LETTER TO MR. RALPH L. CLARK FROM ALLEN W. DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R003800030085-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2002
• Sequence Number: 85
• Publication Date: January 24, 1958
• Content Type: LETTER

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S T A N F O R D R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
WASIIINGTON OFFICE
SUITE 308, 711 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W., WASFIINGTON 5, D.C.
January 9, 1958
Mr. Allen Dulles
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
In accordance with your invitation that we forward any
ideas we may have which could be useful, I am transmitting the attached
draft of a possible project. The Institute, through its work for
the International Cooperation Administration, Ford Foundation, and
other overseas organizations, has a keen interest and considerable
understanding of the economic and industrial problems of many coun-
tries outside the Soviet Orbit. We feel that a project such as
that outlined by the enclosure would be a most useful complement
to the work that Otto's office does on the Orbit.
In our contacts with many leaders of business and finance
in New York who have recently expressed concern on this score, Mr.
Lilienthal was particularly strong in his feeling that the United
States needed a better understanding of the competition we are
facing in the struggle for the uncommitted world.
If we could be of any help on this score, I would be glad
to discuss it further with you, Bob or Otto.
Sincerely,
RLC/js
Enclosure
Ralph L. Clark
Manager
Washington Office
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STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE
WASHINGTON OFFICE
SUITE 308, 711 FOURTEENTH STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON 5, D.C.
January 8, 1958
Possible Project for
RESEARCH ON SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO
THE UNCOMMITTED WORLD
In the past several years Soviet bloc economic penetration into
uncommitted areas has been stepped up very greatly. It has been under-
taken especially in the Middle East, while to a somewhat lesser extent in
South and Southeast Asia. Latin America has become a target and activities
in Africa must be expected to increase sharply.
Soviet bloc economic aid has thus become an important weapon
in the cold war, and is likely to become more important still. Many well-
informed people are generally aware of its importance and have a concept
that it is sizable and widespread. They also know, from reports on a
few specific instances, like the Soviet road program in Afghanistan, that
Soviet aid is a far more serious threat than simply as a propaganda weapon.
Yet we know of no comprehensive analysis of Soviet economic aid which
details its amount, techniques and performance as a whole and which
analyzes its global impact on U. S. stature.
Stanford Research Institute has been aware of this lack, and
has given some consideration to the need for filling it. Specifically,
Mr. David Lilienthal has recently encouraged the Institute to undertake
a project analyzing Soviet aid within the scope of its International
Industrial Development Center and as part of the follow-up to the highly
successful International Industrial Development Conference recently co-
sponsored with Time-Life International. Mr. Lilienthal felt strongly
that such an analysis is badly needed to create a better awareness of
the competition we are facing in the struggle for the uncommitted world.
At present the only known project in process to study this
general subject in any comprehensive manner is in process at the National
Planning Association. It is a study of the "Economics of Competitive
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Coexistence." While this should provide an excellent overall evaluation
of the field, it has necessarily been limited in both geographic and
substantive scope, and will be completed during 1958. Further work is
needed to build on the beginning being established at NPA.
The Soviets have several distinct advantages in foreign economic
aid competition which need to be assessed:
1. A well-exploited dissociation from the historical background
of "colonial exploitation," especially in the Middle East and South Asia.
While the U. S. is also dissociated, it is, as part of the "West," identi-
fied in popular imagery in these areas as related to the old system.
The encouragement of private foreign investment as a matter of policy--
a technique used by the British in colonial days--serves to strengthen
local fears and suspicions of our motivations.
2. The absence of problems of Congressional relations and
fiscal limitations.
3. The experience of having industrialized from a low level
recently and quickly. Soviet approaches frequently seem more relevant
to Asian problems than ours because of this factor. It probably has been
strengthened by the added intellectual and scientific prestige gained
recently by the Soviets.
4. Soviet administrators may not exhibit the gap in living
standards between themselves and local populations to the same degree
American personnel do. Hence, they may more readily identify themselves
with local aspirations and problems.
A study of Soviet aid, primarily from the standpoint of recipient
countries, should inform us how effectively these and other advantages
have been used. Moreover, it may allow us to define more sharply, and
thus use to better effect, offsetting advantages we possess. Further,
an analysis of actual Soviet performance in aid activities should give
us much better answers to questions such as the following:
1. How much are the Soviets committed to long-range economic
aid programs, and to what extent are their activities primarily of short-
term character, directed to propaganda purposes?
2. Are they effectively committing substantial domestic resources
and personnel to these programs? Have they elaborated sizable programs of
research and training for this purpose?
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3. What has their performance been to date in specific projects
as compared to their commitments and our performance?
4. Can we identify areas (both geographic and by subject) where
Soviet aid is more of a threat than elsewhere, and/or where future programs
are likely to concentrate?
5. Can we identify situations where Soviet aid failures may
occur and where, in the resulting disenchantment, we may have extraordinary
opportunity to reap gains through well-conceived crash programs?
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