JPRS ID: 8347 TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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• Collection: JPRS
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• Document Page Count: 62
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPI2S L/8347
22 March 1979
_ ? ~ ~
. TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
FOUO No, 626
,
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARC~ SERVIC~
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1
taom~
. JpR5 publicgCinns cnnCain in~ormtttion primarily from fnreign
newspgpers, periodicals and book~, buC ~lso from news agency
transmissione and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sourcps are translated; Chose from ~nglish-language sources
are transcribed or reprinred, with the original phrasin~ and
other characCeristics retained.
- Headlines, editorial reporCs, and maCerial enclosed in brackeCs
are supplicd by JPIt5. Processing indicators such as [TexC]
or [~xcerpe] in the first line of each item, or following Che
last line oF a brief, indicate how Che original information was
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mation was summarized or extracted,
Unf~miliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
en~losed in pfirentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
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original but have been supplied as appropriaCe in conrext.
OCher unat~ributed parenthetical noCes within t;~e body of an
item originate with the source. Times within iCems.are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or at~~itudes of the U.S. Government.
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BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA 1~ Report No~ 2~ 7. Recipient's A~re~Rion Nu.
sHeEr JPRS L/ 8347
- ~ u r an u tu e S~ eport ate -
TRANSLATIONS ON SUB-SAHRRAN AFRICA, FOUO No. 626 22 March 1.979
6.
Auihur(~1 9. Pertormin;, Otganizrti~~n kept.
No.
9. ~'erlormieg Otganizrtion Name and Addteis 10. Pro~eet/7a~k~Wurk U~u~ ~o,
Joint Publicationa Eteaearch Service
1000 Norrh Glebe Road 11. Contnct/Granc No,
Arlington~ Virginia 22201
IZ Spon~utina Or`~niz~tion N~me and Addre~~ 13. Type of Reporc ~c Pe~iod
Covered
Ae above
14.
IS. Supplemene~ry Note�
16. Ab~tr~ct�
The report containa ~nformation from African aad specialized West European
_ publicationa and radio an political, economic~ and eociological developments.
1~. Kcy Words and Daument Analysi~. 170. Descripcor~
Political Science X Inter-African Aff. X Ghana Rwanda
Sociology X Angola Guinea Sao Tome and
Economics X Benin Guinea-Bissau Principe
Culture (Social X Botawana Ivory Coast X Senegal
Sciences) Burundi Kenya Seychelles
Technologic2,1 X Cameroon Lesotho Sierra Leone
Cape Verde Liberia Somalia
X Central African Madagascar South Africa
Empire Malawi Swaziland
' X Chad Mali Tanzania
Comoro Islands Mauritius XTogo -
X Congo X Mozambique Uganda
D~ibouti Namibia Upper Volta
Equatorial Guinea Niger XZaire
176. (deotifiers/Open-Ended Tetm~ Ethiopia Nigeria ~2ambia
_ X Gabon Tteunion
~ XGambia X Rhodesia
- 17c. C05ATI Field/GrouP Q2~SD~SC~St( `
18. Av~ilab~luy St~tement 19. Securicy Class (1 his 21. Ao. o( F'aRes
?'OR l)i'F1CIA1. USE UNI,Y. Limited Number of R`P�f~ 58
~.Uf1~rti Av~~ilable From J~K$ � ecurity I~ss (This 2~, Nr~~~
Pa6e
�ow~r wt~~.� ~~ev. ~�~i~ UNCLAS~IFIED
THtS FORM IMAY BE REPRODUCED 'JS~~My ''�"'O"
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_ JPRS L/8347
22 March 19 79
- TRANSLATIOIVS ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRI CA
FOUO No. 626
CONTENTS PAGE
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Briefs
Senegal-Guinea-Bissau Dispute Ad~udication 1 ~
- ANGOLA
UNITA: MPLA Will Be Compelled To Negotiate
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANE~,NS, 19 .Jan 79)....... 2
Benguela Railroad Claims and Counter-Claims Reported ~
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDIT~RRt1NEENS, 19 Jan 7Q)....... 4 ~
Briefs
Alleged UNITA Suppqrters 5
Portuguese Prisoners' Release S
UNITA on the Offensive 5
- GDR Port Equipment 5 -
- BENIN ~
Kerekou Calls for Revolutionary Unity _
(Mathieu Kerekou Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 19 Feb 79).. 6
I30'CSWANA
Briefs
- FRG Petroleum Storage Loan 11
CAMF.ROON
Circumspection Characterizes Attitude Toward Oil
_ (Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 7 Feb 79) 12
Cameroon, France Issue ,lc,int Communique
(MARCl~ES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 16 Feb 79)....... 16
- a' [III - NE b A- 122 FOUOj
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_ CONTENTS (ConCinued) Pgge _
CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE
~
Immense RifC BeCween Bokassa, People Claimed -
(Mariam Sysle; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 5-18 Feb 79) 20
Briefa
BNCD's Activitiea 22
CtIAD
Reporter Witnesaes BatCle Betw~een Malloum, Habre Troopa
(Noel Ngouo Ngabisaio; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 28 Feb 79)....... 23
CONGO -
Sassou Nguesso's Presidency Seen as Victory tor Left
(Mariam Sysle; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 19 Feb-4 Mar 79).......... 27
GABON -
New Faces in Government May Assist in Auaterity Program
(Sory Serinde Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 21 Feb 79)........ 29
PDG Extraordinary Congress Results Reviewed _
(Sory Serinde Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 7 Feb 79)......... 32
GAMBIA
Nation Undergoing 'Serious Economic, Social Difficulties'
(Sam Essono; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 19 Feb-4 Mar 79) 9~
GHANA
Brie;`s
' i;~inker Import Licenses 31
MOZAMBIQUE ~
- Briefs I
GDR Agricultural Equipment Training 3s
RHODESIA
Muzorewa Defends Position in Autobiography -
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 21 Feb 79) 39
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CONTCNTS (Continued) PgBe
SENEGAL
- Senghor Seen as Able To Cope With Oppoeition
(Siradiou Diallo; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 31 Jan '79)........... 41
TOGO
Five-Year Plan Reviewed, Future Augurs We11
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 7 Feb 79) 45
Phoaphate Sector Temporarily Hurt, Future Plans Outlined
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 7 Feb 79) 47
ZAIRE
. 'Belgium, United States 'Convinced Mobutu Regime at Lar~C Gasp'
' (Fode Amadou,; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 19 Feb-4 Mar 79)........... 49
Conditions Not Viewed as Improving by 1980
(A. Fall; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 5-18 Feb 79) 51
Briefs
Foreign Investments Reexamined 53
ZAMBIA
New Cabinet Formed lo Control Political Turmoil
(Cherif Rachid; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 5-18 Feb 79) 54 -
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- INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
_ BRIEFS
SENDGAL-GUINEA-BISSAU DISPUTE ADJUDICATION--During a recent debate before the
National. Assembly, the Senegalese minister of foreign affairs, Moustapha Niasse,
officially confirmed that Senegal and Guinea-Bissau would submit their disagree-
ment over their maritime frontier to The Hague International Court. Answering -
a concerned question over the delay taken by the offshore oil exploitation,
off the coast of Casam~nce, the minister declared that one of the main reasons
for this delay was the frontier dispute. Four unsuccessful meetings--the last
held last 3 July--between delegations from the two countries were called in an
attempt to settle the issue. The different positions of the two countries are
a legacy from the colonial past. Guinea-Bissau is using a layout resulting
from the 1885 international agreements, signed by France and Portugal, as a
basis for the delineation of its waters. On the other hand, Senegal is using
a 1960 exchange of letters between France and Portugal, }~earing on a modifi-
cation of the layout. Bissau disputes the legal validity of these letters,
pointing out that they did not lead to the publication of a legal text by
_ Portugal. [Excerpt ][Paris MAR~I~'S TROPIC~4UX ET MEDITERRANEIIdS in French ~
19 Jan ?9 p�135] 685? �
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ANGOLA
UNITA: MPLA WILL BE COMPELLED TO NEGOTIATE
Paris MARCI~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAN~r:INS in French 19 Jan ?9 p 154 -
[Text] Jonas Savimbi, leader of the opposition movement Nazional Union for
~ the Tota1 Independence of Angola (UNITA), indicated in Dakar in an interview
granted the liberal Portuguese weekly TII~tPO, that this movement was present in
11 of the 16 provinces of Angola and it even had administrat~ve infrastructures
in five of them. ~tore precisely, according to Savimbi, UIVITA has control over
t�he Cu~uado-Cubango, Moxico, Bie, Huambo and Cunene regions and ~~excellent ~
prospects" are ~haping up in the Huila and Cuanza-Nord regions.
According to the Angolan rebel, it means that UNITA would control over 3 mil-
lio;~ people, a fact which enabled him to conduct the successful sabotage _
_ oper~ations which were recently mentioned in Sa da Bandeira, Lobito and Benguel.
Jona:, Savimbi added that his movement had 5,000 militiamen in addition to _
12,000 trained and equipped men.
He sai~3 that increased foreign support was available to UNITA in Africa as
well as from parts of the West which ~~has now become aware of the ground it is
- constantly losing in Africa to Soviet strategy.~~ Savimbi assessed that his
movement� could also take advantage of the ~~anti-~tussian activity~~ of the -
People's Republic of China.
Goncernin~; the attitude of the United States, the rebel leaders thinks that ~
Washingtor. could "reconsider its overall strategy~~ under pressure from Western
- Europe whi~:h ~~is constantly remi~iding the United States that it is slowly
relinquishing its role as leader of the western world.'~ Savimbi feels the
recent Guad~~loupe Sinnmit Conference can be explained in that context.
- The UIVITA le,~der believes that, in general, observers interpreted erroneously
Agostinho Net:o's recent reshuffling of the MPLA machine, by presenting it as a
sign of a more open attitude toward the West.
According to .~.'avimbi, Neto dismissed Lopo do Nascimento because he ~~was b~gin-
ning to assume too much importance not only within the party, but also before
the world.~~ H~~ added: ~~Agostinho Neto tried to make believe it involved the
dismissal of mure radical elements, but it is not true. I Imow from a trust-
worthy source that, prior to that event, he had gone secretly to Moscow.~'
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In conclusion, Jonas Savimbi asserted that MPLA,.~~could not escape meeting with
UNITA. There ai�e men within MPLA who admit that, s~oner or later, it will be
compelled to negotiate with u~ and the sooner the better.~~ A~ccording to the -
rebel. leader~ this problem would be the subject of debates within MPLA. _
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979 � -
6857 -
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- ANGOLA
~ BENGUELA RATLROAD CLA7MS AND COUNTER-CLAIMS REPORTID
Paris MARCFiE~S TROPICAUX ET MEDIT~RRANELTIS in French 19 Jan ?9 p 155
~ [Teact] Benguela Railroad: "Paralyzed, Accordi.ng to UNITA ,
In a communique dated 6 January and received in Paris on the 9th, the National. -
Union for the Total Ind~pendence of Angola (UNIT~1) declared that the Benguela _
- railroad continued to k!~ ~~systematically paralyzed by its military activities." -
The communique specified that ~~Although it had promised world opinion to reopen -
this path of co??~nunication to international traffic, Agostinho Neto lrnew he did -
not control the Benguela railroad.~~
Drawing up an accouit of UNITA's ~~military activities" for December 1978, the
communique stated that a railroad bridge, one train ar~d 1,126 meters of tracks
had been destroped.
The communique pointed out that,during the same period, "184 enemies were
killed, over 200 wounded and 35--three officers among them--made prisoners,"
while ~~important material~~ had been recuperated. `
~ Finally, the UNITA communique assessed "The Cuban presence in Angola to approx-
imately 28,000 men, now furtlter strengthened by East Cermans."
� ~'In Operation," Aecording to An~olan Authnrities -
The communique of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) pub3.ished in Paris and reporting a state of total paralysis for the
- Ben~uela railroad, was categorically denied on the same day in Brussels by -
Jose Luis de ALneida, ambassador of Angola to Belgium and France.
'~It is another caper from this movement,~~ declared the ambassador who is also
surprised that ~~Contrarily to the assurances given by the French government,
Paris continues to be the European capital from which such communiques emanate.'~
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
685? "
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_ . ANGOLA
- i
I
BRIEFS '
~ I~
' ALLP;CED IJNITA SUPPORTERS--According to Angolan goverzunental sources , Jonas
Savimbi's UNITA is still benefiting from the support of. the French Secret
Set�v:i.ces, the American CIA, certain circles close to the Italian Christian~
llemocra,cy, Senegal and Zairian opponents who, bitter over the Neto-Mobutu -
' reconcil.iation, have taken refuge in Brussels. [Text] [Pa.ris JEUNE AFRIQUE
in French No 942,24 Jan 79 p 26] 685? -
PQRTUGUESE PRISONElZS' RELEASE--3even Portuguese, prisoners of the Angolan rebel
_ movement UNITA, will be released in the near future, following contact made ,
with Jonas Savimbi by a group 4f liberal Portuguese personalities. [Text] ~
~Paris MARCE~S TROPIGAUX ET MEDITERRANEE~IS in French 19 Jan ?9 p 154] 685?
UNITA OIV THE OFFENSIVE--F~ large n;imber of Angolan refugees have arrived in
Namibia following furthir battlea between the MPLA-Labcr ParCy and the
rebel. �orces of the UNITA. South African televiaion reports that the
refugees, the majority,of whom croased the frontier at Kovango, said that
- the bartles in the southern part o� Angola were exrremely violent. (Excerpt]
(Paris MARCHES TROPZCAUK ET MEDIT~RRAN~ENS in French 16 Feb 79 p 467] S1S7 ~
I
CDR PORT EQUIPMENT--Experts from the East German Kranbau Eberswalde firm
are currently installing modern handling equipment at Angolan ports, in-
volving 14 cranes imported from the German Democratic Republic, which will
, m,zlce it possible initially to increase the loading and unloading capacities _
in Luanda, Lobit'o and Mocamedes by 30 percer.t. [Text] (Parie MARCHES
_ T120I'ICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Feb 79 p 467) 5157 I
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ro~i orrtct~, Us~ ornY
BENIN =
~
KEREKOU CALLS FOR R~VOLtiTIONAItY UNITY
Paris AFRTQUE-ASIE j.n Frencl~ 19 Feb 79 pp 39-41
[Interview with President Mathieu Kerekou by Simon Malley: "African
- Revolutionary Countries Must Organize a Joint Strategy"]
[Text] The purpose of tne attempts by imperialism and its vassals to desta-
_ bilize progreasive ~overnments is to regain recently independent countries.
- Yes, the Benin revolution dues caus~ fear. Yes, the imperialiat countries and
' the African p~sppet governments which they control from a distance fear that
it will gradually contaminate the entire continent. Yes, Che attack that was
- launched on 16 January 1977 by the mercenaries who were led by Bob Denurd
- is only one episode in the battle (today limited, but perhaps generalized
tomorrow) that the Wesr is waging in order to regain recently independent
countries and in order to safeguard their financial interests.
Yes, the colonial powers, alas, find among their vassals, as in the case of
_ Gabon and Morocco, acc~plices to help them in their nasty ~ob. President
Mat~.ieu Kerekou knows this, and makes no secret of it, but, far from lessen-
ing his desire to defend the revolu~ion at any cost, that threat only
- strengthens iC. Let's listen to him. ~ -
[Kerekou] "You asked me about the status ~f relations between Benin and
Gabon. Well, I should like to tell you immediately that, contrary to what
= the Western reactionary press is trying to have one believe, relations -
between our two countries arz not in any way conditioned by any personal
- rivalry between President Omar Bernard Bongo and mysetf. It is quite a
different thing. Everyone knows, in fact, that Bongo and Hassan II, chiefs of
state who are closely tied to Western imFerialism, are the or.es who inspired _
and financed the mercenaries that treacherously attacked ue on 16 January
1977. We know this with certainty thank.s to the damning evidence in docu- _
ments that mercernaries, 3n their headlong retreat, left behind in the
field. Do not forget thut Bob Denard is Bongo's litetime technical adviser ~
_ and ttiat he is responsible for ensuring Bonzo's personal safety.
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1 ~ ~dlt n~~ICIAL US~ UNLY
- You dcc, my ~ournaliet frienZ~ facts gre relentleeg and ~p~ak fnr them~elveg.
Our peo~yle hnve alwayg profoundly b~lieved in Africen uniey. Thpy eherefore
E~el at hnmQ ev~rywhere in Africa. ThaC is wh~~ a great many people :rom
_ ~i~ni� ~eteled in Gaban in order to ccop~rete with Cheir Cabonee~ brother~
' in tt~e building of this country. But when I3onzo'~ role in the Jgnugry 19'77
a~gression wgg m~de known, ehe latter brutally expelled all our fellow
, rountrymen."
~ [MaLleyJ "Yet Cuinean Pregident Sekou Toure offered to be a medigeor in
order to try to find a peaceful solLtion to thE confl:~ct."
[Kerekou] "W~ have nlways been, and we still ~re~ ready to aettle Chrou~h
fair negotigtinn any conflict that gets ue againat a brother country. We
_ h~ve moreover given proof of thie by sen~ing n del~gaCion to Conakry, wherc
ac~ incerministerial conference, eponeored by the OAU (Organizatia~ of African
Unity~ and presided ov~r by~ PresidenC Sekou Toure, was to take place. WeYl,
it was not possible to hold that conference because Bongo, who was hoetile
to our revolueion, did not aend a delegation."
(PtnlleyJ "What about Morocco? Do you Chink that ie is becauae of the
courngeous aCtitude that you took in the Saharen affair that it financed and
armed the mercenariea that attacked you?"
[Kerekou] "No doubt. Revolutionary Benin since 1976 has recognized, supported,
:~nd encouraged the POLISARIO. Our pa$ition hae always been very clear with
respecC to the struggle of people who want to obtain independence and
national sovereignty. Now, historically, the Saharan people have their owr~
~ identtty. They therefore have a right to independence, and no man, king or
president, has the right to oppose this. For us, the Saharan question -
car~not be settleii by amalgamation with a:.;? other country, and the Saharan
- pee~le, in taking up arms, have furthernw rp proved that they were capable of
assuring their independence. It is therefore absurd and ehocking for tWo
member countries of the OAU to challenge this right."
In supporting the just struggle of th~ people of Che 5DRA (Saharan bemocratic
Arab Kepublic], we have merely exerciaed our internationaliet principles.
We, ourselves, have suffered too greatly from colonialism and neocolonialism
not to understand and support the Saharans in their atruggle. Md no dvubt
our attitude did inci~~ the despotic Moroccan government to participate in a
plot that was hatched against us."
[Malley] "In your speeches, you have often spoken a?: length of the role
pl.ayed by France in that plot and in many others that tended to destabilize
the new progresaive govPrnments that Were constituted in various African
countries. What is your opinion today and What are your relationa with Parir.?
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Mathi~u Ker~knu did noe h~giC~te, In epite of ~'renc~'e r~~~ne attempt~ tn
e~eabli~h good rel~tinn~ wiCh CoConou and even ehough in Che paet it had
recalled ite emb~eeador, who very certainly wag involved in the January 1977
gCegck, he clinge eo hope for the future.
(Malley] "We cl~~rly g~id ehig on 30 November 1972 in our platform epeech
concerning recongCruceion end national independence: Benin'e r~1gCl.on~
~ with all foreign couneri~e are ba~ed on th~ principl~g of nnnelignment, of
equglity, and of mutu~l r~~pecr df all nttCione fnr the severignty of all
otherg. Th~ Jenuary 1977 ~ggresgion for a time ~eriouely impaired our
relati~ng with P~ris. But, as x consequenCe of the aolemn commiCmer.tg made
by eh~ n~w ambassador of France when he handed us his cr~denC~als on
15 becpmber 1978, we ~hope that relatione wi11 improve in the forthcoming
mnntha."
Mxtt~ieu Kerekou then iaent on td t1~e prcblemg that concern Africa as a whole.
He did not hesita~e t~~ gpeak of Che crises thAt are upseCting the continent
and the outcome of wh:Lch~ if favoraole--which he does not doubt--wlll
ese~blish ~tability gitd p~ace thrnughout the continent. With regard to the
conflict between Tnnz,~nia and Uganda, started by Amin Dada's aggxesaion
against the national r,erxiCory of Preaident Nyerere's country~ he eaid:
This maneuver was mu�ifestly provoked by en imperialiam with ita back to
the wall, whose ob~ect:ive was to rout the forcea of the two cnuntripe, e~pe-
ciully those of 1'anza~iia, which is pr~rt of the firat line of southern
Africa's front and fi;cmly eupports all people who ~re st.ruggling f~r their
independence in thet icegion nf the c~ntinent. Tt~at gction is particularly
detestable because it tends tc Weaken Tgnz~nia at a time when thie 5outh
African racisCs gnd tl~eir Zimbabwean proteges are becoming increasingly
threatening. We obae~cve the UN Charter, which requirea member countries to
scr.upulously respect the borders inherited from colonialiam. Everything
must be dnne to thWart the imperialist game~ which tries to divide in order
to rule. Thua we openly aupport, and we will a~ways support, those to fignt
for their freedom in ;~imbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Western Sahara,
Palestine, or anywher~a elge. Freedom and independence cannot be bestowed:
they must be won, witli weapons, by all those aho are atill oppressed by
colonialism, neocolontPlism~ and racism.
If you speak to me of the tragedy that ia taking place in the Horn of Africa,
where a fra[ricidal c~mflict oppoaes Ethiopia to Somalia, I Will anewer that
we hope to see theae tc+o countries settle their present differences and find
~n equitable solution~ which would be of great benefit not only to them but
to all of Africa. We are ready to help them to resolve the problems which
~ set them against each other. But, I repeat~ a principle governs us here, as
elsewhere: respect for the borders inherited from colonialism."
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[Mnlley] "A liLtle while ~go you apoke ot the palestininn people. What
- do ynu Chink of the effort~ in behalf of a separate pegC~ between ~gypt
nnd I~rae17" ,
(Kcrekou~ "In our opinion, any real pe~ce in ~he Negr Eg~C mugt fir~C tgke _
into ac:aounC the pal~~tininng and their right to independence. Noe to do
ehis menng to d~ny the exise~nce of the Pglestinian penpl~ who, during
ye~rs of struggl~, heve given go much t~?~gible proof af their very reel
exigCence and eheir dee~rminaeiun. Not to do thig ie glgo to aham~lessly
disregard Che resolutions of the UN and of Che OAU, org~nizations to whic}~
= goMe countries belong, but which~ in apite of belo?~ging, consCantly and
shameles~ly violate the righte of people~ Under ehe presenC circumstances, g
sepnrate peane betw~en Egypt and Iarael would make senee only if it 11181CE9 it
possible Co eettle the eesentigl question, th~t of the right of the P~1~~-
tiriinna to hav~ a cnuntry Chgt ie Cruly Cheirs."
Then ~'reeident Kerekou broached the sub~ect of Benin's domegtic policy, which
i~ still one of hie ma~or preoccupations. He spoke of it with the game
enthusiam as do a11 the leaders of the progressive countries of ttie Third
World, who understand that forFign policy and domestic policy closely overlap
each other and ChgC eapecially without ideological training of the maseee, ehe
building of a~ust and progreasive society will always remain uncerCain.
(Y.erekouJ "The adoption of the Fundamental Law and of tlie First Three Year
Plan, on 26 August 1977," he said with spirit, "has made iC possible for
Benin to ~eC up, with full sovereignty, the ~evolutionary institutions th~t _
~erve it, and will serve it, ae instruments Co carry out a truly revolutionary
action in al'1 domains. The firat phase Was accompliehed on 26 October 1972.
_ We are now in Che second, during which we must establish a people's democracy.
Thduks to the Fundamental Law, the working masses for the first time Will be
able to freely aad effectively participate in a people's government, with the
- ob_iective of accomplishing urgent tasks which are incumbent on us: to pro- -
duce, build~ and ensure the defense of the country and of the revolution.
The o~iective of all theae taska is the abaolute liquidation of colonialis~
and of its uftermath. :t is a question of changing our society, which ie
still neocolonialist, into a socialist society. By means of the 3b May 197$
law, W}~ich institutes the voting card, the central committee of our party
ha~ opened the way, And if certain people fear our revolution so much, as
was shown by the January 1977 aggresaion~ it means that imperialiam, aided by
- its puppets and its mercenaries~ is looking for sometf~ing in return and wants~
at any cost~ to protect its threatened interests."
- i:scorting us out, Mathieu E!erekou elaborated this idea with a profound Can-
viction: in Africa and in the Third Norld in general, inperialism is carry-
ing out a global strategy that nims to regain the countries that recently
acc;t~ired independence and to ain control their i~aense richea.
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.
KerekouJ "In order to gccomplish ehis," seid Marhieu Kerekou~ "the Western
countriea are erying Co deetabilize the newly see up progreesive governmente.
They r~cruit mercennries~ s~nd commandoe~ and even prepar~ large military
expeditions on the eame eCale as Che bloody op~rations of the 19th century.
Thnt is why we mu~e not only organi~e our deferge buC a1eo, and perhap~ -
egpecially, maintain conCinuing relations wieh our friends and our alliea,
itt drder to organize reeietance with the~n eo our mutual enemiea."
CdPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Aeie
CSO: 4400
.
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_
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UOTSWANA
~ BRIE~5
Clt('? 1'~:TabI.~UM STnItAGE LOAN--Car~.y i.n January, a gpokesman for the Minigtry of'
Co?nmerce ~nnounced in Caborone that Botgwana had received ~ West ~erman 10~?~
of 3,~# million dollars for th~ purpose of building twu oil storage facilities.
_ The ypokesman specified that ~~This pro3e~t was intended to cope with an
eventual oil crisis in ~the counCry foll~wing an embargo on oil eaimarked for
South A�ric~." One of the stor Q facilities will be built in Cabarone ~nd -
tlle ntkier in F'rancistown. [Text~] [Paris MARCHES T[tOPTCAUX ET MEDITERRANEEr15
in ~rench 19 Jan 79 p 154] 6857 �
C50: 4400
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~Ott (~~~ICIAL US~: dNLY
CAME R~OON
CIRCUMSPECTION CHAI2ACTERIZES pTTITUDE TOWAi2D OIL
Paris JEUN~ AFRIQUE in F'rench No 944,7 Feb 79 pp 68, 69
IArticle by F'rancofs 5oudan: "After 011 Gives Out"~
(Textj Yaounde han repainted its seven hills in feative colors. Valery
- Giscard d'~staing, the second ~rench president, after Georges Pompidou in
1971, to tread on the soil of independent Cameroon, undoubtedly has not come
to the heart of Africa, from 8 to 10 ~ebruary, to talk about matters that
businessmen straighten up very well without him. But there is one subject,
perhaps, that he will brinq up with ~lhmadou 1lhidjo between official dinners
and the rustling rows of paper flags: that new gift of life to Cameroon
that goes under the name of oil.
Forbidden Subject
"Oh yes, oill" a high Cameroon official said to us, smiling. "It is true
that we have a little, but I beq of you, don't talk too much about it."
In the image of the person of its presiden~, Cameroon is a country that is
often dfscreet and sometines secretive. 7fie same halo of mystery surrounds
this forbidden topic today, which seems to have become black qold, just as
it veiled the armed disturbances yesterday that were tearing the country -
apart and just as it will undoubtedly tone down tomorrow the tensions that
Ahmadou Ahidjo's successfon will not fail to cause.
Nevertheless, Cameroon is an oil-producinq country. It is true that the
contrary would have been astonishinq. Aside from some kind of "geoloqical
scandal," we do not see Why that country, tucked away at the end of the
_ Gulf of Guinea, surrounded by neiqhbors with ofl in varyinq amounta, like
Niqeria, Gabon or Congo, would not also have a few offshore platforms bat-
, tered by the waves.
Prospecting, which started in 1951, while Cameroon was still a territory
under French protection, and which was abandoned several times and resumed
several times, led, in 1976, to the discovery of a deposit at the mouth of
t}~e Rey River, not far from the Nigerian border, ICole.
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7'his digcovery has been surrounded by tihe grea~esti discretion. No cham-
pacJne ~nd nd startling epeech. 5ilence. The only official informatiion pu-
blished to d~te in thie connectiinn mentiioned Che preaence of a modeat, al-
most n~gligible deposit. EL~' [Gasoline and Lubicants Company of France~
5~ItL~CA (C~meronn aubsidiary of ELF Aqui~nine), which had mbtained rights i:o -
explditi tihls d~pogiti ~n association with PECTEN (a She11 aubaidiary), was
~ug~ as reserved. ~o guch a degree that a Wor1d B~nk reporti, da~~d April _
1978, estimat~d thati CamRroon's oil production wou].d not exceed 700,000 me-
, tiric tons a year in 1982 (by way of comparison, Congo produces a little over
2 million metric tons a ye~r and Gabon, i1.5 million).
5ilence -
It was no~ed very quickly, however, that no~ less than 10 oil companies were
~ngaged in prospecting and search activitiea in Cameroon. At the beginning
of 1978, it was learned that two new deposits had just been discovered at
the moueh of the Rey River Ekoundo-Sud and 8etika-Marine and good posgi-
bilities had been discovered farther south, between the island of Fernando
Poo and Victoria, and off Kribi. At the end of 1978, production of the
Kole deposit (the only one being exploited) already amounted to 800,000 me-
tric tons in 12 months and, contradicting its firat forecasts, a seconfl =
world Bank report, con�idential, dated in November, estimated that Cameroon's
~ oil reserves just like the reservos of Ivory Coast were "sizable."
No Doom
Between the few drops of black gold about which oil "forecasters" talked
2 ye~~rs earlier and the future boom predicted here and there, no one, from
Uouala to Yaounde, knows any longer what to belfeve. One thing seems Cer-
tain, nevertheless: Cameroon will never be Niqeria. It is true that es-
- timating a countiy's oil reserves has as much tightrope walkinq as it has
exact science in it, but it would seem exagqerated, at least, to place
Cameroon's offshore potential at over 100 million metric tons. Nbreover,
_ this figure is generally the one put forth at present by international ex-
perts.
With regard to onshore prospectinq, it has only just bequn in the north, not
far from the border with Chad, where the Norweqian NORMINOIL company is
studyinq possible extensfons of the Kaneur deposit, located on the other
side of Logone. Therefore, no boom in the Nigerian manner, but certainty
of ineeting its own needs a refinery with a capacity of 3 million metric
' tons a year is under construction at Victoria, financed by the PROCO-France
company, a subsidiary of the American Universal Oil Products company and
~he possibility of becominq a small exporter one day, in the image of its _
neighbar, Gongo. That fs all and already that is not bad.
Therefore, in view of these reasonably optimistic prospects, what explana-
tion is there for the fact that the authorities express themselves so re- '
servedly as soon as the word oil is mentioned? Oil revenue included in the
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, 1976-1979 budget amoun~s to clos~ tio 5 billinn CFA (African Financial Com-
munity] �rance, paid in dollara by ELF and PECTEN. ~ven though manna from
heaven is not exactly involved, ~he results are appreciable for a firet
year nf exploitation s~nel on a gingle dRpoai~ (tihe Kole depoaiti). We do
not see why the Can~ roon Government would abstain from imi~ating i~s ivory
Coast oppogite number, which ar?rnounc~r~, in 1977, the "qood newa" to its
coun~rymen, with a little emphasis and much certitude.
Of course, Pr~sident Ahicljo cannot be repro~ched for being prudent in ~he
matter, aii tt,e more so since false hopes are expensive. But there t+re
other reasons for this discretiion in that mosaic country with a sizable
Enqlish-speaking minorf tiy.
in fact, uncontrolled utilization o� oil and its reaources runs the riak of
aggravating some of the actual or potential splita that weave CamQroon's
daily web. The very location of the Rey Ftiver depositt~, near Nigeria's
indecisive sea frontier, may very well lead, in the lonq run, to one of
tihose many, compliCated water boundary disputes for example~ ~ike the ones
setting Senegal against Guinea-Bissau, or Tunisia against Libya.
ttegional Imbalances
But there is something more serious: the mere possibility of a timid oil
boom runs the risk of intensifyfng still more the constant flow of rural
migration toward the outskirts of cities in the southwest. The Douala ag-
glomeration, where thousands of huts and overpopulated poverty shantytowns -
are piled up, already has over a million inhabitants. Indigestion or
explosion may not be far off.
Moreover, and unless there is a strict distribution of receipts, the oil
boom will profit only southwestern Cameroon. That southwest, dlready
richer and with a higher rate of school attendance than other parts of
the country. That southwest where the enterprisinq Bamileke middle class _
prevai.ls, at tfines accused of controlling all of Cameroon's coma~ercial
channels. Cameroon's unity, built on blood and tears, would then run the
risk of being challenged once more by mc3ans of an intensification of re-
giona]. imbalances.
7'he barrels of Rey River oil are not powder keqs, however. In that country,
which, over the years, has been successively described as "capitalist,"
"Afric~+n socialist," then "planned liberal," many undoubtedly would like
to knaw what prosFects are offered by the oil discoveries and especially
how these new resources will be used and dfstributed. But the sflence of
the Yaounde authorities conceals, perhaps, a certain amount of cor~fusion
in view of the complexity of this enctnnbering qift.
14
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~OR OFrICTAL U5~ ONLY
( ~ w..~w.~ ~i~~u~~ �
ry~~~kni IMUOOO~M II~f11
Z D~nMN t 1 t ~N ~1nd
3 c.o~~.a: ���~+e~~io~�+nNn
~ ~nu~ , _
� ~nWmM10000~N,
' O 10 000 � 10 G00
10000 � 100000 , fM 1w~?:f
( 6 rw� ~ooooo ~ -
COMMUMkATbN~
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( 9 en~N a. ,~w ~ -
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( ~ )Rio del Rey ~ ~a, i
FERNAN00 �rw 'a
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~ ~w~~ M~ M"1~ ~~1Mww i
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1y~4~~~ lMM
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w� o..,
I IOOM ~ ~ C~~VINtt GAION ro N 11
fnUA/ORIAI/ NG~
The only deposit being exploited is the Kole deposit, in -
the Rey Rfver (heavy-printed derrick). Off Douala and
Kribi, two more deposits not yet exploite8 (light-printed
derricks).
Key: 1. area; 2. density; 3. capital; 4. cities; 5. less
than; 6. more than; 7. asphalted roads; 8. other roads and
trails; 9. railroad; 10. planned railroa~; 11. international
airport; 12. other airports and main aiffields; 13. Chads
14. Central African [En?pirej; 15. Equatorial Guinea;
16. Gulf of Guinea; 17. Rey River
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
10, 042
CSO: 4400 15
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~~ott or~a~rc,r~~t, ust; c~Nt,Y -
CAMEROON -
t
CAri1sRU0N, FItANCE ISSUE JOINT COMMUNZQUE
P~ris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET M~DITE12ItANEENS in French 16 Feb 79 p 431 _
(Textj Garoua, 10 February 1979--On ehe invitation of the preeident uf
the United Republic of Cameroon ~nd Mrs Ahmadou Ahidjo, the preaiderit of
the French republic and Mrs Valery Gi~card d'Eetaing paid an official
visit to Cameroon from 8 to 10 February 1979, Accompanied by Preaident
Ahmadou Ahidjo, they visited Che towna of Douala, Yaounde and Garoua.
Throughout their sCay, they were given a parCicularly friendly welcome by
the people of Cameroon.
_ 'Chis visit, of major political importance, enabled the two partiea to
strengthen still further the feelings of very de~p friendship and high
esteem which have long linked them. In an atmoephere characterized by
cordial calm and confidence, reflecting the quality of the relatione main-
_ tained between the two countries, the chiefa of etate held several talks
to discuss bilateral queationa and current inCernational problemn. The
same atmosphere characterized the talks between the two delegatione, made
up as �ollows:
' Representing France: Minister of Cooperation Robert Galley, Miniater for
Universities Alice Saunier-Seite, Minister of Tranaports Joel Le Theule~ -
Secretary of State to the Miniater of IndueCry Jean-Pierre Prouteau,
_ Assistant Secretary-General to the Preeidency of the Republic Francoia
Polge de Combret, and flubert bubois, the French ambassador in Cameroon.
Representing Cameroon: Secretary-General at Freaidency of the United
Republic of Cameroon Samuel Eboua, Minieter in Charge of Miaeiona at
I~residency Francois Sengat-Kuo, Director of Civil Cabinet of the President -
of the Republic Philemon Beb A Don, Minister in Charge of Misaiona at
~ Presidency Abdoulaye Yadji, Minieter of Foreign Affaira Jean Keutcha,
Minister of Economy and Plan Yousaoufa Daouda, Minieter o� National
~ducation Ndam Njoya, Minister of Social Affairs Delphine Tsanga, Minister
of Transports John Nkengong Monie, General Representative for Touriam
Aminou Oumarou, Special Adviser to the Pre~ident of the Republic Et~ki
Mboumoua, and Salomon Bakoto, Cameroonian ambaoeador to France.
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Tl~e Cwo sCntc:smen Coolc up varioue social~ culCurnl and economic nopects of
_ FrenCh-Cameroonian coopergtion. On this occanion, they expressed muCual
s~CisfucCion wiCh tihe multiplicity and quality o� tho cooperativa relation~ -
= exis~ing betwoen the two countriea. They expreesed the view that thQee
relations ahould continue to develop withouC intierruption in order Co adapt
eo the needs and the poCential of Cameroon iCnelf, as wall as the meana
put to use by ~'rance. Within thio perspective, they diacussed Che main
subjecCs which should be taken up at the meeCing of the High F'rench-
Cameroonian Commiseion which wi11 be h~id next March. ~On this occasion,
apart from the work of thia commiseian, the negotiations pertaining to
maritime transport will be pursued.
In the economic cooperation oecCor~ the Cwo chiefe of staCe noted that the
_ intereaGs of each o� the partiee ehould be balanced and reciprocal.
- Special interESt was again expreas~d by France in certain development
projecta in Cameroan, and in parCicular that nation agreed to take the
proposed route link between Yaounde and Douala under coneidsraCion. The
inoane of pnrticipation in Chis financing of an inCernational nature by =
France will be agreed upon by the two countries.
The two chiefs of state noted Che expansion of trade exchange between the
ewo nations with satiafaction, and sCreseed the desirability of encouragin~
its development. They expressed concern about the need to absorb the im-
balance in this trade, believing in this connection that the implementat~.on
of a certa:.a number of industrial development projects should allow the
- transformation of Cameroonian economic atructures auch as to reduce the
existing dispariCy �urCher.
- In order to respond to the priority goale of Cameroon in the training
sector, France will step up ita aid efforts, in particular in the fields -
- of higher education, research and technical training.
In tt~e same spirit of mutual understanding, the two chiefa of state voiced
their a~;reement on the need to see to it that the exchange agreement whi~h
sees forth the conditions for etaye by their respective nationale in the
ott~er country is implemented in a epirit of goodwill and humanity. To
this end, it was agiead that a work group will meet as soon as poasible.
In ~he international sector, the two chiefs of atate noted the eimilarity -
~ o� principles guiding and directing their approach to international problems,
and they agreed to puraue their fruitful joint efforts in the interests of
peace. In this connection, they stresaed the need for respect of the
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all naCiona. The -
primary role of the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and inter-
national security was reaffirmed, as was the nead to ensure that the spirit
of dialo~; and joint action prevaila within it.
]
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roci or~zcr~., usE or2Y -
_ ~~here rQlation~ batwaon Europe and Africa are concerned, the two chiefs of
9Cr~Ca expressed thair desire tio contribuCe tio their development ar?d con- ~
soLidation in a apiriC of solidarity, wi~h ra~pect for the eovereignty of
the partnera and the sa�eguurding of their in~eresCa. in thie connection, -
Chey expressed Chair. deaire to encourage the pureuit of the North-South
_ dialog by varioua moAne, and ro ~ee the negoCiaCions with a view to the
ugreemant linking African, Caribbean and P~cific natione with rhe European
Cconomic Community lead to posiCive resulCa in ~he fields of trade~
financial, induetrial and ecienti�ia co~~eration and the Cranefe~ of tech-
nulogy, -
The two chiefs of etate voiced their deaire ChaC the various diecueaione _
pursued wiChin the �ramework o� the UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on
- Trade and Development~ and~ the Confexence on InCernational Economic
Cooperation lead Co equiCable oolutions allowing abeorption of the imbalAnce -
remaining in international economic trade, guaranteeing tha counCriea in
Che procesa o� development the means for sustained economic growth. Special
- stress was placed on the need to persuade the induetrialized countriea to
_ agree to make an exceptional effort through new meana to promote the devel-
opment o� AfricA.
In this connection, President Ahmadou Ahidjo expreased hia appreciaCion for
the special and conaisCent intereat President Valery Giscard d'Estaing has
= devoted to Africa and its development, as we11 as to aid to the Third World
and the esCablishment of a new international economic order. The president -
_ of the UniCed Republic of Cameroon also praiaed the dynamic and far-seeing `
action pursued by President Valery Giscard d'Es~~ing se the leader of France,
within ~urope and in the concert of nations.
- The two chiefs o� state expreased regret thaC peace has sti11 not been
re-established in the Near East, deapite the recent undertakings with a `
view to a negotiated solution, and they stresaed the nead for reaching an
overall solution, which alone can lead to a juat and durable peace in the
- region.
The situation in Africa was also the aubject of profound analyeis. The two
chiefs oC state reasserted the inalienabla right of the peoples of Africa
to indenendence. They reiterated ttieir condemnation of tha policy of
Apartheid and stressed the need to achieve a aettlement facilitating ~ccess
to equal rights for the African majority in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South
Atrica. In addition, they reconfirmed their aupport of the efforts under-
taken to thie end by the international community.
The two chiefs of state stressed once again the right of African nations
to govern their afEairs themselvea, to determine their own destiny within
a freely chosen frameworlc, in solidarity and agreement, aafe from any desire
tor foreign domination and intervention. They expremsed the hope that the
- conciliation efforts undertaken under the aegia of the OAU to find a solution
to the conflicts rending Africa will be crowned with success.
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Tl~~~ proeidenC of tlio rranch rapublic took the opportunity offered by his
visiC to Cameroon to issue ~ solemn appeal Co all Africane involved in
- C}ie conflicCa which have multiiplied on Che continent in th~ coure;e of _
recont years Co agreq to put an end to fratiricidal aCruggles, ombarking upon
- ne~oli~tions which ehould make iti poemible eo find j~~~at and enduring solu-
tions. The presidc:nt of the Unitied Itepublic of Cameroon joined in ~hia
appeal, aCreasing that the re-c3st~tblishm,ent of peace is a prerequisite Co
the development and progreae of the African peoplee.
The president of the French republic p~~id homage Co Che wi~dom and realism
of 1'residenC Ahmadou Ahidjo'a policy. lia praised his leading roie in Che
consolidation o� naCional unity and hie contribution in the work of peace
and agreemenC among Che ataCea and naCione.
l~is ~xcellency the Presidenti o� the ~'rench ltepublic and Mrs Giscard d'Eataing
- expressed Co Hie Excellency Che President of Che United 12epublic o� -
~ Cameroon and Mrs Ahmadou Ahidjo, as wel~. as the people of Cameroon and ita
government, their exCreme gratitude for thQ very warm and friendly welcome -
given them in Che course of Cheir etay. They voiced their hopes for the
prosperity, happinesa and lasting friendship between the peoples of France
and Cameroon.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie, Paris, 1979
5157
CSO; 4400 ~
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~
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CENTRAL ArRICAN EMPIRE _
~
_ IMMENSC RIFT BE'TWEEN B~KASSA, PEOPLE CLAIMED
Paris AFRIQU~-ASIE in French 5-18 Feb 79 p 18
[Article by Mariam S;ysle] -
[Text] Neither Che emperor's police, nor Zaire's army
wi11 succeed in keeping the people in indefini~e
slavery.
One year after the coronation parody, nokassa's "imperial" regime has been _
hit head-on. Indeed, the bloody events which ~ust occur~ed in Banqui
prove the deep dissatisfaction and widespread weariness overtaking this
country, as a result of a dictorial regime whose failure is evidenl-.
7
A new, obviously ridiculous, whim of the emperor of Berengo, was enough to
- kindle the fire. He had decided to impose tic~iforms on schoolchildren and
students, so as "to distinguish them from non-schooled children who ar.e -
often bandits." Thus, showing the deep contempt he feels toward his people,
Bokas�sa had in fact thought of a new way to pressure parents and replenish
his co�fers. Outraged by this measure, high school and university students -
revolted on 18 January, supported by many residents of Bangui. For 3 days,
_ despite a savage repression, demonstrators attacked everything which was _
part of the hated regime. This was an open explosion of bit�terness, humilia-
tion and resentment that had accumulated for 12 years.
The conditions suited for a popular uprising have been presenC for a long `
time in the Central African Empire. Only through a dreaded police system
of surveillance, accusation and detention, has the usurper of Bangui been
able to continue his reign and fatten his fortune.
For the large ma~ority of the people, the sittiation has become even worse
during the past monrhs. Daily necessities are becoming scarcer and prices
are climUing very fast. In 1 year, to take but one example, sugar prices
have tripled and meat prices quadrupled. In this country filled with
misery, pressured and abandoned, there is only a single island of opulence:
Berengo, where Bokassa has established his fiefdom where nothing is lacking,
from plantations and herds to stores, movie theaters, factories and schools.
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~nk n~'I~'IC IAI~ U5~ ONI.Y
Nc~~ only were th~ nrtitiCial creation of Ch~ empir~ and the cdrnngtinn
~~cr~~mc~ny felr aH n Cruel humilidtidn by th~ Centrnl Africnn ~~dp1e, but -
thiH tr~gi-comedy wn~ al~o ~n dccagion tn in~r~g~e th~ per~onal tdxe~~
, 'i'h~~v, Iloka~~~ found n n~w ~ubterfuge: he hng mr~de bu~ine~~e~ and ~nterprise~
-~~al.ready gener~l].y itt iingncigl diEf iCUlty--pcty their C~xeg for 1~79 nnd
1~)8U in ~dvance. Similnrly, ehrnugh annth~r triCk~ he h~~ h~d public
ei~terprises p~ying for gov~rnm~nt emplnye~ ggl~ri~g ~ince Auguet.
- liol:uygu!s I~ol~tion
I~ i5 almast unnecess~ry to gay th~t eh.. ~ng~r even r~racheg intn the r~lntivel.y
_ pri.vileged s!:ratu, gurh ~s gnv~rament emplnye~g ~nd e~~chers, whn hnve
wuized in r?ain for eheir wages for aeveral montha~ and ittCo the grmy, which
h~~:~ bcen cong~dered "~uspigcious," gs e result r~f the J~nu~ry event. Igo-
1~t:eJ in h ig Beren~o pnlace~ which has been turned into a veritable fortre~e
~~~d ~urrounde-~ by crooks helping him tn loot the eountry, th~ emperor liv~c
wit}~ che fear oi plots~ eoup d'~Cute~ nnd populnr upriaing. ~igngui'g die-
r.;xtor used his friend MobuCu's goldierg, with their sinister reputation,
to ~to~, po~~ular ingurr~ceinn. zaire's mercennrieg ueed morCar ehellg and
vicrimg number in the hundreds.
')'his ferocious repression c~n only widen even tnore the lnrge gap which
:;~~pnr:iees the former ~rench army corpnral from his peoplP. Giscard's F'rence,
Ein~tici~71 and poliCical ~upport of Boknssn--which gnve him a part ~f its
Cerritory to install in important military base--might be more prudent in
che future.
COPYRICHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
CSO: ~i400
8924 ~
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C~NTI2AL p.~itICAN ~M~'Itt~
BRI~F5
gNCb'S ACTIVI'~I~5--Snmewhat behind ech~dul~, thp Centr~l Africnn Narionnl
Ueposit Benk (gNCb) hg~ published a report on its activiti~s during the
_ 1977 fiec~l year. The BNC10 is Che third largeae bnnk in the terriCory.
On 31 U~cember 1977, the volume of its customere' depositg (demand and
term d~pdeits) amounted to 1.8 billion CFA francs, ~n increase nf 26.5 per-
cent nver ehe ~nd of 197b. Growth wae particulgrly noticeable in Che nre~ _
of private ~ccount~ (aC Che end nf 1977, Che bank had 4,516 accountg~ com-
p.~red with 3,311 a year previouely). Compared with other local commercinl
banks, Che BNCD repregented 20 percent oE all depogiCs made. At the end
vf the fiscal year~ li~bilities (bills in case, advances~ creditg, guarnn-
tees and securities) amounted to 4.8 billion CFA francs, an increase of
95 percent ovpr the end af 1976. ~ut of this total, yearly credits umounted
_ to 2,9 billion 37.6 percent)~ ~ahile standing deficits came to .9 billion
i~.l p~rcent) and guarantees and backing represented .4 billion 341
percent). The BNCD's aid to the economy amounted to 36 percent of the
commitments of the three coaQnercial baaks. After the hiring of personnel
for r.he Bambari agency~ the BNCD had a total of 88 officials and employees
nt the end nf 1977. The trading account showed a favorable trend: Gross
proceeds rose by 39.7 percent and expensea rose by 8.3 percent, with an
allowance of 77 million CFA francs being made for aupplies. Trading results
_ totaled 154.8 million CFA francs, compared with 38.5 million for the 1976
- fiscal year. (Textj [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR~IVEENS in French
12 Jan 79 pp 89-90] 11,464
rso: 4400
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C}~AD
R~pbItT~it WITNESS~S gA7'TL~ g~TW~~N MALLOUM, NAB'R~ ~It00p5
parig J~UN~ A~RIQtJ~ in ~r~nch 28 ~'ab 79 pp 23-24
(Articl~ by Nopl Ngoun Ngabieoio: "It All Beggn With en Incident aC a
High Sehool"j
(TextJ IC all began wiCh an incid~ne ~C Che Ndjamena ggn~r~l high echool
oa Monday, 12 ~~brugry.
In r~newer to th~ convocation of the political-miliCary committee fnr
gecuriCy and surveillance announced by the pre~ident of the republic on -
5~rurday, 10 ~~bruary, Che oupporeero of Prime Minioter Hiasein Habre
began Co distribute a p~mphl~t c~lling f:,r a genergl etrike~ in the edu-
cation nnd trade aectore among otheM~~ on Monday~ 12 February.
, 0~ Monday, as a precauCion againet ponsible trouble, Chadian National Army
troops were poeted as of 0600 houro along the approachea to educationel
establishmente. The population, on awakening~ believed there wa4 a coup
d'etat. Toward 0700 houra~ Mr Hiosein Habre's car Was opotted near the home
of the minister of national educaCion~ not far frcmr the ~elix Eboue high
school~ which in turn ia a few hundred meters from the reeidence of the
prime minister, heavily guarded by hia men. Apparently~ the atrike order
Was not being heeded. But the pro-north~rn students contributed to dia-
tributc the flyere.
Cl~sses proceede~l as ueunl until about 1000 houra, when a ocuffle broke
- out among the studenta. Mr Gilbert, a teacher on cooperative loan from
F'rar~ce, who died in an accident on Thuraday, 15 February, was preaent. He
described the scene Co me. "I had just finiehed my clasa and Wne chatting =
- with another teacher. A fight etarted. Then the ANT (Chadian National =
Armyj soldiera came to separate thQ etudenCs. They may have beaten one
student. The othera fought to prevent their putting him in the police
wagon. The police, i.n order Co diecourage the reaiatance by the yo~ths~
fired in the air and made as if to ~et up a 75-millimeter gun on a[ripod."
It was then that Hisaein H,~bre's guard appeared on the run and fired at
the ANT detachment. The atudents had time to ocatter. But two paesers-by
were killed.
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~tlt~ tl~~ICIAL Uy~ dNLY
it w~~ 103U hour~. Tha ragul~r ~rn?y, ~1~re~d, ~rriv~d wfth iC~ h~~vy
Wenpbna. A wirn~~A ~~y~ eh~C ~�e~r ehea~ fir~e incid~nt~, eh~ primo
mini~e~r w~nt tn rhd ~tNT (Ch~dinn N~ei~n~l Itgc:in Bro~dcg~ein~) eC~eion en
deliv~r ~n ~ddr~~~. Thp radio ~uChoriCiaAi gfeer coneuleing Ch~ pr~uid~ney,
, r~fug~d ed put him on the ~ir, A half-hour laeer~ the broedcarting ~tgtinn
u~~ _o b~ burn~d,
Alerted by gunfir~ whil~ n~~r th~ F~reh~ in~u~~ri~l a~Ctdr, I pro~e~d~d ~
r~pidly ea~?ard eh~ comb~e xon~ n~ar Chd cfty h~ll. i w~~ ehaCting with -
my ~~ll~~gu~ from eh~ A~p'~nd phoeogr~ph~ru when rwo bC-4u df tihe ~~vpn ~
eh~ Ch~di~n army h~~ arearked eh~ ra~idenc~ of Che prim~ minioeer~ It w~~
nonn,
ll~Ctl~ ne Ch~ llo~piC~1
Tow~rd I300 hour,~, th~ hanpiC~l battle b~gan, Ye waa laun~h~d by 11i~oein
H~bre'g ~up~orCer~,, who tried to block tihe policemen who were tgking aome
wounded polic~m~n rhere. The bartle r~ged fnr an hour. ltockete~ machin~
gun~, auCc~mgCic w~apong. ToWnrd 1500 hours all w~s qui~t.
despiC~ Che police barraga, Y managed Co get to the eite. I cnunted abo~t
20 dead, including 5 or 6 civilian~. Y eaW an intact rocket which~ by
so?ne fantgatic luck, did not explade derpite the fire Which broke out nearby.
Three v~hicles had been buxned, an ambulance wae in flameo, and a whole oide
of the premiaes wag deotroyed. The AP~ office oppouite was �truck by a
rockeC which fell in the midet of the director'a office. The town hall waa
also struck. A custome van with five diafigured bodie� lay on ite eide.
. Th~ battle moved toward the African quarter, Kilimat, near the main command
~ post df rtr Habre's cupportero. Ther~ Waa the noiae of 75- and 90-millimeter
guns, rockets, etc, particularly toward the home of the minioter of interior~
one of Iiabre's close friende. ToWard 1900 houre, a DC-4 launched 16 rocketa
at Mr Hissein ltabre's p~eaumed command po~t. From my hotel, located betWeen
the presidency of the republic, Which had becom~s a veriCable entrenched camp
patroled by soldiers armed aith 5oviet-made light auComatic machine gune~
and ehe 13 April barrack~, on the other eide, I could clearly hear the noiae
of the rockets. -
1 ModeraCion
f
Kumors began to fly about the "dieappearance" of Hieoein Habre. Had he
taken refuge in the Sudanese embassy? Wao he dead? The matter Would be
settled for all shortly. But it wa~ noted that the police~ the elite
troopa commanded by Lt Col Wadal A. Kamoughe, had not attacked. Thuo in
the cyes of the regular army, the situation did not aeem eapecially to
require it. Some military lPaders close to Malloum Wanted energetic and
rapid action, but Malloum urged moderation.
For three weeks, the intelligence aerviceo had been Warning that Hisaein
liabre was concentrating weapono and partisana in the African quarter of
Ndjamena. 24
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tt ~~e~med thaC M~llnum pr~f~rr~d ed lee ~ti~oein oCrik~ fir~C. On '~ue~d~y,
1~ ~ebru~ry, h~ ~rieiaiz~d on~ nf th~ ~rmy ~omm~nd~r~~ Lt Co1 plaCfd~
Adoum NgamnYUU, f~r drdering Che air arrgnk dn Cha prim~ mini~Car'~ r~ai~
dEnCe, This uffir~r, vex~d, wa~ eo b~ grresead nn Ch~ ~fCarno~n ~f
Thur~d~y, 1S ~�brugry, in Waze, Cameroon, 140.kilometero �rdm tih~ fronei~r,
' pr~Ctie~lly under my no~~, for I h~d l~fe Ch~d tihat day in ordar ed Cry to
m~k~ ~aY~e~cC wiCh J~UNE AFRIQUE. -
dn Tu~gd~y, th~ ba~tl~a r~eumed ~or fair. An eff~re by N~bra's fnrc~u ed
g~iz~ ehe 13 April bgrr~Ckn during Che night hgd f~iled, buC thay ouCC~~d~d
in t~king ~nd d~etroying eh~ Ce1~CmttmunicaCidno rtgCidn Mdnday night~
Ndj~m~na no longer hgd ~ny eal~phone or T~l~x linka with the nutar world,
Two ~utom~Cic 7.65 rifle bull~rs wer~ fired through my room~ number 33~ at
Che Gr~nd Hot~1,
Th~re w~g to be ~ cerCgin lull during Che day. Uut ehere was C~lk of
batCle~ with mach~e~~ and bowo and arrow~ in eha neighborhodde where moeC
of Che r~sid~neg ~re Gorane (Habre'u eribe) ~nd Choa Ar~br--Kilitn~C~ the
mnsque ~rea, ~tr. Th~ neighborhoods wiCh g Mbai or Sara majority--Mourngl,
Chagoua nnd Parig-Cnngo~ werd calm.
_ Hissein }labr~'s chief of ntaff had regrouped the partiaane in a eecret
rommand posC in the Saint-Martitt basin, As of Wedne9day, 14 February, hia
fnrces were able to mount a new att~ck on the police ba~racka and the 13
April camp. They were repelled. But the advantage than oeemed to owing
back to Habre's troops. Towa�~d 1330 hour~~ rumor~ ebout Malloum's
"capitulation" were circulating, Only Kamoughe wge fighting on, it Wna said.
~vacuation
However, the people aeemed eurpriaed by this capitulation. The preeidency
is not far from the zone staked out b~? the French troopo near the French
embasay. It was not in danger of falling. In addition~ there wae epecu-
lation about the aCtitude of ~falloum, who had not ordered the Chadian
troopa bnsed at the 27 April camp in Farcha into action.
rieginning on Wednesday noon~ almost all the French and other foreignera ~
were ev;~cuated to the Franco-Chadian base at tl~e Adji-Koasei camp in Farcha
(2,000 to 3,000 French soldiers). '~he French community auffered only a
aingle casualty--a pilot in ttie French cooperaCion progrgm, Who was acci-
dentally shot in his oWn doorWay While returning from Sahr where ho had
gone in search of DC-4 reinforcements. The next day thera Wao a oecond
victim, also accidental~ a:ir Cilbert.
The seven "individual" French pilots in the Chadinn army had been eent out
of Chad "so ns to avoid any threat to the French co~unity ae a whole~"
according to the embasay.
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~on ~~~icint, us~ oNLY
Ce~ue-Cir~
An implicfr C~~a~-fir~ w~~ in eff~ct g� df 15 ~~bru~ry, ~h~t d~y, only ~
~ew bur~e~ of m~chin~-gun fire viol~tied rha erue~. ~
M~lloum re~dluC~ly pl~y~d Che ggma of pgaificgCi~n~ on Ch~ gdvic~ of tihe
~rench General ~oreet and certgin African ~hiefo o~ etate. Uu~i~tg thie
time, Hnbre'u ernopg adoptied gu~rri~la ttlCCiCtl~ ~ending rev8r~1 cnmm~ndn -
unitg aggin~C Ch~ polic~ ~t~tiion~ ~nd b~rr~cks. Which rugg~~t~d ~ c~rtain
~dvgntnge in Ch~ Ei~ld for H~bre,
I l~fe Ndjnm~n~ on S~turday, 17 ~ebru~ry, when th~ eitu~ti~n wan politically
cnnfus~d bue ~Cabilix~d from ~ military poinC of vi~w. The dieggre~m~nt~
within the ANT ~ommand and Che heoieatiion were oerioue hindra~ncee to Malloum'~
Croops,
_ llut no nne "won" in ehQ �ield, On th~ oth~r h~nd, tih~re w~r~ henvy lnn~pn:
tor Chgd ~nd ie~ citiz~ns, 1,000 Cd 2,000 dead, ~ubotantinl damage, ~nd
infrastructureg deoCroyed. Ch~d looC 10 yasrs in a few dayr. -
COI~YRIGHT: Jeune Afriqup CItUpJYA 1979
5157
C50: 4400
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CONGO
SASSOU NGULSSO'S P1t~SYDENCX SSEN AS VICTO1tY FOR L~FT ,
P~rie AFRIQUS-ASIE in Fr~nch 19 Feb- k Mar 79 p 30
(Article by Mar3am Sysle: "The Clearing"~
[Textj The cri~ie triggered by lasr year's aseae-
~inaeion of Preaiden~ Marien Ngouabi at last seem~ '
Co have ended.
Events of extreme importance have ~uet taken place in Brazzuville. The
CMP (Party Military Committee)--~which had held full power aince the aeeae-
aination of President Ngouabi on 18 March 1977~-returaed this pover. to -
- the hande of the PCT (Congoleae Labor Party) Central Committee. The
chief of atate, Gen Yhomby Opaago, who had aleo been chairman of the CI~
and of the cabinet, resigned. He wa8 replaced at Che head of the etate
by Denis Saseou Nguesao who had been deputy chairman of the CI~ and de-
_ fense miniaCer. Finally, a special party congreas wa8 scheduled for 26
March and a directory of four membere, under the leaderahip of Thiethere
Tchicaya, permanenC Central Committee secreCary, was appoiaGed to prepare
thia meeting.
These upheavals are certainly not the reault of an alleged palace revolu-
tion--as a certain segment of the presa, which is more interested in aensa-
tional news than careful analyaie, is trying to have everyone believe. On
the cnntrary~ these upseta are the outcome of a bitter and prolonged atrug-
gle between two political lines.
What Was At Stake _
To understaad ahat Was at atake, we must go back to the assasaination of
Preaident Ngouabi. The brutal and tragic disappearaace of the chief of
state had created a vacuum full of daager~ in a context marked by politi-
cal and economic plots, hatched by the imperialiat poxers and, domeatically, -
by the counterrevolutionary forces. The importaat thing therefore aas to
stop these immediate threats as quickly as poasible, to face them under the
best conditiona of effectivenesa.
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Und~r eh~~e condieiong, ehe PCm Cen~ral Commiteee "unCil ~urCher orderg"
eneru~epd ful]. power Co ~n 11-~m~mber miliCary commite~~. In the epirit of
tihe ma~ority of tihe C~ntral Commi.Ctee membera ~nd, more generally sp~aking,
elhe milie~nte, there wag no queetion of an abdicgtion by the party attd ie~
leading role; ~hie was merely a queetion of coneti.tuCing gn exceptional
structure in response to a eituation which itaelf wa~ excepCional.
Now--gnd thig ehe first eplit that man3fege~d ieself within the CMP--
- tihi~ excap~iona]. eituaeion Cended to ~erpetuate itaelf. A~cereain num-
ber of le~dere wen~ along with the idea of pueCing the~par~y and its organ-
izations on gll echelone to sleep and ~uppr~eeing the people's powere
which had been insCiCu~ed in 1974. The decieions were made aC the eummie
- without having been eubmitted for discuasion among the rank and file. Tt?is
produced profound uneasiness among the militants and a demobilization
wh3.ch could not in any way help overcome the redourable problems which
the country had to face.
' In effecC, the foreign and dom~etic plots--the economic quasi-boycott,
the failure of the attempts on the life of Denia Sassou Nguesao~ etc.--
conCinued without eff~cCive countarmeasures being taken. The economic -
situation kept getting worse, bringing financial difficulties Co the point
where civil aervice ealariea were paid after coneiderable delay while
pricee on daily necesaitiea akyrocketed.
The Weight of t~e Younger Generatfon
Popular diacontent was further stirred up by the diversion of public funds
for prestige purpoees ae well as the inactivity of the commission charged -
w.ith investigaCing ill-goCten gaina.
A second aplit developed on the way as to haw to tackle these problems.
In view of imperialist preseure, the right-wing tendency recammended a
policy of conceasions and, on the domestic ~cene, measures Che least of
which one might say were in no way suitable for restoring the situation.
The left-wing tendency--aupported and pushed by Che mass organizationa,
especially the young people--on the contrary demanded that the country
embark on an offenaive policy of radicalization, auch a8 it had been -
suggest~.d by the national conference held in October 1916.
The suamncning, during the weeks to come, of a special congresa, charged
with rhoruughly looking into these problems and appointing the men
charged with carrying out the decisions--not ~ust the regular congress
announced on 1 January by Gen Yhomby Opaago, limited only to economic
problema--conatitutes a victory for this Cendency, juat as did the ac-
cession of Denis~Sassou Nguesao Co the presidency of the republic.
A victory which~ according to all evidence, is in line with the eupectation
of the people of the "Three Glories."
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
5058 28
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~oK oi~ rTr, cni. us~ nr~Y
GAHON
N~W ~ACES IN GOVERNMENT MAY ASSI5T IN AUSTERII'Y PROG1tAM -
P~ria JBUNE AFitIQUE in French No 946, 21 Feb 79 pp 36-37
(Article by Sory Serinde Diallo; "New Facea"]
~ (CxcerpCs~ The congroea of the Gabone0e Democratic Party (PDG) which was
held in Libreville from 24 Co 29 January ~c~r.rkad u relative democratization
of political life in Gabon (eee our isaue No 944). It a18o revealed
President Omar Bongo's inGention of partially replacing hie team for
_ implementing the auateriCy policy the econ~~mic aituaCion in the country
_ makes neceaeary.
_ But this democracy ia etill taking stumbling ateps. Certain membere of the
Central Committee atill occupy aeats on it as a function of their poata
(presidents of apecialized bodiea of Che party, the National Aasembly,
Supreme Court, the minigtera of economy and finance� and national defense)
or their duties.
The prime miniater automatically ia a member of the Political Bureau, the
members of which are in fact chosen fram the Central Committee by the
secretary-general. The founder of the party, E1 Hadj Omar Bongo, the
president of the republic who calls himaelf "the great comrade," remaina
secretary-general by right. That having been said, Che main restriction
on democratizaCion remains the aingle-parCy eyetem. The PDG continues to
monopolize political life and the aecond congresa endoraed ita primacy
over other inatitutiona, governmental and administrative.
The congress in LibrEVille was marked by the resumption of parCy control -
, by President Bongo, to whcm~ the members of the Central Committee, aome of =
_ whom are elected by the people, awore an oath of fidelity and loyalty. If -
indeed such a man as Henri Minko, who has been a member of tho Political
Bureau for about a dozen years, was retained, the choice of the new membera
- was ch.~racterized by the spectacular departure of Dr Eloi Rahandi Chambrier
--a departure some rightly or wrongly linked with the August 1978 affair
involving citizens of Benin--and the striking incorporation of ouch young
technocrats as Jean-Francoia Ntoutoume, minister in charge of coordination -
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~ox o~ricini, us~ orn,Y
ul' ecanomic end ~inancial ~ffgirs ~t Che presidency; ~Cienne Mouenirou,
minister of commerce and induoCrial developmenti; Mamadou Diop, cuatome
dirdctor for th~ pa~e dozen or so yeare; Jules Ogoulinguede, nn emin~nC _
jurist; and Juli~en Mpouho, a personal gdviser to the chief of eCate known
tor liis diecrotion and courtesy.
'1'heae pergonnel change4, to be followed by a minietierial reorgnniznCion and
diplom~Cic changes, seem to be Che reault of the chief of otatie'a deeire
to appoinC new men fo~ n new policy.
"Democratic and concenCraCed progresaiviem" ia the new ideology which wi11
replace "directed and planned liberalism." Thie in tha Gaboneee path of
developmenr. It differs from capitaliam~ socialiem and all the other
economic doctrinea inaofar an iti "givea developmenC priority over growth _
and bives socinl progresa priority over coneumption." Its goal ia eo make -
rhe nation the mnsCer of ita own econoniy, by proCecCing certain profesaiane
against foreign competition, by facili.Cating accesa for ciCizene to credit _
and businesa ownership, by creating small bueineesmen. BuC iC will involve
no naCionalizaCion. In a period of economic recession, iC is clearly a
queation of reducing the very important role of �oreigners in bueinesa
somewhat.
llofore the country can put Chin new economic policy into uae, it must
emerge frum the serious financial crisis it is currently experiencing.
The state launched a number o� major work projects and had to go heavily
inCo debt to finance~these investmenta. The debt c~rae to 507 billion
CFA francs as o� 31 December 1978 (as compared, it is true, to 576 billion
a year earlier). In the year juat paet, 147 billion CFA francs (more than
51 percent of the export income, more Chan 65 percent of the budget) went
to cover the debt service.
To avoid bankrupCcy; Gabon waa forced, under pressure from the World Bank
and tt~e International Monetary Fund in particular, to put into operation,
at the beginning of 1978, an sueterity plan which overall ie yielding good
results.
'rhis led Che sCate to rEduce iCa rate of advance. Public expenditureo
fell from 296 billion CFA franca in 1977 to 167 billion in .1978. The
hiring of public emplo;~eea was suepended, except for young peoplE completing
their schooling. The Gaboneae Celluloae Company (SOGACEL) and cattle
ranch projects were poatponed for lack of funds. Conatruction on the
tranE-Gabonese railroad will continue, but at a slower raCe than planned.
~ The expenditures to be made on thia railroad line this year come to 23
billion CFA francs, as compared to a little more than 40 billion for the
preceding years. The investment total in 1979 ia in principle to be
limired to 82 billion 300 million CFA franca as compared to 87 billion
in 1978. Where prices are concerned, inflation wa~ reduced to 11 percent
in 1978 from 14 percent in 1977.
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t3dtter maetary of prnduceion coeeo (wagea, anargy) will make iC po~oible
to find a cure for the emaciation of the C~bonee;~ eaonomy. 7.'hen it wi11
be poeaible to puC the new economic policy into pracrice with eoine chance
of euccese,
COPYR~GH~: Jeune Afriq~e G1tUPJIA 1979
5157 .
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GABON
PDG EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS 42ESULT5 REVIEWED
- Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 944, 7 Feb 79 pp 22, 23
[article by Sory 5erfnde Diallo: "'Limited Democracy' in Libreville"]
(Text] The second extraordinary congress of the sole party in power, the
- PbG [Gabonese Democratic Party], completed its work on Monday 29 January
before over 300 delegates.
For 6 days, the members of the congress, at times wearing uniforms bearing
the efrigy of E1 Hadj Omar Bongo, chief of state and secretary general of
~ the party, examined the many draft resolutions submitted by the Political
Bureau. The preceding congress, which was also the first one organized
since the establishment of the PDG, in 1968, was held at the beginning of
1973.
"Concerted democratic progressionism" was proclaimed the ~DG's ideology.
~The objective of this doctrine is "the people's well-being," by means of
controlling the country's natural resources (oil, minerals, wood) and "par-
ticipation by everyone in the comanon task of work and dialog."
The congress was an opportunity to introduce a limited dose of democracy
into the party's operation. Thus, the rank-and-file caembexs had the possi-
bility of having more names than the actual number of inembera of the Central
Committee appear on the lists of candidates for that body. -
~ach candidate could be elected only by the delegates from his district of
arigin. That was for the purpose of taking the pulse of the popularity (or
unpopularit.y) of a given candidate.
Some high officials, some members of Parliament, had the disagreeable sur-
prise of not being elected by their fellow countrymen. That was true of
Martin Magnana, governor of Ogooue-LOlo, Joseph Ickamba, deputy mayor of
Koulamoutou, or pominque Boungouere, principal private secretary to the
chief of state. Some people are already saying that these unlucky candi- -
dates will not be long in losing their adminisrative post. At any rate,
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th3s is probably a logical conaequence. Party members would find i~ hard to
understand thati it would be o~herwise after their verdict.
Cabineti Iteshuffle
The congress also decided to forbid henceforth plural3ty of posts. And the
government was invited to ~ake the necessary s:eps. At preserat, a number
of higli-1eve1 state officials and even some mi�isters hold several posts
as director general of companies or of public services. Under these con-
_ di~ions, it should not be amazing to hear the radio give out the following
- refrain all day lonq: "Corruption is a snake. Money earned dishonestly
is a venom." ~
A cabinet reshuffle wi11 undoubtedly be the first consequence of this,con-
gress. It will involve, perhaps, the reduction of a gov~ernment team that
is too numerous (25 ministers and 9 secre~aries of state), as we11 the dis-
missal of those who are suspected of incompetency in their administration.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
10,042
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GAMBIA -
NATION UNDERGOTNG 'SERIOUS ECONOMIC, SUCIAL DIFFICULTIES' _
PArie AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 19 Feb - 4 Mar 79 pp 42, 43
[Article by Sam L~asono: "Democracy--To Do What?"] ~
' [Text~ Being Country of "Roots"--NoC Enough
Ban3u1, 15 minutes by plane from Dakar, at first si$ht looke like a pro-
vincial capital with an unchanged colonial air. This impression is es-
pecially atrong downtown, along Wellington Street, which leads ta the port,
or along Cameroon Street and Buckle Avenue, the section w3.th moat of the
embasaies and banks.
NoC far from there, cloae to the crafts and notions market, the head- -
quartera of the old British administration, which, after. independence,
became the StaCe House, remains intact. -
A fief of the Wolof of Gambia, but a town controlled by a heavily Western-
ized local bourgeoiaie, the Akous, Baa~u1 has for several years been
really swamped with tourists. The Swedes, the firat to be interested in
- the coast of Gambia, grabbed about 10 kilometers of beach where they put
up hotels and bathing facilities which are filled up the year round. _
After this Scandinavian tourism came the Afro-Americans, ever since 1977.
- For the latter, as a matte~ of fact, Gambia has become a kind of pilgrimage
~ place ever since "Roots" was publiahed by the�Black American novelist
A1ex Aaley who, as we know, said that he had discovered h~s origins in
the sma11 Gambian village of D~ouffoure and told of the forced voyage of
his preaumed ancestor, Kunta Kinte, to the Americas. Thus, 6,000 pereons
crossed the Atlantic during the year "Roots" was published. Thia was a
tremendous windfall for Gambia which had ~ust been devastated by the
drought. This influx of tourists produced foreiga exchange earninge and
helped gain a heaxing for the SOS launched by the Gambian government to-
- ~zard the international c~mmunity. t' -
But the beneficial effect of this "invasion" turned out to be very limited. _
The arrival of these foreigners with a purchasing power that was way out of
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~dit O~~ICIAi. U5L dNLY
proporCion to thaC of Che lncgl cieizene wae bound tio trigger e r~al
~pecule~iva Erenzys
Accordi:~g Co one member of ehe Ggmbian Lgbnur Unic~, a union founded in
1928, G~mbi~ gnd Ban~ul, in partiicular, Coday er~ ~acperi~ncing eerioue
probleme. "I~n leee Chan ~ y~are~" he declared~ "in epite of the exietence =
of g congultaCive committee on wages gnd a subcommittee on price controls, -
Che workers no longer m~ngge tn malc~ ~nde meee. Priceg have tripled in
record time 8nd they keep going up, while wage ad~u~tmen~~ are far from
keeping up with Che ~iCuaCion."
In effect, Ban~ul hae ~oined quiCe a few African capitals in terme of the
cost of living; without riek of being wrrng, one might even say tr.at the
Gambian citizeae.today get very littl~ ~dvantage out of Che free port thnt
wae established in Chg city.
Moreover, phenomena of an entirely new cl~arecter in the country--
embexzlement of public fun~is, corruption, and delinqu~ ncy--have made
their appearance. The em~tions caused among ~ublic opinion by the re-
cent scandal involving the embezzlement of aid destined for the drought
victims in particular persuaded the chief ~uetice of the 5upreme Court to
demand severe penaltieg for the guilty individuals, especially the "ahite~ _
collar criminals."
It wa8 thue a Gambia beset by aerious economic and social difficultiea
which, on 18 February~ celebrated thc 14th anniver,eary of ita independence.
T~is is an independence which, it was believed at the beginaing of the
~ixties, would be followed by aesociatfon With 5enegal, into ahich GambiF?n
tert~izory finda itself wedged.
But we know that, in 1965~ the Gambians preferred to go it alone. first of
- all as independent member of the C~~nwealth and then, followiag 24
April 1970, with the proclamation of the Republic.
One of the characteriatic featurea of this country is ite ayetem of
bourgeois democracy inherited from colonial t~mes, which the Gambiane
are very proud of. Summarizing this ;+entiment, President Dawda Itairaba
Jawara delcared on the eve of the April 1977 legielative election: "If
there are African countries that can boast of having petroleum~ thea
Gambia can boaet of haviag democracy." Indeed, ~udgiag by the number
af politi~~l formationa that were able to eatablieh themselvea aince
in4e~,~:~uenc~, but whose existence ie, to tell the truth, often rather ~ .
euphemeral, Gambia remains one of the rare African countries that never
put aa end Co the mutliparty syatem. However~ since 1962, political
life has beec~ entirely dominated by the PPP (Progreasive People'~ Party)
of Sir Dawda JaWara. Thia has been more true than ever before aince the
1977 electione which gave the PPP 27 Aeate out of 35 aad after the oldest
- Gambian organization, the United Party, ~oined the government party (fol-
lowing the death of ita leader, Mr Forster).
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be F'~ct.d Two-Parey SysCem
Moreover, wiCh th~ di~appearance of the Naeional Liberation ParCy--~which
had been created in 1975 by MagC~r Tieyacine Seck--Gambia presenCly in facr
- ddes h~ve n~wo-parey ~ystem. Facing Che pgrtiy ir. power~ we have as a
mgtter of fact only the NCP (National Conveneion ParCy) which has five
se3Cs in parliament. In apiCe of Che very per~onal attacke by itg leader,
Mr 5heriff MoueCapha Dibba, againbc the chief of atate, ehe fact that Che _
NCP is recruiting iollowers especially ~mong Che Mandingue Cribe, hardly
geCs it c~ naCionwide audience. Moreover, peraonaliCy clashes are the our-
se~nding f~ature of the political debate ia Ban~ul and the personality of
Mr Dibba cerCninly does not really lend itself to thaC aorC o� thing.
He i~ ae a matter of facC being approached for having tried to camouflage
Che "Butu scandal"--a amuggling affair in which his bxother was implicared
ut the time when, prior to his expulaion from the PPP, he was vice preai-
dent of the republic. It is true Chat Chis aiCuation still incites Mr
bibba into denouncing the corrupCion existing within the party in power.
'Phis is especially so since political life has, since last December, been
dominated by the sensational diaclosures coming from a high civil servant.
'They concern a diveraion of gifts and food intended for the drought vic-
tims--something which allegedly wae done by government pereonalities. This
sc:andal--in which aeveral aides of the presidenC of the republic are impli-
cated--perauaded Mr Jawara to get rid of three of his ministers while the
administration's secretery-general preferred to take off.
But ~t~e denunciation of corrupCion is far from enough when it comes to
putting a government program together. As for the party in power, one
might ask oneself whether--through its policy oriented toward the free-
enterprise system--it has noC above all become a refuge for certain un-
scrupuloua buainesemen-politicians.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
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~OR O~F'ICIAL U5~ ONLX
GKANA
BRIEFS
CLINKER IMPORT LICENSES--The govarnment of Ghana haa decided to grant
licenses for the import of Clinker in the amount af 40 million cedie thin
yeAr, i.e. 6 million more than laet year. Nowever, with the devaluaCion
of the lucal currency, and if other cheaper eourceo of oupply are not
�ound, this amount will not ev~n cover purchaee of the equivalent v~lume.
This etatement wae made by Col B. K. Ahlijah~ commieoioner for induatriea,
who emphasized the low level of atocka currently on hand. They totaled
about 30,000 tons laot 15 Jenuary, 6,000 of which are exclueively allocc~ted
for Che building of the Kpong hydroelectric power plant. At a consumption
rate of 4,000 tona per week, the commiesioner said, the 24~000 remair.ing
tona would be exhaueted by 25 FebruaYy. The Cwo cement planta are operating
~t only 25 percent of their capacity, due to lack of raw materiala. The
aituation is thus extremely critical, but Ghana hao already experienced
similar ones, which is the reaoon it ie rQlying heavily for conotruction
on the use of clay depoeita and encouraging the conntruction of brick kilna.
(Text] [Paria MARCH~S TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Feb 79 p 452)
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MOZAMB IQil~
BRIE~3
GDR AGRICULTURAL ~QUIpMENT ~RAINYNG--Within the fr~mework of ~ national
program wieh a view to opecialixing antarprisen~ Che Machine Diotribution ~
CDIMA) company~ the m~nagement nf wl~ich the �Cate haa taken over, war
recently placed under the jurirdiction of the Mozentbique Miniatry of
Agriculture. It is to be nationalized wiChin rhio year and will then~
under the name MECANAG1t0, coneern it~elf eolely witih technical areiotance
for farm equipmenC. With a view to expanding the company on Che naCionnl
level, plans now call for the establiahmenC of three regional cenCers
(Maputo, $eira and Nampula) and Che eatabliohment of provincial brenchea
for small and large repaira. Draft bylawo are being written. They were
to have been completed by laaC 31 December~ but amendmente decided upon :
on the higher level led to certain change~ in the Caxt which could noC
eherefore be finiahed in the ocheduled time. Ynten~iva training courseo
have been organized �or pereonnel. Cadrao will be trained in Eaot Cermany~
and a group of eix persono will leave for that country next May. (Textj
(Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Feb 79 p 467~
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~OR O~~ICIAL U5~ bNLY
lWOD~S IA
MUZORE'~IA D6!'BNDS POBITION 1N AUTOBIOGRAPHY
P~rfr JEUN~ A1~RIqUS in lr~nafi 2t !~b 79 p 4y
[it~vf~M by Moh~d M~la~ of th� book NRi~~ Up and Nalkt M Autoefography" by
Ab~l Musor~M~, Bvans eroeh~r~ Linit~d, London ~d Jbadan, 1978~
[T~xt~ Th� atyi~~ fn Mhfch �ol!�r~tfstactfon aont~nda Mfth ~yiticft~~ !a
~o~h~t ~~barra~~ing. Froie th~ wry b~giwnfng~ lbnsfsr?or Ab~i Muaor+~~
onphasls~a tor ua th~ l~ct eh~t ail hia iff~, h~ ha~ h~d not oniy to struggla~
bue �bow all to h~~ftaC~ b~t~?~~n tMO ~?orlda. If no! b~t~~n lf!� a~nd d~~th.
Thus Mh~n 1!!tl� Ab~l (Mho ot royai d~ic~nt on both hfs l~th~r~� u~d h~s
niother~� �fd~) Mas born !n Old U~t~i! on 14 Aprl1 1925, M Mu pr~~tutr. !1~
o~nd hi~ if!� only to th~ skiil o! ~ Swedf~h nun~ Si~t~r Eii~n b~orklund. ?h~n~
chrontcally ili~ ~ ho~plt~l p~ti~nt 1n ~ bu~h clfnf~, M survlv~d tl~ar~ka to
the ~~plricai kn~?i~dae ot hfs �~kuru (~aternal unel~)~ eh~ M~i~r ll~tarachl~i.
Noxt caa~ th~ tlrat y~ars o! h!� ~ducaliont a aunning �lxture o! tradltionai
African cultur~ ar~d tM ~fiit� achooi� conduct~d by t2~~ �!aslonarl~a.
Ft~om th~n on, th~ lutur~ lt~thodlst pt~lat� wauid 1 iw divld~d Mtw~~n a d~vout
lasfly group fn th~ clty and th� untora�ee.bia lov~ o! a gran~oth~r Mtw h~d
r~swlnsd !n th~ cow~try. ~'ln~lly, th~ opposite ln~tiwnc~a o! hfs l~tfahf~e
= uncle and h!� church nouid b~coN cloar.
All this do~s not r+~pr~a~nt an unusu~l b~akgrotmd in thla south~rn A!rlca~
tor~d by Chrlatianfly but bound to th~ traditional v~lu~i. ?h~t fs wfiy, out
of thf� book tha~t sparwing Mith d~tafi and not �fthout hu~or, ~n ehali
m~ntlon only tf� "r~wlation~" cvnc~rning th~ fntrigw~~ p~r~onal riv~lrf~a,
and dirty tricks afilch h~w cotu tantiy �ark~d th~ ~truagl~ o! tha black
_ netfon~lists. H!s oDs~rvationa arr ~~p~cially lnt~t~t~ting b~oaua� Ab~i Musot~wa
is the last o! �11 the Zinbab~n l~~d~rs to arriv~ on th~ politfc+il atvn~t in
1970, wtt~r th~ologic~l studi~a in tha Unlt~d Stat~a and af~ir b~ins nas~d !n
1968 aa a Diahop ot tM Unft~d M~thodiat Churoh o! Rhod~~ia.
H!a lntell~ctual hon~ity eannot be qu~stion~d. eut wMn h~ accu~~� Mr Jo~hu�
Nkoso, hfs p~t awraion ~nd orfginal riv~l, o! having aabotag~d th~ atru~l�
ot th� Zi~bab~n psopl~ sincy 1975 fn or~~r to D~ fn � D~tt~r positlon to 1~~4
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~01t d~~~CIAL US~ dNLY
it, he ts renu~rk~bly quf~C concerning th~ mothod~ o! h!r oan ~tN~! (Mu~orowa
had nn polltical Cr~lnfng unCil ~h~ croatfon o! hi� UniCod Alrfcar? N~Cfdnai _
Coun~ii UANC fn 19'7). Dfdn~t hf~ ro~n manouvor to oxclude Nkomo~� ~n
trom th~ le+~d~r~hlp o! thn lsportanC ag~ncf~~ o! the xlmbabaa Lfb~raCfon Coun-
cfl~ the externai countarpart o! the Afric~n Natfonal Councli (ANC)t S1mfl~rly,
ha tend� Co lorgoC that !t vaa �C tha sugg~stion o! thla raw Nko~ao that ha
aCtalnad the pr~sldoney of the ANC !n 19~4; the ANC vaa tryfng to b~ � brosd~r
natfon~list tronC~ untii ft broko up 2 yoara laC~r.
~'Muz" !a no more convlneing ah~n he ~Yplein~ vhet mu~t be c~il~d an about-laces
_ railying Co I~n Smith sft~r an fnta~tu~t~on aith armed strugglo. Ho aay~~ fn
shorC, that he aaa forcQd Co do thls by tha ambiguous ~tCltudo o! ths lronC-
lfne countrioa ~ipoci~lly Zae~bi+~~ whoa~ pr~~~datC~ K~nr~oth K~und~, fs not
daar to him ard ahlch weicomes Nkoao~s Croops. Thoao countrfos �f~uitanaou~ly
~ncouraged srnNd aCruggio and n~goti~?Cion rfCh th~ ahite gov~rn~oat. According
Co Ttuzorov~, thls could not lasr. So ha had to ehoos~~ or b~ accu~~d o! con-
tusion. Tha truth ia that ha w~s dooad to loaa at that "gaaw~" !or Mant ot
armod aotdfars. In the ~nd~ one c~tu~o! holp saoing !n this ~utoblography
a piaa tor the "lnt~rnai ~gr~amant" that Mu~or~a~ �lgned vith Ian Smith on
3 March 1978 vith th~ int~ntfon~ uong oth~r thfng~., ot ko~ping out o!
pov~r Ch� Patr~oClc FronC~ Qne o! vho~� tt?o prosid~nts f� th~ v~ry sm~ Joshua
Nkomo.
COPYRIGHTt Jauae Atrlque GRUPJYA 1979
1
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~
~Ott d~~LCIAL U5~ ONLY
5~NEGAL
S~NGlIO~t S~~N AS ABLE TO CnP~ WITN OPpOSI'~ION
I'ttri~ J~UN~ AFRIQU~ in ~renCh 31 Jgn 79 pp 32-34
(Ar[icle by Siradiou Ui~11oJ
(TextJ Lf iC is Crue that democracy dies fnr lack of debt~Ces and diecus-
sion~, it muat be believed thaC, ns f~r ~s this point ig concerned, the
experiment iniCiated in Senegal has no need of life insurance. ~or tl~e
past few months, the debgte between those in power and the oppoaition has -
been experiencing guch dimension and such vitality that it no longer leaves
anyone indifferenC. The press, whoae development is reflecting and accom-
panying this new policy, ig widely echoing the debate.
A dny no longer passes without a newspaper, either governmental or of the -
legal (or clandestine) opposition, publishing the contribution of a poli-
tical personality or an independent intellectual. From the official daily
= LE 50LEIL to the TAXAW, organ of Sheikh Anta Diop's National Democratic
Rally (RND], through ANDE SOPI, of former Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, and
LB DEMOCR~ITE , organ of Maitre Abdoulaye Wade's Senegalese Uemocratic Party
(PUS), a review of the Senegalese press presents an unusual sight for the
mind accustomed to the African journalistic landscape. It must also be
completed by reading independent newspapers like LE POLITICIEN, a satirical
organ, and PROMOTION, whose harsh criticism caused, of late, aerious prob-
lems for its young and "relaxed" editor, IIoubacar Biop.
No One Spared
All Senegalese political personalities, cadrea and well-known intellectuals
_ are participating in the debate. At[acks, counter-attacks, replies and
other restatements thus accumulate into interminable columns in the news-
papers. At the same [ime, each one is now subjected to the surveillance
of the press and must take it into account. The smallest pvblic or private
_ statements, activities or actions by anyone are watched, re~~orted, and
~ubmitted to criticism. Accuser or accused, no one is sparF:d, from the head
of state to the chairman of [he National Assembly, through the ministers,
opposition leadera, heads of central services, bank directors and other
prominent businessmen.
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Whae i~ the rooe nf ehe d~b~ee in prdgr~gg in S~negal7 Beaid~ ehe incrense
i~i prices., digCribuCion df incnm~, nbug~~ of power, eheme~ which ~r~ in-
vnriably ~ound in the moueh gnd in th~ wriCings of inembers of th~ oppnsirion _
rrom ull countries of the world, two ~ub~eCCs dominat~ Che 5enegg~~~e pnli-
~ical gc~ne in p~reicular: th~ mulei-pc~rey syseem and ngeiongl independpnne.
The first dir~~ely resulCs in ehe pr~bl~m of Senegnlese demoCr~~y. ~or-- "
~nd ~e firgC sighr ehis C~n be ~urpriging--the oppnsitinn believeg Ch~t
tlie demncracy prgcticed in 5eneg~l ig noe nnly "inadequnCe" buC ~1so "il-
lugory." Cong~qu~n~ly, the opposition condemng, in unison, the multi-pnrey
~y~tem as it now ~uncCions: a gystem which, since the becember 1978 con-
sCituCion~l revigion, limits Che number nf legal politicel pr~rties in
~uet~ority eo four ~nd whicti determineg fdr e~ch pnrty a proper ideologicnl
current ~rom which ir cannot devi~te under penglty of guspension: con-
serv~Cive, liberal, socialigt and Marxise.
Upper Vo1C~ Model
All oppo~iCion leaders will invariably tell us that this limitaCion is noe
onJ.y "absurd" but also "grbitrary" and, consequenCly, unacceptable. Never-
Clieless, among on~ and all, Ct~e positions involve differences of opinion.
'I'lius, rtaitre Abdoulaye Wade is in agreement with Pres~fdent Senghor in be-
lieving that rhe non-limitation of parties would result in a proliferation
wl~icli is tteedless and even detrimental to democracy. However, he considers
"unacceptable" the constitutional procedure tending to confine the parCies
iti[o pre-established ideological corsete. The leader of the PD5 would,
u~~ ti~e wliole, favor the Upper Voltan Model which limits poliCical partiea
to three, but allows all those which are established to freely offer them-
~elves to universal suffrage at the outset. And it is the firat three,
tt~ose which have obtained the most votes, which are legalized; the others
being destined to disappear or to merge with the legal organizations.
On the other hand, Sheikh Anta DiQp dnd Mamadou Dia are advocates of a full-
scale multi-party system. The former has been fighting for 2 years for the
recognition of his party, the RND. Moreover, this is not the first time
tl~at the eminent Egyptologist has been at variance with the authorities.
In tl~e past, he created the coalition of the Senegalese masses, then the
Senegalese National Front, which were dissolved respectively in 1962 and
196G. For all that, he is not discouraged. On the contrary, "We intend
to inscribe our action within the framework of the republic's law," he -
told us.
I3ut the leader of the RND explains: "Senghor refuses to recognize our
party under the fallacious pretext that we have not clearly defined our
political personality, our social plan." In a peremptory tone, he protests ,
~gainst tt~is attitude on the part of "someone who, in other respects, denies
the existence oE social classes in Africa." While claimin~ to be refraining
from bo~lsting, Sheikh Arta defies President Senghor to admit him into the
legal deinocratic game: "~ince the chief of state affirms that we are only
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rox o~~ict~u, us~ ox~.Y
ri h~~nclfu.l oC intnllect~~;~.lx, let him auehorizc ua to presenC ourselve~
beEnre univera~il ~ufC~agp. And rhe world wi11 see." While waitiing, he
prnCe~ts moet vphpmenely ggainst "those who ca11 Che RNU a clandestin~ -
pnrCy." The RNU is, nccording to him, an actual party which ia fighring
Eor its recognition, and which has nothing to hide."
A~ for ehe former prime minister, Mamadou Dia, he is even more categoricul
when he condemns the multi-pnrty system established by President Senghor. -
l~retending eo forger the suspension medsures which he took not so very long
ago ~g~inst cerrain Fareies and oppoaition movemenCs, today he de~lareg
tiimselF ~n advocate of "full-scnle pluralism". Unti1 1963 (he was nrrested
and imprisoned in 1962), he snys withour wincing, Chere was in Senegal e
de fgCto and de ~ure pluralism.
And he affirms: "'There is no danger in returning to full-scale pluralism
in SenegAl. If there is danger, it is more from the arbitrariness which
prevents parties from being freely established than from their proliferation."
Cnnvcrgences -
In fore~gn policy, the critics proved to be even more virulent. The PDS
does not ~o Without condemning the government's positions on Angola and
the 5a}~ara. Maitre Abdoulaye Wade, moreover, is m~}ltiplying his diplomatic
missions to capieals where President Senghor's policy is on the bl~ack list: _
Algiers, Tripoli, etc. The leftist opposition is going still furtl~er. In
the name of national independence, it dettouncea "all the unequal so-called
cooperation or assistance agreements," in particular those passed with
France. It is committed, in the possibility of acceding to power one day,
to abolishing t}~e foreign bases established in Senegal, and to preventing
any possibility of the national territory being used by foreign troops.
The allusion to the French Jaguars stationed in Senegal which, a few months
ago, were flattening the POLISARIO's columns is clear. However, most of
these agreements were signed by Mamdou Dia's own hand. But that was in _
1960, he said in his defense.
, ()n these questions, as on others concerning domestic policy, convergences
oC opinion among the different opposition groups are numerous. Could they
serve them as a platform, if not as a basis for agreement? Mamadou Dia is
convinced of it. Especially since, in November 1978, he founded the COSU -
(Coordination of United Senegalese Opposition). "A truly dyn.:mic unity
was launched," he told us. In reality, it in only in it~ infancy. A long
road remains to be traveled in order to attain unity.
1'he Carrot and the Stick
Not only did the RND ~ot respond to the Eormer prime minister's invitation,
t~ut also [he clandes[ine African Independenc~ Party (PAI) was reluctant to
t~ack the COSU's manifesto. Not to mention that the PDS, as well as Mghjmout
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niop'y 1ega1PAI, were boeh excluded from ehe conclave. "We only invited the
purti~s and organizations not forming part of Che consCituCiongl syetem
required and created by Senghor," Mnmadou Di~ indicaeed to us. Under Chese
r.ondiCions, rhe Social~se P~rry in power seems to have beautiful dayg ahead
nt it. Moreover, it doe~ not waste any opportuniCy to play on ChE incon-
sigtencies of its ~dversaries, while in turn dangling a carror nnd wielding
u~tick. 'That was how not long ago it announced, one afCer the oth~r, the -
legnlization of a fourth aprty, the itepublican Party of MaiCre ~oubacar
Cueye, and the promulgaCic,n of laws sevprely punishing "seditious associa-
- tions." Among others, iC concerns, of courae, Mamadou Dia'~ COSU. Like-
w:tse, a series of laws is being prepared aiming at stricCly regulating Che
press. There, also, the opposition knows what iC is a11 about.
A true pursuie race between the power and Che opposiCion now seems Co be
irrvolved. The leaders are sCriving to conCain their adversaries' impulses
wirl~in the framework which they have chosen, but Dia and Sheikh Anta do not
wane thi~ framework. Moreover, they ignore all Che in~unctions in order
eo organize themselves and act ae if ehey were entitled to it.
~ An LfEective Weapon
T}ien whaC means nre left Co President Senghor to make them listen to renson? _
"Let him arrest us if he wants", they reply in unison.
I3etween the laissez-faire which, obviously, is irritating it more and more
:ind ttie prison to which it seems to be averse, will the power be able to
find the effective weapon which its backers demand? For the 35 years during
wt~icl~ he has dominated the Senegalese political scene, President Senghor
lias proved that he has more than one trick in his bag. ~
- COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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TOGO
FIVE-YEAR PLAN REVIEWED~ FUTURE AUGURS WELL
Paris JEUNE AFItIQUE in French No 944y 7 Feb 79 p 47
_ IText~ Togo has obtained more loans than it wanted, in order ~o carry its
third 5-year plan (1976-1980) to successful conclusion. It had estimated
, 97.7 billion CFA [African Efnancial Community] francs for the first 2
years. Loans r~ceived have exceeded 129 billion. That was more than the -
country could absorb. Only 78.9 billion were used. -
Growth
The lesson drawn at Lome is clear. Togo's policy enjoys an excellent re-
putation abroad as well as at home. But there is a certain degree of de-
ficiency when it is a question of implementing the scheduled projects.
Having said that, the total investment volume is increasinq at an amazinq
speed. From 40 billion CFA francs for the first 5-year plan (1966-1970)
to 76 billion for the second plan (1971-1975), it is going to reach or even
exceed 250 billion for the third plan.
As ~ result of this development effort, growth of the gross domestic
product was particularly rapid in 1976 and 1977: 11.1 percent on the aver-
age at currer?t prices and 8.8 percent at constant prices, that is to say
greater than the forecasts and than the performance of most African coun-
tries.
Development has been especially rapid with regard to the consnunications
infrastructure, urban and tourist equipment (37 percent of projects carried
out with regard to the objectives of the plan), as well as in industry,
handicrafts and trade (35 percent). On the other hand, there has been ~
a serious delay in the implementation of projects pertaining to administra-
tive equipment (15.4 percent), rural development (15 percent), employment
and projects of a social-cultural nature (11 percent).
The slowness of rural development has worried President Gnassingbe Eyadema
very much. For over a year now, he has been trying to make the country
aware of this problem on the topic of the "green revolution." Steps were
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wQre raken Co hasten applicatiion of the agricultiure-landed property re-
~orm and ~ev~ral ~~~rareness eeminars were arranged �or ~hati purpo~e. In
order to give vigor to tihe "green revolution," the financial means of ~he
- Na~.idn~l Agricultiural Grediti Bank (CNCA) were increasefl. An increase in
ehe number of hydrnagricultiural pro~ects by means o� beti~er water contirol,
c]evelopment of agroindustries on the basis o� 1oca1 resources, establish-
mpnt of regional food produc~a offices (ORPV) r~nd "vertical" companiea lik~
mnc~rx~im, TOGOGRAiN, Togolese F'isheries and many othera.
Aust�~rity
bn reaching the middle of the plan, at the end of 1978, stock was taken and -
i~ had to be ~dn~itted that a certain danger, pointed out by the World Bank,
- was threatening. Investments underwent too fast and high a rate. If this _
~rend persists, indebtedness may give rise to some problems. But the cri-
tical threshold has not been crossed and the government, in order not to
aCCentuate these difficulties, is thinking about restraining certain in-
_ vestments, rectifying various projects, reducing the foreign debt to ac-
ceptable limits. All the same, the state has never been "at the edge of
the abyss" or "in suspensfon of payments." It still has excellent friends
all over the world in the fields of politics and finance.
Moreover, the government has gone over from theory to acts by establis~hfng
a 1979 budget less ambitious than anticipated, balanced at 62.6 billion
CFA francs, an increase of barely 3.3 percent in comparison with the i978
budget. And without new tax burdens. Forty-seven billion (+3.8 percent)
are allocated for operating expenses and 15.6 billfon for investments. This
~ budget will be characterized not only by austerity, but also by a stricter
control of expenditures.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
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TOGO
PHOSPHATE SECTOR TEMPORARILY HURT, FUTURE pLANS OUTLINED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 944,7 Feb 79 pp 54, 55
fText~ Phosphates are still the countiry's main mineral resource and ita
primary source of foreiqn exchange. Togo ranks sixth anang the world's -
phosphate producers, at a respectable distance, it 3s true, from the -
three qiants, the United States, the Soviet Union and Nbrocco. It belongs
to the second squad together with China, Tunisia, Senegal, Jordan and South
Africa.
But this resource is beinq seriously disturbed by the drop in pcices and
especially by the depreciation of the dollar in comparison with other cur-
rencies. With 2.5 million metric tons exported, phosphates brought in
34.5 billion CFA [African Financial Community] francs, in 1974. In the
followfng year, tonnage declined to 1.1 million metric tons for 17.4 bil-
lion CFA francs. More seriously, tonnage incre~ased in 1976 (1.9 million
metric tons) while its value continued to declins (13 billion CFA francs).
- In 1977 and 1978, tonnage continued to rise: 3 million metric tons in
1977 and 2.8 million in 1978. But prices stabilized at a level 5Q percent
lower than the 1974 and 1975 prices, when phosphates were sold at over $70
a metric ton.
Doubtful Maneuvers
_ About 20 kilometers separate the Akoupame deposit from the ocean. The
mineral, which is transported by railroad for 27 kilometers, is processed
at the 1Cpeme industrial center, 35 kilometers east of Lome. Then it reaches
a loading wharf on a conveyor belt. Mining began i.n 1961 (700,000 metric
tons). Production doubled in 1965, tripled in 1973, quadrupled in 1977.
The main customers are France and the Netherlands. Between 1961 and 1974,
the Benin Mining Company made large profits from phosphates, but the Toqo-
lese State, at that time a very small sharerolder, derived littl~ prnfit
from them. -
As the resu'lt of doubtful maneuvers, the company was nationalized on 4 Feb-
ruary 1974. Under the new acronym of CTMB [Togolese Benin Mines Company],
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aontrolled by the state from then on, it enabled Togo to have a favorable
balance oE ~rade starting in that very same year, 1974. 'I"hat was alao
the yaar of ~Che great price rise. But fertilizer co,nsumers made aome
savings. Pr3ces and purchases decreased.
IIeyond the Year 2000
While waiting for the end of the crisis, Togo is not giving up the game and
is working at developing a processing industry for its phosphates. Four -
and a half billion CFA francs have been allocated for the establishment of
a fifth production line in the Kpeme plan~. A good part of this investment
(3.1 billion CFA francs) comes from a pool of Arab banks and the xest from
the French Central Fund Eor Economic Cooperation.
Production, which employs over 2,000 workers at present, may thus be in-
creased to 4 million metric tons as.early as 1980.
This effort belies the rumors according ~o which the Akoupame deposit is
said to be almost depleted. Sizable discoveries have been made, moreover, _
and the government is planning the construction of a phosphated fertilizer -
plan~, in the medfum term.
Tngolese phosphates will continue to be mined beyond the year 2000.
Togo even wants to enter the international fertilizer market. It is plan- ~
ning to build a phosphated fertilizer complex using raw material from the
Kpeme region. .
COPYRIGHT: .Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979 _
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z~r~
B~LGIUM, UNIT~D STATES 'CONVINCED MOBUTU R1:GIME AT LAST GASP'
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 1,9 Feb - 4 Mar 79 p 43
[Article by Fode Amadou: " A 5taCe of 5emi-Inaurrec~ion?"] -
[TexC] Several Western captials are convinced that
the Mobutu regime is on ita last legg.
IC was in reality the American preae which sounded the alarm. Several _
correapondents from big New York and Wanhington newapapera in recenC
weeks wrore aeveral articles atating thaC an explosiv~e situation pre-
vailed at Kingha~a, that the people are atarving, that theYe is practi-
cally nothing left to be gotten on the marketa in the capital, that
corruption among membera of the Mobutu family keepe apreading, and that
_ most of the Zairian provinces no longer obey the central authority,
In other worda, the American embassy, whoae diplomats often aerve as
"authorized" sources for ~ournalists from the UniCed Statea, thus tried
either to exert strong presaure on Mobutu or to prepare Weatern opinion =
' for Che inevitable downfall of the bloody Zairian dictator.
This was followed immediately by Mobutu's appeal to Brusaels, Paris, and
Rabat: �1Zaire is once again threatened by red 'subversion,"' Mobutu -
telephoned hie B,~lgian and Freneh friends. "We need a new demonatration
= of your support i.-. ~.rder to deter our adversaries. Help me." That was .
on Monday, 5 F'ebruary.
The Belgian government did not hesitate for an instaat. It looked for
_ an excuse, a pretext. Thus, 24 hours later, the paracommandos, atationed
at Flawinne (Namur), south of Bruasels, were alerted, while the ministry -
~ of foreign affgira confirmed ttiat they would be stationed at the Kitona
Military Base, near Kinshasa, in the northwestern part of Zaire, "by
virtue of the bilateral military cooperation agreement calling for the -
training of the Zairian armed forces." While Bruasels is talking ici
terms of 300 paratroopera, foreign diplowata stationed in Kinshasa are
talkiag about 1,000 aad perhaps even more.
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Th~ B~1gi~n pres~ in general did not share nc~r believe Che ntaCemenCg from
gnvernmenC circl~s. Several editorial writere talked ebout an '~ia?minenC
expulsion" in ehe country while oChere ealked about the arrival of the Bel-
~ien pargtroopere to proCecC and, if ~ecessary~ eo guarantee Che evacua-
eion of 30~000 Lurop~nns frc?m zaire.
- And Ch~ ~orr~~pondenC of Che WASHINGTON POST aC Kinshaea reported~ in a
~ l.~ngehy nna].yeie of ehe zairian situation~ that the people is in a atate
o� semi-insurrention: "Noehing ie working any mora in thie country.
Neieher polieice, nor the economy~ nor �inancea, nor education, nor public
- tiealth. The experts from ehe YMF ere deaperaee." And an AFP [French
- Prees Agency) diepatch d ated Brussels, 8 February, quotes a Belgian
traveler reCurning from Kinahaea, according eo whom "the Zairian capital
is etill on the brink of disaster. Everything eaema to be disorganized."
As for Elyeee (Palace], ite poaition remains reeerved for the moment.
'Tt~ere ie no queation of dispatching French troopa to Zaire~ according eo -
Mr Pierre ~lunt, ita apokesman. But the fact remains that Mr. Simonet~
- ehe head of Belgian diplomacy, kept his French coun~erpart.informed ae
eo Brusaele' decision and thae the lat'ter replied: "Preaident Giscard
is not ~n any way thinkin~ of eending forces to Zaire." '
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Aaie
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7.AItt~
CONDITIONS NOT VI~WED AS IMI'ROVING BY 1980
Paris AFRIQUE-ASI~ in French 5-18 Feb 1979 p 21
(Article by A. Fall: "OpernCion 'Smile "'j
[TextJ The dictator hns promised that by 1980 Zaire's
people will smile again. But can one live on hope?
After a stay in Brussels where he owns a houae and has many friend~, on 15
January General Mobutu visited his "pal" Giscard d'Eataing in Paris. 1'he
French chief of state, who aome weeks ago had publicly deplored the fact
that Occidentals have not managed to overcome their reluctance to help
financially a regime on conatant probation, promised to double France's
contribution (which will reach Fr 35 million) to the "recovery plan" for
Zaire's econonry, which is being called, simple, the "Mobutu plan." _
This support from the French government, which has not Ealtered since ShAba's
first war in 1977, is appreciated by a regime entirely in submiasion to
large capitalistic countries. International Monetary Fund experts are
already working in Kinshasa, where they have teamed with high government
employees in charge of the country's economy and finance.
Wishing to obtain the promised funds as soon as poasible~ General Mobutu
initiated a new devaluation of the zaire~ the national monetary unit, at
the beginning ~f January. The zaire has thu:3 loat, in leas than 2 months,
around 100 percent of its value. Thus, he satisfied one principal condition
laid down by occidental countries, which should take definite positions re-
garding their financial aid in March during meetings in Washington and
Brussels.
Zaire's chief of state also wants it to look as if he is putting some order
into an adminiatration which does not have a reputation for being orderly.
With the new government establisi~ed in January he reduced the number of
ministries to 20, notably creating a super-Ministry of Economy.
S1
~
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NaCidnal CgpiCaliee~
WiCh hi~ usual nffinity for worde and Che spectaCUlgr he gsserCed th,~t "the
year 19~9 would b~ the y~ar of ~h~3ce between governmenC or cnmmerce for
all of zaire's mnnagers." Mobutiu'~ decr~e would gCC~mpti, g~cdrding Co tihe
7.nirinn Pre~g Agency, "Co eCop ~ trpnd obgerved for gaver~l y~are, in which
high offir.ialg hgve mingled unlawful bu~ine~g antivitieg with ~heir adminig-
tr~tive funcCion~."
_ But it is dif�icu1C Ca imggitte how this pregidential in~uncCion could by ie-
self end g 9C8Ce of ~f�aire which is the �illar of zaire's economy~ Besides~
tn deprive the only genuine naCional capitglisea of all or parC of Cheir
fingncial or real-estate intereste, would epeed up a"dezairizetion," by
crexting more opporCuniGiee for foreign investora. Is thie what ia des3red
in Kingh~sa?
Much more will be needed Co see "2aire'e pedple smile aggin," deapite
general MobuCu's promises for 1980.
CnI'YIttGHT: 1979 Afrique-Aaie
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znitt~
BRIEF5
FOREIGN INVESTMENT3 REEXAMINED--Numeroua enterpriges under the multi- `
national8 are in the procese of re~xamining their invesCment programs
_ in zgire following Che explosive tension prevailing iu ee~eral Zairian
cities. People in Kinehaea are Wondering wheCher the Japaneae cone~rtium,
which has ~uat eigned a contract for the consCruction of an 802-meter
suapeneion bridge over the ~aire River~ near Matadi, with a price Cag
oF $170 millian, might not poatpone the date at which wo~k ie to be
started: (Text] [Parie APRIQUE-ASIE in French ~.9 Feb - 4 Mar 79 p 46j
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ZAMBIA
N~W CA$IN~~ FOItM~U TO CONTRdL pOLITICAL TUItMOIL
Paria AFRIQU~-A5I~ in French 5-18 Feb 79 pp 20~ 21
(Article by Cherif Rachid~
(Text] A ciew governmenC to insure cnntrol of a political
clase in turawil.
Kenneth Kaunda, zambia's chief of eCaCe, devoted weeks following his re-
election in December to a takeover of the government and the United Nation-
al Independence Pgrty (UNIP).
In 1978 he had already silenced those accusing him oF "encouraging capitaliam
while condemning it" and those--like 5imon Kapwepwe, onetime candidate for
the presidency--who were in favor of a return to economic liberaliam and of
negotiation at all costs with Zambia's neighbors, including Rhodesia.
Zambia's preaident needed elbow-room in political matters ao that he could
invite foreign capital into the country, negotiate an aid agreement with [he
all-powerful International Monetary Fund and in order to reopen borders with
Rhodesia for trade. These initiatives antagonized the party's left wind and
worried leaders of the Patriotic Front, of which one wing--the ZAPU ied by
Joshua Nkomo--has its headquarters in Zambia.
Recent incidents have demonstrated the tension created by eome of these
measures. At the end of December, for the first time since independence
young Zambiana attacked foreigners, particularly Europeans, in the streets
of the capital. In addition, after several raida in immigration circles
last year, which concluded with the expuls:.on of several hundred "undesira-
bles," on 10 January Zambia's police arrested a dozen guerrillas from the
ZAPU who were accused of participating in violence against villagers east
of Lusaka.
- Lusaka's Supreme Court insulted the chief of state in 1978 by invalidating
the sentence condeaminE a former parlament member and Livingstone's former
mayor to death who had been accused of attempting to overthrow the regime
by force 2 years ago. A young Zambian army officer, Cap Francis Zyambo,
54
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wag al~d rri~d dn 10 Jgnugry becgug~ "he epok~ in f~vor o~ ~ miliegry Cnup"
nnd b~cgu~e he gaid such things gs, "Let rh~ grmy eake over Ch~ gov~rnment
_ in ~umbin gnd you wi11 eee changee."
7'o t~kp cnr?erol of ~ pnlieicgl claeg in turmdil, president Kaunda chose to
refnfdr~~ Ch~ gC~fF of the eingl~ perty: Ptgittz~ Chong, released frnm duey
ag prime minieCer wns gppoinCed Co Chig pogt. Moreover, K~nneeh Kgundg
~ccuged 5duth Africg gnd ithndesig of gupporting zambi~n diesid~nCg in order
eo "g~botgg~ ~nd d~geroy eh~ country," dietinguiahing b~tw~en Chnee of hig
politiCal opponene~ who h~ve a con~Citur~.dnal right and thnse who aim at
degtrdying Ch~ regime~ ~
The new c~binet formed in January further demanstratea thie takeover by the
presid~nt gnd the parCy's lpading team (in charge of "keeping in touch wirh
the n~sges"). However, it ie poesible to wonder abaut the efficacy of thig
"double government" gnd ~bout the conflicts of intere~ts and tenaiona rhet
will undoubtedly ~rise.
COpYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
8924 ~
CSO: 44b0 ~
END
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