JPRS ID: 8329 TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MILITARY AFFAIRS

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JPR.y L/8329
12 March 1979
�
- TRANSiATIONS ON llSSR MIL~ITARY AFFAIRS
- (FOUO 8/79)
~
U. S. JOINT PUBLIC~??TIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
.
_
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NOTC
JPRS publtcaCiony conCain information primarily from foreign
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_ transmissic+ns and broadcasCs. MaCerials from foreign-language
sources are transl~ted; those from English-lan~uage sources
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other characCeristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reporCs, and maCerial enclosed in brackets
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- last line of a briet, indicaCe how the original information was
_ processed. Where n~ ;irocessing indicator is given, the infor- ~
mation was summarized or e:ctracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or CransliCerated are
enclosed in parenrheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the -
original but have been supplied as apprupri~te in context.
Other unaCtribuCed parentheCical n~ces within Che body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items~-are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way repreaent the poli-
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_ BI[iLIOGRAPHIC DATA Report No. 2. Recipicnt's Acceseion No.
SNEEY JPRS L/8329 -
1~ i~ ,~n, tiu i it i~ S. epott ate ~
, TltANS1.ATInN5 ON USSR MILL'fARY AN'CAIRS, (FOUO 8/79) 2
6.
7. Awl~urf.) 8~ Petfnrmin6 Ora~niz~tion (iepc.
No.
= 9. I'etlurming OrKani:atiun N~me ~nd Address 10. Projeet/T~sk/Work Unit No.
JoinC Publicationa Reaearch Set.vice
1000 North Glebe Road 11. Contnct/Gnnt No.
Arlington, Virginia 22201 ~
1Z. ~ponsoring Or~~niz~tion N~me ~nd Address 13. Type oE Repoct ac Period
. Covered
As above
11.
1S. Supplementuy Note~
16. Ab.tractr ~
'1'lie re~~art containa~ information on the Soviet military and civil defense
establishments~ leadership, doctrine, policy, planning, political affairs,
- organization, and equipment. -
17. Kcy Words ~nd Dxument Analysis. 170. De~criptors
USSR
Military Urganizations
Mtlitary Faciliti.es _
Mi.litary Personnel
~
~ 176. IJ~nn(ierz/Upen�F:~ded Tetmt _
17a ~ t�A 1'I I�~rld/Group lsC
~ 18. Avr,l.~t~iluy titetemrnt 19. Secutity Cl~ss (This 21. n'o, of Paaes
_ FOR Uh'F ICIAL USE ONLY. Limited Number of R�?�f~ 52
Co~-ie~ Av~il:ible From JPRS . ecunty ass ( is 22. Pcice _
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' JPFtS L/8329 r
12 March 19 79 ~
TRANSLATIONS ON USSR MII.ITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 8/79)
CONTENTS PAGE
Comments on U.S. Actions in the Middle East ~
(S. Krakhmalov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Nov 78)... 1
Comments on U.S.� Noncommissioned Officers in Europe -
(A. Chekulayev; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZR~NIYE, Nov 78)... 10 "
Comments on Offeneive Operations on a U.S. Army Corps
(A. Ryzhkov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Nov 78)...... 17 _
Comments on Tank Development in Western Countries ~
(Yu. Kraynyuk; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Nov 78).... 25
Development of Field Artillery Ammunition in West
(V. Vorontsov, V. Vyacheslov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOY~;NDIOYE -
OBOZRENT.YE, Nov 78) 32
Comments on Role of Human Factor in Aircraft Accidents
(0. Oblipov, K. Vladimirov; ZARUBEZHNOYE V~YI~~INOYE
OBOZRENIYE, Nov 78) 39
_ Comments on NATO Air Force Exercise Held in June 1978
_ (V. Kondrat'yev; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE,
Nov 78) . . 4~
,
Comments on Development of New U.S. Unmanned Aircraft
_ (I. Aleksandrov; ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, Nov 78).. 50
~
' a - [III - USSR - 4 FOUO]
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Cc~MMENTS ON U. S. ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST -
Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBQZRENIYE in Russian No 11, Nov 78
aiRned to preas 3 Oct 78 pp 3-10
(Article by Ma~ Gen Tank Trps S. Krakhmalov: "The Middle East -
. Center of Teneiona"]
(Text] The Middle East is a vast region with a population of more than -
130 million~. It includes 13 Arab states, Turkey, Cyprus, and Israel,
and lies a~ the intersection of three continents: Europe, Asia, and -
Africa. In the Pentagon assessment, the Middle East is an importanC
strategic region, the southern core of NATO and the "gateway" to
Africa. The shortest sea and air routes between Europe and Asia pass
through it. The Middle East is right next to the borders of Che coun-
tries of the socialist community. The politica and military plans of
_ the United States attach Rreat importance to the oil riches of the
- Middle East. Ac~ording to official American figures, this region has
more than 70 percent (excluding the socialist counCries) of explored
res~tves of "black Rold."
The book "Vne~hnyaya Politika i Natsional'naya Bezopasnost' S3hA" [The
- ForeiRn Policy and National Security of the United States of Ameri:~],
which revealed the ob~ectives of the J. Carter administration in the
foreiRn policy area, emphasizes: "One of the strategic problems of
paramount importance facing thoae who create U. S. policy is }~eeping
the Middle East and the Mediterranean as a region in which American
power :.an be effectively deplo~?ed." As this work points out, the U. S.
objective in this region is not just to insure access ~o a strateRic
raw material (petroleum), but also to "prevent the spread of any foreig~:
influence there."
After World War II, of course, the Arab countries of the Middle East
broke the chains of colonialism through stubborn national liberation
strugRle and acquired independence. The adop[ion of the path of pro-
- Rressive transformations by s~veral Arab countries and the conversion
of ~he Middle East into one of the leading centers of the national
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liberntion movement, which operated on the whole as a factor opposed
to imperialiem, gave riee in the United 5tatas to an inCention to stop
the development of such unfavorable~ from the sCandpoinC of the Ameri.can
legdera, trenda ~C any coat,
The United States reliea primarily on Israel~ which Washington would
like Co use to settle with the progressive regimea of this region~ and
on the Arab conservative governmenCs, reactionary circles. and
bourgeoiae who are tied to imperial3at monapolies by common interests~ -
All these military~strat~gic, political, and economic considerations
have caused conetant U. S. "attention" to the Middle Eaat, which hae -
been a dangerous center of tension for 30 years now.
The Palestinian War of 1948-1949~ the Anglo-Franco-Israeli aggresaion -
a~afnaC F~y?pt in 1956, the landing of U. S. marines in Lebanon in mid-
- 1958, the Israeii aggresaion against Egypt, Jordan~ and Syria in ,June _
19G7, the Arab-Israeli War of 1973~ the aCtempt by Tur~ish forces on
the northern part of the island of Cypru~s to overthrow the Rovernment ~
~ and occupy the island in July 1974, the armed struggle in Lebanon, and
border clashea between various states - this is by no means a full
list of the military conflicts which have brought grief and tears to
the peoples of the Middle East. The problem of Arab-Israeli relations
has been and remains the fundamental factor in these events. -
_ "There is no war in the Middle East now. BuC there is no peace there -
either, let alone tranquility. And who dares to say that the flames of
war will not flare up again? This danger wil"1 continue as long as the -
Israeli armies remain on occupied lands. IC will continue as long as
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, driven from their land, are de-
prived of their legal righta and live in desperate circumstances and _
_ the Arab people of Palestine are deprived of the pos~ibility of estab-
lishing their own national state. Stable peacc in the Middle East
also demands that the security of all states of thl: reg~.on, their
- right to independent existence and devel.opment~ be guaranteed. Cer- -
tainiy it is clear that those who~ pursuing egotistical ends, turn a
Middle Eastern settlement into an ob~ect of political gains, who usc -
separate partial agreements to set back the time of true solutions
and sometimes to question them in general, are taking on a grave re-
sponsibilizy." This is the concise analysis given by General Secretary
of the CPSU Central CommitCee Comrade L. I. Brezhnev of the situation
in the Middle East and its explosive nature in the Accountability Report
of the Central Committee to the 25th party congress. ~
It is cammon knowledge that soon after the Arab-Israeli War of 1973
when the Geneva Conference began to meet, favorable conditions were
established for a peaceful settlement of this conflict. But the United
States preferred KissinRer's "shuttle diplomacy," which aimed at pre-
parinA partial, separate agreements. Up~n coming to power, the present
American administration criticized the technique of "shuttle diplomacy"
in words and announced that it would be necessary to coordinate actions
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= with the USSR Co resolve the wh~le aet of iasues making up Che Arab- ~ -
- Iarae].i problem.
A;~oint Soviet-American stAtement on the Middle East wi.is adopted or~
1 October 1977~ It stated: "The SovieC and American sides believe Chat
all concrete issues of the settlement should be decided within the frame-
work of an all-encompasaing settlement of the Middle Eastern problem;
among t.hege concre~e iasues are such key mattera as withd:awal of Israeli
troops from territory occupied during the 1967 confli~t, the Palestinian
question, which includes Ruaranteeing thE legal righta of the Palestinian
people, ending the staCe of war and establishing normal peaceful rela-
tions based on mutual recognition of the principlea of sovereignty ,
territorial integrity~ and political independence."
The statement went on to say that the USSR and the United States~ as
co-chairmen of the Geneva Conferenc~~ would work together to see that
_ the conFerence reopened by no later than December 1~77 for the purpose
of resolvinR all these issues. Just a few days later, however, after
Carter met with Dayan in New York, Washington, under pressure from -
militaristic circles and the Zionist lobby, in reality re3ected the
Ceneva Conference and inspired and supported separate Egyptian-Israeli -
negotiationa, which once again led the process of Middle Eastern settle-
ment into a blind alley and created a Chreat to the cause of peace. _
In late November 1977 Eg}?ptian PrESident Sadat came forward with a =
"peace initiative" and, makin~ a pilgrima~e to Jerusalem which was occu- .
pied by the Israelis, held talks there with Israc:li Prime Minister =
- Begin. Israeli ruling circles, who had been striving for separate ne-
Rotiationa for a lonA time, willingly accepted a bilateral meeting with
Sadat. Aa for the Egyptian president himself~ he has done everything
possible in recent years to achieve a political reorientation of his
country.
In traveling to Jerusalem Sadat hoped that Egypz an~ ,.Yie other Arab
states would prove their reliability to Washington from the point of
view of American interests in the Middle Ea~t so that the United States
would take the side of the Arabs~ force Israel to renounce its aggre::~
sive policy, and secure a~ust and all-embracing settlement oc the
Middle Eastern conflict. In Washington, however, the very idea of put-
- ting pressur~ on the aggressor was rejected. U. S. reliance on Israel
- remains unchanged.
- Sadat's decision to take the humiliating path of separate negotiations _
with Zsrael was met with exaltation by the bourgeois ~Jest but led ta -
a deep split in the Arab world. Syria, Algeria, Iraq, Libya, the
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and thF; Palestine Liberation
Organization resolutely condemned the capitulationist policy of the
Egyptian president at a summit meeting in Tripoli on 1 December 1977.
In response Egypt br~ke diplomatic relations with these five countries.
Cairo's capitulationist li.ne furthered the polarizatlon of forces in _
the Arab world and offered an opportunity for reactionari~es to rai~e
their heads and furiously attack progressive movements.
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S~dat's "sacred mission of peace" led to a whole series of ineeCings
between Egyptian and Israeli leaders durin~ which the poinelesaness
and danger Co the Araba of separate diplamacy became clear~ In Tel Aviv
Cairo's geature of "historical reconciliaCion" was interpreCed as evi- -
dence of Egypt's weakness. It was no accident Chat thia move encour~
aged Che tradit~onal rigidiCy and uncompromiaing attitude of the I~raeli
leadership in its view of the Middle Eastern conflict. ,
As a reault of the "Sadat misaion," Israeli Prime Minister Begin an-
_ nounced that resolution No 242 of the U. N. Security Council supposedly
_ did not apply to the West Bank of the River Jordan and the Gaza Strip
~ and therefore Israel did not intend to withdraw its troops from these
territories. Tel A,viv announced loudly that it did noC recognize the
right of the PalesCinians to establish their own state and permiC
refugeea Co return to these regiona. Of courae, the "Palestinian
- autonomy" declared in thia announcement was nothing but a ~orm of
Israeli annexation of Arab lands seized in the 1967 war.
~ The meetings and talks between Egypt and Israel which have taken place
this year have not contributed anything new to solving the Middle
i;astern problem, despite concessions by Sadat, who is trying to get at
least the appearance of an agreement with Israel. The three~party
meetin~ of the Egyptian and Israeli ministers of foreign affairs and
the U. S. Secxetary of State held at American initiative on 18-19 July
1978 in the Medieval Leeds Castle near London did not produce any real
- results either.
After these talks the foreign press reported that Israel had proposed ~
to establish limited autonomy for the Arab population on the West Bank
of the River Jordan while maintaining fo~ five yeara Israeli rule with
- its military settlements and garrisons~ After five years there would
" be a referendum which would determine the furt~+~: fate of this region.
These Israeli conditions are not only iatended zo �einforce its hold
on seized Arab territoriea, biit also strike a blow agalnst the Arab
_ people of Palestine and their strugg~e for the right to independent
existence.
Meanwhile the situation of the Palestinian Arabs who were driven from _
their native land is becoming more and more unbearable. It is esti-
mated that ;~ust 500,000 of them remain in Israel itself~ within the
1949 boundaries, whiie 760,000 live in the West Bank of the River Jordan
region occupied by Isrb,t in 1967, 430,000 in the Gaza Strip, up to
900,000 in Jordan~ about 400,000 in Lebanon, and 250,000 in Kuwait.
If we consider that the Palestinian problem is pivotal in the whole
' Middle F.astern crisis, the degree to which Egypt betrayed common Arab
interests becomes obvious.
~
Recent events in Lebanon are also associated with an attempt to strike
a blow against the forces of the Palestine Resistance Movement.
Let us recall that Lebanon, with a poFulation of 3 million, instituted
a system of confession~lism, representation in the highest governmental
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. ~~odiea accordin~ to rhe religious principle, in Z943~ which was when it
- d~cLared iCs independence. In this system the Christian communities,
c~~per.tritly the M~ronLCe whlch i~ Che moAt intluentiaL~ were ~iven cer-
tr~in r~dv~ntn~eq. In parCiculnr, Nix Ct~ristiana were ~lected for every
five Muslima in the Parliament, which has 99 deputies, The president
of the republic is always a Chriatian, the prime minister a Sunni
Muslim~ and the chairman of Parliament a Shiite Muslim. When this -
system wae instiCuted iC was believed thaC thie political atructure cor-
, responded to the size of the particular religinus communities, With
the ~assage of time the number of Muslims has increased, but the es-
; tablished proportions of representation in governmental bod~es ha~v~ -
not been altered. Moreover, the Christian community became the most
_ prosperous parr of the population~ controlli~?g the economy, trade,
finance, and the armed forces.
The confessional contradicCions, which are closely inCertwined with
soctal class contradicCions, created a favorable situation for sub-
versive activity in Lebanon hy imperialist and Israeli agents working
throu~h internal reactionaries.
Organizntions of the Palestine Res~stance Movement are active in -
_ I.ebinon. This fact has been uaed by Israel numerous times as a pre-
text for repeated atta~ks on Lebanon.
The Lebanese crisis which :~ccurred in 1975 was a result of the un-
settled nature of the Arab-Iaraeli conflict and the conspiracy am~ng
imperialism, Zionism~ and reaction. Armed clashes with the Pales-
tinians, begun on 13 April 1975 by the right~wing Christian Party
Cataib, which protects the interests of the bourgeoisie and feudal
lords, engulfed all of Lebanon and split the country into two opposing
camps: on the one hand were the riKht-wing Christian forces supported -
by top army leaders, while an the other wer.e the National Patriotic
Forces and detachments of the Palestine ResisLance Movement. The
foreign press has reported that more thsn 63,Ou0 ~eople were killed,
more than 217,Q00 wounded~ and 170~000 suffered othcr tosses from
military actions during the 19-month civil war in Lebanon. Many
cities and villaAes were destroyed and 30 percent of the country's
. industrial enterprises were closed down. The loss inflicted by the
war is estimated at 7,5 billion Lebanese pounds. Armed struggle
stopped for the rnost part after "int~r-Arab security forces" w~ere
brought into Lebanan in conformity with dECisions made at summit con- _
ferences of the Arab countries in RiyaZh and Cairo in October 1976.
The bulk of the troops~ 2U,000 out of a total of 30~000, in the
- country were Syrian.
In Auqust 1977 a three-party Lebanese-Syrian-Palestinian meeting in
Shtor reached agreement on a program to implement by stages the srill
unfulfilled points of the 1969 Cairo agreement regulating the presence
' of Palestine Resistance Movement formations in Lebanon~ It was con-
templated that subunits of the Palestine Resistance Movement would be
withdr.awn 15 kilometers away from the Lebanese-Israeli border and
the Lebanese Army~ which was bein~ rebuilt, would be assigned to patrol
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and ~;uard the border. This Curn of evenCs plainly did noC suit Tsrael,
_ On t~ March 1978 Taraeli Cank and m~chanized units invaded Lebanon -
n1.~nR the enCire 1engCh of the Lebanese-Israeli border and occupfed
i~ebnner~e Cerritory up to the Litani River. More than 1~300 Lebanese
- r~nd Paleatiniana died as the result of the aggresaor's actions~ On
19 March 1978 the U~ N~ Security Council adopted a resolution calling
on Israel to fmmediately atop military actions against Lebanon and
wiChdraw its troops from all Lebanese territory. The [J, N~ force aent
by the Security Council to keep peace in Lebanon includeri 4,000 men
from troop contingenta of Nepal, Norway~ France, and Iran~
Israel was forced to withdraw its troops from Southern Lebanon in the
middle of June~ hut~it took steps to split Lebanon and create a -
"buffer" zone conCrolled by the right-wing Christians along Israeli
borders. That was why the Israelis turned over key positions in
- Southern Lebanon not to the extraordinary U.. N, forces but to right~
- wing Christian detachments who refused to acknowledge the authority
of the Lebanese Government. We are speaking of a strip of Lebanese
territory about 10 kil~meters wide which the Israeli leaders have de-
clared to be a"security belt" which they do not intend to let out of -
their control under any ci,~cumstances. A conference of the foreign ~
affairs ministers of Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates, Qatar.~ and Sudan, held in mid-October 1978 in the -
Lebanese city of Beit-al-Din, adopted a declaration contemplating
strengthening the authority of the central government in Lebanon, dis-
- arming all illegal.formations and factions, restorin~ the country's -
national army, and prosecuting persons who cooperate w.ith Israeli
forces. -
The events in Lebanon show what can result from complicity with an
aggressor. It was indeed,comprehensive U. 5. support and American
military aid that helped whet Tel Aviv's appetite for aggression. It
is public knowledge that while the United States a'located about 4.4
. billion dollars to Israel in the period between 1 June 1975 and ~
1 October 1977, for the next fiscal year Tel Aviv asked Washington to
raise aid to 2.3 billion dollars and to guarantee delivery of the
latest American weapons. In the opinion of foreign military spe-
cialists~ in the present situation the Israelis with their "j am-packed
military warehouses and growing military industry can wage and win a
war against the Arab3 without counting on American air delivery of
desperately needed ammunition and weapons, as was the case in 1973."
In the time that has passed since 1973, Americans say, Israel has
- modernized its armed forces to a much greater degree than any Arab
statea. With American aid Iarael has built its own guided missile~ '
the new Mexkava tank~ fast patrol boats, and several models of rifles.
The London ~ournal MIDDLE EAST, analyzing the condition of the I~raeli
Armed Forces, reported in September of last year that Israel could
- mobilize 400,000 persons in case of war. The Israe.li Armed Forces now
- have about 600 fighting planes, almost 3,000 tanks, and more than 3,000
armored personnel carriers. Measures carried out since the Arab- -
Israeli War of 1973 make it possible today t~ completely mobilize
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- Israeli forces in 48 hours and units on the borders can be mobilized
in 36 hours,
It ia not accidental that the United States openly declares that Igrael
remains Che chief outpnst of ~merican imperialisC policy in the Middle
East, and recently in Africa too~ The United States is trying to bring
Ierael and the Arab and African reactionaries closer together in order
Co direct them both against the national liberation movement and pro-
greseive forces both in the Middle East and on Che African continene.
Recent eventa in Arrica ahow that Arata reactionaries are already in-
volved there in suppressing the national liberati~n movement~ Gener-
otis financial auppor~ fr.om the oil millionaires of the Arabian
PeninsuLa~ d~llveries of weapons to the Somali aggressors, and finally,
Aending Croop contingents to 2aire were all preplanned operations whose _
ob,jective was to draw the Arab countries ;.nto a snare set ouC by the -
imperialista. -
The purveyor of American policy in the Middle East, alongside Israel, _
is Saudi Arabia, The ruling circles of this oil-rict~ country (petroleum
extraction in 1977 was 453 million tons) are directly dependent on the -
; support of inperialist forces, Co whom they have many ties. Saudi -
Arabia received rou;ghly 40 billion dollars from oil sales in 1377. It
cannot "digest" such amounts and is investing it abroad. The ruling
c~rcles of Saudi Arabia have become closely tied up with American
monopoly capitalists, Saudi Arabia spends billions of dollars in the
West for weapons an~ technical military equi~ment. In 1976 expendi-
tures for weapons reached 7 billion dollars. The Americans are also
drawing the Unite~ ~xac: Emirate~ into the arms race. Be,.ause Saudi -
Arabia does not have iy~ own regular military cadres to handle tha
highly complex types ~r military equipment, it is forced to maintain
several thousand foreign military advisors an4 specialists, most of
� them Americans.
Alongside the build-up of the Saudi Arabian mili ary arsenal, which
Western experts consider to far exceed the country's national defense
needs, the direct American military presence in the Persian Gulf re-
, Rion is growing. According to reports in tY~~ foreign press, the
United States has received the right to make active use of military
bases in Bahrein and on Masira Island in Oman.
. ~
The preservation of a regime friendly to Washington in Saudi Arabia
and control over the receipt of petroleum are one of the foundations
of American strategy in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and the United
States are bou�nd by a bilateral agreement whose milita~y articles re-
main secret~
It is common knowledRe that the reactionary Arab regimes~ with U. S.
support, are trying to create tension in the southern part of the
Arabian Peninsula. The President of the Yemen Arab Republic al-
Ghashmi was killed as a result of the provocation and witn direct
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- participation by the reactionary regimes~ The att~~mpt a~ a coup d'etaC
in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen made by Salim Rubay'i Ali
- on 26 June 1978 pursued the same goal~ The purpose of the co~napiracy
was to prov~ke fratricidal war between the Yemen Arab Repub~ic and Che
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and eliminate progressive trans-
formationa that have been carrfed out in democratic Yemen~
After the failure of the conspiracy an extraordinary sesaion of the -
Council of the Arab League was called in Cairo under pressure from
Saudi Arabia. and Egypt~ Algeria, Iraq~ Libya, the People's Demc?cratic
- ~Republic of Yemen~ Syria~ and the Palestine Liberation Organiza~ion re-
fused to take parc and the Republic of D~ibouti was not represented.
_ The sesaion passed an incompetent resolution; to freeze all political =
and diplomatic relations betwe~n Arab League members and the People's
= Democratic Republic of Yemen and to sCop cultural and economic relations
with it and the granting of technical aid~ ~
According to reports in the Arab press~ the imperialist propaganda _
against Democratic Yemen is a preplanned action~ Reactionary Arati -
_ states have not renounced their aggressive designs in relation to South
Yemen. The reactionaries are especially alarmed by formation of the ~ _
- ruling Yemen Socialiat Party, which has proclaimed a program of pro-~
gressive socioecono~aic tranaformaCions in the People's Demc~cratic
- Republic of Yemen.
Thus~ the situation in the 2Ziddle Easr continues tense, Washington and =
~el Avi~r~ coordinating their actions~ are trying to distract tTie Arab
countries from their primary ob~ective, the struggle to remove the con- _
. sequences of Israeli aggression. Taking advantage of the hopeless situ-
ation of Sadat~ who is following a policy tt~at betrays the interests of
t?~,Q Arab peoplea, the United States now intends to establish itself ~
- openly in this region. This was precisely the ~oal of the three-party _
meeting of Egyptian President Sadat~ Israeli Yrim~. Minister Begin, and
- U. S. Preaident Carter held on 6-17 September 1978 at i;amp David, near -
_ Washington. The protrdcted talks concluded with adoption of two docu-
ments: "FrameWOrk for Conclusion of a Peace T~.'~aty Bet~~een Egypt and
lsrael" and "Framework of Peace in the Middle East."
From the firs~ document it is clear that although Israel does promise
to withdraw its occupation forces from the Sinai Peninsula by stages -
- after conclusion of a peace treaty, even then Egypt will not receive -
. the right to full sov~ereignity over the Sinai.
The problem of the occupied Falestinian territories and other Arab re-
qions is the basis of the second decument. Israel refused to agree =
_ to grant sovereignity to th,~ West Bank of the River Jordan and the Gaza
trip~ thus blo~king the opportunity to establish a separate Palestinian _ ~
~State. Prime Minister Begin said bluntly that Israel intends to keep
its military presence in these regions during the five-year transi- _
_ tional period stipu~ated in the Camp David documents. He said f.urther
- that Israel will never give the Golan Heights back to Syria and that
~ JeLUSalem will be the capital of IsraeZ "as long as the Jewish people
exist."
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'I'he nep,otinCiony in Camp Unvid dre a deal m~de behind the backe of the
Arnb peoplem and mninly suit the interegts of I~rnel~ American imperi-
~li~m~ nnd Arob reareionariey~ The sep~r~te de~.l did not resolve a
- s1ttR1~ bnsic problem oC Che Middle ~asCern settlement; on ChQ c~nCrary~ ~
_ it made n aettlement even more difficult to achiPVe, The intention is
perf~cCly obviou~; eplit the Araba~ pit une againet anothet, and im- ~
poee seCtlement conditions eviCable to Che ag~reseor on Che ~ounCries
ir?dividual~y,
~
No mutter whnt ''framework" tl~e separate deal may be cloth~d in, it
covers up the capitulation of one side and sec~ires Che fruits af ag~
qresaion for the ~ther, for Israel; su~~h a deal can only make the aiCu-
atinn in the Middle East even more explosive~ This is a new anti-
' Arab deal between Isrnel end ERypt, worked ouC wir.h the active partici- ' '
pnCion nf Washington.
Tt ix no accident thnt this separate deal made at Car~p David aroused
- determined protest in the Areb world~ The membera of the Front of
_ ResiPtance and Counteraction to the Capitulationiat Policy of Sadat
(5yrta~ AiAeria~ Lihyu, Democratic yemen, and the leaders uf the PLO)
.hdopted a decision to break diFlomatic relations with Egypt and impose -
an economic boycott on it, In addition, they will try. Co get the
headquarters of the .4rab League moved away from Cairo,
Ag for the Soviet Union~ Lt has always been and remains an advocate of
nn effective~ all-encompassing settlement in the Middle F.ast, a settle-
" ment which woutd meet the true and long��run inCerests of all the coun-
tries and peopleg of this region. As General SecreCary of the CPSU
Central Committee~ Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
- Soviet ComradF: L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in his talk in Baku~ "Long
years of experience prove irrefutably thaC there is only one way to
truly resolv~e the Middle Eastern conflict. T'h:s is complete libera-
tion of all Arab lai~ds occupied by Israel in 1S57, complete and unam-
biguous respect for the legal rights of the Arab p~~u~::.: of Palestine,
includinR the right to eatabliah their own independent s:ate~ and in-
surinq reliably guaranteed security for all countries oP the region,
tncludinq, of course, Israel. Such an all-embracing settlement is po~~-
sible only with the participa[ion of all interested countries, includ- -
inR the Palestine Liberation Organization. And the sooner this settle-
ment is achieved, the sooner the Middle East will cease to be a center
of tensions."
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye"~ 1978
11~176
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_ t~'OEt dE~'~TCTAL U5~ ONLY
~
COh4~tENTS ON U. S. NONC01~4~tISSIONED OF~ICER5 IN EUROP~
- Moscow ZARiJBEZHNOYE VOYENNOY~ OBOZRENIYE in Ruasi.en No 11~ Nov 78 -
aigned to press 3 O~ct 78 pp 15-20 ~
" (Article by Ma~ A~ Chekulayev: "The Noncommissioned Officer Contingent
of American Forces in Europe"]
(Text] The conatructive and consistenC policy of the Soviet Union
aimed at succeasful implementation of the progr.qm worked out by the
25th CPSU Congresa to continue the struggle for international peace
and aecurity~ against the arma race~ for consolidation of detente,
and for international cooperation is finding aupport among hundreds of
milliona of people on all continents. However, the rulin~ circles of
the imperialist countries~ above all the United States~ are continuing
to take steps whoae purpos~e is to increase tension in Europe and build
up military potential in rhis part of the world.
Among these steps is the constant increase in the number of American
trooFs in Europe and aupplying them with the l:tc~st types of weapons
and combat equipment. The Pentagon devotes speci~. =.~-tention he~e to
peraonnel matters, and one isaue is enlarging the role uf NCO's.
After the end of the war in Vietnam and the transition in the U. S.
Armed Forces to voluntary enlistmcnt the American command atepped up
i[s work on the selection~ trainin~, and indoctrination of NCO's.
In the American Army today NCO's end specialists are the largest con-
tingent of personnel. The combat readiness of the armed forces as a
whole depends to a definite degree on their level of training and
practicnl skills. According to figures in the American press~ NCO's
constituted 54.9 percent of all militarq personnel in 1973~ 60.2 in
1974, 60.4 in 1975~ 61.7 in 1976, and were planned to be 62 percent
in 1977. The Pentagon leadership believes that sergeants play an
importunt part in unifying amall subunite, training personnel~ main-
taininR strict discipline, and insuring close checks on the political -
~ttitudes and behavior of'subordinates.
The entire aystem established in the U. S. Armed Forces for recruit-
ment, service~ and the training and retraining of NCO's aims at
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caref~~l, Chorough ~election of thi~ cgeegory of Americ~n servicemen~
- Hnwever~ in the opinion of miliCnry leaderg, this process ia even more
import~nt among Americnn forceg in ~urope~ Therefore~ they are etaffed
- primarily with NCO's and technical epecialigCg who have a high level of -
military and specinliz~d training nnd have been educa*_ed at schnols for
aergeants in Che United Statea~
- At these schools training is of�ered in virCually all Che 480 basic mil~
itary occupational epecialties of the U~ S. Army~ The length of study -
is 4-6 weeka depending on the future ap~cialty.
NCO's for American f~rces stationed on the European continent are -
tr~ined at the achoc;l for aergeante of the U, S, ground forces in
Furope (I3ad-Tolz~ West Cermany) where up to 370 aervicemen c~re rrained
encti yec~r, The courae of training is figured to last five weeks (249
a training houra)~ CAndidates with good referencea from their immediaee
commandere go befor~ a apecial commission which pays special aCCentio~
Co Cheir poliCical "r~liability" and devoCion to the system exisCing
in the United States, Th~s commission decidea if they will be sent
to a school.
The system of training is or~anized so that future NCO's specialize in
. the field they have chosen and acquire the necessar~� practical skills
~n training and indoctrinating subordinatea. For ~this purpose they
learn to organize and conduct training peri.ods with soldfers in the
particular diacipline, to form correct mutual rel.ations with subordi-
nates, and to exert proper influence on them~
Military counterinCelligence~ FBI agents, the military police, and
other organizations participate in checking the political "reliability"
of NCO s being aent to serv2 in Europe.
~ The established procedures for promotion and recE'ving ranks also pro-
. mote careful and thorough selection of sergeants. i'o receive tbe rank
of "corporal," the firat NCO rank~ privates first class must go through
a c~rresponding course of traLning~ pass a teat in the apecialty, and
demonstrate their ability to perform service duties estahlished by
- U. S. Army manuals and regulations in practice. During the taking of
examinations the loyalty of sergeant candidates with respe~t to the
existing order and their political convictions are checked.
A distinctive feature of American military personnel in Europe is the
trend observed in recent yeara toward an increase in the number of
hi~her NCO's with a reduction in the number of corporals. According
to fiRures in the foreign prees, servicemen with the rank of "sergeant"
and "staff ~ergeant" constitute epproximately 75 percent of the NCO's
ir U. S. ground forcea in Europe.
The American comm~nd tries to strengthen its NCO element~ develop their
interest in the service, and increase the su[hority of sergeants by
every meana. On 4 July 1966 the position of command sergeant major was
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The Penragon hae tnken certnin sCeps in recenC years eo increa$e the
effecCivenesa of s~rgeanC Craining~ 5pecifically~ the syllabi aC rh~e ~
echool in Iiad Tolz and ~t retraining courses l~ave been revised and -
new ~hort cour~es orgnaix~d for various categories of NCO"s and gpe~
cialiste. The new ayllabi put special emphaei~ on mssCering leaderehip
' techniques and the nbiliCy to solve mornl and emoCional proBlems~
In late 1976 the headquartere of U. 5. ground forces in Eurdpe approved
n neW four-weQk reCraining program for sergeanCs at echools in the di-
visions. Yn the firat week the aervicemen atudy how Co lead a squad or
platoon. 1'he aecond and Chfrd weeks are dev~ted to field training
periods~ and the last week is allocated �or politic~l training periods
and the study of miliCary adminiatration, equipment~ the tactics of
amall aubunits and other sub~ecCS.
Once a year the NCG peraonnel of U. S. Armed Forcea in Europe are
Cested in their military occupational specialt~?, This involves an oral -
exam and a written exam~ An evaluation of "hiqh," "normal," or "low"
is given on the basis nf the results of the two teats. This score is
conaidered in determining the aerviceman's pay and considering him for
promotion. Peraona with the rank of staff sergeant or higher are re-
quired Co pass examinations in a related military occupational spe-
cialty; these examinations are given once every two ye~rs. For command
aergeant ma~ore theae examinations were abolished on 1 January 1976.
Ideological indoctrinatiori occupies a central place in the system of
- training for NCO's~ as it does for all American military personnel in
Europe. The command of U, S, ground forces in Europe attaches great
importance to increasing the effectiveness of the sergeants' ideological
influence on enlisted men, The American military press has observed
many times that in current condi.tions sergean`s must take more respon~
sibility than before for the mo~~ale of their stibc~~dinates; they must
have the same leadership effectiveness and propaga..'a activism as of,
ficers do.
The enormouo progress made by the Soviet Union and the other social:4t
countries in peaceful building and the spread of communist ideas among
the working people of the world force the American command to employ
- considerable reaources for propagandizing anticormnunism and anti-
5ovtetism and instilling hatred of the USSR and the other socialist ~
countries in she hope of neutralizing the infiltration of progressive
ideas into the barracks. Thr. core of anticommunist propaganda among
NCO's is the myth of the "communist peril" which supposedly threatens
the Western world and the "desire of communism to eliminate the capi-
talist system by force,"
One of the lines of ideological indoctrination of sergeants is instill-
inR them with devotion to the capitalist system existing in the United
States. All personnel are required to maintain loyalty to the prin- _
ciples ~f American "demacracy" and to the military oath and to obey
officers, HoWever~ sergeants are expected to ahow not only personal _
- devotion and carry out all orders wi[hout question, but also teach
theae qualities to their subordinates.
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.
inCroduced in the headquarters of the branches of ehe armed forces by
- decision of the ~entagon. At the game time the position of command
i~crge~nt ma~or wns inCroduced for armed forces commanda~ armies, corps~
divipiotte~ ~r~gadea~ and battalions and for training cpnters nnd schdols
involved witl~ trainin~ ~nd r~Crr~ining milirary cadrea,
The "Manual ~or Sergeant" sentes~"The command aergeant ma~or ie the
senior sergeant in the battalion~ brigade~ division~ and other higher
instancea. He monitors perfarmance of duties by the firat sergeants of
subordinate uniCe and subunits,"
The command eergeant ma~or holda meetinge for NC~'s on queations of com-
bat training, rules of behavior~ discipline~ hygiene, and work pro-
cedures. He gives the commander recommendationa on questions of ap-
~ potntmenta~ promoCiona, allocaCion of leaves~ imposing puniahment~ and
announcing commendationa for enlisted men and NCO's~ The command ser-
geant ma~or participates in inepectiong of subordinate uniCa and aub-
unita, explains the inetructione of the commander on whoae behalf he
works~ and givea appropriate ordera.
At Che beginning of 1973 a school was opened at Fort Bliss~ Texas to .
train command aergeant ma~ora. It is the only achool in Che U. S.
Armed Forcea to which sergeants from all the regional U, S. commands~
including American forces in Europe~ are aent. This is the top school
in the system for training NCO's. The American preas calls it the
~ "war college for sergeanta."
The system of aelecting and training command aergeant najors is ex- -
pected to preclude the admission of democratically minded people,
people who work ir progressive organizations, those suspected of dis-
loyslty to the social system existing in t;~e United States~ and people
who have expresaed dissatiefaction with the arury way of life.
M,~erican propaganda triea to present the command sergeEnt ma,}or as the -
"co.~necting link between the commander and the enliated man" ar the
� "dem~,~ratizing factor in the army" and calls the command sergeant
ma1ors themselves "full-fledged representatives of the common soldiers"
and "defenders" of their intereats. In reality~ the command uses them
to exercise influence on the common soldiers and keeps them obedient
by creating nothing but the appearance of "democratization" of the
army.
~ A far-flung netw~oris: of retraining courae~, asaemblies, and various
special training periods is used extensively in the U. S, Armed Forces
to improve the professional training of NCO's, Each year about 4,000
Aergeanta are retrained at B~d Tolz and up to 3~000 go through re-
traininq couraee for NCO's in divisions. In 4-5 weeks they polish
their command r~kills~ famiiiarize themselves with new Weapons and com-
bnt equipment, and study forms of ideological indoctrination of subor-
dinates. -
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Tha EoundaCinn of this nspece of indocCrination ia exalting the il-
- lusory "advantages" of what ia called ehe "American way of life" and
~ "Americnn democrncy~" which U. S. servicemen nre supposed tio defend. ,
The ideoloqicnl indoctrinaCion apparatua of American forces in ~urope~
rQlying on sergennte nnd using their direct contacCa with personnel,
implant a epirit of miliCariam in s~rvicemen. It is founded on propa-
_ ganda for war againat the Soviet Union and the other countiries of the
- socialist communi~y.
The theais of "Atlantic solidarity" occupies a significant place in _
militariatic propaganda. The NCO's of American forcea in Europe par-
ticipaCe in gctivitiea of the so-called "partnerahip program" which de-
termines Che contenC and form of cooperaCion with differene categoriea
of aervicemen in the NATO armies and actively foatera ehe organizaeion
and conduct of ~oint exerciaes~ firing~ aporting events~ and the like. -
The information department of U. S. ground forces in ~urope has de-
veloped and is following a apecial program Chat obligates all service-
men to atudy the language'of the country in which they are serving.
For sergegnte, apecifically those with the rank of staff sergeant and
- lower, a language training courae lasting 40 hours has been instituCed
and they must r,ake it wit~?in 30 days of arrival in Europe. Thirty hours
are allocated excluaively for the language program and 10 hours are used -
for familiarization with the culture and history of the host country.
Sergeants lst clasa and higher atudy in a 40-hour program that enviaions
only language atudy.
Propaganda for the traditions of the U. S. Armed Forcea occupiea a sig-
nificant place in the ideological indoctrination of sergeants. It be-
came particularly broad in acope during celebration of the 200th_anni-
versary of the arnry and 200th anniversary of Lhe formation of the United
States. Sergeanta who are veterans of World W~: 7I and the wara in
Korea and Vietnam are widely honored. Servicemen rmo ;.ook part in com-
bat in Vietnam exerciae a considerable influence on the ~olitical atti-
tudea and morale of all enlisted and NCO peraonnel. According to the
- testimony of the foreign press, about half of the sergeants in the ~
ground forcea command and 40 percent of the U. S. Air Force sergeanta
in Europe have combat experience gained in fighting againsC the
people's patriotic forcea of South Vietnam.
Religious propaganda also~plays an important role in moral-psychological
training. The American command in Europe considers "obedience to God"
an important moral stimulus and tries to use the fact ~hat most ser-
geants are prieoners of the narcotic of religion. According to a sur-
vey conducted by the newspaper ARMY TIME5~ 87.1 percent of the sergeants
are believers (out of 1,900 servicemen surveyed). More than 17 percent
of thoae surveyed attend church activities regularly.
~
Mass information media are used vigorously in ideolo~ical indoctrination
of NCO's. Propaganda for the work of the most experienced sergeants in
training subordinates and raising their professiona]. skill level occupies _
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n aignifi.c~nt place in Che radio ~n~ CeLevision broadcasCs of t~merican
f~rces in Europe.
- So-r.nlled ~erqennt~ "dnys" nnd "weekg" nre held regularly in AmeriCnn
unt~N nnd aubunitH caCuttoned on Che C~?ropean conCinenC~ and 1976 w~s
prnctuimed the "yenr dC Che eergeant" in U~ S~ ground forcea in F;urope~
During auch evente NCO's are given the righC Co command platoons~ com~ �
_ pnnies~ and battalions~ The temporary eranefer of power in the aub~
unite r.o them ie purely auperficial, because the corresponding offi-
cera nre on the spoC and exercise actu~l leadership. Nonetheless~ the
American command givea such activities broad publicity~ These things -
are done for several purposes: for one~ ro raise the prestige and
authority of NCO's; for two~ to develop in them certain skills in lead~
. ing subunite; and for three, Co instill American servicemen with the
idea of supposed "democracy" in the army~
The appointment of sergeanCs to officer poeitions is done for the same
_ reason. Thus, officer positions as chiefs of NCO reCraining schools,
chiefs of rifle training groundat officer responsible for the safeCy
- of practice firing~ and others are transferred to sergeanCs.
The transition to voluntary recruitment~ the syatem of moral and ma-
teri.71 incentive~ and extended periods of service in the arnry helped
- to shape Che political and class aelf~-consciousnesa of sergeants and
in large degree make them active spokesmen for the political goals of
imperialiam's military preparations.
- Of course, not all sergeants accept anticommunist dogmas and stereo-
types on faith. Some of them are beginning to understan~ that in the
situation of a campaign for detente tfiere is no need whatsoever for
American troops to be present in Europe with the supposed mission of ~
"defending Weatern civilization against aggre:sion from the East." Some -
NCO's are influenced by the peace-loving poiicy of the USSR and its
allies,aimed at eliminating military confrontaCion ~~d development of
mutually advantageous relations wlth capitalist states based on prin-
ciples of peaceful co-existence influences a certain number of NCO's.
The American forcea in Europe also have class and racial conCradic-
_ tions caused primarily by the very atructure of the U. S. Armed
Forces. The officers of the American Army in Europe differ from the
aergeants by social oriRin, education~ and aervice opportunities and
therefore take a haughty and negligent attitude toward them. Some of _
the sergeants are expressing discontent with Che fact that the offi-
cers assign some of their functional duties to NCO's~ do not want
to go into the problems that concern their subordinates. "Discipline
among the troops could be much better if the efficers came down off
their pedestals and tried to understand how personnel live~" remarked
the newspaper STARS AND STRIPES.
The existence of nationality and racial contradictions resulted from
the policy followed by the American couQnand in relation to Black ser- -
geants and representatives of other ethnic groups. The position of
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B1,zck soldiere, who make up four percent of a11c1CU's in U. S. ground
, Eorces in Europe ie mnde more difficult by the fact that noe just White
off.icer~ and sergeanCs, buC also subordinates, are causal with Chem. -
, The moral fiber of thie category of servicemen is also ahowz~ by the ~
eteady rise in alcoholism and drug addiceion. According Co official
- figures for the medical commission of the U. S. ground forcea in
Europe which ia studying the prevention of aicoholism in formaCiona and
unita~ 36 percent of NCO's (the group from staff aergeant to command
sergeant mn~or) used strong alcoholic beverages excesaively.
IC ia ohserved in the Western preas that a significant share of the crime `
committed by American sergeants i.s committed by the drug addicts and
_ alcoholics. A whole range of steps~ beginning with prevenCion and end-
ing w~th harah diaciplinary measures, is being taken to reduce the spread
of drug addiction and alcoholiam among NCO's; the military police, ape-
cially trained agents, and paid informers participate in this program. -
However, Che battle against drug addiction and alcoholism is made more
difficulC by the fact that many sergeants who went thr~~ugh the war in
VietnAm used drugsa and alcohol together with their subordinates and en- _
gaged in the sale and distribution o~ narcotics among American aervice-
men.
The deviant poZitical viewe and attitudes of sergeants, the existence ~
of class and raci.:.l contradictions in this service category, crimes~
- and amoral behavior definitely diminish their political-moral level.
Nowever, the li. S. Army command estimates that on the whole these phe-
- nomena do not have a decisive effect on the fighting effectiveness of
American forces in Europe. 'rhis is owing to careful selecCion, more
intensive training and ideological indoctrination of NCO's, and material -
incentives for work; this ultimately makes sergeants a reliable support
- for the American command in performing the military-political missions
of U. S. imperialism. �
COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye", 1978
11,176
CSO: 1801
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- H'OR UN'~'rGIAL USL nNL;!
COi~4~'IENTS ON OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ON A U. S. ARMY CORPS
Moecow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRF.NIYE in Russian No 11, Nov 78 -
eiqned to presa 3 Qct 78 pp 21-27
[Article by Col A. Ryzhkov, candidate of military sciences, docent:
"The tJ. S. Army Corps on the Offensive"]
[Text~ There are atill influential forcea in the United States and
the other imperialist eountries who have not renounced tbeir cximinal _
p1Ens to unleash nuclear warfare. They are to blame for the facC that
: the arms race ta continuing, that military tiudgets increase each year,
the production of weapons and military equipment is expanding, and
troop combat training is being ateadily improved.
Within the overall system of preparation of the armed forces for a -
future war against the USSR and the other socialist countries the
leadership of the U. S. Army devotes great attention to the organiza-
tion and conduct of offensive actions. American mil~tary specialists
consider the offeilsive one of the primary types of enga~ement or oper-
aeion. The esaential feature of the offensive is .�~Jiably ~itting the ,
enemy wiCh all typea of weapons, including nuclear weapons, and swiftly
moving formations and units to the depth of the enemy deplo,yment in -
order to capture or wipe out men, weapons, and equipment and to tak~ ~
vitally important enemy regiona and objects.
As the foreign military press observes, the U. S. Army corps, the
higheat tactical formation in a theater of action, plays a significant
role in Che operationa of ground forces and ~ay form the basis of a
- coalition group of armies.
The army cor~s haF significant fire and striking power. Because it
combtnes the primary arms of troo~s, it has its own essential means
of combat and loF;istic support, which makes it possible for the corps
- to fight not only within a group of armies but also in an independent
operational sector or cut off from the main forces.
The role of the army Corps in an offensive operation is determined by
ita desiRnation and place in the operational structure of the coalition
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~roup of armies~ Thus, when operatin~ in ehe firet echelon in the axis
of the main ehruat~ it may play an important part in achieving the ob-
je.tive of the offeneive operatinn of g group of grmiea. This is ex-
F~lr?ined by the fc~ct that ne ehe beginning of a war, for examnle, this
Rro~ip will usually Ro over to Che offenaive in a eingle-echelon forma-
tion, holding several divisions in reserve. Du:tng ehe course of Che -
offenaive operationa Cheae divisions are to be mr,de subordinaCe to the
army corps operaCing in the main axis and, aftAr receiving fresh forma-
tions and units, are capab'le of performing mis~ions to the full depth ~
of the offenaive operation of a group of armies. In the sector of the
subsidiary etrike Che army corps performs a mission in support of the
actions of Che main grouping of forces.
Tn the off~naive, foreign military specialists believe, the army corps
will usually be given decisive ob~ectives: smash an opposed grouping, ~
seize territory or key terrain sectors, deprive the enemy of essential
resourcea, demoralize the defending troops and reduce their will to _
_ continue ~es:!atance, and disCract ttie enemy's attention from other re- .
gions of combat actions. Offensive actions may also be carri.ed out for
limited ob.jectives such as pinning down enemy reserves, Chwarting a~i
enemy offenaive~ breaking out of encirclemenC, and releasing friendly
- troopa from encirclement.
According to the views of the U. S. command, the success of the units -
and formations of a corps in an offenaive engagement will depend
largely on meeting the following con~itions: concentration of the neces-
sary men and equipment at the decisi.ve point at the decisive moment; in-
suring reliable command and control in the interests of focusing fire
, efforts and maneuvering in the important se~tors; takir., and keeping -
the initiative through the combined efforts of all arms of troops in
order to achieve maximum effectiveness of friendly weapons and reduce
the e�fectiveness of enemy fire weapons. In an ~ffensive where nuclear
weapons are not used, U. S. Army manuals recomnen, creating a superi-
ority of at least 6:1 over the defenders in the breaktlirough sectors
and ~elivering the main thrust at the most vulnerable points in the
enemy's system of defense. The main factors that make possible thc
necessary superiority over the enemy are surprise, striking power, and
speed of actions.
Foreign experts do not consider it necessary to create a significant
superiority o~er defenders in men and equipment if nuclear weapons are
used in the offensive. In some cases it is even possible to go over to
the offensive with an even ratio of forces. It is recommended that tac-
tical superiority over the enemy in the main sector be achieved by
akillful use of nuclear weapons against the enemy's most important tar-
gets.
The foreign press attaches Areat importance to the surprise factor. It
is assumed that an enemy who is caught unprepared or completely taken
by surprise cannot offer proper resistance, even if he has superior
foxces. It is recommended, therefore, that small forces make maximum
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~ uae of the aurprise factor to create superiority over the enemy~ and
Chat thie be done by the meaeures eo confuse him and by taking advantage of -
_ the high mobility of friendly troops.
, The combat compoeition of the corpa is not fixed and depends on its role -
and pl~ce in the operational structure of the group of armies~ the com-
bat misaions facing them,,terrain conditions, and the poeition and
n~ture of actions af the enemy. The corps may include fr.am two (in a -
_ 'subsid iary axis) to six different typea of diviaions as well ae support
and rear service unita and subunita.
At the be~inning of the war an army corps may go over to the offensive
with those resources that it has at the etart of combat acCions.
The combat miasiona and ecope of operation of the artry corps dFSpend on
~many f.actora~ above all on the misaion of the group of armies, the -
designation and composition of the corps, the nature of actions by the
enemy~ and terrain conditions.
Foreign military specialists believe that an army corps operating in
the sector of the main thruat may be given an aCtack zone 40-80 kilom-
eters wide; in a subaidiary axis the width may be 120 kilometers and
_ more (see illustration below). The depth of the immediate ob~ective
ta 35-40 kilametera and t~ie final ob~ective is 100-150 kilometers deep -
wiCh a total duration of 3-4 days for the operation. The raCe of ad- -
vance where nuclear weapons are not used can be 40-50 kilometers a
day.
~ When the army corpe has 5-6 divisions it can wage combat actions on a
broader front (up to 130 kilometers) and perform missions at depths of as
much as 250 kilometers. These are approximatc values. It is believed .
that corps missions should be given in general terms so that co~anders
will have maximum flexibility and freedom of actio,.. tn the opinion
_ of American experta~ specific atCack ob~ectives should b.: avoided be- _
- cause this leads to restricting initiative and deprives corps commanders
and staffs of freedom of action.
It is recornmended that the battle formation of the army corps on the
offensive be constructed with due regard for the ~;ossibility of effi-
ciently using the resulta of nuclear and conventional strikes, broad
maneuvering in the interesta of concentrating forces for the break-
through~ and rapid dispersal of forcea to defend against weapons of
mass destruction. A strong first ec~?elon is envisioned to inflict a �
blow at the very beginning of the offensive. Specfalists recommend
that an assault group (the main thruat), auxiliary thrust groupings
(up to two)~ and a reserve (aecond echelon) be fo~med among the troops
of the corps.
- The elements of the corps battle formatio?~ are the first echelon, the
combined arma reserve (second echelon)~ an airboxne (air mobile) as-
sault group, cover troops~ groupings of corps field and antisircraft
~ 19
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ConeCruction of the Bxttle Formation and Misaions of the U. S. Army
Corp~ on the OfFQneive (varinCion) .
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