JPRS ID: 8535 TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100060046-4
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 46
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPR5 L/8535
22 June ~9 79
TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUR~PE
(FOUO 39/79) ~ ~ ~
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
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~
NO~C
Jp~5 public~Cinn~ coneain infdrm~Cion prim~rily from �~r~ign
new~pap~rg, pcriddicalg ~nd bnoks, bue ~lg~ from n~wg agency
er~nsmigsions nnd brogdc~sCs. Mgeeri~ls �rnm fdreign-L~ngu~ge
source~ ~re erangl~eed; ehose �rom ~nglish-lnngu~ge sourceg
are Cranscribed dr r~prineed, wieh the original phrAaing end
other ch~rncCeriseics reCained,
Headlin~s, edieorial repnrCs, and mae~rial ~nclo~~d in br~ckeCg
(J are suppli~d by JpR5, procesging indictttors $uch as [T~xt~
or (CxcerpeJ in Che fireC line of e~ch ieem, or following Che
lase line of n brief, indicAte how ehe original itt�ormation was
processed. Wher~ no processing indicaCOr is given, Che infor-
m~tion was summarized nr extracCed,
UnfAmiliar n~mes rendered phonerically or eransliCerated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words nr names preceded by a ques-
rion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
- originnl buC have been supplied as appropriate in conCext.
Other unattributed parentherical noCes within the body of an _
item originaCe with Che source~ Times within items~are as
given by source.
T'he conCents of th is publication in no way represent Che poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. GovernmenC.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND RE~3UI.ATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
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rOR OFT~'ICT11L US~ ON1'~Y
~ ~PRS T,/a535 -
22 Juno ~.979
TRANSLAI'IUNS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 39/79~
CONTENTS PACE ~
a
COUNTRY SECTION
- INT~ItNATIONAL AFFAIRS .
Inveatigation of Red Brigades' Ynternational Ties Continues
(Varioua sources, various dates)............~........... 1
PCF Protests French Involvement, by Michel Na4dy
Reputed Headquartera in Paris, by Paolo Graldi
RelAtionship With 'Autonomy' Organizations, by Antonio
I~'errari
Details of Soviet Weapons, by Gianfranco 5imone
FRANCF
Genesis of 'New Artillery' Diacuesed
(Andre Faverdin; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, May 79).......... 10 -
Navy's Technical Inspection Procedures Outlined
(Maurice Sabatier; ARMEES D'AUJ4U~'?J'HUI, May 79)........ 15 .
Mediterranean Air Defense Factors Discusaed -
(Francois Vallat; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, May %9)......... 2Q -
Reflections on Implementati~n of Soviet-Style Socialiam
(Francis Cohen; LA NOWELLE CRITIQUE, Apr 79;........... 25 -
Chirac Interviewed on Economy's Future -
~Jacques Chirac Interview; LE NOINEL OBSERVATEUR~ -
17 May 79) 28
Briefs -
PLO Terrorism in France 34
-a- [III - WE - 150 FOUO] ~
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CONT~NTS (Cnntinued) pggg ~
?.'CAI~Y
Armed ~orneg Operational Requirements b~gcussed
(~'~brixio Carte; CORRIERE D~LLA SERA, 16 MF?y 79)........ 35
SPAIN
IndusCry Min~ater InCerviewed, Backgroun~d Given
(Carlog Iiuatelo 'Lnx~rview; CAMBI~ ~.6, 27 May 79)........ 38
i:conomy Minister's Background Discussed ~
(CAMSIO 16, 29 Apr 79) 45
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COUNTRY SECTION IN~ERNATIONAL A~FAIRS
INVESTIGATION OF RED BRIGADES' INTERNATIONAL TIES CQNTINUES
� PCF Proteata French Involvement
Paris L'HUMANITE in I~'rench 25 Apr 79 p k ~
[ArCicle by Michel Naudy: "Were the French SecreC Services in Control of
the Red Brigades and Cheir Opposite Numbera in Parie?")
[Text] On Che evening of 23 April, in Paris, 1,500 "autonomous Communiats"
held a meeting in the Mutualite. With the greateat compoaure�and with the
explicit inapiration of the aituation in Italy, a part of. them announced
their intention of reconaidering on 1 May the attempt to violently,interfere
_ with the march on Paris organized lasC 23 March by the CGT [General Federaicion
of Labor]. On 24 April, the Italian paper CORRIFRE DELLA SERA publiahed
revelations by an Italian secret agent according to whom the French and
Italian autonomous groupa are maintaining cloae relationa with the French
secret services and are controlled by them. Are all the elementa of a new
police provocation organized by Minister Bonnet already in place?
"Is 1 May better than 23 Maxch?" This ia considered, also whether Bauveau
Square is better than the Mutualite and, with a great degree of harnwny,
that certain specialists in street action frequent the two places in equal
numbers.
The Molotov cocktail, the iron club aad the incendiary bottle, which served
at the time of the march on Paris by the steelworkere, were at the center =
of the discussions concerning the coordination of the autonomous groups in
Paris on Mondaq evening. There were no police. Or else they were very
, discreet, dresaec! in plaia clothea or more likely in the gaxb nf sutonomous
Communists.
It is that in recent times ~eans and scarves are a un~~orn? for the men of
the Ministry of the Interior. The proo~ accumulated by the CGT on 24 April
leaves hardly any doubt. On the pretext of gathering information and i8_
suing su~anonses it was in fact in throwing stones and gasoline bottles
that certain police of�icera engaged. On command, of course.
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The decision tiakeil in the Council o~ Ministere to 1im~.C the demonstration~
rn the periphcry of the crowdg having been given ampl~ time, 23 March not
h~ving bean ag "decisive" ae might have been hoped, i~ was thought ChaC Chey
mighe do a better ~ob duri.ng Che Labor Day �eativiC~.es.
i=
~
mhe ~iutonomous CommunieCs made that a~atemenC. Or somebody had them make it.
Moaduy howev~r wag even more disturbing: at the time of hearing rhe appeal
of anarchista placed under preve::~ive arrest during the demonstiration of
23 April, the Ateorney General utCered this threat: "Think thaC 1 May ie
~ coming soun. Think a~ the same time of what has happened 3n Italy," he urged
the ~udges.
Chance seems ta have had little opportiunity here. Thia is borne out by the _
fact Chat yea~erday it was learned from Italian sources that all this little
group had been watched, documented, and claesified �or weeke. ~
In iCs edition for 24 April, the Milan daily in fact r~ported the confeasion
of a member of the Italian secret services (SISDE [expansion unknown]), whase
gist, if it were confirmed, would not fail to thicken the voluminous files
on the penetration of terroriat groups through of�icial educational or~,ani~
zations. -
Fnr about one year, and according to the newspaper REPUBLICA, already at the
time of Aldo Moro's kidnapping the leaders of the "Red Brigades" had probably
met reg�larly in Paris~ Thus, they had probably met aeveral timea in a ~
brewery or in a language school, "a kind of institute for the promotion of
culture." ~
The CORRIERE DELLA SERA explains specifically that "they diacussed heatedly
f.or hours. Then they remained in contact by telephone, apeaking without
precaution. They did not imagine that the French secret servicea were lis-
tening to them and were not losing a single one of their worda."
Beyond the activities proper to t~e "Red Brigades," the Foreign Intelligence
and Counterintelligence Service [FDECE] would have been busy with the relaKions
between the French Red Brigades and their oppoaite numbers in Italy. Thus
the FDECE would have collected many docwnents, "dozens and dozena of magnetic
tapes," and transmiCted the file to the Italian secret aervices.
The collaboration between the several secret aervices would have been sa
great Chat for several weeks Italian, Belgian and British agents operated
on French soil and did so in close aollaboration with the FDECE.
The French base of the terrorism and o~ "autonomy" would have been exploited
for several months following the revelations o~ a~ormer terr~xist to a
Padua magistrate. This information would have led to the arreat of political
science profe~sor Antonio Negri, a theoretician af the Italian ultra-left
�~hose many trips to Paris in Che course of recent years (he has taught in
the Higher Normal School on Ulm Street and in several Paris universities)
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would have covexed terroriae activities. I~ it ~te �AceseaXy to handle thia
bulk o.E repoxta winc ~are, the most diveree rumor.~ on thie sub~ect are
circulaC~ng in the Italian capital. The conerc;:l of Che "autonomous Communiats"
by the French secret aexvicee would only cor.firm the atrange man~.pulatione
, in which Mr BonneC's aervices are engaged. Documented, c,baerved, even
regteCered, thoae whoae raiae the breaking and enCry of department stoxea and
_ individual vengeance to the rank of intrinsically revalueionary acte aeem
- lesa sutonomous than ever.
There is furthermore more than a nacae in common between the liCtle groups
. acting in saveral European countries. Between the assassination of mili~ant
workers in Italy and the slogans shouted on 23 March according to which it
was necessary Co "smash L'HUMANITE," there is a dif~erence in degree, a
- difteren~e in organization, but no difference in kind.
The goal is identical, the words are identical and the methods have a tendency
to draw togeth~r: to weaken the workera' movement, to make the represeive
- ursenal of the atate come down on it, to interdict change even in the name
of change, to perpetuate capitalism and ita regime. Mr Bonnet ia in agree-
menC with all of that and the Italian "model" has not failed, during recent
yeara, to inapire in him some reflectiona on the art and the manner of
bringing the old recipes for manipulating beliefa up to date.
~
The groupe of the left have been passed byl The anarchist organizations ~
are rancid! The old plans of the leftist doctrinary anti-Conm~uniam have
been reformed! They work very well from Cime to time, but "autonomy,"
for the very reason of ite radical marginalism, is much more comfortable.
' The claimed abaence of any kinc~ of organization, praise for the apontaneous
and individual act, the copying of fascist practices, all of this moving
in a diffuse ideology o� killing the revalutionary ideal, is a field of
action bleased by Mr Bonnet's specialists.
It is not a question here of ordinary violence. It is a controlled action,
decided dn, applied where necessary and when necessary. It is a class
violence which exchanges according to circumstances the helmet of the
mobile guard for that o� the marginal element, paid or not.
The responsibility of the minister of the interior who has, furthermore,
not always given the lie to reports Prom the Italian preas, is direct. He
must resign. The Communists, while they demand hia dismissal and also the
constitution of a commission of inquiry and the punishment of the guilty
people, are simply caxrying out a task of cleansing. And it is not among
them that it will be necessary to seek the smallest degxee o.f satis~action.
12116
CSO: 3100
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Iteputed Ileudquiirtorti i.n i~nris
Mi I;iii Cclltltlliltl; I~IiI,L~ 51;It~ in Ital~inn 24 ~pr 79 1
~i~rticl~ I~y I~~iolo Gr~~ldi: ~~~Accordin~ to the Secret Scrvices, the nea ~ri~ua~5~
Il~,idqu,irte~~s Wcre in Puris'; ~ startling revel~tion ~bout thc ~udiciul inque5fi
into rho ~~ntitcrrorist 'Ulitz!"~
~'I'ext ~ A m~n who i~sed to he a wnrker, Ited l3rigudesman and nCI mi 1 itnnt is su id
ta hr~vc ~iven Judge C.ilogoro information revealing the internationul links of ~
the "~I r~~l;i~iccihl~ huilrt,
'!'lic~ ~nrtrtcl~;r wLi~;hy Ici.:~ ~;rEimy in u11 r~nci 1:~ ~tA mm lr~n~;; Ic w;i~ clcsi~;ncJ i~~
1!~~i~ ;in~l ir~:+pircxl hy thc 7,J2 M~~u;~cr Kur~ dc~vr.inpad by the Grrm7ns tdr thcir
5turm~ewchr Stu. 4d tittr+.~k riflc, whirh dcrlvrd frnin the nlcl 7.h2 61s~us~r,
7`hc Germ,hn:: hnd ~nuncl c~ut thnt n~artri~igc with ~~a~in~ Inngcr thnn 50 mm
~ w,~~ u:~~1~s~ Clthcr brc7usc mnJ~rn powder~ giv~ mor~ tit~ru~t wlth llnlf the
vc~lumc or ~CCUUSC It w~~y dts~nvcred rh~t n ri~l~ cnrrying mnr~ tht~n 1,30U _
mctcr:~ wn~ r~rcly us~d. ~:dnsequcntly, ldgistie~l :.~dvt~n*a~~s accrucd frnm
rcuu~lnk thc len~;th Uf th~ cnsing tn 33 mm.
~1 nonc:~~mmt;;sinn~~ t,ink corp~ officCr ~~t nn in5pirntion fr~m thc 5turmgcwehr
;u~~l wii~ .iccar~it~d tiri th the Ordcr u~ the ~Cd Star. Mikhuil K~lnshnikov b~};iin
' r.~~ ~c:~i~;n w~7pdns ;is he wti5 c:nnv~lescing from scrious wounds inftiCtcd in
thc b;ittl~ oi` tiri.in~k. llls c~ss~ult rifl~, the AK-47 (Avtdm~t h~l~shniknv,
1~1~t7), ~v,iy cidopteJ by the 5oviet ~rmy in 1J51, it wefghti S,lz7 k~ with .i
t'ul 1, ~U-r~~.ind, curvecl m.~gazinc, It has ~ bnrr~l4l.d Cm Ic~ng nnd n tiot~~i l~n~;th
of ;~c~,8 cm~ 'i'hc throreticul ratc nf fire is 600 rounds t~ minuta; its efr'ectivc
r,~n~;c is :~ncl mctcrs nn automc~tic and 400 met~rs ~n s~midatitom~iti~.
,1 vct�sion ~~ith c~ foldin~; mct~tl stnCk (thC AKP.t) w,7s ~doptcd in 1JSJ ;~ncl h.~s
repl;i~ccl the wood~n-~tn~k AK.
~\cc:ur~in~; to w~tnCSSes, this is thr one t~sed at thc pinzzri Nicosia the d~ty .
bc~orr yc:~tcrday. 'i'his is rrediblc, for it w~i~hs 1.2 kg less and Cnn br
rrdu~c~l tn 70 cm in len~th.
'1'he K;~i,nshnikdv is consicicred the best ~~ssnult rifle in thc world, so much
~o th:~t ev~n Am~ri~~ns in Victn~m used it in place of thrir ~1-IG. The cnrtridgr
~ecros somewh:it obsolescent, and the itussians are said to w,7nt to repi~~ce i t wi th
~~ne oF the sm:~ll~st calibers (4.8), according to Nestern practice. This wouid
crratc lot of problems, because the 7.62 mm Kalashnikov ha's been pr~Juced hy
the tens of millions at least in the US5R, Chinaj GDR, Poland~ Flungary, Czecho-
~lov;~ki7, Ciulgaria, komani~, North Knrea, Yugosl~vi7 and rinl~nnd (whi~h c:xr~rts
them ta AmCric~), and thcy s~re spread throughout Asia (inrludiNb !srael), in
thc 1~r:~b St;~tes, and in some African n~tions, e.g. Tanz~nia, Uganda, I:thiopi.7, ~
Som:ili7, ;~nd the former nortuguese colonies.
'I~his is thc first timc thut arms recently arrived from ~broad have bcen U5CC~
I~y tl~e (ted Brigades, exccpt for the I~ungarian Tokagypt pistols that haJ becn
rcronJitinned ancl given a. new n~me (f~irebird) in IVest Cermany; these werc founJ
in the Alunni hideout in thc Via Negroli. The Ited Brigndes hud been armin~;
themsclves mostly with h'IVI1 weapons that werr stolcn from ~rmy posts, policr-
men, and armories and obtained with falsc documents.
Onc c:in only speculate about who supplied the Kal7shnikovs, but thc source is
rrot~ably n non-~uropean Mediterrancan country.
COt~Y(ti(~IIT: 1979 EJitoriale del "Corriere delta Ser~" s. a. s.
:3782
C50: 3104
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� FRANCE
r
GENE525 0~ 'NEW ARTILLERY' DISCU33ED
~~rig AEtM~~5 D'AUJOUItD'HUI in ~rench Mgy 79 pp 74-75
[Ar~ic1Q by Gen Andre ~~verdin, commgnding officer of the let Army Cdrpg
Arrillery~
~Textj In Che beginning, there wgs the programming 1ga, with~ at irs
gide, th~ new organization of the army~
It wng the intention of the law and rh~ new organization for our me~or
units to be mobile and multipurpoee. While achieving a better balance of
their mean~ of combat, iC Was aleo necessary Co avoid overloading them.
These were the considerationa that served as a basis for the new divisional
chart~ and the creation, aithin the lst Army Corpa, of four armored divi-
~ions (DB) capable of waging vigoroua battle for a certain length of Cime -
as part oE the army corpe. -
Once the divisional model�had been drawn up, it became neceseary to make
available Eo the army corpa commander the organic elements enabling him,
while carrying out the tactical maneuvera of the ma~or interaervice units,
to concentrate hia effortg and react rapidly in the face of an unexpected
thrent. Such organic army Cv''pg elements (EOCA) already exigted, but the
exisrence oE neW structurea, on the one hand, and the disappearance of
organic divisional elements, on the or,her hand, lead to a canplete rethinking
oE their compoaition.
~irst Uay
On the firet day of creation, to apeak only about the army artillery corps
(ACA) and thereby keep to our sub~ect, the units that aere alxegdy part of
it Were revieaed.
Since decigions concerning their use Were made at the highest level and
since the coordination of their fire posaer Was the task of the Army, it
was not Without some uneasiness ~hat the Pluton Regimenta were preaented.
Actually, set up to increase l~y virtue of their preeence alongside the
conventional fnrces their dise~uasive aignifirance and their ability to
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~Ott O~~ICtAL t15~ t~N1~Y ;
- wnge bnCCl~~ they were'quiee ~e home in eh~ ~rmy corp~, the 1eve1 0� eheir
' ap~~liruCinn.
fn th~ ?~r~~~ n~ nn en~n~~mene, ~{je N~wk-Ilip is~qiment wo~ld nl~n b~ ehe pub- i
. ~~rt ~~t ~~c~~~rclfn~~tlc~n maii~ure~ ~n ehe pnre df Che Army, but ir w~~ the key ;
ta ti~c ~~rmy c:hrp~' ~urEnce-en-ai.r defe~e~, it~ ~eployment ea~ily found a
p1~ti~e in ~he rear zone df rh~ corps ~nd it~ reduced mobiliey fie in qnite
well wieh Che ~peed of mdvemen~ of th~e zon~. Iti th~refore continued to
belong tn Ch~ ACA. ~
i
~'inally, th~ pla~e of Che objective achievemene regiment (~AO) was confirmed. !
~quipped with ~20 mi~~il~~ h~vin~ ~ r~ng~ ~f 150 kilnmetere, its pecullar ~
n~ture and br~~dne~~ of outlaok were in keeping wiCh the army corpe~ ;
Secdnd Uay � i-
. ;
Thc gp~oe?d d~y w~~ devoCed to ~n examination of Che new cgndid~ciea: the ~
Ftol~nd gurft~ee-tn-nir grtillery regimentg ~nd conventional surface-Co-
surfac~ artillery regimenCa.
The ttoland regiments did not fail to emphesize th~at they had bEen preferred ,
to other ccmpetitors not without merit preciaely because they were capable
of w~ging g surface-tio-air defense aC the maneuvering apeed of the armored
divisions. Moreover, the first tactical testa demonstrated their ability
td deEend the forward zone of the army corps. Should one then not go bnck
over tre division~l chnrts and include them? 9ut the army corp~ aleo hed
it~ own needg: special defenses for eengitive zones and complementing the ~
Nawk. '~las one then to set up two types of diviaional and atmy corpe regi- ;
ments that would necessarily have different atructures? Such a solution
would go against cuts recommended by law, particularly regarding personnel. _
The decision Was therefore mr.de to include the Roland regimenta in the attny
corps ~rtillery, a,decision that preserved the maximun~ number of poaeibili-
ties: centraliaation, adaptation, complementary nature and effort, ahile
remaining withie the budget.
Wedne~day Co Frid~y
The fnte of the conventional surface-to-surface artillery was the gubject of
hented discussions lasting several dayn.
There were those who Wanted more artillery in the diviaions: two regiments
instead of one and nothing in the army corps. Without seying so, they were
limiting the role ~f the conventional artillery to direct support for inter-
scrvtce groupings, and the delay of the 155 AU F1 materiel temporarily
for[ified their arguments. -
Others thought of using all the possibilities of the artillery in order to
get up a~d lead a maneuver. They recalled the need for in-depth action,
the effectiveness of massive, brutal concentrationa and the artillery's
ability to modify its point of application rapidly. They pleaded for a
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digCributinn df ~rtillery formaCidng beeween rhe twd hierarchic~l level~:
nrmy Cc~rp~ ~nd divigion. ~n ehig wny, there would be me~n~ fdr direcr
~uppnrC, mnre gpeci~.1 mean~ orieneer? toward in-daprh action, end in ~ddi-
ti~�~n, th~ ability tn cancentr~te the maximum fire pnwer wh~thar belonging
Ca aitlier level, an Che condittdn'ehnk Che higher level be ~ndawed with Ch~~
- ~~rc~per me~n~ eE command.
~h~y w~re vpry ~w~re o~ the f~rt ehat for ~ever~l yenre to come, the prin-
ciple~ dE ~~e ~hduld egke into gccdunt the modeee ~cope and pcwer of the
whup~ng ~f Che ~rmy corpe regiment~, which reduced the po~gibilieies of
~~r.tinn oE rhe greillery on Che whnle. Nevertheless, Chey wished to eet up
tt~~ y~ructure~ fnr the future ge ~oon ag pog~ible:
~nr th~ time being, they would make it posaible, if need be, to bring in
gener~l regerve regiment~ and wi~chin ehe fr~mework nf the Allian~e, gather
up ~lli~d me~ng. ~
~nr ehe near f~lCura, they would be ready to t~ke in rndar tracking devices
. nnd multiple rocket launcher (L~ht) unit~.
5ixth bay .
bn the gixth day of creation; the exister.ce of the army corpa aurface-to-
gurEace artillery regiments was confirmed and a command aquadron was set up
m~king it poseible to bring in~o play the nuclear.and conventional aurface-
to-~ir and surfaee-to-surface firepoaer and meang for the achievement af
~b~ective~. The urmy corpa artillery had found itg etructures. In the
lgt Army Corps, it included a'command equadrnn forming a corpa, atpengthened
by a(r~dar) batCery for the achievement of ob~ectives and an NBC [expansion
- unknownJ battery, three Pluton nu~lear regiments, a Hawk-Hip regiment, two
Rol~nd surface-to-air regiments, an R20 objecCive achievemenC regiment, and
three conventional surface-to-surface regimenfe with 105's and 1S5'e.
Sund~y oE SatiafacCion
f~ending over their work on the eeventh dny, the iaw and the new organization
Eound that the demarcation between the divisions and organic elements wae
good and that the army corpa had the elements it needed and they Were
~utisfied.
While an unseasoned observer might view the army corps ae a heavy collection
of unconnected units, a more attentive examinatior.? showa that it is a co-
herent whole with the minimum meana indispensable for the army's information
and fire poWer needs.
My brother nrtillerymen, unity is in the mind. That ia a gr~at deal, but
it would be insufficient if there were not unity in miasion also. In thE
face of an enemy with air and groun~l power, the entire army corps artillery
has the same goal: to'destroy enemy means (particularly his fire power),
prevent or hinder action and intervene effectively in maneuvers so as to
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i
brenk Che bAlUnce locnlly eo Che benefir of the eupported forcea~ 'fhig ia
the ~;ar~.t nf ~11 meang Edr qchieving objective~ through fire power. Since.
m;ineuv~ry ~rc ~~ordinr~ted, thE army CO'Cj1A grtillery g1~o Eind~ it~ unity
!n ehe fippli~t~rion nE t~cCical nucle~r weapon~~ p~rricipating in the safeCy '
o[ th~ir deplnymene nnd the digcov~ry and foll~wup nf ob~ective~~ helping, !
wl~cn Che use df nucle~r �ire power ie decided upon, Co mginCain Che coherence i
nf rhe urrxngemene in the instgnt~ preceding the strike and to carry out
nceinn imm~dige~ly following. !
~
~
~ cl ~ 08GA~lIG8A~~1MF SI61PlIfiE DE l'ACA 1f !
xxx x x
1' C,A. ACA/1 39'EACA ~SUPPORT ACA ~
;
' ~ . i
. ~
X x ~ NUCLEAIR~ ~
~O ~ PLUTON , ~
, ~
t 4
( ) ?
~ ~ SOL.AIR ~
, O NAWK ROLAND !
~
. (6)
C5, 1551t 1 RAO
. ACQUISITION
rigim~nts orgoniqws da~ D.B.
� ~ ~
SOL.SOL ~
O � � CLASSInUE ;
~ ~
1b5 (2) 155 I2)
155 ( 3!
~8 wNt1~ ~'n~ut�N 1~ (11.tiS AU I1.1fS ~~nd~nt risd~ v~nutew~ ~
LJ o~p?n~qw~ 10.~. eu ACA) N ~
11 ~:?.ns ~u r+_ ros ~u w� ~
~n1~~~ ~h~eon~nt 12 (71.1~i tr~s~1. tSS ~i i0 "
~9 (N~NM~ an~rd~d ,
~
~
]
[Key on following page] ~
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,
_ Key:
_ 1. Simplified Chart of the leC Army Arrillery Corpe
2. lst Army Corpa
~ 3. ~OCA n organic army corps elemenCe~ ' `
4. Surfaca-Co-air
S. Organic regimenCs of the armored divieione (D$)
6. Aehievement ~of nb~ectives)
7. Conventinnal gurface-to-surface ~
8. Organic artillery unite (DB or ACA) ~ ~
9. Reinforcement unite (genergl r~serves) .
~ 10. 155 AU Fl, 155 F3 for a tranaitional petiiod
11. 155 AU F1, 105 AU 50 for a transitional period
12. Tr~cCor-drawn 155, 155 BF 50 for a Cr~neitional period
~'gr fram being too large of an ansemble one hae but to note the volume of
Eirc~ power of the moeC modern armies the army corps artillery providea the
~rmy with a berCer balance between the different farces, ae the law intended.
i3iographical xnformaCion
Gen Andre Faverdin apent a tour of duty in the Far East before serving.as
an instructor at Che Artillery School. After aCtending the St~ff School,
he coromanded a battery in Algeria,~then obtained the technical diploma
and was in the 79th clase of the Armed Forcea War College. He headed the
60t1? Artillery Regiment and,then served as director of Che Cenfer of
Tactical 5tudies and Artillery Testing. Aseign~d in 1973 to the Genernl
Sectet~riat of the Office of President of the Republic, he Was promoted
to the rank of general in 1976. Since that time, he has BArved ae the _
commanding officer of the artillery of the lat Army Corpa in Metz.
COPYItICNT: 1979 - Revue des forces armees francaisea "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"
11,464
CSO: 3100
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~
NAVY'S TECHNICAL INSPECTION PItOCEDURES OU'~LINED
Paria A1tMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French May 79 pp 24-25
[Article by Vice Admiral Maurice Sabatier*: "InspecCio~n of Naval Equipmenti")
[TexC~ Within the Ministry of Defense inspectiona conducted by the high
auehorities (minister~ chief of ataff, DGA) represent means for cantrol and
reaction atructurea which inCervene neither in decieian-making or execution
processes.
Yn all armiea inspection functiona operate on two levels: general in-
spection whose range of competence covera all activitiee of the armed forces,
under the ~urisdicCion of the minister, and so-called technical inepectiona
covering excluaively a well-defined part of the activities of eaid army, ~
under the ~urisdicCion of ite chief of staff. The naval equipment inepection
belongs to the latter category.
The naval equipment inspector, a general officer in the technical branch
of the naval officer corps is the direct heir of the inapect~or general ,
mechanic, one of the f ive technical inspectora whoae poeition had been
created by the 1909 decree in connection with the administration of the navy,
operating directly under the minister's ordera. The 1927 reorganization of � � ;
the navy retained�the function but changed the holder's title to inspector ~ a
general of n~achines. His direct subordination to the minister of the navy +
(at that time Georges Leyguea) was confirmed. , ;
i
The situation remained unchanged until 1961. That year the decree estab- ~
lishing the responsibilities of the inspector general of th~ navy placed
under the orders of the latter, ~imself under the ordere of the miniater,
. ~
*Enrolled at the Marine Engineers' School in 1941, Vice Adm Maurice Sabatier
is currently naval equipment inspe~tor. Very early in his career he apecial-
ized in naval aeronautics. He saw service in many unita at home and overseas.
In 1958 he graduated from the Navy War College. His last positione were ma~or 'i
general of the port of Toulon (1974-1975) and deputy chief of atafP for
_ logistics of Naval Headquarters (1976-1977). . ~
, ~
. . ~
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~
Che four Cechnical inepeCtore among whom we ~~.nd our old inspecCor~ thie
etme with th~ ~itie of rechniCnl ~.nepector fnr machine~, a tie].~ which wa~
~hunged ~r eh~ beginning of 1971 to technicai inepec~or Por n~vy equipment.
It w~s al~o 3n 1971 eh~t AnoCher change was m~de in the ~tatug oP Gechnical
in~peceors. In fac~, Che 10 D~cember decree which esCeblished the du~ies of ~
ehe chief~ of gen~ral eraFf in peaceCime, subordinaeed these varioue in-
~pectors to the chief of general etaff of their respecCive eervice. Finally,
the lagt mutaeion o� thie ingpector we have followed over a period of 70
yeare was the following: by order dated 8 February 1977 on the sub~ecC of
in~pectors subordinated to the chief of general ataff of the navy he re-
J ceived his currenC title of naval equipment inapecCor.
Duties and Tasks
However, there was ~ development which effected ue most cloeely: ehe one
which took plnce wiehin Che field of action of thie inapector, concreCized
in 1971 by replacir..g in his title the word "machines" with Che word "naval
equipment." Thia was an imporCant nuance for, henceforth, it was no longer
in charge exclueively of equipment relaCed to the propulaion of the veseels
but of the overall equipment aboard the vesaels, i.e., of installation of
transmission, detection, or navigaCion facilitiea as well ae facilities for
the generation of energy or~ specifically, propulaion.
Within thia physically clearly demarcated demain, activities related to
navnl equipment inspection, defined as a body for inepection~ atudy, and
information, covera essentially the following areas:
Organization and functioning of the maintenance and operation of nava].
equipment; professional qualification and utilization of military technical
personnel;
Adaptation of personnels and maintenance facilities for naval equipment to
requirements.
Each year the chief of general staff of the navy establishes one or several
study topics on which will be focused the inspectiona conducted by the
inspecting admiral during that same year both in the ports of the home
country as well as the bases or units located overaeas. It has been
equally stipulated that, with the approval of the navy chief of staff, the
navy equipment inspector may be aeked by the inapector general of the navy
to conduct aertain speaific inspections.
Tollowing are examples of some such studies conducted in recent years:
T'he "energy-propulsion" installations of the Suffren and Duquesne frigates; -
Ceneral condition of the destroyer escorts Le Brestois and Le Lorrain
(requested by the insper_tor general of the navy); -
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Improving the gatihering of technical in�oru~t~.on supplied by the vessels; !
Org~niznCion of th~ support of the Eorceg in Papeete and Mururoa; ~ ,
i
Condie~ion of ehe f1eeC e~cort ahips refitted for anCi-~ubmarine warPare, and i
provid~n~ ~n estimate of eheir foreseeable lifeepan;
Organixat3on of logistic support of. forcea deployed in Che xone of the i
Indian Oce~n; ~
Competence and rraining of the peraonnel in charge of boilers. ~
;1-
InspecCions and lteports
In order to put together the neceseary data for auch aCudies, the admiral '
inspector wiCb hia eCaff consisCing of two superior ad~utants, one of whom ~
is 1.icensed as a nuclear acientist, vieits the porta where he holde meetings
in ~he courae of which he t~ae talks with the local authorities interested
in the sub~ecti: mg~or general, force commander, or co~nandera of ahipa or -
ground uniCs (military shopa, specifically), military achool principals, arms ,
engineers in charge of repairg, etc. He completes his information aCUdy by '
going aboardship or visiting the involved unita where he talks to officers !
or petty officers in charge of the operarion and maintenance of the materiel,
as well as for purposes of aeeing for himself the general status of the ;
materiel. Finally, same docwaents may be requeated from navy headquartere,
such as technical descriptions, and of conunand reports, inveatigation
reports, reports on maintenance coets, etc. The reporta drafted as a result ~
of such inapectiona are aubmitted to the navy chief of general staff with a
copy ta the inapector general of the navy for information purpoaes.
Inspection of Nuclear Safety Measures ~
Beginning with 1970 the tdinister of defense has assigned to the navy equipN ~
ment inspector Che task of checking, under the authority of the nuclear
armaments inspector, Che implemenCation of nuclear safety measures applied
in naval nuclear installations: nuclear powered ships and ships capable of
bearing atomic weapons, operational bases (~ointly wiCh the inapector from ~
the General Armaments Commission for installations handled by the peraonnel '
of the Naval Construction~Technical Directorate), militazy units in charge i
of nuclear safety in the ports, and military units ~perating ionizing radiation l
sources. ,
~ ;
In order to carry out this assignment, the na ~
vy equipment inspector checks ~
on-site the nuclear training of the operafional and ngintenance peraonnel, ;
the strict obse;:vance of the operational rules lormulated by the mixed army-
AEC~nuclear eafety commisaion (general regulations, safety reports, guidelines, ~
and lists of operations the updating of such documents, procedurea
of personnel radiological observation, and the execution of security exercisea. i
4
(
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Thc 1n~pection report~ ~r~ ~enC Co rhe nuclQ~r at~?mente inepector and
repnrCed en thc~ n~vy c:hie~ oP. genernl seafP Cor the necaHeary actione.
Additional Functione
In nddition ro the two main Eunceiona we have eleecribed, rhe navy equ3pment
inep~ctor plays a role in the very importanC area of the careers of officers
in charge of handling the equipment he inapecte; eo this effect:
H~ is r~ member of the commiasion in charge of submitCing euggesCions �or
nominationa for promotiona and cornmand poaitions;
He is a member of Che advancement council of the Navy School and Che
Training School for LieuCen~nta Junior Grade;
He may submit to the navy chief of general etaff specific problems concerning
the entire technical branch of the naval officers' corps (a branch conaiating
' of the membera of the former corps of marine engineera aboliahed in 1966).
Finally, nver the past six years each of the three vice admirals who have
held the position of navy equipasent inapector has been appointed member of
the Navy High Council. Such appointments apecif ically ahow the clear deeire
to intervene more directly in the ma~or options regarding the navy~ and the
details related to the equipment and logiatica of navy veasels.
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5~
FOR OFFZCLAL U5E ONLY ,
P].nce nf Nnvy ~quipment Inepection in eh~
Comm~nd and Ingpecrion 5Cructures ~
SI1UAiI~N pE t'I~lSPEC110~1 ~U ~,1hYfAlEI IlA~'At '
OANS lES S1flUC1U3ES OE CO'~~~rOAy~Ef,9EHY Ei D'I~~SPEC110N ~
' PRESIDEN? DE LA REpU6UQUE i
. ~
~z~ MINISTRE OE LA DEFENSE ~
~
CONTpBLE (5 ) ~6 ) ~7 ) !
G04VERNEMENTAL SECURITE C.E,M~A. 10/MAR ~
DES ARMEMENTS NUCLEAIRE
NUCLEAtRES ~
~LE~ I.A.N. I
, C~E.M.M. I , I
~ ~
9
INSPECTION INSPECTION ~
DES MESURES DU . '
DE SECURITE MATERIEL ~
NUCIEAIRE NAVAL ~
D' UT~LISATION '
1], I.M.N. ' ~
~
(NSTALLATIONS NUCL@AIRES INSTALlATION~S CLASSIQUE9 . '
~ll}~FORCES r r
~ ~ ~ib) . (17) .
YM 15 wAwdM~uon Y~ wn d'i~~p~etion Rdwn d'Inlorinu~~on
Key:
1. President of the Republic. 9. Inspection of nuclear safety
2. Minisr.er of Defense. measures. ~
3. Governmental control of 10. Navy equipment inapection.
nuclear armaments. 11. Nava1 equipment inspector.
4. Nuclear armaments inspector. 12. Nuclear installations. !
5. Nuclear safety. 7,3. Conventional installaCions.
6. Chief of general staff of 14. k'orces. ~
the ar~y?, 15. Subordination links.
7. Navy inspector general. 16. Inspection 13nk. !
8. Chief of general staff of 17. Information link.
the navy. `
~
COPYRIGHT: 1979 - Revue des forces armees francaises ;
"Armess d'Au~ourd'hui"
5157 19 ~
CSO: 3100
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, ,
COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
� MEDITERRANL�'AN AIR DEFENSE FACTORS DISCUS5ED
Par~s ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French May 79 pp 28-29
[Ar_ticle by Lti Col Francois Vallat*: "Air Defense in the Mediterranean"]
(TexC] Far from being a"peace lake," the Mediterranean is presently one of
the unseable areas in the world. The SixtH American Fleet and the Soviet
Eskadra paCrol it permanenCly. France has become aware of the fact ehat a
' conflicC in that area would risk quickly to affect iCa vital interesta.
Should a~conflicC break out in th'e IrW_diterranean one of the most dangerous
threats which France would have to face would be that of hostile penetxation
by sir crosaing over the Gulf of Genoa or Lyons aimed at economic or military
targets located in the southeastern part of our territory. In order to re-
duce the chances of detecCion, auch raids would unqueatianably attempt ari
approach at very 1ow altiCude, particularly at low altitude above the sea.
The Fifth Fighter Wing
Based in Orange, as an aerial defense cambat unit, the 5th Fighter Wing is
naturally facing Che Mediterranean. Its principal mission is to block
aggression from the air.
However, the detecCion and evaluation of the threat must be properly secured
and the interception must take place before hostile airplanes have reached
our coast.
*Lt Col Francois Va11at graduated from the Air Force School in 1958. He was
certified as fighter pilot in 1961 and began his career with the 11th Fighter
Wing stationed in Bremgarten (FRG). He became flight comimnder with the llth
Fighter Wing and, subsequently, commanding officer of the 2J13 A1pes squadron
in Colmar. He was the commanding officer of the Sth Fighter Flight stationed
in Orange before going back to the Air Force War College in September 1978.
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'Th~ implicaCion is thc~C the disposiCion facing our Medieerranean approachea ~
must bc compleCe: radars, terrain, transmiss~.one, operational nent~rs, com~
put~rion and guidAnce fac~lities, and intErceptors. '
es and has roved its ef fectivenesa ~.n tihe course of a I
This fncilitiy ex~.s p
number of exercises. It would be of interesG, therefore, tlo describe it as ~
it is before showing rhe way it tested in Che course of exercises which ~
oppose it periodicnlly ro the 6th F1eeC aircraft. I
Means of DeCecCion and ConCrol . ~
. , ~
in the western Mediterranean detection is secured through radar installaCions
- located along our Mediterranean coast. The anCennas have been direcred in
such a way that even at low altitude an incoming raid wauld be deCected~
Information on the general aeria~. situation supplied by this radar is sent ,
to STRIDA (System for the Processing and Submission of Aerial Defense In- ,
formation) which processes them, i.e., which sifCs and analyzea them and
visualizes them in terms of rea 1 Cime. ~
InformaC ion on ~3.rplanes flying over Che Mediterranean is always present on ~ ~
the radar screens of the control and operations centers: nationality,
direction, altitude, speed, etc. These elementa make it poasible Co evaluate
the rhrear and to guide and engage interceptors should this be ~usCified by
the situation.
The STRIDA is connecCed with the detection centers of our two Mediterranean
neighbors, Italy and Spain. Finally, if necessary, r..avy ships coulii ~
strengthen detection should special requirements arise. Such ships are ' ~
equipped with SENIT (System for the Navy Exploitation of Tactical InformaCion)' ~
linked with the STRIDA. . . '
Briefly stated, we have from Menton to Banyuls a reliab le, effective, and
coherent system for aerial surveillance, evaluation of the threat, and in- ~
terception control. !
i
The Terrain ~ ~
. ~
Taking into consideration the range of contemporary air-to-ground missiles, j
the interception must take place before the arrival of the hostile raid on ~
our coast and, therefore, most frequently, to re-deploy our interceptors on ~
terrains close to the coast, clstres or Hyeres, for example. ;i
The air force has proved its ab ility to re-deploy very rap~dly substantial
combaC facilities over such areas.
In-flight alarm is used as we11. It enables us to gain time between the
initial detection and the interception. It is particularly enhanced by the (
~
i
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cnpac3.ty of Che Orange Mirage F-~. to be re~ueled in ~1ighC. Thus the
inCercepCions could take p~.ace Par above the,sea gnd make it po~sible Co
engage Che enemy aC the earliest poasible time.
'i'hug, the combined use of coastal terraina and of the independence achieved
through r~fueling in the air makes it poseible ro reduce even further the
Cime needed for engaging aur inCerceptors, taking inCo consideration the
s~peed of the assault ra3ds and the advanced radar warning.
The Mirage F-1 ~
The interception musC be successfully made. This is the role of Che
Mirage F-1 which has been the armament of the Sth Fighter Wing since 1974.
As a successor of the Mirage III, it en~oya a vaetly superior freedom of
' acrion and a more advanced weaponry system which enables it to operate in
both,daylight and at night and in all weather. The performance of the
board radar and the reliability of the automatic pilot enable it to carry
out such delicate missions as interceptions at very low altitude over the
_ sea.
~ . The air-to-air armament of the Mirage F-1 consists of cannons and mtssiles.
The latter, specifically the Matra 550 Magic make it very efficient partic-
ularly at low altitudes against opponents equipped with means for modern
electronic warfare.
Development of Interception Missions
The STRIDA provides the elements of the aerial situation to the various
aerial defense operations centers. The one in Lyons is in charge of engaging
Che interceptors in so~lthwestern France. However, this responsibility may
be assigned to the chief controllers of the coastal radar stations.
Each derection center is responsible for a part of the aerial space over the
high seas. It is within this area that the main waiting lines ox the con-
tact points of the interceptors are located. The latter head toward them
immediately after takeoff and the interception controller then directs.them
toward their targets.
. The number of engaged interceptors is based on the level of the threat.
The pilot is guided until he has made contact with the opponent with his
board radar.
As of that moment he can ~?imself assume Che proper position for firing his
cannons or air-to-air missiles. Should he have ammunition and fuel left _
after the interception, he goes back to his main line waitfng for eventual
new engagement.
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~on o~~~cinc, us~ ~rn~t I
'The ~xerci~~~ .
r~rib~li~nily aur ~~ri~i d~f~n~~ gy~~@m in eh~ M~die~rran~~n i~ e~~e~d. 5om~
~xpc~ig~p ~r~ p~rei~ui~rly impdre~n~ brec~u~~ ~f ~h~ w~~leh of infortnaei~n ~
th~y prnvid~~
Suc~ ig th~ ~~~e wieh ehe nd~ix or t,:f~y~rec ~x+~r~i~~g which pi~ Ch~ a~ri~1
de~en~e ng~in~c: thc 6eh Am~ric~n ~1~ec. In ~f~~ce, thig ie ~ hi~h-qu~i3~y
c~ppun~nt, fnr ir i~ ~ que~~iun df tih~ mo~t modprn girpi~ne~ of eh~ U.S. N~vy a
which n~nkc u~e dX ~11 th~ ~echniqu~~ ~nd e~ceic~ rf mod~rn warfare. ch~ rh~ ;
~1thc~r h~md, the ~pri~i gp~ce ~bove the dff~r~ ~ p~g~ibility of r~~~i~eic `
~accrci~eg, nrg~nix~d ~nd ~~rri~d aue without both~ring the populetion. +
tn the c~~ur~e di the Dn~ix and Lafayette ~xerci8es the a~e~u1C raids are .
C~rried aue ~tire~ggiv~ly foll~wing eh~ rhythm of th~ eakeoffs from th~ d~ek~
of ~he Ameri~~n ~irar~fe c~rri~r~. A-7 Car~~ir, A-6 Intrud~r, ~nd ~-4 Phaneom
~i~hter-bumberg, ~rcompanied by scr~mbler planeg and ~scort~d by aerial
superiority ~irpl~neg guch the ~-14 'Tomc~t try to c ane closer to our
Medirerr~nenn co~gt. ,
~
't'hrse 7~rf.a1 fecilitieg r~eeive rh~ir infore~tion and guidance from long- j
r~tike detecrinn ~nd it~t~rceptar cdnrrol c~irplanee such a~ eh~ Hawkeye whoge
cask, sperifically, ig to indic~te to th~m the lacation of enemy int~rcepCor~.
i
Clearly, the role nf the n~sailants is to pi~rc~ th~ dpfen~es without being ~ ~
interceptpd in order to simulaCe ~n attack on asaigned ground targets on
French eerritory. 'Thar. is why they fly low and f3st, scrambling control ~
stacions, board rgdar And communic~tions, in en effort to keep for as long
aq pb~qible the defens~ in a gtate nf ignorance of the ~elected target. '
Thc purpose of the escorts is to protect Che fighter-bombers. Once the ~
assailant has been cietected, the protection sirplanes engage the interceptors
co enable the heavier and less maneuverable fighter-bombera to eecape.
Cunversely, the defense looks for a detection and, therefore, a long-range `
warning and tries to make the interception far ahead of the French coaet,
hawever great the difficulty caused by the opponent's electronic scrambling ~
may be. ~
The re~ults of each exercise are extenaively etudied by both parts and a
great deal of technical, tactical, and operational information is obtained. ~
i,
The renlistic nature of the tactical situations thus created in the course
of the exercises is further emphasized by the presence on the areas of the
exercise of vessels of different nationalities specializing in the gearch of ~
electromagnetic information, forcing the participants to operate with the
greatest posaible electronic discretion. ~
~
~
' i
i
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Ob~~rver~ ~r~ ~xch~n~ed for ~u~h ~x~rcis@~. Thu~, ~r~nch pi,1oC~ ~r~ invie~d
~bo~rd eh~ 6~h ~l~~e airGr~fe cgrri~r~.
'1'h~y c~n e~~tify nat nniy eo eh~ ine~r~~e di~pi~y~d by th~ U.S. N~vy in
~ueh eonfront~eion~ but ~1~~ eo ehe feei~eg of ~�ficiency th~y get from our
aeri~l d~fen~Q in the M~di~t~rraneen. 'Thi~ r~ciproc~l r~ap~ct promoteg ~ '
competitinn which ingptree both to "pl8y the big g~tt~."
G~PYRIGHT; 1979 - R~w@ d~~ �ore~~ ~rmn~~~ ~i'BflCA~~~~
"Arm~a~ d'Au~ourd'hui"
5157
C5t~: ~i00
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I
~ FRANCE ~I
COUN'~ItY S~CT~dN ~ ~
~
?
~
i
L~~L~CT~ON5 ON ~MPL~N'~ATION OI~ 30VIET-STYL~ 30CIAL~SM ~
P~ri~ L~l N~t~iiELt,E CRI~~QU~ in ~renrh April 79 pp 3-4 ~
~
CArei~1~ by ~'r~nci~ Cah~ns "AbouC th~ 23rd Congra~~; th~ Soviet Cannoeball"~ i
(T~x~] ~hinkin~ about the quegt3on of ~ocial3sm fo~r ~rance tigs led ua to ~
t~k~ a gre~t atep forw~rd in our conception of eocialism in genergl. i
Th~r~ ig no guch thing a~ an idealixed picture of socialism. The latter ~
i~ the ~dncr~et~ responge ~e the concrete problems af society. There ie
nn giant srep which wi11 admie ug to ~ ready-made bett~r world. There is i
rnther a difficult process of progressive improvement. Within the ephere
of gociali~m, there is a struggle for something more than socialigm iteelf.
These di~coveries ars not the result of the eteady progre~g of the mind but
rath~r of a n~w condition of the ~orld. Socialism has grovn up. It ia
nn ldnger a question of having one's back to the wall and fighting tooth and
nnil. We no longer think of gocialism only in terms of being for or against }
it but elso in terms of the "why" and "hoa" of eocialism. ~
i
Wher~vpr socialism exists, debatea, conflicts and opposition are no~
e~sentially the regime. The ccntradictions to be reeolved in order to
- progresa are no longer necessarily the external coatradictions bet~aeen
soci~l3sm and the other systema, as it was in ~the days when the most important
is~u~ Was simply to survive, but the many internal contradictions of the
socialisc movement it~elf. The follouieg is a political example of the
latter poinr: In 1918, the Kronstadt sailors rose up "in favor of the
nnncommunist Sovieta." In 1979, the malcontents are "in favor of good
communists" as opposed to "bad anes."
All of man's greaC problems arise not only ai.th regard to socialism~ but
also within the sphere of socialiem itself. These are concerned with
social relationships but also include problems of uational scope and, as
ae have come to see, problems of aar and peace. From this, ~ae can conclude
that socialism has not generated anything new, that man is atill man and
that capitnlism ie his eternal framework.
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`Chi~ b~].i~f l~nd~ tn ~ mueh brdnder nnd mnre edmfortinbi~ vi~w. We 1e~vp
b~hind ~ dil~tma~ wh~r~ our ~ppdn~nt i~ rrying tio eurround ue and where we
vdlune~rily ~urround our~elve~ gnd in whinh~ ie muge be ~a~.d~ belief often
~ti11 ~xietg 3n eociallgt couner3es.
Thie dil~mma i~ ~ aimple one: We e~.ther have nothing but nice word~ for
~xi~ting sociali~m, or we criticiz~ it adveraely, iti which case w~ receive ~
nbu~p.
W~ 8r~ nn longer in th~e stege~ Pn~ges~ing a clear view which is critical
in eh~ f~il ~~n~~ of Che word with regard to presene-day eocialiam ae well
r~~ with regerd to anything e1~e does not 3mply that we are devi.at~ng nor
thnt w~ ar~ di~united. We are simply part3cipaCing in a movement of
increneingly richer integration of the moat varied and complex elemenra of
r~~lity in Che thought that nourishes communiat action. We do not do thia
to improve our "corporat~" image but rather to contribute Co the gdv~nce of
~oC38~i8m.
A~ fdr the gaod wordg that we have for exiating socialism, thie ia aimply
an obeervation of a most imporCant trurh. With regard to this, the reeolution
plan of the 23rd Congrese, in a statement that is often contegted but rarely
quoeed~ de~lg wirh the superior abil3ty of the new ayatem Co solve the
great problema of gociety.
Thig is the decie!.ve queation. Ia the socialiat system auperior or noC?
Those who add up the ahortcomings to obtain a total value which they believe
1 ro be negative over all believe that socialiam has not yet proved thia
auperiority. They believe that, abatractly speaking, socialiam is superior,
but, since it actually is not perfect (far from it), the proof remains tn
b~ made. This type of reasoning, if piiahed to ita logical limit, leads
one to wonder whether it would not have been bztter if the October revolution
had not taken place. ~
The above is said only to stimulate thought. It is necessary to look at
our world squarely in ~he fecr. Ie requirea a good deal of work to measure
it in detail, wfthout fearing deficiencies nor concentrating on them either,
considering contradictions to be natural, and without allowing advances to
be masked by~them. It is time to atart studying the way in which people
live materially, morally, cultura?3y, politically and nationally in the
socialist world as compared With the rest of the world, each one busy with
his own development.
What would you say of a picture of the world where zones of contact and of
contrast, such as the following, would be examined: Bulgaria-Greece,
Azerbaijan-Turkey, Cuba-French Antilles, North Korea-South Korea, East
Germany-West Germany, Finland-Esthonia, etc.?
The more We deal with France, the more we realize that nothing can be under-
stood today without a worldWide view. The further into the future our
responaibility stretches, the more it appears that nothing can be accomplished
without a historical view. -
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~o~ o~~rc~at, usE orr~~r ~
~
7'hi~ vi~w ~~nnnC E~i1 eu r~v~~~. Ch~e ~oCib~,3~m ig gt eh~ c~nter oE man~a ~
mnv~m~n~ in th~ 20Ch c~n~ury and tha~ eh~ 9~viet Union conCinue~ ~o play
ei~~ prineipal rni~ ~.n i.e. ]:f ehie obaet~vari~~n appeare to be a ehocking one, ;
l~t u~ a~k nu~~elveg a que~t3on. Why i~ Che JSSR ~ cannonball? ~
L~c ug ndngid~r rhe r~n~nt shocking evene~ What ig going on wi~h China? ~ ~
W~11, ~h~ has d~c~ded ~o become d~veloped indugtrially, eo modernize her~elf, '
und eo grm h~~~~l�. Thi~ le~d~ eo the po~s~.bil~.ry of ~normous, coloseal, ~
unima~inabl~ ~nve~emenCg~ How~ver, if the imperialiet pow~rg (USA, Jgpan
~nd nther~ of J,eeg imporeance) grane appropr~ate credita, ehey cannot expect '
th~g~ tn be ~~nerally profitable on a ehorC-C~rm nor even on a medium-term '
;
ba~3s. This iy not the normal way for capitalises to behave. Then, why '
~hould th~y do so?
Yerhnpg th~r~ exigt~ ~ome hape nf bringing back this immen~e cnuntry at
lpngt p~re~.~11y tn oper~tiong of a capit~li~t ngture, al~hough this ig ~ ,
rigky busin~ss. This is a type of change for which no one would say that
che Chinese are ready. ~urthermore, ehig may be gn element of the d~.ecu~aiona
and differenne~ which are evidenced within the Chinese Communiat ParGy.
Nuwever, there is more to :nis story than that. Once again, it is a report
a~ the Trilaternl (the three big-powers) which puts it crudely. The growth
of 5oviet inflUence ig disturbing. We (the Trilateral) are not in a
position to solve this problem. Then~ why not yield our big-power posiCion
eo Ct~ina? mh;g might reduce our sphere of influence but it would reduce that
of the 5ovi~t Union even more. ~
Therefore, the essential force that big capital has to face in combat is
the US5it.
COPYI2IGHT: 1979, Les Editions de la Nouvelle Critique
7619
CSO: 3100
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COUNT~tY SLC~'ION g~JC~; i
~
;
;
~
. CHIItAC INT~RYIEWEll UN ECONOMY ~S FUTUR~;
~'aris L~ NOUV~L OHSERYAT~tJR in Frenoh 17 May ?9 pp 50-51 ~
~ntervfow wfth Ja,cques Chirao, ~ormer rime min3ster end preei- t~
dent o~ the RPR ~e,lly Por the,Republi~, by corre$pondent Roger
priouret; date and place not giver~7 ~ ~
~ex) Since the day Qfter the parl'iamentary
elections, J~,oques Chiraa hQd reservation$
about Ra,ymond garre's economic policy, an-
nouncing that he wnuld ;judge it by its re-
- sults. But since the end of 1978, he in-
creased his critic3.sms snd conPirmed its ~
failure. But what policy doea he propose in ~
ita place? So ~ar, he has been aparing of '
details about the matter. Ke aeked him to
abandon this reticence. But it was logicsl '
to ask him~ ~irst of a~ll, a political question
which everybody has on the tip of their tongue.~
~uestio~ You are accused Prom all sides of xsntinE to promote
a victory o~ the Left either by bringing a,bout parliamenta~ry
elections ahead of time~ or at the time of the preeidential
election in 1981. Since socialists and communists do not under-
stand ea,cli other~ such a generel confusion end lack of au~hority
would result from it that the country Would be on the verge of
anarchy. Then you, J~e,cques Chirsc, would appear as the savior
capable of rallying the majority oP the country.
~Answe~ It is p~culiar how political observers--~and perhaps,
especially the most outstanding of them--hsve a ahort memory.
As early a,s June 19??~ they already seid--and their remarks
appeared in all the press--that I Would observe this "strstegy
nf the sa~rior� for the parliamentary elections the fQ1loWing
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~
,
year. Now I tell you seriously thn~t I w3.11 never oonduot a
poLicy,based on the worst pogsibil3ty. In 19?4~ during the
l~st ~re~idon~tia,l eleQtion~ I took an unQOmf ortable posit3.on '
for royaelf. But it was for ~he sole purpose of defeating
rranaois Mitterrand, al].ied with the communigts.
I guarantee ynu: in all subsequen~t situatione~ the poait3on
which I wi11 talce wi11 be based ~olely on my w3shes and my
miss3,on o~ prenenting a collectivist aand3.date Prom taking
office. And that is not Por pereonal reagons~but becauae it ~
would represent the advent~ even in the confugion of a society
which tho French do not like and is not in Fre~nce;s intereet. '
~uestic,n7 You fanor genu3ne planning and not that which was ~
announced with the Eighth P~la,n. ~
~nswer7 First, let us explain what Z mean by planning. 0~ ~
course, not the fussy and bureaucratic system which I leave to ~ ~
the collectivists and whieh was implicitly prescribed in the
"common program." My conception is both more ambitious and
more unassum3.ng. It is based on everything Which was done
previously, since the creation 4f the plan by aeneral de asulle~ ,
up to the "enthusia,stic obligation" which it evoked a,t the end. ~
It involves, simply, determining in a united and democrstic ;
menner, Nith all the professionel orgsnizstions~ the goa~la
which Fra,nce must set for itsel~, the priorities which that ,
involves and the means which must be used to attain them. That
implies some choices. Conaequently we are very fa,r from the
do-nothing policy of the present government end what is presented . ~
to us as the Eighth Plan, which is only a parody of a, plan. '
That is one of the main points of our di~Perences. For me, the ;
plan is the expression of the national will end n.ot a report or ~
- a well studied~ well balanced speech.
. +
In this conception, free enterprise remains inta~ct.
~uestio~ Is this possible with the opening o~ frontiers? ;
~nswer7 I remind you that Genere,l de Gaulle~ at the same time ,
thut he was following the operation of successive plens, opened ~
the fr~ntiers of Europe~ sts~"ting in 1959. On the contrary~ ~
what t;ie "common program" proposed as planning led to the
~losing of frontiers. ~
~
~uestion] ~And in this program~ would you ~ix a ra,te of growth ~
f or the economy?
. ~
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~n$we~r7 I~t ig obv3.nu~ that un ambi~tioug ratQ o~ growth 3g
neaeas~ry. We have 13.ved ~ long ~ime wi~th a high rate o~
growth. The one today is low. Na,~urally 3t ie due tn the ~
crisis. IIut no~ comple~tely it is alsn the re~leation o~ peo-
ple'~s desire~. There is qu~te a~ohool oP ~hought~ whioh has
exrres~ed itsel,f sinoe 1974 ~r.3 which explains to us the~t we
n~ed "modera~e growth" baoausQ of the ~tandard of livin~ and
also to avoid certain new restrfctiona. The 1'reeident o~ ~he
~epubl~.c repea,ted this idea of "moderate growth" in his book.
Dut li~Q fa chooaing between di~advantag?e~. Now wha,t do we aee
with this pr~esent groWth reduaed to 3 percent~ which they tell ~
us oanno~ be exceeded without destroying import~,nt belances?
The answer is in all the works oP ~the economie foreoasters.
We will have 100~000 to 150,000 more unemp loyed every year end
we will reach 2 mi113on in a few years. I~a,y that thia ig
unacceptable, that 3t is intolerable.
~uestion7 Now ce,n we ob~ta,in a higher growth, while limiting
the risks which it involves?
~nswer7 we must create at least 400~000 jobs a, year and a
growth o~ 5 percQnt is neoessary for tha~t: And it is a minimum:
~uestion7 Then, it is necessary to start up the economy age,in.
~nsWer7 You have come up With the right anawer. When I say
it, they cry: shame on the irresponsible~ thoughtless peraon,
who is going to put us all ba,ck on the road to inflation and
dePicit oP foreign payments. This is not true.
I will take a,n example. In 1975 we had made a considerable
advance. I would point out that it was begun on the reques~ of
the chief of state anci "set to music" technicslly by the minister
of economics and ~inance. Whe,t have we observed? According to
INS~E ~ational Institute of Statistics and Ecanomic Studie),
it me~nt the creation of 400~000 jobs which stopped the rise in
employment cold. And during the period~ still according to the
same source, the rate of inflation dropped regularly a hal~ a,
point per quarter.
~uestion7 In what directions can this edvance start?
~nsWe] It must be sQlective. The first direction~ in my
opinion~ is the liberation o~P sma,ll and medium size businesses
which still have considerable potential energy and which play
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I
a big role, which we do no~t roooqnixe, in the more dynamia
countriess ~he Un3~ted States, Japan a~nd aermany. Now, here ~
in I~rance, s~rength o~ soul and unu~ual aharaotor are necessary ~
to~overcome ~the restraints which aongtant~y weigh down on ~them. ~
I speak about their liberation ~or that reason. They need
gpeoial regula tfons; i~ is impera~ t 3ve ~to elim3na~te credit re- i
strictions on them, which do not hur~t the 1~,rge ~irmg~ bu~ '
which paralyxe them. 1Pe must freo prices oompletely, while ;
el3minat3ng ~the department whi~h exercised the controls. We
must give them a di~~erent tax rate on companies~ whioh exietg ~
~,broad. Our pro~ess3.otia1 tax system, which is absi~rd, works ~ ~ ~
against trhem and against growth. The budget must a~bsorb ~he
contribu~ions for Pa,mily allowa,nces. ~he old age and sioknegs
Qontributions must no longer be bas2d on wa,ges. They need a, ~
apecial system for dismissa,lg, together with the creetion of
an inter-enterprise guarantee ~und to protect the rights of
the workers, so ~hat they ca,n preserve their mobili~y o~ employ- ~
ment. It is necessary to create trading compan3.es which orgqn- '
ize them for export purposes.
But the small ~nd medium enterprises are not t}te only cards to I
play in the economic piakup. I am thinking also oP construc- ~
tion ~.nd public works~ which are in a crisia~ while we have
considerable needs Por in~rastruQture and h~using. And these. ~
two sectors do not involve imports. In addil;ion~ there a,re two '
directions Por economic improvement. On one hand~ an importent
country cannot let steel~, shipyards and textiles decline com- +
pletely. On the other hand~ it mu~t especislly be involved in '
the advance sectors which represent the future. There is mor~ ~ '
and more of a need to develop research and also to regnin the
domestic market. In short, the sta,te must provide ma,ssive� � '
assistance for investments which create jobs, and those which
obtain or save ~oreign exchange. ~
~
T am re~dy to discuss it, but they refuse. The government~s
decisions are ~resented as the expression o~ "revea,led truth'~
and everything else brought up inspires contempt. Is that the ~
agreement which should exist in e ma3ority? I he,ve been sound-
ing the alarm in the economic and sociel ~ield ~or 2 yesrs~ and ~
I am not happy that events prove me right. ;
I thir.k sometimes that our position is like 1938. There Were ~
two policies then. One was to arm ourselves slowly and steadily, ~
which is what we did, with the known results; others armed them- ~
selves ruthlessly. Today it is not a question of military ~
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~o~ o~~zcr.nr, USL ONLY
con~liat, bu~ of eaonomic war. Now invoe~tments~ wha~ elee sre ,
they but eoonomic weapons? We11~ tha~ is beg3nning again. We
are arming ourselve~ leisurely. And thu~ I fesr~ we are antioi- _
pating a g3milar result ~o ~he one in 1940.
~uAStio~ ~hia poliay impl~ea a aertain number o~ expenees.
Hut, at the same time~ you tavor a reduation of the budge~sry
de~3.cit.
~Answ~~ Yes~ T believe we mus~ aim E1t bala~riclA� But not~ce~
with e, grow~h of 5 percent, the rate of tax revenue aould in-
crease at leg~t 20 p~raent for the present pariod. And We
would save a considerable part of wha~t unemployment co~ta.
Then the state ha,s exaeasively high adminigtrative expenditure~~
whioh we must reduce.
~uestio) The budget ta,king over ~amily alloxances is e, very
_ aubstantial expense.
~nswer7 But the prime minister has said that unemployment~
thQ specific policy oP employment~ coste 44 billion, tha~t is
much more. I add that too much money is spent to ps~y people,
who ask Por work, to do nothing ancl that not enough ass3etance
is pronided to creste new ~obs. What I say abou~ the budgeta,ry
dePicit applies e,lso to social security. It is necesgary to .
go much further th~n stop payments for relief ineasures.
~uestion7 Yn sp3te oP everything, I see in your policy oP ~
. economic improvement an acceleration of the rise oS' prices and
a return to protectionism. ,
~nswe~ We heve stagnation plus the rise in prices; the con-
nection is not absolute. A return to improved businesa~ when
there are production capacfties available~ will leQd to a
reduction of unit costs. Of course~ I sm opposed to protection-
ism.
Iiut;,~ notice, Europe as a whole must me,intain e certain protec-
tion, Which the Japanese and the United States are doing, on
their part. We can only alloa limited amownts o~ products to
reech our markets, whose prices are low becsuse labor does not
have any social benefits.
And here let us return to Europe. What were the two assignments
on which everyone agreed: it was on one hand, tho aommon foreign
customs tariff and, on the other hand, the common agricultural
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market. Well: ~the Brussel~ oommission~ made up of irrespons3-
ble poopte, hns m~n3mized ~he importance o~ the common ~ore3.qn
t~rif~, c~~t thQ mercy nf the nagot3ations it is conduating with i
everyone and w}i3.ch have ~3.nally ~ransformed the frontierg of ,
~urope into n s3.eve.
~
I am ame~xed that those who speak of ~urope in idy113o terms ~
disregard ~his first important ~actor. ,
World development in th~e next 20 to 25 years will lead to a ~ `
considerable increase in the aonsumpt3.on of agricultural pro-
ducts, quite simply because of 3ncreased birthe. Now experience
ghows--and that nf the Sov3et Un3.on especially--that it fa pos-
sible to make great progxes~ in the industrial and teohnologic~l
~ield ~,nd still be incepable o~ 3mproving the eoil's yield. ;
- Consequen~ly the countries~ which haYe the good luck to possegs ;
a~ past and agrioultural land, must get themselves in shepe to ~
produce to meet the world~s needs. And there again, I condemn
~the spirit of the Brussels commi~sion, which believes tha.t every ;
increase of agricultuxal pxoduction create surpluses, as I,con-
demn the compensatory payments,which pe~ralyze a~ll French agri-
cultural production and which are not sbout to dige,ppear. A1ss:
on tliis la,gt point, I still could be right.
~uestion7 A more and more a,coepted possibility among the i
remedies for unemployment is ghortening the working week to 35
houra. And the purpose of that is to reduce unemployment. ~
~nswe~ I a,gree that tl~e 35-hour week is an ob~ective to be
reached in time. But we cannot do it alone. And we return to
the European problem. That must be negotisted in a Europesn ~
~ramework, but then we must prote~t ourselves egainst,the
ga,vag~ competition o~ countries xith loW Wages, the~t is,re~e~t ,
free trade Europe and return to a, true idee of the "Coanmon
riarket" s You see, at last, that I a,m more European tha~n they ;
say. ~ `
COPYKIGHT: 1979 "le Nouvel Observateur" .
8490 ~
CSOs 3100 ~
I
. ;
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I~OR OFFICIAL U5C dNLY
COUNTRY S~CTION ~C~
~~~~s
PLO ~~RRORISM SN FR,A.NCE--The DST ~French) Tn~erna]. 8ecurity Servic~ and the
SDECE ~French) Foreign rn~e~~~.gence and Coun~erintelligence ServicJ have
par~ia~~.y f3gured ou~ ~he TO of ~he Paleetinian ~erroris~s in France fb~.-
1.ow3ng ~he arreet, a~ Roisgy ~h~,r].es de C~au].1.e AirporJ 3 week ago, of a
~'ordan3an who w~s ~ranspor~ing a large amoun~ of plaetic ~xplos3.v]. Zt
is naw ~ certainty ~hat the PLO is recruit3.ng pro-IQiomeiny Ira.nian students _
who are regiding 3n F`rance, and that at least tw~ Near F,~st embaesies are
acting as relay po3.nts :Por the terrorist by allowing their di 1.oma~ic
pouches to be uaed to tranafer improved wee.pons for them. TextJ ~Paris
yAT,EURB ACTUELLES in ~ench 4 Jun 79 p i5 w1
CSO: 31.00 -
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COUNTRY 9ECmxON Z'~~+Y
AR ~ F'ORCES OPFRA'.CIONAL ~2EQUZR~S DISCUSSID
Mi~an CORRI~RE DELLA SERA in Italian 16 May 79 P 9
[Articl.e by Fabrizio Carte: "To Cope with the Operational Requirements--
Army and Navy Want More Airplanes"]
(~ccerpts]. After WW I, both for reasons of the prestige of the ascendant
fascism and to check the open rivalry between the Ariqy and the Navy, which
were competing with one another to obtain more and better airplanea from the
specialist firms, it vras decided to take a1.1 of the Ara~y's and the Navy's
aircraPt and men and put them into a singl.e third armed force. The compre-
hensive Aeronautical Admin3stration was born, comprising: (1) the Air Force
Command; (2) Ita].ian Arc~y Aviation; (3) Ttalian Navy Aviation.
This arrangement enabled Moiro, Italo Balbo and Qiuseppe Valle to give a de-
cfsive impulse to the new branch, which, thanks also to the ea.gy and vic-
torious air operations in the skies over Spain, Ethiopia and Albania, found
itself on the eve of WW II with a strength of 9,000 airplanes, stationed at
more than 100 airports.
In WW II, despite the courage, abnegation and spirit of sacrifice of the _
pilots of a1l~units, including those assigned to cooperation with the ground
and naval forces, limitations of an organizational and operational nature
came to light.
The existence of these limit ations emerges cleaxly from the fact that in all
three armed forces--even though different and contrasting reasons apply to
each of them--the poor use of aviation still stands out today as one of the
causes of defeat or failure to achieve complete success in many kar opera-
tions. The Navy ~complains of scarcity and the lack of specific training
for aircraft intended for naval operations support; the Arn~y pinpoints the
' lack of air-ground tactical cooperation as an inhibitor of mar~y actions in
the field. The Air Force, on the other hand, criticizes the fact that too
mt~ny of its units have been taken aWqy from primary air defense and strategic
bombing duties and put into exhausting and wearying operations in support of
the Navy and the Ara4r. _
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_
I~OR OF~'ICZAL US~; ONLY ~ _
Who i~ right? ~ACYI of them, to be sure, seems ~o have val.id reasons for con-
3~.derin~ i~se~.f to be in the right. It seems 1.ogical r~~ th3s point to go
back i;o the origins of the '~Aeronautica~ Adm3n3.stration," described above,
und recogniLe the fact that un~fication had ~eft too m~ny prob lems unsolved:
_ dualism o,~ the ~op mi7.ita,ry levela which, with ~he neceasity of conferring
non~inun~.l.y, led 3nevi~ably to dangerous mutual in~erference, as we11 as
def3ciencies and delays , pr3me cau~es of ~he ob~ainin~ of inadequa~e re-
~ult3; inadequate train3ng, inasmuch as the flying units were not in very
cl.ase touch with the operatit~nal commands for whom they functioned, thus
coming to lack that warking harmony without which any effective cooperation
i3 impossible; and inappropriate selection and assignment of aircraft--as- ,
pects th~,t were governed by cont3nual compromises and which in the last
analyais fail to talte account of the real qualitative and quanti~ative re-
quirements in the indiviflual theaters of operation.
Where do matters stand today, more ~han 30 years after the end of the last
world conflict?
Tn prt~ctice, very litt].e has changed, and so a future war would bring up the ~
,
errors of the past again, in the same terms.
~Cod~.y, in fact, except for a few light aircraft and helicopter groups of the ,
Artr~y and a few antisubmarine helicopter groups of the Navy, all military air- ~
craft, including even those intended for support of ground and naval opera-
tions, are still assigned to Military Aeronautics. Today, the Arrr~y and ~he
IV~vy still bemoe.n the inadequacy of the means at their disposal, as we11 as
considerab 1e difficulties in the use of what they have.
A pr~rticu.larly good example of this ambiguous state of affairs is the organ-
ization of the sea patrol aircraft, the Breguet-Atlantics, which come organ-
ically under Military Aeronautics and operationally under the Navy~ and are
flown by pilots of whom 50 percent belong to each of the two armed forces, �
with a11 the misunderstanding, rivalry and compromise that can be imagined.
Many other nations, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, for
example, solved the problem long ago by establishing, within the compass of
a single armed force, air components appropriately sized and specially trained '
to handle the specific tasks of air cooperation, and consequently assigning
to the Air Force as such only the tasks of air defense, bombing, and strategic
reconnaissance.
Is it advisable for Italy too to adopt an approach different from the present
one, which in the past has produced rather disputable results?
The reply can only be in the affirmative, if it is desired to modernize our
military machinery and make it more flexible and effective. Ruling out, to -
start with, the idea of modifying the present structure once again--that is,
reconstituting three distinct air forces, as in the teginning--this can be
achieved only by giving adequate and coherent replies to the following ques-
t ions :
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1, WhU i~ i~o decide on the p~reenta~e ~f the i~erdnnutirn bu~get to be di~-
tribut,ed tn t}~e three e~mpde~entn--Air Aiarce, Ar~ and Nur~y7 Whd e~tat~li~he~;
thc prioritie~ and keepg trnek df ~h~nget~ gtra~~gic gitu~tion~7 (~t ~hould
he noted thnt ~oc~n,y anly ~ n~g~i~ib~~ p~rt of
thi~ bu~g~~ i~ ~p~t~t ~o m~~t
the ne~dd ~i' the At~y ~nd th~ N~vy~)
2. W}tb~e ,~ob ig it ta ev~lu~t~ ~nd chooge th~ bir~r~ft ~uit~~~.e f~r effec-
i,ive caoper~tion7 (mdd~y, thp range, arm~m~n~, nnd f],ying eh~?r~rt~rigti~n
o� th~ C-91 ar?d ~-104 are cdngid~r~~ in~?d~~uat~ for the requir~m~nts of th~
~1rrr~y ~nd th~ Navy. )
3. Who is to ~ssign the op~rational, training ~nd ~a~~ pri~ritie~ f~r ~uch
zir~rxft7
'I'hese ~re all questions tih~.t r~quir~ cl~~r ~r?d prempt ~g~ters, re~ul~ing not
t'rom preconceiv~d notions and p~rti~~n ,~~�~lou~i~~, but r~th~r inspirec~ by -
understnnding of th~ fact that higher interests ar~ at stake, guch ns de-
fen~e of the country ~d wiser use of the available re~nurc~s. -
COPY~IGHm: ~.q7g ~ditoriale del "C~rrier~ de11a ~era" g~s.g~
11267
CSO: 3104 _
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COUM~RY 3~C'~~ON SPAIN
~NbUSTItY MINIST~R INTtRVIEW~D, BACKCRAUNU GIVEN
t~drid CAt~IO ~6 in 5p~nish 27 May 79 pp 40-42
Ctt~porr nn ine~rviea with Cer1o~ Bugtelo, minigter of induetry; date and
p1aC~ nne given]
tT~xt~ Once a memb~r of the demoaratic so~l,alis~s Kho xere--fighting against
F~anco~ f10M G8r10~ BtiBt@10~ 'lmuah morQ mature and lesa an ideologue~" 3~ minig-
ter of industsy in the firat constitutional g+overnment. He has for the last
month been fighting tooth and nail against the inertia af a pact that ha,s made
th~~ minis~ry a veritable arying toxal.
A 1lttle more than ~0 days at the head of the Ministry of Induetry and ~tergy
ha~ given Ca~r1o~ Bustelo enouBh e~cperience t.o be able to say that "no bu8iness-
man ever coaes here tn ask that the free market reign xhere he ia eoncearned.
The xorkers~ officials~ and a11 Spaniards are guilty of the same laak of soli-
darity~ the same selfiahness. They a11 xar~t a monopoly ~n their field of acti-
vity. If it is guaranteed by the Officia~, Gar~ette~ so much the better. Franco-
ism is still deeply rooted in the 3pant,ah society aad mentality."
"In other societies," he adds~ "all thoae xho are members of the aociety knox
that xhen they receive more than they put in~ it is a1x+~ys at the expense of
, the rest. Here, a large part of the p~oblem lies in the fact that the poli-
tical parties as xell as the unions are not doing anything."
The new miniater of induatry xas born 42 years ag~o in Ribe~deo (Lug~o) almost
by accident~ he says. "In October of 1936~ one xas born xhearever one could."
Of his three children xith Cataloni,an Tere Tortella, one xas b~rn in Paris~
another in Madrid~ and the third in Yashir~gton, D.C.
Rich Kid
His father~ a highxay engineer~ xas a bigxig in the Sp~ariish chemical industry.
'ke lived in the El Viso section of ~tadrid, and xe xere s~aong the first to have
a car. ite xere very p~ivileged."
But the university struggles against the Franoo regime turned a libsaral, upper_
class family into a"nest of reds" as far as the police xere concerned.
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~
ThQ ~irg~t ~:~~t o~ h~e ~roth~r i'~a~, ~tod~y ~~~~~~~ntativ~ cf ~h~ r~d~e~,1~~
win~ of ~th~ 5p~nish Wdrk~re ~oci~~i.~t P~ty (PSO~), r+a~ a re~ bomb.
~:t rra~ Gon~~a Nho ca,m~ to my houg~ at 0500 hour~~ ~er ~~.r~a~ th~n~ I hava had
brnth~r~ ~nci l~o~h~rs-~-law in 3ai1 for a long ~tSm~~ F~om ou~aid~~ I know -
Ca~~~b~nch~~. Pr~son b~tt~r than ar~ron~. " Hn himaelf ha~ been interroga~~d many
'~~.fie~~ 1~1.1t fl~V~;C ~~~t~d�
'Th~ Con~r~as of Young Wri~E~rB df 19~3 mark~d the b~th of his politiaal 11f~.
mh~r~ he m~t the communiat~ Tamames the aocialist ~nrique Mugica--then a mem-
b~r ~f the Spani~h Communist Party ~PCE)--and Dioniaio Ridrue~o.
~ut ~t u~~ xh~n th~ 9oa~aligt Univeraity Group (A3U) rras born in 1957 he
~~.rg~t 3~in~d th~ po~.i~ic~1 struggle.
Ce~r1n~ Bustelo smil~s nox xhen h~ remembera hox hig family's xealth alloxed
him to finance the ASU 1n~astructure.
mhe Bustelos supplied the are~n-colored Renault 4-4, xhS~h appeasa in the pic-
ture of Jorg~ Semp~run on th~ cover of his book "Autobiografia de ~'ederSco
5anche~" [Autobiography of Federico Sar?chez~= it xas the A3U eocialist$ xarn-
ing to th~ PC~. And the photo~opier xhich xas carried in the car~ that "gave
u~ ~ mobility that not ~ven the 3ocial Political Brigade had at that time~"
Ha~ al~o supplied by the fan?ily.
H~ tak~g on a serious notet '"~hose xere bad t,imes. You could easily get
three yeara, as Ceron 'The Good' did (Jeeus Ceron~ b~other of the man xho
years later xould become minister of trade), or you could get a minimum of
one year~ as my tsother Paco did."
He gtill remembers r+hen the diatrict attorney~ in order to lend more force to
the cha~cge against his brother, stated during the trial that "he uaed the back
side of the pamphlets to print the Declaration of the Rights of Mankind."
Nox, says Carlos~ xishing to end an era~ xhat thoae pamphlets xere asking for
is xritten in the Constitution.
Still the 5ame
Since his univeraity years, nothing has changed, maintains the nex miniater.
"I still say the same things I said in lax school~ xhen I got Luis Solana to
~oin the ASU~ and xhen Cregorio Peces Barba xas one of the Catholic membera.
The nnly difference is that then I said it in pamphlets."
Th~oughout the conversation~ Carlos Bustelo exudes calmness and confidence.
Ke is not an economist~ but he has a good grasp of the aub~ect. "Of course,
no thanks are due to the university. I didn't learn a thing there."
He confesses that xhat he does knox about economics he learned mainly f~om
Luis Angel Ro3o~ Enrique Flientes Quintana and Tamames during the five years
xhen he xorked for the Interrational Moneta,ry F1~nd~ and the three years xhen
he xas holed up in a sma.ll OECD office in Paris~ analyzing the economies of
Mediterranean countrios~ especially Spain.
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In P~ris, he mot Sant~,ago Carril~o~ and ~there he ~xperianoad the orisie c~
~Ehe PG~ and the defeotion of Jorge Semprun and Fe~n$ndo Claudin.
"A1ong ttith them~ an~ 1n my posit~.on a~E ~he OECD~ I learned that the analyges
of the Spanish ai~tuation made by the PCE xere completel,y xrot~g~ 1 rea],S~ed ~Eh~t,
not even Lope~ Rodo could a~Eop th~ Spaniah e~onomy. Meanxhi~.e~ the PCE eoono-
m19~t~ contSnued to believe th~~t even ~Ehe free~ee of the orang e erop xere pro-
moting eQeonomia para],y$i8 anfl the huge genaral s~rike,"
Wh~n he re~turned to Spa1n~ as a member of the eoaial demoaratio movement he
maintainafl s~Erong ~ties Nith the pgpE~ Shortly before the first Congreas inside
Sp~in~ Ca,irlos Bust~lo partlaipated in the ~task forae r+hich parepared the e~onomio
platform of the PSO~.
A year later~ the ~conomio ideag of Buatelo, Mariano Rubio and Juan Antonio
Carola Die~ gave birth ~Eo xhat xas to be the Democratia Center Union's (UCD)
~conom3c program,
Leftist UCD
During this period he says he has learned to respeat private enter ise
dea1, and has traveled in more than 50 coun{,rie8~ Of those nations~ the United
States has had the greateat impact on his thinking. "It irritatea me~" he
points out expressively~ "that the Spaniah bourgeoisie talka about thia xithout
knouing the United States."
Although he cooperated xith the PSOE earlier~ he feels absolutely no limi~a-
tions within the UCD. He 3oined that garty a month before its first Congress.
"The UCD perfectly embodies the parogressive democracy that I have alHays looked
for. I think this party can engage Sn the most p~ogressive politics po~sible
at thi~ time. "
He also add.s: "t think that I am in the most pacogressive xing of the UCD.
Perhaps it is in the area of economics xhere the differences among the various
factions are the least marked, but in the development of the Constitution
these differences xill be bloxn up to their true dimensions. I for one xould
like to se~ that development be as secular as possible, that is, xithout any
religioua influence.
"I Am Clearly In Favor Of Divorce"
He is an obvious supporter of d~vorce. Hith regard to abortion, Carlos Bustelo -
remembers the years xhen he lived in the United Statesi '`I'here, abortion is
no p~c~blem. We must give time time."
Until recently, he had not met Adolfo Suare~.
sion of F~ench President Giscard's visit to Spain.f '~~~ef eethen,~ Insax more
of a~y PSOE friends.'�
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La~er h~ had a chanoa ~to s~r~n~hsn ~hat rela~ionsh~p;on ~he ~trips the txo
mad@ ~oge~h~r ~to Cuba and Vene~uela, "Zn ar~y ease~ Z was no~ at a11 surpr~.sed
to b~ nam~d miniater~" h~ indicatea~ poin~Sng to his ~~for~s as underaearetary
of trad~.
mha trS.ps hav~ been Bus~elo's best barga,ining chip~ "I s,p~ke wi~h the King
- quit~ a bit on tha ~tr~.ps to China, Zran and Zraq. In 1,5 days one reveals a
iot ~bou~ ones~i~,
It has been wr~.~~en ~;ha�h there is a Bustel,o for every polltioal option. Now ~
it ~.s the turn of the third of ~our siblings, Ca,rlos Bustelo y Caraia del Real.
A11 of them were pol~.tical fighters during the3r un3v~sity days~ perha,ps wi~th
the axception of th~ oldest, Jose Ramon, who ls now the direator general of
trade.
Bustelo: One For Every Taste
~'hase same st~uggles radicallzed the positions of the b~othe~rs, leading up
to the present confrontation, which became manifest after Franco's death.
"Nox I only diacuss concrete issuos xith n~y fami~yr. "
Paco Bustelo~ according to his t~other, repreaents the hardest 11ne in PSOE.
That rudical stance led him to reaign from the pasty's executive committe~~
At the Congress of Suressnes (France) he could have been elected first secre-
tary~ t.aking Felipe Gonzalez' 3ob away. ~
_ "Carlota, also f~om a radical s~cialiat posit~on, has nox 3oined the feminista,
and is fSghting with the executive committee of the POSE. She says that this
party has Pexer xomen deputies than the UCD."
His current disaf'fection from the PSOE 3s obvious. "When I talk xith my family
and other PSOE members, I get the feeling that the~r positions are the same as
those we had when Ne were university students."
The problem of this party~ he adds~ is that it has very feK members who have
Norked or who have had some responsibility in p~ivate or publia enterprise.
Now, after the municigal elections, they xill have to learn.
PSOE Should I,earn Eng].ish
For Carlos Bustelo, the voluntaristic 3oys of the leftist parties have had a
high price. "There is alxays the consolation aftez~rta~rds of saying that it xas
the CIA, but the CIA is not destabili~ing Sxeden. I xould like to help this
country become more like Sxeden in the next 10 years, and take it ~r~ther aa~ray
from that South American nation that it resembled so closely five years ago."
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"~t is no longer a problem of good o~ bad~ o~' ol~garah~es and exploited ma~r~eg~
but one of seeking th~ b~st possibl~ alloaat~.~n o f s e a
ree resour~es. Thi~ is
the ~olltical game of optiona."
'"~h~re are fex people in the PSO~ who under~~tand th~s, and ~thi~ of course makes
dialog with them 8lfficult. I a],so belleve tha~ it would be good ~or the PSOE
noonomi~ta to learn ~g11~h and forget ~the9r F~cenoh. Everyrthing ~tha,~ i8 r~cit-
t~n ~.n Frenah ~s harmful," concludea the minister. -
He $aYe that nox he has no time for reading~ "not even 'La historia magica d~
Es,pana' ~The Magio H3~tory of Spa1n] by my ~Send Sanche~ ]~rag~o
H~ a great fan of English novels--"until a month ago I read ~ 1ot ~n English"--
but that has given xay to the flood of pape,rwork. Hoxever~ he 3s very satis~
fiod with his ,~ob as minister of industry.
"The truth~" he adds, "is that I could be living the good life there. This
country so far has a1loHed me to live better than other Spaniards n~y age. I
fe~l indebted for that. I have been able to 11ve thanks to Sganiards~ and nox
S th3nk I should pay them back."
Car~.os Bustelo~ 42, raises his eyea to a Casado de Alisal oil painting, called
T~~g�~~ "I don't knox xho that Koman xas, but her skeptiGal and mocking
look is an obsession with me. It's as if she were constantly asking me, 'And
you, what are you doing here?r"
'"The xhole country," he goes on~ "seems to be reac~y to hring all its p~roblem~
to this ministry, Nhich is quite overxhelming. This is still a very F~ancoist
country. The behavior and mental inertia of the last fex years xill take quite
~ xhile to conquer. I am optimiatic for the long run~ trut I am axare of all
we have ahead of us in the struggle to overcome the inertia of F~ancoie~n."
Inflation One Thing, Ayatollah Another
He looks out for a moment at the traffic of Serrano.
into xhich the Minietry of Industry is 3a~mb~ed is constantly~assaultediby~theion
noise of an utterly debilitating traffi.c. Speaking of traffic~ xe are reminded
of the issues of gasoline, oil, and energy.
"We must do something about energy, and xe must do it nox~" he observes thought-
fully as he stares out the xindosr.
[Question] Hoxever, your cabinet aolleague, Minister of Economics Jose Luis
Zeal~ has said that there is no reason to raise energy p~ices nox. Are there
really differences of opinion betxeen you txo? The p~ess has said so.
[AnsHer] Jose I,uis I,eal and I are in agreement on the serious nature of the
problem. The only differences xe have revolve around Hhen xould be the best
time to take the steps to solve the prroblem. Of course~ it is absolutely ine-
vitable that xe must rationalize energy ~ices. Spaniards ca,nnot think or
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hopn thut while the wbrld is ~.n turmoil~ we Spaniardg can oontinue to squ~,nder
energy unth~.nkin$ly~ ~.~.ke a chosen peopl~. Zt would be suioidal ~or Spain to
rapaat Barrera de Ir~r?o s ploy~ ~he o1d no~hing-ig~go~.n~_on-here gam,e ~tha,~t
we ~ro g~~ii ~~~~tt~.ng.
With regard t~ th~ t3ming oS the price increase for energy producta~ among
th~m gasollne, it aeema that ~the minis~ter o f induetry and energy has lost
the battle, and there is r~othing to do until Ju1y. The goal is s~ill to reach
tho home stretch with semester pr~.ces under 6.5 percent in order to prevent
the rev3.sion of co].lective bargaining ag~eements.
"What we will have to do," comments Carlos Bustelo, "3s take energy out of the
co~t of 1lving 9,ndex, as is done in some countriea. Inflation ie one thing=
~he Ayatollah is another~"
~'he issue of his ~.~elationship with Jose Luis Lea1, comes up again. "There
is no dif="erence between us," Carlos Bustelo ha.stens to point out, as we
showed in the conversationa we always ha,ve, I have only knoKn Jose Luis Leal
for a short time, but from the beginning I realized that he is very similar to
me. His education, his past~ T daresay h3s style--all are like mi.ne.
Ctxre Putlic Sector
Perhaps CarZos Buatelo would like to have named a new p~esident of the National
Institute for Industry. However, he could not. In any case~ he prefers not
to discuss the matter. "What I will do," he affirms, "is professionalize as -
much as possible the ma,na,gement of the Inatitute`s firms. I have alreac~y begvn
cleaning up the chairmanships, and I w311 delve into t~;a~ more in the coming
weeks."
The errors of the public sector~ he says, have cost the country tena of billions
of pesetas in recent years~ "a.nd that must stop." ' .
Concerning the policy tt,a~ he wi~Z follow a~s head of the Ministry of Industry~
Bustelo is clearly in favor of doing axay with the Francoist p~actice of sec-
torial policies. "We must establish a common economic policy among all the
ministries, and for my part, I intend. to participa,te in all general economic
policy decisions."
Regarding his ministry, Bustelo wants to put an end to interventionism as much
as possible. Security, unity xith ~.larope and environmental conservation are his
main objectives. "We definitely do not ha,ve to invent great things. We have
Ewcope right there, and we ca.nnot afford to be different." ~
Yes On Nuclear Energy
Carlos Bustelo is an enthusiastic supporter o~ nuclear energy~ although the
final decision wi11 be subject to the dictates of the pol~.tical pasty represen-
tatives. As far as a referendum is concerned, he says it is a poor solution in
a democxatic regime. 'Those are solutions for Franco or De Gau11e."
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- roK ~~~icrni, us~ orr~Y
~tecent7y referendums ware held on ~he nuolear ~,ssue in Au~~tria~ where the anti-
nu~o~.ear ~orees won~ and Sw~.t~erland~ wher~ ~he other s~.da was vic~oriou$.
Aocord3.ng to Bus~elo~ "thle ~.s a new and oontrovarsial [de puntn] �orm of energy
wh~.ch ha~ risks ChaC musC be reduced ~s much as poss~.ble, aven at the cosr of in~
creasing ~the per-kiloxatt prioo. C~,ven the need for ener
country~ it cannot be ignored a~ a basic su ~~�N~h in this -
Pport for consumption."
E'inally, warns the ministeri "St would be a historio deaision if we were to
abandon ~the nualear optionf ona wh~.oh would involve abandoning any possibillt~r
o~ Spa,in bocoming a part of the European ~conomio Community.
C0~'YkIGHT: 1975. CAMBIO 16 INFOEtMACION Y. 1'i1gLICACIONES, S.A.
8926
CSO: 3110
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COUNTRY S~CTION ;
SPAIN ~
I
' ' ;
~CONOMY MINISTER'S BACKGROUND bISCUSSED ~
}
i
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 29 Apr 79 pp 36, 37 !
[Text) He was a fellow student o� Juan Carlos I of Spain in his under-
graduaCe days, buC that ia a biographical fact that Joae Luie Leal in his
discretion prefers to omit. Perhapa for Che same reason, Televiaion Spain '
decided Co leave out the minutieg of film in which the King, ceremoniously
exCending~his hand to all ehe ministera asauming their poats, fell into a '
friendly embrace wiCh ehe new minisCer of the economy. '
~
Jose Luis Leal spent nearly 15 of his 39 years of life abroad. Thst was
cereainly not the future his father, the liberal--according ro hia son--
Admiral Lea1, dreamed of for him. There seemed to be no indication of it
when the young man.began studying law in Madrid.
The admiral had not calculated that university life would plunge his son ~
into the world of the "Felipe" (Popular Liberation Front), and that later
that activity would send him into exile. , ~ ~
"That was a very complicated era," he recalls in his office at Castellana 3.
~ "We were in the university, and at the ~ame time we were plottin~." For
him, as for many others, the mair? concern was personal safety. "The fear
of torture, or, at best, 10 or 15 years in prison.".
Like Penelope ~
Political activity forced.a "sort of double life, which was.very risky, and
in which, likewise, very few of us took part."
Installed in the office that had been Laureano Lopez Rodo's--"Here, like
Penelope, we work to unravel what has been woven earlier"--Jose Luis Leal
tries to explain the meager reaponse those young enthuaiasts found. "The ~
social climate of the times was hostile to debate. The strikes were re-
- sounding failures. We could not assemble anyone except ourselvea. We
always had pamphlets left over."
The reign of terror, perhaps? "More than that; I think that we were far
away from the social reality of the country at that time; our theories were
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~OR O~~ICTAL US~ ONLX
those of the Chird world. On eh~ oCher hand, tih~r~ w~~ ~l~o the influence
the victariaue Cuban revolut~on." Th~ risk, ~een from afar, ~eemed
enormous. "We used Co ca11 n demonstrgtion, and there raere only u~ and
20,000 policemen."
Neverthelesa, for Jose Lui~ Leal, the FLP exp~r3ence had, and etill h~s, an
undeni~ble virtue: it wae n truly autochthonous effort. "Although we were
very far from the reality of the times, we were glways cloeer than rhe
opposition, which had its nucleua abroad, above all in Paris."
And not 3uet that. On a mcre sentimental 1eve1, he also wante to recover
the golid ties developed among the membera of the group. "We w~re v~ry
serongly united."
In the wnrld of secrecy, dangery "the double life," there neverCh~lesg was
room to write poeCry, an inclination that Joae Luis Leal, wiCh a ehy smile,
confesses that he kecps up to thia day. Of couree in thoae timee of rebel-
, lion, the accent was on social problems, influence af "the Spanieh equivalent
of social realism." Time has colored the poetry of the presenC mittisCer
of the economy with greater sentimentaliem. ,
His long stay abroad--"I have some difficulty using Spaniah fluently"--
serves as hia alibi to explain Che way he keepa hie poetry production private.
For all those who live with danger, the time comes when they cross Che line ,
between action and prison. And that time, for Joae Luis Leal, came "around
1960 to 1962." F~.rst Geneva, where he took his degree in political science. _
Then Paris, which gave him the opportunity to get his doctorate in economy
and also the diploma of the Higher Institute of Statistics.
May of 1968 finds him in Nanterre, teaching economics in the sociology
' department. Among the many students he had during the 5 years he taught
in Nanterre, was Daniel Cohn Bendit, for whom Joae Luis Leal does not con-
ceal his fellow feeling.
"He was very intelligent, an excellent debater, and admirable mobilizer,
and likewise, he had an enormous capacity to poke fun at anything."
The memory of that May enlivens the placid features of the miniater of
economy which have a somewhat mature air, despite his youth. The enthusiasm
changes the calm rhythm and the rather low tone nf his voice. "The French
university," he sums up, "was rather amazing up to that point. It was a
very academic world."
The specific scene in which he happened to evolve was a sort of synthesis
of that university world. "Nanterre was an island, in a suburb, on the '
outskirts of Paris." In his memory he relives the wandering of the
studentg, who did'not have even a nearby bar to go to between classes. '
"They sat in the corridors, because there was noC even a meeting room. It
all seemed rather unreal."
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The r~b~~l~on w~~ ~lma~t unno~iced ~e eh~ beginning. "Those k~de wer~ ~
1iCC1~ bi.C an~rchieCic and a litCle b~.C utiop~an. Ae fir~t, ev~ryone wge _
~g~in~r th~m." P~rhap~ b~cause of his youeh--he wgg tihen 28 year~ o1d--or
becau~~ of his Cemperam~nt, or a cereain bas3c anarchiem, Jo~e Luia Lea1
gl~ared eheir �ee13�g~.
Reading Freud is Good
lii~ c~dmirAt~on, he now speculates, perhaps was baeed on ehe fact that the
reb~llion used the weapon of sarcaem a great d~al, "which French society
lik~d very 1~.~~1e." He dplightedly foLlowed the alow growth of the .
rebellioug mnvement, wiCneesed how iC gained support and left the universiCy
to reACh to working ~ectore. "They alwaye had to face tihe opposition of
Maoiste and communists. But when they reached that point, the Maoiets pro-
duced a remarkable self-critique, in which they admitted ChaC they w~re
miatnken abouC the ma~see; that they were not outaide, but were Che
student masses." ~
Going beyond rhe anecdote, Joae Luie Leal atressea the novel nature of the
rebellious movement compared to the academic world and French aociety.
"But it algo questioned Marxist thought, the only kind considered valid
among the intellectuals up to that time." ,
The effecta of May 1968--"which continue to this day"--may have included
allowing the penetration of oCher ideas in a society that was very stratified
until then, and purting more ideas in circulation. "Fteud ia read more, for
example, which seems very positive to me." �
gut while the rebellious movement gained ever more aupport among the student ~
body, ie was not so with the profesaora, who divided up into three tendenciea. _
In Che firse place, there were those who radically opposed it. 7'he present
economy minister recalls with amusement "a ce.rtain very short professor who
I saw ~umping up to set fire to a poeter with his lighter."
Other profesaors--"above all at the end"--took an active part in the rebel-
lion. The third sector, wh~.ch included Joae Luis Leal, watched the changes
that were taking place with curiosity, interest~ and sympathy.
"It was a very radical movement in its plans, but very sofC in its forms."
And almost with complicity. Jose Luis Leal ends, "It wa~ also a lot of fun,
very surprising. Every 'happening' was organized!"
To Choose in a Democracy ~
~
After his teaching experience in Nanterre, Jose Luis Leal entered the
Department of Economic Affairs of the ODCE [expansion unknownJ, where he
was concerned with the Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese econoniies. Still
living in Paris, he went'through all the proceedinga to vote by mail on
15 June 1977--"a very difficult thing"--but wh~n he had it all arranged, he
decided to come to vote in person. "I wanted to aee it with my own eyea."
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Ii~for~ eh~ ~l~cti~n, ~r~ 14 Juna to b~ pX~Ct~ h~ h~ppened to m~et L~nrique
~uent~~ Quintnna, m~,nigeer of rhe ~conomy~ gt a dinner. After Che election,
Fu~nte~ QuinCgn~ offer~d him Che pos~,tion of Director of Economic Policy.
"I accept~d because tha temptation to have ~ ema11 parC in the reeroration
of democracy in thie counrry was very great."
Months later, after the re~ignetion of Fuentes Quintana, Jose Luie Leal is
named Secretary of State, i~t Mareh 19)8.
Littl~ by little, his own acCivity in government circie~ bringe him closer
to ~h~ Union of the Democratic Center (t1CD), which he ~oina ahortly b~fore
th~ fir~t congreee, in October of laet yeer.
"With rhe constitution, I felt thae the trgnsition period was over. bemoc- _
rury obligea people to make choices." Joe~ Luis Leal ~beoluC~ly refuses to
admit that mathod may be ~bove the part3ea. "It ought to b~ aubordinate to
poliCical power." ~
The miniater of economy Was faced with the need to make a choice~ and "the
alCernative that aeemed best to me was the UCD."
"On the other hand," he adds, "another reason for that choice vag that I
believe that eome refora~s muet be made, and ~ith a liberal spirit."
A Paradoxical 3ociety
Scorning naivete, Jose Luis Leal maintains that "it is obvious that Spanish
society still has an enormous amount of Francoist sediment." This after-
taste may be tranalated into a certain rigidity, in still-stereotyped
behavior. "It is a society in which it is still hard to dieaent. They
are all Worried gbout being in agreement. �
"But I th~nk that, at the saaae time, it is a paradoxical society, eince it
acceptg change relatively well, gnd ie very open to innovation." 'Also aur-
prising to him is the absence of a spirit of invesCigation, and not only in ~
the scientific fielda. "There is a complete lack of a apirit of criticiam,
in the Anglo-5axon sense of the aord."
The danger, he points out, is that debate in Spain is understood to be "a~ ~ -
lot of shouting, and not an exchange of ideas in which it is not ebsolvtely
indispensible to:reach total agreement." _
Then is it good that a consensus has been reached? "The conaenaus Was
. necessary to end the transition period, and its result aas the development
of a really preaentable conatitution."
In his opinion this is the beginaing of a period of constructive debate to
reach a pluralist democracy.
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"Now," h~ gu~~~~~ hop~ful].y, "~et'g sa~ 3f we gr~ ~b1e to dissent and debaee
go ~hne th~ c~.ounrry will fe~l rhaC i~ eruly repre~~nCed by itg politicign~ ~
and ~1ir~~ted by iC~ di~cu~aiong." The Anglo-Saxom m~d~1 ~ri~es again; "I
m~ran rniks ~n Parliam~nC, peacefully, c~lm].y."
"I promise"--~nd noC "I gw~ar"--was ehe formula h~ chose to enk~ hig office,
distin$ui$hing h~ms~lf from eh~ oCher ministerg. "Both formulas are per-
Eecely congeiCutiona].," he ~xplaine. "Z choee Che lay �orm because I firmly
b~liav~ thae the ~hurch ahould be separgeed from Che sCaCe."
L~nndmy in Thr~~ SC~geg
_ 'Che Eueure,of ehe ~conomic policy, according to the man responaible �or ie,
has mdre thnn one bg~ig for opeimi~m.
"We Chink rhat we musC make our plan~ in three stages. On Che one hand, the
immedtat~ st~g~, the pressing problems, auch as strikes and inflaeion. We
Chink we nre doing everything possible to hold down the unemployment rate, ~
wieh measures like reducing retirement age in some sectors, stimulating privaCe
initiuCive, which in the final instance is what creates employment. In any
cuse, there is no aingle soluCion for Chis problem."
The second stage, the economy minister continues, is thaC of making medium- '
term forecasts, seeking a way out of the crisis for the next few years. It
would be a maCter of establishing priorities: investment, induaCrial recon-
version, exports, profesaional training, and a long list of others which
should be the ob~ect of careful study.
The third stage, the one Jose Luis Leal srresses Che most, is what he calls
"exploration": "Knowing where we are going. Really knowing ourselves. It
seems ~nbelievable, but we do not even know exactly what our natural resources
are, our reserves in oil and minerals. We must make long-term plans.
"The most important thing," he stressea, "is to be aware, because we have
already ahown that we are able to change."
COPYRIGHT: 1979, CAI~IO 16, Informacion y Publicaciones, S. A.
8587 ~
CSO: 3110
END
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