JPRS ID: 8343 TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 46
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000^I00030046-7

� ~ i ur i

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
. FOR O~FICIAL USE UNLY
JPR5 L/8393
i?
zo March 1979
~ ~
.
.
TRANSLAT~ONS O~i NEAR EAST AND ~(ORTH AFRICA
CFOUO 9/79)
� '
. ~ .
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
~
NO'1'~:
JrR5 publicnCions coneain information prim~rily from foreign
newapapers, periodicals ~nd books, buC nLso from news agency
rransmissi.ons ~nd broadcasts. rt~eeri~ls from foreigtt-l~nguage
sources arc Cranslated; rhose from Cnglish-language sources
are transcribed or reprinred, with the origin~zl phrasin~ and
~ other characteriseics retained.
Fieadlines, edieorial reports, and maCerial enclosed in brackets
are supplted by Jl'RS. I'rocessing indic~eors such as [Texe]
or [Cxcerpe] in r.he firsC line of each iCem, or following the
lase line of ~ brief, indic~lte how the original informaCion was
~ ~rocessed. Where no processing indicaror is given, rhe infor-
maLio.~ was summarized or exeracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parenthes~s. Words or names preceded by a ques-
' tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied asappropri~te in context.
Other unartributed parenrhetical notes wirhin the ~cdy of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
~ given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
~ ~ies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
I
COPYRIGNT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
Mr1TERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
.
BIDLIOGRApNIC OAYA 1. Fieporc No. , _
3~ Reeipient'~ Acrea~io~~ No,
sHE~r JpRS L/8343
_ u e an ~u tit c S. Hepott ate
TRANSIATIONS ON NEA~ ~1ST AND NORT!{ AFRICA, (FOUO 9/79) 20 March 1979
6.
7. Authnr(~) 8. pet(orming Ora~n;eation Hept.
No.
9. F'er(ormin~ Or~~nizat~un Neme qnd AdJte~~ 10. F'rojeet/T~~{c/R'otk linit ~o.
Joint Publications Research Service
1000 North Glebn ROgd 11. Contact/Gnnt No~
Arlington, Virginia 22201
lZ Sponiorins Org~niz~tion Name ~nd Addrei~ 1~. Typt of Report bc Periud "
Coveted
Aa above
t~.
1S. Supplemenc~ry Note~
16. Abitract~
The seriAl report conCains informtttion on socio-economic, government, political,
and technical develapments in the countries of the Near East a~r~i North Africa.
~ '
17. Key u'ords ~nd Doeument Analyiis. 170. Detcriptoa
Political Science x Inter-Arab Affairs X Libya Sultanate
Sociology x
North African x Mauritania of Oman
Economics Affaira x Morocco Syria
Culture (Social Sciences) Afghanistan People's Demo- x Tunisia
Ethn~logy x Algeria � cratic Republic United Arab
Ceography ~Bahrain of Yemen Emirates
Technological _Egypt _ Persian Gulf Western
� Military Scicnces _Iran Area Sahara
17`. Idencifien/C`pe~:-Ended Tecmi "'-IrBq --~-QBtgr Yemen Arab
~Israel _Saudi Arabia Republic
_Jordan _Spanish North
. , Kuwait Africa
_ Lebanon ~,Sudac. _
17t~ COr,ATI Field/Group SD, SC, SK~ 1$
� 18.Avaiiobiliry Statement 19. Secunty Class (This 21. \o. oi P~ses
F'or Official Use Only. R`p 59
Limited Nu~ber of Copies Available From J?RS. �~~~~y i�: c n~: ~2. N~,�
Paae
roww Nr~s�i~ ~~iv, ~.~ai " Uti ASSIFfF.D
YHLS FORN AfAY BE R6PRODUCED uscoM.~�oc
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
~
T'C)k OI~'I~'TCIAL ~ U5~ ONLY
JPRS L/8393
20 March 19 79 =
TRANSLATIONS ON NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
~ (FOUO 9/79)
CON7ENTS PAGE
z~r~-ARAB AFFAIRS
- Reflections on Arab Tradition and Modernity
(Flaad Zakariya; THE JF~2US.IT~ENI QU~PgtLY, l~0 10, 1979) 1 .
NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Algeria.n President New ~igma in Saharan War
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEtTNE AFRIQITE, ~4 Feb 79) 9
ALGERIA' -
Selec:tion ot Algerian President Iliscusaed '
~ (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 1~+ Feb 79) 11
Role of Algerian Ar~}r Viewed
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 14 Feb 79~ 15
Polisario F~ont Announces ~Defection~ oP Moroccan Deputy
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDI'PERRANEENS, 9 F~b ?9) 17 I
Induatrial Development oP Algeria Doea President
Boumediene Honor -
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITg2RANEENS, 9~b 79)...�. 18
Chadli Bend~jedid Called IIzergetic, Realistic
(MARCF~'S TROPICAUX ET MED~'~'F.Rp,".i:~.n~, ; Feb 79) 20
- Briefs
- SNS-Nippon Agreement ~3
E1 Mc~uatakbal Dam ~3 -
Daimler-Benz Vehicles ~3
Equipment for Steel Complex 24
' a- [III - tiE f A- 121 FOUO]
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
1
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY . -
CONTENTS (Con~inued) pa,ge
LT}3YA
Briefs
Libyan Nuclear Program 25
Weapona Deliveries 25
MA~ktITANIA
Deta,ils on SNIM Reorganization Noted
(Abdelaziz De~hrnani; JEUNE ;~,FRIQUE, 14 Feb 79) 26
Agricultural Situati~~ Appears To Be Critical
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDI9'ERRANEENS, 9~b 79) 28 -
Briefs
- Li~utenant~s House Arrest 30
Jape,nese Fishing Center 30
`
MOROCCO
Economic Ferformance, 1978-1980 Plan Detailed
( r~aRC~s ~toPICaux Er t~~nrr~tar~,~s, 26 Ja.n 79 31 ~
TUNISIA
Report on Industrial Activity During FYrst Half of 1978 _
( MARCHES TRO PICAUX ET MEDITE~iRANF~TS, 9~eb 79 51
Trade Deficit Increases in 1978
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITII~RANEENS, 2 Feb 79) 55
Brlefs
Kuwaiti Loa.n 56 -
_ New Railway Station Switch 56
EEC Aid to Citied 56
Japanese Electroizic Aid 56 .
Aid From (3DR 57
. GDR Aid for Phosphates S~
_ ~
- b -
r
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
FOR OF~ICIAL U5~ ONLY
- INTF~'~-ARAB AF'F'AIRS -
~E=
L
- REFLECTIONS ON ARAB TRADITION AND MODEftNI7.'Y -
Jerusalem THE JERUSALF~1 QUARTII~LY in English No 10, Win~cer 1979 pp 77-~3
LAri:Icle by ~Zad ZakariyaJ `
~ex~7 The Ef;yptian wriler T~wfiq a1-~iakim has mad~ the perceptive -
disdr.ction between a'backwarcl' and a'lagging' society. The '
_ formcr has never bcen at the spearhe~d ofprogress while the letter
once led the convoy of civilization, but fell betund when its pace
sl~ckened or stopped completely. AI-~IakIm thus endeavo�,u~ed w
dPfine the relationship between cultur~l development and the
- dimension of time, notably the relationstvp between past and
present. A lagging society tends to be past-oriented, looking with
nostalgia at the good old days when it carried the torch ofprogress. _
. A prime example of such a society is the Arab ~~orld. Any
discussion of this society should take as it~ point of departure that '
special relationship between past and present.
In Arab culture, the past confronLs the present not as an entity
which is linked to and integrated with it. Rather, thepast acts as an
independent force contending with the present, defending iLs own `
privileges against it and sU-iving to take its' place. In brief, oi:r
atdtude towards the past is ahistorical. This is;n contrast with the
~ historical uttitude which places the past in a realisdc con!,ext,
examining it from a relativistic viewpointas a bygonephase which
disappe~u�rd into successive pha,5es of human evoludon leading to
the present. In a historicsl approach the past. does not compete
with the present and there can never be a qtiestion of cong~vity (or
lack of il) between them, fort]~e present carries the seeds of the past
and the past creates the present even es it expires and is
supt:rseded by it. Tn Arab culture, however, the past cut~ ofT' its
relationship with history, loses its relativistic character and ~
_ ~ F. 2ekeriy~ is m Egyptian pbtloeopher who teacha et'Ayn Shams Univer.ity.
7'hi+ Ls a iomewhet abridged veision of an nn3cle published in d�Add6lBeirut).
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
~Olt dFi'ICIAL U5~ ONLY -
P
b~cc~m~~s i?n evcr present S'or4e, independent of the fr~?mework of
- Utne, Il is 11~~s bow~d W clnsh ineluctably wit}i lhc presenc. Pnst =
- und pres~~nt tlius emcrge us two discincl ent~ties, und nat ns cl~ey
ere in fj~ct: pai~t i~nd porcel of one force whnsa chnructer chaiiges
with thc p:~ssaga of eime. This ahistorical s~pprp~ich is res~onsible,
_ to a lur~;e extent, for the backv~ardness af the Arnb world and for =
thc contusion which bedevils Arab culture.
GYitics of Tradition _
The: best illustrat.ion for this cnc~fusion is the o?i~ou~g debate on
tradicion vs, modernity. '
Ori ~~ne side af iliis debatc st~nd che c: itics of lraditio~i, who single ~
out the defects of ~ur cultural heritage and cell for thr,n~ to be
dr~stically remedied. This author agrees with their claims, yet '
rejects t}~cir cnnclusions, The c~itics find our trudition tc~ be replete
with irra~on~l clements; supcrsticions, mysticism, mytholo~;ical -
modes of thinking, Tlus is undoubtec:ly true up to a poinc, bui there
- is nu rcason to conclude - ns t}~e critics do - that our trs~diUon is ut�
terly d~feclive. Let us remember t}~t~t t}~e same irrational elements
- d~d not unpede the progress of European thought, Furopefin
- medit~eval thought was no doubt obscurantist and mystic~l�prone, _
and even modern Europe maintains n measure of irration~il
ele?nents, which permeate iLs scientific activity as well. Until the
18th century, electricity and magnetism were seen as mystical
_ forces, and c:hemists spoke of masculine and feminine minerals. Up
- to Desc:u-tes�' time, animals were considered w be mere instru-
ments, devuid of consciousness and feeling alike. The mentaUy ill ~
tvere sometimes bui~~ed nlive in order to banish t}ie evil spirits
duminatu~g them.
Nevcrtheless, Europe was the spearhead of pro~;ress in the
modcrn cra. If these factcrs did not block the way to modernity in
the West why should they be deemed impediments to progress in
the Arab world? One could even make the case, ~s some European
thinkers do, that these intellectual errors rnay ~ a necessary phase
on the way to discovering the wth. Science, they argue, is not so
_ much a cluster of tni~.hs reached one by one, as a cluster of errors
- progressively overcome. Su~erstition and mystical belieican thus
' bc dcemed stages on the road to kn~wledge, provided other - and
better - stages evolve and superse~e them. From a historical _
viewpoint, irradonal ihought and supersti~onsper se r.annot be the
cause of backwardness. Whether they become so, is determined
_ only by laler developments.
The sume holds true for the accusation th~t the Arab heritage is
fraught with tyranny and repression. Dr. 2aki Nujib Mukiamad in
his Regeneration of Arab Thought (in Arabic) claimed that this
tyranny lay at the root of our backwardness. But is not the hiswry
of European thought replete with cases of liberties repressed? _
~
G
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
- I~'Ult Ul~F']CIAL USL ONLY
Witho?it h~ving lo dclvc fur back intn mediaeval histary or into the
intol~runc~i of th~ R~~formeti~n, cennot nne find in modern history
' u lr.gi~n ~f ~xnmples ~f persecudnn oC inlallectunls in tt~e n:una of '
= rcligiun7 Ciorduno Rnmo wns burnr.d ~+livc, Gnllloo wNS put on
U�ia~ and ~lmost executed, The same fAte men~ced Descnrtes,
~ while Spu~oza had to resurt to nn ~pparently theoingical style in
~ order to hide his essentially radonaJ.istic nppmach. Intellecturil ter� _
ror by the religious establishment is thus not the domnu~ of tho d ark
nges oC Arab traditional culture alone. The West, however, has -
found its way bayond that phaso, into the era of enlig}~terunent and
freedom of expression. Thus, whilo the defects in our tradition
should certainly be overcome, they cannot be considered solely -
rusponsiblo Cor our intellectuxl b~ckwardness, One should rether
investi~ate later, post-mediaeval, ~ievelbpments in the Ar~i world
in order to find the source of our m~laise,
Tl~ose who heap all the blame for today's backwardness on
- mediueva] f~ctors apparently exp~cted tra~dition to be a suf~'icient
basis for solvu~g the problems of the present. They e: e bitterly -
disappointed to fir~d that it does not fulfil this 'tosk'. 'fhe vecy
~ ferocitr of critir;ism levelled at tradition de~otes that thc latter is
being unconsciously r,ompnred to the present.'I'he pASt is perceived -
~s a livin~ forco which should be overcome.
- I~roponents of ?radition
- The same sort of camparison, but with an apposir~; u~tention,
underlies the approach of the defenders of lra~�~..::;n, Theirs is the
obverse of the same coin ; lhey exaggerate the real (i.e., historical)
significance of our traditian. The vaditionalists claim that we are
- bacicwurd because we hove forsaken our heritoge and only when
v~e come back to it can we achieve progress. Some traditionalists ~
ask us only w bc 'inspired' by our tradition, while others see~k to
~ resurrect the entire heritege. They ergu;~ that deliverance will ~
_ come only through an intensive search for s recreation of the past,
even down to such details as dress. Such appeals for a reinstate-
ment of the past cannot be found today in other cultures; they are
wuque tc~ the Arab wori3.
There are trdditionalists ~nhe often depict our heritage as =
encornpassing all human knowledge, ~ast and present, thus
- prectuding the need to overreach its boun3s. Ceriain authors strive
to prove that all n~w scientific discoveries are anticipated and -
toreshadowed in the verses of the Koran. Nuclear science is `
supposed to have its origins there because there are verses which
contain the term dhurra (etom). In anotherphilological sleight-of-
h~nd they claim that modern biology is preGgured in verses ebout
Allah's creating all living beings from weter. Others atill may view
the verse about Muhammod's ascension to heaven as anticipating
space travel. True enough, there are out�and-out traditionalists
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
~
i ~
FOR OI~'1~LCIAL USl: qNLY ~
(e,g� I3inc al�Shr~ti) who rejucl inccrpr~tatruns u~ chis vcu~ and
- refuse tc~ miike t2~e Koren inw o treatise on t}~c nutural scicnces or
space tec}u~olo~}+. T1~ey ar~ua that the Holy Scriptures nre
_ designed to enlighten us on thc r~alm ~of tt~~ spirit and not on thatof
- matter, There are also trnditionalists who reject the above-
mentioned exegesis as depreciating the vnlue of our heritage.
Human reason, they nrgue, hAS c'vcumscribed c~pacides and men
should know that all }us scientific knowledge will always remain
- Intrinsically limited nnd of ser.ondcuy knowledge.
Anothcr lendency clr.irns that Arxb scient.ific tind intellectuul
achievements during ~::he Islamic Colden Era are the source of
- many modern discoveries and innovations. Such a claim is certain-
ly bete.~r borne out by nccepted historiccil facts, yet is steeped in ~
exaggeretfon: it takes Ar, ub scientific heritwge out of its historical
context and - in ~ manner reminiscent of the first te:ndency -
bestows upon it an xbsolute value, vnlid for all times. It is quite
c~mmon, for instance, tn fir~s; Arab thinkers who exert thcroselves
- to prove that the most ~p~to~date scientific discoveries vvere
, known tn the mediaeval Arnbs, One such 'experC claim~d that al-
Binini (973 -1053) was the father oC fhe T1~eory of Relativi!y.
T}iis ahistorical attitude w our heritage refuses to deal wi~, the
present according t.o own specific logic and applies instead the
logic of a bygone pe;riod, however glorious it may hav~ been. In the
linnl analysis, however, such an approach is counterproducdve.
By attributing to mediaeval Arab scholars many of the -
_ achicvements of modern science one intends to prove that the
Arabs preceded the West in these fields, but in fact sur,;~ claims do
nothing but glorify Western thought. Western achievements serve
as the yardstick for measuii,ng the staws of Arab t}unkers. Only if
un Mut~ preceded Einstein, Kant or Hume is he acknowledged to
have bc:en great. Had we really believed in the greatness of our
mediaeval scienasts and thinkers we should have persuaded -
3 humanity of their claim to greatness in their own right. Ii~dced, did
~ the West ever ~lor.fy an outstanding personality because he
~ preceded an Arab thinker in arriving at a certain discovery or
because he succeeded in developing or interpreting an idea
_ launched by an Arab? _
That is the dif'ference betwzen a self-confident culture, using
itself as its own criterion and a culture which has to compare itself
to others, tiying to outdo them.
, Moreover, the ~hhi$tflrical approach assumes that our tradition is .
a living force capable of solving all pYoblems in the present. Some of
its more extremist proponents would go so far as to claim that any
setback we sufYer, be it even a military one, is somehow related to
our attitude towards tradition. It is thus that many thinkers
~ attributed our defeat in the June 1967 war c.o the ignorance of our
roots linduding our religious roots), while our bette: performance
_ in 1973 was claimed to be due to a certain return to tradition. Thus
FOR OFFICI:.L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
_
FOn UFEI(:TA1, U5(i ONLY
tl~e puyt lx:coiru;s t.he ~nly element liublo tn deliver us f'rom the
hardships of thu pres~nt, 5uch nn nhiswiirnl nnd reactionary np-
' pronch is suruly uo ~rci?t hulp ui fcicing up w~c problems of ttie
prc~enl.
Nucure of Arab NErrituye
Our heriCa~e must cectauily have some special characteristics -
wluch inspire the ~ibove~yuated views of crit.ics and progonents
nlike. Por, one might ask, why did not G~'at3onal factors and
repression of free chou~ht in the West produce the s~me results as
t~~ey did 'u~ the ArF?b worid7 Why did t1~e West succeed in shakit~g
o(Y tl~ese impcdimcnts and movin~ forward, while iii Arab society
they blocked progress? WhEit. is it which comQels the proponents of
tradition to clinp, w their roactionary concepes and look for the
sourcQS of modern science in the Holy 5criplures and classical
_ liter?ture't In brief, why do we remain Past-oriented and bogged
down?
'I'1?e Arab cultural heritege con~ains a phanomenun whir,h I shall
refer t~: as 'r,ultural discontinuity'. It is the lack of continuily
lx:tween our past and present, which explnins w}iy we pin im- ~
possible expectations on our heritaRe or lay at its door un- -
warr~nted blame.
in their golden age, Arab sci;;nce and philosophy attained the
hi~;hest de~ree of progress achievable in the Middle Ages. The
_ Arabs were the mentors of world civilization. Yet this era elapsed
and the development of Arab thought stopped completely. In the
late ).9th century there began an M~ movement of renaissance
_ (nahtla, or awakening), basing itself upon this vadition of
mediaeval thought which }~ad been so icnpressive in its own time. It
- disregarded the f~ct that huma,uty had already evolved far
beyond tt~at sta~;e, and the Arabs lagged to such an extent that they .
could not compensate by sirnply putting the train of progress in
motion from the very point where it had stopped so long ago. _
- Cultural discondnuity thus means thnt Arab science and
philosophy do not constitute an unbroken vadition extending &om
its }~eyday ta our own times; we ratherhave before us a Golden Era
_ followed by long Dark Ages. As the Golden Era had no real con-
tinuity, there was no opportunity for it to be integr'ated into the in-
~sllectual make�up of man in the Arab world. Science and
philosophy were insulated from the general society, remaining the
preserve of a tiny elite. Their p1~ir?ciples had never been absorbed
inw the intellectual baggage of the common man.
Take, in contrast, the case of Copernicus. In his own centuty few
_ scientists shared his views, but the continuity of the Copernican
- tradition and the efforts exerted towards its consolidation made it
into a basic ingredient of the general culture. The same is true of
' othQr major Westcrn scientific discoveries, such as the Theory of -
5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
FOR OI~FICIAL U5E ONLY
~
_ Evulution or the emer~;ence of psychu~innlysis. These were the
conceptions of a few u~dividuuls, but chey filtered from thc elite
downwards, thunks to the contlnuity of scientif'ic thought, Arab
_ mentdltty and daily bchaviour, howQVer, were not at'1'ected by
Ar?~b scicnWic c+nd philosophict?1 trndition, One cnnnot sny that the ~
Arab is i?nbued with it es, for insta~ice, the I'renchman can bo said
to be Cartesir~, It is ironical thal the most enthusiastic proponenLs
of Arab tradition present it as e manifestation of elements that'one -
~ could not have conceivably expected' to find in ehe Arab world ond
of individual thinkers of whom it is s~:d: 'the common man would
be astonisl~ed to find how enlightened they were'. This very
, astonishment proves tt~at the heritage of these thinkers has not
been integrated into our being, What is much more dangerous is _
that the very significance of the Arab herit~ge suffcrs from cultural -
- discontinuity and is in need of reassessment. There can be two _
approaches to a hiswrical heritage, one liable to foster progress
' and the other, backwardness. The first approach perceives the -
heritage as developing in a continuous manner, each phase
surpassing and absorbing its predecessor. 'I~adition grows in a ~
- living and developing organism. The second approach tries to .
~ resuscitate discontinued traditions without considering ~vhether
they are relevant W the new conditions. In the first case, the
tradition lives within ils own death; u~ the second, it dies within its
- liie, for it is resuscitated artificially and transplanted as an alien -
b~cy into ~ new age which is bound w reject it.
Lessons nf lhe El~ropcan Renaissance -
The modern Arab's attitude towxrds his scientific and
- philosophical heritage is that of a hoarder and not of a user. Those
whc~ actually used oun c~ritage and profited from it were the
Eurupeans of the.Renaissance era. Arab achievements were added
~ to their body of knowledge and set into motion a process of
development which was to continue without stop. It is Europe -
which has actually preserved Arab culture in a true manner, even -
thou~;h one cannot point out loday a direct present of Arab
tradilion in ~uropean culture. It would also be difficult for you to
detect in your physiognomy t}ie traits of your ancestor of ten -
generations ago, even though you are able to trace your genealogy
~ to him.
The Mab sliould thus ponder the lessons o6 the Renaissance in
order to find out what er.abled the West to develc,p so much more
than ~s, ~lthough their point of departure was lower than ours.
The major ]esson is that the Europe~.ns did not hesitate to reject a -
whole cultural tradition, namely the Aristotelian philosophy which
dominated the Middle Ages. They even went so far as to make
Ariswtle shoulder the responsibility for false commentaries
attributed to him in the Middle Ages. Scientists like Galileo began F=
- with the premise that one should liberate thought from the hold of
6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
r~oK or~icr.~ USE ONLY
thr. Ancients (e,g,, Aristotle) end turn direcdy to nature in ordar to _
~~nderstand the lnws of tho universe. Ttus rejection ci classical
, tradition was due to its discontinuity, ILs accornplishments wore
glorious in Mtiquity but it froze ui the Middle Ages, unable to ab-
sorb new elements and evolve further, Hence the rejection and the
Renaissance clairn that one should begin ub initio. I.ater ori, when
the classical herita~e was no longer a r�e~l competitor, the -
Europeans took a much mor~ balanced viaw, placing it within the
~ appr~priate !!istorical perspective. The classical heritege could be
acknowledged as a force which had been of grent value in its time,
even though later developments far surpassed it. The historical ap- 1j.
proach does away with thQ contradiction between glorifying the
heritage and the admission tl~at it is unsuiled to the present. -
~ Rejection nnd toeal challenge of tradition is, hence, necessary in
the first phase of renaissance, the historical approach being
- adopted only in tho second phase.
Alienation and Westernizaeion
- Our cultural lag leads w a situaL~n of helplessness vis-d vis present
problems, coupled with tho impossibility of ignoring them. The
- major in~nifestetion of this dilemma is a sort of Westernization
va}~ich dqes not prepare the terrain for a new depariure. This
- Westerniza~ion, ~ranically, is self-imposed and not imposed fr~m
the outside.
One kind of this Western9zadon can be found among Arab
disciples of foreign culture: those who tend to complete with the r
help of foreign woi�ds what they cannot expres$ in their own
language, importing from far away lands their life-style, dress,
even facial expressions and body language. Theirs is a
ge~graphical alienation. Their body is still in an Arai~ country, but -
their mind is elsewhere.
The critics ofthis Westernization are also alienated, however, in a
~ much more latent, hence dangerous, manner. Being proponEnts of -
tradition, they are ~tvonologicslly alienated: alien to the problems
of their own t.unes and finding solace and refuge in bygune times, -
= seeking in our ancient vocabulary the expression of new meanings,
, in our ancient philosophy an answer to contemporary eth~cal
problems and in our ancient warfare a guide to modern strategy.
Yet the present unposes itself upon man even when he tries to Ilee `
~ -
7 -
- FOR OFFICIAL liSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
l
J H'Ok dF'F'tCIAI. U5~ ONLY
= Whlch ~licnntion Is worsc~ The geogrephlc~l dlm~nsion tends ta
' be Cnntruct~d nowedays, Technology reduces dilTerences
_ between inc~l cultureq nnd fosters unifor?nity; n worid civili~~don
- is in thd meking, In the din,ension nf Wne, t}~c contary is true, The ~
difi'erence t~etween two ~enerations today is much Wce t}~at
between ten generations in past centuri~s. Chrnnolugical
sl~en~tinn ~ based upan a static concept~on oC tlme ~ thus
r~prescnts d greater dcu~ger. It fnsters nnthing hut self�deluslon. -
~
COPYFtIGHm: The Middle F'.ast Institute, Jerusalem ~
CSO: 4tS20
8
rOR OPFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
rOtt 0~'~ IC iAL us~: oN~Y =
NOItTE1 AF'lt~CAN AFFAIRS -
ALC~f~IAN PRESID~NT NEW I;NICMr1 IN SAiIAF2AN WAIi
_ Pariq J~UN~ AFRYQUE 1.n ~rench l4 Feb 79 pp 3~)-31
(ArCicle by Abde].aziz Uahmani: "Orphan I'OI.i5ARI0?"J
(Text) 'i'}~e Saharan affair enCere3 a new phesc with the election of u new
Al~eri~7n pregident on 7 February. For now, C~?E g~~me "gpheres of influence"
is done. WiCh Houari T3oumedlenne, the POLISAIZIU Front could count on the
unequivical support of the Algerian head of stnte. Some went so fnr es to
say tt?e Saharan affair was Boumedienne's privute preserve.
- This had allowed POLISARIO to reinforce its mili~ary and diploma[ic position
since 1975 to the point of causing serious problem~; to hiorocco and Mnuritania~ ~
so strong aeemed the common purpose of Algerin and it~ proteges. With
$oumedienne ehe POLISARIO lost its principal protector and no ore catil pre-
dict it~ �uture with any certainty, even should Algerian leuders ewear Co
" continue the policiey nf the deceased president.
_ No one could be more sensitive than the POLISARIO to the dangers uf a
possible change in Algeria. Ai~d to keep from weakening, to reassure their
troops~ who felt the death of Boumedienne keenly, the Saharans laLnched
their most murderous offensives to date on Moro~can positions, in the past
few weeks.
- They took advantage of Che preparation for and the holding of the ~LN
[National Liberat~on Frontj Congress on 2J-31 January, of the withdraWal to
Algiers of their poli[ical and military councilors, to launch large-scale
operations. The Saharans even announced "700 Moroccan soldiers dead" and
extensive damage from one operation at Lemseid in Che neighborhood of E1
Aioun, before threatening Morocco with u"military solution."
Psychological Warfare _
The most spectacular operation was 28 January against ~he Moroccan town of
Tan-T'an. We can affirm that there was a great deal af damage and many
deattis on bath sides. The POLISARIO, playing on surpti'ise, partially occu-
pled the town and caused serious damage. They took many women and soldiers
9
FOR OFFICI.11. U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
- ~OEt 0~'~ICTAL US~ dNLY
ns ho~t~ge~~ But while f~lling back th~y wer~ for~ed ineo mnking ~ stand and
~ in turn left dozene of dead.
This nper~tion nggineC Tan-Tan~ gs gudaCious as Che attgck ~gginsC Nounkchote
in June 1976 occurred while the FLN congr~eg w~g in full ewing. When it w~g
~nnaunced, eh~ ma~oriey af the 3,000 p~rtieip~nCg applauded vigorously. The
legs enthueiastic were mdstly miliCary ~nd modergees.
~or the milie~ry~ the ~ttack on Tan-Tan could hava_ been the pr~lud~ en w~r
between Algeria and Mdrocco. Some IsCgqlgl and USFP (5ociglist Union of
People's ~orces~ leaders spoke to deeply felt Moroccan bitternese uging such
cerms as "national dieaster" adding that the threshhold of the "intol~rgble"
hnd been crogsed.
' At Algierq u number of moderntea eaw in this operation unwarranted interEer-
ence with Che conferenre's work and n preferenc~ for the hardlinera, thoge
wanCing to make Morocco regponsible for basic Algerign pr.oblems. Abdelaziz
Bouteflika, minister of foreign affairs, doubtless felt himgelf Co be g
spectal CargeC and was particularly virulent about Morocco.
In a way, this is Che revenge of POLISARIO against thoge~ who are numernus,
who would label them as "only nn Algerian satelliCe." Md now they ~eem to
want to make their protector play their game! Has POL',SAi?FG staked ita all
on this occasion? Yts hard to say for sure bcAfore Algeria's position is
' further clarified and the new president has defined his policy. It is said
thnt Chadli ia a moderate, ready for dialo~, but how far will h{s hands be
free to attpmpt to find with Morncco a solution Co the Saharan aEfair, if
there should be place for it in the dialog? Mauri.tania's ovcrtures for peace
and P~LISARIO's military offensives show that the political issue is tied to
,~lgerian/Moroccan contacts. ,
- During the transition period that began with Boumedienne's illness and was
prolenged unCil the election of Chadli Bendjedid, each party delivered it-
Felf to psychological warfare, not reatraining itself from any means. any
violence, verbal or other--arms parachuted, urban terrorism, assassination
~ attempts--to bend events in ita favor. The resul.ts have not been, so it
seema, what the three protagonidts had hoped for. The principal and new
enigma of the Saharan affair is called Chadli....
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
8860
CSO: 4400
10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
~'dtt 0; ~ICIAL US~ ONLY
ALG~~tIA
S~i.,CC`~ION ALG~I2IAN PRESIU~NT UI5CUS5CD
Pnrie J~UN~ AFRIQU~ in ~rench 14 Feb ~9 pp 27-30
(Article by J.-L. "Who R~ally Is the New President?"J -
(Text] Boumediene's heire have taken good care of things. bn 9~ebruary,
after 45 days nf Mr Rabah Bitc~t's weak interim, Co1 Ch~d1i Beniedfct took
over the highest office. Two dnys ear].ier, tl~e new presidenC (glone) went
before the voters. At the clo~~ of a fourth ~'I.N convention which had
lested long~r Chan planned, a week earlier, tne party had named him as its
candidate to succeed to the presidency. -
The new president who is accepted by everyone, is said to have been chosen ~
by the convention after open debates whEre a lack of compromise between
various factions finally led t}~e army to achieve a consensus by proposing
his candidacy. The transition which was accompnnied with great fanfare,
appears to have taken place flawlessly. The constitution was acrupulously
observed and continuity was assured.
The Most Sen:or
All [his is reassuring, as is the image portrayed of Col Chadli Ben~edid.
Amon~ the first impressions characteriaing this man who has been stationed
in the region af Oran for 14 yearg but who is not well known at Algiers,
= are his moustache and white hair, the "Raf Vallone look" as they say in
Algeria, his relative youth (not quite 50 years old), a solid and discreet
bearing, and a reputati!n of being anything but gullible. Aa the head o� _
the second military region, commanding the most important units of the
Algerian army, this career officer Who was forged in the underground after
serving with the French army, was concerned solely with his own ~urisdic- -
_ tion at Oran. His participation in Algeria's political affairs was minor.
He is considered a man of experience, on the moderate side, without strong
ideologies.
How then can these characteristics m$ke him a head of state? We are told
thac we ahall have to observe him at work, and are offered one explanation
~for the selection of this individual: Chadli Benjedid is the most senior
11 .
FOR OFFICIAL 1J5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
~dK 0~'~ICIAL U5~ ONLY
nfEicer hnlding Che hiqhegC rnnk. `I'his is where we ~un stgrC ngking our-
g~l.ve~ some quc~tidng. The ~nme type of argum~nt prevuilg in other lnti-
rudes, espeeially in L~tin Amcrica: when the army Cakes over the gnverr.~-
m~ne, a~ ~~;ener~l rule the highese r~nking nfficer is ingt~lled gg ehe
he~d of ~C~C~. The deCi~ive factor is not so much a mnCter of qu~lifiC~-
tinng of a perticulgr ~eneral, but g question of whae he repres~ntg: Che _
milit~ry e~tablighment gnd, behind eh~ ~ceneg, the smnll groupg who ac-
tually control it.
it~$rouping
Th~ Comp~rison is val:!d~ to g cert~in extent, with respect to the evr,.,.a
in Algeri~. Colonel Chedli Ben~edid's election did not tak~ place r~e one
wnuld hgve ug beli~ve and the army played a much more important ro'., than
th~t nf simply a final erbit~r. In order to r~constieute Che prrceg~ it
is necessary to go back to the last days of November (goumediene died on
27 December) when the first ~igng of regrouping appeared within the Coun-
cil of the Revolution, in anticipntion of the need to find n su~cessor, _
- 'Cwo ma~or trends took shape, labeling as virtunl candidates the names of
Abdel~ziz Boueeflika, minister of foreigtt affairs, and Mohamed Sulati
Yahtaoui, top leader in ch~rge of the party m~chine. Col Ahmed gen
5herif, former gendarmerie chief, tried Co play his own card. Nolding
Eewer aces than his two ad~~ersaries, Ben Sherif is said to have pleased
for an expanded convention and for a greater number of candidates. His
propoxals were not accepted.
The question then arose, conceXning the assignmenC of control over the
Ministry of Defense to colonels Chadli and Belhouchet, ~s to whether this
decision should be credited to Bouteflika's group or whether it merely
endorsed it. The latter theory now appears more likely: everything
leads us to believe that the army rapidly tried to slow down the rise of
8oumediene's minister of foreign affairs who had a head start in the race
to power according to numerous observers (especially foreign). For this
reason the army is said to have supported Yahiaoui whose expanded possi-
bilities became rapidly apparent. By projecting a double image as an _
Islamic and Marxist scholar, presenting himself as a srrong man who favors ,
pure and hardline Algerian brand of socialism, Yahiaoui seemed to pre-
clominate. His chances appeared to be so much the greater as he was in
charge of the organization of the convention. But his progression alarmed
some members of the state apparatus who were displeased with his plans to
strengthen the purty. Businessmen as well as technocraFs were equally
disturbed, fearing Yahiaoui's economic options. ,
1lhead of Time
- In tl~i~t game of succession which consisted of shifting alliances within a
smnll group of inen, the weight of respective positions taken by these dif-
ferent interest groups was felt in terms of the relationship of forces,on
a pnrticular day. It would appe.qr above all that the military side also
12
FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
I
t~Uit UI~I~ICtAL U51; UNLY
~xrrcy~ed ~eservaliori~ conCerning Yahigdui's extremism. Thud, it t~ re-
poreed rh~it he, :ln Curn, wa~ xlowed down t:o the sgtisfncti4n of other
= grnupg .te~;~ ~~ixious Chnn Che nrmy. Although Ytthiaoui had Co Calte intn
= Account n sCrdn~ repreeetitueion of ehc milit~ry n~ Che cocivenCion, hig
aupporters did constitute c~ majoriCy among the participane~. Thig ig why
the nrmy, in pur~uing iCg offen~ive, presenterl Ch~nclli nen~edid ~s its -
_ candidgee--a move which w~tg f~r from displeaging to m~ny y~ung officers--
and h~d t~tm ~cr~pt~d befdre the meetings of th~ I~LN. If C;~ad1i's cundi-
~ d~cy w~g f.irmed up ghe~d of time, wh~t is thc u~e of Chese dabaee~ ~nd
the c:ldging repdrt, one would ~sk4 It would be ~impliyeic to believe
rhnt it w~~s ~ust a maneuver Cd hoodwink people. Firgt of ~11, it iy to ~
be noCed Chat in addition Ca the deleg~~Ces of a~tructure~ party, the
conventiott wnn attended by different groups conatituting the enlarged
- power ~lite, nam~ly the mtticnry, technocr~tg, repre~ettt~titives o~ gdv- -
- ernment and admini~traeidn, membera of the ~LN app.~ratu~, et~. A num-
ber of p~nrCicip~nts who were rcady to play the game thought that tl~e
c:onvention must in f~1c~ reach an agreement concerning the candid~cy.
_ Ilowever, the prevalectt attiCude, especi~~lly th~~t of certain officer~,
ie s~id to h~ve shown them that it w~s not really w~~rthwhile to po very
f~~r. Not eo mention the sluggishness of bureaucrntic orRanizr~tion, thc
dispersinn and chgnnels within th~ variaus committees and other prngramm~d
intcrference. Those who believed in an orderly process were left with a
certain uneasinegs. At a higher 1evC1, there ~~as a question of balancing
the representnCion of different interest groups and regional congCiCuen- _
_ cies: this preoccupation is reflected in the compositton of the central
committe~ (160 titular Members and 30 substitutes) which is the hypotheti-
ca1 "supreme body" of the ~LN between conventions.
_ 'The New Itegime
~inally and above all, matters yet to be resolved outside Chadli's candi-
d,~cy w~arc at stake. That is to say there was a question of dividing the -
power among the dif:erenC elements present. There was apprehensic?n about
a poysible demonstration on Ben Sherif's part. He is reported to huve been
active and to have been reconciled with Bouteflikn. Yahi~oui, for his part,
was ab]e to keep some of his pro,~ects concernin~ the party--whase support he
i~ad ber.n counting on--but he had to accept, surprisingly, Chadli's designa-
tion as Che FLN's secretary general.
llcre ngoin, as ~ new s~~rprise, the question came up as to whether the army
migl~t not be ntCempting to reconstitute the Boumediene system--whereby nu-
merous rosicions were being given to the chief personages--when it had been
expected that the cards would be widely distributed. Negotiations are con-
tinuing and a first balance of different forces will be reflected in the
composi[ion of the government. It is nevertheless difficult to imagine _
that t}~erc will no[ be a real division of power. The different leanings
hope to be able to derive some benefit under Chac~li. And, after all, the
latter comes in from Oran whereas the others are already ~n Algiers in
their positiona. When it is time to appoint one or mare (probably two or
~3
FOR OFFICYAL USE ONLY
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
~n~t d~F'ICIAL US~ bNLY `
ehre~) vice presidentg c~nd,Che prime miniseer, there wi11 be a beCCer
_ under~tnnding nf the exCenC of compromie~~. The pollCic~1 buregu con-
si~ting nf 17 memb~rg whn r~pr~s~nt ~ sore nf ~nl~rged ~:uunCil di th~
r~voluCidtt, ig r~g~~upin~ Chd~~ who remain within the ~rea of conaidera-
tion. NoCeworthy at thig 1eve1 ig the arriv~l ~f Cnldn~l Mirbgh, the
~hi~f df milit~ry s~~urity~ He undnubtedly is ~ man dn ehe rise. Ch~dli
j llen~edid whd was selected on Clie b~gis of hig quglifiaaeidng, will he
seek t~ ~ssere himgelf when he ig confronted by Choge wh~ pl~~ed him in
pnw~r? It i~ r~~s~ngbl~ to guppose so if one r~members ChgC this mnn
_ gtood firm wh~n Boumediene tried tu pull ,him gw~y from his territory gt
nran.
A n~w regime ig b~ing born at ALgier~.
COpY1tIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
9261 ~
CSO: 4400
~4
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
.
~Oit OI~~ICLAL U5L ONLY
ALC~ttIA
ROLr 0~' ALGERIAN ARMY VIE~JF:D '
Parig J~UN~ A~RIQU~ in ~'r~nch 1G Feb 79 p 29 _
(Article by H. K.: "A Highly Politicized Army"]
(Text] The People's NaCional Army which is dne of the strongeaC ~rn~ies in
Africa gnd in the Arab world (78,800 men), derives from the National Liber-
aCion Army which was forged during seven years of the w~r of. independence.
The NaCional LiberaCidn Army wae divided into autonomous wilayas because of
the n~ture of comb$t ,and the vast~eas of the Algerian territory. Shortly
- nfter Che country's independence this splintering which was aggravated by
divergencies among the FLN leadership, led to Che "crisis of Che wilayae"
which came c1oRe to becoming a bloody conflict. B+at thanks to the support
of the border armies led by Co:onel Boumediene, Mr Ahmed Ben 6ella pre-
vniled over his opponenta in the Provisional Covernment of the Algerian
Republic. After he wes appointed minister nf defense in the first govern-
ment of independent Algeria, Colonel Boumediene managed to unify the
National Liberatton Army which then became the People's National Army.
The Drop of Water
It is through the People's National Army that President Ben Bella succeeded
in suppressing the armed uprisings of his adversaries. Colonel Shaabani
wns executed and Hocine Ait Ahmed was ~ailed. But Che head of state had _
become awa:e ~f the dangers of having to depend on the army. In 1965 he
began to undenriine the powers of his defense minister by naming, during
the latter's absence, Cul Tahar Zbiri as chief-of-staff of the People's
Nutional Army. Colonel Boumediene's comrad~s from the Oujda group were
p~ahed aside: after Messrs Medgehri and Kaid Ahmed came Mr Bouteflika's
dismissal. This was the drop of water which caused the bowl to overflow.
During the night from 18 to 19 June the People's National Army went into
action. President Ben Aella was overthrown. ~
The C~urtship -
President Boumediene who was asaare of the mistakes made by his predecessor,
conaolidated his power by rulying heavily on the army the conunand of which
~5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
~qlt OF~ICZAL U5~ nNLY
h~ ~eal.ously kept for himself. The future would b~ar him out. On -
_ 14 December 1967~ Colonel zbiri, Che chie�-of-staff, advanced on A~giers ~
l~~ding an armored convdy. Hia Croops were rapidly dieper~ed. _
. Being ae serongly pollCicized as its �orerunner, the People's Nntiongl ~
A~my wiCh i.t~ po1~.Cica1 commiesariat as one of ~.Cs moet importanC ele-
ments parCicipates in a11 ma~or decieians. Calling itself th~ "spegr- _
- head" of the revolution, it ~upported PreaidenC Boumediene's initiaCives!
and ir has b~en courted by different lean~nga euch as ehose which surfaced
within the Council of the Revolution during President Boumediene's agony
_ and laCer on during Mr Rabah Bitat's Cerm. As the country's principal or-
ganized force it finally decided in f~vor of Chad11.
Beshir Ben Yahmed wrote ehortly before Che country tiecame ind~pendent,
"Tomorrow's Algeria will be what the People's National Army wante Co make
of it." Thi~ truth stiLl is indiapensable.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979 -
9261
CSO: 4400 -
_ ~6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
,
- I~'Ok ~I~'H'ICIAL U5I. dNLY
_ ALGL"ItIA ~
~ POLISAttIU FRONT ANNOUNC~S 'bEF~CTION' OF' MOItOCCAN ~~PUTY
P~rir MARCH~S 'TROPICAUX ~T MEDITERRANEEN5 itt French 9 I'eb 79 p:~08
il (Text) In n bulletin publi.sh~d in Algiers on 1 Febru~ry, thc~ I'(2LISARIO Fronr
. announced the "defectidn" to the 5aharan movement of Abderrahm~n Ould Leibak,
deputy in the Moroccan Parliament. ~lccording to the POt~ISA1tI0 ~ront, puld
Leibnk is reporCedly also president of the Commt~n~l Council of Bou,jdour
(northern Western Sahara) set up by Rabat and tt member of thc Mo~~occan Red ~
Croas.
D
The bulletin also empliasizea that "important offici~ls from tl~e former Jemaa
(aesembly of notables during the time of the Spanish S~hara) and formex
, tribal chiefs have also ~oined the ranks of the POLISARIO." -
At a press conference held in Al~iers at the headqunrters oE Che Sahnr~n
movement, Leibak, whose "disappea~unce" was officially recognized 3 da~ys ago
by Rabat, said thnt the Moroccan op}~osition partiea, particularly the USFP
- (Socialist Unton of People's Forces] and.the PPS [Party of Progrsss and So-
cialismj of Ali 'lata "speak a great deal about a wideepread war in the region." -
Leibak nevertheless believes that "Morocco could not wage such a war because
th~ authorities in Rabat thnught that it would be the end of the rAyal regime."
~ Leibak also said that Morocco was experiencing a"serious econoraic crisis" ~
- and that the "morale of the Roynl Army was at its lowest point." According
co him, military spending repreaents over 35 percent of the general budgeC
- although no investments have been made for the develo~ment of the Western
Sahnra. ~
1~inally, Leiba� c~tated that he had "infiltrated" the Western Sahara for
several years on behalf of the POLISARIO Front~ tf~at he had been autumati-
callv included on the Istiqlal Party's list for the elections and that his
membership in the Parliament had been "the only way to continue to wage
milit~~nt a~tion."
COPYttIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 19~9 '
11,464
CSO: 4400
17
FQR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
~Ott 0~'F'ICIAY~ US~ ONLY
AL~~RIA
INDUSTRIAL DE1l,~.LOPMENT 0~' ALGERIA DOES PRLSIDENT BOUMEDIENE HONOR
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX E~ MEDZTERRANEENS in Frenc~l 9 Feb 79 p 308
[Texr~ In an editorial devoted to the "oil heritage" of President Boumediene,
_ the periodical PETROLE ~T GAZ ARABES atates that "the name of Houari Boume-
diene will remain attached to the principal events that have completely Crans-
f ormed the physiognomy and atructurea of the world hydroca~bon industry in
the courae of recent years." '
Analyzed by the national agency ALGERIE PRESSE SERVICE, the editorial, which
is signed by Dr Nicolas Sarkis, editor of the periodical and an oil expert,
emphasizes that for Algeria, "nationalization was not an end in itself, but
- a meana of rationalizing the working of its hydrocarbon re~ources an~ inte-
grating the oil and gas induetry into its ambitious economic development
plans. The action was accompanied by a heavy increase in petroleum production,
which went from 26.5 million toaa in 1965 to 57.2 million tons in 1978, and
- the launching of ma~or refining pro~ects (installed capacity will be raised
- from 2 million tons in 196~ i:o over 21 million tons in 1980) and petrochem- _
ical pro~ecta (Arzew, Mn;;ba and Skikda complexes).
"Regarding natural gas, Algeria is already the world's leading exporter of
liquified naturgl ga8 with 6.4 billion cubic meters shipped in 1978. It will
remain so in the foreseeable future with exports that will be gradually in-
creased to 70 billion cubic metera in 1985."
Dr Sarkis~ obaerving that SONATRACH (National Company for the Transport and
Marketing of Hydrocarbons) has "rapidly become the ninth-ranking hydrocarbon
' producer in the world and one of the mosC dynamic national oil companies,"
a.lso emph+~sizes ehe apectacular development of the "human capital" of this
company, which from "a dozen cad�res in 1965 went to qver 5,000 Algerian
- cadres in 1978, while the total personnel of th~: company and its subsidiari.~s
reached the figure of 78,420." He notes that "while assuming the heav}?
reaponsibility for and gas activities in pl.geria, SONATRACH even L~egan
several years ago to grant techr~ical assistance to several Arab and African
nution~s."
- Fitting the action of SONATRACH into an overall perspective, the editorial-
ist of PETROLE ET GAZ ARABES observea that it "was waged within the more
18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
COR OFFICIAL U5~ ONLY _
general framework of thc ecnnomic development plans carri~d ouC under the
Boumediene regime, No less than 420 new pro~ect:s, including 270 planCs
~nnd 150 infraetructure pro~ects, went inCn oper~L�ion between 19~1 and 1977.
In the course of Che last 6 years, over 500 orher pro~ecta were launched in
rhe differenC industriel, agricultural and ~ervice sectors. A few figures
enable one to measuxe the results of Chese efforts: The productian of
electricity went from 1,000 kWhs in 1962 to over 4,OU0 in 1977; that of
unprocessed steel from 5,500 rong f:~ nearly 400,000 tona; that of cement -
from 963,000 to 2.5 million toi:~; anc: tihaC of compotind fertilizers from
46,300 to nearly 600,000 tons.
"MosC of the inves~ments required Co finance Chis deve~opt,:ent come from the
gas and nil export receipts," the editorialist recalls, "which receipts
went from $321 million in 1971 to $6.2 billion in .~.978. It is esCimated that
~t the beAinning oE the 1980's, they will exc~ed $],2 billion with the atart-
up of the ma~or natural gas exporC pro~ects."
Summing up the role aseigned to gas and oil in Che d~velopment of the Algerian
economy, President Boumediene said in February 1978 on Che occasion of the
_ official opening of the Arzew gas liquification complex that "the develop- -
ment of our hydrocarbon reserves in order to increase our export receipts
is dictated by our determination to use these receipts in a wiae, austere and
effecCive manner so as Co encourage the systematic creation of new economic
activities capable of engendering by themselves oCher sources of revenue -
that we must bequeath to the future generations."
COPYRiGHT: Rene Mor~:ux et Cie., Paris, 1979
_ r
11,464
- � CSO: 4400 _
19 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
FOk OF~TCIAL USE ONLY ~
ALGER'IA
CHADLI BENDJEDID CALLED ENERGETIC, REALISTIC
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 9 Feb 79 p 293 -
[Text] Col Caadlf Bend~edid, the new Algerian chief of atate, appears to be
' as regerved in ma.rlner and sparing of his words, as secreCly authoritaria~n
- ~nd modestly devoted to public service, as PresidenC Houari Boumediene was
- when he cacr.c to power. But the r~ewly elected president emerged from a regu-
lar procedure which took place in an atmosphere of perfect calm and in keep-
ing with strictly observed constiCutional standards, while for a long Cime,
his predecess~r could only claim a"revoluCionary legality."
- T1~E choice of the FLN candidaCe actually the appointment of t*~e chief
of state by the party w~?1 in the final analys3s have set two factions
against one another: the hard-line wing of the national organizations,
particularly the workers and youth groups (the UG~A [General Union of Alger-
ian Workers] and the UNJA [National Union of Algerian YouthJ,) which did not -
conceal their desire to see Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui oct~~py the nation's _
highest post; and the mass of moderates, who feared progressive excesses
but who could not hope to impose a person such as Abde~'.aziz Bouteflika,
described, ~apecially abroad, as a liberal.
Under such conditians, the People's National Army, suffi~ienCly well repre-
sented in the Congress to constitute a blocking minority, could offer a _
solution by bringing out of its ranks a man of character, moved ~:olely by
= overriding national interests: Col Chadli Bend~edid, who immedi~ite�'ly Leemed
to be a possible successor to President Boumediene, therefore be~:a~me the
unly possible successor because he was the person who could be a~~repted ~y
everyone.
Balznce Between Government and the FLN _
To say that with Col Chadli Bend~edid it was a question of a"co~~promise
- candidate" makes it possible to explain the reasons for his choice, but it
,~lso risks failing to recognize the character of the new chief of state.
F.verything that one can learn about him, his rural origins and his almost
exclusively military training, his life as a soldier and his career as a ~
military leader within the confines of the West, and finalLy, his strict ,
loyalty to President BoumedienP and his political line, lead o:~e to think
20
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
COIt OI'FICl'AL USE ONLY
Chnt he will be a strong and decieivH personality, in no way U,journeyman
- se~kin~ middling soluCions. `
In other words, those persons ~C home and abroad who wou13 expccC Col Chadli
- Bend~edid to prnvide ~ fundamental revision of Algerian socialism, conaider-
able exp~nsion of rhe privaCe sector and an indulgenC orien~ation townr.d
_ consnmer privileges will know nothit~g but disappointment.
- On the other hand, since he is an ~CCentive observer and a realistic leader, _
_ one can presurt?e th~t a11. pract:ical progress thaC is possible w:ill. be resn-
.lutely sought. It is very likely that th~ trend already affirmed in the
pasC several months toward social and i~uman concerns and tawnrd concreCe
development aimed a[ producCivity will not b~ abandoned; on r.he conCrary.
Lt will perhaps give rise to broader and bolder developments.
While with Mohamed 5alah Yahiaoui the FLN would have tiad its role asser.ted
y and irs optiona radicalized, one may now wonder wher.her. the prirty will, as
prevtously expected, succeed in breaking away from the government in orc~er -
to tt~ke control or" it on behalf of the nation and Eormulate th~ general
pol{cy of the Algerian people, j,ihile with in the party's Central Comn?ittee,
_ which the Congress has ~ust appointed, active faccions that will move ir.
that direction are represented, i.t is nut certain they they will be able to
carry the rest with them.
Furttiermore, the very trad:Ltional makeup of the Politic:al Bureau does not
le~~d on~ to expect radir.al modifications in the general policy. One finds
in it all the members oi the former Council of the Revolution, along with .
- an equal number of prominent persona of diverse merits representing reformist
Muslim thought, as in the case of Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, determination to have
modern i~idustrial development, as in the case of Belaid Abdessel.am, and
continuity oE the high administration, as in the case of Mohammed Seddik
Benyahia. _
New President To Govern Alone?
Ir is highly likely, moreover, in the face of this FLN in the midst of
transformation and whose Euture is difficult to predict, that there will b~
n state authority whicl~ will no longer be, as one saw in the past, concen- -
trated in the person of the president of the republic.
Tt will be remembered that aft~er. Che constitution went into effect, Pra,sident
l~oumediene did not use the power given to him to appoint a vice presi~,ent
_ ~~nd ,1 prime minister. He would probably have done so evenCually, ~;.t first
- of. all he wanted ~o bring about the renewal of the FLN and he undoubtec:ly
thouKtit that the .latter would then have somethic~g to say, not only about
~ the president of the republic but also about the o;.her persons placed at
tt~e head ~P the state.
It is Renerally thought that unliice him, Col Chadli Bend~edid is anxious
to bring two front-rankin~ personages inta the vice presidency and the head
21
FOI~ OFFICIAL USE OIJI.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
~
rOlt U~'~iCIAG U5~ ONLY
di the governmettt, In thi~ wny, he could, it i~ expl~in~d, b~lxnc~ th~ -
different far_Cion~ that w~re rival~ at th~ time of the prenidentiel chni~e,
Hnwever, it i~ not cert~in ChAC the new chief of etnte i~ in~pir~d by ~ueh `
u mixin~. He m~y ~unt ag well govern elotte, fdr ~ certnitt time ar 1~n~C,
or bring in pergons wi~haut ~ny particular politiC~l or soCial dri~nr~tidn.
The choi~e that Col Ch~dli Bendjedid makeg will be of grent ine~regt, fnr
iC wi1l. pr~vid~ nn indic~tinn nbout the Future drient~tion of th~ regim~.
Thp very distributian of high po~tg will perhgpg be ~s imporCant ~g the
preAidentinl choice ,jugt made, _
However, one must not therefore for~et the warning which the newly chosen
pregident immedi,~tely issued: He "will resigt nll pressure, no mntter what -
ite c~rigin, in order Co tackle th~ task of building a gtrong governm~nt."
t~~r m~7ny Western observers, the choice nf a new pregident would n~ce~s~rily
~ive rtse in Algeri~ tn a ch.~nge in political gtmoephere. Whatever fuCUre
r_han~e9 m~1y be mede in structures, the peraon eYected is precisely the one
whn should most clearly take up once again the methoda, attitudes and gCyle
of preyident Boumediene and in the final analysie~ this is perh~ps the
essencinl. ps~~choloqicul reason for his designation.
COPYItI(~HT: Kene Moreux et C1e., Paris, 1979
11,464
CSO: 4400 -
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100030046-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100034446-7
_
F'Olt U!~'M'tCIAL US~ ONI.Y
ALG~~IA
BRI~~5
SNS-NIPPON AGit~EMENT--t'he Jgpgnese firm Nippon 5tee1. hns annuunced that it
will send delegetian to Al.geria headed hy ity vice president, Kanse Hdrnda,
t~ HiRn a memorandum o1` understanding witli the SN5 (Natiunal 5tee1 Comp~ny)
cnncerning Japanese cooperati~n on the conatruction of ,~n intep,rated iron
and yteel plant hevinK an annual capacity of 10 millic~n ton~~ ~f unproce~sed
steel. Acrordiag Co ~ dispatch from Tokyo issue~l by AC~PI, the only details
giv~n are rhnt the program of cooperati~n wil.l last 10 yesr~ and will i~~- -
- volv~ Che design, planning and construction of the plant~ along with euper-
viginn nf iCs operati~n in the fuCure. (Text) (Paris MARC}i~5 TROPi~A11X ~T
MEDt'C~Rft11N~~N5 in French 9 H'eb 79 p 309J 11,464
~L MUUSTAKBAL bAM--The E1 Moustakbal Dam, which will be built on the hills
of snuthwestern Bleda and whose rornerstone was laid on 22 January by Ahmed
nencherif, minister of hydraulics, land development and enviranment