JPRS ID: 8476 TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE

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JPRS L/8476
23 May 1979
TR,4NSLATIONS ON '~IESTERN E~ROPE -
(FOUO 30/79>
. ~ .
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~ JPRS L/8476
23 May 1.979
TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 30/79~ '
CONTENTS PAGE
. COUNTRY SECTION
FEDERAL ftEPUBLIC OF C~ERMANY
Japanese Reporter Ravxews OTRA(~ Program
(Susumu Abe; UCHU JIDAI, No l, 1979) 1
FRANC~
Overseas Intervention Capability Appraised
(Victor Loizillon; AFt~S D~AUJOUItD~HUI~ Mar 79) 9
Paratroop Division~s Capabilities Reviewed
(ARMEES D~AUJOURD~HUI, Mar ?9) 1Lt
Marine 1}ivision~s Cavabilities Outlined
(Jean-Claude I,aboria; ARFSEES D~AUJOURD~HUI, Mar 79) 20
Current Political Scene Viewed, Analyzed
(Michel Gonod, Liliane Gallifet; PARSS MAT~H, 20 Apr 79) 27
Political Situation Seen Con~used, Hazardous
(Arthur Conte; PAF~IS MATCH, 20 Apr ?9) 31
Economic Effects of Normanc~y Ep3zooty Viewed
(Fabien Gruhier; I.E NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 23 Apr 79) 37
ITALY
ENEL~s Projected Electrical Energy Demand to 1987
(Giusepg~ Bonazzoli; L~r,UROPEO, 5 Apr 79) ltl
MALTA .
Report on Act~vities of ~oviet Fleet in Mediterranean
(Gianfranco Simone; CORRSERE DELLA SERA, 31 Mar 79) 1t1~
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUOj
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COUNTRY S~CTION FEDE'RAL REpUBLIC OF CERMANY
'.:APANESE REPORTER ,REVIEWS OTItAG PROGRAM
, Tokyo UCHU JIDAI in Japanese Vol 3, No l, Spring 1979 pp ~t4-~t6
[ArCicle by Susumu Abe, National Space Development Agency: "OTRAG Low-
Cost Space Itocket Under Development"]
[TexC] Why Develop OTRAG?
A rocket which looked like four electric polea bound together was launched
on 17 May 1977 from Zaire in Africa. 'This is a diaposable rocket which
, is being developed by a West German private corporation called OTRAG
. (Orbital Firing Rocket Company), and it is pro~ected to be in practical uae
by 1981. If the rocket is utilized, it is said that various satellitea
' can be launched from it at half the launching cost of existing ruckets.
In developing the rocket, a process deaignated as a compiling system is
- employed. In this system, an ultimate large-size rocket will be realized
by binding multiple principal modules which will consist of comparaCively
small-sized Canks and engines. The rocket launched in May 1977 was a
minimum flight-worthy module with four tanks and four engines. The tanks
were approximately 30 cm in diameter and approximaCely 6.4 in length.
To develop this module into a large-size rocket, the length of Che tanks
is to be elongated while their diameter will remain the same. Further.nore,
. a multiple number of these tanks will be bound togeCher. At this time, it
seems feasible to bind them either in a circular or in a hexagonal shape,
but OTRAG has decided to bind them in a cube. In addition, the OTRAG
rocket is going to be multistaged. The modules bound in several layers
will start cambusting from the outer side. Completely burnt out modulea
will be separated from the rocket unit by unit, and then the next exposed
out layer will be ignited. As this procedure is repeated one after
another, only very few modules will remain in the center by the time a
satellite is puc into orbit. This rocket may be considered rather out
of tlie ordinary by this feature alone, but there are many atrier unique
,features, which may be epochal or fanciful, and are different frcxa the _
features of the existing rockets. The tank is made of a stainless steel
which is cold worked for high t~nsile strength. Nitric acid and kerosene
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roii o~~ rLC [At., us~: orrt,Y
are used as fuels because of their ~vai~ability and manag~ability, and
furtihermore, tiheir low cnst. There are highly efficienti fuels which have
been Al~:~st exclusively util.ized as rockee fuels�, but they were noC
selected becnuse of Cheir h3gh coat and poor manag~abillty. RockeC fuels
are usually forced intio the engines by a pump system or by a high pressure
~as pressure system. The pump meehod was not adopted however, due ta rhe
cnmplex mechanism and comparatively high cost, and Che gas forced method
was chosen. Under this circumytance~ the upper one-third o� the tank is
filled with compressed air, whereas Che .lower two-thirds is fi11~d with
fuel. The aCtitude control system commonly used for a 1lyuid engine is
called a gimbal aystem, which controls the atCitude w4.th the goose-neck
engines. Neverthelese, Chis system was also not adopted, to avoid its
intricate mechanism. ~
Well, then, what kind of ineasures were take:? to substitute the popular
system? 7'he new system is raCher sCrange. With rlenty of engines provided
for the OT1tAG rocket as described before, the aCtitude is going to be
mainCained by regulating fuel suppliea to the engines.
Specifically, fuel supply to the engines in the direction into which the
rocket should face will be reduced so that the attitude will be conCrolled
by Che intentionally created unbalance of the thrust.
For Chis purpose, each engine is attached with a spherical vnlve which
regulates the fuel supply. Three-sCage regulation of full-open, half-open
and shut phases is available. Incidentally, it is very surprising to know
that the valves used for the engines are commercial valves which are used
in the chemical industry, and the motors that move the valves are the
motors used for automobile wipers. Evading complexity and the high cost,
the abrasive system with asbestos and phenol plastic resin coatings is
also used for the structure of the combustion chamber instead of the
recycled cooling system which requires a pipe structure.
Why OTRAG Costs Less
As you may have already noticed by reading the introduction up to this
moment, the principal idea in developing the OTRAG rocket is to hold the
- cosC low by Che maximum simplification of the mechanism and the adoptation
of as many commercial products as possible. OTRAG contends that under
this low cost policy, saCellites can be launched annroximately at half the
cosC of existing rockets and also at a,~ost fully comparable with reusable
space shuttles which will emerge as the main rockets of the U.S.A. in the
1980's. For instance, they say, rockets which are equivalent to the
Delta, AClas Centaur and Titan 3C of the U.S.A. can be offered at approxi-
mately 7 million dollars, 12 million dollars and 15 million dollars
res~,ectively.
However, on-lookers remain quite cool in conCrast to the determiantion and
enthusiasm exhibited by OTRAG. There is some criticism from the special-
ists who point our that with a system.such as this, the capability will
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_ E~Ott U~i~ 1:C t~1(. 1r51s c)NLY
not increase proportionately to the increASe in size,,and thaC Che
comUination of niCric acid and kerosette will not obtain atiable combustion.
A1so, many ques~ion the financial affairs oF OTRAG.
In response Co these criticisms and questions, OTRAG w311ingly recognizea
thaC ~here is an explici~ disadvanCage in the structural effic~.ency, and
that the OTRAG rocket weighs almost twice as much as a U.S. rocket o� an
equivalent capability~ Also, they admit the need to overload the fuel
much more ~han if other specialized fuels were used due to the poor fuel
efficiency. Nevertheless, ehey dispute and conCend tha~ they achieved
successful results in reducing the cost compared to others and in obtaining
stable combustion by tfia use of nitric acid and kerosene. As for their
financial affairs, they say that there is absolutely no need to worry since
their expenses are covered wiCh capital subscribed by approximately 600
privatie investors and they are confident that the number of investors wi11
incrense in the future as the pro~ect progresses.
However, as is commonly known, it is expensive to engage in space develop-
ment, and it seems imposaible that th~ pro;ject can be supported solely by
the private sector. In fact, some reports disclose that Che pro~ect is
subsidized by the National Defen~e DepartmenC of West Germany, or that it
is under the auspices of NATO, although theae reports ar~~ not authenticated.
Regardless of these matters, following the first Cest, OT12AG succeeded in
a secor.d test on 20 May 1978, sohere the rocket reached an altitude of 30 km.
On the first test, approximately 10 km in altitude was reached because the
fuel ts~nks we.re only half filled ;~t that time. The second test was conducted
with full tanks. Incidentally, a principal module with four engines and
four tanks w~s used in the second test ~ust as in the first ~est. However,
in the third test held on 5 June 1978, the rocket made a large arc and
crashed into the grour~d because one of the four engines failed to work,
although the test was conducted using the same principal module as used
in test two.
According to the story told by an OTRAG engineer in regard to this failu~~,
if a similar engine failure should occur in a large rocket there is no
need to worry, since other engines can talce over for the failed engine even
with the same control system used at this time, because the number of
engines used increases more w{*`; a larger rocket. Then, there remains the _
question that failures maq inci.~sase with ~the increase~ in the number of
engines. Since the incident, OTRAG is proposing to conduct a fourth test
with the same principal module at the end of 1978, and to hold the firat
orbitting Cest using a rocket with approximately 80 engines and 80 tanks
in March 1979. ~
� Is OTRAG Really Going To Be A Space Rocket?
_ OTRAG plans to put the rocket into practical use by the yea.r 1981, and
they say they have already received several applications for use of the
rocket. T~ao of the applications were for the use of the OTRAG 2G0, which
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. ~n~ o~rzcr.Ai~ IJ5L UNi,~~
~ is eqtiivalent to tihe U.S~ scouti rockeC c1~ss~ Thia rocketi iQ nboue
20 meter~ long and 1.5 me~ers wi.de, and can put a smn11 s~tellite ~:nto a
long ellipt~cal orbit. The other four applications were fnr the use of
a rocket named OTRAG C 2,500 wh~.ch is equivalent ro tihe U.S. nel~a rocket
class. 'rhis rockex measures 20 meters long and 4 meters wide, and iC is
planned to use the rockee Co ehrust a satelliCe intn orb~.t at an altitude
of 300-500 km in 1981. Iricidenrally, OTRAG r.efuses to disclose the names
of the users who applied for the use o� the rockets, which aroused various
speculat~.ons ,*.ogeCher with the proposals to launch communications satel-
lites, weaCher satellites and others including reconnais~�.nce sa~ellites,
' satellites which are too dangeroua to be launched �rom space shuttles�, and
politically sensitive satellites.
In addieion, OTRAG is planning to develop the OTRAG 10,000, approximate~.y
g meters wide and 30-35 meters long, which is equivalent to the U~S. Atlas
Centaur and is capable of launching a stationary satellite of approximately
2 tons, and also to develop a large rockeC which ia equivnlent to ~he
Titan 3C. What one mus~ noCe here is the grear width of the rockets.
The width o� the OTRAG 2,500, which is equivalent to Delta measures 4 meters,
1.5 t3mes ~~rider than De1Ca. OTRAG cons3ders Chis greaC width as one of Che
mer3.ts of the rocket. Precisely, with ample width allowance, the size
should not become too much of a concern when a satellite is being designed.
~As described previously, the sectional surface of the OTRAG rockets is
cubical, but the part which houses the saCellite is circular ~ust as in
ordinary rockets. The launching program of OTRAG schedules a yearly aver-
age of 10 units from i981 to 1990. OTRAG forecaats that the ma~ority will
be large-sized rockets, although various sizes from small Co large may be
included in the scheduled launching tests.
In Che above, OTRAG gas has been introduced briefly. Now,tlast~.y, let me
refer to why the OTRAG's launching facility was built in Zaire. According
to OTItAG, suitable sites were not found in West Germany or or~ the coast-
lines of the Mediterranean. Thereupon, launching sites were searched in
ehe vicinity of the equator which is advantageous for launching rockets.
" Although the request for the site was also submitted to tTie governments
of Indonesia and Brazil, Pres3dent Mobutu of Z~ire was the first to
respond. It is said that he hopes to see Zaire turn into a"Cape Canaveral."
L~
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_ ~ 7. View of Che OTRAG Launching SiCe
8. Look of the Thard Launching Test
One of the four engines did not work, which resulted in an
unbalanced thrust. The rocket made a large arc and crashed
to the ground.
COPYRIGHT: Cosmos Publication Co.~ Ltd., 1979
F
8940 .
CSO: 4105
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COCJNTRY SECTION ~ FRANCF
~ i
OVER5EAS INTERVENTTON CAPABTLITY APPRAISED
, Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Mar 79 pp 44-45
[Article by Div Gen Victor Loizillon, DCS/OPS, Armed Forces General Staff:
"Foreign Operations"]
[Text] Div Gen Victor Loizillon ~ntered Saint-Cyr in
1940. In 1'~42 he was a second lieutenant with the 4th
Assault Battalion during the Liberation Campaign and
in Germany. Subsequently assigned to the Sth Moroc-
can Spa:hi Regiment and to the Saharan Grcup i.~ Southern
~ Tunisir~, he became an instructor at the Military Aca-
demy it: Strasbourg in 1954; he served with the 27th
Dragoon Battalion.in Algeria between 1956 and 1958
and, after returning again to Strasbourg, which he
~ left ~n 1960, he attended the 74th class at the War
College. After serving as CO of the lst Cuirassier
Regiment at Saint-Wendel fr~m 1956 [sic] until 196$,
Colonel Loizillon became chief of staff of the~8th ~
Division at Compiegae for 2 years; after that he be-
came head of the "general staff" and "general'studtes"
bureau of DPMAT [Military-Technical Assistance Dir�-
ectorate], before becoming chief of "logistics _
org~nization" at the EMA [Army General Staff]. ~France's
armed forces have for several years been commiCted to
Mforeign QperaCions" to the b�_.nefit of countries that
requested French aid and in an effort Co rasolve -
crises that were capable of threatening their security
and that of French nationals living on their terri*_ory.
These operations, which involved various Cypes and ~
variable periods of time, involved limited manpower
and equipment. They were carried out in Africa and.
the Middle East. The media prwed to be very atten-
tive to_this type of activity which literature it-
self sometimes picked up as sub3ect matter without �
.delay or reluctance. This ability to grasp current ~
a~�fairs in terms of real time and under all circum-
s'cances however does not r.ule out certain gaps in
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' the information p~'OG~9g b~cauge nn~ ~anndr alwayb know
and keep up with ~uch und~rtaking~ from the pl~nning
g~age onw~r8.
in Che ~rmed fnr.c~g, thege operat~.on~ were not necn~sarily ~.ne~rpr~t~d in
th~ prop~r conCext~ exc~pt of courg~ outgl.de a emall group of th~ir pro-
t~goni~Cg. Other operatiions--le~g ralked about hecause they w~re ].eea
~pectacular--rgmain relativel,v unknown. ~
1t w~~ rherefore desir~bin for Che magazinc: AFtM~~5 U'At3~'.G.,ltn'HtJI to devoce
on~ of it~ repore~ to the most heavily covered milit~xy operatiions which
how~v~r had not been ~ompletely reported on.
Cgrryin$ t?uC Gover~menC necieions in the ~'ield
In ord~r properly to understand the ultimate purpo~e of France's foreign
op~r~tions and the genera]. context within which they were conducteii, we
~ must refer to the preamble of the law .~pproving the military program for '
1977-1982. This law spella ouC the eeaential migsions aesigned to the
armed fur_ces and the cap~bilities deriving from Chat.
, LeC us cite two extracts:
"Outside ~urope, the armed forces must be capable of contribuCing r,o the
security af countries to which ~'rance is tied by accorda or by d~ '~g~tia
solidarity, either econo~ic or cultural";
"They aaus: be capable of carrying out f~reign operationa in variaus forms~
regardless of whether thiK invloves participating in show-the-f1aA miasions
upon the request of international organizatio~s or oa request of countries
involved, or whether this involves giving military and ~echncial assis-
tance to threaCened sCates."
Foreign operations therefore must be considered within the'general context
of France's foreign policy. The role of the armed forceg is to support
and to carry out the deciaions of the government in protecting French
nationals or defending national interests, as well as with regard to the
prevention and settlemenC of crises ia which France might find itself in-
volved, either direcCly, or by way of implementation of agreements signed
with Friendly countries.
Speed and Discretion--Absolute Requir~ments
These operaCions are arranged in two categories, depending upon their
ultimate purposes.
Direct support operations are conducted by foLces aesembled upon request
in order to respond to a crisis situaticn.
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Ind.ir~cti ~uppore op~rgtiion~ ~re cgrripu ouL Uy ~~.ndin~ gmgll taam9 of
op~~~rionai or t~chnfcal advi~ozo or by ~urt~iehing equ~.pm~nti aad r~nd~rit~~
A~rV~CG~B.
BuC boCh of these tiwo categories raveal common featuroa:
rhey ar~ mo~t o�t~n ur~ent and they are l~unch~d ~uddenly;
Th~y h~ve an ~ccentuated political-military character;
~h~y demand gre~t discretion in tiheir execution; .
And, f.in~lly, they are limited-objective operationg.
Lanuching a foreign operation ig almoat always tt?e resulC of a criais
aituaet~n. The tmportane thing ig to respnnd to the urgent demand of a
fri~ndiy country thae is threatened or Co meet an immediate need. ~or
example, we only had a�ew deys to a~aemble and dispatch the peace-keeping
dee~chmenC Co Lebanon. And the time frame tor launching the Kolwezi opera-
tion involved only ~ mntter of hours.
Nobody can fail to aote the polittc~l-military character of theae opera~
~ tions. The impact on public opinion aad the ineeraatioaal reaentmen~ ~
~ which can be triggered by an incident, even on a modeet level, are ofCen
w~y out of praportion to the ultimaCe purpoae of the operation or th~
volume of resources involved. Under tneae conditions, especially in the
cage of direct support, decieione must generally be passed to the higheet
government guthority, both with regard eo the dispatch of unite and with
respect to their iuitial cocnmitment and the conquest of operationa. In
this rontext,.the concern for effectivenese ~nd efficiency on the part of
those who will carry out the miesion in the field must be constantly
guided by the political effect to be producec~ aad numerous decisions must
be centralized on the armed forceg general ataff [joint staff] echelon.
All of this m~ans that we muet demand perfect discretion on the part of
those who ~ill carry out the operation in the field. This can be achieved
only by atrictly limiting the number of tho~e initiated into the operation.
This resCriction is oftea difficult Cn reconcile with the commaad's desire
. to give the armed forces complete sud objectivv~ information but it ie in-
dispensable to the succesa of d~plomatic maneuvers which the commitment
of forces are supposed to prepare the aay for.
These operaCione finally are limited in nature because they involve only
relatively modeat manpower. The peace-keeping detachment it? Lebanon
nveer exceeded 1,300 men; tha Kolwezi operation was carried ouC by 750
men; the total personnel etrength of the Fxench forces in Chad ie on the
order of 1,900. Military asaistance ox cooperation officer detac:hmeats
rarely exceed several scor~ of officers or NCOs.
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~ Contiinu~.ng Improvement
_ Mnny 1e~~nna w~re 1~~rn~d L�rom thes~ varioue types of opergtione. We will
de~nrib~ four of ~hem here.
The fir~t dea1C wiCh the general nrganization of forcpa and their op~ra-
eionel availabiliey. While France's foreign operational capability es-
eenCially rests on tha exietience of ma~or unite more specifically oriented
toward thia type of operation and kept in a sCaCe readineas so that they
may go into acCion rapidly, it aleo dependa on the aptit~de of the etiher
Components of the armed forces to furnish the tieams neceseary for their
reinforcementi in caee of need. This ie not a matter of arawing at random
upon the normal potentiial of other formaCions, nor does this involve pro-
viding epecialized training for all forcea in this type of operation.
Thia is simply a matC~r o�, in advance, constituti.ng, in the Chree ser-
vices, certain elementary c~lls or detachments that have the required
capabilities and availability. An efforC is in progress along these
linea. It ahould make it poseible considerably to improve our capabil-
ieies.
The second one deals with the need for having very modern and particu~arly
suitable equi.pment available for the uniCs that are committed.
The third one relatea to transpmrtation. Thsee operations as a matter of
fact require sufficienC transport capacity in order to move and support
the strike eleu?ents. Various improvements have been envisaged. They
should take shape rap3dly.
The fourth lesson learned finally deals with communication. The cenCral-
ized conduct of operaCions implias very good long-distance communications.
In this field, improvements are also neceasary. They will see the light
of day in the near future.
This article briefly presented the major features and the principal les-
sons learned from foreign operatians conducted over the past seveYal years.
The aucceases registered bear witness to the trAining level and the cohes-
ion of the units committed; but they also reault from the high degree of
operational availability of all of our forces and their ability to meet
all imaginable situaCions.
Our foreign operac.ions capabilities ~ust be constantly improved. Every-
body must be aware of that. This is the purpose of this report which,
after having described a specific foreign operation in t~e form of the
Kolwezi missioa, will describe the capabilities of each of che services '
and of the Medical Corps in this field.
12 ~
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~ ro~ ~~~~~ctar~ c~s~~: nNLY
~ ~
, .
General Victor Loizillon
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Revae des forces armees francaiaes "Armees d'Au~ourd'hui"
5058
C50: 3100
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~
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COUNTRY 3ECTION F~ANCE
+
~ PARATROOP DIVISION'S CAPABILITIES R'EVIEWEll
Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Mar 79 pp 48-49
[Article by group of llth Airborna Division officera: "2'he Fighring Men .
of the Sky--The llth Airborne Divinion"]
[Text~ You:told me to march and to be ready for ~oy
and suffering (excerpt from prayer by Capt Pierre
Bourgin). ,
It has been 23 yeare now since the reappearance of airborne division or-
ganizational structuree in the ground forces--23 years during which the
idea of the major paratrooper unit has grown atronger. The llth and 25th
airborne divisions, organized in 1956, yield~d to the llth Light Srrik~
Division in 1962. It became the llth Division in 1963, organized in three
brigades, (two parachute and one amphibious) in 1966; after ehat, t:~~ llth
Division became the llth Airborne Division in 197i and then the llth Air-
borne Diviaion and the 44th Mi1~Cary Territorial Division in 1977. The
constant development of its organizational strucr~re turned thia ma~or
unit into a tool that ~ras ever better adapted to the f2uctuating require-
ments of national defense. Recent eventg last year specifically brought
out the aptitud~ of Che llth DP (Airborne Division~ to reapond "all pre-
sent aad accouated for." ahen it came to displaying the twin capability of
a major unit in solving territorial and operational problems.
The 11th DP in 1979 retained undeniable specificity, rendering exemplary
multipurpose service thaaks to an original setup, in coping with real
~ situations out in the field.
Undeniable Specificity
It rests above all on the utilization of the third diaieasion.
The ilth DP is designed to operate through the third dimension. its units
as a matter of fact have a special aptitude for usiag helicopters but above
all aircraft permitting paradrops, as well as air transport and, in parti-
_ cular, assault air transport.
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Th~.~ a~Cieuda ig rh~ re~ult of ~pecif~,c tiechnical ~raining, uniqu~ and
permanent coop~r~e~.on with ~ha Air Force and ALAT (Light Ground Forcas
Aviat3on], down to the lowest 1eve1. The division~e equipmen~ givas ~C
rapid ~nd tremendous strike capabilitiea with ~re~r range in euppo~r of
op~raCions whoae init~al phase implies ehe elemenC of aurpriae.
But the spacificity of tha 11th DP also involves Che foll.owing.
NaCure of Its Re ..ruitment
Made up of volunteer draftees and regular peraonnel, ita uniCs are made
up of motivatad personnel, diverse in terms of their geographic origin
due to natiionwide recruiting but neveYthelesa welded togeCher by the
practic~ of parachuting. .
The young paratrooper of 1979 gladly liatens ro hia eidera and in the
units finde everyday brotherhood through teamwork and in return contri-
butes r~markable readiness.
Yts Structures
This n~~or unit ia unique in its kind by virtue of ita volume and Che
existence ef command organizations capable of interconnecting the raeana
of reconnaiesance for support and assietance, normal,ly found within or-
ganic divisional elemente.
The ~ggential originality of the llth DP ie tied to the fact that it
managed to place chis undeniable specifictty ia the service of the kind
of multinurpose capability desired by the High Command.
Exemplary Multipurpose Capability ~
The 11th DP is a multipurpose unit by virtue of the diversity of ite
forms of commitment which range frrnn action by ~ust a fea men, in mis- ~
aions requiring the use of special techniquea, all Che way to the commit-
ment of a regiment, a bri$ade, or even the entire division, in an AT opera-
tion, for example.
Regarding foreign operations, Che llth DP is capable of:
Either furniahing elements which. for a variable period of time, s~?ill
boost the forces aormally stationed overseas or provide for their periodic
relief in cage of need;
~ Or operating ~riCh all or a portion of its resources in all territories
under French sovereignty, in foreign countries tied to France by defenae
agreemenCa or in any other foreign theater of operations. In this con-
nection, the 11Ch DP operates aithin the frameaork of interservice foreign ~
operations forcee.
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In the ~uropean theaeer, the airborn~ d:Lvision is in reserv~: and at the
disposal of CEMA/CEMGA (Army Chief of Staff/Armed Fnrces Chief of 5raff]
who can comple~ely or by elementi place iC under Ch~ o+rder;
EiCher of a eerriroriai command (defense zone leval),
Or a ma~or operaeianal command already exiati.ng or created as a funceion of
rhp need.
Ic~ th~ first asgumption, it is intended to particip~te i. operations aimed
at oppoaing (on national CerriCory) any aCtempts at enemy penatr~tion of
maritiime or land frontier or by air. :
In th~ second ds3umption, ite commitment may be visualized in the viciniey
of or beyond Che borders against an armored or mechanized adversary who
might have a nuclear and chemical warfare capability. .
In this context, the airborne divieion can be called upon to perform the
following Cypes of action:
Decentralized, in a particular zone, eapecially againat rear areas,
AT action against enemy armored thruat;
"Coromando" type action.
~tegardless of the employment context, the coma?itmenC of this major unit
.is characterized by its instantan~ousness. This capability for instan-
taneous commitmen~c is carefully maintained by an alert syatem and ia
guaranteed by very great flexibility in the elementary structures. The
faet expansion or regrouping o� organic cells within structures adapted
to meet the requirementa of the moment gives the llth DP the ability to
master the meat diverse situationa.
Increased flexibility, in order to develop an even greater multipurpose
capability, demands diveraified and original training.
Original Training ~
This tralning effort is always attractive aad is governed by the idea of
diversity of geographic environment in which training preparatory of com-
bat is given. Moving an, with a miaimum of advance notice, irom [he
familiar eavironment of the military post or camp, to ever new horizons ;
overseas, the men are confronted vith real-life situations such as they '
are unexpectedly encountered in the field and Where the apirit of de- a
cision aad iaaovation is the rule.
CerCain standard situations are alaays revitalized and, without aay break ~
in contiauity, they call for the application of such diversified techniques j
r
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as AT combat, seizing keypointis or the abrupe deetirucr~.on of entrenched
enemy units. ~C is no~ rare for ~he young paraCrooper, in the couree of
: ~uae one quar~er, within very shore time intiervals tio be moved from winCer .
Cime cold a~ Muneingen Co ~he sCif lit~g heaC of ~n i~land in Che ~ndia~?
` Ocean. -
Nexe we look at Che equipmen~ involved. Concerning the use of aircrafti,
Che ma~or ~b~active remains to drop paraCroopers, within the assault
ecb,elon, under condi~iona of total darkness, on terrain tha~ may present
obstaclea, and without the use of any merking equipment or guidance de-
vices on Che ground. But this may also invoive pu~~ing aseaulC elements
down a~ close tiogether as poesible in terma of tim~ and space. Then
there ia always the poseibility of partial or total motorization by meane
of diveraified and o~ten unexpecCed resourcea. Thie fur~hermore involvea
~he use of new, both known and unknown armamenCa, ei~her iseued or picked
up along the way.
We also have certain aupporC functiona here which may involve organic
aspects or reinforcements coming from supporC regimenta for Che brigade
echelon. Under any assumption, air aupporC remains an always poasible
eventuality tn responae to known requirementa.
The techniquea include the following:
Air drops from high altitudes wiChout vieibility;
Orientation and marking for the benefit of ALAT;
Getting across dry or wet terrain featurea;
DestrucCion of battlefield targets;
Search and acquisitioa as well as communication of inCelligence infora?a-
tion.
The original nature of this type of training, the pace and the diversity
of activities create an environment and a lifestyle which guarantaes ,
high-quality military servfce.
The llth DP is a specific, multipurpose, and well-trained outfit but
nevertheless remains a group of human individuals in close harmony with
their habitual way of life, although in keeping with regional realities.
Division in Contact With Territorial Realities
Stationed in the Southwest, the llth DP wanCed to be successful in blen-
: ding the operational and territorial aspects.
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The pxivil,eg~~~ rel.ation~ main~ained wi~h the lncal population in ehe
Southwesti were grea~ly fac~,litated by the hosp3tal~.ty of tihe ~nlidbitiants '
who warml.y me~ the firmly eatablished local. mili~ary ~err~.eorial organi-
zaCions.
Warm Mee~ing
There are tihree passions whi.ch the troops share with tih~ 1oc~1 populaCion
and which enabled the diviaion to establish atrong and lASting bonds of ~
friendahip. ~
~ The love of team aporta, eapecially the "oval ball," man~ged to ~et ~he
~ peopl~ f~rom Pau, from Castre, and ~rom Toulouse together witih tl,te para-
troopers.
The inhabitants of the SouthweaC know tha~ they can count on ~ha division :
in case o~ any ~'bad trouble" and, in exchange, division personnel appre-
ciate the quality of life offered by this part of the counCry.
By tradition passionately involved in everything dealing with aeronautica,
the people of the Southwest are also looking with a sya?paChetic ey~ tio
those who are likewise called "the fighting men of the sky."
~ Md Chen, why noC finally mention this same ~oy of living, Chis same taste
for exploit wiich is so otten embellished and alwaye told over and over
again.
These points of agreement explain many of the harmoniou~ conCacts esCab-
lished wiCh the university (and especially with the Political Studies
Institute of Toulouse which runs the CERSA [Araay Studies and Research
. Center]), as well as sporCing circles and townships.
In this respect, on Che occasion of its merger with the 44th Military
Territorial Division, the 11th DP benefitted from the earlier gains made
by the military territorial organizations.
Reserve cadres, guided by those at the mobilization centers, naturally
headed for the regiments and che establishment of the 111Ch Division will,
. �as of 1980, concretely express the reality of the new mobil3zation plan.
~ The 11th/44th henceforth b-ss a new face. Aware of becoming better adapted
to requirements with each passing day, it knows that it is far from being
the last main in line, in an outdated technique, and it also knows that
it is a reserve element in the hands of the command which combinations
of parachuting and sir transport Cechniques make iC possible to commit
and shuttle back and forth uuder conditions of distance and speed offered
nei~her by the truck nor by the ;+.elicopter.
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In eh~e connection, iC knowa thae iti is irreplaceable and ie tiends tio
: make iCael� known and appreciaxed, witihaut any reluc~ance or false modeaty,
.~.n ~he ~.maga of ~he man o~ acCion who ~ee7.s good on hie own soil.
~ ' FIGURE APPENDIX
. .y~.-ORC~NICRAMME~~E~I~ 11' C,P
x. t e~
w.a
11' 1.~ . ~
. `~Q~~ ,
, F.a.~~
u' T . x .
20' D.PG ~0 ~ 2o�IIP.C
~ ~ ~ s~
, .1 ~ ~S' O.A.R '
~ " ~
~ D ~ Z )
_.~"'la' .I~~l_ ~ _ ( 3 ) .
11th DP OrganizaCional Chart. Key: DP--airborne division; EOD--division
operationa staff RHC--assault helicopter regiment; GSALAT--light
ground forces aviation group; BPCS--Colonial Parachute BaCtalion; RP1Ma--
Marine Parachute Regiment; RCP--Colonial Parachute Regiment; RAP--Airborne
Artillery Regiment; REP--Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment; RGP--Airborne
Engineer Regiment; 1--draftee regiment; 2--semi-regular regiment; 3--reg-
ular rPgiment; [other expansions unknown].
COPYRIGHT: 1979 - Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d~Au~ourd'hui"
5058 19
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY S~CTION FRANC~
MARINE AIVISION~S CA~'ABILI~IES OU'~LINED
Paris ARMEES D'A,UuOURD~HUI ih French Mar 79 pp 50-51
_ ,
_ [Areicle by Col Jean-Claude Laboria: "The 9Ch Marine In~an~ry Diviaion--
- A Divisinn 'On Which the Sun Never Sees
[Text] The ~eatures and deployment o� the 9th DIMa �
' [~x~ne Infantry DiviF ion] conf irm its capability
for foreign opexatians. As if it were necessary to
point out that this ia the reason for its exiseencel {
After all, were noC the Marines designed, created',
and mainCained for this purpose! The 9th DIMa, by
virtue of Che origin of its men, drawn from all navy
units, (with the exception of Che 41st RI [Infantry
Regiment]~, an equipment unit, and an Engineer com-
pany), by virtue of the motivation Chat inspires it,
is a rruly homogeneous ma3or unit. (Col Jean-Claude
Laboria, who ~raduated from Saint-Cyr in the "Gen-
eral Leclerc" class, served in Tonkin~, in Senegal,
in Algeria, and in Cambodia. Assigned to the War
College, he was chi.:f of staff of the TFAI [French -
Territory of Afars and Issas] (D3ibouti) from 1972
~ until 1974; he was a profeasor ae the War College
and then CO of the 3rd Marine A~tillery Regiment
(1975-1977). His current assignment has been chief
of staff of the 9th DIMa since August 1977.)
Rich by virtue of the value of its men, it derives its capabilities from
that to a great extent:
Cohesion resulting from the identity of aspiraCion of the personnel; duty
divided between the home country and overseas; _
Knowledge of the geographic and human environment of foreign texritories
and tactical lessons learned there;
.
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,
~ Ab~.l~.~y eo ad~ust ti~ widely diverse, often confu~~d a~.tiuarion~, alway~
upae~C~,ng for neophy~es.
.
Hi,~tury und Record
Organi,zed on 1 Januxry 1976 as part of the ground forces r~organization
program, the 9tih DIMa is the onl.y ma~or uniC in the army that was initially ~
made up only of Marines.
A marine infantry d~.vision appeared, as such, for the first time in the
French army in 1870. Thia was the logendary Blue lliviaion which distin-
guiahed ixaelf a~ Bazeilles. The three regimenCa o� marine infantry in
. the preaen~-day 9th DIMa belonged to the ni.ue Division. 7'he name "Baz-
eill~s" is now i.nscribed on the flags of tihe let, 2nd, and 3rd RIMa [Marine
InfanCry RegimenCs]. '
Dur~.ng the 1914-1918 war, these Chree regimente, whicta ati the beginning
of ~he conflict were pazC of Che 3rd Colonial Division, were of~en aepar-
ated buti were always in the thick of the �ighting: on th~ Marne, in the
Champagne, on the Somme, the Aisne, Verdun, and even Dobropol~e, in Ser-
bia. The RICM [Colonial Marine Infantry Reg3.ment], the moat-clecorated
regimenC ir.,France, disCinguiahed itaelf �rom the Marne to the Argonne
and captured Fort Douaumont. The 11th RAC [Colo:~ial Artillery Regiment],
now the 11eh RAMa [Marine Artillery Regiment], parCicipated in the battles
of the Champagne and tlie Somme wher~ it added Cwo new battle honors ta
i~s standard.
In 1944 and 1945, the 9rh DIC [Colonial Infanrry Division], whose mantle
the 9th DIMa inherited, participated in thel:iberation and Germany cam-
. paigns. It included the RICM in its ranks.
On 1 January 1976, the 9th DIM,a was created from the personnel of the 9th
Brigade: 1st RIMa, 2nd RIMa, 3rd RIMa, RT.CM, llth RAMa, 409Ch BCS [Com-
mand and Support Bati:alion], to which was added the 41st RI [Infantry
Regiment], a regiment with a Breton Crad~;ti,on whi.ch di.~tf,nguiahed itsel�
during numerous campaigns in Europe and overseas and especially in North
Africa, in the Crimea, and in France during the two world wars.
On 1 July 1977, the 59th Engineer Company ~oined the 9th DIMa. Finally,
on 1 Auguat of that year; the 409th BCS became Che 9Ch RCS [Command and
Support Regiment].
Cadre and Men
In personnel terms, the 9th DIMa has two main features:
Professionalism,
Overseas mission.
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Pres~n~~.y, 4wo o~ itis s~yen reg~.men~a are con,nl~Ce~.y regu~.ar: Che 3rd RIMa
and ~he RxCM; a third one wi].1 become ao be�ora ehe end of'.the year, ~hat
is, the 7.1,~h RAMa; Che 9~h RCS and the 2nd RTMa wi1.1, respectively, geti
75 percen~ and 35 percent regulars. This meana tiha~, while a 1lttle more
tihan half o~ the 6,500 lower-ranking NCOs and EM of ~he diviaion are s~i~.l ~
draftees, ex~endad~aerv~ce peraonnel will be in tihe ma~ority by tihe end o~
1979. Those extended-servi.ce personnel s~.gned'up ~or an ~verage of 3 yeara;
tihey come from a11 parts of France. Their main motivation ia to serve over-
~eas .
~`:~kiQL1~1I1I18~i~E~~l~~~~:-~. ~ -
~r PG
SAINT_ 8 d' CAEN
---~iRA Wl1~i
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~ BRES7 - ~ - ~
~ SAINT.BaI,fUC~ OINA'N ~ A+jyy~ ~ q~M~
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p i~C~ �RENNES
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~ .lA1Ma ANGEpS
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9th DIMa Aeploymen~. Key: PC--CP. .
IA6ANISpTION G~NERAL 8100 hommes ~z~
~1~ TAT MAJaR 1850 v~hicules ~3~
IF lA 9' 0,l.Ma.
arR.i. ~
3' R.I.Ma.
2' R.IJVIa
R~�~+� R.IrC.M. 11'11.A.Ma. 9' R.C.S. 59'C.(i.
a ?~v+m.~,a t ~
~ ~~qiemnt d~ r iment 1 rl~nt de t
r'MfanMN~ mota4N Wf~db Ngsn i~rtiNNi~ mi~t~ eorry dem~nt eomp qr~ ~
ISenM.~ n~2) ~5~ w? A.M.L. ~6Jei iol,sal ~irl �t `7loutlen du gdMl8
22
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r'
9Ch llIM~ Organizational Chart. Key: 1--general sCaf~; 2--men; 3--vehicles;
4-~four regimen~s of mo~orized ~.nfanCry; 5--one regi.menC of AML light tanks;
6-~mixed arti~.lery reg~.ment (ground-to-ground, ground-to-air); 7--one com-
mand and aupporti regiment; 8--one Engineer company. `
The desire for overseas service 3s rea~.ly Che common denomina~or for all
personnel of t~te 9th DIMa, both cadre and EM. This is what motivates the
choice of the young o�ficer or the young NCO upon graduation from school
when he requests dutiy with the Marines. S1ots ar~ hard to geti th~re and
recruitmenC is very good.
' This desire for service is certainly relatied to Che remarkable availability
which we encounter among cadre personnel and ex+tended-service peraonnel.
One mighti even say that in the 9Ch DIMa, this desire for service or at
leasC tihis aCtraction �or overseas duty can be found not only among the
draftees but also among the "continenCals" o� the 4'lst RT who for the
mosC part are volunCeers who have signed up for overseas duty tours.
Pexhaps the fact that more than 50 percen. of the draftees are Bretons
is in keeping with this desire for adventure and this quest for new
horizons.
Characteristics
' The deployment of the 9th DIMa in Brittany makes it possible to mainCain
~ close liaison and cohesion with Navy uniCs, thus facilitating Craining in
combined operations (diagram no 1).
_ Its organization (diagram no 2) is very conventional, apart from the mixed
artillery regiment whose organization permits direct support for our regi-
ments and AA defense, especially on landing beaches.
. Missions
tis in the case of any major uniC, Che defense of national Cerritory is one
of the missions of Che 9th DIM. On that assumpCion, it would go into ac-
tion only within the framework of a defense zone against any enemy forces
that may have landed by sea, that may have parachuted or infiltrated (for
example, fn the case of a threat to the strategic sites in BriCtany), or
within the framework of a ma~or operational command existing beforehand
~ or established in~line with circumstances.
But it is Che foreign operations missions which give the 9th DIMa its
specific nature and which require sometimes special and permanent attention.
Tra3.ning
The diversity of action forms and possibly the isolation of units, the
relatively slender support and logisfiics involved, as well as the hostility
of the environment require particularly varied and sustained training.
23
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Pr~p~ratiion ~ox ~hQg~ mi~~~,o~~ involvee thx~~ a~p~cti~:
The kind o� ~raining giv~n in any militar.y form~~ion;
Sp~cif3.c training for �oreign uperati.ong;
And ~ know],edg~ the environmenti.
Th~ firar on~ involv~:s the following: ,
Physi.~a1 ~pCitude, �
UeilixaLion of equipment, `
xact~.cg connectied with tih~ paxticular arm~
~nt~rsezvice cooperatinn,
Unit cohesion.
It is supplemente~ by the epeCific training eimed aC fnreign operatione:
Assault embarkations and landinge with their extensiong on land;
Heliborne operations ueing the puma helicopt~rs of ALAT (light ground
forces aviarion], or helicoptere of the Naval Air Arm (conducted from
land or from ehipb~ard);
Utilization of ai: support up to the elemeatary unit echelon;
Mastery of corresponding interaervice procedures.
The sturdy naCure and simplicity of equipment issued to tne unita give
them good tactical capabilitiea in aay theater. Along wiCh modern~ hig,h-
performance equipment (MILAN-LRAC, 89-mm FRF-1 rifles, SIG [expansion
unknownj assault rifles, 20-mm M guns, third-generation radio seta),
we have older equipment in service although it is ati11 effective and
tough, suci~ as the AML 60 and 90, the 105-HM2 howitzers~ the 40 (mm~
Bofor~ gune, and the 120 and 81 [mm~ mortars.
Here are the common feat~:res of all of these equipmenr itema: 5implicity
of use, reliabil:ty ~:nder all kinds of climatic conditiona, relative
standardization of logistic supporC (essential qualities in operations
conducted far from support basee).
Strategic mobility resules from the capability of the units, men, and
equipment, to be air-transported by military aircraft or long-range
civilian airplanes. Besides, the proximity of French Navy bases makes it
possibly considerably te reduce the embarkation times asaumiag that the
units are to be moved by sea.
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T~c~ie~l mobi~.iey r~~u1e~~ on the o~n~ h~nd, ~rom eh~ compld~~ motori~~~ion
o� uni.~~ a~d, on eha oeh~r h~nd, from fr~quene ~raining exerci,een invo~.vin~
he].ibcrn~, e~r-t~anepor~, ~nd aeeault l~ndin~ pract3c~.
F~.nally, Che knowledg~ of the phyaicAl, climatic, a:?d human envl.tionmene to
~~r~a~ axr~nt d~te~cmine~ the irma~di~~~ ap~r~tion~l yield ~o b~ tai~~d
from unieg which mo~t o~t~n are ehrown ineo t~a~tie eh~ momeee eh~y arrive
in ~h~ thg~t~r of operation~, '
Thank~ eo tihe lc~~~one i~~rn~d during thgir ovar~ees duty touro, tha c~dre
p~r~onn~l of the M~rin~~ wers familiari~ed wieh the environmene, the pl~cea~
a~nd th~ difficu~tie~ encoune~red ie the course of trAOp movemenCa~ weye to
- guard ~gaineC c1lmaCic, food, para~ite, and infectiou~ diseaee dangers, as
w~li ns ehe peychology of th~ locai inhabitanta and th~ awkward mistakes
to be avoided.
Th~ wegleh of thi~ experience ie toaint~tn~d by the foliowings
Inr~eaee ia the number of 2-3-week duty eours (Marchand Cnurs) reservee'
for ~quad or platoon leaders (especiaily young offic~rg coming out of the
gcad~my) in the d~partmente, territorieg, and independ~nt ovaYaeae coun-
tri~s;
A four-gix-month etay in Gabon and in Ne~,r Caledonia for conetituted units,
eo-c~11ed rotation companiea;
Maneuver~ involving sequences of movement by air or sen, ~+h~re the opern-
tion ie of a ma~or nature ae in Senegal, in ivory CoasC, in Cabon, in the
Antille~, on la Reunion (Callieni and Galux ie)exerciseg).
The for~ign operations in Which the 9th DIMa has already participated
(Djibouti in 1961, Chad in 1970, Lebanon and Chad in 1978) proved the
capgcity of Chis major unit to accodplish itg missiona Wi.th a very short
adaptation time, With tactic~l readiness on the part of unita and vith
high personnel morale, as We11 as a high unit training level; on top of
that ae have the moral and tactical coh~eian and the edaptability of these
unitg Co widely different eituations.
The v~ry rem~rkable aay in which the young cadree and the EM behaved -
"under fire" in 1978 ~re a credit to an intensive training progamm~ dis-
playic~g exemplary cohesion and a very high spirit, these being the main
characteristicg of this division. On the whole, the 9th DIMa appeare as
a major unit proud of its past record and its pregent, reliable and
cr~dible. _
25
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~Oit U~~~CIAL 1)5l~. tlNI,Y
� f rr~.,...~,. w~. �?s'a~r : ~ .
. i ~ ~}x .
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~ Colon~l Jean-Ciaude Laboria
COPYRICEiT: 1919 - Revue des forcee armees francaises "Armees d'Au~ourd'hui"
5058
CSO: 3100
26
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COUNTRY S~CTZON . FRANC~
CURitEN'T POLITICAL SC~N~ VI~,i~U, ANALYZ~n
~ P~rig PAItiS MATCN in ~rench 20 Apr 79 pp 40, 42
(Articl~ by Mich~1 Gonod and Liliene Caill.fee: "Mitterrand i~ Bpeting on
N~w ~leeeion~"]
[T~xtj bd you knnw why ~rancoie M{,tterrand coneinu~e to be vague wh~n he
i~ c~~ked nboue hib poasible candiuacy of the pr~gidential e~ections of
1981 and why he deems th~C this qup~Cion ie untim~ly7 Ie ie not b~cause
of a m~tter of ractics but gimply becauee he bel3ev~s thgt the next elec-
toral datie will not be that one. Indeed, he is convinced that Jacques
~ Chirac wi11 upsee the government long before 1981 and that legislative
clectidne will be held. it is therefore those elections that Mitt~rrand
is viewin~, fee'ling that he should get ready for them eince they could
occur wiChin a few months, perhapg even this summer, after the European
(p~rliam~ntary] electione. ~urthermore Mitterrand believes--not withnut
reason--that this time the left could win them. At Metz, at the PS~
~Fren~h 5ocialigt PartyJ congreeg, this was the only topic which hung in
the air pven though there was barely any mention of it in the speeches.
"Francois Mitterrand is well aware of it. He will wage the next presi-
dential campaign on the basis of my positions," said Michel Rocard in an
irritnted voice. He.was balancing himself nervously with one fout on the
nr.her. ~ Nfs necktie tras insi~e ~~st. One.~~s,awuy:? nab tc~e impceegion that
Rocard has just emerged from a rugby tackle. He did not come out on top
at Metz but neither did he lose. He ie the on~ who generated the only
moment of excitement at that 3-day congress which was especially rich with
~blique insinuations. ThaC moment oc.*_urred wh~n, turning tcr~ard the fear-
less first secretary (Mitterrandj, Rocard told him from the roatrum:
"Dear Francois Mitterrand, I have said and reiterated and repeat here that
you wfll be the f irst nmong us who will have to make the personal decision
of whether or not you will be a candidate at the next presidential elec-
tions. If you will be, I shell not oppose you." The ovation which greeted
this promise shows that Rocard had ~imed right. Now he ig moving from
inside [he party to promote his ideas, his terminology. It is clear to
27
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R~c~rd Chae Miet~rr~nd e~nnoe d~ ,~nythit~g bu~ ~pprdv~ hi~ tcnnomi~ p~~i-
tian~ iittl@ by iitel~. Th~ ~ynthegie whiah ceuld nc~t be rpa~~hed ae Meez
h~e ~v~ry ~hence of b~in~ r~~li~~d by 1981. Th~ ly~ie~ c~r~ rho~e of
ttich~i Roeard whii@ th2 mu~ie i~ by Fr~ncoia Mi~e~rrand. The o~h~r high-
lighe of eh~ PSt~ ~ongr~~~ d~~urr~d ~nth~ win~~ wh~n, on th~ seeond dgy,
f~~iing ehe~ he waul.d not ch~lk up ~n ab~olut~ m~~ori~y, Mie~~rrend w~nt
ine~ a huddle wieh Pi~rr~ Mauroy in g en~ 11 room b~hind th~ roeErum.
Miet~rr~nd ui~hed one final tim~ eo convinc~ th~ mayor of Lili~ eo ~oin
him end eo 1Qav~ Roc~rd a~on~ in the minoriey, eh~e i~, :.i the oppoeieion.
Hut it wa~ ~oc late. Whil~ Mite~rrand had gone ta eAr aw~~rbreade in a
neighb~ring inn Mauroy and Rocard had r~~ch~d ~n a~reem~r.t: ~veryon~ or
no on~. Ae a follower of itocard expl8in~d it, "Mieterrand was wrong in
conaid~ring Mouroy to be a foo1. Mauroy is m~r~1y ~ p~r~on who eannot makh
up hi~ mind bu~ onc~ ha hg~ mad~ a deci~ion he ~tick~ by it." Mirrerrand'~ _
r~pr~sentetion wae thu~ fruitiees. Meuroy prefer~ to be eomeone in th~
minority than nobody ~t all in ~he nes+ emai~~r m~3ority conCrolled by
Mitt~rrand. C~RES (Cent~r for (Socialiet) Studie~, R~~~arch, and Educa-
tion~ wiil perh~p~ make an agr~~ament with Miererrand aft~r the European
elections, but that is unimportane. Jean-pierre Ch~v~n~ment ~head of
CERES] hgd n~goti~ted hi~ ~dh~r~nce, but he wag Coo dcmanding. Ch~ven~-
ment aeked that the r~d carpet b~ unrollcd und~r hia fee~ wh~r~ee Mitter-
rand hnd only open~d the back door to Chevenem~nC. For the first secre- a=,
tary of the PSP, even if he did not dominate the party con~r~ss as ha had
nnticipaeed, even if he had to guffer some booing, ~ven if hig authority~
proved to be blecaiehed, sti11 continues to behave ~s a noble lord granting
hi~ favors and distributing his criticisms. Around him "hia court" aag
being r~noveted. Same stars faded while other~ are ehining with a n~r
~p~rkle. The likes of Mermaz, F111ioud, Herau, Who used to be ligteaed to
previously, h~ve now been replaced by m~n like Quileg, Fabiug, and Jospin.
But it is still the end of an era~ that of ~rencois Mitterrand Who ruled
the roogt and aas sure of himself. On the eve of the P5F congress Pierre
Ma~roy predicted: "If We fail to gchieve a gynthesis, Mitterrand ai~l not
be a candidate in 1981." The synthesig did not occur, but thig half sEt-
back does not g~em Co have ghaken th~ Soci~ligC Perty lcader. Like every-
one ~lse, Mitterrand will see things mor~ clearly following the ~urc~pean
elections of June 1979.
At these elections three h~ads of atate ~r~ "presid~ntial" materi~l
(Jecques Chirnc, Cedrgpg Marchais, and Frencois Mitterr~nd) nnd A11 three
Will have the snme goal: To get ahead of the UDF (~rench Derooccdtic Univn],
for how can one imagine that the one Who m~y be defeated by 5imone Vei1
Can b~at Valery Giscard d'~staing?
According to the President, the Prime Mini~ter, and th~ UDF, "Chirac I~
Bluffing"
"Jacques Chirac is an impostor." It is an RPR (Rally for the Republic~
minigter Who said this. He wished to be anonymou~. He feels indeed that
28 '
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h~ do~~ noe h~ve eh@ righe eo mak~ ~ epi~ah. H~ depiore a it bue eofl-
e~de~ ~e in ord@r not eo env~nom the clim~te Which hnide ~w~y ~m~ng eh~
m~~ority end nae Eo embar~ee~ ~Prim@ Mini~~@rJ Raymond 8arr@. "It i~
hgrd," h~ admitred, "haviag to take biowe wiehoue b~ing abl~ eo r~turn
them." Lik@ ~om~ oE hi~ 10 [ete) coll~~gu~~ i~ ~h~ G~bir~~t wh~ ~r~ m~am-
bera oE eh~ RPR (Boulin, ~ourg~e, P~yrefiet~, G~~~.~y, papon, LQ Th~ui~,
Mourot, P18ntier, Limouzy, ~ecam and t~g~ndre), ehi~ mini~rer ie aiso
freeting. He ia aaare of the fac~ ~heE Ch~r~c i~ piaying Wi~h th~ir
nerv~~. "NQ ex~reiaee permanent blackmail on political ~f@. tt~ he~~~
th~t a c~re8in n~ber of individuals wi~.1 io~e th~ir head, that S~, wili
retort eo hie criticiems."
The RPR minietere participat~d et aeverai meetinge la~t a~Qk at th~ home
of Jacque8 Chaba~~Delmas. There were four meetings in 48 houre. Olivier
Cuichard ~nd Robert Po~~ade att~nded ae did Roger Frey, ch~irman of ehe
Constitut3onal Counc~l. The agenda of ~heae meetin~~ Weg eimpl~: Now eo
eheck the "woret caee policy" pracric�d by Chirec and how to bring ~ut the
fact that the mayor of PBrie (Chirec~ ie ueurping the Geullist affiligtinn.
Synthe~ie of the opiniong Qxpresaed Wa~ difficulE to re~iize. Their
ungnimity bore only on a eingle poin~: Chirec i~ lying, Chirac i~ biuff-
ing. "Ne i~ lying," one of the 11 interested peraong ggid, "wh~n h~ aegerta
that one Gauliis~ voter out of faur or fiv~ ig definitiveiy loet to
Giscard d'E~~aing. Chirac eays I~hat becauee he vanta it to happen. Bu~
he is not eure of it.~in tru~h, 20 percent of the RPR votera are ready to
fo11oW Chirac all the way to he11, but theee do not deserve the deecrip-
tion of Cau113ate since rhey are Chirac follovers." The RPR minieterg
and the bosees of Caullism detached from th~ RPR are also convinced thnC
Chirac Will be unable to aait till 1981 to change th~ situation. Ne W111
thus continue to prep8re the ground so that the French may turn aaay from
Va1~ry Giscard d'Eataing end the governmpnt. "Every dey," said a minieter,
"we are on the eve of a motion of censure." That is What Robert Boulin
ca11s the policy oE "brinkmanship." In the course of its long asideg, che
RPR Council of Ministers mentioned the possibility of a Caullist slate at
the European elections made up of genuine "colleaguee" minus decarationg.
They proposed the designation of some "Companions of the Liberation." But
this plan a~med at going and hunting on Chirac'8 electc.~ral terrain vas
abandoned. It Wa~ not realigtic. Ie addition, a8 nne o� those who had
thought about it said, "Barr~ Would have looked ~illy if 11 membere oE`
his government had decided t4 support a slate other than the one Which
he aill defend hiaiself...."
Pinally, the Ceullist ministers agr~ed to sign a joint declaration in which
they took care not tn have the appearance of provoking Chirac. Robert
Ga11ey ~pitomized this declaretion by mentioning the film of the young
movieaiaker Patrick Schulmann ahose advertisement depicts a ceuple in a
bed. Making a parody of its title the Minister of Cooperatinn explained:
"What ae vished to gay is simply: 'And France, What a messl"'
29
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Fdtt O~~tCIAt, t1S~ f~NI,Y
Ae ~ti~ Ciy~~~ ~pY~~id~t~Ei~1j P~l~c~ ie i~ ~1~d ~hnu~he th~t J~~qu~~
Ghir.~e i~ biuffin~. "H~ wnn'e mdv~ b~for~ 1981," tha f~r~gid~nr'~ ~dvi~-
~r~ ~ndinE~in. Ta b~ ~ur~, Chir~c'~ C~ceir c~n~i~e~ in wa~k~nin~ Gi~c~rd
d'~~eeing ~a th~~ h~ may no 1on~ar b~ in a po~i~ion ~o b~ r~-~i~ct~~l
pr~gident, bue Gl~ir~c do~~ noe have th~ m~an~ of hi~ ambieiang." Aceord=
ing tn rhi~ ~nnlysi~ which eh~~h~ad of ~ta~~ ~ndor~~g, ~h~r~e da~~ noe eu~-
rroi rh~ 43 d~putieg ahv ar~ 3ndi~p~n~~bi~ Co p~~~ ~ motion of r~nsur~a or
nat eo approv~ ~ vot~ of confid~nc~ for the gov~rnm~n~ if th~ i~r~~r ~hould
r~queat. Aecordingly, hi~ threae~ ~r~ oniy d~r~~, f~~eu~ip~ g~~eed eo
dr~m~ei~~ eh~ ~ieu~tion. Th~re i~ s~ch g~trong ronvictinn of thi~ ae th~
~iygEa and ae Mati~nen [Prim~ Min38t~r'g off~eeJ that afeer th~ ~pp~aran~~
a~ Chir~c ~e "C~re~s ~ur tabla" on Z Apri1 1979 rh~ poB~ibility of r~que~e-
ing eh~ Naeional A~~~mbly for ~ voE~ of eonfidenc~ in th~ gov~rnm~nt w~g
~~riouely diacusged. tn f~vor of ie: Chirac ~.g r~porC~diy ag~inst th~
wali. !t~ would hAVe to give ~n ~~nce he ha~ jU~t repeat~d pubiicly theC
h~ dd~~ noE wi~h to provok@ ~ cri~ig. Thae wouid k~~p him qui~C for
~nm~ tim~. Ag~in~t ir: Th~ ~reeid~nt ~houid noe ~ive th~ impr~gsion thae
h~ i~ ~oining Ghirac's gam~. Now, rh~ que~tion of ~onfid~nc~ would gi~nify
ehar h~ accepra the chalienge. Th~ ini~i~tive aould agaume th~ app~aranc~
of ~ provocation. Rgymond Barre, on agcending the gpeakpr'~ rostrum in
the N~tional Ae~embiy, would oniy hav~ one word to gay an iooking at the
RE~R b~nehe~: "Show me!"
At eh~ UnR, Michel Pinton, Andre Di~ig~nt, and Jegn t~canu~t do not doubt
f~r n aecond e'nat Chirac wi11 b~ a candid~t~ in ~he next pregidential
~1e~tiong. ~ut they do nnt think that Chirae has the ability to beat th~
nutgoing prggident in the firet round o~ the balloting. There remains
th~ rundff: Would Chirac cnlmly give Giscard d'Estaing the cold sheulder,
provin$ th~ cnrrectness of hi~ projectiong and giving himseYf che meang to
impos~ himgelf as he~ad of the (newJ opposition? Jean Lecaneut, wl~o is
highly familiar :sith the Gaullists since he ran against Chem in 1965,
explained: "Caullism has always been det~rminant when it occupied ehe
prcgidency and a challenger at all cost When it Was dQprived of the
prh~idency." Lecanuet envisioned the srenario evpn further: "If ae, the
mpn of the center leEt, tri~d to soften the policy of the Socialigts in
office gnd Co scparate them from the communi~ts, even to rebuild a ma~oriCy
with the PSF, Chirac would long for ~ reeurn ~f eh~ Fnurtt~ Republir. He
saould then be condemned to betwv~ like Gen Ceorge~ Boulanger." The UD~'s
conclugion ig that it is necessary to nip in the bud this plan which can
ruin France. Should the ~uropean electiona give 8 to 10 point~ mnre to
rt?e UDF ehan to the ttPR, that is, about 3 million voteg, thia would be an
autcnme gusceptible to discourage Chirac and especially ta detach Erom him
a c~rtnin number of Caulltgt deputies gtill sensitive to the gpirit of
camaraderie. Ag fnr 1981~ ic Would be easy to sustain r~~at Valery Ciacar~
d'~staing would alone be capable of checking the victory of a temporarily
reconciled left. Chirac Would then have to choose his side and his futurc.
COPYftICHT: 1979 par Cogedipresse SA
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COUNTttY SCCT~ON ~~JC~
PdL~TICAL SITtJA'TION SEEN CON~'US~D, NAZARDOUS
PariB pA[ti3 MATCN in French 20 Apr 79 pp 41-42
(Areial~ by Arthur Conta: "~~nd What If the P~e~ident Wer~ Strong~r
Than 'Th~y' Think?"]
~T~xe] Rgrely in hi~tory wi11 the Fren.h political landscape have offered
_ ~u~h ~n ind~~eructible hodge-podge ~s it does today: A re~l ab~tract
p~inting with colors and lines running in all diti~ctiong.
ttnr~ly wi11 each party in itself have ev~n enhanced such confueion and
guC~t contradictions. The games of political parties under Che Third and
Fourth Etepublics were themselvea trivial compared to the bewildering
epectaale which they affer us at present. Gen Charles de Gaulle muet be
chuckling heartily if h~ ia contemplating them from hie perch in eterniCy.
As nnticipated, incidentally, the grand acene of tho pS~ (French Socinlist
Pgrty~ congrgae in M~tz will have changed nothing in this long play of the
absurd. It is too much to be feared thar Francois Mitterrand, as in these
v~ry last feW years, wi11 continue to isolate himself in a dead-end tactic
which dooms tdm to turn perpetually in circles around himself, even with
dizzying virtuosity.
Yee the Sacialist Party leader is one of the rare protaganists who could
~p~n up the system and clarify the episodea. New elements of analysis havc
~ven been able eo contribut~ to ehis hope. Indeed, on one hand the Social-
ist rnrty has now all the legs right to shun the mogt onerous governmental
r~gponsibilities ns the international situation is getting constantly
Worg~: France, with the Whole of free Europe, ig very specifically be-
si~ged, directly threatened in its active endeavors. The day is unques-
tionably coming when the Socielists will be unable to refuse a very firsC
place in the rally of national energies and in a grandiose policy of public
welEare. ~urthermore, in his lntest grand interview granted to L'HUMANITE,
. Ceorges Marchais did no[ conceal [he fact that the Socialists should not
always count on the automatic support of the communist voters in the run-
off: To whoever knoWS how to read a Marxist-Leninist dialectician, this
was tantamount to nnnouncing that the Socialist Party would probably not
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` t~nv~ Ch~ ban~~i~ of th~ eommunige vnt~~ in Che run~~f nC eh~ pr~~id~n-
C3~L ~l~c~~.ong d� 19gL. This ngeurally nh~ngfl~ compl~Cely H11 prnep~crs
nnd prn~~ction~~ I~'or ~.e i~ tioo obvious rh~~~ wirhout rh~ ~ommuni~C voteg
~'rancnig Mittprrnnd'g ~han~~s wnuld be n31 in the t~aC~ of Valery Gi~cnrd
d'F:gt~i.ng ~ven if Ch~ ~.ateer gho~ld lo~e a few regim~nts to the Gaul~.iote~
A~cordingly, Erom both the mo~t mediocre ~1~ctornl vi~wpoine And Chat o~
Ch~ h~gh~~e higeoric~l nn~ly~~.g, g certain hope, eveu w~nk; could latgly
be ~vid~nti on ~~eing Chp firse g~cr~tgry of rhe PS~ proca~d wieh dn ex-
CC~ttS~VE revamping of his sCrgCegy. Afrer al~, on the orhnr s3d~ d~ the
Rhin~, clid the German Social Uemocrata nor prnvide him wirh th~ clea,re~t
nE ~.camplc:y by b~coming allicd in aucc~gsion wiCh Clie Chrise~an Upmocrae~
~nd the Libexal PurCy in order to rule?
nue ir neCesgary tn find that 3t is rhe raveree hypnehesig that muse
b~ m~d~, ae least in the next few months: Mite~rrand wi11 con~inue eo ber
on a government cr~sis and a general dramatization of ngtiongl life wh3ch,
in his mind, must �inally poinr eo him as the only snv3nr. 5o much ehe
worse if ir is necesg~ry Co conCinu~ to bet aC Che s~me time on a commun-
ise alliance whose ~incerity can b~ gauged~ DisCinctly, Mitt~rrand must
rhink th~e the government crisis will be so v:iolent thnt the eddiee will
~v~n crack th~ d3kes which Che PC~ (French Communigt pareyJ is sysCemaGi-
ca11y raising against social democracy.
Obviously, Jacques Chirac is prov3ng a great com�orC to Mitt~rrand in such
calculations. The leader of the RPR (Rally for the Itepublic], ro beeCer
serve his nwn chances oE nne day betng Che great r~llier of narional Eorces,
had himself egsenCially Che choice between two nlternatives: That of
patience and that of chr~llenge. The f3rst alLernative consisted in avoid-
in~ .hll disruptions, in wisely placing himself in reserve for the counCry,
in imrosing htmself as an exemplary mayor of Paris, in continuing to be a
devoted deputy from Correze, and in loyally helping the government to
control all ~olts that could dangerously threaten France.
The second nlternaCive was the strategy of a baCtering ram constantly
dealing out accelerated and more nnerous counCerblows: 'Co maintain the
Socialists in their ghetto; to check the government of Vnlery Giscard
d'~ataing on nll sub~ects to the nth degree; to strive Co weaken it so
gs to render it less than credible; to asserC Gaullism as the only way to
public welfare; to voluntarily and articulately incregse the most violent
attacks to beCrer clear the slate with the ultimate goal of ge~ting him-
selE recognized at the end of a long road of despair as the only possible
savior. Obviously Jacques Chirac, little given to ~uddhist abnegations
incidentally, chose the alternative of challenge. From that point, .
FrAncois Mitterrand already fatally figures out the cdds that a govern-
menr crisis with the dissolution of the National Assembly and a direct
blow at the French President could occur very soon, perhaps even before
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~9~7.~ Mitterr~nd c~n n~.an figur~, ae ehp r~.~k of b~ing ingenuou~ on~~
` mor~, eh~r ~.n the runoff ne the presidanCial e1~Crinng tihe communi~Cg
. wauld vo~~ for him ~gainst G3gcard d'~eCning, ~ven d~spite Georges
M~rch~~.~. MiCCerrattd c~n even go eo ehe poine nr.figuring ehge Gi~C~rd
- d'Cse~~n~ wnuld b~ un~bl~ for lnng Co r~Cain h~s pdgiCinn w~.th tdo di~-
;joine~d u ma~oriey~ Ae ~ny raee, it will no~ be Ctie firse r~.me ehar
M:trtarrand has made a mieC~ke ~bouC an ~dversary or a regime~ Accordingly,
~u~C as obviously, he is more eempted h3mself in turn to xesorC to �orc~.ng
ng~in~ti ehe Pr~sidenr. The forcing of Chirae aueomaeically involves the
forcing nE MiCeerrand, In~lucCgbly, as ghould tiave b~en anricip~ted at
ItPit headqunreers, Chirac is providing an unhoped-for opportun~.Cy tio
Mirtcrr~nd to retrieve fgiCh in his own nationnl destiny againeC Giscard.
Th~ f.ncr nevertheless also rem~ins wiCh similar evidence thar the very
peraonal~ey of ~'rancois Miteerrand is liet]:e given by nature eo nccommoda-
Cion of guch alt~rnatives as ehe shar3ng of power. Thig wae recently ~
evid~ne Erom the harsh manner in which he treated or.caused th~ Creatmene
of ~ powerful rival in his parCy. Mitterrand is a~ little incllned Co
share nnCional power wiCh Valery Giscard d'EsCaing as 5ocialist Party
power w~.th Micl~el Rocard.
It should never be forgotten thar ehere is much that ia CaullisC in Chis
anti-GaullisC individual. Mitterrand pursues brilliantly and almosC volup-
tuou~ly what is a great personal advenCure~ He would have too much a feel-
ing of giving up Coo much of himself if one day he had to reach an agree-
menr w3rh Giscard d'~sCaing. He has apparenCly established himself by
character as muci: ~s by system in the rigidity of intransigence.
He is also too ~owerfully spellbound by what is pathetic. He likes drama
Eor drama's sake. Not only is he one of those who never makes concessions,
~ but he is also among those who never have fun. He alw$ys plays Wagner and
never Rossini. He re3ects dialog with those seeking detente because he
denies the existence or abhors relaxation. In his secret and intense
manner in truth Mitterrand is no less given than Chirac to the passion oE
extreme challenges.
With equal passion he also likes to be right and C~ have his way. He is
constantly striving to uphold Che slightest point of honor. He does not
concede his logic either. ~,renty years ago Mitterrand proclaimed once
and for a11 that the welfare of the French people passed through the unity
of the left and that Che unity of the leftist parties had to have priority.
He continues to hold that position in unruffled manner. No maCCer that
Ceorges Marchais should hurl the worst abuse and worst indignities at
MitCerrand, he will fanatically hang on to his line even though it may
cost him his most profound dignity. We shall never hear Mitterrand admit
that he could have been wrong. He sticks to his plan with the same rigor
as to a dogma.
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~in~11y, M~.ee~rrand lceep~ such faith in his degtiny ehae 1~ nt?ntinu~s en
per~unde h~.~n~e1f of nlw~ys being the mose clev~r, Zr i.~ noti c~ co~nc~.-
dena~ iE tihe superbly M~ch3ave~l~an histiory of Lgwrenc~ rhQ Mngnificene
E~scinaees Mititerrand. Oh, how exhilaraCing eo know hnw to nerv~ onas~lf
d~li~iou~ly while serving Che gov~rnmene and th~ people w~.th no holdg
b~rr~d. He disCinctl.y 1ive~ ehis exhilar~tion of b~ing th~ greaCeeC
virtungo. However, he cannoC demnns~rnte such ~ki11, afe~r too many
S~Cti1Ck8~ un~ass, at th~ conclusion of his struggles, he should ~riumph
over ~very one ae the same Cime, gupreme ~oy--over Giscard d'~stning gnd
the Cau113sCs and Che communiets and over his nwn doubtg wllich eor~ur~
him. One should not only recognize tihae eh~.g great implacable and mys-
Cerious sCag hns no equivalent in the history o� Che five French repub-
1ics: perhaps, aC the moment of rhe greateat revolution, a Louig de
Saint-Juse was simultaneously as troubled and as dogmatic a~ MitCerrand.
Ir is also necessary to no~e that Mitterrand knows this. He is extremely
lucid about his personality. His greatest anger would be not to be able
eo reward h~.s immenae ralenr with immense auccess. A true Mnchigvelli,
vis-a-vis himsel.f, does not have ehe right either to contradict himself,
or to seem Co be making a misrake, or to lose. MiCterrand is unqueaCion-
ably so.
On the wh~le, ehen, for our pro~ections about Che next few years, we do ,
noC h~ve nfter the PSF congress of Metz a Mitterrand different from eh~
one before ehe congress. The climate hgs not changed because of it.
I~ the man would have shown himself to be pro-synthesis at Che con~ress,
miraculously playing the role of 5ocialise peacemaker, and if he had con-
cluded an alliance with Che Michel Rocard-Pierre Mauroy twosome and brought
under his direct auehority the near-totality of the Socialist F'arty, per-
haps then we could have envisioned that, with such a large number of fol-
lowers available, he could more effectively at the said hour frankly move
in a new direction and free himself from communist sponsorship.
The Eact thnt MitCerrand turned down any agreement with his "inferior"
rivals is sufficient to indicate that he is indeed resolved Co continue
to be intransigenC. After a11, MicheL Rocard did not emerge the loser
from the conCest. ~'ar from it.
It was known for a long time that Rocard was stronger outside than inside
the party. The PSF changed nothing as regards his significance. The
deputy from Yvelines continues to be remarknbly avttilable for ''the can-
didacy fnr the big job."
Besides, far from weakening him for the future, Rocard's pledge not to be
a candidate against Mitterrand contrariwise strengthens the former. The
reason, very simply, is that he thereby locks Mitterrand in his full and
unique responsibility: After 5 signif icant setbacks in 1965, 1968, 1973,
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ig7G, ~nd 197g, wi~.1 MiCeBrrgnd b~ ~b1~ ro pergnnally cnmmiC th~ patiCy in
g new disnster under h~.g flag? After ewo defene~ ~r the presidential e1,ec-
eions ~.n 1969 ~nd 1974, can MieCerrand really expose himael~ and the parey
to ~ n~w s~riou~ seCb~ck? M~.tCerrand will h~ve to give up an hi~ own.
By makin~ ~uch ~ pladg~ Roc~rd h~~ not ~.n ~ny wAy disarmed himself.
. Very honorgbly Ch~oarted when the vote~ were counCed and hav~.ng proven
~ Chnt the �~.rat secr~tary of ehe PSF can no lottger do everyChing that he
; wishes, Ronard aesereed hig personaLity and h3s asseta even bet~er. In
the~lggC analysis Rocntid hag even won a~.ot in not ~1lowing himgelf eo be
I intim~.datied by the thunderbolte of Jupiter. No m~titer thaC he plays too
- hard nt being a sperkling figurp, here he was, even more clearly th~n :
' formerly, propelled to the forefront of ehe future, Chis frail fellow
, with the rapid ability to th3nk, his face luminous, hig eye quick nnd
who, in addieion, has an enormoua human pregence on sma11 televie~.on ~creens~
Und~ni~bly, such personallty is made for executive and even creet~.ve rolas,
~ He either charmg or exagpergtes.. And he does not have his equal in the
~ parCy to find �ormulag whiah click when th~y do noe shock. We sha11 un-
. doubt~dly hear more apeeches from this sparkll.ng ~prite.
; This me~ns that Mitterrand hgs not won completely eieher on thar score:
He now has to deal at least with ~ocard ~s between equals.
This can obv3ously not occur without complic~ting the general confuaion
of the French political landscape even more.
t And, after as before the PSF congress of Metz, which will literally have
; been a congress for nearly nothing, we have itt truth no more Chan Cwo fac-
tors which, besides problems, are constants: The communist party and the
~ presidency.
~ The French Communist Party not in the slightest way modified iCs iron
; strategy. It has declared a war to the end on the Socialist Party. The
~ entire apparatus is involved in it without respite. It maCtere little
whether the Socialist Party gets broken more slowly than is anCicipated.
The buddies of Georges Marchais will not give up soon against the social
' democrats. There will be no truce before he reconquers the leading spoC
on the left for th~ PCF. All means will be gond to that end. The
Socinlists have no illusions on that score.
As Eor the presidency, thanks to the Constitution, iC maintains very
strong auChority no matter whaC one may say here or there. The presi-
~ denCial palace continues to represent, thank God, an incomparable element
of stabi:lity. The insCitution is hangi.ng on remarkably well. The waves
of the furies and maledicrions are vainly aCtacking the wall. The wall
continues to be invincibly solid. The French presidents are noC from
this point of view done with giving big thanks to Chnrles de Gau11e. But
r
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~
ir h~ppeng tih~C th~ very p~rsongl.iCy of Va~~ry C~.~c~rd d'~se~in~ a1.~o con- ,
eribuees Co iti, at le~gC for four reasoile. 'i'he fir~C is thnt deep clnwn hn ~
is n m~n nf r~so~.ve: Hi~ adveran~iea whn cnn~ider him a lighewe:lgh~ . '
and us unde~3d~d are gr~utly miataken. The second reason is thati G~.~c~rd
d'C~e~~.ng passesse~ to ~n ohviou~ degree Ch~r indispens~b~.e quality of any
~tntesman: Cool-he~dedne~s~ The eh3rd reaaon i.g that he ~.s too obv~ously
r~.ght when he ~~y~ and repeats ehat, especinl.~.y ~.n dramaeic ineernation~l
c~.rnumstignc~s, it would be roo dangerou~ eo ke~p ehe Sdn~.al.~.sts nuCs~.de
nf their respong~.bili~ies of office for eoo long. In thc_ regpect Gien~rd
d'~stging ig tihe only one ro asserr him~elf as the gr~ae~st ra111gr whnm
noth3ng di~cnurages. The fourth reason is provided by his adversariea
ehemselvee: The more ehey challenge the ~resident, the more they force
him, in order Co beeter impose hia authoriey in ~he ahort term to demand
a s~co nd term. The more Chey discuss his deep-seared legieimacy or sound-
nesg, the more he feels Che obligation of remain3ng energetic~lly at his
post. Z� Valery Gigc~rd d'~atAing had nor yeti envisioned runn3ng in 1981,
3C is now, under the blowg thae are being de~1e to him, that he may make
th~t decis3on. ~'ar from disp~.riting him or hxrming h~.m, precisely because
he is not n weakling, the blows levelnd ae h~m cannot help but harden h~.s
armor. And that is exactly what is happening.
No, fnr Che time being the F'rench political scene is not brilliant in
general~ There are too many reasons for being Curned otf. Clearer dis-
cussions would be desirab~e, more sincere commitments, more apparent
str~tegies. Too much fo~ is hanging over all the horizons. But at least
t}~epresidency manages to hang on. After a11, GhaC is where the head is
ro be found. In passing, incidentally, one wond~rs even more how the error
could be made of shortening the Cerm of ehe head of state. The fact that
it runs for 7 years is one of the ma3or elements in the power of the presi-
dency and the entire French balance. LeC us hope thaC one will not allow
such a fundamental question to be treated with too much romanticism and
unconsCraint. ~Is it noC Coo obvious that, in the presenC state of France
and the world, nothing but nothing should be done ~hat can weaken the
French pres3dency in any respect as such?
COPYRIGHT: 1979 par Cogedipresse SA
2662
CSO: 3100
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CUURTitY SLCTIUN i~ltANC~
l:CO(~,or~.ic h:~'FECTS OF' NORAfAfJDY ~PIZ007'Y VI~WEA
. t~aris L1~ ~lOUVEL U~Sk:RVATF:UR in French 23 Apr 79 op 74-75
~ (Article by Fabien Gruhier~
[T~xt~ In the good old days, ~'~he fever" was never a tragedy. It was endemic
anVwAy, ~n~i raqed.all Che time. People were used ta it. Cvery peasant knew its
symptoms Che du11~~g1irterinR eyes~ the lassitude~ the refusal to ~;raze.
They forced Che animal Co eat mistletoe, They washed the stable with poCassium
chloride. They put a goaC in the sCable, which helped, it seemed, to Ward
off evil spells and dissipate the Foot-and-mouth miasmas tho dtabolical
disease that strikes cloven-hoofed animals specifically. Uiabolical, but not
fatal: "If you leave it alone, the animal most often recovers," coni~irms e
veterinarian, "althou~h it remains a terrible source of virus for ye~rc;~~
Formerly, they put up with sick cows, whose weight stopped growinR end Which .
~ave no more milk. "We ~zot along,~' says a retired farmer. ~'Now~ it~s output.
; They are pushing. Everything is calculaCed very closely. With the loans to
repay and the acrobatic margins, the sli~htest deficit becomes fatal. On top .
oE thar, rhere are the health re~ulations for export. A sick animal can no
lon,�er he toleraCed. And then, the cattle selected for output are much more
vulnprable, less resistant to disease. i'inally, in stables with 200 head,
epidemics propagaCe very fast. I had eight cows."
That is why the foot-and-mouth disease epidemic that burst.upon Lower Normandy
at the end of ~�tarch.is reaching the dimensions of an economic catastrophe for
_ all of Bessin. That is why draconian measures have been decreed: slau~hterinF
oE all the cloven-?~oofed animals on any farm where a single case has been
detected, And prohibition of fairs, markets, sports events, balls, and ~ethc~r-
:r.;;a of all kinds. ~'Except for Mass: they didn~t dare,~' observes the cafe
owner in Saint Germain du Pert, t-he starting point of the epidemic ~'or
rather the epizooCy, as they say since they have been studying the lan~ua~e.~' `
: "Ther~ is no alternative," an expert from the Dtinistry of Agriculture assert~.
"The f`oot-and- mouth disease virus is terribly contagious.~' A total of 2,000
cattle most of'them healthy and nearly 1,OO~J pigs, sheep or goAts have
gone this way. Still nothing in comparlson with the 1974 epizooty in 13ritCAny,
where f~,000 cattle were slaughtered and t�Iass was prohibited. But, by sacrfficing
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gome carel~ qu~ckly and vaccfneting a~th ali their ml~ht~ thay aanCed prQCfoely
to avofd th~ rep~t~C~on of auch e rregedy. 'They hav~ almoet ouccaodod in
containin~ th~ diaast~rs ev~rything leeda them to bel~eve thet the gcourge
hee been ~ugul~CQd~ and that the prlncipal restrlctfona W~11 bQ tii'tad by tho
end of thQ month ia rhQ forbfddon Crfangle Safne Lo, ~ayQUx~ ~nd I~igny.
l~eopie wonder about ChQ orlgfn of the v~rue an ~'O.type v~ru~~" Whfch had
not been seQn ~n France for 25 y~ara. Sihere dfd !t come from? "tE there io
enyon~ Who knoWS~ he aii~ keQp hia m~uth ehur,~~ explodQa a fer~a~r al~o~e cattle
have ell been slaughC~red. ~~Bu~ !t would be enough for a guy to go vlsit soa~a
farms in D9orocco." A~ter the unexpiefnabie landing of Che ~'O.typo~~ vlru� fn
Saint Germain du Pert~ fte ftinerary has be~n partly traceds h~o ot thQ farme
w~re tnfecCed by ehe 5unday vlait of e reietive Who Was hfmtei! a farmQ~
effect~d by the ~~aver, but not knoWing it a8 yet Who carried thr vfrue on
the aolea of hfa sho@a. "non~t Celk too much about frsrhe poor man Cried to
commit 8uicide when he Eound ouC theC he had braughC the dfeeas~a~" a chorftabl@
n~~ghbor Wh~apere ebout Chls un~ortunete man.
La Cambe. A little torrn v~ry cloee to Sainr Cermein du pert on Route 13, ah~ch
aas Che ifne of the eplzooty. A large lera~, ~et as~des Charl~a Deprei~a tattin.
ll~ad sflenc~. ~mpCy sCalis. The lOG young bulls Were sleuqhterad et the end
of March. In the courryerd~ o b!g plle af ~oddAr aestea aaey ~omehoW or other~
AC the rtk rcy of the fntermlttenC doar?pours. Srfli overaheimed by thfs blow o!
fate, Charies Deaprez refuses to eay enything at all. As union represeatetlva
of the Bessln farmers, he has alrgady expressed hfa Choughts. Not to complaln~ .
but on the contrery to condenu~ the secrQt end strictly forblddon trena-
portation of cattle acros$ the contaminated areas. "i1e don~t knou all the hocua-
pocua. Everyone has h!s schemes," eays a reaident of Le Cambe. "Yes, ae~ve
seen catCle-cars said to be fuli of hay. Actu~lly, there aere a few bales of
hay 1n front of the Windo~rs. Nith the ~olts, you saa the horna end the eyes.
The cops even stopped a trailer full of pig~. They had Crouble opening the
door: ~Ce~np trailer. Private home. Do you heve a WarrenC?~ liah! But the drlver
couldn~t prevent his pigs from grunting."
~~The people who do that are dirty. In order to sell a fQa enfmals~ they take
the risk of ines~ing up all of Normandy. They aren~t farmers. Traffickers~
cheats,~' In ord~r to preven~ this transportatlon, the tarmers, Who think that
the police forces are not big enough~ have organixed themselves. In 5alnt
.Tean de Daye, for example~ th~y petrolled Che empty roeda every nlght, exam.
ininf; Che suspect vehicle~.
Penalty PercenCage
Why would one Want et all ~osts to move cattle by ni~ht? There We hit on one
of the most tragic consequences of the disease. The breeders Whose enimals
went to the slauRhterhouse will come aut all right: 21 of them have already
shared nearly 7 miliion francs as e dotm payrnent on the dqmages provfded for
by the Ministry of Agriculture. A sp~ed record, consfdering the endleas de-
lays the adminiatretion !s accustomed to When it hes something to pay outl
"PuC yourself in the place of these hard-hit farmers," they sey at headquaiters
3$
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!n Ca~n. "The Craume fe so ~roat that ae had Co mak~ e qestiure gaeti.~~ After
repayfng thQ aorking capital for the loaC Work~ rhey are noa studying lndem-
niPi~uklun far ~he loea of incocne during th~ reconstitutlon of Che i~vestock~ ~
~+hlch w~li rQqutre a~ leaBt 6 manthe. Md they splft halra over rh~ panu~ry
percenta~e thaC ehould be ievled on ehe breoderg aC 1QaeC a tihfrd of the
vfctlma uhoaQ siaughterod anlmala were not at ail !n ord~r~ from the
hoelCh point oE vlQa. ~~Obviously, ~f eil rhe animals more Chan 6 months old
had been vecc~nated~ ae the laa requ~res~ rherQ Would have b~en no epl~ooty~~~
adml~a e vetQr~nery servlcQ authorlry. "Beaid~a~ !f Che dle~~~a appeered hQra,
fr aag no accfdantt Loaer Normandy ~s kno~m !or !t~ laxlty !n h~aeith mattera."
"Md 1Qt~~ noC ~orget,~' adda a clvfl ~Qrvant~ ~'thet 60~~00 cattle will be
~ slaugh~ered in the Ch~nr~el depertment alone betao@n noa and 1981~ !n the namo
o! the ffght agalnaC tubQrculoa!� and undulant lQVer. It~a on ~ho ech@dule.
Bur Che compeneatfon pafd tor that elaughterlnR !s much lower then ahat fs
b~ing grAnted tor the foot�and�mouth dleease." Thua !n eomo ceeea, the acourge
could heve taken on the appearance of ineru~e lrom heaven.
But there are nll the others, those on ~hose farms no duil~ gllttering eye was
discov~red, and Who ~'dldn~ t underaCand~' Why the oirners of unvaccfnated catCle
Were compl~tely reimbursed. For they have been terribly peneilsed by the
dfsease Char appeared on Che others~ ferms. It fs ~mposs~ble to move rhe
enimals. Thay have to stay Where they ere~ !n ffeids Where there is often noC
e blade of grasa left. Nhat !s the aolution? To buy todder at as~ exorbltant
price. It !s lmpossible to buy or seii a co~?. Noa~ they were ~~juaC beglnnin~
to recover from the 1976 drought," and, et the end o! March, they had ~ust
reached the tltne ahen they had to pey the renC.
~'iglers for Chrlatmas
The situation is especialiy dYpficult for the piglet producers~ the breedera
Who sell their young enimals to the tatteners. In our times, breeding is !n-
dustrialited and specialized~ the contlueat of many commerclal floas and cur-
rents that are completely disconnected by legel regulatlons. The mllk pro-
ducer is not equipped to make meat. The first breeder !s not equipped to
fatCen the nurslings Chat are left on his hands, ilhence tho tempatation to
make a feW secret~ nocCUrnal round trips, to ahich some people have auccumbed.
"The industrial breeders have not been supplied With 8-day celves. Th~ aame
for the piglets v?hich have hed to be aent dlrectly to the slughterhouse in
splte of the huge loss of income thaC thaC represents becau~e it Was tor-
bidden to send theyn elseahere. You can expect to find a surplus ot trozen
suckiin~ pigs on the market at Christmas-time." It fs forbidden to export
local rr~et. The Cermans and other clienta aill look for other suppllera. Large
markets wl11 be lost. Milk lnspectors~ ertificlal insemination experta~ agricul-
tural Work~rs, drivers~ eCc. many professlons Wl11 experfence technical
unemploymcnt. To sey nothin~ of Che losses experlenced by the lodder merchanta.
the or~?anizers of pubiic dances~ the aports clubs, etc. Llke a dog in n game
of skittles, the "0-type virus~' hes Wrecked everythinR !n five or aix counties.
There is no reimbursement for all that. Besides, could could you meeaure the
dama~e~ The Agricultural Bank hes simply agreed to extend the due dates on
39
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ccrtnfn lonns. Cold comfort~ and l.h: B~5SIN LI~R~~ a woQkiy newepaper ~ub-
liahrct in N~yeux~ sfmply fcArs ChaC "the deapalr of the Dessin famiif~s ~
wflt b~ ag ~reat t~s thaC of the Longwy fam~Iies.~~
Thnr.~g snyin~ ~ lot, fer Lou~r Norm~ndy dous not resemblr Lorra~ne. ~nd humor
is no~ c~hown in th~ BARIP a~y. 2'here nre no exploslons~ bur sub~le rearrenp.e�
menCe. "A largca number of local representaefv~s f~ll into dierepute by dpman-
dtnR rhp end of syst~matic slaughteYln~ on the conCam~nat~d farms, a form of
loW d~ma~oqy shoWing contempti for the law~~~ aay~ a"weli-informed~' observ~r
from SAinC Lo. "Md then the malcontents nre in Che procefs of creatfnR ~
ehapter of the rFA e reactionary~ treditlonalist, and egpec~ally rl~ht~st
farr.~er~ union in Bess~n." It is thus thaC by almosC impQnetrable logic~
thA ''U-rype virus~" celled foot-and�mouth dfaeasa, plays into th~ hands of rhe
r~ncrionarfes.
CUl~YR1CHT: 1979 "le h'ouvei Observateur"
~429
CSU: 3l (~0
~7
~ 40
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CdUNTftY S~CTION ITALY
~L' S PFtOJE'CT~b ~CTFtTCAL F~R(3Y DF'�ME1ND 2'0 1987
~ Mi.l~n L' ~t1ROPE0 ~.n Stalian 5 Apr 79 PP 2~-31
[Artin].e by (~iusepp~ Bonazzoli: "Haw Many Hours in the Dark")
[Exc~rptsJ The detailed answer t.o this emergency is contained in a still
unpublished document which hae already been approved by the (ENELj Corpora-
tion's board of directors and forwarded for approval to CIPE (Interminister-
ial Committee for ~conomic Planning) where after an exhaustive technical
analysis plans are made for increasing the aupp].y of ele~Lrical energy; this
being the basic requirement for the industrial and economic development of
the country. This concerns the following dossier: "ENEL [National Electric
Power Agencyj Programa, Electrical Energy Requirements and their Coverage:
New Insta].lations up to i987" which conaists oF 195 pages +~nd contains te~bles
� and graphs. This is a pro~ect which is undergoing unforeseen and worrysome
delays in its realization.
According to the document: "In 1977, while the overall consumption of energy
sagged by 1.2 percent, electrical energy consumption, even during e year of
modest econo~?ic growth, rose by 6.7 percent and thus the rate of national
consumption of electrical energy continued to rise going from ?_4.3 percent
in 1973 to 27.4 ~ercent in 197~+ bringing the structure of Italian consumption
closer to that of the more industrialized countrie~."
The ENEL document starts out with the expected requirements for the years
ahead which are based on the 1977 data: 160.4 billfon kilowatt houra show-
ing an increased consumption of 6.7 percent with respect to the previous
year and therefore it is expected that in 1980 the demand will be for 193
billion kilowatt hours with a set potential of 36.4 millinn kilo~ratt hours.
In 1987 the demand ought ta increase to 330 billion kilowatt hours with a
set potential of 62.5 niillion kilawatt hours.
The importance of Lhe productive development of II1EL is clearly indicated by
the PEN (National Energy Program), approved by CIPE in December of 1977, on
the basis of political and governmental guidelines which recommended a 4 per-
cent increase in gross home production up to 1980 and then f~om 4 to 5 percent
up to 1987. The ~fitEL ~rogram is based on the request for enormous investments
l~.l ?
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~4:~
.
Fo~ o~ic~nT, vsE or~r.~r :
~
a~ ~ dfreeti reeul~ of th~s~ coneidara~ionss Nbre than 23 thau8and bi~.tion
lir~ (e~lau~abed at ~h~ 1978 priaes) for th~ aon~truat~.on 2b t~~w t~ydrd-
~lectric'power plan~s, 39 tihermo-geoelecbric and turbo-g~g power plante, ~
besides the 12 nacl~ar pow~r planbs, all of ~he$e bo be buiit betw@~n 1979 '
and 1987, Thie ie an oubl.~?y which woulc~ be eubdivided ~s foliawe: 1,260 r
bilZione ~n ~97g; i,76y b~iiions ~n 1980; 2,19y billion8 in 1981; 2,810 ;
billione in 19~; 3,335 billione in 1993; 4,2q0 bi11.3ong in 1984; 3,990 ~
billions in i985; 2,230 billions 3n 1986 and 930 bil].iona in 1987~
Th~re is already governmental and parliamentary approval for the nuclee~r
option; however, tihere is conaiderable delay in getiting the prograa? under-
way du~ to the weli-known bureaucratie ~nd ecological poi~mics. Once con-
structed, ~eeted and put into f1~11 operation the 12 nuclear po~r~r stations
ahould produce 12,000 megawatts. Hawever, in 10 year$ th~ requiremenL for
electrical. energy will be coneiderably higher. Hence the need for launching
a"supplemental. operational" program which on paper appears to be enormous--
perhaps too much with respect to what is expected.
Fiowever, the EN~I. dossier contains the warning: "If in the apan of time
covered by the program the requirement ghould end up b~ing gre~ter than the
conceived estimations then it would be imposaible to intQrvene with n~w
installations for filling the resulting gap, because of the length of time
required for bringing such installations into existence. 2'herefore, should
this be the case, the consequences in the sector of ~roduction and civilian
li~e o~ the entire country would be extremely grave.' What ENEL actual],y
says is this: If Indugtrial Ytaly ghould end up growing too rapid]y aith
respect to the suppl,y of energy the community would be forced to pay an -
extremely high price for the erroneous planning.
According to the calculations of the ENEL technicians what is needed by 1987 }
is something li.ke 7,704 megawatts produced.by nuclear type and standard
installations which the document envisages in accordance with the following j
breakdown: 26 hydro-electric power stations, some of ahich will have to be '
built, while those already there would be readied for operation, and then ~
39 ~hermo-electric power stations. It olso points to the necessity of
building four thezmal groups ftiteled by coal; however, notwithstanding the �
insLa].~.ation of costly scrubbing equipment, there is still the problem of
polluting substances which the coal fueled pawer stations input into the
atmosphere. The utilizatian of natural resources of energy is not being
neglected. In fact one chapter of the dossier is dedicsted to "integrating ~
sources" and envisages research activities aimed at a more intensive and
rational exploitation of natural steam ~ets, experiments ar,d studies for '
the utilizatifln of solar energy along Kith the announcement of the construc-
tion of a prototype solar pawer station at the foot c,f M,unt Etns in ~oint- ~
ownership with the European Coc~unity. According to the IIdEEL technicians '
solar energy can contribute decisively to the heating of homes and factories;
however, its maximum application for the production of electrical energy is
still a far away solution. In fact, according to the document: "The average ,
_ ~
l~2 ~
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contrib~~ion of the~~ in~egra~i~ng soura~e in cover~ng ~Eh~ re~~~rem~n~s is
~v~~~nti~,y v~ry ~.~tni~~d by economtQ and t~chnic~l f~etore ~ Thua ther~ i~
anly an~ ~?1~~rc~~?t~+~~t t~ual~~r ~~n~/~~ ~t~?r~d~?~d ~herm~-~1~atrie~l ~rdduetidn~n
2hat 1997 schedul@
~ Ab the concluaion of ~ha lengthy analyrsi~ ~h~ ~L documan~ comee up wi~h
~r?o hypothpaea: Th~ fire~ of theee is an optiimistic one and be~ides the
puttin~ into op~ration the c~uelear pawer stabions which have alreac~y been
approve~ it also envisage$ the opening of etandard poM?er etsbione. The
other is more pessimistic and stems from the presuppo8l~ion tha~ by 198?
it wi11 be po8sible ~o count only on atandard power etQLiona and if this
ia eo ~here aould be a aerious energy ehortage. Iti is for this re~?son ~hat
ENEL w~?rns; "It ig therefore nece8sary to face the pos8lbility that in the
eventi ~h~ economie development of the country ehould experience ratee of
growth con~ecture8 on the basie of an auepicioua development, then ,starting
from 1984 we would b~ facing dangerous insufficiencie~ of eleetric power
whiCh could greatl.y affect this very developmen~ wi~h eas3ly conceivable
consequenees espeeially with regard ~o ~mploymen~." This is an ene~gy and
economic blackout which the country cannot afford.
COPYRIaHT: 1979 Rfzzoli ~ditore
7964
CSO: 3104
43
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COUNTRY 3ECTION MALTA
:
~ REPOttT ON ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET FLEET.IN I~DITERRANEAN
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Ztalian 31 Mar 79 p 6
(Article by Gianfranco Simone: "The Ruesian Fleet Expendg in the Medi-
terranean as NATO Abandone the Bulwark of Malta."J
~Text) La Valletta--Libyan Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, heading a large dele-
gation, arrived tod~y at La Valletta to attend the ceremonies maYking the
end of mil3tary ties between Malta and the UK.
The eheer size of the Libyan delegation (eotellin$ 800 people) raflecta
the growing importance of ehe bilateral relaeione. Up to r?a~, Libya ha8
been the only country ahich has promised economic and eecuri~y guaranteea
to the extent requested (by Malta~.
A historical cycle is about to be completed: after 180 years, the last
~ontingent of British troops remaining in Malta, a company of commandos
of the Roya1 Marines, will depart the island on Saturday. On the 26th,
in faCt, the 7-year treaty expired, a treaty which allo~aed the UK and
thus NATO to lease air and naval bases on the rock upon ~hich, in 1942,
was dashed the Hitlerian dream of reaching Lhe Nile and the Caucasus with
the Afrika Korps. `
When in 1913 the Maltese Prime Minieter, Dom Mintoff, requested an increase
of 10 percent in the annual fee (about 20 billion lire), half of which was
to be ehouldered by NATO (vhich was very much in favor of paying), London
refused, fearing it would be financing its own eviction. In fact, Mintoff
stated that the increase ~,~ould be uaed to industrialize the is'and and
thus render it tndependent from the necessity of renting basea to foreign-
ers.
Perhaps it was to celebrate the even~, and certainly as d warning to the
Arab states following Carter's visit to Egypt, that a third of the Soviet
B1ack Sea fleet this month hae been galavanting about the MediterYanean
with part~cular alacrity, pushing toward the Balearic Islands.
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A group coneieting of the cruiser-aircr~ft carrier Minek (the eecond epeci-
men of the Kiev clase~ ~nd Cwo 10,000 ton m~~sile cruisere, the Tashkanr and
the Petropavlosk, which are the moat Yecent offepring o~ the Nikolayev ~or
Kara, in NATOese) claee, however~ hava aet eail for tha Tyrrhenian S~a~
The other group, which ~teamed between Sardinia and the Daleati3c Island~,
conei~ted of: the Kiev, an Isachenkov (or KresrB II) clase miseile cruieer,
three destroyere, a Juliet clase conventional submgr~ne capable~ however,
of launching cruise miseilea albeit only from khe surface, ~he bYand new
amphibious attack ship Rogov (13,000 Cone~ apee~d 17 knots, carrying anei-
aircraft miseiles, cannone and machineguns, equipped w3th a landing plat-
form for one or two hel3coptere and perhaps also a flood3ng baein for hover-
craft type aseault craft), in gddition to around ewenty support veaeels.
~ Two of the destzoyera were of the Kaehin claes, probably the improved ver-
sion, displacing 4~700 tons~ and the other a Krivak clase unit of recent
producrion~ displacing 3,600 tons.
It appears that at leaet 9 other aubmarinea, including 2 nuclear misaile,
suba, have been picked up by eonar and by magneti.c diaturbance surveyore
on board the 4 ehipa and the Brequet twin engine Atlantic which NATO hae
deplnyed near the Ru$sian vesaels.
Generally the latter exhibit auch a high concentration of artillery, mis-
siles, radar and electronic warfare apparatus that they make portions of
, Western navies seem like yachts, ~ith the exception of the ICalian frigates
Lupo and the English Leanders, the hydrofoil Sparviero and the three French
Tourville destroyer escorts.
Describing the Kiew cruiser-aircraft carriera alone:� 43,000 tons fully
loaded, speed at least 30 knots, 274 metere total length with an angled
deck 189 meters 1ong; the remaining 85 meters, basically the bow, is
bristling with missiles: SS-N-14s, capable of delivering a couple of nu-
_ clear warheads on a submarine, if not capable of targeting iC with an
acoustic Corpedo; SA-N-3s (Goblet) anti-aircraft misailes (range of 50
kilometers, thus capable df reaching an altitude of at least 25,000 me-
ters), and SA-N-3s, also surface to air, but with a range of 10 kilometera,
for point defense.
Still in the bow are a zurret with two 76/60 cannonR (range 14,000 meters,
60 rounds per minute), four 23mm machineguns in separate turreta, each
with 6 rotating barrels (range: 2,500 meters, thus reaching an altitude
of 1,500 meters, tlieoretically capable of between 4,000 and 6,000 rounds
per munute), two 250mm antisubn~arine rocket launchers with 12 barrels each,
one for close-in defense. Astern there are twin Gaffer launchers, another ~
76/60 turret and 4 more 23mm machineguna; furthermore, the Kiav class ves-
vessels (sooa to be three with the launching of the Komsomolek) also have
two 5-tube (533aan) torpedo launchera and mine laying rails.
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The helicopteti wing cons~.sCs of 20 K~mov K~-25 (Kormon~), e~ch equipped
with two automatic hom3ng torpedoea, d~pth chargee (with nuclear option),
and "fire and forget" m~.es~.les (megning that th~y do not hav~ to be gui-
ded, thue enabling the a3rcraft to leave immediately)~
Finally, the Kiev~ houee 12 verticgl takeoff fightar-bombere (Forger)
(Maximum epeed 1,200 k3lometer~ par hour, range berween 370 and 550 kila-
metere), armed with air-to-air ACo11 and gir-eo-surfe~e AS-7 (Kerry) mig-
silee, capable of delivering 90 kilos of exploeive up to 10 kilometiere.
The two a3rcraft carriere of Task Force 60 (Sixth F1eet) which count a
total of 48 Phanthoms and Tomcat F-14s, 72 Corsair nnd intruder attack
aircraf~, 18 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters and aircraft plua
reconnaiseance aircraft, airborne radar pickets and electronic countermaa-
sure airplanes would be sufficient to place the Soviet veasels in the Med~.-
terranean in very grAve di�ficultiea (witih Israel ~t ita back).
Actually, one American aircraft carrier between S~rdinia and the Balearic
Islands and another near Cyprua would cover the whole Mediterranean and
large parts of ad~oining countries.
7`he ewo groups of Soviet vessels have been shadowed by the American de-
stroyer Spruance (a new unit, but eliciting the comanent: "Aren't 8,000
tons a bit much ~uet to deploy two 127mm cannona, six torpedo launchera,
8 anti-submarine missiles and a helicopter?"), and by the Audace (which,
though displacing only 4,400 tons, has Cwo 127/54 pieces, four 76/62s~
two anti-submarine helicopters, a Tartar missile launchin~ ramp for anti-
aircraft point defense, six torpedo launchers and ia capable of mounting
a couple of Otomat-Teaeo anti-ship launchers with a range of 180 kilo-
meCers), the olcl IndamiCo and the aged Tartu which, although only a radar
picket ship for sir control, actually was the veeael which could have
bothered the Soviets the most.
The very war that the superpowers and their allies want to wage in the
Mediterranean, which has been going on for years, is that of the "black
boxes," of radar interference, of radio intercepta.
Strategically, for the next few years, the situation givea rise to some
worries due to the contraction of the navy of the American empire, which
is spread out over two oceans and is based on maritime trade routes, in
contrast to the expansion of the Soviet empire, essentially a l~nd and
continental one, able to operate using internal lines. In a conventional
war, if the US were to loae the navy it would be isolated, if not strangled;
the USSR would lose some forward positions such as Cuba, but would always
be able to reach Mid-East energy sources via land. This leads some to fear
a Mediterranean Pearl Harbor.
For thi~, the loss of that unsinkable aircraft carrier which is Malta is a
problem for NATO; on the other hand, one cannot force 300,000 inhabitants
of a sovereign country always to live on an aircraft carrier, with all the
risks that entails. 46 ,
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\Q JGGOS L~.I N~ATD ` w ' _
. . _ Gl~ ~AB~ ~ 2 ) ~
E6JOYA ~i ru~N LJ solne ru.~?
_ ~ :~~I`l '
~i' . ~ I ~?rui~~~n ~
~ LA OI~X~, ~R ~~in '
~
,
. i LO E IIVORNO ~C ~~AS~ A~t
~
~
_ ELIC ~ ,
ROMA ~ ~ s~
~6e~i~i M
� ~
~ 6AE'fl1 ~
~ ~
~ w~PO~i y
~ ' ~ ~
~ ~ ~-':.TJRF~ND=
~
~naa~vio I
IONIO ~
4?WU ~
.
~ CATANIA
-~~Krcu
~ ~
r G
~ anrn,anart
~ Z LTA
,-d ~ t~PEOt~sA
~ ~
~ ~
MEDITERRANE
~
~ ~B/A ~
u.R.ss.
X,~
~Y.~
- ~-r-- . ~ ~
~
NATO ~E AtIDACE i~vca?r~m
I
�
~ , ~ � ~M....~.~~
ElSfNHOWER
~ Y'`_ - ~ . r. 7ARl~/ ~1
h~
Key:
1. NATO base 4. Air base
2. Soviet base 5. Helicopter base
3. Anchorage 6. Submarine base
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
9209
CSO: 3104
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