coming up--~h~ landing.
Snoa aag ~till falliag. Visibility v~ dropping to the minimum. Th~a crewu
lande8 the aircraft eki11fu11y, h~r~v~r, on~ aftsr anoth~r. Z1~e modern -
ground radar ~nd ~ighting equipm~nt~ combiaed aith the airborne aquipmant~
p~rmits th~a fli~rg to come in accurataly for a landing even in the moet
diffieult aeath~r. ~
7tta flight o;+aretlot~ g!coup~ ~?hlch ie haadad by Colonel Patt SgVal'yavi~h
Shch~tin, Dieti~gui~hed Military Pilot of tha USSR~ parformad vith
� precision and cna~rdination. Ordin~rily a m~an of fev aorde~ ha epoke
t+ith gregt varmth of thoee Who m~intained con~tani com~munication and kept
tha radar aquipment operaciag. They aere all u~nder the command of '
Ha~or Nikolay ~?nlceandrovich Perevozchikov.
1he comm~enic~?tion and radio support eubunite are rquipped vith complex rgdio
~lectronic and ncher equipment. It iacludes varioue typee of radar eets~
radio tee.hnical landing and navigation ayateme, radio aeta with various
- bands and of varitws pcwar~ cooplex light equipmeat and a larga power _
supply ~y~t~m.
Most impartaut are LhQ people, ho~?ever, in ahost akillful hands the modern
equi~pmenti help~ tha fliers to perform the moat difficult taeice and to
' rem~in in a atate of combat readiness. Flight safa~y and rhe eucceas
of flight missions depeud to a great degree on the level of traioiag of
ch~ ~olcti~rs and sergeaats, Warranc off~cers and officere eupporting
air comrtiunicatioas.
Huadreds of radar ayss--the radar stgtion~--continuoualy monitor the
"fifch oceaa." Among those working at the radar Btatione ia Private
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Vaeiliy Roxhka~ operator o~ a landing sygtem. The tarm "radar ].andi.ng
sy~C~m" ie eelf-explanatory. Wh~n ground i~ not visible, an aiYCrafr ia
dir~ct~d in fur a landing by commande from the control tower, ueing Ch~.s
�y~Cem. ~t ie al~o v~~d for reporting the location of other aircra�t in
tha ai.r, the exi~tence nf thunder clouds on rhe rouCa~ and so �orLh.
Vas3.liy Rozhka monitore his compl~x equipment carefully. Cont3nuous
tr~ining~ gn inquiring mind and g love for the equipmene made it poasible
for him tu b~Com~ ~n outgtanding gp~cigligC. Onc~, when,he wae performing -
~d~uetment work, the young goldier wag able Co pinpoinC and eliminaCe a
~ complicgt~d u~lfuncCion in ~ waveguid~, which even an experienced
edgine~r would not e~gily have found. Private Rozhka, a specialieC
firet~cla~~~ hae gleo maetered a second specialty: he has become an
outetanding elgcCrician. Before entering Che a rmy~ t?e had no idea Chat
he wauld be ab1~ to tnaster the complex milieary equipment so rapidly
and would prnvide support for aircrafe landings.
. Junior Serg~ant Vitaliy Kalinin, a native of Yaroslavl', also aerved in
the communicationg subunit. Prior to ChgC he had worked at a plant~
sCudied at a night univeraity and been active in the Yaroslavl' DOSAAF
Radio Club~. Upon ~oinin g the army he rapidly masCered the specialty
of radio technician and learned the complex awdern circuits to perfection,
and theYe was never a case in which the equipment in Kalinin's charge
broke down during a flight. Vitaliy always provided good radio contact
rriCh the aircraft crews. Junior Sergeant Kalinin, a member of the
1Comsomol bureau~ apecialiet first-claes aad an excellent sportsman, was
always tready to help his comrades aad to give the young fighting men
advice and practical assistance as they learned to operate the complex ,
equipment. ~
The proficiency of Private First-Class Nikolay Kovynev, radio telegraphist,
vas well known not only to those who s~erved with him but also by many of
the airborne radio operatora who flew as members of citlitary Transport
Aviation crews. ;liicolay Kovynev was lcnown as the sni.per of the air.
Not so long ago, however, when,after being inducted into the army,he
learned that he would be trained as a radio telegraphist, he decided that
aothing would come of it. Proficiency dici not come easily, buC he
_ poasessed great industry, persistence and a desire ro master the specialty
of radio operator as rapidly as posaible. Practice, practice and more
practice.... After nine months of training Kovynev becaa?e a radio operator ~
aecond-class. Soon thereafter, he passed the tests for operator first-class.
~iis hard work was not in vain: The young radio operator began to feel -
comfortable, at home, with the airways. Outwardly modest, even shy,
Nikolay becomes a different person when he sits down at a radio set and
finds his coatact rapidly and unerringly in the solid masa of sounds.
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Wherever the planee fly--in Che sir above Chukntka, above the coast of
the ArcCic Ocean or the sanda of Central Aeia--radio contact wieh the
aircraft ia uninCerrupted when Private Firat-Clase Kovynev is on duCy.
Private A. Zelenkov arrived in the army with a Chird-class chauf�eur's -
license. He became a driver-electrician in the unit and prepared himself -
to take the exams for chauffeur aecond-class.
An inquiring mtnd, a desire to help his comrades on the combat Ceam,
clas~es by experienced specialiata and training on his own--and Zelenkov
- became a radio operaCor-radio direction finder Chird- and then aecond-class.
Hia comradea elected him group komaomol organizer. Zelenkov is also
highly respected by the flight peraonnel. Whenever the atrmen turn ~
to him for bearings, he always provides them rapidly and unerringly with
the precise figures, helping the crewe to perform their f11ghC, misaions
_ succeaefull.y.
Illumination engineering at the airfields is an integral parC of Che ~
communications and radio technical support service. The personnel who
work with the illum~.nation equipmenC--searchlight operators, electrical
engineers and electricians--also do their part to make it posetble for
- planes to fly safely, by day or by nighC and in various kinds of weather.
In the u~st difficult situatione, the runw~y lights are always ready,
making it possible for the heavy military transports to land at Che
airfield. Searchlight operators and the detachments commanded by '
Junior Sergeants I. Medko and V. Golin perform smoothly and precisely.
A great deal also depends on the perfoz~mance of the power engineere, who
' are in charge of electric power plants capable of supplying an entire
city with electricity, on the ability Qf the driver-electricians to
get the special trucks with the electric power generators to the airatrios
in the field ia any kind of weather and over all kinds of roads, and on
the coordinated and precise performance of many other specialists.
In order to serva in the signal troops, servicemen must possess, in
addition to good special nnd technical trainiag, physical stamina and
the ability to stay at their work station for lengthy periods (literally,
days at a time) and to make decisions on their own, rapidly and correctly,
under the most difficulC cutaditions.
The men in the soldier's overcoats performing ~heir difficult but honored
duty in the Signal and Radio Technical Support Troops and in the
aviatian enginec~riag units--these are the rank-and-file of the great
air army and the combat assistants of their comrades-in-arms, the
military fliers.
I once read that, according to statistics, for every member of a flight crew
- there are several individuals servicing the flight on the ground. I would
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like to re~tr~~~ the w~ll-known fact GhgC the gr~und ~~rvtn~e noC only
mgk~ 3t po~~ib1~ fnr the ~i.rcrgft crewe eucce~~�u11y tn per�orm th~ir
miegion~ in the air, bur gl~~ ingure th~ agf~ty oE ~v~ry f.light.
Readin~~e
In ehe cdurs~ of thni~ work~ p~rannnel nf th~ Milit~ry Tranaport AviaCion -
arp conCinuougly trnining gnd imprnving Cheir ski1L. Uoing their part~
togeCher with gll 5ovi~t p~ople, Co impl~ment decisidn~ of Che 25Ch CpSU
Congreeg, ~irmen of the Militgry Trgn~pdrt Avigeion ~re p~rgistently
m~~t~ring the cdmpl~x ~quipment, legrning thaC which ig required to gchi~ve
viceory in mod~rn warfgre~ ~nd improving their everyday readinese.
The airmen improve their combat ~killg noC only in Craining flighCg: Mi.litary
Transport Aviatian cr~we perform extrem~ly difficult misginng d~ring troop
ex~rci~eg and maneuvers~ in ~~itugtion gimulgting actual combgC a~ nearly
as po~gible.
prgctically no pxercise or maneuver has been planned in recent years without
~ parachute drop ~ehind the front line or a gurprise attack from tha rear~
It wnuld be impossible to carry out sucl~ operations wiChout militnry
transports, which must deliver to Che designaCed areas troops, comb~t
equipment~ ammunition and focd, everything required for the successful
cnnduct of comb~t operdtions.
In the Cr~ining of flight crews great stress ig laid on perfecting Che
more promising methods of employing the Military TransPort Aviation for
combat purposes. This includea refining flight procedures, a need dictated
by the uae of improved and more powerful aviation equipmeat. Along wiCh
the purely technical mastery of the new aircraft, this involvea overcoming
a certain psychological. barrier, the rejection of conventional, obsolete
methods and the adoption of new tactical procedures.
Experimental research flights are therefore systematically conducted in units
of the Military Transport Aviation for purposes of studying possible combat
formations, improving flight control from ground and in the air, ascertaiaing
the operational and performance capabilities of the aircraft equipment, and
a great deal more to improve combat profici~ncy.
Md to sum up the results--troop exercises.
The "t?nepr" exercise conducted in th~ fall of 1967 is a good example.
The exercise took place in approximately the ~same area where determined
battles were fougt;it in 5eptember 13h3 and where troops of the Central Front -
successfully forced the Dne~;r and captured a va~t bridgehead.
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- Th~ ~x~r~i~~~ whieh wg~ nrg~nizad witih n~n~id~raeion for eh~ exp~ri~nne
of th~ Cr~~t p~erioti~ W~r ~nd th~ pu~twgr d~v~inpn~nC nf th~ Arm~d ~orce~~
glong with thp p~rfurm~nc~ a nwnbar df cambati mi~~idn~, wge plannr~d
- sn ge to dr~monstrete the training lavel af Soviet Croop~ and Co indic~te
the focug for fueure combat ereining.
Yn thie reapact~ th~ M~.litary Ttianapnrt AviaCion'~ parCicip~tion 3n the
exerci~e aag of consid~rable imporCance.
7'h~ ~~cerciep wa~ an excell~nt ona. Large ~irborne landing fnrce~ were
delivared precigely to the d~gignatad ar~a~ ~nd lgnded wiehin an ~xerem~ly
shorC tim~. The ground force~ raceivpd the necegeary reinforce~nta.
The Air Porce commaad rated the peYfurmanc~ of Milit~ry rran~port Aviation
cre~re higtil,y~ The flight personnel demonetrated good Craining~
coordination of gctinn and the ~bility to d~liver and land large airborne
_ l~nding foraes precieely in the designated aream and wiChin the time
allocaCed.
The "Unepr" exerciae fully confirmed Che importance of interaction among
the varioue brancheg of troopa to the eucceee of an oparation. This wae
the fireC Cime a landing operaCion involving large airborne forces had baen
carried nuC aith a time limitation.
A gpecific feature of the training of crewa of military Craneports for
performing troop landing operations ia Che fact that during training
flighta, exercisea and maneuvere, all of the mieaions are performed
~ointly with airborne troops. ~xercises by air units of the Air Force
Military Tranaport Aviation are carried out ~ointly with airborne troope.
The Military Transport Aviation~ in turn, takea part la all of the
exerciaea of units and aubunite of airborne troops.
It ig not ~ust good professional training and coordinated action which
characterizes these strong Eies between the Military Tranaport Aviation
and the airborne troops: they are aleo joined together by a etrong feeling
of combat camaraderie, trust and mutual asaiatance, the source of which
lies in long yeara of ~oint combat service.
During the period of preparations for and the conduct of the "Dvina"
maneuvers, folloWing a detailed analysis of the exercise plans and the
coordingtion of interaction between airmen of the Military Tranaport
AviaCion and the Air'vorne Troops, the military tranaport and airborne
unita were massed at the airfielde of departure, Where co~and posts had
been aet up for the Military Tt'ansport Aviation and the Airborne Troops.
The plans for the landing operation, computations and schedules~ weYe
meticulously clarified.
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The ~oine pr~1.3.mingry wnrk w~~ performed to maka C~rGai.n that ~very
afrborn~a i~,roop thdr~u~hly under~tiood how h~ wag eo interect wieh pilot~
aad C~chaici~n~ of eh~ MiliCary '~r~n~port AviaCion. Thrdugh th~ cru~i.g1
moment~ when Ch~ n?~n gnd comb~t equipmenC were being loaded onto Che
aircrafti and when th~ l~nding force was being dropp~d.
It was 10 Merch 1970~ th~ b~ginning of the "Dvina" n~neuver~. "Cnmbat"
operatione wer~ in fu11 ~wing during the ~ntire day, and the concenCra-
tion~ of nirbdrne troops and ~irmen of th~ MiliCary Traneport Aviation
at the airfieldg continued ten~~ly to await Che order to tak~ off. No one
knev ahen command would see fit to uge th~ 1~nding forc~, but the b~ttle
~ fervor wag conCinuously mounCing.
Ther~ were many veterana among the airbnrne troope and the airmen. They
r~membered well th~ combat operations carried out during Che GYeaC
Patriotic War, recalled their experiencee and told the young traopa about
other baCtl~~, real bgttlee and noe Craining ones. 'Their accounCe became
more animated when they cgme eo the battl~e foughr in Belorusgia, where
the "I?viua" maneuvers were being conducC~d. '
As though echoing those distant attd memorable days, circular appenls
passed from one man tn another among the airbdrne troops and the airmen -
of the Military Transport Avi~tion. Their fathers and grandfathers had
exchanged just euch lettera during the Great Patriotic War in order
to give each other support and to reinforce their confidec~ce that they
vould succeed. 'These lettere are printed below:
Dear Comrade, -
We airmen have worked together in single formation With you more than once~
juat ag we are doing now. We have always admired the courage, precision
of action and good training denonstrated by you, sirborne troop, as you
abandon our aircraft. The jump is only the beginning for you, however.
Ahead lies the most important task--"combat." Be brave in the "battle,"
airborne troop:
"Be true to the legacy of the great Lenin"--this ia our motto as you now
fly into the "enemy's'~ rear area. We know that you will remain loyal to
- the glorious traditions of the Airborne Troops of the Soviet Army in the
'battle.' '
For our part, we assure yau that we will deliver you to the drop site
- accurately and on time.
We wish you clear skies, airborne troop, a soft landing and an excellent
performance in the maneuvers:
~ Ai.rcraft Crew
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De~r Comrgde Airmen~
We Gugrd~ ~irborne trnope h~ve been aestgned Che mi~eion of taking parG
in the "Uvin~" m~neuvere. True en Che figheing ergdiriong of our vglorou~
Armed ~orce~, we have gccepted large ~ocialist commitmente in honor of rhe
~ 100Ch annivereary of the birth of V. I. Lenin and have given our word to
perform Chie entire miesion wirh a rating of "good" or "excellent."
We are confident that you ae wall~ proud eagles o� the eocialisC homeland~
will per�orm the drop with no lese than an "exce].1ent."
The long-await~d mdmenC fina].ly arriv~d: It was decided to drop a large
airborne force inCo the "enemy's" rear area. It wae Co help the main ~
grouping of forces carry out a succeaeful offensive. _
7'he air wae rocked by Che roar of powerful turbines. NeiCher tha roar
of numerous aircrafr engines, hoWever, nor ehe tractors, fuel tr~cks gnd
combat vehicles rushing gbout the airfield interferred with the rapid
and smooChly coordinaCed rhythm of the loading operaCion. The aircraft
coum~andera oversaw the boarding of the sirborne troope and tha loading
of the combaC equipmenC. _
A set amount of time elapsed. and the powerful winga lifted the many- -
thousand-etrong landing force into the skies. For the airborne Croops -
thie was a time of relative relaxation, but for the airmen it was the
period of greatest intensity. Each crew mea~ er followed the inetrument
readings closely, studied mape and charts.... Ti~e aircraft commander
analyzed incoming information and issued instructione.
Adjustment and changea in the route are inevitable on a long flight, and
totally unexpected elements are sometimes inCroduced: after all, the
maneuvers are conducted in a aituation approachiag actual combat conditions.
It was nearly time for the drop.
The sirborne landing equipment t~chnician reported the weather to the
commander of the airborne subunit--cloudinesa, wind force at various
~ altitudes and on the ground, and the temperature. IC ia very important
for the airborne t?oops to know what awaits them outside the aircraft,
to men;.ally rehearse the trip to the gro~md, even before ~umping, taking
the special problec~ introduced, this time, by nature,into account.
The aircraft werE flying in close combat formations. The ca:go hatches
were opened simultaneously, and the orange and white parachute canopies
opened up in the grayish haze of the March day. It took 22 minutes to
drop the airborne troop~ and the combat equipment. In the "Dvina" _
maneuvers fighting men of the Milit~ry Transport Aviation a:1d the Airborne
Troops demonstrated good professional training and graphically demonstrated
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rhe pow~r and c~pgbi].iCie~ of Che cc,mbat equipment. Whi].e tho~~ mm~neuv~rs
were under wray, cmny of eh~ gi.rmen ~dined the r~nks of th~ CPSU. S~ninr
Lieutenant Yu. A. fied~tov, ~ ngviggCor~ who p~rfnrmed ~11 of hi.g t~elt~
with ex,c~llenc~~ ~lgo applied ae a c~ndidate for member~hip 3.n Che CPSU.
'Tha "Dvina" m~nauver~ con~tituCad g report from the Soviet fighting m~n
to the Central CommiCCee of Che CPSU and thg 5ov3~t Gov~rnmenti on Che -
increased combaC cgpability of the Armed Fnrc~g and tiheir readin~gs Co
defend the conqu~st of Cha Gr~aC October Socialigt R~voluCion. Genergl
Secretary of the CpSU Centir~l Connni.tte~ L. I. ~rexhn~v d~liver~d a epeech
when the maneuvers w~re gummed up. Ke also attended a revi~w of Ch~
troops in Minak~ ~apital of the B~lorusaian SSR. '1'hia was yet another
demonstration of the constant attention devoted tn matters of military
organizational development by the Cocmnuniat Parry and it~ Central
Commd.ttea.
The�year 1978 arrived. This was the 60th anniveregry of the Armed Forces
of the U55R, a year in which all Soviet fighting men demonstrated with g
sense of special responeibility eheir readinesa to protect the Soviat
Nation.
A report from the US5R Minister of Defense was publiahed in mid-January:
"An exercise will be conducted by troops of the Beloruseian Military -
Diatrict� Code~-named 'Berezina," it will take place between 6 and_10
Feb�ruary 1918 in the area of Minsk, Orsha, Polotsk.
"Ground forces together with Air Force units and eubunits will be involved
in the exercise...."
The exercise was again to be held in Belorussia, which had suffered cruelly
during the harsh years of Che war and was soaked in the blood pf ita de-
fenders and liberators. ~
, Statues and monuments, majestic and sorrowful memorials, are a silent~
reminder of the past.
Numerous monuments rising above the Belorussian earth preserve the gratitude
of the descendants of those glorious eagles--fighters of the awesome
- heavens of the war. One of them atands at a fork in the road near the
settlement of Radoshkevichi. IC was here that Hero of the SovieC Union
N. F. Gastello performed his immortal feat on the fifth day of fighting.
The forthcoming test of combat readiness was elevating the spirits of the
fighting men. It seemed as though history itself were observing them,
checkiag to sae whether the past had been forgotten....
i
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Th~ unitg and gubunit~ r~~d wieh r~al excit~m~nt th~ Appe~~ di th~
Militgry Cnuncil nf th~ it~d ~gnn~r Beiorug~ian Mi].it~ry U~.gCricC to
pgrCicip~nt~ in eh~ "Berezina" ~x~rci,~~~ � -
"Comrgde nffic~rg, uarranC officers, eoldiere and eergeanCs:
Th~ unite in which you ~~rve ~re Co Cgke p~rC in th~ 'Berezina' exerci~e.
The importanc~ ~f Chis ~x~rci~~ gnd eh~ ~p~c1,a1 responsi.bili,ty involved
etem from the fact that i~t ie b~ing conduct~d on the eve of ehe 60th
annivergary of Che Sovi~t Armed Forces and compri~es a gort n~ repnrt
from th~ peraonnel to th~ Party and peopl~a on the combat readineee of
_ the troopa....
Comrade fighting men;
In the ex~ercise you are representing your own Red Banner B~loruseian
Military DiaCrict. The fighting color~ of iCe unite nre covered wirh th~
glnry of heroic victories. Your fatherg and grandf~thers wrote more than
one brill~ant page in the hietory of the Great Patriotic War. Pilot
Nikolny Gastello, infantryman Yuriy 5mirnov, tank driver Pavel ltak,
parCiean KonetanCin Zaelonov and thousand~ of other patriots of the
homeland performed their immortal feate here, in heroic Soviet Belorueeia.
Be worthy of the heroic feaCe peYformed by old~r generationa of defendere
of the eocialist homeland. Sacredly observe and add to the diatrict's
glorious combat traditions. The homeland has provided yau with remarkabla
equipment and weapons, the mast advanced in existence~
May skill, initiative, persistence, mutual aseiatance and atamina be your
partners in the perfo~ance of the aseigned missions.
The military council is firmly convinced of the fact that all of the
~ personnel will spare neither effort nor energy to make the exercise a
success, that they will add a new page to the Red Banner Military District'e -
chronicle of combat glory and will prove that they are worthy of being -
called reliable defenders of the sacred borders of the Soviet State.
Military Council of the Red Banner
Belorusaian Military District"
The forthcoming exercise Was important for yet another important reason:
It Was to be atcended by representatives of ten aocialist and capitalist
nations.
Under the terms of the Final Act of the Conference oa Security and Cooperation
in Europe, our nat~on's government informed the nations taking part in the
confereace in Helsiaki about the exercise. Military observers from the
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Kittgdom n~ Betgium, eh~ G~~man U~tnocratic ~~public, the ~~d~tigl tt~publlc
nf Gern~ny, tt~e Kingddm of eh~ Neeharl~c?d~~ tihe po].i~h Paopl~'~ Republia, -
the United Kingdom of Gre~t grirg~n ~nd Nnrthe~a Ireland, Che United
Statee of America, the Pr~nch ltepublic, the Cz~choelov~k 3oai~].i~C ltepublin
and th~ Ccnfed~rgtion of 5w~.Czerland arrived in Min~k in ~~bruary.
Oae wa~ autom~tically remiad~d of the y~gr 1935 and the 1~rg~ m~neuvere
carried out by th~ Ki~v Militgry Digtrice~ whi.ch hgd ba~n aetend~d by =
repre~entativ~~ nf for~ign ngtiong. Th~ dropping of g].grg~ airborn~'
force during th~ ex~rcise~ had produaed a gtunning ~ff~ct.
What changee had occurred aince that time2 What cgpabiliti~g did Che
modern, pow~rful and superbly equipped SovieC Military Tran~port Avi~tion
posseeg? What heights had it gttained? Our airm~n were ro demonetrate
all of thie during the exercis~. ~
- I nou].d underetand the impati~nce of unit and aubunit cocmnastders of Che
Military Traneport Avigtion, who were anxioug to learn who would be
entrusted with the important mission of dropping the airborne group
during the "Betiezina" exercise. Lieutenant Colonel Yutiiy Timofeyevich
Cherkasov, a young unit commander, was receiving special attention. He -
had never before had the opportunity to take part in such an ~xarcise
ae a commander and group leader, but the lieutenanC colonel's questions
reflecCed guch a raadiness, such a deaire to demonstrate his knowledge
and abilities, to snow what he had trained his men, and how well~ that
thoee around him were naturally infected with his impatience and fervor.
A short time prior to the beginning of Che exercise, we received the
concrete mission covering the dropping of the airborne landiag force.
Among the units to which it was decided to entrust the miesion of landing
the troopa and cargo was Che unit over which Lieutenant Colonel Yu. T. _
Cherkasov had assumed ca~nand relatively recently. Lieutenant General
of A~ation N. N. Ti~shevskiy and I set out for the unit.
Even at the airfield one could feel that the peraonnel--from the comm~ander
to the rank-and-file air specialists--were in an unusual mood. They were
proud of the confidence and faith in their knowledge and skill and of
the opportunity to 8emonsCrate them in such an important setting.
Frankly speaking, ~+a were slightly concerned about entrueting this difficult
miss,ion, part of the exerc.ise, to young airmen: t his was practically the
third generation in that ~nit which had not only never known war but which
also had very little experlence in performing combat airborne landings
of inen and cargo. .
NonethelesE, the youth could be relied upon: their excellent theoretical
training, their desire to possess all of the keys to their profession,
their tireless effort to achieve that goal and their training under highly
rated commanders spoke for themselves.
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~h~ unit l~~d~r~ war~ given ~p~cific ~~rignmenC~t ro d~t~rmin~ th~
deadlines for preparing ehe crew~, Ch~ avi~Cion aquipm~nt ~nd the aignal
and ~uppore equipcmnt ~nd th~t of ell thg othgr ~~rvice~ who were to
part3cip~te in th~ dropping of eha ~irborn~ fotice.
Tha eitugtion ia which Che impanding mireion aae to ba p.rfoYm~d w~
analyaed e~pecially car~fully.
Aad the eituation aas ~ faiYly complux on~.
The importance of the forChcoming airborne landing opargCion was due in
great part to the fgct thgt fnreign ob~ervere were to witn~aa for Che firet
time the dropping of ~n airborn~a lgnding~fnrce from I1~76's. (ir~at
profaeeional skill aould be needed to dYOp the he~?vy equipment gnd the
combat vehicle crewe praciaelv into the a~~igned area in Cha cloge combat
formatioae of heavy but high~apead military traneporte. ,
The weaCher ~iCuaCion in tha exerciee area Wge al~o a eource of concarn~
As a rule, the weather in Fabruary ie etablet ti here are snow, winds and
conaidergble varigtinne in temperature. The weathermen predicted nothiag
to comfort us betaeen 6 and 11 F'ebruary~ when the exerciae was to be held.
I visit+~d the unit a aecond time on the eve of the landing operation. '
Wet, sticky anow aas falling and a eolid blanket of clouda hung over the
airfield, obacuring the sky. The cockpit of th~ aircraft on which I
arrived became covered by ice cryetal8 during the flight, but tha da-icing
system functioned well.
On the ground~ apecialiet~ with the airfield angineeYing eervice were ~
keeping the runvay in usable condition With great difficulty. Hoarfroet
formed on the concrete, which had cooled off during the night~ inetantly
forming into a thin~ aeemingly poliehed crust of ice which could only be
removed by the hot breath of epecial ica-melting vehiclea.
Lieucenant Colonel Cherkasov reporCed that the aviation equipment had~
been fully readied for the forthcoming u?iseion, the personnel aere
completing the last flight preparations and the aviation techniciana,
~ together with the airborne troops, w~re loading combbti equipment onto
the aircraft.
"Where are the flight peraonnel rigt?t now?" I asked Yuriy Ticwfeyavich.
"At the training area. In a few minutes We shall begin the final rua-through
of thE flight."
I obaerved this form of training with great interest, a form which has
become an established part of the work of our airmen. There ie no longer
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~ny ~rgum~nt to th~ n~~d fnr euch drii,l~, and eh~r~ i~ prgctically not
a~ingla ong of nur unitg whiah dde~ not hava ~n ~~e~ ~eC up fdr "flying
nn tha ground" flight~, gn ~xtr~ordingrily ~f~ecrive ~nd ei.mpl~ foYm
~ of Craining.
rhe antir~ frouC~ ~nd ~i1 of th~a ~ntion~ requ~.re8 of the crewe were
degigct~~ed in tha ~re~, including, naturally, Ch~ mo~t ~mpo~ctant motn~nt~~Che
dropping of the girb~rne l~ndin~ forc~. . ~
The comm~ander wae ch~ckirig wieh h~ir-splitting thoroughne~e to ee~ that
- all elem~nts of the f].ight had be~n ma~ter~d and rhgt the pilote ~nd ,
navigators wera prepared to handle a chgng~ in th~ gituation.
"Check t3me--123U. What will you be doing"?--Cherkasov gsked one of the
aircraft commanders.
Young CapCain Yuri Al~ks~y~vich 7.adykhin anew~red concisely: E1e knew
~xactly vh~t hig crew had tn do and hnw.
"Captain Klop~v, wha t will you do in case one of the eyatams breaks down
in the equipment for droppin$ the eirborne force"?
The captain's strong-tailled expression reflected a momentary play of thought,
- and then--a preciee, competent ~nswer demonatr~ting the thorough knowledge
of the equipment and the ability to apply his knowledge in analogous
eituationg not covered bY instructione.
Msaers followed questiona, one after another, almoat without pauge. The '
men aere well trained. It was a plexsure to se~ their confidence in
themselves and their kaowledg~ and the unrestrained manner in which they
conducted themselves. I detected in thie relaxed behavior Che atamp
of an individual present in apirit at the Craining area: Lieutenant
Colonel Matoliy Nikolayevich Muraehov--inatructor and subunit commander,
~rho had taught all of these men to fly the I1-16.
Pirst-class pilot~ superb methods expert and a highly experienced con~maader~he
is a model of the real instructor and lrnows how to impart his knowledge and
experience to others, to teach them to think on their own, without
pressure and to make well-considered decisions taking the smallest
details into accoua t.
The unseen presence of another teacher was also obvioualy there, that of
Major Valeriy I~anovich Sermavkin, a subunit navigator. He is an
extraordinarily conscientious individual. I recall a class on combat
employment in that unit, the thoroughneas and grdphic clarity of the
diagrams and mock-ups needed for =raining the pilots and navigators, which
were ~de under his supervision.
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Th~~~ highly ~xperi~nc~d ~i.rm~n have hundr~d~ of ~~nd~,ng np~r~?ei,on flighr~
to thair ~~r~diC, fli~he~ tio vgri~u~ ~r~a~ of ouY n~eion in ~xer~m~ly
div~r~~ w~gth~r condiCinn~. Th~y h~v~ ~om~ehiag to p~g~ on ~n Ch~ youth~
Th~y aan te~~h withouC ~v~dtng difficultii~~.
The work at the training arag w~~ ending~
The preElight pr~paratioea w~re concluded wiCh g tAlk with the flight
p~reoc~n~l~ which provicf~d y~t ~noth~r opportunity to ~e~ how wg11 prepared
the fl3ght pergonnel w~r~ to p~rform th~ forthcomtng misrion.
Aftar th~ dri11~ on tha aimulator~ there was a report from Waather
reconnaie~~nce pLane.
A cyclone w~a moving ia, accompgni~d by eecondary ironre. He~vy enoa wa~
falling in the landing grea~ and the wind forc~ was "aC the limit~" that
is~ the wind wa~ blowing c~ith the maximum forca which aould seill
p~rmit the landing operation to b~ perform~d.
The next nwrning airm~n ~nd airborne troop~ met at th~ ~ircrgft parking
areae. Th~ commandere nf the "flying inf~ntry" eubunitg war~ intrnduced
to the aircrafC commander~--the ueual proc~dur~. The icrtportance of thi~
evenC l~ave~ it~ mark on everything tgking plece, however. Sometimee~ if
it is a~imple friendly handshake and the uaual exchange of standard
questio~t~--routine prepargtions for routine work.
In exerciaea euch as the "Herezina," however, the firet contact between the
airmen and the girborne troepa prior to boarding the aircraft are
especially eigaificant. When they meet each other the participants in
tha landing operatioa ecrutiaize thair comrades slightly more carefully ch~a
- they ordinarily would. It is not difficult to guees the unepokan queetioa.
Everyone senaes it and~ if posgible~ anawers it:
"Well, friend, has everything been Worked out"?
"Everytning."
"~vexything aill be O.K."?
"Up to ~tandard":
A solemn moment arrived. Airmen and airborne troopa e:ood in a siagle
formation of preciae ranka. The Air Force flag fluttered in the sairl.ing
anow, and the traditional melody was heard: "Ever higher and higher...."
Now the ceremony was over. The airborne troops boarded the gircraft, and -
~ the airmen took their positions.
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Tha girfi~id w~g in ehe grip~ of ~~now~C~rm~ ~h~ v~hicl~~ which had
cieared th~ runa~y nwved o~f to th+~ ~id8 ~o thee th~ h~evy ~ircraf~ oouid
tgk~ off.
- 93gna1 flat~~~ shot up into ehe swiriing el~m~ae~ ai,th e his~ing eound.
Taka~-o f f :
Tha ~ircrat li�t~d off ~xactiy accord~tng to ~ch~dul~.
In th~ f3r~t ph~~~ of the ~ii~ht ie W~~ eh~ ~ob og chn trar�port cre~r~ to
t~k~ oEf pr~ci~ely ot~ eour~~ ~ith eh~ ~~~ign~d ~ee~rval~ to foirm up in th~a
comb~t ord~r~ and to negotiat~ eh~ ~~athar front.
Cloud~ env~lop~d tihe aircr~ft in a den~ae, mulei-layetied blankat, and th~
cret~r~ could ~~e th~ othdr ~ireraft ia their graup only on Ctie radat�
~cre~ne. C~r~fully moaitoring the biip~ on th~ ~cr~~n,~, the aircr~fG
comm~ndera made adju~tm~nt~ in th~ir cour~~ ~nd gpeed. -
A certnin amount of eim~ paes~d, ~nd th~ poaarful aircraft eho`+ed up o~n
the radar~crepn nf th~ director of the landing operetl,on in ths form
of a n~at chain With preci~ely mea~ured linke.
The gircraft reached the beginning of the targeC run--that section of the
route on ahich final preparationg ~rould be made for dropping the airborne
landing forc~.
It was 60 kilometers to the drop area. Some gort af commun~ty 1ay baloa.~
it was barely noticeable on the rader ecreenst Televieion and radio '
etations creat~d a great deal of interference. The aircrafc cr~?a Were
forced to use eelf-contain~d facilities ~lone for approaching the area
ahere the landiag operation was to be performed. ~ '
The crews Who aere to drop the "snatch" force had an ~specially diffi~:ult
~ob. The leader of that group Was Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Petrovicfi
Abros'kin, unit deputy commander, and the aircraft navigator aas Ma~or
Yuriy Aleksgndrovich Drobyghev. They Would be the firat to arrive at
the designated site. They must do so with absolute accuracy and drop
the "snatch" force precisely at the designated spoc and at the preecribed
time. Thoae following them aauld have a far more aimple 3ob. Abros'kin
and Drobyghev would provide the necessary corrections. The creare ~
following them xould glso make adjustments by radar reference pointe
vhich they could see on their radar screens.
"Distance 10. Opening cargo hatches~" came the report from Major -
Drobybhev.
"Diatance 10" meant that it was 10 kilometers to the objective, 1 and 1/2
or two minutes of flying left until the landing of the "saatch" force
~rould begin.
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The ~irbdrn~ e~~hniei~n ronnitdring ~h~ n~rg~ hatnh~~ r~pore~dt
~~Cargo h~ech~$ op~n~"
,
Th~ cambgC ~quipmpnt would now b~ dropp~d ta aarth. Thi~ w~g th~ baginntng
nf on~ of tha mo~t diffi,cult p~r~od~ for th~ aircr~ft conm~nd~rs Wh~n
th~ firae arm r~d vehiei~ aQighictg many eon~ left rha ~ircr~f t ie
af~ect~d th~ Crgnaport~e stability re~geively littl~, but e~ter th~ second
vahicl~ ~ra~ dropped th~ c~nter of gr~vLey ~hl,gt~d ~nd it bac~m~ far mor~
difficult to ~ilot tha plac?e. Th~ pilot t~~~d~d a graat daal of praceical
piioting expert~~ca i~ order to k~~p rigidly on cour~a aed lend the othar
cr~a~. "
~ig~r~~ light~d up oa th~ in~trumantg, indicating Ch~ dige~nce from th~
- ~anding giCe to the tutning po~et And 1~t~ra1 deviationg. The comm~nder
t~ad to congider sevaral r~ndings at onee in ordar to maka ad~uetmantg
for d~vi8tiong from ~h~ preecribed flight condition~, in ordar tn ~
~ m~iatain th~ preci~d cour8a, ~pa~d and alti~ud8. '
'bi~tgnCa S." -
The doore op~npd far dropping th~ combgC t~ame.
~fie commaader cnncantr~ted atitention on ahaC Wae meet important--altieude~
s~paed nnd caurse. '
~e indicator ehos~ed ~~ero.
Hajor Drobyohev presead the cargo relaase button and gave the command:
~ u J~~~ ~
.
Obeervers present at the landing site had been hearing the roar of powerful
jet engineg for several minutes. It Wag already growing noticeably fainter
, When the eihouettes of combat vehicles and the figuree of airborne troopa
deacendieg near them became visible againgt the enowy background.
The "snatch" forca vas headed by Senior Lieutenant I. Dolgov~ son of
Hero of Lhe Sovi~et Union Lie~tenant Colonel P. Dolgov, the intrepid
parachute teater.
Polloaing the "snatch" force, the military traneports dropped the main
forces.
Several more minutee paesed, and the airborne troopa were rushing to begia
their combat miasion.
The transport planes had dropped to minimum flight eltitude aa~d aere
returning to base. _
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A voice wa~ hagrd over rh~ ~~.rs
"~xcel~ent~ cnmrada airmen: We11 done": .
Thie ie how Che exercige director rated eheir performance.
Tt?e f~c~g of the pilot~, navigaCore, airborne tiechnicians and radio
operators 1it up---gll c~f th~g~ who had lived through the highly tense
minutee gnd war~ now deserv~dly experiencing real ~oy from a~ob we11 done
~nd ~rom Che performance nf rheir military and comradely duty.
- Our exerciges are approximately like Chat ~uat described. And each of '
them pr~genre a new level in the achievement of combat proficiency.
It is not ~uat during axerciaes and maneuvers, however, rhaC the Soviet .
fighring n?en's reac3he~s, stamina and Craining are Cested. The performance
of th~ir ordin~ry day-to-day tasks also involve many difficulties and
~ometimes unexpected developmenCg. These tasks may differ greatly with -
respecC to degree of difficulCy and inteneity: they require noC only
thorough knowledge, steadfasCnesa and training, but also resourcefulness,
courage and gelflessneas for the sake of dury.
The Military Transport Aviation performs specific missions for the
natior~'s ~conomy and has to be on Che spot immediately, whexever our
equipmenC nnd profeasional know-how are required. It frequently happens _
that the performance of some previously unknown task is asaigned to airmen
of the Military Transport Aviation, and our fliera honorably ~usCify
this confidence.
Personnel of the M.ilitary Transport Aviation learned a great deal from _
helping builders of the Tyumen' oil pipeline during the winter. The
flight crews delivered bulldozers and various machinery to the line~
cargo which until then had been considered impoasible to transport by
air. Special supports and pallets were made, to which pipe and machinery
were aecured. This assignment was a test not only of the personnel's
- flying skill, but of their ingenuity~ reaourcefulnesa and physical
stamina as well. N. F. Zaytsev, military pilot f~:sC-class, considered _
the complexity and the unusual nature of the assignment, made the first
trip to deliver cargo to the site and then discussed subsequent flights
in detail with the other officer~s.
Training flights were aet up under conditions approaching those of the
impeading flights~ the duties of the crews were defined with respect to
loading amd unloading the equipment~ and the special aspects of flying
aircraft at full load were determined.
This was not the only area, however, in which the commander's organizing
role was revealea. At first, the crews were not able to perform more than
- ~
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one Elight in Che course of a day. N. F. Zaytaev was again the fireC ,
iadividual to perform two flights, thnn three, and then four in a single
day . _
The formusa "Follow my example:" ~ueCified itself entirely: Following
= the commander's example, all of the crewa strove to achieve Cha maximum
performance in their work.
- A great deal of work was accomplished as a reault, which accelerated -
= construction of Che oil pipeline and saved the sCate'millions of rubles.
The Military Transport Avi~tion was for a number of reasona aeaigned the '
new and exCraordinarily important ~ob of'opening up Che line �or trans-
porting heavy, nonstandard, ao-called single-itiem cargo for Glavtymune'naftegaz
j Main AdmtnistraCion for the Construction of Oil and Gas Pipelines in
Tyum~en' Oblastj i.n tha harsh winter conditiona.
The sing].e-item cargoes were gas pipes up to 2 meters in diameter and more
- than ].0 meters long, bul.ldozers, excavators and pipeline pumping atations. _
Such cargo had never before b~en tranaported by air, neither by aircraft
of the rliniatry o� Civil Aviation, nor by the heavy aircraft of the
Military Transport Aviation. It ia now a regular occurrence to fly the
route with a 40-ton pumping station on board or with pipes which will aot
fit into the fuselage of an enormous aircraft, but at that time many -
indiv3duals considered it not ~ust fantastic or unrealistic but actually
. . dangerous. ,
There was no experience to rely upon, neither for loading or securing the
cargo nox for unloading it or for operatiag such giants as the An-22 in the
harsh wiater conditions. Temperatures sometimes dropped to 50 degrees
below zero, and the heavy transports flew out of airfields liCtle suited
for their use. � ~
Nonetheleas, our airmen--aircraft commanders, engineers, navigators, airborne
technicians and radio operators--demonstrated once again the enormous -
performance capabilities of the An-22, just as they had been demonstraCed
more than once ~uring the performance of important missions under the most
diverse conditions.
I would like to make special mention of the calmness and stamina and of the
vast knowledge and experience which contributed to the search for the
- optimal solution to the problem. _
Practical preparations began with the selection of the pereonnel. The group
included the very best airmen, 50 percent of whom were comm~unisCs and
30 percent members of the Komsomol. They included the crews of Lieutenant
Colonel Podduvalov, Major pobryanskiy, Ma~or Kalinin and others. A number
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of taltcg were held with pe~~onnel of th~ group~ and meetings with the
Military Trniispore Avintion command, which wer~ to give the pereonnel the .
proper orientation for the excellenC p~rfdrtngnCe of x mte~ion of gCaCp
impoL'tanCe.
All of the crewe making up the group thoroughly atudied conditione aC the
Tyumen'. Surgut and Nizhn e vgrtovek airfielde, the mp~cial ~light
conditiong gnd the pe~uliaritieg of operating aircraft in th~ low
temperatureg, over unmarked terraitt and in difficulC weather, the special
requirements for landing ~ofeh maximum gnd mtnimum loads and insCructione
for hauling oversize iteros~
All navigation~l preparations for rhe �lighCe were made in advance: r ouCes
were plotted, computgtions were m~de fnr the flighC plan and for the
en~ineer and navigation plan, and the aeronautical features of the mgin
and alternate airfields were studied.
M advance group, consisting of the crews of Lieutenant Colonel Podduvalov
and Majora Panov and D'yakonov, arrived in Tyumen'. After the first test
runs were made, there was an exchange of know-how on matters of preparing
the aviation equipment at low temperatures, loading and unloading oversiae
cargo and performing flights. Majors Pestrov, Trofimov and D'yakonov and
C~ptnin Gerasimov made suggestions for reducing the amounC o� time required
to load and uriload the aircraft, which made it posaible subsequently to
make two trips in a flight day.
The list of essential work which was approved by the deputy commander for _
aviation-engineer support~ shows the thoroughness of the preliminary =
preparations. =
A re~ular technical crew and maintenance teams were assigned to each
aircraft. Preliminary and preflight preparation of the aircraft was
performed by regular crews according to flow charta.
A commisaion was created, which worked with deaigners and engineers of
Clavtyumen'neftegaz, to determine the M-22's capacity for hauling single-
item cargo, eo work out the specifications for rigging the cargo to make
_ it possible to load and unload items and to secure them reliably in the
aircraft, to determine what additional devices would be needed to prevent
the aircraft from being damaged in the loading and unloading and whi].e
in :light. and to campile temporary instructions for hauling the required
cargo.
Self-propelled ~cked vericles were driven onto the sircraft. The tracked
vehicl.es were lined up precisely along t`.e axis of the aircraft and moved -
on a Lloping ramp, without any turning whatsoever. In order to make the ~
equipment more stable, the ramp boards were covered with ropes from the
air:.raft loading kit.
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Cr~n~d w~re u~ed for ld~?dtng exn~vgCnrs weighin~ 2U ton~ or mor~~ ~inc~
the lic~i.Ced mobility (pnor m~neuver~biliey, the gbsenc~ o� gripe nn Che
Crack linkg, and the naed to ad~ust the pngit~.on oE the ~ib gnd bucket
for load3ng by r~mp) made rhe proceae extremely difficult and noC
entirely eafe.
When loading two self-prop~].led units, th~ firat nne wa~ tEmporarily left
in the c~ntr~l p~rt of the cargo compgrtm~nt, since moving it further
mi.ght low~r the noge e~ction of Che aircrgft ~nd increage the angle
of incline of the remp, gnd thia would make it harder to load Che second
" vehicle. ,
Difficulties were encountered in the performance of the miesion~ which
held up ~nd complicated the flighte. 'The aircraft parking site and the
loading areg were ~ ie~ei and gloped tow~rd the nose of the aircraft.
Becauee of rhis the aircrgft were tilted laterglly and longitudinally.
The surface was never the sama after a enowfall~ even when the snow was
promptly removed, and this made it difficult Co taxi on to end off the
parking eite and to load cargo.
Thanks to Che akill of the airmen and technical peraonnel, however, all of
the difficultiea were overcome and the assigna~ent was completed o?1 tirn~. -
'I'hroughout the operation, Che party and komsomol aktiv devoCed a great
deal of attention to flight safety and the prevention of accidents. The
party bureau kept watch over every single cre~. The conmmuniats aet an
example by prepgring the equipment w~ll and reducing Ch~ time required
to perform the missions. Tlianks to purposive party-political work the
peraonnel performed with endurance and professional skill in every -
situation, even the most difficult.
Ignoring the time and their fatigue, the technical' personnel did everything
- poasible rapidly to eliminate problems whenever they occurred, and the
- aircraft were always ready for the next flight. Captain A. Rysev and _
aenior aircraft technician Captain N. Kondrat'yev~ membere of Ma~or
Dobryanskiy's crew, for example, and CapCain N. Pisarenko, chief of the
~ sirfield support crew, worked eix hours one night to replace a front
window.
The other spE~cialists taking part in that operation also gave their best
effort. All difficulties were overcome, and an important government
assignment was successfully fulfilled.
The transport aviation came to the rescue of builde:s and oil workers of
Glavtyumen'neftegaz one other time. This time the group of An-22's was
headed by Lieutenant Colonel V. A. Volkov, commander of an excellent sub- _
unit.
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,
The following are ~ few lines from hie wnrk l.og. They give an idea o�
khe situaCion and Che ~.neen~e pace gC which our girmen work:
"1'h~ weather hag nn m~rcy. The land of Tyumgn' ia n capricioue entity....
"After an ittgp~ction flight with Ma~or V. Y~Eremov we had to land with
o3nimum vigibility. 'rhree crewa were ready for the first run. WhaC an
_ assortment of cargo: There were drilling riga, pumping ataCions, -
caterpillar tractors~ excavators, 'Ikarus's The centering of ehe
vehiclea is calculated with great care. The number of flights is growing.
The crewe'have been specialized. Ma~or V. Solodnik hauls primarily
'Sputnik' pumping stationa weighing 11.5 tons; V. Yefremov haula various '
_ machinery; ~nd Ma~or Yu. Yevelin and I h~ul containers, fiCtinga and
orher 'trifles' weighing more than 30 tona. The men here work euperbly:
Majnr R. Anvarov, CapCains V. Golubev and S. Grigor'yev~ LieutenanCs
V. Kleshnev and V. Golubovich--it would be impossible Co name them all.
Yevelin's crew is solidly in firsC place in the competition. Yefremov
is upset: he says that I assigned too few flights. 'It's embarrasing,
Commander,' he says, 'we have the political worker and secretary of
the komsomol organization on board but we are still not able to keep up
with the fronCrunners.'
_ "One nighC, outstanding ground radio operators Vasilenko, Belov, Levura
and Pimenov worked until almost morning to ascertain why one of the
. sets was not performing right. The aircraft was ready for take off."
I wauld like to say a few special words about Vladimir Akimovich Volkov
himself. His name is well known to all those who operate the giant ~
An-22. Lieutenant Colonel Volkov was one of the first in the Mtlitary ~ ,
Tranaport Aviation to learn to fly this heavy aircraft, and he has flown
it Co the most remote areas in our nation.
I could not understand the make-up of this individual at once: at first,
he seemed overly calm, even sluggish. I saw him once at the airfield, ~
however, quick-moving, active and energeti;., he infected everyone with his
enthusiasm, and the work literally hummed along, easily and rapidly.
V. A. Volkov has a highly developed sense of responsibility and duty. I ,
recall the following incident. Command decided to transfer Volkov as a
veteran instructor to another unit. It was being prepared for a transition '
to the An-22 aircraft, and personnel had to be trained. Vnikov's position
_ Would be the same, without any advantages. In addition, he would have ~
to leave an area in which he felt at home and travel to a new location,
- which almost certainly did not have the comforts of a large city. This ~
did not disturb Volkov, however.
He performed an enormous job at the new location and within a short time `
had trained his subunit to perform the diff~~ult tasks of the Military
~
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~ rranapore Aviation. It wae for this regson Char com~mnd entrusted hie
subunit to perform the mission for G1avCyumen'nefCegaz.
Speaking of ageietance eo the naCional economyi, I could not fail to menCion
the fact Chat as early as 1948, a group of Military Tranaport Aviatian
crews reached the NorCh Pole flying Li-12'8 and contributed g great deal
ko the development of that forbidding region. Airmen of the Military
TransporC AvigCion have had to work in Che ArcCic more than once in
recent years.
Once~ emergency cargo had to be delivered to an inacceeaible Cranspolar
area. Everything was considered ir? the careful preparations made for
the flight, including such psychological factora as the long polar nighC,
blizzards, magnetic sCorms, the silent expansea of the ocean and rapidly
changing weather conditions. The flight, which wnuld last many houre,
was also complicaCed by the fact that Che cargo had to be droppad so thaC
it would all land on a barely diacernible ice floe.
Even after approaching the deaignated site, P.t an altitude of around ~
200 meters, the airmen could sea only a frosty haze and fog over the
crevices and patches of water.
The miasion was succeasfully performed, however. In the endlesa wasteland
of ice and water the crewa of Lieutenant Colonela D. L. Sverdlov and V. G.
Konatantinov, Captain A. N. Mikhal'chenko and Ma~or B. I. Orlov found ~
the ice floe aad dropped all of the cargo accurately in the designated
area. The cargo was apread over an area no more than 100 meters wide
and 500 meters long. It was pleasant to hear the worda of gratiCude
aent over the radio by thoae who had received the cargo "from the aky":
"Wiah we could have made it easier, but we could not: Well done:
= Thank you": -
Md once again, there was only the North with its unbridled nature. The
temperature was 49 degrees below zero, visibility 1500 meters; there was
fog and light snaw. ~
The crews painstakingly studied the route and the climatic peculiaritiea
_ of the area to be prepared to meet any whims of nature fully armed.
= The small dirt airfield lacked radar monitoring facilities. It had only
a single homing station and was located in a valley on the bank of a river.
The correct pattern would have to be determined for coming in for a landing
along the river channel.
The technicians headed by Engineer-Captair~ D. P. Bespalov, deputy squadron
commander for aviation engineer service, readied the aircraft equipment:
They checked the instruments ar~d the radio and electronic equipment and
checked to aee that the land;ng gear was in good working order.
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CapCain V. V. Born and his crew flew out first to familiarixa ~hems~].ves
' with rhe fli~he and 1.anding condition~. The airmen studied the ei.tu~Cion
ChoYOUghly and, degpite th~ limited amount of time availabLe, prepared
~ mock-up oE the landing air�ield which ~nc].udpd Che 3pwl.~.as t detai~.s .
The flighC p~raonnel xan throu~h mock Lattdi~,spr,~ by thie map, and the
persietenC dril].a help~d them prepare for i:he forthcoming flighte.
The time arrived~ and the gupuniti commander reporCed:
"Crews prep~re to perform the governmene mi~aion."
The command to take off wae given. The aircraft lifted off ona after
another. ,
They flew at an altitude of 6,000 meters. The further north tiiey wenC,
the more rhe terrain changed. Hills and Caiga gave way Co anow-peaka~.
mount~ins. In a few more hours they would be flying above water D:.u
islands.
' The commanders flew the aircraft; the navigators plotted Che course; L�he
radio operators maintained contact; the senior aireraft technicians
followed the performance of the engines carefully; and the aircraft
technicians.... they were busy making coffee. Tn short, every,thing w~s
as it should be.
- FinalJ.y, the navigator reporCed thaC, according to plaai, they would b~
descending in three minuCes. A workers' settlementindicated on the map
flashed by. T?tey landed.
One by one the planes taxied to the unloading sites.
"Open cargo hatches":
Al1 of the crew members set about their work. Everyone understood that
there was little time and Chat the cargo was urgently needed, and the
work proceeded rapidly. -
A brief critique of the flight, reports on the flight readiness of the
equipment, and the aircraft took off and set out on the return trip....
Airmen of the Military Transport Aviation are always ready to aid those
atruck by natural disacter. I have already mentioned the assistance
provided Tashkent after the earthquake. E~en earlier, in October 1948,
the airmen helped the citizens of Ashkhabad, which was hit by an earthquake. _
Medical personnel, tons of inedical supplies and other emergency cargo were
delivered to the disaster area.
A combat alert also takes our aircraft into the sir when people who have
suffered a disaster require assistance.
~
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Th~ tirengport av3ation performed ~n operaCion wiCh a strictly pe~ceful
name--"S~no [Hay]". It consi~ted in helping to eave l.iveatock in Che
steppes of the Kalmyk ASSR, where the deliverx of feed was cuC off
becauae of a aerious natural disaster--fl.ooding. This occurred in the
winCer of 1967. The mi~eion wae performed by a group command~d by Colonel
8Carogtin. An alerC ~gw the ~ircr~ft in the air. They took off at night~
in the rain, in poor vieibility~ The fli.ghrs to the air�ield where the
hay was loaded was made gafely, however. Th+a hay waa dropped at unfamiliar
gnd unmarked aites from mi~iinum $leitudea.
1'he �1lghrs over the steppe at minimum altitude, without any aort of
landmarks, ~equired great exertion, concenCration ~nd atami.na on tha
part of pi1~Cs and navigators, and most importantly--excellent piloting
techniques to fly the,heavy tuxboprop aircra�t at minimum alCitude.
The aircraft first Cook on 120 bales of compressed hay. After rhe first
few flights, however, it was determined that the load could be increaeed
to 180 balea. The loading proceas was delayed because the balea of hay
wexe loosely packed and the airmen were forced Co pack them better to
prevenC them from breaking aparC when they hit the ground or while atill -
in Che air.
A total o~ 389 tons of hay was dropped within a ahort time (three to four
days), and the livestock were saved.
The flight group received constant practical aeaistance from party and
soviet organs of Volgogradskaya Obla~t and the Kalmyk ASSIt, eapecially
from Comrade 0. 0. Gorodovik, first aecretary of the Kalmyk ASSR obkom..� , -
For the3.r successful performance of the misaion, by an ukase of the �
Preaidium of the Kalmyk ASSR, Starostin's group of officers was awarded
~ the Commemorative Red Bannar, and many of the pilots, navigators, engineere
and techaicians were awarded honorary certificates of the Kalmyk obkom
of the CPSU and the Council of Ministera of the Kalmyk ASSR. ,
~ Z~o years later, during the winter of 1969~ a subunit of An-12's dropped
hay and other feed to flocks of sheep in the Uzbek Republi.c.
, The readiness of fighting men in the Military Transport Aviation to perform
' asaignments for the homeland is tested in various ways. The assignments
themselves also vary. Large or small, however, they graphically
demoastrate the enormous capabilities of the Military Transport Aviation
and its power.
The successful operations of units and aubunits of the Military Transport
Aviatioa under the most diverse conditions attest the fact that our
aviation equipment is in a constant state of combat readiness and that
personnel of the Military iransport Aviation are highly Crained and have the
morale and fighting efficiency to cope with the assigned ~ob with excellence.
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It ie Co the honor of our Milltary Transpozt Aviarion thaC it h$e never
failed to compleCe g sing].e gea3gnment �or Che homeland. Pereonnel of
the Air Foxca Migm~b~thegCPSUrCentra].iCommi.t~erandrth~~S vi~C~Governn~aC~
ta~k asei.gnad Ch y
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~ ~
CONCLUSION
During the yeare of ies exietence~ Soviat aviatinn, including unite
performing gir trgngport ini~eions, has trgveled a glorious p~Ch of erruggle
_ and victory. ~he comb~t hietory of air units, out of whiah rh~ Sovieti
Military Traasport Aviation wae created~ has been a never-ending source
of developm~nt of courage and skill in airmen of the Air Force Military
Trengport Aviation. Tt?e r,reaCive appllcation o� the experience gained
from the Great Patrioeic War, adapted to the modern maCerial and
technical bage of th~ 5oviet Armed Forces and their qualitative advancee,
ie rmking it possible to improve and develop miliCary affaire more .
rapidly, Co anticipate what warfare of the future wi11 be lika, and
to raiee the combat capaciry of the Army and Navy.
Our Party is making it poesible to furthar improve the homeland's defense
capability and to maintai.n the defenders of the world's firsC 5oviet
Natiou aC a nigh lavel of combat readiness as one of the main conditiona -
for accompliehing the taske involved in the building of communiem.
_ The soci+al.ist atata does not engage in predatory wars. All of the work
- performed by the Party to bui].d up the military and all of the Soviet
people's efforts to strengthen the fighting capacity of the Armed Forces
are based on concern for reliably protecting the great conquests of -
_ October. ~
We must not forget ehe fact that the forces of reaction and aggression
in the capitalist nations are continuing to hamper the process of detenCe,
atCempting to complicaCe the resolution of current international problema �
aad making an effort not only to preserve existing sourcea of tension,
but a18o to create new military conflicts.
Reactionary imper~aliat groups have not rejecCed their aggressive inteaCions:
They are continuing the arms race and stubbornly reaisting measures sitned
at achieving political and military dstente. They have not given up their
~fforts to retard the positive developments occurring in the world. It is
therefore more important than ever to maintain vigilance and be prepared
to repel them at any time.
True to the Leninist policy of strengthening friendship among nations, the
Soviet Union, closely united with the fraternal socialist nations,
ateadfastly puraues a foreign policy based on love for peace. Because
- of these efforts, the principles of peaceful coexistence and mutually
beneficial cooperation among nations with different social syatems are
becoming more and more solidly established on the planet, and the
achievement of international detente is progressing.
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At the ~ame Cime, the CommunieC P~Yty and the Soviet Government~ whil~
pur~uing a congierent and vigorous policy of peac~~ ~re devoting conetant
etCentton Co building up the nation's da~enae capebility gnd eCreng~hening
tha fight~ng capacity of the Arm~d ~orces.
The 3ovieC people, guided by the Communiet Pa~tiy~ have advanced consider~bly
in a~.l area~ of communiet cnnstruction since the war.
In the aviation~ these years have seen rapid technological progreas~ th~
achi~vem~nt af supergonic speede and unprecedented flight rangea and
altitudes. ~
All of the succeases achieved in the cre~tion and developa?ent of our
gviation, its combat glory and iCs p~esent invincible power, gr~ the
resulC o� the Communist Party's constant c~ncern for sCrengthening the
homeland and its Armad Forcea.
The tQChnical equipment of our aviation and the profeasional Craining
of the peraonnel are now on a level to meet the higheet requirements made
in this modem era.
The SovieC Military Tranoport Aviation is being improved by the day. -
Guided by the principlea of Soviet military doctrine and Soviet military
art, ~nd relying on experience acquired in exerciaes and in the daily
practi.cal work, personnel of the Military Tranaport Aviation are building
up the combat capabilities of the CransporC aviation.
' Ae a result of the 3oint work carried out by scientists and workers,
designers and fliers, aircraft of the Soviet Military Transport Aviation
can operate at high or low altitude3, deliver troops and combat equipment
over enormous distances and within a matter of hours and land airboxne
troops and weapons by parachute. The teams of experimental design
offices are ~aorking pereistently to improve the basic and most important
features of the aircraft: speed, altitude, range and economy. SovieG
military transparts are deaervedly considered to be among the best in
the world. The names of Soviet aircraft designers S. V. I1'yushin,
0. K. Antonov, G. V. Novozhilov, D. N. Kuznetsov, A. T. Ivchenko and
others are knowa far beyond the nation's borders.
The SovieC Military Transport Aviation is very atrong. Its large
capabilities stem from the broad range of tasks facing the Military -
Transport Aviation at the contemporary stage. The delivery of troops
and combat equipment and of every possible sort ~f cargo, landing them
- or dropping them by parachute, transport operations for the national
econoury and the rendering of assistance to victims of natural disasters--
this is far from a complete list of the missions which the Military
Traasport Aviatioa is capable of handling, as demonstrated by exercises.
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Nonerhele~e, cnneidering the cnmpiexiey di the inC~rn~tional eiCu~Ciori~
we mugC continue p~r~igtenrly Co perfect th~ ~ntire M31it~~y Ttign~pnrt
Aviation ey~tem Co improv~ the reli~billty of_aircra�C gnd 3ncreage Cheir
capab3liti~e.
A new generation of airmen i~ developing~ The Mi.li,tary T~~neport Aviation _
hg~ producad real experts in operarittg thg heavy turboprop aircr~fe and
performtng landing operationg~
UniCS of the Air Force Mili.taYy Trgnsp~rC AvigCion h~ve repeatedly recaived
- awards from the USSR Minietry of Defen$e and the Commander in Chie~ nf
the Air F~orce for their successful performance of misaione aeeigned Chem.
T'he great successee achieved by th~ Military Traneport Aviation would have
been impogsible without gnod cooperation and exceptional undQrsCanding
on the part of our comradea in armg--Che renowned flying infantry. Hero
of the Soviet Union Army General V. Margelov, commander in chief
of Airburne Troops, Lieutenant General P. F. Pavlenko, chief of etaff
of Airborne Troops, and Lieutenant General I. I. Bliznyuk, chief of the
political secCion~ have applied themselvea especially to the achievement
of successful ~oinC operations.
Uutatanding units of the Military Transport Aviation have been highly
commended for their achievements by the Communist Party and the 5oviet
Government. For their successes in combat and political training,
hundreda of pilats, navigatora, engineers and techniciana, airborne
gunners and radio operators have been awarded ordera and medals: The more
experienced aviation specialists have been awarded the honorary titles
"Diatinguished Military Pilot of the USSR," "Distinguished Military
Navigator of the USSR" and "Distinguished Radio Operator of the USSR."
Many unita of the Military Transport Aviation have been awarded
commemorative banners of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministere.
.The day-to-day valor of our military collectives is reflected in the good
results achieved in socialist competition for honorable fulfillment of
decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. In the 1977 aocialiat competition
ia honor of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist
Revolution and the 60th anniversary of the Armed Forces, more than
50 perc~nt of the subunits achieved the ranks of the excellent and 60
- percent of the personnel in units of the Military Transport Aviation
achieved the level of excelleace in combat and p~litical training.
Personnel of the Military Transport Aviation are deeply aware of the
noble and grand nature of the tasks assigned the Armed Forces of the USSR.
Real patriotism and loyalty to cou~unist ideals produce in the hearts of
the sirmen a love for their military profession, profound reapect for their
service and Cheir elected specialty, and a sense of great respoasibility
for the job of defending the Soviet homeland assigned them by the people.
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1~Olt O~1~YCYAL USL~ ONY.Y '
Ln eingl~ forn~Cion with al~ 9oviet people~ fighting men of tha Alr Fores
~,Litiary Tti~n~poxt Av3ation apply a].1 their e~rength and knowledge to
improving their combar training and tha~.r sk~.li in oparaCing the modern
a~rlation equipment. ~'hey are aYwaYe in ~~tate of tieadinees to per~orm
any task asei~ned th~m by eh~ homeland.
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~oo~ctox~s
1. "Pzogxamma Kommur?i~~icheakoy ~~x~i,i. Sovetekogo soxuxa" IProgzam o~ tha ,
conIInuniet Paxty of the 8ovi,et ~nl,on~, Moscnw~ ~.973, p ili.
Z. L. r. grezhn~v, "Velikiy Oktiyabr' i pzogxesg chelovechestva" tQrea~
Octdber end Hu~man Progreaejr MoaooW~ ~,977~ p 9.
3. KRASNAYA ZVE~DA, 21 Augus~ 1977.
4. M. N: Kozhevnikov, "Komandovaniye 3, shtab WS Sovetskoy Armi.i v Velikoy
Ot~chegtvenr?oy voyne 1991-1995"(Coa~and and 9taff of the 5ovieti Army
~ Air Force in the Great Pa~riotic War of 1941-1945), Mo~cow, 1977, p 81.
5. V. Lenin, "Poln.sobr. soch.n (Complete Collectied Works~, Vol 40,
pp 76-77.
6. V. K. Triandafillov, "1Qtar~lcter oper~t~iy sovremannykh arn~i.y'! (The Nature
of Operations Parforcnad by Modern Arn~iesa, Moscow, 1932, p 27.
7. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s'~yazdov, konferentsiy i plenumov
TsK" [Tha CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congressas, Conferences
and Plenums of the Central Committee], Vol 4, Moscow, 1970, p 282.
8. IbiB., pp 282-283.
9. I. i. Lisov~ "Desantniki" [The Paratroopers], Moscow, 1968, p 25.
10. "2storiya vtoroy mirovoy voyny" ~A History of World War iI~, Moscowj'
1973, p 299. .
11. I. I. Lisov and S. A. Rozhdestvenskiy, "Vozduahnyye desanty" [Airborne
Landinq Operations~. Moscaw, 1959~� p 11. ~ -
12. "Sov~etskiye Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne
1941-1945'~ (The Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945],
Moscow, 1968, p 23.
13. G. Feuchter~ "Istoriya vozdushnox voyny v yeye proshlom, nastoyashchem
3. budushchem" [Past, Pzesent and Fukure Hi,stoxy of Aerial Warfare],
Moscaw, 1956, p 161.
14. NEW YORK TIMES, 19 Max 1,940.
15. A. N. Lapchinskiy, "Vozdushnaxa axmi,ya" [The Air ArmX], Moscow~ 1939, p 157.
16. "Polevoy ustav Krasnoy Armt~. 1940 g." [Field Service Regulations of the
Red Army], Moscow~ 1940, p 20.
- 17. TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], fund 53 BAD, inven-
tory 1, file 10, sheet 65i fund 1 BAP, inventory 536233, file 3, sheet 13.
� � 173
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18. TeAMO~ fund 53 HAU, inventoxX ~3,~,~ ]~5, ~heet 10.
1g. "Fi.na],. I~toziko-memuarn~ ocherk o xazgxome imperialisticheakoy Xaponii"
[7'he` ~i,n,ale:' An Au~obi,ograQhica]. Accoun~ of tihe Defeat of I~erialist
- Jdp~t]. editad by Maxeha], o~E ~he Soviet Union R. Xa. Malinovakiy~ Moscow,
1966, p 331.
20. A. G. F'edorov, "Aviatsiya v bitve pod Moskvoy" [Aviation in the Battle
of Moscow~, Moscawr 197'S, pp 260-263.
21. I. I. Lisov~ "Desantniki~" p 114. ,
22. V. I. I,enin, "Poln. sobr. soch.'~" Vo]. 44, p 205.
23. TsAMO, �und VDV, inventory 301229, file 2, sheet 37.
- 24. S. M. Shtemenko, "General'nyy shtab v gody voyny" [~e General Staff
During the War], Moscow, 1975, p 250.
25. PRAVDA, 30 November 1943.
26. �Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945"
n;iistory of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945 ,
� Vol 2, Moscow~ 1961, pp 236-239. .
27. Archives of the Main Civil Air Fleet Directorate, fund 17, inventory
17, file 359, sheet 134. -
28. "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945," Vol
4, Moscow, 1962, p 316. ~
29. TsAMO, fund 19, inventory 11539, file 57, sheet 58.
30. OGONEK, No 36, 1~74.
31. "Sovetskiye Voy~enno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne
' 1941-1945," p 444.
32. TsAMO, fund 2 ADON, inventory l, fi,le 10, sheet 30.
33. TsAMO, fund 2 ADON, inventoiy l~ �ile 8, sheet 14.
3q. ~Nepokorennyy Leningrad. Kratkix ocherk istorii goroda v period Veli,koy
Otechestvennoy voyny" [Unconquered Leningrad: A Brief Account of the
City's Histozy Durinq the Great ~atx~.oti,c War]. 2d edition, Leningrad,
1974, p 161.
35. D. M. Geyvin, "Vozdushno-desantnaya voyna" [paratroop Warfare], Moscow,
1957, p 13.
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36. �Matezialx XX~V s"yezda KPSS" [Ma~e~ial,s o~ tha 24~he CPSU Congzeas,
Moscowr ~.972, ~ 81. ,
_ 37. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 8 Julx ~.976. '
38. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. eoch,. Vo~, p 8].. _
END
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M~rs{~al of the Soyiet Union M. N. Tukhachevskiy
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P. I. Grokhovskiy, chief of the Special Design Office of the Workers' and
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Lieutenant General I. I. Lisov, deputy commander of Airborn Troops, 1971
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Chief Marshal of Aviation A.�Ye. Golovanov, Commander of the Lvng-Range
Aviation, 1944
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Lieutenant General of Aviation K. N. Smirnov, commander of Airbori:e and
Transport Aviation 1946
178
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Marshal of Aviation N. S. Skripko .
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Command of the 2ud Special Purpose Air Division (V.G. Grachev ie in the
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Hero of the Soviet Union; Lieutenant Colonel I.D. Kozlov, 1945
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