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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T05439A000300130013-4
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• Original Classification: T
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• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Approved For CIA-RDP78T05439A00030013001
Preface
25X1 B
This account of the Soviet arms build-
up in Cuba was compiled by the U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency as a basis for examina-
tion of the lessons to be derived from the Cuba
experience with respect to arms control inspection
and verification.
Agency. The date of information cutoff was
appro'imately 1 March 1963.
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
25X1 B
 I.
II.
IV.
V.
VI.
C O N T E N T S
Preface
Page
Earliest Indications of Soviet Build-up in Cuba
A.
Indications of the Soviet Decision
1
B.
Increase in Soviet Shipping and Military
Activity in Cuba in July and Following Months
7
The First Move - Surface-to-Air Missile
(SAM)
Installations
14
A.
Soviet MRBM's and IRBM's in Cuba
27
B.
The Search for Nuclear Weapons in Cuba--
Nuclear Components
46
C.
Soviet IL-28 Jet Light Bombers in Cuba
55
Other Soviet Arms in Cuba
A.
Coastal Defense Cruise Missiles
58
B.
Komar Guided Missile Patrol Boats
63
C.
MIG-21 Jet Fighters
64
D.
Soviet Armored Forces and Ground Equipment
66
Soviet Command/Control and Communications System-
In Cuba
A.
Command/Control and Communications
76
The Removal of Soviet Offensive Weapons from Cuba
A.
The Quarantine
84
B.
Dismantling of Sites and Removal of MRBM's
And IRBM's
86
Proposals for Inspection in Cuba
99
D.
Verification at Sea of Missile Removal
103
E.
Removal of the IL-28 Jet Light Bombers
105
Soviet Personnel in Cuba
109
'`possible Concealment of Soviet Weapons in Cuba
113
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 Approved For Rp"e,%(04QE(r7
I. EARLIEST INDICATIONS OF THE SOVIET BUILDUP IN CUBA
A. Indications of the Soviet Decision
One of the most difficult aspects of the Cuban buildup
is the determination of just when the decision was made by
the Soviet Union to put offensive weapons in Cuba, together
with the surface-to-air missiles which we now believe to
have been placed in Cuba primarily as protection for the of-
fensive weapons to come. Even from the easier position of
looking backward, it is difficult to see what indicators
there were before July, at best.
Early 1962. In March 1962 the only major military items
discoveredtobe en route to Cuba were torpedo boats and sub-
marine chasers. There were 31 MIG's (3 MIG-19's and 28 MIG-
15 or -17's) located at airfields at San Antonio de los Banos,
Camaguey, and Santa Clara. (Another report stated that about
60 of these earlier model MIG's had been delivered to Cuba
during the previous year.) Naval communications were in the
the teletype/microwave
process of changing from regular nets
links, but this could not have suggested and improved communications facilities necessary for the
developments of September and October: It was estimated on
15 March that there had been no major increase, changes or
redeployment of military equipment or personnel in Cuba with-
in the-preceding few weeks. This judgment was repeated on
8 May 1962. There had been unconfirmed evidence in inter-
cepts in early April that Cuba might now have the Soviet
BAR LOCK early warning radar and FISHNET IFF radar; and there
was a report of 30 April that a Cuban Government communications
center, with iponitoring, decoding and deciphering equipment,
had been established in Havana under the command of a Soviet
colonel.
Even as far back as March there had been low-level
reports. of suspected missile activity in or near Mayari Arriba,
Cuevas del Pepu, and Mangos de Baragua (all in central Oriente
Province), but these were not confirmed. There were additional
reports 23 April of two independent missile sightings in the
Managua, area; these were allegedly surface-to-air missiles,
25X1C described as being of the Nike t-~ e. One sighting, reported
was in the T~!tas de Managua hills, on
two occasions, the first four months earlier. Another source
reported 15 to 16 missiles about 20 miles south of the road
from Santiago de las Vegas to Managua, about 5 kilometers
east of Santiago de las Vegas. Despite the specificity of
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these reports, they could not be confirmed.
revealed no missiles or missile-related activity in the
etas de Managua hills. A secured area containing two occu-
pied three-gun artillery positions and storage
facility was located there. On the same daze, no missiles or
related activity were revealed in the indicated area near
Santiago de las Vegas. (Santiago de las Vegas did later be-
come a SAN support and assembly area.) 25X16
A CINCLANT report of 17 May to DIA summed up the sit-
uation regarding missile reports as follows:
All intelligence collection and research sources avail-
able to CINCLANT had for,over two years been concerned with
the problem of possible missiles or atomic weapons in Cuba.
The findings were that although there had been many rumors
of missile sites, there was no confirmation of the presence
in Cuba of any type of guided missile, and no evidence of
air-deliverable or any other atomic weapons in Cuba, nor of
suitable delivery vehicles. There was no evidence of Soviet
atomic weapons of any type en route to Cuba, nor evidence of
any Soviet intent in this regard. CINCLANT concluded that
it was "highly unlikely the USSR would select Cuba as the
first country to obtain Soviet atomic weapons, or that the
USSR would place atomic weapons in a militarily untenable
location such as Cuba."
Political indications.. There may (now, at least). be
said to have been some political indications that a signifi-
cant increase in Soviet assistance to Cuba, and correspond-
ingly in Cuba's status, was about to take place, but cer-
tainly until 'the reports of July 1962 these could not have
indicated the direction or degree of Soviet aid. A Soviet
official in a briefing given to Soviet Bloc UN delegates,
reported 6 April, allegedly said that the Soviet Union "had
plans for Cuba" and was supporting her transition to a full-
fledged Socialist state. This statement was supported by
Khrushchev's speech of 18 May in Pleven, Bulgaria, which
carried- a step further Soviet public incorporation of Cuba
into the Sloc. The May Day slogans published in the 17 April
Pravda promoted Cuba to a "candidate status" by listing it
c irectly after the Bloc states and ahead of Yugoslavia. The
American Embassy in Moscow commented that Soviet press
accounts of Cuban developments were found on occasion to be
surprisingly open in treating Cuba in the same fashion as
Bloc members. There is no indication, however, until July
that any unusual decision had been taken to "fortify" Cuba.
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SovietAmbassador to Cuba Kudryavtsev was on 4 June
replaced by-his second in command, A. I. Alekseyev, who has
been identified since at least 1947 with Soviet intelligence.
The circumstances and timing of Kudryavtsev's recall were
somewhat unusual, and a later report deriving from Raul Roa
Khouri Cuban ambassador in Prague and son of the Cuban
Foreign Minister, stated that Kudryavtsev had had "a terrible
interview" with Khrushchev on his return. Khrushchev, who
was very angry with him, reportedly said that Kudryavtsev
knew nothing about Cuba, and had been mistaken about the
whole situation there.
Raul Roa Khouri is allegedly the source of another
interesting report, an ex post facto chronology (10 December
1962). According to th-s, Cuba learned in April 1962
that the United States was preparing an attack on Cuba.
Cuba then "immediately" sent a military delegation to the
Soviet Union, which succeeded in obtaining an increased
quantity of arms and equipment, and also an agreement for
the establishment of strategic missile bases. The agreement
stipulated that the missiles would be under Soviet command,
and would be used only in the event of a US nuclear attack.
There were, however, only two known relatively high-
ranking missions to Moscow during April. On 3 April, Cuban
Minister of Interior Ramiro Valdes and another Cuban security
official were in Moscow, and on 29 April Minister of Public
Works Osmani Cienfuegos and Joaquin Ordoqui, Army chief of
Supply, arrived in Moscow. As Minister of Public Works,
Captain Cienfuegos was involved in military construction
activities.
An NSA report says that possible evidence that the Soviets
had been planning missile installations in Cuba as early as
April 1962 may be seen in recently noted reports in the Soviet
journal Sovetskaya Rossi a in May and August 1962 that one
Feodor Mi vich on arenko arrived (unnoticed) in Cuba
on 6 May and departed on 8 June. A Soviet General-Major of
Artillery of that name has been identified in the Moscow Air
Defense (PVO) District as concerned with surface-to-air
missile training. Although the name is not an uncommon one
and several other Russians with all three names the same have
been noted in it is suggestive that the arrival in
Cuba of General-Colonel N. I. Gusev and General-Lieutenant
of Abiation S. F. Ushakov had been noted in 0 of 5 and
6 May. There is no explanation in the report of why ref-
erence is made to April, when the visits were in May.
TOP SECRET
 that the Soviet decision 'to send strategic Missiles
to Cuba was probably taken sometime between late March and
mid-May, and most probably during the month of April, although
the decision very likely had been under consideration for
some time. The political climate in Cuba was probably not
considered propitious for the missile venture by the USSR
until after the resolution in late March of the political
conflict within the Cuban leadership. The estimated time to
marshal the equipment in the Soviet Union for shipment to
Cuba (the first ship left the USSR in mid-July) indicates
that the decision was probably taken by mid-May. Also, it
was on 14 May that the supplementary protocol to the Cuban-
Soviet trade agreement was announced. This agreement sub-
stantially increased Soviet econom c support for Cuba and
may well have been a quid pro quo or Cuban acceptance of
the missiles. In addition, in mid-May it became apparent
from intercepted messages that the Soviet military aid pro-
gram in Indonesia was without warning being subjected to
delays. With thi benefit of hindsight, it seems likely that
the delay in Indonesia was being caused by the sudden imple-
mentation of a high priority program elsewhere, i.e., in
Cuba.
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Raul Castro's July trip to Moscow. Implementation of
the Soviet-Cuban agreement probably began with the visit to
Moscow on 2 July. of Raul Castro, on the invitation of :the
Soviet Defense Ministry. With him were nine Cuban army or
air force officers, and one Alexei-Dementiev, identified as
a Cuban with a diplomatic passport when he departed Havana
aboard the Cu1ana flight to Prague, but revealed by inter-
cepted Soviet plain text messages to be the Havana repre-
sentative of the Soviet Engineering Directorate, the organi-
zation which handles Soviet military aid to foreign countries.
Raul Castro was given VIP treatment on his arrival; he was
met at the airport by Defense Minister Malinovsky and other
high officials, and on 3 July had an audience with Khrushchev.
But there was little publicity during the latter part of his
visit, and he departed with little fanfare. His return to
Havana was announced on 17 July. 25X1C
service on 15 August 1962 that Raul Castro on his visit to
Moscow signed an agreement allowing the Soviets "free use of
Cuban territory for handling any matter military or otherwise
as they saw fit, not having to give any account of their acts
to the Cuban Government."
There was independent reporting
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25X1 B
 Further indication of some sort of new factor in the
Cuban military scene was given at the time of Raul Castro's
Moscow visit by Cuban army officers, who were reported to
have said during conversation concerning the possibility
of Cuba's surviving an attack from the United States that
the danger of US invasion is decreasing with the passing of
time and "will be over by September." An economist and close
friend of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, President of the National
Institute of Agrarian Reform, was reported to have said that
the United States is afraid to interfere with Soviet-flag
vessels, but "in September the Americans will also respect
the Cuban flag." At another point the same informant was
reported to have referred to the NATO nations as a belt of
bases surrounding the Soviet Union; he added that "in
September Cuba is going to be the buckle in this belt."
Oddly enough, the same remark was attributed also to
Che Guevara, in.reported conversations with a friend on 28
and-30 June. Guevara was said to be fearing an invasion in
July, when Cuba was unprepared. Guevara referred to a
"desperate plan" to ask the Soviet Union to locate an atomic
base in Cuba which would b% "like a buckle in a belt of
bases surrounding the USSR," but he felt there was no time
left for such a measure. Although he is an admirer of Stalin
and Mao and does not have confidence in the present Soviet
regime Guevara implied that there had been-no recourse but
to turn to the Soviets by sending Raul Castro to find out
exactly what aid Cuba can count on. This report is no at 25X16
all compatible with what is known of Guevara, but is in-
cluded as an illustration of the problem of discrimination
of accurate iu'formation. that the reference'to
Cuba being a buckle in the belt of NATO bases was heard from
Cuban military sources before and after this time.
A Cuban source close to Fidel Castro and regarded as
reliable stated on 11 August that any attempt to land forces
in Cuba would meet with disaster because the country now had,
with Soviet assistance, "four times greater capability to
repel outside attack."
September statements. A joint Cuban-Soviet communiqud
issue in Moscow on September following a week-long visit
by Che Guevara and Emilio Aragones contained a strong Soviet
affirmation of its "right" to provide Cuba with military
equipment and technicians, to help Cuba counter the threat
from "aggressive imperialist quarters." It stated that in
response to Cuban requests for assistance in arms and
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technicians, the Soviet Union had agreed that "as long as
threats from the aforementioned quarters... continue, the Cuban
republic has every right to adopt measures to guarantee its
security...and all sincere friends of Cuba will have full
right to accede to these legitimate demands." This line was
continued in a Soviet government authorized statement issued
on 11 September, stating that "it is now impossible to attack
Cuba and to consider that such an attack would go unpunished
for the aggressor." Assuming this to be an accurate trans-
lation, the apparent emphasis on the word '!now'is significant
in connection with the Soviet-Cuban decision then being implemented.
A
repor ed on 13
September) that on 11 September the party's secretary general
stated he had received an official Cuban message that Havana
had recently signed a secret but formal mutual defense treaty
with the Soviet Union. He said the treaty would make Cuba a
member of the Warsaw pact group and, according to the Pan-
amanian Communist leader, the most significant featu of the
arrangement was that it would provide a legal basis fo the
"construction of Soviet and Bloc military bases in Cuba." An
intelligence comment at the time said that it was unlikely
that a Panamanian Communist leader would have been favored
with "an official Cuban message" dealing with a subject of
such gravity; nevertheless, it is interesting to note that
this seemingly accurate report =is not ex post facto, as
several other analyses were, and that -it correlates well vi
other information reported above.
An Intercept of the Soviet Air Force link in Hungary on
14 September stated that "volunteers for the defense of Cuba"
were expected "to hand in applications." Another message on
the same link requested the number of volunteers which had
applied. As of 19 September, requests for volunteers for
Cuba among Soviet military units stationed in East Europe
were continuing; messages to this effect were intercepted on
Soviet military links in East Germany and Poland.
Another unusual occurrence that might have attracted
attention was the notification to foreign newsmen by the
Cuban Government on 25 September that thereafter they would
have to get special permission to visit any part of Cuba
outside Havana's city limits. There was no explanation of
this actiop by the Foreign Ministry. Existing press cre-
dentials were canceled, and correspondents were instructed
to apply for new press cards two days later.
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B. Increase in Soviet Shipping and Military
Activity in a in my and Following Months
Shipping pattern. The decision to enlarge the Soviet
military presence in Cuba became evident toward the end of
July 1962, when substantially increased military cargoes and
Soviet personnel began to arrive in Cuba. As we now realize,
the first of the heavy shipments of arms and personnel left
Soviet ports in the Baltic and Black Seas in mid-July, just
prior to Raul Castro's departure from Moscow, suggesting
that agreements for new material had been worked out prior
to the visit, but that the signal to begin deliveries had
been delayed until the Cuban delegation arrived to complete
arrangements. By the end of the month a steady stream of
Soviet merchant ships was leaving the USSR carrying military
equipment to Cuba. Almost all civil cargoes apparently were
diverted to non-Bloc ships. From an average of nineteen
Soviet Bloc dry cargo ship arrivals in Cuba during the first
seven months of 1962, the arrivals rose to 43 in August and
50 in September, and 36 in October. Known military inbound
dry cargo to Cuba (in thousand metric tcns; rose from 2.0
in the April-June period to 4.6 in July. 45.3 in August,
66.8 in September, and 4J.7 in October. 'Note that October
figures are for only about half the months since they do not
include the ships that turned back or were not dispatched
because of the quarantine. Thus the total figures for October,
without US intervention, would have shown an increase over
September.)
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 25X1 B
some 1,500 "economic technicians" and students,
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From 15 July to 8 August
some sixteen Soviet merchant ships made false declarations
of their destination when leaving the Black Sea, and each
reported a cargo tpnnage well below its capacity. No cargo
information was available at this time, but light loads and
false declarations have been characteristic of Soviet arms
shipments in the past.
Passengers to Cuba. It might have been expected that
personne wou arrive prior to the equipment they were to
set up or the construction they were to carry out, and this
proved to be the case. One of the first direct indications
in Cuba of the Soviet decision came with the arrival of five
passenger ships from 26 July to 6 August, with the last one
being distinguished by the publicity given it as carrying
It was at about this time too that
began to be received that some
of these Soviet personnel were engaged in unidentified mil-
itary construction; and there were continuing rumors from
within Cuba of a large influx of Soviet Bloc personnel, the
estimated numbers ranging from a few hundreds to many
thousands. References were also made to secret installations
on the northern coast of Cuba controlled by Soviet troops.
There was, however, no firm information at this time of who
the Soviets were or what their task might be.
The equipment reported to be entering Cuba included
anti-aircraft fire-control radar, early warning radar, and
25X18 assorted other military communications equipment. An
credit sent by Moscow on 16 August to the head o th-e-Sovie-C
military aid group in Havana of $145,000. This was the
largest payment of its kind previously noted; a similar pay-
ment in July had been for only $8,000. (Although much of
25X1 B
a
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25X1 B
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 25X1 B
that this construction was being done by recently arrived
Soviets with newly delivered equipment and material. The
construction at both sites was at this time (21 August) in
of construction activity, and of forced evacuations of Cubans
from certain areas throughout the country.
motor transport, mobile generator units, prime movers,
tracked vehicles, cranes, trailers, fuel tanks, and other
construction equipment, all of which could be associated
with SAM sites. Several Soviet vessels were reported on 5
September to have been in the Bahia de Nipe area since 29
August offloading heavy equipment and munitions and dis-
embarking personnel under rigid security conditions.
s Approved For Rd1QFe W41OMT
Construction activities. The first estimate that the
USSR might be establishing surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites
in Cuba was made on 17 August, although other guesses were
that the construction activity which served as the main
indicator could be the building of a system
llations,
targeted against Cape Canaveral and otner U0111
or an ECM system aimed at US space,,;aissile, and/or other
operational electronic systems.
ugus there had been as many as 26 suspec ov a arms
shipments since mid-July (in addition to regular tanker and
cargo ships). Passenger ships arriving since late July or
then en route carried a minimum of about 5y400 persons, the
arrival of only 1,500 of whom had been publicly announced.
Recently unloaded Soviet equipment included electronic vans,
25X1 B
very early stages and involved large amounts of equipment
(over 100 trucks, trailers, and other vehicles at one) and
that similar activity might be under way or about to start
at other places in Cuba.
some type of excavations.
"Coupled with the extra-
ordinary Soviet Bloc economic commitments made to Cuba in
recent months, these developments amount to the most ex-
tensive campaign to bolster a non-Bloc country ever under-
taken by the USSR." "Such an influx of Soviet personnel
and equipment into a non-Bloc country is unprecedented in
Soviet military aid activities; clearly something new and
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different is taking place." Apparently no one yet thought
beyond SAM sites, however, and it was said that there was
no hard evidence that any of these Soviet Bloc personnel
were in combat military units.
25X1 C
25X1 B
personnel in Cuba who observed some of
the equipment and personnel felt that it suggested that SAM
and radar sites were being constructed. Soviet personnel
also were reported using the former reformatory school at
Torrens, Southwest of Havana; this developed into what is
now believed to be the central Soviet command headquarters
(see Section V of this study).
J
An unusual announcement by Radio Moscow on 24 August
in a Spanish transmission to the Caribbean area, an obvious
claimed that many Soviet vessels were carry-
ing agricultural machinery, etc., to Cuba. 25X1C
reports, however, told of such events as the unloading by
the Soviets, under tight security, of large wooden boxes
or vans, military vehicles and trucks, tanks, etc., at the
part of La Isabela 16-18 August from the Soviet vessel
Khirurg Vishnevskiy. These were reportedly taken to a
am called .an an some 8 kilometers south of the port.
Moscow also publicized large shipments to Cuba of food-
stuffs and material supporting Cuba's economic development.
A TASS report stated that the volume of Soviet/Cuba trade
had grown to such a large degree that part of the shipments
to Cuba were being carried on chartered foreign ships. 4s
was pointed out by NSA, however, although the flow of
industrial materials continued at a steady rate during July
and August, since July no shipment of this nature on a
Soviet vessel had been noted (to 28 August), suggesting
that the USSR may have initiated a policy on about 1 July
to utilize chartered Western vessels for ordinary shipments
to Cuba, reserving its own vessels for other cargoes.
Pattern of construction activity, 28 August 1962. By
28 August was possible to summarize cons ruction.activity
by Soviet Bloc personnel in Cuba as follows:
1. La Coloma - Guatana area in the weern part
of Pinar del Rio ovince. Cuban civilians were `evacuated
from a farm in the Guatana area in late July. Subsequently,
Cuban militiamen stationed on the farm were replaced by
non-Cubans and the entire area is said to have been enclosed
with barbed wire. Quantities of construction equipment and
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were sent into the area. I
it
I
ems
military
reported an encampment off the Coloma highway of som
Soviets who disembarked at Mariel.
e 400
Another center of activity in western Pinar del Rio 25X1C
Province was reported at Vinales, midway between the city of
Pinar del Rio and the north coast of the province.
25X1C reported this to be the site of a Sovxec -
campment, and on 20 August
observed a military convoy on the road just south of Vinales 25X1C
headed toward that location.
2. Mariel area in eastern Pinar del Rio Pro ince.
Much of the equ pmen t at an e a this north coast' por
and many of the passengers who debarked here from at least
two Soviet vessels were evidently sent to other places in
Cuba, but some apparently stayed in the immediate vicinity.
25X1C that equipment unloaded at nearby
ports to the east of Mariel was seen being convoyed toward
25X1C Mariel and that an island near Mariel,
recently renamed Cayo Lenin, was evacuated of Cuban civilians
who were also debarred from a nearby beach area.
was taking place had been summarily moved out in late July.
25X1C that men and equipment un-
loaded in Matanzas and Havana were convoyed in the direction
of Santa Cruz del Norte during the first half of August.
5. Canimar River area just east of Matanzas. Con-
struction activity consisting of the leveling and grading of
a naturally almost level portion of a hillside by Soviet
Bloc heavy equipment and personnel was observed early in
August at a site called El Bongo. Numerous. reports indicate
TOP SECRET
3. Torrens area SW of Havana city. Torrens boys'
reformatory was taken over and residents of several farms in
the vicinity were ordered to leave, apparently by Minister
of the Armed Forces Raul Castro personally. Evacuees were
told the area was needed for Soviet personnel. The area was
apparently intended to be a central control point for the
activities under way elsewhere.
4. Santa Cruz del Norte, on north coast midway
between Havana and Matanzas. Construction activity on the
top of a hill just south of the town was reported by a
refugee and his information subsequently confirmed by photog-
raphy. The farmer on whose land the construction activity
 Approved For Relh W 200 07Y07T
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that men and equipment were taken to this area early in
August. eport that Soviet personnel who dis-
r embarked in Matanzas made numerous trips between the port
ea a and El Bongo convoying much heavy equipment to the area.
6. Sagua la Grande and Cayo Esquivel in northern
Las Villas Province. A number of reports indicate that the
Soviet vessel Khirur Vishnevskiy docked at the port of La
Isabela on 16 ugA ust. Much o he equipment was taken to
the Santana farm midway between La Isabela and Sagua la
Grande. On Cayo Esquivel, an island off the coast near
Isabela, two sources reported the evacuation of civilian
residents in late July and the shipment of non-Cuban per-
sonnel to the island.
7. Sancti Spiritus area in southern Las Villas.
Several ships apparently unloaded in the south coast port
of Casilda and their cargoes were transported through Tridi-
dad in the direction of Sancti Spiritus. The final desti-
nation was unknown, but it may have been near the Cuban air
base at Santa Clara.
8. The Banes area in Oriente Province.
Military cargoes were unloaded at Nicaro and apparently other
ports in the vicinity of Banes in early August and the cargoes
taken in the direction of Banes or the Peninsula de Ramon.
Residents of an area near Banes were evacuated in lat
July. I indicated that extensiNe
military construction was under way in the area. A fre-
quent item in these reports was the alleged arrival in the
area of rockets or missiles, described by one source as
offloaded in the port of Nicaro between 1-4 August, between
18 and 50 in'number, 20-21 feet long, 18 inches in diameter,
red, with yellow nosecones.
that confirmation was received that a 5AM system
was being deployed (photo 1). Twelve sites were identified.
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Analyses of Soviet shipping and construction. Despite
this information, felt it necessary
to state in its "Conclusions on Cuba" on 29 August 1962
that we were not able to determine on the basis of the evidence
available at this time the precise nature or purpose of the
intensified program of Bloc military assistance and construction
in Cuba. At the least, they said, recent deliveries indicated
a significant Soviet effort to improve the defensive military
capabilities of the Cuban regime. 25X1D
25X1D It was in photography I
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 Approved For R41Q@e$
(As an interesting sidelight, Raul Roa Khouri, Cuban Ambas-
sador in Prague, was reported to have said shortly before
4 September that recent Soviet deliveries to Cuba have even
included "rockets of the same kind that shot down the U-2
plane." One MIG-21 jet fighter was seen'at the airfield in
Santa Clara (the first confirmation of the presence in Cuba
of the MIG-21), and indications were noted that at that air-
field there might be at least 13 more MIG-21's still un-
assembled (photo 2). Eight Komar-class missile boats were
also seen, and one land-based anti-shipping cruise missile
site. 25X1C
that I extensive construction activity believed to De cunnecciedl
with a missile site was in progress at Cabanas. Work was
said to be going on around the clock, performed by "Soviet
and Chinese personnel." Cubans were barred from the area,
as they were from another to the south of San Antonio del
25X1C_. 9 October report from a fairly ?_ __-^~^
reportedly being constructed in the restricted area, where
approximately 800 Soviet Bloc personnel were said to be
billeted in tents. At the same time, initial construction
was reported to be under way on an unidentified facility at
Banes, where ground had been cleared in the southeastern
portion of the port area and a number of pieces of unidenti-
fied equipment were observed.
on Soviet
An NSA analysis of 12 October, of recent
[::;=
shipping for Cuba, indicated that although Sovie cargo ship-
ments so far in October continued at a rate considerably
above the rate prior to the summer, there had been a slight
decrease since the peak level of the first week in September.
There had recently even been some Soviet ships declaring for
Cuba, although the vast majority of ships continued to screen
their activities by either making false cargo and port decla-
rations or simply not issuing declarations of any kind.
From this point on, with a vast increase in reconnaissance
and other information, it will be more comprehensible to con-
tinue the account on a topical' basis, reviewing first the
information learned about the various weapons systems.
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 25X1 D
25X1 D
25X1 D
25X1 D
25X1 D
Construction began on SAM sites in
eastern Cuba at Manati, Senado, and Manzanillo.
Approved For Red flWT~
II. THE FIRST MOVE: SURFACE-TO-AI~ MISSILE (SAM)
INSTALLATIONS IN CUBA
Arrival of SAM units. The Soviet operation in Cuba
began with the movemen of surface-to-air missile (SAM)
battalions, armored groups and construction units. The first
units of 6 SAM regiments, of about 700 men each, began
leaving the Soviet Union in mid-July, and their deployment
to Cuban battle stations continued through August. The
timing of arrival and the subsequent positioning of the SAM
units as well as the armored groups appear to have been
phased with the closely following MRBM and IRBM units, and
make it clear that the primary purpose of the air defense
_-system conbtituted by the SAM's and MIG's and associated
radar was to protect and screen the offensive weapons systems.
SAM battalions and armored groups were first deployed to
western Cuba in early mid-August, and construction of fixed
sites for IRBM's began soon thereafter. MRBM units in this
area arrived at these sites about mid-September. In central
Cuba the SAM's and armor arrived by early September, preceding
the beginning of MRBM and IRBM construction by two or three
weeks. Toward the end of September a third group of SAM sites
and an armored group were established in easteri} Cuba. It is
interesting to note that based on known characteristics of
the SA-2 system and extrapolation from the pattern observed
i was possible
a as many as 24 sites might eventually be set up.
Chronology The probable chronology with respect to SAM
sites is as follows:
Work began on SAM sites at Matanzas, Havana,
,Marcel, Bahia Honda, Santa Lucia, San Julian, and La Coloma
surrounding the area where the San Cristobal MRBM sites and
the Guanajay IRBM sites were later established.
Construction began on SAM sites at Sagua
la Grande, Caibarien, and Sancti Spiritus in central Cuba.
These with Cienfuegos ringed the eventual locations of the
Sagua la Grande MRBM sites and the Remedios IRBM sites.
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 25X1 D
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25X1 B
25X1 B
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Late September - early October: The fourth increment
of SAM sites was being developed to complete the coverage
of the island.
As of all 24 SAM sites were individually
operational with both missiles on
siteshwereainstalledswithal
radar in position (photo 3).
haste and final construction work such as building revetments
was still going on.
As of all elements of a standard SA-2
site had been identified at one or more of the sites in
Cuba including launchers, GUIDELINE missiles,
(formerly FRUIT SET) guidance radar, SPOONREST acquisition
radar, SCOREBOARD IFF antenna, and MERCURY GRASS communications
equipment. Although an integrated command and control
netdered t for SAM sites had not been firicommandeand control net for
highly probable that an integrated
SAM's was by this time in existence in Cuba.
A detailed analysis of the 24 individual SA-2 sitesking
shows that they were chosen so as to have negligible
of their radio horizon by local., obstacles and terrain. This
enhances eir early acquisition and detection capability.
25X1 B
Twenty-three o the sites do no ave a masK
whic exceeds elevation. Fourteen of the sites do 25X18
elevation. (One
25X1D not have a mask which exceeds
25X1D has a masking of
25X1D Site pattern and missile characteristics. The sites
have s ix launch positions encircling a central guidance
The sites are in most cases joined by a road network in a
"Star of David" pattern (photos 1, 4, & 5). Personnel
quarters and missile trailers are situated nearby. In order
to acquire an emergency operational capability during the
d
initial deployment phase, the missile equipment was placedh
into position prior to the construction of permanent
and guidance revetments. Later, wheU launch revetments were
constructed, they were net-covered and contained a ccadnvas-
covered missile launcher positioned
ntained a canvasrcovered FAN
guidance area (ordinarily) contained
25X1D SONG radar surrounded by vertical camouflage netting, enclosed
25X1D
by an earthen revetment.
The SA-2 missiles a t booster and liquid
25X1D and include a solid prope
propellant sustainer. The latter stage contains both the
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 Approved For Re1QaE251F4QRf7T
guidance package and the warhead. Three missile-hold revet-
ments with seven refire missiles are positioned along the
circular perimeter road. It is estimated that the SA-2
system has a capability to reload and refire in a period of
5 to 10 minutes.
In the central guidance area of the La Coloma SAM site,
taken as an illustration (photo 5 ), there is a centrally
positioned FAN SONG guidance radar with supporting control
and generator vans. The radar includes a single dish-shaped
reflector, a trough-configured reflector, and other
observable components. Such a radar has an estimated capa-
bility to track hostile aircraft up to altitudes of 95,000
feet, at horizontal ranges out to 110 nautical miles.
25X1 D
indicate that the latest Soviet FAN SONG radar is deployed
on the island. The identification of this particular model
in Cuba is significant because it had never been observed
in the hands of any other than Soviet personnel; it is thus
25X1 D
the following was the status o SAM installations in Cuba:
25X1D SAM status
San Julian
22-05-28N
84-08-58W
La Coloma
22-18-42N
83-32-35W
Santa Lucia
#1 -
22-41-05N
83-55-45W
Bahia Honda
22-57-32N
83-17-28W
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Revetted 3-5 miss.on launcher
6 miss. transporter
Revetted 1 miss. on launcher
8 transporter
2 prob.miss.on launcher
Revetted 3 miss.on launcher
7 miss. trailer
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25X1 D
Mariel
23-00-55N
82-49-30W
Havana East
23-09-25N
82-13-32W
Caibairen
22-28-15N
79-29-35W
Chambas
22-13-20N
78-53-30W
Chaparra
21-07-20N
76-26-20W
Cienfuegos
22-02-50N
80-24-20W
Jiguani
76-20-OOW
Sagua La
Grande
22-51-ION
80-05-50W
Sancti Spir-
21-47-45N
79-29-30W
Senado
21-36-30N
77-33-31W
Ciego De
Avila
21-42-13N
78-50-21W
Manati
21-13-45N
77-02-15W
Revetted 3 miss.on launcher
6 miss. trailer
Unrevetted 3 miss.on launcher
7 miss. trailer
Unrevetted 2 miss.on launcher
1 poss.miss.on launcher
4 transporter
Unrevetted 3 miss.on launcher
7 transporter
Unrevetted 3 miss.on launcher
7 miss. transporter
Unrevetted 5 miss.on launcher
6 miss. transporter
in hold revetment
Unrevetted 3 miss.on launcher
6 miss. transporter
(1 in position to
load)
Revetted 3 miss.on launcher
1 transporter-
4 poss. transporter
U/C 3 miss. on launcher
Revetted
Unrevetted 3 miss. on launcher
7 trailer
Unrevetted 3 miss.on launcher
Unrevetted 1 miss.on launcher
6 poss. transporter
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 Approved For Rely A&ME7T
25X1 D
21-55-48N
25X1 D
Santa Lucia #1
Los Angeles
21-00-40N
75-41-43W
20-06-20N
Seguena
21-37-33N
82-57-33W
23-c1-5ON
Manzanillo
20-18-20N
77-06-08W
22-59-31N
Unrevetted 4 miss.on launcher
6 miss. transporter
Unrevetted 4 miss.on launcher
7 miss. transporter
Unrevetted 2 miss.on launcher
7 transporter
Revetted 3 miss.on launcher
1 poss. transporter
transporter covered
Unrevetted 2 prob.miss.on launcher
5 miss. transporter
Unrevetted 6 launcher
4 miss.on launcher
Santiago De
Cuba
19-59-20N
75-50-58W
Launch
Pad Status
3 miss.on launcher
Alternate
Site For
Deleite #2
Unoccupied
Alternate Site for
23-01-30N
Deleite #1
80-44-39W
Unoccupied
Alternate Site for
#2
22-43-40N
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 Approved For Re1 ~24f0RkT
25X1 D
SAM SUPPORT AND ASSEMBLY AREAS
Observed
Observed
Santiago De
Las Vegas
22-57-40N
82-21-30W
Santiago De
Cuba
20-03-1ON
75-53-20W
Ciefuentes
22-36-ION
80-05-03W
Ciego De
Avila
21-52-OON
78-44-07W
Pinar Del
Rio
22-21-09N
83-39-15W
Victoria De
Las Tunas
21-04-40N
77-00-OOW
20-18-20N
77-06-08W
(Assembly
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Ot her
Equip._ Equipment
34 trans- 5 miss.dollies
porter 12 pieces heavy equip.
12 prob. 35 misc. vehicles
miss.
35 trailer 35 add'l vehicles
75 miss.
container
5 trans- 10 vehicles
porter 2 tractor-trailer
4 poss. 2 liq. storage tanks
trans-
porter
12 canister
20 poss.
canister
27 miss. o Approx 55 vehicles
transporter
45 miss. con-
tainer
4 revetted
storage
19 trans- Stacked U/I equip.
porter 25 add'l vehicles
Approx. 50
canister
100 miss. 50 vehicles
canister 16 tents
24 trans- 2 long buildings
porter
 Approved For ReITDRAW8 7T
25X1 D
25X1 D
25X1 D
CIA-RDP78T05439A000300130
SAM support equipment. As an instance of the circular
or spiral nature of confirmation in these matters, it was
announced on 25 October that a re-examination of photographs
of Soviet ships bound for Cuba dating from late
disclosed that at least 15 tank trucks specially
designed to transport SA-2 missile propellant were sent to
Cuba. Identification was based on pictures of six ships
taken between 25X18
25X18 SAN re iment or anization.
six SAN regiments, each with a strength
25X18 of about 1,000, are operating the entire complex of launch
sites and support facilities. A single SAM regiment is
responsible for four SA-2 sites, each manned by a battalion
of about 140 persons. The battalion at a single SAM site
would normally include one firing battery of six launchers
and a radar and technical company. The total Soviet personnel
requirements would be reduced considerably if Cubans per-
formed some of the security and support functions.
25X1 B
25X1 B
The SAM system would necessarily have a central command
control headquarters -- probably located at air defense
district headquarters -- together with associated communi-
cations. The first clear evidence identifying the communi-
cations facilities associated with the SAM components was
noted in VHF radio intercepts on 9 November in a SAM training
exercise in Oriente Province. Photographic evidence of some
sites indicates that both HF radio and VHF multi-channel
.radio relay equipment are probably providing operational and
administrative communications for these sites. Target track-
ing data appArently is relayed either directly to the SAM
sites or via sector or district broadcast facilities. If the
Analysis of recent SAM developments in Cuba. Six SA-2
GUIDELINE surface-to-air missile sites have recently been
redeployed in Cuba. The movement of three of them materially
affects the over-all defense of the island, but the other
three were transferred only very short distances.
Inikial deployments suggested that the SAM sites were to
be around the periphery of the island and that the Soviets
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 Approved For Re TeQ AF4Q%97 CIA-RDP78T05439A000300130
25X1 B
A minimum of 30 installations would have been required
to provide a complete barrier, but construction seemed to
stop with only 24 sites emplaced. Three major gaps were
apparent: (1) the important crossroads at Camaguey; (2)
the east-west corridor across the southeast section of the
island; and (3) the central portion of the southern coast-
line. To date, three major redeployments have been made:
(1) the Cabanas site was moved about ten nautical miles
northwest to Maldonado; (2) the Senado installation was
shifted about 18 nautical miles to Camaguey; (3) and the
Chaparra site was moved about ten nautical miles southward.
These repositionings filled two of the gaps. The corridor
on the eastern end and around the Holguin area was closed
and the Camaguey area, including the airfield, is now well
inside the SA-2 defense ring. It is believed that the three
sites were redeployed for the express purpose of correcting
inadequacies in the original SA-2 deployment under the zonal
or barrier defense concept as well as providing more effec-
tive air defense of important military installations in the
Camaguey and Holguin areas.
25X1 D revealed a new
SAM site under construction 2.5 nm south-southeast of the
Camaguey airfield. The equipment at the new site almost
certainly came from the Senado site, approximately 18 nm
25X1D northeast of the new one, which was noted abandoned in
The new site is typically star
configured, is unreve e , and contains six launch positions
with six launchers mounted on missiles. It also contained,
at the time of photography, guidance radar, seven missile
transporters, ten prime movers, and four large and one small
tents.
25X1 D
25X1 D
revealed that a new SAM site had
been set up in the Holguin area, 11.1 nm west of the city of
Holguin. The site includes six unrevetted launchers and
complete guidance equipment. Also at the site when photo-
graphed were seven missile transporters, 32 vehicles, and
four large and three small tents. The launchers are arrayed
in the usual circular pattern, but were not at the time
served by roads. The equipment for the new site almost cer-
tainly came from the former SAM site at Chaparra, which
photography of had showed to be in the process of
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 Approved For R1IOj?eS 0WT
A missile guidance signal intercepted from Cuba on 12
January 1963 suggests that the USSR may be introducing less-
advanced radars for use with surface-to-air (SAM) missiles,
perhaps preparatory to phasing Cubans into the SAM system.
The signal is believed to be the missile guidance portion
of an S-band version of SAM radar. In the past only the C-
band version, more advanced than the older S-band equipment,
has been identified in Cuba. The C-band has been kept in
the hands of Soviet personnel, both in Cuba and the Bloc,
and it is unlikely the Soviets would relinquish control of
the C-band SAM radars to the Cubans.
25X1 D
25X1 B
The presence of the advanced C-band equipment has been
confirmed at all 24 Cuban SAM sites. The appearance of the
older equipment suggests that replacement is in the process
of taking place. The less efficient S-band FAN SONG has in
the past been found in those areas where Soviet control is
not exercised over the SAM system, such as in East Germany.
Conversely, the advanced C-band equipment has never been
noted out of Soviet control. The change in Cuba therefore
strongly suggests the possibility of diminished Soviet
interest in the SAM system in Cuba and the possibility of
an eventual Cuban takeover of the system.
There is no firm evidence of Cuban training in the SAM
system, but that such training may be taking place is sug-
gested by the coincident references intercepted from the
Soviet controlled R-401 communications system to Soviet
departures and Cuban training. Although not all R-401"
communications facilities in Cuba have been equated to the
air defense system, some of them have.
Soviet manning of surface-to-air missile installations
in Cuba. v ence indicates that the rapid establishment of
more than 20 surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba during
was evidently to protect and screen the offensive weapons
systems (MRBMs, IRBMs, and IL-28 bombers) which were
installed as the air defense system was being completed.
was part of a program to build up
a Soviet equipped and operated air defense system in Cuba,
incorporating modern radar systems-and MIG-21 jet fighters
in addition to the SAMs. The primary purpose of the program
equipment. The first SAM sites to be set up were located in
the western half of Cuba around the first long-range Soviet
missile installations; the next near the ballistic missile
TOP SECRET
 Approved For R21 se` &Q#&
installations in central Cuba, and it seems likely that the
sites now existing in relatively remote areas of eastern
Cuba were intended to guard similar offensive missile units
which had not yet arrived.
There is no evidence that Cubans received any type of
training for the operation, support, or maintenance of the
Soviet SAM installations now located in Cuba. There is no
25X1 B
There have, however, been no indications from any source
of training in the Bloc for Cubans on any form of missile.
In the past, this sort of evidence has been available on the
training programs for Indonesians, Iraqis, and Egyptians.
Missile training sites have also been observed in other-
countries receiving Bloc missiles. The number of Soviet
personnel sent to non-Bloc countries being supplied with
missiles has been relatively small, ranging between 100 and
200 technician's. 25X1C
25X1C Virtually all the reportsl
indicate that Cubans are excluded from the
SAM sites and that the entire system,at least until very
recently- has been under exclusive control of the Soviets.
25X1 C
Cubans apparently are
25X1C utilized in some unloadings of ships -- although frequently
they also are excluded from this work -- and as military
escorts for convoys of equipment up to the missile sites.
All evidence -- including official Cuban statements -- how-
ever, indicates that Cubans are not allowed to observe, much
less participate in, the operations at such sites. Premier
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 25X1 C
25X1 C
Approved For ReT ThT:
Castro, for example, stated to U Thant that there are not
and have not been any Cubans on missile sites and they have
been rigidly excluded throughout the program.
stated that in
early August Cuban Major Dermido Escalona, military commander
of Pinar del Rio Province and a political leader of the
province, was denied access to a Soviet missile installation
in the province, and was told by Soviet sentries at pistol
point that "not even Fidel Castro" could enter without the
Soviet commander's permission.
that Cubans were forbidden to enter
Soviet military areas at Bahia Honda, Mariel, and La Cabana.
The source of this report finally secured the Soviets' re-
luctant permission to enter only long enough to supervise
the installation of 1000-man military messes at each site.
The few Cubans who entered were closely escorted and watched
while inside these areas.
It would take some time for the Cubans to be trained
sufficiently to take over the SAY system now existing in
Cuba. Meanwhile, if the system is to be operational, it will
require the continuing presence of at least 3000 Soviets.
There are as yet (1 March 1963) no indications that any
SAM sites in Cuba have been turned over to Cubans. Informa-
tion is too scanty at this time to permit a conclusive
judgment on the timing of such a transfer. It is now believed
that SAM training for Cubans is under way, although there is
little direct evidence as to when such training may have
begun. A number of reports, including some COMINT material,
point to March 1963 as the time when some kind of change
related to the status of the SAM sites is likely.
Following are summaries of the significant intelligence,
arranged in chronological order, so far received indicating
that transfer of the SAM sites to the Cubans is planned:
a. A report in late November 1962 referred to
Spanish-speaking Soviet officers instructing Cuban militiamen
at a "camp" which has been identified as a SAM assembly and
support area.
b. During November and December 1962, and January
1963, Soviet communications operators made several references
to training Cubans. None of these references, however, could
be traced directly to SAM units.
TOP SECRET
25X1 C
 ? Approved For RJIaL S R' T
c. In mid-December, Cuban officers were reported
attending "indoctrination" lectures on "missiles." It is
not clear whether these were general orientation or training
lectures, but the reported content of the lectures indicates
that they concerned SAMs. 25X16
d. On 2 January, a SAM transporter with a Guideline
missile was driven in a parade in Havana by Cuban personnel.
A cruise missj1e r was also driven by Cubans in
this parade. the im-
plication might be that the SAM and cruise missiles had or
were to become part of the Cuban military inventory.
25X1 C ? d J ar
anu
aircraft effort to clear Cuban skies of unidentified aircraft.
An order to this effect was said to have been circulated as
of 17 January.
f. On 8 February, operators' chatter in Spanish with
Cuban idiom was heard on unidentifiable terminals of Soviet
VHF multichannel (R-481) radio relay communications. The
chatter, using terminology which suggested that the operators
were already trained rather than in process, teferred to
tuning R-401 equipment and subsequent readability. This is
the first firm indication that Cubans are using this equipment.
The major identified users of R-401 facilities in Cuba-are
Soviet SAM installations, although R-401 facilities are known
to be used by other Soviet elements of as yet undetermined
subordination,.
1 March the Cuban military would activate an 'all-out' anti-
g. In mid-February, Joaquin Ordoqui, chief of
Cuban Army logistics, was quoted as stating that as of early
February the Soviets were instructing Cubans in the operation
of SAMs. When Cubans had become proficient, the Soviets
would be withdrawn and the Cuban Government would then have
the sole right to decide when to use these weapons. The
Cubans had agreed with the Soviets not to use the weapons
against US reconnaissance flights.
h. In his speech of 22-23 February, Fidel Castro
implied that Cuban technicians were needed to "manage" SAM
systems. He said, "We need a good technician to manage a
surface-to-air missile, but at the same time we take him
out of school. No, it hurts to lose a good technician. What
to do?"
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" mi -
 Approved For ReTe M W7T~
i. On 23 February, Soviet operator chatter from
the Banes station of the Soviet command group included the
statement that "all have gone home. Pros March we train
the Cubans....I will be going hose in March." This statement
could refer to training with SAMs, cruise missiles, or other
facilities in the Banes area.
25X1 B
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 25X1 D
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III. SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA
First evidence. We shall discuss first the MRBM and
IRBM missile sites, and then the IL-28 jet light bombers.
The first hard information on the delivery of Soviet offensive
weapons to Cuba came, however, in connection with IL-28's.
25X1 C
reported the arrival of crates
which met the IL-28 description during the third week of
25X1C September. I reported seeing four such crates
arriving at Mariel on 19 September. Another source reported
the arrival of an unspecified number of IL-28 crates in
Havana on 20 September. There was no way to determine the
accuracy of these reports when first received, however, for
at that time no IL-28 crates had been seen on the decks of
Soviet ships going to Cuba. In retrospect, it is likely 25X1C
that at least one of these reports was correct, for there
definitely was one IL-28 shipment missed byl
of Soviet shipping. There was also one report with date of
information 2 October which may have been correct, since the
Kasimov arrived in Cuba about 1 October.
25X1D Information concerning the IL-28's and the Kasimov was
25X1 D
we s n a i l s u
this more critical development first, and then return to the
IL-28's.
A. Soviet MRBM's and IRBM's in Cuba
1. Summary
The Soviet Union, by late October 1962, had
established nine offensive missile sites in Cuba at four
separate locations (photo 7). Six were field sites for the
road-transportable Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM),
and three were fixed sites for the Intermediate Range Ballistic
TOP SECRET
 Approved For Rem 2SE IF7
Missile (IRBM). Four of the MRBM sites were located in an area
near San Cristobal, 50 nautical miles southwest of Havana.
The two other MRBM sites were located near the town of Sagua
la Grande, 135 nautical miles east of Havana. Each of the
25X9 MRBM sites included four launch positions, mobile ground
25X9 support equipment, and
The fixed IRBM sites were located at Guanajay near
Havana and at Remedios, 175 miles to the east. The Guanajay
location included two fixed four-launcher sites, while the
25X9 Remedios site, which was in an early stage of construction,
included a single four-launcher site. The fixed IRBM sites
9SXA also included concrete control bunkers,
In summary, there were nine offensive missile bases
completed or under construction in Cuba by 22 October, with
a projected total of 36 launching positions -- 24 MRBM and
12 IRBM.
25X1D 2. Chronological Account
The photographic missions. The
25X1 D first conclusive evidence o oviet offensive miss missile -deploy-
ment in Cuba came from a high altitude U-2 reconnaissance
mission of Prior to that time, routine high
25X1D altitude photo reconnaissance over the four locations bad
revealed no evidence of missile activity. Flights from about
25X1D shows no military activity at all on the sites at Guana'a
San Cristobal, Sagua la Grande, and Remedios
25X1D Weather conditions and a series of operational equipment
failures had caused stand-downs from the latter date until
25X1 D
25X1 D
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 25X1 D
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25X1D Since weather had permitted coverage of only two of
the four missions assigned forl these flights were
25X1D carried over, with a peripheral mission on alon
the southeast coast, and a peripheral mission on
25X1D along the northeast coast. There was a mechanical abort on
and weather stood down the planes
inclusive.
25X1 C
dated October requested priority coverage o suspec e
25X1D surface-to-surface (MRBM) areas in Cuba. The planes stood
25X1D down on because authorization forl
25X1D flights had not yet been granted, and on
because of weather. Transfer of responsibility for
25X1 D
25X1 D
25X1 D
the flights precluded a mission on
revealed two Soviet field
MRBM units deployed in the heavily wooded San Cristobal
area
I. In the most advanced site found,
there were eight missiles and four launchers visible
. Seven missiles on trailers were clustered near
two missile shelter tents, while the eighth was positioned
adjacent to an emplaced erector. Propellant equipment was
also observed nearby, and temporary military billeting
facilities and other supporting equipment were seen.
At the second site found approximately five miles away,
25X1D the Soviets were detected in the early stages of setting up
a missile encampment
Six MRBM's on trailers had apparently just arrived and
were parked in a wooded area. In addition, a missile vehicle
convoy was noted arriving at the site. During the few days
following, the Soviets established two more MRBM sites in
this area, which on the date of this photography were not
25X1 B
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25X1 D
25X1 D
25X1 D
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Rc11QFe WeQ fbT
25X1 B
25X1 D
Missile identification. At-this early stage, analysis
was directed toward the i entification of the type of missiles
deployed. On the basis of site characteristics it was
difficult at this point to distinguish between the 700 nautical
mile and 1100 nautical mile Soviet missile systems: neither
precluded identification of similar field type launchers in 25X1
report that the 1100 n.m. missile can be readily deployed to
presurveyed alternate sites in a matter of six hours plus
* Definitions. 1. An Emergency Operational Capability
exists when a site could launch some missiles should a
decision be made to do so.
2. A Full Operational Capabilit is
achieved when a site has reached a steady state of readiness
with the ability to salvo its first missile load within about
six to eight hours and with the ability to refire within
four to six hours. An emergency operational capability could
be achieved at an MRBM site as soon as the launch crews,
missiles, launchers, propellants, warheads and necessary
checkout equipment have arrived at a presurveyed area. Full
operational capability would be achieved when the erector?
aunc ers are in p ace, the cabling between launchers and
control is permanently installed, and the launch crews,
missiles, and propellant trucks, warheads, and checkout
equipment are arranged at the site in an orderly manner. At
an MRBM site, full operational capability would probably lag
the emergency operational capability by about five days.
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 Approved For R"Fe @LCgff@T
transit time. The balance of evidence, including interpre-
tation estimates of the missile size (those photographed
were canvas covered, with blunt noses), was on the side of
the 1100 n.m. missile.
Area photo coverage. As a result of the identifications
made in the San Cris o al area, the President, who was
advised of these findings on 16 October, directed that high
altitude aircraft survey the island completely in order to y
determine precisely the nature and extent of Soviet offensive
25X1D missile base construction in Cuba. There was of course no
25X1 D
25X1 B
"San Cristobal Area:
The sites in this area are considered to be unimproved
25X1D field type sites and to have an emergency launch-capability
-
photographic coverage identified two more
Soviet MRBM_sites, nine miles apart, 135 miles east of
Havana near the small town of Sagua la Grande (Photo 14).
These sites resembled the ones at San Cristobal but appeared
to be more permanent in nature. The Soviets had constructed
a new road system into the site area and had already emplaced
erectors at two of the launch pads. The other two launch pads
were not yet completed, but the erectors for these positions
were observed nearby.
as of 20 October 1962 if nosecones and warheads are avai
All c ntial elements for an operational unit (launchers,
a
h t r h to resemble a field-type MRBM site described in
a
ced and missiles-are-available. These sites appear in the
25X1C P o og
p y Soviet personnel are there, living in
- ---I
he
en
`
capability that could not be identified on photo-
25X1 D
it
25X1 B
graphy are warheads and nosecones for missiles.
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 Approved For R11a?e'Z&9/OT/07
25X1 B
25X10
From direct data defining
Soviet MRB unit reactions and refire time, it is possible
to conclude that the units found in Cuba have a four to six
hour refire capability.
It was estimated that0the third site near San Cristobal
addition, only 50 per cent of the necessary equipment for a
and 2, and there were differences in configuration. In
and two missile transporters. However, the support structures
at this facility were more extensive than those at Sites 1
might be a launch site because it contained two launchers
Sagua In Grande Area:
The two sites in this area, covered by photography of
25X1D were designated improved field type sites
because of their more permanent appearance . They
closely resembled the sites in the San Cristobal area, but
the terrain features here dictated considerable clearing and
grading for deployment of the system. There were also several
permanent structures at the launch pad areas which were not
found at the San Cristobal sites.
25X1 D
At this time it was estimated that the launch sites in
this area could be operational within one week; the estimate
was on further analysis lengthened to 1 November. Launchers
were already being emplaced on the pad clearings, and
missiles and related equipment, including an appropriate
number of fuel trucks, were in the area. Thirty-five vehicles
arrived in a support area at Site 1 within the
period between the two photographic missions of
25X1 D
Guanajay Area: 25X1 D
25X1D photographic coverage of this area was obtained on 0
Nearly all features of the sites
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in this area observed to this time indicated heavy construction
of a permanent nature. At Site 1, heavy construction involv-
ing excavations for fuel tanks, transverse cable tunnels, and
25X1D probable vehicle revetments were observed. Concrete was being
poured for launch pads, and two concrete batch plants were
present. The launch pads measured feet, and when
25X1D completed later incl a ring and flame deflector
at the center. Four probable propellant tanks
were located adjacent to one excavation. The site was being
fenced. Site 2, also with four launchers, was in an earlier
stage of construction, and only a few of these features were
observed. At Site 1, the paired pads were separated by 750
feet and were served by a centrally positioned control bunker.
25X1 B
25X1 B
The site configuration was similar in many rep ects to
launch areas at I I which
have been associated with IRBM test firings. The similarities
included launch pad configuration and separations, and vehicle
revetments. Transverse cable tunnels have also been observed
The configuration of
the sites at Guanajay was also similar to thirteen deployed
sites which are believed to be IRBM sites.
No missiles or missile-associated equipment were observed
in Cuba, nor have they been seen elsewhere.
eluded that the sites were intended for the Soviet SS-5 2200
nautical mile missile, although none of these were ever seen
these sites at the time of the photographs. It was thus con-
possibility of mobile missile-related equipment occupying
extent of construction activity was taken to preclude the
in the area of the sites. In addition, the current nature and
The date of operational readiness for Guanajay Site 1
was at this time estimated to be the end of November, and the
other between 15-30 December
Construction of a similar site
.
25X16
om
leted ire 1, period Tt
hoc been
c
p
25X1D can determined from photography that the earliest date
25X1D The appearance of the site no more than six
weeks later indicated an urgency in the site construction
program. The remaining construction work could probably be
completed on this urgent basis in four to six weeks. Six
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25X1 B
 Approved For Re1FOP2$ R
weeks was considered the earliest time that this site could
reach an operational status and still allow time for a
thorough check of installed equipment, and Site 2 appeared
to lag Site 1 by about one month.
25X1 D
Possible central missile checkout, storage, and repair
bases were also located at this time at Soroa, between the
two western deployment areas, and at Managua, south of Havana.
Photography of and subsequent analysis,
confirmed a new offensive missile site at Remedios, which
was quickly identified as an IRBM site. It was in an early
stage of construction. Initial excavations in the launch
pad area had been completed and clearing for cabling and
the control bunker were completed, as well as footings for
the other control bunker. A concrete batch plant had been
established, and a
was under construction. As at Guanajay, no missile equipment
was identified in the area. The site appeared to be in the
same general stage of construction as Guanajay Site 2.
Analysis of these IRBM sites in these different stages of
construction provided a basis for determining the characteristics
of a completed site. A centrally located launch control bunker
serves two launch pads. Cables from a vehicle revetment to
the launcher are below ground level in a preformed concrete
conduit which is large enough to allow launch crew access.
This design facilitates refire capability. The entire site is
permanent in nature.
An MRBM battalion,.on the other hand, has the capability
of conducting launch operations from unimproved launch areas.
However, in order to achieve a better readiness and maintenance
capability, certain improvemehts are necessary. These include
missile-ready shelters, launch pad leveling, and stabilization
and revetments. Preliminary analysis indicates that erection
of the missile is accomplished by use of the missile trans-
porter in conjunction with the launcher-erector,' probably
using an "A" frame technique. Each missile is serviced by
two oxidizer trucks and one fuel truck. A small revetted
area located about sixty feet away contains a possible check-
out panel and/or power supply. The identifications and
location of complete missile checkout equipment has not been
determined. After firing, a second missile, with its
associated fuel and oxidizer trucks, is brought to the site
and the operation is repeated.
25X1D Beginning of low altitude flights. High altitude photog-
raphy through provided additional information on
continuing construction of the sites, but no important new
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 Approved For RTQReEkW OT7
details were forthcoming until the commencement of low
altitude flights. The restrictions on low altitude re-
connaissance were removed following the President's speech
25X1D on 22 October, and intensive coverage of the missile sites
and other installations was begun, using reconnaissance
versions of the Navy F8-U and the Air Force RF-lOl (Photo
These aircraft were directed to fly at altitudes below
25X1D The results were striking, and quickly
permitted more accurate analysis of the operational readi-
ness of the Soviet offensive missile sites.
Soviet response. As might be expected, there was
Sovie response to these low altitude missions. Conventional
25X16 anti-aircraft artillery was de to ed
On several occasions pilots returning from low altitude
missions reported that they believed they had been fired on
by ground batteries, but that the shooting was ineffective.
There is no way of determining whether the batteries in these
instances were manned by Soviet or Cuban personnel.
25X1 B
25X1D Continuation of site construction. Low altitude photo-
graphy at an Cristobal Launch Site oni _j showed
considerable activity. Five canvas-covered missile trans-
? 25X1D were observable. A
truck was visible half-way out o one end of one of these
tents, suggesting the possibility of an additional missile
transporter. A missile erector was observed under canvas,
with cabling linking the firing position with command con-
trol equipment positioned nearby in the woods. Five
camouflaged, van-type vehicles on wooden hard-stands were
positioned to the side of each launch position. Probable
theodolite stations were present, with at least one being
used. A POL storage area contained four large tanks and
porters and seven drive-through, missile-ready tents
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25X1 D
25X1 B
25X1 D
 Approved For RTQse'200#TtO :CIA-RDP78T05439A0003001 0013-4
25X1 D
a large number of drums similar to 55-gal. drums. Sixteen
oxidizer trailers and eight fuel trailers are ground together
in one area Twelve tracked prime movers and
four trucks with special van-type bodies were also noted in
this same area.
25X1 B
At Site 3 at San Cristobal, it was possible to tell
from this low altitude photography that from each of the
four leveled launch pads a cable extended to a three-.sided
bundled and was suspended above ground by short stakes.
At three of the pads, a possible theodolite was located
under a roofed shelter, about 60 to 70 feet from the pad.
Three of the four erectors were in position, and all four
erectors were canvas covered. There were four missile-
ready tents, only one possible missile transporter, and
six truck-mounted vans.
Particularly good quality photo ra h was acquired
of the Sagua la Grande Site 2 on showing that
25X1D the site had the necessary personnel equipment, and
facilities to be fully operational Only four
missile transporters had been observed to this date. There
were 16 oxidizer trailers and eight fuel trailers in the
area. A wide looping service road ran into the launch
positions where a canvas-covered missile erector and launch
stand were emplaced. Vehicle trackage into one of the
missile shelter tents indicated that a missile and trans-
porter might be inside. Camouflage netting was being
25X1D stretched out near the missile erector prior to being
placed across the site. In low level photo-
graphy four canvas-covered erectors and launch stands were
25X1D emplaced on prepared launch positions with cabling in
place. Five missile-ready tents, 100 0 feet, were then
in the area. Two vans were parked near a group of three
missile-ready tents; two large ducts led from the vans to
the tents, possibly for heating, airconditioning or de-
humidifying the tents.
25X1 D
25X1 D
The I low level reconnaissance over Guanajay
produced considerable evidence of Soviet activity. At Site
1 surveying equipment and personnel were noted on two of
the pads, and at Site 2 bulldozers were in the process of
excavating and grading the launch pad positions. An open
storage area at Site 1 contained many pre-formed concrete
slabs of various sizes, and at Site 2 there were stock-
piles of pre-formed concerte slabs in the pad areas.
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 Approved For RRI0e9E(GRE07
Trucks could be seen moving about the area of Site 2, and
large, truck-mounted cranes were being used in loading and
offloading material.
25X1D Byl there was practical certainty that the
field-type MRBM sites were for the SS-4. (SANDAL) 1100
nautical mile ballistic missile system... All of the essential
elements of this system had been identified: canvas-covered
missile transporters, launch stands, erectors, oxidizer and
fuel trucks, cabling, theodolite stations, power generators,
and communications equipment. The evidence was also clear
that the Guanajay and Remedios sites were for a different
missile system from that employed at the field-type MRBM
sites. The pad design, size, and separation were compatible
with what are believed to be IRBM installations
25X1D Low-level photography of San Cristobal Site 1 on 0
(Photo 20) showed only four of the eight previously
25X1D identified missile transporters. These four were without
nosecones. The missing transporters were probably in the
ready tents. Cabling could be seen running from the missile-
ready tent into the woods where power generators were pro-
bably located. This suggested that the missile was either
being checked out or was being held in readiness. The four
missiles in open storage had not been checked out or mated
with their nosecones.
With respect to IRBM's,additional analysis ofi
low level photography showed that at Remedios there was an
improved road with wide radius turns approximately 3 1/2 miles
southeast of the previously identified site. The road termin-
ated at the edge of a wooded area which was possibly the
planned location for a second site in the area. The large
mount of prefabricated concrete forms and other construction
material in open storage areas would be adequate to support
25X1D an additional site.
As of there was no evidence of any intention
.,. L.e,t --tr.,e-tinn_ dismantle or move the missile sites.
25X1 B
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25X1 B
25X1 D
 Approved For RJILMe QFAT
25X1 B
Indications of operational activity. There was also at
this time considerable evidence of operational activity as
well as the continuation of construction activity. At some
of the sites, missiles were being moved about, implying a suc-
cessive checking out of the missiles in the ready tents.
Although no specific indicators were detected, warhead check-
out may also have been occurring in the ready tents, although
there is no direct knowledge that warheads were or are present
in Cuba. There was also considerable movement of vehicles at
all MRBM sites. At Sagua la Grande there was heavy trackage
in the launch areas, and at Site 2 heavy trackage in the vicin-
ity of the erectors and oxidizer and fuel trailers indicated
that the system had been exercised, possibly at night.
25X1D At the Guanajay Site 1 IRBM installation, construction
and vehicle activity was marked and at least 44 missile-support
25X1D vehicles were identified in an area some 500 yards south o
the o en storage area. None were in the immediate area onlI
25X1D and only 6 could be seen on the photography.
Some appeared similar to that seen at MRBM sites, including
2 fuel trailers, 2 oxidizer trailers, 2 tracked prime movers,
and 7 van-type trucks. The vehicles were located in the edge
25X1D of a wooded area and other equipment may have been hidden from
view. On there had been an increase to at least
61 vehicles, including two additional possible fuel trailers.
All four possible fuel trailers were definitely larger than
those seen at MRBM sites.
A possible regimental headquarters was discovered approxi-
mately midway between Guanajay IRBM Sites 1 and 2. The area
25X1D contained approximately ten buildings, all of which were present
in This is a known military camp, which may have
been occupied by Soviets; vehicles and personnel were visible,
and there was evidence of vehicle movement between the area
and Sites 1 and 2.
Adjacent to this headquarters area, a microwave communi-
cations station was identified, with one of two parabolic
antennas oriented toward a large, high-frequency radio station
near Bauta, and the other undetermined. At Sagua la Grande
Site 2, a microwave relay tower with two dish antennas oriented
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 Approved For ReIGA EffiC016T
approximately 1350/3150 was found, to the rear of the launch
area, with three associated camouflaged communication vans.
Microwave towers were also identified at San Cristobab MRBM
Sites 1 and 3. This would suggest an integrated microwave
command and control communication system, but the use of high
frequency radio is also indicated by the presence of high fre-
quency antennas at Sagua la Grande Sites 1 and 2.
25X1D Automatic anti-aircraft weapons and personnel trenches
for protection against air attack were evident at many of the
25X16 MRBM sites, introduced within the few days before
photography taken on
1 1. Ground fire was noted on the low-level photographic
25X1 D
25X1 D
25X1 D
25X1 B
25X1 D
Situation on the date
of the Soviet decision to remove the offensive missile bases
from Cuba, it was possible to summarize the situation as fol-
lows (information up through detailed analysis of low-altitude
A total of 33 missile-transporters and 33 missile-ready
tents had been identified. With the 24 launchers of the 6
MRBM sites believed to be fully operational, there was a cap-
ability to launch up to 24 1100 n.m. missiles within six to
eight hours of a decision to do so and a refire capability of
up to 24 additional MRBM's within four to six hours. Activity
was continuing at all the MRBM and IRBM sites covered by the
was an increase in defensive measures, e.g., a 6-gun 57 m.m.
AAA position with WHIFF radar and rangefinder at San Cristobal
Site 1.
No IRBM missiles, missile tranports or erectors had been
identified. However, there were oxidizer trailers and possible
fuel transporters, larger in size than similar transporters
at MRBM sites. No new MRBM or IRBM sites had been detected;
however, there had been no high altitude coverage appropriate
for search since There was evidence of the
25X1 D
25X1 B
however, judged not to be ready for storage, assembly or checkout.
photographic missions.
TOP SECRET
 TOP SECRETI
On 28 October Scrambler communications between the USSR
and Cuba were established, thus meeting the requirement of
the deployed missile units in Cuba for a communications
syste^ which is both very secure and capable of handling a
large volume of traffic. These links were the best candidates
to date for Soviet command and control of the missile forces
in Cuba.
25X1 B
25X1 D
25X1 B
25X1 B
25X1 B
Soviet decision to remove missiles. At the critical
period us after rum c ev s announcement that the of-
fensive missile sites would be removed,
Available evidence did not, however, indicate Soviet
preparation for dismantling or vacating the offensive missile
sites identified in Cuba. On the contrary, full operational
capability at all MRBM sites still existed as of mid-afternoon,
that construction activity was continuing at the San Cristobal
and Sagua la Grande MRBM sites, but limited and poor photog-
raphy of the IRBM sites precluded positive assessment of con-
struction activity.
Many of the missile erectors at the MRBM sites had been
moved from their hardstands and were no longer visible (photo
22). There was evidence that at least one of these erectors
as were the majority of the
missile-associated vehicles and equipment. Launch stands,
cabling, and other components of the launching complexes were
still in place at each of the IQRBK sites, although if the
sites were being dismantled one would expect the cabling to
be removed first. The movement of erectors away from positions
next to the launch stands was judged to have no effect on full
operational capability, provided the erectors remained in
the general area.
at Sawua la Grande. Guanajay, and Remedios.
Soviet offensive missile orgp.nization in Cuba. It is
believed that the diets intended to deploy a to al of five
missile regiments in Cuba, two at San Cristobal and one each
TOP SECRET
25X1
25X1 B
25X1 B
25X1 B
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Approved For Release 2004/07/07 : CIA-RDP78TO5439A000300130013-4
 7FX1A On 4 November, Kuznetsov in conversation
This pattern was substantially realized at all of the
MRBM sites in Cuba. A total of 33 MRBM missiles were
identified through photography; 23 at the San Cristobal
sites and 10 at Sagua la Grande. The fact that at least
six missile transporters were observed at four of the six
MRBM sites, or more than one missile per launcher, leads
us to the belief that the Soviets intended to follow
normal doctrine and provide two missiles per launcher at
each MRBM site in Cuba.
Although we did not observe the estimated total of
48 MRBMs, knowledge of the actual number probably is in-
complete because of limitations on air coverage and Soviet
efforts at camouflage and concealment. It was estimated
on 5 November that there almost certainly were more MRBM
missiles in Cuba than the 33 observed. 25X1A
25X1 B
(presumably either MRBM or IRBM or both). Although the
Kuznetsov statement cannot be substantiated, the number
used would accord with the estimate that about seven ships
carrying at least six missiles and missile transporters
each have arrived in Cuba. If we assume that the number
25X18 of missiles actually delivered was 41 or 42, then 7 or 8
Some IRBM missile support equipment was observed at
Guanaj ay . J
25X1 B
However, no IRBMs were observed during the removal
of offensive missiles from Cuba, whereas the "missing"
MRBMs were detected during this phase. It is assumed,
therefore, that no IRBMs had been brought to Cuba. Even
if IRBMs were hidden, the sites (unlike those for MRBMs)
take a considerable time to construct,which could be detected
by continuing surveillance.
Approved For Rele a A 7T~
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25X1 B
 Approved For ReTIPPe M / b
3. Time Factors in Construction of Soviet Missile
Bases in Cuba
Relation .to type of site. The type of IRBM site
that appeared to be under cons rumen in Cuba would have
required about two and one-half to three months after the
time of the initial site survey to achieve full operational
capability. With good quality photography, the first identi-
fication of this type of IRBM site could be made within two
or three weeks after the survey, or nine to ten weeks prior
to full operational status. None of the three identified
IRBM sites in Cuba had reached an operational capability
prior to withdrawal.
The MRBM sites in Cuba were of a field type, requiring
a minimum amount of construction prior to the emplacement of
equipment. These sites appear to have reached full operational
capability in about three to four weeks after arrival of basic
equipment at the site. Positive identification of the type
of MRBM sites observed in Cuba would be difficult even with
good quality photography prior to the arrival of the missile
trailer and launcher erector equipment at the site. In
Cuba, this critical point in the delivery of equipment
appears to have occurred about two weeks before the site
became fully operational. Camouflage, concealment, or de-
ception efforts could make positive identification more
difficult.
Under optimum conditions, it would take no more than a
week to complete the initial site survey, site preparation,
and installation of equipment necessary for the type of MRBM
system deployed in Cuba to achieve full operational status.
With good photography, a site for such a system could be
identified upon arrival of the missile equipment, which could
occur within the first three to four days, or as late asr
eighteen hours prior to full operational capability. At any
time during site preparation an emergency capability to
launch at least one missile could be achieved in about eighteen
hours after the missile unit arrived at the pre-surveyed site.
Such an emergency effort was never made in Cuba.
Site timing as revealed by clandestine reporting. A
thoroug review of re ugee reports concerning the general areas
in which IRBM and MRBM sites were found produced some prob-
able indicators of scheduling. This collateral information
indicated that plans to deploy ballistic missiles in Cuba
were being implemented by the end of August. Site locations
TOP SECRET
 25X1 B
probably all of the an Cristobal sites were selected wx
25X1 C
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0013-4 25X1 D
apparently had been selected and the surveys for the initial
installations were probably completed by that time.* IRBM
site construction was apparently under way in and
preceded the MRBM sites. This sequence is also indicated by
the photography.
San Cristobal Area. Reported activities indicate that
f
MRBM deployment in August
Material delivered to the project included lumber and pre-
fabricated concrete forms. This suggests that site con-
struction was under way at that time.
Gruana j ay Area .
25X1 C
Prefabricated
25X1D concrete slabs up to in size and more than
30 dark colored cylindrical tanks about 30 feet long and 10
feet in diameter were offloaded about 8 August. Tubular and
25X1D semicircular shaped concrete forms arrived in Mariel during
the same period. Similar items have been photographed at
25X1C this material was designed for use in building
25X1C missile ases, and that some of the cargo was delivered to
25X1C the Bauta area. On
25X1 D
special construction was well under way at this time at
locations coincident to the two IRBM sites. This indication
that construction activities were probably under way in Sep-
tember is compatible with photographic evidence that work was
initiated after
This analysis is ex post facto. It appears possible that
similar indications could have been obtained by such analysis
earlier, perhaps by
25X1 D
TOP SECRET
25X1 B
25X1 D
25X1 C
25X1 C
25X1 C
 Approved For ReTOR S CRFDT:
25X1D
.,`.ieemedios Area. Concrete forms similar to those observed
at :Yarie were o loaded-at the port of La Isabela during.
August On construction equipment in the
general area of Remedios was commandeered by the militia for
25X1C use in improving access roads.
a roc e
base?was,being constructed by the Soviets at a location now.
25X1C ideutifi-edtfrom photography as Remedios Site 1. A second
base` a missile site was not found in
photography although new road construction was observed in
thd: !area.
25X1 D
25X1 D
25X1 B
Ship .re uirements. After, . identif ication - of the
KRBM missiles in Cu. a, was clearly of interest to determine
how and when they had been sent there, since no visual evidence
of their shipment had been obtained. Because of their size,
it was determined that the only possible way for Soviet SANDAL
missiles to reach?Cuba clandestinely was to transport them
below ,the, decks of large hatch-ships,. of the kind shown in a
Although our naval re-
connaissance aircraft photographed these shi s and carefully
analyzed their deck cargoes, as the photograph
shows there.was no evidence of missile equipment. Only con-
ventional cargo trucks appeared on the deck. Alter the event,
25X1 C
Suitable Soviet ships. Several Soviet ships were found
25X1D to have a c es large enough-to load SANDAL missiles. 25X1D
25X1D These made a total of six voyages to-Cuba
25X1D or 9trt-way, mostly involving delivery of military equipment.
_eTbe was en route to Cuba from the Black.Sea with
mil ary equipment-at the-time the quarantine was established,
with-an estimated arrival date of about 3 November. It was
one of the seven Soviet ships contacted by individual cipher
messages from Moscow six hours after the president's public
25X1D statement regarding the quarantine, and it turned back toward
the Soviet Union. The Darrived.at Mariel on 28 July from
the Black Sea, with a suspected arms cargo, arrived again at
an unidentified Cuban port on 7-8 September and again in mid-
25X1D October, both times.from the Black Sea, and with suspected
arms cargo. The arrived'in Cuba on 29 August and
about 8 or 10 October, a so from the Black Sea and with a
4.: The Shipping of Missiles into Cuba..
TOP SECRET
 suspected arms cargo. Other possible ballistic missile
carriers are
land this ship made voyages from
the Black Sea to Cuba in August and September with probable
military equipment, and was en route to Cuba at the time
25X1D of the quarantine. It is estimated that the holds beneath
such long hatches are probably capable of storing 24 crated
missiles of 70' dimensions or about 16 missiles
mounted on these trans orters without --tin
Approved For ReTe MKT
cargoes. The seven ships just listed made a total of 13 25X1D
it turned around. The made
one voyage to Cuba from the Baltic in mid-August, and one
from the Black Sea in early October, both suspected arms
cargoes, and was en route from the Baltic in October when 25X1D
hatch opening; it arrived in Cu a rom the Baltic in ugust,_
from the Black Sea in September, both judged to be arms
included the ten IL-28's. The 25X1D
The was one of the ships that reversed course,
and was photographed in the Baltic on with a
deck cargo which included two special IRBM launch ring
transport trucks, one of which contained an IRBM launch
ring and flame deflector, and other missile-associated
equipment, thus confirming the surmise that it carried 25X1D
25X1D missiles on its earlier trips.
ma a one voyage to Cuba,
arriving is early October. Its military car o at that time
25X1 D
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On the other hand, the was one of the ships which
took missiles out of Cu Da deck-loaded; therefore it may not
25X1D have been possible to use its hold for missiles. Also, the
were the ships which removed
a1T 42 of a -28's from a deck-loaded, even though
they could apparently have loaded the crates into the hold.
25X1C Soviet unloading procedures. A report 25X1C
stated that when a
Soviet vessel approached for unloading military equipment
in Havana, the standard procedure was for two Cuban sub-
chasers to escort it into harbor from about six to eight
miles off the coast. Other Cuban vessels patrol and maintain
surveillance of the route of the vessel, and the waters around
the dock are searched by Soviet frogmen, sixteen of whom are
based at the naval arsenal in Havana. Frogmen apparently
perform similar duties at Mariel.
m er carr ers, L-M Y. I 25X1D
have missile-carrying ca acit
25X1D Soviet ti b i
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when the missiles and equipment had been brought to Cuba,
they had been unloaded from Soviet ships with the greatest
precautions. Soviet personnel were dressed "in special
costumes and even wore masks." When the missiles were re-
loaded for embarkation the personnel were dressed merely in
shorts and shirts,
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Collateral evidence. There have been indications that
between the USSR and Cuba. These links were probably not
suitable for command purposes, but more likely were intended
weapon shipments in transit to military units.
During the crisis, the KGB established three Morse links of
relatively slow transmission and low data handling capability
for traffic of an administrative character.
and the security arrangements required for Soviet personnel
would logically explain KGB presence. The characteristics
of the communications links tends to favor the latter ex-
planation.
C. Soviet IL-28 Jet Light Bombers in Cuba.
The IL-28. As was mentioned earlier, the Soviet ship
0
capable of
ranges of 590 nautical miles and return. wing-
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tip tanks
to ranges of 740 nautical miles. The aircraft is capable o
speeds up to,465 knots.
In summary, by late October 42 of these unassembled
bombers had been delivered to Cuba, by ship, and were sent to
San Julian airfield in the west and Holguin in the east.
San Julian received 33 disassembled aircraft, of which
13 were uncrated and seven completely assembled. None of the
other nine aircraft delivered to Holguin were ever uncrated.
Of the 21 fuselage crates and one fuselage photographed at San 25X1D
Julian on ten were those seen on the and
the remainder it is believed were delivered in late September
on one or two ships, which were never photographed at sea. 25X1D
Seven more IL-28 crates were photographed on thel
before it arrived in Cuba on These too, were
taken to San Julian, bringing the total there to 29. Photo-
graphs of the
showed l IL-29 crates on deck. These photographs
number of crates. The arrived in Cuba about o ZjL
October, but was not photographed again. It delivered nine
fuselage crates to Banes, from where they were delivered to
Holguin. The remaining four crates were delivered to Mariel,
and taken to San Julian during the first week in November.
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Thus only three ships were photographed with IL-28 crates,
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F-
Early indications of IL-28's in Cuba. Although the dis-
covery of these crates on a ship headed or Cuba had been the
stimulus for the reconnaissance missions of
once probable offensive missile sites were found priority
As early as August 1962 there had been a
was rightly given to them, and there was little reportin
25X1D in summary material at least, on the IL-28's. On
arriva s o cra es containing IL- bombers, but these were
not confirmed. The estimate that the crates seen on the
probably contained IL-28's was reported to the
intelligence community on 10 October. On 21 October it was
reported that extensive construction had been noted at Holguin
airfield, but it was not until surfacing of the Cuban offensive
weapons picture that comments began to appear on IL-28's.
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report that Soviet personnel had completely taken over the
air base at San Julian. This report
also included statements that
Soviet military personnel had occupied all of the coastal
positions in Pinar del Rio which had been manned previously
by Cubans, and that Soviets and Czechs controlled the aikr
b"e at San Antonio de los Banos. F__ I
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San Antonio
d los Banos is one of the three fields associated with MIG-21
jet fighters, which to the present time are apparently operated
by Soviets and Czechs.
25X1 C
repor a in mid-October that although
a e was defended by Cuban military personnel
guarding the entrance to the base, Cubans were not permitted
on the base, which was occupied only by Soviet Bloc personnel.
Photographic confirmation. Previous coverage of San
Julian airfield a revea a no evidence of aircraft act ty,
but when high-altitude photographs were made on
21 shipping crates measuring 60 feet in length and conform- 25X1D
fuselage. The latter directly confirmed the earlier judgment
of the contents of the crates. In addition to the large
fuselage crates, component crates were also observed.
observed near the center of the airfield and one exposed
ing to the crate configuration f
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During the next few weeks the Soviets assembled several
of the IL-28 bombers at San Julian, and when low-altitude
25X1D reconnaissance began the details became known. Only partial
coverage of the field was obtained on but two
IL-28's had been assembled, two were partially assembled,
and there were 23 fusels a crates bringing the total IL-28's
in Cuba to at least 27. a convoy of 35 trucks,
27 of which were towing twin-mount 30 mm anti-aircraft artil-
lery, was observed on the main entrance road behind the oper-
ations area. It was reported on 29 October that one IL-28
was in the final stage of assembly, both engines having been
25X1D installed, and three more in-various stages of assembly. A
photograph of showed two aircraft in an advanced
stage of assembly, an other aircraft, aircraft components, 25X1D
and shipping crates (photo 27). On two six-gun
AAA sites, at least one of which was occup a and manna
were discovered at the airfield, in addition to one con-
crete pillbox and at least eight small log and dirt bunkers
25X1D with firing slits. San Julian had earlier (at least up to
weapons positions, trenches, etc.
Status of IL-28s at time of missile removal. There was
25X1D continuing assembly o L- s between late
and no evidence of intention to withdraw them rom
Cuba. Nine ' fuselage crates were identifiedi at
25X1 D Holguin Airfield 25X1 D
25X1D almost certainly the crates observed on
before it docked at Banes near Holguin on 20 or 21 c o er.
With the nine aircraft and twenty fuselage crates at San
Julian airfield, and the four fuselage crates observed at ?
a transshipment point near San Julian, the newly identified
crates raised the total of IL-28's and IL-28 crates observed
in Cuba to forty-two.
Work had begun earlier in the year on lengthening the
runways at Holguin and building covered aircraft revetments
there. This work was apparently completed in July, but the 25X1D
airfield was used little if at all up to the date.
The sixteen covered revetments were similar to those used
by MIG fighters at three other Cuban military airfields.
25X1D Photography of showed a total of twentyfour
IL-28 crates at San Julian, four more than on as--
hich appeared to be completely assembled. On
25X1 D
photography showed that the two partly assembled
at San Julian were not being worked on; and there was no-
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change in the status of other IL-28's or crates at either San
Julian or Holguin. Assembl of IL-28's had been resumed, ac-
cording to photography, and two more IL-28
fuselages had been removed from crates since at
San Julian. Of the seven completely assemble at least one
and probably two were airborne during Four or
five were in various stages of assembly on
compared with only two on
there was no change in the status of the
aircraft at San Julian except for the addition of camouflage
netting. On F_ I thirteen uncrated aircraft had been
seen there, compared to twelve on the preceding day. Cover-
age of San Julian airfield on revealed a total of
thirteen aircraft uncrated, of which seven had been completely
assembled and appeared flyable (four of these were trainers)
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IV. OTHER SOVIET ARMS IN CUBA
A. Coastal Defense Cruise Missiles.
Key beach and harbor areas in Cuba are protected by So-
viet coast defense cruise missiles. Three operational and two
possible coastal defense cruise missile sites have been identi-
fied (photo 30). The Banes site covers a section of the north-
eastern coastal area; Santa Cruz del Norte and Campo Florido
provide cover of beaches east of Havana; Guerra protects the
approaches to Mariel; and Siguanea covers the approaches to
the Isle of Pines. Campo Florido and Guerra, listed as possi-
ble launch sites, may function as cruise missile support and
training centers.
hostile shipping and amphibious landings.
The Soviet cruise missile (modified AS-1). The missile
system deployed at these five sites prow es defense against
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Soviet cruise missile sites in Cuba. The first identifi-
cation of cruise missile deployment in Cuba was made from high
25X1D altitude photography obtained over the Banes area in eastern
Cuba on Preliminary analysis was completed
25X1D on and the site was reported as a probable coastal 25X1
defense cruise missile site. On a detailed anal-
ysis was completed and the facility was con irmed. The site
had two revetted 35' rail launchers, each connected to a Soviet
WHIFF tracking radar. Other equipment included missile trailers,
generators, electronic vans, and general purpose vehicles, as
well as tents for personnel.
The Banes and Santa Cruz del Norte sites were considered
operational at least as early as 18 October. low- A
level photography of the Banes site showed extensive camouflage
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of significant elements of the installation. The site appeared
fully operational.
Photography of the Banes area onl _j revealed that
a road connects the coastal defense cruise missile installation
there with an alternate launch site some 1.1 n.m. to the
25X1D north-northeast. The alternate launch site, first observed
in photography of contains two launch revetments
and nine other rectangular revetments of varying sizes. They
were still unoccupied as of 9 January and no tents or service
facilities were located near the alternate site. No change
was observed in the original site.
25X1 B
western coas of the Isle of Pines, has
The Siguanea cruise missile site, deployed on the south-
launchers emplaced behind earthen revetments.
Some idteresting shifting of equipment took place in con-
nectidn with the Campo _ Florido site. Cruise missile equipment
was noted there at a fairly early stage in the identification
of.cruise missile sites, but photography of
disclosed the presence of a new cruise missile site 3 1/2 miles
southwest of La Sierra, which is located about 15 miles south-
east of Cienfuegos in Las Villas Province. The site appeared
operational and included two canvas-covered transporters aft
of the two launchers. Control positions to the rear of the
two launchers were connected by cable to the launcher and to
unidentified radar in the immediate area. A three-gun, small-
caliber AAA position was observed in the immediate area.
Equipment observed in the area included two vehicle revetments
(one containing a van), three trucks, five arched-roof crates
five tents, and one truck-mounted antenna. As of
however, it was discovered that the equipment at the La Sierra
site had apparently been moved to Campo Florido, located about
ten nautical miles east of Havana. It is possible that some
of the equipment earlier seen at Campo Florido was dispatched
25X1D to and subsequently returned from La Sierra. Photographic
reconnaissance of revealed that the La Sierra
site had been abandoned. No missiles or missile-associated
equipment remained, and the only remnant of the site was the
earthen revetment, which was empty.
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Two uncovered and fully assembled cruise missiles were
noted on at the Campo Florido installation.
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site is located several miles from a coast in a valley, and
2X1D the configuration of the site does not suggest a missile-launch-
ing function.
0
An area near Mayari Arriba in an inland, moutainous area
of Oriente Province some 40 m =es from Guantanamo Naval Base
may also be connected with cruise missiles. Missile-related
equip could at first not be identified was determined
after photography to be similar to equipment at
the Banes cruise missile site. On 24 November, an intercepted
Cuban ground forces VHF voice communication referred to the
presence of a Cuban battalion guarding a Soviet camp at Micara,
which is in the immediate area of Mayari Arriba and may be the
installation described here. Because it was not on the coast,
however, the site was thought to be a supply and storage point
rather than an additional cruise missile site. Reports reach-
ing the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay have also referred to
the storage of military?hequipment, including missiles of
an unidentified type, in this area.
25X1D Further analysis of photography of the area as of
25X1 B
]indicated that eight vehicles
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appear to have any launchers, fuel trucks, or electronic 25X1D
equipment. Forty-eight large crates, F_ j in
size, identical tp crates seem at Cuban coastal defense cruise
missile sites, were noted at Mayari Arriba, and were believed
to contain cruise missiles. Their presence as well as the
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0
25X1D general appearance of the installation suggest that it may
have been planned as a cruise missile support or storage facil-
ity. There was little change in the appearance of the instal-
lation from possibly indicating that
work had been halted.
25X1D Aerial photography of showed twelve
cruise-missile transporters near the Guerra site several miles
west of Mariel. This was the first crime-missile equipment
positively identified at this site. In addition, the photog-
raphy revealed 43-45 crates resembling cruise-missile crates,
and nine prime movers, ten cranes, and at least 150 other
vehicles. Previous photography reveals that such crates were
present in the area earlier than
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31 January 1963 cruise missile summary. The coastal de-
fense cruise missile situation in Cuba was summarized as
follows on 31 January:
Three operational Soviet cruise missile units have been
confirmed in Cuba. They are located in prepared sites at
Santa Cruz del Norte, Banes, and Siguanea on the Isle of
Pines. It is believed that there is a fourth operational
unit which was briefly deployed to the south coast (La Sierra)
in November 1962 and then returned to Campo Florido where it
occupies what may be a stand-by and training site. In addi-
tion to these four units, there are two others, at Mayari
Arriba and Guerra.
The four known operational units are each equipped with
25X1D at least eight cruise missiles and possibly ten, making
for a total of 32-40 operational cruise missiles. In addition,
a total of 94 crates which probably contain cruise missiles
25X1D have been counted in photography of Mayari Arriba (48) and
Guerra (46). The crates at Guerra probably arrived at that
spot between It is not known if they arrived
25X1D by sea during the period immediately prior to I or
if they had already been in storage in Cuba for sometime. Two
25X1D but they were believed to- be- carrying commercial cargoes. The
tractor trailers which are present in the same location as the
crates, however, are now known to have been there since 0
It is believed that each cruise missile unit (probably 25X1D
a battalion) normally has eight missiles -- four for each of
its two launchers. The 94 probable cruise missile crates
stored at Mayari Arriba in the east and Guerra in the west
suggest that the original program called for the deployment
of twelve more cruise missile units en the coasts of Cuba.
The coasts east and west of Havana, east of Banes, east and
west of Santiago de Cuba, and the central southern coasts
are likely areas for such deployments.
It seems likely that the USSR intended to deploy more
than the four operational cruise missile units which have
been identified in Cuba. The three operational sites now
occupied by units give only scant defense to key areas and
possible invasion points. The long stretch of coast to
the east and west of Santiago de Cuba, and the coast in the
south-central area from the Bay of Pigs east, are both un-
covered, although one unit was deployed temporarily to the 25X18
latter in early
November.
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New units may in time be manned by Cuban personnel.
25X1 C
Supplementing the land-based coastal defense missiles
against invasion and shipping are twelve Komar-class guided
missile patrol boats. For some time, eight boats operated
from the port of Mariel in the west, while the remaining four
operated from Banes (photos 32, 33, 34). Between 5 and 7 Jan-
uary 1963 the four stationed at Banes returned to Mariel, ac-
cording to intercepted naval messages and visual sightings
by U.S. Navy elements. The reason for and--aignif icance of
the redeployment are not clear. It may be that all twelve
boats are to,operate out of Mariel in order to train Cuban
crews to man them (the crews have been mixed Soviet and Cuban).
It is also possible that the vessels have been transferred to
Mariel for eventual reshipment to the USSR. The reason for
the move was thought to be an important one, since it left
the Banes area -- the scene of considerable recent construc-
tion of naval port facilities -- and the northeastern sea
approaches to Cuba protected by only one Kronstadt-class
subchaser and one patrol boat.
25X1 B
long launcher cannisters positioned aft. The boats must re-
turn to base or to a tender for reloading. Tenders for these
craft were not as of identified in Cuba. The Komars
have all been transported to u a as deck cargo on Soviet
ships, two and four per shipload. The first shipment arrived
in Havana on
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Intercepted communications during a 30 and 31 January
naval exercise involving a Cuban "frigate" (patrol escort) and
an undisclosed number of Komar-class missile patrol boats tends
to substantiate the view that the Komar boats are tactically
controlled by Soviet personnel during practice activity. The
intercepts reveal that Soviet personnel boarded the Cuban
"frigate" in the company of a Cuban interpreter.
maintenance, there were no indications that any were being
modified to serve as a full-scale submarine base. Also, no
Soviet submarine had been detected operating in the Western
Atlantic since early November.
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vided during the summer of 0 the first confirmatiop of
the presence in Cuba of the MIG-21 came on when
one was observed at the airfield near Santa Clara, parked in
front of four aircraft shipping crates (photo 2). There were
indications that there might be at least thirteen more MIG-21's
at the airfield, still unassembled. Construction of covered
aircraft revetments had been reported at Holguin Airfield
early in but no aircraft were observed, and it was
thought a ere was no increase in the estimate of some
45-48 jet aircraft of earlier models supplied so far by the
Soviet Bloc.
C. MIG-21 Jet Fighter.
First sighting of MIG-21 in Cuba. Although high alti-
tude reconnaissance coverage of uban airfields had been pro-
Location in Cuba. The high-performance MIG-21 interceptor
aircraft, nicknamed ISHBED, has a delta wing configuration
and is capable of speeds up to about 1000 knots at 40,000 feet,
and of ranges up to 290 nautical miles without auxiliary fuel
tanks (photo 35). They are usually armed with two air-to-air
missiles each and have a combat ceiling of 51,000 feet. Three
airfields in Cuba have been associated with deployment of
the MIG-21. Initially, the aircraft were delivered to Santa
Clara airfield in central Cuba where they were than assembled.
(Santa Clara was reportedly taken over by the Soviets during
the first week of September.) Subsequently, some were deployed
to San Antonio de los Banos in the west, and Camaguey in the
East (photo 36). To date, a maximum of 42 MIG-21's have been
identified at these three airfields. 25X1 B
Deliver of MIG-21's to Cuba. The Soviet
w c arrived in Cuba early in September,
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delivered at least twenty-two MIG-21's
and other information strongly suggest
Readiness of MIG-21's at Cuban airfields. In the six-week
period between September and 17 October the Soviets assembled
38 additional MIG-21 aircraft (above the single one first
seen) at Santa Clara airfield. In one photograph they are
he num-
a
ted to
ber of MIG-21's in Cuba as of 26 September was estim
be between 25 and 30; these were in addition to about 60 MIG
fighters and trainers of earlier models delivered during 1961.
25X1D shown parked along a taxiway in groupings of 11, 12 and 16
Other aircraft noted at the field
include 20 MIG-15 Fagot fighters and three liaison types.
The fact that some of the MIG-21's were flyable was con-
firmed by high altitude photography acquired a day later than
the previous photograph; a MIG-21 in flight was observed
35 MIG-21's and four more probables were located at Santa
Clara, raising the total of MIG's of all types to nearly 100.
By 21 October the four probables had been confirmed. Communi-
cations intercepts indicated that the pilots and controllers
spoke Spanish with a Slavic accent. The first Comint indica-
tion of MIG-21 operation was on 18 October; the pilot was
Soviet, and there were indications in his conversation that
the aircraft had a retractable nose cone, and thus was of the
newest generation of fighters.
Air-to-air missiles on MIG-21s. The first evidence of
air-to-air missiles in Cuba was provided by
photography at Santa Clara airfield, although it ha earlier
been assumed that Cuba's recently acquired MIG-21's would be
equipped with these weapons (photo 39). This missile, de-
signated as the AA-2 and nicknamed ATOLL, was observed lying
in front of one of the aircraft in preparation for loading.
Other MIG-21 aircraft observed in the area already had air-to-
air missiles loaded beneath their wings. The ATOLL missile
25X1 B
25X1D it had been determined that eleven of tha
MIG-21C jet fighters at Santa Clara were armed with the air
to-air missiles. A total of 29 of these fighters could be
seen. Low-level photography of San Antonio de los Banos
airfield on the same date showed 8 MIG-21C's, also equipped
with missile launchers, and provided the first information on
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25X1D Number of MIG-21s found in Cuba. High-level photography
of over the military a rfields near San Antonio
de los Banos and Santa Clara revealed a total of forty-two
MIG-21 jet fighters at the two airfields. The highest number
25X1D of MIG-21's previously accounted for was thirty-nine, which
were first seen at Santa Clara airfield on It is
considered almost certain that all the MIG-21 aircraft in
25X1D Cuba arrived there before photog-
raphy also revealed continued construction of aircraft revet-
ments at the San Antonio de los Banos airfield. In this case,
as with the MRBM's, it is interesting to speculate where the
additional ones, beyond those observed by aerial photography,
were.
D. Soviet Armored Forces and Ground Equipment.
Locations. Soviet ground forces are deployed in Cuba
at four major installations (photo 40). Each installation
includes a regimental size armored task force with modern
Soviet ground force fighting equipment, including tactical
rocket launchers. A rtemisa and Santiago de las Vegas are
located in western Cuba near Havana. Remedios is situated in
central Cuba, and Holguin, the location also of an important
military airfield, is in the east.
25X1 D
"Standard" ground armaments had been furnished to the
Cuban forces since the beginning of Soviet militar assistance
to Cuba, but after discovery as early as of the
large encampment and vehicle storage area near Remedios (photo
41), there evidence began to accumulate that Soviet ground
forces were present in Cuba in greater strength than was
previously apparent. The Remedios encampment contained what
was thought to be a FROG (Free Rocket Over Ground) launcher
on an amphibious tank cbasgis anU thirty-one-probably T-54 tanks.
A tank park containing thirty-four probable T-54 tanks was
also found near Havana on the same date.
Equipment, description, and organization. Analysis of
photographic coverage available up to I I suggested
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that the four major military camps in Cuba contained highly
mobile composite Soviet Army ground combat forces of regimental
size These units had
earlier been equated to four reinforced medium tank battalions,
a FROG artillery rocket battalion, and a SNAPPER antitank
missile unit, with a total strength of about 1,200 men. It
now seems that these composite groupings contain a total of 25X16
well over 4,000 troops. The presence of Soviet Army units
in such strength reflects
to create and maintain a strategic missile base in Cuba.
With the removal of the missile bases, it was thought that
the ground combat units might also be withdrawn, although no
preparations for their departure have been noted.
All four of these camps evidently had been established
since the beginning of the Soviet build-up in July, and they
have certain similarities. While most of their facilities
were of a temporary character, construction of permanent build-
ings similar to those at the missile sites has been started. 25X1B
Modern sophisticated equipment,
was identified
at each of these camps. At one--Santiago de las Vegas--So-
viet Army emblems, including the elite "Guards" unit badge,
the armored'insignia, and the Red Army Star, were prominently
displayed on the ground at two separate areas.
The disposition of these units also reflect their Soviet
identity; all are in areas containing sensitive military in-
stallations of prime interest to the Soviets. Three are near
the former offensive missile bases, and the fourth is adjacent
to the strategically significant airfield at Holguin in east- 25X1B
ern Cuba. Runways over 10,000 feet long and
hangars ans storage facilities are being built at this field,
Since there were some differences in the types and
quantities of equipment identified at these camps--because
of camouflage, dispersal and incomplete coverage--the exact
composition and strength of the units had not been established
as of the November date. The pattern, however, appeared to
be that of a composite, heavily armed grouping consisting of
a medium tank battalion, an armored reconnaissance company,
an armored infantry unit of company or possibly battalion
strength, a multiple rocket launcher battery,
FROG artillery rocket battlaion with two launchers, and a
SNAPPER antitank missile company with about nine triple
launchers. At least one of the groupments (Holguin) also
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included a 120-mm. mortar company with 10 pieces (photo 42),
a 57-mm. antitank battery, an antiaircraft unit with self-
propelled guns, which may be new-model. 85-mm. (SU-85) guns
with auxiliary fuel tanks, and an engineer unit with self-
propelled hydraulic bridging equipment. Each of the camps
also has one or two emplaced antiaircraft batteries, but these
may not be organic to the mobile groupment. A formation of
this composition would comprise at least 1,000 to 1,500 men,
and possibly as many as 2,500. There were enough tents in the
cantonments at Holguin to house more than twice that number
of troops under normal field billeting conditions.
25X1 B
The introduction into Cuba of Soviet ground combat
forces is consistent with a capability not only to defend
their sensitive installations against invasion, but also
to secure them against "counterrevolutionary" activity.
Their presence also provides also provides the Soviets a
potent source of influence on the internal Cuban scene.
Retention of these units in Cuba after the withdrawal of the
MRBM's would seem to indicate that Moscow has not abandoned
the concept of developing Cuba as a strategic Soviet mili-
tary base.
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SUMMARY OF EQUIPMENT AT MILITARY CAMPS IN CUBA
SANTIAGO DE
TYPE HOLGUIN REMEDIOS LAS VEGAS ARTEMISA
T-54 tank 30 prob 33 39 30
SU-100 Assault 9 9 2 plus 9
SNAPPER AT
Missile
1 - 2
Armored Personnel 7 14
Carrier (BTR-50)
8-Wheel Personnel 11 Poss 8 Poss
Carrier
Multiple Rocket - 5-6
Launcher
57-mm. AT Gun 2
120-mm. Mortar
AAA Battery
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10 Poss 9-10 Poss 6 Poss 2 Poss
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The camps were discovered to be similar in configuration
and to include numerous platoon and squad tents in unit group-
ings and a large motor pool area. Ground forces equipment was
parked in the open. The early high-altitude photography was
helpful in locating garrison areas, but had to be supplemented
by low altitude photography in order to determine the types
of equipment deployed at the four locations.
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(photo 43). It was possible to count and identify numerous
other kinds of vehicles and equipment (e.g., photos 41, -42,
43, 44).
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The FROG system. The FROG free flight tactical rocket
system included in the Soviet arms delivered to Cuba provides
a long-range artillery support capability. The weapons iI
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on a standard amphibious PT-76 tracked tank chassis and are
capable of ranges between eleven and twenty-six nautical
miles. They are highly mobile and may be employed in either
offensive or defensive roles to supplement the firepower of
_
I
25X18 tube-type artillery. F
FROGs were probably intended for forces defending the MRBM and
IRBM sites. Their mobility makes them suitable for use, in
conjunction with other armored equipment, as part of a mobile
defense force against amphibious invasion.
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The number, organization and type of
FROG units in Cuba are not known with certainty. A low level
photograph of the Remedios camp taken oa shows a
group of six FROG transporters clustered beneath the natural
camouflage of tree foliage and secured by a double wire fence.
These transporters are used only to transport the FROG whereas
the erector-launcher is used to erect,
aim and launch the FROG. This equipment has been observed in
heavily secured and camouflaged areas at three of the Soviet
military camps in Cuba. None has been observed at Holguin.
The SNAPPER antitank missile system. In addition to the
FROG missile, the Soviets also brought into Cuba their most
modern antitank missile system. This new system, nicknamed
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parking area at the Artemisa Military Camp showed Soviet
SNAPPERS in line near a heavily wooded sector (photo-44).
The triple rail launchers were exposed on two vehicles, while
others appeared to have the launch section covered. A total
of eight SNAPPERS was observed at this location on F_ I
the SNAPPER was also observed at Remedios, Santiago-de las
Vegas, and Holguin.
Continuing construction at Soviet military camps. As air
25X1D photographic coverage of the four Soviet encampments continued,
it was found that not only was there no indication of removal
of these forces, but the equipment continued to increase, and
construction of permanent facilities was continued and com-
25X1D pleted. As of activity was continuing at
two of the four identified Soviet military encampments covered
in high-altitude photography of At the encampment
near Artemisa, construction on ten buildings was completed
25X1D and another nineteen were being built. This represents an in- 25X1D
crease of nine over these noted in photography of
and six more than were observed on The presence
at this camp of 180 vehicles and pieces of equipment, in-
cluding five probable FROG rocket transporters and an unidenti-
25X1 B fied number of tanks and trucks, was also noted on
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25X1 D - , ___ , ..._...., ~~~+...~...,..~ ..-P , -* ,,4,. I e 25X1 D
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This system consists of three missiles mounted
on retractable short-rail launchers installed on a modified
amphibio ed personnel carrier BRDM). The missile
25X1D measures in length and has a maximum ran a of 2500
meters, minimum range 600 meters; body diameter is
It is estimated to be capable at 0 degrees of pene ra ng
11-19 inches of armor (sufficient for any known tank), and to
have a single shot hit probability of 70-80%. The missile is
believed to be command-guided, utilizing a wire link between
the missile and the launching vehicle. Target missile track-
ing is estimated to be optical from either the vehicle or a
remote station connected with the vehicle by cable. System
effectiveness would be reduced by either battlefield conditions
or night; in the latter case flares or IR devices could improve
performance. -
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the encampment near Remedios in northern Las Villas Province
on revealed that at least 155 vehicles, including
39 tanks, were present there. Aerial photography of an area
near the City of Matanzas on showed four vehicles
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tentatively identified as Soviet FROG rocket transporters.
The vehicles were located on a short winding road leading
to a dead end at a possible mine or quarry.
photography showed no signs at the encampments
of preparations to dismantle or withdraw additional forces from
Cuba. About 200-250 vehicles, including roughly 35 tanks,
were observed at each of the four encampments. At Artemisa,
construction of barracks-like buildings was continuing.
In photographic coverage of construc-
tion of barracks-like buildings was continuing at Artemisa
and Remedios.- Each of the four encampments included one
medium tank battalion, and at least three of them were equipped
with FROG artillery rockets, SNAPPER antitank missiles, and
other mobile weapons, with no change in numbers.
the Soviet armored group encampments might shortly be shipped
25X1D back to the USSR was obtained in photography of
25X1D when ten FROG missile transporters were observed on
a pier at the port of Mariel both before and after a-freighter
entered the bay and tied up at the same pier. No FROG missiles
or launchers were seen, however, on either day. The only
other time FROG transporters have been even tentatively
identified'outside the four Soviet encampments was the sight-
25X1D ing mentioned above of four transporters on a road near Matan-
zas. The Soviet ship is believed to have picked
up the ten FROG transporters from Mariel, when it left Mariel
on 1 January. It proceeded to Bahia Honda where it appears
to have loaded additional material.
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Photography of showed that construction of
barracks and other permanent buildings appeared to be nearing
completion at Artemisa. Only seventeen tents remained of the
approximately 120 observed at the encampment two weeks earlier,
suggesting that the barracks had been occupied. Again, there
were no signs here or at the three other camas of any orenar-
2bX1U ations for withdrawal (cf.
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Other Soviet military equipment in Cuba. A number of
reports and observations concerned other kinds of Soviet
military equipment in Cuba.
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An intercepted message of 20 November from the Soviet
organization in Moscow dealing with the export of aircraft
informed the Soviet trade representation in Havana that six
MI-4 (Hound) helicopters were shipped to Cuba aboard the
Soviet vessel Kimovsk on 12 November. As of the month of
November 1962, Cubawas estimated to have a total of over 100
Soviet MI-4 and MI-1 (Hare) helicopters.
In the 2 January 1963 military parade in Havana there
were 102 T-34 medium tanks, 68 SU-100 assult guns, 31 JS2
heavy tanks, ordinary artillery including 150 heavy field
pieces and mortars, and 150 antiaircraft and antitank weapons.
In addition to Czech Beehive RM130 rocket launchers, shown
the previous year, there were thirty 132mm launchers M-13
with their tilts and all the ramps for sixteen small-size
rockets. Twenty army jets flew overhead, including three
MIG-21's, and a formation of 24 helicopters passed along the
parade route. No Soviet personnel were observed,in the
ground elements in the parade.
Soviet military support facilities in Cuba. By late
October 62-7t-Fe--soviet Union Had completed construction of
the logistical support facilities that were designed to sus-
tain for long periods of time the military force deployed in
Cuba. These facilities were located throughout the island
and were so constructed or situated as to support a particular
segment of the Soviet military force. Re-supply and servicing
centers for surface-to-air missiles, as well as a uniquely
configured, isolated and heavily secured port area to receive
propellants for offensive missile systems, were uncovered by
high altitude surveillance. In addition newly constructed
heavily secured strategic storage points for high explosives
and POL were also found.
In support of their twenty-four deployed surface-to-air
missile sites, the Soviets constructed six SAM support and
assembly areas: at Santiago de las Vegas, Santiago de Cuba,
Ciefuentes, Ciego de Avila, Pinar del Rio, Victoria de las
Tunas, and Manzanillo. A typical SAM assembly area, as
shown by aerial photography, includes assembly and checkout
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buildings, numerous Guideline missile transporters, missiles,
propellant storage, and other related equipment.
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The exact date that activity was initiated at Punta
25X1D Gerardo could not be determined, but it is clear that propel-
lant supply point was in operation by It is
likely that the operation was initiated during the month of
25X1D September. It appeared byl coverage that additional
support facilities were planned. Also, a light tank was seen
patrolling between the double fencing.
In. order to provide special construction support and to
assist in negotiating difficult terrain, a special Soviet
25X1D engineer camp was established at San Jose de las Lajas. This
camp, as shown in photography of I I, included modern
Soviet heavy floating bridge ponton sections, cranes, tractors,
graders, amphibians and other supporting engineering equipment.
Strategic reserves of POL were stored on the island in
order to accommodate the large amounts of military equipment
25X1D moved into Cuba. One of the storage areas for POL is at San
Ricardo. As photographed on it contained
130 liquid storage tanks in seven separate excavations.
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Approved For Release 2004/07/07 : CIA-RDP78TO5439A000300130013-4
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V. SOVIET COMMAND/CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM IN CUBA
A. Command/Control and Communications
Soviet command. NSA reported in an analysis of 5 December
1962 that Soviet communications in Cuba appear to reflect a
senior Soviet military authority in the Havana area who controls
Soviet ground, naval, air and air defense elements in Cuba,
with direct communications facilities between this authority
and the Ministry of. Defense in Moscow.
Evidence suggests that the Soviet military forces remaining
in Cuba may represent a formation with the command structure
of an organization directly subordinate to the Ministry of
Defense and comparable in command composition (although not
in strength) to other Soviet armed forces elements outside the
USSR proper. These Soviet communications and Soviet organiza-
tional doctrine indicate that the command structure within
Cuba is comparable to that of a Soviet Group of Forces. This
hypothesis is based on the totality of evidence avail-
able to the December date, and the comparison of communications
activity, communications0equipment usage and typical-Soviet
doctrine for the employment of operational-tactical forces.
reports indicate the widespread use of Soviet
communications procedures and callsigns, Soviet scrambler
communications within Cuba and between Cuba and the USSR, the
appearance of an address representing the Ministry of Defense
in communications between Cuba and the USSR, the use of
Soviet high-grade literal and digital cryptographic systems,
the use of Soviet multi-channel VHF and UHF systems, and the
continued appearance in communications of references to high-
level Soviet military personalities in Cuba.
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25X1C Soviet General Stazenko identi-
fied himself as the commander of all Soviet military personnel
in Cuba.
With respect to communications, Deputy Minister of
Communications Kavtaradze from the Georgian SSR of the Soviet
Union was in Cuba at least since June 1962. In the middle of
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 February 1963 he was being transferred back to Moscow for
a new assignment. He was reported to have said that it
would take at least a month to complete what he was doing
in Havana.
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Torrens-possible Soviet command/control center. As early
as August 1962 it was suspected that the former ys? Reform-
atory at Torrens, southwest of the city of Havana, had been
selected as the central control point for Soviet activities
under way elsewhere on the island. Residents of several
farms in the vicinity were ordered to leave, and these orders
were apparently delivered by Minister of the Armed Forces
Raul Castro personally. Evacuees were told that the area was
needed for Soviet personnel.
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The Soviets were reported to have
installed personally a subterranean multi-pair communications
cable to the town of El Chico and to be using some adjacent
farms.
Soviet activity in the Torrens area was continuing at the
end of November, although it was less than in October.
that the reform-
atory appeared to being transformed into a major Russian
encampment and that considerable construction had been carried
out between the aerial arrays and the main buildings. Eight
large sheds about 130 feet long were being built, 154 hard-
stands for vehicle parking, and 215 sheds. On these hard-
stands and in the trees behind were at least forty vehicles.
In the trees behind the aerial array at least thirty electronic
vehicles and large gasoline-pump trucks were seen. Over 100
Russians were seen, but accommodation existed for over 1,000.
Microwave Communications. Microwave communication
facilities identified on 26 October in the Guanajay IRBM
area were oriented toward a large high-frequency radio
installation near Bauta. This suggested the possibility
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that the command control of Soviet Forces in Cuba may be
exercised through a high-frequency radio link to the Bauta
installation and relayed to individual sites or regimental
headquarters through a microwave system. The microwave
system could also provide a capability to communicate
between sites.
A Cuban military microwave radio relay network was
installed by RCA during the Batista regime. There was a
correlation between the locations of identified missile
sites and the terminal, relay and feeder facilities of
the Military Network, which forms a main communications
artery running from Santiago de Cuba through Havana to
Pinar del Rio and is the principal telecommunications
facility in Cuba for military traffic. The RCA equipment
provides twenty-four telephone channels in the 1700 to
1985 megacycle frequency range, and with modification has
a capacity potential of 120 telephone channels. There is
also a sizable number of spur lines and base stations.
The Guanajay and Sagua la Grande microwave antennas could
be part of, or tied in with, this original system, but
construction activity at the Guanajay terminal at the end
of October showed that the system was at least being
modified or,extended.
Soviet communications channels. Intercepts continued
to indicate the presence in Cuba of communications
facilities for handling high volume, extremely secure
communications. Analysis covering the period 28 October
through 7 November revealed the existence of at least two
identifiable Soviet communications groups in Cuba passing
messages in what appeared to be high-level Soviet cipher
systems and utilizing operational procedure unique to
Soviet communications. The first use of HF radioprinter
"Scrambler" was noted in Cuban communications on 8 November.
A reference to "switch to Scrambler" had been noted in
chatter on 30 October. This particular link is believed to
be reserved for Soviet use.
On 10 November it was said that at least two and
possibly three additional Soviet communications groups had
become active in Cuba since the end of October, using proc#_-
dures unique to Soviet communications and transmitting
messages with the characteristics of high-level Soviet
cipher systems. The identities and locations of the users
were not known; it could mean the establishment of additional
unidentified Soviet military facilities in Cuba.
Soviet communications activity continued to reflect
planning for establishment of permanent Soviet bases associated
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with all branches of the armed forces. There also appeared
to be exclusive Soviet manning of all surface-to-air and
coastal defense cruise missile sites.
Analysis on 2 November 1962 of potential command links
between Moscow and the missile forces deployed in Cuba
indicated that of nine possible links, five were not consider-
ed suitable for command purposes because of relatively slow
transmission speed and low data handling capacity; and two
broadcast links, one VLF and one HF, are one way only and
would require another link to pass traffic back to Moscow.
The two remaining links, considered the most likely ones for
command communications, first appeared on 23 October passing
Morse traffic, and began Scrambler operations on 28 October,
by which date all MRBM sites were believed to have become
operational. Scrambler provides the volume, speed and
security believed necessary for missile command and control.
Within Cuba, the orientation of microwave towers located
at MRBM and IRBM sites suggested that they linked the launch
sites with a location in the Havana area. None of these
antennas was a part of the Cuban National VHF/UHF network.
The existence of an alternate means of communications-between
the Havana area and these sites was suggested by the large
number of MF/HF communications vans observed at the sites.
N
It appears that direct radio links from Moscow to Havana
provided communications between Headquarters Strategic
Rocket Forces in Moscow and the Division Headquarters in
Havana. The microwave circuits between Havana and the sites
probably linked Division Headquarters with each of the
Regimental Headquarters.
Soviet Communications traffic patterns. An unusually
high volume of Soviet diplomatic traffic was passed between
Moscow and Havana on 18 December; there was no collateral
information indicating what the cause may have been. On
that day ow sent 50 encrypted messages, 21 of them
priority, o avana on the KGB-controlled circuit. On the
same dat , messages, 17 of them priority, were sent from
Havana t M scow. The average had been about 15 to 16 messages
each wa a record daily high for Moscow to Havana was on
1 November when 77 messages, 48 of them priority, were sent.
The record high for Havana to Moscow was on 31 August when
50 messages were sent, four of them priority. Outgoing messages
from the Soviet communications center--both to the command
communications group inside Cuba and to a lesser degree to
Moscow--more than doubled in December over November. Most of
the increase (in message numbers used) occurred after 19
December. The significance is not understood, but the
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increased messages may relate to possible Soviet troop
rotations or other movements.
During January 1963, three communications stations
serving the command group of the Soviet forces in Cuba ceased
activity. On 10 February two of these three were again
noted active. One of the two, the station which is believed
to link the commander of Soviet forces in Cuba with the main
Soviet communications and relay center at Torrens, was not
active between 25 January and 10 February, when it was heard
again. The other facility to resume operations was the
unidentified Soviet station at Santa Cruz del Norte. Still
not active as of 10 February was the station which is be-
lieved to link the commander of Soviet Naval forces in
Cuba with the center at Torrens. This station had not been
heard since 19 January. In addition to the return on 10
February of the two cited stations, a new station became ac-
tive on that day. Preliminary analysis by NSA suggested that
this unlocated station may be subordinate to the station at
Santa Cruz del Norte. The long absence of the two command-
group communications stations suggests that alternative com-
munications facilities under Soviet control were in use dur-
ing this period.
Soviet naval communications. With respect to the naval
station mentioned above, SIGNIT analysis of the communications
features of the Havana terminal of the Soviet naval link
indicated that it had developed into an almost complete sub-
marine communications service facility. The terminal has
basically the same communications capabilities as the sub-
marine base stations located in the Soviet Union but as of the
end of December 1962, when the analysis was made, was operating
on a much more limited scale. The facility in Cuba is compar-
able to those at a Soviet fleet headquarters, with the important
exception of a demonstrated broadcast capability. The sophis-
ticated facilities available to the Soviet naval communications
station in the Havana area provide secure and rapid communica-
tions of a type usually reserved for major Soviet naval com-
mands.
B. The Development of the Soviet Air Defense System in Cuba.
Early information and organization. Beginning as early
as May 1962 the Cuban Revolutionary r Force (CRAF) was
expanded and, with the introduction of MIG-15, MIG-17, MIG-19
and later MIG-21 aircraft, had a greatly increased capability.
Fighters were noted in various training exercises including
GCI practice, night flying, drag chute landing, aerial gunnery
exercises, etc. Soviet influence was apparent through the
use of Russian voice on observed communications. The Soviets
at this time were apparently acting as instructors. These
aircraft were deployed at the CRAF headquarters at San Antonio
de los Banos, Santa Clara, and Camaguey.
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In mid-September the first ntercepts of SPOONREST
radar were noted, compatible with the Mariel and Bahia Honda
SAM sites, although no communications were isolated which
could be equated to these SAM sites. The Cuban Air Surveil-
lance network was initially isolated in n 9 October;
the reporting code and message format showe oviet influence.
The system used for reporting of targets was markedly similar
to the Soviet and European satellite bloc air defense organi-
zations prior to 25 March 1962.
The Air Defense network consists of five stations report-
ing target reflecticns, which include both Cuban and U.S.
flight activity. These five stations are located at (1)
San Antonio de los Banos area, (2) Niagara area, (3) Santa
Clara area, (4) Camaguey area, and (5) Alquizar. These
stations provide overlapping coverage of Cuba except for
the area east of 76-45W, and dense overwater coverage out
60 to 80 nm and-in the Havana area out to 120 nm.
The CRAF had by 26 October 1962 increased its air defense
activity, concurrent with the increase of U.S. reconnaissance
flight activity. An all time high was noted on 18 October
with 63 MIG pilots noted in exercises. Thirty-two of these
were believed to have been Russian (a new high) and one was
believed to be a Czech.
Change in system 27 October 1962. The air surveillance
organization of the Cuban r Defense System underwent a
major structural change in the early morning hours of 27
October 1962. The change resulted in a close-knit communica-
tions grouping with apparent headquarters at or near Havana
(the CRAF headquarters is at San Antonio de los Banos).
The complete Russian dominance was apparent through the
introduction of Russian callsigns, codes, procedures, and
language. It appeared that the air defense system was
heavily manned by Soviet personnel. The surveillance area
was also expanded to encompass all of Cuba and overwater
coverage to a distance in excess of 100 nm. Communications
were also improved, as reflected by multichannel VHF
communications, operated exclusively by Soviet operators
engaged in air surveillance reporting. ELINT intercepts
provided indications of rapid deployment of the latest Soviet
models of early warning/ground control intercept and height-
finding radars in Cuba. In less than a week commencing
24 October, the following equipment was intercepted from Cuba:
FLAT FACE, BAR LOCK, STONE CAKE, BIG MESH and ROCK CAKE.
About thirty-five EW and/or GCI sites had been identified,
most of which included more than one type of radar. In addition
there were a number of acquisition and fire-control radars
associated with SAM's and antiaircraft artillery. These radars
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covered the entire island and should provide excellent
coverage from low to high altitudes.
Communications intelligence of 5 November indicated
exclusive Soviet operation of certain air defense communi-
cations systems, ground control intercept centers, and the
fighter aircraft under control of these centers. One report
indicated that Soviet pilots under Soviet GCI control were
flying coastal patrols. Another report noted the introduc-
tion in air defense traffic of a highly complicated off-line
communications security device which hitherto had been
detected outside the USSR only in occasional fleet command
use. These developments followed the rapid conversion to
operational status during the previous two weeks of modern
Soviet-controlled radar facilities throughout Cuba.
Later Organization. As of 10 November 1962, it was
estimated that the u an air defense system continued to be
composed of a controlling authority believed located in the
San Antonio de los Banos, the Santa Clara, and the Camaguey
areas. Each of these facilities had a broadcast station
for the forwarding of correlated tracking information to
interested consumers. Manual Morse communications were
employed for this purpose by the three sector headquarters.
The National Broadcast facility utilizes both manual Morse
and the high frequency radiotelephone communications for the
same purpose.
The Russian dominance of the Cuban air defense syste,,,
continued to be apparent from the signal procedures noted
and the use of Russian language. The degree of participation
by Cuban personnel in the over-all system was not determined;
however, the existence of a communications link serving an
air defense role and employing exclusively Cuban procedures
had been noted. This link was noted active on 5 November
1962, but activity prior to or subsequent to this date was
not known. The information available indicated that this
link was located in the central sector, with the radar
equipment {iding served possibly located at Santa Clara.
The general situation of the system remained as previously
reported; however, the Western and Eastern sectors employed
four subordinate radar stations, while the central sector
continued to have three subordinate-radar stations. There
'was an indication, not confirmed, that this sector may have
gained an additional station after the 10 November callsign
change. The territorial organization of the system appeared
to be patterned after a single Soviet-type air defense
district, with the three sectors coinciding roughly with the
known tactical regions of the Cuban ground forces. The over-
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all joint Cuban/Soviet direction center was thought to be
located in the Havana area and the main fighter-control
center--believed predominantly Soviet-manned--probably
at nearby San 'Antonio de los Banos airfield.
No significant changes in either the control or the
capability of the air surveillance system in Cuba has been
noted since 22 January 1963. Soviet forces continue to
maintain control of the surveillance system and to predom-
inate in its operations, although results of tracking are
exchanged with the Cuban national air defense authorities.
There appears to be no trend toward increased Cuban
participation, although there have been recent references
in operator chatter to some men going home and replacements
arriving, and references on the Soviet command communications
facilities to training Cubans. It appears that Soviet personnel
continue totally to control and man the surface-to-air missile
system, although some Cuban participation may be in the o-ffing.
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25X1A
THE 1962 SOVIET ARMS BUILD-UP
IN CUBA
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODEWOR D MATERIAL
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